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In order to practice critical theory today, you need a new kind of political sensibility. You need a flair for complexity that does not give in to relativism. I want to defend a political style that is fluent in the language of complexity and multiplicity yet remains rigorous. Fluidity does not mean ever-receding boundlessness or amorphousness. I call this the philosophical style of "as if." This refers to a practice of strategic repetition aimed at engendering difference as a conceptual form of creativity or a qualitative leap out of the aporias of postmodern discourse. I will enact here a few of these strategic repetitions in the mode of a conceptual opera. They are variations on the theme of bodies and memories in the geopolitical space of the European Union.

PROLOGUE

There is a shared conviction among many "post-" intellectuals (modern/industrial/colonial, etc.) that the crucial task of accounting for the social reality of a fast-changing world that is disaggregating under the acceleration of the digitally clad global economy is both more necessary and more complex than ever before. Along these lines I would argue that the notion of diagrams of the present — in Michel Foucault's sense of the term — needs to be revised in light of Gilles Deleuze's nomadic philosophy.

In an attempt to provide a critical redefinition of power relations that moves beyond the humanist residues of modernism, Foucault introduced the notion of philosophy as a dramatic reading of the present. At the heart of Foucault's critique of Marxist notions such as ideology, repression, and hegemony is the idea of "mapping the present" in terms of intersecting networks of power effects that simultaneously enable and constrain the subjects.

The notion of the diagram undergoes a radical conceptual revision in Deleuze's work, notably — and perversely — in his book on Foucault. Here, the diagrams are not only cartographical devices that enable the tracking of power effects but also concepts, embedded and embodied abstractions that aim at redesigning a framework for the subject that comes after — after all the "posts" mentioned above and especially after Foucault.

In an attempt to set the variables that frame our discussion of how to enforce difference through repetition, I will start, following Deleuze's notion of nomadic subjectivity, with the assumption that we can only really know where we are coming from, that is to say, what we no longer are. Retrospective, external, and relational accounts of subjectivity are all that we have. We can only know what we have already ceased to be. I want to stress this because I am aware that, in architectural discourse, the notion of the "diagram" has very different meanings and functions. This clarification may contribute to a clearer discussion between the philosophers and the architects engaged in the Anyhow conference.

Even more important for me is the element of affectivity or desire invested in and shaped by the diagram of the present. Here too the subject is off-center or external in relation to the flow of affects; desire is what remains unthought at the heart of thinking because it triggers and sustains the power of thinking. This is why — upon closer scrutiny — Foucauldian cartographies must be amplified and made more useful by taking up the challenge of the abstract conceptual devices that Deleuze proposes.

ACT I: RECASTING

As if radically materialist forms of remobilization and remembrance were not only desirable but actually possible.

ADAGIO

A Deleuzian "body" is an assemblage of forces or passions that solidify (in space) and consolidate (in time) within the singular configuration commonly known as "individual." This intensive and dynamic entity is not, however, the emanation of an inner essence along the lines of the classical axiom "Man as a thinking, speaking, mortal animal." Nor is it merely the effect of biologically or genetically inscribed codes. The intensive Deleuzian body is rather a concentration of forces that is stable enough — spatiotemporally speaking — to sustain them and undergo constant, though necessarily contained, fluxes of transformation. It is a field of transformative affects whose availability for changes of intensity depends on its ability to sustain and to encounter outside forces or intensities.

In this field of transformative forces, sustainability is crucial. It is a socio-symbolic idea of ecological stability in which changes in intensity are directly proportional to the ability to sustain the shifts without cracking. The borders of the framing, or containing, exercise are crucial to the success of the outcome, an affirmative and not dissipating process of becoming.

This is extremely important to prevent nihilism and self-destruction. That the subject for Deleuze be a transformative, affective apparatus is not meant to suggest infinity or limitlessness that would be the expression of a delirium of megalomania that would flip the subject into a pit of regressive passions. It is a sustainable system that encounters clear limits and, in that encounter, frames a territory or an affective space tolerable for him/het.

ANDANTE

The subject lies at the crossroads with external forces. "Becomings are a matter for geography: it is a question of orientations, of points of exit and entry."¹ The question for Deleuze's subject is not "what" but rather "where" it is.

Neither a sacralized inner sanctum nor a purely social construction shaped by external "forms of production," the subject is rather in-between: a folding in of external influences and a simultaneous unfolding outward of affects. A mobile entity, an enfleshed sort of duration, the subject lasts in and through a set of discontinuous transformations and remains extraordinarily faithful to itself.

This faithfulness is not to be understood in the mode of sentimental attachment to an "identity" that often is little more than a social security number. Nor is it authentic voice expressing a belief in the importance of one's starving ego, one's petty likes and dislikes. Rather, it is all the more rigorous because it is a more pragmatic expression of a sustainable self-in-process, of faithfulness of endurance. It is the expression of one's continuing adherence to certain dynamic spatio-temporal coordinates. Deleuze's view of subjectivity owes a great deal to Friedrich Nietzsche's anti-humanism. For these philosophers, subjectivity needs to be disengaged from the liberal view of the thinking subject. Rather, subjects can be analyzed in terms of latitudinal and longitudinal forces that structure subjectivity. It is a deeply materialistic view that argues that subjects come in different mileages, temperaments, and beats. Of course, one can change gears and move across these coordinates, but one cannot claim all of them, all of the time. The contemporary fascination of our culture has engendered (a very genderized) flirtation with disembodiment via a multiplication of virtual embodiments, such as the cyberpunk flight from the body and the fashion industry's obsession with the anorexic body.

Deleuze warns us that a little *les abstraction* would be welcome in contemporary debates about subjectivity. In reflecting upon the subject as a site of multiple becomings, due attention must be given to sustainable limits. That means that the rhythm of the sequences, the selection of the constitutive elements, and other geopolitical variables framing the process of becoming have to be taken into account. This careful selection of the forces involved in the process of becoming prevents a slippage into the fantasy of megalomaniacal expansion. For Deleuze, the reaffirmations of the "intensive" subject take the form of radical immanence: the actualization of a field of forces apt to frame the singularity of a subject.

ALLEGRO MA NON TROPPO

Becoming is intransitive, it's becoming nothing in particular, nothing more than what one is capable of sustaining. It is life on the edge, but not over it; it is excessive, but not in a sacrificial sense (exit Bataille). It is not devoid of violence, but is deeply compassionate insofar as it begins with the recognition of one's limitations as the necessary counterpart to one's forces or intensities. It is ethical, following Spinoza's notion of the adequacy of one's passions to the modes and times of their enactment. It is collective-minded and social because it is interrelational insofar as it requires impact with and upon others. It can only be embodied and embedded and is thus a radical form of immanence.

Deleuze's central figuration is a general becoming-minority, or becoming-nomad, or becoming-molecular/woman/animal, etc. The minority is the dynamic or intensive principle of change in Deleuze's theory, whereas the heart of the (phallogocentric) majority is dead. The space of becoming is posited as a space of affinity and symbiosis between adjacent forces; it is a space of dynamic marginality and of affinity between entities at the point where they intersect (Deleuze's "plan of immanence"). Proximity is both a topological and a quantitative notion, both geography and meteorology, which marks the space of common becoming of subjects as sensible or intelligent matter.

The process of becoming requires the decolonization of the thinking subject in the grip of dualism. This also implies the dissolution of all seized identities based on gendered opposition. Thus, the becoming-woman is the necessary starting point for the deconstruction of phallogocentric identities precisely because sexual dualism and its corollary, the positioning of woman as figure of otherness, are constitutive of Western thought.

Insofar as Man represents the majority, there is no "becoming-man"; he is stuck with the burden of Being. By implication, the various minorities (women, children, blacks, animals, vegetables, molecules) are the privileged starting points for the process of becoming. This is to say that the multiple variables of difference or of devalued otherness are positive sites for the redefinition of subjectivity.

Deleuze suggests an asymmetrical starting position between minority and majority. This means that the process of deterritorialization is dual and minorities can undergo the process of becoming only by disengaging themselves entirely from the unity imposed upon them by opposition to the majority. Common asymmetrical becomings turn the former dialectical opponents (men and women, old and young, white and black, etc.) into traveling companions in the process of undoing the common grounds for their formerly unitarian — albeit dualistically opposed — identity.

Thus, "as if" in the sense of recasting subjectivity is the patient repetition of steps aimed at approximating, through a series of adaptations, the raw simplicity of the forces that shape one's embodied intensity or existential temperature. It is the unfolding of a subject that appears in its bare skeletal structure as speed of remembrance, capacity for perception, empathy, and impact over others. De-essentialized vitalism.

ACT II: REMEMBERING

As if memory could be disengaged from its attachment to and indexation on a fixed identity.

I become, therefore I will have been.

Crucial to this process of becoming is the question of memory. Fixed identity is predicated on a molar or majority subject: white, heterosexual, property-owning, male, and fluent in a standard Western language. A huge data bank of centralized knowledge is relayed through every aspect of his activities. The "majority subject" holds the keys to the central memory of the system and has reduced to the rank of insignificant, or rather assigning practices, the alternative or subjugated memories of the many minorities. Homogeneous and centralized, the majority subject functions by organizing differences and relaying them to the periphery. Saskia Sassen gives a perfect example of this model: the most digitalized information centers in the world are also the largest urban agglomerates.

In reaction to this vision of memory as data bank, Deleuze activates a minority memory, a power of remembrance without a priori propositional contents, or memories. This intensive power does not retain and retrieve information in linear order. It functions instead as a deterritorializing agency that dialogues the subject from his/her sense of a unified and consistent identity. "I" is not the owner of the portion of space/time that I occupy; "I" is only a rubber stamp, and I am actually only passing through.

¹ Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues* (Paris: Flammarion, 1977), 8.

What do you do when you remember?
According to Deleuze you reinvent yourself on the basis of the very fragments that remain from whatever you are capable of retaining from the past. Like trying to remember a face and sequence of events after a particularly bad hangover, one needs to try and string the pieces together. Remembering in this nomadic mode is active reinvention of a self that is joyfully discontinuous, as opposed to mournfully consistent. It's like picking up a family photo that has nothing to do with your family and finding ample family resemblances. As Deleuze suggests, paraphrasing Virginia Woolf's style of remembrance: it will have been a childhood, though not necessarily my own. We must shift from the reassuring platitude of the past ("I remember when I was young") to the openings offered by the future perfect (*le futur antérieur*). This is the tense of virtual reality in that it builds a bridge between past and present. It also conveys the force of the imperative: "We will have been free" amounts to "We have to manage to become so."

Memories (in this molecular mode) are virtual, that is, perfectly real insofar as they already act as a propelling force within the subject. They are not potential; rather, they exist as embodied modalities in him/her/it and simply await the possibility for actualization: they propel toward and compel to action. It is like walking the tightrope between the possible, the plausible, the half-thought, and the only remotely likely. Actualization requires careful orchestration, i.e., the arrangement of empowering conditions – or spatiotemporal coordinates – that would enable the unfolding of these propelling forces.

In this regard, Deleuze's theory of subjectivity is like a choreography of passions that require an adequate script in order to become (actualized). Whether or not the script is adequate is determined by the correspondence between the structuring elements of the forces at the point of their intersection (plan of immanence). These elements are speed, intensity and capacity to create connections, and the immediate surroundings. The *adéquatio* in question is therefore a question of cohesion and empathy between the constitutive elements,

All minority subjects, including women, need to act on both times, though the subversive potential is on the side of positive affirmation or becoming. The dual structure of memory also needs to be made more complex. It is absolutely the case that, for the majority, the line of becoming requires an antimemory that would vehiculate a nomadic or deterritorializing force. It is equally true, however, that for minorities, it would be of the utmost significance first to have their own data bank of accumulated experience recognized as an official "memory." I must stress this dissymmetry in the respective positions of the majority and the minority vis-à-vis the question of memory.

All this notwithstanding, I would suggest that to enact a Deleuzian becoming, we need new conceptual coordinates. These are not elaborated by voluntaristic self-naming but rather through careful revisitations and retakes. I would describe it as a process of peeling off, stratum after stratum, the layers of signification that have been tattooed on the surface of the body and – more importantly – in its psychic recesses and in the internalized folds of one's sacrosanct "experience." Like a snake shedding an old skin, one must ultimately remember to forget it.

I would like to propose therefore that the classical axiom "Man is a thinking, speaking, mortal animal" should be processed in the same way that Gertrude Stein (who, among other texts, also wrote a great opera) composes her texts. It would then become "Man is a thinking is speaking is mortal is animal is . . ." The sequence is open.

As in Stein's operatic prose, what matters ultimately is the recurrence of that process whereby Being – the only verb that, according to Deleuze, has no workable infinitive – gets an irresistible beat and actually starts whirling, opening new spaces of becoming.

ACT III: THE RETURN OF FIGURATIONS

The politics of "as if," or the strategic practice of mimics

Feminist thought is a laboratory for picking up the challenge of learning how to think differently. Feminist theory has emphasized both the notion of embodied subjectivity and the need for conceptual creativity. The latter has been expressed as the need for new "figurations," following Donna Haraway or "fabulations," to quote Marleen Barr. They are needed to express the alternative forms of female subjectivity developed within feminism, as well as the ongoing struggle with language to produce affirmative representations of women. The array of terms available to describe this new female feminist subjectivity is telling: womanist, cyborg, postcolonial, lesbian, queer, post-Woman women, etc.

A figuration is no mere metaphor but rather a diagram, a politically informed map of the present that renders one's embodied and embedded location. I read figurations in terms of the feminist politics of locations that, from Adrienne Rich to Haraway's "situated knowledges," provided the foundations for both feminisms' knowledge claims and political accountability. Second, I read figurations with Deleuze's notion of the diagram as an attempt to move beyond the "image of the thought" embedded and inscribed in logocentric philosophy.

The starting point for feminist refigurations of subjectivity is a new materialism that emphasizes the embodied and therefore sexually differentiated structure of the speaking subject. The body, or the embodiment of the subject, is understood as neither a biological nor a sociological category but rather as a point of overlap between the physical, the symbolic, and the sociological. In other words, feminist emphasis on embodiment goes hand in hand with a radical rejection of essentialism. In feminist theory one speaks as a woman, although the subject "woman" is not a monolithic essence defined once and for all but rather the site of multiple, complex, and potentially contradictory sets of experience defined by overlapping variables such as class, race, age, lifestyle, sexual preference, and others. One speaks as a woman in order to empower women, to activate socio-symbolic changes in their condition. Accountability is a form of "embodied genealogy."

A figuration expresses one's sense of spatiotemporal location; it marks a point of origin in space and in the sense of historical memory. A location is where one takes one's departure. Highlighted is the political practice of self-reflexivity about one's own location (in both the spatial and temporal sense of the term) and of an accountability for it.

Accountability can best be explained in terms of making visible one's implication in the very power formations against which one is fighting. It is a form of self-criticism in terms of one's relationship to power and/as knowledge that Foucault and Deleuze inaugurated in philosophy, even though feminism invented it as a practice. Accountability is a form of "embodied genealogy" that makes one responsible for understanding the conditions of one's existence, a radical critique of one's own embedded and embedded foundations. In its antifoundationalist stance, feminist postmodernism has redefined the political in terms of radical accountability.

To practice "the politics of as if" one must have a flair for these complexities; a political culture of difference must support what would otherwise be only an intimate project of transformation. To illustrate this politics, I would like to take the (hopefully) classical feminist axiom "Woman is a subject inscribed in power via class, age, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation" and activate it as a set of inner differences that go on multiplying themselves. Once again, Stein's operatic prose. The logocentric gravitational pulls of the sentences would implode under the strain inscribed in its power via its class is age is race is ethnicity is sexual is orientation is, and so on indefinitely.

What matters ultimately to this feminist politics is repetition. Being gets dislodged from its fundamentalist pedestal and loses the dogmatic authority of its essentialist predicates, exposing at last the multiple "differences within." Being thus becomes activated as a force whose function is to stitch together the different moments that it enacts but does not encompass. The metaphysical weight of Being is reduced to a mere shifter: it drops the pretense of essential continuity on which it erected its imperialist power of signification in order to return each subject to the specific multiplicity of one's singularity. "We," the female feminist subjects of an-other discourse, will have been free.

ACT IV: REFRAMING EUROPE

What if Europe could rethink itself as periphery, not as center?

In European philosophy, the project of the politics of "as if" coincides historically with the decline of classical humanism, thus opening up that proliferation of discourses about "otherness" that Arjun Appadurai takes as one of the traits of our era.

This is a topical question because in these days of the renegotiation of the treaty of Maastricht/Amsterdam and the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, no notion is more contested in social theory than that of European citizenship.

Historically, Europeans have perfected the trick of turning themselves into the center of the universe while the rest of the world becomes one huge periphery. The postmodern predicament is — among other things — about the shift of geopolitical power away from the North Atlantic in favor of the Pacific Rim and especially Southeast Asia.

This shift in geopolitical power becomes both confirmed and theorized in terms of the decline of the Eurocentric logocentric system. Philosophers such as Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, and Massimo Cacciari have pointed out one perverse aspect of this shift: what makes Western philosophical culture so perennially effective and so seductive is that it has been announcing its own death for over one hundred years. Since the apocalyptic trinity of modernity — Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud (and Darwin) — the West has been thinking through the historical inevitability and the logical possibility of its own decline; so the state of "crisis" has become a hegemonic theme. Nobody, let alone critical thinkers, should take the "crisis" of Western humanism naively or at face value; this state of prolonged and self-

One of the crucial points of intersection between contemporary social and political theory and feminist thought is the desire to leave behind linear intellectual thinking, the teleologically ordained style of argumentation that most of us have been trained to respect and emulate. The point for me is not loyalty to existing philosophies but accountability for one's gender: a nomadic feminist is necessarily an undaunted daughter.

In this regard the feminist project intervenes at the level of historical agency in the linear time of patriarchal progression (Chronos) and that of individual identity and the politics of becoming (Aion). It thus engages both conscious and unconscious levels of subjectivity. Identity becomes a site of "as if" formations. Let me give you an example: feminist women go on functioning in society as female subjects in these postmetaphysical days of the decline of gender dichotomies, as if "Woman" were still a significant location. In so doing, however, feminists treat femininity as an optional extra, as the site of available poses and costumes, rich in history and social relations but no longer fixed and compulsory. Woman is simultaneously asserted and deconstructed in a strategy of mimetic repetition.

Strategic mimesis is the process of revisiting and consuming the old, both within and without. What counts as "the old" here is the established definition of the feminine as "the Other of the Same." Mimesis is a constant renegotiation of the forms and the contents of female identity, an inner erosion of the feminine by women who are aware of their own implication in that which they attempt to deconstruct. The purpose of this mimetic exercise is not deconstruction for its own sake but the political project of breaking down old social and mental habits and forms of identification.

agonizing crisis may be the "soft" form that Western postmodernity has chosen in order to perpetuate itself.

The convergence of the discourse of "crisis" within poststructuralism and the postcolonial deconstruction of imperial whiteness is not a sufficient condition for a political alliance between them, though I would argue it is a necessary one. Anthony Appiah² reminded us of the need not to confuse the "post" of postcolonialism with the "post" of postmodernism but to respect instead the specific historical locations of each.

I do think, however, that facing up to these contradictory demands is our historical responsibility because Europeans, as early-21st-century North Atlantic people, are historically condemned to our history, insofar as we come after the historical decline of the promises of the Enlightenment. Whether you choose to call our predicament "postmodern," "post-humanist," or "neo-humanist" makes little difference. What does matter is our shared awareness that we must make ourselves accountable for the history of our culture without burying our heads in the sand and without giving in to relativism. Relativism is not an option because it erodes the possibility of both political coalitions and intellectual discussions.

Postcolonial thinkers like Stuart Hall, Avtar Brah, and Paul Gilroy have stressed the extent to which the political focus has shifted from the 20th-century question about essences: from "What is European Civilization?" to the 21st-century question about genealogy. "Who entitles, agency, and participation: 'Who is entitled to call him/herself a European?'"

As a white European and a first-generation migrant, I would like to emphasize, out of the many conflicting answers that are circulating on this point, the ones that offer a potential reframing of Europe. This positive approach goes hand in hand with reactivating a minority memory of European consciousness that aims at undoing the power of the centralized memory or data bank that jealously maintains European identity. One needs to forget the heroic definitions of Europe and remember against the grain, focusing on the other side of that heroic tale.

5 See, also, Phidonnata Exel, *Understanding Empire: Racism As Interdisciplinary Theory* (London: Sage, 1997). Continuing the line of Black and Indigenous Women

in the European Union, a report by the European Women's Lobby for the European Forum of Left Feminists and others.

6 September 2002, Beverly Guy Sheffall, *Women's Studies: A Retrospective* (New York: Peter Foundation, 1998). Herina Lutz, *Obstacles to Equal Opportunity*

in a book by Immanuel Wallerstein with Peter A. Hall, *Worlds of Difference: The World-Kingdom, Germany and the World's Countries*

of the Joint Study Group in May 2000, "Cultural Diversity and Identity of Women and Men of Color" (2001) in *Anti-Racism*

7 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

8 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

9 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

10 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

11 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

12 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

13 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

14 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

Released from the fantasy of being the center, a European space that would be capable of self-reflexivity might develop a sense of accountability for imperialism, colonialism, and fascism. This in turn could put the making of multicultural spaces, where the relationship of "sameness" to "difference" would be renegotiated, at the center of the reframing of Europe. This would allow for the strategic relocation of cultures in an antiracist, situated European mode.

The risk, of course, is that this progressive aspect would be drowned in more reactionary trends at work within the European Union, leading instead to the recreation of a Fortress Europe that would be as problematic for those it locks in as for those it locks out. The two options make European identity one of today's most contested areas of political and social philosophy. (The reactive tendency toward a sovereign sense of the Union is also known as the Fortress Europe syndrome, which has been extensively criticized by feminists and antiracists such as Helma Lutz, Nira Yuval-Davis, Avtar Brah, Floya Anthias, and Philomena Essed.⁵)

"European identity" today is a contested zone where entitlement and access, exclusion and participation are crucial. "Europe" today means — also, but not only — a site of possible political resistance against the nationalism, xenophobia, and racism that accompany European unification.⁶

Is the reframing of Europe (yet again) a utopian project? It is, if by utopian we mean the impulse to create ethical and political solutions that may engender hope and empowerment change. As such, the reframing is not only useful but necessary.

THE POWERS OF REPETITION
If the point of repetition is to engender difference, it follows that conceptual creativity is accomplished always and already by doing it again. Repetition is not to be understood in any recognizable Hegelian dialectical mode but rather in a stubbornly nomadic mode of sequential renakes. Foucault argues that we are historically condemned to our historicity, which in his frame of referencements that postmodernity is condemned to critical theory, in the absence of a new conceptual or fundamental breakthrough. We are condemned to the patient task of revisiting and revisiting the archives of philosophical discourse, without the comfort of a primary philosophy.

Deleuze is definitely more optimistic. He believes that conceptual creativity can be engendered by releasing the nomadic potential of a philosophy that would invest in intensity and becoming, rather than in rationality and being.

The concept of repetition is crucial to both Foucault and Deleuze, but it functions in very different ways in their respective philosophies. What they share is the conviction that subjectivity needs to be reconceptualized according to different degrees, colors, intensities, and speeds of repetition, without the comforting option of dialectical release.

Social theorists like Appadurai have suggested that at this end of the millennium the spent dialectics of sameness and difference have regrouped in a joint hijacking of the twin Enlightenment ideals of the triumphantly universal and the resiliently particular.⁷ This calls for conceptual and political responses that move beyond the falsely universal, even monological discourse of classical binarism. New balances among dynamic forces are needed. New frames of becoming must engender positive differences through carefully framed repetitions. It is our task as critical thinkers to divide the diagrams that are adequate to the subjects we have already become or will have been.

15 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

16 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

17 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

18 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

19 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

20 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

21 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

22 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

23 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

24 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

25 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

26 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.

27 *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15. See also, *Journal of American Studies*, 36 (2002), 1-15.