

an interest in the Victorian period or in the relationship between science and literature more generally, will find much of value in this book. For my own part, not only did Beer's analysis make me want to go back to Carroll's texts; more importantly, she made me want to go to the works that shed further light on what Carroll was doing—to the linguists, logicians, philosophers, men of science, and even dreaded mathematicians who helped create a space for Carroll's imagination to run wild.

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Saulo de Freitas Araujo. *Wundt and the Philosophical Foundations of Psychology: A Reappraisal.* xiv + 254 pp., bibl., index. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2016. €105.99 (cloth).

One of the most fascinating but also most problematic aspects of the long career of Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), spanning not only several decades but also an impressive number of different disciplines, is that as yet very little clarity has been achieved even in the most basic assessment of his work. While it is easy to agree that he had a key function in establishing experimental psychology as an academic discipline, all other aspects of his academic program are open to question: How does his prominent and notoriously problematic “Völkerpsychologie” relate to experimental psychology? How should we characterize his career steps from physiology to philosophy and psychology? How, in particular, can we evaluate his status as a philosopher? After all, he held a chair in philosophy from 1874 onward, published widely about virtually all subfields of philosophy, and was highly regarded as a philosopher with an encyclopedic overview of the special sciences and with a systematic attitude.

In addressing such questions, Saulo de Freitas Araujo, in what is the first monograph on Wundt the philosopher in a long time (that the author succeeds in presenting Wundt the philosopher in a single concise volume is a genuine achievement!), clearly feels the need to find a distinctive point of entry into Wundt's work. He does so by focusing specifically on Wundt as a philosopher who wants to lay the foundations of psychology. This is both a strong and a debatable decision. Why not try to present his philosophy within a more general overview? Why be very brief in terms of biographical detail and why omit a sociological or institutional analysis (both would have been highly interesting, but Araujo dismisses them out of hand because of the threat of sociological reductionism [p. 15])? What the author promises, instead, is a “philosophical history” (p. 15) of Wundt's ideas on psychology. In practice, this amounts to a thorough and thoroughly immanent and “genetic” (p. 18) reading of Wundt's philosophical work. As such, it lacks profound contextualization of the interaction between philosophy and science in the nineteenth century, yet it contains many important insights, especially into the fine details of the development of Wundt's thought; it also offers a very useful bibliography.

The sharpest edge that Araujo adds to our understanding of Wundt concerns the early development of his philosophical thinking. He identifies three key theses in Wundt's early psychological project (p. 43): “panlogism”—that is, the idea that every mental act is structured by logical rules; a prominent role for unconscious processes; and—linking up the first two theses—the doctrine that the mind makes “unconscious inferences” in building up more complex representations on the basis of, for instance, data from sense perception (here, Araujo convincingly shows that Wundt preceded Hermann von Helmholtz in using the term “unconscious inference”). Araujo argues that the key steps that led Wundt to give up on these theses are to be found in his engagement with topics in Kantian philosophy, which led him to conclude that “all the axioms of physics originate from an inadequate transposition of logical forms of thought to the external world” (p. 108). The implications of Wundt's abandoning these three theses are far reaching; they

are worked out in what was probably Wundt's most influential single text, his *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*, in which he argues that we need an account of the subject matter of psychology that is everywhere based on (inner) experience and that we need other ways of characterizing how experiences are brought together to form more complex mental representations. Araujo remains rather evasive as to the sense in which one can speak of a genuinely philosophical project here and with regard to how one should assess the relationship between philosophy and psychology in the early stages of Wundt's work. Compared to the detailed discussion of Wundt's first steps toward a "psychological project" based on philosophical grounds, the next two chapters sketch "Wundt's Idea of a Scientific Philosophy" and his "Mature Project of a Scientific Psychology" with rather broad strokes. For both chapters, one might ask whether it might not have been a good idea to follow Wundt's own characterization of his project in more detail. The key term that Wundt gives us in his *System der Philosophie*—namely, the idea of philosophy's aiming at an integration of the results of the special sciences into a comprehensive "Weltanschauung"—is given a rather scanty treatment; and the precise nature of the "close relationship between the particular sciences and philosophy" (p. 128) is hinted at in a tantalizingly vague fashion. Similar remarks apply to the final chapter, in which the methodology and the basic categories of Wundt's mature conception of psychology are developed. In particular, the description of Wundt's ideas concerning the methodology of psychological experiment is not very illuminating. Moreover, the label of "voluntarism" that Wundt himself adopted for his psychological project deserves a more extended and argumentative analysis.

In sum, the philosopher will wish for more detailed argument (e.g., on issues such as psychophysical parallelism, on the role of the will, on the precise argumentative structure of Wundt's engagement with Kant), the historian of philosophy and of science for more detail and context, the psychologist for a more profound analysis of the methodology of psychological experiment, and the reader for, in a number of places, some tidying up of the English. But these issues, in a way, mirror the difficulty in adequately positioning Wundt's *oeuvre* itself. Araujo's book is important in taking the philosopher-psychologist Wundt seriously according to his own terms and in working out important aspects of his philosophical development; it is a first rather than a definitive analysis.

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Brian J. McVeigh. *The History of Japanese Psychology: Global Perspectives, 1875–1950.* (Studies in Modern and Contemporary Japan.) ix + 319 pp., figs., tables, apps., bibl., index. London: Bloomsbury, 2017. \$114 (cloth).

Brian McVeigh has written an ambitious book with several aims. He wants to tell a conventional story of how the academic discipline of psychology emerged in the West and was exported to Japan (as it was to other countries around the world). But he also frames his account in terms of the conditions that made it possible for a modern understanding of psychology to emerge at all. He then applies that account to the specific historical conditions that made Japan receptive to developments in the academic discipline; and, finally, he integrates these accounts by showing how Japanese psychologists did not passively absorb elements of the subject from the West but "cultivated and reaped the benefits of the new field" (p. 160). In all this he has succeeded admirably.

The schema of the book is laid out in a series of conceptually and chronologically interwoven chapters that deal with the emergence of the self-contained individual mind and how the psyche became separated from the soul as a result of political developments that affected the rise of the nation-state during the mid-