

# The Deleuze Dictionary

Edited by Adrian Parr

Edinburgh University Press

realities; they are very dangerous for societies, although they can get by without them, and sometimes manage to keep them to a minimum' (D&G 1987: 204). From this viewpoint, art functions as a line of flight, traversing individual and collective subjectivities and pushing centralised organisations to the limit; it combines a variety of affects and percepts in ways that conjugate one another.

In many respects the connective, expansive and deterritorialising character of lines of flight, when considered in terms of art, draws our attention to the ethical dimension of art. Here the question of ethics in relation to art is primarily taken to be a problem of organisation. Art makes possible, it enables us to broaden our horizons and understanding, sensitising us to our own affective dimension in relation to the world as a whole. It is, therefore, no accident that art often becomes the primary target once repression sinks in, usually setting off alarm bells, and warning us that the social sphere is on the verge of becoming fascistic.

As Deleuze and Guattari insist in *A Thousand Plateaus*, when desire turns repressive it finds investment in fascistic social organisations; at this point the active lines of flight indicative of the political undercurrents of art are susceptible to blockage. This is not to suggest that art is immune to fascistic investment. It, too, can be turned against itself; that is when art is consumed by the black hole that annihilates the innovative radicality of art. For example, although many of the German Expressionists were exemplified as producers of degenerate art by the German Nazis in the 1937 exhibition, *Reflections of Degradence* (in Dresden Town Hall), Lukács insisted that the artists in question in fact participated in the selfsame irrational impulses motivating Nazism. In other words, when positive lines of flight are withdrawn or used to prop up the regulative nature of negative lines of flight, what we are left with is an ethical distinction formed between 'the politics of art' or 'the art of politics'. In effect, then, the politics of art comes from how art engages political subjectivity, sustaining an impersonal reality that allows pre-individual singularities to structure and collectively to orient subjectivity. The politics of art survives along the mutative dimensions positive and creative 'lines of flight' expose; it is not fully apparent and still it exists as a 'yet to come'.

## LINES OF FLIGHT + SUICIDE

### Rosi Brulotti

The Deleuzian subject is a singular complexity, one that enacts and actualises a radical ethics of transformation. This 'subject' simultaneously

rejects individualism and the nihilism of self-destruction. In an ecosophical sense, Deleuze thinks of the subject in terms of a connection, one that takes place between self and others, pushing the subject beyond self-centred individualism also to include non-humans or the earth itself.

On the issue of suicide, Deleuze is as clear as Baruch Spinoza: the choice for self-destruction is not positive, nor can it be said to be free, because death is the destruction of the *conatus* – defined as the desire to actualise one's power of becoming. Self-preservation, in the sense of a desire for self-expression, constitutes the subject. A *conatus* cannot freely wish its own self-destruction; if it does, this is because some physical or psychological compulsion negates the subject's freedom. As connectivity and mutual implication are the distinguishing features of an intensive understanding of the subject, dying as such means ceasing to partake in this vital flow of life. Hence, the inter-connectiveness of entities means that self-preservation is a commonly shared concern.

Joining forces with others so as to enhance one's enjoyment of life is the key to Deleuzian ethics; it is also the definition of a joyously lived life. The greatest ethical flaw is to succumb to external forces that diminish one's capacity to endure. From this viewpoint, suicide is an unproductive 'black hole'.

Deleuze's view of death is far removed from the metaphysics of finitude. Death is neither a matter of absolute closure, nor a border that defines the difference between existing or not existing. Instead, the Deleuzian subject is produced through a multiplicity of connections that unfold in a process of becoming. This affirmative view of life situates philosophical nomadism in the logic of positivity, rather than in the redemptive economy common to classical metaphysics. What is more is that this vision of death-as-process, or a Nietzschean vision of the 'eternal return', emerges out of Deleuze's philosophy of time: endurance and sustainability.

Life is the affirmation of radical immanence. What gets affirmed is the intensity and acceleration of existential speed characteristic of desire or the expression of *potentia*. The ethics of nomadic subjects asserts the positivity of *potentia* itself. That is to say, the singularity of the forces that compose the specific spatio-temporal grid of immanence composes one's life. Life is an assemblage, a montage, not a given; it is a set of points in space and time; a quilt of retrieved material. Put simply, for Deleuze what makes one's life unique is the life project, not a deep-seated essence.

Commenting on the suicides of Primo Levi and Virginia Woolf, Deleuze – who also chose to end his own life – stressed that life can be affirmed by suppressing your own life. This he felt was especially true in the case of failing health or when life is spent in degrading social conditions, both of which seriously cripple one's power to affirm and endure life with joy.

We do need to exercise some caution here, though, because Deleuze is not proposing a Christian affirmation of life geared toward a transcendent enterprise; rather he is suggesting life is not marked by any signifier or proper noun: Deleuze's vision is of a radically immanent fleshed existence intensively lived.

Deleuze introduces a fundamental distinction between personal and impersonal death. Death is the empty form of time, the perpetual becoming that can be actualised in the present but flows back to the past and seeps into the future. The eternal return of death is 'virtual' in that it has the generative capacity to engender the actual. Consequently, death is the ultimate manifestation of the active principle that drives all living matter, namely the power to express the pre-individual or impersonal power of *potentia*. Death is the becoming-imperceptible of the nomadic subject and as such it is part of the cycle of becoming. Yet, death is still interconnected with the 'outside' and always on the frontiers of incorporeality.

## M

### MAJORITYTARIAN

#### *Tamsin Lorraine*

Deleuze and Guattari describe a majority as a standard like 'white-man' or 'adult-male' in comparison to which other quantities can be said to be minoritarian (D&G 1987: 291). Human life in a capitalist society operates on the strata of the organism (various corporeal systems organised into the functioning wholes of biological organisms), 'significance' (systems of signifiers and signifieds that interpreters interpret), and subjectification (systems that distribute subjects of enunciation and subjects of the statement – that is, subjects who are speakers, and subjects of what is spoken about). Rather than assume that the subject is somehow prior to the society of which it becomes a member, Deleuze and Guattari take the Foucaultian stance that collective systems of enunciation (these could be compared to Michel Foucault's discursive systems, for example legal discourse) and machinic assemblages (these could be compared to Foucault's nondiscursive systems, for example the bodies, lay-out and behaviours related to the court room) are the condition of the subjects they produce. What counts as meaningful speech is dictated not by an individual subject, but by the systems of 'significance' that determine what makes sense in

a given situation. What counts as a recognisable subject (to oneself as well as others) is dictated by systems of subjectification that determine a subject's position vis-à-vis others.

Deleuze and Guattari insist it is the 'axioms' of capitalist society that constitute majorities (D&G 1987: 469). The axioms of capitalism are primary statements that are not derivable from other statements and which enter into assemblages of production, circulation and consumption (D&G 1987: 461). The functional elements and relations of capitalism are less specified than in other forms of society, allowing them to be simultaneously realised in a wide variety of domains (D&G 1987: 454). Whether you are the worker or businessman or consumer depends more on the function you are performing and the relations into which you enter, than who or what you are. This gives capitalism a peculiar fluidity. Deteritorialising flows can be mastered through the multiplication or withdrawal of axioms (in the latter case, very few axioms regulate the dominant flows, giving other flows only a derivative status) (D&G 1987: 462). The operative statements of various regions of the social field (statements concerning, for example, school and the student, the prison and the convict, or the political system and the citizen) constitute the majoritarian elements of a denumerable set. The majoritarian standard constituted through these statements specifies recognisable positions on points of the arborescent, mnemonic, molar, structural systems of territorialisation and reterritorialisation through which subjects are sorted and significations make sense (cf. D&G 1987: 295). Systems of significance and subjectification sort social meaning and individual subjects into binary categories that remain relatively stable and render 'minor' fluctuations invisible or derivative. Minorities are defined by the gaps that separate them from the axioms constituting majorities (D&G 1987: 469). These gaps fluctuate in keeping with shifting lines of flight and the metamorphoses of the assemblages involved. Minorities thus constitute 'fuzzy' sets that are nondenumerable and nonaxiomatisable. Deleuze and Guattari characterise such sets as 'multiplicities of escape and flux' (D&G 1987: 470).

From the polyvocal semiotics of the body and its corporeal coordinates, a single substance of expression is produced through the subjectification of bodies to discipline by the abstract machine of faciality (a 'black hole/white wall system'); the fluxes of the organic strata are superseded by the strata of significance and subjectification (D&G 1987: 181). The 'white, male, adult, "rational," etc., in short the average European' is the 'central' point by reference to which binary distributions are organised. All the lines defined by points reproducing or resonating with the central point are part of the arborescent system that constitutes 'Man' as a 'gigantic memory' (D&G 1987: 293). The majoritarian standard is thus this 'average'

## PLATO (c. 428–c. 348 BC)

Alison Ross

Plato's philosophy exerts a profound influence over modern thought. Immanuel Kant's 'Copernican revolution' in philosophy was styled as an inverted Platonism in which the dependence of a finite consciousness on sensible forms to think ideas reversed the Platonic hierarchy between the intelligible and the sensible. Friedrich Nietzsche, who found Kant's critical philosophy inadequate for such a reversal on account of the primacy in Kant of the moral idea, defined the task of the philosophy of the future as the 'reversal of Platonism' in which the distinction between the real and the apparent worlds would be abolished. Deleuze follows Nietzsche in this task of a reversal of Platonism, but also refines the 'abstract' Nietzschean formula of this task by asking about the motivation of Platonism. In his analysis of this motivation Deleuze finds in Plato, unlike Nietzsche's 'external' critique, the conditions for the reversal of Platonism. For this reason, Deleuze's reversal of Platonism is also better equipped to critique the dualist ontology of Platonism that continues to operate in Kant.

The motive of Plato's theory of the Ideas needs to 'be sought in a will to select and to choose' lineages and 'to distinguish pretenders' (D 1990: 253–4). In Plato, the hierarchy that distinguishes Ideas from models and copies describes a degradation of use and knowledge. According to Plato, the sensible world is derived from and modelled as a 'copy' on the realm of the Ideas. 'Copies', that comprise the sensible world, mark a graded descent away from the realm of the Ideas to the merely 'apparent' world of the senses. The copying of these copies in art marks a further decline in ontology (use) and epistemology (knowledge). In the *Republic*, the mimetic mechanism of art leads to Plato's hostility to art as a 'copy of a copy' and to the dramatic arts in particular which dissimulate their status as a copy of a copy. The Idea of 'a bed' is a model untrammelled by sensibility and contains only those features that are the necessary conditions for any bed (that it is a structure able to support the weight of a person). A sensible 'copy' of this Idea necessarily places certain limitations on this form by making it a certain height and colour. However, the painter who paints a copy of this bed copies all the things about the bed that are inessential to its use (that it is a particular colour, a particular height, in a particular setting), but is unable to copy any of those features of the bed that relate to its function (that it has a structure able to support the weight of a person). The restriction of painting to the copying of the mere appearance of the object shows, for Plato, that the artist produces things whose internal mechanisms they are ignorant of. This degradation of use and knowledge in the fabricated object makes art a futile,

but harmless activity. Dramatic poetry, however, is dangerous because it produces a spectacle able to suspend disbelief. The spectators of dramatic poetry are inducted into the world of the performance where an actor playing the role of a statesman or a philosopher 'is' this role. For Plato this dissimulation of its status as a copy renders dramatic poetry dangerous to the proper order of the State because it trains in the souls of its citizens a disregard for the distinction between the true and false copy. This distinction in Plato between a harmless copy and the malevolent copy, that itself becomes a model, is the key to Deleuze's project of a 'reversal of Platonism'.

According to Deleuze the pertinent distinction for the reversal of Platonism is not model-copy but copy-simulacra. The simulacra are those false copies that place 'in question the very notations of copy and model' and the 'motivation' of Plato's philosophy is transcribed by Deleuze as the repression of the simulacra in favour of the copies (D 1990: 256–7). Simulacra are images without resemblance to the Idea. As such they undermine the dualism between Idea and image in Platonic thought, which regulates and grades terms according to a presupposed relation of resemblance to the Ideas. It is because the simulacra are not modelled on the Idea that their pretension, their merely external resemblance to the Idea, is without foundation. But it is also because of this merely external resemblance that the simulacra suggest a conception of the world in which identity follows 'deep disparity', and contest the conception of the world in which difference is regulated according to a prior similitude (D 1990: 261). Thus, Deleuze's 'reversal of Platonism' asserts the rights of the simulacra over the copy. He argues for a pop art able to 'be pushed to the point where it changes its nature' as a copy of a copy (Platonism) to be 'reversed into the simulacrum' (anti-Platonism) (D 1990: 265). In this way, the essence-appearance or model-copy distinctions used by modern philosophers to tackle Plato are shown by Deleuze's genealogy of Plato to be ineffective in reversing Platonism.

## Connectives

Kant  
Nietzsche  
Thought

## POLITICS + ECOLOGY

Rosi Braidotti

Adapting Baruch Spinoza's monism to an ecosophy of transcendental empiricism, Deleuze constructs the concept of 'immanence': incorporating

strains of vitalism and yet still by passing essentialism. Choosing to move beyond the dualism of human/non-human, Deleuze's ecosophy rejects liberal individualism as much as it does the holism of 'deep ecology'. Primarily, the ecosophy of Deleuze aspires to express the rhizomatic structure of subjectivity. The subject's mind is 'part of nature' – embedded and embodied – that is to say immanent and dynamic. As the structure of the Deleuzian subject is interactive, it is inherently ethical. In this manner, when Deleuze imbues ethical agency with an anti-essentialist vision of 'commitment' he accordingly displaces the anthropocentric bias of communitarianism.

The ecosophical ethics of Deleuze incorporates the physics and biology of bodies that together produce ethological forces. Instead of the essentialist question – 'What is a body?' – Deleuze prefers to deflect his questions slightly differently. He asks: 'What can a body do?' and 'How much can a body take?'. We are therefore invited to think about the problem of ecosophy in terms of affectivity: How is affectivity enhanced or impoverished? In this way, ethical virtue, empowerment, joy and understanding are implied. However, an act of understanding does not merely entail the mental acquisition of certain ideas, but it also coincides with bodily processes. It is thus an activity that actualises what is good for the subject, for example *potentia*. Mind and body act in unison and are synchronised by what Spinoza calls *conatus*, that is to say the desire to become and to increase the intensity of one's becoming.

The selection of composite positive passions, that constitute processes of becoming, works as a matter of affective and corporeal affinity. An ethical relation is conducive to joyful and empowering encounters that express one's *potentia* and increase the subject's capacity to enter into further relations. This expansion is bound both spatially (environmental) and temporally (endurance). By entering into ethical relations, nomadic beings engender possible futures in that, as they produce connections, they in turn produce the affective possibility of the world as a whole.

Vitalist ecosophy also functions to critique advanced capitalism; more specifically capitalist consumerism and the over-indulgent consumption of resources. As a temporal sequence, capitalism engenders the schizophrenic simultaneity of opposite effects and therefore it short-circuits the present. Thus, it immobilises as it saturates the social space with commodities. The temporal disjunction induced by the speedy turnover of available commodities is not different from the jet-lag one suffers after flying from London to Sydney. Capitalism induces a perverse logic of desire based on the deferral of pleasure fulfilment, deferring the gratification onto the 'next generation' of technological commodities and gadgets: the piecemeal instalments of popular culture in the form of 'into-tainment' that become

obsolete at the speed of light. These legal additions inflate without release, inducing dependency without any sense of responsibility. This mixture of dependency and dissatisfaction constitutes power as a nucleus of negative passions, such as resentment, frustration, envy and bitterness. Deleuze's ecosophy of radical immanence and intensive subjects responds to the unsustainable logic and internal contradictions of advanced capitalism. This Deleuzian body is in fact an ecological unit. Through a structure of mutual flows and data-transfer, one that probably is best understood in reference to viral contamination or intensive interconnection, this body is environmentally interdependent. This environmentally-bound intensive subject is a collective entity; it is an embodied, affective and intelligent entity that captures, processes and transforms energies and forces. Being environmentally-bound and territorially-based it is immersed in fields that constantly flow and transform.

All in all, Deleuze expands the notion of universalism to be more inclusive. He does this in two ways. First, by affirming biocentred and trans-species egalitarianism as an ethical principle, he opens up the possibility of conceptualising a post-humanity. Second, a new sense of global interconnection is established as the ethics for non-unitary subjects, emphasising a commitment to others (including the non-human, non-organic and 'earth' others). By removing the obstacle of self-centred individualism, the politics of Deleuzian ecosophy implies a new way of combining interests with an enlarged sense of community. Deleuze insists that it is the task of philosophy to create forms of ethical and political activities that respond to the complex and multilayered nature of 'belonging'. In other words, philosophy in the hands of Deleuze becomes a nomadic ecosophy of multiple beings.

## POSTCOLONIAL THEORY

### *Ierema Conley*

Postcolonial theory is derived from terms such as 'minoritarian', 'nomadism', 'becoming' and their variants. A worldwide becoming-minoritarian bears a potential (*quissance* or virtuality) that can affect bodies and words. The context is one of sexual politics, of undermining the power (*power* or given force) of the white male who has order-words at his disposal. Minorities have nothing to do with numbers but with internal relations. Of importance are the connections between bodies and words, especially conjunctive forms (such as 'and' and 'plus') that augment value to the terms between which they are found. Every major language is riddled

## SCHIZOANALYSIS

*Eugene Holland*

Schizoanalysis is the revolutionary 'materialist psychiatry' derived primarily from the critique of psychoanalysis. As the concept 'schizoanalysis' indicates, Sigmund Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex is the principle object of critique: schizoanalysis, drawing substantially on Karl Marx, transforms psychoanalysis so as to include the full scope of social and historical factors in its explanations of cognition and behaviour. Yet psychoanalysis is not rejected wholesale: schizoanalysis also draws substantially on Freud and especially on Jacques Lacan to transform historical materialism so as to include the full scope of libidinal and semiotic factors in its explanations of social structure and development. Ultimately, though perhaps least obviously, both structuralist psychoanalysis and historical materialism are transformed by Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of nihilism and asceticism and his transvaluation of difference, which inform both the libidinal and the social economies mapped by schizoanalysis. Ultimately, universal history for schizoanalysis offers the hope and the chance that the development of productive forces beyond capitalism and the expansion of Will to Power beyond nihilism will lead to greater freedom rather than enduring servitude.

The basic question posed by schizoanalysis (following Baruch Spinoza and Wilhelm Reich) is: Why do people fight for their own servitude as stubbornly as if it were their salvation? The answer is that people have been trained since birth in asceticism by the Oedipus complex, which relays social oppression into the heart of the nuclear family. Social oppression and psychic repression, thus, are for schizoanalysis two sides of the same coin, except that schizoanalysis reverses the direction of causality, making psychic repression depend on social oppression. It is not the child who is father to the man, as the psychoanalytic saying goes, rather it is the boss who is father to the man, who is in turn father to the child: the nuclear family imprints capitalist social relations on the infant psyche. Just as capital denies (through primitive accumulation) direct access to the means of production and the means of life, and mediates between the worker, work, consumer goods and eventual retirement, so the father denies (through the threat of castration enforcing the incest taboo) direct access to the mother (the means of life), and mediates between the child, other family members and eventual marriage with a mother-substitute. By denying the child all the people closest to her, the nuclear family programmes people from birth for asceticism and self-denial.

The critique of Oedipus is mounted on two fronts. Internally, schizoanalysis models the psyche on schizophrenia rather than neurosis, thereby revealing the immanent operations of the unconscious at work beneath the level of representation. The Oedipus complex is shown to be a systematic betrayal of unconscious processes, an illegitimate metaphysics of the psyche. But it is a metaphysics that derives directly from the reality of capitalist society. For in the external critique of the Oedipus, through a comparison of the capitalist mode of production with two other libidinal modes of production, schizoanalysis shows capitalism to be the only social formation organised by quantitative rather than qualitative relations. Capitalism organises the social by the cash nexus of the market rather than by codes and representation. Furthermore, this is the only social formation where social reproduction is isolated from social production at large, through the privatisation of reproduction in the nuclear family: the nuclear family, but also Oedipal psychoanalysis itself, are thus revealed to be strictly capitalist institutions. Yet at the same time that the nuclear family is capturing and programming desire in the Oedipus complex, the market is subverting codes and freeing desire from capture in representation throughout society at large, thereby producing schizophrenia as the radically free form of semiosis and the potential hope of universal history.

## Connectives

Desire

Freud

Marx

Oedipalisation

## SCHIZOPHRENIA

*Rosi Brailotti*

The touchstone of Deleuze and Guattari's conceptual critique of psychoanalysis is their emphasis on the positivity of schizophrenic language. Refusing to interpret desire as symptomatic of 'lack' or to use a linguistic paradigm that interprets desire through the system of metaphor and metonymy, they insist we understand desire in terms of affectivity, as a rhizomic mode of interconnection.

Although Sigmund Freud recognises the structure of affectivity and the heterogeneous and complex pleasures of 'polymorphous perversity', he

ends up policing desire when he captures it in a normative theory of the drives. The Freudian theory of drives codes and concentrates desiring affects into erotogenous zones. Thus, psychoanalysis implements a functional vision of the body that simply turns schizoid language and expression into a disorder. This is in stark contrast to the schizoanalytic vision both Deleuze and Guattari offer us.

Building on Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari blur the distinction drawn between normal/pathological and all the negative connotations that this model of desire implies. Casting affectivity, the passions and sexuality along the axes of either normative or pathological behaviour, they say, is complicit with those selfsame political forces of bio-power that discipline and control the expressive potentialities of a body. The double burden that comes from medicalising emotions and affects, in conjunction with reducing sexual expression to genitalia, leaves bodily affects and intensities in an impoverished state. Their theory of the Body without Organs (BwO) not only critiques psychoanalysis' complicity in repression but the functionalist approach to human affectivity as well. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari assert the positive nature of unruly desire in terms of schizoid flows.

For Deleuze, the distinction between proper and abject objects of desire is implemented as a normative index to police and civilise behaviour. The more unmanageable aspects of affectivity have either to come under the disciplinary mechanism of representation or be swiftly discarded. Deviance, insanity and transgression are commonly regarded as unacceptable for they point to an uncontrollable force of wild intensity. These tend to be negatively represented: impersonal, uncaring and dangerous forces. Concomitantly, such forces are both criminalised and rendered pathological. The schizophrenic body is emblematic of this violent 'outside', one that is beyond propriety and normality.

Deleuze's efforts to depathologise mental and somatic deviancy, unconventional sexual behaviour and clinical conditions – like anorexia, depression, suicide, and so forth – is not a celebration of transgression for its own sake. Instead, it is integral to his intensive reading of the subject as a structure of affectivity. That is, Deleuze maps out alternative modes of experimentation on the level of sensation, perception and affects. The intensity of these states and their criminalised and pathological social status often makes them implode into the black hole of ego-indexed negative forces. Deleuze is interested in experimenting with the positive potential of these practices. What is at stake in this reappraisal of schizophrenia is how other modes of assemblage and variations of intensity for non-unitary subjects are gestured to.

A subject is a genealogical entity, possessing a minoritarian, or counter-memory, which in turn is an expression of degrees of affectivity:

Genealogical ties create a discontinuous sense of time, closer to Friedrich Nietzsche's Dionysiac mode. Hence, spatially, a subject may seem fragmented and disunited; temporally, however, a subject develops a certain amount of consistency that comes from the continuing power of recollection. Here Deleuze borrows the distinction between the molar sense of linear, recorded time (*chronos*) and the molecular sense of cyclical, discontinuous time (*aion*) that the Greeks once described. Simply put, the former is related to being/the molar/the masculine; the latter to becoming/the molecular/the feminine. The co-occurrence of past and future in a continuous present may appear schizophrenic to those who uphold a vision of the subject as rational and self-contained, however, we need to have some caution here as Deleuze's philosophy of immanence rests on the idea of a transformative and dynamic subject who inhabits the active present tense of continuous 'becoming'. Using Henri Bergson's concept of 'duration' to guide him, Deleuze proposes a subject as an enduring entity, one that changes as much as it is changed through the connections it forms with a collectivity.

Also important to note is that Deleuze disengages the notion of 'endurance' from the metaphysical tradition that associates it with an essence or permanence. Hence, the potency of the Deleuzian subject comes from how it displaces the phallogocentric vision of consciousness, one that hinges on the sovereignty of the 'I'. It can no longer be safely assumed that consciousness coincides with subjectivity, or that either consciousness or subjectivity charges the course of events. Thus, the image of thought implied by liberal individualism and classical humanism is disrupted in favour of a multi-layered dynamic subject. On this level, schizophrenia acts as an alternative to how the art of thinking can be practised.

Together with paranoia, schizoid loops and double-binds mark the political economy of affectivity in advanced capitalism. These exact the double imperative of consumer consumption and its inherent deferral of pleasure. With capitalism the deferral of pleasure concomitantly turned into a commodity. The saturation of social space, by fast-changing commodities, short-circuits the present inducing a disjunction in time.

Like the insatiable appetite of the vampire, the capitalist theft of 'the present' expresses a system that not only immobilises in the process of commodity over-accumulation, but also suspends active desiring-production in favour of an addictive pursuit of commodity goods. In response, Deleuze posits 'becoming' as an antidote: flows of empowering desire that introduce mobility and thus destabilise the sedentary gravitational pull of molar formations. This involves experimenting with non-unitary or schizoid modes of becoming.

## Connectives

Becoming  
 Bergson  
 Black hole  
 Body  
 Body without Organs  
 Duration  
 Molar  
 Nietzsche  
 Representation

## SEGMENTARITY

*Kylie Message*

'Segmentation' is a fundamental structuring principle that contributes to organising the individual and social life of all humans. While Deleuze and Guattari explore the superficially dichotomous relationship of the dominant segments—primitive, supple or molecular, that are differentiated against the rigid or molar state segment—they do so in order to contend that each of these dominant segments can themselves be sub-compartmentalised into binary, circular and linear forms. More important than the distinctions existing within each of the terms of the dichotomy, however, is the idea that yet another—far less discernible and easily defined—space exists in between these two segments. This liminal third space is produced by one or several lines of flight that binds the binary terms into dialogue with each other at the same time as it works to enforce a kind of decoding procedure for each of the segmented forms. In other words, it both binds and separates the terms, but ensures that a continual mutability carries on existing between the two.

Although Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge that binary couplings appear at the basis of their approach to the concept of segmentation, this mode of differentiation is consciously and cautiously invoked in order to show that even the most formalised of dichotomous states have a relationship that is in fact more pliable or porous than would first appear. In this sense everything is political: every politics is always both macro-politics and micropolitics. Illustrating the inter-relationship of the binary term that is always tied into dialogue with its contrasting figure (via the third, liminal space that tends to be occupied by deterritorialising lines of flight) while at the same time being differentiated against it, individuals

and societies are understood as being organised according to two dominant and interwoven modes of segmentation: one molar, the other molecular. These terms are always closely related because they co-exist and cross over into each other.

Exploring the dominant forms of segmentation, Deleuze and Guattari contrast the idea of a primitive or supple kind of segmentarity against the notion of modern statehood, where primitive societies exist without delimited political institutions. Considerable manoeuvrability and communicability are maintained between the differentiated, heterogeneous fields of these societies, primarily because of the segmented relationship that each of these fields or units shares with the other. Operating according to discrete, localised forms of management, Deleuze and Guattari characterise this primitive segmentarity as functioning through polyvalent codes that emerge as a result of various relationships and lineages, and as an itinerant territoriality that is based on local divisions that overlap rather than exist in any discrete state. Communication, codification and territorialisation occur in these societies via a process of shifting relationships and inter-sections, rather than any centrally organising power.

While these systems of organisation are perhaps more molecular (focused on small-scale trajectories and local environments) than those of modern societies, it would not be true to claim that they are more organic or less systematic, and in accord with their contention that the molar exists within the molecular and vice versa, Deleuze and Guattari explain that it is a mistake simply to contrast this primitive, supple or molecular segmentarity against the more rigid global organisations that characterise the modern State society. Acknowledging that the modern political system is a unified and unifying global apparatus, they maintain that it is organised in a formation of clearly ordered subsystems. However, despite the reaching agenda that motivates this inclusive process, it cannot be entirely differentiated from the primitive system out of which it has evolved. Accordingly, the overarching system is never free from gaps, displacements and partial processes that interconnect with each other and yet it never attains proper signification.

To ignore these spaces of slippage that exist in between the privileged or State-sanctified units is a mistake, Deleuze and Guattari counsel, because these often indiscernible spaces may contain either—or perhaps both in some cases—the rumblings of popular mass dissatisfaction with the dominant and determining State body (as in the social upheavals of May 1968), or the quotidian embodiment of extreme State power whereby everyday citizens adopt a self-regulating attitude or belief that is based on their individual internalisation of a particular political code or ideal promoted by the State (as in Nazi Germany). In both cases, these ruptures are

negation go beyond action and reaction because they are interior to the movement of becoming itself. Affirmation is the power to become other; negation is the process of becoming-reactive. These powers are interior to action and reaction and bring these qualities into being. What is at stake in the distinction between affirmation and negation and action and reaction is nothing less than the distinction between interpretation and evaluation. Interpretation, Deleuze points out, determines the relation of forces; evaluation determines the Will to Power that confers value upon a thing. It is the element of Will to Power that determines the nature of values; the value of a value is established by the quality of Will to Power that it expresses. The value of value inheres in this differential element; consequently genealogical and immanent critique seeks to establish the quality of Will to Power at the origin of every evaluative gesture.

### Connectives

#### Active/Reactive

Nietzsche

### WOMAN

#### Rosi Braidotti

Like all formations of identity in Deleuze's thought, 'woman' is a molar entity that pertains to and sustains the political economy of a majority. However, in a much broader phallogocentric historical system 'woman' is also positioned as 'other'. Deleuze shows great sensitivity in his treatment of 'woman' neither casting her as the mistress of alerity, nor fetishising her as the privileged object of masculine desire. Rather Deleuze avoids the tropes common to philosophical discourse on the feminine, choosing to remain polymorphous on the topic of sexuality, all the while performing a double displacement at the level of both Platonic theories of representation and psychoanalytic theories of desire.

Deleuze rejects the speculative self/other relationship of dialectics and argues instead that these terms are not linked by negation, but are two positively different systems each with its specific mode of activity. Thus 'woman' is not the sexualised 'second sex' of the phallic system, but a positive term: as the other, she is a matrix of becoming. Deleuze also rejects the psychoanalytic emphasis on negativity (lack) and the equation of bodily materiality with the originary site of the maternal. Instead of the régime of the phallus and of its specular other – woman – Deleuze prefers

heterogeneous multiplicities and internal differentiation. In this sense he empowers 'woman' through positive figurations such as the non-Oedipal little girl of Alice in Wonderland, who has not yet been dispossessed of her body by the phallic law of the father; or in the equally empowered position of Ariadne, the philosopher's fiancée who expresses the feminine face of philosophy and is also the source of ethical transmutation, turning negative or reactive values into affirmative ones. Transcending the negative passions that the Oedipalising economy of the phallus induces is in effect a Deleuzian engine of the transformation, what Deleuze otherwise calls 'becoming'.

The role of 'woman' in Deleuze's theory of becoming is noteworthy. 'Becoming' is the actualisation of the immanent encounter between forces which are apt mutually to affect and exchange parts of each other in a creative and empathic manner. The notion of 'forces' accomplishes a double aim, which is central to Deleuze's emphasis on radical immanence: on the one hand it gives priority to affectivity in his theory of the subject; and on the other, it emphasises the embodied structure of the subject and the specific temporality of the embodied human. A force is a degree of affectivity or of intensity, in that it is open and receptive to encountering other affects. The transformation that occurs in the process of becoming asserts the affirmative, joyful affects over and above the negative ones.

Woman not only can enact processes of becoming-minoritarian but also, especially for Guattari, constitutes the main bloc of becoming for all processes of deterritorialisation. 'Becoming-woman' is both integral to the concept and process of becoming and also uncomfortably written into it as a constitutive paradox of Deleuze's nomadic subjectivity: 'The woman in question here is not an empirical referent, but rather a topological position, which marks degrees and levels of intensity and affective states. It expresses impersonal and ungendered forces; and, as is to be expected, this has generated a lively and often critical debate with feminist poststructuralist philosophers.'

Moreover, 'becoming-woman' is a moment, a passage, a line of flight which bypasses empirical women per se. Processes of becoming are not predicated upon a stable, centralised 'self' who supervises their unfolding. Rather, they rest on a non-unitary, multilayered, dynamic subject. Becoming woman/animal/insect is an affect that flows, like writing it is a composition, or a location that needs to be constructed in the encounter with others. All becomings are minoritarian, that is to say they inevitably and necessarily move into the direction of the 'others' of classical dualism (such as sexualised, racialised and/or naturalised 'others'). Yet becomings do not stop there; they become displaced and are reterritorialised in the process. Thus, 'becoming-woman' marks the threshold of patterns of 'becoming-minoritarian' that cross through the animal and go into the 'becoming-imperceptible' and beyond. There are no systematic, linear or

teleological stages of becoming; each plateau marks a framed and sustainable block or moment of transformation that is actualised immanently.

Alternatively, patterns of becoming can be visualised as an affirmative deconstruction of dominant subject-positions (masculine/white/heterosexual/speaking a standard language/property-owning/urbanised and so on). Or else, becoming can be understood as stepping stones to a complex and open-ended process of depersonalisation of the subject. Internally self-contradictory, becoming can best be expressed by figurations: the wasp and the orchid; the woman and the turning of the waves; the sound and the fury, signifying nothing. In this way, the process of becoming is not about signification, but about actualising new modes of affective interaction: it asserts the potency of expression. Expression is the non-linguistically coded affirmation of an affectivity whose degree, speed, extension and intensity can only be measured materially and pragmatically, case by case. And it is therefore interesting to note that women are not *a priori* molecular; they too have to become woman.

#### Connectives

Becoming  
Expression  
Force  
Lines of flight  
Molar  
Psychoanalysis

### WOOLF, VIRGINIA (1882–1941)

#### *Clair Colebrook*

One of the challenges Deleuze presents to late twentieth-century philosophy and theory is his critique of linguistics, or the idea that we can only think within a language and that language structures our perception. His idea that true thinking must plunge back into the life from which language emerges, rather than remain within a language, is profoundly modernist and continues an early twentieth-century concern with the genesis of systems of signs. Although Deleuze writes positively about a series of modernist writers and artists, including James Joyce, his and Guattari's celebration of Virginia Woolf in *A Thousand Plateaus* is significant for two reasons. First, Woolf's own work is contemporaneous with Henri Bergson who was so important for Deleuze. It is possible that Woolf's concern with

pre-linguistic perception may well have emerged from the same intellectual milieu to which Deleuze appeals. Woolf's Bloomsbury circle was concerned with the autonomy of the aesthetic and its difference from the fixed categories of logic. Bergson's appeal to the undivided flow of creative life from which fixed terms emerge was part of a broader modernist reaction against reification, intellectualism and technological rationalisation of which Woolf's style is perhaps the greatest expression. Second, the most explicit appeal made by Deleuze and Guattari to Woolf is in the 'becoming-woman' section of *A Thousand Plateaus*.

If modernism in general shares the Bergsonian distaste for a world reduced to clock time, mathematical space and impoverished experience, Virginia Woolf's response is uniquely positive and affirmative. Unlike other modernists who used techniques such as the fragmentation of language, quotation, allusion, punning and parataxis – linguistic techniques – to show signs operating as machines beyond human intent, Woolf used literature to think and express the extra-literary. This is perhaps why, when Deleuze and Guattari want to think about becoming, they turn to becoming-woman and Virginia Woolf.

Whereas 'man' is the presupposed universal subject of the system of speech and the being to whom all becoming is represented, woman is the key to all becomings. Woman is not the Other of man, not that which lies outside language as unrepresentable, negative and undifferentiated. If we want to think the life, becoming or perceptions from which the subject emerges then we need to move beyond 'man' as subject or ground to woman as becoming, expression and creation. Woolf is crucial here not because she is a woman writer, expressing women's experience in language (for she argues in *A Room of One's Own* (1929) that it is fatal, when writing, to think of one's sex). Rather, Woolf's style is becoming-woman.

On the one hand, Woolf's writing is about perception; her sentences in *The Waves* (1931) create characters who are their perceptions, and whose world is not a set of static objects so much as a perception of others' worlds. Characters receive impressions not as extended objects in time but as intensities or becoming, 'blocks of becoming'. On the other hand, Woolf's work is not just about perception and a world of impressions; she also enacts becoming and intensity at the level of style, with many of her sentences complicating and subverting the subject-predicate structure of standard speech and logic.

#### Connectives

Becoming  
Bergson

Power  
Woman  
Writing

## WRITING

*Rosi Braiddotti*

Deleuze's philosophical monism makes no categorical difference between thinking and creating, painting and writing, concept and percept. These are all variations of experimentation, more specifically, an experimentation with intensities that foster patterns of becoming. Experimentation expresses different topological modes; they enact a creative process that is not configured by unfolding a fixed essence or *telos*. Creativity is understood as a multiple and complex process of transformation, otherwise the flux of becoming. Put simply, creativity affirms the positive structure of difference.

Writing then, is not the self-assertion of a rationally ordained imaginative subject, rather its eviction. It has to do with emptying out the self, opening it up to possible encounters with a number of affective outsiders. The writer's eye captures the outside world by becoming receptive to minute and seemingly irrelevant perceptions. During such moments of floating awareness, when rational control releases its hold, 'reality' vigorously rushes through the sensorial/perceptive apparatus. This onslaught of data, information and affectivity simultaneously propels the self out of the black hole of its atomised isolation, dispersing it into a myriad of data-imprints. Ambushed, the self not only receives affects, it concomitantly recomposes itself around them. A rhizomic bond is thus established that, through the singular geometry of the affects involved and their specific plane of composition, confirms the singularity of the subject produced on a particular plane of immanence.

One needs to be able to sustain the impact of affectivity: to 'hold' it. But holding or capturing affectivity does not happen dialectically within a dominant mode of consciousness. Instead, it takes the form of an affective, depersonalised, highly receptive subject which quite simply is not unified. The singularity of this rhizomic subjectivity rests on the spatio-temporal coordinates that make it coincide with nothing more than the degrees, levels, expansions and extensions of the 'outside' as it rushes head-on, moving inwards and outwards. What are mobilised are one's capacities to feel, sense, process and sustain the impact in conjunction with the complex materiality of the outside; a sort of fluid but self-sustaining sensibility, or

stream-of-consciousness that is porous to the outside. Our culture has tended to code this as 'feminine'. Pure creativity is an aesthetic mode of absolute immersion along with the unfolding and enfolding of one's sensibility in the field of forces one inhabits – music, colour, light, speed, temperature and intensity.

Because of the historical bond that ties writing to regimes of power, the activity of writing plays a special pragmatic role; it is a tool that can be used to decode the despotic power of the linguistic signifier. In this way, the intensive writing style particular to Deleuze spells the end of the linguistic turn, as he releases the subject from the cage of representational thinking. Writing is therefore, not explained with reference to psychoanalytic theories of symbolic 'lack', or reduced to an economy of guilt, nor is it the linguistic power of the master signifier. Writing is an intensive approach that stresses the productive, more than the regressive. Put differently, Deleuze insists writing is the structure of affectivity that animates the subject. At the heart of Deleuze's rhizomatics is a positive reading of the human as affirmative, a pleasure-prone machine capable of all kinds of empowering forces. It is just a question of establishing the most positive or even joyful connections and resonances.

For Deleuze what is at stake in writing is not the manipulation of a set of linguistic or narrative conventions; nor is it the cognitive penetration of an object; nor even the appropriation of a theme. Writing is an orientation; it is the skill that consists in developing a compass of the cognitive, affective and ethical kind. It is quite simply an apprenticeship in the art of conceptual and perceptual colouring.

A new image, or philosophical concept, is an affect that breaks through established frames and representations. It illuminates a territory through the orientation of its coordinates; it makes visible/thinkable/sayable/hearable forces, passions and affects that were previously unperceived. Thus, the question of creation is ultimately technological: it is one of 'how'? It is also geological: it is about 'where?' and 'in which territory?'. Ultimately, it is ethical: it is concerned with where limits can be set and how to sustain altered states or processes of change.

### Connectives

Black hole  
Creative transformation  
Difference  
Immanence  
Power  
Representation