

Animals in Fact and Fiction

by Aurora Kenney

Contents

Introduction	3
I. Empiricism and the question of what is “given” in experience	7
II. Agency	14
III. Voice and Language, Emotion and Reason	21
IV. Responsibility	36
Conclusion	60
References	67

Introduction

In science there is ongoing debate about what kinds of description and interpretation of animal behavior is anthropomorphic, or ascribes human qualities to other animals. There are similar debates about whether a given work of fiction achieves realism in its representations of other animals. In both areas there is increasing attention to the anthropocentrism of this way of assessing representations of non-human animals. The growing consensus is that we don't have the foundational knowledge of human nature that would warrant such comparison, because 'the human' is defined in terms of 'the animal' and vice versa. The category of 'the animal' has been problematized as one form of the enactment of a divide between man and nature. In both science and literary studies alternative epistemologies and aesthetics have been developed that counter this worldview.

According to evolutionary anthropologist Christophe Boesch, "Originally, most scientific propositions about human origin did not rely on observations from other species, simply because information on these species was not available."¹ Propositions about purportedly uniquely human capacities, such as culture, tool use, and empathy, were made before any relevant data on animal populations were available. In this respect the twenty-first century has been identified as a turning point in the life sciences, seeing as, for example, "we have progressed from a position of almost complete ignorance about wild chimpanzees just decades ago, to having gathered very detailed knowledge through hundreds of field and laboratory studies."² Although much more knowledge about wild animal behavior has been amassed in the past few decades, it is feared that this scientific window of opportunity for "new levels of integrative analysis"³ will be fleeting, and it is already beginning to close due to species endangerment and extinction. These issues have prompted some reflection on why we want knowledge of other species, and on who has a stake in such knowledge. Aside from whatever intrinsic value the empirical knowledge being gathered about other species might hold, pragmatically, it may aid management and preservation efforts but does not seem entirely capable of slowing environmental destruction and the extermination of wildlife. One problem may be the tendency within many disciplines to proceed as if non-human beings do not actively participate in, or have a stake in, the production of knowledge. Now that the anthropocentrism is recognized as a deeper problem than anthropomorphism, new questions are being raised.

The issue of biodiversity loss puts a spotlight on different views about our knowledge of non-human animals, who/what it is for, and who participates in it. A markedly different take on the issue comes from Katherine Yusoff, who states that what is lost is not just potential knowledge, but the possibility of non-hierarchical difference, "...not a grand knowledge project of the biotic world, whose limits are configured around the accumulating potential of biological description, but a project that attempts to configure parallel universes of sense, which are in

¹ Boesch, *What Makes Us*, 227.

² Whiten, *Second Inheritance*, 57.

³ *Ibid.*, 57.

excess of knowledge, but nonetheless reside in and beyond the virtual recesses of those knowledge-forming practices.”⁴ She offers the beginnings of a positive alternative, stating that rather than solve problems “with the false equivalences of capital,” such as “offsetting” and “ecosystem services”, we might take up “...a mode of thought that does not return to itself and is never entirely confident of what it does and to whom.”⁵ This would entail “the loosening of a notion of agency as the basis for social action without a parallel disavowal of responsibility.”⁶

Yusoff’s criticism of the “mode of recognition” rooted in “a notion of agency as the basis for social action,” problematizes the concept of sociality or the social itself. While sociality is presumably the foundational concept of the social sciences, defining “the social” has been a subject of debate, particularly as it concerns the relationship between the social and natural sciences. Yusoff’s suggestion that responsibility comes from a mode of thought characterized by uncertainty points toward a novel way to conceptualize sociality that is often overlooked. This would involve neither the social constructivist route of locating sociality entirely outside of the individuals that make up a society, in something like “social structures,” nor locating sociality entirely inside the individual subject via something like the “social brain hypothesis.” A third approach seems to have taken shape around issues of relationality, and requires relational concepts, or rethinking individualistic concepts when transposing them to relational questions.

Yusoff suggests that there is a specific “mode of thought” associated with social action. Furthermore, it is “a mode of thought that does not return to itself and is never entirely confident of what it does and to whom,” suggesting that there is a constitutive element of uncertainty in social relations. Though rarely spelled out, a similar connection is made between ethics and uncertainty in moral philosophy, specifically the branch concerned with I-Thou relations or the “second-person standpoint.” This is the perspective from which unanticipated differences can appear, whereas differences in degree and differences in kind could in theory be known before taking up the second-person standpoint. What Yusoff suggests is that this sort of uncertainty does not mark a limit of knowledge but a different kind of knowing, which has more to do with a subject to respond to than with an object to represent. The importance of the second-person standpoint is that it is the perspective from which one responds to persons as such; as Stephen Darwall explicates, it is the perspective you and I take up when we make and acknowledge claims on each other’s will.⁷ More precisely, Darwall defines the second-person standpoint as, “...the perspective one assumes in addressing practical thought or speech to, or acknowledging address from, another (whether as an “I” or as part of a “we”) and, in so doing, making or acknowledging a claim or demand on the will... What the second-person stance excludes is the third-person perspective, that is, regarding, for practical purposes, others (and oneself), not in relation to oneself, but as they are (or one is)

⁴ Yusoff, *Insensible Worlds*, 210.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 210

⁶ *Ibid.*, 210.

⁷ Darwall, *Second-Person*, 3.

“objectively” or “agent-neutrally” (including as related to the person one is). And it rules out as well first-personal thought that lacks an addressing, second-personal aspect.”⁸ Martin Buber first developed the idea that the I-Thou relationship is the basis of ethical-aesthetic judgements, and one of his illustrative examples was his personal childhood experience with a horse.⁹ As Josephine Donovan states, the relationship between boy and horse is dialogical: “...both terms of the relation are seen as spiritual presences that have a reality of their own to communicate, which must be respected and attended to.”¹⁰ What Donovan describes as a dialogical or participatory relation to animals has been brought into tension with epistemological assumptions that are particularly unsuited to the study of animals. A shift toward relational epistemologies is common to many instantiations of ‘the animal question’ in various disciplines. Relational epistemologies bring the second-personal aspect of human-animal relations to the fore. While this shift is applicable to more than non-human animals, it is particularly important with respect to this subject-matter, given that the interests of other animals are often neglected or subordinated to human interests. We find it too easy, that is, to presume that we have good reason not to take other animals into account. The second-personal aspect of human-animal relations reveals the insufficiency of “third-personal” reasoning when it comes to decentering human interests. As Darwall argues, it is from the second-person standpoint that we see that we can act on reasons that are not outcome-based; “When you and I make claims on one another’s will, we take ourselves to be free to act on reasons that are grounded not in our relations to an independent ordering of the value of different outcomes or possible states of the world but just in our authority with respect to each other.”¹¹ This may be why the relational, dialogical aspect of human-animal relations has received much emphasis of late, because it provides a basis for non-instrumental human-animal relations.

The two main questions guiding this thesis are how various disciplines have gone about ‘decentering the human,’ and secondly, how to represent animals in a way that serves their interests. Posing the second question in terms of “interests” is a pragmatic way to ask what constitutes an ethical representation of non-human animals, and assumes that it is possible to significantly “decenter ourselves,”¹² so as to act on reasons that are not fundamentally human-centered, even if “our reconstitutions of animal lives remain human.”¹³ It is apparent that there is growing interest in these questions across disciplines. Drawing from a wide range of secondary literature will indicate what various efforts to ‘decenter the human’ have in common. The concepts I will focus on are agency, language, and responsibility, because it seems that recent attention to anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism are causing these concepts to shift in meaning. Traditional notions of agency, language, and responsibility are increasingly being problematized as anthropocentric.

⁸ Darwall, *Second-Person*, 9-10.

⁹ Donovan, *Aesthetics of Care*, 82.

¹⁰ Donovan, *Aestheticizing*, 213.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 253.

¹² Baratay, *Building*, 12.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 12.

There are analogous theoretical movements away from Cartesianism, representationalism and so on across disciplines including history, philosophy, science studies and literary studies. Considering animals as historical actors, for example, has led some historians to problematize some of the epistemological assumptions organizing their field. For example, Erica Fudge points out that the way in which historical periods are defined and characterized may have no relevance to non-human animals.¹⁴ Similarly in literature, Josephine Donovan identifies modernist authors exemplative of a markedly different aesthetic tradition to that typical of modern literary treatments of animals, an ‘aesthetics of care,’ which she argues, “...is rooted in an alternative epistemology to the “dominative “I-it,” “sado-dispassionate” conception offered in the Cartesian-Kantian constructions of Enlightenment modernity.”¹⁵ Similarly in *The Animal Claim: Sensibility and the Creaturely Voice*, Tobias Menely shows that in the history of moral philosophy, alternatives to the Cartesian-Kantian ethos associated with modernity were in use much earlier than we might expect. Finally, fiction can be seen as working through problems of animal representation in the absence of fully explicated concepts, which may not admit of stable definitions, criteria, or rules for their application. Therefore, I will attempt to discern whether and how concepts in the theoretical literature can help to make sense of works of fiction containing animal representations. A related question concerns what, if anything, does fiction add to these endeavors. Because literary theory and literature seems to have engaged with problems of representation most explicitly, literary examples may be especially useful in asking how to represent non-human animals in a way that serves their interests.

The expression ‘the animal question’ was centered on ethics when it was first used in the early nineteenth century, although the field of study built around this question has since expanded and ethics is no longer central to all work in this area.¹⁶ Nonetheless we see questions of moral significance appearing in a wide range of research in animal studies, including research primarily focused on historical, philosophical, scientific, or literary material. The integration of positive and normative questions is a feature of the general tendency toward relational epistemologies. Moral philosophical concepts seem to be the most ambiguous aspect of cross-disciplinary research in animal studies, and are used often without being explicated. This is a problem because terms like claim, demand, and responsibility are far from clear. I’ll look to the moral philosophical literature for clarification, focusing on the concepts that appear frequently in the secondary literature. With regard to relational epistemologies, the most relevant literature from moral philosophy is that focused on the I-thou relationship or the second-person standpoint.

These alternative epistemologies are in some sense efforts to revise concepts from philosophy of mind that at least in their traditional usage, have exhausted their utility. They are also not entirely new, as what are now deemed “alternatives” to Cartesianism evidently have guided the scientific study of non-human animals in the past, though perhaps rarely, and the fact that they are only now being conceptualized is similar to the situation in cognitive science. This

¹⁴ Fudge, *Left-Handed Blow*, 6.

¹⁵ Donovan, *Aesthetics of Care*, 73.

¹⁶ Vilmer, *Foreword*, vii.

is the subject of the following section, which will provide background on how different approaches to the “other minds problem” underlie different conceptions of human-animal relations.

I. Empiricism and the question of what is “given” in experience

And just as there are no words for the surface, that is,
 No words to say what it really is, that it is not
 Superficial but a visible core, then there is
 No way out of the problem of pathos vs. experience.

- John Ashbery, “Self-Portrait In A Convex Mirror”

Independently of any interest in non-human animals or human-animal relations, individualistic concepts in philosophy of mind are becoming difficult to reconcile with research in the mind sciences. Concepts associated with ‘classical cognition’ are being reworked in the study of ‘situated cognition’, and situated concepts such as embodiment and embeddedness are invoked often in discussions of human-animal relations. The study of cognition as a situated phenomenon has since the 1970s begun to supplant formerly predominant paradigms in the mind sciences, which took the approach of “methodological solipsism,” which is to effectively “bracket off the world beyond the individual in characterizing and individuating cognitive states and structures.”¹⁷ Many developments in cognitive science since then, which depart from this individualistic conception of mind and cognition, are of relevance to the various epistemologies described as “alternatives” to Cartesianism.

For example, Clark states that what is now understood about neural plasticity supports “constructive” rather than biological notions of agency. Neural plasticity allows biological brains to fluently deal with bodily change and growth; they have the natural propensity “...to be open to many forms of physical and cognitive hybridization.”¹⁸ This “open-ended process of physical and cognitive self-creation,” requires a different understanding of agency, one that locates cognitive processes not within “the old metabolic boundaries of skin and skull,” but attends to “the computational and functional organization of the problem-solving whole.”¹⁹ This view of cognition as situated and extended has implications for concepts such as agency, namely that it may be best understood as constructive and relational.

Regarding social cognition, the standard approach in cognitive science encompasses “theories that frame the problem of intersubjectivity in terms of mindreading the other’s mental states from an observational standpoint,”²⁰ which assume that perception is a third-person

¹⁷ Wilson & Clark, *How to Situate*, 3.

¹⁸ Clark, *Intrinsic Content*, 9.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁰ Gallagher, *Philosophical epilogue*, 488.

observational process, and that extra-perceptual processes are required to explain or predict another person's behavior. Understanding others is framed as a problem of accessing other minds, which are presumed to be hidden away, that is, imperceptible. By demonstrating that the view of perception underlying this approach is impoverished, the 'situated cognition' approach attempts to dissolve or reformulate the other minds problem. They appeal to developmental psychology to show that "we are not third-personal observers, but rather are involved, from the earliest point in infancy, in second-person interactions and dialogical relations with others, and that we start to 'understand' others through a variety of embodied practices."²¹ The problem to be solved is not how we move from observed behavior to hidden mental states, because, "everything I need for understanding her is there in her action and in our shared world."²²

The other minds problem is thus posed as a problem for practical reason, not theoretical reason, which implies that it is not necessary to appeal to anything other than the concept of perception to explain social cognition.²³ The difference between the two approaches is whether or not the "social aspect" is there in perception itself, or requires inferential processes that follow perception. Social cognition may still involve things like theory of mind or simulation, but Gallagher espouses the view that extra-perceptual capacities are not required and are rarely needed, stating that,

"before we are in a position to theorize, simulate, explain or predict mental states in others, we are already in a position to interact with and to understand others in terms of their expressions, gestures, and purposive movements, reflecting their intentions and emotions. We already have specific perception-based understandings about what others feel, whether they are attending to us or not, how they are acting toward us and others, whether their intentions are friendly or not, and so forth; and in most cases we have this without the need for personal-level theorizing or simulating about what the other person believes or desires. Moreover, we have this without the benefit of anything that on the sub-personal level could be considered an extra cognitive step, a simulation, or inference."²⁴

As mentioned above, defining "the social" is a topic of debate, and the enactivist approach in cognitive science has implications for both terms, "social" and "cognition." Gallagher asserts that social cognition is "often nothing more than social interaction," in that, "in ordinary instances of interaction with others, I am not in the observer position; I am not off to the side thinking or trying to figure out what they are doing. Rather, I am responding to them in an embodied way."²⁵ This suggests that the second-person standpoint is qualitatively different from the third-person standpoint. On similar premises, van Grunsven further explicates the ethical import of the second-person as opposed to the third-person standpoint: "By taking up a third-person stance of observation, explanation and prediction towards an other we will fix in

²¹ Ibid., 489.

²² Gallagher, *Direct Perception*, 540.

²³ Ibid., 535.

²⁴ Ibid., 542.

²⁵ Ibid., 540.

generalities or formulas something that by definition will always in part escape and transcend such formulas. We will miss not the propositional content of a person's beliefs and desires but the manner in which she inhabits and negotiates the world as a precarious autonomous being who continually realizes herself as a person through her comportment with the world and others."²⁶ These arguments cohere with Darwall's account of moral obligation, as it holds that the 'second-person standpoint' is essential to morality.

Van Grunsven makes this link to moral philosophy explicit, stating that enactivism shares several features in common with the 'ethics of care' and with P.F. Strawson's second-personal approach to moral responsibility, primarily in that they all foreground "human agents understood in their affective second-person engagements with one another."²⁷ Van Grunsven states that while the implications of enactivism for concepts like responsibility and autonomy have been considered, it has not been brought into dialogue with these branches of moral philosophy that also foreground second-person interaction. Furthermore, she argues that ultimately, cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind tend to undermine the second-personal link between enactivism and ethical theory.²⁸

Enactivism understands cognition as sense-making, "an affectively motivated (inter)active rather than an observational-representational affair," and therefore "autonomy" is "relationally achieved."²⁹ Autonomy is not self-sufficiency, but "precarious dependency on, and exposure and perceptual responsiveness to environmental affordances."³⁰ Enactivism grows out of the idea that, as stated in Haugeland's landmark paper, "[t]he primary instance [of cognition] is rather interaction, which is simultaneously perceptive and active, richly integrated in real time," as opposed to the view that the other minds problem is "in the first instance" a problem for individual observers.³¹ If the enactive approach is right, then "other persons are firstly perceived as subjects who afford engagement and address and who in turn can engage and address me."³²

Van Grunsven points out that at first glance, the 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, and/or enactive) view of agency may seem to undermine "our responsibility practices," i.e., "the ongoing everyday ways in which we take responsibility for the (often precarious dependent) lives of others."³³ As van Grunsven states, some enactivists have argued along these lines, presuming that if agency is always situated and shaped by others, "we lack the kind of autonomy that seems to be a necessary enabling condition for genuinely being responsible."³⁴ Van Grunsven argues that calling into question the "justificatory ground" for these practices

²⁶ Van Grunsven, *Enactivism*, 140.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 134.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 134.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 135.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 148

³¹ *Ibid.*, 139.

³² *Ibid.*, 140.

³³ *Ibid.*, 148.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 148.

undermines enactivism's own commitments "to a second-person phenomenologically oriented approach to human interaction, or participatory sense-making, and its ethical significance."³⁵ That is, they explain away the sense of responsibility that characterizes the second-person standpoint, even though they challenge the view that cognition is first and foremost third-personal. They tend toward the view that the third-person attitude presupposes the "more pervasive" participant attitude, where the latter is characterized by what P.F. Strawson deems 'reactive attitudes' such as guilt, shame, remorse etc.³⁶ However, they don't follow through on this line of thought when it comes to responsibility, presuming that responsibility only has meaning on the methodologically individualist conception of agency that enactivism opposes. Van Grunsven demonstrates the confluence between enactivism and the care ethical and Strawsonian view that "an involved participant orientation towards others is primary not just in a developmental and an epistemological, but also in an ethical sense."³⁷

As stated by Wilson and Clark, situated cognition has been mostly described as an alternative to or modification of "classical cognition" and the philosophies loosely associated with it, including Platonism, Cartesianism, individualism, representationalism, and even computationalism about the mind, but has received relatively few positive characterizations.³⁸ Relevant concepts such as embodiment and embeddedness are under-explicated, however Wilson and Clark point out that a lack of conceptual articulation has not stalled researchers in the "situated movement" in the cognitive sciences.³⁹ That the branch of cognitive science working on situated cognition is making up a larger proportion of the field and, as the author's suggest, is something of a growing but under-theorized disciplinary paradigm, might partly account for the lack of concepts with which to theorize sociality in fields tangential to the mind sciences.

Wilson and Clark also point out that the situated approach has philosophical and psychological antecedents and influences extending back over the last century.⁴⁰ William James' Radical Empiricism is an earlier example of a relational ontology, and has been identified as a useful way to frame the situated cognition approach, as opposed to Hume's Sensationalistic Empiricism.⁴¹ The central tenet of 'Radical Empiricism', coined by James, is the unity of experience, where experience is "the original flux of life before reflexion has categorized it."⁴²

James defines experience as the "active sense of living which we all enjoy," in which difficulty consists of "disappointments and uncertainties," which are not intellectual contradictions.⁴³ Both Empiricism with Rationalism involve translating experience "from a more concrete or pure into a more intellectualized form, filling it with ever more abounding verbalized

³⁵ Ibid., 148.

³⁶ Ibid. 152.

³⁷ Ibid., 155.

³⁸ Wilson & Clark, *How to Situate*, 1.

³⁹ Ibid., 1.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 1.

⁴¹ Rockwell, *Representation*, 220.

⁴² James, *The Thing*, 29.

⁴³ Ibid., 29.

distinctions,”⁴⁴ but Empiricism measures the success of such analysis by its ability to solve practical problems rather than intellectual contradictions. James states that his philosophical approach begins by “insisting in a general way that the immediately experienced conjunctive relations are as real as anything else,”⁴⁵ and much of the theory on human-animal relations seems to proceed along similar lines.

The other minds problem

Various strategies for representing other animals can be compared in terms of how they are conceived as presenting a version of the ‘problem of other minds.’ The problem of how to represent what we do not have ‘direct access’ to is not limited to written texts or literary fiction, but is rooted in a more fundamental problem of what is ‘directly given’ in experience. The epistemological side to this problem has an inextricable ethical dimension. It is not merely an intellectual paradox or a question of the limits of human knowing, but also involves, “...a genuine and interminable practical difficulty - concerning whether we know and respond to each other appropriately or sufficiently or wholeheartedly – that characterizes our everyday life with others.”⁴⁶ One view is that representing non-human animals involves an amplified version of the problem of other minds, but is not qualitatively different from the problem with respect to humans. The view that whatever imaginative projection is involved in human-animal relations may be greater in degree but no different in kind than when considering human actors motivates the idea that in theory one can do non-anthropocentric history, science, or philosophy.

As many examples from the history of science show, “imaginative projection” can be an invaluable aspect of behavior-based approaches in fields such as ethology and cognitive science. Individualizing animals, imagining them as individual subjects with points of view, should not be idealized as the key to attaining non-anthropocentric knowledge of other animals, but neither should it be discounted as inevitably anthropomorphic, or as tainting the objectivity of scientific research. While in science this issue is not usually discussed in terms of representation, the lack of consensus about how to frame studies of non-human animals suggests that there are fundamentally different views about the possibility of decentering the human.

Even within a broadly behaviorist paradigm, we find debates about anthropomorphism that reflect fundamental disagreement about what is self-evident in animal behavior. The idea that we do not have access to the “inner lives” of non-human animals brings the charge of anthropomorphism to representations of animal experience; to avoid anthropomorphism, on this view, would limit one to presenting the fact that animals have subjective experience without giving it any qualitative specificity. The question of what we do have access to is not settled, however, partly because there is no agreement about what assumptions ought to guide our observations and interpretations of animal behavior. That is, what sort of observable evidence

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁴⁶ MacArthur, *Vision of Blindness*, 309.

can we glean from animal behavior that tells us what we want to know about animal livelihood. As the above discussion of cognitive science shows, however, this is a problem of social cognition in general, and is not fundamentally about the human-animal divide. Disparate views about what exactly we do have access to, and in what sense, are expressed in two general epistemological approaches. One centers on an “I-it” relationship characteristic of an inanimate view of nature, which assumes that we have no access to non-human subjectivity, effectively rendering animals inanimate objects of study. An alternative centers on an “I-thou” relationship characteristic of social relations, and which seeks out an active, participatory role for the subject/object of study.

In *St. Mawr*, D.H. Lawrence conveys the sense in which our inability to understand other animals without tremendous effort puts us in separate “worlds.” The eponymous horse in the novel is described by his groom as unusually temperamental, “as if he was a trifle raw somewhere. Touch this raw spot, and there’s no answering for him.”⁴⁷ The protagonist sees that St. Mawr is “in a state of absolute mistrust, like a cat crouching to spring,” and when the groom explains that “They gave him a beating once or twice,” she thinks, “Not any raw spot at all. A battle between two worlds. She realised that St. Mawr drew his hot breaths in another world from Rico’s, from our world.”⁴⁸ Even though St. Mawr has twice caused fatal accidents, the protagonist decides to purchase him for her husband, Rico. Lewis, the groom who has been with St. Mawr since he was born, says “He’d be alright with anybody as would meet him half way,” and Louise realizes that “half way across from our human world to that terrific equine twilight was not a small step.”⁴⁹

According to Anderton, the trope of animal otherness comes from the idea that a lack of secure self-knowledge marks the “autobiographical silence shared by all living creatures.”⁵⁰ He suggests that some authors are drawn to the representation of non-human animals “...partly as a way to keep the unknown close, grow familiar with its enigma as an enigma that we also share⁵¹ ... Declining a stance of imperial domination, these writers work against totalizing narratives that imagine they could somehow adequately inscribe the lives of animals, remaining open to obscurity and difference, to the unaccountable complexity of animal life.”⁵² On this view, the enigmatic quality that binds us with other animals, and that characterizes dialogical human-animal relations, is not conceived as a limit of knowledge, but rather a flaw in our conception of nature. Primarily, it recognizes that we cannot step “outside” of nature, and that the third-person perspective associated with science is fictional in that it involves the imagination of a “view from nowhere.” Daston points out that the latter “epistemological fantasy” is a search for transcendence, and states that all curiosity about other minds is underwritten by

⁴⁷ Lawrence, *St. Mawr*, 49.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁵⁰ Anderton, *Dogdom*, 283.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 286.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 286.

transcendentalism in some form.⁵³ Nagel's "view from nowhere" exemplifies one approach to transcendence, "toward the distillations of philosophy, which seek the essence of reason or justice, independent of its particular manifestations."⁵⁴ On the other hand, opposing this universalist attitude is "the exoticism of certain brands of anthropology, history, and imaginative literature (especially science fiction), which revel in the astonishing variety of other minds."⁵⁵ Daston states that although the search for transcendence pulls in either of these two opposing directions, both are preoccupied with the language of perspective, and neither can do without perspectival metaphor, whether aiming for "perspectival suppleness" or for "an escape from perspective altogether."⁵⁶

Daston concludes that the perspectival mode is "the apotheosis of subjectivity of the essence of mind,"⁵⁷ and suggests that equating mindedness to subjectivity is why debates about anthropomorphism are at a dead end; "Either we understand other minds subjectively or we do not understand them at all."⁵⁸ The underlying assumption is that understanding non-human minds means experiencing nonhuman subjectivities. She suggests that, "Perhaps if we could formulate questions about understanding other minds in some other mode than "What is it like to be an X?" we might partly redeem, both intellectually and morally, the pleasures of anthropomorphism."⁵⁹ Irrespective of how the question is posed, ambivalence about anthropomorphism reflects the view that the problem of other minds is not different in kind for animals and for other humans; in neither case does one have access to another's subjective experience. In this regard, Daston also points out that, "It is paradoxical that empathy and sympathy, the glue of communities, should be invoked to contract communities to like minds, that is, to one's own species and contemporaries: to extend a neighborly gesture of recognition across centuries or species lines is to be suspected of overlooking the otherness of other subjectivities."⁶⁰

Daston's suggestion that the question of other minds be reformulated so as to avoid the notion of subjective experience is borne out in the shift toward relational epistemologies, central to which is a re-conceptualization of agency. Agency as the capacity to affect and be affected is markedly different in that it does not invoke intentionality or other features of mindedness. The move to a relational epistemology may not escape the perspectival mode, but it adds a new dimension in the form of the I-thou, second personal relation. It transforms the problem of other minds into a problem of responding to others.

⁵³ Daston, *Intelligences*, 52.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 54.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 54.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 54.

II. Agency

Across disciplines engaged in animal representation, attempts to decenter the human encounter the problem of understanding other minds. Part of why this problem seems intractable is due to assumptions about agency.

The problem of other minds is the focus of recent discussions of animals in historical research, which are motivated by the idea that human and animal histories are intertwined and that the interconnections between human and non-human lives raises some specific historiographical problems, such as the issue of historical periodization mentioned above. Rethinking animal agency is central to the solutions that I will discuss below. These considerations of animal agency raise the question of what kind of influence animals may have over their representation.

Hilda Kean illustrates the interpretive problem that animals pose for historiography with Brecht's poem "Questions from a worker who reads." Firstly, she notes the poem's explicit emphasis on "the materials for creating the past outside books, particularly traces from the physical landscape. Such traces could include the gradients modified or not by the labor of horses, the rat runs under floor boards, the tracks in the wood taken by foxes, the marks on trees scratched by cats."⁶¹ On another level, the poem questions the nature of conventional history by suggesting that answers can be revealed in silence, by what is not stated verbally; experience, including that of those without a voice, states Kean, "...have been marked in the landscape, in the material culture of the past. Hence, other histories are possible."⁶² The idea that experience is marked in the landscape reflects the idea that we can "read" animal expressivity from what is observable, without imagining the "inner-life" of the mind. This may be seen as an attempt to shift our conception of what is "directly given" in experience. It also connects agency to expressivity, and therefore asks us to consider the dialogical, second-personal character of human-animal relations.

Similarly, Baratay writes that though it seems paradoxical, with help from present-day ethology we can search for "animal acts and gestures" in existing historical archives.⁶³ Baratay notes that when doing human history, historians must often work through intermediaries. The actors of interest for a historian did not always leave accounts of their own, but evidence can be gleaned from secondary accounts. Likewise, we can learn about animals from the accounts of humans who took interest in them. Animal history is always mediated by humans, their writings, their photographs, and their films, and furthermore, it is by way of these technologies that "animals today bear witness."⁶⁴ If we can find documents that are the product of human interest in the "real acts and gestures" of animals, these records can be set alongside present-day records

⁶¹ Kean, *Challenges*, 64.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 64.

⁶³ Baratay, *Building*, 6.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

“...as usable anecdotes, data from a terrain of observation situated in the past, in the same way that contemporary psychologists and cognitive ethologists are now using present-day anecdotes.”⁶⁵ Given that historical evidence about animals is mediated by humans, Baratay, like Kean, emphasizes the importance of seeking out sources that are the product of human interest in animals themselves.

As animal studies has become a designated field, writes Baratay, it has remained in the vein of cultural studies in its focus on human uses, practices, and representations of other animals.⁶⁶ These approaches are insufficient because, “...they have created and maintained a blind spot at their center—that of animals as feeling, acting, responding beings, who have their own initiatives and reactions.”⁶⁷ The problem, he states, is fundamentally one of, “...a Western cultural worldview that has impoverished the dialectical theme of humans and animals, reducing it to a field with one magnetic pole (humans) and a single directional pull (humans towards animals), thus forgetting or dismissing much of its reality and complexity.”⁶⁸ The dualism between a concrete species, the human, to a nonexistent concept, the animal, reflects our lack of knowledge about other animals; the knowledge we do have shows that there are alternative ways to empirically study animals that are not rooted in an anthropocentric epistemology. Ethology’s “growing insistence—at least for certain species and an increasing number of them—on the behaviors of each animal as actor, individual, and even person; on the cognitive capacities of animal individuals; and on the sociability and cultures of animal groups—and thus revealing the inadequacies of purely human approaches. Similarly, historical documents show that when this information is not rejected as anecdotal, that humans have seen or foreseen and assessed animal interests and have reacted, acted, and imagined as a result.”⁶⁹

The problem of representing animals in history writing is caught up in broader debates surrounding the representation of animals, namely debates concerning anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism. The views summarized above are optimistic about the possibility of representing animals, because the fact of animal agency means that they are not necessarily absent from their representations. From the abundance of relevant documents, states Baratay, “We can thus demonstrate that these are truly animals who act and react, compelling humans to consider them.”⁷⁰ In other words, animals necessarily influence the way in which humans represent them, and although the balance is clearly not usually in their favor, one can strive toward maximizing animal agency. Though representations are at a remove from animals themselves, the suggestion is made that in records of second-personal human-animal encounters, there is empirical material for animal-centered histories. An important aspect of this view is that the use of animals as figures, even if they bear little resemblance to animals themselves, nevertheless depends on an awareness of human-animal continuity. This suggestion resonates

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

with the growing interest in reexamining past texts, as far back as ancient animal fables, for traces of the animals in human-animal interactions.

Baratay calls for “critical anthropomorphism” as opposed to “an already conclusive anthropomorphism that foists humanity on animalities and thus denies their specificities.”⁷¹ This means, he states, recognizing the flexibility of concepts under investigation without abandoning them. When attempting to understand animal subjectivity without a clear definition of the subject, “We must remember that we have just barely begun to search for these parameters in the animal world; if we find that these parameters lack some consistency, it may be that we need to consider a greater plurality of meanings.”⁷² Baratay notes that this approach is already being taken for abilities such as visual perception but less so for “mental abilities,” “...because these are what allow us to value ourselves over animals.”⁷³ Baratay explicitly connects the issue of representation to animal ethics, stating that since there is no way in which to divide humans from all other animals on empirical grounds, it is reasonable to believe that the divide is also empty of normative value.⁷⁴

Kean also highlights ethics in her discussion of animals in history, stating that much of the focus in the broad Animal Studies field “is not around agency or representation as such, but an attempt to show in the present the importance of animals in the past (and present) or that change has occurred or that the lives of animals and people are (in various ways) intertwined.”⁷⁵ She suggests that historians should broach the animal question by first attending to historians’ intentions, not the subject of interest itself. This is in line with the view that there is a normative dimension to knowledge, at least with respect to questions of animal representation, evident in the choices historians make that define the parameters of research. Focusing on this aspect of research leads ultimately to questions about what we want to know and why.

Kean’s focus on attention is connected to her argument that animal agency is evident, though often minimized, in representations of animals. Dismissing human-authored texts as “mere representation” implies that we are only presented with a construction outside the animal’s perspective. To the contrary, Kean argues that, “Human authored texts...can provide insights that are not merely reducible to the human perspective,” and these insights can somehow be traced back to the represented animals themselves.⁷⁶ Animals have at least relative autonomy in the relationship between writer and animal subject, “...albeit because of the incidents that the human has chosen to record.”⁷⁷ Other animals may have a particularly strong hold on the human imagination because of their agency; they are interesting because they are surprising, and because their opacity makes them particularly rich and problematic subjects of interpretation.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 4.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁷⁵ Kean, *Challenges*, 64.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 61.

As literary theorist Susan McHugh states, with the reconceptualization of agency, animals are being reconceived “as key players in all sorts of cultural productions.”⁷⁸ Conversely, awareness of the affective and material role that other animals play in human lives, and their involvement in the production of knowledge, weakens humanist conceptions of agency. This assertion about animal agency applies both to animal representations, and to real animals, for example on farms and in slaughterhouses. The latter are the focus of Vinciane Despret’s discussion of agency and resistance.

Despret draws attention to animal agency in the agricultural context. She points out that the work required of animals tends to be invisible when things run smoothly, however when closer attention is paid, it becomes apparent that animals are no less agents when cooperating. Animals are capable of fulfilling our expectations and this is why they may appear machine-like; “When animals do what they know is expected of them, everything begins to look like a machine that is functioning, and their obedience looks “mechanical,”...when they move away from the machine after the milker has finished, when they move here and there to allow the breeder to clean their stalls, when they do what has to be done in response to an order, when they do what they must so that everything happens as it is supposed to.”⁷⁹ The active investment demanded of them usually only becomes visible when animals cease to cooperate; “As in the case of human work, animals’ collaboration at work is visible when it is not obtained.”⁸⁰ Animals used in scientific experiments are in a similar position; the success of the experiments depend on the animals’ cooperation.⁸¹ That animals’ labor is predicated on their active involvement means that resistance is response, not reaction, between “the creatures that are engaging one another in an ever-new story.”⁸² While usually associated with independence and autonomy, agency is on the contrary, according to Despret, “about the multiple ways one given creature depends on other beings. To be an agent requires dependency upon many other beings; being autonomous means being pluri-hetero-nomous.”⁸³ Agency, she states, is always “interagency,” a relational concept that is better conveyed with a verb like “agenting,” which “connects and articulates narratives.”⁸⁴

Despret writes that positing “a world rich in affects, full of beings able to affect and be affected by others,”⁸⁵ is often described as the enchantment or re-enchantment of the world, as if “de-animating” the world is the essence of science because the world is properly viewed as such. Animating the world seems to be a necessary first step, and Despret challenges the idea that the subsequent de-animation is the important and rational step in the emergence of a scientific

⁷⁸ McHugh, *Animal Stories*, 10.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 42-43.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁸¹ Despret, *Interagency*, 42.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 44.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 35.

concept. Despret argues that animation often comes first, and that “No one re-enchants the world, here. They just resist de-animating it, actively--or not.”⁸⁶

Across disciplines, a relational concept of agency is common to many calls for an alternative approach to the study and representation of other animals, one that does not deny or minimize non-human agency. In the literary realm, McHugh states that novels may owe much of their popularity to their voicing of the individual subject of representation, noting that in the English-speaking world the rise of the novel dovetails with that of identity politics. If this exhausts the function of fiction, then fictional animal representations could only matter “as gauges of its inhuman limits.”⁸⁷ What research into animal narrative shows, however, is that “forms do not automatically follow the functions of literature,” and according to McHugh “the success of the novel form follows instead from its usefulness for experiments with multiple perspectives and processes that support models centered on agency rather than subjectivity, reflecting as well as influencing ongoing social changes.”⁸⁸ Models centered on agency bring attention to relations that exceed the abilities of individual subjects. This builds on conceptualizations of agency as other than a property of the human subject, and also concerns “the processes whereby the agency of literary animals comes to consist precisely in the way that they cannot finally be enlisted in the tasks set for them.”⁸⁹

While attention to animal representation may be a relatively recent focus of literary and film theory, many such theorists argue that works of fiction themselves were always implicitly or explicitly dealing with the problem of animals’ “resistance” to human-centered meanings. Growing interest in the idea that animals have meaning in themselves, other than symbolic meaning ascribed to them, has brought newfound attention to the representation of animals in fiction. For modern authors, as Scholtmeijer demonstrates, “What the animal means—the obsession of past and present thinkers—is secondary. That the animal means in our century is crucial.”⁹⁰; that is, “Contrary to recent attempts to teach chimpanzees to use human signs and grammatical forms, the point is not that animals can communicate our own meaning back to us. Rather, humanity is obliged to seek out significations in itself which may meet up with the animal’s state of being.”⁹¹

McHugh argues that narratives that work in this mode are contingent on the effects of modern living on cross-species companionship, but also productively inform ideas about shared lives.⁹² Reexamining stories of shared lives, with attention to animal representations, is not just a way to articulating an emerging sense of “nonhuman social agency,” but has ethical import. As McHugh states, “...narrative ethology suggests an irreducibly relational ethics, a way of valuing social and aesthetic forms together as sustaining conditions of and for mixed communities...

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁸⁷ McHugh, *Animal Stories*, 1.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁹⁰ Scholtmeijer, *Animal Victims*, 13.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁹² McHugh, *Animal Stories*, 5.

certain engagements with narrative configure people and animals as working together to do things that do not add up to a sum of individual efforts, and so invite more precise considerations of agency and narrative form.”⁹³ She states that literature can be especially informative of debates about animal representation and about actual animals because authors have been especially concerned with realism and metaphor; “...viewed as one among many peculiar operations of agency, the metaphorical animal’s ways of inhabiting literature without somehow being represented therein present tremendous opportunities for recovering and interrogating the material and representational problems specific to animality.”⁹⁴ The inability to represent animals “themselves” in literature applies equally to scientific representations of animals, and motivates renewed attention to empiricism. In neither domain are animal representations all or entirely metaphorical.

Representations of animals in contemporary fiction and film demonstrate awareness of the skeptical “problem of other minds,” but as in *St Mawr*, they do not necessarily work through this problem by attempting to represent non-human subjective experience. In *St. Mawr*, the attention of both the protagonist and the reader are directed to outward signs, and there is very little intimation of “inner experience.”

St. Mawr, a horse, is the main focus of the novel’s preoccupation with domestication, or subservience vs. wildness. *St. Mawr* is up for sale because he is violent and uncontrollable, having injured and killed several riders, but Louise Witt, the protagonist, insists that he is not mean in spirit and purchases the horse as a gift for her husband. As noted above, *St. Mawr* is a symbol of otherness and exemplifies the “reality effects” of animals who are attributed a perspective outside human culture and language. Lawrence depicts a world in which humans and animals alike are subjected to humanity’s striving toward dominance and mastery, and *St. Mawr* symbolizes a positive force that withstands these negative forces, the remaining vitality in nature. The protagonist’s discontentment with what she sees as society’s artificiality, its veneer of pleasantness over the vindictive dynamics of subjection and mastery, is what interests her in *St. Mawr*.

Lawrence does not need to describe the “real nature” of *St Mawr* in order to affirm its value as perceived by the protagonist; “Herself, all she cared about was the horse himself, his real nature.”⁹⁵ We mostly learn about his real nature through what it is not, as in Lou’s conversation with Laura, a family friend described as having “a slight hiss in her speech, a sort of aristocratic decision in her enunciation, that got on Lou’s nerves.”⁹⁶ “Lou could feel the peculiar reverence for *St. Mawr*’s breeding, his show qualities,”⁹⁷ as Laura remarks on *St. Mawr*’s beauty but chastises the “wicked” look in his eye.

St Mawr is the focus of the novel and of the protagonist’s disillusionment until their anticlimactic arrival in the American southwest. Louise and the grooms all display mixed feelings when they see that *St Mawr* takes so well to the ranch, and they are disappointed that he

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁹⁵ Lawrence, *St Mawr*, 146.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 146.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 146.

displays no resistance as he had in England. St. Mawr is left at the ranch in Texas and Lou later states that, “Even the illusion of the beautiful St. Mawr was gone.”⁹⁸ Glenn Willmott states that when she is immersed in English life, “the heroine needs St Mawr as a symbol...By the end of the story, she no longer needs either the property or the symbol, and can let him go. And St Mawr no longer needs her.”⁹⁹

Like the protagonist, her mother Rachel Witt is similarly dissatisfied with modern society, but is a foil for her daughter’s optimistic assertion that “I know, and there’s no altering it, that I’ve got to live differently. It sounds silly, but I don’t know how else to put it.”¹⁰⁰ Mrs. Witt states, “the sensible thing is to try and keep up the illusion. After all, as you say, you may be no better.”¹⁰¹ She nevertheless moves from Texas to New Mexico with Louise, leaving Lewis and St. Mawr behind, as she “can’t stand the sound of automobiles outside here another week,” but is cynical where her daughter is optimistic. Louise takes interest in the natural setting of Las Chivas much as she had taken interest in St. Mawr, almost replacing the latter with the former, stating “It is quiet on my ranch, mother: the stillness simply speaks,” to which Mrs. Witt replies, “I had rather it held its tongue. I am simply drugged with all the bad novels I have read. I feel as if the sky was a big cracked bell and a million clappers were hammering human speech out of it.”¹⁰²

This is a continuation of the idea set up previously that there is another world from which Mrs. Witt is excluded, as she is acclimated to a society set in opposition to, or bent on controlling “nature”. Mrs. Witt affirms the existence of both “The visible world, and the invisible. Or rather, the audible and the inaudible,” But “She had lived so long, and so completely, in the visible, audible world she would not easily admit that other, inaudible. She always wanted to jeer, as she approached the brink of it.”¹⁰³ When Mrs. Witt saw Phoenix and Lewis together “she knew there was another communion, silent, excluding her. And sometimes when Lewis was alone with St. Mawr: and once, when she saw him pick up a bird that had stunned itself against a wire: she had realized another world, silent, where each creature is alone in its own aura of silence, the mystery of power: as Lewis had power with St. Mawr, and even with Phoenix.”¹⁰⁴ As becomes clear, Mrs. Witt and Louise are similarly fixated on “otherness,” both idealizing those who seem to them to be living in other worlds. Regarding Lewis, Mrs. Witt feels that “...in spite of the fact that in actual life, in her world, he was only a groom, almost chetif, with his legs a little bit horsey and bowed,” he is nonetheless, “perhaps the only real entity to her.”¹⁰⁵ She attributes this effect to, “his seeming to inhabit another world than hers. A world dark and still, where language never ruffled the growing leaves, and seared their edges like a bad wind.”¹⁰⁶

What is at stake, it seems, is the ability to non-dominatively, or non-violently relate to others. This becomes clear in Louise’s conversation with Lewis, when she tries to convince him

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 157.

⁹⁹ Willmott, *Modern Animalism*, 62.

¹⁰⁰ Lawrence, *St Mawr*, 174.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 175.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 171.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 124.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 142.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 124.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 124.

to come along to America with St. Mawr despite his rejection of Mrs. Witt's marriage proposal. Louise says that Mrs. Witt's proposal was a momentary lapse of judgement, stating "She thinks if she feels moved by a man, it must result in marriage--or that kind of thing. Surely she makes a mistake... It seems to me men and women have really hurt one another so much, nowadays, that they had better stay apart till they have learned to be gentle with one another again. Not all this forced passion and destructive philandering. Men and women should stay apart, till their hearts grow gentle towards one another again. Now, it's only each one fighting for his own--or her own--underneath the cover of tenderness."¹⁰⁷

The novel ends on an ambiguous note with Lou purchasing a property in the mountains of New Mexico, "...new blood to the attack."¹⁰⁸ As Willmott states, the narrative message is not calling for a return to primitivism, or for mimicry of some essential horse or essential animal, as some have suggested. It is evident that the author was aware that the novel might be read as primitivist. Rather, on Willmott's reading, the message is that "...the human animal realizes itself, and enjoys wonder, in its very plasticity, the creative subjection of its nature to history."¹⁰⁹ The novel suggests that a non-dominative relationship to nature is possible, and depends on creatively imagining and enacting ways of life not dependent on mastery; relinquishing control does not mean resigning oneself to death or consigning the human species to extinction, because what plasticity indicates is transformative potential, or survival by other means.

III. Voice and Language, Emotion and Reason

The fact that animals instigate response presents a problem with their exclusion from the moral domain, because it produces an ineliminable sense of obligation to other animals, yet they are persistently said to lack the capacities necessary to make claims on our reason. If there is evidence that a particular species has the relevant human-like capacities, it seems to be enough to show that these capacities are more highly developed in humans to maintain the moral division. While the notion of biological continuity has led us to conceive of differences between humans and other animals as differences in degree, not in kind, there is still a strong tendency to reinstate a divide based on concepts such as language or other "higher" cognitive capacities.

After human-animal relations were put in evolutionary terms, language seems to have remained the sharpest dividing line between humans and all other species. There is a recurring tendency to see linguistic capacity as marking a difference in kind, one that maps onto political and ethical boundaries, at least as far back as Aristotle, and the centrality of language in the history of ethical and political thought since then is well-documented. Language is strongly associated with moral standing perhaps because of its link to the reasons-giving capacity fundamental to the second-person standpoint.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 142.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 171.

¹⁰⁹ Willmott, *Modern Animalism*, 63.

Both concepts, language and reason, remain highly contentious, particularly in that reason is said to be falsely pitted against emotion. Similarly, human language is loosely defined in opposition to other forms of expression (e.g. voice, speech, gesture), where the latter are associated with emotion. Both distinctions are apparently useful at the same time as they are continually called into question. Therefore we see continual attempts to deconstruct these dichotomies. The underlying intuition seems to be that the expression of emotion can be obligating; this intuition is problematic if we maintain that emotion and reason can be neatly distinguished, but looks plausible given that emotion and reason are so entangled as to be practically indistinguishable.

Through its link to reason, language remains central to much contemporary ethical and political thought. The idea that expressions of emotion are obligating is difficult to explicate without reconceiving emotional expression as a form of reasons-giving, and thus rethinking the divide between emotion and reason, or coming up with a different account of moral obligation. An example of the latter approach is the claim that our shared sense of suffering with other animals extends the moral domain beyond the human. This is perhaps the most common approach in animal rights literature, and appeals to evolutionary continuity and cross-species similarity. The former approach, based on I-thou or second-personal relations, is equally important because if as Darwall argues, the very ideas of wrong and moral obligation are rooted in second-personal address.¹¹⁰ Darwall's account, by showing that moral obligation comes from claims or demands made from one to another, shows why language and communication are so central to debates about the moral status of non-human animals.

Some combination of these two approaches is possible and would be worthwhile, because we seem to lack the theoretical resources for justifying seemingly self-evident responsibilities to non-human animals themselves. Instead, there are an abundance of ways to deny other animals the moral standing that would acknowledge their "claims" on our reason, or obligate us to them directly. Arguments for the moral standing of non-human animals, to the effect that humans have responsibilities directly to other animals, often phrase these relations in terms of claims and demands. Darwall suggests that although moral philosophy rarely ties moral obligation to second-personal authority, such a connection is implicitly assumed.¹¹¹ Unsurprisingly, this is also true of other disciplines tangential to moral philosophy. Because they implicitly or explicitly use second-personal concepts, debates about the ethics of human-animal relations might be read alongside Darwall's analysis of the second-person standpoint. The widespread use of these concepts supports Darwall's contention that moral obligation is fundamentally connected to second personal reasons, and can only be explicated in terms of a "circle" of second personal concepts. As Darwall summarizes:

"Second-personal reasons are invariably tied to a distinctively second-personal kind of practical authority: the authority to make a demand or claim. Making a claim or a demand as valid always presupposes the authority to make it and that the duly authorized claim

¹¹⁰ Darwall, *Second-Person*, 99.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 96.

creates a distinctive reason for compliance (a second-personal reason). Moreover, these notions all also involve the idea of responsibility or accountability. The authority to demand implies not just a reason for the addressee to comply, but also his being responsible for doing so. Conversely, accountability implies the authority to hold accountable, which implies the authority to claim or demand, which is the standing to address second-personal reasons. These notions--second-personal authority, valid claim or demand, second-personal reason, and responsibility to--therefore comprise an interdefinable circle; each implies all the rest. Moreover, I contend, there is no way to break into this circle from outside it. Propositions formulated only with normative and evaluative concepts that are not already implicitly second-personal cannot adequately ground propositions formulated with concepts within the circle.”¹¹²

This further explains why the standard approaches to animal ethics, those focused on welfare and/or rights, are inadequate. By relying solely on third-personal reasons, these approaches can not accommodate the sense in which other animals have claims or demands on us; that is, they do not allow other animals second-personal practical authority. As Darwall states, a third-personal reason, even if addressed second-personally, “...depends fundamentally on a person’s relations to facts and evidence as they are anyway, not on her relations to other rational cognizers.”¹¹³ Acknowledging that another agent has access to facts and evidence is different from acknowledging them second-personally. The former involves “epistemic authority of the ordinary third-personal kind,” whereas the latter involves practical authority of an irreducibly second-personal kind that cannot be reduced to the former.¹¹⁴ The significance of the latter is that the other may address “a reason that would not exist but for her authority to address it through her command.”¹¹⁵

Darwall states that from the second-person standpoint we get a perspective on our own agency that is crucial to understanding moral responsibility; from this perspective we see that bringing about valuable states is not the only principle guiding practical reason.¹¹⁶ On the contrary, in taking up the second-person standpoint, “..we recognize a kind of reason for acting, a second-personal reason, that neither derives from nor is reducible to any value of states or outcomes. And in so doing, we recognize a practical standing that is fundamentally second-personal, which neither depends upon nor can be defeated by the other’s relation to any independent order of value, that is, by whatever facts there may be about how the world should be.”¹¹⁷ Second-personal reasons are not “agent-neutral,” but “agent-relative,” deriving from agents’ relations to one another, and would not exist but for their role in second-personal address.¹¹⁸

¹¹² Ibid., 11-12.

¹¹³ Ibid., 12.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 12.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 13.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 287.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 288.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 8.

Darwall anticipates the objection that even though his account can accommodate moral obligations concerning other species, "...there is no place in it for the idea that these obligations are owed to the beings themselves if they lack second-personal competence and so, according to my argument, the authority to demand anything."¹¹⁹ Though he does not address the issue in detail, he states that "the kind of view I develop may have resources for response even here," and suggests that moral obligations to beings who lack second-personal competence would have to be elaborated in terms of, "...“trustees” (for example, the moral community’s) authority to demand certain treatment on their behalf (perhaps also to claim certain rights, compensation, and so on, for them)."¹²⁰ He also states that if indeed we find it natural to think that we owe obligations to non-rational beings, this is because we impute to them "a proto- or quasi-second personality, for example, as when we see an animal’s or an infant’s cry as a form of complaint."¹²¹ That other animals are not imputed "full" second-personality suggests that we are reluctant to consider the idea that non-human animals are persons, even though our actions and reactions sometimes presume as much.

As shown by Tobias Menely in *The Animal Claim: Sensibility and the Creaturely Voice*, this problem of distinguishing humans from other animals has long vexed the moral philosophical tradition in which Darwall explicates the concept of moral obligation. The dichotomies between reason and emotion and between linguistic and non-linguistic expression have long been illustrated by reference to a human/animal boundary. Menely finds, in philosophical precursors to liberal contract theories that presume an ontological distinction between humans and other animals, attempts to work through the relationship between the terms in these dichotomies. This tension is more deeply inscribed in the history of philosophy than might be expected, given how reason is said to be elevated above emotion and language above other forms of expression.

Menely denotes the long eighteenth century ‘The Age of Sensibility’, to mark the development of "...a novel conceptualization of the significance of vocal and bodily expressivity, the prelinguistic semiosis humans share with other animals."¹²² Thinkers in this tradition posited continuity between humans and other animals with respect to communicative capacities; "Sensibility expands and revalues the domain of communication Aristotle had identified with the voice (*phone*)... Writers of sensibility did not deny the distinctive properties of conventional language, such as the conceptual abstraction facilitated by the arbitrary linguistic sign. They tended to emphasize, however, the formal and genealogical continuity between natural and instituted signs, creaturely voice and human speech."¹²³ Nevertheless they almost inevitably reinscribe a moral division by treating the human as given.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 29.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 29.

¹²¹ Ibid., 29.

¹²² Menely, *Animal Claim*, 1.

¹²³ Ibid., 2-3.

Hobbes follows Aristotle in describing the activity of imagination in semiotic terms, as the construction of mental “representations” of objects in the world.¹²⁴ Hobbes’ view, as summarized by Menely, is that, “Imagination depends on a principle of mimetic iterativity, the re-presenting of objects as mental images, which may be compared in the mind, offering a form of preverbal categorical knowledge. Hobbes explicitly describes this principle in terms of a nonlinguistic “signe” function. Signs enable imaginative cognition and also offer a means of conveying information to others, most significantly information about our passions.”¹²⁵ Whereas words may be used arbitrarily, physical activity and actions are the best, most certain signs of passions. These affective signs are how animals communicate, says Hobbes, but they also may comprehend conventional signs such as words; such comprehension requires the faculty of imagining and yields understanding, a faculty “common to Man and Beast.”¹²⁶ (Hobbes cited in Menely) Hobbes describes a preverbal form of communication, involving nonlinguistic signs/representations, upon which language is built. Preverbal communication is associated with “passions,” whereas verbal language is associated with rational reflection, and it quickly follows that advanced cognitive abstraction depends uniquely on the verbal sign. Other animals can comprehend but not communicate commonality, because only with words can one represent what particulars have in common.¹²⁷

This strict division between linguistic and nonlinguistic thought renders cooperative animal life a mystery, and Hobbes must therefore explain how beings such as ants and bees live in natural communities.¹²⁸ He decides that they do so on account of emotional propensities against competitiveness and envy, as well as some minimal use of voice that allows them to express “desires, and other affections.”¹²⁹ Human language, on Hobbes’ account, reflects the fallibility of linguistic reasoning. Compared to the certainty of gestural communication of the passions, linguistic communication necessitates some ‘Arbitrator’, whose authority comes from the capacity “to inscribe violence on the body, to compel subjects by intensifying their anxious sense of corporeal vulnerability.”¹³⁰ As Menely summarizes, “To become a subject, for Hobbes, is not to speak but to listen, to be constituted—as a fearful, hopeful, and desirous being—within the field of representation maintained by sovereign power. A subject is one who is addressed by a sovereign whose very beastliness gives him the authority to speak.”¹³¹ As Menely argues, and as Hobbes recognized, it remains to be seen how this conception of language as a capacity to be addressed distinguishes humans, “made subject by a linguistic authority substantiated on the impassioned body,”¹³² from other animals.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 51.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 51.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 53.

Hobbes's argument anticipates liberal contractualism; his view is that while animals may understand signs, only humans enter into dialogue, negotiate, and make promises.¹³³ Yet Menely notes that there is a contradiction built into Hobbes' account of language and reason:

“Sovereignty, for Hobbes, is the presymbolic power to produce the symbolism that figures forth human and animal, the focalizing mark of the brutality that preserves justice. Yet when Hobbes speaks of the status of animals in the commonwealth, he defines them in relation to a human who always already shows the reflective capacity to speak and make promises.”¹³⁴ The problem is that Hobbes presumes the exceptionality and transcendence of human linguistic reason; “...when Hobbes speaks of humans, he treats them as natural creatures whose political status is contingent on the appearance of a sovereign authority that constitutes them as such. When he speaks of animals, by contrast, he distinguishes them from humans whose status as self-present linguistic beings is given before any political, performative intervention.”¹³⁵ His account is built on a comparison between humans and animals, where the human is treated as given; that is, he resorts to anthropomorphism, where “To use an anthropomorphism is to treat as known what the properties of the human are.”¹³⁶ Hobbes, “when confronted with the question of the animal, rediscovers the human as the unique animal that can say exactly what he means,” thus departing from his aim to provide a naturalistic account of politics and fully nominalist account of the “human.”¹³⁷ Hobbes figuratively invokes animals to describe how linguistic reason supposedly distinguishes humans from other creatures, and this is because he recognizes “a figural quality intrinsic to all linguistic meaning,” and furthermore, “the inescapably creatural foundations of any knowledge or communication.”¹³⁸

Menely's reading of Hobbes is especially pertinent because many contemporary moral philosophers similarly posit the uniqueness of human language and its connection to reason, and circularly invoke the human-animal divide to justify human exceptionalism. The notion of non-linguistic thought already complicates the idea that the reasons-giving capacity central to moral obligation is uniquely connected to (human) language. Without specifying the difference between linguistic and nonlinguistic communication, such that only the former can be morally obligatory, it seems as though invoking language as the basis of moral obligation is circularly rooted in an anthropocentric definition of language.

Presupposing vs. imposing speech upon personified animals

Fiction involving animal narration is especially conducive to an exploration of how language impinges on human-animal relations. Scholtmeijer points out that animal speech plays

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 51.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 54.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 55.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 55.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 55.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 53.

qualitatively different roles in different works of fiction, depending on how it is contextualized.¹³⁹ The qualitative difference between works that presuppose animal speech versus those that impose speech upon personified animals marks two different ways of representing non-human animals; one erases difference and the other uses language to convey phenomenological difference. In the latter mode, language may serve as, “a mechanism for the dissemination of difference.”¹⁴⁰

Therefore, we should not assume that animal speech in fiction is necessarily an imposition of human speech on personified animals, at least not in the way that animal fables for instance blatantly use animals to voice human moral concerns. In contrast, fictional animal language may be “naturalized” in the context of a mythical or magical world, either to illustrate phenomenological or ethical difference, or to gesture toward an external perspective on human culture. Non-human animals often symbolize the possibility of having an external and therefore more objective view of human culture, as when they are represented as “witnesses” of human action, particularly acts of violence. This symbolic role is in some sense reductive, but it also leaves open the precise relationship between humans and non-human animals. The use of animals as symbols of otherness can be seen as commenting on but not necessarily offering positive solutions to the relegation of animals to the boundaries of modern life and morality.

Non-human language is naturalized in the context of Haruki Murakami’s *Kafka on the Shore*, meaning that the cats in this novel are supposed to be speaking their own language and not a human language. Presupposing animal speech is used to bypass issues of imaginative projection. The cats convey their own personalities in speech, and therefore the reader gets to know them without imagining their subjective experience. It is crucial to the plot that the reader may suspend doubts about cross-species animal communication between Nakata, an elderly man, and the missing cats he helps to return to their homes, because, as stated by Willmott, “[the cats’] knowledge (and, in their murder, their suffering) plays a role in the conjunction of the characters’ fates.”¹⁴¹ Willmott states that the cats in *Kafka on the Shore* thus function as mediators between worlds.¹⁴² They provide Nakata with crucial information that moves the plot forward, directing his actions. Aside from emphasizing continuity between human and non-human characters, (or rather, declining to posit ontological differences between humans and other animals) Murakami links violence against humans to violence against animals. This link is most apparent in the unexplained connection between the protagonist’s father and a serial cat-killer who takes the form of whiskey icon Johnnie Walker. Furthermore, as stated by Willmott, Johnnie Walker’s familiarity as a commercial icon links the “horrific genocide” that he enacts upon animals to consumerism.

Creating a character with the ability to speak to cats sets up the scene that Willmott refers to here, and which I will discuss further in the next section, in which I focus on how the novel

¹³⁹ Ibid., 259.

¹⁴⁰ Wolfe, *Faux Post-Humanism*, 144.

¹⁴¹ Willmott, *Modern Animalism*, 72.

¹⁴² Ibid., 72.

thematizes responsibility. Presuming animal speech is another way to get at the assumption underlying an aesthetics of care, that the “appeals” of nature exist whether or not we are sensitized to them. One could even read the novel as presuming such a philosophy, on a more abstract level beyond the fact that Nakata literally converses with cats. Scholtmeijer argues that the representation of speaking animals is one way in which “...modern culture, in its own inept fashion, is attempting to penetrate the silence of the animal and comprehend animal language. Fiction, and myth, aids the dull human consciousness to break through the barrier thrown up by scientific cynicism. In conjunction with the creative imagination, ethics lends rational value to animal speech.”¹⁴³ Scholtmeijer claims that such works have an ethical dimension because animal speech is given rational value and is thus tied to their status as ends rather than means. The rational value of animal speech need not be made explicit to serve the purpose “of discomposing settled belief in the blankness of animal consciousness.”¹⁴⁴ She argues that the presupposition of animal speech may foster an ethical sensibility capable of giving standing to non-human animals.

The next author I will discuss does not explicitly invoke animal speech, however, as Isabel Karremann states, “The ability of animals, plants, rock and landscapes to produce signs that mislead human agency and thought – and thus to mock anthropocentric presumptions – is everywhere at work in the poetry of John Clare.”¹⁴⁵ Invoking Anat Pick’s formulation of “the creaturely” as a category for working through the human-animal divide, Karremann states that embodiment is key to a “creaturely poetics,” a decentered reading practice privileging non-human perspectives or frames of reference.¹⁴⁶ As a condition shared among all animals, embodiment counters claims of human exceptionality and autonomy. She reads John Clare’s poems as affirming that embodiment is the condition of subjection but also a source of subjectivity and meaning.¹⁴⁷ As stated by Pick,

Embodiment ... provides a critical space for thinking the human outside Cartesian abstractionism, as rigorously material ... it is not a matter of taking the body out of discourse as some pure precultural matter, but of looking at how notions of embodiment – the material, the anonymous, the elemental – provide a powerful antidote to anthropocentrism.¹⁴⁸ (Pick cited in Karreman)

This provides a theoretical basis for understanding Clare’s representations of human-animal relations.

The ecological awareness and political urgency of John Clare’s poems comes from his observation of the destructive effects of the enclosure movements of the early nineteenth century on various forms of life, which contributed to his impulse to both document and voice flora and fauna, a matter that seems to have become more urgent in his later works. The Enclosure Acts

¹⁴³ Scholtmeijer, *Animal Victims*, 260.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 260.

¹⁴⁵ Karremann, *Human/Animal*, 98.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 96.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 96.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 96.

privatized land that was previously part of the commons. The town of Helpston, where Clare lived through early adulthood, and which was previously laid out on a circular grid, was fully enclosed by 1820.¹⁴⁹ Nostalgia for an unenclosed rural living space, which he associates with freedom for humans and animals, is one of the most salient aspects of Clare's poems. Miller states that in the poem "The mores," for example, enclosure "...clutters and disintegrates the open landscape with directive signs and insurmountable fences. These labels and barriers impair the freedom of the terrain. This freedom consists especially in the ease of errancy, which deflects utilitarian purposiveness and dissolves classificatory compartments."¹⁵⁰ In the poem, both the "following eye" (7) and the "wandering scene" (9) are in motion; and the epithet, states Miller, "is lively, liable to transposition from subject to object and back again."¹⁵¹ He states that the moors in this poem represent "ground not plowed into those "classes" and "orders" that the masters of language, natural history, and society impose,"¹⁵² and also, "a porous world in which the poor can evade utter servitude and nature can wander in and out of cultural subjugation."¹⁵³ Miller notes that the unenclosed landscape familiar to Clare was literally circular, and Clare contrasts circulation and movement with the taxonomic "will to enforce ultimate immobility, to deny the dynamic integrity of an environment."¹⁵⁴

In "The Lament of Swordy Well," Clare personifies an ancient stone quarry and local piece of common ground, lamenting the signs of ecological instability that as Paul suggests, Clare may have seen earlier than most.¹⁵⁵ The animals in this poem are ascribed the same feelings of disempowerment and unnatural exclusion as the lower classes: "The bees flye round in feeble rings / & find no blossom bye / Then thrum their almost weary wings / Upon the moss & die / Rabbits that find my hills turned oer / Forsake my poor abode / They dread a workhouse like the poor / & nibble on the road" (10.1-10.8).¹⁵⁶ Clare is said to have had "an early ecologically minded, worm's-eye-view of his times," because he portrays the fencing in of common areas not as usurping traditional rights or ancient custom, but "as a crime against the animals, birds, insects, trees, flowers, rivers and streams themselves," that threatened "organic symbiosis with nature."¹⁵⁷ Paul's comments reflect the recent tendency to read Clare as a precursor to ecocriticism. Paul states that as the son of a cottage farmer in Helpstone, Northamptonshire, Clare's poetic response to these events provides rare insight into the reaction of a member of the lower classes to enclosure, and suggests that Clare's personal experience of work on the land gave him "a sense of physical and spiritual identification with the soil."¹⁵⁸ According to Paul, this connection to nature, coupled with anger at its pollution and

¹⁴⁹ McAlpine, *Keeping Nature*, 90.

¹⁵⁰ Miller, *Enclosure*, 643-44.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 645.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 644.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 645.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 643.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁵⁷ Paul, *A Language*, 28.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 34.

mismanagement, accounts for the ecological awareness and political urgency of Clare's poems.¹⁵⁹ Clare's representation of animals, however, shifts in tone over the course of his writing career.

While his earlier animal poems focus on animal *umwelt*, his later poems include "primal portraits of tortured animal bodies,"¹⁶⁰ which in part reflects concern for the fates of animals post-enclosure. As Washington states, "In Clare's vision, enclosure's reach extends beyond public spaces, transforming the private lairs of animals into confrontational staging grounds between humans and animals."¹⁶¹ In the poem "The Fallen Elm," for example, "The common heath, became the spoiler's prey / The rabbit had not where to make his den" (5.10-5.11).¹⁶² As stated by Castellano, "The Fallen Elm" equates abstract notions of liberal rights with socially destructive self-interest,¹⁶³ and across Clare's works, "he poetically establishes a common ground among forms of life that are being appropriated into property (land, trees, animals, the poor)."¹⁶⁴ This interconnectedness is not narcissistic, according to Castellano, "...but rather illustrates the tragic hubris of liberal conceptions of human freedom,"¹⁶⁵ and is realized in the shared suffering and displacement which for Clare, links the marginalized poor with non-human animal victims. The anthropomorphism and zoomorphism of Clare's poetry, "...instead of positing a comforting underlying substance or narcissistic fantasy of wholeness, uncannily exposes the irrational underside of claims to property and other individualist rights."¹⁶⁶ He conveys the self-condemning hypocrisy of the encloser's invocation of "freedom", "liberty," or "rights" to sanction greed, but according to Washington, "...he continued to have faith in the word and its power to assert its true meaning even within the discourse of those who tried to preempt its meaning."¹⁶⁷ The enclosers, as Washington states, "speak a language less human than the language of his beloved elm tree,"¹⁶⁸ : "With axe at root he felled thee to the ground / And barked of freedom - O I hate that sound" (4.13-4.14).¹⁶⁹

McAlpine points out that despite critical attention to the similarities between the poet and the animals he describes, both displaced by enclosure, Clare himself rarely makes such gestures of comparison.¹⁷⁰ However, despite the fact that Clare is "most reluctant to use the natural world to describe his own mind,"¹⁷¹ he does seem "both to identify with and separate himself from his

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 34.

¹⁶⁰ Washington, John Clare, 666.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 665.

¹⁶² Clare, Major Works, 98.

¹⁶³ Castellano, Anthropomorphism, 155.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 143.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 156.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 156.

¹⁶⁷ Washington, John Clare, 52.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 52.

¹⁶⁹ Clare, Major Works, 98.

¹⁷⁰ McAlpine, Keeping Nature, 89.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 87.

subject simultaneously.”¹⁷² This suggests that he moves beyond the tendency among modern authors to, as Scholtmeijer states, “[vacillate] wildly between empirical and anthropomorphic abstraction.”¹⁷³ McAlpine argues that Clare develops an “intermediate mode of seeing” that avoids both sentimentalism and stark objectivity.¹⁷⁴ His poems contain successions of images so varied and spatially distinct that the implied vantage points are often incompatible.¹⁷⁵ Furthermore, images are presented as if they are all seen at the same time even though it would be impossible to see them as such.¹⁷⁶ Even though the poem “Emmonsails Heath in Winter” begins “I love to see,” the poet’s eye, states McAlpine, “is less significant to the scene than he would have us believe in line one,” because the rest of the poem is so disorienting for the would-be human observer.¹⁷⁷

As McAlpine shows, Clare de-prioritizes his own perspective or the perspective of the human eye even in poems represented through the point of view of a human.¹⁷⁸ For example, in “Sheep in Winter,” neither the absent speaker nor the boy who appears in the middle of the sonnet detract attention from the sheep with which the poem begins and ends. McAlpine points out that Clare uses strong and memorable verbs to describe the movements of the sheep, whereas the boy is introduced as the grammatical object of a preposition, not the subject of his own verb,¹⁷⁹ as the sheep “...go noising round / The boy that pecks the turnips all the day / & knocks his hands to keep the cold away / & laps his legs in straw to keep them warm / & hides behind the hedges from the storm,” (1.5-1.8)¹⁸⁰ surrounding him by the sheep in the imagined scene and in the poem itself.

As McAlpine shows, although Clare has been likened to other Romantic poets for his view of the interconnectedness of art and nature, his manner of description precludes the depth of knowledge of and communion with nature sought openly by other naturalist poets.¹⁸¹ When thought enters Clare’s poems it is “sudden” and the poet does not dwell on his own experience of “wonder,” which as suggested by McAlpine, stops short of knowledge or wisdom.¹⁸² She ties this to the poet’s “anxiety over the trespass that knowing might create.”¹⁸³ In Clare’s poems, the perception of one image simply leads to the perception of another, constituting a different mode of sight than that typical of Romantic poems, which often end in theoretical musing or sentimentalism.¹⁸⁴

¹⁷² Ibid., 88.

¹⁷³ Scholtmeijer, *Animal Victims*, 326.

¹⁷⁴ McAlpine, *Keeping Nature*, 101.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 92.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 93.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 93.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 90.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 80.

¹⁸⁰ Clare, *Major Works*, 263.

¹⁸¹ McAlpine, *Keeping Nature*, 81.

¹⁸² Ibid., 94.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 94.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 101.

The newfound emphasis on animal suffering and death in Clare's later poems is a shift encapsulated in "The Badger," the only one in which the featured animal dies. Washington states that his later attention to animal suffering is not a feint for a more fundamental message about rural laborers, because his is an ecological vision of interconnectedness among living things. Clare, states Washington, "does not view animals as anthropomorphic grist for poetic mills, but as sentient, autonomous creatures who hurt, who suffer, and who die painful deaths. His formal experimentation thereby presents a challenge to observe, as he does, the real world of animal others to which he fears the life-altering events of modernity will blind us."¹⁸⁵ One could still read these poems as using animal death to heighten the immeasurable losses to human "personal happiness, dignity, creativity, and freedom,"¹⁸⁶ sustained by rural laborers after enclosure. However these losses are rooted in a shifting relationship to nature, due to "the encloser's refusal to acknowledge any relationship between man and nature which was not predicated upon possession."¹⁸⁷ The badger in Clare's poem could be seen as a vehicle for metaphor, but as in "Sheep in Winter," Clare inventively directs attention to animals themselves.

As Washington states, in the poem's opening -- "the badger grunting along his woodland track" (1) -- the badger is foregrounded as the subject and located in action within his habitat.¹⁸⁸ Washington states that the empirical observational description in "The Badger" is sparser than in Clare's other poems, such as his quasi-taxonomic descriptions of birds' nests, but its details are no less informative.¹⁸⁹ Careful attention is paid to the badger's appearance and actions, however "once humans appear on the scene, they receive a cursory, and obfuscatory, generalized grouping...with the dogs subjugated to their masters' purpose to chase the badger, another instance of human violence towards animals.... they are simple, universally undistinguished and indistinguishable groups: 'the crowd' and 'all'."¹⁹⁰ In contrast to the thin sketches of human characters, "the badger claims nearly all of the strongest, present-tense, active verbs in the poem."¹⁹¹ The poem, Washington states, "creates a faceless community of human killers,"¹⁹² however it does not explicitly make moral pronouncements, and it thereby also "evacuates the privileged human authority of the speaking voice and attempts to fulfill the tacit promise of prosopopoeia: to manifest a non-human voice decoupled from the human voice."¹⁹³

The issue of the "aestheticization" of animal suffering is central to Josephine Donovan's theorization of an 'aesthetics of care.' By condemning representations in which "the ethical reality of the actual existing being is subordinated to another, aesthetic purpose,"¹⁹⁴ Donovan raises the question of what an ethical aesthetics of animal representation would entail.

¹⁸⁵ Washington, John Clare, 667.

¹⁸⁶ Clare, John Clare, 36.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹⁸⁸ Washington, John Clare, 673.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 673.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 673.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 674.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 673.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 674.

¹⁹⁴ Donovan, *Aesthetics of Care*, 49.

Using animals to say something about humans can be harmless, as in Donovan's example of describing a dancer as having "gazelle-like grace."¹⁹⁵ At the other end of the spectrum, she writes that a morally objectionable metaphor concerning a gazelle occurs in Tim O'Brien's novel *The Things They Carried*, in which a hunter inflicts a slow death upon a gazelle to express anguish at his wife's decision to leave him, the point being, as Donovan suggests, "to show how upset the G.I. is and/or how war brings out the worst in everyone."¹⁹⁶ This is a clear-cut example of how "an ethical subject is transposed into an aesthetic object," producing a dispassionate spectator. That this is such common practice in the arts is why Donovan and others state that a "dominative Cartesian/Kantian ethos" is the basis of the prevailing aesthetics of modernity. The formalist aesthetics of modernity, states Donovan, relegates living beings to the status of objects to be dominated or 'civilized.' This aesthetic sensibility is tied to the foundation of modern humanism, the enactment of a difference between man and nature, whereby man defines himself by separating himself from a natural state in which animals are supposedly confined.

There are numerous works of contemporary Avant Garde art that aestheticize animals in this way; "violating bodily integrity and thereby its inherent dignity, it also necessarily denies the subjecthood of the animal, cruelly reducing her to the status of object to be manipulated for human aesthetic purposes."¹⁹⁷ Donovan is referring here to contemporary artist Eduardo Kac's genetically modified "glowing bunny," which he named Alba. More common in literature and film is the representation of animals as stand-ins for humans, or using an animal as an "objectified vehicle through which to reveal or express human feelings." As exemplified by Tim O'Brien's representation of a gazelle in *The Things They Carried*, this often involves exploiting animal pain for aesthetic effect. Donovan describes a host of examples of literature in which "the animal's death is of interest only for its effect on the human characters and/or as a vehicle to dramatize human relations and feelings," cases in which "the author is using the pathos of the death of an innocent animal to create a powerful aesthetic effect."¹⁹⁸ Were our attention drawn to the animals' suffering, states Donovan, the anthropocentric aesthetic design of the works would be disrupted.¹⁹⁹ Theorizing an aesthetics of care shows that there are other modes of aesthetic perception, and that aesthetics is not necessarily defined by disinterestedness.

Stories in which an animal's suffering is depicted to make a point about human characters are aesthetically satisfying in how they dramatize human emotions, but "in their transposition of an ethical subject into an aesthetic object, they require the sacrifice of the animal as an independent being to human aesthetic interests."²⁰⁰ If the reader pays attention to the animal's suffering in these cases, it comes across as gratuitous and the work's intended effect is weakened.²⁰¹ Many uses of animals in fiction demonstrate discomfort with the aestheticization

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 47.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 48.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 46.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 48-49.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 48.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 48.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 48.

of animal suffering. If not, the work is clearly unethical according to an aesthetics of care. Examples that demonstrate discomfort with representing animal suffering shows that authors evidently find it worthwhile to attempt, perhaps unsuccessfully, to represent the realities of non-human animal lives.²⁰²

It is an open question whether and how representations of cruelty can positively contribute to improving the lives of real animals, and many attempts to do so can be seen as working this out in practice. Because representations of animals admit of so many interpretations, it is difficult to assess with any finality the extent to which a given author enacts an aesthetic of care in representing animals.

Depicting victimized animals may seem tangential to questions of animal agency, and the potential for animals to contribute positively to their own representation. At times Donovan suggests that any depiction of human violence against animals makes itself complicit, inevitably reproducing the logic it seeks to overcome. However, in choosing how to portray animal lives, it may seem disingenuous not to somehow represent the fact that many animals are subjected almost entirely to human use. Una Chaudhuri cites the statistic that, "...98 percent of all animals with whom humans interact in any way, even including pets and zoo and circus animals, are farmed animals—that is, bred for human use (Wolfson and Sullivan 2004:206). An amazing statistic indeed: not only does it tell us that we eat animals much more than we do anything else with them; it should also help us to recognize that the self-identification as animal lovers that we perform every day in our homes (and on Sundays when we drag the kids around the zoo) is part of a paper-thin but rock-hard veneer on an animal culture of staggering violence and exploitation."²⁰³ The scale of this problem shows that there is no simple solution and no easy way to respond. While there may be some complicity in representing violence against animals, the compulsion to do so may be in part an attempt to convey the reality of animals in modernity. The risk in trying to represent an individual animal as an ethical subject is that our attention may be drawn mostly to our own experience of pity rather than thinking about the value animal life has for itself and how this independence might be acknowledged.

Washington argues that John Clare's poem "The Badger," deals directly with this problem of the figural nature of animal representation; "...the poem observes, and forces the reader to observe, its own observance of what it does not see: the real badgers being abused by human beings in the actual world."²⁰⁴ Washington concludes that though we are literally only drawn to the words on the page, "the ethical charge" of the poem "redirects us to our misdirected focus: the real animal."²⁰⁵ It does this by emphasizing the "literal blind spot" between reality and representation, which "is not inert, though, and indeed, its invisibility calls the eye to its presence."²⁰⁶ Washington states that the ethical force of the poem comes from noticing this

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 49.

²⁰³ Chaudhuri, (De)Facing, 10.

²⁰⁴ Washington, John Clare, 676.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 676.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 676.

“visceral gap between reality and representation.”²⁰⁷ In failing to bridge this gap, “the poem turns the reader’s attention to the problem of prosopopoeia - the need to observe, to become conscious of, failures of conscious observation.”²⁰⁸

Donovan states that literature is uniquely capable of giving voice to fellow creatures, to imagine and articulate various points of view, despite the fact that authors, especially in the modern era, have failed in this endeavor with respect to non-human animals.²⁰⁹ Animal standpoint critics, she states, draw attention to the “critical blindness that often accompanies animal representation, questioning the absences and elisions, the lapses and lacunae in texts where animals appear.”²¹⁰ Following in this vein, Donovan’s central examples are where animals’ suffering is neglected by the author, for example in the depiction of horse drawn coaches, and she states that such critical impercipient comes from, and perpetuate, speciesist assumptions.²¹¹ The same tendency pervades the theoretical literature, however to reduce or ignore the animals that feature in literary texts now seems like blatant carelessness.²¹² For example, Wordsworth scholars, states Donovan, have long managed to write about the poem “Hart-Leap Well,” without acknowledging the suffering of the deer that is the subject of this poem.²¹³ In contrast, more recently, critics have insisted that the hart’s suffering is not as a figure for more noteworthy forms of human suffering, but is a subject of ethical interest in itself; the poem is an example of taking animal experience seriously.²¹⁴

Something similar can be said of the philosophical literature, in that as Menely shows, the attention given to animals by key figures in the history of philosophy has gone largely unnoticed in the standard readings of their texts. Though the goal of many of these philosophical texts seems to be, as Hache and Latour argue, to minimize the significance of animals or to “desensitize” us to their claims, this habit is reproduced in their reception. As Menely also shows, and as the growing interest in ‘the animal question’ suggests, the arguments whereby philosophers deny ‘the animal claim’ are flawed. Much of the cross-disciplinary work in animal studies assumes as much, and attempts to pinpoint exactly how the standard view of non-human animals goes wrong and /or develops an alternative world view.

Returning to literary fiction, Donovan states that it is crucial, according to animal standpoint critics, to focus on individual creatures rather than abstract generalities such as species and ecosystems.²¹⁵ Writers have an obligation, Donovan states, to try to “represent the animal’s being directly,”²¹⁶ rather than as a stand-in for its species or for ‘the animal’ or as metaphor for human beings. She contrasts authors who turn animal stories into metaphor for

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 676.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 676.

²⁰⁹ Donovan, *Aesthetics of Care*, 99.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 99.

²¹¹ Ibid., 99.

²¹² Ibid., 99.

²¹³ Ibid., 99.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 100.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 100.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 101.

those who attend to animals as animals, and acknowledge the individual animal as “thou,” thereby resisting figuration and “allowing it its own expression and vitality.”²¹⁷ In a variety of ways, authors may convince us that the literal referent has “a being that is valuable and worthy of attention.”²¹⁸

IV. Responsibility

There ought to be room for more things, for a spreading out, like. Being immersed in the details of rock and field and slope — letting them come to you for once, and then meeting them halfway would be so much easier — if they took an ingenuous pride in being in people’s blood. Alas, we perceive them if at all as those things that were meant to be put aside--costumes of the supporting actors or voice trilling at the end of a narrow enclosed street. You can do nothing with them. Not even offer to pay.

- John Ashbery, excerpt from *For John Clare*

In *Morality or Moralism: An Exercise in Sensitization*, Hache and Latour argue that the ability to “suspend belief in any a priori division between beings capable and beings incapable of obliging us to respond to their call,” is constitutive of morality.²¹⁹ Morality entails holding open the question of means and ends, where the ‘hesitation’ with which such questions are held open is crucial. Resisting whatever tendency there is to decide moral questions on the basis of preformed categories entails a sensitivity to a different kind of appeal, to which there is a learned sensitivity characteristic of what the authors deem ‘moralism.’²²⁰ Foreclosing moral questions by mapping moral standing onto divisions in kind such as that between human and nonhuman animals constitutes moralism.

The authors proceed in this paper by reversing the usual way of thinking about the scope of morality. The epistemological tradition they criticize is marked by separations between nature and culture and between facts and values, where non-human animals are relegated to nature and are outside the scope of morality. This presumes ‘the human’ as given, such that, “So long as objects are taken for what the epistemological tradition has made of them, it will always seem ridiculous to lengthen the list of beings to whose call we should respond scrupulously; doing so will only be seen, in the context of modern epistemology, as contemptible anthropomorphism.”²²¹ What we know about other animals cannot be accommodated by this epistemological tradition or the moral theory associated with it, because animals are increasingly recognized as autonomous sources of knowledge and values. To accommodate these insights, to make them more readily apparent, the authors reverse the standard view, stating that, “What we

²¹⁷ Ibid., 91.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 104.

²¹⁹ Hache & Latour, *Morality or Moralism*, 312.

²²⁰ Ibid., 321.

²²¹ Ibid., 324.

should find amazing are the strange operations whereby we have constantly restricted the list of beings to whose appeal we should have been able to respond. From this point of view, there is nothing less “natural” than philosophical modernism.”²²²

They suggest that is more “natural” to think not of an extension of moral concern beyond the human, but of a sensitization to matters of concern that have historically required laborious and unsound arguments to dismiss. This reversal allows them to articulate a view that is perhaps closer to experience, one that can accommodate the sense in which we are already in relation with, and have direct responsibilities to, nonhuman animals. Their reading of the history of philosophy shows that this is not a recent sensibility toward which we are progressing but a pervasive one that has been continually stifled. In key texts such as Immanuel Kant’s *Critique of Judgement*, which have been read as unambiguously speciesist, they find evidence of “...the extraordinary difficulty that philosophers must have faced, a bit more than two centuries ago, when immunizing themselves against the evidence—contrary to their own arguments—of a proliferation of moral subjects calling out for scrupulous treatment.”²²³ The difficulty with which philosophy has attempted to restrict morality to human beings is reflective of how difficult it is to “silence one’s scruples,” which is why “modernism in philosophy was a brief parenthesis in intellectual history.”²²⁴ With hindsight, they state, “...its moral philosophy and epistemology must strike us as aberrant.”²²⁵

The authors map these two opposing views of morality, one that sees moral progress as the reasoned extension of rights and the other as a return to sensibility, onto different conceptions of science. They argue that moral sensibility is incompatible with the view that scientific objectivity depends on being able to separate facts from values. The certainty of moralism, “...its lack of scruple regarding the distribution of beings relevant to morality,” comes from a particular view of scientific facts, which are accorded “...an objectivity so total that the sciences can have nothing to say about values.”²²⁶ In this way moral questions are linked to basic questions about the sciences, “...since the fact-value distinction is possible only if one embraces a conception of nature that empties the world of morally consequential yet nonhuman beings.”²²⁷ To moralistically distinguish between humans and nonhumans on a scale of “moral” value, “...it must be possible to show that facts and values are kept rigorously separate,” and that morality-bearing subjects are always considered as ends, never as means, while the “mere objects” may serve as means and never be considered as ends.²²⁸ If instead the means-ends distinction is necessarily open, then moral sense is a matter of hesitation regarding decisions concerning means and ends, and the scale of values becomes defined by “...its relative indifference to the nature of beings (human or nonhuman, it matters little) and by the quality of the attention it pays

²²² Ibid., 325.

²²³ Ibid., 326.

²²⁴ Ibid., 326.

²²⁵ Ibid., 326.

²²⁶ Ibid., 316.

²²⁷ Ibid., 321.

²²⁸ Ibid., 324.

to their appeals (an attempt is made to respond to them, and one thereby becomes responsible for them).”²²⁹

Timothy Morton makes some similar points in articulating an ‘ecology without Nature,’ which he describes as “an endless network of strange strangeness,” involving a “radical openness to non-identity.”²³⁰ Morton states that this entails a view close to traditional animism, a term which must be put “under erasure” for its essentialism.²³¹ On his view, a non-anthropocentric view of Nature would regard all beings as people with whom one is always already in a social relation, “...prior to any specific concept of social formation—prior, in fact, to any ontology.”²³² Morton presents this as a non-essentialist way to imagine collectivity (which he distinguishes from community) while preserving difference, where the relevant differences are not between humans and animals but concern singularity/uniqueness.²³³ On Morton’s view, the decision to coexist cannot revert to biospheric holism and reciprocal responsibility, but “must instead reside in the singularity of, and conscious commitment to, the other.”²³⁴ Like Hache and Latour’s account, Morton’s ‘ecology without Nature’ suggests that a relational perspective involving responsiveness is constitutive of morality. Morton emphasizes that social relationships are guided by subjective difference not grounded in identity, and states that “ontological hesitation,” is required for an ethics of nonviolence.²³⁵ Ontological hesitation becomes “the essence of aesthetic contemplation,” rendering aesthetic contemplation “the basis of an ethics of non-violence,” and “the key to understanding life forms.”²³⁶ Ecology without Nature “implies a nonconceptual network of infinite proliferation and diversity.”²³⁷

In line with the above arguments, Scholtmeijer states that the long history of proposing rational arguments against the abuse of animals has made little progress against customary practices and entrenched habits of thought because, “...over the centuries, providing aids to sensibility has not been the aim of those infrequently appearing philosophers who preach consideration for nonhuman animals.”²³⁸ The standard approach follows the same structure found in the debate over animal souls, or lack thereof, flexibly applying a given criteria in support of or in opposition to compassion for nonhuman animals. The ease with which the victimization of non-human animals continues to be justified, she argues, reflects the fact that we are still somewhat wedded to a disavowal of human animality and narratives of human exceptionalism. These depend on a categorical distinction between human and non-human

²²⁹ Ibid., 324.

²³⁰ Morton, *Unworking Animals*, 77.

²³¹ Ibid., 77.

²³² Ibid., 77.

²³³ Ibid., 77.

²³⁴ Ibid., 93.

²³⁵ Ibid., 84.

²³⁶ Ibid., 84.

²³⁷ Ibid., 84.

²³⁸ Scholtmeijer, *Animal Victims*, 25.

animals. As demonstrated by Cary Wolfe, this pattern continues in many contemporary discussions of animal minds and animal consciousness.²³⁹

Wolfe points out that the relevant question in debates about the treatment of animals is often presumed to be whether humans and nonhuman animals are morally equivalent, in which case all interests of humans and other animals are to be weighted equally. The prevalence of this assumption explains the overwhelming attention on moral capacities, often presumed to be distinctively human. Acknowledging that similar capacities are observed in other animals does not solve the root of the problem, which is that the capacities identified as morally significant are defined in opposition to “animality,” even though there are no criteria by which “human nature” is distinguishable from the rest of the animal world.

As stated by Wolfe, the use of concepts such as freedom to drive an ethical wedge between the human and nonhuman animal is a weakness of the standard approach. Because such concepts are ill-defined, and because there is always the actuality or possibility that a member of the human species falls on the “wrong” side of the demarcating line, it usually results in a question-begging resort to speciesism.²⁴⁰ He states that we need an alternative to the standard framework, in which an individual’s possession of rights is based on its possession (or lack) of morally significant empirical characteristics. Rather, he states that the guiding assumption should be that where there are similar interests, these interests ought to be counted equally, independently of species.²⁴¹ This would mean eliminating assumptions about ontological difference on which questions about the moral standing of non-human animals are based. Interests can be compared across species at the same time as specific differences are taken into account.

Wolfe argues that for ontological distinctions to enter into moral decision making is definitive of speciesism. This does not mean discounting the ethical relevance of ethological or biological work (Wolfe cites Goodall, Maturana, and Varela as examples), because all it means is that, “...in the historically and socially contingent discourse called “ethics,” we are obliged—precisely because ethics cannot ground itself in a representationalism relation to the object—to apply consistently the rules and norms we devise for determining ethically relevant traits and behaviors, without prejudice toward species or anything else.”²⁴² Wolfe argues that it is precisely postmodernism’s apparently self-defeating absence of foundations that keeps ethical questions alive.²⁴³ Similarly to the paper on ‘Morality or Moralism’, Wolfe states that searching for a link between the essential characteristics of a given being and their moral standing forecloses ethical questions.²⁴⁴ When framed as a debate about empirical similarities and differences, questions of moral standing tend to reach a deadlock, because the characteristics that are considered morally significant do not map onto species categories. Questions about “the

²³⁹ Wolfe, *Animal Rites*, 27.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 37.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 58.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 42.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 16.

²⁴⁴ Wolfe, *Posthumanism*, 76

framework against which our judgements of value get their sense,” he states, are absent or hidden.²⁴⁵ Wolfe argues that when we focus on moral capacities, both sides of the debate evade a sense of undecidability that is essential to ethics, a sense in which, as stated by Cavell, “the other can present me with no mark or feature on the basis of which I can settle my attitude”²⁴⁶ (Cavell cited in Wolfe).

Whereas positing a gap between humans and other animals ensures that there can be no responsibility toward any living thing other than the human, presuming that we are already in relation opens questions of means and ends. Any social relation presupposes the capacity to respond, and to acknowledge claims that might be made on one’s reason. Like the distinction between means and ends, the distinction between response and reaction is also an open and relational question, and while working definitions have been proposed, it may not be a distinction that can be formulated theoretically. As Hache and Latour propose at the beginning of their paper, “I become *responsible* by *responding*, in word or deed, to the call of someone or something. If this game rule is accepted, the reader will think it normal to focus on extension and reduction in the class of beings for which one feels (according to one’s capacity to understand their call) more or less responsible.”²⁴⁷ (emphasis original) Similarly, according to Haraway, these distinctions only make sense when considering particular “entanglements” among “the irreducible multiplicity of living beings.”²⁴⁸ Haraway also suggests that discerning response from reaction is a normatively loaded question, one that ultimately “pivots on the unresolved dilemmas of killing and relationships of use.”²⁴⁹ Haraway argues that it is a mistake to draw a line between those who may be killed and those who may not, for example via a human-animal boundary, but it is also a mistake to “pretend to live outside killing” by extending the commandment “Thou shalt not kill” beyond a presupposed boundary.²⁵⁰ She suggests that the commandment “Thou shalt not kill,” be read “Thou shalt not make killable,” stating that the way to become responsible to non-human animals is not to redraw the boundaries of the command not to kill, but rather, “...to learn to live responsibly within the multiplicitous necessity and labor of killing, so as to be in the open, in quest of the capacity to respond in relentless historical, nonteleological, multispecies contingency.”²⁵¹

One work of fiction that speaks to this issue, of the purported “necessity and labor” of killing, is Haruki Murakami’s *Kafka on the Shore*, particularly one important chapter towards the middle of the novel. Responsibility is one of the main themes of the novel, tying together its disparate plots. Patricia Welch states that this novel marks a shift in Murakami’s writing, in that he no longer is content to write about “the mindlessly empty consumerist culture that is contemporary Japan, and the concomitant potential for violence lying just under the surface, but

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 56.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 76.

²⁴⁷ Hache & Latour, *Morality or Moralism*, 312.

²⁴⁸ Haraway, *When Species Meet*, 80.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 80.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 80.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 80.

finds it necessary to write novels that ask the reader to question what they will do, in light of that information.”²⁵²

The even-numbered chapters follow Satoru Nakata, an elderly man who lost his ability to read and write in a childhood accident but gained the ability to speak with cats. Nakata has earned a reputation among his neighbors for his ability to find missing house cats, and at the start of the novel he is looking for a cat named Goma. The climactic event of Nakata’s storyline is the killing of several cats by a man who inexplicably appears in the form of commercial whiskey icon Johnnie Walker. Through Nakata’s conversation with a cat named Mimi, we first learn of the man who is later identified as Johnnie Walker. Mimi tells Nakata that several cats have been lured from a vacant lot and thrown into a large sack by a man wearing a tall silk hat. Nakata is at a loss for what someone would do with stolen cats, and Mimi describes the many ways cats have been used by humans:

“In the old days they used to make shamisens out of cat skin, but nowadays not too many people play the shamisen. And besides, I hear they mainly use plastic now. In some parts of the world people eat cats, though not in Japan, thank goodness. So I think we can exclude both of those as motives. Which leaves, let me see . . . people who use cats in scientific experiments. Cats are used a lot in experiments. One of my friends, in fact, was used in a psychology experiment at Tokyo University. A terrible thing, but it’s a long story and I won’t go into it now. There are also perverts -- not many, mind you -- who just enjoy torturing cats.”²⁵³

Nakata says he will have a look at the empty lot, and Mimi tells him to be careful as the man is “more dangerous than you can ever imagine,” continuing,

“Mr. Nakata, this world is a terribly violent place. And nobody can escape the violence. Please keep that in mind. You can’t be too cautious. The same holds true for cats and human beings.

“I’ll remember that,” Nakata replied.

But he had no idea where and how the world could be violent. The world was full of things Nakata couldn’t comprehend, and most things connected with violence fell into that category.”²⁵⁴

While continuing to search for Goma, Nakata encounters a dog who leads him to Johnnie Walker. Nakata does not recognize Walker as the whiskey icon, but when Walker tells him, “A person’s got to have an appearance and a name, am I right?”, he understands, for as we learned in a previous chapter, he gives the cats names out of convenience.²⁵⁵ Walker shows Nakata the severed heads of the cats he’s already killed, and says that he is getting ready to kill the rest, including Goma. He says that he is harvesting their souls, which he uses to make a special kind of flute which he himself can hear--“If I don’t hear it none of this would work”²⁵⁶-- but ordinary

²⁵² Welch, Haruki Murakami’s *Storytelling*, 214.

²⁵³ Murakami, *Kafka*, 81.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 83.

²⁵⁵ Welch, Haruki Murakami’s *Storytelling*, 218.

²⁵⁶ Murakami, *Kafka*, 141.

people cannot; “Even if they do hear it, they don’t realize it. They may have heard it in the past but don’t remember.”²⁵⁷ Later in the novel, as I will discuss below, we learn more about the flute in connection with violence.

Walker goes on to rationalize what readers would probably assume to be inexcusable, though Walker knows it too, stating:

“Listen -- I’m not killing cats just for the fun of it. I’m not so disturbed I find it amusing,” he went on. “I’m not just some dilettante with time on his hands. It takes a lot of time and effort to gather and kill this many cats. I’m killing them to collect their souls, which I use to create a special kind of flute. And when I blow that flute it’ll let me collect even larger souls. Then I collect larger souls and make an even bigger flute. Perhaps in the end I’ll be able to make a flute so large it’ll rival the universe. But first come the cats. Gathering their souls is the starting point of the whole project. There’s an essential order you have to follow in everything. It’s a way of showing respect, following everything in the correct order. It’s what you need to do when you’re dealing with other souls. It’s not pineapples and melons I’m working with here, agreed?”

“Yes,” Nakata replied. But actually he had no idea. A flute? Was he talking about a flute you held sideways? Or maybe a recorder? What sort of sound would it make? And what did he mean by cats’ souls? All of this exceeded his limited powers of comprehension. But Nakata did understand one thing: he had to locate Goma and get her out of here.²⁵⁸

Nakata, who has no memory of the war due to his injury, is characterized as an innocent, blank slate, and is said to have no understanding of violence. Walker tells Nakata that he will hand over Goma in exchange for a favor, stating, “I want to cut off Goma’s head, but you don’t want that to happen. Our two missions, our two interests, conflict. That happens a lot in the world. So I’ll tell you what -- we’ll negotiate. What I mean is, if you do something for me, I’ll return the favor and give you Goma safe and sound.”²⁵⁹ Walker explains that killing cats is a job that he has grown tired of, but which he is bound to continue as long as he lives:

“...murder one cat after another and harvest their souls. Following things in the correct order, step one to step ten, then back to one again. An endless repetition. And I’ve had it! Nobody respects what I’m doing, it doesn’t make anybody happy. But the whole thing’s fixed already. I can’t just suddenly say I quit and stop what I’m doing. And taking my own life isn’t an option. That’s already been decided too. There’s all sorts of rules involved. If I want to die, I have to get somebody else to kill me. That’s where you come in. I want you to fear me, to hate me with a passion -- and then terminate me. First you fear me. Then you hate me. And finally you kill me.”²⁶⁰

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 141.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 140-41.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 141.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 142.

Walker has therefore set up an exchange between his own life and the lives of however many cats he has collected, the number of whom dwindles the longer Nakata hesitates. Beginning to suggest that one of his main purposes has been to set up this exchange, and that the reason he targeted Nakata specifically is due to Nakata's attachment to cats, the dialogue continues:

"But why -- why ask me? Nakata's never ever killed anyone before. It's not the kind of thing I'm suited for."

"I know. You've never killed anyone, and don't want to. But listen to me -- there are times in life when those kinds of excuses don't cut it anymore. Situations when nobody cares whether you're suited for the task at hand or not. I need you to understand that. For instance, it happens in war. Do you know what war is?"

"Yes, I do. There was a big war going on when Nakata was born. I heard about it."

"When a war starts people are forced to become soldiers. They carry guns and go to the front lines and have to kill soldiers on the other side. As many as they possibly can. Nobody cares whether you like killing other people or not. It's just something you have to do. Otherwise you're the one who gets killed." Johnnie Walker pointed his index finger at Nakata's chest. "Bang!" he said. "Human history in a nutshell."

"Is the Governor going to make Nakata a soldier and order me to kill people?"

"Yes, that's what the Governor will do. Tell you to kill somebody."

Nakata thought about this, but couldn't quite figure it out. Why in the world would the Governor do that?

"You've got to look at it this way: this is war. You're a soldier, and you have to make a decision. Either I kill the cats or you kill me. One or the other. You need to make a choice right here and now. This might seem an outrageous choice, but consider this: most choices we make in life are equally outrageous." Johnnie Walker lightly touched his silk hat, as if making sure it was still in place.²⁶¹

Walker then states that "The one saving grace for you here--if indeed you need such a thing--is the fact that I want to die."²⁶² As Pick argues, drawing from the philosophy of Simone Weil, political and ethical transformation occurs "within, not beyond, the idea of necessity,"²⁶³ and here Walker convinces Nakata that killing is a necessity, for himself and for Nakata. Furthermore, Walker stresses the importance of transformation, of "a person not being himself anymore."²⁶⁴

Nakata says he doesn't know how to kill, to which Walker responds, "The knack to killing someone, Mr. Nakata, is not to hesitate. Focus your prejudice and execute it swiftly--that's the ticket when it comes to killing."²⁶⁵ He illustrates this for Nakata using the cats he has collected:

²⁶¹ Ibid., 142-43

²⁶² Ibid., 143.

²⁶³ Pick, *Turning To*, 79.

²⁶⁴ Murakami, *Kafka*, 148.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 143.

“I have an excellent example right here. It’s not a person, but it might help you get the picture. Johnnie Walker stood up and picked up a large leather case from the shadows below the desk. He placed it on the chair where he’d been sitting and opened it, whistling a cheery tune. As if performing a magic trick, he extracted a cat from out of the case. Nakata had never seen this cat before, a gray-striped male that had just reached adulthood. The cat was limp, but its eyes were open. It looked conscious, though only barely. Still whistling his merry tune -- “Heigh Ho” from Disney’s Snow White, the one the Seven Dwarves sang -- Johnnie Walker held up the cat like he was showing off a fish he’d just caught.

Walker’s talk about war suggests that Murakami intends to call our attention to past wars and the possibility of future wars, and that he is mostly concerned with the conditions that produce these most severe justifications of killing. That Walker kills the cats on a desk also explicitly connects this chapter to the previous chapter, in which Kafka reads a nonfiction book about Adolf Eichmann’s involvement in World War II and his subsequent trials. He picks up the book not for any particular reason, having only “a vague notion of him as a Nazi war criminal, but no special interest in the guy.”²⁶⁶ He learns how “this totally practical lieutenant colonel in the SS” was assigned to design a “final solution” for the Jews, “and how he investigated the best ways of actually carrying this out....Eichmann studied how many Jews could be packed into each railroad car, what percentage would die of “natural” causes while being transported, the minimal number of people needed to keep this operation going. The cheapest method of disposing of the dead bodies -- burning, or burying, or dissolving them. Seated at his desk Eichmann pored over all these numbers.”²⁶⁷ “Of course his project didn’t always go according to plan. Conditions at various sites slowed things down. When this happened he acted like a human being--at least a little. He got angry, is what I’m saying. He grew incensed at these uncertain elements that threw his elegant solution into disarray... Eichmann hated the war itself -- that element of uncertainty that screwed up his plans.”²⁶⁸ Eichmann came to be known as exemplifying the term ‘desk murderer’ and the notion ‘the banality of evil,’ following Hannah Arendt’s *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, and the scene discussed here alludes to this fact.

The narrative centered on Nakata’s relationship with cats could be read as nothing but a way to make a point about human wars. The overall theme might be summed up in the penciled note that Kafka finds written in the back of the book on Eichmann: “*It’s all a question of imagination. Our responsibility begins with the power to imagine. It’s just like Yeats said: In dreams begin responsibilities. Flip this around and you could say that where there’s no power to imagine, no responsibility can arise. Just like we see with Eichmann.*”²⁶⁹ (emphasis original) That is, Murakami created a character with a magical ability to talk to cats in order to set up a scene of violence that would feel realistic, relating this to the war that Nakata has no memory of.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 131.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 132.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 135-36.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 132.

That there is more to this scene is suggested by Walker's address to Nakata, which could also be seen as directed to the reader. Additionally, this scene relates to the broader theme of humanity's relation to nature, which is addressed explicitly in the previous chapter in which Kafka spends time in a cabin far from the city, reading and walking in the woods. Kafka remarks:

“Just like Crow said, the world's filled with things I don't know about. All the plants and trees there, for instance. I'd never imagined that trees could be so weird and unearthly. I mean, the only plants I've ever really seen or touched till now are the city kind--neatly trimmed and cared-for bushes and trees. But the ones here--the ones living here--are totally different. They have a physical power, their breath grazing any humans who might chance by, their gaze zeroing in on the intruder like they've spotted their prey. Like they have some dark, prehistoric, magical powers. Like deep-sea creatures rule the ocean depths, in the forest trees reign supreme. If it wanted to, the forest could reject me--or swallow me up whole. A healthy amount of fear and respect might be a good idea.”²⁷⁰

Returning to the subsequent chapter, we learn that Johnnie Walker has given the cats injections to paralyze them in order to “keep them from thrashing about.”²⁷¹ He states that, “It's not an anesthetic--they're not asleep and they can feel pain, but they can't move their arms or legs. Or even their heads.”²⁷² The importance of the fact that the animals' will be in pain is emphasized in the following passage, in which Walker asks Nakata to imagine the “unimaginable pain” he would feel in their situation.

“I've got five cats inside this case, all from that vacant lot. A fresh batch. Just picked, fresh from the grove, so to speak...What I'm going to do is slice open their chests with a knife, extract their still-beating hearts, and cut their heads off. Right in front of your eyes. There'll be lots of blood, and unimaginable pain. Imagine how much it'd hurt if somebody cut open your chest and pulled out your heart! Same thing holds true for cats--it's got to hurt. I feel sorry for the poor little things. I'm not some cold, cruel sadist, but there's nothing I can do about it. There has to be pain. That's the rule. Rules everywhere you look here.” He winked at Nakata. “A job's a job. Got to accomplish your mission. I'm going to dispose of one cat after another, and finish off Goma last. So you still have some time to decide what you should do. Remember, now--it's either *I* kill the cats or *you* kill *me*. There's no other choice.”²⁷³

The connections to the discussion of Adolf Eichmann in the previous chapter are also hinted at above and in what follows. Next, Walker reiterates that “in everything there's a proper order,”²⁷⁴ and prepares to kill the cats, taking out various tools and setting them on a desk, “All the while whistling ‘Heigh-Ho,’” a song about working for money without knowing why. After killing the first cat Walker “lovingly placed the severed head on the metal tray,” examined it with narrowed eyes “...as if relishing a work of art,” before disposing of the rest of the body “like

²⁷⁰ Ibid., 134.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 143.

²⁷² Ibid., 143.

²⁷³ Ibid., 144.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 144.

some useless shell.”²⁷⁵ He shows Nakata his bloody hands and says, “A bit of work, don’t you think? You can enjoy a nice fresh heart, but look how bloody you get... This is a special outfit, after all. I should wear a surgical gown and gloves, but I can’t. Another *rule*, I’m afraid.”²⁷⁶ Walker’s assertion that he must be dressed like the whiskey icon while killing the cats emphasizes the connection between violence and consumer culture. While he ought to wear a surgical gown and gloves, rules prevent him, and he apparently must kill the cats in the guise of this commercial icon.

At first Nakata does not know any of the cats and we learn nothing of their personalities, but their individual physical characteristics are described, such as “a white female, not so young, with the tip of her tail bent a little.”²⁷⁷ Aside from these characteristics, each cat’s death is the same:

“As before, [Walker] stroked the cat’s head for a while, then leisurely traced an invisible line down her stomach. He picked up a scalpel and again made a quick cut to open up the chest. The rest was the same as before. The silent scream, the convulsing body, guts spilling out. Pulling out the bloody heart, showing it to Nakata, popping it in his mouth, chewing it slowly. The satisfied smile. Wiping the blood away with the back of his hand. All with “Heigh-Ho” as background music.”²⁷⁸

Before revealing the next cat, which is the first one familiar to Nakata, Walker says, “We’re just getting to the main event. That was just the opening act, a mere warm-up. Now we’re getting to the lineup you know. So open your eyes wide and take a good long look. This is the best part! I hope you’ll appreciate how hard I’ve tried to make this entertaining for you.”²⁷⁹ Walker theatrically introduces Nakata to Kawamura, and states,

“Now’s the time to stop me if you’re going to, Mr. Nakata. Time’s ticking away, and I won’t hesitate. In the dictionary of the infamous cat-killer Johnnie Walker, hesitate is one word you won’t find.”

And indeed without any hesitation at all he slit open Kawamura’s belly. This time the scream was audible. Maybe the cat’s tongue hadn’t been fully paralyzed, or perhaps it was a special kind of scream that only Nakata could hear. An awful, bloodcurdling scream. Nakata closed his eyes and held his trembling head in his hands.²⁸⁰

In these passages Murakami continually returns the reader’s attention to Nakata in order to show the process by which he eventually no longer “feels like himself.” That Nakata can hear Kawamura’s scream, as opposed to the “silent screams” that came before, is given special significance.

The emphasis on sound, as well as Walker’s insistence that Nakata open his eyes, is also worth noting. Hearing is associated with receptiveness in a way that vision is not, probably

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 145.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 145.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 145.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 145-46.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 146.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 146.

because it is most directly associated with communication. Murakami thematizes communication often by drawing attention to ears and listening. Furthermore, vocalizations are not just markers of sociality but can be interpreted as claims or appeals, of the kind that Hache and Latour suggest we are naturally sensitive to but capable of being desensitized to. As stated by Sarah Jane O'Brien in an analysis on filmic representations of animals, sound is often overlooked in assessing the significance of animal representations, although vocalizations may be more impactful than visual signs.²⁸¹ O'Brien states that the sounds of animal suffering and death are not only significant for their affective power, but also because sounds are often markers of "intelligence, self-awareness, and sociality."²⁸²

O'Brien argues that endeavors to "expose" cruelty to animals often utilizes a "slaughterhouse aesthetic," a mode of cinematic representation that seeks to maximize the visibility of animal slaughter, yet almost inevitably reinforces a sense of separation.²⁸³ The films themselves and their commentary primarily emphasize the visual, which according to O'Brien, "distances" or desensitizes the spectator. She states that, "...by relying on conventions that disconnect slaughter from daily life and disassociate the spectator from the slaughtered animal body," these films reproduce the logic they are aiming to critique.²⁸⁴ Giving the spectator a sense of separation from the sight of animal slaughter fosters disconnect rather than responsiveness, and produces complacency rather than motivating further thought or action.

However, she argues that these conventions can be creatively reworked; "by dint of their susceptibility to deviation, possess a productive potential."²⁸⁵ Specifically, she concludes that we should focus on "representational strategies that destabilize the notion of slaughter as something apart," underscoring the auditory dimension in particular because of "the affectively potent aural evidence of slaughter,"²⁸⁶ which in its instability, has an "unnerving potential."²⁸⁷

The chapter from *Kafka on the Shore* discussed here deals with just this issue of the perception of violence and animal suffering. Murakami emphasizes Nakata's perception of various visual and auditory signs, and the way in which these dynamics are manipulated by Johnnie Walker is especially interesting in light of O'Brien's account of spectatorship. Not only does Walker paralyze the cats so that they cannot move or make vocalizations, he insists that Nakata open his eyes, explicitly focuses on the visual, and as Nakata grows more distressed it is stated that, "His vision was changing drastically."²⁸⁸

"You have to look!" Johnnie Walker commanded. "That's another one of our rules. Closing your eyes isn't going to change anything. Nothing's going to disappear just because you can't see what's going on. In fact, things will be even worse the next time

²⁸¹ O'Brien, *Unnerving Images*, 127.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, 129.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, 104.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 110.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 108.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁸⁸ Murakami, *Kafka*, 146.

you open your eyes. That's the kind of world we live in, Mr. Nakata. Keep your eyes wide open. Only a coward closes his eyes. Closing your eyes and plugging up your ears won't make time stand still."

Nakata did as he was told and opened his eyes.

Once he was sure they were open, Johnnie Walker made a show of devouring Kawamura's heart, taking more time than before to savor it.

"Please, Mr. Walker, Nakata can't stand it anymore!"

Johnnie Walker stopped whistling. He halted his work and scratched an earlobe. "That won't fly, Mr. Nakata. I'm sorry you feel bad, I really am, but I can't just say, *Okay, will do*, and call this off. I told you. This is war. It's hard to stop a war once it starts. Once the sword is drawn, blood's going to be spilled. This doesn't have anything to do with theory or logic, or even my ego. It's just a rule, pure and simple. If you don't want any more cats to be killed, you've got to kill me. Stand up, focus your hatred, and strike me down. And you've got to do it *now*. Do that and it's all over. End of story."

Johnnie Walker started whistling again. He finished cutting off Kawamura's head and tossed the headless body into the garbage bag. Now there were three heads lined up on the metal tray. They'd suffered such agony, yet their faces were as strangely vacant as those of the cats lined up in the freezer.

"Next comes the Siamese." Johnnie Walker said this and then extracted a limp Siamese from his bag--which of course turned out to be Mimi.²⁸⁹

As Walker continues Nakata gradually becomes more distressed although he does not say a word, "though something was beginning to stir in his mind. The room smelled of blood, and strains of "Heigh-Ho" rang in his ears."²⁹⁰ The repeated mention of "Heigh Ho" also makes it clear that one of Murakami's concerns in this scene is how such acts may be disguised as work. As the tension heightens, Nakata's mental and physical state is described in unemotional, mostly physiological terms: "Something was definitely rising up within him, a horrible confusion transforming his very being. He was breathing rapidly, and a sharp pain throbbed in his neck. His vision was changing drastically."²⁹¹ When Nakata states, "*Please*, stop it. If you don't Nakata's going to go crazy. I don't feel like myself anymore,"²⁹² Walker's reply confirms that this was part of his plan:

"So you're no longer yourself," He said carefully and quietly. "That's very important, Mr. Nakata. A person not being himself anymore." He picked up a scalpel he hadn't tried yet and tested its sharpness with the tip of his finger. Then, as if doing a trial cut, he ran the blade along the back of his hand. A moment later blood oozed up, dripping onto the desk and Mimi's body. Johnnie Walker chuckled. "A person's not being himself anymore," he repeated. "You're no longer yourself. That's the ticket, Mr. Nakata.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., 146-47.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., 145.

²⁹¹ Ibid., 145-46.

²⁹² Ibid., 148.

Wonderful! The most important thing of all. O, full of scorpions is my mind! Macbeth again.”

Without a word, Nakata stood up. No one, not even Nakata himself, could stop him. With long strides he walked over to the desk and grabbed what looked like a steak knife. Grasping the wooden handle firmly, he plunged the blade into Johnnie Walker’s stomach, piercing the black vest, then stabbed again in another spot. He could hear something, a loud sound, and at first didn’t know what it was. But then he understood. Johnnie Walker was laughing. Stabbed in the stomach and chest, his blood spouting out, he continued to laugh.

“That’s the stuff!” he yelled. “You didn’t hesitate. Well done!”²⁹³

Murakami describes the cats’ deaths in overwhelming sensory detail as if we are observing the scene but not imagining their experience, and this may draw attention to the representation versus the reality of violence. This would be consistent with Murakami’s interest in not just the human propensity for violence, but also its connection to the tendency to thoughtlessly follow rules. Whereas Walker is a caricature of the rationalization of violence, Nakata accedes thoughtlessly, not out of reason or emotion, to Walker’s system. Walker succeeds in getting Nakata to act without hesitation, which he demonstrates by killing the cats.

A crucial aspect of this chapter is the change Nakata undergoes as he watches the scene unfold. O’Brien’s discussion of how depictions of violence in various media disconnect viewers from what is represented is significant in this regard; O’Brien argues that even slaughterhouse films that intend to promote animal ethics tend to foster a sense of disconnect between the spectator and the representation, because they are framed as ‘exposing’ what happens behind the scenes to render animals into meat. Animal slaughter may not be immediately visible in everyday life, but it does not take ‘exposure’ to make the inference. By assuming that animal slaughter is something that needs to be exposed, such an approach may foster a sense of disconnect between representation and reality. The “slaughterhouse aesthetic,” as O’Brien formulates it, fulfills a desire to distance ourselves from aspects of our relations to other animals that might produce discomfort. A better way to represent animals, one that to the best of our knowledge has their interests in mind, would not avoid this sense of discomfort. O’Brien suggests that if there can be an ethical representation of animal slaughter, fostering a sense of “undecidability” would be necessary.²⁹⁴ Walker’s repeated assertion that the key to killing is not to hesitate is significant here, especially considering how heavily the concept figures in the moral philosophical discussions above.

The chapter consists partly of dialogue between Walker and Nakata, and therefore, at times the reader’s attention is drawn to Nakata’s reactions rather than the suffering animals, but in this attention to one does not come at the other’s expense. An important element is how Walker addresses Nakata, which can be experienced as an address to the reader, seeing as like Nakata we are spectators to a scene of violence. Walker’s statement that “I hope you understand

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, 148.

²⁹⁴ O’Brien, *Unnerving Images*, 63.

how hard I'm trying to make this entertaining for you," could be seen as a taunting statement serving to characterize Walker as a sadistic personality, but it also could direct the reader's attention to their own reading of the chapter.

Nakata gives in to Walker's demand, thereby preventing the remaining cats from being killed, but in the subsequent chapter we learn that he has lost his ability to speak with cats. This ability constitutes and symbolizes a sort of receptiveness to the world around him that mostly eludes Murakami's protagonists at their own and other's expense. Although Nakata is often seen as another example of Murakami's interest in issues of self-identity, he could also be seen as problematizing the idea of a search for one's identity. As far as we know at this point in the novel, his former ability to speak with cats was his only unrealistic attribute, whereas the other things that make him unusual are considered mental disabilities but would not lead us to classify him as unreal or inhuman. This could suggest that what makes Nakata more "human" in this context is the act of killing with which the prior chapter ended. This is also consistent with Murakami's preoccupation with an apparent human proclivity for violence, an issue discussed explicitly in the chapters following Kafka's story, and which is suggested in this chapter by the war imagery invoked by Walker. As a whole, the Chapter can be read as illustrating the process of desensitization that exacerbates such possibilities.

The previous chapters in which we are introduced to individual cats through Nakata, learning of their differences in behavior and personality, sets up this Chapter. Individuality and personal relationships are emphasized in this chapter, as Nakata becomes more horrified with every cat that is killed, but is more affected by the ones he knows by name and personality. Walker clearly expects as much, and explains that he planned this out especially for Nakata's "entertainment."²⁹⁵ Considering that the reader is linked to the cats through Nakata, Walker's manipulation of Nakata puts some attention on the reader's reactions to the killing that is represented in this scene.

The chapters are centered on Nakata, in that we see what Nakata sees, and this viewpoint is meant to be a real window into the world of the novel. The only fantastic element of Nakata's experience up until now is his communication with cats, but neither this nor anything else he perceives is called into doubt or portrayed as an illusion. After he kills Walker he loses consciousness and wakes up back in the vacant lot without knowing how he got there. Even though there is no blood on his arms or clothes, and he looks the same as when he'd left his apartment, he clearly remembers the events of the prior chapter: "In order to save the two cats, he'd stabbed Johnnie Walker--the cat-killer--to death. That much he remembered all too clearly. He could still feel the knife in his hands. It wasn't a dream--blood had spurted out of Johnnie Walker and he'd collapsed to the floor, curled up, and died. Then Nakata had sunk back on the couch and lost consciousness... Seeing Mimi and Goma beside him proved it wasn't a dream, but for some strange reason now he couldn't understand a word they said."²⁹⁶

²⁹⁵ Murakami, *Kafka*, 146.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 163-64.

It turns out that the body of Kafka Tamura's father is found stabbed to death also in Nakano ward, and we can presume that this is the connection between Kafka and Nakata, Nakata who inexplicably wakes up with clean clothes, and Kafka who wakes up with his shirt covered in blood. Kafka reads in the news that his father, a famous sculptor, was found dead. He figures that his father was murdered the same night he woke up covered in blood, and tells Oshima "I have no idea how that blood got all over me, or whose blood it could be. It's a complete blank... But maybe I did kill my father with my own hands, not metaphorically. I really get the feeling that I did. Like you said, I was in Takamatsu that day -- I definitely didn't go to Tokyo. But *In dreams begin responsibilities*, right?.. Maybe I went through some special dream circuit or something and killed him."²⁹⁷ Oshima states that, "To you that might feel like the truth, but nobody's going to grill you about your poetic responsibilities. Certainly not the police. Nobody can be in two places at once. It's a scientific fact -- Einstein and all that -- and the law accepts that principle."²⁹⁸ Oshima says that his theory is just that "A bold, surrealistic theory, to be sure, but one that belongs in a science fiction novel,"²⁹⁹ and although Kafka agrees, he states "But my father always used to say that without counter evidence to refute a theory, science would never progress. A theory is a battlefield in your head--that was his pet phrase. And right now I can't think of any evidence to counter my hypothesis."³⁰⁰

Yeung states that the issue of fate and freedom guides this novel's inquiry into the theme of responsibility. Despite the presence of prophecies and prophets, "this novel does not merely depict the human being as a passive agent on which capricious fate exerts its force," but rather "...actively inquires into the interaction between the predetermined and the self-determinable aspects of humankind."³⁰¹ She states that the question of whether Kafka is responsible for his father's murder is connected to the intertextual digression on the biography of Adolf Eichmann, the moral of which is summed up in the note Kafka finds written in the margins: "*Our responsibility begins with the power to imagine.*"³⁰² (emphasis original)

Interestingly, the characters are guided in their journeys toward self-determination by animals or human-animal hybrids. They do not so much determine themselves as look to external sources of guidance or inspiration, as evidenced mainly in the dialogues between Kafka and Crow, and between Nakata and the various cats. Crow is introduced in the first Chapter and appears to be an alter ego to Kafka, who says that the name he chose for himself is the Czech word for 'crow.' He is variously referred to as either 'Crow' or 'the boy named Crow,' and has both crow-like and human-like physical attributes and behaviors.

The first chapter of the book is entitled "The Boy Named Crow" and begins with a conversation between Kafka and Crow, who reappears at various points throughout the book. Like the cats do for Nakata, Crow seems to act as a guide for Kafka, admonishing, encouraging,

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 204.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 204.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., 204.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 204.

³⁰¹ Yeung, Time, 152.

³⁰² Murakami, Kafka, 132.

or advising him. Despite the fact that he seems to be a figment of Kafka's imagination, Crow is identified by Kafka as an external, guiding figure; "I need Crow's help--need him to show up from wherever he is, spread his wings wide, and search out the right words for me."³⁰³

Glenn Willmott's analysis of "problem creatures" in contemporary comics and literature suggests an explanation for the role that animals play in guiding Murakami's protagonists. Dealing with the theme of scarcity, he identifies a trend in works of literature that attempt to imagine a world of habitat co-existence rather than human domination. Rather than imagining the future toward which we might progress, they evoke attentiveness to non-human life forms or what Willmott deems 'problem creatures,' a category in which we increasingly place ourselves, because after modernism, "...human form and identity have been rendered radically plastic, simultaneously in language and visual depiction."³⁰⁴ He argues that identification with 'problem creatures' has more to do with aesthetic style than with sympathy or other sentiment.³⁰⁵ The challenge with which we have become familiar, he states, is "...to re-imagine human and individual identity as traversing racial, animal, gender, and technological categories, rather than organizing them invisibly from above, in favour of somebody's power and status."³⁰⁶ He argues that this challenge is the by-product of economic pressures, "prompted at first by modernist ennui with bourgeois life, and subsequently by the postmodern revelation of limits to natural resources and life-sustaining ecology."³⁰⁷ The various human-animal relations in Murakami's works of fiction, particularly in *Kafka on the Shore*, fit this description of 'problem creatures' well.

Kafka says that his father, who "polluted everything he touched, damaged everyone around him,"³⁰⁸ repeatedly told him a prophesy "like he was chiseling each word into my brain."³⁰⁹ He prophesied that someday Kafka would murder his father and sleep with his mother and sister, and Kafka ran away to escape this curse. After reading the newspaper report of his father's death, Kafka tells Oshima that it looks like there's no escape, and the boy named Crow interjects "**Distance won't solve anything.**"³¹⁰ (emphasis original) Kafka thinks that he is fated to cause suffering to others, and as Amitrano states, he must cope with the fact that he fails to "get rid of the violence that dominates his life."³¹¹ This is in fact what Crow tells Kafka, stating "I tried my best to stop you. I wanted you to understand. You heard, but you didn't *listen*. You just forged on ahead... You thought that's how you could overcome the curse, right? But was it?"³¹²

³⁰³ Ibid., 106.

³⁰⁴ Willmott, *Modern Animalism*, 4.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., 4.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., 4.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., 5.

³⁰⁸ Murakami, *Kafka*, 203.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., 202.

³¹⁰ Ibid., 204.

³¹¹ Amitrano, *Echoes*, 101.

³¹² Murakami, *Kafka*, 386.

The blurring of human-animal boundaries across Murakami's works of fiction has been noted by several scholars. Willmott, for example, states that the cats in *Kafka on the Shore* and the Sheep Man in *A Wild Sheep Chase* "bridge conventionally human and animal worlds," and through these characters, the protagonists discover "a buried history of human violence," for which the cure is "a plunge at one and the same moment into the degraded animal and the concealed history of a modern habitat."³¹³ In *Kafka on the Shore*, Crow, like the Sheep Man, has both human- and animal-like qualities, and plays a similar role in providing guidance to the protagonist. There is also a parallel between what Mimi tells Nakata and what Crow tells Kafka, both making assertions about violence. In an earlier chapter, when Kafka is musing about the nature of war and whether it comes from anger or fear, Crow says, "Listen up--there's no war that will end all wars... War breeds war. Lapping up the blood shed by violence, feeding on wounded flesh. War is a perfect, self-contained being. You need to know that." Similarly, Mimi says to Nakata, "...this world is a terribly violent place. And nobody can escape the violence. Please keep that in mind. You can't be too cautious. The same holds true for cats and human beings."³¹⁴ A human-animal hybrid also brings a message about violence in one of Murakami's other works, *Dance Dance Dance*, in the following dialogue between The Sheep Man and the narrator. The narrator has found The Sheep Man holed up in the Dolphin Hotel, where he has apparently taken refuge because, "It's somewhere out of the elements. The woods got wild animals. Know what we mean?"

"So tell us, what's the world outside? We don't get much news, not in here."

I crossed my legs and shook my head. Same as ever, Nothing worth mentioning.

Everything's getting more complicated. Everything's speeding up. No, nothing's really new."

The Sheep Man nodded. "Next war hasn't begun yet, we take it?"

Which was the Sheep Man's last war? I wasn't sure. "Not yet," I said.

"But sooner or later it will," he voiced, uninflected, folding his mittened hands.

"You better watch out. War's gonna come, no three ways about it. Mark our words.

Can't trust people. Won't do any good. They'll kill you every time. They'll kill each other.

They'll kill everyone."³¹⁵

Anat Pick's discussion of "the potential of violence beyond all mechanisms of exclusion,"³¹⁶ resonates with Murakami's portrayal of violence in *Kafka on the Shore*. Pick argues that two theories have informed criticism of the exclusion of animals from moral consideration, both of which, however, only reluctantly invoke 'the animal' as a figure of exclusion, neglecting to consider animals "concretely."³¹⁷ Agamben develops the idea of 'bare life' as the state of exception from moral law, and Levinas develops the idea of Otherness as a transcendent presence, where for Levinas the state of exception pertains both to the Other, and to

³¹³ Willmott, *Modern Animalism*, 73.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 83.

³¹⁵ Murakami, *Dance*, 81.

³¹⁶ Pick, *Turning to Animals*, 73.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 70.

the self ‘held hostage’ by radical alterity.³¹⁸ Pick argues that when critical theory swings between these discourses of biopolitics and ethics, respectively, the issue of ‘justice and animals’ is reduced to “the forsaken dispensable body or the Other’s overwhelming vulnerability.”³¹⁹ The problem is that neither can account for violence that persists “beyond all mechanisms of exclusion,” that persists between these positions of radical immanence (biopolitics) and radical transcendence (ethics).³²⁰

The issue of violence beyond mechanisms of exclusion is dealt with in Murakami’s *Kafka on the Shore*, and is dealt with most explicitly in the chapter focused on above. Before killing the cats, Walker tells Nakata that they will suffer, and that imagining their suffering is surely within his powers of comprehension. Walker also draws his own blood at one point in the chapter, further emphasizing his shared vulnerability. He therefore does the opposite of exclude them from moral consideration. This illustrates the fact that presupposing kinship does not erase the possibility of violence, for as Pick argues, “without the recognition of the Other’s suffering and injurability, violence has neither meaning nor function and loses its somber, titillating drive.”³²¹

As Pick states, the possibility of violence beyond all mechanisms of exclusion indicates that it depends not only on distancing and estrangement, on mechanisms “that frame lives in such a way as to render them ungrievable, but also and simultaneously on mechanisms that presuppose kinship and precariousness.”³²² This issue is also central to O’Brien’s discussion of the distancing effect produced by ‘exposures’ of animal cruelty in film. These efforts, epitomized by ‘the slaughterhouse aesthetic,’ further the notion that violence is an exception to the rules we live by and is not in fact systemic.

If as Pick argues, “...violence does not solely depend on mechanisms that distance and estrange, that frame lives in such a way as to render them ungrievable, but also and simultaneously on mechanisms that presuppose kinship and precariousness: violence is always also domestic violence,”³²³ then seeking release in “gestures of indefinite hospitality and welcome,” are insufficient.³²⁴ Rather than condemning reason as “inherently murderous”³²⁵ and escaping to a fantasy of unbounded community, similarly to Haraway, she states that the political and ethical transformation that constitutes meaningful change, “...comes from an adequate appreciation of necessity.”³²⁶ To change the norms that condone the exploitation of other animals and allow us to define them as property, would require an “appreciation of necessity.”³²⁷ Therefore, the question for Pick is one of obligation, of appreciating the appeals of other animals

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 72.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 72.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, 73.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 73.

³²² *Ibid.*, 73.

³²³ *Ibid.*, 73.

³²⁴ *Ibid.*, 73.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 73.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 79.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, 79.

as providing necessary reasons for action; that is, appreciating that they have, in the terms used by Darwall, ‘practical authority,’ which is central to ascriptions of personhood.

The wrong way to go about this project is to seek out the characteristics that qualify for inclusion in the moral community; Pick’s account instead adheres to embraces ethical openness or ‘universal moral consideration,’ asserting that “everything counts,”³²⁸ while recognizing that how things count is contextual, “...as dependent on the (ever-shifting) limits of our attention.”³²⁹ However, while deconstructions of the human/nonhuman boundary are conceptually attractive, disavowing ‘human identity’ buries the continuing exploitation of nonhumans that seems to be intensifying despite the growth of animal welfare and animal rights discourse. This situation is underwritten by deeply entrenched power relations, and thus, as stated by Pick, “it is not enough to pursue the ‘end’ of the human subject... without committing to and detailing a revised order of relations, which turns ‘us,’ whatever we happen to be, towards animals in a decisively different way.”³³⁰ The problem of violence at the centre of animal ethics, states Pick, cannot be fully addressed by focusing on inclusion or hospitality as a corrective to exclusion. Focusing on exclusionary mechanisms suggests that inclusion is the answer, but the idea of ‘moral status’ is by definition exclusionary. Rather, on Pick’s account of creatureliness, ethical thought is rooted “first and foremost in materiality and not in the rights of ‘qualified’ individuals.”³³¹ Creatureliness is not just about embodiment, but is “a particular comportment towards the finitude, abundance, and vulnerability of materiality recognized as necessity.”³³²

Pick states that moral significance comes from a being’s perishable materiality, and that an ethics of “creatureliness” is “a particular comportment towards the finitude, abundance, and vulnerability of materiality recognized as necessity.”³³³ Materiality and vulnerability however, do not alone constitute an obligation or command, which requires an element of “necessity,” that certain things be made impossible for us. She states that this sense of necessity comes from a mode of attention that acknowledges the “reality” of animals.³³⁴ “Perceived as necessity...reality becomes beautiful because we no longer desire to ‘redeem’ it by imagining it as something that obeys our fantasies about how things ought to be.”³³⁵ In this vein, we could understand the second-person standpoint not as “imaginative projection,” but as a “mode of attention,” in line with James’ assertion that “relations are as real as anything else.”³³⁶ Denying the claims and demands of non-human animals is therefore denying their reality.

According to Pick, advocating for nonviolent practices like veganism does not necessarily assume that violence will cease; it is not a means to an end, but is perceived as

³²⁸ Ibid., 76.

³²⁹ Ibid., 76.

³³⁰ Ibid., 79.

³³¹ Ibid., 80.

³³² Ibid., 79.

³³³ Ibid., 79.

³³⁴ Ibid., 81.

³³⁵ Ibid., 79.

³³⁶ James, *The Thing*, 44.

necessity on a worldview affected by “creaturely love.”³³⁷ This worldview is reflected, she states, in Hauerwas and Berkman’s comments on Christianity and nonviolence. Whereas pacifism, states Pick, “refuses to accept the reality of violence as a limit,” Christians, according to Hauerwas and Berkman, “are not called to be nonviolent because nonviolence is a strategy to free the world from war, but because as Christians we cannot conceive of living other than nonviolently in a world of war.”³³⁸ (Hauerwas and Berkman cited in Pick) Pick’s statement that creatureliness “contracts humanity to recuperate its animality,”³³⁹ resonates with the various representations of animals in *Kafka on the Shore*. The cats in this novel, with whom Nakata is identified, are exemplars of vulnerability. In particular, Nakata is identified with Kawamura, who Mimi says was one of the smartest in his litter until an accident. Crow is identified with Kafka, and can be seen as guiding Kafka’s process of transformation. This process indeed seems like a recuperation of “animality,” given Kafka’s habit of listening to the boy named Crow, and also to the sounds of actual crows, in making practical decisions.

The third-to-last chapter in *Kafka on the Shore* is also entitled “The Boy Named Crow,” and stands out because it focuses on its titular character, breaking with the pattern established by the rest of the book, which focuses in alternating chapters on either Kafka or Nakata. It illustrates another element of Walker’s justification of violence against animals, as he states several times that Crow is not just incapable but is not “qualified” to stop him. This is reminiscent of the standard approaches to animal rights and animal welfare, which can only superficially extend moral standing to other animals. Both approaches solely attend to ‘third-personal’ reasons, which as Darwall argues, are not the kind of reasons that produce a sense of responsibility or moral obligation. The insistence that animals do have the requisite qualifications to obligate us to them, to provide necessary reasons for action, implies that welfare and rights based approaches to animal ethics are insufficient because they do not attend to second-personal reasons.

The chapter begins with Crow flying in “large, languid circles” above the forest, before spotting an opening where he finds who we can presume to be Johnnie Walker:

“In one corner of the clearing was a large round rock and a man in a bright red sweat suit and a black silk hat was sitting on it. He wore thick-soled hiking boots, and a khaki-colored bag lay on the ground beside him. A strange getup, though the boy named Crow didn’t mind. This was who he was after. What the man had on was of little consequence. The man looked up at the sudden flapping of wings and saw Crow land on a large branch.”³⁴⁰

In another example of the presumption of animal speech, Walker greets Crow cheerfully, stating that he knew that the two would meet before long, and says to no reply, “How about coming over

³³⁷ Pick, *Turning To*, 82.

³³⁸ *Ibid.*, 82.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, 80.

³⁴⁰ Murakami, *Kafka*, 431.

here? We can have a nice little talk. What do you say?”³⁴¹; “The boy named Crow kept his mouth shut, holding his wings close in against himself.”³⁴² Walker continues:

“Ah, I see. You can’t speak, can you? No matter. I’ll do the talking, if you don’t mind. I know what you’re going to do, even if you don’t say a word. You don’t want me to go any further, do you? It’s so obvious I can predict what’ll happen. You don’t want me to go any further, but that’s exactly what I want to do. Because it’s a golden opportunity I can’t let slip through my fingers--a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.”

He gave the ankle of his hiking boots a good slap. “To leap to the conclusion here, you won’t be able to stop me. You aren’t qualified. Let’s say I play my flute, what’s going to happen? You won’t be able to come any closer to me. That’s the power of my flute. You might not know this, but it’s a unique kind of flute, not just some ordinary, everyday instrument. And actually I’ve got quite a few here in my bag.”³⁴³

The man describes how he made the flutes out of the souls of cats, and says that although he felt sorry “cutting them up like that,” he couldn’t help it because “This flute is beyond any world’s standards of good and evil, love or hatred. Making these flutes has been my longtime calling, and I’ve always done a decent job of fulfilling my role and doing my bit. Nothing to be ashamed of.”³⁴⁴ He explains that he died at his own bidding and is now a soul in transition who has adopted a temporary form, and that he is on his way to construct a larger, more powerful flute out of the smaller ones, “...a supersize flute that becomes a system unto itself... I’m not the one who decides whether that flute turns out to be good or evil, and neither are you. It all depends on when and where I am. In that sense I’m a man totally without prejudices, like history or the weather--completely unbiased. And since I am, I can transform into a kind of system.”³⁴⁵ He says, “Once I play this flute, getting rid of you will be a snap... But whether I play the flute or not, you can’t stop me. That should be obvious.”³⁴⁶

“The only one who could wipe me out right now is someone who’s qualified to do so. And--sad to say--you don’t fit the bill. You’re nothing more than an immature, mediocre illusion. No matter how determined you may be, eliminating me’s impossible for the likes of you.” The man looked at the boy named Crow and beamed. “How ‘bout it? Want to give it a try?”³⁴⁷

“As if that was the signal he’d been waiting for,”³⁴⁸ the boy named Crow attacks the man, pecking away his eyes, but as with Nakata: “The man put up no resistance, didn’t lift a finger to protect himself. He didn’t cry out, either. Instead, he laughed out loud. His hat fell to the ground,

³⁴¹ Ibid., 432.

³⁴² Ibid., 432.

³⁴³ Ibid., 432.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., 432.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., 432.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., 432-33.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 433.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., 433.

and his eyeball was soon shredded and hanging from its socket.”³⁴⁹ The attack continues, and when his face is “nothing more than a lump of reddish flesh,”³⁵⁰ Crow attacks the top of his head, but the man laughs louder the more gruesome the attack, “as if the whole situation was so hilarious he couldn’t control himself.”³⁵¹ Even as his face is destroyed, “The man never took his eyes--now vacant sockets--off Crow, and in between laughs managed to choke out a few words,”³⁵² and says that Crow’s effort is useless and can’t hurt him, reiterating that “You’re not qualified to do that. You’re just a flimsy illusion, a cheap echo.”³⁵³ At which point,

“The boy named Crow stabbed at the mouth these words had come from. His huge wings ceaselessly beat at the air, a few shiny black feathers coming loose, swirling in the air like the fragments of a soul. Crow tore at the man’s tongue, grabbed it with is beak, and yanked with all his might... once it was pulled out from deep within the man’s throat, it squirmed like a gigantic mollusk, forming dark words. Without a tongue, however, not even this man could laugh anymore. He looked like he couldn’t breathe, either, but still he held his sides and shook with soundless laughter. The boy named Crow listened, and this unheard laughter--as vacant and ominous as wind blowing over a far-off desert--never ceased. It sounded, in fact, very much like an otherworldly flute.”³⁵⁴

Amitrano reads the novel as suggesting that there is transformative potential in Kafka’s acknowledgement of his possible crimes and responsibilities, stating that, “the experience of being cursed by a prophecy...is, among other things, a lesson in ethics.”³⁵⁵ The sequence with Crow and Walker suggests that Kafka’s struggle with prophetic narratives will continue, as the “unheard laughter” never ceased. Kafka recognizes that, as Crow states, “distance does not solve anything,” which he learns when physically distancing himself from his father does not allow him to escape the prophecy. However, the ending of the novel suggests that by taking responsibility for the possibilities that he cannot rule out, Kafka enables some sort of transformation, as suggested in the following dialogue:

“You’d better get some sleep,” the boy named Crow says. “When you wake up, you’ll be part of a brand new world.”

Eventually you fall asleep. And when you wake up, it’s true.

You are part of a brand new world.³⁵⁶

The significance of animals in Murakami’s works of fiction has much to do with the imagination, specifically the desire to expand the imagination or to escape systems that limit the imagination. The protagonists do not attempt to take up a non-human perspective or imagine non-human experience, but through their encounters with actual animals or animal-human

³⁴⁹ Ibid., 433.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., 433.

³⁵¹ Ibid., 433.

³⁵² Ibid., 433.

³⁵³ Ibid., 433.

³⁵⁴ Ibid., 434.

³⁵⁵ Amitrano, *Echoes*, 102.

³⁵⁶ Murakami, *Kafka*, 467.

hybrids, we might say that they “decenter” themselves. Because the animals speak, the protagonists do not need to have mind-reading powers to respond to the animals they encounter. As we have seen, however, the animals are not easy to understand; their messages are often cryptic or abstract. This is especially true of the Sheep Man, who appears in both *A Wild Sheep Chase* and *Dance Dance Dance*, and whose unusual way of speaking is marked for the reader by the lack of spaces between his words. Additionally, his speech is abstract and difficult to interpret, as noted by the protagonist as he ruminates on what the Sheep Man might have been telling him; “I brought the words softly to my lips: You have but to seek and the Sheep Man shall connect. Not that I completely understood what that meant. It was a bit too figurative, metaphoric. But maybe it was the sort of thing you had to express metaphorically. For one thing, I could hardly believe the Sheep Man had chosen to speak that way for his amusement. Maybe it was the only way.”³⁵⁷

In *Kafka on the Shore*, this process of listening and/or understanding others is directly linked to responsibility. Over the course of the novel Kafka gains insight into the workings of his own imagination, many times directly from “the boy named Crow,” and this self-understanding is a prerequisite for the transformation hinted at in his final dialogue with Crow, which is not just a change in self but a change in world.

Since most interpretations focus on what the cats in *Kafka on the Shore* imply about Nakata’s and Walker’s personalities, it would be plausible to argue that they are mostly subordinated to symbolic use. That Walker is a ‘serial cat killer’ is considered significant for how Nakata is induced to kill Walker, which links his story with Kafka’s, as the secondary literature is silent on any additional significance of Nakata’s and Walker’s involvement with cats. However, the various animals and human-animal hybrids across Murakami’s fiction warrant more focused analysis, and as in the examples discussed here, they are central to some of his most puzzling and/or unsettling narratives. Giving cats human language in *Kafka on the Shore* thematizes responsiveness; it does not aid our understanding of other animals, but rather emphasizes differences that while unbridgeable, do not foreclose response, and are in fact what make us inclined to respond in the first place.

It is especially significant that Walker calls Crow an illusion. To make this point more explicit, in not allowing Crow to determine Walker’s actions, Walker denies Crow’s actuality. However much violence Crow does to Walker, Walker’s assertion that Crow is “unqualified” to stop him is borne out, simply because Walker does not acknowledge his reality. His laughter signals that he does not take Crow seriously. Walker cannot be stopped by Crow because for Walker, Crow is “unqualified,” “an illusion,” “a cheap echo.” It is because Walker refuses to acknowledge Crow as a reality that there is nothing for Crow to address. In this sense, Walker exemplifies what Anat Pick refers to as “...our own heretofore inanimate, ‘dead’ (dualistic, one-directional, instrumental) relationship to matter.”³⁵⁸ This worldview, states Pick, has been recently countered by ‘New Materialism,’ a worldview which Pick describes as a

³⁵⁷ Murakami, *Dance*, 94.

³⁵⁸ Pick, *Turning to Animals*, 76.

“...reawakening of ‘inanimate’ matter itself, the view of life as essentially expressive.”³⁵⁹

As Scholtmeijer’s account suggests, animals themselves have something to do with this sort of “reawakening,” to the extent that it has evidently become more and more difficult to deny non-human “claims” or “appeals.” Scholtmeijer states that, “If animals had remained silent, discourse could have remained contentedly self-enclosed. Philosophy and science could have continued unchallenged to make assertions about what animals are and are not. With the stirring of the once dormant animal in the human psyche, the natural animal now has something to address.”³⁶⁰

The treatment of non-human animals, and to a lesser extent human-animal relations, are increasingly coming to the forefront of human concerns. This is perhaps because, as Scholtmeijer suggests, we now have some basis for identification. However, the critical responses to Murakami’s works of fiction reflect the fact that we are still in the habit of separating issues of human identity from our identification with other animals. The non-human animals in these works inevitably enter critical discussions of the protagonists’ search for identity, but their significance as animals is almost always overlooked. Murakami portrays other animals and animal-like creatures as guiding the protagonist in his search for identity, or sometimes just as the subject of the protagonists musings on identity and naming, but rarely do critics note that Murakami also focuses significant attention on animals themselves. Regarding the protagonist’s frequent semi-philosophical asides on matters loosely connected to the plot, critics frequently point out discussions of naming and identity, but rarely notice the discussions of irreducible phenomenological differences between species and between individuals.

Efforts to be more responsive and responsible to non-human animals are tied to the human animal’s own self-identification as an animal, as opposed to the entrenched view that human identity depends on a resistance to or elimination of “animality.” The latter view assumes that humanity can exist independent of animality, a notion that is linked to violence against humans and other animals. This is a view of human nature that Murakami’s works can be seen as working to extricate. Both efforts, to understand oneself as an animal and to understand the independent existence of non-human animals, are necessary to the goal of being more responsive to the interests of non-human animals, that is, to decentering the human.

Conclusion

The assertion that we ought to pay more attention to other animals and their representation is being made in various disciplines, including science, history, philosophy, and literary studies. This is part of a growing awareness of the intertwinement and interdependency of various human and animal lives, and the practical and ethical significance of these interconnections. Part of why discussions of human-animal relations present us with seemingly intractable theoretical problems is that we are stalled, it seems, by a reluctance to posit human-

³⁵⁹ Ibid., 76.

³⁶⁰ Scholtmeijer, *Animal Victims*, 12.

animal continuity on a number of grounds, particularly when it comes to expressivity/language and reason. This reluctance forecloses consideration of the direct responsibilities we may have to animals, as animals are presumed to be incapable of obligating us directly, and humans are presumed to be incapable of responding to animals directly. The assumption is not only that we are not in communication with, but that we are not in relation, second-personally, to non-human animals.

There is a parallel between two discourses on the animal question, one centered on actual animals and the other on animal representations, both of which deal with questions of whether and how animals matter. Regarding actual animals, the question is whether we consider them independent agents, attending to what they themselves value, and thereby respecting their second-personal authority; this goes beyond attending to third-personal considerations such as welfare. Similarly, there is much debate over the significance of animals in various works of literature, namely whether they are significant in their own right, or solely as symbols or metaphors. In both cases, however, when animals are used instrumentally in a manner that denies their claims or demands, they seem to exceed or resist that which is imposed on them. This is true of both real animals and animal representations. Anat Pick states that it is because animals are figures of exclusion that they are endowed with “a strange kind of agency” or “disruptive force.”³⁶¹ Routinely excluded from various categories, non-human animals occupy “an exceptional space, and the space of exception,” and “embody a particular, and we might say an exclusive, case of exclusion.”³⁶² “In their very exclusion,” states Pick, “...animals assert their proximity to and elicit a range of responses from us, from repression to violent retaliation to the recognition of animals’ personhood.”³⁶³

Interestingly, the secondary literature discussed in the chapter on agency implicitly connects agency to communication, if not to language. Baratay, for example, states that the abundance of animal representations in our culture reflects the fact that animals “act and react, compelling us to consider them.”³⁶⁴ This is quite similar to Scholtmeijer’s assertion that, “the very complexity of theoretical considerations constitutes one form of animal resistance.”³⁶⁵ They thereby seem to attribute a “quasi-second-personality” to other animals, as Darwall speculates we are apt to do, given that we have some sense of responsibility to non-human animals.³⁶⁶ The works of literature and poetry I have discussed may be seen as more boldly representing human-animal relations as fully second-personal, suggesting that the second person standpoint is not a fundamentally human phenomenon. That we take up the second-person standpoint with respect to non-human animals is naturalized in these works.

In all of the works of fiction I have discussed, connections are made between language and responsibility, particularly in the poetry of John Clare and the fiction of Haruki Murakami.

³⁶¹ Pick, *Turning To*, 69.

³⁶² *Ibid.*, 69.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, 69.

³⁶⁴ Baratay, *Building*, 7.

³⁶⁵ Scholtmeijer, *Animal Victims*, 17.

³⁶⁶ Darwall, *Second-Person*, 29.

In contrast to *St Mawr*, The works of John Clare and Haruki Murakami explicitly invoke animal voice and language in their representations of non-human animals, and this device has ethical resonance. A particularly incisive illustration of the idea that what underlies denials of “the animal claim” are failures of observation, is John Clare’s poem “The Badger,” as discussed above. Similarly, the representation of animals in *Kafka on the Shore* suggests that failures to respond are rooted in perceptual inattentiveness, or failures to listen. D.H. Lawrence’s *St Mawr* emphasizes expressivity and responsiveness to similar effect, without ascribing language or speech to the titular character. That is, the protagonist’s assertion that St Mawr “would never respond”³⁶⁷ (suggesting that there is an unbridgeable gap between she and the horse) does not preclude her responsiveness or responsibility.

The use of anthropomorphism as a tool reflects the widespread view that animals live meaningful lives in and of themselves, and its bluntness is partly due to the fact that animals, their behavior and language, are poorly understood; the desire to bridge this gap in fiction sometimes involves rhetorical leaps of the imagination that land in the realms of fantasy or science fiction. These representations of non-human animals both affirm the desire for unmediated understanding, and the intrinsic risk that such efforts devolve into the imposition of human-centered meanings on other animals. However, in taking an “I-thou” as opposed to the less anthropomorphic, “I-it” approach to the representation of other animals, they may be better able to do justice to animals themselves, without necessarily striving for knowledge or understanding. As McAlpine argues, Clare’s poems are skeptical of the desire to understand other animals, which is associated with disruption and violence.³⁶⁸ Hesitant to claim a depth of knowledge about other animals, Clare achieves an “intermediate action,” that is, “a compromise between knowing and total separation.”³⁶⁹ In Murakami’s case, although giving non-human animals human language is blatantly anthropomorphic, this device contributes crucially to the novel’s thematization of ethical transformation and responsibility; both protagonists are in dialogue with non-human animals or human-animal hybrids, and take direction from these characters.

Conceiving of human-animal relations as second-personal, I-thou relations involving mutual participation presumes not just agency, but the possibility of communication. As Menely states, “This is, of course, the “fantasy” that defines sensibility, with its notion that the basic conditions of existence—an aversion toward suffering, a striving toward happiness—are shared among creatures, shared in that they are universal but also communicable: we may become averse to another’s pain or find that another’s joy intensifies our own.”³⁷⁰ This approach has elements of anthropomorphism and sentimentality that are, in liberal societies “bad mental habits... premised on the fantasy of substitutability, the metamorphic illusions of sympathetic communication.”³⁷¹

³⁶⁷ Lawrence, *St Mawr*, 84.

³⁶⁸ McAlpine, *Keeping Nature*, 96.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 96-97.

³⁷⁰ Menely, *Animal Claim*, 186-87.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 186.

Menely states that the tendency to associate ‘fellow-feeling’ for animals with overwrought sentimentalism emerged in the middle of the eighteenth century, as evident in the reception of popular poets of sensibility and in the backlash against animal advocacy rhetoric, which conservatives saw as symptoms of cultural decline.³⁷² Caring for non-human animals was attributed to artificial and disproportioned passion, and its status as a “dangerous affectation,” is retained in the twentieth century.³⁷³ According to Menely, “one essential postulate of the anti-sentimentalist,” is that “affection is a finite resource.”³⁷⁴ The anti-sentimentalist argues against “excessive” affection for animals but also against brutality without cause, because both “demean our humanity... to the extent that we relinquish our natural dominion and squander our limited sympathies.”³⁷⁵ Pathologizing sentimental anthropomorphism affirms a division between humans and animals.³⁷⁶

As I have discussed, in the absence of any empirical difference between humans and all other animals, the only way to establish such a division is to posit the superiority of the human animal. Furthermore, Darwall shows that empirical characteristics are not themselves the origin of moral concepts like responsibility and obligation, which are presupposed only from a second-person standpoint. If Darwall is correct that the second-person standpoint is essential to moral concepts like responsibility and obligation, then our tendency to take up a second-person standpoint with respect to non-human animals means that we are somewhat inclined to treat them as sources of second-person reasons.

To counter the division between human and non-human animals, where the assumption is that only the former can be sources of valid claims or demands, we might, as Daston and Mitman argue, further explore and take seriously the possibility that there are good reasons for anthropomorphism, rather than explaining away these tendencies. In this light, the fictional examples I have provided are useful not just as evidence that the issue of animal personhood is a live one, but as thought experiments that might suggest fruitful areas for debate. Most generally, by framing human-animal relations as second-personal relations, the examples I have discussed suggest that there are genuine reasons to take other animals, both actual animals and the profusion of animals in literature and the arts, more seriously. What makes it difficult to develop this idea conceptually is that, as my discussion of relational/participatory epistemologies and the second-person standpoint suggests, relations between persons involve a kind of practical reasoning that loses force when taken out of context; as Darwall argues, practical reasoning of a second personal kind has no analogue in theoretical reason. The second-person standpoint, that is, gives access to a kind of reasons, second-person reasons, that are not apparent from a third- or first-person point of view.

The idea that other animals can address us as fellow animals is at the core of each of the themes discussed in this thesis. *Kafka on the Shore* weaves together many of these themes in its

³⁷² Ibid., 191.

³⁷³ Ibid., 197-98.

³⁷⁴ Ibid., 192.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., 192.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., 200.

focus on interpersonal violence and responsibility. If the narrative centered on Kafka shows that one cannot distance oneself from violence, Nakata's encounter with Walker shows that violence persists beyond exclusion, as Walker insists that the cats must suffer for their deaths to have meaning. In some sense, these two stories demonstrate the insufficiency of two responses to violence; one involves trying to attain distance by escaping to a third-person point of view, and the other involves introspecting on one's own experience. Both seem to refrain from acknowledging 'the creaturely claim,' or in other terms, they avoid or are unable to take up a second-person standpoint.

Baratay's assertion that, "...we must leave the human side, moving to the animal side, in order to better understand human/animal relationships, but also in order to better know these living actor-beings who deserve to be studied in and of themselves,"³⁷⁷ would involve just such a shift to the second-person standpoint, as opposed to a purely first- or third-person standpoint. The second-person standpoint is qualitatively different from the first- and third- person perspectives that we oscillate between when producing, as Scholtmeijer states, anthropomorphic and empirical abstractions. Taking up the second-person standpoint is how one might achieve the decentering described by Baratay, which he states is exemplified by field ethologists' methods of observation and participation. Baratay states that their approach refuses a tokenistic anthropomorphism; it does not purport to offer a full sense of animals' lives, but even so involves the imagination, which must be used "in as controlled a way as possible, so that we come out of ourselves, our condition, so that we decenter ourselves and move to the animal side."³⁷⁸

I have attempted to show that this project of decentering the human is enriched by bringing it into dialogue with the theoretical literature on the second-person standpoint. The assumption that when it comes to other animals we don't have access to "other minds," and that therefore we are not in relation to animals the way we are with respect to other humans, precludes responsibility to other animals, because human-animal relations are purportedly not fully second-personal. Human-animal relations would be definitively third-personal, involving an "I-it" perspective. Efforts to improve human-animal relations that attend solely to animal welfare or intrinsic value are only considering third-personal, "agent-neutral" reasons, and never enter the domain of second-personal reasoning that, according to Darwall, is the basis of morality.

However, the distinction Darwall makes between directing another's will by coercion as opposed to second-personal address arguably applies to our relations with non-human animals as well. As Darwall states, "The very distinction between coercion, that is, attempting to direct someone's will without second-personal reasons he can be expected to accept, on the one hand, and making a directive claim on someone's will backed by second-personal authority, on the other, itself presupposes that addresser and addressee share a common authority as free and rational, which they reciprocally recognize in the address and uptake of an *Aufforderung*

³⁷⁷ Baratay, *Building*, 3.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

[“summons”].³⁷⁹ Darwall also points out that the second-person reasons that structure social relations need not be explicitly addressed in order to guide second-personal interactions; the second person standpoint involves “practically directed and directive thought,”³⁸⁰ not necessarily language. A claim can be as simple as a basic claim on another’s attention, such that “even in a case where one has no genuine claim except to make a request or a plea, if someone to whom one addresses the request refuses even to give one a hearing, this too constitutes a kind of disrespect.”³⁸¹ The basic sense in which other animals can claim or direct our attention weakens the view that animals are excluded from the moral domain because they lack second-personal competence and authority. What Menely identifies as “the prelinguistic semiosis humans share with other animals,”³⁸² may provide the basis for the sense in which other animals have claims or demands on us.

We might think of “moving to the animal side” in terms of the second-person standpoint; this sort of “decentering” would entail taking up a standpoint from which other animals can give us reasons for acting. Darwall’s explication of the moral significance of the second-person standpoint shows why there is so much attention to the dialogical aspect of human-animal relations, because without access to second-personal reasons, there is no way to argue that we have moral responsibilities directly to other animals. A second-person standpoint takes us out of the domain of third-person or purely first-person reasons, into a space of second-personal reasons-giving, in which others with “second-personal authority” can give us reasons for acting. Engaging in this sort of practical reasoning with respect to non-human animals would constitute the kind of decentering that does not stifle their interests, and would recognize other animals as sources of claims and demands that can directly obligate us to them. To the contrary, Darwall states that such obligations can only be indirect; if we are morally responsible for such things as, “...the protection of cultural treasures, wilderness, and/or the welfare of other sentient beings, quite independently of the relations any of these have to the interests of free and rational persons...then these are among the things we free and rational agents have the authority to demand of one another.” He thus asserts that humans and “nonrational beings” such as animals or infants do not relate second-personally.³⁸³ Nonrational beings, on Darwall’s account, lack the second-personal competence that both makes us subject to moral obligation, and gives us the authority to make claims and demands of one another.

The idea that animals can obligate us directly is controversial in part because, as Menely argues, “the creaturely claim” has been devalued since the eighteenth century.³⁸⁴ The claims of animals are “structurally effaced,” and when it comes to modern agriculture for instance, “the expressive creature has been transformed into a commodity, flesh without voice,” as violence is

³⁷⁹ Darwall, *Second-Person*, 22.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 60.

³⁸² Menely, *Animal Claim*, 1.

³⁸³ Darwall, *Second-Person*, 28.

³⁸⁴ Menely, *Animal Claim*, 202.

subsumed into industrial process.³⁸⁵ The ambivalent status of “the creaturely claim” is reflected in the simultaneous extension of moral standing in animal welfare law, alongside the intensification of animal exploitation in agro-capitalism.³⁸⁶ The fact that the claims of animals have been variously recognized and denied in the political-juridical domain, as animals differ in their status and treatment, “...is one fundamental expression of the contingency that underlies any definition of rights-bearing personhood, the contingency of the decision that establishes the realm in which justice is realized.”³⁸⁷ Historically, states Menely, there is an imperative toward “a justice that exceeds human ends... a responsivity to the animal that inheres at the very core of political community.”³⁸⁸ To take a “sensitivity” approach to animal representation, he argues, is to take account of “nonlinguistic injunction and address... in the uniquely human labor of speaking for others.”³⁸⁹

Efforts to “meet the animal on its own terms”³⁹⁰ reflect discomfort with reductive attitudes toward non-human animals, and are prominent in modern fiction. While there are many examples in modern fiction of the desire to truthfully represent animals, Scholtmeijer shows that they often vacillate between “empirical and anthropomorphic abstractions,” demonstrating that “the grasp of reason and sentiment upon the real animal is clearly precarious.”³⁹¹ Empirical abstraction is associated with the third-person “I-it” perspective, and anthropomorphic abstraction is associated with the first-person perspective. The possibility of a genuinely second-person perspective, enabling one to appreciate and act on reasons given by another, may be the middle ground that is sought. A crucial assumption of such works of fiction is that second-personal human-animals are possible, because other animals are expressive on their own account, and it is within our capabilities to respond.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 204.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 202.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 203.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 203.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 206.

³⁹⁰ Scholtmeijer, *Animal Victims*, 323.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 236.

References:

- Amitrano, Giorgio. "Echoes of Ancient Greek Myths in Murakami Haruki's novels and in Other Works of Contemporary Japanese Literature." *Ancient Greek Myth in World Fiction Since 1989* 1 (2016): 91.
- Anderton, Joseph. "Dogdom: nonhuman others and the othered self in Kafka, Beckett, and Auster." *Twentieth Century Literature* 62.3 (2016): 271-288.
- Baratay, Éric. "Building an Animal History." *French Thinking about Animals*. Edited by Louisa Mackenzie (2015).
- Boesch, Christophe. "What makes us human (*Homo sapiens*)? The challenge of cognitive cross-species comparison." *Journal of Comparative Psychology* 121.3 (2007): 227.
- Castellano, Katey. *The Ecology of British Romantic Conservatism, 1790-1837*. Springer, 2013.
- Chaudhuri, Una. "(De) Facing the Animals: Zooësis and Performance." *The Drama Review* 51.1 (2007): 8-20.
- Clare, Johanne. *John Clare and the Bounds of Circumstance*. McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 1987.
- Clare, John. *Major Works*. Oxford University Press, USA, 2004.
- Clark, Andy. "Intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mind." *Analysis* 65.285 (2005): 1-11.
- Darwall, Stephen L. *The second-person standpoint: Morality, respect, and accountability*. Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Daston, Lorraine. "Intelligences: Angelic, animal, human." *Thinking with animals: new perspectives on anthropomorphism*. Columbia Univ. Press, 2005. 37-58.
- Daston, Lorraine, and Gregg Mitman, eds. *Thinking with animals: New perspectives on anthropomorphism*. Columbia University Press, 2005.
- Despret, Vinciane. "From secret agents to interagency." *History and Theory* 52.4 (2013): 29-44.
- Donovan, Josephine. *The Aesthetics of Care: On the Literary Treatment of Animals*. Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2016.
- Donovan, Josephine. "Aestheticizing animal cruelty." *College Literature* 38.4 (2011): 202-217.
- Fudge, Erica. "A left-handed blow: Writing the history of animals." *Representing animals* 26 (2002): 3.
- Gallagher, Shaun. "A philosophical epilogue on the question of autonomy." *Handbook of the dialogical self theory* (2011): 488-496.
- Gallagher, Shaun. "Direct perception in the intersubjective context." *Consciousness and Cognition* 17.2 (2008): 535-543.
- Hache, Émilie, and Bruno Latour. "Morality or moralism? An exercise in sensitization." *Common Knowledge* 16.2 (2010): 311-330.
- Haraway, Donna. "When species meet: Staying with the trouble." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 28.1 (2010): 53-55.

- James, William. "The thing and its relations." *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 2.2 (1905): 29-41.
- Karremann, Isabel. "Human/Animal Relations in Romantic Poetry: The Creaturely Poetics of Christopher Smart and John Clare." *European Journal of English Studies* 19.1 (2015): 94-110.
- Kean, Hilda. "Challenges for historians writing animal–human history: what is really enough?." *Anthrozoös* 25.sup1 (2012): s57-s72.
- Latour, Bruno. "How to talk about the body? The normative dimension of science studies." *Body & society* 10.2-3 (2004): 205-229.
- Lawrence, D.H. *The Woman who Rode Away; St. Mawr; The Princess*. Penguin Classics, 2006.
- Macarthur, David. "A Vision of Blindness: Blade Runner and Moral Redemption." *Film-Philosophy* 21.3 (2017): 371-391.
- Mackenzie, Louisa, and Stephanie Posthumus, eds. *French Thinking about Animals*. MSU Press, 2015.
- McHugh, Susan. *Animal Stories: Narrating across species lines*. U of Minnesota Press, 2011.
- McKusick, James. "'A language that is ever green': The ecological vision of John Clare." *University of Toronto Quarterly* 61.2 (1992): 226-249.
- Menely, Tobias. *The Animal Claim: Sensibility and the Creaturely Voice*. University of Chicago Press, 2015.
- Miller, Eric Randolph. "Enclosure and Taxonomy in John Clare." *SEL Studies in English Literature 1500-1900* 40.4 (2000): 635-657.
- Morton, Timothy. "Ecologocentrism: Unworking Animals." *SubStance* 37.3 (2008): 73-96.
- Murakami, Haruki. "Dance Dance Dance. 1988." Trans. Alfred Birnbaum. London: Vintage (2003).
- Murakami, Haruki. *Kafka on the Shore*. Vintage, 2006.
- Rockwell, Teed. "Representation and radical empiricism." *Intellectica* 2.60 (2013): 219-240.
- O'Brien, Sarah. *Unnerving Images: Cinematic Representations of Animal Slaughter and the Ethics of Shock*. Diss. 2012.
- Paul, Ronald. "'A language that is ever green': the poetry and ecology of John Clare." *Moderna språk* 105.2 (2011): 23-35.
- Perkins, David. "Sweet Helpston! John Clare on Badger Baiting." *Studies in Romanticism* (1999): 387-407.
- Pick, Anat. "Turning to animals between love and law." *New Formations* 76.76 (2012): 68-85.
- Scholtmeijer, Marian Louise. *Animal victims in modern fiction: From sanctity to sacrifice*. Univ of Toronto Press, 1993.
- Van Grunsven, Janna. "Enactivism, second-person engagement and personal responsibility." *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 17.1 (2018): 131-156.
- Washington, Chris. "John Clare and Biopolitics." *European Romantic Review* 25.6 (2014): 665-682.

- Welch, Patricia. "Haruki Murakami's Storytelling World." *World Literature Today* 79.1 (2005): 55.
- Whiten, Andrew. "The second inheritance system of chimpanzees and humans." *Nature* 437.7055 (2005): 52.
- Wilson, Robert A., and Andy Clark. "How to situate cognition: Letting nature take its course." *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition* (2005).
- Wolfe, Cary. *What is posthumanism?*. Vol. 8. U of Minnesota Press, 2010.
- Wolfe, Cary. *Animal rites: American culture, the discourse of species, and posthumanist theory*. University of Chicago Press, 2003.
- Yusoff, Kathryn. "Insensible worlds: postrelational ethics, indeterminacy and the (k)nots of relating." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 31.2 (2013): 208-226.