

## 2 Algiers burning


### The United Kingdom of the Netherlands and the post-Napoleonic European order of peace and security

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#### Introduction

In the late summer of 1816, half a dozen Dutch poets suddenly seem to have felt urged to pick up their pens and write in jubilation. One W.P. Turnbull de Mikker wrote that double prestige had been obtained for the nation as valiant compatriots had selflessly avenged not just their fatherland, but all of humanity. Other poets composed 'laurel wreaths' and 'hymns for lyre' to mark the occasion.<sup>1</sup> The cause behind this poetic outburst had been a devastating, ten-hour-long cannonade that left an estimated 2,000–8,000 dead or wounded.<sup>2</sup> On 27 August 1816, Dutch and British naval squadrons together attacked Algiers, thereby forcing Omar Agha, the ruling *dey* of the North African city state, to sign peace treaties and issue an official declaration on the abolition of 'Christian slavery'.<sup>3</sup> The poets that shortly afterwards sang the praises of the victory considered it such a prestigious feat because they thought the bombardment had been a victory for Europe as a whole. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands and Great Britain, through their concerted action, had confronted a common foe and abated a shared security concern. These contemporaries thus linked the bombardment of Algiers to a broader international politics of securing the continent in the wake of Napoleon's final defeat, of fostering general peace and tranquillity, of creating a new order in Europe. By participating in a cooperative attack with Great Britain, the Netherlands had situated itself at the forefront of this international project, contemporaries thought.

Much of this reading of events has been lost in the 200 years that have passed since 1816. The image that arises from the later historical literature is that the concerted attack was the result of coincidence, that it was the consequence of a chance encounter between two naval commanders who happened to be docked in Gibraltar at the same time.<sup>4</sup> The poetic exaltations of European interests and the bombardment's relation to continental peace may then merely seem the post-hoc window-dressings applied by a few high-strung individuals. Yet, even if these claims of European significance were nothing but mirages, it would still be worthwhile to figure out why contemporaries



*Figure 2.1 Bombardment of Algiers by the United Anglo-Dutch Naval Squadron (1816). Gerardus Laurentius Keultjes. (© Rijksmuseum Amsterdam)*

applied them. Through such inquiry, we can begin to understand how these historical actors tried to justify the violence displayed at Algiers in August 1816 – and get a sense of why they did not hesitate to associate this devastating event with peace and security. In this chapter, I approach the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers as a moment of international cooperation and present it as a feature of the post-Napoleonic continental order that was taking shape at the time. In answering the question how the Dutch navy got to be involved in the concerted action, I argue that this involvement was not the result of chance, but rather of diplomatic negotiations, naval considerations and public pressures.

A diverse and international cast of historical actors contributed to the interplaying dynamics that led up to the bombardment of 1816. Befitting the volume's intention of bringing transnational connections and non-official source material to the fore, this chapter envelopes a collection of actors that extends well beyond national statesmen and includes the merchants, sailors, captains' wives, pamphleteers and poets who were participants and stakeholders in the formation of foreign policy. The sources used here reflect this diversity and span from diplomatic correspondence and consular files to newspaper articles, parliamentary proceedings, activist pamphlets and travel accounts that were found in the Dutch and British state archives as well as online. I analyse these different texts to show, in subsequence, how various groups of actors initially perceived conflict with Algiers, endeavoured to

turn it into a shared international issue and, in the end, evaluated the Anglo-Dutch bombardment. A brief historiographical section precedes this analysis to show how new perspectives on the transnational connectedness and internationalist sensibilities of the early nineteenth century – as well as their imperialist workings – can help us to recast the history of Dutch international relations.

### **Blurring the balance of power: new outlooks on the nineteenth century**

Europe's post-Napoleonic international order may have been architected by the continent's Great Powers, but a multitude of smaller powers inhabited the construct. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands, which was founded and officially recognized by the other European governments in 1815, was one of those smaller continental powers. Its second-rank place in the international geopolitical hierarchies therefore seemed clear, especially to Great Power figures like Lord Castlereagh, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.<sup>5</sup> Statesmen of Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia (joined by those of France after 1818) haggled over territories, drew state boundaries, decided on interventions and distributed colonial possessions. Representatives of small powers were sometimes invited to have a say on particular matters, but only when Great Power statesmen saw the need to do so.<sup>6</sup> The corresponding notions of 'balance of power' delineated spheres of influence for each Great Power. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands was squarely situated in England's sphere of influence and the diplomatic elites of the new kingdom were therefore expected to follow the British lead in foreign politics.<sup>7</sup> The new kingdom fulfilled a central role in guaranteeing British strategic interests. The Duke of Wellington, a British victor and thus one of the main architects of the new continental order, saw the Netherlands as an important bulwark against future French aggression.<sup>8</sup> Geopolitically, the new kingdom had the function of a doorstep – and that, on the surface of things, seemed to be all it contributed to the larger international politics of the time.<sup>9</sup>

Recent publications, however, have clarified that the 'balance of power' was about much more than geopolitics alone. The idea of the 'balance of power', which was so central to the international politics of the age, did not only have to do with territorial settlements aimed at preventing the rise of a continental hegemon akin to France under Napoleon. The notion also related to conducting a 'balanced' international politics based on rationality, debate and mutual understanding.<sup>10</sup> The recent work of German historian Matthias Schulz has been pioneering in this regard. In his *Normen und Praxis*, Schulz opted to look at the nineteenth-century international system as a collection of shared norms and diplomatic practices. Such guiding principles were, to some degree, institutionalized through the codification of international law, the founding of international organizations, and,

especially, through the convening of international conferences and congresses. Through mediation, European diplomats sought peaceful solutions to continental issues in order to avoid the sort of great wars that had ravished the continent between 1793 and 1814. Schulz has directed attention to the largely overlooked dynamics of international cooperation in the nineteenth century by stressing the importance of norms and practices over geopolitical calculations and rivalries.<sup>11</sup>

Drawing from the work of Schulz, the Dutch historian Beatrice de Graaf has highlighted the centrality of ‘security’ as a concept that drove international cooperation and lay behind shared norms and practices. She argues that a European ‘security culture’ took shape following the defeat of Napoleonic France and the ensuing Congress of Vienna.<sup>12</sup> The notion of a security culture entails that the European powers, despite occasional rivalries and sometimes mounting tensions, worked together to solve issues and confront threats that might appear to endanger the continental order of peace and tranquillity. De Graaf posits that such visions were interwoven with conceptions of the ‘balance of power’, a term that thus entailed much more than geopolitical calculations alone and, in fact, was understood as the management of the various issues that might upset security.

This notion of a nineteenth-century European security culture ties in with recent pleas to reset the confines of diplomatic history and study wider networks of actors.<sup>13</sup> De Graaf understands security as a set of ideas and practices shaped by discussion and debate on conceptions of threats and interests.<sup>14</sup> What security meant and what constituted a threat was not solely or even primarily defined by Ministers, ambassadors or other official actors. Public opinion could play an important role in putting issues on the agenda as security threats. To avoid state-centrist readings of international security it is therefore imperative to include the outlooks of diverse groups of historical actors, including those individuals or collectives that were deemed to be threats.

How does the case of the 1816 Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers fit in this historiography? In this chapter, I treat the concerted attack as an instance of international cooperation that was reflective of larger continental security politics. But, in addition to drawing from the literature, this case study also contributes to it. In analysing how the bombardment came about, I argue that smaller powers such as the United Kingdom of the Netherlands could play a more active role in the international political order of the time than their geopolitical status might lead to believe. Moreover, the Anglo-Dutch bombardment displays the imperialist, colonizing side to the European order of peace and security. The episode indicates how peace on the continent also meant that warmongering could become feasible elsewhere – a connection that British historian Edward Ingram has hinted at before.<sup>15</sup> Imperialist and expansionist tendencies were redirected externally, legitimized with recourse to rhetoric of European security concerns. Encroachment and predation were presented as security measures and the

very practice of cooperation sometimes served to argue for the selflessness of such interventions.

The 1816 attack reflected these dynamics and points to their consequences. The violence of the Anglo-Dutch cooperation made the changing power relations between the European and North African states more apparent to populations and elites on both sides of the Mediterranean.<sup>16</sup> The sound victory that the two European powers obtained and the near total destruction of the Algerian fleet further eroded the international standing of the Regency of Algiers and its once so daunting corsairs. The bombardment of 1816 was therefore an important event in the longer historical process of the conquest and colonization of North Africa.<sup>17</sup> By reconsidering its aspects of international cooperation and pointing to the contribution of smaller European powers, I intend to shed light on generally overlooked Dutch complicity to European imperialism in the Mediterranean region. As will become clear, this involvement was not just beholden to the provision of naval fire-power, it also enveloped the circulation of the reductionist perceptions of threats that were intended to legitimize the use of force.<sup>18</sup>

### **Fear and commerce: The conflict between the United Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Regency of Algiers**

Early in 1814, before Napoleon had even been exiled to Elba, the merchants of Amsterdam dared to be cautiously optimistic again for the first time in years. The Continental System, which severely impacted Amsterdam's position as a node of international trade, had come to an end when French occupying troops retreated.<sup>19</sup> One pamphleteer quickly exalted the occasion: 'The sea is free! Trade revived!' Accordingly, the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce declared that Dutch trade in the Mediterranean ought to recommence as quickly as possible.<sup>20</sup> Under this veneer of optimism, however, there were deeper anxieties about the possible dangers of navigating the Mediterranean Sea again.

In February 1814, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Anne Willem van Nagell received a letter from the merchants of Amsterdam. The directorate of the Board of Levantine Trade requested information about the current status of the Dutch diplomatic relations with North Africa's 'Barbary Regencies': Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. 'The security of shipping', the Minister replied, 'dictates that our relationships with the Barbary Regencies be renewed'.<sup>21</sup> The three regencies largely conducted their own independent foreign policies even though they were nominally subsidiaries of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>22</sup> Diplomatic relations had existed off and on since the middle of the seventeenth century when Vice-Admiral Lambert Hendricksz hanged several Algerian captives from the topmast of his ship to enforce the conclusion of a treaty between Algiers and the United Provinces.<sup>23</sup>

In 1814 it was of the utmost importance to Dutch sailors and merchants that there were clear treaty relations between the United Kingdom of the

Netherlands and the North African regencies. If these relations were unclear, it might mean that the Dutch government would be at war, and ships flying the flag of the Netherlands would become legitimate wartime prizes. The revenues from privateering were among the prime sources of income for the regencies, next to agricultural produce, the export of grains and cattle, and, in the case of Tripoli, the trans-Saharan transit trade.<sup>24</sup> A state of war with one or more European powers could augment the incomes of the Barbary regencies.<sup>25</sup> Belligerency provided the opportunity for their privateering (or 'corsair') fleets to take enemy ships, confiscate cargoes and hold crews or passengers for ransom. The smaller European powers such as Denmark, Sweden, the Italian states and the Hanseatic cities particularly suffered from this corsairing, as they did not possess enough warships to overpower the corsair fleets. Disgruntled Europeans and the jurists working for them at times declared that the Barbary corsairs were pirates, but technically they were not.<sup>26</sup> The regencies acted under the rights of war and therefore peace treaties were the most common way to avoid being a legitimate target for the corsairs. The different North African rulers demanded yearly tributes and consular presents in return for peaceful relations.<sup>27</sup>

The United Provinces had maintained a tributary status to ensure peace with the Barbary states for most of the early modern period.<sup>28</sup> The revolutionary wars, the French occupation, and the total standstill of Dutch Mediterranean trade put a stop to the tributes and thus upended the basis of peace. Dutch consuls left their posts in the North African port cities after the Netherlands became part of the French Empire. In 1814 much was therefore uncertain about the status of the relations between the United Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Barbary regencies. When new diplomatic missions were sent to North Africa it quickly became clear that some rulers would not follow the official reasoning that a new Dutch state had come into being, warranting the conclusion of new treaties.<sup>29</sup> The Regents pointed instead to the older treaty obligations of the United Provinces. Hammuda Pasha, the *bey* of Tunis, swiftly re-instated peace, but his counterparts in Tripoli and Algiers claimed that, new monarchy or not, the Netherlands was seriously behind on its tributes. Yusuf Karamanli of Tripoli and *dey* Hadj Ali of Algiers argued that they had not received payments for over six years. Peace could only be restored if these arrears were compensated first. Karamanli almost immediately accepted a lower counter-offer, but Ali Hodja remained firm and stuck to his demand that the deficit had to be paid in full.<sup>30</sup> The tribute was suspended from 1809 onwards and Algiers had received about 50,000 guilders per year so the total sum at stake was some 250,000 guilders. The Dutch government was unwilling to pay this amount, which brought about a status of war between the Netherlands and Algiers.<sup>31</sup>

The consequences of this diplomatic deadlock quickly became clear. On Friday 24 June 1814, when he was struggling to navigate around the tip of Cape St Vincent in thick fog, Captain Gerrit Metzou from Vlaardinggen heard

cannon shots in the obscured distance. That eerie roar in the mist proved foreboding. A day later, his herring boat *The Two Brothers* was taken by corsairs from Algiers. The shots that Gerrit had heard earlier had been fired during the taking of another Dutch ship, *The Vigilante*. In the account he would later publish, Metzton describes how the ships (together with two Danish vessels and a Swedish one) were taken to the harbour of Algiers, where their cargoes of salt and cork were declared legitimate prizes and sold. The captured crewmembers and passengers were brought to prison and put to work in the dockyards.<sup>32</sup>

The Amsterdam Board of Levantine Trade urged Van Nagell to find a solution before more ships and crews would follow, but the Dutch government stuck to its resolve not to meet the *dey's* demands.<sup>33</sup> The Minister of Foreign Affairs hoped that the upcoming peace talks at the Congress of Vienna would somehow bring about a less costly solution to the conflict.<sup>34</sup> These hopes proved unfounded since Barbary corsairing was not part of the official deliberations at Vienna, which, according to American historian Brian Vick, particularly had to do with Metternich's unwillingness to put the subject on the agenda because he did not want to offend the Ottoman authorities.<sup>35</sup>

Still, the fact that the European powers were at peace with one another from 1815 onwards did alter contemporary attitudes on the nature of relations with the Barbary regencies. The peace that was consecrated at Vienna allowed European officials and citizens to see Barbary corsairing as a shared problem. The Netherlands, at this point, was not the only power in conflict with one of the Barbary regencies. Other smaller powers such as Denmark, Sweden, Spain, Portugal and the Italian Kingdoms of Sardinia and Sicily were also at war with Algiers, Tunis or Tripoli.<sup>36</sup> In earlier times, the North African regents had happily made use of mutual conflicts to play the European states against one another.<sup>37</sup> Governments and monarchs often greedily participated in these struggles in order to seek advantages over military and commercial rivals.<sup>38</sup> The start of a general European peace changed these circumstances and to contemporaries it suddenly seemed that taking a united stance could be a viable option. The Dutch ambassador in London, Hendrik Fagel, put forward this argument, urging the British government to work together with the other powers to find a remedy to Barbary corsairing.<sup>39</sup>

Great Britain was the sought-after partner for the Dutch government. Internal memos posited that assistance from the powerful British navy was crucial if the Netherlands was to attack Algiers.<sup>40</sup> Ambassador Fagel repeatedly mentioned the conflict with Algiers to British statesmen, arguing that the 'depredations' on Dutch shipping were a threat to unhampered trade. He framed the matter as a transnational problem and warned that the 'security of commerce' of all 'commercial peoples' was at serious risk.<sup>41</sup> However, paying the tribute that would have suspended this acute threat, as had been such common practice before, suddenly appeared out of the question. This

‘demeaning tribute’, Fagel claimed, would buy the Netherlands nothing but a precarious and uncertain safety at best.<sup>42</sup>

The other prime group of Dutch stakeholders in this affair adopted a very different outlook. The Board of Directors for Levantine Trade argued that there was little to be done besides giving in to Algerian demands. Balthasar Ortt, one of the Board’s directors, wrote a letter to Van Nagell to state that paying Algiers would be the most effective way to protect Dutch shipping, no matter how degrading or costly it would be. ‘Every state has its weak side’, Ortt wrote. The Dutch weak side was that it could only thrive during peace, dependent as the country was on revenues from commerce. The sole option, therefore, was to pay and if this meant spending over 200,000 guilders on tributes, Ortt concluded, then ‘so be it’.<sup>43</sup>

Within the Netherlands there were thus very different conceptions of how shipping ought to be protected against corsairing. Governmental officials linked the security of commerce to honour and international prestige: paying for safety was considered to be humiliating and anachronistic. For merchant stakeholders, however, this notion of ‘honour’ carried little meaning. In their opinion, the targeting of Dutch shipping simply had to stop, and paying tributes would be the quickest way to do so. Convoying provided a sort of middle ground between both positions.<sup>44</sup> A royal decree of 8 August 1814 ordained that no vessel flying the Dutch flag was allowed to sail south of the Gulf of Biscay without naval protection.<sup>45</sup> However, the convoy squadron got into heavy weather on the North Sea and was battered into the harbours of southwest England – where most of the crewmembers jumped ship.<sup>46</sup>

At the same time, the appeals for British assistance and mediation did not bring any results. Reactions from British officials were largely elusive and non-committal. Lord Castlereagh, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, only promised the Dutch government that he would instruct the British consul in Algiers to help.<sup>47</sup> The consul himself, however, did not really see of what service he could be as there was no diplomatic solution in sight and he lacked the financial means to liberate Dutch captives.<sup>48</sup> The British government, moreover, was not in conflict with Algiers or any other Barbary regency. Castlereagh thus perceived the Barbary regents as allies rather than a potential threat, especially as the North African ports had proven crucial in supplying British troops on Malta and the Iberian Peninsula in the wars against France.<sup>49</sup>

Because British replies carried little practical value the Dutch government eventually decided to go at Algiers alone. Another squadron was sent out to the Mediterranean and it arrived off Algiers on 25 July 1815. The commanding Vice-Admiral Jan van Hoogenhouck Tulleken had intended to make some captures on the way to press his government’s demands, but he found out that all corsair ships were safely at port. The Dutch fleet was not powerful enough to launch a bombardment and when Tulleken tried to impose a blockade instead, a solitary cruiser still slipped through. When the



Dutch fleet sailed off again five days later, Gerrit Metzou recounted how he and his captive compatriots were ridiculed by ‘fellow slaves as well as the Turks’.<sup>50</sup> From The Hague, Van Nagell noted that ‘the outlook for national shipping remains worrying as ever’ and Tulleken was sacked as the commander of the Mediterranean squadron. His political superiors concluded that the Vice-Admiral had seriously damaged the honour and international reputation of the Dutch Navy.<sup>51</sup>

The failure of this Dutch unilateral attempt was thought to be all the more embarrassing when an American expedition at about the same time yielded different results. Just one month before Tulleken sailed to Algiers, an American commander had threatened to bombard the city and managed to conclude a peace that did not involve tributes.<sup>52</sup> A British pamphleteer upheld the expedition as proof that ‘half a dozen ships of war’ could reduce the Barbary regencies ‘into complete humiliation’.<sup>53</sup> In comparison, the Dutch navy had provided a rather poor showing. In fact, the Dutch government had sought to cooperate with the Americans, but failed. King William I ordered the Mediterranean squadron to join the American fleet at Algiers, but the instructions were sent out too late.<sup>54</sup>

### **Abolitionism as security-policy: framing an international issue**

The initial attempts of Dutch official actors to internationalize their conflict with Algiers and make it an issue of European significance did not bring many results. The British statesmen from whom Van Nagell and Fagel sought help hardly shared the idea that the Dutch war with Algiers reflected a broader threat to the security of Mediterranean commerce. Great Britain was at peace with Algiers, Castlereagh ceaselessly reminded his Dutch contacts. Therefore he saw little need to act on the small power’s pleas for help. Yet over the course of 1815 the stance of the British government changed. By the beginning of 1816, Castlereagh was drafting instructions for a Royal Navy mission to North Africa. The change was inspired by continued smaller power efforts to internationalize Barbary corsairing as well as mounting public critiques that increasingly linked the Barbary regencies to other British foreign policy goals.

In the face of British non-decision and a failed unilateral action, Dutch governmental actors began to work with other European allies. At Spanish behest, they became involved in negotiations on a bilateral ‘defensive pact’ against the Barbary states.<sup>55</sup> The plans quickly became more ambitious and the idea emerged to expand this bilateral pact into a multinational European ‘league’. Together, the two powers decided that the Dutch government would invite the courts of Copenhagen, Stockholm and St Petersburg to join, while the Spanish authorities would ask Naples, Turin and Lisbon to accede. The reactions were lukewarm at best. Hugo van Zuylen van Nijvelt, the Dutch envoy in Madrid, claimed that British obstruction, or even ‘jealousy’, had caused these half-hearted replies.<sup>56</sup>

The members of the British Cabinet indeed were not taken in by the prospect of a multinational league that Great Britain could, at best, only partially control. The treaty obligations of mutual guarantees and concerted naval patrols were perhaps too infringing on the predominance of the British navy in the Mediterranean. Abolitionist policies and the diplomatic campaign to make Spain end its trans-Atlantic slave trade were also at play.<sup>57</sup> Castlereagh was pushed to promote the abolition of the slave trade internationally by a very vocal public at home. A complete and immediate ban on the trans-Atlantic slave trade had been one of the British goals for the Congress of Vienna.<sup>58</sup> However, the Spanish and Portuguese delegates there would not subscribe to this agenda. They suspected that, for Britain, abolition was really about gaining some competitive, commercial advantage and referred to the captured Christians in North Africa to prove their point.<sup>59</sup> Critical pamphleteers and petitioners also ensured that the ‘enslaved’ captives in Algiers were put forward to indicate the assumed partiality of British abolitionist policies.<sup>60</sup> The Barbary Regencies thus became a bargaining chip in European negotiations on the slave trade.<sup>61</sup> The Spanish–Dutch defensive pact could negatively influence the British bargaining position: if Spain and Portugal would arrange their own protection against the corsairs, then the British government would have one less means to persuade them of immediate abolition.

The rising prominence of the so-called ‘White Slave Trade’ in public opinion across the continent was effectuated by activist networks such as the ‘Knights Liberators of the Slaves in Africa’. This order was founded by the retired Royal Navy Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith and counted ‘knights’ from all over Europe amongst its members.<sup>62</sup> Smith organized a well-attended fundraising picnic during the Congress of Vienna.<sup>63</sup> He also sent a bewildering number of letters and pamphlets to courts and high-ranking officials far and wide – including a package to Van Nagell, which arrived in The Hague in March 1816.<sup>64</sup> Smith expressed his hopes to the Minister that the Dutch government would stick to the ‘honourable principle’ of not paying tributes for ‘hollow truces’ with Algiers.<sup>65</sup> Among the assorted writings that Smith sent along was a pamphlet by another Royal Navy officer, Walter Croker, who detailed the hardships of Christian captives held in Algiers.<sup>66</sup>

Over the course of two years of war with Algiers, twenty-eight Dutch subjects had been captured. Most of them were subjected to the same hardships of menial labour and poor living conditions that Smith and Croker wrote about. Mrs Riedijk, the wife of one imprisoned captain, maintained a steady correspondence with the Minister. Her husband, Arij Riedijk, had been sailing the cot *De Vrije Zee* when corsairs captured his ship on the waters near Lisbon in May 1815. Together with his son and grandson, who were also on board, the 64-year-old Arij was taken to Algiers. His spouse wrote to Van Nagell to ask for information and lament her husband, son and grandson, who, she claimed, were devoid ‘of religion’ under ‘these barbarians’ and had to fight ‘like dogs’ for a few odd scraps of bread.<sup>67</sup>

The plight of European captives, linked as it could be to abolitionist policy and transnational public opinion, provided the frame that could reconceptualize Barbary corsairing as an issue of continental significance, warranting Great Power action. Van Nagell began referring to the captives in his writings to Castlereagh in early January 1816. He praised British abolitionist efforts and inquired whether the Foreign Secretary might be willing to contribute to a project eradicating ‘Christian slavery’. Van Nagell presented this project by sending the draft articles of the ‘defensive pact’ with Spain as attachments to London.<sup>68</sup> The Dutch minister thereby linked smaller power initiative against the Barbary corsairs to popular critiques on the supposedly limited idealism of British abolitionist policy. The efforts of British activists like Smith and Croker were thereby transferred back to the British government through diplomatic channels.<sup>69</sup>

The mounting critiques on British abolitionist policy and the advancing Spanish–Dutch initiative to develop a multinational league seem to have carried effect. By 29 January, Castlereagh was drafting instructions for a diplomatic mission to the Barbary regencies. The small power plans for a general league outside direct British control perhaps created a new sense of urgency in London. The direct influence is hard to gauge in the absence of a direct reference by the British Cabinet, but the draft articles sent along by Van Nagell were included in the files that contained Castlereagh’s instructions and their attachments.<sup>70</sup> The instructions ordered Admiral Lord Exmouth to obtain declarations from each of the Barbary regents that ‘Christian slavery’ would be abolished. ‘Your Lordship’, the orders read:

is aware of the very general spirit of indignation that exists throughout Europe at the unrestrained system of piracy and violence, carried on under the pretext of war by the Barbary Powers ... and there is no feature of this system so revolting to the general feeling as the mode in which their captives are thrown into, and retained in slavery.<sup>71</sup>

When Fagel found out about the instructions he reported to The Hague that Castlereagh no longer seemed ‘entirely deaf’ to ‘the general cry of outrage that these pirates, with their robberies, have provoked all over Europe’.<sup>72</sup>

### Cooperation at work

Between March and May 1816 Exmouth sailed up and down the North African coast, calling at the ports of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli with an intimidatingly large fleet of eighteen warships under his command.<sup>73</sup> He managed to obtain the declarations from *bey* Mahmud of Tunis and Yusuf Karamanli of Tripoli. In Tunis and Tripoli captured Europeans were, from then on, to be treated as prisoners of war.<sup>74</sup> Exmouth had first visited Algiers before going to Tunis and Tripoli, but he had only managed to liberate Sicilian captives in exchange for ransom.<sup>75</sup> The admiral thus decided to return to

Algiers after his successes with the other regents. According to the French consul, the *dey* of Algiers was astonished by Exmouth's return and the new demands for total abolition that he presented so menacingly.<sup>76</sup> A heated debate ensued that nearly ended in outright hostilities. *Dey* Omar Agha only agreed to take the matter into consideration and deliberate further with the Grande Porte in Constantinople.<sup>77</sup> The British demands had put him in a difficult position. These were times of great internal unrest in the regency. Several revolts by the Janissary troops on which the *dey*'s authority depended had taken place in the preceding years.<sup>78</sup> These elite troops received significant shares from the ransoms paid for captives. Buying time by consulting with Constantinople thus seemed a better option to ensure political stability than accepting Exmouth's demands and thereby risking an outright revolt.<sup>79</sup>

When Exmouth returned to England it quickly became apparent that his mission had hardly abated the popular and foreign critiques directed at the British government. The British mission was criticized for being to the benefit of only to the subjects of imperial domains, while the expedition had been presented beforehand as an endeavour of European scope.<sup>80</sup> Henry Brougham, an opposition MP in the House of Commons, demanded that the documents relating to Exmouth's negotiations were made public.<sup>81</sup> He argued that the treaties Exmouth concluded on behalf of Hanover, the Ionian Islands, Sardinia and Sicily would only lead the Regencies to redirect their corsair activities to target other, unprotected powers. As a consequence, the British government would therefore tacitly sanction continued robberies. 'In what other light can the affair be viewed by the rest of Europe?', he wondered.<sup>82</sup> And indeed, journals on the continent lamented that this 'forbearance' was what had come of 'the hopes that Europe had vested in the Congress'.<sup>83</sup>

The British mission seemed to have resulted in too little now that Barbary corsairing and the 'slavery' of Christians had successfully been framed as a European security issue. Critiques on British foreign policy grew even louder when news reached the European mainland of a tragedy in Bona, a coastal town some 600 kilometres east of Algiers. On 23 May 1816 the local community of Sardinian coral fishers had gathered on the beach to celebrate Ascension Day. A few days earlier, when Exmouth was negotiating with Omar Agha and their talks turned hostile, the latter ordered the arrest of all British subjects in his domains. The messengers carrying the orders had already galloped far out of Algiers by the time the heated debate had tempered and mutual apologies were exchanged. Though he wanted them revoked, the *dey*'s commands reached Bona on the day of the fisherman's festival. Being taken for British allies, the celebrating party was attacked and an estimated 200 people were killed or wounded.<sup>84</sup> The 'Bona massacre' became a prime news event in the summer of 1816.<sup>85</sup> Debates in the House of Commons were covered internationally in the general expectation that the government could not but retaliate the attack.<sup>86</sup> The Dutch newspaper *Overijsselsche Courant*, for example, pushed the argument that if only

Britain possessed the will to do something it could easily humiliate the Barbary States and render them powerless.<sup>87</sup>

Up to that point, Castlereagh had fended off critiques by stating that violent action against Algiers would be a breach of treaty.<sup>88</sup> Castlereagh also argued that the other powers of Europe had little reason to complain and condemn 'piracy' on the Mediterranean until they were prepared 'to purge themselves of the taint of the Slave Trade'.<sup>89</sup> However, the Secretary's stance changed profoundly after the 'Bona massacre' and its coverage in the media. Castlereagh instrumentalized the event to reframe the use of force as an act of retaliation, rather than a suspension of the peace between Great Britain and Algiers. Omar Agha had actually told the British consul that he regretted the tragedy at Bona, but this was largely unknown to the public in Europe.<sup>90</sup> Instead, the charged newspaper articles posited the murder of the coral fishers as a confirmation of the much older stereotypical notion that the 'overlords of Algiers' were tyrants ruling their domains in despotic and cruel fashion.<sup>91</sup>

Castlereagh drafted a new set of instructions to Exmouth, this time with orders to cooperate with the Netherlands. The instructions mentioned the 'outrages which had recently been committed' as the main incentive for another expedition. Exmouth was ordered to declare war on Algiers and only accept peace when the *dey* would sign a declaration renouncing 'Christian slavery' forever. Furthermore, those remaining 'Victims of a system repugnant to the Laws of all Civilized Nations' were to be released from Algiers immediately and without ransom, while earlier ransoms had to be returned.<sup>92</sup> The admiral was ordered to do all this in cooperation with the commander of the Dutch Mediterranean squadron, 'the Prince Regent being desirous that no opportunity should be lost of reviving in the two countries those ancient habits of naval & military cooperation, by which the liberties of Europe have heretofore been so happily upheld'.<sup>93</sup> Peace between the Netherlands and Algiers was to be concluded on the exact same terms as those of Great Britain.<sup>94</sup> After two years of incessant effort, the Dutch government now had the assistance it had endeavoured for, in large part as a result of popular agitation.

After Tulleken's mission it had become a common thought in Dutch navy circles that support from other maritime powers would be necessary for a successful attack against Algiers. The Secretary for the Navy had warned that the Netherlands lacked the means to violently force a long-term peace on Algiers. Bomb vessels with heavy mortars would be needed to launch a successful and 'safe' attack, but such ships the navy did not possess.<sup>95</sup> A more formidable naval partner would therefore be needed to assist the Dutch squadron.

While Exmouth prepared to set sail for the Mediterranean again, his Dutch colleague was already in the Bay of Gibraltar. Vice-Admiral Van Capellen had been the commander of the Dutch Mediterranean squadron since the beginning of the year, when his predecessor was fired. Van Capellen

received the news of Exmouth's deployment with much enthusiasm. He immediately wrote to the Dutch envoy in Madrid to ask whether he had already received equivalent orders from The Hague.<sup>96</sup> Generally considered a staunch supporter of the House of Orange, Van Capellen spent most of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Great Britain after he surrendered to a British–Russian fleet in 1799.<sup>97</sup> Exmouth's wartime record contrasts more starkly with the 'ancient habits' mentioned in his instructions. In 1806 he commanded an attack on the Batavia roadstead, sinking 26 Dutch merchant vessels and dealing a decisive blow to Dutch control over the Southeast Asian colonies.<sup>98</sup>

When the British fleet came sailing into Gibraltar Bay on 10 August, Van Capellen still had not received his instructions – but he eagerly offered his assistance to Exmouth nonetheless. So eagerly, in fact, that Exmouth wrote in his logs: 'I have also found here, or rather waylaying me, the Dutch Vice Admiral Van Capellan [*sic*] with six Frigates, most anxious to join us in this chosen work'.<sup>99</sup> Rumours about this cooperation had already made their way to Algiers long before Exmouth and Van Capellen even met. In June, the *dey* wrote to Constantinople about stories of 'an allied fleet of the Christian nations' that would be on its way with 'evil intentions'.<sup>100</sup>

These intentions would quickly become clear when the Anglo-Dutch fleet reached Algiers on 27 August. Exmouth first posed his government's demands, giving the *dey* of Algiers an unusually and unrealistically short time to reply before the bombardment commenced. The six ships under Van Capellen's command took position to protect the British force against cannonades from the fortifications on Algiers' south side.<sup>101</sup> In his battle report, Exmouth later wrote in praise about his Dutch aides: 'In no instance have I ever seen more energy and zeal; from the youngest Midshipman to the highest rank, all seemed animated by one soul'.<sup>102</sup> The bombardment ended around midnight, after almost ten hours of firing and explosions. Daybreak the next morning made it all too clear how badly the coastal fortifications and the fleet of Algiers had suffered.<sup>103</sup> Overlooking the ruins, Omar Agha and his most high-ranking officials saw little alternative but to accede to the Anglo-Dutch demands.

The *dey* of Algiers was made to declare in writing that 'the practice of condemning Christian Prisoners of War to Slavery is hereby formally and for ever renounced'. In the event of future wars, European captives were to be treated as prisoners of war. In accord with 'European practice in like cases', prisoners would be liberated without ransom after the cessation of hostilities.<sup>104</sup> All remaining Christian captives were freed immediately and the earlier ransom that had been paid for the Sardinians and Sicilians was restored.

The treaty that Vice-Admiral van Capellen concluded with the Regency of Algiers on behalf of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands contained just two articles. The first stipulated that peace was restored on the basis of earlier treaties, dating back to 1757.<sup>105</sup> The second article merely noted that

the Dutch consul was, after a wait of more than a year, allowed to move to Algiers and take up residence in the city.<sup>106</sup> The treaty did not terminate the yearly tribute of the Netherlands to Algiers. Such ‘insufferable’ tributes had been one of the main Dutch incentives for the attack on Algiers, but the peace treaty only mentioned that the arrears dating back to 1809 no longer had to be compensated.<sup>107</sup>

The lack of more far-reaching stipulations is striking as the treaty in no way resembled the American agreement with Algiers that had been such a source of envy. The differences may indicate that the conflict over tributes reflected broader, seemingly more ephemeral questions. The tributes in themselves do not seem to have been the issue after all; it was rather their sheer volume and especially the manner in which conflict over them would be settled. Notions of prestige and honour permeated the formation and execution of Dutch foreign policy from the earliest debates in 1814, when government officials and merchants were pitted against each other on the question whether to pay Algiers or not. Such considerations were also at play in the dismay over the failed expedition of 1815. They underlay the rhetoric of Christian captivity as an outrage to humanity and provided the frame of reference in which the treaty with Algiers was situated. The authorities of the newly founded United Kingdom of the Netherlands, Dutch historian Susan Legêne has argued, thought that they needed to pursue assertive policies on the world’s stage to manifest their position internationally and kindle popular patriotic sentiments within Dutch society.<sup>108</sup> International prestige was bolstered when Dutch state actors adopted popular discourses and thereby managed to turn a national conflict with Algiers into a broader continental issue, relating the matter to European projects of peace and security.

### **The imaginary of 1816**

The idea, and legitimizing discourse, of promoting international interests and the pursuit of European security was present throughout the planning and conduct of the 1816 bombardment of Algiers. It was utilized in the initial Dutch diplomatic attempts to obtain British assistance, in Castlereagh’s two sets of instructions to Exmouth and in the treaty that Omar Agha was eventually made to sign by force. Notions of national prestige were not at odds or incompatible with these claims to European significance. These were two sides to the concerted action that actually reinforced each other. Bombarding Algiers was thought to bolster the international standing of the Netherlands at least in part because contemporaries thought that this act could be linked to European peace and security. On the basis of official correspondence alone one might lose sight of these varied state and non-state rationalizations, while my aim here is actually to grasp the ways in which contemporaries, also those outside governmental circles, understood Dutch foreign policy and the 1816 bombardment. Contemporary perceptions and

the memorialization of the Anglo-Dutch attack can help to clarify how non-state actors made sense of this episode.

References to 'a general outrage' and the defending of 'Europe's liberties' were not just the pretence of statesmen; this is reflected in the celebrations and reactions of gratitude that the bombardment provoked all over Europe. A large religious ceremony of gratefulness was held in Rome on 19 September 1816 in order to celebrate 'Exmouth's success'.<sup>109</sup> The city of Marseilles presented the British Admiral with a metre-high, laureled silver decorative craftwork.<sup>110</sup> The Emperor of Morocco also wrote to Exmouth with congratulations and assured him that the authorities of Algiers 'do not consider that God is their director, as otherwise they would not have deviated from his orders and brought upon them this calamity'.<sup>111</sup> In contrast, the Dutch chargé d'affaires reported that the Ottoman authorities in Constantinople maintained a 'deadly quiet' on the subject.<sup>112</sup>

The Dutch contribution to the attack and Van Capellen's commanding efforts were extensively commemorated in the Netherlands. The bombardment was the subject of poems, plays, panoramas and paintings.<sup>113</sup> The half a dozen high-strung rhymes that appeared in Dutch memorialized from what dire circumstances of foreign occupation and corsairing losses the United Kingdom of the Netherlands had emerged. Many of the poems began with descriptions of 'The stain of many frightful years' and 'The plight that had tormented the Seas'.<sup>114</sup> The common narrative of redemption that characterized this poetry often ended with praises such as 'The shame was avenged / By which was Europe was defiled'.<sup>115</sup> Thanks to Dutch effort, Mediterranean shipping would be tranquil again in the future: 'Now the merchant lives at ease / While no robber man appears / Navigation is at peace / And our endeavours will bring riches'.<sup>116</sup> The plight of Dutch seamen was thus extended to all that traversed the seas, linking the shame over Dutch victimhood to the humiliation of Europe as a whole. Accordingly, lyricists further emphasized the international, 'European' significance of the bombardment. Exmouth and Van Capellen had acted to rid the continent of a shared threat: 'The ruffians of Africa's beaches'.<sup>117</sup>

Yet the same poets would also refer to national greatness and patriotic pride. J.L. Nierstrasz Jr., for example, took recourse to the national past and imagined how Van Capellen was visited by the spectre of Admiral Michiel de Ruyter, that naval hero so exemplary of bygone maritime glory.<sup>118</sup> The Dutch public, according to these poets, could take pride in national bravery and the return of Dutch heroism after the many years of French rule and the humiliations of failed efforts to counter Algiers. The commemorative poetry thereby matched and perhaps even reinforced the reconciliatory nationalism that was intended to solidify new monarchic rule after 1813.<sup>119</sup>

The bombardment was also conceived as a sign of approval from the highest authorities. The popular author Petronella Moens wrote a prose piece in humanist vein in which she called the victory a sign of God approving



the international abolition of the slave trade. Furthering the popular linkage of 'black' and 'white slavery' and adopting an assertive notion of righteous intervention, Moens argued that as Christianity was ridding itself of the 'horror' of slavery, it was entitled to break slave chains wherever they could be found.<sup>120</sup> Patriotism, internationalism and imperialism thus coalesced in the popular Dutch perceptions of the bombardment of Algiers.

## Conclusion

The writings of Petronella Moens and the other commemorative poets display an understanding of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands as a vigorous actor on the international stage, willing to work for the sake of European interests under the banner of moral and divine righteousness. Contemporaries thus envisioned a much more active and assertive role for the Netherlands within European politics than that of a stale, entrenched bulwark that would passively ensure geopolitical stability. In this chapter I have sought to show that representatives of smaller powers such as the Netherlands and Spain participated in broader continental politics and, at times, were to a significant extent able to set international agendas. The management of European peace and security was not exclusively a Great Power affair. Nor were the destructive external consequences of these projects entirely of Great Power making.

The internationalist and popular aspects of the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers may be overlooked when we solely focus our inquiries on Great Powers and their officials' geopolitical calculations. Conversely, I have argued here that the making and conduct of Dutch foreign policy in this period cannot be understood without paying attention to the European stage on which these policies were enacted. If smaller power diplomacies, transnational activism and contemporary internationalist thinking are left out of sight, then the Anglo-Dutch cooperation of 1816 may indeed seem to have been a mere coincidence. Yet the efforts of British abolitionist activists, the writings in contemporary newspapers, and the continued efforts of Dutch diplomats, indicate that naval cooperation was the result of prolonged processes of negotiation.

Initially, British statesmen did not share in the idea that Barbary corsairing was a threat of European significance. The conflict that had arisen between Algiers and the Netherlands seemed a national issue more than the universal threat to the security of all 'commercial peoples' that ambassador Fagel had tried to make of it.<sup>121</sup> Disagreements over the perceived threat of corsairing and the interests deemed to be at stake at first stood in the way of concerted action. Changes came about as a consequence of abolitionist activism, both in Britain and abroad, as well as transnational outrages over events such as the 'Bona massacre'. The independent Spanish-Dutch initiative to create a defensive league ensured, together with the popular linkage of captivity and abolition, that Barbary corsairing not only became an urgent matter to the

British government, but also that violence against Algiers could be framed as a security measure.

Notions of what amounted to a security threat and would warrant repressive action differed greatly between groups of actors. Understandings of security were not universal or uncontested, as the initial failure of Dutch agenda-setting efforts illustrates. Moreover, when the notion of security was eventually utilized to bring about and legitimize violent action against Algiers, this meant that other conceptions of security were ignored or superseded. When Admiral Exmouth first appeared in Algiers, *dey* Omar Agha had argued that the sort of demands that the British made could seriously jeopardize the stability of his rule. Treaties without tribute, the *dey* claimed, could cut off the regency from supplies of arms and naval stores, exposing the polity to dangers of external invasion and unchecked revolts in the interior.<sup>122</sup> Moreover, Omar Agha warned that a declaration ending ‘Christian slavery’, such as Exmouth demanded, could provoke uprisings among his troops. When the Admiral forced this declaration on him through a violent bombardment, the troubles of the *dey* intensified. The Janissaries eventually killed Omar Agha in September 1817.<sup>123</sup>

The Anglo-Dutch bombardment of 1816 signified that power relations between the European states and the North African regencies were tipped more and more to the former’s advantage. By understanding the concerted attack as an instance of international cooperation that reflects broader European politics, we can begin to understand how peace on the continent was linked to violent intervention and predation elsewhere. The post-Napoleonic peace, with international security as a central concept, constituted a context in which multinational leagues between European powers became conceivable and concerted external violence could ensue. The efforts of Dutch diplomats, poets, journalists and shipmen show that it were not just Great Powers, but also their smaller counterparts, that forged the links between tranquillity in Europe and roaring cannonades in Algiers.

## Notes

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1 A sample of these writings is kept in Nationaal Archief, The Hague (hereafter NL-HaNA), 2.21.008.01, inv. 149.

2 The two limits of these estimations are represented by D. Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs: The End of a Legend, 1800–1820* (Leiden/Boston MA 2005) 287; R. Perkins and K. Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary: Admiral Lord Exmouth’s Battle with the Corsairs of Algiers in 1816* (Havant 1982) 151.

3 The declaration is in The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), CO 2/6, ‘Treaty concluded between Admiral Exmouth and the Dey of Algiers’, Algiers 28–08–1816, fols 224–225.

4 O. Löwenheim, “‘Do ourselves credit and render a lasting service to mankind’: British moral prestige, humanitarian intervention, and the Barbary pirates’,

- International Studies Quarterly* 47:1 (2003) 23–48, 31; Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 129.
- 5 N. van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste bondgenoot: Nederland, Engeland en Europa, 1813–1831* (Groningen 1985) 3–4 and 8.
  - 6 M. Schulz, *Normen und Praxis: Das Europäische Konzert der Großmächte als Sicherheitsrat, 1815–1860* (Munich 2009) 68 and 542–543.
  - 7 N. van Sas, ‘The Dutch and the British Umbrella 1813–1870’, in: N. Ashton and D. Hellema (eds), *Unspoken Allies: Anglo-Dutch Relations since 1780* (Amsterdam 2001) 33–42, 37.
  - 8 B. de Graaf, ‘Nederland en de collectieve veiligheid’, in: J. Pekelder, R. Raben and M. Segers (eds), *De wereld volgens Nederland: Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek in historisch perspectief* (Amsterdam 2015) 42–58, 50.
  - 9 A. Vandenbosch, *Dutch Foreign Policy since 1815: A Study in Small Power Politics* (The Hague 1959) 53.
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  - 12 De Graaf, ‘Bringing sense and sensibility’; idem, ‘Nederland en de collectieve veiligheid’, 43–48.
  - 13 E. Conze, ‘Abschied von Staat und Politik? Überlegungen zur Geschichte der internationalen Politik’, in: E. Conze, U. Lappenküper and G. Müller (eds), *Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen: Erneuerung und Erweiterung einer historischen Disziplin* (Cologne 2004) 15–44, 33–34; D. Armitage, *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge/New York 2013) 8.
  - 14 B. de Graaf and C. Zwierlein, ‘Historicizing security: Entering the conspiracy dispositive’, *Historical Social Research* 38:1 (2013) 46–64.
  - 15 E. Ingram, ‘Bellicism as Boomerang: The Eastern Question during the Vienna System’, in: P. Krüger and P. Schroeder (eds), *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848: Episode or Model in Modern History?* (Münster 2002) 205–225, 224–225.
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  - 17 Over the decades that followed after 1816, European political actors would begin to perceive and treat the regencies as delegitimised robbers’ nests that were up for imperial grabs. M. Kempe, *Fluch der Weltmeere: Piraterie, Völkerrecht und internationale Beziehungen, 1500–1900* (Frankfurt/New York 2010) 22–23; C. Windler, ‘Diplomatic history as a field for cultural analysis: Muslim–Christian relations in Tunis, 1700–1840’, *The Historical Journal* 44:1 (2001) 79–106, 97; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 290–292.
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  - 19 J. Joor, ‘Significance and Consequences of the Continental System for Napoleonic Holland, Especially for Amsterdam’, in: J. Joor and K. Aaslestad (eds), *Revisiting Napoleon’s Continental System* (New York 2015) 259–275, 263.
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- 21 NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 94, no. 88a, 'Memoir on relations with the Barbary states', 04-02-1814.
- 22 Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 9-12, 17-20; A. Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge, MA 2002) 250-251.
- 23 Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 28-29; J. Schokkenbroek, 'Lambert Hendricksz en zijn jihad tegen de Barbarijse zeerovers', *Leidschrift* 26:3 (2011) 117-129.
- 24 Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 9-12; K. Folayan, *Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli* (Ile-Ife 1979) 60-61. Salvatore Bono argues, following the reasoning of Michel Fontenay, that corsairing and commerce need not even be at odds as prizes were circulated back into Mediterranean trade networks again, often by European merchants that were established in North Africa. S. Bono, *Les corsaires en Méditerranée* (Paris 1998) 202 and 207-210.
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- 41 NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 26, no. 154, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 07-11-1815.
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- 75 TNA, FO 8/2, 'Exmouth to Croker', Algiers 06-04-1816.
- 76 CADN, 22PO/1/32, no. 23, 'Journal d'Alger, 13.04.-17.08.1816', entry for 16-05-1816.
- 77 For the discussions on Christian captivity, TNA, CO 2/6, 'Exmouth to Croker', Algiers 18-06-1816, f. 168-178.
- 78 Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 295-296.
- 79 CADN, 22PO/1/32, no. 23, 'Journal d'Alger, 13.04.-17.08.1816', entry for 16-05-1816.
- 80 NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 26, no. 28, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 05-03-1816.
- 81 A discussion of Whig MP Henry Brougham's motion is in *Edinburgh Review* XXVI:LII (June 1816), 451-456. Mention of Brougham's parliamentary actions is also made by Fagel in NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 27, no. 87, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 21-06-1816.
- 82 *Edinburgh Review* XXVI:LII (June 1816), 455-456.
- 83 *Arnhemse Courant*, 21-05-1816, 1-2, which cites an article from *Journal de Francfort*.
- 84 TNA, FO 3/18, 'McDonell to Bathurst', Algiers 30-06-1816.
- 85 For example, *The Times*, 24-06-1816; *Rotterdamse Courant*, 25-06-1816, and; *Overijsselsche Courant*, 05-07-1816. All, in turn, refer back to Italian and French newspapers which further illustrates the transnational news event that Bona turned out to be.
- 86 *Nederlandsche Staatscourant*, 18-06-1816; Löwenheim, 'Do ourselves', p. 42.
- 87 *Overijsselsche Courant*, 05-07-1816.
- 88 NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 27, no. 77, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 31-05-1816.
- 89 TNA, FO 65/102, no. 9, 'Castlereagh to Cathcart', London 28-05-1816.
- 90 TNA, FO 3/18, 'McDonell to Bathurst', Algiers 21-07-1816.
- 91 J. Östlund, 'Swedes in Barbary captivity: The political culture of human security, circa 1660-1760', *Historical Social Research* 35 (2010) 148-163, 152; Legêne, *De baggage van Blomhoff*, 127; A. Sens, 'Mensaap, beiden, slaaf': *Nederlandse visies op de wereld rond 1800* (The Hague 2001) 12-15.
- 92 NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 59, 'Croker to Exmouth', 18-07-1816.

- 93 TNA, FO 8/11, 'Bathurst to the Admiralty', London 17-07-1816; NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 27, no. 108, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 13-08-1816.
- 94 NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 59, 'Additional instructions to Lord Exmouth from the Office of the High Admiral', 18-07-1816.
- 95 NL-HaNA, 2.12.21, inv. 4, no. 16 'Van der Hoop to Van Nagell', 25-06-1816.
- 96 NL-HaNA, 2.21.179.01, inv. 5, 'Van Capellen to Van Zuylen', Gibraltar 29-07-1816.
- 97 G. Köffler, *De Militaire Willemsorde, 1815-1940* (The Hague 1940) 94.
- 98 J. de Moor, "'A Very Unpleasant Relationship": Trade and Strategy in the Eastern Seas: Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Nineteenth Century from a Colonial Perspective', in: G. Raven and N. Rodger (eds), *Navies and Armies: The Anglo-Dutch Relationship in War and Peace, 1688-1988* (Edinburgh 1990) 49-69, 52.
- 99 C. Parkinson, *Edward Pellew Viscount Exmouth: Admiral of the Red* (London 1934) 453. Van Capellen had earlier attempt to cooperate with Exmouth at Algiers during the latter's first expedition but adverse winds and ongoing negotiations with the *dey* prevented this.
- 100 As quoted in Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 284.
- 101 Schokkenbroek, 'Lambert Hendricksz', 117.
- 102 *The London Gazette*, 15-09-1816, 1791, kept in NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 59.
- 103 Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 286-287.
- 104 TNA, CO 2/6, 'Treaty concluded between Admiral Exmouth and the Dey of Algiers', Algiers 28-08-1816, f. 224-225.
- 105 TNA, CO 2/6, 'Treaty concluded between Vice-Admiral van Capellen and the Dey of Algiers', f. 252-253. For the 1757 treaty, J. Piek van Langen, *Neerlands betrekkingen met andere staten, volken en mogendheden, 1813-1817* (Dordrecht 1818) 471-490.
- 106 Krieken, *Kapers en kooplieden*, 92.
- 107 Legêne, *De baggage van Blomhoff*, 140.
- 108 *Ibid.*, 141.
- 109 S. Bono, 'Deux ecrits italiens sur le bombardement d'Alger de 1816', *Revue d'Histoire Maghrebine* 7/8 (1977) 49-56, 52 and 56.
- 110 Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 168-169.
- 111 TNA, CO 2/6, 'The Emperor of Morocco to Exmouth', 26 Shawwal 1231 [19-09-1816], f. 288-290.
- 112 NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 91, no. 4559, 'Testa to Van Nagell', Constantinople 25-10-1816.
- 113 The same went for England: Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 168-170.
- 114 Paraphrased from J.L. Nierstrasz Jr., *De overwinning op Algiers* (Rotterdam 1816).
- 115 G.v.R., 'Bij de beteugeling van Algiers door de vereenigde Britsche en Nederlandsche Eskaders den 27 Augustus 1816'. Both are in NL-HaNA, 2.21.008.01, inv. 149.
- 116 'Nu leeft de Koopman gantsch gerust / Wijl zich geen Rovers meer vertonen / De Zeevaart gaat nu recht met Lust / En zal ons ijver rijk belonen'. J. Christiani, 'Vrede met Algiers', also in NL-HaNA, 2.21.008.01, inv. 149.
- 117 'De snoodaarts van Afrika's stranden'. Nierstrasz Jr., *De overwinning op Algiers*.
- 118 'Men zegt, eer Neêrland zegepraalde / En de oorlogsdonder zich ontstak / Dat Ruiter's schim uit d'Ether daalde / Zich tot den Vlootvoogd wended, en tot de krijgren sprak ...'. Nierstrasz Jr., *De overwinning op Algiers*.

- 119 J. van Zanten, *Schielijk, winzucht, zwaarhoofd en bedaard: Politieke discussie en oppositievorming 1813–1840* (Amsterdam 2004) 44 and 49–50.
- 120 P. Moens, 'Iets over den vernietigden slavenhandel', *Euphonia: Een tijdschrift voor den beschaafden stand* 3:4 (1816) 677–685 and 695–801, 699 and 800.
- 121 NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 26, no. 154, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 07–11–1815.
- 122 TNA, FO 8/2, 'Exmouth to Croker', Algiers 06–04–1816.
- 123 Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 295.