

## Hungry Minds: Eisenhower's Cultural Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1953–1961\*

In his memoirs, President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote about how decolonization had overwhelmed him: “In flood force, the spirit of nationalism had grown in all Africa.” The determination to attain “self-rule . . . resembled a torrent overrunning everything.” Although the United States had no direct interests on the continent, Eisenhower did not want to “see chaos run wild among hopeful, expectant peoples,” because “the communists would be only too delighted to take an advantage.”<sup>1</sup> The metaphor of a mighty river was part of a burgeoning modernization discourse and reminiscent of longstanding imagery of primitive uncontrollable hordes. Yet, Eisenhower was confident he could “make constructive use of it” and relied on cultural assistance.<sup>2</sup>

Cultural assistance is the use of cultural resources, such as education and film, to accelerate the modernization process. Cultural assistance and informational diplomacy became vital in dealing with “transitional” societies. In Europe these activities were forms of public diplomacy: an international actor’s attempt to conduct foreign policy by engaging with foreign publics.<sup>3</sup> However in Africa, where the Soviet threat was minimal, information and education became part of a “psychological modernization” effort meant to foster nation-building. For political scientists Lucian Pye and Charles Tilly “nation-building” required leaders who were

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1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace: 1956–1961: The White House Years* (Garden City, NY 1965), 572.

2. James Meriwether, “‘A Torrent Overrunning Everything’: Africa and the Eisenhower Administration,” in *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War*, ed. Kathryn Statler and Andrew Johns (Lanham, MA, 2006), 175–96.

3. Nicholas Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989* (Cambridge, MA, 2009), x.

psychologically stable. Their work was influenced by Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons, who drew on European ethno-psychology of the 1930s.<sup>4</sup>

The application within ethnography of psychiatric insights remained popular because it allowed white settlers in Algeria and Kenya to explain violent indigenous resistance as the symptom of a mental disorder. John Carothers analyzed the Kenyan Mau Mau, Alex Inkles described the “syndrome” of modernity at Harvard, while David McClelland at Yale equated the need for achievement with the need for food: one wanted it more the longer one went without it.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the psychological impact of colonialism was a key concern of anticolonial thinkers as well. A psychiatrist, Franz Fanon, and a Martiniquan writer, Aimé Césaire, became prominent voices of resistance because they framed colonial subjugation as an assault on the dignity and psychological well-being of non-whites.<sup>6</sup>

In practice, cultural assistance was loosely defined. When operatives of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and British Council officials debated their English language program, they concluded that English was “a neutral skill (aid programs)” as well as “a vehicle of cultural projection.”<sup>7</sup> Eisenhower talked about helping “ancient” cultures by spreading education. Walt Rostow and Max Milikan rejected the opaque role of cultural assistance in policymaking by advocating a social scientific approach to development. Although Rostow believed modernization was “psychological” rather than “narrowly economic,” the “take-off” process could only be kindled by investments that were adapted to the absorptive capacity of developing nations.<sup>8</sup> This transition to socioeconomic modernization in the early 1960s has obscured how “psychological modernization” influenced strategy formulation within the Eisenhower administration.

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4. Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, MD, 2004), 170, 73–97.

5. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, *Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts* (New York, 2000), 79; John Carothers, *The African Mind in Health and Disease: A Study in Ethnopsychiatry* (Geneva, 1955); Alex Inkeles and David Horton Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge, MA, 1974); David McClelland, *The Achievement Motive* (New York, 1953), 110.

6. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York, 1967), 73; Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York, 1972), 21–23.

7. Report, “Anglo-American Conference Ditchley Park, November 19–22, 1965,” [November 1965], 249, P 249, folder: English, box 1, Record Group 306 (hereafter RG 306), National Archives (hereafter USNA).

8. Dwight Eisenhower, “Address and Remarks at the Baylor University Commencement Ceremonies,” May 25, 1956, available online at Gerhard Peters and John Woolley, eds., *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10499>, accessed June 6, 2016; Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, 155–202; David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton, NJ, 2009), 173; Walt Rostow, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Foreign Aid* (Austin, TX, 1985), 43–44.

President John F. Kennedy and Rostow claimed Eisenhower wanted to avoid Africa and the developing world, and many historians have agreed.<sup>9</sup> Disregard for cultural assistance has made it difficult to reconcile contradictions that emerge from the documents. Eisenhower, for instance, has been seen as someone who wanted to create stability at all costs, ignored demands for independence, and supported right-wing dictatorships and European allies. At the same time, he tried to uphold the U.S. anticolonial ideal when writing to French and British politicians or as he spoke during National Security Council (NSC) meetings.

The revisionist scholarship has pointed to domestic opposition to explain why Eisenhower's discourse in support of aid did not lead to an increase of aid grants.<sup>10</sup> Africanists and historians of the decolonization process in the 1980s discerned a subtle but effective U.S. policy in favor of independence, particularly within the context of an Anglo-American imperial system, as William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson argued.<sup>11</sup> Recent Africanist scholarship takes its cue from civil rights historians, accepts the notion that Eisenhower disdained calls for independence, and focuses on the Cold War's impact on Black Internationalism. Jean Allman and Carol Anderson have rejected established interpretations and argued that civil rights leaders and peace activists continued to link their struggles with the anticolonial cause despite the ravages of the Cold War.<sup>12</sup>

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9. Vernon McKay, *Africa in World Politics* (New York, 1963); Philip Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans: John F. Kennedy's Courting of African Nationalist Leaders* (New York, 2012); Rostow, *Eisenhower*, 75–109; Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA, 2003), 116.

10. Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, vol. 2, *The President* (London, 1984), 387; Vernon Ruttan, *United States Development Assistance Policy: The Domestic Politics of Foreign Economic Aid* (Baltimore, MA, 1996), 87.

11. Olajide Aluko, "Politics of Decolonization in British West Africa, 1945–1960," in *History of West Africa*, ed. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder, vol. 2 (Essex, 1987), 694–95; Henry Wilson, *African Decolonization* (London, 1994), 54–56; William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, "The United States and the Liquidation of British Empire in Tropical Africa, 1941–1951," in *The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940–1960*, ed. Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (New Haven, CT, 1982), 48–49; Jeffrey Frieden, "The Economics of Intervention: American Overseas Investments and Relations with Underdeveloped Areas, 1890–1950," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31, no. 1 (1989): 55–80; D. Cameron Watt, *Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900–1975* (Cambridge, 1984), 250–52; James Hubbard, *The United States and the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa, 1941–1968* (Jefferson, NC, 2010), 364.

12. Jean Allman, "Nuclear Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle for Peace and Freedom: Ghana, 1959–1962," *Souls* 10, no. 2 (2008): 86; Carol Anderson, *Bourgeois Radicals: The NAACP and the Struggle for Colonial Liberation, 1941–1960* (New York, 2014), 1–10; Brenda Gayle Plummer, *In Search of Power: African Americans in the Era of Decolonization, 1956–1974* (Cambridge, MA, 2012); James Meriwether, *Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1935–1961* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2002); Penny Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Boston, MA, 2006), 12–13.

Eisenhower post-revisionists, most prominently Robert McMahon, have argued that the president conflated nationalism with communism.<sup>13</sup> Global Cold War historians have widely accepted the notion that Eisenhower saw Africans as racially incompetent, thus making a genuine policy in support of independence impossible.<sup>14</sup> Even scholars who study public diplomacy conclude that the Eisenhower administration failed to craft “a modest program of public persuasion” to deal with imperial disintegration.<sup>15</sup> The State Department’s jazz tours, which are seen as preoccupied with projecting a positive image of U.S. progress on civil rights, are an example of this.<sup>16</sup>

But the Eisenhower administration did not ignore calls for independence because of a Soviet threat. The continent was understood through the lens of “psychological modernization.” U.S. officials in the 1950s believed they were already supporting self-government by encouraging education as a means to establish political and social structures. Moreover, disagreements about the function of education and information in modernization efforts—something about which Eisenhower felt “deeply”—shaped the foreign aid discussion.<sup>17</sup> In 1956 Africa accounted for less than two percent of total U.S. aid abroad and between 1945 and 1957 Africa received only 0.15 percent of the grants that were offered by the United States.<sup>18</sup>

How can we explain why a fiscal conservative pushed for aid to the Third World while aid grants remained low? Why did the administration hesitate to offer aid to

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13. Robert McMahon, “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists,” *Political Science Quarterly* 101, no. 3 (1986): 457; John Kent, “United States Reactions to Empire, Colonialism, and Cold War in Black Africa, 1949–57,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 33, no. 2 (2005): 216. A critical interpretation can be found in Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1980* (New York, 1988).

14. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, 2005), 27; Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford, 2003), 76; Joey Long, *Safe for Decolonization: The Eisenhower Administration, Britain, and Singapore* (Kent, OH, 2011), xi; David Schmitz, *Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921–1965* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999), 178–235.

15. Kenneth Osgood, “Words and Deeds: Race, Colonialism, and Eisenhower’s Propaganda War in the Third World,” in *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War*, ed. Kathryn Statler and Andrew Johns (Lanham, MD, 2006), 9–10.

16. James Vaughan, *The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945–57: Unconquerable Minds* (New York, 2005), 244; Penny Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY, 1997), 122–44; Jason Parker, “Crisis Management and Missed Opportunities: U.S. Public Diplomacy and the Creation of the Third World, 1947–1950,” in *The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History*, ed. Kenneth Osgood and Brian Etheridge (Boston, MA, 2010), 225–56.

17. Memorandum, Washburn, “America’s ‘Open Opportunities’ Program—for Development of Education in Africa and Other Emerging Areas,” July 13, 1960, 2, Educational Development 1959–60 (4), box 12, Abbott Washburn Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter DDEL).

18. Dollars in nominal terms. Ebere Nwaubani, *The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950–1960* (Rochester, NY, 2001), 99–100.

an independent Guinea, making it appear complacent in the face of a Soviet takeover of this former French colony?<sup>19</sup> Eisenhower's conviction that the Soviet Union attached more weight to political tactics, the administration's ideological attachment to the free market, the fear that countries would become permanently dependent, as well as bureaucratic infighting between traditionalists such as Chairman of the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy Clarence Randall—who viewed aid as a short-term security measure—and progressives such as Rostow—who considered aid an instrument of long-term development—have all been cited as possible explanations.<sup>20</sup> This article, in contrast, seeks to answer these questions by exploring the ways in which U.S. cultural assistance schemes were implemented.

#### EISENHOWER'S PATERNALISM (1953–1956)

In January 1953 Eisenhower aired his views on nationalism over dinner with the British prime minister, Winston Churchill. The president argued that “dependent peoples” did not automatically seek Europe's guidance, but had to be convinced that their only hope of maintaining independence was “through cooperation with the free world.” While slower, it had the certainty of being “orderly” and “healthy.”<sup>21</sup> Colonialism was on the “way out,” therefore obstacles that prevented “self-government” had to be eliminated.<sup>22</sup> Eisenhower believed a colony could cast off its shackles provided it was sufficiently prepared.

Initially, Eisenhower urged leaders of the imperial powers to impress upon dependent peoples that their claim for self-rule came with a heavy responsibility.

19. Sergey Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956–1964* (Stanford, CA, 2010), 59; Nwaubani, *The United States*, 226; Hubbard, *The United States*, 288–89.

20. Michael Adamson, “‘The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy’? The Eisenhower Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World,” in *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War*, ed. Kathryn Statler and Andrew Johns (Lanham, MA, 2006), 58, 56. For bureaucratic infighting, see Sergei Shenin, *America's Helping Hand: Paving the Way to Globalization (Eisenhower's Foreign Aid Policy and Politics)* (New York, 2005), 77. For a revisionist perspective, see Burton Kaufman, *Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953–1961* (Baltimore, MD, 1982); Stephen Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1988); Thomas Zoumaris, “Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy in the 1950s: The Case of Latin America,” in *Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s*, ed. Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers (Chicago, IL, 1987), 155–91. The ineffectiveness of Eisenhower's aid is addressed in David Anderson, *Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953–1961* (New York, 1991); Nick Cullather, *Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of the United States-Philippines Relations, 1942–1960* (Stanford, CA, 1994).

21. Diary Entry on Tuesday, January 6, 1953, 3–5, Dwight D. Eisenhower (hereafter DDE) Personal Diary Dec. 52-8/19/53 (1), box 1, DDE Diaries Series, Papers as President, DDEL.

22. Letter, Eisenhower to Churchill, July 22, 1954, 2, 3, Churchill—July–December 1954 (2), box 19, International Series, Papers as President, DDEL. Andrew Goodpaster remembers Eisenhower saying “colonialism has passed,” see Oral History interview with Andrew Goodpaster Jr., April 10, 1982, page 35, Columbia Center for Oral History Archives, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University in the City of New York.

The U.S. presence in Puerto Rico had taught Eisenhower that people would insist upon retaining their connections with the mother country once “the native” was told about “the responsibilities and increased costs.”<sup>23</sup> Although he also stressed the point to French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France, the president was convinced that Churchill was in a better position to give “a thoughtful speech” on “self-government.” When the British prime minister informed Eisenhower about his talks with Soviet leader Georgy Malenkov, Eisenhower responded by asking him to announce an effort by the “Western World to bring educational opportunities to all peoples.”<sup>24</sup> The prime minister admitted he was “a laggard” when it came to self-government. The Anglo-American democracies had been “slowly and painfully forged and even they” were “not perfect,” making him “skeptical about suffrage for the Hottentots.” Churchill’s position disappointed Eisenhower who pledged to “never stay around in active position so long that age itself” would make him “a deterrent” to “reasonable action.”<sup>25</sup> Although the president was 62 years old, he considered himself to be more in tune with the times.

The White House took the European “civilizing mission” seriously. The concept, introduced by the government of the French Third Republic at the end of the nineteenth century, referred to the duty to remake “primitive” cultures. Postwar commitments to civic education such as the 1946 British development plan for Nigeria, focused on the need for educated men in public service.<sup>26</sup> Nonetheless, Eisenhower drew a sharp distinction between this “old-fashioned, paternalistic” line taken by the colonial powers and his own plans. When Churchill claimed that newly independent peoples would “recognize the wisdom of our suggestions,” the president retorted that “emerging peoples” had to be persuaded to follow the British and the U.S. example.<sup>27</sup>

What distinguished Eisenhower from French and British leaders was his attachment to the anticolonial origins of the United States. Despite the interaction with Africa dating back to slavery, Liberia, and Garveyism, there had never been a U.S. colony in Africa. The president preserved a distinction between his plan to provide Africans with education and the debates about racial equality at home. Unlike W. E. B. Dubois, who argued that “whiteness” shaped global politics, Eisenhower did not globalize the color line. He integrated his foreign policy within the contradictory story of U.S. imperialism. Eisenhower’s views had

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23. Letter, Eisenhower to Grunther, November 30, 1954, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, box 8, DDEL.

24. Letter, Eisenhower to Churchill, July 22, 1954, 2, 3, box 19, DDEL; on Eisenhower’s frustration about Pierre Mendès-France’s attitude, see Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, 64.

25. Roland Quinault, “Churchill and Black Africa,” *History Today* 55, no. 6 (June 2005): 31–36; Diary Entry on Tuesday, January 6, 1953, 3–5, box 1, DDE Diaries Series, Papers as President, DDEL.

26. Memorandum, “Broad Lines of Future Educational Policy in Nigeria,” August 1959, CO936/564, The National Archives of the U.K. (hereafter TNA); Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (San Francisco, CA, 2005), 37, 144.

27. Diary Entry on Tuesday, January 6, 1953, 3–5, box 1, DDE Diaries Series, Papers as President, DDEL.

matured during the time he accompanied General Douglas MacArthur between 1935 and 1939 as assistant military advisor in the Philippines where U.S. teachers had been stationed since 1900.<sup>28</sup> In his diary, Eisenhower describes the locals as children who, due to their “lazy” nature, were difficult to educate. Filipinos, from whom he expected “a minimum of performance from a maximum of promise,” were unaccustomed to administrative procedures. His relationship with Manuel Quezon, the Philippine president, remained distant. “Why in the hell do you want a banana country giving you a field-marshalship?” he asked MacArthur after he himself had refused this honor.<sup>29</sup> As president, Eisenhower claimed to understand African leaders because of these experiences. In his talks with Ghanaian Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah as well as in NSC meetings, he remarked that the Philippines would have become a dictatorship if the United States had not offered training in democracy.<sup>30</sup>

Instead of waiting for the colonial powers to expand leadership cadres, USIA Deputy Director Abbott Washburn was asked in October 1954 to investigate the state of overseas education. Harold Hoskins, counselor for diplomatic missions in the Middle East, produced a report for the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) in which he concluded that President Harry Truman’s emphasis on “technical advice and training” had been misguided because “ideas” would not automatically be adopted. The OCB passed these findings to USIA and the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) where there was initially little enthusiasm. Only USIA officer Earl Wilson promoted a plan for civic education after ICA deputy director for education William Russell, who was also the dean of Columbia University’s Teachers College, had persuaded him. Russell in turn had been inspired by Eisenhower, then president of Columbia, to create the “Citizenship Education Project,” which aimed to expand the teaching of U.S. democratic concepts. In “laboratories” the free individual, the free government, the free economy, and the free world were discussed. In December 1957, Saxton Bradford of the Bureau of International Cultural Relations sent around the “Bases of Freedom”

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28. Elwood Dunn, *Liberia and the United States during the Cold War: Limits of Reciprocity* (New York, 2009), 34; Jonathan Zimmerman, *Immocents Abroad: American Teachers in the American Century* (Cambridge, MA, 2008), 34; Adebayo Oyeade and Toyin Falola, “West Africa and the United States in Historical Perspective,” in *The United States and West Africa: Interactions and Relations*, ed. Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola (Rochester, NY, 2008), 17–37; Borstelmann argues that Eisenhower could not preserve the distinction between struggles about race at home and abroad, see Borstelmann, *The Cold War*, 5.

29. Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, vol. 1, *Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890–1952* (London, 1983), 101–4, 106, 109.

30. Memorandum of the 397th Meeting of the NSC, February 26, 1959, 397th, box 11, NSC Series, Papers as President, DDEL; Memorandum of discussion (hereafter memdisc) of the 432nd Meeting of the NSC, January 14, 1960, box 12, NSC Series, Papers as President, DDEL; Discussion at the 410th Meeting of the NSC, Thursday, June 18, 1959, 4, 410th, box 11, NSC Series, Papers as President, DDEL; Memorandum of conversation (hereafter memcon), July 24, 1958, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*) 1958–1960, vol. XIV, Africa, eds. Harriet Dashiell Schwar and Stanley Shaloff (Washington, DC, 1992), 647–52, doc. 295.

project to USIS offices in Asia and Africa to encourage the teaching of citizenship in schools and civic organizations.<sup>31</sup>

Wilson believed that education in new nations “should aim to make men good as men and as citizens” and abandon the emphasis on technology.<sup>32</sup> Similarly, Eisenhower’s advice to European leaders was not a public posture, but part of his “great equation.” Only a combination of spiritual, economic, and military force guaranteed security.<sup>33</sup> What distinguished Eisenhower from Churchill and Mendès-France was his willingness to give concrete meaning to the notion that stable leadership was essential for “emerging” societies, something that led Eisenhower to Baylor University.

The Bandung Conference of 1955 and the Suez Crisis of 1956 foregrounded the complexities of the White House’s stance on the Third World. The Afro-Asian meeting revealed that the global landscape was changing, but as Jason Parker writes, the administration maintained its support for the colonial powers.<sup>34</sup> In contrast, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal and the French and British military intervention that followed prompted Eisenhower to ask Congress for a resolution that authorized him to pledge economic and military aid to the developing world. The Eisenhower doctrine—as Salim Yaqub argues—encouraged Arab unity in spite of the president’s belief that “Arabs” were incapable of grasping U.S. notions of freedom.<sup>35</sup> Why did the Eisenhower administration take a clear public stance against colonialism in 1956 while its response to Bandung was characterized by hesitance and support of the metropolises?

The most persuasive explanation lies in the way the perceived psychological state of colonial peoples influenced the White House’s actions. In 1955 Richard Nixon guffawed as Eisenhower remarked “facetiously” that they could best handle the envoys at Bandung by handing out dollars or by approving any method “up to but not including assassination of the hostile delegates.” By labeling Third World

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31. Report, Harold Hoskins, “Report on American Overseas Education,” October 29, 1954, Educational Development 1961 (6), box 12, Abbott Washburn Papers, DDEL; Earl Wilson, interview by G. Lewis Schmidt, October 14, 1988, retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib001273/>, accessed October 6, 2016; Letter, Saxton Bradford to Earl Wilson, December 1957, folder: Correspondence 12/17/1957–06/14/1983, box 1, Earl J. Wilson Papers, Georgetown University Library Special Collections Research Center.

32. Memorandum, James Halsema to Washburn, “Role of USIA in Overseas Education,” December 15, 1960, folder: Educational Development 1959–60 (1), box 12, Abbott Washburn Papers, DDEL.

33. Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York, 1998), 44; Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KA, 2006), 73. For the claim that Eisenhower’s requests for speeches were propaganda, see Nwaubani, *The United States*, 39.

34. Jason Parker, “Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era,” *Diplomatic History* 30, no. 5 (2006): 888.

35. Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004), 1–2.



leaders as bribable, Eisenhower sarcastically signaled that he considered them to be unprepared for the challenges of international affairs.<sup>36</sup> Action was taken to strengthen U.S. interests in line with Eisenhower's commitment to education two days before the conference's closing. On April 22, 1955 Andrew Berding of the State Department's Bureau of Public Affairs sent around a paper in which he argued that communism had successfully identified itself with nationalism in Africa because of European colonialism. However, Berding recommended not a war of words with the communist adversary, but the teaching of "democratic techniques" to capitalize on nationalistic sentiment.<sup>37</sup>

Suez made clear that this paternalist U.S. strategy was incompatible with the British and the French ambition to reaffirm their imperial positions. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles urged NSC members to decide if the future meant reasserting "colonial control" or opposing "such a course of action." USIA choose the latter, stressing that United States Information Service (USIS) officials had to vocally oppose colonialism while suggesting ways in which the Eisenhower doctrine could be "psychologically" implemented. Charles Lucet, the French chargé d'affaires in Washington, instantly grasped that the doctrine posed a threat to the French cultural presence in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>38</sup>

The administration differentiated between communist infiltration and nationalism, which was not "to be feared" when people were "capable of self-government." Additionally, Eisenhower acknowledged that those in developing areas did not necessarily think in Cold War terms, "in terms of opposing concepts of communistic dictatorship and of human rights and freedom."<sup>39</sup> Foreign aid therefore had to address the need for preparation alongside Cold War objectives. Specifically, because modernity was believed to be non-ideological, there were no guarantees that new nations would not choose communism as their route to modernity. "Who was going to have title and ownership over these plants which had been built with U.S. funds?" Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson asked in 1954, "If the ultimate owner was the state, we would be helping these countries proceed down the road which led to . . . communism." When Central Intelligence

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36. Despite the explicit reference to sarcasm, "facetiously," Eisenhower has been taken seriously: Parker, "Crisis Management," 165.

37. Memorandum, Andrew Berding, May 9, 1955, A11587-M, folder: Nationalism, box 63, RG 59, USNA.

38. Ray Takeyh, *The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953-57* (London, 2000), ix-26; Memdisc at the 302nd Meeting of the NSC, November 1, 1956, 302nd, box 8, NSC Series, Papers as President, DDEL; Guidance paper, Damon and William Handley, "Psychological Implementation of Eisenhower Doctrine," January 2, 1957, P 253, folder: Eisenhower Doctrine, box 2, RG 306, USNA; Letter, Charles Luce to Christian Pineau, "Doctrine Eisenhower et l'Afrique," April 5, 1957, 10-11, Etats-Unis 1952-1963, Direction Amerique, 91QO/433, Archives de ministère des affaires étrangères (hereafter AMAE).

39. Eisenhower, "Address and Remarks at the Baylor University Commencement Ceremonies"; McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism," 457; Matthew Connelly, "Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence," *American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000): 739-40.

Agency director Allen Dulles concluded that the Soviet Union was attempting to increase its influence in the underdeveloped world, the question of how to provide economic aid without kindling unrest became more pressing.<sup>40</sup>

NSC 162/2 hinted at a solution in 1953 by concluding that “economic assistance alone” could not be counted on to win the support of “uncommitted areas.” Constructive “political and other measures” were required.<sup>41</sup> In Africa after 1955 these measures were information and education because “whoever brings the African education has the power to influence him.” The activities that were listed by the State Department were relied upon in Europe to win the Cold War: “Increase our general information program” and “move to assist local education.”<sup>42</sup>

On May 25, 1956 Eisenhower laid out his doctrine on nationalism, trade, and international cooperation in a speech at Baylor University in Texas on which he had worked intensively. If a stable, prosperous, peaceful world was to emerge, he cautioned, other peoples had to become like the United States. Many nations, “though their cultures” were “ancient and rich in human values,” did not possess the resources for “the needed education.”<sup>43</sup> To strengthen the free world, institutions had to be built that satisfied “the hunger for knowledge.” Eisenhower subscribed to a Wilsonian brand of internationalism that equated the spread of U.S. values with security. Military or economic interventions could only be effective if a “community of interests” was established. Nongovernmental organizations had to heed the call and equip foreign peoples with the values that underpinned the U.S. model.<sup>44</sup>

In the next year academic and government committees reflected on ways in which private foundations and universities could assume a greater role in providing cultural assistance. A conference at Baylor University in December 1956—organized to give substance to Eisenhower’s commencement address—turned its attention to the need for basic education, “drawing those from many nations who wish to study this body of principles and return . . . to teach it to others . . . in Asia

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40. Memdisc at the 226th meeting of the NSC, December 1, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, part 1, China and Japan, eds. David Mabon and Harriet Schwar (Washington DC, 1985), 971–75, doc. 419; Memdisc at the 273th meeting of the NSC, January 18, 1956, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, vol. X, Foreign Economic Policy, eds. Robert McMahon, William Sanford, and Sherrill Wells (Washington DC, 1989), 64–68, doc. 14.

41. Report by the Executive Secretary to the NSC on Basic NSC Security Policy NSC 162/2, October 30, 1953, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, vol. II, part 1, National Security Affairs, eds. Lisle Rose and Neal Petersen (Washington DC, 1979), 577–97, doc. 100.

42. Memorandum prepared in the Office of African Affairs, The United States in Africa South of the Sahara, August 4, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, vol. XVIII, Africa, eds. Stanley Shaloff and John P. Glennon (Washington DC), 21, doc. 7.

43. Letter, Eisenhower to Barbara Bates Gunderson, June 7, 1956, Louis Galambos and Daun Van Ee, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower* (Baltimore, MA, 2001), vol. 17, 218; Quote in Eisenhower, “Address and Remarks at the Baylor University Commencement Ceremonies.”

44. Eisenhower, “Address and Remarks at the Baylor University Commencement Ceremonies.” On Eisenhower’s Wilsonianism, see Steven Metz, “Eisenhower and the Planning of American Grand Strategy,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 14, no. 1 (1991): 49.

and Africa.”<sup>45</sup> The improvement of funding and coordination became a top priority. The United States Office of Education catalogued existing government and private programs, such as the Carnegie Corporation’s support for the Gold Coast College of Technology, while Senator J. William Fulbright passed an amendment on the educational exchange act of 1948—Public Law (P.L.). 402—in June 1957 that made it possible to fund U.S. sponsored schools abroad. Baylor’s president, William White, asked the president in May 1957 to fund his Nigerian-American House, an institution that would provide training in government services. White’s plan struck a sensitive chord for Eisenhower because Africa had “come to assume an importance hardly glimpsed a few short years ago.” Nonetheless, in June 1955 the State Department had already offered the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Phelps-Stokes Fund financial assistance for their African programs. Eisenhower invited Phelps-Stokes Director Frederick Patterson for stag dinners, asked his help when the Liberian president, William Tubman, visited the United States in 1954, and listened when he reported about his trips to Nigeria and Ghana.<sup>46</sup>

To find a formula that permitted the government to guide private organizations while avoiding direct involvement, the OCB formed a committee in October 1956 chaired by Berding. Because too much governmental influence would raise target audiences’ suspicions, private foundations were a crucial intermediary between the state and Africans. At the same time, governmental funding and coordination remained essential for success.<sup>47</sup>

The constraints universities faced compelled USIA, ICA, and the State Department to become more involved. Washburn seized upon the People-to-People program, launched in 1956, to increase USIA involvement in organizations such as the Catholic and Protestant missions with a budget of \$120,181,195 in 1954. The Institute of International Education (IIE), which exchanged 3,343

45. Report, Paul Geren, “Conference on Implementation of the Baylor Proposal,” 1956, 3, 8, A15082, folder: Educational & Cultural Exchange, box 3, RG 59, USNA.

46. Paul Bodenman, *American Cooperation with Higher Education Abroad: A Survey of Current Programs* (Washington, DC, 1957); Letter, White to Eisenhower, April 30, 1957, Letter, Eisenhower to White, May 9, 1957, memorandum, “Nigerian College—Baylor University,” May 7, 1957, Chronological - Dearborn, April-July 1957 (2), box 1, OCB Series, Administrative Subseries, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, White House Office, DDEL; Memcon, State Department (hereafter StateDep), “Interest of Various Foundations in Africa South of the Sahara,” July 2, 1955, A13112J, folder: Ford Foundation, box 1, RG 59, USNA; Letter, Eisenhower to Frederic Patterson, July 16, 1953, Letter, Patterson to Eisenhower, March 12, 1954, Letter, Patterson to Eisenhower, May 3, 1954, Phelps-Stokes Funds Records, folder: Eisenhower, box 96, New York Public Library.

47. Report, President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (hereafter PCIAA), “A Program for International Educational Development,” August 8, 1960, 1, 5, Educational Development 1961 (3), box 12, Abbott Washburn Papers, DDEL; Memorandum for the Operations Coordinating Board (hereafter OCB), “Subject: Progress Report on Activities of the OCB Inter-Agency Committee on the President’s Baylor Proposals,” June 26, 1957, 1–2, 4, 7, A15082, box 3, folder: Educational & Cultural Exchange, RG 59, USNA; Report, Charles Johnson, “Progress Report on Activities of the OCB Inter-Agency Committee on the President’s Baylor Proposals,” July 17, 1957, A15082, folder: Educational & Cultural Exchange, box 3, RG 59, USNA.

students and 931 leaders in 1959, also received USIA's support.<sup>48</sup> The IIE initiated its Africa program in 1949, received \$150,000 from the Ford Foundation between 1951 and 1956, and benefited from the U.S. Government Trust Territories Program, which from 1953 onward allowed students from Italian Somaliland, British Cameroons, French Togoland, French Cameroons, and Sudan to receive P.L. 402 grants. After 1960 the Belgian Congo, Guinea, French Cameroons, and French West Africa were added. Until 1960–61 quotas were in place for the independent African countries and the British Commonwealth.<sup>49</sup>

These activities were executed in the spirit of Baylor. ICA regional director for Africa, Marcus Gordon, aspired to create “productive citizens,” while establishing stable institutions motivated the Bureau of International Cultural Relations.<sup>50</sup>

However, officials found it difficult to operationalize the Baylor guidelines. In 1956 James Morrill, President of the University of Minnesota and State Department consultant, tried to convince ICA to move away from “technical programs” while the State Department’s international exchange services (IES) held on to “cultural programs.”<sup>51</sup> Edward Roberts, the first USIA Assistant Director for Africa, stressed that assistance also had to produce “informational or cultural profit.” USIS officers on the ground also demanded a response to Soviet propaganda. USIS-Leopoldville, for instance, wanted to use English classes to convey the benefits of Western society and promoted an anticolonial resolution put forward by a group of congressmen. USIA’s “bible,” *Study of the Cultural Program in Africa*, remained ambivalent about the final aim of cultural assistance: if USIA could train teachers and write textbooks, U.S. principles would be “deeply impressed upon” leaders. Nonetheless, “political objectives” remained important.<sup>52</sup>

48. Draft, Washburn, “People-to-People-Education,” August 5, 1960, Educational Development 1961 (3), box 12, Abbott Washburn Papers, DDEL; Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 214.

49. Memorandum, “History of IIE Exchange Activities with Africa,” 1959, 1, 2, UD-WW 285, folder: Regional, FRC carton 2 (hereafter FRC), RG 306, USNA; Draft, OCB, “Progress Report on Activities of the OCB Inter-Agency Committee on the President’s Baylor Proposals,” May 14, 1957, 7, A15082, folder: Educational & Cultural Exchange, box 3, RG 59, USNA.

50. Transcript, Marcus Gordon, “Activities of the ICA in Africa in the Education and Cultural Fields,” November 23, 1959, 13, UD-WW 285, folder: ICA, FRC 2, RG 306, USNA; Memorandum, Saxton Bradford to John Noon, “Exchange of Information on Activities in the Educational and Cultural Field in Africa,” December 17, 1959, 1-3, UD-WW 285, folder: Regional, FRC 2, RG 306, USNA.

51. Report, James Morrill, “A Proposal for the coordination of the Exchange of Persons Programs of the IIES and the ICA,” May 1, 1956, 13, A11066, box 8, RG 306, USNA; Memorandum, Andrew Berding and William Handley, “USIS-ICA Cooperation in the NEA Area,” December 19, 1955, P 257, folder: ICA Memoranda, box 2, RG 306, USNA.

52. Memorandum, Hamilton Mathes to Walter Roberts, “College Affiliation,” April 27, 1960, UD-WW 285, folder: IOC, FRC 3, RG 306, USNA; Telegram 003012, Streibert to USIS-Leopoldville, “Country Objectives,” UD-WW 285, folder: country objectives, box 1, RG 306, USNA; Draft, Peter Koffsky, “The United States Information Program in Africa, 1945–1970,” p. 2-1, A11072, folder: African Program, Historical Background, box 9, RG 306, USNA; Report, Argus Tresidder, “A Study of the Cultural Program in Africa with Especial Reference to Education,” October 1957, 280, 44, 78, 102, UD-WW 285, folder: Regional, FRC 2, RG 306, USNA.

This ambivalence allowed ICA to expand its exchanges with Africa from 469 in 1958 to 796 in 1960.<sup>53</sup> Unlike IES, which provided exchange grants and planned to spend \$150 million for 9,000 foreign participants in 1959, ICA sponsored vocational and public administration training, \$31.5 million for 4,600 foreign grantees. ICA's Fund for Africa, created in January 1960, funded formal education. Gordon stressed that political stability hinged on a well-trained corps of administrators and increased the aid for training from \$93,000 in 1957 to \$473,000 in 1960. Gordon argued that on the job training "improved" cultures, leadership training was key, and secondary school programs had to turn out "educated citizens" and inform leadership styles.<sup>54</sup>

The State Department provided coordination from 1958 onward through the Regional Committee on Educational, Technical and Cultural Activities for Africa. By December 1959 exchange programs with eight independent countries and 16 dependent areas in Africa had been created. The number of grants rose from only 24 in 1952 to 363 in 1959. The President's Special International Program sponsored tours of artists for \$222,648 in 1959. Even though the integration of civic education within the original tasks of IES, ICA, and USIS was difficult, the exchanges for African countries totaled 1,438 for 1959 while 1,868 were proposed for 1960.<sup>55</sup>

The Eisenhower administration was thus not complacent about developments in Africa. Admittedly, the Randall Commission was skeptical about socioeconomic modernization in 1954, but Randall also wanted to keep "pushing for democratic ideals" via teacher and vocational training, particularly in Ghana. In 1958 he argued that "better education for civilians" had to be provided in order to give sub-Saharan Africa "a real chance for free government." Similarly, the reliance on private organizations has been interpreted as a sign of disinterest. Kennedy's undersecretary of state, George Ball, refuted this and argued that it was precisely the "voluntary organizations" that made educational exchange successful. The intricacies of nonprofit involvement as well as the debate among officials at

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53. Memorandum, "Coordinated Exchange Programs for Africa for FY 1959 and 1960," October 3, 1958, UD-WW 285, folder: Regional, FRC 2, RG 306, USNA; Minutes, Cultural Affairs Committee, June 19, 1959, UD-WW 285, folder: Regional Committee, FRC 2, RG 306, USNA.

54. Memorandum, "Fund for Africa South of the Sahara," January 13, 1960, Arthur Richards and Jane Alden, "Relations of Mutual Security Act Amendment to the President's Baylor Proposals," n. d., P36, folder: Africa Fund, box 3, Record Group 469 (hereafter RG 469), USNA; Minutes, Cultural Affairs Committee, June 19, 1959, UD-WW 285, folder: Regional Committee, FRC 2, RG 306, USNA; Transcript, Gordon, "Activities of the ICA in Africa in the Education and Cultural Fields," November 23, 1959, 13, FRC 2, RG 306, USNA; Shenin, *America's Helping Hand*, 49, 62.

55. Letter, Bradford to Noon, "Exchange of Information on Activities in the Educational and Cultural Field in Africa," December 17, 1959, RG 306, USNA; Memorandum, "Coordinated Exchange Programs for Africa for FY 1959 and 1960," October 3, 1958, UD-WW 285, folder: Regional Committee for Country Planning, FRC 3, RG 306, USNA.

USIA and ICA about the relationship between PR and development became contested issues in the foreign aid debate of the 1950s.<sup>56</sup>

#### FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND GUINEA (1957–1960)

The centrality of aid in the inaugural address of 1957 motivated Rostow and Eisenhower's psychological strategy advisor, Charles Douglas Jackson, to urge the president to increase aid initiatives. In 1954 an earlier attempt to sell Eisenhower on a World Economic Plan had failed. This scheme, launched at the Princeton Inn Conference, rejected the single-minded focus on capital formation and attached more weight to the socioeconomic and political effects of grants and loans. Why was so much effort required to persuade the president to adopt this socioeconomic approach, even though he endorsed the aid bill of 1956?<sup>57</sup>

Rostow attributed his failure at convincing Eisenhower to the influence of traditionalists such as Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, who saw foreign aid as a short-term security measure. Eisenhower sought a compromise with the progressives, who seized on aid to improve global living conditions, by appointing Harold Stassen as director of the Mutual Security Agency (MSA). It was in the context of these factional fights that radical progressives such as Jackson and Nelson Rockefeller attempted to push their proposals through Congress in 1956. Nonetheless, by focusing solely on bureaucratic infighting it becomes difficult to illuminate Eisenhower's own aid conception. A close reading of *A Proposal* reveals more profound grounds of disagreement particularly in a chapter where Rostow defined education narrowly, as training, and found cultural resources useful only as PR: "values could be more quickly grasped" through programs of "common action" than through education.<sup>58</sup>

Rostow and Jackson sent Eisenhower "Blueprint for Foreign Aid," an article written by Director of the Economic Cooperation Administration Paul Hoffman, and in response the president developed a three-pronged critique on the progressive aid doctrine. Hoffman argued that the encroachment of Soviet aid could only be stopped if it was matched by a U.S. offer. To be effective, this aid had to be "without strings" and have a purpose "which the countries" could "wholeheartedly share." Political friends who could be bought were unreliable, Hoffman wrote.

56. Memdisc of the 410th Meeting of the NSC, June 18, 1959, 4, 410th, box 11, NSC Series, Papers as President, DDEL; Summary, George Ball, "Report to the President on Sub-Saharan African Student Programs," October 13, 1961, Africa: General, 9/29/61–10/31/61, National Security Files, Papers as President, box 2, John F. Kennedy Library; Memorandum to Council on Foreign Economic Policy, "CFEP 568—United States Foreign Economic Policy for Africa South of the Sahara," June 5, 1958, 2, P 206, folder: Aid for Africa South of the Sahara, box 13, RG 469, USNA.

57. Shenin, *America's Helping Hand*, 113–14; Kimber Charles Pearce, *Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid* (East Lansing, MI, 2001), 53; Letter, Eisenhower to Barbara Bates Gunderson, June 7, 1956, 218.

58. Shenin, *America's Helping Hand*, 76–77; Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 173; Rostow, *Eisenhower*, 44; Pearce, *Rostow*, 53; Max Millikan and Walt Rostow, *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy* (New York, 1957), 83.

Moreover, Moscow would use “angry cries about strings” to cast the United States in the role of “colonial master.”<sup>59</sup>

In his correspondence with Humphrey, Eisenhower suggested a third way between the security-focused ad-hoc reliance on aid and a long-term modernization strategy. The president agreed with Humphrey that “neither education or mutual aid” in itself sufficed. “Only in their unity” would “we find the strength necessary to do what we need to do.” But aid grants could only serve as an engine of development if it had “strings.” So-called underdeveloped peoples had to be instilled with a “true desire for individual freedom” to “persuade them permanently to our way of life.” Eisenhower did not believe, as Rostow would later argue, that U.S. values could be grasped through the concrete results of aid programs.<sup>60</sup>

Secondly, Eisenhower questioned the transformative power of aid. The United States could not simply export the success of its own development “because the circumstances and conditions that allowed a few men to put a steel plant in a corn field and another successful one in a marsh are as different from today’s conditions in most of the Afro-Asian countries as day is from night.” He was happy Humphrey agreed with him on an issue so close to his heart: aid would not result in a transformation of values.<sup>61</sup>

Finally, Eisenhower was unsure if economic assistance could create political change. Eisenhower agreed with the progressives that there was value in promoting “economic development and political progress” even without a communist threat. However, this did not signal support for the progressive gospel of long-term foreign aid.<sup>62</sup> He believed that people had to be educated first, only then assistance could be granted. If countries were veering toward Moscow it was already too late to undertake “programs for their orderly economic development and political progress.” When Moroccan King Mohammed V asked the president to support development in African countries on the verge of independence, Eisenhower claimed the king was “putting the cart before the horse.” To be effective the United States had to provide cultural assistance before governmental structures were in place.<sup>63</sup> Overpopulation in Eisenhower’s eyes posed a particular challenge because a saturation point had been reached before citizens were able to grasp concepts such as “personal rights” and “personal freedom.” United Nations

59. Paul Hoffman, “Blueprint for Foreign Aid,” *New York Times Magazine*, February 17, 1957, 38; Letter, Secretary of the Treasury (Humphrey) to the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, March 20, 1957, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, vol. X, 177, doc. 36.

60. Letter, Eisenhower to Humphrey, March 27, 1957, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, vol. 17, 115–17; Letter, Eisenhower to Frank Altschul, October 25, 1957, *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, vol. 18, 512; Hoffman, “Blueprint for Foreign Aid,” 43; Millikan and Rostow, *A Proposal*, 38.

61. Letter, Eisenhower to Frank Altschul, October 25, 1957, 512; Letter, Eisenhower to Humphrey, March 27, 1957, 115–17.

62. Ambrose, *Eisenhower. The President*, 2, 387.

63. Memdisc of the 432nd Meeting of the NSC, January 14, 1960, 432nd, box 12, NSC Series, Papers as President, DDEL; “The United States Information Program in Africa, 1945–1970,” 2-1, RG 306, USNA.

(UN) experts had already in 1951 concluded that financial assistance in itself was insufficient because individual psychology, social structures, and overpopulation hampered development.<sup>64</sup>

When the Belgian departure from the Congo sparked riots in Leopoldville in 1960, Eisenhower worried that “loud speakers in the public square” would “exhort people to freedom” without a plan for society. However, in Eisenhower’s opinion, backing “rulers and governments who won’t support reforms” was unsustainable as well.<sup>65</sup> After a conversation with Ted Reppelier of the Advertising Council, he therefore proposed a “United Nations effort” at the Fifteenth UN General Assembly. The image of a president who reluctantly addressed the General Assembly hardly does justice to the zeal with which Eisenhower called upon his fellow delegates to provide Africans, and the Congolese in particular, with “the mental tools to preserve and develop their freedom.” Eisenhower wanted to use the United Nations as a superintendent who could provide education, enshrine liberal internationalism, and in that way manage a continent that had acquired its independence too soon.<sup>66</sup> He pledged to assist the United Nations in matters of African security, proposed a UN fund for the Congo, and asked UN support for long-term modernization.<sup>67</sup> Robert Murphy, who headed the U.S. delegation in Leopoldville, offered 300 scholarships and the OCB offered 200 scholarships for administrators while USIA flew in staff to strengthen the 33 posts in 21 African countries.<sup>68</sup>

Before Eisenhower’s speech, ICA secretary Alice May already sent out a transcript to African posts, while a draft resolution covering the president’s proposals was distributed among UN delegates. At a meeting of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris, the U.S. delegate insisted upon an increase of the budget for African education. Secretary of State Christian Herter wanted to make a two-million-dollar contribution in a dramatic

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64. Letter, Eisenhower to Humphrey, March 27, 1957, 115–16; Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge, MA, 2010), 187; Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 157–59, 163–68.

65. Editorial note, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, vol. XIV, Africa, 274, doc. 101; Memorandum, Washburn, “America’s ‘Open Opportunities’ Program—for Development of Education in Africa and Other Emerging Areas,” Educational Development 1959–60 (4), box 12, Abbott Washburn Papers, DDEL.

66. Transcript, “President Eisenhower Addresses U.N. General Assembly,” n. d., P 206, folder: Africa—General 7/60—12/60, box 1, RG 469, USNA. Eisenhower’s speech is characterized as lifeless; see Lise Namikas, “Battleground Africa: The Cold War and the Congo Crisis, 1960–1965” (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 2002), 109; Ryan Irwin, *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order* (New York, 2012), 8.

67. Letter, Robert Mullen to Washburn, September 16, 1960, Educational Development 1959–60 (2), box 12, Washburn Paper, DDEL.

68. Memorandum, Fitzhugh Green to USIA, June 30, 1960, folder: 23, box 6, Fitzhugh Green Papers, Special Collections Georgetown; Report, Dorothy Rigdon, “Draft of 15th Report to Congress,” [1961], P 249, box 6, RG 306, USNA; Operation committee minutes, March 23, 1960, memorandum, “Notes on OCB Meeting June 22 1960,” June 23, 1960, P 249, folder: Policy—OCB, box 8, RG 306, USNA.



way to ensure maximum “psychological impact.”<sup>69</sup> In Leopoldville UNESCO constructed schools together, for instance, with the *Institut pédagogique of Djelo Binza*.<sup>70</sup> The UN became a means for Eisenhower to foster the right kind of nationalism (Figure 1).

When the United States abstained from the vote on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in December 1960, Eisenhower did not end up allowing the Europeans to make policy.<sup>71</sup> On the contrary, the move signalled the president’s engrained paternalist commitment to a stable transition in the face of a resolution that wanted to hasten the end of empire. Civic education provided the cornerstone of his approach to Africa and distinguished Eisenhower from his predecessor and successor. In the words of Washburn: “the over-riding need is for trained, educated manpower to provide the leadership, essential if these countries are to succeed.”<sup>72</sup>

Neither Truman with his Point Four program nor Kennedy approached education as a means to strengthen postcolonial citizenship. Truman underscored the importance of technical assistance to project the “benefits of scientific advances” and foster economic growth and political stability.<sup>73</sup> Kennedy wanted education to produce “human resources,” the creation of a pool of manpower.<sup>74</sup> With Kennedy’s message to Congress on March 22, 1961, the belief in education as a tool to project U.S. values faded almost instantly. Senator Lyndon Johnson had already seen the writing on the wall when his bill on the use of surplus foreign currencies for university education abroad was not voted on in June 1960.<sup>75</sup>

In an attempt to preserve the Baylor philosophy, Washburn asked presidential candidate and Africa enthusiast Nixon during the election campaign of 1960 to

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69. Letter, Riddleberger to MSP, “FY 1962 Proposals for the United Nations Program in Africa,” October 11, 1960, folder: FY 1962 Africa Guidelines, box 11, RG 469, USNA; Secretariat note ICA, “President Eisenhower’s Address to the UN General Assembly: Program for Africa Stressed,” October 20, 1960, P 206, folder: Africa—General 7/60–12/60, box 1, RG 469, USNA; Airgram, Herter to Posts, “Aid to Education in Africa through the UN System of Organizations,” November 22, 1960, P 206, box 1, RG 469, USNA.

70. Bureau of Relations with Member States, “Projet” 20-02-Congo-35 Constructions Scolaires,” November 1, 1962, box S-0728-0010, United Nations Archives, New York, NY.

71. Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present* (New York, 2013), 263.

72. Memorandum, Washburn, “Suggested New Emphasis in U.S. Foreign Programs,” June 6, 1960, 1, Educational Development 1959–60 (4), box 12, Abbott Washburn Papers, DDEL.

73. Samuel Butterfield, *U.S. Development Aid—An Historic First: Achievements and Failures in the Twentieth Century* (Westport, CT, 2004), 51; Hannah Higgin, “Disseminating American Ideals in Africa, 1949–1969” (PhD diss., Cambridge University, 2014), 25; Sergei Shenin, *The United States and the Third World: The Origins of Postwar Relations and the Point Four Program* (New York, 1999), 23.

74. John F. Kennedy, “Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid,” March 22, 1961, available online at Gerhard Peters and John Woolley, eds., *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8545>, accessed June 6, 2016.

75. Memorandum, “Johnson Bill for Overseas Education,” June 2, 1960, letter, Jerome Plapinger to Washburn, September 21, 1960, Educational Development 1961 (1), box 12, Abbott Washburn Papers, DDEL.



**Figure 1:** Eisenhower talks with African UN ambassadors on October 14, 1960. Issoufou Sarr of Senegal, Issoufou Djernakoye of Niger, Frédéric Fernand Guirma of Upper Volta, and Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Francis Wilcox. Butler Eugene Allen brings drinks. Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

support “Open Opportunities for Education,” a plan proposed by policy planning staff director Gerard Smith. Washburn believed Nixon was a kindred spirit after reading the *Life* article in which the vice president claimed that the revolution of rising expectation could only be addressed by extending “the goals of the preamble of our Constitution.”<sup>76</sup> In a draft speech for Nixon, Washburn inserted Johnson’s “Fifth Freedom, the freedom to learn” as a key tenant of the liberal international system: operating “modern [self-governing] societies,” required education. Food was only “one of the two great human needs of the newly emerging nations,” educated men and women were equally important. With vice presidential backing, Nielsen and Washburn constituted themselves a task force that worked out a program to expand education in the service of “representative government.”<sup>77</sup>

76. “The Vice President’s ‘Open Opportunities’ Program,” September 21, 1960, memorandum for Kevin McCain, Gerard Smith, “Open Opportunities for Education,” September 29, 1960, Educational Development 1961 (1), box 12, Abbott Washburn Papers, DDEL; Richard Nixon, “Our Resolve is Running Strong,” *Life*, August 29, 1960, 87–89.

77. “America’s ‘Open Opportunities’ Program,” July 13, 1960, “Suggested New Emphasis in U.S. Foreign Programs,” June 6, 1960, Educational Development 1959–60 (4), DDEL;

Washburn wrote to the chairman of Kennedy's Task Force on Latin America, Adolf Berle, and advisers such as Thomas Sorensen, Philip Coombs, and Rostow in an attempt to get a "Marshall Plan of the sixties." On March 22, 1961, the day of Kennedy's speech on aid, he got an appointment in the Oval Office to make his case that government could "not flourish on empty minds."<sup>78</sup> His efforts were quashed during a 14-minute conversation. He gave the president the Sprague Report, a report on Eisenhower's public diplomacy strategy, which Kennedy thumbed through in a way that suggested to Washburn he had never seen it before. The USIA deputy director repeated that the type of societies that emerged in Africa would depend on the "attitudes men acquire in the course of their education." Kennedy nodded his head, but deflected the conversation toward a discussion about *Reader's Digest*. As he walked to the door, Washburn did not realize that the meeting had been the end of his vision for overseas education.<sup>79</sup>

This subtlety also escaped USIA director George Allen who could not understand Washburn's displeasure, believing the Washburn proposal was identical to the Fulbright program. Eisenhower's UN speech also acquired new meaning. On March 23, 1961, Adlai Stevenson mentioned the speech in his comments to the UN committee on Africa to mark UNESCO's new program for African education. For Stevenson, however, education was imperative, not because it furnished people with the mental tools to preserve their freedom, but because education accelerated socioeconomic modernization.<sup>80</sup>

In short, when it came to aid for Africa, the White House was less concerned with the People's Republic of China and the USSR, even though it remained important to "pre-empt" Africa "for the Bloc," as former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Mansfield Sprague and Foster Dulles claimed.<sup>81</sup> The United States was not running a race with the USSR, as the

Memorandum, Washburn, "A Program for the Development of Education in the Emerging Countries," February 14, 1961, annex, "Suggested Paragraphs for a possible presidential speech," February 14, 1961, 1, Educational Development 1959-60 (1), box 12, Abbott Washburn Papers, DDEL.

78. Letter, Allen to Washburn, February 14, 1961, 4-5, Educational Development 1959-60 (1), box 12, Abbott Washburn Papers, DDEL.

79. Thomas Noer, *Soapy: A Biography of G. Mennen Williams* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2006), 1-10; Letter, Washburn to Adolf Berle, February 20, 1961, Letter, Washburn to Sorensen, February 28, 1961, Report, PCIAA, "A Program for International Educational Development," August 8, 1960, 1, folder: Educational Development 1961 (3), box 12, Abbott Washburn Papers, DDEL; Letter, Washburn to Nielsen, March 22, 1961, Educational Development 1959-60 (7), box 12, Abbott Washburn Papers, DDEL.

80. Letter, Allen to Washburn, "A Program for the Development of Education in the Emerging Countries," March 30, 1961, folder: Educational Development 1959-60 (7), box 12, Abbott Washburn Papers, DDEL; Press Release No. 3674, "Statement by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson," March 23, 1961, P 249, folder: Policy—Education in Africa, box 14, RG 306, USNA.

81. Report, Sprague, "Africa South of the Sahara," 1960, 16, PCIAA #31 (1), box 23, PCIAA: 1960-61, DDEL; Rabe, "Eisenhower Revisionism," 306; "Diary Memorandum for Records—December 26, 1960," Diary December 1960, box 11, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Papers as President, DDEL.

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Joseph Charles Satterthwaite claimed.<sup>82</sup> Communist activities were ancillary to the “revolution of rising expectations,” the idea that the unfulfilled promise of modernity created political instability.<sup>83</sup> Communism could thrive because of the ripples brought about by development, an effect that the United States could even create if values were not deliberately imprinted through cultural assistance.

The scheme to manufacture informed citizens was tested on September 28, 1958 when Guinea declared its independence from France. Charles de Gaulle had listed two options on the ballot of a referendum: accept a subordinate position within the French Community, or choose independence and suffer the loss of French aid. Guinean leader, Ahmed Sékou Touré chose the latter. When French administrators left, Ghana, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States rushed to Touré’s aid after his request for teachers to provide “moral and spiritual” assistance. The teacher held a mythical status in postcolonial societies where national leaders adopted pedagogical leadership styles to help subjects become citizens. Eleven days before the referendum the French ambassador, Jean Mauberna, therefore asked French teachers who were holidaying outside of Guinea not to return.<sup>84</sup>

The rumors of Soviet intrusion were met with a measured U.S. response because economic assistance could strengthen Moscow if it was not embedded within a cultural assistance strategy. As Dulles explained, it was not in the U.S. interest to reward “premature” independence. Eisenhower had written Humphrey in 1957 that nationalism and the “hunger for some betterment in physical conditions and living standards” demanded education.<sup>85</sup> During his White House visit of October 27, 1959, Touré was therefore told to expand education (Figure 2).<sup>86</sup>

Touré’s frustration about the quantity of U.S. assistance did not reflect U.S. hesitation. The Guinean leader played different countries against each other. In August 1959, Sékou Touré’s half-brother, Ismaël, publically suggested recognition for the provisional government of the Algerian Republic to test how far he could go in his negotiations with the French. While he waved the Soviet-Guinea

82. Draft, Satterthwaite, “U.S. Objectives in Africa,” 1960, 4, UD-WW 285, folder: Conferences, FRC 2, RG 306, USNA; Report, “Views expressed by the African Advisory Group regarding the Report of the Study group on U.S. Aid to Africa,” May 17, 1960, P36, folder: Africa Advisory Conference, box 11, RG 469, USNA.

83. Report, “Report of the PCIAA,” 1960, 10, box 26, PCIAA: 1960–61, DDEL; David Ellwood, *The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century* (Oxford, 2012), 274.

84. Memdisc of the 432nd meeting of the NSC, January 14, 1960, 432nd, box 12, NSC Series, Papers as President, DDEL; Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Legacies of Bandung: Decolonization and the Politics of Culture,” in *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives*, ed. Christopher Lee (Athens, OH, 2010), 53; Elizabeth Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946–1958* (Athens, OH, 2007), 166; Letter, H. Carr CRD to A. C. Cameron BC, October 27, 1959, FO371/138838, TNA.

85. Letter, Eisenhower to Humphrey, March 27, 1957, 117.

86. Memdisc of the 432nd Meeting of the NSC, January 14, 1960, 432nd, box 12, NSC Series, Papers as President, DDEL; Memcon, October 27, 1959, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, vol. XIV, Africa, 698–701, doc. 322.



**Figure 2:** “Foundations of an Enduring Friendship,” USIA pamphlet on Touré’s visit to the United States, October 1959, U.S. National Archives, College Park, MD.

cultural cooperation agreement around, the British chargé d’ affaires, Wynn Hugh-Jones, was told by Touré about Czechoslovakian weapon deliveries. It is not surprising that de Gaulle’s memoirs describe Touré—who wanted to hire a U.S. PR firm—as a skillful manipulator.<sup>87</sup>

Increasingly, the encroachment of Soviet aid in Guinea made officials question their reliance on cultural assistance. Upon his return from Ghana’s independence celebrations in March 1958, Nixon concluded that the eyes of the world would be fixed on Accra to determine whether the formula for an “orderly transition” as prescribed by the U.S. liberal model was durable. Because U.S. influence did not

87. Letter, Wynn Hugh-Jones to FO, September 2, 1959, FO111/138838, TNA; Mazov, *A Distant Front*, 133; Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization*, 171, 174, 277; Foreign service despatch 1125, London to StateDep, “Reported Interest of Sekou Touré, President of Guinea in Hiring an American as Public Relations Advisor,” November 18, 1959, CDF 1955–1958, 870.461/8-1258-871.00/12-2657, RG 59, USNA; Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d’Espoir: Le Renouveau 1958–1962* (Plon, 1970), 60.

solely depend upon educational assistance, but was contingent upon Africans' understanding of the U.S. principles of "independence, equality and economic progress," the number of information posts had to be increased. The president frequently returned to the topic of public relations in 1958: "We must win Africa, but we can't win it by military activity . . . we couldn't win wars unless we won the people." Nixon added that cultural relations would allow for the support of a brand of "neutralism, which the national independence movements favor" without being accused of importing the Cold War.<sup>88</sup>

In 1960, ICA Deputy Director James Saccio demanded more attention for the PR dimension of aid, the so-called "politico-psychological" effects, to avoid "another Guinea."<sup>89</sup> The USSR's "impact-type projects" had turned Guinea into a showpiece of "*apparent* development" leading Saccio to also showcase projects.<sup>90</sup> In February 1960, the U.S. ambassador in Conakry, John Morrow, wanted to create a mobile medical team because it was "dramatic." The Bureau of International Cultural Relations concluded that the United States had tried to have its "cake and eat it, to avoid offense to our friends in Europe." The lack of U.S. encouragement of African self-government had indirectly benefitted communism.<sup>91</sup> Like the Soviets, ICA therefore wanted to go beyond a change in psychological attitude and appeal to the "vanity, the hearts or stomachs."<sup>92</sup>

This strategic recalibration did not spring from a deference to de Gaulle. Diplomatic recognition was withheld until November 1, 1958, but officials pushed the boundaries. Murphy impressed upon the French ambassador to Washington, Louis Joxe, that he was "ready now!" to appoint an ambassador.<sup>93</sup> Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa James Penfield, USIA, and ICA were eager to intervene because the training of "civil servants capable of assuming responsibility" took time. When the Quai d'Orsay sent out their envoy, Pasteur

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88. Report, Nixon, "The Emergence of Africa," [March 1957], 1–2, UD-WW 285, folder: Briefing Paper, FRC 1, RG 306, USNA; Memdisc at 375th NSC meeting, August 7, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, vol. XIV, Africa, 21, doc. 6.

89. Memorandum for Joseph Satterthwaite, James Saccio, "ICA Paper on U.S. Assistance to Tropical Africa for Mr. Dillon," March 25, 1960, 8, P 36, folder: Africa Dillon Meeting, box 9, RG 469, USNA.

90. Memorandum, StateDep, "Communist Influence in Guinea," March 9, 1960, Central Decimal Files 1960–63, 751.563111/1-760 – 751F.00/7-261, RG 59, USNA.

91. Foreign service dispatch 194, John Morrow to StateDep, "Recommendation for Impact Project in Guinea," February 15, 1960, P 206, folder: Guinea, box 3, RG 469, USNA; Memorandum, "U.S. Assistance to Africa South of the Sahara: A Memorandum Prepared by the Bureau of International Cultural Relations in response to a Request from AF – Mr. Satterthwaite," March 18, 1960, folder: Africa Dillon Meeting, P 36, box 9, RG 469, USNA.

92. Memorandum for Joseph Satterthwaite, "ICA Paper on U.S. Assistance to Tropical Africa for Mr. Dillon," March 25, 1960, 9, folder: English teaching, P 249, box 10, RG 306, USNA.

93. Summary record of the third meeting at ambassadorial level, April 28, 1959, 2, FO371/137966, TNA.

Mabille, to investigate other countries' aid offers, Dulles asked Mabille why de Gaulle had granted independence if the general still wanted influence.<sup>94</sup>

Ultimately, it was this competition that drove U.S. policy. A report of the French counterespionage service of December 1958 revealed that delegations had come from the United States, West and East Germany, and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Secretariat. Guinea had sent envoys to Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, the Ivory Coast, and the UK.<sup>95</sup> In August 1959, the ICA survey team arrived to assist Marie Gadsden, an African-American teacher who had set up an operation by herself. By October 1960 this resulted in two classes of ten advanced students and a beginners' class of 28. In October 1959 Touré was promised 150 scholarships and the placement of 50 Guinean students per year for three years. An ICA seminar for Guinean teachers made Christopher Ewart-Biggs, officer at the Foreign Office, nervous because he wanted to make British rather than U.S. books the standard for language education. If ICA convinced a minister to use U.S. books, the British had to offer more money. Much like ICA, the British Council improvised and an unknown English teacher, C. H. Judd, was placed in a *lycée classique*.<sup>96</sup>

The complex connection between education and PR was accentuated in Guinea, but had been part of USIA's Africa program since the early 1950s because cultural assistance had consequences that were unique to Africa. USIA's civil rights campaign was not solely aimed at countering Soviet allegations. USIA directors made that case in their reports to Congress, however, to obtain more funding and many historians have rooted their analysis in these documents.<sup>97</sup> By educating Africans, ICA and USIA were producing citizens, it was believed, who were more interested in world events, including Jim Crow. PR had to repair the damage to the U.S. image that its own education program inflicted. Particularly in the Gold Coast, the situation was seen as pressing because its population was more educated and Nkrumah was responsible for internal affairs, two factors

94. Foreign service despatch 319, USIS-Accra to StateDep, "Educational Exchange: Proposed Fiscal Year 1960 Country Program," May 13, 1958, folder: Exchange of Persons, Ghana Post Files General Records 1952-58, box 2, RG 84, USNA; Letter, Penfield to Ferguson, "Suggestions for Airgram to Paris and Conakry," May 1, 1959, box 1, Lot Files A13112B, RG 59, USNA; Memorandum, A. T. Oldham, January 14, 1959, FO371/138170, TNA.

95. Memorandum, "Record of Anglo French Official Talks on Africa held in London," December 8, 1958, CO936/564, TNA; Report, SDECE, "La Situation Interieure et les Relations Extérieures de la Republique de Guinee (Oct.-Nov. 1958)," December 2, 1958, 27, Guinee, Direction Afrique-Levant, 51QO/35, AMAE.

96. Memorandum, Eugene Abrams, "FY 60 Contracts for Guinea," June 29, 1960, Foreign service despatch 14, Wilbert Petty to USIA, "English Teaching Potential," October 27, 1960, 2, P 206, folder: Guinea, box 3, RG 469, USNA; Memorandum, Christopher Ewart-Biggs, September 29, 1959, FO1110/138838, TNA; Report, J.D.B. - Fowells, "Report on Visit to Guinea, January 14th-26th 1960," [1960], BW132/1, TNA.

97. Karen Bell, "Developing a 'Sense of Community': U.S. Cultural Diplomacy and the Place of Africa during the Early Cold War Period 1953-54," in *The United States and West Africa: Interactions and Relations*, ed. Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola (Rochester, NY, 2008), 139; Eschen, *Race against Empire*, 122-49; Brenda Gayle Plummer, "Introduction," in *Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1988*, ed. Brenda Gayle Plummer (Chapel Hill, NC, 2003), 11, 15.

which—in USIA’s reasoning—led to a “psychotic concern” with the issue of race relations.<sup>98</sup> After Ghanaian independence, the State Department exchanged its damage control policy for a response to “pan-African” propaganda, because Nkrumah promoted “his country as a haven for persecuted Negroes.”<sup>99</sup>

In Guinea, competition led USIA to inflate the PR dimension of English teaching. James Echols, the agency’s language consultant, and Wilbert Petty of USIS Conakry admitted they wanted to reach key groups and if those people were sitting in classes of the British Council, USIA would be unable to influence them.<sup>100</sup> In 1960 USIS Conakry established language classes at a cost of \$21,000. Resources were allocated on the basis of public impact rather than need. Students who were already proficient were prioritized and enrolled in intensive classes to become fluent to add to U.S. prestige.<sup>101</sup> Between 1958 and 1960 cultural assistance became a PR competition.

Guinea reveals the paradoxical quality of Eisenhower’s strategy. The president hesitated to offer aid and accepted the damaging consequences for the U.S. image because he believed that aid without cultural assistance would be ineffective in the face of Soviet influence. This assessment was overtaken by the developments in Guinea where it became clear that civic education and the promotion of the U.S. image were intertwined. Africans who were unfamiliar with the challenges of international diplomacy not only jeopardized the cause of an orderly transition, but also damaged the U.S. reputation because the execution of assistance programs could be slow. Moreover, informed citizens also provided a barrier against communism. The Sprague committee therefore recommended a presidential speech highlighting the \$20,000,000 ICA Special Assistance Program for Tropical Africa.<sup>102</sup> This was Wilsonianism at its most paternalistic: a world run by U.S. standards benefited Africans and the United States alike.

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98. Letter, Hyman Bloom to StateDep, “USIE: Need, in all media, for greater emphasis on affairs of U.S. Negroes,” April 2, 1951, CDF 1950–1954, 511.45K3/10–1254–511.45R3/7–2850, USNA.

99. Memorandum for Gerald Morgan, John Calhoun, “Request from the Civil Rights Commission: Treatment of Minorities in the United States,” December 4, 1958, P 283, folder: Minorities in the US [½], RG 306, USNA; StateDep report, “Treatment of Minorities in the United States,” P 283, box 11, folder: Minorities in the US [½], RG 306, USNA.

100. Memorandum, “N.E. Policy,” [1961], A11066, folder: English Language Teaching 1962, box 194, RG 306, USNA; Foreign service despatch 14, Wilbert Petty to USIA, “English Teaching Potential,” October 27, 1960, 1, RG 469, USNA.

101. Bell, “Developing a ‘Sense of Community,’” 136; Memorandum, Eugene Skora to Carlston, “English Teaching Program,” June 12, 1962, A11066, folder: English Language Teaching 1962, box 194, RG 306, USNA; Foreign service despatch 26, Conakry to StateDep, “USIA Program for Guinea, Particularly English-Teaching Program,” July 21, 1959, P 206, folder: Guinea, box 3, RG 469, USNA; Foreign service despatch 14, Wilbert Petty to USIA, “English Teaching Potential,” October 27, 1960, 2, box 3, RG 469, USNA.

102. Report, “Africa South of the Sahara,” 1960, Africa #31 (1), box 9, PCIAA: 1960–61, DDEL.



## CONCLUSION

Behind the mantra of “orderly development,” there was a nudge in the direction of a form of self-government beneficial to the U.S. liberal world order. Providing education to the Third World was self-interested and paternalistic, but it allowed Eisenhower to reconcile his long-term aim of global stability and his short-term willingness to be “on the side of the natives for once.”<sup>103</sup> In the 1950s, when independence was one of many possible futures, the communist threat took a back seat to paternalistically inspired concerns about citizenship and leadership capabilities. In this light, the question of whether Eisenhower was sympathetic to anticolonial demands becomes less relevant: self-government was inevitable in the eyes of the president but only acceptable if territories were stable and prepared for the task ahead.

Rostow’s advancement of modernization theory alongside a disorganized set of U.S. initiatives in the 1950s makes it difficult to appreciate the extent to which ideas about education captured the imagination. The importance of public opinion for U.S. diplomacy has been acknowledged, but U.S. cultural diplomacy in the Third World is still considered a suboptimal alternative to psychological warfare.<sup>104</sup> However, alleviating the paternalistic need for education took precedence over the war of words. At the same time this approach faced its limitations when the reality of the Cold War set in and Europeans protested U.S. interference. The president called on Churchill and Mendès-France to fulfill their civilizing promises and encouraged private initiatives in 1956, while ICA, USIA, and the State Department increased their involvement. The PR effect of cultural assistance became more important in the competition to supply Guinea with teachers. Historians should therefore study cultural assistance more closely.

Moreover, discussions about cultural assistance informed the foreign assistance debate. That aid in real numbers remained low during the Eisenhower presidency in spite of his vocal support, stemmed from the belief that aid grants could only be effective in unison with educational assistance. Eisenhower rejected the “demonstration effect”: the positive outcome of development projects would not automatically encourage people to aspire to Western standards. This conviction led U.S. officials to back away from a rapid response in Guinea, but at the same time motivated them to provide teachers. The tentative cultivation of relations with Guinea and Africa was not brought about by indifference. It stemmed from a well-rounded view on the psychological state of colonial subjects and was delayed by bureaucratic infighting over the appropriate response to French disgruntlement.<sup>105</sup>

103. Memdisc at 375th NSC meeting, August 7, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, vol. XIV, Africa, 21, doc. 6.

104. Osgood, “Words and Deeds,” 14–16.

105. Walt Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (London, 1960), 27. For the argument of a disinterested White House, see Muehlenbeck, *Betting on the Africans*, 26.

The optimism of Eisenhower officials about the abilities of Africans to apply U.S. ideas brings into focus how archetypal instruments of the civilizing mission, education and information, could be used to spur development and advance the cause of self-government within a U.S.-led international system. It adds to a growing understanding in the literature that conceptualizes decolonization as a contradictory process, rather than a clash between defenders of empire and anticolonial activists.<sup>106</sup> Eurocentric imperialism was delegitimized in the 1950s, but alternative models, such as Eisenhower's world order, were riddled with colonial ideas and new forms of Orientalism. By the early 1960s when a focus on psychology was exchanged for industrialization, Eisenhower's cultural approach came to be seen as old-fashioned.<sup>107</sup> A colonial vocabulary of racial psychology was replaced by a language laced with technocratic expertise.

The interrelated nature of development, psychology, race, and Cold War concerns in the Africa strategy of the Eisenhower administration suggests that understanding the U.S.-Africa relationship as well as the link between decolonization and the Cold War requires historians to employ concepts like "modernization" and "race" in a more integrated way. Eisenhower's use of education was consistent with his Cold War concerns, but not motivated by the need to contain Soviet influence. It drew strength from his racial prejudice, but circumvented the civil rights struggle as well as global resistance to white supremacy. It centered on modernization, but not Rostow's foreign aid approach, which would come to mark the global Cold War from the 1960s onward.

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106. Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960* (Princeton, NJ, 2014).

107. A. G. Hopkins, "Rethinking Decolonization," *Past & Present* 200, no. 1 (2008): 244; Irwin, *Gordian*, 7-8.