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In mainstream public debates the posthuman is usually coated in anxiety about the excesses of technological intervention and the threat of climate change, or by elation about the potential for human enhancement. In academic culture, on the other hand, it is equally disturbing in its two main modes of appearance: first as post-humanism and second as post-anthropocentrism. The critique of anthropocentrism has even more shattering implications both for our understanding of subjectivity and for our social interaction than the transformative agenda of posthumanism. The post-anthropocentric turn, linked to the compounded impacts of globalisation and of technology-driven forms of mediation, strikes the human at his/her heart and shift the parameters that used to define anthropos. This shift goes beyond the by now familiar deconstructions of unitary visions of the Humanist subjects, which were introduced by the poststructuralist generation.

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Posthuman as Becoming-Machine

The issue of technology is central to the post-anthropocentric predicament. The relationship between the human and the technological other has shifted in the contemporary context, to reach unprecedented degrees of intimacy and intrusion. The post-human predicament is such as to force a displacement of the lines of demarcation between structural differences, or ontological categories, for instance between the organic and the inorganic, the born and the manufactured, flesh and metal, electronic circuits and organic nervous systems.

As in the case of human-animal relations' the move is beyond metaphorization. The metaphorical or analogue function that machinery fulfilled in modernity, as an anthropocentric device that imitated embodied human capacities is replaced today by a more complex political economy that connects bodies to machines more intimately, through simulation and mutual modification. As Andreas Huyssen (1986) has argued in his classical analysis of modernity, in the electronic era wires and circuitry exercise another kind of seduction than the pistons and grinding engines of industrial machinery. Electronic machines are, from this angle, quite immaterial: plastic boxes and metal wires that convey information. They do not 'represent' anything, but rather carry clear instructions and can reproduce clear information patterns. The main thrust of micro-electronic seduction is actually neural, in that it foregrounds the fusion of human consciousness with the general electronic network.

Contemporary information and communication technologies exteriorize and duplicate electronically the human nervous system. This has prompted a shift in our field of perception: the visual modes of representation have been replaced by sensorial-neuronal modes of simulation. The aesthetics of the algorithm is upon us. As Patricia Clough puts it, we have become 'biomediated' bodies (2008: 3).

We can therefore safely start from the assumption that the cyborgs are the dominant social and cultural formations that are active throughout the social fabric, with many economic and political implications. The classical vision of the Vitruvian Man — the 'measure of all things human' — has gone cybernetic. Let me qualify this statement by adding that all technologies can be said to have a strong bio-political effect upon the embodied subject they intersect with. Thus, cyborgs include not only the glamorous bodies of high-tech, jet-fighter pilots, athletes or film stars, but also the anonymous masses of the underpaid, digital proletariat who fuel the technology-driven global economy without ever accessing it themselves (Braidotti, 2006).

The fact that technological mediation is central to a new vision of posthuman subjectivity provides the grounding for new ethical claims. A posthuman notion of the enfleshed and extended, biomediated, relational self keeps the techno-hype in check by a sustainable ethics of transformations. This sober position pleads for resistance to both the fatal attraction of nostalgia and the fantasy of trans-humanist and other techno-utopias. It also juxtaposes the rhetoric of 'the desire to be wired', to a more radical sense of the materialism of 'proud to be flesh' (Sobchack, 2004). The emphasis on immanence allows us to respect the bond of mutual dependence between bodies and technological others, while avoiding the contempt for the flesh and the trans-humanist fantasy of escape from the finite materiality of the enfleshed self. The issue of death and mortality is raised almost by necessity by such emphasis on the self-organising 'vital' structure of today's subjects. The biopolitics of subjectivity also entails large doses of necro-political devastation. I regret that I can't pursue this further here.

I want to argue for a vitalist view of the technologically bio-mediated other. This machinic vitality is not so much about determinism, inbuilt purpose or finality, but rather about becoming and transformation. This introduces a process that Deleuze and Guattari call 'becoming-machine,'[2] inspired by the Surrealists' 'bachelor machines,' meaning a playful and pleasure prone relationship to technology that is not based on functionalism. For Deleuze this is linked to the project of releasing human embodiment from its indexation on socialized productivity and become 'bodies without organs,' that is to say without organized efficiency. This is no hippy-like insurrection of the senses, but rather a carefully thought-through programme that pursues two aims. Firstly, it attempts to rethink our bodies as part of a nature-culture continuum in their in-depth structures. Secondly, it adds a political dimension by setting the framework of recomposition of bodily materiality in directions diametrically opposed to the spurious efficiency and ruthless opportunism of advanced capitalism. Contemporary machines are no metaphors, but they are engines or devices that both capture and process forces and energies, facilitating interrelations, multiple connections and assemblages. They stand for radical relationality, and delight as well as productivity.

The process of 'becoming-machine' understood in this specific sense indicates and actualizes the relational powers of a subject that is no longer cast in a dualistic frame, but bears a privileged bond with multiple others and merges with one's technologically mediated planetary environment. The merger of the human with the technological results in a new transversal compound, a new kind of eco-sophical unity, not unlike the symbiotic relationship between the animal and its planetary habitat. This is not the holistic fusion that Hegel accused Spinoza of, but rather a web of radical transversal relations that generate new modes of subjectivity, held in check by an ethology of forces. They sustain a vitalist ethics of mutual trans-species interdependence. It is a generalized ecology, also known as eco-sophy, which aims at crossing transversally the multiple layers of the subject, from interiority to exteriority and everything in between (Braidotti, 2006).

This process is what I mean by 'post-anthropocentric posthumanism.' It involves a radical estrangement from notions like moral rationality, unitary identity, transcendent consciousness or innate and universal moral values. The focus is entirely on the normatively neutral relational structures of both subject formation and of possible ethical relations. The elaboration of new normative frameworks for the posthuman subject is the focus of collectively enacted, non-profit-oriented experimentations with intensity that is to say with what we are actually capable of becoming. They are a *praxis* (a grounded shared project), not a *doxa* (common sense belief). My own concept of nomadic subject (Braidotti, 1994; 2011a) embodies this approach, which combines non-unitary subjectivity with ethical accountability by foregrounding the ontological role played by relationality.

According to Felix Guattari, the posthuman predicament calls for a new virtual social ecology, which includes social, political, ethical and aesthetic dimensions, and transversal links between them. To clarify this vision, Guattari proposes three fundamental ecologies: that of the environment, of the social nexus, and of the psyche. More importantly, he emphasizes the need to create transversal lines through all three of them. This clarification is important and I would connect it to a theoretical reminder, namely that we need to practice de-familiarization as a crucial method in posthuman critical theory and learn to think differently.[3]

I t is crucial for instance to see the interconnections among the greenhouse effect, the status of women, racism and xenophobia and frantic consumerism. We must not stop at any fragmented portions of these realities, but rather trace transversal interconnections among them. The subject is ontologically polyvocal. It rests on a plane of consistency including both the real that is already actualized, 'territorialized existential territories', and the real that is still virtual, 'deterritorialized incorporeal universes' (Guattari, 1995: 26). Guattari calls for a collective reappropriation of the production of subjectivity, through 'chaosmic' de-segregation of the different categories. You may remember that 'Chaosmos' is the universe of reference for becoming in the sense of the unfolding of virtualities, or transformative values. A qualitative step forward is necessary if we want subjectivity to escape the regime of commodification that is the trait of our historical era, and experiment with virtual possibilities. We

need to become the sorts of subjects who actively desire to reinvent subjectivity as a set of mutant values and to draw our pleasure from that, not from the perpetuation of familiar regimes.

The work of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1972) is a great source of inspiration in redesigning this type of environmentally bound post-anthropocentric and non-Kantian ethics of codetermination between self and other. The notion of codependence replaces that of recognition, much as the ethics of sustainability replaces the moral philosophy of rights. This reiterates the importance of grounded, situated and very specific and hence accountable perspectives in a move that I call zoe-centred egalitarianism.

In his analysis of the 'collective existential mutations' (1995: 2) currently taking place, Felix Guattari refers to Varela's distinction between autopoietic (self-organizing) and allopoietic systems. Guattari moves beyond the distinction proposed by Varela by extending the principle of autopoiesis (which for Varela is reserved for the biological organisms) to cover also the machines or technological others. Another name for subjectivity, according to Guattari, is autopoietic subjectivation, or self-styling, and it accounts both for living organisms, humans as self-organizing systems, and also for inorganic matter, the machines.

Guattari's machinic autopoiesis establishes a qualitative link between organic matter and technological or machinic artefacts. This results in a radical redefinition of machines as both intelligent and generative. They have their own temporality and develop through 'generations': they contain their own virtuality and futurity. Consequently, they entertain their own forms of alterity not only towards humans, but also among themselves and aim to create meta-stability, which is the precondition of individuation (Parisi, 2004). The emphasis on self-organization and metastability frames the project of becoming-machine of the posthuman subject. It helps us rethink transversal technologically mediated subjectivity while avoiding scientific reductionism. In his critique of the rhetoric of bio-technological vitalism (1997) Ansell Pearson warns us against the pernicious fantasy of a renaturalized notion of evolution mediated by advanced bio-technological capitalism. I think that the point of the posthuman predicament is to rethink evolution in a non-deterministic but also a post-anthropocentric manner. In opposition to classical, linear teleological ideas of evolution (Chardin de Teillard, 1959), I want to emphasize instead the collective project of seeking for a more adequate understanding of the complexity of factors that structure the posthuman subject: the new proximity to animals, the planetary dimension and the high level of technological mediation. Machinic autopoesis means that the technological is a site of post-anthropocentric becoming, or the threshold to many possible worlds.

The key notion is the transversality of relations, for a postanthropocentric and posthumanist subject that traces transversal connections among material and symbolic, concrete and discursive lines of relation or forces. Transversality actualizes zoe-centred egalitarianism as an ethics and also as a method to account for forms of alternative, posthuman subjectivity. An ethics based on the primacy of the relation, of interdependence, values zoe in itself.

I also refer to these practices of becoming-machine

3. For an in-depth analysis of the method of de-familiarization see Braidotti, 'Complexity Against Methodological Nationalism' in *Nomadic Theory*, Columbia University Press, 2011b., pp. 209-238.

as 'radical neo-materialism' (Braidotti, 1991), or as 'matter-realism' (Fraser et al., 2006). These ideas are supported by and intersect with changing understandings of the conceptual structure of matter itself (De Landa, 2002; Bennett, 2010), under the impact of contemporary bio-genetics and information technologies.

In other words, to be posthuman does not mean to be inhuman, or de-humanized. It rather implies a new way of combining ethical values with the well-being of an enlarged sense of community, which includes one's territorial or environmental inter-connections. This is an ethical bond of an altogether different sort from the self-interests of an individual subject, as defined along the canonical lines of classical humanism, or from the moral universalism of the Kantians and their reliance on Human Rights for all species, virtual entities and cellular compositions (Nussbaum, 2006).

The Spinozist switch to a monistic political ontology stresses processes, vital politics and non-deterministic evolutionary theories. Politically, the emphasis falls accordingly on the micropolitics of relations, as a posthumanist ethics that traces transversal connections among material and symbolic, concrete and discursive, lines or forces. The focus is on the force and autonomy of affect and the logistics of its actualization (Massumi, 2002). Transversality actualizes an ethics based on the primacy of the relation, of interdependence, which values non-human or a-personal Life. This is what I call posthuman politics (Braidotti, 2006).

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