

in all of their complexity and encouraging dialogue across time and discipline. In this way, we can hope to harness these challenges toward deeper para-chronological understanding of the place of classical antiquity in modern history, but also of the modern lenses that filter our perception of classical antiquity.

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Vladimir Petrović, *The Emergence of Historical Forensic Expertise: Clio Takes the Stand*. New York: Routledge, 2017. Pp. 257. £110.00 (cloth).

The recent film *Denial* (2016), starring Rachel Weisz as professor on history Deborah Lipstadt, is based on the 2000 trial in which Lipstadt and her publisher were sued by Holocaust denier David Irving for libel. It was won by Lipstadt and demonstrates not only the controversial role of history in society but also the potential influence of historians on the course of justice, since the expert witnesses for the defense included historians Richard J. Evans and Christopher Browning. Vladimir Petrović's book *The Emergence of Historical Forensic Expertise: Clio Takes the Stand* therefore discusses an important, yet so far unexplored, side of (public) history. It is also a welcome contribution to the field of expertise studies, which has mostly focused on the role of scientists as experts.

Petrović, a historian who is currently a senior researcher at the Institute for Contemporary History in Belgrade, has chosen to discuss various types of court cases in which historians featured as expert witnesses. His modest aim is to shed "some light on the neglected history of historical expert witnessing" (1). Throughout the book, Petrović shows how the role of historians in the courtroom was contested, since the fields of history and law were for a long time regarded as incompatible: the law aiming at judgment and assessing the present, with the discipline of history aiming at interpretation and weighing the more distant past. The monograph traces the development of this role, demonstrating how the legal testimony of historians as experts has become increasingly accepted.

The book, the chapters of which follow mostly a chronological order, starts with the famous Dreyfus Affair and its accompanying military tribunal in 1894, in which the French officer of Jewish origin Captain Alfred Dreyfus was tried for treason and sentenced to life imprisonment (and rehabilitated in 1906). Historians performed the role of expert witnesses in this trial—and its later review—by testifying on the authenticity

of documents. This early involvement of historians would prove to be an exception in a period in which the historian's neutral position was of paramount importance. Historicism preached that historians should be objective rather than engaged or partisan.

Beginning in the mid-1950s, historians became regular experts in the courtroom, especially to interpret sources. During the Nuremberg trial in 1945, historians did not act as expert witnesses, yet Petrović regards this trial as a hallmark on the road in which history and law were increasingly seen as compatible. History itself seemed to be on trail, made possible by the availability of an abundance of historical documentation. In particular, the 1952 Remer trial in Braunschweig is seen by the author as a turning point in the involvement of historians as expert witnesses. SS Major General Otto Remer was accused of slandering the participants in the rebellion of July 20, 1944, whom he called traitors in 1951. Among the expert witnesses were theologians and a church historian, who testified on the moral and theological implications of the resistance according to Catholic and Lutheran creed. In addition, historian Hans Rothfels, who had become director of the newly founded Institute for Contemporary History in Munich, testified, next to other historians, on the history of this particular resistance movement. They acted more as witnesses for the prosecution than as experts of the court. Petrović underlines the impact of new institutions of contemporary history on the stature of historians as experts, in addition to more frequent publication of primary sources after the war, for example, parts of the captured German archives.

In the United States, historical forensic contribution became fully institutionalized in the 1960s. Historians testified in cases concerning the Indian Claims Commission and voting rights, and in other trials accounting for historical injustices based on racial prejudice. The NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) challenged discriminatory legislation, such as the issue of public schooling. Historians testified to the original intention of constitutional texts on equality and explained the context of slave emancipation and the period of Reconstruction. They convinced the judges that there was no conclusive interpretation of the original intent of the amendment regarding segregated public education. The Supreme Court voted in favor of the NAACP in 1954 but was much more influenced by the testimonies of social scientists, who elaborated on the effects of the segregated educational system upon the self-esteem of young African Americans, than by historians.

The author's choice to discuss the trials mostly chronologically turns out well because the reader experiences the tension and eagerly anticipates the outcome of the trials. This effect is particularly felt with the description of the 1961 Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, which featured one historian as expert witness: Salo Wittmayer Baron, professor of Jewish History at Columbia University and one of the founders of Jewish Studies in the United States. In court, Baron spoke about the continuity of anti-Semitic

sentiments in European culture and the destruction of European Jewry by the Nazis. His remained, however, a general historical account, without specifying the role of Eichmann and his responsibility. Several commentators therefore thought his statement was irrelevant to the question of Eichmann's guilt. Hannah Arendt complained that the prosecution and Ben Gurion used the trial as a public lesson to enhance Jewish national consciousness. The historical expertise was mostly dismissed in the judges' final judgment.

Just like for the Eichmann trial, in the 1963 Frankfurt Auschwitz trial, historical experts were hired by the prosecution, but the judges opined that their focus on historical backgrounds also could lead to digression and expressed reservations toward historical testimony at the trial in the final judgment. Yet, Petrović argues, historical forensic contribution came to be seen as indispensable in providing context. Historical expertise was increasingly valued because of increased global awareness of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

This monograph discusses influential and fascinating trials and is easy to read. The author pays sufficient attention to relevant developments in the historical profession and to the differences between inquisitorial and adversarial legal systems. However, the book also lacks analysis: over half of the text consists of lengthy quotations, and the research question could have been more focused; the book sometimes digresses from its topic of historians as expert witnesses to elaborate on the general role of history in courts of law and the public engagement of historians. It hardly pays any attention to methodology, and it contains numerous linguistic and typographical errors. Instead of highlighting "lessons to be drawn," the last section could have addressed how this research can affect other important debates in contemporary (public) history.

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