

26. See Benice Johnson Reagon, "Coalition Politics: Turning the Century," in Barbara Smith, ed., *Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology* (New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, 1983), 356–69. Reagon criticizes the attempt to seek the comforts of home in politics, but as I read her she does not reject the values of home.
27. Martin and Mohanty, "Feminist Politics," 196.
28. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 87.
29. Martin and Mohanty, "Feminist Politics," 209.
30. De Lauretis, "Eccentric Subjects," 138.
31. Honig, "Difference," 585.
32. bell hooks, "Homeplace: A Site of Resistance," in *Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics* (Boston: South End Press, 1990), 42.
33. *Ibid.*, 43.
34. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: New Left Books, 1983).
35. Compare Jeremy Waldron, "Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom," in *Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981–1991* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 309–38.
36. Seyla Benhabib affirms this individuating function of home and privacy in her discussion of the need for feminists to retain a certain meaning to a distinction between public and private. See Benhabib, *The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt* (London: Sage, 1996), 213.
37. For a feminist defense of privacy as the right to inviolate personality, see Jean L. Cohen, "Democracy, Difference and the Right of Privacy," in Seyla Benhabib, ed., *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
38. Anita Allen, *Uneasy Access* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenheld, 1988).

Cyberfeminism with a Difference

Rosi Braidotti

In this chapter, I will first of all situate the question of cyberbodies in the framework of postmodernity, stressing the paradoxes of embodiment. I will subsequently play a number of variations on the theme of cyberfeminism, highlighting the issue of sexual difference throughout. Contrary to jargon-ridden usages of the term, I take "postmodernity" to signify the specific historical situation of postindustrial societies after the decline of modernist hopes and tropes. Symptomatic of these changes is urban space, especially in the inner city, which has been cleaned up and refigured through postindustrial metal and Plexiglas buildings, but it is only a veneer that covers up the putrefaction of the industrial space, marking the death of the modernist dream of urban civil society.

This is primarily, but not exclusively, a Western world problem. The distinct feature of postmodernity is in fact the transnational nature of its economy in the age of the decline of the nation-state. It is about ethnic mixity through the flow of world migration: an infinite process of hybridization at a time of increasing racism and xenophobia in the West.¹

Postmodernity is also about an enormous push toward the "third-worldification" of the "first world," with continuing exploitation of the "third world." It is about the decline of what was known as the "second world," the communist bloc, and the recurrence of a process of "Balkanization" of the whole Eastern European bloc. It is also about the decline of the legal economy and the rise of crime and illegality as a factor. This is what Deleuze and Guattari call "capital as cocaine." It proves the extent to which late capital-

ism has no teleological purpose, no definite direction, nothing except the brutality of self-perpetuation.

Last, but not least, postmodernity is about a new and perversely fruitful alliance between technology and culture. Technology has evolved from the panoptical device that Foucault analyzed in terms of surveillance and control, to a far more complex apparatus, which Haraway describes in terms of "the informatics of domination." Approaching the issue of technology in postmodernity consequently requires a shift of perspective. Far from appearing antithetical to the human organism and set of values, the technological factor must be seen as coextensive with and intermingled with the human. This mutual imbrication makes it necessary to speak of technology as a material and symbolic apparatus, that is, a semiotic and social agent among others.

This shift of perspective, which I have analyzed elsewhere as a move away from technophobia, toward a more technophilic approach, also redefines the terms of the relationships between technology and art.² If in a conventional humanistic framework the two may appear as opposites, in postmodernity, they are much more interconnected.

In all fields, but especially in information technology, the strict separation between the technical and the creative has in fact been made redundant by digital images and the skills required by computer-aided design. The new alliance between the previously segregated domains of the technical and the artistic marks a contemporary version of the posthumanistic reconstruction of a technoculture whose aesthetics is equal to its technological sophistication.

All this to say that I wish to keep my distance from, on the one hand, the euphoria of mainstream postmodernists who seize upon advanced technology and especially cyberspace as the possibility for multiple and polymorphous reembodiments, and on the other hand, from the many prophets of doom who mourn the decline of classical humanism. I see postmodernity instead as on the threshold of new and important relocations for cultural practice. One of the most significant preconditions for these relocations is relinquishing both the phantasy of multiple reembodiments and the fatal attraction of nostalgia.³ The nostalgic longing for an allegedly better past is a hasty and unintelligent response to the challenges of our age. It is not only culturally ineffective—insofar as it relates to the conditions of its own historicity by negating them, it is also a shortcut through their complexity. I find that there is something deeply amoral and quite desperate in the way in which postindustrial societies rush headlong toward a hasty solution to their contradictions. This flight into nostalgia has the immediate effect of neglecting, by sheer denial, the transition from a humanistic to a posthuman world. That this basic self-deception be compensated by a wave of longing for saviors of all brands and formats is not surprising.

In this generalized climate of denial and neglect of the terminal crisis of classical humanism, I would like to suggest that we need to turn to literary genres such as science fiction and more specifically cyberpunk, in order to find nonnostalgic solutions to the contradictions of our times.

Whereas mainstream culture refuses to mourn the loss of humanistic certainties, "minor" cultural productions foreground the crisis and highlight the potential it offers for creative solutions. As opposed to the amorality of denial, these cultural genres cultivate an ethics of lucid self-awareness. Some of the most moral beings left in Western postmodernity are the science fiction writers who take the time to linger on the death of the humanist ideal of Man, thus inscribing this loss—and the ontological insecurity it entails—at the (dead) heart of contemporary cultural concerns. By taking the time to symbolize the crisis of humanism, these creative spirits, following Nietzsche, push the crisis to its innermost resolution. In so doing, they not only inscribe death at the top of the postmodern cultural agenda, but they also strip the veneer of nostalgia that covers up the inadequacies of the present cultural (dis)order.

In the rest of this chapter, I would like to suggest that first and foremost among these iconoclastic readers of the contemporary crisis are feminist cultural and media activists such as the riot girls and other "cyberfeminists" who are devoted to the politics of parody or parodic repetition. Some of these creative minds are prone to theory, others—feminist science fiction writers and other "fabulators"⁴ like Angela Carter—choose the fictional mode. While irony remains a major stylistic device, of great significance are also contemporary multimedia electronic artists of the nonnostalgic kind like Jenny Holzer, Laurie Anderson, and Cindy Sherman. They are the ideal travel companions in postmodernity.

It's a good thing I was born a woman, or I'd have been a drag queen.

—Dolly Parton

The quote from that great simulator, Dolly Parton, sets the mood for the rest of this section, in which I will offer a survey of some of the sociopolitical representations of the cyberbody phenomenon from a feminist angle.

Let us imagine a postmodern triptych for a moment: Dolly Parton in all her simulated Southern Belle outlook. On her right hand, that masterpiece of silicon reconstruction that is Elizabeth Taylor, with Peter Pan lookalike Michael Jackson whimpering at her side. On Dolly's left, hyperreal fitness fetishist Jane Fonda, well established in her post-Barbarella phase as a major dynamo in Ted Turner's planetary catholic embrace.

There you have the Pantheon of postmodern femininity, live on CNN at

any time, any place, from Hong Kong to Sarajevo, yours at the push of a button. Interactivity is another name for shopping, as Christine Tamblyn⁵ put it, and hyperreal gender identity is what it sells.

These three icons have some features in common: first, they inhabit a *post-human body*—that is to say, an artificially reconstructed body.⁶ The body in question here is far from a biological essence: it is a crossroad of intensive forces; it is a surface of inscriptions of social codes. Ever since the efforts by the poststructuralist generation to rethink a nonessentialized embodied self, we should all have grown accustomed to the loss of ontological security that accompanies the decline of the naturalistic paradigm. As Francis Barker puts it, the disappearance of the body is the apex of the historical process of its denaturalization.⁷ The problem that lingers on is how to readjust our politics to this shift.

I would like to suggest as a consequence that it is more adequate to speak of our body in terms of embodiment, that is to say, of multiple bodies or sets of embodied positions. Embodiment means that we are situated subjects, capable of performing sets of (inter)actions which are discontinuous in space and time. Embodied subjectivity is thus a paradox that rests simultaneously on the historical decline of mind-body distinctions and the proliferation of discourses about the body. Foucault reformulates this in terms of the paradox of simultaneous disappearance and overexposure of the body. Though technology makes the paradox manifest and in some ways exemplifies it perfectly, it cannot be argued that it is responsible for such a shift in paradigm.

In spite of the dangers of nostalgia, mentioned above, there is still hope: we can still hang on to Nietzsche's crazed insight that God is finally dead and the stench of his rotting corpse is filling the cosmos. The death of God has been long in coming and it has joined a domino effect, which has brought down a number of familiar notions. The security about the categorical distinction between mind and body; the safe belief in the role and function of the nation-state; the family; masculine authority; the eternal feminine and compulsory heterosexuality. These metaphysically founded certainties have foundered and made room for something more complex, more playful, and infinitely more disturbing.

Speaking as a woman—that is to say, a subject emerging from a history of oppression and exclusion—I would say that this crisis of conventional values is rather a positive thing. The metaphysical condition in fact had entailed an institutionalized vision of femininity that has burdened my gender for centuries. The crisis of modernity is, for feminists, not a melancholy plunge into loss and decline but, rather, the joyful opening up of new possibilities.

Thus, the hyperreality of the posthuman predicament so sublimely represented by Parton, Taylor, and Fonda does not wipe out politics or the need for

political resistance; it just makes it more necessary than ever to work toward a radical redefinition of political action. Nothing could be further from a postmodern ethics than Dostoyevsky's overquoted and profoundly mistaken statement that, if God is dead, anything goes. The challenge here is rather how to combine the recognition of postmodern embodiment with resistance to relativism and a free fall into cynicism.

Second, the three cyborg goddesses mentioned above are immensely rich because they are media stars. Capital in these postindustrial times is an immaterial flow of cash that travels as pure data in cyberspace till it lands in (some of) our bank accounts. Moreover, capital harps on and trades in body fluids: the cheap sweat and blood of the disposable workforce throughout the Third World; but also, the wetness of desire of First World consumers as they commodity their existence into oversaturated stupor. Hyperreality does not wipe out class relations: it just intensifies them.⁸ Postmodernity rests on the paradox of simultaneous commodification and conformism of cultures, while intensifying disparities among them, as well as structural inequalities.

An important aspect of this situation is the omnipotence of the visual media. Our era has turned visualization into the ultimate form of control, in the hands of the clarity fetishists who have turned CNN into a verb: "I've been CNN'd today, haven't you?" This marks not only the final stage in the commodification of the scopic, but also the triumph of vision over all the other senses.⁹

This is of special concern from a feminist perspective, because it tends to restate a hierarchy of bodily perception which overprivileges vision over other senses, especially touch and sound. The primacy of vision has been challenged by feminist theories.

In the light of the feminist work proposed by Luce Irigaray and Kaja Silverman, the idea has emerged to explore the potentiality of hearing and audio material as a way out of the tyranny of the gaze. Donna Haraway has inspiring things to say about the logocentric hold of disembodied vision, which is best exemplified by the satellite/eye in the sky. She opposes to it an embodied and therefore accountable redefinition of the act of seeing as a form of connection to the object of vision, which she defines in terms of "passionate detachment." If you look across the board of contemporary electronic art, especially in the field of virtual reality, you will find many women artists, like Catherine Richards and Nell Tenhaaf, who apply the technology to challenge the in-built assumption of visual superiority which it carries.

Third, the three icons I have chosen to symbolize postmodern bodies are all white, especially and paradoxically Michael Jackson. [. . .]

On related aspect of the racialization of posthuman bodies concerns the ethnic-specific values it conveys. Many have questioned the extent to which

we are all being recolonized by an American, and more specifically, by a Californian “body-beautiful” ideology. Insofar as U.S. corporations own the technology, they leave their cultural imprints upon the contemporary imaginary. This leaves little room to any other cultural alternatives. Thus, the three emblems of postmodern femininity on whose discursive bodies I am writing this could only be American.

Confronted with this situation, that is to say, with culturally enforced icons of white, economically dominant, heterosexual hyperfemininity—which simultaneously reinstate huge power differentials while denying them—what is to be done?

The first thing a feminist critic can do is to acknowledge the aporias and the aphasias of theoretical frameworks and look with hope in the direction of (women) artists. There is no question that the creative spirits have a head start over the masters of meta discourse and especially those of deconstructive meta discourse. This is a very sobering prospect: after years of poststructuralist theoretical arrogance, philosophy lags behind art and fiction in the difficult struggle to keep up with today’s world. Maybe the time has come for us to moderate the theoretical voice within us and to attempt to deal with our historical situation differently.

Feminists have been prompt in picking up the challenge of finding political and intellectual answers to this theoretical crisis. It has largely taken the form of a “linguistic turn,” that is, a shift toward more imaginative styles. Evidence of this is the emphasis feminist theory is placing on the need for new “figurations,” as Donna Haraway puts it, or “fabulations,” to quote Marleen Barr, to express the alternative forms of female subjectivity developed within feminism, as well as the ongoing struggle with language to produce affirmative representations of women.

But nowhere is the feminist challenge more evident than in the field of artistic practice. For instance, the ironical force, the hardly suppressed violence and the vitriolic wit of feminist groups like the guerilla girls or riot girls, is an important aspect of the contemporary relocation of culture and the struggle over representation. I would define their position in terms of the politics of parody. Riot girls argue that there is a war going on and that women are not pacifists; we are the guerilla girls, the riot girls, the bad girls. We want to put up some active resistance, but we also want to have fun and we want to do it our way. The ever-increasing number of women writing their own science fiction, cyberpunk, film scripts, zines, rap and rock music, and the like testifies to this new mode.

There is definitely a touch of violence in the mode exposed by the riot and guerilla girls: a sort of raw directness that clashes with the syncopated tones

of standard art criticism. This forceful style is a response to hostile environmental and social forces. It also expresses a reliance on collective bonding through rituals and ritualized actions, which far from dissolving the individual into the group, simply accentuate her unrepentant singularity. I find a powerful evocation of this singular yet collectively shared position in the raucous, demonic beat of Kathy Acker’s *In Memoriam to Identity*,¹⁰ in her flair for multiple becomings, her joy in the reversibility of situations and people—her borderline capacity to impersonate, mimic, and cut across an infinity of Others.

As many feminist theorists have pointed out, the practice of parody, which I also call “the philosophy as if,” with its ritualized repetitions, needs to be grounded in order to be politically effective. Postmodern feminist knowledge claims are grounded in life experiences and consequently mark radical forms of reembodiment. But they also need to be dynamic—or nomadic—and allow for shifts of location and multiplicity.

The practice of “as if” can also degenerate into the mode of fetishistic representation. This consists in simultaneously recognizing and denying certain attributes or experiences. In male-stream postmodern thought,¹¹ fetishistic disavowal seems to mark most discussions of sexual difference.¹² I see feminist theory as a corrective to this trend. The feminist “philosophy of as if” is not a form of disavowal but, rather, the affirmation of a subject that is both nonessentialized, that is to say no longer grounded in the idea of human or feminine “nature,” but she is nonetheless capable of ethic and moral agency. As Judith Butler lucidly warns us, the force of the parodic mode consists precisely in turning the practice of repetitions into a politically empowering position.

What I find empowering in the theoretical and political practice of “as if” is its potential for opening up, through successive repetitions and mimetic strategies, spaces where forms of feminist agency can be engendered. In other words, parody can be politically empowering on the condition of being sustained by a critical consciousness that aims at the subversion of dominant codes. Thus, I have argued that Irigaray’s strategy of “mimesis” is politically empowering because it addresses simultaneously issues of identity, identifications, and political subjectivity.¹³ [. . .]

One of the great contradictions of virtual reality images is that they titillate our imagination, promising the marvels and wonders of a gender-free world while simultaneously reproducing not only some of the most banal, flat images of gender identity, but also of class and race relations that you can think of. Virtual reality images titillate our imagination in the same way that pornographic representation does. The imagination is a very gendered space,

and the woman's imagination has always been represented as a troublesome and dangerous quality as the feminist film theorist Doane has put it.¹⁴

The imaginative poverty of virtual reality is all the more striking if you compare it to the creativity of some of the women artists I mentioned earlier. By comparison, the banality, the sexism, and the repetitive nature of computer-designed video games are quite appalling. As usual, at times of great changes and upheavals, the potential for the new engenders great fear, anxiety, and in some cases even nostalgia for the previous regime.

As if the imaginative misery were not enough, postmodernity is marked by a widespread impact and a qualitative shift of pornography in every sphere of cultural activity. Pornography is more and more about power relations and less and less about sex. In classical pornography, sex was a vehicle by which to convey power relations. Nowadays anything can become such a vehicle: the becoming culture of pornography means that any cultural activity or product can become a commodity and through that process express inequalities, patterns of exclusion, fantasies of domination, desires for power and control.¹⁵

The central point remains: there is a credibility gap between the promises of virtual reality and cyberspace and the quality of what it delivers. It consequently seems to me that, in the short range, this new technological frontier will intensify the gender gap and increase the polarization between the sexes. We are back to the war metaphor, but its location is the real world, not the hyperspace of abstract masculinity. And its protagonists are no computer images, but the real social agents of postindustrial urban landscapes.

The most effective strategy remains for women to use technology in order to disengage our collective imagination from the phallus and its accessory values: money, exclusion and domination, nationalism, ironic femininity, and systematic violence.

Another qualitative leap is also necessary, however, toward the affirmation of sexual difference in terms of the recognition of the dissymmetrical relationship between the sexes. Feminists have rejected the universalistic tendency that consists in conflating the masculine viewpoint with the "human," thereby confining the "feminine" to the structural position of devalORIZED Other. This division of social and symbolic labor means that the burden of devalORIZED difference falls upon certain empirical references who can be defined in opposition to the dominant norm as: nonman, nonwhite, nonowner of property, nonspeaker of a dominant language, and so on.

This hierarchical organization of differences is the key to phallogocentrism, which is the inner system of patriarchal societies. In this system, women and men are in diametrically different positions: men are conflated

with the universalistic stand and therefore are confined to what Hartsock defines as "abstract masculinity." Women, on the other hand, are stuck with the specificity of their gender as the "second sex," as Simone de Beauvoir observed. The price men pay for representing the universal is disembodiment, or loss of gendered specificity into the abstraction of phallic masculinity. The price women pay, on the other hand, is loss of subjectivity through overembodiment and confinement to their gendered identity. This results in two dissymmetrical positions.

This produces also two divergent political strategies when it comes to looking for alternatives. The masculine and the feminine paths to transcend the phallogocentric sociosymbolic contract diverge considerably. Whereas women need to repossess subjectivity by reducing their confinement to the body, thus making an issue of deconstructing the body, men need to repossess their abstracted bodily self by shedding some of the exclusive rights to transcendental consciousness. Men need to get embodied, to get real, to suffer through the pain of reembodiment, that is to say, incarnation.

A splendid example of this process is the fall of the angels from the inflated heights of the Berlin sky in Wim Wenders's film *Der Himmel über Berlin* (*Wings of Desire*). When the angels do choose the path of embodiment, the pain of incarnation is rendered with acute insight. bell hooks astutely observed the culture-specific nature of such an exercise, in her rather witty reading of the Teutonic angst in this film.¹⁶ I think she correctly points out the quintessentially western character of the flight from the body and of the related creation of abstract masculinity as a system of domination of multiple "others." In her equally culture-specific account of the need for a revision of the phallogocentric sociosymbolic contract, however, Julia Kristeva also stresses the need for a redefinition of the position of the female body in this system.

I would like to argue, therefore, that the central point to keep in mind in the context of a discussion on cyberspace is that the last thing we need at this point in Western history is a renewal of the old myth of transcendence as flight from the body. As Linda Dement put it: a little less abstraction would be welcome.¹⁷ Transcendence as disembodiment would just repeat the classical patriarchal model, which consolidated masculinity as abstraction, thereby essentializing social categories of "embodied others." This would be a denial of sexual difference meant as the basic dissymmetry between the sexes.

In the project of exploring the dissymmetry between the sexes, I would emphasize very strongly the importance of language, especially in light of psychoanalytic theory. In so doing, I also mean to distance myself from the simplistic psychology and the reductive cartesianism that dominate so much cyberpunk literature and cyberspace technology. In opposition to these, I would like to emphasize that Woman is not only the objectified other of patri-

archy, tied to it by negation. As the basis for female identity, the signifier Woman also and simultaneously pertains to a margin of dissidence and resistance to patriarchal identity.

I have argued elsewhere that the feminist project intervenes on both the level of historical agency—that is, the question of the insertion of women in patriarchal history—and that of individual identity and the politics of desire. It thus engages with both the conscious and the unconscious levels. This deconstructive approach to femininity is very strongly present in the politics of the parody that I defended above. Feminist women who go on functioning in society as female subjects in these postmetaphysical days of decline of gender dichotomies act “as if” Woman were still their location. In so doing, however, they treat femininity as an option—a set of available poses, a set of costumes rich in history and social power relations but not fixed or compulsory any longer. They simultaneously assert and deconstruct woman as a signifying practice.

My point is that the new is created by revisiting and burning up the old. Like the totemic meal recommended by Freud, you have to assimilate the dead before you can move onto a new order. The way out can be found by mimetic repetition and consumption of the old. We need rituals of burial and mourning for the dead, including and especially the ritual of burial of the Woman that was. We do need to say farewell to that second sex, that eternal feminine that stuck to our skins like toxic material, burning into our bone marrow, eating away at our substance. We need to take collectively the time for the mourning of the old sociosymbolic contract and thus mark the need for a change of intensity, a shift of tempo. Unless feminists negotiate with the historicity of this temporal change, the great advances made by feminism toward the empowerment of alternative forms of female subjectivity will not have the time to be brought to social fruition.

We rather need more complexity, multiplicity, and simultaneity, and we need to rethink gender, class, and race in the pursuit of these multiple, complex differences. I also think we need gentleness, compassion, and humor to pull through the ruptures and raptures of our times. Irony and self-humor are important elements of this project and they are necessary for its success, as feminists as diverse as Hélène Cixous and French and Saunders have pointed out. As the Manifesto of the bad girls reads: “Through laughter our anger becomes a tool of liberation.” In the hope that our collectively negotiated Dionysian laughter will indeed bury it once and for all, cyberfeminism needs to cultivate a culture of joy and affirmation. Feminist women have a long history of dancing through a variety of potentially lethal minefields in their pursuit of sociosymbolic justice. Nowadays, women have to undertake the dance through cyberspace, if only to make sure that the joysticks of the

cyberspace cowboys will not reproduce univocal phallicity under the mask of multiplicity, and also to make sure that the riot girls, in their anger and their visionary passion, will not re-create law and order under the cover of a triumphant feminine.

NOTES

1. Stuart Hall, “Race, Nation: The Fateful/Fatal Triangle,” the W. E. B. Du Bois lectures, Harvard University, April 25–27, 1994.
2. See especially Rosi Braidotti, “Refiguring the Subject,” in *Nomadic Subjects* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
3. Frederic Jameson, *Postmodernism: Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
4. Marleen Barr, *Alien to Femininity: Speculative Fiction and Feminist Theory* (New York: Greenwood, 1987).
5. Remark at the conference “Seduced and Abandoned: The Body in the Virtual World,” held at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, London, March 12–13, 1994.
6. *Post Human*, catalog of the exhibition at Dieichthorhallen, Hamburg, 1993.
7. Francis Barker, *The Tremulous Private Body: Essays on Subjection* (London: Methuen, 1984).
8. Caren Kaplan and Inderpal Crewal, eds., *Scattered Hegemonies: Postmodernity and Transnational Feminist Practices* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).
9. Evelyn Fox Keller and C. R. Croptowski, “The Mind’s Eye,” in Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka, eds., *Discovering Reality* (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Reidal Publishing Company, 1993), 207–24; Luce Irigaray, *Speculum* (Paris: Minuit, 1974); Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” in *Simians, Cyborgs and Women* (London: Free Association Books, 1990), 149–82; Haraway, “Simulated Knowledge,” *ibid.*, 183–202.
10. Kathy Acker, *In Memoriam to Identity* (New York: Pantheon, 1990).
11. See, for instance, Naomi Schor, “Dreaming Dissymmetry: Foucault, Barthes and Feminism,” in Alice Jardine and Paul Smith, eds., *Men in Feminism* (New York: Methuen, 1987); Tania Modleski, *Feminism without Women: Culture and Criticism in a “Postfeminist” Age* (London: Routledge, 1991).
12. Rosi Braidotti, “Discontinuous Becomings: Deleuze on the Becoming-Woman of Philosophy,” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 24/1 (January 1993): 44–55.
13. Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects*.
14. Mary Ann Doane, *The Desire to Desire: The Womens’ Film of the 1940s* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987).
15. Susan Kappeler, *The Pornography of Representation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
16. bell hooks, *Yearning* (London: Turnaround, 1991).
17. Remark at the conference “Seduced and Abandoned: The Body in the Virtual World.”