

# **THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER**

Attitudes towards the political participation  
of ethnic minorities

PAUL HINDRIKS

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**THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER**  
ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
OF ETHNIC MINORITIES

**DE STRIJD OM DE MACHT**  
HOUDINGEN TEN AANZIEN VAN DE POLITIEKE PARTICIPATIE  
VAN ETNISCHE MINDERHEDEN  
(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

**LA LUCHA POR EL PODER**  
ACTITUDES SOBRE LA PARTICIPACIÓN POLÍTICA  
DE LAS MINORÍAS ÉTNICAS  
(con una síntesis en español)

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*Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.*

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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 27.1



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**Chapter 1**

**General introduction  
to the dissertation**



## 1.1 Background

Over the past fifteen years, the number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow rapidly: from 173 million in 2000, up to 244 million in 2015 (United Nations, 2016). The consequences are felt strongly in Europe and Northern America that, taken together, host more than half of all migrants in the world, while their White majority populations are shrinking due to aging and low fertility rates (United Nations, 2016; The Migration Observatory, 2013). Demographic studies are now projecting that by the year 2061, most European populations (particularly the Mediterranean and Central-Northern ones) will consist of more than a third of persons with an immigrant-origin background (Lanzieri, 2011). Canada will pass the 30% mark by as early as 2031, and by the year 2044 more than half of the U.S. population will belong to what currently are considered minority groups (Colby & Ortman, 2015; Statistics Canada, 2016). According to the International Organization for Migration (2015), people of migrant origin already account for significant shares of the populations of cities like Brussels (62%), Toronto (46%), London (37%), New York (37%), Amsterdam (28%), and Paris (25%). These demographic trends indicate that Western societies face unprecedented social and political challenges.

Immigration and cultural diversity often invoke ethnic prejudice among the majority members of a society. They feel that newcomers and minority groups pose a threat to their culture, employment, housing, and even to their safety. Fueled by the rise of Jihadist terrorism and the European refugee crisis, many Western countries are witnessing an increase in xenophobia and racist violence, and strong calls for stricter regulation of immigration (EC, 2015; FRA,

2007; Iganski, 2013). For example, the UK Home Office (2016) reported 41% more racially and religiously aggravated offences following the Brexit referendum (Corcoran & Smith, 2016). Amnesty International (2016) warned that Germany is failing to tackle the sharp increase in hate crimes targeting asylum seekers, and a Gallup poll showed that a record high of 42% of Americans worry “a great deal” about race relations in the US. Admittedly, police brutality incidents and the Black Lives Matter movement contributed mostly to this increase, but so did the anti-Mexican and anti-Muslim rhetoric of President Donald Trump (Gallup, 2017). Advocating for a ban on mosques, a ban on the Quran and for leaving the European Union to regain control of national borders, radical right-wing parties across Europe are winning seats in parliaments with their blatant anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim discourse (PVV, 2017; Front National, 2017).

Against this societal backdrop, the current dissertation seeks to address two urgent issues that result from increased migration to Western countries. As the amount of political power held by groups in democratic societies is a function of their relative group size, an increase of the share of minorities poses a direct challenge to the dominant position of the majority group. That raises the issue of how majority members justify their dominant position and how they respond to the political participation of minority groups. The second issue is related to the fact that academic research focuses heavily on relations between the majority group, on the one hand, and minority groups, on the other. This focus is justified, of course, but as a consequence, relations among minority groups themselves have largely been ignored. Inter-minority relations are often more intense than minority-majority relations because immigrants tend to relocate to cities, where they live in the ethnically diverse neighborhoods and have more dealings with each other than with the majority group (IOM, 2015). This dissertation, therefore, also investigates social and political attitudes among members of different minority groups.

## 1.2 Research aim and focus

The main objective of this dissertation is to explain negative attitudes towards immigrant-origin minority groups and their political participation. It does so by presenting seven empirical studies (divided over five chapters) that take different theoretical perspectives and employ some innovative methodological approaches. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 take the point of view of the majority group: they examine how majority members respond to the growing numerical influence of ethnic minority groups. Specifically, they investigate the extent to which negative out-group attitudes can be explained by majority members' justification of their socially dominant position in society, on the one hand, and by investigating how majority members respond to minorities' wishes to participate in the political system of the country, on the other. Chapters 5 and 6, in turn, take the perspective of the minority groups. They examine how immigrant-origin groups respond to each other, within the social and within the political domain. Table 1 presents the research questions of each chapter.

**Table 1: research questions and datasets per empirical chapter**

Ch.	Research question	Dataset	Participants
2	How does majority members' social dominance orientation explain their negative attitudes towards minority groups?	Representative sample of Dutch majority members collected online by TNS NIPO in 2012.	$N = 802$ , 18–87 years, 50% male.
3	Do minority members' political acculturation strategies (group interests) explain majority members' negative attitudes towards minority groups?	Study 1: sample of Dutch majority members collected online via Thesis-tools.be in 2013. Study 2: representative sample of Dutch majority members collected online by TNS NIPO in 2014.	Study 1: $N = 233$ , 16–83 years, 53% male.  Study 2: $N = 3278$ , 18–93 years, 51% male.

Ch.	Research question	Dataset	Participants
4	Do minority members' political participation strategies (party membership) explain majority members' negative attitudes towards minority groups?	Study 1: representative sample of Dutch majority members collected online by TNS NIPO in 2011. Study 2: representative sample of Dutch majority members collected online by TNS NIPO in 2012.	Study 1: N = 928, 18-88 years, 52% male.  Study 2: N = 802, 18-87 years, 50% male.
5	Do minority members' political participation strategies (party membership) explain negative attitudes among minority groups?	Representative sample of Dutch (26%) majority members, and Surinamese (25%), Turkish (25%) and Moroccan (24%) minority group members, collected online by TNS NIPO in 2014.	N = 664, 18-84 years, 46% male.
6	To what extent do established intergroup theories explain negative attitudes among minority groups?	Stratified sample of Moroccan (50%) and Turkish (50%) minority members, collected for the Netherlands' Life Course Study in 2009-2010.	N = 1985, 14-49 years, 47% male.

The overall focus of this dissertation is on attitudes towards Muslim minority groups, as they are the focal point of exclusionary rhetoric in nearly all Western societies. The suspicion that Muslims wish to 'Islamize' their 'host countries' has been voiced loudly by a great many political parties and movements: Trump and the Tea Party in the United States, the Front National in France, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria, Britain First in the United Kingdom, the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, and Vlaams Belang in Belgium. Originally from the eastern German city of Dresden, the organization 'Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West' (Pegida) spread in just a few years to many other European countries, with demonstrations drawing up to 20,000 supporters (Smale, 2015). While it is certainly true that other minority groups suffer discrimination, too, Muslims appear to be targeted more frequently, and more systematically – justifying the focus of this dissertation.

## 1.3 The Dutch context

All studies were conducted in the Netherlands: a country that, due to its history, development, and population composition, arguably is prototypical for Western Europe. Ethnic diversification in the Netherlands is closely tied to its colonial past, to labor migration, and to a lesser extent to asylum. Non-Western minority groups currently make up about 12 per cent of the Dutch population (CBS, 2017), which is comparable to countries like Germany, France, the UK, and Spain. Immigrants from former Dutch colonies in South America, the Caribbean and Asia possessed the Dutch nationality and were proficient in the Dutch language upon arrival. In comparison to other large minority groups, they occupy a much more favorable structural and social position in Dutch society (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2009). Labor migrants were actively recruited by the Dutch government in the 1960s as a source of cheap labor. Men from Turkey and Morocco were brought to the Netherlands and given a temporary visa, under the expectation that they would return to their countries of origin after a few years. However, more than half of these ‘guest laborers’ chose to stay and brought over their families in the 1970s (CBS, 2004). Most Turks and Moroccans self-identity as Muslim, live in similar urban neighborhoods, and occupy relatively low status positions in Dutch society (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2009; Maliepaard, Lubbers & Gijsberts, 2010; Maliepaard & Phalet, 2012). Today, most Dutch Muslims are from Turkish and Moroccan origin, with smaller numbers of refugees from countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, and Syria.

The Netherlands is a parliamentary democracy: the government derives its legitimacy from commanding the confidence of a bicameral parliament. Most power resides with the lower House of Representatives, as the Senate does not have the power to propose or amend laws. The House of Representatives is directly elected by proportional representation without a threshold, meaning that a politi-

cal party only needs about 63,000 votes to win a seat. The national parliament consists of a great number of parties (13 parties as of 2017: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2017) and the Dutch governments always consist of a coalition between two or more parties to secure parliamentary trust (no single party has held a majority since the 19th century). It is important to note that government sometimes depends on parties that hold only a handful of seats to obtain a parliamentary majority. In 2013, for example, the government relied heavily on a Christian-orthodox party with just three seats to secure a majority for its austerity measures.

Several political parties that explicitly present themselves as Muslim or draw inspiration from Islam hold seats on municipality councils (e.g. Rotterdam and The Hague). None have been successful in obtaining a seat in national parliament, although the national party DENK has an outspoken focus on Muslim minority groups originating from Turkey and Moroccan and is currently (2017) represented with three seats. It is more common to find ethnic minority members elected to national parliament as members of traditional political parties. Minority group members wishing to participate in the Dutch political systems are often met with discrimination and skepticism. In part, this is due to concerns of clientelism by minority politicians (Van den Dool, 2013). For the most part, however, it seems to be the increasing polarization of Dutch society that explains these negative attitudes. For decades, Dutch society seemed to be characterized by a divide between Dutch natives (*autochthones*) on the one side, and immigrant minority populations (*allochthones*) on the other. Public debates on racism, immigration, and acculturation intensified considerably over the last two decades and continue to do so today. Two political examples clearly illustrate this.

First, populist right-wing parties have been on the rise since the early 2000s. They blatantly agitate against Muslims and the so-called 'Islamization of the Netherlands', and they hold traditional

parties responsible for the ‘failed integration of immigrants’. The Freedom Party of Geert Wilders won 13% of the votes in the 2017 general elections, making it the second largest party in the House of Representatives. Back in 2007, he submitted in the national parliament a motion of no confidence calling for the resignation of two cabinet members with migration backgrounds, claiming that their cabinet positions proofed that the Turkish and Moroccan governments “effectively infiltrated the heart of the Dutch center of power” (Trouw, 2007). Ten years later, he called for a demonstration in the city of Arnhem because Ahmed Marcouch – a former member of the national parliament for the social democrats – was selected as mayor and that he “is a fan of the islamofascist Muslimbrother al-Qaradawi” and “more suitable to become mayor of Rabat” (Van Ast, 2017).

The second example is one of strong, negative reactions to the political participation of a minority group member. In May 2016, the Dutch public prosecutor investigated and eventually trialed 22 social media users who called Dutch television host Sylvana Simons (born in Suriname, raised in Amsterdam) a “cry nigger” and a “monkey” after she had announced her joining the aforementioned party DENK (NOS, 2016; 2017).

## 1.4 Main theoretical frameworks

In 1958, American sociologist Herbert Blumer contended that ethnic prejudice should not be understood merely as a set of feelings that individuals have towards members of other racial groups, the common approach of the time, but rather from a sense of group position. He argued that previous lines of research, such as that into the authoritarian personality, were overlooking a crucial

fact: “The dominant group is not concerned with the subordinate group as such, but is deeply concerned with its position *vis-à-vis* the subordinate group” (Blumer, 1958, p4). In other words, ethnic prejudice should be understood as the product of a combination of social identification with an ethnic group, the vested interests of that group, and the threats other groups are believed to pose to those interests. This section outlines the main theories used in the empirical studies in this dissertation, many of which can be traced back to Blumer’s proposition. It is divided into three sections: one on power relations, a second on minority participation, and a third on theories of ethnic prejudice.

## Power relations

One of the most popular social psychological theories for understanding the dynamics of societal power relations, is Social Dominance Theory. Building on the work of Blumer, it asserts that modern societies are structured as group-based hierarchies and that individuals within societies endorse or challenge the group-based inequalities that stem from these hierarchies (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In other words, it claims that individuals to varying degrees internalize the existing macro-level power structures. Empirical research has provided ample support for this notion by demonstrating that individuals’ Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is one of the strongest individual difference predictors of ethnic/racial prejudice and support for a variety of group-related public policies. Chapter 2 puts recent advancements in Social Dominance theorizing to the empirical test and shows how it functions in relation to group boundaries, cultural diversity beliefs and national identification in the prediction of majority members’ negative attitudes towards four prominent minority groups. Chapters 4 and 5 incorporate SDO as a variable possibly moderating the relation between minority political participation and negative attitudes towards that minority.

From the insight that ethnic groups occupy certain status positions with corresponding proprietary claims over material, symbolic, and political resources and interests, follows that other groups often are perceived as threats to those claims (Blumer, 1958). Indeed, research has demonstrated that the more majority members view minority groups as threatening their culture or status position, the more they reject minority members' participation (Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Matera, Stefanile & Brown, 2011). Threat, therefore, should constitute an inherent part of any study on the link between negative out-group attitudes and political participation. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 include perceptions of threat as a predictor of negative out-group attitudes in three ways: as a threat posed by immigrants, as a threat reflecting fifth column sentiments towards Muslims (i.e. the notion that Muslims are an 'enemy within'), and as a threat posed by ethnic out-groups. The chapters will show that using these different operationalizations is contextually relevant, and underscores the importance and range of the perceptions of threat.

When analyzing group power relations, one must establish who belongs to a group (and is therefore granted certain political rights), and who does not. Indeed, the extension of political rights is crucial for the influence immigrant-origin groups can exert over the state of affairs in a country. When conceptualized in an ethnic sense, national group boundaries are perceived in terms of ancestry and cultural homogeneity, consequently denying membership to anyone who is not a member of the native majority group (Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2010; Pehrson, Vignoles & Brown, 2009b). By contrast, a civic conceptualization of nationality emphasizes democratically negotiated criteria for entry, residence, and citizenship. It grants group membership to anyone who meets those criteria and is more open to newcomers (Heath & Tilley, 2005, Pehrson et al., 2009b). Ethnic and civic conceptualizations of nationality are incorporated in Chapters 2 and 4.

Finally, there are several ideological beliefs on how cultural diversity in society should be managed, and what can subsequently be expected of majority and minority groups. Viewed in terms of diversity ideology, one can distinguish between assimilation and multiculturalism. The former emphasizes the abandonment of immigrant cultures in favor of adoption of the host society culture. The latter acknowledges the value of immigrant cultures and emphasizes a reappraisal of the in-group culture (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005; Pettigrew, 1997; Plaut, 2010; Vasta, 2007). Thus, to the extent that these diversity ideologies prescribe how majority and minority members must change, they are essentially concepts defining cultural freedom and group positions of power. Chapter 2 includes endorsements of assimilation and multiculturalism to examine whether they are associated with majority members' justification of their dominant position in society. Chapter 6 investigates whether these constructs determine, in part, the way minority group members evaluate each other.

### **Minority participation**

While assimilation and multiculturalism can be considered ideological beliefs, they can also be construed as adaptation strategies that members of different groups take when they come into structural contact with 'cultural others' (cf. Berry, 1997). This so-called process of acculturation is typically seen as the product of two key issues. First, minority members need to decide on the extent to which they want to engage with the dominant majority group vis-à-vis remaining primarily among themselves. The second issue concerns the extent to which the heritage culture should be maintained, versus the extent to which the majority culture ought to be adopted. The combination of these two issues leads to the well-known four acculturation strategies: assimilation, integration, separation and marginalization (Berry, 1997). Chapters 3, 4 and 5 make two important contributions to the acculturation literature.

First, they shift the focus from minority group behaviors to majority group reactions to those behaviors. That shift constitutes an integral part of Berry's original work, yet it is a perspective not commonly taken in acculturation research (Brown & Zagefka, 2012). Second, and more innovatively, the acculturation framework is applied to the political domain rather than to the traditional socio-cultural domain of life.

Previous research has shown that majority group members prefer minorities to assimilate or integrate because this indicates that minority members value the host society culture to the extent that they want to adopt it (Brown & Zagefka, 2012). Minority members seeking to maintain their cultural heritage, on the other hand, tend to be viewed as a threat to the majority culture and are consequently evaluated more negatively (e.g., Tip, Zagefka, González, Brown, Cinnirella, & Na, 2012). This raises the question of whether similar responses are found in the case of minorities' *political* participation. Using the acculturation framework, three chapters of this book investigate closely to what extent negative reactions to minority political participation depend on the strategy of their participation (assimilation, integration, separation), and on the nature of that participation (advancing general or Muslim interests; participating through new or existing political parties).

## **Ethnic prejudice**

Social identities enable people to understand the world in meaningful but often binary terms: others either belong to your group (the in-group) or belong to another group (the out-group). This differentiation has consequences for intergroup attitudes, because individuals tend to see their own group in a positive manner which provides a positive sense of (collective) self. Intergroup comparisons, therefore, are typically made such that out-groups are evaluated less positively compared to the in-group (Tajfel &

Turner, 1979). Numerous empirical studies provided evidence for these theoretical mechanisms, establishing Social Identity Theory as an influential framework for understanding intergroup relations, in general, and ethnic prejudice, in particular. Social identity theorizing is incorporated in all chapters (with the exception of Chapter 3) to shed more light on the relations between negative out-group attitudes, SDO, and minority political participation. In doing so, this dissertation advances current academic discussions in three ways.

First, Social Identity scholars challenge the Social Dominance Theory by claiming that support for group-based hierarchies and inequalities is a function of in-group identification and in-group interests, rather than of a general and relatively stable orientation like Social Dominance Orientation (Ho et al., 2012; Schmitt, Branscombe & Kappen, 2003; Turner & Reynolds, 2003). If true, this would imply that social identification processes would at least moderate the relation between SDO and ethnic prejudice (see Chapter 2). Second, only a handful of researchers have analyzed the role of social identification from an inter-minority perspective. Chapter 5 taps into recent debates on the role of dual identification as a politicized collective identity (Fischer-Neumann, 2014; Simons & Klandermans, 2001). It investigates whether minority members' perceptions of in-group interests (derived from identification with the minority group) and feelings of entitlement (derived from identification with the broader society) influence their political attitudes. Chapter 6 tests several social identity hypotheses on minority members' social categorization, out-group distinctiveness, and superordinate identification (religious, national, or with the majority group).

The final major framework included in this book is Intergroup Contact Theory. Originally coined by Gordon W. Allport in 1954, this classic theory holds that structural and positive contact (such as friendships) between members of different groups leads to more fa-

vorable out-group attitudes. Indeed, a great number of studies have confirmed this pattern (e.g., Binder et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2007; Swart et al., 2011), establishing intergroup contact as an important determinant for both ethnic prejudice and political attitudes such as exclusionism towards foreigners (Escandell & Ceobanu, 2009), or endorsement of ethnic minority rights (Frølund Thomson, 2012). Chapter 4 investigates the possible moderating role of interethnic contact in the relation between Muslim minority political participation and negative attitudes of majority group members. Previous research has also shown that the effect of contact is asymmetrical in the sense that it is stronger for the out-group attitudes of majority members than for minority members' attitudes towards the majority (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005). Chapter 6 examines this idea in greater detail; with a focus on minority members' attitudes towards similar and dissimilar minorities, as well as towards the dominant majority group. It also investigates the presence of secondary transfer effects, which are the reduction in ethnic prejudice towards a secondary out-group that was not directly involved in the contact someone had with a primary out-group (Eller & Abrams, 2004; Van Laar et al., 2005; Tausch et al., 2010).



## Chapter 2

# Social dominance, legitimizing myths and national identification

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Hindriks wrote the main part of the manuscript and conducted the analyses. Verkuyten and Coenders substantially contributed to the manuscript. The authors jointly developed the idea and the design of the study.



## 2.1 Introduction

Social dominance theory proposes that modern societies are structured as group-based hierarchies and that individuals within these societies endorse, to a varying degree, the group-based inequalities that stem from it (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Social dominance orientation (SDO) is one of the strongest individual difference predictors of out-group attitudes, including ethnic prejudice. Although the scales with which SDO is measured were intended to be unitary and unidimensional, recent research has suggested that SDO in fact consists of two correlated dimensions: one that measures support for group-based dominance (SDO-D) and one that measures opposition to equality (SDO-E).

Evidence for this distinction, however, is still limited. Jost and Thompson (2000) performed confirmatory factor analyses on data from four samples of African American and European American students in the USA, providing clear support for the two-factor solution. Using similar methods and samples from the US and Israel, Ho and colleagues (2012) provided further validation of the distinction. In Sweden, Larsson, Björklund and Bäckström (2012) related the two SDO-dimensions to right-wing authoritarianism but they did not provide statistical evidence for the two-factor structure of SDO. Perhaps more important than the fact that the SDO-dimensions have been investigated in three countries only, almost all participants in these studies were university students (Ho et al., 2012; Jost & Thompson, 2000; Larsson et al., 2012).<sup>1</sup> In

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<sup>1</sup> This was true for all samples in Jost & Thompson (2000) and Larsson et al. (2012) and most samples in Ho et al. (2012). Only two out of seven samples in Ho et al. (2012) were not drawn from a university pool. The first was drawn from an unknown internet population using Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform. The second sample is likely to be the most representative: a probability sample of Los Angeles County residents.

social psychology, serious concerns have been raised about the use of student samples for the generality of intergroup dynamics and theoretical conclusions about prejudice (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Henry, 2008). Clearly further research is needed among representative population samples.

Furthermore, according to social dominance theory, majority members strive to maintain and justify their superior group position with legitimizing myths (LMs). The individual endorsement of these myths would mediate the relationship between SDO and various outcomes (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). While Jost and Thompson (2000) and Ho et al. (2012) showed that the two SDO dimensions relate differently to various outcomes, they did not demonstrate the mediating roles legitimizing myths might play within the two-dimensional SDO framework. In fact, the mediating role of legitimizing myths generally receives little empirical attention (Levin et al., 2012). We will investigate the mediating role of both hierarchy enhancing and hierarchy attenuating LMs for the relation between SDO and ethnic prejudice.

The role of SDO for out-group attitudes is debated within the literature. Social identity scholars claim that support for group-based hierarchies and inequalities is a function of in-group identification and in-group interests, rather than of a general and relatively stable orientation like SDO (Ho et al., 2012; Schmitt, Branscombe & Kappen, 2003; Turner & Reynolds, 2003). This would either imply that SDO is redundant once social identification processes are taken into account (c.f. Turner & Reynolds, 2003), or that the positive relation between SDO and prejudice should become stronger when people identify more with their in-group (c.f. Sidanius, Pratto & Mitchell, 1994). By comparing the importance of the SDO dimensions for explaining prejudice among lower and higher group identifiers, respectively, we will examine the moderating role of social identification.

In the current chapter we study the SDO explanation of ethnic prejudice among a representative sample of native Dutch majority members. Specifically, we investigate the distinction between the two SDO dimensions, the mediating role of legitimizing myths, and the moderating role of national identification on prejudice towards migrant groups.

## 2.2 Theoretical Framework

### Dimensions of SDO

The degree to which individuals endorse a system of group-based hierarchies is called Social Dominance Orientation (SDO, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Research suggests that SDO is not related to specific groups, policies or contexts, but rather constitutes ‘a general measure of individual differences in the preference for group-based dominance and inequality’ (Kteily, Ho & Sidanius, 2012, p. 547; Quist & Resendez, 2010). It is regarded and demonstrated to be a relatively stable individual difference factor underlying prejudice against out-groups (Kteily, Sidanius & Levin, 2010; Sibley & Duckitt, 2010).

Using CFA, Jost and Thompson (2000) and Ho and colleagues (2012) have shown that in all their samples, a two-factor solution fitted the 16 items SDO-scale better than a one-factor solution. Thus, SDO appears to consist of two complementary and strongly related dimensions. The first dimension is SDO-Dominance (SDO-D) and refers to individual differences in the preference to *overtly* dominate other groups. It is related to perceptions of zero-sum group competition and active subjugation of subordinate groups, for instance by using force or stepping on other groups. Jost and Thompson (2000) showed that SDO-D is related to ethnocentrism, attitudes toward so-

cial policies, and neuroticism. Ho et al. (2012) found that immigrant persecution, racism, beliefs of zero-sum competition, and support for war were all significantly predicted by SDO-D. Furthermore, Larsson and colleagues (2012) showed that SDO-D is related to favoring torture-like intergroup aggression.

The second dimension is SDO-Egalitarianism (SDO-E) and refers to the preference for non-egalitarian intergroup relations, as opposed to open oppression of inferior groups. It is related to aversion to the equality principle (e.g. groups have equal rights and status) and to opposition to social policies that aim to reduce status differences between groups (Ho et al., 2012). Research using different samples showed that SDO-E corresponds to 'less confrontational hierarchy-enhancing ideologies that legitimize relatively egalitarian but still socially stratified systems' (Ho et al., 2012, p. 593), such as opposition to affirmative action, opposition toward redistributive and conservative social policies, and economic system justification (Ho et al., 2012; Jost & Thompson, 2000).

### **Legitimizing myths: Hierarchy enhancing and hierarchy attenuating**

The more individuals support social hierarchies and social inequality (i.e. higher in SDO), the stronger their ethnic prejudice tends to be (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The justification of these orientations and attitudes constitutes an essential part of social dominance theory. Based on classical political sociologists like Marx, Engels, Pareto, and Mosca (see: Sibley & Duckitt, 2010; Sidanius & Pratto 1999), the theory maintains that SDO causes individuals to endorse societal discourses about the social order and group-based nature of equality. These discourses are considered legitimizing myths (LMs): coherent sets of 'attitudes, values, beliefs, stereotypes and ideologies that provide moral and intellectual justification for the social practices that distribute so-

cial value within the social system' (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 45). The potency of a LM is a function of the degree to which it serves as a link between the desire to establish a group-based hierarchy (SDO) and the endorsement of attitudes, behaviours and policies that maintain the system (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Although LMs constitute a key feature of the social dominance framework, they have received relatively little empirical attention (Levin et al., 2012). Rather than examining the mediating role of LMs, SDO is typically related directly to various outcomes. This is also the case in the studies that investigated the two SDO dimensions (e.g. Ho et al., 2012; Larsson et al., 2012). We propose that the relations between SDO-D and SDO-E, on the one hand, and ethnic prejudice, on the other, are mediated by *hierarchy-enhancing* myths (HELMS) and *hierarchy-attenuating* myths (HALMs), respectively. HELMs provide justification for the existence of hierarchies and inequality among social groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). HALMs provide justification for equality between social groups. In line with Ho and colleagues (2012), we expect HELMs to be related more strongly to SDO-D than to SDO-E. SDO-D implies a zero-sum perception of intergroup relations: inferior out-groups will have to be suppressed in order to advance the position of the in-group. Those high in SDO-D will therefore be inclined to support ideological justifications that overtly subjugate out-groups, and maintain or improve the privileged position of the in-group (Ho et al., 2012; Jost & Thompson, 2000). By contrast, SDO-E is not so much about improving the situation of the in-group as it is about preserving the status quo. It is about opposing out-groups from acquiring a better, more equal status position rather than overtly oppressing them (Ho et al., 2012; Jost & Thompson, 2000). Social justifications that more subtly redistribute social value (i.e. HALMs) can thus be expected to be more strongly related to SDO-E than to SDO-D. What follows are two expectations. Firstly, while controlling for the influence of SDO-E, the relation between SDO-D and ethnic prejudice will be mediated by HELMs. By contrast, the relation

between SDO-E and ethnic prejudice will be mediated by HALMs, while controlling for the influence of SDO-D.

The current study incorporates four LMs, of which two are typically considered HE and two HA. Studies on ethnic prejudice and the incorporation of immigrants and minority members into the national community tend to focus on the role of group boundaries and cultural diversity beliefs. Group boundaries determine who belongs to the national community and who does not. Research on group boundaries in sociology and political psychology is dominated by a HE view (ethnic citizenship), and a HA view (civic citizenship). These competing views are also prevalent in Dutch society, making them suitable as LMs. Cultural diversity beliefs deal with individual differences in how diversity should be managed in society, and what is expected of the integration of immigrants and minority group members into society. Research tends to distinguish a HE view of cultural diversity (assimilation) from a HA view (multiculturalism) (e.g., Verkuyten, 2011). Whether Dutch society should adopt an assimilationist or a multiculturalist position has been the subject of strong debates, both inside and outside the political sphere (Vasta, 2007), indicating that both cultural diversity beliefs are present within Dutch society, allowing us to investigate them as LMs.

### **Legitimizing myths: group boundaries**

In studies on nationalism, a distinction is typically made between ethnic and civic conceptualizations of citizenship. In the ethnic representation the nation is understood in terms of ancestry and cultural homogeneity, and national membership is denied to anyone who is not a member of the native majority group (Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2010; Pehrson, Vignoles & Brown, 2009b). Research has shown that Belgians who subscribe more to an ethnic conceptualization display higher levels of ethnic prejudice (Meeus et al., 2010). Similarly, Pehrson, Brown and Zagefka

(2009a) found that British students who more strongly endorse an ethnic definition of nationality show more negativity towards asylum seekers. Ethnic belonging can be seen as a HELM as it justifies the maintenance of the group hierarchy and group-based inequality between the majority group and immigrants. We therefore expect that support for ethnic citizenship will be related more strongly to SDO-D than to SDO-E.

By contrast, in a civic conceptualization nationality is defined by the acquirement of citizenship, be it through birth or through immigration (Heath & Tilly, 2005). Within this representation, group boundaries are more permeable: anyone who meets the democratically negotiated criteria is granted group membership (Meeus et al., 2010). Comparative research shows that in countries where the nation is defined by a civic criterion of national belonging, the association between national identification and anti-immigrant prejudice is significantly weaker than in other countries (Pehrson et al., 2009b). Additionally, research in Britain shows that people who have a civic conception of citizenship, grant immigrants more rights, are more liberal toward immigration, and are less likely to describe themselves as prejudiced (Heath & Tilly, 2005). Yet, endorsing a civic conceptualization of national belonging does not necessarily imply that people are unconditionally in favor of admitting immigrants into the national community. Rather, it means that people restrict access to the nation by setting citizenship requirements. Civic citizenship can be seen as a HALM, as it is a subtler form of inclusion and exclusion than its ethnic counterpart. We thus expect it to be related more strongly to SDO-E than to SDO-D.

### **Legitimizing myths: cultural diversity beliefs**

While citizenship conceptualizations deal with who belongs to the nation, cultural diversity beliefs focus on how diversity should be managed in society and what is expected of immigrants and

majority members. Assimilation requires immigrants to abandon their group identity and culture, and adapt and conform to the dominant group in the host society: 'This vision deals with difference by removing it' (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005, p. 226). For members of the dominant majority group this ideology provides intellectual and moral justification for rejecting out-group members and is typically favored over other cultural diversity beliefs. In four different studies using different samples and various dependent measures, Verkuyten (2011) showed that in the Netherlands, assimilation is associated with negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities. Wolsko, Park, and Judd (2006) showed in the context of the USA that endorsement of assimilation is positively associated with a greater tendency to evaluate the ethnic in-group more positively than the out-group, especially for white majority members. Levin et al. (2012) found that assimilation is hierarchy enhancing as it is positively related to both SDO and generalized prejudiced, and that the endorsement of assimilation mediated the SDO-prejudice relation. We thus expect that assimilation is related more strongly to SDO-D than to SDO-E.

In both scholarly and societal debates in the Netherlands, multiculturalism is often considered the opposite to assimilation (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005; Vasta, 2007). However, this one-dimensional definition does not capture the full extent of multicultural beliefs (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005). For majority members, endorsement of multiculturalism is not only associated with acknowledging the value of other cultures but also with a re-evaluation of their in-group culture and privileged group status (Verkuyten, Thijs & Bekhuis, 2010). We therefore focused on a form of multiculturalism that has been referred to as the 'interactive pluralist approach of multiculturalism' or 'deprovincialization' (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005; Pettigrew, 1997; Verkuyten et al., 2010; also see Brewer, 2008). Like any definition of multiculturalism this form posits that other groups and cultures should be acknowledged and valued (Berry, 1997; Rattan & Ambady, 2013), but it also empha-

sizes a reappraisal of the in-group culture (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005; Pettigrew, 1997). In this view, multiculturalism is more than mutual recognition. It involves a new understanding of the self in order to understand the 'other' (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005). Previous research has demonstrated that multicultural endorsement generally has positive effects on intergroup relations (see for reviews: Deaux & Verkuyten, 2014; Rattan & Ambady, 2013). Levin et al. (2012) demonstrated that support for multiculturalism is a HALM, as it is negatively associated with SDO and generalized prejudice, and significantly mediates the SDO-prejudice relation among students of three US colleges. Like other HALMs, we thus expect multiculturalism to be related more negatively to SDO-E than to SDO-D.

## National identification

Social dominance orientation scholars maintain that SDO represents a generalized and relatively stable orientation towards group-based hierarchies (c.f. Kteily et al., 2012). Others, however, have posited that the endorsement of SDO is influenced by group identities and group interests (c.f. Jetten & Iyer, 2010; Schmitt, Branscombe & Kappen, 2003; Turner & Reynolds, 2003). The interplay between SDO and social identification is further complicated by the conceptual distinction between SDO-D and SDO-E. This raises the question whether the two SDO-dimensions are equally important for majority members who differ in their national identification.

Sidanius, Pratto and Mitchell (1994) demonstrated that in-group identification interacts with SDO in affecting intergroup evaluations (but see Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, Phalet, & Kuppens, 2009). They argued that the moderating influence of social identification makes sense because SDO 'is likely to be maximally engaged only when people actually identify with the group they are discriminating in favor of' (Sidanius et al., 1994, p163). Given that

high-identifiers are more concerned with the relative position of the in-group and that SDO-D is related to perceptions of zero-sum competition with subordinate groups, we expect the relation between SDO-D and ethnic prejudice to be stronger for majority members who identify more strongly with the nation.

Conversely, we expect that for lower identifiers, the relation between SDO-E and prejudice will be stronger than for higher identifiers. As they attach less value to their in-group, lower identifiers will be less inclined to overtly dominate out-groups. For them, resisting groups and policies that reduce inequality will suffice to maintain the status quo. Research has indeed demonstrated that even people who are not strongly engaged with their national in-group (e.g. low-identifiers), they can still be mobilized to express exclusionary responses to immigrants when immigrants are considered to undermine the national identity and culture (Smeekes, Verkuyten, Poppe, 2011; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).

What can be expected from the combination of the two-dimensional SDO setup and social identity theorizing are two distinct pathways for higher identifiers and lower identifiers, respectively. For individuals that identify relatively strongly with their national in-group, the paths from SDO-D via HELMs to ethnic prejudice should be stronger. By contrast, the paths from SDO-E via HALMs to ethnic prejudice should be stronger for lower identifiers than for higher identifiers.

## 2.3 Method

### Sample

A representative probability sample ( $N = 802$ ) of Dutch natives (18 years and older) was drawn by TNS NIPO Consult, a bureau spe-

cialized in collecting representative data. Respondents received an online questionnaire about cultural diversity, politics, group rights, and Dutch and European identity. The response rate was 51%, which is normal for Dutch surveys (for a review on Dutch response rates, see: Stoop, 2005). The ages range between 18 and 87 years, with a mean age of 50.7 years and standard deviation of 17.2 years. Fifty per cent of the respondents were male.

**Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of items by latent variable**

Variable	Item label	Item name	Min	Max	Mean	SD
Ethnic prejudice	Feeling thermometer Turks	VR24r	0	10	4.81	2.20
	Feeling thermometer Moroccans	VR25r	0	10	6.72	2.12
	Feeling thermometer Surinamese	VR26r	0	10	4.66	2.13
	Feeling thermometer Antilleans	VR27r	0	10	5.96	2.21
SDO-D	Some groups are simply not the equals of others	VR68	1	7	4.48	1.58
	Some people are just worthier than others	VR70	1	7	2.96	1.63
	Some people are just more deserving than others	VR72	1	7	4.07	1.72
	To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others	VR75	1	7	3.48	1.46
SDO-E	We should treat one another as equals as much as possible (r)	VR69r	1	7	2.54	1.14
	Equality is an important principle to me (r)	VR71r	1	7	2.66	1.18

	There would be fewer societal problems if people would treat each other more equally (r)	VR73r	1	7	2.83	1.27
	It is important that we treat other groups as equals (r)	VR74r	1	7	2.88	1.19
Civic citizenship	Everyone who lives legally within the Netherlands is a real Dutchman	VR41	1	7	3.94	1.58
	Everyone who has a passport is a real Dutchman	VR42	1	7	3.96	1.54
Ethnic citizenship	A real Dutch person is someone who is originally from the Netherlands	VR39	1	7	4.35	1.81
	A real Dutch person has Dutch ancestors	VR40	1	7	4.34	1.81
Assimilation	Immigrants have to give up their own culture and adopt the culture of the host country	VR16	1	7	3.99	1.56
	Immigrants have to think and act the same way as native inhabitants do	VR19	1	7	3.84	1.55
	If immigrants want to preserve their own culture, they should do so in their private lives	VR20	1	7	4.36	1.56
	Immigrants have to adapt to the native inhabitants of a country	VR23	1	7	5.10	1.45
Multiculturalism	The Dutch culture surely is not better than other cultures	VR35	1	7	5.04	1.31
	One should always try to have a broader horizon than just the Netherlands	VR36	1	7	5.41	1.10

	The way we look at the world in the Netherlands, is just one of many possibilities	VR37	1	7	5.48	1.07
	One should always nuance one's world view, rather than considering it to be absolute	VR38	1	7	5.51	1.08
National identification	My Dutch identity is an important part of myself	VR61	1	7	5.59	1.21
	I identify strongly with the Netherlands	VR62	1	7	5.47	1.25
	I feel I am a real Dutchman	VR63	1	7	5.74	1.17
	My Dutch identity is important for how I consider myself and how I feel about myself	VR64	1	7	5.33	1.39

Note:  $N = 802$  for all variables. (r) = reversed score; SDO, social dominance orientation; SDO-D, SDO-Dominance; SDO-E, SDO-Egalitarianism.

Respondents indicated the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements on 7-point scales ranging from 1 = 'Strongly disagree' to 7 = 'Strongly agree', with 4 = 'Do not disagree, but do not agree either' as a neutral point. Only the control variables and the measures for ethnic prejudice are an exception to this. Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for all items. As we use structural equation modeling to estimate latent variables for each scale, traditional reliability analyses are not informative.

## Measures

To measure our dependent variable, *ethnic prejudice*, we used the well-known 'feeling thermometer' (c.f. Ho et al., 2012; Pettigrew, 1997; Verkuyten et al., 2010). Respondents were asked to indicate

how they feel about migrant groups in the Netherlands by marking a number on a scale. The target groups were the four major minority groups in the Netherlands: of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Antillean background. High numbers (maximum was 100 degrees) indicated positive feelings about a group, low numbers (minimum was 0 degrees) indicated negative feelings, and the midpoint (50 degrees) indicated feelings that are 'neither positive nor negative'. The scales were recoded so that higher values indicate stronger ethnic prejudice on a scale of 1 to 10. Following the modification indices in the Mplus software, the error terms of two items (prejudice towards Surinamese and Antilleans, respectively) were allowed to co-vary to improve model fit (see also Figure 2.1). Theoretically, this coincides with the views of the Dutch majority group that these groups are highly similar because of their shared Caribbean origin and history of colonization.

*Social dominance orientation* was measured by eight items based on Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle (1994) that were validated and translated to Dutch by Van Hiel and Duriez (2002). This scale has previously been used in research in the European context (e.g., Duriez, Soenens & Vansteenkiste, 2007; Meeus et al., 2009). The first dimension, SDO-D was measured by four items such as: 'Some groups are simply not equal to other groups' (see Table 2.1). Higher scores indicate more support for SDO-D. The other dimension, SDO-E, was measured by items such as: 'We should treat each other as equals as much as we can' (see Table 2.1). These items were recoded so that higher scores indicate more opposition to equality. Following the modification indices in the Mplus software, the error terms of the last two SDO-E items (see Table 2.1) were allowed to co-vary to increase model fit (see also Figure 2.1). The SDO-D and SDO-E items were presented in a random order.

*Civic citizenship* was measured by two statements: 'Everyone who lives legally within the Netherlands is a real Dutchman' and 'Everyone who has a Dutch passport is a real Dutchman'. *Ethnic cit-*

*izenship* was also measured by two statements: ‘A real Dutch person is someone who is originally from the Netherlands’ and ‘A real Dutch person has Dutch ancestors’ (cf. Heath & Tilly, 2005; Meeus et al., 2010; Pehrson et al., 2009).

*Assimilation* was measured by four statements, such as: ‘Immigrants have to give up their own culture and adopt the culture of the host country’ (cf. Verkuyten, 2011; see Table 2.1).

*Multiculturalism* was measured by four statements such as: ‘The Dutch culture surely is not better than other cultures’ (see Table 2.1). These items were based on the work of Hartmann and Gerteis (2005), and that of Pettigrew (1997).

*National identification* was measured by four statements such as: ‘My Dutch identity is an important part of myself’ (c.f. Smeekes et al. 2012; Verkuyten, 2011; see Table 2.1). The items of national identification were summated into a single scale (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .93$ ) to facilitate the use of this measurement as a moderator in the analysis.

To make sure that our results are not confounded by other factors we included several control variables: *gender* and *age* (see Sample for descriptive information), *educational attainment* (5.5% completed primary education only, 36.2% completed secondary education only, 33.3% completed lower tertiary education, and 25% completed higher tertiary education), *religiosity* (56 per cent indicated they are ‘not at all’ or ‘not very’ religious and 13% indicated they are ‘quite’ or ‘very’ religious), and *political orientation* (11% classified themselves as left, 19% as center left, 45% as center, 18% as center right, and 7% as right).

Analysis of variance supplemented with cross-tabulations on item level showed there were small but statistically significant differ-

ences between males and females concerning their scores on the SDO items.<sup>2</sup> Also, there were small but statistically significant differences between higher and lower identifiers concerning their scores on the SDO items<sup>3</sup>, and differences concerning ethnic citizenship, civic citizenship, assimilation, and multiculturalism between higher and lower identifiers.<sup>4</sup>

## Analytical strategy

We employed SEM using the Mplus software (Muthén & Muthén, version 7.11) to analyze our data and test our expectations. All models were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. Model fit was assessed with criteria outlined by Hu and Bentler (1999): a cut-off value close to .06 for the root-mean-square-error of approximation (RMSEA), a cut-off value close to .95 for both the comparative fit index (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), a cut-off value close to .08 for the standardized-root-mean-residual (SRMR). Differences were labeled 'significant' when the p-values were lower than .05 (one-tailed, because we formulated specific predictions on the di-

2 Concerning SDO-D, for item VR68,  $F(1,800) = 6.93, p = .01$ ; for item VR70,  $F(1,800) = 6.37, p = .01$ , and for item VR75,  $F(1,800) = 6.13, p = .01$ . Concerning SDO-E, for item VR69,  $F(1,800) = 4.69, p = .03$ ; for item VR74,  $F(1,800) = 6.32, p = .04$ . See Table 2.1 for item names. Closer inspection using cross-tabulations showed that differences in responses were small, with men scoring higher on SDO than women. Output is available upon request.

3 Concerning SDO-D, for item VR68,  $F(1,800) = 42.52, p < .01$ ; for item VR70,  $F(1,800) = 18.29, p < .01$ ; for item VR72,  $F(1,800) = 23.23, p < .01$ . Concerning SDO-E, for item VR71,  $F(1,800) = 6.52, p = .01$ , and for item VR74,  $F(1,800) = 13.04, p < .01$ . See Table 2.1 for item names. Cross-tabulations showed that differences in responses were small, with higher identifiers scoring higher on the SDO items. Output is available upon request.

4 Concerning ethnic citizenship, for item VR39,  $F(1,800) = 78.54, p < .01$ , for item VR40,  $F(1,800) = 74.73, p < .01$ . See Table 2.1 for items names. Cross-tabulations showed that higher identifiers endorsed the items more frequently than lower identifiers. Output is available upon request. Concerning civic citizenship, for item VR41,  $F(1,800) = 13.72, p < .01$ , for item VR42,  $F(1,800) = 16.17, p < .01$ . Cross-tabulations showed that higher identifiers disagreed with the items more frequently than lower identifiers. Output is available upon request.

Concerning assimilation, for item VR16,  $F(1,800) = 24.00, p < .01$ ; for item VR19,  $F(1,800) = 64.40, p < .01$ ; for item VR20,  $F(1,800) = 44.73, p < .01$ ; for item VR23,  $F(1,800) = 64.16, p < .01$ . Cross-tabulations showed that higher identifiers endorsed the items more frequently than lower identifiers. Output is available upon request.

Concerning multiculturalism, for item VR35,  $F(1,800) = 18.43, p < .01$ ; for item VR36,  $F(1,800) = 25.53, p < .01$ ; for item VR37,  $F(1,800) = 5.34, p = .02$ ; for item VR38,  $F(1,800) = 10.61, p < .01$ . Cross-tabulations showed that differences in responses were small, output is available upon request.

rections of effects). As we included continuous rather than binary covariates in the models, we reported standardized results (STDYX: standardized on both dependent and independent variables). Using CFA we first tested if the two-dimensional distinction of SDO fits the data better than a one-factor solution. Next, we conducted CFAs on the LMs and SDO. Once we established that these latent constructs can be distinguished empirically, we tested and interpreted the structural model for all respondents.

We conducted a multi-group analysis (lower vs higher identifiers) to test if the relations between the SDO dimensions, LMs, and ethnic prejudice are moderated by national identification. A multi-group analysis was preferred over analyses in which national identification was kept continuous because in order to use national identification as a continuous moderator, we would have had to include a total of 14 latent interaction terms in the model (national identification with six variables predicting ethnic prejudice, plus national identification with SDO-D and with SDO-E each predicting four legitimizing myths). Such a SEM would have been an example of non-parsimony. It would have required considerable computational power and would have severely reduced statistical power. Furthermore, we are interested in differential effects across groups, not in the main effect of national identification. As national identification was generally high, a median-split was used to create a group of lower national identifiers ( $N = 389$ ) and a group of higher identifiers ( $N = 413$ ).

## 2.4 Results

### Confirmatory Factor Analyses

We conducted a CFA in which SDO-D was distinguished from SDO-E. This model yielded a good fit of the data, with  $\chi^2(18, N = 802) = 55.6$ ,

$RMSEA = .05$ ,  $CFI = .98$ ,  $TLI = .97$ ,  $SRMR = .04$  (Hu & Bentler, 1999). A second CFA combined the two SDO dimensions into a single factor and yielded a poor model fit [ $\chi^2 (19, N = 802) = 285.3$ ,  $RMSEA = .13$ ,  $CFI = .87$ ,  $TLI = .80$ ,  $SRMR = .08$ ]. The difference in Chi-square is statistically significant [ $\Delta\chi^2 = 229.7$ ,  $\Delta df = 1$ ,  $p\text{-value} < .01$ ], indicating that the distinction between SDO-D and SDO-E is supported by our data.

Likewise, we conducted CFAs on the other latent variables. These analyses demonstrated that assimilation and multiculturalism do not form a single construct [ $\chi^2 (20, N = 802) = 786.2$ ,  $RMSEA = .22$ ,  $CFI = .75$ ,  $TLI = .65$ ,  $SRMR = .12$ ] but rather two separate constructs [ $\chi^2 (19, N = 802) = 57.5$ ,  $RMSEA = .05$ ,  $CFI = .99$ ,  $TLI = .98$ ,  $SRMR = .03$ ]. As both ethnic and civic citizenship were measured by two items each, comparing the fit of different CFAs for ethnic and civic citizenship is somewhat meaningless, as a two-factor model is a saturated model with a perfect fit. However, based on the correlations between the citizenship items, we can assume that ethnic and civic citizenship are separate constructs: the correlation between the ethnic citizenship items was strong ( $r = .86$ ), as was the correlation between the civic citizenship items ( $r = .70$ ). Furthermore, the correlations between the items of ethnic and civic citizenship were low (i.e. ranging between  $r = .22$  and  $r = .26$ ). As an additional test and to verify that all constructs in our study are distinguishable from each other, we combined all latent constructs in various ways using CFA. The results are presented in Table 2.2 and indicate that these combinations never fit the data. Thus, the analyses demonstrate that the proposed constructs fit the data better than any alternative model in which two or more constructs are modelled as a single construct. The model fit of the final measurement model fits the data well [ $\chi^2 (229, N = 802) = 574.08$ ,  $RMSEA = .04$ ,  $CFI = .96$ ,  $TLI = .96$ ,  $SRMR = .04$ ] and is graphically presented in Figure 2.1.

**Table 2.2. Confirmatory factor analyses testing various alternative measurement models with combinations of the constructs<sup>1</sup>**


<b>N. of latent constructs</b>	<b>Combination of latent constructs</b>	$\chi^2$	<i>df</i>	<i>RMSEA</i>	<i>CFI</i>	<i>TLI</i>	<i>SRMR</i>
6	Ethnic citizenship & Multiculturalism	1639.052	235	.086	.846	.820	.069
6	Ethnic citizenship & Assimilation	1404.483	235	.079	.872	.850	.054
6	Civic citizenship & Multiculturalism	1157.935	235	.070	.899	.881	.065
6	Civic citizenship & Assimilation	1093.304	235	.067	.906	.890	.058
5	Ethnic & Civic citizenship & Multiculturalism	2188.187	240	.101	.787	.755	.078
5	Ethnic & Civic citizenship & Assimilation	1896.301	240	.093	.819	.792	.064
5	Ethnic citizenship & Multiculturalism & Assimilation	2268.311	240	.103	.778	.745	.070
5	Civic citizenship & Multiculturalism & Assimilation	1919.562	240	.093	.816	.789	.072
4	All LMs combined	2763.611	244	.113	.724	.688	.078

1 Latent constructs are as follows: SDO-D, SDO-E, ethnic prejudice and four legitimizing myths (LMs: ethnic citizenship, civic citizenship, assimilation, and multiculturalism). Analyses test whether one or more of these constructs can be combined into a single construct.

2	All LMs and SDO dimensions	3419.043	249	.126	.653	.616	.085
1	LMs, SDOs & Prejudice	3671.654	250	.131	.626	.587	.089
7	Final model (no combinations)	574.077	229	.043	.962	.955	.044

Note: N = 802 for all models. SDO dimensions are allowed to co-vary, as are the LMs.

**Figure 2.1: The final measurement model. SDO, social dominance orientation; SDO-D, SDO-dominance; SDO-E, SDO-Egalitarianism**



## Structural model

In the structural model, ethnic prejudice was predicted by four co-varying LMs (ethnic and civic citizenship, assimilation, and multiculturalism). In turn, these myths were predicted by SDO-D and SDO-E (also allowed to co-vary). Control variables were included, and nine respondents were dropped because of missing values on educational attainment. The model fit the data well [ $\chi^2$  (314,  $N = 793$ ) = 826.09,  $RMSEA = .05$ ,  $CFI = .95$ ,  $TLI = .93$ ,  $SRMR = .04$ ] and explained 54% of the variance in ethnic prejudice. Table 2.3 presents the factor loadings, Table 2.4 presents the bivariate correlations between all latent variables in the model, Figure 2.2 presents the structural paths (for direct associations only).

The two SDO dimensions were, as expected, significantly related to each other. In line with our expectation, SDO-D was positively associated with HELMs but not with HALMs. SDO-E was positively associated with HELMs and negatively with HALMs. Further inspection showed that the strength of the paths from the two SDO dimensions to ethnic citizenship were not statistically different from each other ( $Wald = 2.75$  with  $df = 1$  and  $p\text{-value} = .10$ , not reported in figure). All other paths from the two SDO dimensions to the LMs were statistically different (difference between the paths from the SDO dimensions to civic citizenship was  $Wald = 4.37$  with  $p\text{-value} = .04$ ; to multiculturalism  $Wald = 32.88$  with  $p\text{-value} < .01$ ; to assimilation  $Wald = 4.38$  with  $p\text{-value} = .04$ ; all statistics with  $df = 1$ , Wald statistics not reported in figure). These findings indicate that the two SDO dimensions relate differently to HELMs and HALMs. For ethnic citizenship (although not statistically significant), civic citizenship and multiculturalism, these differences were as expected: SDO-D is stronger positively related to HELMs, whereas SDO-E is stronger negatively related to HALMs. Assimilation was, however, not only related to SDO-D but also to SDO-E.

**Table 2.3: Factor loadings for all latent variables in the final measurement model**

Latent construct	Item name	Overall		Lower Identifiers		Higher Identifiers	
		Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE
Ethnic prejudice	VR24r	.601	.028	.647	.031	.534	.032
	VR25r	.854	.019	.911	.023	.806	.026
	VR26r	.575	.029	.593	.034	.497	.035
	VR27r	.682	.023	.704	.026	.620	.031
SDO-D	VR68	.523	.036	.520	.039	.532	.039
	VR70	.737	.033	.788	.039	.659	.041
	VR72	.525	.034	.521	.037	.496	.041
	VR75	.415	.037	.414	.039	.379	.040
SDO-E	VR69r	.788	.017	.766	.023	.801	.022
	VR71r	.783	.018	.796	.022	.768	.023
	VR73r	.548	.029	.552	.033	.542	.032
	VR74r	.848	.015	.854	.019	.841	.019
Ethnic citizenship	VR39	.926	.014	.916	.018	.918	.016
	VR40	.930	.014	.915	.018	.932	.017
Civic citizenship	VR41	.805	.031	.819	.036	.804	.033
	VR42	.870	.032	.855	.033	.860	.037
Assimilation	VR16	.752	.019	.722	.026	.727	.025
	VR19	.777	.018	.781	.024	.749	.023
	VR20	.761	.019	.718	.025	.766	.023
	VR23	.711	.021	.674	.027	.720	.025
Multi-culturalism	VR35	.666	.022	.710	.026	.623	.026
	VR36	.827	.014	.840	.017	.805	.020
	VR37	.841	.014	.824	.019	.857	.016
	VR38	.837	.014	.836	.018	.834	.018


Note: Standardized (STDYX) results. All estimates are significant at  $p < .001$ . SDO, social dominance orientation; SDO-D, SDO-Dominance; SDO-E, SDO-Egalitarianism.

**Table 2.2. Confirmatory factor analyses testing various alternative measurement models with combinations of the constructs<sup>1</sup>**

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Ethnic prejudice						
2. SDO-D	.36					
3. SDO-E	.49	.49				
4. Ethnic citizenship	.47	.44	.37			
5. Civic citizenship	-.41	-.22	-.35	-.32		
6. Assimilation	.68	.42	.52	.55	-.32	
7. Multiculturalism	-.52	-.38	-.66	-.42	.26	-.56

Note: All estimated correlations are significant at  $p < .001$ . SDO, social dominance orientation; SDO-D, SDO-Dominance; SDO-E, SDO-Egalitarianism.

**Figure 2.2. Direct paths for structural model without group structure. SDO, social dominance orientation; SDO-D, SDO-Dominance; SDO-E, SDO-Egalitarianism**



\*\*  $p < .01$  \*  $p < .05$  (one-tailed)

Standardized results STDYX. Two items of SDO-E were allowed to co-vary, as were two items of the dependent variable. All legitimizing myths were allowed to co-vary. Except for civic citizenship with multiculturalism, all myths are significantly correlated. Model is controlled for gender, political orientation, religiosity, education, and age. Model fit:  $\chi^2(314, N = 793) = 826.09$ ,  $RMSEA = .05$ ,  $CFI = .95$ ,  $TLI = .93$ ,  $SRMR = .04$ ,  $R^2 = .54$

Figure 2.2 further shows that both HELMs (ethnic citizenship and assimilation) were positively associated with ethnic prejudice, while the HALMs (civic citizenship and multiculturalism) were negative predictors. However, of key interest to the current study are the mediating roles of the LMs. Table 2.5 presents all paths (total, direct, and indirect effects) from the two SDO dimensions to ethnic prejudice. The table shows that in the overall model, the relation between SDO-D and ethnic prejudice was fully mediated by the HELMs ethnic citizenship and assimilation. In turn, the association between SDO-E and ethnic prejudice was fully mediated not only by the HALMs civic citizenship and multiculturalism, but also by assimilation (a HELM).

**Table 2.5: Total and specific indirect effects on ethnic prejudice**

SDO dimension	Effects and paths	Overall model	Low identifiers	High identifiers
SDO-D	<i>Total, direct and indirect effects</i>			
	Total effect SDO-D	.10*	-.17*	.25**
	Direct effect SDO-D	-.01	-.19**	.11
	Total indirect effect SDO-D	.10**	.02	.14**
SDO-D	<i>Indirect paths SDO-D and prejudice</i>			
	Indirect via ethnic citizenship (HELM)	.02*	.00	.04*
	Indirect via civic citizenship (HALM)	.01	.00	.01
	Indirect via assimilation (HELM)	.06*	.01	.09*
	Indirect via multiculturalism (HALM)	.01	.00	.00
SDO-E	<i>Total, direct and indirect effects</i>			
	Total effect SDO-E	.35**	.50**	.30**

	Direct effect SDO-E	.07	.21*	.01
	Total indirect effect SDO-E	.29**	.29**	.29**
SDO-E	<i>Indirect paths SDO-E and prejudice</i>			
	Indirect via ethnic citizenship (HELM)	.01	.00	.02
	Indirect via civic citizenship (HALM)	.04**	.05*	.03
	Indirect via assimilation (HELM)	.15**	.11**	.21**
	Indirect via multiculturalism (HALM)	.08**	.13*	.03

Note: Standardized (STDYX) results. SDO, social dominance orientation; SDO-D, SDO-Dominance; SDO-E, SDO-Egalitarianism. Significance levels (one-tailed) \*\* =  $p < .01$  \*  $p < .05$

## National identification

To assess the potentially moderating role of national identification, we conducted a multi-group analysis across the groups of higher and lower identifiers. Firstly, we tested measurement invariance for higher and lower identifiers by estimating a series of models following the checklist outlined by Van de Schoot, Lugtig and Hox (2012). All models were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation in Mplus (version 7.11). Model fit was again assessed with criteria outlined by Hu and Bentler (1999): a cut-off value close to .06 for the RMSEA, a cut-off value close to .95 for both the CFI and the TLI, and a cut-off value close to .08 for the SRMR. As ethnic and civic citizenship were measured only by two items each, these constructs had to be excluded from the analysis of measurement invariance. By fitting the CFA for both higher and lower identifiers, configural invariance was established [for lower identifiers  $\chi^2 (158, N = 389) = 357.90$ ,  $RMSEA = .06$ ,  $CFI = .94$ ,  $TLI = .93$ ,  $SRMR = .05$ ; for higher identifiers  $\chi^2 (158, N = 413) = 343.72$ ,  $RMSEA = .05$ ,  $CFI = .95$ ,  $TLI = .94$ ,  $SRMR = .06$ ]. To test for metric invariance,

a model was run in which factor loadings were constrained to be equal across groups, while intercepts were allowed to differ. The model fit was good [ $\chi^2 (336, N = 802) = 729.05, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .94, TLI = .94, SRMR = .07$ ], indicating that respondents across the two groups attribute the same meaning to the latent constructs and that the effects can be meaningfully compared across groups (Van de Schoot et al, 2012). Next, a model was run where only the intercepts were equal across groups (factor loadings were allowed to differ). The acceptable model fit [ $\chi^2 (336, N = 802) = 880.38, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .92, TLI = .91, SRMR = .08$ ] indicated that the meaning of the levels of the underlying items (as measured by the intercepts) was equal in both groups. Finally, a model was run where both factor loadings and intercepts were constrained to be equal across groups [ $\chi^2 (356, N = 802) = 905.32, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .92, TLI = .92, SRMR = .09$ ]. With a model fit comparable to the previous model, it demonstrated scalar invariance, implying that scores on latent variables can be meaningful compared across groups.

After establishing scalar measurement invariance, we proceeded with the structural model to examine the role of national identification. The overall model fit of the multi-group structural model was acceptable [ $\chi^2 (662, N_{low} = 386, N_{high} = 407) = 1329.17, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .93, TLI = .91, SRMR = .05$ ]. Differentiating between the level of national identification revealed that the model for higher identifiers explained more variance in ethnic prejudice than the model for lower identifiers ( $R^2_{low} = .49, R^2_{high} = .60$ ). The results for the structural model show that for lower identifiers, SDO-E was positively associated with ethnic prejudice, whereas SDO-D was not (see Table 2.3). As expected, the association between SDO-E and prejudice was partially mediated by HALMs civic citizenship and multiculturalism, but unexpectedly also by the HELM assimilation. For higher identifiers, the SDO-prejudice relation was fully mediated. The relation between SDO-E and ethnic prejudice was mediated by assimilation. Furthermore, and in line with our ex-

pectations, the relation between SDO-D and ethnic prejudice was mediated by the HELMs ethnic citizenship and assimilation.

## 2.5 Discussion

Recent research suggests that individual differences in SDO consist of two dimensions (Ho et al., Jost & Thompson, 2000; Larsson et al., 2012). Yet, evidence for the distinction between SDO-D and SDO-E is almost exclusively based on non-representative student samples in the USA, Israel, and Sweden, and the full SDO6 scale. Using a representative population sample, the current study validated the distinction between SDO-D and SDO-E among Dutch natives. Both SDO dimensions were positively associated with each other but independently associated with prejudice towards immigrant groups. Furthermore, the analyses indicated that the two dimensions related differently to various LMs, which suggests that the ideological nature of SDO-D and SDO-E indeed differs.

In contrast to most SDO-based research, we included LMs to examine in more detail the two-dimensional SDO-prejudice association, thereby following up on a suggestion for future research by Ho and colleagues (2012). The fact that both SDO-prejudice relations were fully mediated by LMs supports the proposition that individuals high in SDO use LMs to justify their prejudice (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). However, we found that they do so in different ways. The results showed that the more people desire to openly subjugate subordinate groups (high in SDO-D), the more they endorsed HELMs that were related to prejudice. People ‘merely’ preferring non-egalitarian relations in society (high in SDO-E) endorsed a wider range of myths, both hierarchy attenuating and hierarchy enhancing.

Whereas Ho et al. (2012) found hierarchy-attenuating outcomes to correlate with both SDO dimensions (albeit more strongly with SDO-E), we found that HALMs were associated with SDO-E only. This difference might be due to the Dutch normative context. For decades, the Netherlands was considered a tolerant country in which it was considered politically incorrect to express prejudice against immigrant groups. But, especially since the early 2000s, immigrants are increasingly and publically blamed for lacking responsibility to integrate and for having a 'backward culture' (Vasta, 2007). As a result, people higher in SDO-D might feel that they can more freely voice their resistance against immigrants rather than to have to express their attitudes in more covert or subtle ways (i.e. hierarchy-attenuating rhetoric). Conversely, those high in SDO-E may still feel uncomfortable by explicit expressions of prejudice and dominance and resort to a more diverse array of discourses to justify the status quo. Furthermore, with the rise of far-right parties and the rejection of the so-called politically correct multiculturalism, the discourse of assimilation has become increasingly prominent in public and political debates (Vasta, 2007; Verkuyten, 2011). As a consequence, the need for assimilation has become more widely endorsed and is more readily available for arguing against cultural diversity and immigrants. This might explain why the endorsement of assimilation did not only play a mediating role between SDO-D and prejudice, but also between SDO-E and prejudice. Future research should investigate to which extent differences in the normative context have an impact on the endorsement of either SDO-D or SDO-E and the relations with available LMs and ethnic prejudice (see De Oliveira, Guimond & Dambrun, 2012; Fischer, Hanke & Sibley, 2012).

Given the debate between SDO-scholars and social identity theorists (Jetten & Iyer, 2010; Schmitt, Branscombe & Kappen, 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 2003; Turner & Reynolds, 2003), we investigated whether the distinction between SDO-D and SDO-E relates differently to ethnic prejudice for lower and higher national identifiers.

Research has demonstrated that in-group identification interacts with SDO in affecting intergroup evaluations (Sidanius et al., 1994; but see Meeus et al., 2009), but this interplay is further complicated by the conceptual distinction between the two SDO dimensions. Combining the two-dimensional SDO setup with social identity theorizing, we predicted distinct pathways for higher identifiers (from SDO-D via HELMs to prejudice) and for lower identifiers (from SDO-E via HALMs to prejudice), respectively. By and large, the results confirmed this expectation.

SDO-D was significantly related to more ethnic prejudice but only among natives who strongly identified with their national in-group. Moreover, higher identifiers endorsed HELMs more strongly. This was true for both the paths from SDO-D to prejudice and from SDO-E to prejudice. Conversely, there was no positive association between SDO-D and ethnic prejudice for lower identifiers. To be sure, this does not mean that SDO is irrelevant for lower identifiers. The results revealed that for lower identifiers, stronger endorsement of SDO-E was significantly associated with higher levels of ethnic prejudice. As they attach less value to their in-group, it appears that lower identifiers simply feel no need to overtly dominate migrant groups and instead prefer to maintain the status quo by resisting equal intergroup relations. This pattern confirms previous work on lower national identifiers that shows that they can be mobilized to display prejudice toward immigrant groups, when these groups are perceived to undermine the national culture and identity (Smeekes et al., 2011; Sniderman & Hagedoorn, 2007). As expected, lower identifiers justified their ethnic prejudice and SDO-E by means of the HALMs civic citizenship and multiculturalism. Also, endorsement of assimilation mediated the relation between SDO-E and prejudice. Again, this might be due to the fact that assimilation has become a more widely accepted and used ideology in the discourse on immigrants in the Netherlands (cf. Vasta, 2007). Interestingly, for lower identifiers, the relation between SDO-E and ethnic prejudice was only partially mediated

by LMs. Our model could explain about half of the variance in ethnic prejudice. It could be that lower identifiers who endorse SDO-E use additional LMs that were not included in our study, such as perceived cultural threat (Smeekes et al., 2011; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).

We investigated the distinction between SDO-D and SDO-E in a new context with a representative sample and by using a shortened SDO-scale. In agreement with Ho et al. (2012), Jost and Thompson (2000) and Larsson et al. (2012), we found that individual differences in SDO consist of two rather than a single dimension. We additionally showed that these two dimensions are related to ethnic prejudice through different LMs, and that these relations differ for higher and lower national identifiers. Additional studies in other contexts should verify these findings to further confirm the two-dimensional setup for SDO research and the role of group identification. LMs have often been neglected in SDO research, and the current study focused on various myths in the explanation of prejudice toward ethnic minority groups. It showed that the two SDO dimensions relate differently to HELMs and HALMs, and these myths, in turn, were related to ethnic prejudice. Future research should investigate if these mediated relations can also be found in other contexts and with different outcomes such as support for social policies, political attitudes, or different domains of prejudice (Duckitt & Sibley, 2006). Considering different outcomes is further important because in social dominance theory, ethnic prejudice has been conceptualized as a legitimizing myth that justifies processes of discrimination that maintain the status quo (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Yet, there are many studies that have examined SDO as underlying prejudice, and the founders of social dominance theory themselves have presented ethnic prejudice as an outcome variable of interest – ‘SDO is as a general orientation that predicts prejudice against many different groups’ – and have explicitly separated ethnic prejudice from legitimizing myths – ‘SDO has been found to be related to (...) ethnic prejudice against a

range of different minority groups (...). In addition, SDO has been found to be related to a range of hierarchy-enhancing ideologies and policies' (Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, 2010, p. 283). This justifies the use of ethnic prejudice as a variable that is predicted by both SDO and an array of LMs.

Because of time and space considerations, many researchers use shortened SDO scales, rather than the full 16-item scale (e.g., Jetten & Iyer, 2010; Küpper & Zick, 2011; Peña & Sidanius, 2002; Quist & Resendez, 2010). The current study demonstrated that the two-dimensional SDO setup can also be found with a shortened scale. However, the scale has some potential limitations. Our SDO-D items might have focused more on general intergroup relations or 'group worthiness', rather than domination per se. Furthermore, the SDO-D items might have captured attitudes toward groups and people, while the SDO-E items focused on how groups should treat each other. In addition, all SDO-D items were protrait items, whereas all SDO-E items were contrait items. This might have influenced our results (Jost & Thompson, 2000). However, Ho and colleagues (2012) have demonstrated that the empirical distinction between SDO-D and SDO-E cannot simply be attributed to confounding item wording.

Finally, the cross-sectional nature of this study and of previous research (Ho et al., 2012; Jost & Thompson, 2000; Larsson et al., 2012) prevents drawing conclusions about causality. However, the model tested was derived from theory, and there is experimental evidence that SDO is a causal predictor of ethnic prejudice (Kteily et al., 2010; Sibly & Duckitt, 2010) and that different LMs mediate this causal effect (Levin et al., 2012). Yet, these studies did not consider the two dimensions of SDO. Future experimental and longitudinal studies should further examine the proposed pathways, in general, and among lower and higher group identifiers, in particular.



## Chapter 3

# Majority members evaluating minorities' political acculturation: group interests and goals

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Hindriks wrote the main part of the manuscript and conducted the analyses. Verkuyten and Coenders substantially contributed to the manuscript. The authors jointly developed the idea and the design of the study.



## 3.1 Introduction

Acculturation processes involve mutual adaptations that different groups and their individual members make when they come into structural contact (Berry, 1997). Research, however, focuses primarily on the adaptation and attitudes of minority groups, and to a far lesser extent on the views of majority members (Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Matera, Stefanile & Brown, 2011). Furthermore, while acculturation is studied extensively in the social and cultural domains of life, for example by examining heritage cultural maintenance (Ruggiero, Taylor & Lambert, 1996), host society language acquisition (Jiang, Green, Henley & Masten, 2009), group identifications (Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind & Vedder, 2001), and social contacts (Greenland & Brown, 2005), researchers have largely ignored acculturation in the political domain. Although minority representation in political systems is widely recognized as crucial for improving the socio-economic position of disadvantaged groups (Bieber, 2008; Martiniello, 2005; Pande, 2003; Petrussevska, 2009), immigrant minorities are met with much controversy and resistance when they participate politically (e.g., Petrussevska, 2009). These negative reactions could lead to increased inequality and exclusion, and might negatively affect the democratic process. Thus, it is important to understand the processes underlying majority members' willingness to accommodate minority members in the political domain.

This chapter presents two experimental vignette studies designed to examine how majority members' out-group feelings are influenced by the political acculturation strategies of Muslim minority members. Specifically, we tested the proposition that out-group

feelings depend on the group interests that politically active Muslim minority members are advancing. Further, and in line with the other chapters of this book, we will examine the role of power threat perceptions on the relation between minority acculturation strategies and majority evaluations. Our research was conducted in the Netherlands where Muslims (whether first, second, or third generation) are placed at the heart of debates on immigration and minority participation (McLaren, 2003; Scheepers, Gijsberts & Coenders, 2002). Since this is the case in many European countries (Helbling, 2012), the Netherlands offers a prototypical context for our research.

### **Political acculturation**


Although the importance of political acculturation processes is acknowledged (Berry, 1997), research has not systematically applied the acculturation framework to the political domain. In the socio-cultural domain acculturation is typically seen as involving two key issues that determine minority members' acculturation strategies (Berry, 1997). First, minority members need to decide on the extent to which they want to have social contacts and get involved with the dominant majority group vis-à-vis remaining primarily among themselves. The second issue concerns the extent to which the heritage culture should be maintained, versus the extent to which the majority culture should be adopted. The combination of these two issues leads to the well-known four acculturation strategies: assimilation, integration, separation and marginalization.

Experimental vignette studies operationalizing these four strategies show that majority members respond to them differently. For example, in the context of the Netherlands, native majority members clearly preferred assimilating or integrating immigrants over those that endorse separation and marginalization (Van Ouden-

hoven, Prins & Buunk, 1998; Verkuyten, Thijs & Sierksma, 2014). Native Italians have also been found to evaluate assimilating and integrating minority members more positively than their separating and marginalizing counterparts (Kosic, Mannetti, Lackland & Sam, 2005). In general, majority members prefer minorities to assimilate or integrate because this indicates that minority members value the host society culture to the extent that they want to adopt it (Brown & Zagefka, 2012). This makes majority members feel valued, which in turn results in more favorable out-group attitudes. Conversely, minority members seeking to maintain their cultural heritage tend to be viewed as a threat to the majority culture and consequently are evaluated more negatively (e.g., Tip, Zagefka, González, Brown, Cinnirella, & Na, 2012).

Minority members can participate politically in various ways, such as: voting in elections, running for office, establishing a political party, joining political demonstrations, contacting politicians, signing petitions, and being politically active on internet forums and social media (Carlisle & Patton, 2013; Marien, Hooghe & Quintelier, 2010). We know very little about how people respond to minority members adopting any of these political behaviours. Following the acculturation framework, we focus in this chapter on minority's political participation in terms of advancing particular group interests and goals. First, minority members face the question whether or not they wish to advance politically the interests and goals of their minority in-group. Second, they face the question whether they wish to advance interests and goals that benefit society as a whole. When we consider these two issues simultaneously, we can derive four political acculturation strategies (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1: Political acculturation strategies



*Marginalization* refers to the situation in which minority members do not wish to represent any group interests or goals. Since this implies that one wants to keep away from group-based politics we will not further consider this strategy.

When a minority member wishes to advance society's interests and not those of his or her minority group, the *assimilation strategy* is defined. We expect that majority members will evaluate this strategy most positively because it does not harm them, and signals acceptance of the existing political system and status quo, as well as acceptance of the dominant culture at large (Tip et al., 2012).

*Separation* is the strategy in which minority members wish to advance only the interests of their minority in-group. Majority members will probably evaluate this strategy most negatively. Group competition is an important basis for prejudice and discrimination (e.g., Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Sidanius & Pratto,

1999) and the separation strategy directly challenges the political status quo, and with it, the privileged status position of the majority group in society.

We expect that Dutch majority members will evaluate the *integration strategy* at an intermediate level. Politically integrating minority members advocate for the interests of their minority in-group but also pursue goals that are relevant for society as a whole. Thus, on the one hand, they try to advance the position of their minority group and, on the other, demonstrate political commitment to improve the broader society. It follows that majority members can be expected to evaluate this strategy more positively than the separation strategy, but more negatively than assimilation.

In sum, we expect Dutch majority members to be most positive about the assimilation strategy, most negative about the separation strategy, and to rank the integration strategy in between.

### **The role of perceived power threat**

In addition to this ranking of out-group feelings, we expect perceptions of power threat to play a role in the evaluation of the political acculturation strategies. Threat perceptions are related to various political attitudes, such as limiting civil rights to natives compared to immigrants (Scheepers, Gijsberts & Coenders, 2002), and stronger support for the exclusion of immigrants (McLaren, 2003). Attitudes towards political participation of minority groups will probably not be an exception to that rule. Previous research showed that the more majority members view minority groups as threatening the majority culture or status position, the more they reject minority members' participation (Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Matera, Stefanile &

Brown, 2011). Arguably, threat perceptions are even more relevant in the political domain because politics deals with power and influence. An experimental study in the Netherlands found that natives who perceived higher power threat had more negative feelings towards the establishment of a Muslim political party, towards Muslims that tried to advance the Muslim cause by joining an existing political party, but not towards minority members that did not wish to be involved in politics. In general, majority members tend to become more negative toward minority groups when they believe that these groups threaten the power position of their in-group. As the degree of perceived group competition differs across the three acculturation strategies, we expect to find a moderation effect of threat perceptions. More specifically, we expect that differences in the evaluation of the three political acculturation strategies will be more pronounced for people who perceive relatively high power threat of Muslim immigrants, compared to people who perceive relatively low power threat.

## Overview

We present two vignette studies designed to investigate the extent to which majority members' evaluations of Muslims depend on their political acculturation strategy. Rather than investigating specific political behaviors, we examine the more basic question whether it matters for majority members whose group interests minority members are advancing. Further, and in line with previous research, we examined the influence that power threat perceptions might exert on the evaluation of the political acculturation strategies. In addition to the three political acculturation strategies, we included a control condition in both studies. This allows us to 'anchor' the evaluation of the acculturation strategies and informs us on which strategies

negatively affect feelings toward minority members, and which have the opposite effect.

Study 1 employed a sample of Dutch adults from a pool of respondents maintained by a company performing non-commercial online research. Since various concerns have been raised about the use of convenience samples for the generality of findings and theoretical conclusions, especially in relation to out-group evaluations (c.f. Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Henry, 2008), we conducted a second study using a representative sample of the Dutch adult population. In doing so, we also respond to important concerns about the lack of replication research in social psychology, and the need for direct replication studies that improve precision and test robustness and generalizability (Cumming, 2014; Makel, Plucker & Hegarty, 2012; Simons, 2014). Furthermore, Study 2 considered two additional factors that might have a moderating influence, in addition to power threat perceptions: interethnic friendship and generalized social trust.

## 3.2 Study 1

### Method

#### Participants

A questionnaire on “The Netherlands in the Past and Present, Cultural Diversity, and Politics and Group Rights” was set out in the Netherlands via Thesistools.be – a company for non-commercial online research that maintains an online panel. Participants were invited via e-mail and were paid €1.50 for completing the questionnaire. To ensure that the sample contained native majority members only, participants were selected by an initial lead question asking about the ethnic origin of their

parents. In total 233 participants (53% male, 47% female) completed the survey. Participants were aged 16 to 83 ( $M = 48.94$ ,  $SD = 14.61$ ), and most (72%) were not affiliated with a church or religious community. All participants completed at least primary education (6% completed secondary education only, 32% completed lower tertiary education, 36% obtained a Bachelor's degree, 25% obtained a Master's degree or higher). Concerning participants' political orientation, the sample is not entirely representative for the Dutch population because relatively many participants placed themselves on the left side of the political spectrum: 20% classified themselves as "left", 25% as "center left", 32% as "center", and only 15% and 7% as "center right", and "right", respectively.

## Experimental procedure and measurements

Following the design of previous research (Matera, 2011; Van Oudenhoven, 1998), participants were presented with a short excerpt from a fictitious interview with a Muslim named Ahmed that "was recently published in a well-known morning newspaper". In this interview, the group interests Ahmed advocated for were varied and participants were assigned randomly to one of four experimental conditions. In all conditions, Ahmed first said: "I am 30 years old and Muslim. Just like my parents I was born in Turkey, but I've been living in the Netherlands for more than 20 years". To the question "Do you have clear ideas about Dutch politics?" Ahmed answered: "Yes, I do". Participants in the *control* condition were only presented with this introductory text. All other participants were presented with an additional text in which Ahmed responded to the question: "Do you think it is important that Muslims are politically active in the Netherlands?". Depending on the experimental condition, Ahmed gave one of three answers. In the *separation* condition, Ahmed answered: "Yes, absolutely. They have to try to advo-

cate especially – and as much as possible – for the interests of Muslims”. In the *assimilation* condition, Ahmed answered: “Yes, absolutely. But they should advocate for issues that are relevant for society in general; not so much for the interests of Muslims”. In the *integration* condition, Ahmed answered: “Yes, absolutely. They have to advocate for the interests of Muslims, but not exclusively. They should also advocate for issues that are relevant for society in general”.

To measure the dependent variable, *negative out-group feelings*, participants were asked to indicate “their feelings toward people like Ahmed” using six emotion terms: sympathy, irritation, fear, concern, admiration, and warmth (see Matera, 2011; Tip et al., 2012). The items (range 1 to 7) were summated into a single reliable scale ( $\alpha = .89$ ) with higher scores indicate more negative feelings. On average, participants scored below the midpoint of the scale ( $M = 3.21$ ,  $SD = 1.29$ ).


Four items with 7-point scales measured *Perceived Power Threat (PPT)*: “Because many immigrants live here, native Dutch people have less and less influence”, “The native Dutch are slowly losing the Netherlands to newcomers”, “Due to an increasing number of immigrants, native Dutch can determine what happens in the Netherlands to a lesser extent”, and “Sometimes it seems like natives have to adjust to immigrants, instead of the other way around”. These items formed a reliable scale with a higher score indicating more perceived power threat ( $\alpha = .93$ ). The mean PPT score was 3.85 (with  $SD = 1.72$ ).

## Results

To examine differences in negative out-group feelings we formulated a GLM that included experimental condition as the be-

tween-subjects factor<sup>5</sup>. The results show that the effect of experimental condition was significant and substantial ( $F(3,231) = 21.88, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .22$ ). As expected, participants in the separation condition were most negative ( $M = 4.16, SE = .15$ ), while participants in the assimilation condition were most positive ( $M = 2.45, SE = .15$ ). Participants in the integration ( $M = 3.10, SE = .15$ ) and control conditions ( $M = 3.17, SE = .12$ ) were evaluated in-between the other two acculturation strategies (see Figure 3.2). A post-hoc test (see Table 2.1: top half) showed that all mean differences were statistically significant, except for the difference between the integration and the control condition.

**Figure 3.2: Mean score for negative out-group feelings for the four experimental conditions of Study 1**



<sup>5</sup> Univariate analyses of variance first showed that there were no statistical differences across the experimental conditions for participants' age ( $F(3,231) = 1.17, p = .32$ ), gender ( $F(3,233) = .675, p = .57$ ), political orientation ( $F(3,233) = 1.29, p = .28$ ), and religiosity ( $F(3,233) = .479, p = .70$ ). There was, however, a significant difference for educational attainment ( $F(3,233) = 2.83, p = .04$ ). We then tested educational attainment in an additional GLM analyses that found that it was not associated with negative out-group feelings ( $F(1,121) = 1.27, p = .26, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .01$ ).

**Table 2.1: Post-hoc comparisons of the differences in marginal means between all experimental conditions of Studies 1 and 2**

Study	Experimental condition (I)	Experimental Condition (J)	$\Delta M (I-J)$	SE	P-value
1	Separation	Integration	1.05	.21	.00
		Assimilation	1.71	.21	.00
		Control	.98	.22	.00
	Integration	Assimilation	.66	.21	.01
		Control	-.07	.21	1.00
	Assimilation	Control	-.73	.21	.01
2	Separation	Integration	.63	.05	.00
		Assimilation	1.18	.05	.00
		Control	.89	.05	.00
	Integration	Assimilation	.56	.05	.00
		Control	.26	.05	.00
	Assimilation	Control	-.29	.05	.00

All post-hoc comparisons were tested using the Bonferroni method

Next, we added PPT (centered) as a continuous covariate to the model. The results show that the main effect of PPT ( $F(1,231) = 138.00, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .38$ ) was strong and significant, in addition to the effect of experimental condition ( $F(3,231) = 33.46, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .31$ ). To examine if PPT has a moderating influence we added an interaction term between experimental condition and PPT to the model and found it to be significant,  $F(3,231) = 3.56, p = .02, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .05$ . This indicates that the effect of the experimental condition on negative out-group feelings depends on individual differences in PPT. Across conditions, participants who reported low PPT did not differ much in their out-group feelings (see Figure 3.3). With higher PPT, however, the differences between experimental conditions were larger. The effect of PPT was strongest within the separation condition, and weakest within the assimilation condition. The effect sizes of PPT within the integration and control conditions were nearly identical (see Table 3.2: top half).

Figure 3.3: Negative out-group feelings by PPT for each condition of Study 1




Table 3.2: Estimates of the effect of PPT on negative out-group feelings within each experimental condition of Studies 1 and 2

Study	Condition	Estimate	SE	t-value	p-value
1	Separation	.56	.09	6.39	.00
	Integration	.42	.08	5.07	.00
	Assimilation	.24	.09	2.73	.01
	Control	.42	.10	4.30	.00
2	Separation	.39	.02	17.41	.00
	Integration	.36	.02	16.01	.00
	Assimilation	.26	.02	11.51	.00
	Control	.25	.02	10.67	.00

## Discussion

Muslim minority members who exclusively advocate for the political interests of their minority group were evaluated more negatively – compared to their integrating counterparts, but also compared to majority members' baseline attitude (control). Conversely, majority members were significantly more positive toward minority members that advance goals that benefit society at large (assimilation). Majority members' feelings towards integrating minority members could not be distinguished from the baseline attitude.

Perceptions of threat to the political power position of the majority group were associated with out-group derogation in all three political acculturation strategies. Yet, differences between experimental conditions were larger for participants who perceived more power threat. As expected, minority members' political participation was evaluated more negatively when more power threat was perceived, in particular towards politically separating and integrating minority members. Apparently majority members are not so much threatened by the fact that minority 'outsiders' become active politically, but rather fear that they will have to relinquish power and influence to them.

## 3.3 Study 2

Study 1 found strong support for the claim that political acculturation is an important intergroup phenomenon involving perceptions and concerns about group power and influence. In Study 2 we tried to replicate these findings using a large-scale representative sample for Dutch majority members. Furthermore, in addition to perceived power threat, Study 2 examined the possible moderating roles of interethnic friendship and generalized social trust.

Intergroup contact is widely known to reduce ethnic prejudice (e.g. Brown, Eller, Leeds & Stace, 2007; Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner & Christ, 2011). Although contact is studied far less extensively in relation to political attitudes, more intergroup contact has been associated with more favorable political attitudes. In a longitudinal study in Spain, for example, contact with immigrants had an effect on lower endorsement of foreigner exclusionism (Escandell & Ceobanu, 2009). Further, a Danish study showed that more intergroup contact in the workplace was related to stronger endorsement of ethnic minority rights (Frølund Thomson, 2012). Interethnic friendship is a particularly strong predictor of positive out-group attitudes (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011) and these friendships could lead majority members to become more sympathetic to minority members' political involvement. In addition, intergroup friendships might mitigate negative feelings towards minority members who advocate for their in-group interests. Hence, we expected to find an interaction effect between the political acculturation strategies and intergroup friendships. For those with no or very few friends, the differences in evaluations of the political acculturation strategies may be more pronounced. Majority members with out-group friends, on the other hand, may view political acculturation strategies that focus on minority group's interest less as a political power issue. Hence, among majority members with out-group friends, differences in the evaluation of the three political acculturation strategies may be less pronounced.

We included generalized social trust as another additional moderator, because in the political sphere trust "allows citizens to join forces in social and political groups, and it enables them to come together in citizens' initiatives more easily" (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002, p. 3). Social trust is commonly viewed as an individual predisposition that refers to expectations on how other people will treat us (Matthes, 2013). Majority members can be expected to be less resistant toward the political acculturation of minorities, when they place more trust in people. Similar, generalized social trust may moderate the evaluation of different political acculturation strategies. Majority mem-

bers high in social trust may be less skeptical toward strategies that advance the interests of minority groups. Hence, we expect stronger differences in the evaluation of political acculturation strategies among those low in social trust, whereas these differences will be less pronounced among those high in social trust.

## Method

### Participants

In March 2014, a questionnaire about “Your political views, and your opinion on government policy and the welfare state” was administered to the online panel of TNS NIPO Consult; a bureau specialized in collecting representative population data. This online panel is not based on self-selection, and consists of over 200,000 participants, representative for gender, age, education and region. A representative sample of the adult population was drawn from this panel, based on gender, age, educational level, family size, and region. Respondents were invited to participate via e-mail and were paid €1.20 in vouchers (or could donate that amount to charity) for completing the questionnaire. A total of 4,103 participants completed the survey, amounting to a response rate of 69%. To ensure that our sample contained native majority members only, participants were excluded when they indicated that they themselves or their parents were born outside the Netherlands ( $N = 410$ ). Another 415 respondent could not be included in the analyses because they did not answer the items for the dependent variable, resulting in a dataset of 3,278 cases<sup>6</sup>. Participants (51% male,

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<sup>6</sup> Univariate analyses of variance showed that participants who answered the items of the dependent variable were not different from those who did not answer, with respect to gender ( $F(1,3691) = 2.57, p = .11$ ) and political orientation ( $F(3,3267) = 1.24, p = .27$ ). There were, however, differences for age ( $F(1,3691) = 18.39, p < .01$ ), educational attainment ( $F(1,3693) = 58.95, p < .01$ ), and religiosity ( $F(1,3630) = 5.15, p = .02$ ). Participants who did answer the items were on average slightly older ( $M = 48.25$  years) than those who did not answer ( $M = 44.62$ ). They were more highly educated ( $M = 4.30$ ) than participants who did not answer the items ( $M = 3.58$ ), and they were more frequently affiliated with a church or religious community (32% affiliated, 68% not affiliated) than those who did not answer (26% affiliated, 74% not affiliated).

49% female) were aged 18 to 93 ( $M = 48.25$ ,  $SD = 16.21$ ), and most (68%) were not affiliated with a church or religious community. About 4% of the respondents completed primary education only; 25% completed secondary education; 36% completed lower tertiary education; 24% obtained a Bachelor's degree, 10% obtained a Master's degree or higher. Concerning participants' political orientation, 10% classified themselves as left, 17% as center left, 32% as center, 20% as center right, and 12% as right (8% did not answer the political self-placement question).

### Experimental procedure and measurements

The experimental design of Study 2 was identical to that of Study 1 and part of a larger data collection. The items for the dependent variable (the six emotion terms) were summated into a single reliable scale ( $\alpha = .87$ ) so that a higher score indicates more negative out-group feelings. On average and similar to Study 1, participants scored below the midpoint of the scale ( $M = 3.44$ ,  $SD = 1.10$ ).

*Perceived Power Threat (PPT)* was measured by the same four items as Study 1 that formed a reliable scale ( $\alpha = .95$ ). The mean PPT score was 4.26 (with  $SD = 1.59$ ), which is somewhat higher compared to Study 1.

A single item measured interethnic friendship: "How many friends do you have that belong to an ethnic minority group?". It should be noted that the question refers to ethnic minority groups and not to Muslims. In the Netherlands, immigrant minority groups are predominantly discussed and understood in relation to Muslims (Vasta, 2007). Respondents could choose an answer on a five-point scale ranging from 1 = "None" to 5 = "Four or more" ( $M = 2.35$ ,  $SD = 1.54$ ).

*Generalized social trust* was measured with the much-used standard question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” (Matthes, 2013). Respondents could choose an answer on an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 = “You can’t be too careful” to 10 = “Most people can be trusted” ( $M = 5.18$ ,  $SD = 2.44$ ).


All correlations between the variables of interest were statistically significant ( $p < .01$ ). Negative out-group feelings were associated with PPT ( $r = .46$ ), generalized social trust ( $r = -.32$ ), and weakly with intergroup friendship ( $r = -.09$ ). The correlations of friendship with PPT and generalized social trust were also low ( $r = -.10$ , and  $r = .08$ , respectively). The correlation between PPT and generalized social trust was  $r = -.42$ .

## Results

To examine differences in negative out-group feelings we used a GLM that included experimental condition as the between-subjects factor, with PPT, interethnic friendship, and generalized social trust as continuous covariates (centered)<sup>7</sup>. The results showed significant effects for PPT,  $F(1,2985) = 448.17$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $partial\ eta^2 = .17$ , generalized social trust,  $F(1,2985) = 89.83$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $partial\ eta^2 = .03$ , and interethnic friendship although this effect was extremely small,  $F(1,2985) = 12.50$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $partial\ eta^2 = .004$ . Participants with higher scores on PPT were more negative towards the Muslim out-group member, whereas participants with more interethnic friendship and generalized social trust had less negative out-group feelings.

<sup>7</sup> Univariate analyses of variance showed that there were no statistical differences across the experimental conditions for participants' age ( $F(3,3278) = .75$ ,  $p = .53$ ), gender ( $F(3,3278) = 1.05$ ,  $p = .37$ ), educational attainment ( $F(3,3278) = 1.01$ ,  $p = .39$ ), political orientation ( $F(3,3007) = .03$ ,  $p = .99$ ), and religious affiliation ( $F(3,3630) = .88$ ,  $p = .45$ ).

**Figure 3.4: Mean score for negative out-group feelings for the four experimental conditions of Study 2**



More importantly, there was a significant and substantial effect of experimental condition,  $F(3,2985) = 251.92$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $partial\ eta^2 = .20$ . Similar to Study 1, participants in the separation condition were most negative ( $M = 4.11$ ,  $SE = .03$ ), while those in the assimilation condition were most positive ( $M = 2.93$ ,  $SE = .03$ ). Participants in the integration ( $M = 3.50$ ,  $SE = .03$ ) and control conditions ( $M = 3.25$ ,  $SE = .03$ ) had a score in-between the other two conditions (see Figure 3.4). Post-hoc tests (see Table 3.1: bottom half) showed that all mean differences were statistically significant, including the difference between participants in the integration and control condition. This is different from Study 1 and might be due to the large sample size. To investigate whether this latter difference is substantial we ran an additional GLM with only the integration and control conditions. This showed that the difference between these two conditions is significant but quite small in terms of effect size:  $F(1,1621) = 30.14$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $partial\ eta^2 = .02$ .

## Testing moderation


To the model we added interaction terms of the three continuous (centered) predictors with the experimental condition. The interactions between experimental condition and PPT ( $F(3,2985) = 10.54, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .01$ ), and between the experimental condition and generalized social trust ( $F(3,2985) = 4.24, p = .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .004$ ) were statistically significant. The interaction between experimental condition and interethnic friendship failed to reach statistical significance. Simple slope analysis of the interaction with PPT (see Figure 3.5 and Table 3.2; bottom half) revealed that threat had a positive effect within each experimental condition, with stronger effects within the separation and integration conditions compared to the assimilation and control conditions. Thus similar to Study 1, the differential evaluation of minority acculturation strategies was more pronounced for majority members who perceived more power threat. In contrast to Study 1, however, the effect of PPT in the control condition was similar to that in the assimilation condition.

Simple slope analysis of the interaction with generalized social trust revealed that higher trust was related to less negative out-group feelings, especially within the separation and integration conditions ( $B = -.15$ , and  $-.18$ , respectively) and less so in the assimilation and control conditions (both:  $B = -.12$ ). These differences in effect size of generalized social trust across the experimental conditions were very small. Among those higher in social trust the differences in the evaluation of political acculturation strategies were somewhat less pronounced than among those lower in social trust. Yet, the very small differences between those higher and lower in social trust, combined with the extremely small effect size of the interaction effect, indicates that the interaction was significant but not very meaningful.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> To be sure, we also examined the three-way interaction between experimental condition, PPT, and generalized social trust. This interaction was not significant ( $F(3,3188) = .54, p = .65, \text{partial } \eta^2 < .01$ ).

Figure 3.5: Negative out-group feelings by PPT for each condition of Study 2



## Discussion

Like Study 1, the results of Study 2 support the proposition that political acculturation is an important intergroup phenomenon. Majority members' out-group feelings depended on the group interests that Muslim minority members wished to advance in the political domain. Again, we found that, compared to the baseline condition, politically separating minority members were evaluated more negatively, while assimilating minority members were evaluated more positively. The results further showed that, although statistically significant, the difference in out-group feelings between participants in the integration and control conditions was not very strong or relevant.

The effects of PPT were similar to those found in Study 1. Yet, in contrast to Study 1, the effect of PPT in the control condition was similar to the effect in the assimilation condition. In the representative sample of Study 2, the effect of threat was stronger in the separation and integration condition, compared to the assimilation and control condition. Hence, political acculturation strategies in which Muslim minority members advocate for Muslim interests increased the salience and relevance of perceived power threat. Both interethnic friendships and generalized social trust significantly predicted negative out-group attitudes, but only generalized social trust marginally moderated the relation between minority members' acculturation strategies and out-group feelings.

## 3.4 General Discussion

Acculturation involves intergroup processes in which attitudes and perceptions of both minority and majority group members are important (Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Matera, Stefanile & Brown, 2011). Many studies, however, exclusively focus on minority group members and on acculturation in the socio-cultural domain, largely ignoring political acculturation. Yet, minorities are often met with resistance and controversy when they wish to participate politically. Negative attitudes in the political domain can have a real impact on the standing of minority and immigrant groups, as well as on the democratic process (Petrusevska, 2009). In the context of the Netherlands, we designed two vignette studies to investigate the extent to which majority members' out-group feelings are influenced by the political acculturation strategies of Muslim minority members. Specifically, we investigated whether it matters for majority members whose group interests minority members are politically advancing.

The results of both studies, using different samples, showed that the effects of our experimental manipulations were consistent and substantial, indicating that participants responded quite strongly to the political acculturation strategies. Muslims who exclusively advocated for the political interests of their minority group (separation) were evaluated more negatively than their integrating or assimilating counterparts. Conversely, majority members were most positive about Muslims that advanced goals that benefit society as a whole (assimilation). This ranking is in line with previous experimental research on majority evaluations of socio-cultural acculturation strategies (Kosic et al., 2005; Matera et al., 2011; Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998). By including a control condition, we were able to observe how participants' responses to the political acculturation strategies differed from baseline attitude toward Muslims. It turned out that participants in the separation condition became significantly more negative, whereas those in the assimilation condition became significantly more positive. In other words, majority members welcome politically active minority members when they assimilate, but are far more negative towards those that focus upon and wish to improve the situation of their minority in-group.

We considered perceived power threat to be a factor that might moderate the differential evaluation of the acculturation strategies. Research on socio-cultural acculturation demonstrated that the more majority members view minority groups as threatening the majority culture, the more they reject their participation (Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Matera, Stefanile & Brown, 2011). Arguably, threat perceptions are even more relevant in the political domain because power and influence are involved. The results indeed showed that natives were more negative about Muslim political participation when they perceived more power threat, especially when they faced separating or integrating minority members. The effect of perceived threat was consistently weaker in the assimilation condition. We can draw two conclusions from these

findings. First, majority members apparently are not so much threatened by the fact that 'ethnic outsiders' become politically active, but rather fear that they will have to relinquish power and influence to political out-groups. Second, perceived threat appears to affect out-group feelings as a function of the level of perceived group competition. Among those with strong perceptions of power threat, differences in the evaluation of the three political acculturation strategies were more pronounced. The moderating effect of perceived threat was quite consistent across the two studies, which indicates the relevance of threat perceptions for political relations.

We hypothesized that other factors, too, might influence the evaluation of political acculturation strategies. We expected interethnic friendship to be such a factor, but did not find significant interaction effects. The number of interethnic friends is a useful indicator of positive interethnic contact (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011), but we had only a single item to measure it. More elaborate measurements of interethnic friendships might have yielded stronger results. It is also possible that interethnic contact does not translate into improved political out-group attitudes (Frølund & Thomson, 2012). Having interethnic contact reduces ethnic prejudice towards an array of out-groups, but perhaps it takes more to influence people's attitudes towards politically active minority members.

Generalized social trust had a very small moderating effect, driven primarily by the difference between the separation and integration conditions on the one hand, and the assimilation and control conditions on the other. Higher trust was related to less negative out-group feelings, especially when participants were presented with minority members that advance the interests of their in-group. However, the moderation effect was quite small and it is possible that more specific measures (for example assessing trust in politicians and political institutions) will indicate a stronger role of trust.

There are some limitations to our research that provide directions for future studies. Firstly, the fact that our research was conducted in the Netherlands raises the question of generalizability. Yet, we believe that the findings are fairly representative for Western European countries because of similar migration histories with immigrants coming from less developed countries and former colonies (McLaren, 2003). Moreover, in many of these countries Muslims are placed at the heart of public debates on migration and integration (Vasta, 2007). It would be both interesting and relevant to investigate if our findings can be replicated in other countries in other regions in the world, with different political cultures and systems. Furthermore, future research should examine whether the findings are specific for the political participation of Muslim minorities that are evaluated quite negatively in many European countries (Helbling, 2012), or can be generalized to other minority groups.

Secondly, we focused on minority's political participation in terms of group interests and goals. Future studies could examine specific forms of political engagement and participation, such as running for office, establishing a political party, or online activism. It is possible that some forms of minority political action are perceived as more threatening than others, which could lead to a different pattern of evaluation of political acculturation strategies.

A final recommendation for future research relates to the fact that many Western countries and cities are increasingly comprised of numerous ethnic minority groups. For example, in the city of Rotterdam currently live more ethnic minority members than majority members (Hankel, 2009), and the United States expect to see more minority than majority children born within the next few years (US Census Bureau, 2013). It is therefore not only interesting theoretically but also of societal relevance to examine other minority groups' perceptions and evaluations of political acculturation strategies. For example, it is unknown whether non-Muslim minority groups share Dutch natives' attitudes toward the politi-

cal participation of Muslims, or rather identify with Muslims as a minority in the face of the dominant majority group. These and other issues concerning inter-minority relations should be investigated in future studies.

In conclusion, using large-scale national samples our research shows that majority members react strongly to different political acculturation strategies of minority members. Feelings towards a Muslim minority member advancing the interests of the Muslim in-group were quite negative, while Muslims furthering goals that benefit society as a whole were met with considerably less resistance. The findings further indicate that this differential evaluation of political acculturation strategies was more pronounced among majority members who perceive more power threat. The studies show that majority members' willingness to accommodate minority members in the political domain depends strongly on the specific political acculturation strategy that minority groups adopt and the power threat that these strategies imply.





## Chapter 4

# Majority group evaluations of immigrants' political acculturation strategies: party membership

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Hindriks wrote the main part of the manuscript and conducted the analyses. Verkuyten and Coenders substantially contributed to the manuscript. The authors jointly developed the idea and the design of the study.



## 4.1 Introduction

Similar to many other countries, the Netherlands has a great many political parties, twelve of which are currently represented in Parliament. Voters have a range of parties which fit their beliefs and political orientation, including several small Christian parties. These parties represent specific sections of the population and try to achieve their goals within the existing political system. In the municipality elections of March 2014 ten immigrant and Islamic parties were on the ballots and tried to do the same by securing minority group representation in local governments. Although these parties have not been very successful so far, their participation in local elections is an important – yet understudied – aspect of immigrant acculturation.

Acculturation is the process of mutual adaptation that cultural groups and their individual members make when they come into structural contact with each other (Berry, 2005). It is typically studied in relation to the social and cultural domains of life. For example, researchers have focused on heritage culture maintenance (Ruggiero, Taylor, & Lambert, 1996), host language acquisition (Jiang, Green, Henley, & Masten, 2009), group identifications (Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind, & Vedder, 2001), emotional experiences (De Leersnyder, Mesquita, & Kim, 2011), and preferred social contacts (Greenland & Brown, 2005). While the social and cultural domains are of obvious importance to the acculturation process, research has largely ignored acculturation in the political domain. This is unfortunate because the political aspect of the acculturation process implies changing power relations that may have real and important societal consequences.

Migrant and minority groups may become politically active within the existing political system and this can have consequences for existing power relations (Berry, 1997). From a dynamic intergroup perspective (Brown & Zagefka, 2011) it can be argued that the way majority members evaluate and respond to migrant and minority groups depends on the political acculturation of those groups. Yet, very little is known about majority members' willingness to politically accommodate minority members, and whether their willingness is dependent on the political acculturation strategies of those minority members.

With two experimental vignette studies we investigated whether native Dutch majority members evaluate different political acculturation strategies of Muslim immigrants differently. We argue that a struggle for political influence and power is at the core of questions of political participation and will therefore examine whether or not natives' political acculturation attitudes are related to feelings of perceived power threat. We specifically look at the reactions of majority members to Muslims' political participation, as the latter group is placed at the heart of the West-European acculturation debate (McLaren, 2003; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).

Like every citizen, immigrants can participate politically in various ways: they can vote in elections, sign petitions, contact members of parliament, and organize public meetings. In the current study we consider political participation in terms of party membership and examine how natives react to Muslims becoming active in the Dutch democratic system, either by joining existing parties or by founding an Islamic party. Party membership is a standard indicator for normative political behavior and civic engagement, and is recognized as a higher-cost mode of political participation than, for example, voting (Marien, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2010; Weldon, 2006).

Study 1 investigates whether feelings toward Muslim immigrants vary across their political acculturation strategies, over and above

the effects of common determinants of negative out-group feelings. In addition, we will investigate whether the expected differences depend on the perception of power threat from immigrants. The second study further examines the political acculturation strategies by including an experimental baseline condition that does not refer to politic participation; by considering the role of social dominance orientation, and by including an additional measure of perceived power threat related to Muslims.

In both studies, we used a nationally representative sample of the native Dutch adult population. In social psychology, various concerns have been raised about the use of student samples for the generality of findings and theoretical conclusions, especially in relation to out-group evaluations (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Henry, 2008). For example, students might be less conservative than the general public and this may have an effect on their evaluation of immigrants' political acculturation strategies. Therefore, we wanted to test our predictions among non-student samples.

## 4.2 Theory

### Political acculturation


Berry's (1997) well-known acculturation model distinguishes between four acculturation strategies that are the result of two main issues. First, minority members decide on becoming socially involved with the dominant group, or rather remaining primarily among their in-group. Second, there is the question of heritage culture maintenance versus mainstream culture adoption. When these two issues are considered simultaneously, four acculturation strategies emerge: marginalization, separation, integration, and assimilation (Berry, 1997). When we adapt these issues to the political domain, minority members are faced with two similar

questions. The first concerns the extent to which they engage with and want to be involved in regular host society politics. The second question concerns the extent to which they want to represent politically their minority in-group. From these two issues, four acculturation strategies emerge that can be used to map minority participation in politics (see Figure 4.1).

If minority members do not wish to participate in the existing political system, we view them as adopting the acculturation strategy of *separation* or *marginalization*. Marginalization implies that one does not want to be involved in host society politics and separation refers to minority group mobilization outside of the political system. An example of the latter is the use of non-normative political means by radical groups that try to accomplish their (non-democratic) goals. In the current research we focus on normative political action and therefore only consider the acculturation strategy of marginalization.

When minority members do value participation in host society politics, they need to decide to what extent they wish to represent their own minority group. If they specifically represent their in-group, we view them as adopting the acculturation strategy of *integration*. In the current study we understand political participation as exercising influence through political parties (party membership). Therefore, the integration strategy implies that minority members choose to participate in the mainstream political arena with their own political party, which is similar to Christian parties and one-issue political parties (e.g. party for the elderly). Finally, if minority members want to participate politically but without representing their minority group specifically, we view them as adopting the acculturation *strategy of assimilation*. In this study, assimilating minority members are seen as participating in the political system by joining an existing political party.

**Figure 4.1: Political acculturation strategies**



**Majority group responses**

Research demonstrated that majority members’ out-group attitudes are affected by the perceived cultural acculturation strategies of minority members (Brown & Zagefka, 2011). European majority members prefer assimilation and then integration of immigrants, over separation or marginalization (e.g., Kotic, Mannetti, & Sam, 2005; Van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998). For example, in an experimental study on social and cultural acculturation strategies Dutch natives displayed most positive feelings towards immigrants that strive to assimilate, followed by those that adopt the integration strategy, whereas separation was judged far more negatively (Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998). Assimilation and integration involve the adoption of the host culture, whereas separation/marginalization does not. For majority members, the former two strategies indicate that the host culture is valued to the extent that immigrants want to adopt it. Additionally, it has been suggested “that majority members view the desire of mi-

nority members to maintain their original culture as a threat to the majority culture and to the unity of society as a whole” (Tip, Zagefka, González, Brown, Cinnirella, & Na, 2012, p. 23). Thus, majority members tend to prefer immigrants to culturally assimilate or integrate as these strategies signal that they accept and value the majority culture, while segregation and marginalization are evaluated negatively.

Yet with regard to the political domain, there are reasons to expect that majority members evaluate immigrants’ acculturation strategies differently. When it comes to politics, minority participation relates to issues of influence and power: to questions of who holds the power to make decisions that will affect society. Majority members might fear that the more influence immigrants gain, the more power the majority loses. Within social psychology, group competition is considered an important cause for prejudice and discrimination (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and a critical ingredient in anti-immigrant attitudes (see Esses, Jackson, & Bennett-AbuAyyash, 2010; Wagner, Christ, & Heitmeyer, 2010). Out-group members that are seen as being in a position to enact changes in the status quo are especially likely to be perceived as potential competitors for influence and power. This could mean that majority members will feel most positive about Muslim immigrants who opt for the strategy of marginalization. After all, these immigrants do not wish to participate in the political domain and therefore do not pose a challenge to the power position of the native majority group. Yet, Muslim immigrants who do want to participate in the political system and thereby pursue political influence can be expected to be evaluated more negatively. The competitive power threat is probably highest when Muslims want to secure their interests and express their views by participating in the existing political system with their own political party (integration strategy), while the political assimilation strategy is likely to elicit an intermediate level of resistance. Although pursuing

political influence, the latter strategy implies that Muslim immigrants do not wish to represent their minority in-group in politics, but rather prefer to operate within existing political parties. Therefore, majority group members might view them less as competitors for power and influence than their integrating counterparts. Thus, and in contrast to research on the evaluation of socio-cultural acculturation, we expected native Dutch to be most negative towards political integration of Muslim immigrants, followed by political assimilation, and to be least negative towards political marginalization.

### **Perceived power threat**

Central to our theorizing is that the evaluation of immigrants' political acculturation strategies depends on perceptions of out-group competition and threat. The role of out-group threat can be examined in different ways and here we focus on the moderating influence of individual differences in perceived power threat. Many studies have shown that majority group members display an array of negative attitudes toward ethnic out-groups when they feel threatened or believe they are in competition over resources. These attitudes range from opposition to granting civil rights to legal immigrants (Scheepers, Gijssberts, & Coenders, 2002), support for exclusion of immigrants (McLaren, 2003), to prejudice toward ethnic groups (Stephan & Stephan, 1996). There are many different forms of threat that, depending on the circumstances, are more or less important for out-group attitudes. Considering the political nature of the current study we focused on perceptions of power threat: the belief that immigrants pose a threat to the power position of the native Dutch majority. We expected that the predicted differential evaluation of the three political acculturation strategies is more pronounced for majority members who feel threatened by the potential loss of political power to Muslim immigrants compared to majority

members who perceive little power threat. Thus, perceived power threat was expected to moderate the experimental effects.

## 4.3 Study 1

In Study 1 we investigated whether feelings towards Muslim immigrants depend on their political acculturation strategy. We expected natives to have the most negative feelings towards the strategy of political integration, followed by assimilation and then marginalization. These differences were expected to be stronger for those who perceive relatively high out-group power threat. We tested these predictions by controlling for any effect on out-group feelings of intergroup contact, endorsement of ethnic and civic citizenship, national identification, political orientation and educational level. These factors have been found to be important predictors of attitudes towards immigrants (e.g., Hello, Scheepers, Vermulst, & Geris, 2004; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005; Van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000; Wagner et al., 2010; Wakefield, Hopkins, Cockburn, Shek, Muirhead, & Reicher, 2011). Thus, we wanted to examine whether there is an effect of the acculturation strategies on feelings towards Muslim immigrants over and above the effects of these factors.

### Method

#### Participants

A representative probability sample of Dutch majority members (18 years and older) was drawn by TNS NIPO Consult, a bureau specialized in collecting representative data. In December 2011, participants received an online questionnaire about Dutch history, politics and identity, and cultural diversity. The response rate was 57%, which is normal for Dutch surveys (for a review on Dutch re-

sponse rates, see: Stoop, 2005). Five participants who themselves or their parents were born outside the Netherlands were excluded from the dataset and six cases were rejected because of missing data. The final sample consisted of 928 participants between 18 and 88 years ( $M = 50$ ,  $SD = 17.15$ ) with 52% male and 48% female.

## Experimental procedure and measurements

Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions. Using the design of previous research (Matera, Stefanile, & Brown, 2011; Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998) we presented participants with a short excerpt from a fictitious interview that “was recently published in a well-known morning newspaper”. In this excerpt a 30-year-old Muslim named Ahmed was interviewed. He first described himself as being born in Turkey, just like his parents were, but he has been living in the Netherlands for the last 20 years. When asked by the interviewer if he had a clear idea about Dutch politics, Ahmed answered “Yes, I do”. Next, he was asked if he thinks it is important that Muslims are politically active in the Netherlands. Participants were then presented with either one of three answers that reflected the three acculturation strategies. In the integration vignette, Ahmed answered “Yes, they should try to exercise as much influence as possible through an Islamic political party”. In the assimilation vignette, Ahmed answered: “Yes, they should try to exercise as much influence as possible through an existing political party”. In the marginalization vignette, Ahmed answered: “No, they should not get involved in politics”.

Following Matera et al. (2011), participants were subsequently asked to indicate “their feelings toward people like Ahmed” using six emotion terms: sympathy (reversed coded), irritation, fear, worry, admiration (reversed coded), and trust (reversed coded). For each emotion a 7-point scale was presented ranging from 1 = “Not at all” to 7 = “Very much”, with 4 = “Average” as the mid-

point. The items were summated into a single, reliable scale ( $\alpha = .85$  with item-total correlations ranging between  $.58$  and  $.70$ ) with a higher score indicating more negative feelings.<sup>9</sup>

*Perceived power threat (PPT)* was measured by three items: “Because many immigrants live here, native Dutch people have less and less influence”, “The native Dutch are slowly losing the Netherlands to newcomers”, “Sometimes it seems like natives have to adjust to newcomers, instead of the other way around” (see Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013). The three items were summated into a single score ( $\alpha = .90$ ) and a higher score indicates more perceived power threat.

*Contact with Muslims* was measured by two items asking participants how often they have contact “with [Turks/Moroccans], for instance at work, in school, or in your neighborhood or spare time”. Participants could answer on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = “Never” to 7 = “Every day”. As nearly all Turks and Moroccans self-identity as Muslim (Maliepaard, Lubbers, & Gijssberts, 2010) and are portrayed as such in Dutch society this measure was used as a proxy for contact with Muslims. Because the intercorrelation was high ( $r = .73, p < .01$ ), the two items were summated into a single scale.

The endorsement of *civic citizenship* was measured with two statements (7-point scales;  $r = .75, p < .01$ ): “Everyone who lives legally within the Netherlands is a real Dutchman” and “Everyone who has a Dutch passport is a real Dutchman”. Ethnic citizenship was also measured with two statements ( $r = .88, p < .01$ ): “A real Dutch person is someone who is originally from the Netherlands” and “A

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9 Exploratory Factor Analysis using maximum likelihood estimation and oblique rotation extracted two factors for positive and negative feelings, respectively. Yet, the first component explained 58% of the variance, whereas the second component only explained 23%. Furthermore, after factor rotation, all items loaded relatively high on both dimensions, resulting in low factor scores. As we did not have a-priori reasons to expect different results for positive and negative feelings, and because the overall scale is reliable, we chose to analyze out-group feelings as one variable. However, we repeated all our analyses in a MANOVA with positive and negative feelings as two dependent variables; this did not yield any substantive differences from the findings reported for the single scale.

real Dutch person has Dutch ancestors” (c.f. Heath & Tilly, 2005; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009). The correlation between ethnic and civic citizenship was  $r = -.20$ ,  $p < .01$ , indicating that these two constructs share only 4% of their variance and can be distinguished empirically.

*National identification* was measured by four statements (7-point scales) that have been used in previous research in the Netherlands (e.g., Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Poppe, 2012): “My Dutch identity is an important part of myself”, “I identify strongly with the Netherlands”, “I feel I am a real Dutchman”, “My Dutch identity is important for how I see myself and how I feel about myself”. Alpha for these four items was .94.

*Political orientation* was measured by using the well-known political self-placement scale (Jost, 2006). This scale was presented at the end of the questionnaire and had 5 categories: left (11%), center-left (17%), center (44%), center-right (19%), or right (9%).

*Educational level* was measured by asking participants to indicate their highest level of education completed on a 7-point scale that corresponds to the Dutch educational system. For 5% of the participants, primary education was their highest level, 15% completed secondary education, 49% completed vocational education, 20% obtained a Bachelor’s degree, and 10% obtained a Master’s degree or higher.

Mean scores, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations are presented in Table 4.1. Almost all correlations between the different measures were statistically significant. The relations between the endorsement of civic citizenship and educational attainment, and between civic citizenship and national identification, were not significant. Contact with Muslims was only significantly correlated with the endorsement of ethnic and civic citizenship.

**Table 4.1: Means and standard deviations of and intercorrelations between the measures in Study 1**

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1 Out-group feelings								3.82	1.17
2 Perceived power threat	.40**							4.55	1.46
3 Contact with Muslims	.02**	-.06**						3.38	1.92
4 Civic citizenship	-.27**	-.32**	-.08**					3.86	1.48
5 Ethnic citizenship	.23**	.48**	-.11**	-.20**				4.54	1.71
6 National identification	.09**	.21**	-.04**	-.02**	.33**			5.40	1.13
7 Political orientation	.22**	.38**	-.02	-.18**	.22**	.10**		2.99	1.08
8 Educational attainment	-.10**	-.30**	.04**	.05**	-.28**	-.15**	-.07**	5.21	1.74

Significance levels (two-tailed): \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$


## Results

Considering the experimental design, difference in out-group feelings was examined using the general linear model (GLM) univariate procedure. A between-subjects analysis was conducted in which the experimental condition (three political acculturation strategies) was included as factor, and perceived power threat (PPT), ethnic and civic citizenship, contact with Muslims, national identification, political orientation and educational level as continuous centered variables. There were significant main effects

for the endorsement of civic citizenship,  $F(1,922) = 21.64, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .02$ , and for PPT,  $F(1,922) = 80.16, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .08$ . Participants with higher scores on civic citizenship had less negative out-group feelings, whereas those with higher scores on perceived power threat had more negative out-group feelings. The effects of political orientation, educational attainment, ethnic citizenship, contact with Muslims, and national identification were not significant.


More importantly, there was a significant main effect for experimental condition,  $F(2,922) = 70.57, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .13$ . As expected (see Figure 4.2), participants in the integration condition felt most negative about people like Ahmed ( $M = 4.67, SE = .06$ ), those in the marginalization condition felt least negative ( $M = 3.73, SE = .06$ ), while participants in the assimilation condition ( $M = 4.16, SE = .06$ ) occupied an intermediate position. As the 95% confidence intervals of these estimated marginal means did not overlap, all mean differences were statistically significant from each other.

**Figure 4.2: Mean score for negative out-group feelings for the three experimental conditions of Study 1**



Next we added to the model the interaction terms of each predictor with the experimental condition. The results again showed that the effect of the experimental condition was significant,  $F(2,922) = 72.33, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .14$ , over and above the effects of the other variables. Furthermore the interaction between PPT and the experimental condition was statistically significant,  $F(2,992) = 10.34, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .02$ , whereas none of the other interaction terms were. The significant interaction indicates that the effect of the experimental condition on out-group feelings depends on individual differences in perceived power threat. Analysis within the three experimental conditions (Figure 4.3) revealed that higher PPT was associated with more negative feelings within the assimilation and integration conditions ( $B = .41, t = 9.76, p < .01$ , and  $B = .44, t = 10.38, p < .01$ , respectively), whereas the effect of PPT within the marginalization condition was not significant ( $B = .09, t = 1.91, p = .06$ ).

**Figure 4.3: Negative out-group feelings by perceived power threat (centered) for each condition of Study 1**



## Discussion

The results show that majority members rank minority members' political acculturation strategies in line with our expectations. Muslim immigrants that opt for the strategy of political marginalization were evaluated the least negative, followed by those that opt for the assimilation strategy. The political integration strategy was evaluated most negatively by majority members. The effects of the experimental manipulation were found over and above those of the level of contact with Muslims, the endorsement of ethnic and civic citizenship, national identification, political orientation and educational level, and were dependent on the level of perceived power threat. Within the assimilation and integration conditions, participants reported more negative feelings toward people like Ahmed when they scored higher on PPT. Within the marginalization condition, there was no significant effect of PPT.

Study 1 demonstrated that majority group members' feelings toward immigrants are associated with the way immigrants strive to acculturate politically. The preferred ranking is distinctly different from research on socio-cultural acculturation that has found that majority members dislike marginalization most and prefer cultural integration and assimilation. Study 1 further demonstrates that perceptions of power threat play an important role in majority members' evaluations.

## 4.4 Study 2

The first aim of Study 2 was to replicate the findings of Study 1. In doing so, we respond to major concerns about the lack of replication in social psychology and the critical importance of carrying out direct replication studies that can improve precision and test robustness (Cumming, 2014; Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012; Simons, 2014).

Study 1 revealed a clear pattern of results but did not include a baseline condition. It could be that the mere association of Muslims with political participation invokes negative feelings in Dutch natives. Large-scale research has shown that about four out of ten native Dutch find Muslims politically untrustworthy (Sniderman & Hagedoorn, 2007). This could mean that Muslim immigrants might need to explicitly distance themselves from politics (marginalization) in order to be evaluated more positively. The use of a baseline condition can shed light on this and therefore was included in Study 2.

Additionally, the perceived power threat measure used in Study 1 focused on immigrants in general. Although in line with the tendency in Dutch society to make a distinction between native ‘autochthones’ and immigrant ‘allochthones’, the measure did not directly assess the political power threat posed by Muslims (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013). Muslims are sometimes considered politically untrustworthy because they would remain loyal to their country of origin and of wanting to press forward a hidden agenda to ‘Islamize’ the Netherlands. Shadid (2006) and Sniderman and Hagedoorn (2007) refer to this discourse as ‘fifth column sentiments’ (‘enemy within’) that influences debates on the acculturation of Muslims. Therefore, in Study 2 we included a measure of perceived power threat that reflects fifth column sentiments about Muslims.

In Study 1 we controlled for various factors that have been found to predict attitudes towards immigrants, but we could not control for one of the strongest predictors of prejudice, social dominance orientation (SDO) (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). According to social dominance theory individuals who are higher in SDO tend to believe in group inequality and support hierarchies in society. They are especially likely to perceive the world as a competitive jungle in which there is competition for resources such as jobs and political power (Duckitt, 2006). SDO is not directly concerned with out-group threat but is “a general measure of individual differences in the preference for group-based dominance and inequality” (Kteily, Ho, & Sidanius,

2012, p. 547). Yet, higher SDO tends to be associated with higher perceived out-group threat which might mean that the effect of perceived power threat found in Study 1 is due to SDO. Furthermore, research suggests that SDO and perceived power threat can interact in predicting out-group attitudes. Among Whites in the US, Quist and Resendez (2002) showed that perceptions of Blacks gaining political influence elicited stronger endorsement of stereotypical beliefs and prejudicial attitudes, in particular among Whites who had a relatively strong SDO. We will therefore also investigate if PPT and SDO interact with the experimental conditions (three-way interaction) in predicting feelings towards the different politically acculturation strategies of Muslim immigrants.

## Method

### Participants

Again a representative probability sample of Dutch majority members (18 years and older) was drawn by TNS NIPO Consult. Participants in Study 1 did not participate in Study 2. Participants received an online questionnaire in February 2012 about cultural diversity, politics, group rights, and Dutch and European identity. The response rate was 51 per cent. Eight participants who themselves or their parents were born outside the Netherlands were excluded from the dataset and nine cases were rejected because of missing data. The final sample consisted of 802 participants, with ages ranging between 18 and 87 years ( $M = 51$ ,  $SD = 17.16$ ) with 50% female.

### Experimental procedure and measurements

The design of Study 2 was identical to that of Study 1, but an additional experimental condition was used. Thus, participants were randomly assigned to one of four different conditions whereby in the fourth baseline condition participants only received the beginning of the interview in which the interviewee introduced and

described himself. That excerpt ended before the question was asked about the importance of Muslims becoming politically active in the Netherlands. After reading the vignette, participants were again asked to indicate their feelings toward Ahmed using the same six items and scales as in Study 1 ( $\alpha = .86$ ,  $M = 3.77$ ,  $SD = 1.12$ , with item-total correlations varying between .54 and .69).

Perceived Power Threat (PPT) was measured by two items with 7-point scales reflecting fifth column sentiments: “Most Muslims are politically unreliable, in the sense that in the end, they are more loyal to their country of origin than to the Dutch society”, and “Most Muslim are really not to be trusted politically, because deep down they desire to turn the Netherlands into an Islamic country when given the chance” (c.f. Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). The items were summated into a single scale ( $\alpha = .82$ ,  $M = 4.33$ ,  $SD = 1.63$ ).

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) was measured by four items (7-point scales) previously used in European research (Duriez, Soenens, & Vansteenkiste, 2007; Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, Phalet, & Kuppens, 2009): “Some groups are simply not the equals of others”, “Some people are just more worthy than others”, “Some people are just more deserving than others”, and “To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others”. The items of SDO were summated into a single scale ( $\alpha = .62$ ,  $M = 3.75$ ,  $SD = 1.09$ ).


The correlation between negative out-group feelings and PPT was not very strong ( $r = .33$ ,  $p < .001$ ), and out-group feelings was also weakly correlated with SDO ( $r = .21$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The correlation between PPT and SDO was significant but also not very strong ( $r = .26$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

## Results

We performed a GLM with negative out-group feelings as dependent variable, experimental condition as factor, and perceived power threat (PPT) and SDO as continuous (centered) scores. Negative

out-group feelings were stronger among participants with higher scores on SDO,  $F(1,802) = 17.32, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .02$ , and among those who perceived more power threat,  $F(1,802) = 104.24, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .12$ . More importantly, the main effect of the experimental condition was significant,  $F(3,802) = 55.96, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .17$ .<sup>10</sup> As shown in Figure 4.4, the ranking of the out-group feelings was similar to Study 1: participants in the integration condition were most negative about people like Ahmed ( $M = 4.36, SE = .07$ ), followed by those in the assimilation ( $M = 3.96, SE = .06$ ) and the marginalization condition ( $M = 3.56, SE = .07$ ). Participants in the control condition felt the least negative ( $M = 3.19, SE = .07$ ). All mean differences were statistically significant because the 95% confidence intervals of these estimated marginal means did not overlap.


**Figure 4.4: Mean score for negative out-group feelings for the four experimental conditions of Study 2**



<sup>10</sup> As a check we performed an additional analysis that included all covariates used in Study 1 (similar measures for political orientation, educational attainment, ethnic and civic citizenship, national identification, and PPT, but not contact with Muslims which was not available in Study 2). The results, available upon request, showed that the effect of the experimental manipulation was significant,  $F(3,793) = 57.31, p < .001$ .

To examine the moderating roles of PPT and SDO we next added to the model all two-way and three-way interaction terms of PPT, SDO, and experimental condition. Similar to Study 1, the interaction between experimental condition and PPT was significant,  $F(3,802) = 13.76, p < .01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .05$ . Simple slope analysis (see Figure 4.5) of this interaction revealed that higher PPT again was associated with stronger negative feelings within the integration condition ( $B = .36, t = 8.20, p < .001$ ) and the assimilation condition ( $B = .34, t = 8.14, p < .01$ ), but not in the marginalization condition ( $B = .02, t = .39, p = .70$ ). Higher PPT was also associated with more negative out-group feelings in the control condition ( $B = .18, t = 4.02, p < .01$ ). The interaction between experimental condition and SDO was not significant,  $F(3,802) = 1.75, p = .16, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .01$ , and also the three-way interaction between experimental condition, PPT, and SDO failed to reach statistical significance,  $F(3,802) = .89, p = .45, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .00$ . These findings indicate that the experimental effect on out-group feelings depends on PPT and not on SDO.

**Figure 4.5: Negative out-group feelings by perceived power threat (centered) for each condition of Study 2**



## Discussion

In Study 2, the ranking of out-group feelings in response to the political acculturation strategies was similar to the ranking found in Study 1. Participants confronted with political integration of Muslims felt most negative, followed by those in the assimilation and marginalization conditions, respectively. Participants in the control condition in which no political acculturation strategy was mentioned were the least negative. This suggests that the mere association of Muslims with political participation (in whatever form) lead Dutch natives to evaluate Muslims significant more negatively. Similar to Study 1, the effect of the experimental manipulation was dependent on the level of PPT. In the assimilation and integration conditions participants reported more negative feelings toward people like Ahmed when they perceived more power threat, whereas the effect of PPT was absent in the marginalization condition. This indicates that perceived power threat in the sense of immigrants gaining more influence (Study 1) or Muslims constituting a fifth column (Study 2) has the same effect on how native Dutch feel about the different political acculturation strategies. Furthermore, PTT was also associated with out-group feelings in the control condition. This suggests that those who perceive more out-group power threat are more suspicious about the intentions of Muslims. It is only when Muslims explicitly state that they do not want to be involved in Dutch politics (marginalization) that PPT does not play a role for out-group feelings.

The role of SDO did not differ between the experimental conditions and did not account for the role of PPT. This supports the proposition that SDO tends to lead to competitive driven prejudice rather than threat driven prejudice (Duckitt, 2006). Higher SDO was related to more negative out-group feelings independent of experimental condition. This suggests that SDO is a more general measure of the preference for group-based dominance and inequality (Kteily et al., 2012).

## 4.5 General discussion

Acculturation research demonstrated that majority members prefer immigrants to participate culturally and socially because it implies valuing and acceptance of the majority culture and contacts (Kosic et al., 2005; Matera et al., 2011; Oudenhoven et al., 1998; Tip et al., 2012). Thus, natives tend to prefer the socio-cultural acculturation strategies of assimilation and integration, over separation and marginalization. While the relevance of studying acculturation in the socio-cultural domain is well established, previous research largely ignored acculturation in the political domain. Politics is about power and influence and natives might evaluate immigrants' acculturation strategies in this domain quite differently. Among representative samples of Dutch natives, we found in two studies that Muslims who opt for the strategy of political marginalization were evaluated least negatively, followed by those who prefer the political assimilation strategy, whereas the political integration strategy was evaluated most negatively. This pattern of results is in opposition to the ranking found for the evaluation of socio-cultural acculturation strategies.

Politics is about power and influence, and unlike socio-cultural acculturation, political acculturation deals with questions of who gains and who loses power and influence. Group threat is an important cause for prejudice and discrimination and various forms of threat drive negative attitudes towards immigrants (see Wagner et al., 2010). Out-group members who are seen as being in a position to enact changes in the status quo are especially likely to be perceived as potential competitors for political influence and thereby as threatening the majority group's power position. As a result, Muslim immigrants who want to participate in the political system - and thereby pursue political influence - are evaluated negatively. Moreover, the threat to power is higher when Muslims want to participate with their own political party in the existing political

system (integration strategy) rather than to join existing political parties (assimilation strategy). Furthermore, both these strategies are more power threatening compared to the situation in which Muslim immigrants do not wish to involve themselves in host national politics (marginalization).

The integration strategy is probably evaluated most negatively because an Islamic party poses the greatest threat to the privileged power position of the native majority group. This strategy means that Muslim immigrants organize themselves in a political party and collectively compete with other parties for influence and power within the existing political system, similar to what Christian and one-issue parties do. The strategy of assimilation involves Muslim immigrants who wish to participate in politics, but choose to do so by joining existing political parties. This means that natives are not faced with an organized Muslim front and might consequently feel less threatened. Yet, the assimilation strategy was evaluated more negatively than the marginalization strategy. A possible explanation might be that natives resist politically assimilating minority members because they fear minority members might gradually take over existing political parties. Indeed, some political parties (e.g., Labour parties) are known to attract a relatively large share of Muslim candidates and Muslim votes, which might influence the party's agenda-setting and political program. Another possible reason is that natives might be afraid of clientelism by minority group politicians (Lemarchand & Legg, 1972). In the Netherlands, there have been public concerns and reports of clientelism by local minority politicians. For example, in 2013, local politicians from Turkish origin intimidated and pressured local administrators to allocate subsidies to Turkish organizations (Van den Dool, 2013).

A number of other findings support our proposition that power threat considerations lead majority members to rank political acculturation strategies differently than what is commonly found for socio-cultural acculturation strategies. First, we considered vari-

ous alternative explanations and demonstrated that our results are robust. Majority members' differential evaluation of the political acculturation strategies existed over and beyond the effects of intergroup contact, national identification, the endorsement of ethnic and civic citizenship, political orientation, and educational attainment. Furthermore, the findings were replicated in two studies that both were based upon national samples rather than convenient samples of students (Henry, 2008).

Second, in Study 2 we also included social dominance orientation (SDO) which tends to lead to competitive driven prejudice rather than threat driven prejudice (Duckitt, 2006). Higher SDO was related to more negative out-group feelings but this relationship was similar for the four experimental conditions. In contrast, in both studies perceived power threat was related to out-group feelings in the more threatening political integration and assimilation conditions, but not in the marginalization condition. Thus, when it was explicitly stated that one did not want Muslims to be involved in Dutch politics (marginalization), higher perceived power threat was not related to more negative out-group feelings, whereas SDO was related to out-group feelings. The role of perceived power threat is further supported by the fact that the use of different measures in the two studies yielded a similar pattern of findings.

Third, we included a baseline experimental condition in Study 2 which revealed that Dutch natives were quite positive about Muslim immigrants when political participation was unmentioned. In fact, respondents in the baseline condition were more positive than respondents in the marginalization condition in which political participation was explicitly rejected. In the Netherlands, Muslims are often seen as being politically untrustworthy and trying to Islamize the country (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Shadid, 2006). As a result, the mere association of Muslim immigrants with political participation seems to invoke negative feelings among Dutch natives.

There are several limitations that provide directions for future studies. First, we examined the moderating role of perceived power threat and showed that those who more strongly feel that Muslim immigrants are 'taking over', become more negative in the assimilation and integration conditions (in which Muslims participate in the party political system). Future studies could test whether the different political acculturation strategies also lead to different levels of perceived power threat which subsequently drive out-group feelings.

Second, our research was conducted in the Netherlands and focused on the political acculturation of Muslim immigrants. The context of the Netherlands might be important because of its system of proportional representation with numerous political parties. This system offers the possibility for small parties to have real influence. The way in which majority members react to immigrants' political acculturation strategies might be different in other countries with different political systems (e.g. UK or US). We focused on Muslims because they are at the heart of the acculturation debate in Europe. They are singled out as typical and threatening outsiders, and Islam is considered a 'bright boundary' (Alba, 2005). Future studies could examine whether a similar pattern of findings exists for the perceived political acculturation strategies of other immigrant groups. For example, natives might find the political participation of Christian immigrants less threatening.

Third, we focused on political participation in terms of political parties. While party membership is an important and standard way of looking at political participation, future research could also employ other measures of host national political behavior, such as voting, joining political rallies, contacting politicians, signing petitions, or internet activism (Carlisle & Patton, 2013; Marien et al., 2010). The evaluation of these political activities might be different than for political party membership. Furthermore, future research could examine political parties in terms of the goals that they pursue. For

instance, natives might react more positively to Muslims' political parties that strive for equal access to health care and the labor market, founding Mosques and Muslim schools.

Fourth, we focused on the evaluations of natives but from a dynamic intergroup perspective (Brown & Zagefka, 2011). In this light, it is important to also consider the perspective of Muslim immigrants and how they feel about the different political acculturation strategies. Furthermore, meta-perception is another interesting avenue for future research. What natives think that minority members prefer politically and what immigrants think that natives want them to do, can have consequences for intergroup relations (Brown & Zagefka, 2011).

## 4.6 Conclusion

These studies demonstrated the importance of extending the existing acculturation research to the political domain. Previous research focused on socio-cultural changes as the result of structural contact, and has made a distinction between for example acculturation attitudes in the private and public spheres of life (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003). The findings show that majority members' evaluation of immigrants' acculturation strategies can be quite different in the political domain. In contrast to socio-cultural acculturation, majority members prefer Muslim immigrants not to get involved in host society politics (marginalization); they are quite negative about strategies that imply joining existing political parties (assimilation), and even more negative about establishing an own minority group party for participating in the political system (integration). Politics is about power and influence, and raises other concerns than processes of cultural and social acculturation do. The potential loss of political power is threatening for majority members, and critical for their evaluation of immigrants' political acculturation strategies.

## Chapter 5

# Political acculturation from an intergroup perspective

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Hindriks wrote the main part of the manuscript and conducted the analyses. Verkuyten and Coenders substantially contributed to the manuscript. The authors jointly developed the idea and the design of the study.



## 5.1 Introduction

Acculturation processes involve changes that cultural groups and their individual members make when they come into structural contact. These processes, by definition, involve groups that differ in status and power (Berry, Phinney, Sam & Vedder, 2006; Brown & Zagefka, 2011). Acculturation research has differentiated between various dimensions and domains, has focused on (meta) perceptions and preferences of immigrant-origin groups and, to a lesser extent, of native majority group members (see Schwartz, Vignoles, Brown, & Zagefka, 2014). What has not been studied is the way in which different immigrant-origin groups perceive and evaluate the acculturation strategies of other immigrant groups. This is unfortunate because there are many regions, cities and institutions (e.g., schools) that are comprised predominantly of different immigrant and ethnic minority groups that compete over status and power, and where inter-minority relations can be rather negative (Van Oudenhoven & Ward, 2013). Thus, what is lacking is research that investigates the ways in which members of one immigrant-origin group prefer members of another to adapt to the mainstream culture and participate in the wider society.

Furthermore, while the political domain is distinguished as a separate domain of acculturation (Berry, 1997) research has largely ignored preferences pertaining to political acculturation (but see Navas, Rojas, Garcia, & Pumares, 2007). Immigrants are not only objects of politics but also political subjects, and political participation is important for improving the societal position of disadvantaged groups (Pande, 2003; Petrusevska, 2009). At the same time, political participation of immigrant-origin groups

can trigger feelings of threat and is frequently met with skepticism and controversy.

Using a national sample and an experimental vignette design we investigated the attitudes towards political acculturation strategies of the Turkish-Dutch (separation, integration, and assimilation). Specifically, we focused on attitudes among the native Dutch, and among people with a Moroccan, Surinamese and Turkish background as the three largest and most prominent immigrant-origin groups in the Netherlands. We also examined how perceptions of threats to one's ethnic group status relate to the various acculturation strategies. For the Turkish-Dutch participants, we additionally investigated the role of dual identity in the evaluation of the political acculturation strategies of their in-group (Simon & Ruhs, 2008).

Turks and Moroccans have a history of labor migration to the Netherlands dating back to the 1970s and nearly all of them self-identify as Muslims (Maliapaard, Lubbers, & Gijsberts, 2010). The Moroccans, followed by the Turks, occupy the most disadvantaged position in Dutch society in terms of educational attainment, labor market position, and experiences with discrimination (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). The Surinamese have a more favorable position in society. Coming from a former Dutch colony, most Surinamese immigrants possessed the Dutch nationality and spoke the language upon arrival (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2009).

## 5.2 Theory

### Political acculturation

Acculturation is typically examined using Berry's (1997) conceptual framework, which identifies two key issues immigrants need to decide on. The first issue deals with the extent to which immigrants


wish to get involved with the dominant majority group vis-à-vis remaining primarily among themselves. The second issue concerns the extent to which they adopt the majority culture in favor of maintaining their heritage culture. The combination of these two issues results in the four well-known acculturation strategies of assimilation, integration, separation, and marginalization.

Experimental vignette studies focusing on the socio-cultural domain show that majority members clearly prefer immigrants to assimilate or integrate (e.g., Kosic, Mannetti, Lackland & Sam, 2005; Van Oudenhoven, Prins & Buunk, 1998; Verkuyten, Thijs, & Sierksma, 2014), as these strategies indicate that minority members value the host society culture to the extent that they want to adopt it. Immigrants seeking to maintain their cultural heritage tend to be viewed as a threat to the majority culture, and are evaluated more negatively (e.g., Tip, Zagefka, González, Brown, Cinnirella, & Na, 2012). Research further shows that immigrants generally prefer the acculturation strategy of integration (Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998; Zick, Wagner, Van Dick & Petzel, 2001). This strategy allows them to maintain their cultural heritage and provides a secure in-group identity, while simultaneously allowing immigrants to engage with the majority group and adopt the mainstream culture.

There are various ways in which minority members can participate politically, for example by voting in elections, establishing a political party, joining political demonstrations, or by being politically active on internet forums and social media (Carlisle & Patton, 2013; Marien, Hooghe & Quintelier, 2010). Here, we focus on political participation in terms of advancing group interests and goals. In applying the acculturation framework to the political domain, we adapted the two main issues that immigrations face. First, they face the question of whether or not to advance politically the interests and goals of their minority in-group. Second, they need to decide on the extent to which they wish to advance interests and goals that benefit society as a whole. When considering these two

issues simultaneously, four political acculturation strategies can be identified (see Figure 5.1).

**Figure 5.1: Political acculturation strategies of the Turkish-Dutch minority group**



*Marginalization* refers to the situation in which minority members do not wish to represent any political interests or goals. Since this implies that one wants to keep away from group-based politics we will not further consider this strategy. *Separation* is the strategy in which minority members wish to advance only the interests of their ethnic in-group. Politically *integrating* minority members advocate for the interests of their in-group and also pursue goals that are relevant for society as a whole. The *assimilation* strategy is defined when minority members wish to advance society's interests and not those of their ethnic minority group.

Previous chapters of this book demonstrated that questions of power, influence, and group competition play a central role in the evaluation of political acculturation. Indeed, group competition is

an important basis for prejudice and discrimination (e.g., Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), which is why we expect Dutch natives to evaluate the separation strategy most negatively. This strategy directly challenges the political status quo, and with it, the privileged status position of the majority group. By contrast, Dutch natives can be expected to evaluate political assimilation most positively, as it focuses on the interests of society as a whole, while posing little threat to the existing status quo. Moreover, this strategy signals acceptance of both the existing political system and the dominant culture (Tip et al., 2012). We expect Dutch majority members to place Turks adopting the political integration strategy at an intermediate position. With this strategy, minority members advance the interests of their minority group, while demonstrating political commitment to the broader society. It follows that majority members will evaluate this strategy more negatively than the assimilation strategy yet more positively than the separation strategy.

We expect that concerns about potential limits to, or losses of, political influence are important to minority members as well. Minority members might reject political participation of minority out-groups because it reduces their own opportunities for political influence. Seen from this intergroup competition perspective (also see: Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2005), a gain in political power of a minority out-group implies a challenge to, and loss of, influence for one's minority in-group. It follows that the ranking of political acculturation strategies among minority members (Moroccans and Surinamese) can be expected to be identical to that of majority members. In statistical terms this means that for the evaluation of the acculturation strategies there should not be a significant interaction effect between strategy and ethnic group.

We can derive an alternative reasoning from the commonality approach (Glasford & Calcagno, 2012). This approach assumes that minority commonality inspires political solidarity among minori-

ty groups. Minority members may endorse political participation of other minorities, because their shared disadvantaged status makes ethnic minority group boundaries less salient. To counter majority dominance, minorities might welcome political participation of other minority groups. Facing the same social disadvantages, minority participation could strengthen political influence of minority groups in general. Thus, minority members might feel they will benefit from the political participation of other minority groups. This reasoning means that compared to the native Dutch, Moroccan and Surinamese participants will be more positive about political separation and integration. Statistically this means that there should be a significant interaction effect between acculturation strategy and ethnic group.

### **Perceived power threat**

In addition to differences between the specific political acculturation strategies, we expect perceptions of power threat to play a role in the evaluation of politically participating out-group members. Perceptions of out-group threat form a crucial determinant of acculturation processes and outcomes (Licata, Sanchez-Mendes & Green, 2011; Schwartz et al., 2014). Majority members may feel threatened by immigrants when these are perceived as undermining the national culture, competing for resources, or gaining too much influence. As a result, majority members can be more negative towards immigrants who strive to be fully included in society (Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Matera, Stefanile & Brown, 2011).

Such considerations should certainly play a role with regard to political acculturation, since politics deals with competition over influence and power, and with the related threat of being overrun and losing one's privileged position. A previous experimental study in this dissertation found that natives who perceived higher power threat had more negative feelings towards immigrants who

established a Muslim political party or tried to advance the Muslim cause by joining an existing political party, but not towards Muslim immigrants who did not wish to be involved in politics. In general, people tend to become more negative towards out-groups when they believe that these groups threaten the power position of their in-group (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). As the degree of perceived group competition differs across acculturation strategies, we expect to find a moderation effect of threat perceptions. More specifically, we expect that differences in the evaluation of the three political acculturation strategies will be more pronounced for participants (natives, Moroccans and Surinamese) who perceive relatively high power threat of out-groups, compared to participants who perceive relatively low power threat. This expectation is examined by considering the statistical interaction between acculturation strategy and perceived power threat.

### **In-group evaluation and dual identity**

We further investigate how minority members evaluate the political acculturation strategies of their in-group. Most immigrants try to reconcile their minority group identity with a sense of belonging to the host society (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012). They feel attached to their heritage culture and ethnic community, and they identify to a greater or lesser extent with the nation in which they reside. The integrative political acculturation strategy secures the interests of both their in-group and those of the wider society, we therefore expect it will be preferred most by our Turkish-Dutch participants. It is more difficult to predict which of the remaining two acculturation strategies will be liked least. On the one hand, assimilation could be rejected strongest, because it implies that in-group political interests are not represented. On the other hand, Turkish minority members might fear that the separation strategy puts them in opposition to the majority pop-

ulation, potentially increasing discrimination and isolating them from mainstream society.

The ways in which the political acculturation strategies are evaluated might further depend on dual identity. Research among Turkish immigrants in Germany, Netherlands, and the USA demonstrates that dual identifiers are more likely to act politically on behalf of their ethnic in-group (Fischer-Neumann, 2014; Klandermans, Van der Toorn, & Van Stekelenburg, 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). A dual identity would function as a politicized collective identity, because it combines perceptions of in-group interests and goals (derived from identification with the minority group) with feelings of entitlement (derived from identification with the broader society). Immigrants emphasize their belonging to society because only by virtue of this membership are they entitled to societal support for the interests and goals of their disadvantaged minority group (Simons & Klandermans, 2001). It follows that for in-group members, dual identification can moderate the evaluation of the political acculturation strategies. Higher dual identifiers want to see their ethnic minority group interests represented and advanced; they can therefore be expected to be more positive about the separation and integration strategies. In contrast, dual identifiers should be less positive about the assimilation strategy as it ignores the specific interests of their disadvantaged in-group.

## 5.3 Method

### Participants

In April 2014 a questionnaire on ‘Societal developments in the Netherlands’ was administered to a subset of the online panel of TNS NIPO Consult – a Dutch bureau specialized in collecting representative pop-

ulation data. The panel (consisting of over 200,000 adult inhabitants) is not based on self-selection and is representative for gender, age, education, and region. Samples were drawn of native Dutch, Surinamese, Turkish and Moroccan group members. Respondents were invited to participate via e-mail and were paid €1.20 in vouchers for completing the questionnaire (or could donate that amount to charity). The questionnaire was locked when at least 150 respondents of each ethnic group filled out the survey. In total 664 respondents completed the survey: 26.1% Dutch, 25.3% Surinamese, 24.8% Turks, and 23.8% Moroccan<sup>11</sup>. Participants (46% male, 54% female) were aged 18 to 84 ( $M = 43.94$ ,  $SD = 14.77$ ). Surinamese and Dutch participants were somewhat older than the Moroccans and Turks,  $F(3, 663) = 30.59$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $partial\ eta^2 = .12$  (see Table 5.1). When asked ‘How important is your religion to you’, 18% indicated ‘not at all’, 11% chose ‘not very’, 7% chose ‘a little’, 14% indicated ‘average’, 9% chose ‘quite’, another 9% chose ‘very’, and 26% indicated ‘very much’. Another 6% opted for the option ‘not applicable’ (recoded as ‘not at all’). Moroccans and Turks found their religion more importance than Surinamese and Dutch,  $F(3, 663) = 44.42$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $partial\ eta^2 = .17$ . About 8% of the respondents completed primary education only, 37% completed secondary education, 30% completed lower tertiary education (vocational), 18% obtained a Bachelor’s degree, and 8% obtained a Master’s degree or PhD. There was a significant difference between the four groups, with Moroccan and Dutch participants having somewhat higher levels of education than the Surinamese and Turks,  $F(3, 659) = 3.34$ ,  $p = .02$ ,  $partial\ eta^2 = .02$ . On the well-known political self-placement scale, 19% classified themselves as left, 16% as center left, 27% as center, 8% as center right, and 7% as right (23% did not know). Compared to Surinamese and Turks, Moroccans were more left-wing orientated, whereas the native Dutch were more right-wing orientated,  $F(3, 509) = 8.37$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $partial\ eta^2 = .05$ . To prevent 23% of our cases from being list-wise deleted in the analyses, participants who answered with ‘do

11 48 respondents, mostly Moroccans, shared a household with another participant. Additional analyses, however, showed there were no significant differences with participants from separate households only. There were no differences across the control variables, neither across experimental conditions. Results are available upon request.

not know' were assigned the mean political orientation score of their ethnic group. Table 1 shows for each ethnic group the mean scores on the control variables age, education (1 = 'primary education only', 7 = 'Master's degree or PhD'), political orientation ('1' = left, 7 = 'right') and religiosity (1 = 'not at all', 7 = 'very much').

**Table 5.1: Mean scores on control variables by ethnic group**

<b>Ethnic group</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Educational attainment</b>	<b>Political orientation</b>	<b>Religiosity</b>
Moroccan	39.46	4.28	2.24	5.25
Surinamese	44.75	3.88	2.55	3.54
Turks	39.18	3.95	2.60	4.69
Dutch	51.77	4.36	2.95	2.78
Grand mean	43.93	4.12	2.59	4.04

## Experimental procedure and measurements

Following the design of previous research (Kosic et al., 2005; Matera, et al., 2011; Van Oudenhoven, et al., 1998), participants were presented with a short excerpt from a fictitious interview 'recently published in a well-known morning newspaper'. All respondents received an introduction in which a person named Ahmed introduced himself: 'I am 30 years old. Just like my parents, I was born in Turkey but I've been living in the Netherlands for more than 20 years'. To the question 'Do you have clear ideas about Dutch politics?' Ahmed answered: 'Yes, I do'. Then, Ahmed was asked 'Do you think it is important that Turks are politically active in the Netherlands?' Depending on the experimental condition, Ahmed gave one of three answers. In the separation condition, he answered: 'Yes, absolutely. They have to advocate especially and as much as possible for the interests of Turks in the Netherlands'. In the integration condition, Ahmed answered: 'Yes, absolutely. They have to advocate for the interests of Turks, but

not exclusively. They should also advocate for general societal issues'. In the assimilation condition, Ahmed answered: 'Yes, absolutely. But they should advocate for general societal issues and not for the interests of Turks'. For each of the four ethnic groups, participants were randomly assigned to one of these three conditions.

Following previous research and for measuring negative out-group feelings, participants were asked to indicate "their feelings toward people like Ahmed" using six emotion terms: sympathy, irritation, fear, concern, admiration, and warmth (see Matera et al., 2011; Tip et al., 2012). The items (ranging from 1 "not at all" to 7 "very much"; positive items were reverse coded) were summated into a single reliable scale ( $\alpha = .82$ ) with higher scores indicating more negative feelings. On average, participants scored below the midpoint of the scale ( $M = 3.16, SD = 1.06$ ).

Three items with 7-point scales measured perceived power threat (PPT): 'Because there are many ethnic groups, my own group is increasingly unable to decide what happens', 'My ethnic group has less and less influence on what happens in society', and 'Compared to other ethnic groups, people of my group do not have a lot to say in this country'. The items were adapted from previous chapters of this dissertation and correlated strongly ( $r > .70; \alpha = .89$ ). Higher values indicated higher perceived power threat ( $M = 3.73, SD = 1.49$ ).

For Turkish participants, dual identity was assessed with six items (7-point scales), adapted from previous research (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). Three of these items focused on the blended form of dual identity ('I feel I am both Turkish and Dutch', 'I feel that I am a combination of both: Turkish and Dutch', and 'I feel that I am a Turkish Dutch'), while three other items focused on the alternating form ('Sometimes I feel more Turkish and sometimes more Dutch - it depends on the situation', 'One moment I feel Turkish and the next moment Dutch', and 'It is as if I switch between feeling Turkish and feeling Dutch'). How-

ever, and similar to previous research (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014), all six items correlated strongly and formed a single reliable scale ( $\alpha = .94$ ;  $M = 4.27$ ,  $SD = 1.95$ ).

## 5.4 Results

### Out-group political acculturation attitudes

Considering the experimental design, differences in negative out-group feelings were examined using the general linear model (GLM) procedure. Between-subjects analysis was conducted in which experimental condition (three acculturation strategies) and ethnic group (native Dutch, Moroccans, Surinamese) were included as factors, and perceived power threat (PPT) as a continuous centered variable. Since there were ethnic group differences in age, educational attainment, political orientation, and importance attached to religion, we controlled for these factors in the analyses. Gender was not included because there were no statistical differences between males and females: not across ethnic groups nor across experimental conditions. To test our moderation predictions, the model further included two interaction terms: one between experimental condition and ethnicity, and one between experimental condition and PPT.

The findings (shown in Table 5.2) indicate that there was a significant and substantial effect of experimental condition (also see Figure 5.2). As expected, in the separation condition, participants were most negative ( $M = 3.55$ ,  $SE = .08$ ), followed by those in the integration condition ( $M = 3.19$ ,  $SE = .07$ ) and then the assimilation condition ( $M = 2.76$ ,  $SE = .08$ ). All three conditions differed significantly from each other. The effect for experimental condition did not differ between the three ethnic groups, which supports the intergroup competition perspective and not the commonality


approach. There was, however, a significant main effect of ethnic group. In general, and compared to the Moroccans ( $M = 2.97$ ,  $SE = .09$ ), the Surinamese and Dutch were more negative ( $M = 3.28$ ,  $SE = .08$ , and  $M = 3.25$ ,  $SE = .08$ , respectively). Table 5.2 further shows that there was a significant main effect for threat, with higher PPT being associated with more negative out-group feelings. This effect for PPT was similar in the three experimental conditions because the interaction between PPT and condition was not significant. Finally, there were significant effects of educational attainment (higher attainment was associated with less negative out-group feelings) and political orientation (right-winged participants reported more negative out-group feelings).

**Table 5.2: Negative out-group feelings towards Turkish-Dutch as a function of political acculturation strategies, ethnicity, perceived power threat, age, educational attainment, religiosity, and political orientation**

Variable	<i>F</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>Partial Eta</i> <sup>2</sup>
Experimental condition	26.40	.00	.10
Ethnicity	3.76	.02	.02
Perceived power threat (centered)	24.85	.00	.05
Age	2.12	.15	.00
Educational attainment	4.00	.05	.01
Religiosity	.15	.70	.00
Political orientation	7.18	.01	.02
Condition * ethnicity	1.73	.14	.01
Condition * threat	1.56	.21	.01

$R^2 = .215$

**Figure 5.2: Negative out-group feelings by experimental condition**



### **In-group Political Acculturation Attitudes**

Using the GLM procedure we investigated how the Turkish-Dutch evaluate the political acculturation strategies of their in-group. The model included the experimental condition (three political acculturation strategies) as a fixed factor, with perceived power threat (centered), dual identity (centered), age, educational attainment, religiosity, and political orientation as continuous covariates. It further included two interaction terms: between experimental condition and threat, and between experimental condition and dual identity.

The results shown in Table 5.3 indicate that the effect of the experimental manipulation was not significant ( $M_{separation} = 3.28$ ;  $M_{integration} = 3.17$ ;  $M_{assimilation} = 2.90$ ). There was, however, a relatively strong effect for PTT. The more participants perceived their in-group power to be threatened by other ethnic groups, the more negative they were about their in-group member. This was similar across the three experimental conditions. There was a significant interaction effect between experimental condition and dual identity. As expected, within the separating condition, higher dual identity was marginally associated with less negative in-group feelings ( $B = -.14$ ,  $SE = .07$ ,  $t = -1.89$ ,  $p = .06$ ). In contrast, in the assimilation condition higher dual identity was associated with more negative feelings ( $B = .15$ ,  $SE = .06$ ,  $t = 2.28$ ,  $p = .02$ ). Dual identity was not associated with negative feelings in the integration condition ( $B = -.09$ ,  $SE = .06$ ,  $t = -1.47$ ,  $p = .14$ ).

**Table 5.3: Negative in-group feelings towards Turkish-Dutch as a function of political acculturation strategies, perceived power threat, age, educational attainment, religiosity, and political orientation**

Variable	<i>F</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>Partial Eta</i> <sup>2</sup>
Experimental condition	2.76	.07	.04
Perceived power threat (centered)	22.58	.00	.13
Dual identification (centered)	.49	.48	.00
Age	.00	.97	.00
Educational attainment	2.36	.13	.02
Religiosity	5.10	.03	.03
Political orientation	11.65	.00	.07
Condition * Threat	.41	.67	.01
Condition * Identification	5.24	.01	.06

$R^2 = .318$

## 5.5 Discussion

Using national samples and an experimental design we investigated the evaluation of political acculturation strategies by other immigrant-origin groups, the native majority, and the minority in-group. We tried to go beyond the existing literature by studying acculturation preferences from a multiple group perspective and by applying the acculturation framework to the understudied domain of political participation (also see: Navas et al., 2007).

We found a clear ranking in the evaluation of out-group acculturation strategies: participants were most negative about Turkish minority members who exclusively advocated for the interests of their in-group (separation), most positive about those who wished to advance societal interests (assimilation), while Turkish minority members that advocated for both their in-group and society as a whole (integration) were evaluated in between. Thus, the more the acculturation strategy focused on the interests of the minority group, thereby challenged the existing political status quo, the more negative participants were. This indicates that questions of power, influence, and group competition play a central role in political acculturation preferences.

For Dutch majority members the ranking of the out-group acculturation strategies was in line with our expectations and the existing research on socio-cultural acculturation (e.g., Kosic et al., 2005; Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998; Verkuyten et al., 2014). The fact that the rankings of Surinamese and Moroccan participants were identical to that of the Dutch suggests that these minority members do not see Turks as potential allies against the dominance of the majority group. Minority commonality did not appear to inspire political solidarity (Glasford & Calcagno, 2012) whereby, compared to the native Dutch, minority members evaluate political separation and integration strategies of other minorities more positively. The same

ranking among the three groups is more in line with an intergroup competition perspective (Esses et al., 2005) whereby the gain in political power of one group implies a threat to the influence and power of one's own (majority or minority) group.

The important role of threat is further indicated by the finding that Turkish out-group members were evaluated more negatively when the power position of the in-group was perceived to be threatened by other ethnic groups. However, in contrast to all of the previous chapters of this dissertation we did not find that the effect of threat varied across experimental conditions. One possible reason is that in the current study we focused on Turkish immigrants as the target group, whereas previous research focused on Muslim immigrants. Islam has emerged as the focus of immigration and diversity debates in Europe (Zolberg & Long, 1999). It is argued that Islam forms a 'bright boundary' separating immigrants from host societies (Alba, 2005), and feelings of threat are strong predictors of anti-Muslim attitudes (Velasco González, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008). Thus, it is likely that perceived power threat plays a differential role in the evaluation of political acculturation strategies of Muslim minorities rather than ethnic minority groups. For people who perceive relatively high power threat the mode of political acculturation might be more important in relation to Muslims than in relation to ethnic groups.

We also examined the attitudes of Turkish participants towards the different political acculturation strategies of their in-group. Similar to acculturation in the socio-cultural domain, we expected them to prefer the integration strategy over separation and assimilation, because it secures political interests of both their in-group and the wider society. The results, however, showed that Turkish participants did not differentiate between the three acculturation strategies. The evaluation of the three strategies did depend on the level of dual identification. Higher dual identifiers were less positive towards assimilating Turks and more positive towards separating

Turks, whereas dual identity was not associated with in-group feelings in the integration condition. Dual identifiers are more negative about political assimilation because it implies that the specific interests of their disadvantaged minority group are ignored. These interests are central in the separation strategy and higher dual identifiers were more positive about this strategy. Our findings indicate that dual identifiers are concerned about the way their in-group acculturates politically, and that dual identity can be a Politicized Collective Identity that operates 'as a unique social psychological motor of political involvement' (Simon & Grabow, 2010, p. 718). However, going beyond the research of politicized dual identity of immigrant-origin groups (e.g., Klandermans et al., 2008; Simon & Ruhs, 2008) the findings demonstrate that the particular political acculturation strategy is an important boundary condition on the relationship between dual identity and the evaluation of political participation (Wiley, Figueroa, & Lauricella, 2014).

We further found (across the three experimental conditions) that higher perceived power threat was associated with more negative in-group feelings. Thus, the more Turkish-Dutch participants believed that the position of their ethnic in-group was threatened by other ethnic groups, the more negative they were about politically active in-group members. One reason might be that Turkish minority members fear that political activism could have a backlash in the form of polarized intergroup relations and conflicts. Future research should systematically examine this possibility.

There are several limitations that we want to mention, because they provide suggestions for future research. A first one is that we focused on the Netherlands which means that it is unclear whether the current findings generalize to other countries with different political cultures, migration histories and immigrant-origin groups. We do not have clear reasons to expect that the findings will be different in other countries, but there might be relevant country-related moderating conditions. Furthermore, while the current study

is among the first to shed light on inter-minority attitudes in the domain of political acculturation, it is limited in the sense that it examined a single minority target group. Future research could try to examine the mutual evaluations of groups occupying different positions in the ethnic hierarchy. In addition, we examined the moderating influence of perceived power threat and dual identification but there are other constructs that might be important to consider such as social dominance orientation and authoritarianism. Future research should further examine these and other factors and conditions on the evaluation of political acculturation strategies of immigrant-origin groups. Furthermore, although the advancement of group interests and goals is an important form of political participation there are other ways in which immigrants can participate politically (Carlisle & Patton, 2013; Marien et al., 2010), and it remains to be seen whether the current results hold for other forms of political behavior. More research is needed to develop a further understanding of the evaluation of political acculturation strategies of immigrant-origin groups and to fully test the different mechanisms and boundaries conditions.

In conclusion, our research is the first that has examined the evaluation of immigrants' political acculturation strategies from a multiple group perspective. Immigrants are typically considered as objects of politics, but it is important to perceive them as political subjects that contribute to the legitimacy of the political system and the functioning of society. Immigrants are often not expected or supposed to act politically, but their political participation is a critical issue in the development of an equal and just society. We tried to make a novel contribution to the understanding of immigrant's political participation by studying among native majority members, other immigrant groups, and the immigrant in-group the evaluation of different political acculturation strategies. The findings indicate that these strategies are evaluated quite differently by majority and minority out-group members. The strategy of assimilation was evaluated most positively, followed by inte-

gration and then separation. The more members of a particular immigrant-origin group want to advance their in-group interest, the more negatively they are evaluated by the native population as well as by members of other immigrant-origin groups. This indicates that minority members do not view minority out-groups as potential allies to counter the dominance of the majority group, but rather as competitors for political influence. Finally, the role of dual identification for the evaluation of in-group political participation was found to depend on the type of political acculturation strategy. This indicates that the particular strategy forms an important boundary condition on the relationship between dual identity and political participation.

## Chapter 6

# Interminority attitudes: ethnic and national identification, contact, and multiculturalism

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## 6.1 Introduction

There are numerous studies on the causes and correlates of prejudices and discrimination toward minority members (see Brown 2010). There is also a good amount of research on attitudes of minority members toward the majority group (e.g., Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995). Few scholars, however, have considered relations among ethnic minority groups (e.g., Al Ramiah & Hewstone, 2012; Craig & Richeson, 2011; Philip, Mahalingam, & Sellers, 2010; Verkuyten, Hagendoorn, & Masson, 1996; White, Schmitt, & Langer, 2006); this is unfortunate for two reasons. First, there are many cities, neighborhoods, and institutions (e.g., schools) that are predominantly comprised of different ethnic minority groups, and where interminority relations can be rather negative. Second, investigating relations between minority groups is theoretically interesting because it allows us to examine existing theories in a different context and to test contrasting predictions.

Research examining intergroup relations among migrants and minorities considers three theoretical perspectives: categorization, intergroup contact, and acculturation processes. Studies tend to examine theoretical predictions related to these three perspectives separately, while our aim is to test predictions simultaneously in order to examine their relative importance for understanding interminority relations. Specifically, we focus on group differentiation and identifications (categorizations), intergroup contacts, and the endorsement of multiculturalism (acculturation preferences).

Empirically, we focus on the two minority groups that are numerically greatest and socially most prominent in the Netherlands:

people of Turkish (2.3 percent of the population) and Moroccan (2.1 percent) origin. Both groups have a history of labor migration, dating back to the 1970s. In most cases, men arrived first and their families followed later. Most Turks and Moroccans self-identify as Muslim (e.g. Maliepaard, Lubbers, & Gijsberts, 2010; Maliepaard & Phalet, 2012). They tend to live in similar urban neighborhoods (e.g. neighborhoods in the four largest cities of the Netherlands, in which more than half of the inhabitants are of non-Western origin) and occupy low status positions in Dutch society. We examine interminority relations in terms of how Turks and Moroccans evaluate each other. Furthermore, we will investigate how they evaluate the Surinamese / Antilleans, another important minority group in the Netherlands. People of Surinamese and Antillean origin make up 2.1 and 0.8 percent of the population, respectively. Members of these groups emigrated from former Dutch colonies in South America and the Caribbean, and generally possessed the Dutch nationality and spoke the Dutch language upon arrival in the Netherlands. In comparison to Turks and Moroccans, the Surinamese and Antilleans have a much more favorable structural and social position in Dutch society (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2009). Finally, we consider the attitudes of Turks and Moroccans toward the majority group of native Dutch (80% of the population) because this allows us to examine contrasting hypotheses more fully.

## 6.2 Theories

### Social Identity Perspective

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) proposes that intergroup differentiation results from the quest to establish a distinct and positive identity and it argues that group members strive to differentiate their in-group from relevant out-groups. One implication is that threats to intergroup distinctiveness instigate

attempts to maintain or restore a separate identity, for example, by in-group bias in which the in-group is evaluated more positively than other groups. The “reactive distinctiveness hypothesis” states that the more similar a relevant out-group is to the in-group, the stronger the distinctiveness threat and the stronger the tendency for intergroup differentiation (Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004). We thus expect that Turkish and Moroccan minority members have more negative attitudes toward each other than toward other ethnic minority groups (Hypothesis 1a). After all, Turks and Moroccans are both Muslim groups, share a similar history of labor migration, and have an equally low status in Dutch society. These factors set them apart from other migrant groups in the Netherlands and make them more similar to one another.

Differentiation as a reaction to threatened group distinctiveness is particularly likely among individuals who identify strongly with their in-group (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Those who are strongly committed to their group will more easily perceive low intergroup distinctiveness as threatening and therefore be motivated to restore distinctiveness through increased differentiation. This means that specifically Turkish and Moroccan minority members who identify more greatly with their ethnic background (higher ethnic identifiers) will have more negative attitudes toward the Turkish or Moroccan out-group. It also means that identification is less strongly related to the attitude toward the dissimilar out-group of Surinamese/Antilleans.

Differentiation might also occur when groups are clearly distinct rather than relatively similar. The competing “reflective distinctiveness hypothesis” (Jetten et al., 2004) states that high distinctiveness defines the in-group more clearly and increases the salience of group boundaries. According to self-categorization theory (Turner et al. 1987), group salience and the prominence of group boundaries form the basis of subsequent differentiation. This means that large differences between groups stand in the

way of positive intergroup relations, whereas more similar groups are evaluated more positively. This reasoning is similar to predictions derived from belief-congruency theory and the homophily principle on interpersonal relations. The former proposes that low distinctiveness with others leads to increased attraction because of similar values and beliefs (Byrne 1971). The latter states that people have the tendency to associate with others who share similar backgrounds (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). In their meta-analysis, Jetten et al. (2004) found that reflective distinctiveness processes emerge mainly on attitudinal measures such as the social distance questions we used in the present study and are more pronounced for those less strongly committed to their group (e.g., lower identifiers). The competing hypothesis that follows is that Turks and Moroccans will have more positive attitudes toward each other than toward the other minorities (Hypothesis 1b). This attitude difference should be stronger for those who identify less with their own ethnicity.

### **Shared Identity**

According to the common in-group identity model, in-group bias can be reduced when members of different groups conceive of themselves as belonging to a shared, inclusive superordinate category (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). The processes that lead to favoritism toward in-group members would then be directed at former out-group members. There is clear support for the model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), but to our knowledge the relationship between identification with a superordinate category and attitudes toward minority and majority out-groups has not been tested before.

First, we consider being Muslim as a religious superordinate identity. When individuals identify more strongly with their religious group, they can be expected to regard those who have the same faith more strongly as in-group members. In the Netherlands,

nearly all Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, including the second generation, define themselves as Muslim and identify with their Muslim in-group (e.g., Maliepaard et al., 2010; Maliepaard & Phalet, 2012). Following the common in-group identity model, this could mean that for the Turkish and Moroccan participants higher religiosity is related to a more positive attitude toward each other and a less positive attitude toward the non-Muslim out-groups of Surinamese/Antilleans and native Dutch (Hypothesis 2).

Second, Dutch society might serve as a superordinate identity for ethnic minorities. Research on the common in-group identity model has shown that negative out-group feelings can be reduced when out-group members become fellow national in-group members (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This could mean that Turkish and Moroccan participants who identify more strongly with Dutch society (e.g. participants for who the Dutch identity is a more important part of their self-identity, and who feel more strongly connected to the Dutch society) will have more positive attitudes toward all out-groups, including the majority group of native Dutch (Hypothesis 3a).

There is also a competing hypothesis possible, however, which is that national identification leads to more positive feelings toward the majority group but not toward other minorities. Following realistic conflict theory (Sherif, 1966), one possible reason for this is competition and conflicts of interest in which the gains of another minority group are at the expense of one's own minority in-group. Stronger national identifiers experience more competition and conflicts of interest. Another reason is that societal stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes toward minorities might be transferred to minority groups who are seeking acceptance from the majority group. Lewin (1948) argues that members of minority groups can assimilate to the majority group, resulting in negative attitudes toward other minority groups. There is some empirical evidence for this (Philip et al., 2010). For instance, the more Basque people

identify with Spaniards, the more negatively they view Catalans as a subgroup that seeks autonomy (Martinovic, Verkuyten, & Weesie, 2011). For the Turkish and Moroccan participants this reasoning leads to the contrasting prediction that higher (host) national identification is associated with a more negative attitude toward other ethnic minority groups and a more positive attitude toward the native Dutch (Hypothesis 3b).

### **Intergroup Contact**

A great number of studies has shown that positive out-group contact leads to more favorable out-group attitudes (e.g., Binder et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2007; Swart et al., 2011). Research also indicates, however, that the effect of contact is asymmetrical in the sense that it is stronger for the out-group attitudes of majority members than for minority members' attitudes toward the majority (see Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005). Very little research has examined intergroup attitudes and contact between minority groups. An exception is the study by Tsukashima & Montero (1976) that showed that equal-status contact reduced prejudice of blacks toward Jews. More recently, Van Laar et al. (2005) found that having Asian American roommates did not reduce prejudice among black college students, whereas for Asian students having black roommates was associated with more favorable attitudes toward blacks (see also Bikmen, 2011). Following contact theory, we expect that Turkish and Moroccan participants who have more personal contact with members of a particular minority out-group will have a more positive attitude toward that group (Hypothesis 4).

Recent studies suggest that the prejudice-reducing effect of contact with a particular out-group can extend to another group that is not directly involved in the contact (Pettigrew, 2009). Evidence for this so-called secondary transfer effect was found in different studies (e.g., Eller & Abrams, 2004; Van Laar et al., 2005). For exam-

ple, in four studies, Tausch and colleagues (2010) found supporting evidence for the secondary transfer effect in different national contexts. Contact with a primary out-group predicted attitudes toward secondary out-groups, “over and above contact with the secondary out-group, social desirable responding, and prior attitudes” (Tausch et al., 2010:282).

The main explanation for the secondary transfer effect is the mechanism of attitude generalization (Pettigrew, 2009), a process by which attitudes toward one object generalize to other, linked objects (Walther, 2002). Indeed, Tausch et al. (2010) found attitude generalization to mediate the relationship between primary out-group contact and the attitude toward the secondary out-group. At the level of social groups this means that the improved out-group attitude that results from contact with one group can lead to improved attitudes toward similar out-groups. Ethnic minority groups share their minority position in society and therefore are more similar to each other than to the dominant majority group (Craig & Richeson, 2011). Thus, we expect secondary transfer effects of contact to other minority groups, but not to the native Dutch. Specifically, we expect contact with a primary ethnic minority out-group to be positively related to attitudes toward a secondary minority out-group (Hypothesis 5). This relationship should hold while controlling for contact with that secondary out-group.

## Multiculturalism

Cultural diversity beliefs represent ideologies that suggest how groups should accommodate one another and how best to organize a diverse society (Plaut, 2010). Two cultural ideologies dominate the Dutch discourse of diversity: multiculturalism and assimilation (Vasta, 2007). Both are strongly and negatively correlated, with the one typically considered to be an alternative to the other (Berry, 1997). The endorsement of multiculturalism appears to

have positive effects on intergroup relations because it prompts—in contrast to assimilation—an outward focus away from the in-group and toward learning about and from ethnic out-groups (for reviews, see Deaux & Verkuyten, 2013; Rattan & Ambady, 2013). Multicultural recognition can provide confidence, trust, and security among everyone living in plural societies (Berry, 1997). This leads to the prediction that the more Turkish and Moroccan participants endorse cultural diversity, the more positive their attitudes are toward other ethnic minority groups as well as toward the majority group (Hypothesis 6a).

It is also possible, however, that the endorsement of cultural diversity is positively associated with the attitudes toward other minority groups but not toward the majority group. The native Dutch tend to prefer assimilation and often consider multiculturalism as threatening to their in-group because it requires them to relinquish some of their power and status. In the Netherlands, multiculturalism is typically seen as identity supporting for ethnic minority groups (Van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998). In agreement with this, ethnic minority members consistently endorse multiculturalism more strongly than the native Dutch (see Verkuyten, 2006). This could mean that a stronger endorsement of cultural diversity is associated with more positive attitudes toward other ethnic minority groups but not toward the dominant majority group (Hypothesis 6b).

## Hypotheses Overview and Social Distance

Table 1 provides an overview of the different (contrasting) hypotheses we formulated above. In examining ethnic attitudes, we focused on social distance: the extent to which people wish to avoid contact with members of ethnic out-groups (Bogardus, 1925). Social distance questions have been used in many studies, including research on interminority relations (e.g., Verkuyten et

al., 1996), and constitute reliable and valid measures of ethnic attitudes. In addition to out-group attitudes we focus in the analysis also on in-group bias as a measure of the differential evaluation of the in-group and out-group. A difference score in in-group and out-group attitudes corresponds to the theoretical idea of positive group differentiation and has the advantage of taking the effects of some response biases into account, such as the tendency to give positive responses. In addition, focusing on both out-group attitudes and in-group bias allows us to develop a more detailed understanding of interminority relations.

**Table 6.1: Hypotheses overview**

Hypothesis 1a: Reactive distinctiveness	Turks and Moroccans have more negative attitudes toward each other than toward other ethnic minorities. This is particularly the case for high ethnic identifiers.
Hypothesis 1b: Reflective distinctiveness	Turks and Moroccans have more positive attitudes toward each other than toward the more different ethnic minorities. This is particularly the case for low ethnic identifiers.
Hypothesis 2: Superordinate religious identification	The more religious Turks and Moroccans are, the more positive they are toward each other and the less positive they are toward non-Muslim out-groups.
Hypothesis 3a: Superordinate national identification	The more Turks and Moroccans identify with Dutch society, the more positive their attitude is toward other ethnic minority groups and toward the majority group.
Hypothesis 3b: Superordinate majority identification	The more Turks and Moroccans identify with Dutch society, the more positive their attitude is toward the majority group, but the more negative their attitude toward other minorities.
Hypothesis 4: Contact hypothesis	The more Turks and Moroccans have personal contacts with members of another minority group, the more positive their attitude is toward this group.

Hypothesis 5: Secondary transfer effect of contact	The more Turks and Moroccans have personal contact with a primary minority out-group, the more positive their attitude is toward a secondary minority out-group, but not toward the majority group.
Hypothesis 6a: General multicultural endorsement	The more Turks and Moroccans endorse multiculturalism, the more positive they are toward other minority groups and toward the majority group
Hypothesis 6b: Minority multicultural endorsement	The more Turks and Moroccans endorse multiculturalism, the more positive they are toward other ethnic minorities but not toward the majority group.

## 6.3 Method

### Sample

We used the Nederlandse Levensloopstudie (NELLS, in English: *The Netherlands' Life Course Survey*, De Graaf et al., 2010), which contains a large sample of Turkish and Moroccan minority members in the Netherlands between the ages of 14 and 49 years ( $M = 30.95$ ,  $SD = 8.97$ ). The survey employed a two-stage stratified sample: a quasi-random sample of municipalities by region and urbanization, followed by a second stage in which respondents were randomly selected from the population registry, based on age, country of birth of the respondents, and country of birth of parents. People of Moroccan and Turkish origin were over-sampled to facilitate comparisons between groups. The survey was administered in Dutch. Respondents received incentives to maximize the response rate, up to 35 Euros (depending on the stage of fieldwork and the nonresponse category). The questionnaire was pretested and the data were collected in 2009–2010 by means of self-completion questionnaires. The overall response

rate was 52 percent, which is similar to other Dutch surveys (De Graaf et al., 2010; Stoop, 2005). In total, 25 respondents were excluded from the analyses because they did not answer either any of the dependent or any of the independent variables. The resulting data set contains information of 1,987 respondents of Moroccan (50 percent) and Turkish origin (50 percent) from the urban regions in the Netherlands. Most respondents (64 percent) are first-generation immigrants (who on average were 15 years old when they migrated to the Netherlands, with  $SD = 9.46$ ), and 36 percent are second-generation immigrants. Most of the respondents self-identified as Muslims (88 percent), and just over half of the sample is female (53 percent).

## Measures

*Social distance* was measured with respect to the in-group and three ethnic out-groups: toward a Muslim out-group (Turkish or Moroccan), toward another minority out-group (Surinamese/Antillean), and toward the majority out-group (native Dutch). For each out-group, respondents were asked to what extent they would be bothered by having someone from that group as their: (a) boss at work, (b) neighbor, and (c) son/daughter-in-law. Participants could answer each question on a 3-point scale, with 1 = not at all problematic, 2 = not so problematic, and 3 = problematic.


We examined three measurement models using maximum-likelihood estimation in Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2010). The first model considered three correlated latent variables: social distance toward the Muslim out-group, toward the other minority group, and toward the majority group. Each of these latent variables was predicted by the respective three items (e.g., Dutch boss, Dutch neighbor, Dutch in-law). That model did not fit the data,  $\chi^2(24, N = 1,986) = 3,224.5$ , Comparative Fit Index ( $CFI$ ) = .793,

root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .260. We then used an adaptation of the multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) approach. We used the same model but added three additional latent variables (boss, neighbor, and in-law) that were predicted by three items each (e.g., Muslim boss, minority boss, majority boss). This model takes respondents' general resistance to having out-group bosses, neighbors, and in-laws into account (see Figure 6.1). The resulting model had a good fit,  $\chi^2(16, N = 1,987) = 56.5$ ,  $CFI = .997$ ,  $RMSEA = .036$ . To investigate if the respondents made an empirical distinction between the three out-groups we tested a third model, also using the MTMM approach, that estimated a single latent construct of out-group attitude. This model did not fit the data  $\chi^2(19, N = 1,987) = 3,308.6$ ,  $CFI = .787$ ,  $RMSEA = .305$ . This indicates that a meaningful empirical distinction between the attitudes toward the three out-groups can be made.<sup>12</sup>

*Cronbach's Alphas* for Muslim, minority, and majority out-groups are .80, .75, .69, respectively. In addition to three out-group attitude scores, we also computed three in-group bias scores by subtracting the social distance score toward each out-group target from the social distance score toward the in-group so that a higher score means more in-group bias.

12 We also conducted a measurement invariance test to examine whether the items of the latent variables assessed the same constructs among the two groups of Turkish and Moroccan respondents. We fitted the construct for the two groups separately in an unconstrained model and subsequently compared this to a model in which loadings and intercepts were constrained to be equal. The results show that the model fit of the equal loadings model is significantly worse ( $\Delta\chi^2 = 33.41$ ,  $\Delta df = 9$ ,  $p < .005$ ) compared to the unconstrained model. However, the overall model fit of the equal loadings model is acceptable,  $\chi^2(47, N_{\text{Moroccans}} = 995, N_{\text{Turks}} = 993) = 219.615$ , *Comparative Fit Index* ( $CFI$ ) = .989, *Tucker-Lewis Index* ( $TLI$ ) = .983, *root mean square error of approximation* ( $RMSEA$ ) = .061, *standardized root mean square residual* ( $SRMR$ ) = .058. Furthermore, the decrease in model fit was due to only two items (Muslim neighbor and majority boss) that, however, had similar associations with out-group attitudes among the Turkish and Moroccan participants. Thus, there is partial measurement invariance whereby at least two items have similar factor loadings for each out-group measure.

**Figure 6.1: The Multitrait–Multimethod Model**



*Ethnic identification* was measured by four statements that have been used in previous research in the Netherlands (see Verkuyten, 2006): “I am proud of my ethnic background,” “I strongly identify with my ethnic group,” “I really feel connected to my ethnic group,” and “My ethnic identity is an important part of myself” (5-point scales: 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). Cronbach’s Alpha for these four items is .91.

*National identification* was measured by four similar statements and using the same scales. The statements were: “I feel at home in the Dutch society,” “I identify strongly with the Netherlands,” “I really feel connected to the Netherlands,” and “My Dutch identity is an important part of myself.” Cronbach’s Alpha for these four items is .87.

We analyzed two distinct aspects of *religiosity*, religious salience and religious practices. Religious salience was measured with the question “How important is your faith to you personally?” (1 = not important at all, 5 = very important). Because Islam is a religion in which orthopraxis (action or activity) is central (Williams, 1994), adherence to religious practices was measured with five items. Respondents were first asked whether or not in the last three months they had read the Qur’an and had prayed. Subsequently they were asked whether they tend to fast (e.g., during Ramadan), drink alcohol (reversed scored), and eat pork (reversed scored).

For measuring *intergroup contact*, participants were asked to indicate (1 = never, 7 = daily) for each ethnic group how often they have had personal contact in three different settings: in the neighborhood, at work/school, in an association or club. Additionally, respondents were asked whether they have one or more good friends with the following ethnic backgrounds: Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese/Antillean, Dutch (yes, no).

*Multicultural endorsement* was measured by asking participants to what extent they agreed (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree) with the following two statements: “It is better for a country when everyone has the same customs and traditions” and “It is better for a country when everyone has the same religion” (both reversed). These questions have been used in previous Dutch studies and tap into whether a person believes cultural diversity is desirable for society (Verkuyten, 2006). A higher score indicates stronger endorsement of multiculturalism.

*Ethnicity* was defined by the self-reported country of birth of the participant and both parents (value 0 for Moroccan, value 1 for Turkish). In accordance with the classification of Statistics Netherlands a participant was classified as first generation (value 0) when the person and one or two parents were born

outside the Netherlands and as second generation (value 1) if the person was born in the Netherlands but at least one parent was born outside this country.

## Analyses

To test our hypotheses, we used multiple analysis of variance (for Hypotheses 1a and 1b) and structural equation modeling (for the other hypotheses). Using latent variables, effect sizes and standard errors are estimated more precisely with Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) compared to ordinary regression analysis, yielding more reliable results.<sup>13</sup> Using SEM also allows us to estimate a single model with multiple independent variables predicting multiple dependent variables, rather than running separate analyses for each of our three dependent variables (Muslim out-group, minority out-group, majority out-group). This means that we can directly compare the effect sizes and significance levels of the predictors for the three out-groups.

To the specified measurement model (Figure 6.1) we added other latent variables as predictors (e.g., national identification). Gender and age did not show any significant relationships and therefore were not further considered in the analyses. Generational status and educational level (highest diploma obtained) were included as controls in the analyses.<sup>14</sup>

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13 One could construct an “ethnic identification” scale by summing the respondents’ scores on each of the items. Structural equation modeling (SEM), however, regresses the response on each item onto a latent variable “ethnic identification.” Effectively, the latent variable is predicted by the observed variables and predicts an outcome variable. By doing so, SEM retains all variance and makes much better use of the information in the data.

14 We also included length of stay in the Netherlands in the analyses (for the first generation: age at migration, for the second generation: age at time of interview). Results showed very small effect sizes of length of stay and no changes in the effects of the other predictors. Therefore, length of stay is not further discussed in this chapter.

## 6.4 Results

### Descriptive Statistics

The descriptive statistics of all measures and for the two ethnic groups are presented in Table 6.2, and Table 6.3 shows the associations between the various measures and for the two groups. Compared to Moroccans, Turkish respondents reported more social distance across the board. This is in line with previous research showing that the Turkish minority group is more cohesive and closed and has relatively little contact with out-group members (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2009). Respondents of both groups report the least social distance toward the in-group and the most social distance toward the minority out-group. Turkish respondents follow the expected pattern of ethnic hierarchy (Verkuyten, 2006) by reporting the least social distance toward the in-group, followed by the majority group, and then by the remaining minority out-groups. Moroccan respondents hardly differentiate in their evaluation of the Muslim and majority out-group.

**Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics by ethnic group**

Variable	Min	Max	Moroccans			Turks		
			<i>N</i>	Mean	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>	Mean	<i>SD</i>
Social distance toward in-group	1	3	992	1.38	0.49	990	1.45	0.52
Social distance Muslim out-group	1	3	992	1.62	0.53	986	1.90	0.59
Social distance minority out-group	1	3	992	1.78	0.54	984	1.96	0.56
Social distance majority out-group	1	3	990	1.64	0.49	988	1.72	0.49
Ethnic identification	1	5	971	4.16	0.75	973	4.13	0.80
National identification	1	5	994	3.79	0.76	987	3.63	0.72

Religion important	1	5	996	4.61	0.77	992	4.31	0.98
Contact Muslim out-group	1	7	989	3.51	1.79	983	3.34	1.76
Contact minority out-group	1	7	988	3.13	1.84	984	2.89	1.68
Contact majority out-group	1	7	995	4.76	1.57	988	4.79	1.51
Multicultural endorsement	2	5	995	3.60	0.78	987	3.51	0.76
Religious practices (categorical)	0	1	995	0.76	0.30	992	0.61	0.36

Note: to compute these statistics, scales were constructed by summing the items and dividing them by the number of items. These statistics therefore differ from the latent variables estimated in the SEM models of this chapter.

**Table 6.3: Intercorrelations between the different measures: Moroccans above the diagonal and Turks below the diagonal**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Ethnic identification		-.02	.36**	.30**	.08**	.02	-.03	.03
2. National identification	-.06		.06*	-.03	.05*	.06**	.12**	.13**
3. Religious importance	.43**	.00		.59**	.10**	.05*	-.04	-.03
4. Religious practices	.36**	-.08*	.60**		.13**	.06*	-.03	-.01
5. Contact Muslim	.09**	.09**	.12**	.15**		.73**	.58**	.03
6. Contact minority	.01	.11**	.04	.05	.74**		.54**	.04
7. Contact majority	-.03	.17**	-.06	-.06*	.57**	.52**		.09**
8. Multiculturalism	.06	.09**	-.04	.03	-.00	.00	.08*	

\*\* Bivariate correlation significant at  $p < .01$ , two-tailed

\* Bivariate correlation significant at  $p < .05$ , two-tailed

For the predictor variables, a one sample t-test showed that the overall mean score for religious importance is clearly above the neutral midpoint of the scale:  $t(1,986) = 73.11, p < .001$ . Thus, religion is important to most respondents, but more so for Moroccans than for Turks (see Table 6.2). Ethnic identification is also relatively high (very similar for both groups of respondents) and significantly stronger than host national identification, with  $t(1,938) = 1.72, p < .001$ . Table 6.2 shows that Moroccans endorse multiculturalism a bit stronger than Turks do. A one sample t-test showed that respondents on average endorsed multiculturalism as the overall mean score is significantly above the midpoint of the scale,  $t(1,980) = 32.20, p < .001$ . Moroccan respondents report higher levels of contact with the minority out-group, and Turks and Moroccans report about equal levels of contact with the majority group (see Table 6.2). Paired t-tests show that on average, contact with the other minority group (Surinamese/Antilleans) is lower than contact with the Muslim out-group,  $t(1,953) = 14.14, p < .001$ , and also lower than contact with the Dutch majority out-group,  $t(1,959) = 50.78, p < .001$ . Paired t-tests also show that contact with the Dutch majority out-group is higher than contact with the Muslim out-group,  $t(1,958) = 40.48, p < .001$ .

### **Types of Out-groups and Identification**

Our first contrasting hypotheses were on the difference in social distance toward the two minority out-groups. We expected Turks and Moroccans to have either more negative (Hypothesis 1a) or more positive (Hypothesis 1b) attitudes toward each other, compared to the minority group of Surinamese/Antilleans. Because in SEM group means are considered relative to one another, we performed a multivariate repeated measures analysis (general linear model) for testing these competing hypotheses. Ethnic group was a between-subjects factor and ethnic identification a continuous cen-

tered variable.<sup>15</sup> The results indicate that respondents reported significantly more social distance toward the minority out-group than toward the Muslim out-group (*Wilks's*  $\lambda = .93$ ,  $p < .001$ , *partial eta*<sup>2</sup> = .07; also see Table 6.2 for the means). Furthermore, the effects of ethnic group and ethnic identification on the within-subjects factor were not significant ( $ps > .11$ ), nor was there a significant interaction term with ethnic group and ethnic identification (*Wilks's*  $\lambda = .999$ ,  $p = .16$ , *partial eta*<sup>2</sup> = .001). Thus, the results support the reflective distinctiveness hypothesis (Hypothesis 1b) among both the Turks and Moroccans, but the differential evaluation of the minority out-groups was not more pronounced for those less committed to their ethnic group.

## Group Identification

The SEM analyses indicated that the model explains 27 percent of the variance in social distance toward the Muslim out-group, 30 percent of the variance toward the minority out-group, and accounts for 15 percent of the variance in social distance toward the majority group. The results shown in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 demonstrate that higher ethnic identification was associated with less social distance toward the non-Muslim minority out-group and toward the majority group and with greater in-group bias toward all three out-groups. This indicates that stronger ethnic identification was related to lower in-group social distance rather than higher out-group distance.<sup>16</sup>

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15 The results showed that the observed covariance matrices of the independent variable ethnic group were not equal across groups (*Box's M* = 18.59,  $F = 6.19$ ,  $p\text{-value} < .01$ ). This is not a serious problem because the sample sizes of both groups are equal and the total sample size is large (Stevens, 1986). Because Levene's test indicated that the error variance of the dependent variables is not equal across groups, we used a more conservative alpha level ( $p\text{-value} < .01$ ) for determining significance.

16 Using Wald tests for parameter constraints, we tested if the parameters were equal across the Turkish and Moroccan respondent groups. No significant differences were found for the analyses on out-group attitudes. For the analyses on in-group bias scores there were only two differences between Turks and Moroccans, and both concerned the estimates of multiculturalism: in relation to the minority out-group ( $Wald = 3.97$  with  $p\text{-value} = .046$ ) and the majority group ( $Wald = 9.24$  with  $p\text{-value} < .01$ ). All other estimates were similar across groups.

**Table 6.4: Unstandardized regression coefficients of the structural equation modeling (SEM) on social distance toward the three out-groups**

Variable name	Muslim	Minority	Majority
Religious salience	.03	.04*	.04**
Religious practices	-.02	.00	.01
National identification	-.11**	-.13**	-.12**
Contact with Muslim group	-.05**	-.05**	-.01
Contact with minority	-.05**	-.06**	-.01
Contact with majority	-.06**	-.09**	-.03
Multicultural endorsement	-.43**	-.49**	-.30**
Ethnic identification	-.05	-.06*	-.09**
Ethnicity (reference is Moroccan)	.26**	.19**	.08**
Generation (reference is first)	-.12**	-.13**	-.10**
Education	-.01*	-.01**	.00
Explained variance ( $R^2$ )	.27	.30	.15

\*\* Significant at  $p < .01$  two-tailed \* Significant at  $p < .05$  two-tailed

**Table 6.5: Unstandardized regression coefficients structural equation modeling (SEM) on in-group bias (out-group social distance minus in-group social distance) in relation to the three out-groups**

Variable name	Muslim	Minority	Majority
Religious salience	.02**	.03*	.04**
Religious practices	.03*	.05**	.06**
National identification	-.06**	-.08**	-.07**
Contact with Muslim group	-.03**	-.02*	.02*
Contact with minority	-.03**	-.04**	.00
Contact with majority	-.05**	-.07**	-.02
Multicultural endorsement	-.14**	-.22**	.00
Ethnic identification	.15**	.14**	.10**
Ethnicity (reference is Moroccan)	.17**	.11**	.00
Generation (reference is first)	-.03	-.04	-.01
Education	-.01**	-.01**	.00
Explained variance ( $R^2$ )	.12	.13	.07

\*\* Significant at  $p < .01$  two-tailed \* Significant at  $p < .05$  two-tailed

We expected that more religious respondents would be more positive toward the Muslim out-group and less positive toward the non-Muslim out-groups (Hypothesis 2). Table 4 shows that the more importance respondents attached to their religion, the more social distance they indeed report toward the non-Muslim minority group and the majority group. Religious salience, however, was unrelated to social distance toward the Muslim out-group. In addition, participants who adhered more to religious practices did not report more or less social distance toward the three out-groups (see Table 6.5). This pattern of findings provides partial support for Hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 3a on superordinate national identification was clearly supported by our data. Greater national identification was related to less social distance toward all three out-groups and also to lower in-group bias in relation to these groups (see Tables 6.4 and 6.5). Conversely, the competing Hypothesis 3b on superordinate majority identification was not supported.<sup>17</sup>

## Intergroup Contact

The analyses show that increased contact with members of a particular minority group (Muslim or Surinamese/Antillean) is associated with less social distance and bias toward that group (Tables 6.4 and 6.5). This confirms the standard contact hypothesis (Hypothesis 4). Interestingly, more contact with majority group

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<sup>17</sup> The common in-group identity model suggests that a dual identity might be particularly beneficial for minority members' intergroup relations (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009). Although we did not have a direct measure of dual identity, it was possible to examine the statistical interaction effect of ethnic and national identification. Additional regression analyses showed no significant interaction effects: in predicting social distance toward the Muslim out-group the interaction between ethnic and national identification was  $\beta = -.02$  with  $p = .358$ ; in predicting social distance toward the minority out-group,  $\beta = -.02$  with  $p = .289$ ; in predicting social distance toward the majority out-group,  $\beta = .03$  with  $p = .175$ .

members did not affect the social distance (or bias) respondents reported toward the Dutch majority.<sup>18</sup>

The findings also confirm the expectation of secondary transfer effects of contact (Hypothesis 5). The more contact respondents had with a primary minority out-group, the more positive their attitude was toward a secondary minority group (Table 6.4). These secondary transfer effects of contact exist while controlling for the effect of contact with the secondary minority group itself, and were also found for in-group bias (see Table 6.5).<sup>19</sup> In addition, more contact with the majority group was associated with lower social distance toward the minority groups, whereas more minority group contact was not related to social distance toward the majority group. Finally, more contact with a Muslim out-group was associated with greater in-group bias in relation to the native Dutch (Table 6.5).

## Endorsement of Multiculturalism

Support for the positive role of multiculturalism was consistent across the three out-groups. It was the strongest predictor in the

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18 The common in-group identity model argues that intergroup contact can lead to higher superordinate (i.e., national) identification, which in turn affects intergroup attitudes (Dovidio et al., 2009). In additional analyses we found no statistical evidence for this mediation reasoning, nor for the possibility that the effect of intergroup contact depended on the level of ethnic or host national identification. All interaction effects were non-significant.

19 The transfer effect implies that intergroup contact with a primary out-group affects the attitude toward that primary out-group, which in turn affects the attitude of a secondary out-group. Due to our analytical strategy (multitrait-multimethod [MTMM]) we were unable to model this mediating mechanism. The MTMM approach (as displayed in Figure 6.1) estimates the three dependent latent variables simultaneously while controlling for a general resistance against having bosses, neighbors, and in-laws from different ethnic backgrounds. This simultaneous estimation allows for direct comparisons of social distance toward various ethnic groups and hence for a simultaneous test of the theories used. As one can deduce from Figure 6.1, however, the model specifies that the three dependent latent variables need to co-vary. This means that the dependent variables cannot be used as predictors for one another. The alternatives (either running separate analyses for each dependent variable or developing a dynamic model) all involve letting go of the MTMM approach, which would hamper the comparability of the findings. Instead we examined whether more contact with a primary out-group was associated with less social distance toward a secondary out-group while controlling for the effects of direct contact with that secondary group.

models (Table 6.4 and 6.5), with higher endorsement of cultural diversity being associated with lower out-group social distance. It was also associated with lower in-group bias, except in relation to the native Dutch.<sup>20</sup> This pattern of findings is in line with the general multicultural hypothesis (Hypothesis 6a).

## 6.5 Discussion

This study is among the few to investigate interminority relations among immigrant groups (e.g., Philip et al., 2010; Verkuyten et al., 1996). With a large sample in the Netherlands and using advanced statistical modeling, we examined the social distance that Turkish and Moroccan minority members have toward each other and toward the minority group of Surinamese/Antilleans. We examined the relative importance of three elements that affect intergroup relations by simultaneously testing theoretical predictions related to group differentiation and group identifications (categorization), intergroup contact, and the endorsement of multiculturalism (acculturation preferences).

A first finding is that participants indicated less social distance toward the Muslim out-group compared to the Surinamese/Antilleans. This is in line with the “reflective distinctiveness hypothesis” (Hypothesis 1b) derived from self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), stating that stronger group differences increase the salience of group boundaries, which form the basis for intergroup attitudes. Turks and Moroccans are much more similar to each

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20 We conducted an additional multigroup analysis to investigate if the parameters were equal across the Moroccan and Turkish groups. These results are not reported in the text as only two effects were statistically different. Moroccans reported less social distance toward the minority out-group when they strongly endorsed multiculturalism, relative to their in-group (e.g., bias scores). For Turks, the same effect was statistically insignificant. Toward the majority group, higher multicultural endorsement was associated with higher social distance bias for Turks, whereas it was statistically insignificant for Moroccans.

other compared to the Surinamese/Antilleans. This suggests that larger differences between groups stand in the way of positive intergroup relations, whereas more similar groups are evaluated more positively (see also Byrne, 1971; McPherson et al., 2001). A meta-analysis (Jetten et al., 2004) has shown that reflective distinctiveness is typically found for attitudinal measures such as the social distance questions that were used in the present research. This meta-analysis however also indicates that for behavioral measures, reactive distinctiveness implying stronger negativity toward more similar out-groups is more likely. This could mean that the Turkish and Moroccan participants show less positive behavior toward each other than toward the Surinamese/Antilleans. Future studies should examine this possibility and could also include measures of identity distinctiveness threat to examine the processes of reflective and reactive distinctiveness more closely.

Jetten et al.'s meta-analysis (2004) further showed that reflective distinctiveness is particularly likely for lower group identifiers, whereas reactive distinctiveness is more typical for higher group identifiers. In the present study, ethnic identification was generally high and was not associated with attitudinal differentiation between the two minority out-groups. Thus, higher compared to lower identifiers did not make a stronger or weaker differentiation between the Muslim and the non-Muslim minority out-groups. Greater ethnic identification was however related to more in-group bias for all three out-groups. This pattern of findings indicates that stronger ethnic minority identification does not necessarily result in a more negative attitude toward out-groups. As higher identifiers tend to have a more favorable attitude toward their in-group (Brown, 2010), it does imply, however, stronger differentiation in favor of one's ethnic in-group. This pattern of results demonstrates the importance of examining out-group attitudes as well as in-group bias. Stronger ethnic minority identity might imply a more secure, stable, or achieved sense of ethnic self that provides the basis for acceptance and openness to other

groups and cultures (Phinney, Jacoby, & Silva, 2007). Yet it can also lead to a higher tendency to favor the in-group above out-groups, which might have real consequences in everyday life, for example, when people are asked to choose one group over the other.

In the context of interminority relations, ethnic identity relates to group boundaries and group differences. In contrast, religious and national identities can encompass different ethnic groups and thereby act as a shared, common category. The common in-group identity model argues that (former) out-group members will be evaluated more positively when they are seen as part of a shared category (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). We examined this model in terms of Muslim group identification and national identification. For Muslim identity we found that the more importance participants attached to their religion, the more social distance they reported toward the minority and majority out-groups. Yet, toward the Muslim out-group we did not find a significant association. In addition, stronger adherence to religious practices was associated with more in-group bias in relation to all three out-groups. This pattern of results does not suggest that a stronger Muslim identity acts like a superordinate category in which Muslim minority members feel more positive toward co-believers with a different ethnic minority background (in contrast to Hypothesis 2). One reason might be that there is a strong association between ethnic and religious group identification. What it means to be a Muslim is strongly related to what it means to be Turkish or to be Moroccan. There is evidence for this from several studies in the Netherlands (e.g., Phalet & Güngör, 2004; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Furthermore, and in line with the social identity complexity model (Roccas & Brewer, 2002), there is also evidence that the strong intersection of both identities goes together with negative out-group attitudes (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012). Another reason might be that the diversity of Muslims prevents the perception of belonging to a superordinate category. Moroccan Sunni Muslims tend to follow the Maliki school of Fiqh while Turkish

Sunni Muslims tend to follow the Hanafi school of Fiqh. It might be that Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands focus more on this distinction than on their shared religion.

In contrast to religious identity and in agreement with Hypothesis 3a and the common in-group identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), it turned out that higher national identification was associated with a more positive attitude toward the two ethnic minority out-groups and the majority group. This demonstrates that a sense of national belonging has a more generic positive meaning for the way in which minority members perceive ethnic (majority and minority) out-groups. As such, it supports the proposition of various scholars, including proponents of multiculturalism (Modood, 2007; Parekh, 2000), that a well-functioning society needs a sense of commitment and common belonging to foster mutual acceptance and tolerance.

Many studies have demonstrated that more favorable out-group attitudes result from positive intergroup contact (e.g., Binder et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2007; Swart et al., 2011). The current findings show that more contact with the majority group was not associated with less social distance toward this group. Yet, going beyond most of the previous contact research, we found that increased contact was associated with more positive interminority attitudes. In support of Hypothesis 4, Turkish (or Moroccan) participants who had more contacts with Moroccans (Turks) indicated less social distance toward this minority out-group, and the same was found in relation to the Surinamese/Antilleans.

A number of scholars have investigated the “ironic” effects of intergroup contact by showing that it cannot only lead to more positive attitudes toward the majority group but also to reduced support for actions designed to challenge discrimination and other social injustices (see Dixon et al., 2012). Because contact improves attitudes toward the majority, it would decrease perceptions of

injustice, undermine support for minority rights and policies, and reduce solidarity between minority groups (Glasford & Calcagno, 2012). In contrast, our findings show that more contact with the native Dutch was not associated with less social distance toward them but rather with lower social distance toward the minority groups. Furthermore, intergroup contact was positively related only to interminority attitudes. More positive attitudes and feelings of closeness toward other minority groups can form the basis for a sense of commonality, solidarity, and commitment. Such a sense is important for the development of minority coalitions that can challenge existing inequalities and injustices in the host society (Craig & Richeson, 2011). Thus, our findings indicate that the “ironic” effects of intergroup contact should not be overstated and are probably more important in some situations (i.e., deeply divided and unjust societies) than in others (i.e., Dutch welfare state). It is important that future studies examine more closely the types of contexts in which intergroup contact reduces minority support for collective actions that challenge inequalities and social injustices.

The results further provide evidence for Hypothesis 5 that relates to the so-called secondary transfer effect of contact (Pettigrew, 2009). Because of attitude generalization, positive attitudes from contact with a primary out-group can spread to similar out-groups. We were not able to test the transfer effect directly (i.e., the mediating role of primary out-group attitude; see note 8), but we did find that more contact with one particular minority out-group (e.g., Moroccans) was associated with less social distance toward another minority group (e.g., Surinamese/Antilleans), over and above the effects of direct contact with that other group (see Tausch et al., 2010; Van Laar et al., 2005). Interestingly, secondary transfer effects of contact were not found for the social distance toward the majority group. This supports the idea that attitude generalization depends on out-group similarity (Tausch et al., 2010). In the Netherlands, with its large native Dutch population,

a strong and pervasive distinction is made between the majority group of autochthons (“born from the soil”) and the minority groups of allochthons (“from somewhere else”).

The findings do show, however, a positive secondary transfer effect of contact with the native Dutch for the attitude toward the two minority groups. Together with the result for national identification, this indicates that there was no evidence for the proposition (Hypothesis 3b) that minority members with a stronger majority group orientation adopt the social stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes of the dominant society (Lewin, 1948; Philip et al., 2010). Rather, stronger national identification and more contacts with majority members were associated with less social distance toward the two ethnic minority groups. This further supports the importance of social and psychological integration in the host society for intergroup relations.

The strongest associations were found for the endorsement of multicultural recognition. The more minority members supported cultural and religious diversity in society, the less social distance they reported toward all ethnic out-groups. This finding is in support of the general multicultural endorsement hypothesis (Hypothesis 6a). Together with other findings (e.g., Velasco González et al., 2008; Ward & Masgoret, 2006), they are in line with Berry’s (1997) argument that multicultural recognition can provide confidence, trust, and security among everyone living in plural societies. The associations were stronger, however, for the attitude toward the minority groups, and in-group bias in relation to the majority group was not associated with multiculturalism. This indicates that also minority members tend to consider multiculturalism as identity supporting for ethnic minority groups rather than for the native Dutch (Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998; Verkuyten, 2006).

## 6.6 Limitations

There are several limitations of the present work that offer opportunities for future research. First, we examined correlations and cannot draw any firm conclusions about causality. Yet, our predictions were theoretically derived and there are several experimental and longitudinal studies that showed, for example, that intergroup contact (e.g., Binder et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2007) and multiculturalism (e.g., Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Verkuyten, 2006) have causal effects on out-group attitudes. Future studies, however, should use panel data to examine the direction of the associations.

Second, we have focused on two ethnic minority groups that are the least accepted in Dutch society (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2009). Research on horizontal hostility indicates that interminority attitudes can differ between groups that are either less or more similar to the majority population (White et al., 2006). This could mean, for example, that the culturally and religiously more similar Surinamese and Antilleans might show a different pattern of interminority attitudes. Yet, this does not have to mean that the roles of national identification, intergroup contact, and multiculturalism for these attitudes operate differently. A mean difference in the level of social distance does not necessarily imply different relations with the various predictors: the mechanisms might operate similarly.

Third, although the response rate of 52 percent is typical for Dutch surveys, it does imply some form of selectivity. Furthermore, there often is a tradeoff between the advantage of using data from large-scale minority samples and the measurement of constructs. These data are typically collected for different purposes by a multidisciplinary team of researchers, which has implications for the number of questions that can be asked for the different con-

structs. For example, the endorsement of cultural diversity was measured with two items and intergroup contact with only four. More extensive measures of multiculturalism might result in even stronger relations with out-group attitudes, and a more comprehensive measure of the nature and quality of contact might show additional effects.

## 6.7 Conclusion

This is one of the first studies that has examined interminority relations among a large sample and two ethnic minority groups. The findings demonstrate that a relatively large part of the variance in social distance (up to 30 percent) could be accounted for and that different theoretical constructs are uniquely related to interminority attitudes. Thus, various forms of group identification, intergroup contact, and the endorsement of multiculturalism are important factors to consider in understanding these attitudes. In our increasingly diverse societies, interminority relations are becoming more prevalent and important for understanding group relations in national, regional, local, and institutional settings. Therefore, the factors and processes involved in these relations deserve greater social scientific attention. This is also important for theoretical reasons, as it allows us to examine existing theories in an interminority context and to test alternative predictions. We have tried to show that group differentiation and group identifications, intergroup contacts, and the endorsement of cultural diversity are separate and important factors to consider for explaining interminority relations.



**Chapter 7**

**General conclusions  
of the dissertation**



Western countries are facing unprecedented demographic and socio-political challenges due to increased international migration and shrinking majority populations. One such challenge is how different ethnic groups respond to each other's political participation. Ethnic minority participation in the political system is widely recognized as crucial for improving the socio-economic position of disadvantaged groups and the development of equal, just and peaceful societies (Bieber, 2008; Martiniello, 2005; Pande, 2003; Petrusavska, 2009). Politically active minority members create awareness (i.e. they fulfill an agenda-setting role), help shape public policies targeting problems that otherwise might not be addressed properly, and contribute to the overall legitimacy of the political system. Yet, minority members are often met with controversy and resistance when they wish to partake in the political system (Petrusavska, 2009), presumably because they are seen as a direct threat to the privileged status position that the majority group occupies in the societal hierarchy.

In light of these developments, this dissertation set out to explain negative attitudes towards immigrant-origin minority groups and their political participation. It presented seven empirical studies that take different theoretical perspectives and employ some innovative methodological approaches. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 took the point of view of the majority group: they examined how majority members respond to the growing numerical influence of ethnic minority groups. Specifically, they investigated the extent to which negative out-group attitudes can be explained by majority members' justification of their socially dominant position in society, on the one hand, and by investigating how majority members respond to minorities' wishes to participate in the political system of the country, on the other. Chapters 5 and 6,

in turn, took the perspective of the minority groups. They examined how immigrant-origin groups respond to each other, within the social and within the political domain.

The results demonstrated that minorities are indeed met with controversy upon expressing the wish to participate politically. Even the mere mentioning of political participation leads to increased negative attitudes among majority members, regardless of how minorities would participate or whose interests they would advocate for. These results are worrisome because an unwillingness to politically accommodate ethnic minority groups, whether voiced as 'simple' skepticism or blatant rejection, could effectively hinder the integration process; worsen the disadvantaged structural conditions that minorities face; and, in a worst-case scenario, could undermine the functioning of democracy as a whole. The first conclusion we should draw, therefore, is that there is a pressing need for further in-depth research into this matter. Pressing, because world population projections for the next few decades predict a relatively high and stable international migration figure, and a steady decline in natural growth in developed regions until it is eventually negative (United Nations, 2016). This means that ethnic communities will keep growing, and that their unconditional democratic representation will become more urgent, rather soon. Scientists, policy makers, and educators need to fully understand where resistance towards minority political participation is coming from; how to mitigate its consequences; and, ideally, how to prevent it from occurring in the first place. While this dissertation broadens the scope of traditional socio-political research and offers a number of initial explanations, more research is required if we are to prevent and reduce ethnic (political) tensions.

## Group threat and the need for an inclusive national narrative

In line with Blumer's proposition that group members are primarily concerned with the position of their own group vis-à-vis other groups, feelings of threat consistently played a role in the studies of this dissertation. This is not surprising in itself, for research conducted in 'ordinary' socio-cultural domains of life had already demonstrated that majority group members display an array of negative attitudes toward ethnic out-groups when, for example, they believe to be in competition over resources (McLaren, 2003; Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 1996). In the political domain, these sentiments are further heightened as the struggle for power and influence is easily perceived as a zero-sum game in which a gain for one, translates into a diametrical loss for the other. Even minor changes in the status quo likely are perceived as direct competition over power. An out-group member expressing the desire to participate politically is perceived as a challenger – as a threat to one's influence or decision-making power. More control for 'them' equals less control for 'us'. Indeed, the participants in my studies often seemed to respond out of conservatism – understood not in an ideological sense, but in a sense of protecting one's privileged position. Majority members were not so much threatened by 'ethnic outsiders' becoming politically active, but rather seemed to fear that they would have to relinquish some of their control and influence.

Yet, it is important to point out that not everyone felt threatened by politically active minority members: there were large individual differences in the degree to which people felt that the position of their in-group was threatened by other ethnic groups. The findings of the second chapter warrant an additional nuance: while there are people who openly subjugate out-group members, there are plenty of others who 'merely' display resistance to challenges in the status quo. People justified their initial

resistance in different ways, and for different reasons (because they believe that immigrants ought to adopt the host society culture, for example). Importantly, there are significant differences between people who strongly identify with their country, and those who do not. It follows that one should consider how national identities are constructed. A civic perspective in which everyone is accepted who meets the democratically negotiated criteria for citizenship, is far more likely to foster positive intergroup relations than an ethnic perspective on citizenship in which minorities are not considered full members of society because ‘they are not originally from here’. Teachers, parents, policy makers and politicians should take up a more prominent role in constructing an inclusive national narrative – one that goes beyond merely granting out-group members the right and opportunity to participate, and promotes the idea that everyone is welcome to participate regardless of their cultural heritage, place of birth, religion, or political ideology. The following evidence further underscores that notion.

When asked about their feelings towards the foreign-born Ahmed, Dutch majority members were most negative when Ahmed had stated previously that minorities should advocate exclusively for the interests of their ethnic group. Conversely, they were most positive when Ahmed said that minorities should pursue interests that benefit everyone, or shy away from politics all together. The fact that this differentiation was found across different, representative population samples and, moreover, that it was consistent for different kinds of people (e.g. irrespective of individual characteristics like age, gender, or educational level) attests to the need for a more inclusive narrative. People should be made aware of their differential attitudes; of when and why they consider ethnic out-group members as competitors or intruders; and why those reactions will have negative consequences for everyone, eventually.

## Interminority attitudes: competition or coalition?

It is not just native majority members whose attitudes become more negative when they are confronted with a minority member offering an opinion on politics or wanting to participate in politics. Ethnic minority members, too, are hesitant to welcome out-groups into the political arena. In fact, their ranking of preferred political acculturation strategies is identical to that of native majority members. This strongly suggests that minority commonality does not necessarily inspire political solidarity (c.f. Glasford & Calcagno, 2012). Rather than confronting the dominant majority group as a unified coalition, minorities tend to view each other as competitors over political influence. On the one hand, this could be interpreted as a lost opportunity. Minority members generally face the same struggles (e.g. discrimination, neighborhood safety, low political representation) and apparently do not take advantage of their potential 'strength in numbers' to better conditions. On the other hand, it is understandable because minority groups often differ in important characteristics, such as religion, country of origin, language proficiency, and their status position in society. Those differences could simply be too big to overcome. Several findings, however, suggest that this is not necessarily problematic for interminority relations.

First, Chapter 5 showed that perceptions of power threat were irrelevant in the evaluation of political acculturation strategies. This implies that they might not perceive their political rivalry in terms of a zero-sum game. It is entirely possible that they prefer their own minority group to gain power (hence the ranking), but think that both groups will benefit should the other minority win instead. In other words: among minorities, political power held by one group is not necessarily threatening the position of the other. Second, Chapter 6 demonstrated that higher ethnic identification is related to more in-group bias for all out-groups. This suggests that more negative evaluations among minority group members are not so much about those other groups, in particular, but rather a display

of favoritism towards the in-group. Perhaps it is not about the minority out-group losing, but about preferring the minority in-group to win. Minorities might not see each other as political allies, but they do not have to see each other as threats, either.

### **Limitations and directions for future research**

It would be both useful and interesting to replicate (parts of) this research for three reasons. First, replication is an essential part of the scientific method and allows for correcting ‘false positives (and negatives)’, upgrading one-time findings to widely accepted proof, for generalizing theoretical conclusions (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Henry, 2008), and for improving precision and test robustness (Cumming, 2014; Makel, Plucker & Hegarty, 2012; Simons, 2014).

Second, all seven studies in this dissertation were conducted in the Netherlands. While this country arguably is representative for (at least) Western Europe, it is possible that Dutch particularities have influenced the results. For example, since the early 2000s Dutch society is characterized by a divide between the native majority, on the one hand, and ethnic minority members, on the other. There are many majority members who feel like the Dutch finally have shed the taboo of ‘political correctness’ and that they are therefore entitled to openly criticize, even insult, people with different backgrounds. The fact that radical right-wing parties consistently have won a large part of the electoral vote is a clear manifestation of those sentiments. Other countries, however, might not experience such a strong divide. It is likely that participants in such countries would respond differently to questions on ethnic minorities. Repeating this work in other contexts will help clarify to which degree these results are generalizable.

Third, the focus of this dissertation has been on attitudes of majority members towards non-Western minority groups. A slide modification of that focus (e.g. on other minority groups such as Christians, the LGBT community, feminists, or Western immigrants) could shed more light on the generalizability issue. At this point, it is important to recognize that the focus on Muslims is particularly sensitive in times of Jihadist terrorism, mass-immigration from Muslim countries (IOM, 2016), and a “widespread moral panic about immigrants and ethnic diversity” (Vasta, 2007, p713). One could insist, however, that it is especially important to keep an eye on how we meet ‘the other’ in difficult times. Related, future research should investigate whether it matters to focus on ethnicity, rather than on religion. It probably will not matter so much in the Dutch context, where most Turks and Moroccans self-identify as Muslim (for more information see: Maliepaard, 2012). Moreover, Muslims are the focal point of public and political discourse in nearly all Western societies, including the Dutch, so it is very likely that majority members in the Netherlands associate the designations ‘Turkish’ and ‘Moroccan’, with ‘Muslim’.

Moving on, there is a clear difference between attitudes and behavior. People might respond to psychological measures one way, but act differently in real-life situations. Respondents who reacted negatively towards political acculturation of out-groups, might not openly express their opposition, much less act on it. This phenomenon is hard to circumvent for social scientists, but future research could, for example, investigate whether the same patterns of results are found for different outcome variables. Instead of focusing on prejudicial attitudes such as social distance or felt emotions, research could examine support for social policies, voting intentions, or the willingness to extent political rights to out-groups. It might also be useful to analyze majority members’ responses to different political behaviors of ethnic out-groups. People have at their disposal an array of political behaviors: they can vote, run for office, attend protests and rallies, sign petitions, contact rep-

representatives, and so forth. Whereas the current studies focused on advocating for group interests and political party membership, it is likely that people's attitudes and beliefs depend on the type of political participation. Put in other words: different political behaviors might induce different reactions depending on who displays them, who perceives them, and in which context they occur.

### **Concluding remarks**

Following the rise of Jihadist terrorism and the European refugee crisis, many Western countries are currently witnessing an increase in xenophobia, racist violence, and exclusionary rhetoric of the public and of representatives at the highest levels of government (Amnesty International, 2016; EC, 2015; FRA, 2007; Gallup, 2017; Iganski, 2013). Demographic trends will likely add more fuel to that fire, as population projections show that in the next few decades, international migration will remain high and European and North American majority populations will continue to shrink (United Nations, 2016). That means that Western societies, particularly their urban regions, will quickly become more ethnically diverse and will face additional social and political challenges. One of those challenges will be the unconditional representation of ethnic minorities in the democratic system, which is widely recognized as crucial for improving the socio-economic position of disadvantaged groups and for the development of equal and just societies (Bieber, 2008; Martiniello, 2005; Pande, 2003; Petrusevska, 2009).

Through seven empirical studies this dissertation demonstrated that native majority group members react negatively to minorities voicing an interest in politics. Depending on the degree to which minority members wish to advance Muslim interests or wish to participate with an Islamic political party, majority members felt like their privileged position was under threat. They justified those feelings in different ways (for example by requiring that minori-

ties adopt the dominant culture) and exhibited large differences in the strength of national identification. These results are understandable from a social-psychological point of view. From a societal perspective, however, they are worrisome. An unwillingness to politically accommodate ethnic minority groups (whether voiced as ‘simple’ skepticism or blatant rejection) could eventually hinder the integration process; worsen the disadvantaged structural conditions in which minorities live; and, in a worst-case scenario, could threaten the functioning of democracy. Teachers, parents, policy makers and politicians should take up a more prominent role in constructing an inclusive national narrative that goes beyond merely granting out-group members the right and opportunity to participate. Rather, it is important to emphasize the idea that any citizen is welcome to participate in the democratic process, regardless of their cultural heritage, place of birth, religion, or political ideology.

Ethnic minority members, too, are hesitant to welcome each other into the political arena. The fact that their ranking of preferred political acculturation strategies is identical to that of native majority members, strongly suggests that minority status does not necessarily inspire political solidarity (c.f. Glasford & Calcagno, 2012). Some nuance is required, however. Evidence suggested that minorities do not see each other as threats (where majority members do), and that their negative intergroup attitudes are mostly a display of favoritism towards their own group.

The studies in this dissertation are innovative both in their theoretical focus and methodological designs. This means that the studies presented might inspire similar research in other contexts and hopefully provide directions for future research avenues to explore. The studies must be replicated in contexts other than the Dutch, and need to be applied to different minority groups to establish generalizability of results. While this dissertation broadens the scope of traditional socio-political research and offers a num-

ber of important explanations, more research is required if we are to prevent and reduce ethnic tensions. Scientists, policy makers, and educators need to fully understand where resistance towards minority political participation is coming from; how to mitigate its consequences; and, ideally, how to prevent it from occurring in the first place. Such efforts, hopefully, will prevent intergroup conflicts that undermine the functioning of society.





# UITGEBREIDE SAMENVATTING

## SUMMARY IN DUTCH

### Introductie

Het aantal internationale migranten is in de afgelopen vijftien jaar steevast toegenomen. Migreerden er in het jaar 2000 wereldwijd 173 miljoen mensen naar een ander land; in 2015 liep dat aantal verder op tot 244 miljoen (United Nations, 2016). De gevolgen zijn merkbaar in Europa en Noord-Amerika, waar de ‘witte’ meerderheden door vergrijzing en lagere vruchtbaarheidscijfers alsmaar kleiner worden, maar tezamen meer dan de helft van het aantal migranten huizen (United Nations, 2016; The Migration Observatory, 2013). Demografen voorspellen dat de Europese bevolking in het algemeen, maar name de mediterrane en centraal-noordelijke landen, rond het jaar 2061 voor meer dan een derde zullen bestaan uit personen met een migratie-achtergrond (Lanzieri, 2011). Canada zal dat punt reeds rond het jaar 2031 passeren en tegen 2044 zal meer dan helft van de Amerikaanse bevolking bestaan uit wat men vandaag de dag nog een ‘minderheidsgroep’ noemt (Colby & Ortman, 2015; Statistics Canada, 2016). Volgens de Internationale Organisatie voor Migratie (2015) vormen migranten nu al een aanzienlijk deel van de bevolking in steden als Brussel (62%), Toronto (46%), Londen (37%), New York (37%), Amsterdam (28%) en Parijs (25%). Deze demografische ontwikkelingen tonen aan dat Westerse samenlevingen voor ongekende sociale en politieke uitdagingen staan.

Immigratie en culture diversiteit in een samenleving roepen vaak sterke etnische vooroordelen op onder de leden van de meerderheidsgroep. Zij zien nieuwkomers en minderheidsgroepen als een bedreiging van hun cultuur, werkgelegenheid, huisvesting, zelfs hun

veiligheid. Gevoed door het toenemende Jihadistisch terrorisme en de Europese vluchtelingen crisis zien veel Westerse landen een sterke stijging van xenofobie en racistisch gemotiveerd geweld. Bovendien horen ze een telkens luidere roep om striktere migratiewetgeving (EC, 2015; FRA, 2007; Iganski, 2013). Het Britse Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken rapporteerde in 2016 een stijging van 41% in het aantal racistische en religieus gemotiveerde geweldsplegingen (Corcoran & Smith, 2016). In hetzelfde jaar waarschuwde Amnesty International dat Duitsland niet in staat was om de stijging van het aantal haatdelicten tegen asielzoekers tegen te gaan, terwijl een recordaantal van 42% van de Amerikanen zich grote zorgen maakt over de verhoudingen tussen de rassen in hun land. Politiegeweld en de *Black Lives Matter* beweging hebben uiteraard bijgedragen aan die gevoelens, maar een belangrijke factor was zeker ook de anti-Mexicanen en anti-moslim retoriek van President Donald Trump (Gallup, 2017). Tot slot zien we overal in Europa dat radicaal-rechtse partijen electoraal succes boeken met hun voorstellen om moskeeën te sluiten, de Koran te verbieden en de Europese Unie te verlaten om meer controle te krijgen over de nationale grenzen (PVV, 2017; Front National, 2017).

Dit proefschrift behandelt twee dringende vraagstukken die direct volgen op toenemende migratie naar Westerse landen. Hoeveel politieke macht groepen bezitten, is in democratische samenlevingen een weerspiegeling van hun relatieve omvang. Wanneer het aandeel minderheden toeneemt, vertaalt zich dat voor de meerderheid in een bedreiging van hun dominante positie. Dit roept de vraag op hoe autochtonen die positie rechtvaardigen en hoe zij reageren op de politieke participatie van minderheidsgroepen. Het tweede punt komt voort uit het feit dat migratie in wezen een stedelijk vraagstuk is (IOM, 2015, p26). Migranten verhuizen naar steden, waar ze samenleven in dezelfde wijken, hun kinderen sturen naar dezelfde scholen en hun boodschappen doen in dezelfde winkels. Doordat sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek voornamelijk gericht is op de

verhoudingen tussen autochtonen en allochtonen, is grotendeels voorbijgegaan aan de verhoudingen tussen minderheden onderling.

## **Doel en focus van het proefschrift**

Dit proefschrift onderzoekt verklaringen voor de negatieve houdingen ten aanzien van de politieke participatie van allochtonen. De eerste drie hoofdstukken nemen het perspectief van de Nederlandse autochtoon en bestuderen hoe leden van de meerderheid reageren op de toenemende numerieke invloed van etnische minderheden. In het bijzonder onderzoeken ze 1) de mate waarin mensen hun dominante positie in de samenleving gebruiken als rechtvaardiging voor hun negatieve houdingen tegenover andere groepen en 2) hoe men reageert op minderheden die wensen deel te nemen aan het politieke systeem. De laatste twee hoofdstukken, op hun beurt, bestuderen hoe minderheden op elkaar reageren in zowel het sociale, als het politieke domein.

In totaal zijn er zeven empirische studies verricht op basis van representatieve steekproeven onder de Nederlandse bevolking. Het proefschrift test de validiteit en toepasbaarheid van een groot aantal traditionele theorieën en zet daarbij een aantal innovatieve methodologische benaderingen in. Eén van de belangrijkste theoretische concepten van dit proefschrift is ‘politieke acculturatie’, hetgeen is ontleend aan het werk van John W. Berry (1997) en verwijst naar de verschillende strategieën die groepsleden kunnen gebruiken om zich al dan niet aan elkaar aan te passen. Acculturatie is het product van twee vraagstukken. Ten eerste moeten migranten beslissen in welke mate ze in contact willen treden met de dominante meerderheidsgroep of liever alleen omgaan met leden van hun eigen etnische groep. Ten tweede moet men besluiten of de herkomstcultuur behouden dient te worden, of dat ze liever de meerderheidscultuur overnemen. De combinatie van deze twee

dimensies leidt tot de vier bekende acculturatiestrategieën: assimilatie, integratie, separatie en marginalisering.

De algemene focus van dit proefschrift ligt op de houdingen ten aanzien van moslims, omdat deze groep in vrijwel alle Westerse samenlevingen wordt uitgezonderd. Het vermoeden dat moslims hun 'gastlanden' wensen te 'islamiseren' wordt vertolkt door vele politieke partijen en bewegingen: Trump en de Tea Party in de Verenigde Staten, het Front National in Frankrijk, de FPÖ in Oostenrijk, Britain First in het Verenigd Koninkrijk, het Vlaams Belang in België, en de PVV in Nederland. De van oorsprong Duitse organisatie Pegida (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes) heeft zich in slechts een paar jaar verspreid naar menig Europees land, waar haar demonstraties soms wel 20,000 mensen op de been krijgen (Smale, 2015). Hoewel het waar is dat andere minderheidsgroepen evenwel discriminatie ervaren, worden moslims vaker en systematischer uitgezonderd – hetgeen de focus van dit proefschrift rechtvaardigt.

## Bevindingen

Politieke participatie van etnische minderheden wordt algemeen erkend als cruciaal voor het verbeteren van de sociaal-economische positie van achtergestelde groepen (Bieber, 2008; Martiniello, 2005; Pande, 2003; Petrussevska, 2009). Politiek actieve leden van minderheidsgroepen creëren bewustwording, beïnvloeden beleid dusdanig dat het problemen bestrijdt die anders niet goed geadresseerd zouden worden en dragen bij aan de algehele legitimatie van het politieke systeem. Toch toont dit proefschrift aan dat minderheden weerstand en controversie ondervinden wanneer ze blijf geven van hun wens om deel te nemen aan de politiek (zie ook: Petrussevska, 2009). Alleen al bij het eenvoudig vermelden van hun politieke participatie zien we een duidelijke toename in de negatieve houdingen van autochtonen – nog los van hoe minder-

heden zouden willen deelnemen of wiens belangen ze dan zouden vertegenwoordigen.

Dit resultaat is verontrustend omdat een onwil om te voorzien in de politieke participatie van minderheden, of het nu gaat om ‘eenvoudige’ scepsis of onverholen afwijzing, ernstige gevolgen met zich mee kan brengen. Het kan de structurele achterstandspositie van minderheden verslechteren en, in het ergste geval, kan dergelijk onwil het functioneren van de democratie zelf ondermijnen. Het eerste wat dit proefschrift derhalve moet vaststellen, is dat nodig meer onderzoek verricht moet worden. Nodig, gezien het feit dat demografische projecties voor de komende decennia voorspellen dat internationale migratie relatief hoog en stabiel zal blijven, terwijl de natuurlijke aanwas van populaties in ontwikkelde landen zal afnemen en uiteindelijk zelfs negatief zal zijn (United Nations, 2016). Etnische diversiteit zal dus blijven toenemen en daarmee zal de onvoorwaardelijke, democratische vertegenwoordiging van minderheden zeer binnenkort nog urgenter worden. Wetenschappers, beleidsmakers en onderwijzers moeten begrijpen waar weerstand ten aanzien van de politieke participatie van minderheden vandaan komt, hoe de gevolgen kunnen worden tegengegaan en, bij voorkeur, hoe die weerstand überhaupt kan worden voorkomen. Hoewel dit proefschrift de horizon van traditioneel sociaal-politiek onderzoek verbreedt en een aantal initiële verklaringen biedt, is meer onderzoek geboden indien we verdere etnische en politieke spanningen willen voorkomen.

### **Groepsdreiging en de noodzaak van een inclusieve, nationale retoriek**

Gevoelens van dreiging speelden een consistente rol in de verschillende studies van dit proefschrift. Op zich is dat geen verrassende bevinding. Onderzoek in het ‘gewone’ sociaal-culturele domein heeft reeds vaak aangetoond dat leden van de meerderheidsgroep een ver-

scheidenheid aan negatieve houdingen ten toon spreiden wanneer ze menen dat ze moeten concurreren met andere groepen (McLaren, 2003; Scheepers, Gijsberts & Coenders, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 1996). Dergelijke attitudes worden verder aangewakkerd in het politieke domein. De strijd om macht en invloed verwordt gemakkelijk tot een *zero-sum game* waarin winst voor de één zich direct vertaalt in een diametraal tegenovergesteld verlies voor de ander. Zelfs kleine veranderingen in het evenwicht kunnen worden beschouwd als directe concurrentie. Iemand van een andere groep die zegt politiek actief te willen worden, is al snel een bedreiging voor de eigen invloed en de vrijheid om zelfstandig besluiten te kunnen nemen. Meer invloed voor 'hun' staat gelijk aan minder macht voor 'ons'. Vaak leken de participanten in deze studies inderdaad te reageren vanuit conservatisme – niet gezien als een politieke stroming, maar als een wens om de eigen groepen te behoeden tegen verandering van de status-quo. Leden van de meerderheid waren schijnbaar niet zozeer bedreigd door de politieke participatie van 'etnisch anderen', maar leken eerder benauwd om macht en invloed op te moeten geven.

Gezien deze bevindingen is het belangrijk te wijzen op het feit dat niet iedereen zich bedreigd voelde door politieke participatie van allochtonen: er bestonden grote, individuele verschillen onder de respondenten. De resultaten uit het eerste hoofdstuk vragen om een aanvullende nuance. Hoewel sommige participanten van mening waren dat etnische minderheden simpelweg niet gelijkwaardig zijn, waren er ook velen die 'slechts' weerstand boden tegen een verandering van de status-quo. Respondenten rechtvaardigden deze aanvankelijke weerstand op verschillende manieren en met verschillende beweerden (bijvoorbeeld omdat ze van mening zijn dat immigranten de cultuur van het gastland moeten overnemen). Er waren daarbij belangrijke verschillen tussen mensen die zich sterk identificeren met Nederland en zij die dat in mindere mate doen. Hieruit volgt dat we goed moeten nadenken over hoe nationale identiteiten tot stand komen. Het is veel waarschijnlijker dat positieve intergroepsrelaties tot stand komen wanneer men immigranten beziet vanuit een natio-

naal perspectief gebaseerd op burgerrechten waarin eenieder wordt geaccepteerd die voldoet aan de democratisch vastgestelde spelregels. De tegenpool is het nationalistisch-etnisch perspectief, waarin minderheden niet als voorwaardige leden van de samenleving worden gezien omdat ze 'hier niet vandaan komen'. Onderwijzers, beleidsmakers en politici zouden daarom een prominentere rol moeten gaan spelen in het tot stand brengen van een inclusieve, nationale retoriek. Eén die verder gaat dan enkel het recht en de mogelijkheid bieden om mee te doen, maar de notie bevordert dat iedereen welkom is om te participeren in het politieke stelsel ongeacht de culturele achtergrond, geboorteplaats, geloofsovertuiging, of politieke ideologie. De volgende resultaten onderstrepen dit idee.

Wanneer autochtonen werden gevraagd naar hun gevoelens ten aanzien van de in het buitenland geboren Ahmed, waren ze het negatiefste wanneer Ahmed eerder had verteld dat hij meent dat minderheden voornamelijk voor de politieke belangen van hun eigen groep moeten opkomen. Ze waren daarentegen het positiefst wanneer Ahmed eerder had gesteld dat minderheden die belangen moeten nastreven waar iedereen van zal profiteren, of zich überhaupt niet met de politiek dienen te bemoeien. Dat deze verschillen opdoken in verschillende, doch representatieve, steekproeven en bij verschillende soorten mensen (ongeacht leeftijd, geslacht, opleidingsniveau) toont de noodzaak aan voor die eerder vermelde inclusieve retoriek. Men zou zich meer bewust moeten zijn van discriminerende houdingen; van wanneer en waarom ze leden van andere etnische groepen zien als concurrenten of indringers; en waarom dergelijke reacties uiteindelijk niemand ten goede zullen komen.

### **Interetnische houdingen: competitie of coalitie?**

Het zijn niet alleen de leden van de meerderheid wiens houdingen negatiever worden als ze geconfronteerd worden met een allochtoon met een politieke opvatting of een wens om deel te nemen

aan het politieke systeem. Minderheden ontvangen elkaar ook niet bepaald met open armen: hun rangschikkingen waren identiek aan die van de autochtone meerderheid. Dit suggereert sterk dat een gedeelde etnische minderheidsstatus niet noodzakelijkerwijs inspireert tot politieke solidariteit (zie ook: Glasford & Calcagno, 2012). In plaats van de autochtone meerderheid tegemoet te treden als een verenigd front, beschouwen minderheden elkaar als concurrenten over politieke invloed. Aan de ene kant kan dit geïnterpreteerd worden als een gemiste kans. Minderheden zien zich veelal geconfronteerd met dezelfde problemen (discriminatie, veiligheid in buurten, gebrekkige politieke vertegenwoordiging), maar maken schijnbaar geen gebruik van hun potentiële *strength in numbers* om structurele condities te verbeteren. Aan de andere kant is het begrijpelijk: minderheden verschillen vaak in belangrijke eigenschappen als religie, taal, herkomst en hun positie in de samenleving. Mogelijk zijn dergelijke verschillen te groot om te overbruggen. Toch zijn er aanwijzingen dat deze verschillen niet per definitie problematisch zijn voor de onderlinge verhoudingen.

Ten eerste toonde hoofdstuk vier aan dat gevoelens van machtsdreiging geen rol speelden in de evaluatie van de verschillende strategieën voor politieke acculturatie. Dat impliceert dat minderheden onderlinge, politieke concurrentie wellicht niet zien als een *zero-sum game*. Mogelijkerwijs zien minderheden bij voorkeur dat de eigen etnische groep meer politieke macht verwerft (vandaar dat de rangschikking identiek was aan die van de meerderheid), maar tegelijkertijd verwachten ze dat winst van een andere minderheid uiteindelijk ook de eigen groep zal helpen. In andere woorden, politieke macht in de handen van de ene minderheid is niet noodzakelijkerwijs bedreigend voor de positie van de ander. Ten tweede liet hoofdstuk vijf zien dat sterkere etnische identificatie meer gerelateerd is aan vooringenomenheid over de eigen groep, dan met vooroordelen ten aanzien van andere groepen. Dit zou betekenen dat negatieve houdingen tussen minderheden niet zozeer een reactie zijn op de afwijkende eigenschappen van 'de

ander', maar eerder het product zijn van een sterke voorkeur voor de eigen groep. Wellicht gaat het er tussen minderheden niet echt om dat de ander verliest, maar meer om dat de eigen groep wint. Minderheden zien elkaar dus niet als politieke bondgenoten, maar als vijanden zien ze elkaar zeker ook niet.

## Tot slot

De studies uit dit proefschrift waren innovatief zowel in hun theoretische focus als hun methodologische aanpak. Daar het zeer zou bijdragen aan de generaliseerbaarheid van de bevindingen, is het te hopen dat dit proefschrift andere Nederlandse wetenschappers inspireert tot vergelijkbaar onderzoek, maar ook dat men de vergelijkbare studies toepast in andere landen en op andere minderheden. We weten dat etnische diversiteit wereldwijd, maar vooral in Europa en Noord-Amerika, zal blijven toenemen en dat daarmee de onvoorwaardelijke, democratische vertegenwoordiging van minderheden binnenkort nog urgenter zal worden. Wetenschappers, beleidsmakers en onderwijzers moeten begrijpen waar weerstand ten aanzien van de politieke participatie van minderheden vandaan komt, hoe de gevolgen kunnen worden tegengegaan en, bij voorkeur, hoe die weerstand überhaupt voorkomen kan worden. Dit proefschrift verbreedt de horizon van traditioneel sociaal-politiek onderzoek en biedt een aantal initiële verklaringen, maar meer onderzoek is geboden om verdere etnische en politieke spanningen te voorkomen.



# SÍNTESIS

## SUMMARY IN SPANISH

En los últimos quince años, el número de migrantes internacionales ha aumentado constantemente. Mientras que en el año 2000, mundialmente, emigraron 173 millones de personas a otros países, en el 2015 fueron 244 millones (United Nations, 2016). Los efectos son más notorios en Europa y América del Norte, donde las mayorías “blancas” disminuyen debido al envejecimiento de sus poblaciones y las bajas tasas de fecundidad, mientras que estas regiones albergan a más de la mitad de los migrantes internacionales (United Nations, 2016; The Migration Observatory, 2013). Los demógrafos predicen que para el año 2061 en Europa, en general, y en los países mediterráneos y centro-nórdicos, en particular, más de una tercera parte de los habitantes tendrá una historia de migración internacional (Lanzieri, 2011). Canadá sobrepasará este punto en 2031 y, para el año 2044, se espera que más de la mitad de los estadounidenses pertenezcan a alguna “minoría”, de acuerdo con el significado que hoy se da al término (Colby & Ortman, 2015; Statistics Canada, 2016). Según la Organización Internacional de Migración (2015), los migrantes ya constituyen una parte significativa en las poblaciones de ciudades como Bruselas (62%), Toronto (46%), Londres (37%), Nueva York (37%), Ámsterdam (28%) y París (25%). Estos cambios demográficos muestran que las sociedades occidentales se enfrentan a grandes retos sociales y políticos.

La migración y la diversidad cultural a menudo invocan fuertes prejuicios étnicos en los miembros de la mayoría. Las poblaciones locales consideran a los recién llegados como una amenaza a su cultura, empleo, provisión de vivienda, e incluso, su seguridad. Impulsados por los continuos ataques del terrorismo yihadista y

la crisis europea de refugiados, muchos países occidentales están registrando un aumento considerable en la xenofobia, la violencia racial, y cada vez se escuchan más voces a favor de leyes de inmigración más estrictas (EC, 2015; FRA, 2007; Iganski, 2013). El Ministerio del Interior británico informó un aumento de 41% en la violencia racial y religiosa en el año 2016 (Corcoran & Smith, 2016). En el mismo año, Amnistía Internacional advirtió que Alemania estaba fallando en combatir el aumento en crímenes de odio contra los solicitantes de asilo, mientras que un récord 42% de la población estadounidense se dijo muy preocupada por las relaciones raciales en su país. Es verdad que la violencia policial y el movimiento *Black Lives Matter* contribuyeron a afianzar este estado de ánimo; pero, también ha sido incitado por los discursos anti-mexicanos y anti-islámicos del presidente Donald Trump (Gallup, 2017). Por último, observamos que en toda Europa los partidos de derecha radical han tenido un cada vez mayor éxito electoral con sus planes de cerrar mezquitas, prohibir el Corán y salir de la Unión Europea para recuperar más control sobre las fronteras nacionales (PVV, 2017; Front National, 2017).

La presente tesis responde a dos cuestiones urgentes que son resultado directo del incremento de migración hacia los países occidentales. En sociedades democráticas representativas, la cantidad de poder que poseen ciertos grupos es una función de su tamaño relativo. Un aumento en la proporción de minorías implica una amenaza a la posición dominante del grupo mayoritario, lo cual plantea la cuestión de cómo los miembros de la mayoría justifican su posición y cómo responden a la participación política de las minorías. La segunda cuestión resulta del hecho que “la migración es, efectivamente, un asunto urbano” (IOM, 2015, p26). En particular, los inmigrantes llegan a las ciudades y viven en los mismos barrios, mandan a sus hijos a las mismas escuelas, y hacen sus compras en las mismas tiendas que otros inmigrantes. Los estudios científicos se han abocado principalmente a entender las relaciones may-

oría-minorías; sin embargo, dada la naturaleza del fenómeno, es fundamental entender también las relaciones inter-minoritarias.

## **Objetivo y enfoque de la tesis**

La presente tesis busca explicar las actitudes negativas contra la participación política de minorías étnicas en los Países Bajos. Los tres primeros capítulos asumen la perspectiva de la mayoría e indagán cómo ésta responde a una creciente influencia numérica de las minorías étnicas. Específicamente, los capítulos estudian: 1) el grado en que la gente justifica sus actitudes negativas hacia otros grupos a través de su posición dominante en la sociedad; y 2) cómo responde al deseo de las minorías de participar en el sistema político. Los últimos dos capítulos, a su vez, investigan cómo responden las minorías entre sí, tanto en el dominio social como en el político.

Se han realizado un total de siete estudios empíricos con base en muestras representativas de la población holandesa. Se han utilizado metodologías innovadoras para poner a prueba la validez y la aplicabilidad de varias teorías tradicionales. Uno de los conceptos claves de la tesis es la “aculturación política”, estudiada en la obra de John W. Berry (1997), la cual se refiere a las diferentes estrategias que miembros de grupos pueden adoptar para ajustarse entre sí. La aculturación es el producto de dos cuestiones. Primero, los migrantes deben decidir hasta qué grado se ponen en contacto con la mayoría dominante, o si prefieren mantener contacto exclusivamente con su propio grupo étnico. Segundo, tienen que decidir si mantienen su propia cultura o tienden a adoptar la cultura de la mayoría. La combinación de estas dos dimensiones produce cuatro estrategias de aculturación: asimilación, integración, separación y marginalización.

El énfasis general del trabajo de investigación está en las actitudes hacia los musulmanes, pues es el grupo que se singulariza más en todas las sociedades occidentales. La sospecha de que los musulmanes buscan “islamizar” a sus países “anfitriones” es denunciado por muchos partidos y movimientos políticos: Trump y el Tea Party en los Estados Unidos, el Front National en Francia, el FPÖ en Austria, Britain First en el Reino Unido, el Vlaams Belang en Bélgica y el Partido para la Libertad en los Países Bajos. De la ciudad alemana oriental Dresde, la organización Pegida (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes) se ha extendido en sólo algunos años a muchos países europeos, y sus manifestaciones logran movilizar hasta veinte mil personas (Smale, 2015). A pesar de que otros grupos minoritarios también sufren de discriminación, son los musulmanes quienes son señalados de manera más frecuente y más sistemática – lo que justifica el énfasis del presente libro.

## Los aprendizajes

La participación política de las minorías étnicas es reconocida ampliamente como fundamental para mejorar la posición socio-económica de grupos desfavorecidos (Bieber, 2008; Martiniello, 2005; Pande, 2003; Petrussevska, 2009). Los miembros de minorías que participan en política generan conciencia, influyen en las políticas públicas para resolver problemas que quizás no habían sido abordados adecuadamente, y contribuyen a la legitimización general del sistema político. Sin embargo, los resultados de esta tesis demuestran que las minorías son recibidas con polémica y oposición cuando pretenden participar en el sistema político (ver también: Petrussevska, 2009). Incluso si sólo se menciona su posible participación en política, se puede observar un aumento en las actitudes negativas de los miembros de la mayoría, independientemente de la manera en que las minorías participan o los intereses que éstas representan.

Dicho resultado es preocupante porque una renuencia a facilitar la participación política de las minorías, trátase de un “simple” escepticismo o de un flagrante rechazo, puede generar consecuencias graves. Puede empeorar aún más la posición estructural de desventaja de las minorías, e incluso, en el peor de los casos, puede socavar la democracia. La primera conclusión de la investigación, por tanto, es que existe una necesidad fundamental de profundizar en el tema con más estudios. Esto en tanto las proyecciones demográficas muestran que la migración internacional permanecerá alta y estable, mientras que el crecimiento natural de las poblaciones de países desarrollados disminuirá hasta el punto que será negativo (United Nations, 2016). De ahí que la diversidad cultural seguirá incrementando y, por ende, la representación política de las minorías étnicas será aún más relevante. Los científicos, los creadores de políticas públicas y los educadores deben entender de dónde proviene la resistencia a la participación política de minorías, cómo se puede combatir y, preferentemente, cómo se puede prevenir. Aunque esta tesis amplía el alcance de investigaciones tradicionales y ofrece varias explicaciones, ciertamente se requiere de más trabajo académico para prevenir mayores tensiones étnicas y políticas.

### **La amenaza del grupo y la necesidad de crear un discurso nacional incluyente**

Los sentimientos de amenaza grupal desempeñan un papel importante en varios estudios de este libro. Esto no es sorprendente. Muchas investigaciones ya han demostrado que los miembros de la mayoría exhiben una plenitud de actitudes negativas cuando creen que tienen que competir con otros por recursos (McLaren, 2003; Scheepers, Gijsberts & Coenders, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 1996). Dentro del dominio político estas actitudes, no obstante, se avivan aún más. La lucha por el poder y la influencia se vuelve en un juego de suma cero en el que la ganancia de “ellos” se traduce

en la pérdida simétrica de “nosotros”. Incluso, cambios pequeños al estatus quo se perciben como competencia directa. Un miembro de un exogrupo (*out-group*) que expresa su intención de participar en la vida política, pronto es visto como una amenaza contra la influencia y el poder de toma de decisiones del grupo propio. Es decir, más influencia para “ellos” se traduce en menos poder para “nosotros”. Los participantes en nuestros estudios a menudo parecieron impulsados por un sentido de conservacionismo (no en un sentido de ideología política, sino en el de proteger a su grupo de cambios en el balance político). Bien parece que los miembros de la mayoría no están preocupados con la participación política del “otro”; más bien, temen sacrificar su poder.

Considerando los resultados, es importante señalar que no todos se sintieron amenazados por la participación política de las minorías étnicas, pues hubo grandes diferencias entre los participantes. Los resultados del primer capítulo, por ejemplo, ofrecen un matiz importante. A pesar de que algunos participantes sí opinaron que las minorías étnicas simplemente no son “iguales a otros grupos”, muchas otras personas “simplemente” resistieron cambios en el estatus quo. Estos participantes justificaron su oposición inicial en diferentes maneras y con diferentes motivos (p. ej., porque creen que los inmigrantes deben adoptar la cultura del país anfitrión). Además, existen diferencias notables entre las personas que se identifican fuertemente con los Países Bajos y aquéllas que no. De ahí que sea importante contemplar cuidadosamente cómo se construyen las identidades nacionales. Es más probable que surjan relaciones intergrupales positivas cuando la gente considera a los migrantes desde una perspectiva nacional basada en los derechos civiles, en la que cualquier persona es aceptada si se cumplen criterios negociados democráticamente. Por el contrario, desde una perspectiva étnica-nacional, no se considera a los migrantes como miembros dignos de la sociedad en tanto “no son de aquí”. Educadores, creadores de política pública y políticos deben adoptar un papel más proactivo en la creación de un discurso nacional incluy-

ente: un discurso que trascienda el simplemente ofrecer el derecho y la oportunidad de participar para promover la idea de que todos son bienvenidos a participar en el sistema político, independientemente de su herencia cultural, lugar de nacimiento, religión o ideología política.

Los siguientes resultados abonan también en este argumento. Cuando se preguntó a los miembros de la mayoría holandesa sobre sus evaluaciones afectivas del extranjero hipotético “Ahmed”, estos eran más negativos cuando Ahmed opinó que las minorías deben luchar por los intereses de sus propios grupos. En cambio, los miembros de la mayoría fueron más positivos cuando Ahmed declaró que las minorías deben representar intereses que beneficien a todos o que las minorías deben alejarse de la política. Estas diferencias aparecieron en diferentes muestras representativas y fueron consistentes para diferentes grupos de personas (independiente de factores como el género, edad o escolaridad). Necesitamos ser más conscientes de nuestras actitudes discriminatorias: del cuándo y por qué consideramos a los integrantes de otros grupos como competidores o intrusos, y por qué estas reacciones son contraproducentes.

### **Actitudes interétnicas: ¿competencia o coalición?**

No sólo los miembros de la mayoría desarrollan actitudes negativas cuando se enfrentan a minorías con una opinión política o con deseos de participar en el sistema político. Las minorías también desarrollan actitudes negativas. De hecho, su clasificación de preferencias de las estrategias de aculturación política fue idéntica a la de la mayoría. Esto implica que el compartir estatus de minoría étnica no necesariamente favorece solidaridad política (ver también: Glasford & Calcagno, 2012). En lugar de afrontar a la mayoría étnica como un frente unido, las minorías se tienden a considerar competidores políticos. Por un lado, este resultado

puede interpretarse como una oportunidad perdida. A pesar de que las minorías enfrentan muchos de los mismos problemas (discriminación, inseguridad en los barrios, representatividad política inadecuada), al parecer no utilizan su potencial y fuerza numérica para mejorar sus condiciones estructurales. Por otro, el resultado tiene sentido ya que las minorías a menudo son diferentes respecto características importantes como la religión, la competencia lingüística, el origen o la posición dentro de la jerarquía social. Es posible que estas diferencias sean demasiado grandes para ser superadas; sin embargo, también hay evidencia de que las diferencias no son tan problemáticas como para prevenir buenas relaciones intergrupales.

Primero, el capítulo cuarto demuestra que los sentimientos de amenaza no desempeñaron un papel importante en la evaluación de las estrategias de aculturación política. Ello sugiere que las minorías no consideran la competencia política entre ellas como un juego de suma cero. Es posible que prefieran que su propio grupo gane más poder (y, por tanto, jerarquizan de la misma manera que la mayoría las estrategias de aculturación) y, al mismo tiempo, esperan que una ganancia obtenida por otro grupo minoritario también favorecerá a su propio grupo. Es decir, el poder político de una minoría no necesariamente amenaza la posición de otra. Segundo, el capítulo quinto demuestra que una identificación étnica más fuerte se relaciona más con la preferencia por el grupo propio que con prejuicios hacia otros grupos. Esto implica que las actitudes negativas entre miembros de las minorías no son tanto una consecuencia de las características diferentes del “otro”, sino que son el producto de una preferencia fuerte hacia el grupo propio. Quizás es más importante que gane el grupo propio a que pierda el otro. Es decir, las minorías étnicas no se consideran como aliados políticos, pero tampoco como adversarios.

## En conclusión

Los estudios contenidos en este trabajo son innovadores tanto en su enfoque teórico como en su metodología. En tanto su contribución, en última instancia, depende de cuán generalizables sean los resultados, se espera que los estudios sirvan de inspiración a otros científicos holandeses y sean una invitación a realizar investigaciones similares. También se espera que investigaciones parecidas sean realizadas en otros países y aplicadas a otros grupos minoritarios. Sabemos que la diversidad étnica aumentará en el mundo. Por esta razón es urgente la representación democrática, sin condiciones, de las minorías étnicas. Científicos, tomadores de decisiones y educadores deben entender de dónde proviene la resistencia a la participación política de grupos minoritarios, cómo se puede combatir sus consecuencias y, preferentemente, cómo prevenir el antagonismo con oportunidad. La presente tesis doctoral amplía el alcance de la investigación social y política tradicional y ofrece nuevas explicaciones; sin embargo, aún existe la necesidad de estudios adicionales para prevenir mayores tensiones étnicas y políticas.



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# Curriculum Vitae

Paul Hindriks (July 18, 1985) did his undergraduate studies in Sociology at the University of Groningen (the Netherlands), where he specialized in public policy and religious intolerance. He obtained the degree Bachelor of Science in Sociology in 2008 and was subsequently invited to join the Research Master program Behavioural and Social Sciences at the same university. Specializing in Europeans' fear of terrorism, Paul was awarded the degree Master of Science in 2010. He remained a member of the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS) when he started working as a PhD-candidate at Utrecht University (the Netherlands) and the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (Ercomer). Late 2014, Paul moved to Mexico where he finished his dissertation. He currently works as Project Manager for Social Inclusion and Evaluation at the Coordination of National Digital Strategy, in the Office of the President of Mexico.



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