Partnerships in biodiversity governance

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An assessment of their contributions to halting biodiversity loss

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1　Introduction

1.1　Background

International environmental policy is surprisingly old. The earliest bilateral agreements on hunting and fishing date back to the 18th century, and the first multilateral convention on endangered species, the 'Convention Designed to Ensure the Conservation of Various Species of Wild Animals in Africa that are Useful to Man or Inoffensive', was signed in 1900 (Sand 2001). Nevertheless, international environmental policy as we know it today was mainly developed during the second half of the 20th century. This period of contemporary international environmental policy can roughly be divided into four phases. The first phase lasted from the end of World War II to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, the UN's first conference on international environmental issues. This period can be characterized by a rather narrow technical approach to environmental problem solving and domination by the developed states. The second phase lasted from the Stockholm Conference to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio in 1992. In this phase international environmental problems were also seen as socio-economic problems, including the impact of poverty and prosperity on the environment. The North-South dimension also slowly emerged (Andresen and Hey 2005). The 1970s represent a peak in international environmental policy; many international environmental conventions were developed in this decade after the issue of environmental degradation had been placed on the international agenda by the seminal works 'Silent Spring' (Carson 1962), 'The tragedy of the Commons' (Hardin 1968), and 'Limits to growth' (Meadows, Meadows et al. 1972). The third period lasted from Rio to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002. Sustainable development, meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED 1987) emerged as the central theme; the North-South dimension became integral part of the main focus. A large number of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) were also adopted in this phase. The WSSD can be seen as the beginning of a fourth phase, in which market and civil society actors are increasingly viewed to play a prominent and evident role in sustainable development, a transition often called the shift 'from government to governance' (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). In Johannesburg, the partnership concept was launched as a practical way forward and public-private partnerships featured prominently. It is expected that in this fourth phase, the market mechanism and cooperation between public and private sectors will become widely accepted as instruments for sustainable development (Andresen and Hey 2005).

This dissertation focuses on some of the specific characteristics of this fourth phase in contemporary international environmental governance. It aims to increase our understanding of the relatively new instruments of partnerships and their contributions to and consequences for sustainable development. My interest in this phenomenon can be explained in two ways.

First, one of the earliest partnerships, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was developed in my former field of work, international forest policy. Therefore, I was already aware of both the potentials and the limitations of this instrument at the start of my research (see chapter 2 for the issue of forest partnerships). Moreover, before starting my research for this dissertation, I worked for Greenpeace Netherlands, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) which mostly uses a campaigning strategy of placing issues on the agenda and of 'blaming and shaming', instead of a more collaborative strategy of working in partnership with governments and/ or business actors to improve their environmental performance. I noticed the increased use of the collaborative strategy by other NGOs, and realized that this was part of a broader trend in society, in which working together was becoming the norm. I was inspired by these changes and at the same time worried about their longer term effects on the societal acceptance of more confrontational and fundamental critique, and on the relationships within civil society between the more campaigning and partnering NGOs. This dissertation includes analyses of both my advantageous and critical perspectives on these roles and implications of partnerships.

1.2   Biodiversity

The conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity has been chosen as empirical field for this dissertation, because it is one of the main and established international environmental issues. It is important to realize, however, that even though international conservation policy dates back to the 18th century, the issue of biodiversity itself, as it currently features dominantly on the international environmental agenda, is only a few decades old, and was successfully placed on the international agenda by, among others, conservation researchers (Hannigan 2006). The term biodiversity became widely accepted in conservation biology and on the international environmental agenda after the 1986 National Forum on BioDiversity (Wilson 1988; Wilson 2001). Today, several major intergovernmental regimes cover the issue and, as stated above, the biodiversity governance system is home to some of the oldest international partnerships. The dissertation thus aims to draw conclusions on the role of partnerships in a major international environmental field, biodiversity governance, and thereby seeks to produce lessons for international governance for sustainable development in general.

This dissertation is written in a time when the international community is struggling to meet its so-called '2010 Biodiversity Target', to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss at the global, regional, and national level, as decided by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), endorsed by the WSSD and the UN General Assembly, and incorporated into the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

There are 1.9 million species formally described today (Baillie, Hilton-Taylor et al. 2004). These species represent only a small proportion of the total global biodiversity; estimates of the total number of species worldwide range from five to thirty million. A large part of the world's terrestrial species biodiversity is located in a relatively small part of the world, mainly in the tropics. Most threatened species also occur in the tropics (Baillie, Hilton-Taylor et al. 2004). Human activity is threatening the survival of species and has even caused extinction of species. Current rates of biodiversity loss exceed those of the past by several orders of magnitude and

show no indication of slowing down (MEA 2005a). Estimates of the increase in the species extinction rate, caused by human activity, over the past hundred years range from 50-500 times higher than natural extinction rates found in the fossil record (for known extinctions), to 100-1000 higher (when possibly extinct species are included). Both are extremely conservative figures (Baillie, Hilton-Taylor et al. 2004).

Virtually all ecosystem types have been dramatically transformed by human actions. In the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment the anthropogenic causes of biodiversity and ecosystem change are called indirect drivers, and include demographic, economic, sociopolitical, cultural and religious, and scientific and technological drivers. Important issues among the indirect drivers are globalization and growing consumption of ecosystem services, due to growing populations and growing per capita consumption. The indirect drivers cause the so-called direct drivers (MEA 2005a).

Figure 1.1 gives an overview of the main direct drivers. Habitat and land cover change have been the most important direct drivers of biodiversity loss for terrestrial ecosystems in the past fifty years; for marine ecosystems, the most important direct driver of change has been overexploitation (fishing). A driver of increasing importance is climate change, and other drivers are invasive species (especially on islands) and pollution. The figure shows a relatively dramatic picture. Only 1 of the 65 current trends represents a decreasing impact, and 34 of the current trends reveal a very rapid increase of the impact. Moreover, the impact of 20 out of the 28 drivers, which have had a low impact on biodiversity over the last century, will increase. Summarizing, the overall impact of the direct drivers on biodiversity will increase significantly, showing the urgent need for effective governance.

Figure 1.1: Impacts of the main direct drivers on biodiversity (MEA 2005a)

'The cell color indicates the impact to date of each driver on biodiversity in each biome over the past 50-100 years. The arrows indicate the trend in the impact of the driver on biodiversity... This figure is based on expert opinion consistent with and based on the analysis of drivers of changes.... This figure presents global impacts and trends that may be different from those in specific regions' (MEA 2005a, p.50).

The urgency becomes even more apparent when taking the social, economic and political aspects of biodiversity into account. Biodiversity has intrinsic, spiritual and religious value. Moreover, ecosystems provide important practical services for people, including biomass production, nutrient and water cycling, soil formation and retention, and climate regulation. More concretely, ecosystems provide food; certain types of ecosystems, like mangrove forests and coral reefs help protect coastal communities from flooding; and wood fuel from forests provides more than half the energy used in developing countries. Even though many people have benefited from biodiversity use, change and loss, many local communities and poor people who are most dependent on ecosystem services have often been disadvantaged by biodiversity loss (MEA 2005a). Economic and political aspects have often dominated international negotiations on biodiversity. Important aspects have been the economic value of biodiversity and its ownership, including the issue of intellectual property rights; the autonomy of developing countries to decide on the biodiversity within their national borders; and the rights of local communities dependent on biodiversity (Hannigan 2006). Biodiversity conservation should thus be considered an issue of sustainable development, incorporating ecological, social and economic aspects. This broad scope has strengthened the position of biodiversity on the international agenda, but can also be seen as one of the causes of the slow progress made towards the '2010 Biodiversity Target'.

Finally, even though this dissertation does not aim to contribute to the knowledge development in the natural sciences, it is important to acknowledge the existing scientific uncertainty on some relevant issues. Biodiversity (loss) remains difficult to measure or value, and significant knowledge gaps remain. Little is known, for example, on the status of biodiversity in several types of ecosystems, including marine ecosystems (MEA 2005a). The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment reports, including the publications used in this dissertation, deal with these scientific uncertainties by presenting specific figures, when appropriate, accompanied by the level of scientific certainty the figure should be interpreted with. Thus, the facts on biodiversity, biodiversity loss, its causes and effects as presented in this dissertation should be viewed as the current scientific consensus, taking into account the scientific uncertainties and political dimensions of the issue.

1.3   Theoretical background

This dissertation can be placed within the current debates in social science on the rise of private steering mechanisms in the international governance of sustainable development, and their relationship with and consequences for (inter-) governmental environmental regimes. This research generally takes place from the perspectives of international relations, political sciences, public administration, business administration, and sociology. The main bodies of literature are regime and governance literature, which are described below: regime literature has traditionally concentrated on intergovernmental regimes, and governance literature focuses specifically on the roles of new steering mechanisms. Partnership literature is viewed here as a specialized part of governance literature and is discussed separately.

The differentiation between regime and governance literature is conceptual, yet relevant. It is conceptual, since regime researchers are increasingly paying attention to the role of non-state actors, and therefore the boundary between the two bodies of literature is increasingly blurred. The traditional division into separate bodies of literature is still relevant, however, since the central research topics tend to be different. The focus of regime literature lies on intergovernmental regimes; in governance literature the focus is broadened to all steering mechanisms in society. This implies that governance authors are of the opinion that steering society is not only performed through political processes but also through other societal processes outside the traditional political arenas, for example by using the market as steering mechanism for sustainable development. Where regime authors, when incorporating non-state actors in their work, mainly focus on their role in intergovernmental regimes (e.g. the effects of the lobby by NGOs), governance authors generally focus on the role of non-state actors in society (e.g. the effects of sustainability standards developed by partnerships). Also, whereas regime authors have devoted significant attention to empirical research and developing research methodologies, the governance debate has been relatively theoretical, with less attention for methodology.

An important contribution to the further integration of these two bodies of literature is the 'Earth system governance' project (Biermann 2008; Biermann, Betsill et al. 2009). Although the research project proposes to regard regime and governance questions as separate themes – regime research is positioned under the theme 'architecture' and governance research under 'agency' – it incorporates (among others) both approaches as parts of the overarching earth system governance debate. The project represents a research plan for over a decade; its implementation will provide numerous opportunities for furthering the integration of regime and governance research. The research proposal includes some practical suggestions for combining regime and governance approaches. An example is trying to use the methodologies developed to analyze regime effectiveness to research the effectiveness of private governance initiatives, an idea which is already largely implemented in this dissertation.

1.3.1   Regime literature

Since the development of regime literature in the 1980s (Haggard and Simmons 1987; Krasner 1982; Keohane 1982; Keohane 1984; Young 1980; Young 1982), regime authors have made important contributions to the research of (1) regime effectiveness and (2) regime interaction. Regimes can be defined as 'principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area' (Krasner 1982, p.185). International environmental regimes have increasingly become an important empirical focus of regime literature.

The regime effectiveness debate (Miles, Underdal et al. 2001; Nollkeamper 1992; Rittberger 1993) '… ultimately deals with the ability of international regimes to solve the problems that prompted their establishment' (Andresen and Hey 2005, p.211). Underdal distinguishes between three levels of regime effectiveness: output, outcome and impact (Underdal 2002). Output effectiveness is for example a policy developed by a regime; an indicator of effectiveness at the outcome level is the number of actors influenced by the policy; and impact effectiveness is the effect the policy has 'on the ground', its environmental impact. Researchers in social science generally exclude

the analysis at the impact level, since this would require knowledge and methodologies from the natural sciences. The research shows that regimes generally make a positive contribution to the problem addressed, the effectiveness of a regime tends to increase over time, and more recently established regimes are more effective than the older ones. The nature of the problem also has a large impact on regime effectiveness (Miles, Underdal et al. 2001).

In the regime interaction or institutional interaction debate, scientists presume that (the effectiveness of) one regime is affected by its interactions with other regimes from the same issue area and/or with regimes governing other issues (Keohane, Haas et al. 1995; Leebron 2002; Oberthür 2002; Oberthür and Gehring 2006; Paavola 2007; Skjærseth, Stokke et al. 2006; Young 1996; Young 2002a). The focus on regime interaction by researchers can be viewed as a logical reaction to the fact that over the last decades a growing number of intergovernmental environmental agreements have been developed. Due to this rising density of institutional arrangements at the international level, the number of interactions among international institutions is expanding (Young 2002a). Oberthür and Gehring have developed a methodology for the analysis of regime interaction, in which they 'untangle' complex interactions among regimes into single occurrences of interaction. Their research shows that regime interaction in the majority of analyzed cases improves regimes effectiveness. This positive interaction mostly takes place among regimes in the same policy field; most negative influences occur among regimes from different policy fields (Oberthür and Gehring 2006). Several regime interaction researchers are currently focusing on the question how regime interaction can be managed: the issue of interaction management (Van Asselt 2007; Oberthür 2008; Stokke 2001).

As stated earlier, some regime scholars have incorporated the role of non-state actors in their work (Haas, Keohane et al. 1995; Oberthür and Gehring 2006). Moreover, some authors have specifically concentrated on the role of NGOs in MEAs (Arts 1998; Raustalia 1997). Some of the themes are similar to those in governance literature, like the different roles of NGOs and the implication of the increased participation of NGOs in international environmental treaties for the sovereign states system. Raustalia argues that the 'NGO inclusion does not come at the expense of state centrality...' (Raustalia 1997, p.720). He also states that NGO participation does not automatically imply that the effectiveness or the democratic character of international cooperation is improved.

1.3.2   Governance literature

Although the term governance traditionally refers to government steering, it has come to denote something broader since the 1980s (Kjær 2004). 'Governance has currently come to indicate the totality of mechanisms and instruments available for influencing social change in preordained directions' (Lafferty 2004, p.5). The term governance is used for different forms of so-called 'governance without government'. In international relations and public administration, it is used for analyzing the shift 'from government to governance' (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992), the emergence of private steering mechanisms for, among others, sustainable development, and governance in and by partnerships. 'Governance' is also used to study forms of self-organization. The most well-known example is the important work by Ostrom (Ostrom 1990) on the management of common pool resources by local communities without state or market steering (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2001).

Governance authors thus study the ongoing fundamental changes in the manner in which society is being steered. Not only governments, but also actors from the other two main societal domains, the market and civil society domain, have and take responsibility for steering society. Researchers use different terminologies for these private steering mechanisms. Examples are the production of public goods by the private sector (Ronit and Schneider 1999), private authority (Hall and Biersteker 2002), private international regimes (Cutler 2002), a new global division of regulatory labor (Lipschutz and Fogel 2002), non-state market driven authority (Cashore, Auld et al. 2004), and private governance (Pattberg 2005a). Important issues in the literature are (1) finding explanations for the development of these new political spaces; and (2) discussing the implications for and interactions with governments and studying the functioning of the emerging public-private network of governing entities and processes.

Several scientists (Jessop 1998; Kooiman 1993; Ostrom 1990; Stoker 1998) explain the shift from government to governance in the realization by different actors that contemporary society is so complex that neither the government, nor the market or civil society can solve its problems alone. Causes for this complexity are often sought in globalization and the development of (information) technology. Other explanations for the shift to governance can be found in the (deliberate or implicit) liberalization, privatization, and deregulation by governments (Nelissen 2002).

Governance researchers value the increasing role of private steering mechanisms in the governance of sustainable development in different ways. Glasbergen (Glasbergen 2007, p.16-17) distinguishes between the following three views. Some evaluate private steering mechanisms in a positive manner, as a necessary reinvention of policy and politics in the emerging network society; others have a negative opinion, viewing private steering mechanisms as an erosion of public authority, or the private capture of what should be public (Cutler, Haufler et al. 1999; Saurin 2001); and yet another stream of authors represent a pragmatic view, according to which private and public steering mechanisms can complement each other (Reinicke 1999; Ronit and Schneider 1999; Stewart and Gray 2006). Paterson uses a similar but different division into three types of interpretations. He distinguishes between a regime perspective in which the new governance structures are interpreted as changing little to the intergovernmental dominance; a second interpretation which suggests that the centrality of the state is being weakened by the new governance mechanisms; and a third opinion which states that the new governance mechanisms can take the shape either of new top-down governance by large international institutions, or more 'grassroots globalization' governance initiatives, which tend to challenge the top-down governance initiatives (Paterson 1999).

In their research on the interactions between governance instruments and governments, Jordan et al. mostly discovered complementing roles and found no evidence of replacement of governmental functions by private initiatives. Governments often support governance instruments (Jordan, Wurzel et al. 2005). Several other authors have also identified a strong relationship between governments and private steering mechanisms. Often, the imminent threat of public regulation is one of the reasons for private regulation (Ronit and Schneider 1999). Moreover, it seems private governance is most successful in developed countries, where governments are often stronger (Ronit and Schneider 1999; Van Kooten, Nelson et al. 2005). In

developing countries, the capacity of self-regulation is limited and the political-administrative system has problems overseeing private arrangements. Ronit and Schneider conclude that 'effective private action often needs an element of public recognition' (Ronit and Schneider 1999, p.260). Kooiman sees new tasks for governments in contemporary society, enabling social-political interactions and creating and sustaining different 'co-arrangements'. In the last resort, governments should reserve for themselves the possibility to break through vested interests and other blockades in social-political arrangements (Kooiman 1993). Several authors (Jessop 1998; Kooiman 1993; Meuleman 2008; Stoker 1998) see a role for governments in metagovernance: strategic steering or coordination in the governance system.

1.3.3 Partnership literature

Intersectoral collaboration, collaboration between state, market, and/or civil society actors, is not a new phenomenon. Especially governments and market actors have a tradition of working together. The public-private partnerships (PPPs) which emerged in the 1990s, for example, were an expression of the aim of governments to work more efficiently through privatizing or outsourcing governmental activities (Selsky and Parker 2005). When contemporary partnership literature speaks of partnership as a 'new species of governance' (Bäckstrand 2006, p.293), authors refer to the current generation of partnerships for sustainable development.

In this dissertation, the term partnership addresses a broad range of organizational forms of intersectoral collaboration ranging from global policy or action networks (Levy, Keohane et al. 1995; Reinicke 1999; Waddell and Khagram 2007), to partnerships between an individual company and NGO (Huijstee, Francken et al. 2007). Other terms used for the phenomenon of intersectoral partnerships include multi-stakeholder partnerships (Stewart and Gray 2006), multi-sectoral partnerships (Bäckstrand 2006), or cross-sector partnerships (Selsky and Parker 2005). The literature on partnerships can be categorized according to (1) the perspective used and (2) the empirical focus.

Partnership literature can be differentiated into research from an actor or an institutional perspective. With the actor perspective, researchers look into partnerships (Huijstee, Francken et al. 2007). These authors analyze the internal dynamics of individual partnerships, including the visions of and relations among the partners in order to explain and optimize the partnership's performance. Authors are usually researchers on organizations, business administration or collaboration (see for example Austin 2007; Bendell and Murphy 2000; Gray 2007; Selsky and Parker 2005).

In the institutional perspective, partnerships are viewed as new institutional arrangements contributing to and shaping the governance of sustainable development (Huijstee et al 2007). The functions and effectiveness of partnerships as new steering arrangements, and their relationship with and consequences for governmental arrangements are researched. The main discussions are the potentials and dangers of partnerships as steering mechanisms. Several researchers are positive about the role of partnerships in environmental governance. Intersectoral partnerships could fill a governance niche, due to the fact that they engage actors from different societal sectors. The theoretical potentials of intersectoral partnerships include the possibilities for creative and innovative solutions (Bäckstrand 2006; Hale and Mauzerall 2004; Waddell

and Khagram 2007), since they bring together actors with different backgrounds and strengths, and for quicker action than through intergovernmental processes (Hale and Mauzerall 2004). Different governance functions fulfilled by partnerships can be found in the literature, including agenda setting, policy development, implementation, knowledge development and dissemination, improving institutional effectiveness, facilitating solutions, learning, broadening participation, developing markets, standard setting, and linking global policy with local practice (Andonova and Levy 2003; Bäckstrand 2006; Huijstee, Francken et al. 2007; Pattberg 2005b).

For its empirical focus partnership literature can be categorized in terms of scale, topic and orientation of the analyzed partnerships. In terms of scale, a differentiation can be made between research on local or national partnerships (see for example Ros-Tonen 2007) and research on international partnerships. Secondly, in terms of topic, one can distinguish between partnerships with mainly development or social goals (see for example Ashman 2001) and those with mainly environmental goals, although most partnerships intend to contribute to the wider goal of sustainable development, incorporating among others environmental and social aspects. Thirdly, one can differentiate between partnerships that mainly use the market as steering mechanism versus the more policy oriented partnerships. Below, literature on international partnerships with sustainable development and/or environmental goals, which are either policy or market oriented, is discussed.

Several authors researching international intersectoral policy oriented partnerships, using an institutional perspective, focus on the partnerships presented at the World Summit on Sustainable Development. This is a logical choice, since the formal recognition by international political leaders at the WSSD of international intersectoral partnerships as a main tool for implementing sustainable development, and the extent to which the partnership instrument has been used since then are historic. The goal of the WSSD was, among others, to set out strategies for greater and more effective implementation of sustainable development (Hens and Nath 2003). The launch of partnerships for sustainable development at the WSSD can be assessed in two manners. Firstly, the focus on partnerships grew out of a strategic and sincere understanding of the need to find new ways forward in the implementation of sustainable development, since governments cannot reach these goals by themselves, and all societal sectors have a joint responsibility for sustainable development. Secondly, as it became clear that the Summit was not going to create any breakthroughs at the intergovernmental level (the so-called Type I intergovernmental agreements), the status of the 'Type II Partnerships' was raised as a tactical maneuver for the summit not to fail (Andonova and Levy 2003). The Type II partnerships were intended to achieve further implementation of Agenda 21, agreed upon ten years earlier at UNCED, help reach the Millennium Development Goals, and complement and not substitute governmental commitments (Hens and Nath 2003).

Doubts on the strategy to use partnerships as one of main tools for the implementation of sustainable development include the fear that they may indeed replace governmental obligations (Hens and Nath 2003) and reduce political pressure on governments to make binding agreements (Hale and Mauzerall 2004). Another question is whether they will enable additional funding for sustainable development or will only redirect existing funds (Hale and Mauzerall 2004). Authors also discuss the danger of unclear accountability structures of partnerships and

the risk of power imbalances among the partners (Ashman 2001; Hale and Mauzerall 2004; Lister 2000; Stewart and Gray 2006). Moreover, partnerships could 'lead to the privatization of global governance, give rise to corporate power, weaken and fragment the multilateral order and reinforce a neoliberal world order' (Bäckstrand 2006, p.294). Research shows that in practice, the majority of the WSSD partnerships have been mainly driven by Northern partners, with a lack of grassroots and business involvement (Andonova and Levy 2003; Hale and Mauzerall 2004), and that little new funding was found (Bäckstrand 2006). Suggestions for improving partnership success include increasing attention for partnership accountability and learning among partnerships, and broadening participation in partnerships.

Research on partnerships using the market as steering mechanism also mainly uses an institutional perspective. This group of authors focuses on, among others, partnerships that develop international sustainability standards or work on improving the sustainability of production chains of commodities (Bitzer, Francken et al. 2008; Cashore, Auld et al. 2004; Gulbrandsen 2004; Pattberg 2005b). Important issues are, once again, the roles played by the partnerships and the effectiveness of their contributions.

1.4   Research questions and methodological approach

Until today, the literature is inconclusive about the roles of partnerships in the international governance of sustainable development. Different scholars value the contribution of these private steering mechanisms, and more in general, the development 'from government to governance' in different ways. Moreover, the empirical research on partnerships for sustainable development is only in its infancy. Therefore, the aim of this dissertation is to contribute to an improved understanding of the contributions of partnerships to international environmental governance, more specifically to biodiversity governance, and the consequences for the biodiversity governance system as a whole. The central research topic is further demarcated as international intersectoral partnerships in the international biodiversity governance system, focusing the research on the international arena. International intersectoral partnerships can be defined as strategic alliances between governments, market actors, and/or civil society groups from more than one country. The international biodiversity governance system is defined as the total of all public, public-private, and private international initiatives working on the conservation and/or sustainable use of biodiversity.

Figure 1.2 sketches the international biodiversity governance system, using the governance triangle as developed by Abbott and Snidal (Abbott and Snidal 2009). The governance system includes public steering mechanisms like the biodiversity regimes (in section 1 of the triangle), private steering mechanisms, including market initiatives, civil society initiatives, and intersectoral partnerships between market and civil society actors (in sections 2, 3 and 6), and public-private intersectoral partnerships, between regimes and market and/or civil society actors (in sections 4, 5 and 7). Important biodiversity regimes include the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). A well-known example of a market initiative is the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), which supports its business members on among

Figure 1.2: The international biodiversity governance system triangle

others ecosystem issues. Examples of civil society initiatives are international networks of NGOs which are set up for a joint lobby effort on a specific topic. All these steering mechanisms are international initiatives working on the conservation and/or sustainable use of biodiversity. The research in this dissertation concentrates on the intersectoral partnerships and the biodiversity regimes (accentuated in the triangle), in the context of the entire international biodiversity governance system.

Placing the dissertation in the main issues in literature, as described in section 1.3, it focuses on the second main issue discussed in the governance literature, the public-private interplay; approaches partnerships mainly with an institutional perspective, concentrating on international partnerships with either a policy or market focus; and discusses both effectiveness and interaction issues from regime literature. Formulating the aim as stated above inherently means that the theoretical institutional questions in the governance debate are at the heart of this dissertation. Partnerships are viewed as governance mechanisms, new steering mechanisms, with a potential to contribute in a unique manner to biodiversity governance, but potentially also with consequences for the role of governments and for the governance system as a whole.

This institutional perspective implies that the contributions of partnerships to the governance system as a whole and the relationships between partnerships and other governance actors are at the heart of the dissertation, contrary to the actor perspective in which the individual partners in a single partnership are the central focus. With the institutional perspective, the pivotal question is whether partnerships change the institutional dynamics in the biodiversity governance system, in other words, whether they change the manner in which biodiversity is governed. Against this background, the central research questions are formulated as follows.

I.   *What are the contributions of international intersectoral partnerships to biodiversity governance, and how can these be explained?*

II. *What are the consequences of these partnership roles for (inter-) governmental regimes and the biodiversity governance system as a whole?*

These research questions are answered through the analysis and discussion of the following three main theoretical themes, as distilled from the literature. All three main theoretical themes contribute to answering both central research questions.

1. Functions
The contribution of partnerships is firstly operationalized as the governance functions they fulfill. The types of functions that partnerships fulfill logically have consequences for (inter-) governmental regimes and the governance system as a whole. The following governance functions are distinguished.

a.   *Agenda setting*
     Starting the debate on new issues in the governance system
b.   *Policy development*
     Developing public or private policy, for example sustainability standards
c.   *Implementation*
     Contributing to or enabling implementation of sustainability measures 'on the ground'
d.   *Metagovernance*
     Strategic steering and coordination in the governance system
e.   *Ensuring good governance*
     Improving transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and/or responsiveness (UNHCHR 2000) in the governance system

The first three functions, agenda setting, policy development and implementation, are based on partnership literature (see 1.3.3) and literature on the policy cycle and process (Jann and Wegrich 2007; Pierre 2000; Sabatier 1999). This policy literature also often includes the role of non-governmental actors. The distinction of roles of different actors during various phases in the policy cycle is used here to analyze governance functions performed by partnerships. The fourth function, metagovernance, is grounded in governance literature (see 1.3.2), in which the need of metagovernance in a network society with numerous different steering initiatives is discussed. Here, it is used to research whether partnerships fulfill metagovernance functions. The final governance function, ensuring good governance, is based on the discussions in international

policy and in development cooperation and development policy on improving the policy process (see for example Doornbos 2001; Weiss 2000). The term is used here to analyze whether partnerships contribute to improving governance in terms of transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and/or responsiveness. Together, these five governance functions represent essential elements of governance, with contributions to the governance process, contemporary types of steering, and improving governance quality.

2. Effectiveness

Secondly, the contribution of partnerships to biodiversity governance is operationalized by the effectiveness with which they fulfill these governance functions. Questions include whether partnerships in practice live up to their theoretical potential as described in the literature, what functions they perform best, under what circumstances partnerships are most effective, and what types of partnerships are most effective. Again, the effectiveness of partnerships has consequences for the whole governance system. Effectiveness is researched by using, among others, the methodology of Underdal (Underdal 2002) in terms of output and outcome, leaving aside impact (see 1.3.1).

3. Interaction

Finally the contributions are operationalized by looking at how partnerships interact with (inter-) governmental regimes in fulfilling governance functions. How can the public-private interplay be characterized? Are partnerships taking over tasks that traditionally belonged to governments, or are they fulfilling complementary functions? Is there evidence for the development 'from government to governance', and is this governance system as a whole more effective than (inter-) governmental activity alone? Another important question under this theoretical theme is how these interactions are being managed. Do partnerships play a role in interaction management? The research methodologies used for institutional interaction and interaction management are based, among others, on the work of Oberthür and Gehring (Oberthür and Gehring 2006) (see 1.3.1). Although the focus of the research is on public-private interaction at the international level, the interaction with national governmental regimes is sometimes included when it is relevant for the international biodiversity governance system.

With this research aim, theoretical framing, and methodological approach, this dissertation is intended to make the following theoretical, methodological and societal contributions. The dissertation aims to contribute to current theoretical and methodological debates by furthering current research efforts in regime and governance literature and by advancing the ongoing merging of the two bodies of literature. The research is focused on new and emerging themes in regime and governance literature like interaction management and metagovernance. It also further develops research methodologies and provides empirical evidence for the institutional governance debate on whether and how partnerships change the manner in which biodiversity is governed.

The dissertation is positioned at the cross-roads of regime and governance literature, integrating the ongoing theoretical and methodological debates in both bodies of literature. It introduces modern governance questions to the regime debate, expanding the debate to include the effectiveness of private steering mechanisms, the functions they fulfill, and their interaction with

and consequences for (inter-)governmental regimes. It also applies the concepts of effectiveness and institutional interaction from regime literature to private steering mechanisms, and methodologies developed by regime authors are used to analyze new governance instruments, partnerships.

In terms of its societal contributions, the dissertation aims to develop knowledge on the manners in which biodiversity governance system participants are working on biodiversity conservation and the effectiveness of their efforts, and can thus create lessons for improving governance system effectiveness. With this research, I aim to provide insights for the international biodiversity conservation community which it can use to increase the effectiveness of its efforts to halt biodiversity loss. Moreover, since halting biodiversity loss is among the most prominent issues on the international sustainable development agenda, improving our understanding of contemporary biodiversity governance can provide insights which are relevant for sustainable development in general.

The choices for the theoretical and empirical focus and the methodological approach of the empirical chapters have been made with the aim to be able to draw general conclusions on the contributions of international partnerships to biodiversity governance, and the implications for the governance system as a whole, based on the combined research of the four chapters. In total, the dissertation researches twenty-four international intersectoral partnerships. These twenty-four partnerships represent the majority of 'truly' international partnerships working directly on biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. The group of twenty-four is thus not meant as a representative sample of bilateral or regional partnerships (although some of these partnerships are included), or partnerships working indirectly on biodiversity conservation, like those mainly focused on capacity building or knowledge exchange. In most chapters, except for chapter 3, the majority of the international partnerships working on the specific topic covered by the chapter are analyzed. The dissertation covers important subtypes of partnerships, including partnerships for development cooperation; partnerships with different approaches, like partnerships using the market as steering mechanism for sustainability versus more policy oriented partnerships; and partnerships with different sizes, from bilateral partnerships to global ones. Collectively, the empirical chapters cover the ecosystems harboring the majority of global biodiversity, forests and oceans, and comprise the most important direct threats for biodiversity, habitat and land cover change, overexploitation, and climate change.

Moreover, different types of analyses are used to enable different insights into the roles of partnerships. Most chapters mainly use an institutional perspective on partnerships, while chapter 3 also applies the actor perspective. Two chapters follow a case study approach, focusing on a limited number of partnerships; two other chapters use a 'helicopter view' to give an overview of the contribution of a larger number of partnerships on a specific issue. The analysis 'stays inside' the biodiversity governance system until chapter 5, when the climate change governance system is included in the analysis in order to study the role of partnerships in addressing climate change, the main future threat to biodiversity. For the research in the empirical chapters, data was collected by review of literature, analysis of public reports, studying partnership documents, semi-structured interviews by phone and in person, visits to partnership

secretariats, and a questionnaire. Further methodological accounts are given in each of the empirical chapters.

1.5   Outline

Chapter 2 aims to deliver insights in the contributions of partnerships to forest governance, uncover the public-private interplay in the forest governance system, and analyze the implications for the forest governance system as a whole. Forests are important ecosystems for global biodiversity; they provide habitat for half or more or the world's known terrestrial plant and animal species (MEA 2005b). The chapter gives an overview of the main international partnerships in forest governance and is organized around the specific threats to forest biodiversity on which the different partnerships focus. Most of the partnerships are working to make international markets more sustainable. The partnerships are analyzed in terms of their effectiveness, the governance functions they fulfill, and their interactions with (inter-) governmental steering initiatives. The chapter uses a research methodology from regime literature to analyze effectiveness.

Chapter 3 improves our understanding of partnerships in development cooperation and marine biodiversity. More than 70% of the earth is covered by oceans and majors seas, and coastal and marine ecosystems are among the most productive ecosystems in the world (UNEP 2006). Thus, together chapter 2 and 3 cover the majority of global biodiversity. The chapter combines several focuses. A first focus lies on fisheries, the main threat to marine biodiversity. The chapter also concentrates on a specific group of partnerships, working on development cooperation. Because most biodiversity worldwide is found in developing countries, several partnerships combine development cooperation and biodiversity goals. Chapter 3 is also the only chapter that focuses specifically on bilateral (and trilateral) partnerships, instead of more 'truly' international partnerships with a broader participation. It provides an in-depth analysis of two partnerships, both of which work towards making international markets more sustainable. The chapter introduces a transactional model for partnership analysis with which the performance of the partnerships is explained.

Chapter 4 tries to find evidence to support or contradict the three hypotheses found in governance literature on the role of partnerships as governance mechanism (positive, negative, or utilitarian). The empirical focus lies on conservation partnerships, another specific subset of partnerships. Contrary to most partnerships examined in chapter 2 and 3, conservation partnerships do not use the market as steering mechanism, but are more policy oriented and focused on the conservation of a specific type of biodiversity. The three researched case studies are very closely linked to international governmental regimes. All three main theoretical themes introduced earlier, the functions fulfilled, the effectiveness, and the interaction with (inter-) governmental regimes, are discussed. The chapter uses methodologies from regime literature to analyze effectiveness and interaction.

Chapter 5 answers the question of what role partnerships play in the interaction management of the biodiversity and climate change governance systems. Thereby, the chapter contributes to

a current research topic in regime interaction literature, namely interaction management. The theoretical questions of governance functions and effectiveness are also addressed. Empirically, the chapter focuses on climate change, the main new threat to global biodiversity. The chapter provides an overview of the main partnerships active in the interaction management of the issues on which the biodiversity and climate change governance systems interact most intensively. The chapter uses methodologies from regime literature to research interaction.

Chapter 6 provides the conclusions of the dissertation. The chapter first summarizes the lessons learned from the empirical chapters. Then the contributions of the twenty-four partnerships are analyzed, after which these contributions and the consequences for the governance system as a whole are discussed at a more abstract level. Also, recommendations are given for a more strategic use of the partnership instrument. Finally, the chapter presents theoretical and methodological reflections and suggestions are provided for future research on partnerships.

2 Partnerships in forest governance[1]

2.1 Introduction

One of the major current global environmental challenges is the conservation of forest biodiversity. Almost three billion hectares, half of the original forest cover worldwide, is gone. Much of it has been destroyed during the past three decades. Every year about 16 million hectares are destroyed (Siry, Cubbage et al. 2005). Forests are important for conserving biodiversity, since 50-90% of all terrestrial species live in the world's forests. Many of these species are threatened, mainly because of habitat loss.

Forest biodiversity is being threatened by non-sustainable industrial logging, energy development, mining and new infrastructure, conversion from forest to agricultural land, and excessive vegetation removal, for example for firewood. Important underlying causes for these threats are illegal logging and poverty (Bryant 1997). Another major threat is climate change (Watson 1995).

The last decades, governments have agreed on sustainable use and conservation of forests in several international forums (Humphreys 1996). The origins of the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) date back to the 1970s. In Rio in 1992, the Forest Principles were adopted. Since then, governments have agreed on sustainable use of forests in, among others, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF). If all these commitments made would be realized, solutions to forest biodiversity loss would be closer. However, the problem has been lack of implementation. Also, international negotiations for an international legally binding forest treaty have failed due to fundamental differences in visions on forests (Arts 2002). Northern countries wanted to conserve forests; Southern or developing countries wanted (financial) support to do so (Humphreys 1996). In other words, countries without large areas of forests want to conserve the world's forests, and countries with large forests want to keep the right to decide themselves how to use their forests.

In recent years we have seen rather fundamental changes in the global institutional framework governing the use of forests. Although the development of public institutional arrangements continues, new political spaces for global forest governance have emerged. Characteristic of these arrangements is the engagement of private actors in authoritative decision-making, which was previously the prerogative of sovereign states. 'Governance without government', as early recognized by Rosenau and others, has become institutionalized as an additional driving force in global governance (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). As new systems of rules, private arrangements circumvent the global public issue arrangements. They fill in what governments are not (yet) willing or able to regulate, sometimes to outplay them and to prevent the governments from taking action, and sometimes to show alternatives for public governance or to challenge it to

take up more thorough public action. This private regulation of public affairs has taken four institutional forms:

- Business initiatives;
- Civil society initiatives;
- Private intersectoral partnerships (strategic alliances between civil society and business);
- Public-private intersectoral partnerships (strategic alliances between governments and business and/or civil society).

With the rise of these new political spaces, the ontology of global forest governance is changing rapidly. The state-centric structure seems to be transformed into a complex multi-centric structure of diverse and still relatively autonomous but co-existent public and private rule systems. These systems differ in scales (both in terms of time, space and size), specific goals and means, discourses and architecture. We are still in the midst of this process of change. The outcomes in terms of a new ordering of interstate, supra-state and trans-state activities – in a kind of hierarchy, complementary to each other, piling up on each other or even replacing each other – are still uncertain. Some authors stress the multi-layered and diffused character of the new global governance (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Others assume that the balance between inter-state activities and supra-state plus trans-state activities is appreciably tilting away from the former (Taylor 2005). Evaluative judgments range from private governance as eroding states, resulting in private capture of what should be a public affair (Cutler, Haufler et al. 1999; Saurin 2001), to the idea that these new forms of governance will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of governance (Cashore 2002; Cashore, Auld et al. 2004; Nelissen 2002), and to the observation of an extremely large but unexplored potential for global governance (Ronit and Schneider 1999).

This chapter takes a governance perspective to analyze the changes in the international forest biodiversity governance system. Such a perspective understands the governance system as a "collective", a shared set of responsibilities of states, market actors and civil society actors. The international forest biodiversity governance system is defined as the total of international initiatives to conserve forest biodiversity and/or use it in a sustainable manner. It includes both the international formal governmental regime and the four types of private regulation described above. It is assumed that the public and private actors shape the governance system through their interactions (Glasbergen and Driessen 2002; Kooiman 2003). Improvements of the system depend on the functional interdependencies the actors are able to shape, the deliberate allocation of tasks and the strategic alliances they are able to forge (Young 2002b). From this perspective the chapter will address the following questions:

1. What are the characteristics of the new intersectoral partnerships and what are their contributions to the forest biodiversity governance system?
2. In what way can the public-private interplay in the forest biodiversity governance system be characterized and what are the implications for the improvement of the system?

The research methodology consists of comparative case studies of partnerships, based on literature and document analysis and complementary interviews with partnership representatives.

First, the partnerships and other initiatives on forest biodiversity are classified according to their main focus, unsustainable logging, conversion or illegal logging. Some partnerships have more than one focus; they have an integrated approach. Sections 2.2 through 2.5 analyze the different partnerships per focus. The analysis includes the following.

First the institutional form of the partnerships is analyzed in terms of public-private or private intersectoral partnerships.

The effectiveness of the partnerships is analyzed, inspired by the methodology of Underdal, in terms of output and outcome (Underdal 2002). Examples of output are new policy or a signed agreement; output can be assessed with criteria for the policy stringency and its inclusiveness. Outcome is for example the number of target groups using the new policy.

The partnerships' functions are also described. Partnerships can fulfill different functions in the forest biodiversity governance system: they are active in agenda setting, policy development, implementation, metagovernance and ensuring good governance. Agenda setting is starting the discussion on new issues in the governance system. Policy development is for example the development of a standard for sustainable logging. Implementation means the implementation of sustainability measures "on the ground", for example managing a forest area in a sustainable manner. Metagovernance can be defined as strategic steering and coordination in the governance system. Ensuring good governance is ensuring that the basic elements needed for a governance system to function are functioning, for example combating corruption.

In each section the public-private interplay is analyzed. Possible forms of public-private interplay are partnerships performing traditional governmental roles, governments using the policies developed by partnerships, government involvement in partnerships and the impact of government policy on partnerships. Section 2.6 pays more detailed attention to the role of governments in the governance system.

The conclusion will address the question of the contribution of private regulation in forest biodiversity governance and the prerequisites to make partnerships a vital part of the governance strategy.

2.2   Partnerships for sustainable logging

The main threat to forests worldwide is not-sustainable industrial logging for the timber and paper industry (Bryant 1997). Especially developed countries, like the USA, Canada and European countries, produce large amounts of industrial timber. These countries and developing and strongly developing countries with very large forests and/or a strong tradition in the logging industry, like Malaysia, Indonesia, Russia, Brazil and China, use their forests profitably by exporting industrial timber (WRI 2004). The export of most forest products has expanded considerably over the past 25 years (Bulte and Barbier 2005).

Partnerships for sustainable industrial logging are older and further developed than partnerships working on other threats to forest biodiversity. The partnerships are voluntary certification schemes for sustainable forestry. They develop standards for sustainable forest management, using principles, criteria and indicators. The best-known schemes are the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the Canadian Standards Association (CSA), the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), the Malaysian timber Certification Council (MTCC), and the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification Schemes (PEFC).

Founded in 1993, the FSC is a private intersectoral partnership between industry, social groups and environmental groups. It was the first large certification scheme for sustainable forest management. Today, the FSC is a global organization for certification of sustainable forestry and forest products. There are 39 national FSC initiatives (FSC 2006). The organization is unique because of the balance of power between the partners. The three chambers (economic, social and environmental) each have one third of the votes in the General Assembly. Within each chamber, representatives from Southern and Northern countries each have half of the votes in order to ensure fair representation of both perspectives (FSC 2005a). The Board of Directors has nine directors, of which two represent economic interests. The others represent social and environmental interests (FSC 2005b). The FSC standard (FSC 1996) is a performance based standard; it requires effective, specifically described and verifiable measures to ensure sustainable forest management.

Summarizing, the FSC fulfilled and/or fulfils the functions of agenda setting, policy development, implementation, metagovernance and ensuring good governance. The agenda setting function of the FSC should not be underestimated. Because of the FSC, certification of sustainable timber has become normal. The FSC fulfils its metagovernance role by coordinating a global system for sustainable forest management. Because it includes requirements on legality, the FSC ensures good governance. Seventy-three million hectares of forests in more than 72 countries are FSC certified (FSC 2006).

The Canadian Standards Association (CSA) develops different types of standards, not only for forest management. CSA is a public-private partnership. Most CSA members are businesses; some are governmental organizations. The most recent version of the forestry standard (2002) was developed by the Technical Committee on Sustainable Forest Management. The committee includes representatives from four categories, academia and professionals, general interest (among others consumer and environmental organizations and indigenous representation), government and industry (CSA 2002a). The CSA forest certification system is therefore a public-private intersectoral partnership between government, business and civil society. However, the decision-making procedures do not require support from all four interest categories in order for the committee to adopt a standard.

The standard (CSA 2002b) describes issues that should be addressed; these include ecological and social issues. Compliance with legislation and respect of indigenous rights are demanded. The criteria are formulated in a clear and prescriptive manner. Issues that are not discussed are the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), chemicals or exotic species. However, the extent to and the manner in which the criteria are realized are up to the forest manager.

Managers on public land are required to organize a public participation process in which the ways of implementing the criteria are defined together. Private forestland owners are not required to do so. Since the government owns most of the forestland in Canada, the majority of forest managers will organize a public participation process. The public participation is meant especially for local parties, even though input from regional or national parties is possible. Efforts to let workers, unions and indigenous people participate are required. The participants agree together on content and methodology of the participation process. The forest manager has to demonstrate that all comments have been considered. Because the translation of the criteria is organized per forest area to be certified, civil society groups that operate on a regional or national level will have difficulty delivering input, since the number of participation processes will be high. It is expected that participants will be mainly local and directly impacted people and organizations, who are not specialized in forest issues.

Summarizing, the CSA fulfils the functions of policy development and implementation. It is, however, not a true performance based standard. The criteria are defined in a prescriptive manner. However, because the forest manager translates these demands to the local level, and the different interests in forestry issues are not equally represented in this translation process, sustainable forest management is not guaranteed. In 2005, a total of almost 70 million hectares were CSA certified (Abusow 2005).

The SFI started in 1994 as a business initiative, an initiative of the American Forest and Paper Association (AF&PA). Since 2000, the Sustainable Forestry Board (SFB) is responsible for the SFI standard for sustainable forestry. The SFB has three groups, an industry, civil society and a broader forestry community group, which includes representatives from government and academia. Social issues are not represented in the SFB, since only environmental groups are involved. The decision making process is organized in such a manner that representatives of none of the groups, representing different interests, can be outnumbered (SFB 2005). The SFI is a public-private partnership between government, business and civil society.

In 2005, the SFI standard was revised (SFI 2002; SFI 2004; SFI 2005a). The requirements ensuring legal and social procurement of timber products from outside North America have been strengthened, but are still not waterproof. Even though the scheme deals with most issues relevant to sustainable forest management, the description of most criteria leaves much room for interpretation and therefore does not guarantee sustainable forest management. For example, the SFI requires forest managers to "manage the quality and distribution of wildlife habitats and contribute to the conservation of biological diversity by developing and implementing measures that promote habitat diversity" (SFI 2004), where for example the FSC requires that forest managers "shall conserve biological diversity" (FSC 1996). Moreover, the SFI allows the use of GMOs and does not require active commitment to stop the use of chemical pesticides. The rights of indigenous peoples are only addressed as a "commitment to comply with social laws". For forests on public lands, forest managers should communicate with indigenous peoples. This does not guarantee the respect of the legal and customary right of indigenous peoples.

Summarizing, the SFI fulfils the functions of policy development, implementation and ensuring good governance by developing and implementing a standard for sustainable and legal forest

management. It is, however, not a true performance based standard; it requires many measurable activities from the forest manager, without guaranteeing effective measures for sustainable forestry on the ground. In 2005, more than 51 million hectares were certified to the SFI standard, about 29 million in Canada and about 22 million in the United States of America (SFI 2005b).

The MTCC was created in 1998. It developed out of an earlier initiative by the Malaysian government and timber industry. The MTCC is governed by a Board of Trustees. The board should consist of a chairman, and two representatives each from academic and research institutions, the timber industry, civil society and government agencies. However, in 2004, the board consisted of three government representatives, two research representatives, two business representatives and one union representative (MTCC 2004a).

In 2002 the Malaysian Criteria and Indicators for Forest Management Certification (MC&I 2002) were revised. At a national-level consultation, held in 2002, the standard was finalized and adopted. There were 106 participants, of which 14 represented social and environmental interest groups (Meng Chuo 2004). The National Steering Committee (NSC), especially formed for the improvement of the standard, finally adopted the 2002 standard. The NSC consisted of 28 members, of whom 5 left the process. Of the 23 remaining participants, three members represent social organizations (MTCC 2006). MTCC documents do not clarify the organization of the decision-making process both in the national-level consultation and in the NSC.

There is a history of critique of the MTCC by civil society. The critique focuses on the insufficient recognition of issues put forward by civil society and the inadequate attention for rights of local communities and indigenous peoples. WWF Malaysia resigned from the Board of Trustees in 2002, because the standards had been developed without balanced stakeholder participation. Since they felt their views on especially indigenous peoples' rights had not been taken into consideration, 13 NGOs withdrew from the process to develop the 2002 standard (Meng Chuo 2004).

Because the MTCC mainly uses consultative instead of participatory processes for civil society groups, it is classified as a public-private intersectoral partnership between government and business.

The 2002 standard includes some criteria and indicators that were not covered by the earlier standard. However, the indicators are less complete than in other standards, not very specific, and mostly not performance based. The standard often asks for plans or guidelines, instead of concrete measures. Also, the indicators for rights of local communities or indigenous peoples depend on the availability of legal documentation that often cannot be provided by these groups. Also, these indicators rely on existing laws with which there have been problems in the past (Meng Chuo 2004). GMOs or exotic species are not mentioned (MTCC 2004b).

Summarizing, the MTCC fulfils the functions of policy development, implementation and insuring good governance by developing and implementing a standard for sustainable and legal forest management. However, there are problems with participation of civil society and indigenous peoples' rights. Also, because the standard depends largely on government policy

in its implementation, the standard is only strong where policy is strong. The MTCC can only partly be called performance based. Only the principles and criteria are described in a performance based manner, but the further translation into concrete verifiable measures does not guarantee sustainable forest management. At the end of 2004, more than of 4.7 million hectares were MTCC-certified according to the 2001 standard (MTCC 2004a).

Created in 1999 as the Pan European Forest Certification Scheme with only European members, the PEFC Council has developed into a global umbrella organization of national forest certification schemes, and has been renamed the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification schemes. Thirty-two national forest certification systems are members of the PEFC, of which 22 have been endorsed by the PEFC (PEFC 2005a). The CSA, SFI and MTCC are PEFC members; the CSA and SFI have been endorsed as PEFC certification schemes. The PEFC is classified as a public-private intersectoral partnership between governments and business for the following reasons. The PEFC General Assembly, the highest decision making body, includes both representatives of national certification schemes and extraordinary members. All extraordinary members are forest owners or industry representatives. Only "national forest owners' organizations or national forestry sector organizations having the support of the major forest owners' organizations in that country", can take the initiative to set up a PEFC national governing body and apply for PEFC membership (PEFC 2005b). Even though these organizations should invite relevant interested parties to become involved, these national bodies are clearly meant to be business initiatives.

In order to be endorsed as a PEFC scheme, national schemes should be based on the inter-governmental processes for the promotion of sustainable forest management (PEFC 2005b). These processes, however, were meant for assessment and monitoring. They lack a description of performance standards at the local level, and were not intended for forest management certification (Ozinga 2004). The PEFC does demand that national forest certification schemes respect relevant legislation. Also the core ILO conventions should be respected (PEFC 2005b).

Summarizing, the PEFC fulfils the functions of policy development, metagovernance and ensuring good governance. Especially its metagovernance role, coordinating the cooperation of different national certification schemes, has had a significant impact on the forest governance system. Because the PEFC has taken the initiative to coordinate national schemes into a global system, there are now two competing global certification schemes, the FSC and the PEFC. The effectiveness of the PEFC can only be assessed at the national level, since the member schemes vary in their stringency and inclusiveness. Over 187 million hectares of forests are PEFC certified (this includes the large areas of forest certified under CSA and SFI). The PEFC is the world's largest certification scheme (PEFC 2005a).

When analyzing the characteristics of the partnerships for sustainable logging, the composition of actors involved shows remarkable differences. The FSC is the only private intersectoral partnership. The CSA and SFI are classified as partnerships between government, business and civil society, and the MTCC and PEFC as partnerships between government and business representatives. The FSC is the only partnership in which social and environmental interests have their own formal place in the organization. In other partnerships, the civil society

"chamber" includes environmental, indigenous peoples', workers' and consumer interests. Also, these partnerships have more interest groups, for example governments and academia. This means the relative influence of civil society is smaller. It could even mean that standards are adopted without the support of specific interest groups in civil society, for example social groups that are involved in these partnerships. These organizational differences can be explained by the historical development of the partnerships and their relationships. The FSC was set up by civil society and willing businesses, in reaction to the lack of progress in the international intergovernmental processes for forest conservation and sustainable forest use (Falkner 2003). The logging industry, supported by their governments, set up their own certification schemes as a reaction to the success of FSC. The SFI and CSA have increased the participation of civil society in the course of time in reaction to civil society critique.

The effectiveness of the different certification schemes also differs. The FSC is the most stringent and inclusive. The FSC clearly specifies the level of performance or results that must be achieved in a forest; it is a performance based system. It also addresses issues that the others do not. The public-private partnerships originally were set up as system standards; they hardly specified any minimum levels of performance, but instead required the forest manager to set his own targets and to show, by setting up a management system, that these self-determined goals were being met (cf. Gulbrandsen 2005), and that the forest manager continuously improved his sustainability performance. These partnerships have included performance based criteria in the later versions of their standards in order to answer to critique. Especially the implementation of these criteria into concrete measures for verifiable sustainable forest management remains problematic in the public-private partnerships. They still are not able to guarantee sustainable forest management.

The partnerships for sustainable logging have contributed to the global forest governance system and interacted with governments in several ways.

In 2004, more than 153 million hectares of forests and plantations were certified (Ozinga 2004). In this manner, the partnerships have played a major role in the implementation of sustainable forest management; they have taken over this role from governments. In some countries, being certified has become a regular aspect of being in the logging industry. In recent research in the USA, for example, 87% of the logging companies researched was certified (Dyke, Cash et al. 2005). This large area of certified forest has had major effects on the international timber trade. The trade has become more transparent, since the origin of certified timber is known. However, certified timber is still a niche market; most of the timber traded worldwide is not certified (Gulbrandsen 2005) and worldwide deforestation and forest degradation have not been stopped (Rametsteiner 2002). Moreover, most of the certified forests are located in the North. For example, almost 80% of the FSC-certified forests are located in the North, and about 20% in the South (Pattberg 2005c); certification is not yet a global solution. Also, most certified forests are certified using less rigorous standards. Therefore it cannot be guaranteed that these certified forests are actually managed sustainably.

Some governments have used the standards in their own procurement policy, and Mexico has developed a forestry law that closely mirrors the FSC standard (Pattberg 2005c). Privately developed policy is finding its way into the formal governmental regime.

The public-private partnerships with less rigorous standards are active in countries with large areas of forest and/or where the timber industry is an important economic sector. It seems countries that have tried to defend their forestry sectors in the international governmental regime, are trying to achieve their political goals through private initiatives. Forest certification has become politicized. This competition between the different types of certification schemes can be seen as a battle between the different approaches to certification, the performance standards and the system standards; it can also be seen as competition between domination of certification by business or civil society (Cashore 2002). The degree to which forest certification will contribute to the forest biodiversity governance system will depend on what approach to certification prevails in the long term, the performance standard or the system standard approach.

2.3   Partnerships to control conversion

A major threat that has become increasingly important over the last few years is conversion from forest to agricultural land. In Southeast Asia and South America, forests are being destroyed to make room for oil palm or soy plantations. Malaysia and Indonesia are the main producer countries for palm oil. The area planted with oil palm in Indonesia has expanded from 600.000 ha in 1985 to over three million hectares in 2000. Conservative figures show that nearly half of plantations planted by 2002 involved some form of forest destruction. The demand for palm oil is expected to grow intensely (FoE 2003; Glastra, Wakker et al. 2002; Wakker 2005). The area cultivated for soybean in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay has also increased rapidly.

Initiatives to control conversion are only a few years old. There is a partnership for sustainable oil palm production, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), and a partnership for responsible soy production, the Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS).

The RSPO is a private intersectoral partnership. Most of the members of the RSPO are business representatives. Civil society groups have four out of 16 seats in the Executive Board. Main goal of the RSPO has been to establish principles and criteria for sustainable palm oil. These were adopted in 2005 (RSPO 2005). In the principles and criteria, the most crucial issues are tackled. Sustainable palm oil production should be legal and does not diminish legal or customary rights of other users. New plantations may not replace primary or otherwise valuable forest. New plantations cannot be established on local peoples' land without their free, prior and informed consent as expressed through their own representative institutions. One major issue, the use of GMOs, is not addressed. The RSPO has decided that because there are no GMO oil palm plantations at the moment, no guidance is needed on this issue. However, the decision not to address the issue could have major effects in the future, not only for palm oil, but also for the definition of sustainability of other agricultural crops. Also, demands for some other issues, for

example biodiversity conservation in and around existing plantations, are not described strongly and some criteria are not performance based.

The RTRS is also a private intersectoral partnership. The first roundtable conference of the RTRS took place in 2005, the second in 2006. The organizing committee includes soy producers, users, investors and environmental and social NGOs, and coordinates the roundtable until a more formal structure is in place. In the 2005 roundtable, all relevant stakeholder groups were represented. The roundtable conference did not result in the acknowledgement of specific problems and ways to address these, and in that sense the roundtable conclusions were disappointing. The opinions of the different participants were too far apart in order to reach consensus (Dros 2005). The second roundtable discussed a draft declaration with principles for responsible soy (RTRS 2005; RTRS 2006). The draft principles are not rigorous, especially on the issues of conversion and protection of biodiversity and rights of indigenous peoples. It is the intention of the RTRS to develop the principles into globally applicable criteria for responsible soy. One of the main problematic issues in the RTRS is the use of GMOs. Both NGOs that want to exclude GMO soy from the definition of responsible soy and companies that are already involved in the large-scale production of GMO soy are involved in the roundtable. The organizing committee has stated that "The Round Table process will not promote the production, processing or trading of either genetically modified or non-genetically modified soy" (RTRS 2005).

As seen on the issue of sustainable logging, the partnerships to control conversion are filling the gaps when governments are not willing and/or able to meet sustainability goals. Both partnerships fulfill the functions of agenda setting and policy development. No plantations are certified according to the RSPO standard yet, since it has only recently been adopted. It is also still too early to assess the effectiveness of the RTRS. The partnerships to combat conversion would not be necessary if governments had developed a sustainable land use planning system, with protected areas and areas for sustainable forest use. In the major palm oil and soy producing countries, however, this is not the case. If a sustainable land use planning exists, it is often not adequately enforced. Important future government legislation will be the implementation of the agreement of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) to have a worldwide representative network of terrestrial protected areas in place by 2010. This legislation should contribute to halting conversion of forests for agricultural plantations.

2.4   Partnerships to control illegal logging

Important underlying causes for all threats on forest biodiversity are illegal logging and corruption and the trade in illegal timber. In some producer countries, the amount of illegally produced timber exceeds the legally produced amount. In these countries forest laws are not properly enforced and corruption is endemic. Examples are Brazil, where 80% of the logging is illegal, Indonesia, with 70% illegal logging, Cameroon, with 50-60% illegal logging, and Russia, where an estimated 30-60% of the logging is illegal (Richert 2003). Of the 44 countries with the largest area of natural forest, 33 score extremely low on the international corruption index (cf. Graf Lambsdorff 2004; WRI 2004). The European Union (EU) is an important market

for timber. It is estimated that 50% of the tropical hardwood on the European market is illegal (Richert 2003).

Most initiatives on the issue of illegal logging are relatively new. At the moment, the most important initiatives are bilateral or multilateral governmental agreements, in which governments agree on ways to tackle illegal logging and the trade in illegal timber together. The main political processes are the Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) initiatives. There is the East Asia FLEG, the African AFLEG, and the FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade) of the European Union. The Europe and North Asia (ENA) FLEG and a process for South America are being developed. In the FLEGT initiative, the EU wants to develop voluntary agreements with the producer countries that provide the largest amounts of timber for the European market. In these agreements, the partner countries will develop a common definition of legality. Timber products from the partner producer country will only be allowed on the European market if they have a legality license. The partner countries will set up a control system for legality (Commission 2003). Business and civil society are consulted in these political processes. Since the initial development of the FLEG processes, their further development and implementation have been extremely slow. In a resolution in July 2005, the European Parliament called on the European Commission and the Member States to "make strong and rapid progress on the implementation of the FLEGT action plan" (EP 2005).

Besides government initiatives, existing partnerships that originally only worked on sustainable logging have developed instruments to tackle illegal logging and the trade in illegal timber. The FSC, for example, has strengthened its demands for timber products using the FSC-logo that do not come from FSC-certified forests. (The FSC allows products carrying the FSC-label to partly contain not certified timber if this is clearly indicated on the label.) Under the new rules, suppliers of timber products from not-certified forests have to prove that the timber was produced legally. Also, the less rigorous certification schemes for sustainable forestry see the debate on legality as an opportunity to become more accepted in the marketplace. They promote their certified timber as "almost sustainable, and guaranteed legal". The MTCC, for example, is very successful in communicating this message. NGOs have raised serious questions on the reliability of the MTCC as proof of legality (Greenpeace 2005). Because legal but not sustainable timber is cheaper than legal and sustainable timber, the not sustainable timber could create problems for the already small niche market for sustainable timber. In order to prevent that these two positive developments, sustainable forest use and legal forest use, undermine each other, labeling legal timber as such for final consumers should be avoided. Instead, governments should take legal measures against the trade in illegal timber, for example through the FLEG processes. In this manner, legal and sustainable timber will not compete for the small market for sustainable timber.

There are numerous other initiatives on illegal logging, some of which are partnerships. NGOs are guarding protected areas in order to protect them from illegal logging, and timber traders are marketing timber as guaranteed legal. European timber importers and their business partners in exporting countries are trying to find ways to guarantee legality. The Dutch timber trade federation (NTTA), for example, has developed a mandatory code of conduct that demands 100% legal business from its members. For the code of conduct, the NTTA members have

asked their timber suppliers for a guarantee of legality (NTTA 2002). NGOs find especially the implementation of the code of conduct much too weak.

There is a strong debate on the definition of legal logging and legal timber. There are two main issues. The first one is the scope of the laws that a logging company has to abide by in order to be a legal forestry operation. The question is whether a logging operation should only abide by for forestry relevant laws, or whether it should take all national and international laws into account. The second major question is indigenous peoples' rights. Sometimes the law in a producer country does not respect all indigenous rights. The question is whether timber that is produced according to the law, but in contradiction with indigenous rights, is legal. If the definition of legal logging would exclude the legal and/or customary rights of indigenous peoples, this would have major implications for them. In some forest regions, indigenous peoples have been fighting for their rights to use the forests they live in for generations. Two major approaches towards legal timber can be distinguished. The less rigorous approach, mostly found in the timber industry, uses a narrow definition of legal logging, using only for logging relevant laws and excluding indigenous rights. The more rigorous approach, used mostly by civil society, uses the broad definition of legal logging. The different approaches towards sustainable logging, the less rigorous system standard and the more rigorous performance standard, are finding their way into the legality debate.

The issue of illegal logging emerged on the political agenda in the traditional way: civil society groups pushed governments to create legislation. This is logical, since law enforcement is a classical government role. Governments responded by actively taking up the issue, however, their speed has slowed down. Private initiatives have become active in this gap; they are taking over governments' classical role. Partnerships fulfill the function of policy development, implementation and ensuring good governance.

Governments are starting to use the policies produced by partnerships. The Danish and UK governments have both accepted the MTCC as proof of legality for their procurement policies (Denmark 2003; UK 2004). The UK government also accepts the FSC, CSA and SFI as proof of legality and sustainability. The UK accepts MTCC only as proof for legality for products with 100% certified timber, since the UK government finds the MTCC requirements for control of uncertified timber in mixed products not adequate to ensure legality. The Danish government only accepts MTCC as proof of legality when a traceability certificate accompanies the certificate for forest management. These are very strong examples of how partnership policy becomes formal government legislation: the private sector is defining the terms of the procurement policies of governments.

2.5   Partnerships with an integrated approach

Partnerships with an integrated approach focus on several threats to forest biodiversity. The World Bank-WWF Alliance for Forest Conservation and Sustainable Use is a public-private intersectoral partnership with an integrated approach. Since its establishment in 1998, the alliance works on, among others, creating protected areas, improving the management

of protected areas, increasing the area of certified forest and combating illegal logging. Its activities are global (WWF 2005). The Alliance combines the functions of policy development, implementing projects on the ground and ensuring good governance.

Another public-private intersectoral partnership with an integrated approach is the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP). It is a consortium of 29 governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector that works to improve communication and coordination among its member organizations on their projects, programs and policies. Goals of the partnership are to provide people with sustainable means of livelihood, improve forest and natural resource governance and develop a network of effectively managed protected areas. The CBFP is closely linked to the Central Africa Forests Commission, COMIFAC. COMIFAC was designed as the implementing body of the Yaoundé Declaration, which was signed during the Yaoundé summit in 1999. Ministers agreed on a framework document for all conservation and sustainable use of forests in Central Africa. In February 2005, 10 countries signed the COMIFAC treaty (COMIFAC 2005).

According to critics, local civil society is barely involved in the CBFP. The partnership also does not put enough effort into developing African civil society and does not address some of the core issues, like corruption and illegal logging. At the moment, international organizations in the partnership are taking over basic tasks of African governments, like managing protected areas, instead of investing in processes that will enable African governments to do these tasks themselves. Also, the CBFP consolidates the existing land use planning, in which the majority of the forest is designated as production forest (Verbelen 2005). WWF, a founding member of the CBFP, recognizes some of these issues. Even though several CBFP members are working on strengthening local civil society, there is a gap between what is being done and what needs to be done. The same is true for the issue of illegal logging. WWF stresses, however, that the strength of the partnership is the facilitation of the communication between the partners. The CBFP has the merit of bringing together partners that have a strong will to address common goals and find common solutions. Moreover, the CBFP has been successful in engaging its partners more in their commitments to increase the flow of funds to the region, and creating more coordinated interventions and more synergy in their efforts towards providing necessary support to the people and governments of the central African region (Somé 2005).

The public-private intersectoral Asia Forest Partnership (AFP) is also a regional partnership with an integrated approach. Members are governments, inter-governmental organizations, civil society groups, the private sector and intersectoral partnerships. The AFP promotes sustainable forest management in Asia through addressing the issues of illegal logging and its associated trade, forest fires, and rehabilitation and reforestation of degraded forests and land (AFP 2005). The fact that the MTCC, an intersectoral partnership, is a member of the AFP, another intersectoral partnership, is a good example of the increasing complexity of the forest biodiversity governance system.

The main functions of the CBFP and the AFP are metagovernance; partners exchange information and coordinate activities in order to increase efficiency and effectiveness. Another important function is creating additional funding for forest conservation in the region. It is

interesting to note that governments or governmental organizations are involved in all these partnerships with an integrated approach.

2.6   The role of governments in forest governance

Many authors have discussed the implications of private regulation for the role of governments in forest governance. Most authors recognize that governments have a large effect on the success of private initiatives (Cashore, Auld et al. 2004; Ostrom 1990). All authors acknowledge the new roles of governments in a multi-centric governance structure. Some are of the opinion that governments have lost their top-down steering capacity, and only have a mediator role in governance (Jessop 1998; Stoker 1998). Others see a dual role for governments. Traditional top-down steering is still attractive in some circumstances; in others governments have a metagovernance role (Cashore, Auld et al. 2004; Kooiman 1993). The analysis in this chapter supports the latter vision. Governments can contribute to the effectiveness of the forest biodiversity governance system both through "classical" government policy and metagovernance.

With "classical" government policy, governments contribute themselves to sustainable development and create the conditions in society needed for partnerships and other private initiatives to be successful. Examples of classical government policy that are important for forest governance are diplomacy amongst sovereign states, for example in (the implementation of) international agreements, like the CBD. Also, governments are buyers of forest products, for example, for large infrastructure and public housing projects. In Europe, government procurement accounts for 11% of the EU gross domestic product (Rametsteiner 2002). If governments implement green procurement policies, the market share of sustainably produced products would increase automatically. Last but not least, governments are the largest forest owners: governments own about 87% of the forests worldwide. A large part of the deforestation takes place in government-owned forests (Siry, Cubbage et al. 2005). Governments should ensure that the forests they own themselves are protected and/or used sustainably.

In their metagovernance roles, governments play a proactive role in the governance system, trying to attain their own (sustainability) goals. They are trying to build and manage the governance system needed to reach these goals. Governments can support important partnerships, initiate partnerships, promote information exchange and bring actors together. They should ensure that governance systems for different problems support each other's efforts. For example, initiatives for forest biodiversity conservation sometimes do not take the issue of poverty alleviation into consideration, and vice versa, even though millions of peoples are dependent on forests for their every day survival.

The developments in the governance system on the issue of illegal logging need a proactive attitude of governments. The classical role of governments is especially crucial, since the solution to most threats to forest biodiversity is largely dependent on land use planning and law enforcement, which are exclusive responsibilities of governments. In many forest regions, working towards sustainability is severely challenging because of widespread corruption and large-scale illegal logging. Both governments in forest regions and countries with large markets

for timber products can take specific measures against these threats. Together they should take legal measures against the trade in illegal timber. A proactive role by governments is also needed in the debate on the definition of legal logging and legal timber. All these measures could take place through the FLEG processes.

The competition of certification schemes also requires a proactive role by governments. In the marketplace, rigorous certification schemes compete with less rigorous schemes and government supported partnerships compete with private partnerships. Rhone and others describe this competition between public and private rule-making bodies as a "blurring of public and private spheres" (Rhone, Clarke et al. 2004). This is very confusing for buyers. Clarity on the differences is necessary for buyers to trust these certificates in the longer term (cf. Gulbrandsen 2005). Governments can play a role in two ways. They can ensure fair competition between different forest certification schemes by informing buyers about the differences between the certification schemes, or they can assess the different schemes, like the UK government has done (see section 2.4). In a recent discussion on the role of governments in certification of sustainable forest management, governments themselves concluded that their best role is to remain neutral between competing schemes (UNECE and FAO 2005). In practice, however, most governments have chosen to be involved in the less rigorous initiatives.

Until today, governments have not been very successful in both their classical government policy and in their metagovernance roles in the forest biodiversity governance system. In their classical government policy, governments have not used their exclusive responsibilities, like land use planning and law enforcement, which are crucial in forest biodiversity conservation. Some governments have been more successful than others in ensuring that their own forests are managed sustainably, and in implementing a sustainable procurement policy for timber products. Some initiatives, like the FLEG processes are promising. In their metagovernance responsibilities, governments have not ensured fair competition between the different certification schemes for sustainable forestry products.

Overall, governments have not taken a proactive role to conserve forest biodiversity or to improve the forest biodiversity governance system. Reasons for this behavior are numerous. In timber producing and buying countries, the logging industry and/or the timber trade is an important sector for the national economy. Also, the construction sector is dependent on timber as a raw material, and the global economy is dependent on paper. Therefore, it is difficult for governments to drastically reform the forestry sector. Also, the industry and government often have good relations. Countries with large forest areas and biodiversity of worldwide importance want the world community to help pay for conserving this biodiversity. Developed countries are often not willing to pay more than they already do for conservation.

2.7   Conclusions

There are a large number of partnerships active in the field of forest biodiversity conservation; the ontology of global forest biodiversity governance has indeed changed from a single-centric structure, with states regulating forest biodiversity, to a more complex structure in which

governance is both a public and private affair. An important feature of this structure is the overall lack of strategic links between the various partnerships and between the partnerships and public initiatives. Allocation of tasks between actors hardly takes place; only a few partnerships fulfill a metagovernance role in the governance system. Functional interdependencies are hampered because there are almost too many private initiatives. Also, they differ greatly in their goals and composition, hardly communicate with each other and compete against each other. Often partnerships develop ad hoc and at random, to solve a specific problem or one threat to forest biodiversity. One of the main negative aspects known in market steering, sub-optimization is taking place in forest biodiversity governance: both the public and private actors involved have strategies of their own, without taking the governance system as a whole into account. A coordinating and integrating mechanism is lacking.

However, in the instances when actors are able to create functional interdependencies and strategic alliances, this indeed has a relatively large impact on the governance system. For example, the moment that the former adversaries, members of the logging industry and civil society, started the FSC, can be seen as the start of the process "from government to governance" in the international forest biodiversity governance system. In another example, when the PEFC became a global organization for the coordination of national forest certification schemes, this group of certification schemes gained momentum vis-à-vis the FSC. As a third example, the MTCC has gained momentum since it has become recognized as proof of legal timber by some European governments.

Based on the analysis, private regulation of public affairs is not the one and only solution to forest biodiversity conservation. Although there are some positive effects of the partnerships active today, which would not have been realized by formal government regimes, these effects are still limited. Contributions are the large area of certified forests, the creation of a market for sustainably produced timber and more transparency in the timber sector. The most valuable contribution of partnerships for forest biodiversity conservation has been filling the gap when governments were not willing and/or able to regulate. The movement in the forest biodiversity policy issue, the emergence of sustainable logging, the putting on the agenda of the issues of conversion and illegal logging, is largely due to private initiatives. The partnerships on conversion also fill the gap of lack of law enforcement of land use planning policy. On the issue of illegal logging, government and private initiatives are evolving at the same time. It seems, however, that private partnerships are faster in implementing this new policy; government diplomacy is slower. The successes have their limits, however. Most of the certified forests are managed using less stringent schemes, the market for sustainable timber is still a niche market and the exact origin of the majority of the timber and paper traded in the international market is still unknown.

In conclusion, public and private regulation can enhance each other in the field of forest biodiversity governance. Governments' "classical" competence in international negotiations, land use planning and law enforcement can be complemented by private initiatives that use informal influence and market power. However, there are several prerequisites to develop a more forceful governance system for forest biodiversity conservation.

- There seems to be a trend for partnerships to choose for less stringent and less inclusive approaches towards sustainability. The FSC and RSPO are the only exceptions (although it may be too early for definite conclusions about the RSPO). If this trend continues, the added value of partnerships in the forest biodiversity governance system will remain limited. It seems the most powerful actors in all three sectors of society (government, business and civil society) are able to create strategic alliances in which they find a common approach to sustainability. Often, the more difficult issues, like indigenous peoples' rights or the use of GMOs are not (thoroughly) addressed. The less powerful actors, that favor the more stringent and inclusive approaches, are either excluded from the partnership, or decide to leave the partnership themselves. This utilization of the phenomenon partnership will not solve the more fundamental sustainability issues, and will only develop piecemeal improvements. In order for the forest governance system to become more effective, true commitment for sustainability is needed from the most powerful actors in all three sectors of society.

- Partnerships are dependent on effective government policy for their success. Especially "classical" government policy on illegal logging, corruption and the trade in illegal timber are prerequisites for large-scale sustainable forest use. Governments also need to ensure fair competition in the governance system. Until today governments have mostly had a negative effect on the success of private regulation, both through their "classical" government policy and in their metagovernance roles. Governments have to understand that forest law enforcement is in the long term interest of their forestry and/or timber trade industry.

- The trend of the partnerships in forest governance to develop certification schemes has had a broader impact on the whole sustainable development discourse. Certification schemes are being developed for many commodities and other internationally traded products. However, this may not always be the most effective way to tackle a sustainable development problem. Also, since these partnerships work on marketing sustainably produced products, they have made their success largely dependent on the will and ability of buyers to pay extra for a sustainable product. This makes them very vulnerable. Until today, the market for sustainable timber is still a small niche market. Thus, even though these partnerships have had a successful complementary role to formal government legislation, the main question for the future is how to enlarge the current niche contribution of these certification schemes to the forest governance system.

- Another current trend of partnerships focusing on one threat to forest biodiversity is not the most effective or efficient way to contribute to forest governance. A more integral approach, taking into account the different threats for forest biodiversity and the interrelationships between them, should be more effective. In this approach, the different public and private actors can allocate tasks according to their different strengths and the instruments needed to conserve forest biodiversity, and develop a more strategic and reserved policy towards creating more new initiatives. The best level for this metagovernance could be the regional or ecosystem level. In this context, the Asia Forest Partnership, the Congo Basin Forest Partnership and the FLEG processes are interesting developments.

3 Partnership as governance mechanism in development cooperation: Intersectoral North-South partnerships for marine biodiversity[2]

3.1 Introduction

North-South relationships in development cooperation are almost per definition relationships between unequal partners. Traditionally, the 'Northern' donor government finances development projects in the developing 'Southern' country, a process strikingly described by Glasbergen and Miranda as a 'one-way transfer of both money and morals' (Glasbergen and Miranda 2003, p.1). For decades, efforts have been made to improve these relationships in terms of equality and mutuality. These improvements are a necessity for realizing several main goals of development cooperation, improving autonomy and self-determination of the South (Maxwell and Riddell 1998).

Defining North-South relations in terms of partnership has been an important part of these efforts to make development cooperation a more two-way street. In development cooperation, the term partnership is used to describe different types of relationships, sometimes referring to the relationship between a Northern and Southern government only, and sometimes including actors from other sectors of society, like market or civil society actors. 'Literature about partnership between North and South tends to focus on donor-recipient relationships, in particular on the dimensions of power, participation, trust and sustainability, as well as mutuality' (Johnson and Wilson 2006, p.72).

Examples of early efforts to change the relationship between donor and recipient countries are the Lomé Conventions between the European Union and a group of countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (the ACP group) and the sustainable development agreements (SDAs) between the Netherlands and Benin, Bhutan and Costa Rica. The Lomé Conventions, dating back to 1975, enabled the recipient country to take the lead in defining objectives and means of implementation of the development cooperation agreements. During the course of time, these principles of partnership were however gradually replaced by more control by the donors, because the Northern countries disapproved of the choices made or 'could not accept that aid should be provided irrespective of human rights violations' in some countries (Maxwell and Riddell 1998, p.261). The SDAs from the 1990s were grounded on the principles of equality, reciprocity and participation, with the aim of establishing a new pattern of relationships between North and South (Verhagen, Dorji et al. 2003). The agreements strived for a more equal

relationship between the donor and developing country. Also, because the goal of the SDAs was sustainable development, the agreements implied change not only for the developing but also for the developed country, since both needed to change in order to achieve sustainability. Therefore the principle of reciprocity was adopted. The idea behind the principle of participation was the need to strengthen the position of civil society in the developing countries. The SDAs were not successful for many reasons, but mainly because the Northern country had difficulties with the principle of reciprocity (Glasbergen and Miranda 2003; Rinzin 2006).

These examples raise the question of whether partnership can actually improve North-South relations in development cooperation. The major challenge is how to handle existing unequal relations between partners (Johnson and Wilson 2006). If these inequalities are not addressed adequately, there is even a danger of partnership actually 'reinforcing power asymmetries' (Lister 2000, p.236).

This discussion on the role of partnership in development cooperation is part of a broader debate on the role of partnership in sustainable development. This debate is concentrated less on partnership as a tool for the emancipation of the South, but more on partnership as a mechanism for the participation of all actors necessary for sustainable development. The focus is on intersectoral partnership, partnership between state, market actors and/or actors from civil society, since attaining sustainable development is increasingly seen as a responsibility of all sectors of society instead of governments only.

The objective of this chapter is to better understand the role of partnership as governance mechanism in development cooperation in this broader context of sustainable development. The chapter will focus on the role of partnerships in the governance system for marine biodiversity, since several developments are taking place on this issue that are especially relevant for both development cooperation and sustainable development.

The chapter presents a transactional model for the analysis of international partnership. The analysis will focus on a form of partnership that is especially relevant for development cooperation, intersectoral North-South partnership. In these partnerships, the governments, market actors and/or civil society groups in both a developing and a developed country cooperate, thus combining a partnership for development cooperation approach and a partnership for sustainable development approach. Intersectoral North-South partnerships have mainly evolved between countries with an economic relationship, usually between a Southern country that produces a certain product for a market in a Northern country. One of the goals of the partnership is often to make the production more sustainable, a common problem of the producing and buying countries. Since this type of partnership represents a specific part of the total arena of partnerships, the results will be especially useful for North-South partnerships that focus on a combination of development cooperation, sustainable development and trade.

The performance of two intersectoral North-South partnerships is analyzed: the shrimp partnership between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Netherlands and the anchoveta partnership between the Netherlands and Peru. These partnerships were chosen because they are a few years old and thus both their start and development over time can be researched; they involve

the same Northern country (the Netherlands) enabling comparison; and they play a role in the governance of the most important current sustainability issues in marine biodiversity. The lessons learned through these two case studies can deepen our understanding of the potential of partnership as governance mechanism for development cooperation.

The results are based on the analysis of partnership documents, desk research of literature and 26 interviews with marine biodiversity and fisheries experts and participants in the partnerships representing the sectors of society in all countries involved.

3.2   A transactional model for partnership analysis

Partnerships can be analyzed from different theoretical angles. Huijstee et al. (Huijstee, Francken et al. 2007) make a distinction between *actor* and *institutional* analysis of partnerships. In the actor approach, interactions between the partners are the key unit of analysis. Topics like how partners communicate, exchange information and influence each other are analyzed. An example is Bendell and Murphy's analysis of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), where they assess the role of the non-governmental organization (NGO) WWF, the timber industry and governments from the actors' perspectives (Bendell and Murphy 2000). An institutional analysis, on the other hand, takes another point of departure. Here, the emergence of partnerships from institutional dynamics in a society is studied. According to Arts, for example, partnerships are an expression of recent political modernization processes (Arts 2002). During the last decades the political roles of state, market and civil society have been redefined and their boundaries have become blurred, due to the impact of neo-liberalism, privatization, governance and so on. This has enabled the emergence of new policy arrangements 'beyond the state', such as intersectoral partnerships.

This chapter combines the actor and institutional approach, while emphasizing the former. Therefore the framework used for the analysis is called a *transactional* model on partnerships. With that, intersectoral and international relationships between Northern and Southern partners from state, market and civil society are the key units of analysis. This focus is chosen because the most interesting theoretical question is what the different partners do, think and decide, individually or together. An empirical argument is that the marine biodiversity partnerships dealt with in this chapter are only a few years old, so there is not much 'path dependency' to study. Yet, the chapter will also show that the interactions in and among partnerships are colored by the rules of the game and the power relations of the past (such as diplomatic traditions and donor-recipient dependencies among governments).

In Figure 3.1 the theoretical framework is presented. Its starting point is the triangle of the 'state', 'market' and 'civil society' sectors within countries (and beyond). Such distinctions are rather common in sociological and political analyses and are often applied to the analysis of environmental governance (Dubbink 1999; Van Tatenhove, Arts et al. 2000; Driessen and Glasbergen 2002). Figure 3.1 distinguishes such triangles in two countries, in this case a developed and a developing country. As a consequence, intersectoral relationships are not only horizontally established (*within* countries), but vertically as well (*among* countries). At this

Figure 3.1: Transactional model for partnership analysis

vertical axis, dynamics among the sectors are to be distinguished, however, not only *inter*sectoral dynamics (e.g. state-market or market-civil society), but *intra*sectoral as well (e.g. state-state or market-market). Exactly on the crossroads of such horizontal and vertical relationships, the establishment and embedding of intersectoral North-South partnerships take place.

The model also distinguishes three situational contexts: two national and one international situational context. These refer to specific regulatory practices on certain issues on the one hand (in this case, existing fishery and marine biodiversity regulations) and to specific market conditions regarding certain products and services on the other (in this case, fish products and environmental standards).

The final concept of Figure 3.1 to be elaborated upon is partnership performance. Performance is defined as the extent to which a partnership realizes its potential in terms of establishing *new* relationships and producing *new* outputs. This can be achieved at different levels:

1. Bringing together relevant *stakeholders* for a specific sustainability problem;
2. Bringing together relevant views on a problem and thus realizing *integrative solutions*;
3. Introducing or increasing intersectoral *cooperation* in developing (and developed) countries;
4. Strengthening the position of *civil society* in developing (and developed) countries;
5. Increasing attention for *sustainability* issues in developing (and developed) countries.

It is hypothesized that the performance of partnerships is dependent on: (1) the situational contexts; (2) intersectoral relationships (between state, market and civil society *within* countries) and (3) international sectoral relationships (between state, market and civil society *among* countries). The situational contexts may have a considerable impact on partnerships and their performance. For example, if there is already much regulation in place or market conditions are unfavorable, it is probably hard for a partnership to emerge and institutionalize. Also, the added value of a partnership in a situational context in which many other governance initiatives already exist will probably be smaller than in a situational context with fewer other mechanisms in place. Partnerships will probably also have difficulties institutionalizing when intersectoral and international sectoral relationships are troubled.

Conceptually, interactions can be studied from many angles: contacts, conflicts, communication and so on. For this chapter, the choice has been made to study the intersectoral and international sectoral relationships at the level of three dimensions: discourses, power and rules, comparable with the policy arrangement approach (Van Tatenhove, Arts et al. 2000). *Discourse*, first, is an important concept to understand how groups of people frame reality in a certain way, through particular ideas, concepts and narratives (Hajer 1995). This concept helps to analyze the various sustainability discourses in different sectors and countries. The hypothesis is that these different discourses will color interpersonal relations in partnerships, although implicitly most of the time.

Power is an important concept in political and social analyses alike (Clegg 1989), but even more so in this case, given the (potential) power inequalities among developed and developing countries on the one hand and among the three sectors of society on the other. It is relevant to see how and to what extent these inequalities co-determine interactions in partnerships, enabling or constraining some agencies more than others in achieving their goals.

Rules, finally, refer to established norms, conventions, routines and the like, which shape interaction among agencies (Giddens 1984). Through 'rules of the game' one can explain how new partnerships are affected, even paralyzed sometimes, by 'patterned interactions' from the past. It should be mentioned that in applying these three concepts – discourse, power and rules -the chapter does not aim at a full systematic analysis. The starting points are the interactions themselves and only when one or more of the dimensions seem relevant to explain what is actually happening in the partnership, they are discussed.

Below, the chapter will assess whether and to what extent the marine biodiversity partnerships achieve the five levels of partnership performance. Success and failure will be linked to the situational contexts and the three dimensions of interaction (discourses, power and rules) in both the intersectoral relationships and the international sectoral relationships.

3.3   Development cooperation and marine biodiversity

One of the most important services of marine ecosystems for humans is the provision of food in the form of fish. Marine products are in demand as luxury food, subsistence food and as feed for aquaculture and livestock. Because of the growing demand for fish, the rapid expansion of fishing

fleets in the twentieth century and the use of destructive fishing methods, fishing has become one of the largest threats to marine biodiversity worldwide. Marine fisheries are in a global crisis (Pauly, Christensen et al. 1998). Most industrial fisheries are either fully or overexploited (UNEP 2006): about 47 percent of the main stocks or species are fully exploited, 18 percent are over-exploited and 10 percent are significantly depleted or are recovering from depletion (FAO 2002). The global fishing industry is 'fishing down marine food webs', first depleting the large, long-lived, slower-growing, predatory fish that have a position high in the food web, like tuna, and then moving on to smaller fish species (Pauly, Christensen et al. 1998, p.860). Research suggests that the global ocean has lost more than 90 percent of large predatory fishes (Myers and Worm 2003). Several commercially valuable marine species are considered endangered or commercially extinct (ICTSD 2006).

The most important trend in global fisheries today is the emergence and rapid development of industrial aquaculture. Aquaculture is one of the fastest-growing food producing industries, with an annual global growth rate of about 9 percent since 1950. Today almost half of the fish consumed is produced by aquaculture (FAO 2006). Aquaculture could become a sustainable alternative to catching fish in the wild, lowering the pressure on marine biodiversity. However, the current aquaculture industry has several sustainability problems of its own. The industry copes with polluted wastewater (Tacon and Forster 2003) and the farms are often built in ecologically important areas, which are destroyed or impacted due to these developments. Furthermore, the industry often has a negative impact on the livelihoods of local communities.

One of the most important sustainability issues in aquaculture is the fact that most fish produced in industrial aquaculture are carnivorous species. This type of aquaculture is dependent on industrial feeds, of which a major ingredient is wild-caught fish (Deutsch, Gräslund et al. 2007): industrial aquaculture is 'farming up the food web' (Naylor, Goldburg et al. 2000, p.1018). Already, almost one-third of the fish caught globally is used to produce fishmeal and fish oil, most of which is used as fish feed in aquaculture (FAO 2002). Around half of the produced fishmeal and about three quarters of the produced fish oil is used by aquaculture; the remainder is mostly used for animal feed. The feed often comes from fully or overexploited fisheries. Moreover, the protein conversion rate is very high: the weight of the fish caught to produce fish feed is often higher than the weight of the fish that is farmed. So, when aquaculture uses wild fisheries capture for fish feed, it is not only considered to be unsustainable in an environmental sense (Pauly and Watson 2003; UNEP 2006), it also contributes little to world food security (Naylor, Goldburg et al. 1998). Aquaculture of carnivorous species is not intended to provide food, but to generate revenues (Deutsch, Gräslund et al. 2007). The industry is working towards improving the protein conversion rate, and is researching alternative sources for fish feed. Soy is an important replacement for fishmeal and fish oil. However, this only moves the problem to a different type of ecosystem, since in South America large areas of primary forests are already being converted into agricultural land for soy production.

Another important development in fisheries is the globalization of the production chain (Deutsch, Gräslund et al. 2007). The international trade in fish has grown tremendously over the past decades, spurred on by a growing international demand for (high-quality) fish, increased aquaculture production and the demand for fishmeal and fish oil for animal feed. This demand

is expected to remain equal or increase. An important part of the trade in reality means that fish produced in developing countries is exported to developed countries. Developing countries were responsible for about half of all exports in 2002. Japan, the United States and the European Union were responsible for about 75 percent of all imports (ICTSD 2006). The international trade has increased the quantity and quality of fish available in developed countries (UNEP 2006). The question is whether the development of an export industry, like industrial fisheries or aquaculture, can contribute to sustainable development in developing countries. Export-driven fisheries over-exploit the resource base in developing countries, and divert food away from the local market. Often only a few companies profit from this industry and it has proven to be extremely difficult to let local populations also profit from this development. Moreover, large industrial fishing fleets that focus mainly on export markets often compete with artisanal fisheries for local markets (Pauly, Christensen et al. 2002). Fish is extremely important for the food security of these local fishers. At least six million artisanal and small scale fishers worldwide earn less than US$1 per day.

Because the rapid development of aquaculture and export-driven fisheries has great impact, socially, environmentally and economically, these issues are of great relevance for development cooperation initiatives for sustainable development. The analyzed intersectoral North-South partnerships play a role in the governance of these important current issues. The shrimp partnership is active in one of the most important aquaculture sectors that use industrial feed. Shrimp, a high-value luxury seafood, is the main fish trade commodity in terms of value and is the most traded seafood product internationally (FAO 2002). It is produced mainly in developing countries for markets in industrialized countries (Naylor, Goldburg et al. 1998). The anchoveta partnership is focused on the world's largest fishery. Peruvian anchoveta was the largest single species catch in 2000 (FAO 2002). Peru is the world's main supplier of fishmeal and fish oil: more than a third of the world production comes from the Peruvian anchoveta fisheries. Fishmeal and fish oil are the fifth largest type of fisheries trade in terms of value (ICTSD 2006).

3.4   The shrimp case

3.4.1   Shrimp and sustainability

Shrimp is both caught in the wild and produced in aquaculture. About 30-40 percent of the global shrimp production comes from aquaculture. Tropical shrimp aquaculture is the second largest aquaculture sector in terms of market value, and sixth in terms of quantity (FAO 2006).

Shrimp aquaculture causes several sustainability problems. Shrimp farms are frequently developed in mangrove forest areas. About 38 percent of mangrove loss worldwide can be attributed to shrimp aquaculture (UNEP 2006). The loss of wild fisheries stocks due to habitat conversion by shrimp aquaculture is large (Naylor, Goldburg et al. 2000), since these mangroves are important nursery habitats for many juvenile fish caught as adults in coastal and off-shore fisheries. In Southeast Asia, mangrove-dependent species account for about one-third of the total wild fish catch. Moreover, mangroves impact the condition of coral reefs, which account for about 10 percent of global human fish consumption. The development of shrimp aquaculture

also has negative consequences for local communities, who use the mangrove forests, for example to fish. When the forests are destroyed, these sources of income and food disappear. Formerly publicly accessible land with many resources is transformed into privately owned farms (Naylor, Goldburg et al. 2000). Shrimp aquaculture also copes with pollution, and still depends on natural supplies of shrimp from the sea. In some cases, small shrimp is caught and raised in farms. In most other cases, adult females are caught in the wild and brought to hatcheries to produce larvae (CREM 2004). Wild shrimp is overexploited in many parts of the world (ICTSD 2006). Finally, because of its dependence on wild-caught fish for feed, intensive shrimp farming actually results in a net loss of fish protein (Naylor, Goldburg et al. 1998). Figures for 1997 show that for every kilogram of farmed shrimp about 2.8 kilograms of wild fish is needed as feed (Naylor, Goldburg et al. 2000). Approximately 70-80 percent of all farmed shrimp is grown on commercial feed (Deutsch, Gräslund et al. 2007).

The main sustainability problem of shrimp fisheries is bycatch. Bycatch are marine species unintendedly caught. They are often thrown overboard and die due to the injuries incurred. Shrimp trawl fisheries are the fisheries with the most bycatch globally, both measured in weight and numbers (Alverson, Freeberg et al. 1994). For one kilogram of shrimp, about 10-17 kilograms of bycatch is caught. These bycatch levels are so high because shrimp fisheries use small-maze nets, and they fish near the shore, where nurseries are located for many other kinds of fish.

These facts and figures on the sustainability of shrimp are interpreted differently by different actors. Two main discourses can be distinguished. Supporters of the first discourse realize that there are some practical sustainability problems in shrimp farming, but do not see fundamental problems in developing the industry itself. The second discourse is based on the opposite conviction. Supporters have fundamental problems with the development of shrimp farming for export markets as such; solving the local sustainability problems per farm is not going to solve the problem as a whole (Béné 2005). These various ideas to a large extent overlap with different discourses on development cooperation. On the one hand there is the 'economic growth and global market access' discourse. Supporters of this discourse are of the opinion that economic development within the context of the globalized economy should be the overall goal of development cooperation. This discourse is countered by another one, in which the goal of development cooperation is sustainable development, thus placing the target of economic development in the context of environmental and social goals.

3.4.2   The situational contexts: Many other initiatives

Aquaculture shrimp production is a fast-growing industry. It is expected that this growth will continue. The governments of both Southern partner countries in the shrimp case, Indonesia and Malaysia, have plans to increase the production of aquaculture shrimp massively, even though it is expected that the global production of aquaculture shrimp will soon exceed demand (Ekmaharaj 2006).

In Indonesia, shrimp aquaculture is already an important economic sector. In 1999, Indonesia was the third largest producer of cultivated shrimp in the world, following Thailand and China. In 2000, it was also the third largest wild shrimp producer, following China and India. The shrimp export is important for the Indonesian economy, with an export value of about US$1

billion in 1996 (CREM 2004). Indonesia is mainly a producer of raw material, with most of the added value produced during the processing realized by other countries (CREM 2004). The Indonesian government, supported by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and bilateral donors, including the Dutch government, has stimulated the intensification and expansion of shrimp aquaculture for decades (CREM 2004). This is part of a global approach, in which the growth of shrimp aquaculture has been promoted and supported by national governments, private investors and international development agencies wanting to generate foreign exchange, profit and employment (Naylor, Goldburg et al. 1998). This shows that the international governmental community has been part of the 'global market access' discourse in development cooperation.

There are several Indonesian regulations that influence shrimp aquaculture and shrimp fisheries. They include the Law on Water Resources (UU No.6/1996), the Law on Fishery (UU No.31/2004) and the Law on Decentralization (UU No.32/2004). These laws use the ecosystem approach and require sustainable management. The Indonesian government has also developed specific regulations to minimize the impacts of shrimp aquaculture and the catch of wild shrimp. The government requires an environmental impact analysis (EIA) for the development of shrimp ponds larger than 50 hectares. For smaller projects an environmental management plan and an environmental monitoring plan must be available. Shrimp ponds in mangroves must leave 40 percent of the mangroves intact and a green belt must be maintained. Shrimp trawling has been prohibited in Indonesia since 1980. The Ministry of Fisheries has also taken the initiative to develop a Code of Conduct for shrimp aquaculture (CREM 2004). Overall, on paper, the Indonesian policy on marine biodiversity is adequate. Yet, the implementation of the regulations and policy remains problematic in practice because of lack of information and/or enforcement (CREM 2004).

Malaysia is currently a relatively small player in global shrimp production. However, the government aims to increase shrimp production from the estimated 40.000 ton in 2006 to 180.000 ton in 2010. In order to achieve this target, the government wants to further develop 25.000 hectares of coastal land into aquaculture ponds (Anonymous 2007).

The Malaysian federal government has repeatedly committed itself to strict mangrove protection. However, a large part of mangroves is 'state land' that falls under state government instead of federal government jurisdiction. Different Malaysian legislations are relevant for shrimp aquaculture, most of which are of voluntary nature. The national 'Inland Fishery Rules (Aquaculture)' are being developed and adopted at a very slow pace. According to the rules, state governments are required to develop aquaculture development plans that ensure sustainable development of aquaculture. The Environmental Quality Act requires an EIA for land-based aquaculture projects that involve clearing of mangrove swamps covering 50 hectares or more. However, because most farms are smaller than 50 hectares, an EIA is usually not required. In the Guidelines on Development of Aquaculture, recommendations are made for the selection of sites for aquaculture development. The Malaysian Code of Conduct for Responsible Aquaculture provides non-binding guidance for aquaculture producers. In the Code, mangrove areas are discouraged as sites for aquaculture development. The Malaysian government has also developed

its own 'Malaysian Aquaculture Farm Certification Scheme' (SPLAM), based on the FAO Code of Conduct for responsible fisheries. It includes both food quality and sustainability issues, however, it is not clear how stringent the scheme is (AIDEnvironment 2005).

Besides these national regulations, the production of shrimp is an issue that is also covered by several international private initiatives and partnerships. The most important ones are international initiatives to set standards for and/or certify sustainably produced shrimp. Some of them are still developing their standard; others are already certifying shrimp. The most influential are the following. The first one, the International Principles for Responsible Shrimp Farming were developed by the FAO, the Network of Aquaculture Centres in Asia-Pacific (NACA), the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the World Bank Group (WB), and the World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) (NACA 2006). The principles were welcomed by the 50 countries attending the UN FAO (COFI) Subcommittee Aquaculture meeting in September 2006, and can serve as a harmonization tool for the large number of certification initiatives for shrimp (Gianni 2006). The second, the Global Aquaculture Alliance (GAA) is an international business initiative. The shrimp farm standards are developed by a technical committee in which conservation NGOs are represented. Governments are not involved. The Aquaculture Certification Council (ACC) has been given the exclusive right to certify farms using GAA standards. The GAA/ACC could have a large impact on the industry over the next few years, primarily because two major seafood retailers in the United States have recently endorsed the GAA standards and ACC certification scheme (Gianni 2006).

Maybe even more influential is the initiative of the company Heiploeg, the main Dutch shrimp importer to propose to integrate sustainability criteria for shrimp in the Eurep Gap certification system. Eurep Gap is a commonly used certification system of the European retail industry focused on food safety issues. The initiative is the result of a dialogue between Dutch shrimp importing companies and Dutch NGOs that started after a NGO campaign on shrimp. The dialogue developed parallel to the shrimp partnership analyzed in this chapter, and the participants of both initiatives largely overlap. In the Dutch dialogue, importers and NGOs agreed on minimum criteria for the sustainability and transparency of shrimp imports. The NGOs developed the minimum criteria into detailed environmental and social criteria for sustainable aquaculture shrimp. Eurep Gap has set up a working group, chaired by Heiploeg, to further develop the sustainability criteria for shrimp. The criteria adhere to the International Principles for Responsible Shrimp described above. If Eurep Gap adopts these criteria, this would mean the certification criteria for sustainable shrimp aquaculture would be endorsed by the majority of the European retail industry, and, more indirectly, that most large shrimp farms would have to adhere to the criteria. In addition, it could be the start of Eurep Gap including more sustainability criteria in its system, also for other products. It must be said that caught shrimp is not included in this system.

A last private initiative is Naturland that certifies organically produced shrimp, including farms in Indonesia. It is and will probably remain a certification scheme for a niche market.

Based on this overview of international and national initiatives and regulations on the sustainability of shrimp, the question is really what the partnership between Indonesia, Malaysia

and the Netherlands analyzed in this chapter can contribute to this already almost overcrowded governance system for sustainable shrimp.

3.4.3 Partnership background

The shrimp partnership between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Netherlands was agreed at the World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002 (Anonymous 2003). It is part of a larger WSSD partnership called 'Market Access Through Meeting Quality Standards for Food and Agricultural Products', with more countries involved and on more products, for which the Dutch government has reserved €8 million. Here, the focus is on the partnership for shrimp.

At the beginning, food safety standards, and not environmental or social issues, were the main focus of the partnership. Later, environmental and social issues were incorporated, but the struggle for the aims of the partnership continued. The organization of the shrimp partnership was unclear for some time. For several partner organizations the decision-making procedures, financing, agenda-setting process and voting procedures were not transparent. In order to create more clarity, an organizational scheme was developed and implemented. There is a trilateral committee in which the representatives from the three countries decide on the focus of the partnership, the work program and so on. The trilateral committee meets about twice a year. Representatives of the three sectors of society (state, market and civil society) of all three countries should be represented on the trilateral committee. In each of the three countries, there is a national committee that decides on the national implementation of the partnership. The three sectors of society should also be represented in these committees. In principle, decisions are taken by consensus. In 2005, the Dutch partner NGOs, the Dutch Committee of the World Conservation Union (IUCN NL), Oxfam Novib and Friends of the Earth Netherlands (Milieudefensie), left the partnership. The Malaysian NGOs, Consumers' Association of Penang (CAP) and Friends of the Earth Malaysia (SAM), are no longer active in the partnership since they were mainly involved for a mangrove rehabilitation project, which has been implemented. The partnership continues despite the lack of wide participation by civil society. At the moment, only WWF is still actively involved in both Indonesia and the Netherlands.

A partnership secretariat has been has been set up to coordinate the partnership activities and the partnership has implemented several projects. Different training programs on food safety issues were realized; in Malaysia a mangrove rehabilitation project was implemented, with 10.000 trees planted; in Indonesia, a 'road show', a tour to several locations to create awareness of sustainability and product safety issues in shrimp aquaculture took place. Since the implementation of these projects, the partnership progress has slowed down. Maybe the most important indirect result of the partnership has been the successful effort in 2006 to ensure that shrimp from Indonesia will continue to be allowed onto the European market, in which several partner organizations were involved.

3.4.4 Intersectoral relationships: An uneasy start

One of the main problems of the partnership was that it started more as a multilateral governmental agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Netherlands than as an intersectoral partnership. Governments took the initiative, some market actors were involved,

but civil society was invited later. This imbalance was never fully repaired. Most NGOs felt they were not seen as true partners throughout the period of their engagement in the partnership. Also, until today, governmental organizations dominate the partnership.

The fact that one sector of society, civil society, was absent at the start of the partnership had major consequences for its focus. Most of the partners involved from the start were part of the first development cooperation discourse in which its main goals are promoting economic development and strengthening the position of a country or industry in the global economy. Therefore they easily agreed that solving the existing problems with the export of shrimp to the European Union should be the main focus of the partnership. It also explains why the partnership was agreed upon as a WSSD partnership called 'Market Access Through Meeting Quality Standards for Food and Agricultural Products'. In particular, the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia wanted the partnership to focus on ensuring that farmed shrimp from these countries fulfilled the European food safety and quality demands. The European Union had rejected some shrimp imports from Asia due to residues of antibiotics, and the governments wanted support from the Netherlands in improving their control systems for food quality and safety. They were not particularly interested in sustainability issues of shrimp farming in the partnership; they wanted improved market access. Also, within the Dutch government, ministries differ in their perspectives on development cooperation. The Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV) is interested in improving the market access from developing countries, since it supports the more economic discourse on development cooperation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, supports the other discourse, in which sustainable development is the main goal. The fact that within the Dutch government the Ministry of LNV has the lead in this partnership strengthens the market access orientation of the partnership.

In the different countries, the partners sharing the same discourse on development cooperation often had existing rules for working together in order to achieve their common goals. In Malaysia, for example, the government and industry are used to cooperating in order to further develop the shrimp aquaculture industry; they have an existing good relationship. The expansion of shrimp aquaculture is an official governmental target, because of its potential as a high-value export product. The government sees its role as facilitating the industry, and the industry wants to be supported by the government. Both viewed the partnership as an opportunity for capacity building in order to fulfill international food safety standards.

When governments did try to involve civil society in the partnership, this was especially problematic in Indonesia and Malaysia. This can be explained by the existing rules for intersectoral cooperation for sustainable development in the different countries. In the Netherlands, the actors were used to discussing sustainable development issues in an intersectoral setting; in Indonesia and Malaysia this was not the case. In these countries, government and industry are generally not used to consulting NGOs regularly. Even though the Dutch partners were able to ensure the participation of the Southern NGOs, they never had a large input in the partnership. An exception is WWF Indonesia, which already had a good relationship on sustainability issues with the Indonesian government before the partnership, and has improved its relationship with market actors through the partnership. In Malaysia, the relationship between the government and NGOs has improved because of their cooperation in the mangrove

rehabilitation project. Thus, the partnership has enabled some increased understanding between societal sectors and countries. However, the rules for intersectoral relations in general have not been changed. Moreover, because all three governments mostly did not involve civil society as equal partners – instead treating them, in the 'old-fashioned' manner, as lobby groups – the old rules for intersectoral relationships were able to dominate the partnership.

Also, because of the dominance of the market access goal of the partnership, organizations with a more sustainable development approach to development cooperation and with fundamental concerns towards shrimp aquaculture were less eager to become partners. This was especially the case for many Southern NGOs, whose main constituency is focused on local socio-economic issues. The Southern NGOs that did become involved mainly used the partnership for implementing individual sustainability projects, like the mangrove rehabilitation project in Malaysia and the 'road show' in Indonesia. However, the Southern NGOs did not have enough power in their intersectoral relationships to tilt the balance between attention for market access and sustainability towards the latter. Through their role in the partnership, the Dutch NGOs' achievement was that the partnership as a whole adopted sustainable shrimp production as a formal goal on paper, even though the balance between economic goals and social and environmental goals was never found in practice, as described above.

3.4.5 International sectoral relationships: A divided civil society

The government and business partners involved at the start of the partnership represent the discourse on the sustainability of shrimp aquaculture that views the industry as not fundamentally problematic. This is coherent with the international debate on shrimp aquaculture, in which international development agencies, the majority of governments, and the industry represent this discourse and most NGOs the more fundamental one. There is a degree of agreement among NGOs, but there is also conflict of opinion (Béné 2005).

This conflict of opinion among civil society groups has had a large impact on the performance of the partnership. Most NGOs that have been involved in the partnership had fundamental critique on shrimp farming. Only WWF, IUCN NL and Oxfam Novib had a more pragmatic perspective on the sustainability of shrimp aquaculture. These organizations took the industry as a given and wanted to work on making the industry more sustainable. With this pragmatic approach, the NGOs manifested themselves as part of the less fundamental discourse in the debate on shrimp aquaculture. Within the Friends of the Earth network, the partners in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Netherlands had different opinions. During the course of the partnership, all Friends of the Earth representatives adopted the more fundamental view. Although the NGOs with a pragmatic position represented a minority position in the international NGO community, they were the larger, powerful ones, who most often cooperate with market and state actors in partnership. Nonetheless, in the shrimp partnership, the international more fundamental NGO community was successful in pressuring the Dutch NGOs to discontinue their participation in the partnership.

There are several explanations for this remarkable outcome. As described above, the NGOs involved in the partnership had great difficulty getting attention for sustainability issues in the partnership, so their willingness to stay involved deteriorated over time. Second, the partnership

was meant to be a 'true' intersectoral North-South partnership, and therefore a lot of effort was put into involving Southern NGOs. Through them, the more fundamental discourse received a voice in the partnership. However, due to the weak position of Southern NGOs in intersectoral relations they were unable to influence the core focus of the partnership. Yet, they were able to influence the Northern NGOs. Third, differences in perspectives on the phenomenon of partnership are also part of the explanation. Some organizations view partnership as a process in which partners meet new actors, can discuss common issues and try to influence one another, learn to understand each other and build trust.

Also, in this discourse, partnership is seen as a way to have more relationships in which all three sectors of society are involved. Others see partnership as a way to reach concrete goals by implementing projects. The Dutch and Malaysian NGOs supported the latter view. They wanted to make the shrimp aquaculture industry more sustainable through specific projects. WWF Indonesia, on the other hand, has a more process-oriented perspective on partnership. It regarded the partnership as a means of meeting new actors and build trust. The Northern NGOs could not realize their specific goals, and felt strong pressure from the civil society community, both in- and outside the partnership. They felt they had no other choice but to withdraw from the partnership.

At the same time, the Dutch government was not eager to take a critical stance towards its Indonesian and Malaysian counterparts in order to increase attention for sustainability issues. Their existing diplomatic relations did not allow such criticism. After all, the Dutch government and the Malaysian and Indonesian governments have a long diplomatic history of negotiations on natural resources, especially timber. The Dutch representatives in the partnership were the same people as in international forest negotiations. These existing relations and prior experiences have influenced the shrimp partnership process. The Dutch government, acting as the partnership coordinator, became 'stuck' between the wish of the Indonesian and Malaysian governments to focus mainly on market access issues, and civil society groups to focus more on social and environmental issues.

As described above, the Indonesian and Malaysian market actors were mainly interested in fulfilling international food safety norms. The Dutch importers were divided in their interest in sustainability. The Dutch companies that were interested in sustainability chose to be active in a more practical, direct manner, working on certification of shrimp through the Eurep Gap system, an initiative that seems to be far effective than the intersectoral North-South partnership itself. Moreover, the Dutch importers had already lost their powerful position as buyers to convince their counterparts to pay more attention to sustainability. After the rejection of shrimp imports from Asia, most of the import of Indonesian and Malaysian shrimp moved to other EU countries. In general, the partnership has enabled a better understanding between Northern and Southern governments and market actors, and enabled the discussion of sustainability issues between these actors for the first time, even though the relationships have not really changed.

3.5   The anchoveta case

3.5.1   Anchoveta and sustainability

The present Peruvian industrial fishing industry dates back to the 1950s when anchoveta started to be processed into fishmeal and fish oil (Pauly and Tsukayama 1987). There are two stocks of anchoveta: the northern stock is found in Peruvian national waters only; the more southern stock appears in both the Peruvian and Chilean exclusive economic zones (EEZ). Anchoveta is therefore considered a transboundary fish stock. The species has been declared fully exploited (Zuzunaga 2002).

The anchoveta stocks are part of the Humboldt Current Large Marine Ecosystem, in the Southeastern part of the Pacific Ocean, one of the most productive marine areas of the world, due to the Humboldt Current, an upwelling of cold, nutrient-rich waters. The fish resource is periodically highly impacted by 'El Niño' Southern Oscillation (ENSO). In El Niño years, catches have declined to about a quarter of the catch in normal years (Hatziolos and de Haan 2006). This natural extreme volatility makes fish stock management especially complicated. Both the impact and the delays in recovery of El Niño are likely to be deepened by overfishing (Deutsch, Gräslund et al. 2007). In 1972 the anchoveta population collapsed due to both heavy fishing pressure and a strong El Niño (Brainard and McLain 1987). Other El Niño events occurred in the early 1980s and in 1998 (Huntington, Frid et al. 2004). Climate change models predict more frequent occurrences of El Niño, and it is expected that the anchoveta stocks will become even more volatile (Hatziolos and de Haan 2006).

Anchoveta sustains a large and diverse food web, including sea lions, seals, dolphins, sea birds and other fish species. Since the development of the industrial anchoveta fishery, the amount of anchoveta available for sea birds has declined significantly. The sea bird population has declined from about 20-30 million in the 1950s to about three million today (Majluf, Barandiarán et al. 2005). This was already recognized by Tovar and Guillen et al. in 1987. They concluded that 'The fishery thus affects the guano bird populations, by reducing their food base before, during and after an El Niño event' (Tovar, Guillen et al. 1987, p.217).

Because Peru has become the world's main supplier of fishmeal and fish oil, the global aquaculture industry is increasingly dependent on this one marine ecosystem (Deutsch, Gräslund et al. 2007). The sustainable management of anchoveta is therefore of interest for the international aquaculture industry and global markets for fish.

Two main discourses can be distinguished on the issue of sustainable fisheries. The first discourse, with a less inclusive approach towards sustainable fisheries, mainly focuses on the state of the managed fish stock. The goal in this approach is to ensure the long-term sustainability of the fish stock. Over-exploitation of the stock is prevented by regulating the fishing industry.

The second discourse uses a more inclusive definition of sustainable fisheries, including the ecosystem approach and equity issues. An ecosystem approach considers ecosystem interactions and the 'health' of the marine ecosystem in the management of marine resources. The goal of the ecosystem approach is to develop and manage fisheries in a manner that addresses the multiple

needs and desires of societies, without jeopardizing the ability of future generations to benefit from the full range of goods and services provided by marine ecosystems (Huntington, Frid et al. 2004, p.4).

This second discourse also questions the sustainability of the current extent of the use of fishmeal and fish oil to produce fish feed. In Peru, the discussion on whether it is sustainable to view anchoveta purely as a fish to produce fishmeal and oil has recently intensified. Since the whole industry is set up as a feed production export industry, a local campaign has started to try to get people to view anchoveta as food instead of feed. In this view, anchoveta is seen also as food for Peruvians. Also, exporting anchoveta as a table fish next to feed would be an opportunity for the industrial fishery.

3.5.2   The situational context: Few other initiatives

For Peru, the anchoveta fishery is one of the major sources of income. Fisheries exports are the second largest earner of foreign exchange (Hatziolos and de Haan 2006). Main buyers are China and Europe.

The Peruvian government started regulating the anchoveta fishery in the 1960s (Castillo and Mendo 1987). The Peruvian General Fisheries Law dates back to 1992. It prohibits expansion of the fleet and processing capacity. The law intends to comply with the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Hatziolos and de Haan 2006) and includes provisions for a third-party self-monitoring system to fight illegal fisheries. The law has been adapted several times since then, weakening the legislation. There have also been difficulties with enforcement. The governmental measures are mainly focusing on managing the anchoveta stocks. Government controls include satellite tracking systems on vessels, closed fishing seasons, limits on minimum size of fish landed and consideration of stock assessment in setting harvest limits (Huntington, Frid et al. 2004). Yet several problems remain, including the effects of the fisheries on marine biodiversity and the ecosystem, the management of the Southern stock of anchoveta, which is shared with Chilean fisheries, overcapacity of the fishing fleet, social issues, pollution by the factories and the public availability of information. One of the main problems is the overcapacity of both the fishing fleet and processing industry (Hatziolos and de Haan 2006). For example, due to the number of vessels and their large carrying capacity, the fleet is only allowed to fish for 120 days a year, even though the anchoveta stocks could allow for a 200-day fishing season (Majluf, Barandiarán et al. 2005). The overcapacity is both economically inefficient and creates continuous pressure to allow for more fishing.

As described in section 3.3, the main use for fishmeal and fish oil is the aquaculture industry. Even though the level of fishmeal and fish oil use in fish feed will continue to decline, the total demand will keep rising, due to the ongoing expansion of the aquaculture industry (Huntington, Frid et al. 2004). This demand for fish feed creates a continuous pressure to maximize fishing efforts, even though the anchoveta fishery is already fully exploited. Moreover, this seemingly inexhaustible demand does not support efforts for innovation or change. However, the aquaculture industry is looking into substitutes for the long term. Main replacements named are the further improvement of the use of plant material, the use of bycatch and the development of alternatives through biotechnology.

Compared with the almost overfull situational context in the shrimp case, the context of the anchoveta partnership is extremely quiet. A large part of the international fisheries governance system is not relevant for anchoveta. Even though it is a transboundary fish stock, it is not considered a 'straddling fish stock' or a 'highly migratory fish stock'. Therefore the international agreements on these stocks are not applicable to anchoveta. Also, the anchoveta partnership is the only known international partnership in this field. In fact, the partnership could turn out to be the beginning of an international fish feed governance system if a roundtable for sustainable fish feed will become reality (see below). Because of the relatively 'empty' governance system for sustainable anchoveta, or in a broader sense, sustainable fish feed, the potential added-value of the partnership, both for the Peruvian and the international context, is high.

3.5.3   Partnership background

The anchoveta partnership started as a Dutch intersectoral partnership between the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IUCN NL and the company Nutreco, whose daughter company Skretting is the world's largest fish feed producer, with a 40 percent market share. The partnership developed out of the 'transition biodiversity' process organized by the Dutch government, an interactive process to develop long-term strategies to conserve biodiversity. The Dutch partners were all involved in this process.

The partnership has organized two conferences. Even though the organizational form and membership of the partnership are not formally arranged, one could say that in the process of organizing these conferences, the Peruvian government and industry and the International Fishmeal and Fish Oil Organization (IFFO) have joined the partnership. Peruvian civil society groups are not partners.

The first conference was held in Peru in 2005. It was hosted by the governments of Peru and the Netherlands, and was co-hosted by the Sociedad Nacional de Pesquería (SNP), which represents over 70 percent of the fishing industry in Peru. The meeting was co-sponsored by Nutreco and IUCN NL. The conference was attended by about 50 people, representing different governments, intergovernmental organizations, research institutes, certification organizations, industry and local and international civil society groups. The meeting produced a joint statement by the Peruvian and Dutch governments. The governments wanted to develop a joint workplan, in which the following subjects needed to be included: 'evaluation criteria for economic and social effects of the fishery, mechanisms to disperse the latest scientific and technical experience to the public in and outside Peru, and further development of integrating the ecosystem components in the anchoveta fisheries management' (Anonymous 2005).

The second conference was organized by the Dutch and Peruvian governments, SNP, IFFO, Nutreco and IUCN NL and took place in the Netherlands. Many of the people who attended the first meeting were present again. During this meeting, the idea for a roundtable for sustainable fishmeal came up. The roundtable would not only focus on Peruvian fishmeal and fish oil but would try to involve other regions. Conclusions of the meeting included the initiative of IFFO to research the possibilities of a global roundtable for sustainable fishmeal and fish oil, the initiative of Nutreco for a business-to-business working group between Peru and the

Netherlands to map potential issues and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate the follow-up actions.

Until today, the partnership has mainly been successful in agenda-setting. Major contributions of the partnership are attention for transparency, ecosystems and independent certification in regard to the anchoveta fishery. No new sustainability measures have been implemented due to the partnership. The partnership could develop into a roundtable, an outcome not foreseen at the start. An important reason for trying to organize a global roundtable is to involve other major actors, like the Chinese. A negative side effect of the development of a global roundtable could be that there will be less attention to the specific Peruvian problems and the implementation of the partnership action plan. It seems like this is already the case. The partnership process is slowing down, while the development of the roundtable is also extremely slow.

3.5.4 Intersectoral relationships: A powerful industry

All three Dutch partners have a process-oriented perspective on the partnership phenomenon. They are convinced of the potential of an intersectoral partnership approach. They are cooperation-oriented and are used to working together. Even though their relationship is not formally equal – for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsidizes the work of IUCN NL in the partnership – the partners in practice *seem* equal. Also, because the Dutch partnership evolved from an earlier initiative in which all three partners were involved, all of them joined at the same time, enabling these equal positions.

In Peru, the existing rules of the game guiding intersectoral relations are quite different. Due to the rule of authoritarian regimes until the end of the twentieth century, civil society does not have a powerful position in Peruvian society. Government and industry are not used to consulting NGOs regularly. The position of civil society is slowly improving, however. The first partnership conference was the first time that the Peruvian government, fisheries industry and civil society groups, universities and international civil society groups were all active participants during the same meeting on the issue of anchoveta. This was a major step for the parties involved and it was confrontational at times. Peruvian representatives of the less and more inclusive discourses on sustainable fisheries exchanged views for the first time. The meeting enabled civil society and university groups to bring issues from their more inclusive perspective onto the agenda, among others the ecosystem approach and the inaccuracy of and lack of transparency on fishing statistics. For some NGOs, the meeting was also an eye-opener; they realized that the government and industry were really trying to manage the anchoveta fishery properly. Only, their definition of 'properly' was very different from that of the NGOs.

The partnership has not (yet) changed the existing rules of intersectoral relations in Peru. The main reason is the fact that the Peruvian intersectoral relationship has an extremely unequal power balance. The Peruvian anchoveta fishery is so important for the Peruvian economy that the industry finds itself in an extremely strong power position. The fishery is an important political issue, the lobby of the industry is very influential, several of its representatives are politically active and the relationship between government and the industry is in general very close. Not surprisingly, the anchoveta fishery representatives are part of the Peruvian elite. Consequently, the visions of the government and industry are in general the same.

For NGOs the story is quite the opposite. Few Peruvian NGOs are active on the issue of anchoveta fishery because the issue is simply 'too big', and the fishing industry is simply too powerful. However, the NGOs also have not prioritized the anchoveta issue themselves; the efforts in Peru of the international environmental movement are more focused on forest conservation because of the high biodiversity in Peruvian forests. Other explanations are that the partnership conferences were not organized with equal representation among societal sectors in mind. During the first conference of the partnership, for example, some representatives of the more inclusive discourse on sustainable fisheries felt more like observers than partners, and experienced the participation between societal sectors as unevenly balanced. In addition, artisanal fishers were not represented, excluding equity issues from the meeting.

3.5.5   International sectoral relationships: Careful first steps

Power relations were also the main drivers in the international sectoral relationships. The company Nutreco is aware of the strongly increasing demand for natural resources: 'We have to start managing scarcity', as the interviewee put it. Nutreco wants to cooperate with Peru to produce sustainably because the company realizes sustainable management is simply a necessity in order to ensure its supplies in five to ten years. It also feels increasing pressure from society to guarantee that its products are sustainable. Even though Nutreco is a large customer of the Peruvian anchoveta fishery and a major player in the international fish feed sector, its economic power was not strong enough to convince the Peruvians to increase their efforts towards sustainability. Due to the booming aquaculture industry, the global demand for fishmeal and fish oil, especially from China and Chile, is so high that if Europeans stopped buying from Peru for sustainability issues, there would still be plenty of other customers. Furthermore, Peru is a powerful IFFO member, which decreases the opportunities for IFFO to play a more independent role.

Right from the start of the partnership, the Peruvian industry distrusted the interest of the Northern parties in the way Peru manages its fish stocks. The industry feels very strongly about maintaining the autonomy to manage its national natural resources, and does not want to share the management with other countries or organizations. The industry felt pressured to start working with the independent certification scheme Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), among others because different fish feed fisheries in South America are already working with or are thinking about MSC certification. During the partnership conferences, certification was discussed, despite the sensitivity of the issue. In particular, the Peruvian industry does not want external mingling on social issues. Moreover, the industry is skeptical about private international standards; working with (governmental) FAO-based standards is considered more acceptable. Until today, the industry has been of the opinion that they are managing the anchoveta stock sustainably and they feel that they do not need an independent certificate to prove this. Moreover, the industry does not have a tradition in external accountability. The industry realizes, nonetheless, that sooner or later it will have to start working with eco-labeling. Also, because of the partnership, the Peruvian anchoveta industry has gained more understanding of the sustainability concerns of its clients and other actors and the value of communicating about its own sustainability efforts. The partnership gave the Peruvian government and industry the opportunity to inform an international forum about the measures already taken to make the anchoveta fishery more sustainable.

All three involved Dutch organizations are convinced of the added-value of the partnership given the fact that government, business and civil society are all involved on the Dutch side. They very consciously made the effort to engage the right counterparts of all three sectors of society from Peru. Consequently, the Dutch partners succeeded in finding the right Peruvian people in their own sectors. However, because all three Dutch organizations have a process perspective on partnership and therefore view partnership especially as a way for new actors to work together and build trust, there was little pressure to attain concrete sustainability measures. This discouraged some participants with an output-oriented view, especially those who also have a more inclusive perspective on the sustainability of the anchoveta fisheries. The different actors involved therefore have different opinions on the added-value of the partnership conferences.

3.6   Conclusions

This chapter has tried to improve our understanding of partnership as governance mechanism in development cooperation, using the marine biodiversity empirical field for the research. Although this work is relevant for understanding the role of international intersectoral partnership in general, the conclusions are especially useful for intersectoral North-South partnerships that focus on a combination of development cooperation, sustainable development and trade. The presented transactional model used in this chapter has proven a useful tool for analyzing international intersectoral partnership. The model unravels the different influences on partnership performance by focusing on the situational contexts and on discourse, power and rules in intersectoral and international sectoral relations. Because in practice these causes interact, the model can be used as a beneficial instrument to weigh the relative influence of each dimension.

Both the shrimp and the anchoveta partnership did not fully realize the potential of working through international intersectoral partnership. Of the five levels at which intersectoral North-South partnerships were expected to establish new relationships and produce new outputs (engaging stakeholders, realizing integrative solutions, increasing intersectoral cooperation, strengthening civil society and promoting sustainability) only two were partly realized. Both partnerships did bring together relevant stakeholders from all three sectors of society, and thus did bring together several relevant views on the sustainability problems at hand, even though not all relevant stakeholders were involved. The main successes of the partnerships therefore can be found in the sphere of agenda-setting and increased understanding among partners. However, the concrete outputs that were produced hardly integrated the perspectives of the different partners; thus, integrative solutions were only partially developed. Also, the partnerships did not contribute to improved intersectoral cooperation in the longer run, and attention for sustainability, including all its dimensions, has not increased. These conclusions cannot be seen as definite, since both partnerships are relatively recent initiatives and are ongoing.

Both cases show that important success and failure factors may lie outside of a partnership, in the *situational contexts*. In the shrimp partnership, the pressure from the international NGO community outside the partnership on the NGOs inside was overwhelming, and in the anchoveta partnership, earlier societal pressure on the company Nutreco to become more

sustainable was one of the driving forces to start the initiative. Moreover, the potential added-value of a partnership is dependent on the number of other initiatives that are working on the same issues. In the shrimp case, the question is really what the partnership can contribute to a governance system in which numerous public and private governance mechanisms are already in place. The contribution of the anchoveta partnership to the governance system in Peru, on the other hand, could become significant, since the partnership has been able to place new issues on the agenda, for example the ecosystem approach. The partnership's contribution to the international governance system could become influential if the partners succeed in enabling an international roundtable on sustainable fish feed. With that, the partnership could actually become the start of an international governance system for sustainable fish feed. The development of the roundtable is, however, extremely slow.

The case studies have also made clear that partnering is extremely problematic when different *discourses* meet. It seems that a basic consensus among partners on the strategies for sustainable development, on development cooperation and on the role of partnership as governance mechanism is needed in order for partnership to be successful. The consequences of this prerequisite can already be seen in the current practice of partnership, not only in the field of marine biodiversity but also, for instance, in the field of forest biodiversity (see also chapter 2). Often the NGOs with more pragmatic strategies towards sustainability and with more process-oriented perspectives on partnership as governance mechanism become and remain involved in partnership. The NGOs with more inclusive views on sustainability and more output-oriented approaches often do not become involved or leave partnerships due to the perceived lack of progress. This practice has substantial impact on the role of partnerships. It means that some discourses are not or underrepresented in partnerships, disabling their potential in addressing certain sustainability issues.

This is exactly what happened in the shrimp case, where 'true' partnership, in which all actors cooperate towards a common goal, was impossible due to the domination of one discourse. Because of the late involvement of civil society, the partners with an economic discourse on development cooperation and with less fundamental objections towards the development of shrimp aquaculture as an export product were able to set the tone of the partnership. Due to this positioning of the partnership, NGOs with fundamental critique on industrial shrimp aquaculture were hesitant to play a role and finally convinced most of the more pragmatic NGOs to leave the partnership. Both cases show that discourses on the phenomenon of partnership also influence partnership performance. In the shrimp case, some of the partners that viewed partnership as a way to reach concrete goals are cooperating successfully in a different setting, the dialogue between Dutch importers and NGOs working on Eurep Gap certification criteria. In the anchoveta case, the partnership did enable the representatives of less and more inclusive discourses towards sustainable fisheries to exchange views, but because the Dutch partners all have a more process oriented perspective on the partnership phenomenon, there has been little momentum for concrete steps towards increased sustainability. In fact, the development of both partnerships is losing momentum due to the fact that few partners are proactive. It seems that working in partnership is viewed by many as additional work and not as part of their core business. This attitude is preventing the partnerships from realizing their potential in the longer term.

Existing *rules* also have a large influence on partnership performance. Both case studies demonstrate that, in particular, existing rules in intersectoral relations have a large impact. Most organizations in both the North and the South are not used to working together in intersectoral partnerships that include all three societal sectors. Generally, the Southern governments and industries have a good and close working relationship to further develop export industries. It is difficult for them to view civil society as an equal partner, since the Indonesian, Malaysian and Peruvian governments and industries do not have a tradition in proactively involving civil society; civil society usually has a weak position in Southern intersectoral relations. In both the North and the South, if civil society is invited to become involved, it is often through consultation, and not as an equal partner. In the cases when NGOs do become partners in intersectoral partnership, the relationships within the partnership are of a very different character, because the partnership for the government and industry means the continuation of an existing relationship and for civil society the partnership means a new type of relationship with both government and industry. Also, civil society groups sometimes have difficulty fulfilling this new role as partner. They have to commit themselves publicly to the partnership and have to implement projects, while some NGOs have little experience in implementation. Businesses especially show little patience when NGOs have trouble committing to the often incremental improvements achieved by intersectoral partnership.

In conclusion, the existing rules for intersectoral relations are so strongly established that the analyzed partnerships have not been able to improve this cooperation structurally. Moreover, the existing weak position of the Southern NGOs in local intersectoral relations has been incorporated in and reinforced by the partnerships. Practice shows that it is a tall order for partnerships to change existing rules and that the potential of partnership to increase intersectoral cooperation is difficult to realize.

Existing rules in international sectoral relations also impact partnership performance. The core business of most civil society groups is campaigning, trying to bring about change in governments and industries by showing their current unsustainable behavior and proposing improvements. They are less used to working in partnership with these organizations in order to enable more sustainable behavior step by step, making compromises and taking public accountability for these compromises. Some NGOs that are increasingly using the partnership approach instead of the campaigning approach are criticized by other civil society groups. The shrimp case is a good example of this split in civil society. In this case the campaigning NGOs convinced most of the NGOs that were willing to work in partnership to make shrimp aquaculture more sustainable to discontinue their involvement in the partnership. Existing rules for intergovernmental relations also affect partnership performance. Governments are used to cooperating with each other in bi- or multilateral governmental arrangements that generally include a number of specific formalities. These intergovernmental formalities sometimes stand in the way of a more informal manner of cooperation in partnership.

The case studies point out that *power* inequalities, both in intersectoral and in international sectoral relations, have large impacts on partnership performance. Also, it is extremely difficult to change power imbalances through partnership. Especially in the anchoveta case, 'true' partnership was hampered mainly by existing unequal power relationships. The importance of

the anchoveta industry, both for the national economy and for the global supply of fish feed, dominated both intersectoral and international sectoral relations.

The traditional power imbalance in North-South development cooperation relations, as described in the introduction, was less present in the analyzed partnerships. This was not only due to the fact that the partnerships did not follow 'the rules of the game' of traditional development cooperation, with the Northern country bringing a large budget into the relationship, since relatively little money was spent on the analyzed partnerships. Another explanation can be found in the inclusion of the market sector through the intersectoral approach in the partnership. Because the analyzed partnerships are bi- or trilateral North-South partnerships, the economic partners from the North were only one of the many international buyers of the market partners in the South. Consequently, the most powerful actors in the North-South partnership were in fact the Southern economic partners. This reversed the power imbalance compared with traditional development cooperation relationships. Thus, the partnership approach enabled the South to become the most powerful partner. This indicates that intersectoral North-South partnership can contribute to the emancipation of the South.

This could, in turn, have a negative backlash for the position of civil society groups. As described above, civil society does not have a powerful societal position in the existing intersectoral relations in the South. Governments and market actors are often very close. They share the same discourses and goals and are not used to consulting civil society groups. Therefore, the fact that the South can become the most powerful country due to the partnership approach can disable the input of civil society in partnerships. The views of some NGOs, often those who support a more inclusive approach to sustainable development, can become under-represented in the partnership approach. This is precisely what the case studies have shown. The studied partnerships have indeed 'reinforced existing power asymmetries', as described in the introduction. However, the existing power asymmetries that were reinforced were not the international sectoral relations, but the intersectoral relations in the South. The potential of the partnership approach to emancipate civil society in the South is obviously extremely difficult to realize. This potential can only be achieved if the partnership is proactively managed with this emancipation goal in mind.

These conclusions touch upon a fundamental issue concerning partnership performance. By focusing on shrimp aquaculture and the production of fishmeal and fish oil for aquaculture, the partnerships legitimize sectors that could in essence be unsustainable. By focusing on export industries, the partnerships also do not question the sustainability of the trend of increasing numbers of natural resources and basic products being produced in the South for Northern markets. The development of export industries in developing countries for markets in developed countries is not unique for fisheries; this is a broader trend. Other export crops are soy and palm oil: protein is being exported from poorer countries to richer countries, instead of being used by the local population. By addressing issues in these sectors, the partnerships reinforce these trends and existing institutions, instead of questioning their sustainability. In this manner, partnership will only realize piecemeal improvements towards sustainability instead of breaking unsustainable trends. The question is whether partnership can help solve these more fundamental sustainability problems, since their essence is involving all relevant sectors of society. Most of

these actors have a stake in maintaining the industry concerned, and will not automatically be willing to discuss shifting trends or changing to different economic activities. Partnership seems to be more valuable as a governance mechanism for making existing trends more sustainable than breaking unsustainable trends. This contradicts the expectation that because relevant stakeholders and views are involved, more integrative solutions could be developed through partnership.

4 Conservation partnerships in biodiversity governance:
Fulfilling governance functions through interaction[3]

4.1 Introduction

Over the last decades a growing number of international governmental environmental agreements have been developed. Today more than two hundred such agreements exist (Oberthür and Gehring 2006, p.2). Due to this rising density of institutional arrangements at the international level, the number of interactions among international institutions is expanding (Young 2002). This phenomenon of institutional interaction is receiving increasing attention (Leebron 2002; Paavola 2007). More specifically, researchers studying the effectiveness of international environmental regimes have started to analyze the effects of these interactions on regime effectiveness (Oberthür and Gehring 2006; Skjærseth, Stokke and Wettestad 2006; Young 2002). Some of these authors have included the role of other societal sectors besides government (market actors and civil society) in their research (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1995; Oberthür and Gehring 2006).

However, the involvement of market and civil society actors in international environmental policy has not been thoroughly researched in the regime effectiveness literature, even though private steering mechanisms have made a significant contribution to the current density in international environmental governance. Not only the number of interactions between formal governmental regimes is increasing; these regimes are also interacting with a growing number of private steering mechanisms, making institutional interaction even more frequent and complex. The role of these private steering mechanisms is analyzed in the governance literature (recent contributions include Cashore et al. 2007; Huijstee, Francken and Leroy 2007; Pattberg 2007).

This chapter aims to improve our understanding of this contribution of private steering mechanisms to the governance of sustainable development. It also aims to contribute to the further development and integration of the regime and governance literature by incorporating themes and approaches of both bodies of literature, broadening and refining research methodologies, and applying methodologies developed in the regime literature to the empirical field of public-private interaction.

The analysis concentrates on international intersectoral partnerships (strategic alliances between governments, market actors, and/or civil society groups) in the international biodiversity

governance system, in which several different international regimes and international intersectoral partnerships are active. Three partnerships that focus on the conservation of a specific type of biodiversity are researched: the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF), which works on biodiversity hotspots, the Great Apes Survival Project (GRASP), and the International Coral Reef Action Network (ICRAN). All three partnerships are so-called WSSD partnerships: they were introduced at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. The chapter is based on literature review, 33 interviews with partnership representatives and partner organizations, analysis of partnership documents, visits to the partnerships' secretariats, and seven returned questionnaires sent out among GRASP government focal points and implementing partners. The questionnaire was used to attain insight in GRASP's activities on the ground. For CEPF and ICRAN this was done by interviewing the regional coordinators. Since GRASP is organized nationally, instead of regionally like the other two, the number of interviewees would have been too large, and therefore a questionnaire was used. The next section elaborates on the chapter's theoretical and conceptual context, and section 4.3 presents the research methodology. The following sections describe the three case studies, while section 4.7 encompasses the conclusions.

4.2   Theoretical and conceptual context

As briefly introduced above, two bodies of literature are most relevant when discussing the rise of private steering mechanisms in the international governance of sustainable development, and their relationship with and consequences for (inter-) governmental regimes: regime and governance literature. The literature on partnerships represents a prominent part of governance literature. The differentiation between regime and governance literature is predominantly conceptual, since some researchers studying (inter-) governmental regimes include the role of private actors in their work (Arts 1998; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1995; Oberthür and Gehring 2006; Raustalia 1997). Therefore the boundary between the two bodies of literature is gradual and becoming increasingly blurred. Both bodies of literature use sustainable development as an important empirical focus.

Regime literature has made significant contributions to understanding regime effectiveness (Miles, Underdal et al. 2001; Nollkeamper 1992; Rittberger 1993) and institutional interaction (Keohane, Haas et al. 1995; Leebron 2002; Oberthür 2002; Oberthür and Gehring 2006; Paavola 2007). The regime effectiveness debate '… ultimately deals with the ability of international regimes to solve the problems that prompted their establishment' (Andresen and Hey 2005, p.211). In the regime (or institutional) interaction debate, authors presume that (the effectiveness of) one regime is affected by its interaction with other regimes from the same issue area and/or regimes governing other issues.

Governance literature studies the ongoing fundamental changes in the manner in which society is being steered, the so-called shift 'from government to governance' (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Not only governments, but also actors from the other two main societal sectors, the market and civil society sector, have and take responsibility for steering society. Three different

hypotheses on the increasing role of private steering mechanisms in the governance of sustainable development can be distinguished in the governance literature:

- A positive evaluation: private steering mechanisms represent a necessary reinvention of policy and politics in the emerging network society;
- A negative evaluation: private steering mechanisms are an erosion of public authority, the private capture of what should be public; and
- A utilitarian view: private and public steering mechanisms can complement each other (Glasbergen 2007, p.16-17).

Partnerships represent a specific type of new forms of governance. In this chapter, the term partnership addresses a broad range of organizational forms of intersectoral collaboration ranging from global policy or action networks (Levy, Keohane et al. 1995; Reinicke 1999; Waddell and Khagram 2007), to partnerships between an individual company and a non-governmental organization (NGO) (Huijstee, Francken et al. 2007). Partnerships can be analyzed from an actor and institutional perspective (Huijstee, Francken et al. 2007). Researchers applying the actor perspective study the internal dynamics of individual partnerships (Austin 2007; Bendell and Murphy 2000; Gray 2007). Other researchers analyze partnerships using an institutional perspective, focusing on the functions and effectiveness of partnerships as new steering arrangements and/or their relationship with governmental arrangements (Ashman 2001; Bitzer, Francken et al. 2008; Cashore, Auld et al. 2004; Gulbrandsen 2004; Hens and Nath 2003; Lister 2000; Stewart and Gray 2006).

4.3   Research methodology

The research methodology used in this chapter builds on the contributions to regime, governance and partnership literature presented in section 4.2. Using the three hypotheses distinguished in governance literature, this chapter answers the question to what extent the role of international intersectoral conservation partnerships in biodiversity governance can be assessed using a positive, negative, and/or utilitarian qualification. Are the partnerships a reinvention of policy and politics, necessary in contemporary global biodiversity governance; do they erode public authority; or do they complement public steering mechanisms? Reinvention of international biodiversity politics takes place when actors enable fundamental change, change in leading discourses or rules, necessary to improve the effectiveness of the governance system. Actors have a complementary role when they aim to improve existing regimes, and support others to improve their contributions to the regimes. Erosion of public authority takes place when actors take over functions that used to be fulfilled, and can be performed better by governmental regimes.

In order to interpret the implications of conservation partnerships for public biodiversity policy, both the functions partnerships fulfill in the biodiversity governance system, and the institutional interaction that takes place between the partnerships and governmental regimes when the partnerships fulfill these functions are researched. The term regime is defined, based on Leebron, as the (inter-)national institutions and formal agreements (treaties) that govern an issue area (Leebron 2002). Institutions are then defined as 'organized patterns of socially constructed norms and roles, and socially prescribed behaviors expected of occupants of those

roles, which are created and re-created over time' (Goodin 1996, p.19). Finally, the international biodiversity governance system is defined as the total of all public, public-private and private international initiatives working on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.

For the assessment of the role of partnerships it is necessary to know to what extent the partnerships improve the effectiveness of biodiversity governance by fulfilling governance functions. If partnerships effectively fulfill functions in support of governmental regimes, they may be complementary; if they effectively fulfill functions that used to be fulfilled by governments, they may be eroding public authority; or if they fulfill functions in a new manner, they may be reinventing politics. In this chapter, the functions agenda setting, policy development, implementation, metagovernance (strategic steering and coordination in the governance system), and ensuring good governance are analyzed. Based on Underdal, effectiveness is analyzed in terms of output and outcome (Underdal 2002). For the different functions output can be interpreted as new issues on the agenda; new or improved policy; increased or improved implementation; improved coordination; and improvement of transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation or responsiveness (UNHCHR 2000). Outcome can be analyzed by the number of actors reached and/or involved (for the functions agenda setting, metagovernance, and ensuring good governance), the number of actors implementing new policy, and integration into existing policy.

In assessing the role of partnerships it is also necessary to understand how they interact with (inter-) governmental regimes while they are fulfilling governance functions, since it is through this interaction that the reinvention of, erosion of or contribution to biodiversity governance takes place. Institutional interaction, interaction between the partnerships and governmental regimes, can occur between the international partnerships and international biodiversity regimes, and between the international partnerships and regional and/or national biodiversity regimes. Based on Young, two types of institutional interaction are distinguished: overlap and influence (Young 2002). For overlap the analysis focuses on whether and how this overlap is managed, and for influence, the methodology of Oberthür and Gehring is used, who disaggregate complex relationships between regimes into single occurrences of influence. Institutional influence 'in essence … refers to a causal relationship between two institutions, with one of these institutions ('the source institution') exerting influence on the other ('the target institution')' (Oberthür and Gehring 2006, p.6). This methodological approach, developed for influence among international regimes, is used in this chapter to 'untangle' the complex relationship between a partnership and a regime.

The interactions (both the overlap and the influence) between the partnerships and governmental regimes are analyzed in terms of content (policy goals), discourses (basic visions of groups of people), and rules (established norms, routines, etc). This enables a broader analysis of institutional interaction than has been done in the regime literature until today. Researchers have focused mainly on interaction of content, for example the fact that the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands helps the Convention on Biological Diversity to achieve its targets (Oberthür and Gehring 2006, p.377). The broadened analysis builds upon other work in which analyses on the actor level and institutional level are combined (see Arts 2000; Arts, Leroy and Van Tatenhove 2006 and chapter 3). This type of analysis is necessary for the assessment of the role of

partnerships, since reinvention of politics implies interaction in terms of discourses and/or rules, and complementation implies interaction in terms of content.

4.4 GRASP

4.4.1 Introduction

Great apes are the members of the family Hominidae, which encompasses six species besides human beings: two species each of gorilla, chimpanzee (one of which is called Bonobo), and orangutan. The chimpanzee, Bonobo, eastern lowland gorilla, and the Bornean orangutan are considered endangered by the World Conservation Union, IUCN. This means there is a very high risk of extinction in the wild in the near future. The Western gorilla (Hopkin 2007), mountain gorilla, and the Sumatran orangutan are considered critically endangered, meaning the species face an extremely high risk of extinction in the wild in the immediate future (Caldecott and Miles 2005).

The Great Apes Survival Project (GRASP) was launched in 2001. Its secretariat is based at the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in Nairobi, Kenya, and is co-sponsored by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Partners include all 23 great ape range states; donor states; biodiversity related Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), including the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS), the World Heritage Convention (WHC), and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands; more than thirty NGOs with a significant involvement in great ape conservation; and supporting organizations. GRASP's mission is to conserve great apes in their natural habitat, to ensure that interactions between apes and people are mutually positive and sustainable, and to conserve other species sharing the ecosystems where great apes live (GRASP 2005).

4.4.2 Agenda setting: Making great ape conservation a global issue

One of the most important functions that GRASP has fulfilled is agenda setting at the international level. GRASP has effectively changed the discourse on great ape conservation in the biodiversity governance system by making it a global instead of a regional or national issue (see also Jolly 2005). This institutional influence has had high outcome effectiveness: GRASP's agenda setting role has had a broad reach in the biodiversity governance system, including range states, donor states and MEAs. GRASP has also created high level political attention for global great ape conservation, and has brought the range states together. The first intergovernmental meeting on great apes in Kinshasa in 2005 is seen by all interviewed participants as a historic moment, where ministers, other politicians and GRASP partners came together to discuss great ape conservation. The Kinshasa declaration which aims to secure the future of all species and subspecies of great apes in the wild by 2015 has been signed by 21 range states.

4.4.3 Differing success in policy development

GRASP has formulated the following ambitions to influence the content of both national and international policy: GRASP's great ape population and habitat priorities should be integrated

in national conservation and development plans; national and international legislation relating to great apes should be reviewed and tightened if necessary, and their enforcement should be improved; and GRASP priorities should influence implementation of MEAs and other international mechanisms (GRASP 2006). Until today GRASP's influence on national policy has been limited; most of its influence on policy content has taken place at the international level. Explanations can be found in the fact that the partnership first had to develop its own priorities for great ape conservation, which it has done through its Scientific Commission and by developing National Great Apes Survival Plans (NGASPs). Also, because GRASP's implementation on the ground has remained limited (see below), there has been less interaction at the national level.

GRASP's Scientific Commission's main purpose is to give scientific advice to GRASP. In aiming to manage content overlap, the Commission is closely linked to the IUCN scientific network: the majority of the Commission members are also member of the Section on Great Apes (SGA) of the Primate Specialist Group (PSG) of the IUCN species survival commission (SSC), ensuring strong links with the global great ape scientific community. The Commission has developed a draft list of 110 priority populations for conservation in 94 sites. However, due to internal debates the output of the Commission has been limited; the list of priority populations has remained a draft.

GRASP has developed NGASPs and has supported the development of regional action plans. Such national or regional plans, which prioritize the conservation needs for great apes, have been developed in multi-stakeholder processes for 17 of the 23 range states. The plans could also become tools for metagovernance among implementing partners and/or fundraising tools to enable implementation. The fact that the plans are being used by the CMS in the development of its gorilla agreement (see below) shows the potential influence of the NGASPs and regional plans as policy instruments. However, none of the NGASPs have been formally adopted by the range states, and implementation and funding is lacking.

Most of the institutional interaction between GRASP and MEAs takes place with CITES and CMS. An explanation could be that the content overlap with these conventions is the greatest, since these regimes are species based conventions, and GRASP is mainly a species based initiative, although it also works on habitat and livelihoods issues. This content overlap is managed mostly by close collaboration in policy development and implementation.

CMS aims to protect migratory species, species that cross one or more national boundaries. All gorillas are listed on Appendix I (Endangered Migratory Species) of CMS. The convention has developed a binding CMS agreement on international cooperation in the conservation of gorillas, which was finalized in 2007. GRASP has been involved in developing this 'gorilla agreement' from an early stage. In order to manage overlap, the action plans that are being developed for the gorilla agreement are based, among others, on the GRASP NGASPs and regional action plans. Because CMS intends to use existing GRASP work and institutions as much as possible, the latter is influencing CMS in terms of content. CMS also influences GRASP: the fact that the convention is very active on gorillas, and is one of the more active GRASP partners, could result in the partnership being more active on gorillas than on

the other great apes. Their collaboration also shows that the partnership is not eroding (inter-) governmental authority. CMS continues to initiate policy; however, it now does so in partnership.

4.4.4   Too little implementation

Implementation on the ground of GRASP activities is done by the partner organizations, which have until today implemented 20 projects. Most projects work on capacity building or community involvement. GRASP projects are thus complementing governmental regimes, since most interviewees and questionnaire respondents name lack of capacity as one of the main problems in great ape conservation. Most range states have adequate legislation and protected areas in place, but the capacity for enforcement and implementation is limited. GRASP can enable conservation implementation by its partners through fundraising. The total GRASP budget has been $6.4 million from 2001 to 2007, even though its goal was to raise $25 million by 2005. The secretariat and the partners realize that this output is not enough to reach their conservation goals, and have developed plans to raise new funds. Many partners feel that GRASP has not lived up to its potential as an implementation facilitator.

At the international level interaction takes place mainly in the form of managing content overlap by close collaboration in implementation. As mentioned above, CITES is one of the MEAs that interact most with GRASP. All non-human apes are listed in its Appendix I, which means that their trade is strictly regulated, and will only be authorized in exceptional circumstances. The cooperation between CITES and GRASP was formalized in 2004, when the convention adopted a resolution on the conservation of and trade in great apes, in which its parties, the secretariat and others are urged to work closely together with GRASP (CITES 2004). Since then, there have been joint missions to Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia. Because the capacity of the CITES secretariat for doing this type of research is limited, the joint missions have in practice meant that a large part of this responsibility of the secretariat has been focused on great apes. GRASP, CITES, and Interpol also collaborate on a regular basis in specific cases of trade in great apes. The development of GRASP rules on when and how to get involved in specific cases of illicit trade in great apes is a good example of the management of content overlap in implementation. Most NGO partners would like the partnership to campaign in every case, whereas the (inter-) governmental partners do not want GRASP to act as yet another NGO. The GRASP Executive Committee, in which both governmental partners and NGOs are represented, has decided that the partnership should not get involved while the MEAs are working on a case. CITES, a member of the Executive Committee played an important role in this discussion. These interactions show that the work of this MEA is being complemented by the partnership. CITES remains a strong MEA, which shares its authority when this is effective, but defends it when appropriate.

The interaction between GRASP and the site based conventions Ramsar and WHC consists mainly of management of content overlap in implementation. The fact that these conventions are GRASP members focuses their work on great apes. The Ramsar list of wetlands of international importance includes 15 sites with great apes. In 2007 Ramsar and GRASP formally agreed to closer cooperation, among others to improve management of Ramsar sites with great apes, and designate new Ramsar sites with great ape habitat. There are also 14 World Heritage Sites

(WHS) harboring great apes, six of which are listed as World Heritage in Danger, meaning their conservation requires major operations (Caldecott and Miles 2005). The convention was adopted by UNESCO, which is co-sponsor of GRASP. The fact that a great ape site is a WHS enables UNESCO to become involved when a site is threatened.

4.4.5   Main influence through metagovernance and good governance

GRASP is especially effective in its metagovernance and good governance roles. In fulfilling its good governance function, GRASP has mainly contributed to improving participation. Because the functions of metagovernance and good governance are so closely connected, they are discussed jointly.

Through its metagovernance role, GRASP has enabled interaction among governments, NGOs, and scientists at the international, national and local levels. The informal network that has been established is one of the key strengths of the partnership. GRASP is a point of coordination in the international biodiversity governance system; it is able to involve large parts of the great ape conservation community. GRASP has influenced the rules for cooperation in the biodiversity governance system by enabling collaboration among partners that used to have more traditional rules for their interaction. NGOs that formerly only lobbied governments, for example, are now also collaborating with them.

It is important to note that all partners influence GRASP. Especially the partners that have been involved since the formation period, like some of the MEAs, have had a strong influence on what GRASP has become. Therefore it is sometimes difficult to detangle the influences between these partners and GRASP, since they are an integral part of the partnership. GRASP understands the added value of being a partnership, of being a vehicle for interaction, and makes strategic use of the formal status of the UN on the one hand and the intense level of activity of NGOs on the other. 'A lot of what GRASP does is successful because it operates just under the radar of formality', as an interviewee summarized it. The advantage of being a partnership is that GRASP can work around many of the existing rules of the UN bureaucracy, and can be more critical than the UN system would be, although its effectiveness is still influenced by the sometimes slow pace of the UN system. On the other hand, the fact that GRASP is intertwined with the UN enables the partnership to have a different relationship with national governments than its NGO partners could have on their own. GRASP provides NGOs with a unique access to governmental regimes: it acts as a 'funnel' for NGOs. This process of interaction between the UN (including the MEAs), national governments and NGOs is really where the added value is created.

4.5   CEPF

4.5.1   Introduction

Biodiversity hotspots, first defined by Norman Meyers (Myers 1988), are terrestrial areas with high biodiversity that are under extreme threat. In order to be called a hotspot an area must have at least 1500 endemic plant species, and must have already lost at least 70% of its original vegetation due to the impact of human activities. First, 25 hotspots were defined; later the list

was revised and expanded to 34 hotspots (Mittermeier et al. 2005; Myers et al. 2000). Together these hotspots harbor half of the biodiversity in the world, even though they cover only 2,3% of the Earth's surface.

Within the hotspots the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF) focuses on globally threatened and geographically concentrated species, the sites critical for their survival, and the landscapes necessary to maintain ecological and evolutionary processes: the key biodiversity areas. The partnership was founded in 2000 by Conservation International (CI), the World Bank (WB), and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which is, among others, the financial mechanism for the CBD. The government of Japan, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the French Development Agency joined the partnership later. CEPF is a global grant-making programme that invests in civil society in hotspots. The CEPF office is located at the CI headquarters in Arlington, U.S.A., the lead organization in the partnership.

CEPF's functions and institutional interaction at the regional and national level is analyzed for the nine hotspots in which the CEPF investments have been finalized: the Guinean Forests of West Africa; the Tropical Andes; Madagascar and Indian Ocean Islands; Sundaland; the Philippines; the Atlantic Forest; the Tumbes-Chocó-Magdalena hotspot; the Cape Floristic Region; and the Mesoamerica biodiversity hotspot (CEPF 2006-2007). The outputs and outcomes in the hotspots have not been achieved through CEPF funding alone, but CEPF has contributed to them significantly.

4.5.2   Agenda setting of hotspots and civil society

One of the most effective functions of CEPF has been agenda setting. CEPF has had significant institutional influence on the biodiversity governance system by increasing attention for the issues of focusing on hotspots and investing in civil society. In the nine analyzed hotspots CEPF has had institutional influence in terms of content, discourse, and rules: new policy has been developed, the hotspot discourse is used by others, and civil society is more involved in conservation.

When CI set up CEPF, it had the ambition to influence the core business of the CEPF donor partners through the partnership. Although CI has not been highly effective in realizing this ambition until today, CEPF has had some influence on its donor partners. When CEPF started, it was relatively new for the donors to collaborate with civil society. Since then the discourse to cooperate with civil society has become institutionalized in the international biodiversity governance system, and CEPF has contributed to this increased recognition of the contribution of civil society by its partners. The partnership has also influenced the donor partners in terms of content. They are more aware of the need to invest in the most critical areas, like hotspots; CEPF has shown that it is possible to focus. The partnership has also strengthened the ongoing discourse to work more regionally instead of nationally.

4.5.3   Policy development: Influence at the hotspot and national level

CEPF starts its work in a hotspot by developing an 'ecosystem profile' and 'strategic funding directions'. It involves local stakeholders, mainly from government, civil society and science in this process. The grants awarded to civil society groups in the hotspot should then contribute

to achieving the goals defined in the strategic directions. Through working in partnership in the hotspots, other organizations get involved in working towards CEPF hotspot priorities.

A lot of CEPF's influence on governmental policy has been attained (partly) due to the political sensitivity and connectivity of both CI and CEPF. Their political networks at all levels are extensive. Globally at least 22 policies, laws, or regulations in 12 countries have been affected through CEPF projects (WB 2007), which represents a significant outcome effectiveness. Changes in national, regional and local government policy include the incorporation of the corridor concept in policies, the development of new legal instruments for indigenous land claims and private protected areas, the cancellation of logging concessions and a highway, and the development of public-private partnerships. Also, in several hotspots CEPF has funded research on the conservation status of species. These species are often endangered and become listed on the IUCN list of threatened species or their listing is updated. New species have even been discovered.

4.5.4   The core business of enabling implementation

CEPF's core business is enabling implementation by fundraising. The partners are donor organizations; together they committed $150 million for the first 5-year phase. The second 5-year phase, starting in 2007/2008, has an equal financial target; the partners have today almost committed $82 million. The partnership has been successful in leveraging funds and co-financing: almost $130 million of external funding has been spent on CEPF goals (WB 2007). This was exactly CI's strategy in developing a partnership to strengthen civil society for conservation. CEPF can be seen as a strategic fundraising tool of CI, engaging donor organizations in a partnership that supports CI's strategies and using the partners' investments to enable co-financing and leveraging of these funds by third party investors. Because CI is also a major CEPF grantee, there has been a perception of conflicts of interest (Wells, Curran and Qayum 2006). Measures have been taken, and the amount of CEPF funding paid to CI has decreased substantially (WB 2007; Wells, Curran and Qayum 2006).

In the first phase CEPF prioritized 14 hotspots out of the then 25 existing hotspots. For the second phase, ten new hotspots will be prioritized, and the 'old' regions are eligible for limited consolidation grants (CEPF 2007a). Not all (countries in) hotspots are eligible for CEPF funding, since CEPF only invests in countries that are WB clients (developing countries) that have ratified the CBD. 25 hotspots covering 77 countries are wholly eligible, and five additional hotspots include 17 eligible countries (CEPF 2007b). Thus CEPF's implementation outcome after 10 years will include the support of projects in 24 out of 30 (partly) eligible hotspots. The decision on to what extent CEPF would expand into new hotspots in the second phase, and thus phase out the old ones, was difficult. The organization tried to balance the wish to consolidate its past investments and its ambition for other hotspots. A fundamental question is to what extent five years of CEPF investment will suffice to sustain the institutional influence it has had, especially for fundamental change like shifts in discourses or rules. In all hotspots the partnership has made a significant but incomplete contribution; the accomplishments are still fragile (CEPF 2006-2007).

CEPF's support of conservation implementation complements and strengthens the existing regimes. CEPF's hotspot approach focuses the implementation of governmental biodiversity policy. When applying the hotspot approach in a region for the first time, gaps are often found in the existing network of protected areas. The partnership mostly works on filling these gaps. Thus, in the vast majority of hotspots, CEPF works on corridors and connectivity, and on transboundary cooperation. Until early 2007 CEPF's outcome included supporting the creation or expansion of almost 10 million hectares of protected areas worldwide, and improving the management effectiveness of 21 million hectares of protected areas (WB 2007).

Besides the interaction among the CEPF partners there is little interaction between CEPF and international biodiversity regimes at the international level. Only some information exchange takes place. Most of the institutional interaction happens at the hotspot, national and local levels, since CEPF funds conservation implementation. The partnership explicitly aims to contribute to the GEF and CBD biodiversity targets (CEPF 2007b), and in practice supports governments in implementing their international commitments to all international biodiversity regimes. In the nine analyzed hotspots, CEPF contributed to the implementation of the CBD, CITES, WHS, CMS, Ramsar, and the UNESCO Biosphere reserves. To manage overlap and to realize government buy-in, national government officials and national focal points of the international biodiversity regimes are involved in the development of the hotspot strategy, and the strategy has to be approved by the national GEF focal points. There is, however, little effective operational collaboration between CEPF and its partners at the field level.

4.5.5   Metagovernance through engagement and funding
Metagovernance, or 'alignment' as CEPF calls it, of conservation investments is an explicit CEPF goal (CEPF 2007b). CEPF wants as many other organizations to work towards achieving its goals as possible, and aims to manage overlap. A Regional Implementation Team (RIT) is responsible for the coordination of the CEPF work in the hotspot; these are NGOs that were already present in the hotspot. In the majority of the nine analyzed hotspots this was the local CI office. As described earlier, the partnership aligns conservation efforts in the hotspots by developing its conservation priorities in a multi-stakeholder process, and by financing projects that fit in this prioritization.

The partners' different rules and discourses influence the partnership. Most importantly, the fact that CEPF is a partnership of donor organizations has a large influence on the organization. The donor community is keen on measuring the effectiveness of its investments, and requires thorough monitoring and reporting back. CEPF has internalized these existing rules of the donor community, and because of these reporting requirements, CEPF has become a transparent partnership. Also, the WB, Japan and France, with strong roots in the development cooperation discourse, want the partnership to contribute not only to biodiversity conservation but also to poverty alleviation. CEPF has now included indicators for livelihoods in its work, enabling the partnership to show its livelihoods effects to the donors, while remaining in essence a biodiversity partnership.

4.5.6   Good governance through supporting civil society

CEPF has also worked towards good governance in an effective manner. It has improved participation by enabling civil society in developing countries to become more involved in conservation, and by enabling the development of partnerships in different hotspots. All interviewees see supporting civil society in hotspots in developing countries as the CEPF core business. The partners have internalized the discourse that sustainability can not be attained by governments alone; both a strong government and civil society are necessary. CEPF is complementing the existing work of the donor partners by expanding the content of their work. Through CEPF, the governmental partners can channel relatively small amounts of funding to civil society, something they are not equipped for themselves. Thus CEPF enables large institutional donors to make grants available for a new target group, and local civil society groups to access new sources of funding. More than 1000 civil society groups, including community-based groups, indigenous-based groups, local, national and international NGOs, have been supported by CEPF grants (CEPF 2007c). This strengthening of civil society is influencing the existing local rules for interaction between the different sectors of society, a reinvention of conservation policy. Local NGOs have sometimes for the first time been formally involved in conservation management together with government officials. The civil society community and individual NGOs have become better equipped to contribute to biodiversity conservation, due to increased capacity, improved information exchange and coordination, and the establishment of partnerships and networks. Also, community participation in conservation and sustainable use has been supported in many hotspots, and CEPF grantees have worked with communities on alternative livelihoods.

4.6   ICRAN

4.6.1   Introduction

Coral reefs are the most biologically diverse marine habitats in the world. About a quarter of all marine fish species inhabit reefs; reefs play an important role for this major food source for humans. Reefs can be found in the tropics, with one region centered around the wider Caribbean, and the second reaching from East Africa to the Central Pacific. Knowledge about coral reefs is limited; it has been estimated that less than ten percent of the organisms found on reefs have been described. Reef growth is tremendously slow; their formation takes place over geological time scales (Spalding, Ravilious and Green 2001). Almost 60% of the reefs worldwide are under medium to high threat (Bryant et al. 1998). Most important threats to reefs are pollution, sedimentation, overfishing, climate change and direct physical damage. Coral reefs are very sensitive to low and high temperatures, with high temperatures driving 'coral bleaching'. Mass coral bleaching, like the global mass bleaching in 1998, shows high correlation with the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events (Spalding, Ravilious and Green 2001).

The International Coral Reef Action Network (ICRAN) was established in 2000 by UNEP, the World Fish Center, the World Resources Institute (WRI), UNEP-World Resources Monitoring Centre (WCMC), the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network (GCRMN), the International Coral Reef Initiative secretariat (ICRI), and the Coral Reef Alliance (CORAL). Later partners are the United Nations Foundation (UNF), four UNEP regional sea programmes, the Coral

Reef Alliance (CORAL), the Marine Aquarium Council, the Nature Conservancy, Reef Check, and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). Its aim is to halt the trend of degradation of coral reefs worldwide and to maintain the biodiversity, health and productivity of coral reefs and related ecosystems. The partnership focuses on three interlinked types of activities: reef management, global coral reef monitoring and assessment, and communication and knowledge dissemination (UNEP 2004a). The secretariat is located at UNEP-WCMC in Cambridge, UK. ICRAN is an operational network of ICRI, a global network of governments, NGOs, MEAs, multilateral institutions, and research institutions (Dight and Scherl 1997). ICRI is an international political network which develops policy recommendations and statements. ICRAN was established as a reaction to the lack of implementation of ICRI's statements 'Call to Action', 'Framework for Action', and 'Renewed Call to Action'. There is a large overlap between the partners of ICRI and ICRAN. This analysis focuses on ICRAN because of the comparability of its global implementation organization with GRASP and CEPF.

4.6.2   Agenda setting by political network ICRI

Like CEPF, ICRAN interacts little with governmental regimes at the international level. Most of the institutional interaction on coral reefs occurs between ICRI and the international regimes. The interaction between ICRAN and MEAs mostly consists of information exchange, and has taken place with, among others, Ramsar and the WHC. Contrary to great apes and their habitats, coral reefs are still relatively underrepresented in most MEAs and other international regimes. 20 coral reef sites are Ramsar sites, 18 sites are WHS, and 17 sites have been declared Biosphere reserves. All species of hard coral are listed under CITES Appendix II, permitting trade if regulated (Spalding, Ravilious and Green 2001). In 2007, for the first time, three species of coral were added to the IUCN red list of threatened species (Hopkin 2007). Because of this relatively low presence of coral reefs in international regimes ICRAN can not use the regimes as mechanisms to further strengthen political awareness, like GRASP has done. Although ICRAN has not prioritized the listing of more coral reef sites and species in international conventions, it does support the implementation of international governmental regimes. ICRAN projects have included World Heritage Sites, for example. Coral reefs are better represented in marine protected areas (MPAs): there are 660 marine protected areas worldwide that include coral reefs. Unfortunately, these parks are often poorly managed 'paper parks' (Spalding, Ravilious and Green 2001). ICRAN has contributed to improving the management of these parks (see below).

In the coral reef regions, ICRAN has fulfilled a modest agenda setting role. ICRAN has increased attention for coral reef conservation at the regional, national and local level by financing coral reef conservation work.

4.6.3   Little ambition for policy development

An interesting fact is that ICRAN has little ambition to fulfill a policy development function at the global level. The partnership is formally guided by the ICRI framework for action, which is too broad to give real guidance in prioritization. Therefore ICRAN, compared to the other two analyzed partnerships, does not fulfill as clear a niche in the international biodiversity governance system. ICRAN does have an explicit goal to influence governmental regimes at the national and local level in terms of content. It wants them to support improved coastal and MPA management. ICRAN has co-funded research on threats to coral reefs in different regions.

The reports have contributed to the application of a regional approach to coral reef conservation, and governmental organizations have often used the results of ICRAN-funded research.

4.6.4   Enabling implementation: The core business

ICRAN's main function has been facilitating implementation; the partnership has supported implementation mainly through funding. ICRAN has enabled different local projects by providing a connection between the international donor community and local project sites, comparable to CEPF. The majority of ICRAN funding has come from the UNF, a fund to strengthen the UN. The main problem influencing ICRAN's effectiveness has been the fact that the partnership was established to access these UNF funds. Consequences have been that ICRAN's organizational form was designed to adhere to the UNF demands, partners did not become members for the potential added value of a partnership, but for the funding, and ICRAN lacked a common vision and programmatic background. All interviewees described this internal debate on fundraising, the distribution of funds, and the global organization of the partnership as problematic, and these issues affected the partnership throughout the years. The total ICRAN budget has been around $15 million, of which $10 million has come from the UNF. The other $5 million were leveraged. The UNF funding will end in 2010. ICRAN is changing its fundraising strategy to raising funds for specific programmes developed by groups of ICRAN partners.

The partnership's implementation has been organized through the UNEP Regional Seas Programme (RSP). There are 13 regional programmes established under UNEP auspices and five independent partner programmes. Because these multilateral governmental regimes function as the ICRAN focal points in the regions, the partnership's activities are coordinated regionally, and buy-in by the national governments is ensured. Through this collaboration of ICRAN and the regional seas, content overlap has been managed, and ICRAN has influenced the regional seas and their member states to pay more attention to coral reefs. In several regions ICRAN funded the coordinating role of the regional sea for ICRAN activities. ICRAN's implementation role has been effective in terms of outcome; it has funded activities in more than 40 coral reef related sites in over 35 countries in all seven regional seas where coral reef are located globally: Eastern Africa, East Asian Seas, Pacific, Wider Caribbean, South Asian Seas, and, to a lesser extent, the ROPME Sea Area, and the Red Sea & Gulf of Aden region.

The work in the regions is seen by many as the most successful part of ICRAN. In the different regions the ICRAN priorities in the regional programme were developed by the regional seas in consultation with local governmental representatives, experts, and civil society groups. The programmes included site-based activities and regional activities. The partners selected demonstration sites and target sites: the good practices at the demonstration sites were translated to and implemented in the target sites. The majority of the ICRAN sites were Marine Protected Areas (MPAs); others were managed by traditional law. Most of these regional ICRAN programmes have been implemented. ICRAN has started to change its methodology from developing regional programmes to developing specific projects with groups of partner organizations. These more recent projects are often organized as large (groups of) regional partnerships, or constitute larger projects focused on developing new major MPAs or improving their management (UNEP 2001; UNEP 2004b; UNEP 2005).

A specific aim of ICRAN has been building the capacity of the regional seas programmes. Due to the fact that ICRAN worked through the regional seas, the effectiveness of the ICRAN work has also been influenced by the existing capacity of the regional sea organizations. In some regions, where the regional seas have limited capacity, the ICRAN secretariat is strongly involved in coordinating the regional work. In South Asia, for example, the coordination of the ICRAN work is being done by the ICRAN secretariat in close collaboration with the SACEP, the organization responsible for the South Asian regional sea programme. In regions where the regional sea organization has more capacity, it has been able to play a more proactive role as ICRAN partner. In the Caribbean, for example, the regional sea, CEP, has had institutional influence on the ICRAN work in the region. CEP has advised ICRAN on what activities to implement, and ICRAN has funded the continuation of already existing successful initiatives.

An important question is how sustainable ICRAN's influence has been in the regions. Different interviewees spoke of ICRAN in the past tense, as a programme or group of projects that were useful, but have been completed. Even though ICRAN did aim to have sustainable influence when planning its activities, its sustainability is, especially for the site-based activities, questionable. Other activities could have more sustainable influence, including the partnerships that have evolved from ICRAN, the improvements of the institutional arrangements for regional coral reef policy, like the coral reef task forces (see below), and the more recent, larger projects.

4.6.5   Metagovernance through networking

ICRAN also effectively fulfills a metagovernance function. The ICRAN secretariat facilitates information exchange among partners, and brings together a broad intersectoral network of organizations, both at the global and at the regional level. This networking role has been an important added value of the partnership. Through its network ICRAN has enabled collaboration among partners that had not worked together before. An important function has been peer to peer interaction in the regions, for example among MPA managers. Moreover, initiatives that have been successful in one region are copied to others through the ICRAN network. ICRAN has improved regional coordination and collaboration on coral reef policy among governments in two regions by developing so-called coral reef task forces, groups of experts, linked to the regional sea organization, who coordinate the work on coral reefs.

4.6.6   Good governance through capacity building

Because of its implementation methodology ICRAN has also worked towards good governance. It brings different actors together, improving participation, both at the regional level and at the site level. ICRAN has influenced the rules for collaboration among societal sectors, since it has enabled the formation of partnerships and other forms of collaboration between civil society groups and governmental actors in regions where this is often still a novelty. Capacity building has been one of the core activities of ICRAN, improving the capacity of communities, local civil society groups and others to participate in coral reef conservation and sustainable use. Many ICRAN projects have focused on capacity building or have included capacity building elements.

4.7   Discussion and conclusions

This chapter has researched the question to what extent the role of international intersectoral conservation partnerships in biodiversity governance can be assessed using a positive, negative, and/or utilitarian qualification. In order to answer this question both the governance functions that partnerships fulfill, and the institutional interaction between the partnerships and (inter-) governmental regimes when the partnerships fulfill these functions have been researched. The analysis of three conservation partnerships supports the first and third hypotheses. Although the partnerships' effectiveness in fulfilling the different functions varies, they contribute to biodiversity conservation in a unique manner, making necessary improvements in the governance system, and complement existing governmental biodiversity regimes. No evidence was found to support the hypothesis that these partnerships erode public authority. International governmental regimes remain pro-active, and defend their role when they are of the opinion that goals can be achieved better by intergovernmental processes than through partnership.

4.7.1   Reinventing conservation politics

The partnerships have reinvented conservation governance mainly by fulfilling agenda setting, metagovernance and good governance functions. They have had institutional influence on leading discourses and rules in the governance system; changes which are necessary to improve its effectiveness.

GRASP has influenced the discourse on great ape conservation, making it a global issue instead of a regional or national issue, and CEPF's hotspot discourse has been adopted by other actors, including governments. All three partnerships have contributed to the further institutionalization and implementation of the ecosystem approach as the organizing principle by public, public-private and private actors in the international biodiversity governance system.

The most important influence on the governance system has been achieved through metagovernance. The conservation partnerships, especially GRASP and CEPF, fully understand the added value and niche of the partnership approach. By strategically using this added value approach they play a unique role in the biodiversity governance system, which could not have been done by the partners separately. They make maximum use of the fact that the partnerships themselves are in essence vehicles for interaction among societal sectors, and among formal governmental and informal processes. They have added a new public-private network intertwined in the intergovernmental system, creating new relationships and interaction in order to coordinate, focus and improve biodiversity governance.

The partnerships work towards good governance by improving the participation and strengthening the role of civil society in global, regional and national conservation politics, and by involving communities in local conservation. Thereby the rules for intersectoral collaboration are influenced. The fact that all three partnerships, but CEPF most strongly, work on capacity building of civil society in developing countries is an important contribution to the governance system. All three partnerships endorse the discourse that conservation in developing countries can only be realized if local civil society and the implementation capacity of all societal sectors in developing countries are strengthened. Through the conservation partnerships these new

rules for intersectoral collaboration for conservation have been further institutionalized and implemented in the governance system. Especially CEPF and ICRAN also enable the development of new regional and national intersectoral partnerships. In this manner, the rule to work in intersectoral partnership is being 'exported' from the global environmental governance system, where partnerships are already becoming an institutionalized way of doing business, to developing countries, where they are often still a novelty.

4.7.2   Complementing (inter-)governmental biodiversity regimes

The partnerships have complemented (inter-)national biodiversity regimes mainly by fulfilling implementation and metagovernance functions. Through institutional influence in terms of content, they have improved the effectiveness of existing regimes, and have supported others to improve their contributions to the regimes.

All three partnerships explicitly aim to contribute to the implementation of international biodiversity regimes. They enable implementation through funding. The partnerships concentrate on developing countries, CEPF more consciously, realizing that these societies need the most support, and GRASP and ICRAN simply because most biodiversity can be found in the South. In essence, the partnerships are instruments to help these countries implement the commitments they have made in international biodiversity regimes. This improves the effectiveness of these regimes, which in the end depend on national implementation for their effectiveness, since most biodiversity worldwide is located within national territories. Because the partnerships focus the international biodiversity governance system towards ecosystems which are among the areas with the highest biodiversity worldwide, such as tropical rainforests, hotspots and coral reefs, they make the international biodiversity governance system more effective.

All three partnerships fulfill a metagovernance function at the regional or national level. They complement governmental regimes by proactively bringing together public and private actors. GRASP's NGASPs, CEPF's ecosystem profiles, and ICRAN's regional programmes have all been developed through multi-stakeholder processes. By fulfilling this metagovernance function the partnerships also work on capacity building of governments in developing countries. The partnerships cooperate with governmental anchors for their work in the regions and countries. ICRAN uses the UNEP regional seas for its regional coordination; CEPF uses the existing national GEF focal points; and GRASP has created its own focal points in the range states, which are comprised of government officials. Moreover, the partnerships enhance regional collaboration between governments in conservation, since a lot of great ape habitats, hotspots and coral reefs are located in more that one country.

4.7.3   Varying effectiveness

The effectiveness of the partnerships in fulfilling the different functions varies. Even though GRASP has been effective in agenda setting, metagovernance and working towards good governance, the effectiveness of its policy development varies, and its implementation on the ground is limited until today. Its output of new policy is adequate, but its outcome is limited: the policies developed by GRASP have little influence on other actors. The output of implementation on the ground has been disappointing due to limited funding. CEPF has been effective in fulfilling all five governance functions, although the partnership may be spreading

itself too thin over too many hotspots worldwide in trying to attain a high outcome; CEPF wants to influence the conservation policies of as many other actors as possible. ICRAN has produced output through funding implementation, metagovernance, and working towards good governance. Its outcome varies in the different regions. In some regions, the influence of the partnership has been limited to the implementation of a number of projects. Important negative influence on its outcome is the fact that ICRAN has not formulated its own priorities for coral reef conservation. Therefore the partnership is less strategic and focused in its fulfillment of functions than the other partnerships.

The effectiveness of all three partnerships in fulfilling governance functions is of course influenced by the existing political situations. In different regions, the political tensions in and/or among countries that share an ecosystem have made collaboration difficult. An important general question on effectiveness is how sustainable the influence of the conservation partnerships in the regions is. Although the partnerships aim to attain achievements that will last in the longer term, they only fund the implementation of projects for a limited period of time. This question is especially relevant for the more fundamental change, like shifts in discourses or rules that the partnerships have achieved. Finally, despite the fact that the analyzed conservation partnerships fulfill important roles in biodiversity governance, their contribution remains limited. A partnership is only one instrument with limited financial means in a densely populated and large governance system.

This chapter has shown the relevance of public-private interaction in biodiversity governance. The effectiveness of the biodiversity governance system can be further improved by strengthening this interaction and using it strategically. The researched partnerships should be seen as effective implementation instruments for MEAs. However, although no evidence was found in this chapter for partnerships eroding governmental authority, it is important to note that tension could develop between the partnerships and national governments, since the partnerships are deciding on conservation priorities and funding their implementation within national territories. National sovereignty issues have been an important debate in MEAs, and the partnerships could be viewed as a way to bypass these discussions. Awareness of these tensions should be integrated in the recommended strategic use of intersectoral collaboration for conservation implementation.

An important success factor in the analyzed partnerships is the interaction between NGOs that are experienced in conservation implementation and international institutions. When these types of partners are both represented, the partnership becomes a natural link between the international governance system and conservation on the ground. Since lack of implementation is one of the weakest aspects of the international biodiversity governance system, donors should embrace this type of partnership to further adequate implementation of international regimes. A suggestion could be to initiate partnerships not only around specific types of biodiversity, but also to support the implementation of a specific (part of an) international agreement or decision, like the CBD programme of work on forest biological diversity. Public-private interaction can also be used to strengthen institutional capacity for metagovernance at the ecosystem level. Conservation NGOs, which are focused on ecosystems, can use partnerships to facilitate, improve and institutionalize coordination among governments at this level. The type of analyzed

partnerships can also be utilized as political instruments, enhancing political momentum for conservation. The partnerships should be seen as a form of institutionalization of the increasing role of conservation NGOs in international biodiversity politics. In the partnerships, the public-private interactions are not only formalized but also intensified. Through this intensified interaction, working on improving the effectiveness of the governance system becomes easier for both the public and private partners.

5 Interaction management by partnerships: The case of biodiversity and climate change governance system interaction[4]

5.1 Introduction

The interaction among regimes is a prominent theme in regime literature (Gehring and Oberthür 2008; Keohane, Haas et al. 1995; Oberthür 2002; Oberthür and Gehring 2006; Young 1996; Young 2002a). Authors studying regime interaction presume that (the effectiveness of) one regime is affected by its interaction with other regimes from the same issue area and/or regimes governing other issues. Several regime interaction researchers are currently aiming to develop a further understanding of how regime interaction is and can be managed, and are exploring the issue of *interaction management* (Asselt 2007; Oberthür 2008; Stokke 2001). Other regime authors have broadened the research focus to not only include intergovernmental regimes, but also (public-) *private steering mechanisms* (Arts 2000; Haufler 1993; Palmujoki 2006; Pattberg 2007). These researchers realize that these (public-) private initiatives are playing an increasingly important role in international governance. With this broadened focus, regime literature is becoming more closely related to governance literature, which studies issues of contemporary governance, including these (public-) private steering mechanisms (see for example Glasbergen, Biermann et al. 2007).

This chapter aims to contribute to these current research issues in regime and governance literature by creating a better understanding of the contribution of (public-) private steering mechanisms to interaction management, and of the implications this may have for governance systems as a whole. *Governance systems* are defined as the total of all public and (public-) private steering initiatives – intergovernmental regimes, private initiatives, public-private partnerships, etc. – working on the amelioration of a certain sustainability problem, such as pollution, biodiversity loss or climate change. The focus of the research is the management of governance system interaction (instead of regime interaction in a more narrow sense). The analysis focuses on the role of so-called *international intersectoral partnerships*, defined as strategic alliances between state, market, and/or civil society actors from more than one country. The contribution of partnerships to the governance of single environmental issues is already topic of research (Glasbergen, Biermann et al. 2007), but little is known on whether partnerships can also contribute to the management of governance system interaction.

Researching interaction management is particularly relevant where governance system interactions are intense and their importance is clearly recognized. Therefore this chapter focuses on the interactions between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems, since the

interactions between these two systems are substantial and ever more recognized and acted upon (IPCC 2002; Lovejoy and Hannah 2005; MEA 2005a). Thus, the main question of this chapter is: *What is the contribution of international intersectoral partnerships to the management of the interactions between the international biodiversity and climate change governance systems?*

Sub-questions are:

1. Do partnerships fulfill interaction management functions? If yes, what functions, and with what focus and effect?
2. How does this compare to the interaction management functions, and their focus and effects, fulfilled by the main regimes?

For the second sub-question the interaction management functions of the main intergovernmental regimes are analyzed. Regime theorists have discussed the scope and size of the regime concept, whether it refers to rule systems in a broad sense or to single conventions in a narrow sense, at length. Several theorists have chosen to follow the broad interpretation (Haggard and Simmons 1987; Rittberger 1993), although Oberthür and Gehring (2006) use a more narrow approach of the regime concept. In this chapter, the choice has been made to consider 'intergovernmental regimes' and 'single conventions' as synonyms for analytical clarity; the term 'governance system' refers to the broader rule system. This has been done in order to single out the roles played by conventions (or regimes) within a governance system on the one hand and international partnerships on the other.

The main intergovernmental regimes that will be analyzed are the CBD in the biodiversity governance system and the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol in the climate change governance system. Different authors have discussed the interactions between these regimes (Caparros and Jacquemont 2003; Kim 2004; Oberthür and Gehring 2006; Pontecorvo 1999; Saint-Laurent 2005). However, they mainly focused on the issue of afforestation and reforestation, with the exception of Ebeling and Yasué (2008), who focused on avoided deforestation, and Van Asselt (2007), who included some interaction management aspects. This chapter will add to these analyses by also including (1) the *management* of the interactions; (2) the roles of *international intersectoral partnerships* and (3) *additional current issues* of interaction.

The chapter aims to provide an overview of the interaction management functions fulfilled by the main regimes and partnerships. The twelve analyzed international intersectoral partnerships represent the main partnerships active in interaction management on the main current topics on which the biodiversity and climate change governance systems interact most intensely. Other relevant partnerships were not found. Due to this broad scope of the chapter, the empirical evidence does not include in-depth case studies, but focuses solely on the interaction management contributions of the regimes and partnerships. The analysis is based on literature review, 15 interviews with representatives of (partner organizations of) the partnerships, and analysis of partnership and regime documentation. In the next section the conceptual framework for analyzing governance system interaction management is introduced. Section 5.3 analyzes the two main causes for the interaction between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems and the governance system interactions themselves. The interaction management by

the regimes and partnerships is analyzed in respectively sections 5.4 and 5.5, and the last section encompasses the chapter's conclusions and reflections.

5.2   Conceptual framework for analyzing governance system interaction management

This section presents the conceptual framework for analyzing 'Governance System Interaction Management' (GSIM). The framework is based on the various conceptualizations of regime interaction and interaction management developed by different authors. For regime interaction the framework builds on the work of Young, Oberthür and Gehring; for interaction management the framework is based, among others, on the approaches of Oberthür and Stokke.

Young distinguishes between different *causes* for regime interaction. Firstly, institutional arrangements interact due to the fact that they deal with issues that are related (e.g. environmental and economic issues), which is referred to as *functional interdependencies*. These interdependencies are just "a fact of life" (Young 2002, p.23). Secondly, regimes can be based on principles that are cross-cutting (e.g. a global regime to conserve a specific species and a regional conservation regime in a region where this species occurs). Here Young speaks of *regime overlap*. Overlap is – contrary to functional interdependency – no "fact of life", but a consequence of institutional design. The GSIM framework applies these causes for regime interaction to the subject of governance system interaction.

The next step in building the GSIM framework is addressing the *interactions* themselves. Oberthür and Gehring address this question extensively, focusing on *how* institutions interact. They analyze individual cases of interaction in which one institution, the *source* institution, affects a *target* institution's effectiveness or institutional development (Oberthür and Gehring 2006, p.1, p.6). These individual cases of interaction can have a *positive*, *neutral* or *negative* influence. In the GSIM framework, these methodologies to analyze institutional interaction are applied to governance system interaction in order to distinguish individual occurrences of interaction between the climate change and biodiversity governance systems, and to consider the nature of the influence (positive, neutral or negative).

The final building block of the GSIM framework is the concept of *interaction management*. Stokke defines interplay (or interaction) management as "deliberate efforts by participants in … regimes to prevent, encourage, or shape the way one regime affects problem solving under another" (Stokke 2001, p.11). Elaborating on this definition, this chapter defines governance system interaction management, or GSIM, as: *Deliberate efforts by governance system participants to improve the effectiveness of the governance systems as a whole, thus turning negative interactions into neutral or positive ones, changing neutral interactions into positive ones, and/or strengthening positive interactions.*

Oberthür distinguishes between three modes of interaction management (Oberthür 2008): Firstly, cognitive interplay management, focused on offering knowledge and information; secondly, regulatory interplay management, or the development of norms and rules, and thirdly

capacitating interplay management, or developing an enabling framework for actors to pursue interaction management activities. Building on this distinction, this chapter differentiates between the following interaction management *functions*:

- *Agenda setting*
  Starting the debate about the interaction
- *Policy development*
  Developing public or private policy for managing the interaction
- *Implementation*
  Implementing synergistic activities
- *Metagovernance*
  Coordinating among actors from both governance systems
- *Ensuring good governance*
  Improving participation of relevant actors

The function of agenda setting overlaps with Oberthür's cognitive interaction management mode; the function of policy development is closely related to the regulatory interaction management mode, and the last three interaction management functions can be viewed as part of the capacitating interplay management mode.

The interaction management functions are also based on other bodies of literature. The first three functions are based on literature on the policy cycle and process (Jann and Wegrich 2007; Pierre 2000; Sabatier 1999) and on the functions discussed in partnership literature (see for example Huijstee, Francken et al. 2007). The fourth function, metagovernance, is based on the governance literature in which the need of coordination in a modern society with numerous steering initiatives is discussed (see for example Kooiman 1993). The function of ensuring good governance is based on the UNHCHR definition of good governance: improving transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and/or responsiveness (UNHCHR 2000). In this chapter the analysis focuses on improving participation. Together, these five interaction management functions represent essential manners in which to manage governance system interaction, including contributions in terms of process, coordination, and improving governance quality.

Interaction management functions are considered successful when they improve the existing governance system interactions, thus when they are able to change negative interactions into neutral or positive ones, neutral interactions into positive ones, and/or strengthen positive interactions. A distinction can be made between fulfilling functions with significant effect, contributing in a relevant manner and/or to a substantial extent to improving existing governance system interactions, and fulfilling functions with some effect, thus contributing in a less relevant manner and/or to a lesser extent.

To sum up, the presented GSIM framework distinguishes between two *causes* of governance system interaction (functional interdependence and institutional overlap), three types of *influence* of governance system interaction (negative, neutral or positive) and five *functions* of interaction

management (agenda setting, policy development, implementation, metagovernance and good governance).

5.3 The biodiversity and climate change governance system interactions

The biodiversity and climate change governance systems interact due to the functional interdependencies and the institutional overlap between the two issues. Climate change is a threat to biodiversity, and biodiversity can play a role in combating climate change.

5.3.1 The functional interdependence and institutional overlap

Climate change is already affecting both terrestrial and marine ecosystems (IPCC 2007b). By the end of this century, climate change and its impacts may even be the dominant direct driver of biodiversity loss and changes in ecosystem services globally (Lovejoy and Hannah 2005; MEA 2005a). If increases in global average temperature exceed 1.5-2.5°C, approximately 20-30% of plant and animal species are likely to be at increased risk of extinction, and there are projected to be major changes in ecosystem structure and function, with predominantly negative consequences for biodiversity, and ecosystem goods and services (IPCC 2007b). Vulnerable ecosystems include tropical and boreal forests, and marine and coastal zones (CBD 2007a). Species with limited climatic ranges and/or restricted habitat requirements and/or small populations are typically the most vulnerable to extinction (IPCC 2002). Forests are at the centre of the overlap between biodiversity and climate change. Since forests harbor almost half of the world's biodiversity, conserving forests contributes in a significant manner to biodiversity conservation. Forests also play an important role in the carbon cycle; forests can act as reservoirs (or pools), sinks (removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere) or as sources of GHGs. Forest loss and degradation is responsible for about 20% of global green house gas emissions (IPCC 2007a).

5.3.2 The governance system interactions

The discussion on governance system interaction management is relevant only for part of the biodiversity and climate change governance systems; on some issues the governance systems interact little. This chapter focuses on the current issues on which the governance systems interact most intensively: climate change-integrated conservation strategies (CCS), afforestation and reforestation, biofuels, and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD). All the interactions are measures taken in the climate change governance system that influence the biodiversity governance system (see Table 5.1).

CCS
"…Successful adaptation is an adjustment by an ecosystem … to a new or changing environment without simplification or the loss of structure, functions and components" (CBD 2006, p.5). Hannah, Midgley et al. have introduced the term 'climate change-integrated conservation strategies (CCS)' to describe measures needed for ecosystems to be able to adapt to climate change (Hannah, Midgley et al. 2002). Measures include the reduction of other pressures, like over-exploitation, since genetically-diverse populations and species-rich ecosystems have a greater potential to adapt to climate change; and enabling capacity for species movement, thus

promoting habitat connectivity and preventing habitat fragmentation and loss (CBD 2003; CBD 2006; Hannah, Midgley et al. 2002; IPCC 2002). Governance system interactions on CCS have a positive influence, since the topic of adaptation strengthens the attention for issues that are of fundamental importance for biodiversity conservation in general, like combating over-exploitation. The effectiveness of conservation policy in the biodiversity governance system is thus strengthened if actors in the climate change governance system develop and/or implement CCS measures.

Biofuels
The development and use of biofuels are promoted to reduce GHG emissions. Depending on the type of biofuel measures committed to or implemented by climate change actors, the biodiversity governance system will be influenced negatively or neutrally. The influence depends on the crop that is used, management practices, land-use changes and energy processes. The main impacts of biofuels include competition for land, additional GHG emissions, deforestation, land conflicts, food prices, and water-related impacts (CBD 2007b). The influence is negative when climate change actors promote the use of biofuels which compete for land use in important areas for biodiversity conservation; the influence is neutral when actors in the climate change governance system take potential negative influences on biodiversity into account when developing biofuels measures.

Afforestation and reforestation
Other important interactions take place through the afforestation and reforestation measures taken for climate change mitigation. Depending on the type of afforestation and reforestation measures committed to or implemented by climate change actors, the effectiveness of the biodiversity governance system will be influenced positively, neutrally or negatively. The influence depends on the ecosystem being replaced, management options applied, and the spatial and temporal scales (CBD 2003). The influence is positive for reforestation with native trees or afforestation with native trees on degraded land; net neutral or uncertain for other reforestation or afforestation; and negative for afforestation on other native ecosystems (e.g. natural grassland or savannah) or conversion of natural forests to plantations (CBD 2001, p.13).

REDD
The main issue in the interaction between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems due to their overlap is using forest conservation and sustainable use as a climate change mitigation instrument. The conservation of existing carbon pools is achieved by avoided deforestation; also, improved forest management can enhance carbon uptake or minimize carbon losses and conserve biodiversity. Preventing further deforestation is relatively cheap compared with other types of mitigation; it is a highly cost-effective way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Stern 2006). The manner in which actors in the climate change governance system develop or implement REDD policy influences the effectiveness of the biodiversity governance system. Since the forests harboring the most carbon may not always be the most biodiverse forests, REDD policy purely made from a climate change perspective will not support forest biodiversity conservation efforts, and the influence will be neutral. If climate change actors include biodiversity aspects in the development or implementation of REDD policy, and provide

Table 5.1: Main interactions of the biodiversity and climate change governance systems

Issue	Influence
CCS	Positive
Biofuels	Negative and neutral
Afforestation and reforestation (A/R)	Positive, negative and neutral
REDD	Positive and neutral

funding for biodiversity friendly REDD policy, the biodiversity governance system is influenced positively.

5.4   The interaction management by the CBD and UNFCCC

In this section, the interaction management functions that the two main intergovernmental regimes, the CBD and the UNFCCC have fulfilled are analyzed. The period of analysis starts in 1992, the year in which both conventions were adopted, and ends at the UNFCCC Bali COP in December 2007. First the general interaction management by the regimes is reviewed; then the interaction management per issue is analyzed.

5.4.1   General interaction management

The CBD has played a proactive role in the general management of the interactions between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems (see also Van Asselt 2007). The UNFCCC has played a more reactive role, supporting the CBD initiatives, since the vision of the UNFCCC Parties and secretariat is that the core business of the convention is climate change, and that biodiversity and other issues are 'co-benefits'.

Already in 1996 and 1998, the CBD COP requested the CBD Executive Secretary to develop closer relationships with the UNFCCC to make implementation activities and institutional arrangements mutually supportive, and in 2006 the COP requested the Joint Liaison Group, or JLG (see below) to consider options for enhanced collaboration among the so-called Rio conventions (the CBD, UNFCCC, and CCD). The UNFCCC has supported this agenda setting role by affirming the need for cooperation. The secretariats of both conventions have fulfilled metagovernance roles in interaction management by organizing workshops on the governance system interactions for actors from both governance systems.

The CBD has also fulfilled a policy development role in interaction management by taking the initiative for a report on the integration of biodiversity considerations in the implementation of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. The UNFCCC and CCD participated in the development of the report, which states that the CBD and UNFCCC are closely inter-related and discusses all four issues analyzed in this chapter (CBD 2003). The CBD also requested the IPPC, the main advice panel to the UNFCCC, to develop a technical paper on climate change and biodiversity. The paper discusses both the impact of climate change on biodiversity and

the interlinkages between climate change mitigation and adaptation measures and biodiversity (IPCC 2002). In 2006, the CBD discussed the further integration of climate change impact and response activities into its own programmes of work. The convention has followed the UNFCCC in promoting an interaction management implementation role at the national level. In 2003 and 2004 the UNFCCC had, among others, urged its national focal points to cooperate with their counterparts for the other conventions.

The most eye-catching example of general interaction management has been the establishment in 2001 of the JLG of the three Rio Conventions to enhance the collaboration of their secretariats. With the JLG, the metagovernance role in interaction management has become institutionalized. The JLG has promoted an implementation role in interaction management at the national level by calling for greater collaboration among the national focal points of the three conventions; it has played a metagovernance role by aiming for enhanced collaboration among convention bodies; and it has fulfilled a policy development role by publishing a report on the links between forests, climate change, desertification and biodiversity to inform UNFCCC COP 13 (JLG 2007).

5.4.2   CCS
The UNFCCC placed the interaction on the issue of adaptation on the agenda in Article 2 of the convention text: "the ultimate objective of the convention … is stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change…" (UNFCCC 1992). In 2005, UNFCCC COP played a policy development role by adopting a five year programme of work, later renamed as the Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change.

In 2002 the CBD COP also fulfilled a policy development role through its expanded programme of work on forest diversity, which promotes the maintenance and restoration of biodiversity in forests in order to enhance their capacity to adapt to climate change. The CBD has played both a policy development and a metagovernance role through its report on synergy among activities addressing biological diversity, desertification, land degradation and climate change. The report focuses on synergies among adaptation measures (CBD 2006). Both conventions have promoted an implementation role in interaction management at the national level.

The conventions have, however, not been able to strengthen the positive influence among the biodiversity and climate change governance systems on the issue of CCS through these interaction management activities.

5.4.3   Biofuels
The debate on the sustainability of biofuels is relatively young. Until the end of 2007, both regimes had contributed little to governance system interaction management on this issue. In 2007, the CBD fulfilled an agenda setting role by discussing the issue of biodiversity and liquid biofuel production. Parties and other governments were invited to develop a policy framework

for liquid biofuels production options which contributes to both the mitigation of greenhouse-gas emissions and the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.

5.4.4 Afforestation and reforestation

On the issue of afforestation and reforestation, especially the CBD has tried to avoid negative influences of the climate change governance system on the biodiversity governance system through interaction management activities.

The UNFCCC placed the interaction on the issue of afforestation and reforestation on the agenda in Article 4.1.d of the convention text: All parties… shall "promote sustainable management, … conservation and enhancement … of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases…., including biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems" (UNFCCC 1992). The convention fulfilled a policy development function through its Kyoto protocol, which entered into force in 2005. Under the protocol, developed countries and countries with economies in transition (so-called Annex I countries which have committed to emission reduction targets) should implement measures to protect and enhance sinks and reservoirs, taking into account their commitments under relevant international environmental agreements. The protocol also includes three flexible mechanisms: an emission trading system, joint implementation (JI), and the CDM. Annex I countries can use afforestation, reforestation and deforestation for their domestic implementation and joint implementation; only afforestation and reforestation can be used in the CDM.

The CBD played an agenda setting role in the interaction management of LULUCF activities (IPCC 2000) through the note by the CBD Executive Secretary to the UNFCCC COP on cooperation between the CBD and UNFCCC on climate change and biological diversity. The note states that "inclusion of LULUCF activities under the CDM could provide significant positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in developing countries, if appropriate eligibility criteria, screening procedures of impact assessments are applied" (CBD 2001).

5.4.5 REDD

On the issue of REDD, both conventions have formally aimed to develop a positive interaction between the biodiversity and climate governance systems.

The UNFCCC fulfilled an agenda setting role for the issue of forest conservation as climate instrument in Article 4.1.d of the UNFCCC convention text (see 5.4.4). In 2002, the CBD COP also played an agenda setting role through its expanded programme of work on forest diversity, which promotes assessing how the conservation and sustainable use of forest biological diversity can contribute to the international work relating to climate change.

Reducing emissions from deforestation was officially placed on the UNFCCC agenda in 2005 based on a submission by the governments of Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica (supported by seven other developing countries). The UNFCCC fulfilled policy development and metagovernance roles by organizing policy workshops on REDD in 2006 and 2007 for actors from both governance systems. The participants agreed that there is an urgent need to take

Table 5.2: Interaction management effect of regimes

Issue	Interaction management function	Regimes	
		CBD	UNFCCC
General	Agenda setting	++	
	Policy development	+	
	Implementation	+/-	+/-
	Metagovernance	+	+
	Good governance		
CCS	Agenda setting		+
	Policy development	+	+
	Implementation	+/-	+/-
	Metagovernance	+/-	
	Good governance		
Biofuels	Agenda setting	+/-	
	Policy development		
	Implementation		
	Metagovernance		
	Good governance		
A/R	Agenda setting	+	+
	Policy development	+/-	+/-
	Implementation		
	Metagovernance		
	Good governance		
REDD	Agenda setting	+	++
	Policy development		+
	Implementation		
	Metagovernance		+
	Good governance		

++   Significant effect on governance system interaction
+   Important contribution to interaction management, with some effect on governance system interaction
+/-   Interaction management activity, but no effect on governance system interaction
Empty   No interaction management activity

action to reduce emissions from deforestation in developing countries, that such action should be compatible with sustainable forest management, promote several important co-benefits, like biodiversity conservation, and complement the goals of, and enhance synergies with other multilateral processes. In 2007, the UNFCCC COP affirmed the urgent need to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and recognized that reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries can promote co-benefits and may complement the aims and objectives of other relevant international conventions and agreements.

5.4.6   Conclusions

The two analyzed intergovernmental regimes, the CBD and the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol have actively managed the interactions between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems. The number and extent of interaction management activities by the regimes are large; both regimes realize the interactions need to be managed. The most frequently fulfilled interaction management functions by the regimes are agenda setting and policy development, followed by implementation and metagovernance. The regimes have not fulfilled good governance functions (see Table 5.2).

The regimes have played an important role in general interaction management, which is not focused on single or multiple issues, but on the interaction between the governance systems in general. The CBD has continuously played a proactive role in placing the general governance system interactions on the agenda. On the issue of *CCS*, the regimes have not been able to strengthen the existing positive influence between the governance systems, which they could have done by, for example, increasing their implementation efforts. On the issue of *biofuels*, little interaction management activity by the regimes has taken place in the analyzed period. Most intergovernmental interaction management on this issue has taken place through the public-private partnership GBEP, discussed below. On the issue of *afforestation and reforestation*, the CBD played a proactive agenda setting interaction management role during the development of the Kyoto Protocol, trying to ensure that the Protocol would also benefit biodiversity conservation. On the issue of *REDD*, the regimes mainly fulfill agenda setting and policy development functions. The REDD policy development is part of the negotiations of the UNFCCC post-2012 climate regime.

Summarizing, although the regimes actively manage the interactions on numerous issues, and do affect the governance system interactions in specific cases, they have not enabled structural improvements of existing negative and/or neutral influences between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems.

5.5   Interaction management by partnerships

In this section, the twelve main partnerships involved in the interaction management between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems are analyzed. The partnerships are grouped according to the issue on which they have contributed to interaction management most.

5.5.1   CCS

Of the analyzed partnerships in this chapter, only the HSBC Climate Partnership, a partnership among the bank HSBC, WWF, and other companies and institutes, has focused its interaction management activities specifically on CCS. The partnership's main purpose is to develop freshwater adaptation practices and solutions, and focuses on the Amazon, Ganges, Thames and Yangtze river basins (WWF 2008). The partnership has successfully fulfilled policy development and implementation functions in governance system interaction management by working on pilot projects to develop methodologies that can then be scaled up and used by others.

5.5.2   Biofuels

Four partnerships manage the governance system interactions on the issue of biofuels. The Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) is a partnership with a broad range of members, including governments, intergovernmental organizations, companies, research institutes, partnerships and NGOs. The partnership has contributed to the agenda setting function since it became active on the issue of sustainable biofuels relatively early; only a few other initiatives had already started. The RSB has fulfilled a significant policy development function by developing criteria for sustainable biofuels (RSB 2008). The draft standard includes the demand that biofuels must contribute to reducing GHG emissions. This demand is measured from 'land to tank', thus including GHG emissions resulting from land use changes as land is converted to biofuel crop production. It also includes both direct and indirect GHG emissions. The RSB has also worked towards good governance by improving participation, through working with open working groups and organizing stakeholder processes in different regions. The partnership has not decided whether the standard will become a meta-standard, judging standards that are being developed for specific crops used for biofuels (like the RSPO and BSI discussed below), or whether the standard will be applicable itself in the verification of different biofuel crops. Depending on this decision, the RSB could have an important metagovernance role, placing existing commodity standards into a global sustainable biofuels framework, or a policy development and implementation role, if the standard becomes applicable for certification on the ground.

The Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) was developed before palm oil had been recognized a major biofuel crop; the commodity is traditionally used in the food industry. Over 200 organizations are an RSPO member; the executive board includes industry and NGO representatives. The RSPO has mainly contributed to policy development in interaction management by developing a standard for sustainable palm oil. The standard includes a demand on land-use change that "new plantings … have not replaced primary forest…" (see also chapter 2), which supports both biodiversity and climate change goals. It has also established a working group to consider all issues relating to GHG emissions relevant to the oil palm sector. It has also fulfilled a metagovernance function by including several companies involved in the biofuels industry as RSPO members. Also, the partnership has fulfilled an agenda setting role by producing a position statement which states the "RSPO believes that the use of any first generation feed stocks should provide clear greenhouse gas benefits after considering the entire life cycle of the raw material" (RSPO undated).

The third biofuels partnership, the Global Bioenergy Partnership (GBEP) was officially launched in 2006, after the G8 +5 had agreed to the initiative. Partners include governments, intergovernmental agencies and business associations. GBEP has fulfilled a metagovernance function through its aims to find international consensus on bioenergy and sustainability issues, promote a global high-level policy dialogue on bioenergy, facilitate international cooperation, and act as a cross-cutting initiative, working in synergy with other initiatives (GBEP 2006). It has also developed a report on the current state of bioenergy development in the G8 +5 countries and a review of existing initiatives worldwide on the issue of bioenergy (FAO/GBEP 2007). An important policy development contribution has been the development of a draft harmonized methodology to measure GHG emission reductions. The partnership has set up a taskforce on

sustainability that has policy development and metagovernance ambitions; it will, among others, develop criteria and indicators for sustainable bioenergy, and identify synergies among different initiatives.

The Better Sugarcane Initiative (BSI) is a partnership of main sugar producers, sugar using food and energy companies, and NGOs. The partnership has fulfilled an important policy development role in interaction management by developing principles and criteria for more sustainable production and processing of sugar cane for mainstream sugar production (BSI 2008). Similar to the RSPO, the BSI was not set up specifically to produce a standard for sustainable biofuel production. However, the debate on the sustainability of biofuels has become an important driver for the work of the BSI. The draft standard includes criteria on GHG emissions and local biodiversity conservation. Important omission in the draft standard is the lack of criteria to prevent the conversion of natural habitat for sugar cane production.

5.5.3 Afforestation and reforestation

Two partnerships mainly contribute to interaction management on afforestation and reforestation. Although the Global Partnership on Forest Landscape Restoration (GPFLR), a network of over 25 governments, intergovernmental organizations, research organizations, NGOs, communities and individuals, works on all of the analyzed issues, it has contributed most to the issue of afforestation and reforestation. Forest landscape restoration implies integrated approaches, combining different types of land use in a landscape, including protected areas and well-managed commercial plantations. The partnership has fulfilled agenda setting and good governance interaction management functions on all four analyzed issues by producing a draft statement on land use, forests and climate change, which promotes integrated approaches to climate change and forests, and including local communities in the land use decision making (GPFLR 2007). The GPFLR has also played agenda setting and policy development roles on the issue of afforestation and reforestation by developing a draft report which analyzes the degraded forest areas worldwide which are suitable for landscape restoration.

The second partnership mainly contributing to afforestation and reforestation, the BioCarbon Fund (BioCF), is a partnership of the World Bank (WB), Northern governments and business actors. The BioCF, together with the partnerships CCBA and FCPF (see below), has managed the biodiversity – climate change interaction by contributing to the development of the market for carbon credits for afforestation, reforestation, and REDD, which is still relatively small (BioCF 2007; Capoor and Ambrosi 2008). The fund has played agenda setting and policy development roles in interaction management by demonstrating how LULUCF activities can generate emission reductions with environmental and livelihoods benefits, by playing an important role in the development of most methodologies for afforestation and reforestation carbon finance, and by contributing to the development of a more inclusive forestry policy, integrating afforestation, reforestation and REDD in the post-2012 regime. The fund has also enabled implementation of projects through funding. The BioCF aims to use a landscape approach and to include climate, biodiversity and social issues in every project. Several BioCF projects are aiming for verification by the CCBA.

5.5.4 REDD

The largest group of partnerships works on managing the governance system interactions on REDD. The Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) has mainly contributed to the interaction management on REDD, although it also works on other issues. Its partners include NGOs, like Conservation International (CI) and companies. The partnership has played a policy development role by developing the CCB standard for land management projects that simultaneously minimize climate change, support sustainable development and conserve biodiversity (CCBA 2005). It has fulfilled an agenda setting function by developing its standard relatively early, in 2005; therefore it has literally 'set the standard' for multiple benefit carbon finance. It has worked on implementation by validating projects on the ground according to the standard. CCBA is a pioneer in REDD policy; the first REDD projects worldwide are (working towards becoming) CCB verified. The partnership has also worked towards ensuring good governance, especially at the project level, where stakeholder participation is important, but also in the development of the standard.

The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is, like the BioCF, a World Bank carbon finance partnership. The partnership was launched in 2007, after the G8 Summit Declaration had supported the initiative. Partners include nine developed countries and the NGO the Nature Conservancy. The partnership is meant to build the capacity of developing countries in tropical and subtropical regions for REDD, but also includes adaptation measures. The FCPF has mainly fulfilled an agenda setting role through its piloting activities. By simply starting to experiment with REDD, producing real life experience, the partnership enables UNFCCC Parties to develop a more effective REDD policy in the post-2012 climate change regime. Its piloting activities have also contributed to policy development and have enabled implementation. The extent to which the FCPF will manage the biodiversity – climate change interaction is partly dependent on the political debate on REDD. Because the FCPF is being developed at a time in which REDD is a highly political issue, the partnership has to reflect the majority view of UNFCCC Parties, who are of the opinion that the key driver of REDD policy is climate change. Currently, the FCPF is in essence a carbon measure; "to the extent possible" the activities will be planned in order to also gain poverty reduction and biodiversity "additional benefits" (FCPF 2008).

The third partnership managing the interactions on REDD is the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF). It was established in 2000 through a decision by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC 2000). Members include forest research institutions, international institutions, the secretariats of intergovernmental organizations and IUCN. The CPF aims to contribute to managing the interaction between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems by playing a metagovernance role. The partnership has decided to play an active role as platform of the forest sector in REDD; it wants to coordinate the input of CPF members in the REDD negotiations. The CPF partner Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) took the initiative to organize the successful 'Forest Day' at the UNFCCC COP in 2007, which was supported by the CPF. The event was meant to be a platform for multi-stakeholder discussion, and the idea is to repeat Forest Day at the upcoming UNFCCC COPs (IISD 2007).

Partners of the Great Apes Survival Project (GRASP) include all 23 great ape range states, donor states, international institutions, and NGOs (see chapter 4). GRASP has fulfilled important agenda setting and policy development functions by proactively engaging in the REDD debate to enable the development of REDD policy with biodiversity and great ape conservation co-benefits. Donors have made significant funding available for developing REDD policy, which could in practice mean new funding opportunities for forest conservation, and in particular, great ape habitat conservation. GRASP has developed pilot projects for multiple benefit REDD and a site selection list that can be used to prioritize locations for REDD projects (GRASP 2008). GRASP will aim for verification by CCBA. With the projects, GRASP aims to inform the REDD debate in the development of a post-2012 scheme.

The last REDD interaction management partnership, the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP) is a network of the ten African member countries of the Commission for the Forests of Central Africa (COMIFAC), donor countries, intergovernmental organizations, industry, research institutes, and NGOs (see chapter 2). The CBFP has successfully fulfilled an agenda setting function by supporting the COMIFAC countries in their lobby for extending the reducing emissions from deforestation agenda to include forest degradation. This is important for the Congo basin, since forest degradation is a larger problem in the area than deforestation. In this manner, REDD has also become a funding opportunity for the Congo basin forests. The partnership has fulfilled policy development and good governance roles by supporting the Congo basin countries in strengthening their participation in the international debate, by building capacity in the region to prepare for and implement the REDD mechanism, and by supporting partners in formulating and implementing REDD pilot activities and feeding the lessons learned into the international debate (CBFP 2008).

5.5.5   Conclusions
The twelve analyzed partnerships have actively managed the interactions between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems. Their most frequently fulfilled interaction management functions are agenda setting and policy development, followed by implementation. Good governance and especially metagovernance roles have been played relatively little (see Table 5.3).

Most partnerships have specialized in managing the interactions on one or two issues. Only one partnership has focused on managing the governance system interactions on the issue of *CCS*. For a few others adaptation is one of the (minor) focuses. On the issue of *biofuels* most interaction management has taken place by partnerships. The partnerships have mainly fulfilled policy development functions by designing standards for sustainable biofuel production. They have not been able to turn the negative and neutral governance system influences into respectively neutral or positive ones, simply because the issue of biofuel sustainability is too young. Most current interaction management on the issue of *afforestation and reforestation* is also mainly done by partnerships. The partnerships have been successful in strengthening the existing positive influence between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems by placing so-called 'multiple benefit' solutions on the agenda, and by developing and implementing these solutions. These partnerships have, however, been unable to avoid the possibility of other actors using afforestation and reforestation measures that have a negative or neutral influence on the

Table 5.3: Interaction management effect of partnerships

Issue	Interaction management function	Partnerships											
		HSBC	RSB	RSPO	GBEP	BSI	GPFLR	BioCF	CCBA	FCPF	CPF	GRASP	CBFP
General	Agenda setting												
	Policy development	+											
	Implementation	+											
	Metagovernance												
	Good governance												
CCS	Agenda setting						+		+				
	Policy development								++	+/-			
	Implementation							+/-	+				
	Metagovernance												
	Good governance						+		+				
Biofuels	Agenda setting		+	+			+						
	Policy development		++	+	+	+							
	Implementation			+	+								
	Metagovernance												
	Good governance		+				+						
A/R	Agenda setting						+	++	++				
	Policy development						+	++	++				
	Implementation							++	+				
	Metagovernance												
	Good governance						+		+				

Issue	Interaction management function	Partnerships					
REDD	Agenda setting	+	+	++	++	++	++
	Policy development		+	++	++	+	+
	Implementation		+	++	++	+	+
	Metagovernance					+	
	Good governance	+		+	+		+

++   Important contribution to interaction management with a significant effect on governance system interaction
An effect is considered significant when fulfilling an interaction management function contributes in a relevant manner and/or to a substantial extent to improving existing governance system interactions.

+   Important contribution to interaction management, with some effect on governance system interaction, but in a less relevant manner and/or to a lesser extent.

+/-   Interaction management activity, but no effect on governance system interaction

Empty   No interaction management activity

biodiversity governance system. Most partnerships have been active on *REDD*. They have played agenda setting, policy development and implementation roles. Some of them are ahead of the regimes, already piloting implementation. They are strengthening the positive influence between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems and are working towards turning the neutral influence into a positive one. They want to enable the development of a future climate change regime with a positive influence on the biodiversity governance system by feeding the process of policy development by their experiences on the ground.

Partnerships have delivered an important contribution to governance system interaction management. They have generally been more successful in their interaction management activities than regimes: the partnerships' interaction management more often has significant effects on the governance system interactions. Only in a very few cases partnerships have been active without affecting the existing governance system interactions. However, even though they are actively managing the interactions, and are affecting the existing interactions in specific cases, the partnerships have not enabled structural improvements of existing negative and/or neutral influences between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems.

5.6   Reflections and general conclusions

This chapter has aimed to develop insight into the contributions of international intersectoral partnerships to the management of the interactions between the international biodiversity and climate change governance systems. The analysis has focused on those issues on which the governance systems currently interact most intensively, namely CCS, biofuels, afforestation and deforestation, and REDD.

Through this research a specific differentiation between regimes and partnerships regarding interaction management functions was discovered; something that was not foreseen. Whereas regime participants generally exhibit a helicopter view on interaction management and mainly fulfill agenda setting and policy development functions successfully, partnerships exhibit a much more detailed focus and also fulfill successful implementation (piloting) functions. This is a different functional differentiation as generally referred to in the traditional NGO literature, where these actors are often considered to have mainly – or even *only* – an agenda setting role, while governments do the policy making and implementation (see e.g. Willetts 1982).

Partnerships especially play a unique role in interaction management by initiating pilots on emerging issues, like CCS, afforestation and reforestation, and REDD. Through the partnerships, new methodologies are developed that can then be scaled up and be used by others. The effect of this policy development function through piloting should not be underestimated; partnerships can be important innovative instruments in governance system development. Another specific partnership role in interaction management is their contribution to the development of sustainability standards for interactions and/or the fact that they use sustainability standards from both governance systems in a combined manner. For example, projects that are verified by CCBA may also be FSC and/or CDM-certified. Especially on the issue of biofuels, the different initiatives developing standards are communicating regularly, trying to avoid overlap. Increasing efforts in this type of interaction management, like consolidation of or collaboration

among sustainability standards, may be necessary in the future, as the biodiversity and climate change governance systems continue to interact more intensely, and new standards continue to be developed.

Even though most of the interactions between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems were placed on the agenda as early as 1992 in the original text of the UNFCCC, most of the active interaction management by partnerships started only over the last few years, even on the older interaction issues like adaptation and afforestation and reforestation. This can be explained by the fact that the partnership instrument is relatively new; its use has only grown exponentially since their formal recognition at the WSSD in Johannesburg in 2002. Now that the partnership instrument has become more institutionalized, partnerships become active in interaction management as soon as an issue rises on the international agenda. Moreover, partnerships are often deliberately set up to play a role in placing governance system interactions on the agenda. Other, already existing partnerships have adjusted their work to include interaction management activities. Most of these evolving partnerships are active on REDD and biofuels. Existing forest partnerships from the biodiversity governance system have proactively engaged in the REDD issue, realizing that this new interaction between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems could become a unique funding opportunity for forest conservation. Also, partnerships that were developing standards for the sustainable production of commodities realized 'their' commodity is or can be used for biofuels, and are including biofuel members in their partnership and biofuel aspects in their standards.

When overseeing the interaction management efforts by both partnerships and regimes as a whole, several gaps can be distinguished. In terms of interaction management functions, both metagovernance and good governance are performed less. Only partnerships fulfill good governance roles, enabling broader input and involving actors that may be affected by policy, like indigenous groups or developing countries. The regimes fulfill metagovernance roles, involving actors from both the biodiversity and climate change governance systems, more often than partnerships. The fact that governance system actors pay little attention to these roles is an important gap. The under-representation of these functions could be part of the explanation of the fact that the management of the interaction between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems is not able to structurally improve the existing negative and/or neutral influences. Most actors specialize in either the issue of biodiversity or climate change; few people actively follow both issues, and the two governance systems operate relatively autonomously. This separation enables the development of non-integral solutions. An increased effort in metagovernance could overcome these boundaries by bringing a broader base of knowledge and different priorities into the discussion of issues on which the biodiversity and climate change governance systems are functionally dependent or overlap. Also, generally little effort is made to involve those affected by international policy in the policy development process. In this manner, potentially negative influences can be overlooked. An increased effort in improving participation could enable the development of integral, effective solutions, and thereby improve the existing negative and/or neutral influences.

In terms of focus, there is a relatively low level of attention for the issue of CCS, which could have problematic effects. Due to the current focus by many actors on the management of the

forest – climate change interactions for climate change mitigation, the conservation of other types of ecosystems on which the governance systems interact only on adaptation, among others marine biodiversity or non-forest terrestrial biodiversity, may receive less attention and funding. This could decrease the effectiveness of the biodiversity governance system, which risks neglecting important types of biodiversity while focusing its efforts on improving the negative and/or neutral influences by the climate change governance system, and on finding funding for forest conservation through the climate change debate.

As stated earlier, interaction management by the analyzed partnerships generally has more effect on the governance system interactions than the interaction management by the regimes. This could be explained by the fact that most partnerships have smaller and more informal organizational forms than the regimes, and thus are more flexible to adjust to changes and new opportunities. Also, because they usually specialize in one issue, it is easier to have a relatively large contribution to that part of the governance systems. The low effects of the general interaction management by the regimes could be explained by the current dominant discourse in the climate change governance system. Because the UNFCCC negotiations are already complicated, most participants are hesitant to further increase the complexity by including biodiversity concerns. Moreover, the UNFCCC is a more powerful regime than the CBD, due to the larger funds available, the more commonly felt urgency and larger political will for the issue of climate change. Therefore the effects of the interaction management efforts by the CBD remain limited.

The empirical findings validate the regime and governance research which theorizes specifically about institutional interaction, the role of private players and/or interaction management. The findings also validate the presented GSIM conceptual framework, since all the causes, types and functions of governance system interaction (management) were unraveled in the case studies, as distinguished in the framework. The findings also support the specific approach used in this chapter, in which two current issues in regime and governance literature, focusing on interaction management and including the roles of private initiatives are combined. In future research, this approach could be theoretically further developed by working towards more general explanations for the different roles of regimes and private initiatives in interaction management, and for the extent to which interaction management is able to affect existing interactions. Also, since interaction management is a relatively new research theme, the empirical base also needs to be broadened to include the interaction among other issues, for example between environment and development. Moreover, more fundamental questions, including what the consequences are of the increasing role of private steering mechanisms in interaction management, and, more generally, in the governance of sustainable development need to be answered. Issues include managing the balance between environmental issues for which the market is willing to pay versus issues for which the market mechanism does not seem to be an effective steering mechanism, how to ensure general interaction management in an era of increasing roles of partnerships, which usually focus on a specific issue, and ensuring adequate metagovernance functions in an international sustainable development governance system which is becoming increasingly densely populated and complex.

6   Discussion and conclusions

6.1   Introduction

As discussed in the first chapter, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) can be viewed as the start of a fourth phase in contemporary international environmental governance, a phase in which collaboration between public and private actors is becoming an increasingly accepted manner to work towards sustainable development. This dissertation has studied an important instrument for this intersectoral collaboration: partnerships. The dissertation has aimed to answer the following research questions:

I.   *What are the contributions of international intersectoral partnerships to biodiversity governance, and how can these be explained?*

II. *What are the consequences of these partnership roles for (inter-)governmental regimes and the biodiversity governance system as a whole?*

The empirical focus on biodiversity governance was not only chosen because biodiversity conservation is one of the major international environmental issues, but also because the issue is truly an issue of sustainable development, combining economic, environmental and social concerns. Inspired by the main theoretical debates in regime, governance, and partnership literature, the research has been organized around the central themes of governance functions, effectiveness, and interaction. The empirical chapters have been presented in the chronological order of the development and implementation of the four different research projects through which the research for this dissertation was performed. They reflect the research and development process over a period of several years. Below, the evidence provided by the empirical chapters is presented first. Section 6.3 includes a theoretical discussion and conclusions, with which the research questions are answered, and recommendations for a more strategic use of the partnership instrument. Finally, section 6.4 presents theoretical and methodological reflections and suggestions for future research, while section 6.5 gives a personal reflection on the dissertation.

6.2   Evidence provided by the empirical chapters

Chapter 2, 'Partnerships in forest governance', is positioned firmly in the governance literature. Public-private interaction is not yet interpreted using regime literature, as in later chapters, but based on the different types of steering roles played by governments in practice. The research methodologies applied in this chapter for the terms effectiveness and governance functions have been used throughout the dissertation. The chapter has shown that a clearly demarcated

governance system, like the forest biodiversity governance system, is an appropriate level of abstraction to assess the contribution of partnerships.

The chapter analyzes the contribution of international partnerships focused on the main threats to forest biodiversity, namely unsustainable logging, conversion, and illegal logging, and of partnerships which use a more integral approach. The research shows that partnerships fill gaps when governments are not willing or able to regulate. One of the major problems of the formal intergovernmental forest regimes has been lack of implementation. Partnerships for sustainable logging have complemented these regimes by developing and implementing standards for sustainable forest management, thereby contributing to conserving forest biodiversity 'on the ground'. The partnerships do this with varying effectiveness, however, since the standards differ in terms of stringency and inclusiveness. Moreover, the market for sustainable timber remains a niche market, and most of the certified forests are found in the North, even though one of the main aims of forest certification has been to enable sustainable forest management in the South. The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) has fulfilled a noteworthy agenda setting function. Because the partnership was one of the first to develop an international sustainability standard, the FSC has contributed significantly to the widespread acceptance of certification as an instrument for sustainable development.

Evidence is provided for the development of a complex structure of forest biodiversity governance by both public and private actors, with intense public-private interaction. Most of the new developments in the forest biodiversity governance system are due to private initiatives. Also, the partnerships' standards are being used by governments as proof for sustainability or legality in their procurement policies. The main explanation for the limited partnership effectiveness can be found in the public-private interaction, especially since public-private partnerships choose for less stringent and inclusive approaches towards sustainability. These partnerships were developed by government and industry actors to compete with the more rigorous FSC. Because governments are involved in these partnerships, forest certification has become politicized: forest-rich countries and their forestry industries are using the new steering mechanisms to defend their interests. In the chapter, it is argued that both the more classical government policy, including intergovernmental negotiations, procurement policy, land use planning, law enforcement, and the role of governments as forest owners, and metagovernance by governments, for example supporting and initiating partnerships and ensuring fair competition among sustainability standards, can contribute to the effectiveness of the forest biodiversity governance system. However, governments have in general not been very successful in either role.

Contrary to the other chapters, which apply the institutional perspective, *Chapter 3, 'Partnership as governance mechanism in development cooperation: Intersectoral North–South partnerships for marine biodiversity'*, uses both the actor and institutional perspective. Therefore the chapter provides different types of insights, emphasizing both the interactions among partners in a specific partnership and the interactions of a partnership with other governance mechanisms. The chapter shows the influence of discourses (basic visions), power, and rules (established norms) in the partners' relations on partnership effectiveness. It introduces a transactional model which helps to determine the relative influence of each of these factors. The main methodological

lesson based on this chapter is that combining the actor and institutional perspective is important in developing an understanding of both the internal and external dynamics that affect the contribution of partnerships. Also, applying the dimensions of discourses, power and rules to the analysis of interaction provides important additional insights.

The chapter analyzes the performance of two development cooperation partnerships; one that works on sustainable shrimp aquaculture, and one that focuses on sustainable anchoveta fisheries. The partnerships have delivered a modest contribution in international fisheries governance. They have brought together relevant stakeholders from all three sectors of society, enabling agenda setting of different approaches to sustainability and increasing the understanding among partners.

Main explanations for this limited performance can be found in the situational contexts, and in the three dimensions of interaction (discourses, power and rules) in both the intersectoral and international sectoral relationships. The chapter shows that it is difficult for partnerships to add value to a situational context or governance system in which numerous public and private governance mechanisms are already in place. Also, partnering is extremely problematic when different discourses or fundamental visions meet. A basic consensus among partners on, among others, strategies for sustainable development seems necessary for partnership success. This implies that civil society groups with more pragmatic approaches towards sustainability, which match the approaches of market and governmental actors, usually become involved in partnerships, and NGOs with more inclusive views on sustainability do not. Consequently, some discourses become underrepresented in partnerships, disabling their potential of addressing certain issues. Another explanation can be found in the existing rules for intersectoral relationships. The research shows that the partnerships are not able to structurally improve these relationships; the existing weak position of Southern NGOs has been reinforced by the partnerships; they have not been able to contribute to the emancipation of civil society in the South. Existing power inequalities in both intersectoral and international sectoral relationships also have an important influence on partnership effectiveness. In the analyzed case studies, the economic importance of the fishing and aquaculture industry had a decisive impact on the partnerships' performance.

In *Chapter 4, 'Conservation partnerships in biodiversity governance: Fulfilling governance functions through interaction'*, the research becomes more closely associated with regime literature. The chapter contributes to the further development and integration of regime and governance literature by incorporating issues and methodologies from both bodies of literature. The two types of institutional interaction as distinguished in regime literature – overlap and influence – are used to analyze the interactions between (inter-) governmental regimes and partnerships. The research methodologies from regime literature are also further developed by broadening the scope from analyzing only content interaction to also include interaction in terms of discourses and rules. Moreover, the chapter contributes to the further elaboration of the hypotheses found in governance literature on the effects of private steering mechanisms on governmental authority, as the reinvention, complementation and erosion of (inter-)government regimes by partnerships are defined more concretely and thus made more researchable. Reinvention of politics takes place when partnerships cause changes in the governance system in terms of discourses or rules;

a complementary role is defined as partnerships supporting (inter-) governmental regimes, and erosion denotes that partnerships perform functions that used to be done by governments. The chapter shows that the methodologies developed by regime authors are applicable also for governance questions. The chapter also demonstrates that interaction between (inter-) governmental regimes and (public-) private steering mechanisms is highly relevant for regime effectiveness.

The research, which focuses on three partnerships that work on the conservation of great apes, hotspots and coral reefs, produces evidence for partnerships reinventing and complementing (inter-) governmental regimes, and no evidence for partnerships eroding regimes. The analyzed conservation partnerships play a unique role, although with different effectiveness. They reinvent conservation politics by placing new conservation discourses on the governance system agenda. Two partnerships play an important metagovernance role by making strategic use of the fact that partnerships are in essence vehicles for interaction among societal sectors and among formal governmental and informal processes. They also improve participation and strengthen the role of civil society in global, regional, and national conservation politics. The partnerships complement (inter-) governmental regimes by fulfilling implementation functions and enabling conservation implementation through funding. They support developing countries in implementing their commitments in international biodiversity regimes and can be regarded as implementation instruments for these international regimes. By enabling collaboration between experienced conservation NGOs and international institutions, the partnerships form a natural link between the international arena and the implementation 'on the ground'. The partnerships' effectiveness is influenced by the political situation in the regions in which they are active and by the partnerships' limited resources. The resources cannot support the intensity and duration of activities in all regions necessary to ensure lasting fundamental changes, like changes in terms of discourse and rules. Therefore the effectiveness of the fulfilled functions is significant but fragile.

In *Chapter 5, 'Interaction management by partnerships: The case of biodiversity and climate change governance system interaction'*, the research is further embedded in regime literature by contributing to one of the current theoretical debates, interaction management. This debate is again broadened to include governance questions, researching the contributions both of regimes and partnerships to interaction management. Also, the question of interaction management is not focused on the management of interactions among regimes, but among governance systems. A governance system interaction management (GSIM) conceptual framework is introduced, which is mainly based on regime interaction literature.

The chapter studies the functions partnerships fulfill in interaction management on the issues of climate change-integrated conservation strategies (CCS), afforestation and reforestation, biofuels, and reducing emissions from avoided deforestation and forest degradation (REDD). The analysis shows that both the partnerships and the intergovernmental regimes mainly fulfill agenda setting and policy development functions, followed by implementation. Metagovernance and good governance roles are underrepresented. The regimes, especially the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) proactively manage the biodiversity-climate change interaction. While the regimes are more active in general interaction management, the partnerships focus on the interaction management on a specific issue; they thus complement each other. The

governance system interaction on some issues is mainly being managed by partnerships, and partnerships are generally more successful in their interaction management activities than the regimes. However, the regimes and partnerships have neither been able to structurally improve existing negative or neutral interactions between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems, nor have they structurally strengthened positive ones. Partnerships play a unique policy development role by initiating pilots on emerging issues. In this sense partnerships are innovative instruments, developing new methodologies that can then be scaled up and used by others. The issue of CCS receives relatively little attention from governance system actors. This can be explained by the fact that the other issues represent better funding opportunities. Especially REDD is seen by many actors working on forest biodiversity as a new funding opportunity for forest conservation. The danger of this development is that the conservation of other ecosystems that do not play a significant role in climate change mitigation, including coral reefs and non-forest terrestrial ecosystems may become underrepresented in both the biodiversity and climate change governance systems.

6.3   Theoretical discussion and conclusions

Based on the evidence from the empirical chapters, the two research questions can be answered and discussed at a more abstract level. First, the concrete governance contributions of the twenty-four partnerships included in this dissertation are analyzed, after which the overall contributions of the partnerships are discussed. Then these contributions are explained. These discussions contribute to answering research question I. Next, the section reflects on the consequences of these partnership roles for the governance system as a whole in order to answer research question II, and recommendations are made for a more strategic use of the partnership instrument.

6.3.1   The contributions of the twenty-four analyzed partnerships

The twenty-four analyzed partnerships can be categorized using the governance triangle by Abbott and Snidal, as presented in Chapter 1. Figure 6.1 shows that the research encompasses all categories of intersectoral partnerships: public-private (between government and market and/or civil society representatives) and private partnerships (between market and civil society representatives). Most of the analyzed partnerships are public-private partnerships.

The analyzed partnerships contribute to biodiversity governance in different manners and with varying effectiveness. Table 6.1 provides a general overview, integrating the research from the four empirical chapters. The table should be viewed as an indication of the contributions of the partnerships, since the research for the various chapters uses different approaches and different methodologies. The table also categorizes the partnerships into those that are mainly market-oriented versus those which are mainly policy-oriented.

Table 6.1 shows that all partnerships fulfill governance functions. In the majority of cases, the functions are carried out with high or medium effectiveness. Almost one third of the partnerships (7) have fulfilled functions with high effectiveness, representing an important contribution to biodiversity governance; eleven have fulfilled functions with medium

State

CBD
CMS
CITES

CSA   AFP   RSPO
MTCC   CBFP   RTRS
PEFC   SFI   WB-WWF
BioCF   Shrimp   GRASP
GBEP   Anchoveta CEPF
           RSB   ICRAN
                     CPF
                     FCPF
                     GPFLR

FSC
CCBA
HSBC
BSI

Market   Civil society

7421

Figure 6.1: The analyzed partnerships in the governance triangle

effectiveness, delivering a small contribution to biodiversity governance; five have achieved a low effectiveness, contributing very little; and one has fulfilled governance functions with a negative influence. Together, the partnerships fulfill all five governance functions. The functions of agenda setting and policy development are most often carried out with high effectiveness; the functions of implementation and good governance are most often performed with low effectiveness. Policy development is fulfilled most often with high or medium effectiveness (by 15 partnerships), followed by agenda setting (12), implementation and metagovernance (8), and good governance (6). Of all the aspects of good governance included in the definition used by the UNHCHR (see chapter 1), partnerships mainly work on improving participation. They thus contribute very modestly to this governance function.

The majority of the analyzed partnerships (18) are public-private partnerships. This relatively high involvement of state actors was to be expected, since the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity has traditionally been a state responsibility. The overall contribution of 12 out of 18 public-private partnerships is high or medium; this is a lower percentage than private partnerships, of which all six attain high or medium effectiveness. Thus, as a group, private partnerships are more effective than public-private partnerships.

Table 6.1: Overview of the analyzed partnerships

Partnerships	Market or Policy oriented	Overall contribution	Governance functions				
			Agenda setting	Policy development	Implementation	Meta-Governance	Good governance
Chapter 2							
FSC	M	++	++	++	+	+	++
CSA	M	+/-		+/-	+/-		
SFI	M	+/-		+/-	+/-		+/-
MTCC	M	+/-		+/-	+/-		+/-
PEFC	M	-/-			+	-/-	+/-
RSPO	M	++	+	++		+	
RTRS	M	+	+	+			
WB-WWF	P	+		+	+/-		+/-
CBFP	P	+	+	+	+/-	+/-	+/-
AFP	P	+/-			+/-	+/-	
Chapter 3							
Shrimp	M	+/-			+/-		
Anchoveta	M	+	+				
Chapter 4							
GRASP	P	++	++	+	+	++	+
CEPF	P	++	++	++	+	++	++
ICRAN	P	+			+/-	+	+/-
Chapter 5							
HSBC	P	+		+	+		
GPFLR	P	+	+	+			+
BioCF	M	++	++	++	++		
CCBA	M	++	++	++	++		+
FCPF	M	++	++	++	+		
CPF	P	+				+	
RSB	M	+	+	+			+
GBEP	P	+	+/-	+		+	
BSI	M	+		+			

++	Fulfilled governance function(s), with high effectiveness
+	Fulfilled governance function(s), with medium effectiveness
+/-	Fulfilled governance function(s), with low effectiveness
-/-	Fulfilled governance function(s), with negative influence
Empty	No (observable) governance function(s) fulfilled

Of the seven partnerships with high effectiveness, three are private partnerships, three are partnerships between state and civil society representatives, and one is a state-business partnership. Thus, when civil society collaborates separately with state or business representatives, the highest effectiveness is attained. Moreover, none of these partnerships have attained low

effectiveness; all state-civil society partnerships and private partnerships attain at least medium effectiveness.

When state and business representatives collaborate, they are not very successful. Only one state-business partnership, with or without civil society involvement, attains high effectiveness, and half (5) attain low effectiveness. The only analyzed partnership with a negative influence on the governance system, PEFC, is also a state-business partnership. It has been developed to compete with the FSC at the global level, using a less inclusive and stringent standard. Moreover, none of the partnerships in which all three sectors of society collaborate attain high effectiveness; half of the partnerships (3) fulfill governance functions with medium effectiveness, and the other half with low effectiveness.

The majority of the analyzed partnerships (14) are market-oriented partnerships. They include most (5) of the partnerships which fulfill governance functions with a high effectiveness. However, when looking at both high and medium effectiveness, a higher percentage of policy-oriented partnerships are successful: 9 of the 10 policy-oriented partnerships attain at least a medium effectiveness. Most of the partnerships with low effectiveness are market-oriented. The largest group of most effective partnerships (3) is made up of market-oriented private partnerships; the largest group of least effective partnerships (4) consists of market-oriented public-private partnerships. The effectiveness of market-oriented partnerships is thus more varying than of policy-oriented ones.

Civil society collaborates with business actors mainly on market-oriented partnerships (5 out of 6), and with state actors for policy-oriented partnerships (6 out of 7). The same is true for state actors, who also collaborate with business mainly for market-oriented partnerships (4 out of 5). In only one policy-oriented partnership, civil-society is not represented; the same is true for state actors: there is only one policy-oriented partnership without state representation. There is also only one market-oriented partnership without business representation.

The research shows that partnerships can contribute to biodiversity governance in a unique and important manner, and that several partnerships do so. The seven partnerships which deliver an important positive contribution to the biodiversity governance system, the so-called 'gems' of partnerships, are the FSC, the RSPO, GRASP, CEPF, the BioCF, the CCBA, and the FCPF. Most of these partnerships, except for the RSPO, fulfill more than one governance function with high effectiveness. Success stories of individual partnerships have been found for all governance functions. The agenda setting role of GRASP, for example, has had an important influence on conservation politics by changing the existing discourse on great ape conservation. Other partnerships, like the FSC and the CCBA, have developed policy by designing sustainability standards that are now being used and implemented by public and private actors throughout the governance system. The RSPO was one of the first partnerships to develop a standard for an internationally traded agricultural commodity, and this approach is now being used for several other crops. The CEPF is successfully fulfilling a metagovernance role at the ecosystem, or hotspot level, bringing together the necessary actors to manage the hotspot sustainability, and is also ensuring good governance by working on capacity building of civil society in developing countries, improving their participation in biodiversity conservation. The BioCF and FCPF are

playing important agenda setting and policy development roles by initiating pilots for carbon markets.

Summarizing, the main conclusions on the contributions of the twenty-four analyzed partnerships are:

- Agenda setting and policy development are the most effectively fulfilled governance functions;
- Private partnerships are generally more effective than public-private partnerships;
- The highest effectiveness is found in private partnerships and state-civil society partnerships, while partnerships between state and business actors are less successful;
- The effectiveness of market-oriented partnerships is more varying than of policy-oriented ones;
- Seven 'gems' of partnerships deliver unique and important contributions to biodiversity governance.

6.3.2 The overall contributions of international intersectoral partnerships

Based on the analysis in section 6.3.1, the overall contribution of international intersectoral partnerships to biodiversity governance should be evaluated as varying. The 'gems' of partnerships fulfill important governance functions in a successful manner, while others play less paramount roles.

The evidence from this dissertation supports the conclusion in partnership literature that partnerships can develop creative solutions and provide opportunities for quicker action than through intergovernmental processes (see 1.3.3). As the 'gems' have shown, partnerships deliver the most important contributions when they fulfill governance functions in an innovative manner; partnerships can be very effective drivers of governance system innovation. Governance system actors regularly choose to start a partnership to experiment and initiate pilots. These partnerships can have a profound influence on the governance system by developing new insights, ideas and experiences, moving the governance system forward and improving its effectiveness. This influence is created through the interactions among the partnerships and other governance system participants, as partnerships for example place new issues on the governance system agenda or develop new policies that are then also used or implemented by other actors. Certification standards have become the most important product of market-oriented partnerships; moreover, several of these partnerships have made a significant contribution to the institutionalization of certification as a tool for sustainable development and the use of the market as a political space.

Partnerships could contribute in an important manner to regime and governance system effectiveness by fulfilling implementation functions, since one of the main weaknesses of (inter-) governmental regimes is lack of implementation. These existing international environmental agreements are generally ambitious; if all agreed measures were implemented, many sustainability targets would be within reach. International biodiversity regimes depend on national implementation for their effectiveness since most biodiversity can be found within national borders (Sand 2001); however, this national implementation is often the Achilles heel

of the regimes. It is therefore worrying that only a third of the analyzed partnerships perform implementation functions with high or medium effectiveness (see table 6.1). Thus, while several partnerships do indeed fill the implementation gap left by governments to a certain extent and can be viewed as implementation instruments for (inter-) governmental regimes, the overall contribution of partnerships in implementation remains limited. The hope raised at the WSSD that partnerships could become an important instrument for the implementation of sustainable development measures has not become a full reality until today.

Also, based on the partnership literature it was expected that partnerships, representing different societal sectors and constituencies, would contribute significantly to improving participation in biodiversity governance, thus fulfilling good governance functions. Although some partnerships make a conscious and successful effort to improve the participation of developing countries, civil society and/or local communities, enabling good governance is an often neglected function. This can be seen as a grave omission, since good governance functions are often also neglected by the (inter-) governmental regimes. The evidence shows that the potential of the partnership approach to, among others, emancipate civil society in the South can only be achieved if a partnership is proactively managed with this emancipation goal in mind. A conscious choice by partnership partners to work on improving governance is therefore needed.

Summarizing, the overall contribution of partnerships to biodiversity governance should be evaluated as varying. The most important contribution is the innovative role partnerships play; they can be effective drivers of governance system innovation. Certification standards have become an important partnership instrument.

6.3.3   Main explanations for the contributions

As concluded above, the 'gems' of partnerships deliver unique and important contributions to biodiversity governance. The seventeen other partnerships – out of twenty-four – perform governance functions with lower effectiveness, contributing less or little to biodiversity governance. One of the most important explanations for this varying success is the difference in the discourses that the different partnerships represent. The gems represent more stringent and inclusive discourses on sustainable development; they have a high level of ambition for sustainability. They also represent the less process-oriented discourse on partnerships; they do not only view partnerships as a means to improve intersectoral collaboration, but also want to reach tangible results. The low effectiveness of market-oriented partnerships can be explained by the less stringent and/or inclusive discourses on sustainable development; the small contributions of most policy-oriented partnerships can be explained by their process-oriented discourse on partnerships.

The success of market-oriented partnerships is thus highly dependent on the level of ambition of the partners. All less effective market-oriented partnerships are public-private partnerships; private market-oriented partnerships are more successful. As discussed in chapter 2, partnerships use the market, just like the political arena, as a political space to work towards their political goals. Several public-private market-oriented partnerships are collaborations between governments and important national industries who want to defend their common interests, which develop less stringent standards which are cheaper to implement. NGOs and their

business partners also use the market place as a political space, aiming for dominance of stringent and inclusive approaches to sustainability in the market place, and hoping to also influence the approaches towards sustainability in intergovernmental regimes through these market activities. The less stringent and/or inclusive standards are often developed to enable certification of products for mainstream markets, contrary to the more stringent and inclusive standards, which until today have resulted in niche markets for sustainable products. The certification schemes for mainstream products are developed because partners are of the opinion that the potential size of the niche markets is finite since only a minority of consumers is willing and/or able to pay a relatively high premium for sustainable products, and that niche and mainstream standards can exist parallel to each other in the same market. Especially the second view could be questioned, since chapter 2 has shown that standards do compete with each other. Whereas regime interaction literature concludes that interaction among regimes from the same policy field has a positive influence on regime effectiveness (see 1.3.1), it has to be concluded based on the evidence in this dissertation that this is not always the case for partnerships from the same issue area. The effectiveness of the stringent and inclusive sustainability standards is negatively influenced through their competition with the less stringent and inclusive standards. Since most of the latter standards are public-private standards, it can be concluded that the interaction among public-private and private partnerships, or public-private interaction, has a negative influence on the effectiveness of the private partnerships. The consequences of this competition and interaction in the longer term are unclear (see 6.3.4).

Based on the conclusion of regime effectiveness literature that the nature of the problem which a regime addresses influences its effectiveness (see 1.3.1), it is interesting to question whether the nature of the problem also influences partnership effectiveness. This dissertation can only add to this discussion carefully, since it has focused on one issue, and thus a comparison of partnerships on different topics is not possible. Chapter 5 shows that partnerships play similar roles in the biodiversity and climate change governance systems, but more research is needed to verify these preliminary findings of similar partnership roles on different issues. The dissertation does show, however, that regimes and partnerships run into the same obstacles which are typical for the issue of biodiversity. Important economic and political topics which have dominated the international biodiversity regimes include the rights of local communities and the autonomy of states to decide on the biodiversity within their national borders (see 1.2). When national governments are involved in partnerships, their view on these issues dominates the partnership's perspective. This became clear in both chapters 2 and 3. Only a few partnerships, all part of the group of gems of partnerships, are able to address the issue of local community rights. They work around the vested interests and dominant discourses in intergovernmental regimes, and use a new arena, like the market, which has more favorable power relations for the partnerships' aims. It often proves difficult in the longer term, however, to maintain this comparative advantage, as the powerful actors from the intergovernmental arena quickly find their way to the market arena to defend their interests. The discourse of state autonomy which is dominant in intergovernmental regimes and the existing powerful positions of national governments and their industries thus also influence the effectiveness of partnerships which try to work around these constraints.

Power relations among the partners also influence the extent to which a partnership is able to deliver governance contributions. If the power relations in a partnership are too unbalanced, it is difficult for the alliance to become a 'true' partnership, which reflects the interests and goals of the different partners in a proportionate manner. These partnerships often do not last long. Especially in developing countries, where civil society is often weaker than in developed countries, unbalanced power relations have a large influence on partnership performance. Partnership effectiveness is also influenced by existing rules in intersectoral relations and those in international relations. It has proven difficult for single partnerships to change institutionalized rules in intersectoral relations among the partners, especially in developing countries, where intersectoral collaboration is often still a novelty. Moreover, partnerships, just like other initiatives, are dependent on the current and local political situation. In countries where for example corruption is problematic or where the political situation is unstable, it is difficult to implement conservation initiatives. Thus, existing power relations, rules, and the local political situation have an especially large influence on biodiversity partnerships, since most biodiversity is located in developing countries, where civil society is often weak, intersectoral collaboration is not yet common, and governance problems are regularly present.

The dissertation supports the conclusions from governance literature that there is a strong relationship between governments and private steering mechanisms (see 1.3.2). Moreover, the dissertation shows that partnerships are dependent on effective government policy for their success. As discussed in chapter 2, governments can have a tremendous influence on the governance contributions of partnerships, both through their 'classical' government policy, like land use planning or law enforcement, and through their metagovernance roles, for example by ensuring fair competition among certification schemes. The lack of success of these government roles limits the potential of partnership contributions. If governments would support ambitious standards and other potentially highly influential initiatives, partnerships could have a larger influence with the same input, due to the created synergies between the public and (public-) private governance mechanisms. Although partnership effectiveness is supported by effective classical and metagovernance governmental roles, it is often not supported by governments becoming active as members in partnerships, as shown earlier in this chapter.

Another important explanation for the differences in the success of the gems and other partnerships is their strategic approach. The gems understand the potential added value of the partnership approach, and their initiators and partners have a clear strategy for the partnership's role in biodiversity governance. Several gems successfully make strategic use of the public-private interaction that takes place in the partnership, using the partnership as a vehicle of interaction. Other less successful partnerships have not formulated a clear strategic governance role for the partnership.

Partnerships also have difficulty adding value to a policy environment which is already densely populated. The most successful partnerships find new issue areas, like global great ape conservation approaches or REDD, and develop innovative initiatives for these relatively empty political spaces. The question is whether this innovativeness is due to the fact that the activities are implemented in a partnership, bringing together different perspectives, as suggested in the partnership literature (see 1.3.3), or whether innovative actors who need and want to collaborate

to achieve a common goal simply decide to start a partnership. The research in this dissertation suggests the latter. Also, the fact that most partnerships focus on or specialize in a single issue supports this innovative role. They can play a unique role in a clearly defined issue area.

Funding is another explanation for partnership success. Funding opportunities are an important explanation for the proliferation of partnerships on a certain issue, and lack of funding represents an important limiting factor for partnership success. Even the effectiveness of the gems of partnerships is affected by limited funding. Through the lack of funding, partnerships attain project-like properties; a group of projects is implemented for which funding is available, after which partnerships focus on new projects, for which new funding has been found. Due to the limited funding, partnerships thus pay less attention to sustaining the successes achieved by the projects. This approach to partnership activities could be a dangerous development, since the contribution in the longer term may not be guaranteed.

Some final, more practical explanations for lower contributions by some partnerships include the relatively small size of some partnerships or the fact that the partnerships are simply too young to have been able to make a larger contribution until today.

Summarizing, important explanations for the partnerships' governance contributions can be found in the discourses they represent, the competition among the sustainability standards produced by different partnerships, the constraints which are typical for the issue of biodiversity, power relations in a partnership's context and among the partners, existing rules in intersectoral relations, the political situation, the role of governments, the strategic approach of the partnership, the number of other initiatives working on the issue, and funding.

6.3.4   The consequences for the governance system

This section places the evidence provided by this dissertation in the debate in governance literature on whether private steering mechanisms such as partnerships should be evaluated in a positive, negative or utilitarian manner (see 1.3). A second aim of this section is to answer the question, raised in chapter 1, whether partnerships change the institutional dynamics in the biodiversity governance system, in other words: whether they change the manner in which biodiversity is governed.

The dissertation shows that public and private steering mechanisms in biodiversity governance can enhance each other. Most partnerships complement or support (inter-) governmental regimes (with varying success), and a few are able to reinvent biodiversity politics by initiating fundamental improvements in terms of discourses or rules in the governance system. No evidence has been found for partnerships eroding governmental authority. The evidence also shows, however, that there are limitations to the governance contributions of the partnership instrument.

If the current trend of most partnerships developing less stringent and/or inclusive standards continues, the contribution of certification, and thus of market-oriented partnerships as instruments for biodiversity governance and sustainable development will remain limited, since the sustainability improvements made in order to adhere to these standards will be relatively

small. Furthermore, there is a risk that the proliferation of standards with different stringencies and scopes could undermine the position of the niche market standards with more ambitious sustainability demands, since the products certified according to mainstream standards, with lower demands are cheaper. Although the less stringent and inclusive schemes sometimes strengthen their standards in order to compete with the more stringent ones, the opposite effect, the more stringent schemes lowering their standards due to the competition, can also be observed (see chapter 2). This latter development would further decrease the potential contribution of certification partnerships in biodiversity governance. By depending solely on the market mechanism to establish the dominant discourse for sustainability, a race to the bottom may actually be enabled. Market regulation may therefore be needed (see below). Governance system actors should therefore not mainly depend on certification systems for policy development and implementation functions.

Many market-oriented partnerships focus on export industries in developing countries. Although this is highly relevant work since there is a trend of increasing volumes of natural resources and basic products being produced in the South for Northern markets, including timber, soy, palm oil, fish, and sugar cane, all of which have high impacts on biodiversity, the partnerships may be legitimizing sectors or trends that could in essence be unsustainable by focusing on these commodities. Fundamental questions are being raised by actors representing more inclusive discourses on sustainability on whether export industries can contribute to the sustainable development of developing countries and on the potential sustainability of the commoditization of global production and consumption patterns in continuously rising volumes (see chapter 3). The partnerships direct governance efforts and funds towards improving the sustainability performance of international commodities, away from other solutions to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. Market-oriented partnerships may therefore only enable piecemeal solutions; they may be better equipped to contribute to making existing trends more sustainable than breaking unsustainable trends. Policy-oriented partnerships have a varying track record on the question whether they can break unsustainable trends. The conservation partnerships (see chapter 4) have in several occasions been able to influence governmental policy to become fundamentally more sustainable. Critique on the regional metagovernance partnerships (see chapter 2) has been that they reinforce existing unsustainable policy, like land use planning. Partnerships can therefore contribute to stepwise improvements towards sustainability, but biodiversity governance system participants should not expect most individual partnerships to cause broad paradigm shifts.

Although the high number of new biodiversity governance initiatives taken by different partnerships creates opportunities for innovative and additional contributions, they are not based on common strategies or analyses of what is needed most. This creates the risk of at random choices, leaving governance gaps, as shown on several occasions in this dissertation. Gaps can be created in terms of issues, as shown in chapter 5 where many actors focused on REDD as a new funding opportunity; in terms of steering mechanisms, for example when certain instruments, like certification standards become institutionalized and frequently used tools; discourses, in case certain discourses are underrepresented in partnerships; and actors, for instance when partnerships implement biodiversity measures in developing countries while not building the capacity of these governments or including them as partners. This at random governance,

sometimes caused by perverse incentives like funding opportunities and sometimes reinforcing existing power relationships, can lead to an unbalanced and a less effective governance system.

The growing contribution of private actors in biodiversity governance can also lead to blurred accountability structures and legitimacy questions. Although these issues go beyond the scope of this research it is important to raise them briefly. Where governments are expected to be accountable through clearly defined democratic structures and processes for equal representation, market and civil society actors are less clearly organized and are not viewed as representing society as a whole. Intersectoral partnerships further weaken the transparency of accountability. These effects exacerbate the risks of at random governance, since it is becoming increasingly difficult to hold (one or a few) actors accountable for the choices made in the governance system, and the (lack of) effectiveness of the biodiversity governance system as a whole.

Partnerships have contributed to the ongoing change in the manner in which biodiversity is governed; international intersectoral partnerships represent an important component in the process 'from government to governance' on the issue of halting biodiversity loss. The biodiversity governance system that has emerged since the beginning of the 1990s, when the first partnerships emerged, has developed into a solid and complex network of interacting (inter-) governmental regimes and (public-) private steering mechanisms. The political space in the governance system for intersectoral collaboration has expanded and is expected to continue to grow. Intersectoral collaboration is becoming an autonomously growing and self-strengthening phenomenon, as partnerships work on enabling new partnerships throughout the world. The rule to work through intersectoral partnership is being 'exported' from the international biodiversity governance system to the regional, national, and local level, especially in developing countries where intersectoral collaboration is often still a novelty. Partnerships themselves thus contribute to the further institutionalization of the partnership approach.

A consequence of this further institutionalization of intersectoral governance could be that there will be less political space for more fundamental discussions, among others on discourses and rules, since opposing views are usually put aside by partners due to the wish to collaborate in partnerships. The work of partnerships is focused on overlapping views and interests of partners, not on conflicting ones.

Moreover, the increased use of intersectoral governance could create less attention, funding, and perhaps recognition of the 'classical' roles of governments, market actors, and civil society. In Abbott and Snidal's governance triangle as presented in chapter 1, this process could be seen as sections 1, 2 and 3 of the triangle becoming smaller, and the other sections taking up an increasingly large part of the governance triangle. So even though the research provides no evidence of single partnerships eroding governmental authority, the institutionalization of the partnership approach in the long term may have exactly this effect, not only for governments, but also for the other societal sectors.

The effects of this development on civil society can already be noticed. There is increasing tension between the more confrontational and the more collaborative NGOs, in other words, between the NGOs that represent the more fundamental discourse on sustainable development

and the result-oriented discourse on the partnership instrument versus the ones that are part of the more pragmatic discourse on sustainable development and the process-oriented discourse on partnerships. The question is how much political space will remain in the biodiversity governance system for the more fundamental discourses and, maybe just as important, for critique when partnership effectiveness remains limited. The civil society sector can be seen as the most susceptible for the effects associated with the increase in intersectoral governance, since it does not have a formal power base like governments who can make and enforce laws, and market actors with economic power. The developments, therefore, weaken part of the informal power base of civil society that it uses for strengthening, broadening and speeding up the process of sustainable development.

The increasing use of the partnership instrument could also have a negative influence on the effectiveness of the governance system in developing countries, where several prerequisites for partnership success are weaker (see 6.3.3). This represents a serious threat to the effectiveness of the biodiversity governance system as a whole, since most biodiversity is located in developing countries. This threat needs to be proactively managed by governance system participants.

Summarizing, the roles of partnerships have important consequences for the biodiversity governance system as a whole.

- Depending too strongly on the market mechanism to establish the dominant approach to sustainability, as is currently the case, may enable a race to the bottom. Regulation may be needed in order to ensure a fair competition among the different certification schemes produced by partnerships.
- Individual partnerships mainly contribute to stepwise improvements towards sustainability, and thus should not be expected to cause broad paradigm shifts.
- Partnerships can contribute to at random governance, creating an unbalanced and less effective governance system.
- Intersectoral partnerships can lead to blurred accountability structures and legitimacy questions.
- The growth in intersectoral governance could leave less political space for more fundamental discussions and less recognition of the classical roles of governments, market actors and civil society.
- The effectiveness of the biodiversity governance system in developing countries could be affected negatively, since several prerequisites for partnership success are weaker there.

6.3.5 Towards a more strategic use of the partnership instrument

The strengthened process 'from government to governance' increases the urgency of improving the effectiveness of partnerships' governance contributions and managing the potential negative consequences associated with contemporary governance. The potential contributions of partnerships as instruments for sustainable development can be much greater than those revealed by the research for this dissertation. The analyzed partnerships are among the first international intersectoral biodiversity partnerships; all empirical chapters include partnerships that were launched at the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). The partnership instrument is thus still relatively novel. A more strategic positioning

and use of the partnership instrument can enhance its contribution and decrease the negative consequences significantly. Prerequisites for this strengthened contribution of partnerships in biodiversity governance are improved and increased metagovernance, interaction management, and a more proactive role by (inter-) governmental regimes.

Metagovernance, strategic steering and coordination in the governance system, is becoming increasingly important in ameliorating the effectiveness of the biodiversity governance system. The international biodiversity governance system is becoming increasingly complex due to the rising number of interacting international public and (public-) private steering mechanisms. Unfortunately, the research has discovered an overall negligence of metagovernance in biodiversity conservation. Metagovernance implies taking the whole (or a specific part) of the governance system into account, including all public, public-private, and private initiatives, and taking measures to improve its effectiveness, whilst taking into consideration the strengths and weaknesses of different types of steering mechanisms. Metagovernance is needed, among others, to ensure that the governance system as a whole focuses on the most effective priorities and no gaps are left due to at random governance. Metagovernance is also needed at the ecosystem or regional level. Measures can include supporting initiatives that are fulfilling unique, important governance functions, starting initiatives or convincing other actors to do so when gaps are found or steering initiatives in a certain direction. Metagovernance functions can be fulfilled by all governance system participants.

Because not only the international biodiversity governance system, but the whole international system exhibits an increasingly high density of initiatives, enhanced governance system interaction management is also needed. Such interaction management focuses on improving single interactions between governance systems. The participants of the biodiversity governance system are actively managing the interaction at the governance system level with the climate change governance system, as seen in chapter 5, although with little structural effect. Effective interaction management between the biodiversity governance system and the climate change governance system – or also others, including the trade governance system – is urgently needed in order to enhance the performance of the biodiversity governance system.

As suggested above, metagovernance and governance system interaction management can be performed by any governance system participant. Private participants can fulfill metagovernance functions by working towards the most effective combination of public and (public-) private instruments for the issue they work on or the region or ecosystem in which they are active. A special responsibility is envisioned for (inter-) governmental regimes in these roles, however, since they are expected to be able to have a general overview of all active steering mechanisms.

Giving new responsibilities for metagovernance and governance system interaction management to (inter-) governmental regimes is problematic, since the emergence of private steering mechanisms and the biodiversity governance system as it exists today is to a large extent a reaction to the lack of effective governmental action in the past. However, a more effective biodiversity governance system is not conceivable without a more proactive role for (inter-) governmental regimes. Increasingly, not only NGOs but also market actors are asking governments to take action, among others to create a level playing field in the market for

sustainable products, and to develop stable long-term visions to enable better informed, solid and strategic decision-making for sustainable investment by companies.

Governments can support private steering mechanisms through their metagovernance, governance system interaction management, and classical roles. In their classical and governance system interaction management roles, governments can improve the sustainability impacts of their own policies and ensure that all (inter-)national policies, including economic, international relations, and natural resource management policies, are biodiversity-friendly and sustainable. With regard to metagovernance, governments should ensure fair competition among certification schemes, enabling the co-existence of niche and mainstream market certification standards, and take measures to ensure that the international biodiversity governance system as a whole is as effective as possible. Measures can include gap analyses to find issues or areas that are inadequately governed; taking initiatives to fill these gaps or stimulating other actors to do so; supporting initiatives with a (potentially) large contribution to biodiversity governance; and developing specific policy for sustainability innovators, the mainstream and laggards. Only when governments take up these roles in a proactive manner, an effective biodiversity governance system can be achieved.

6.4   Theoretical and methodological reflections and suggestions for future research

This dissertation has aimed to contribute to current theoretical debates in regime, governance and partnership literature. The research has taken place on the theoretical crossroads between regime and governance literature, contributing to and integrating the ongoing theoretical and methodological debates in both bodies of literature. It has introduced modern governance questions to the regime debate, expanding the debate to include the effectiveness of private steering mechanisms and their interactions with (inter-) governmental regimes. It has also applied the concepts of effectiveness and institutional interaction from regime literature to private steering mechanisms, and methodologies developed by regime researchers have been used to analyze new governance instruments. Thereby the dissertation has contributed to the further development and to the ongoing merging of the two bodies of literature; it has shown that combining insights from and building on the work of these two bodies of literature is a fruitful manner to research partnerships, public-private interaction, and, more generally, contemporary governance. Future research should continue to contribute to the further integration of regime and governance literature. This research could include more in-depth research on metagovernance and governance system interaction management, since these functions will become increasingly important, as discussed earlier; more in-depth research into the effects of the further institutionalization of intersectoral governance on the 'classical' roles of the societal sectors; and research which also includes the contributions of market and civil society sectoral initiatives, thus expanding the focus from only governmental regimes and partnerships.

The regime effectiveness literature has shown that the effectiveness of regimes increases over time, and that the more recently established regimes are more effective than the earlier ones (see 1.3.1). Since many partnerships, including many analyzed in this dissertation, are relatively recent,

research on partnerships should continue. It is expected, not only based on regime literature, but also on the research of the few older partnerships in this dissertation (especially in chapter 2), that the contributions of partnerships and their interaction with each other and formal regimes change over time. Future research should therefore include analyses of the changes in (the contributions of) partnerships over time. Additional research is also needed to further explain the differences in effectiveness between public-private and private partnerships. Further research is also necessary on the specific group of market oriented partnerships using certification. This research should include analyses of the competition among certification schemes and its effects, and more in-depth research on the public-private interaction on certification schemes.

Although the dissertation has mainly used an institutional perspective, the actor perspective was applied together with the institutional perspective in chapter 3, relatively early in the research process. This has enabled taking on the lessons learned from this perspective in the later stages of the research. Especially viewing interactions in terms of discourses, power and rules, as done in chapter 3, has been important for the dissertation as a whole, since this approach towards interaction among individual actors can easily be adapted to be applied in institutional interactions. Since explanations for partnership effectiveness can be found both within and outside of partnerships, it is recommended that future research on partnerships combines the actor and institutional perspective, and further develops research methodologies in which these perspectives are combined.

Besides the methodological lessons provided by the different empirical chapters, as discussed in 6.2, there are several methodological lessons to be drawn when the entire dissertation is taken into account. The dissertation has analyzed a total of twenty-four international intersectoral partnerships in biodiversity governance. Demarcating the empirical field of the dissertation in terms of the international biodiversity governance system has proven to be useful, since it is large enough to research a fair number of partnerships and several intergovernmental regimes, and small enough to be able to cover a considerable group of international intersectoral partnerships on the issue. Because biodiversity is one of the main international environmental fields, the research can also be used as an indication for the contribution of international intersectoral partnerships in the governance of sustainable development. This generalization should of course be done cautiously. Future research could include the comparison of the contribution of partnerships in different governance systems in order to be able to reach more definite conclusions about the role of partnerships on different issues.

The international biodiversity governance system is a conceptual construct. Although the intergovernmental regimes included in this dissertation are generally accepted as the group of international environmental regimes on biodiversity, it is expected that representatives of many of the analyzed partnerships would not consider themselves part of a biodiversity governance system. If asked, they would probably view themselves as initiatives working on forests, fisheries, agricultural commodities, conservation or climate change. However, interviewees felt comfortable about the fact that their partnership had been categorized as part of a biodiversity governance system, since in practice this is the broader field that they are working in.

The list of five governance functions, agenda setting, policy development, implementation, metagovernance and ensuring good governance, as developed in chapter 1, has been used throughout the dissertation. It has proven to be a complete list of functions; no extra functions needed to be added during the course of the research. Only the definition of implementation has been broadened to not only include the actual implementation of measures 'on the ground', but also enabling this implementation by generating funding. As discussed earlier in this chapter, partnerships only work on improving participation when fulfilling good governance functions. In future research, this function should be renamed 'improving participation', in order to reflect the actual relatively modest contribution to this governance function.

Metagovernance has been defined as strategic steering and coordination in the governance system. This broad definition implies that metagovernance can be focused on the whole or any part of the governance system and can thus have many different forms. Good examples are the regional partnerships AFP and CBFP, discussed in chapter 2, which fulfill metagovernance functions at the regional or ecosystem level. When metagovernance is focused on managing a single interaction, it is considered an interaction management function, as discussed in chapter 5, in which governance system interaction management is researched. Governance system interaction management is focused on improving a specific interaction between two governance systems. Thus metagovernance as a governance system interaction management function is one of the forms of metagovernance as governance function, and is defined as coordinating among actors from both governance systems (see chapter 5). An example of metagovernance as governance system interaction management function is the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group (JLG) of, among others the CBD and the UNFCCC, in which these regimes from both governance systems collaborate on issues on which the governance systems interact. The JLG improves coordination among the conventions. Although the definitions of these concepts and the relationships between them are analytically correct, it is advised to use different terms in future research for metagovernance as governance function on the one hand, and metagovernance as interaction management function on the other hand to improve analytical clarity.

6.5   Personal Reflection

I started this research endeavor to gain more insight into the reasons why the international biodiversity governance system has such a hard time achieving its self-set goals for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. During the years I spent on this research, it has remained frustrating, just as during my earlier work at Greenpeace, to see so many genuinely concerned people working hard, accomplishing important improvements on a case by case basis, but overall not succeeding in addressing the underlying causes for biodiversity loss. It has, however, also been a very inspiring period, especially when I discovered the 'gems' of partnerships, with highly motivated people strategically using the partnership approach and enabling remarkable change.

This dissertation does contribute to an improved understanding of the causes for the low effectiveness of the biodiversity governance system, be it modestly. The bottom line is that the

fundamental changes needed to address the underlying causes for biodiversity loss are not being made in the biodiversity governance system – neither by governments nor through partnerships. Goals such as global equity (sharing welfare more justly between North and South); combating corruption and illegal use of natural resources; and stopping unsustainable economic activities, including the overexploitation of natural resources like fish or timber, cannot be attained by voluntary initiatives and incremental improvements alone. A conscious, consistent and common fundamental choice for sustainable development – and against unsustainable development – is needed. Effective sustainable development needs to continuously constrain and transform unsustainable activities and comfort and support sustainable ones.

The partnership phenomenon can contribute to improving the effectiveness of the biodiversity governance system by actively engaging all sectors of society in the process of sustainable development, which is a prerequisite to attain the set goals. However, engagement in itself does not cause actors to change their unsustainable discourses in the short term, as the research has shown. Even though the hopes of many for successful sustainability contributions by market actors are understandable, since putting our hopes on (inter-) governmental regimes has not been very effective until today, it is perhaps a bit naïve to depend so strongly on the proactive and voluntary contributions of precisely the societal sector where the changes necessary for sustainable development will hurt the most.

So, reinvention of biodiversity policy and politics is necessary, not only to modernize and adjust to biodiversity governance as it is functioning today, but also to enable the fundamental changes needed to reach the set '2010 Biodiversity Target', which aims to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss. Unfortunately but realistically this target will most likely be reached with considerable delay.

As the 'gems' of partnerships have shown, it is possible for partnerships to contribute to this reinvention, helping to change discourses and rules that contribute to current unsustainable practices, and strengthening discourses and rules that support sustainable development. The research has however proven my worries about the potential negative consequences of the increasing use of intersectoral governance to be correct. The societal acceptance of more fundamental critique and confrontational strategies is diminishing slowly, and the gap between confrontational and collaborating NGOs is growing. These negative consequences of modern biodiversity governance need to be dealt with urgently.

Biodiversity governance system participants aiming to contribute to its reinvention should view partnerships as one of a pallet of instruments, which, if strategically combined, can enable the necessary change. These participants thus need to pay increased attention to metagovernance – strategic steering in the governance system among the different steering mechanisms – to improve the effectiveness of the whole. The crucial question is whether this reinvention will take place in time for the biodiversity – the species and ecosystems – which are currently already under extreme threat.

Notes

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Abbreviations

ACC   Aquaculture Certification Council
AFP   Asia Forest Partnership
AF&PA   American Forest and Paper Association
A/R   Afforestation and reforestation

BioCF   BioCarbon Fund
BSI   Better Sugarcane Initiative

CAP   Consumers' Association of Penang
CBD   Convention on Biological Diversity
CBFP   Congo Basin Forest Partnership
CCBA   Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance
CCD   Convention to Combat Desertification
CCS   climate change-integrated conservation strategies
CDM   Clean Development Mechanism
CEPF   Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund
CI   Conservation International
CIFOR   Centre for International Forestry Research
CITES   Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
CMS   Convention on Migratory Species
COMIFAC   Central Africa Forests Commission
COP   Conference of Parties
CORAL   Coral Reef Alliance
CPF   Collaborative Partnership on Forests
CSA   Canadian Standards Association

EEZ   Exclusive Economic Zone
EIA   Environmental Impact Analysis
ENSO   'El Niño' Southern Oscillation
EU   European Union

FAO   Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCPF   Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FLEG   Forest Law Enforcement and Governance
FLEGT   Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
FSC   Forest Stewardship Council

GAA   Global Aquaculture Alliance

GBEP	Global Bioenergy Partnership
GCRMN	Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GHG	Green House Gas
GMO	Genetically Modified Organism
GPFLR	Global Partnership on Forest Landscape Restoration
GRASP	Great Apes Survival Project
GSIM	Governance System Interaction Management
ICRAN	International Coral Reef Action Network
ICRI	International Coral Reef Initiative
IFFO	International Fishmeal and Fish Oil Organization
IPPC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITTO	International Tropical Timber Organization
JI	Joint Implementation
JLG	Joint Liaison Group
LULUCF	Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEA	Multilateral Environmental Agreement
MPA	Marine Protected Area
MSC	Marine Stewardship Council
MTTC	Malaysian timber Certification Council
NACA	Network of Aquaculture Centres in Asia-Pacific
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NGASP	National Great Apes Survival Plan
PEFC	Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification Schemes
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PSG	Primate Specialist Group
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation
RSB	Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels
RSP	UNEP Regional Seas Programme
RSPO	Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil
RTRS	Roundtable on Responsible Soy
SCC	IUCN species survival commission
SDA	sustainable development agreement
SFB	Sustainable Forestry Board
SFI	Sustainable Forestry Initiative
SGA	Section on Great Apes

SNP	Sociedad Nacional de Pesquería
SPLAM	Malaysian Aquaculture Farm Certification Scheme
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNF	United Nations Foundation
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFF	United Nations Forum on Forests
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
WB	World Bank
WBCSD	World Business Council for Sustainable Development
WCMC	UNEP-World Resources Monitoring Centre
WHC	World Heritage Convention
WHS	World Heritage Sites
WRI	World Resources Institute
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WWF	World Wide Fund For Nature

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Summary

Partnerships in biodiversity governance
An assessment of their contributions to halting biodiversity loss

Introduction
Although the first international environmental agreements date back to the 18th century, international environmental policy as we know it today was mainly developed during the second half of the 20th century. This development took place in several phases; each with its own specific characteristics. The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002 can be seen as the beginning of a new phase in contemporary international environmental policy, in which market and civil society actors are increasingly viewed to play a prominent and evident role in sustainable development, a transition often called the shift 'from government to governance' (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). It is expected that in this new phase the market mechanism and cooperation between public and private sectors in partnerships will become widely accepted as instruments for sustainable development (Andresen and Hey 2005). This dissertation focuses on some of the specific characteristics of this new phase in contemporary international environmental governance. It aims to increase our understanding of the relatively new instruments of partnerships and their contributions to and consequences for sustainable development.

Biodiversity
The conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity[1] has been chosen as empirical field, because it is one of the main and established international environmental issues. The international community is struggling to meet its so-called '2010 Biodiversity Target' to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss at the global, regional, and national level, as decided by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), endorsed by the WSSD and the United Nations General Assembly, and incorporated into the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Human activity is threatening the survival of species and causes extinction of species, and virtually all ecosystem types have been dramatically transformed by human actions. Habitat and land cover change represents the most important cause of biodiversity loss for terrestrial ecosystems; overexploitation (fishing) is the main threat to marine biodiversity. A driver of increasing importance is climate change. It is expected that these impacts will increase significantly in the future, showing the urgent need for effective governance (MEA 2005a).

The urgency becomes even more apparent when taking the social, economic and political aspects of biodiversity into account. Especially local communities and poor people who are most dependent on ecosystem services, like the provision of food or wood, have been disadvantaged by biodiversity loss. Economic and political aspects have often dominated international negotiations

on biodiversity: important issues are the economic value of biodiversity and its ownership, the autonomy of developing countries to decide on the biodiversity within their national borders, and the rights of local communities dependent on biodiversity (Hannigan 2006). Biodiversity conservation should thus be considered an issue of sustainable development, incorporating ecological, social and economic aspects.

Theoretical background

This dissertation can be placed in the current debates in social science on the rise of private steering mechanisms in the international governance of sustainable development, and their relationship with and consequences for (inter-) governmental environmental regimes. The main bodies of literature are regime literature, traditionally focused on intergovernmental regimes, and governance literature, focused on new steering mechanisms. Partnership literature is regarded as a specialized part of governance literature. Although the boundary between these two bodies of literature is becoming blurred, since regime authors are increasingly including governance questions in their research, the two can still be viewed as separate bodies of literature.

The research of this dissertation takes place on the theoretical crossroads between regime and governance literature, contributing to the further development and to the ongoing merging of the two bodies of literature. It introduces modern governance questions to the regime debate, expanding the debate to include the effectiveness of private steering mechanisms and their interactions with (inter-) governmental regimes. It also applies the concepts of effectiveness and institutional interaction from regime literature to private steering mechanisms, and methodologies developed by regime researchers are used to analyze new governance instruments.

The aim of the dissertation is to obtain an improved understanding of the contributions of partnerships to international environmental governance, more specifically to biodiversity governance, and the consequences for the biodiversity governance system as a whole. The central research questions are formulated as follows.

I.   *What are the contributions of international intersectoral partnerships[2] to biodiversity governance, and how can these be explained?*

II.   *What are the consequences of these partnership roles for (inter-) governmental regimes and the biodiversity governance system[3] as a whole?*

These research questions are answered through the analysis and discussion of the following three main theoretical themes. All three main theoretical themes contribute to answering both central research questions.

1. Functions
The contribution of partnerships is firstly operationalized by the governance functions they fulfill. The following governance functions are distinguished.

a.   *Agenda setting*
      Starting the debate on new issues in the governance system

b. *Policy development*
    Developing public or private policy, for example sustainability standards
c. *Implementation*
    Contributing to or enabling implementation of sustainability measures 'on the ground'
d. *Metagovernance*
    Strategic steering and coordination in the governance system
e. *Ensuring good governance*
    Improving transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and/or responsiveness (UNHCHR 2000) in the governance system

2. Effectiveness
Secondly, the contribution of partnerships to biodiversity governance is operationalized by the effectiveness with which they fulfill these governance functions. Effectiveness is researched, among others, in terms of output and outcome (Underdal 2002), leaving aside impact.

3. Interaction
Finally the contributions are operationalized by the manner in which partnerships interact with (inter-) governmental regimes in fulfilling governance functions.

The empirical chapters
Chapter 2, 'Partnerships in forest governance' analyzes the contribution of partnerships to the conservation and sustainable use of forests, which provide habitat for half or more or the world's known terrestrial plant and animal species (MEA 2005b). Several partnerships are focused on one of the main threats to forest biodiversity, namely unsustainable logging, conversion, and illegal logging, while others use a more integral approach. The following partnerships are analyzed: the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), Canadian Standards Association (CSA), Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), Malaysian Timber Certification Council (MTCC), Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification Schemes (PEFC), Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS), World Bank – WWF Alliance for Forest Conservation and Sustainable Use (WB-WWF), Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP), and the Asia Forest Partnership (AFP).

The research shows that partnerships fill gaps when governments are not willing or able to regulate. One of the major problems of the intergovernmental forest regimes has been lack of implementation. Partnerships for sustainable logging have complemented these regimes by developing and implementing standards for sustainable forest management, thereby contributing to conserving forest biodiversity 'on the ground'. They do this with varying effectiveness, however, since the standards differ in terms of stringency and inclusiveness.

Evidence is provided for the development of a complex structure of forest biodiversity governance including both public and private actors. The main explanation for the limited partnership effectiveness can be found in public-private interaction, especially since public-private partnerships choose less stringent and inclusive approaches towards sustainability. These partnerships were developed by government and industry actors to compete with an existing more rigorous standard. Because governments are involved in these partnerships, forest

certification has become politicized: forest-rich countries and their forestry industries are using the new steering mechanisms to defend their interests.

Chapter 3, 'Partnership as governance mechanism in development cooperation: Intersectoral North–South partnerships for marine biodiversity' improves our understanding of partnerships in development cooperation and marine biodiversity. Marine biodiversity represents an important part of global biodiversity, since coastal and marine ecosystems are among the most productive ecosystems in the world (UNEP 2006). The performance of two development cooperation partnerships is analyzed: one that works on sustainable shrimp aquaculture, and one that focuses on sustainable anchoveta fisheries.

The partnerships have delivered a modest contribution to international fisheries governance. They have brought together relevant stakeholders from the different sectors of society, enabling agenda setting of different approaches to sustainability and increasing the understanding among partners. Main explanations for this limited performance are the following. It is difficult for partnerships to add value to a governance system in which numerous initiatives are already in place. Also, partnering is extremely problematic when different discourses (or basic visions) meet. A basic consensus among partners on, among others, strategies for sustainable development seems necessary for partnership success. This implies that civil society groups with more pragmatic approaches towards sustainability, which match the approaches of market and governmental actors, usually become involved in partnerships. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with more inclusive views on sustainability generally do not. Consequently, some discourses become underrepresented in partnerships, disabling their potential of addressing certain issues. Another explanation can be found in the existing rules (or established norms) for intersectoral relationships. The research shows that the partnerships are not able to structurally improve these relationships. The existing weak position of Southern NGOs has been reinforced by the partnerships; they have not been able to contribute to the emancipation of civil society in the South. Existing power inequalities among the partners also have an important influence on partnership effectiveness. In the analyzed case studies, the economic importance of the fishing and aquaculture industry had a decisive impact on the partnerships' performance.

Chapter 4, 'Conservation partnerships in biodiversity governance: Fulfilling governance functions through interaction', focuses on the Great Apes Survival Project (GRASP), the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF), and the International Coral Reef Action Network (ICRAN), which work on the conservation of great apes, hotspots and coral reefs respectively. The research contributes to the debate whether private steering mechanisms reinvent, complement or erode public regimes. The analyzed conservation partnerships reinvent conservation politics by placing new conservation discourses on the governance system agenda and by playing important metagovernance roles. They also strengthen the role of civil society in global, regional, and national conservation politics. The partnerships complement intergovernmental regimes by fulfilling implementation functions and enabling conservation implementation through funding. They support developing countries in implementing their commitments in international biodiversity regimes. The partnerships' effectiveness is influenced by the political situation in the regions in which they are active and by the partnerships' limited resources. The resources cannot support the intensity and duration of activities in all regions necessary to ensure lasting

fundamental changes. Therefore the effectiveness of the fulfilled functions is significant but fragile.

Chapter 5, 'Interaction management by partnerships: The case of biodiversity and climate change governance system interaction' answers the question of what role partnerships play in the interaction management of the biodiversity and climate change governance systems. The chapter focuses on climate change, the main new threat to global biodiversity. The following partnerships are discussed: the HSBC Climate Partnership, Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB), RSPO, Global Bioenergy Partnership (GBEP), Better Sugarcane Initiative (BSI), Global Partnership on Forest Landscape Restoration (GPFLR), BioCarbon Fund (BioCF), Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA), Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF), GRASP, and the CBFP.

The chapter studies the functions which partnerships fulfill in the interaction management of the issues on which the governance systems interact intensively: climate change-integrated conservation strategies (CCS), afforestation and reforestation, biofuels, and reducing emissions from avoided deforestation and forest degradation (REDD). Both the partnerships and the intergovernmental regimes mainly perform agenda setting and policy development functions, followed by implementation. The regimes, especially the CBD proactively manage the biodiversity-climate change interaction. While the regimes are more active in general interaction management, the partnerships often focus on the interaction management on a specific issue; they thus complement each other. The governance system interaction on some issues is mainly being managed by partnerships, and partnerships are generally more successful in their interaction management activities than the regimes. However, neither the regimes nor the partnerships have been able to structurally improve the existing interactions between the biodiversity and climate change governance systems. Partnerships play a unique policy development role by initiating pilots on emerging issues. In this sense partnerships are innovative instruments, developing new methodologies that can then be scaled up and used by others. Because REDD is seen by many actors working on forest biodiversity as a new funding opportunity for forest conservation, it receives relatively much attention. The danger of this development is that the conservation of other ecosystems may become underrepresented in both the biodiversity and climate change governance systems.

Conclusions

The contributions of partnerships to biodiversity governance
The twenty-four analyzed partnerships contribute to biodiversity governance in different manners and with varying effectiveness. Seven partnerships (FSC, RSPO, GRASP, CEPF, BioCF, CCBA, and the FPCF) deliver unique and important contributions to biodiversity governance; they have been named the 'gems' of partnerships. The seventeen other partnerships perform governance functions with lower effectiveness and play less paramount roles. The following general conclusions on the partnerships' contributions can be drawn:

- Agenda setting and policy development are the most effectively fulfilled governance functions;

- Private partnerships (between business and civil society actors) are generally more effective than public-private partnerships;
- The highest effectiveness is found in private partnerships and state-civil society partnerships; partnerships between state and business actors are less successful;
- The effectiveness of market-oriented partnerships (which mainly use the market as steering mechanism and often develop certification standards) is more varying than of those which are more policy-oriented.

The overall contribution of partnerships to biodiversity governance should be evaluated as varying. The most important contribution is the innovative role partnerships play; they can be effective drivers of governance system innovation. Certification standards are another important partnership contribution. Contrary to the hope raised at the WSSD that partnerships could become an important instrument for the implementation of sustainable development measures, their contribution to implementation has overall remained limited. Partnerships have generally also not lived up to the expectation that they would improve participation of different actors in biodiversity governance.

Explaining the contributions
A first important explanation for the partnerships' governance contributions is the discourses which the partnerships represent. The 'gems' have a high level of ambition for sustainability: they represent more stringent and inclusive discourses on sustainable development. Moreover, they do not only view partnerships as a means to improve intersectoral collaboration, but also want to reach tangible results: they represent the result-oriented discourse on partnerships. The low effectiveness of other partnerships can be explained by the less stringent and/or inclusive discourses on sustainable development and/or their process-oriented discourse on partnerships.

Partnerships also run into the same difficult issues that have dominated the international regimes, like the autonomy of states to decide on the biodiversity within their national borders, and the rights of local communities. Only a few partnerships have been able to address the issue of local community rights. They have worked around the vested interests and dominant discourses in intergovernmental regimes, and use a new arena, like the market, with more favorable power relations for the partnerships' aims. It often proves difficult in the longer term, however, to maintain this comparative advantage, as the powerful actors from the intergovernmental arena quickly find their way to the market to defend their interests.

Existing power relations among the partners, rules in intersectoral relations, and the local political situation also explain the contributions of partnerships. These factors have an especially large influence on biodiversity partnerships, since most biodiversity is located in developing countries, where these factors are often not favorable for partnership success.

Partnerships are also dependent on effective government policy for their success. Governments can have a tremendous influence on the governance contributions of partnerships, both through their 'classical' government policy, like land use planning or law enforcement, and through their metagovernance roles, for example by ensuring fair competition among certification schemes.

Partnership effectiveness is usually not supported by governments becoming active as members in partnerships.

The differences in the success of the gems and other partnerships can also be explained by their strategic approach. The gems understand the potential added value of the partnership approach, and their initiators and partners have a clear strategy for the partnership's role in biodiversity governance. Several gems successfully make strategic use of the public-private interaction that takes place in the partnership, using the partnership as a vehicle of interaction. Other less successful partnerships have not formulated a clear strategic governance role.

The consequences for the governance system
The roles of partnerships have important consequences for the biodiversity governance system as a whole. Public and private steering mechanisms in biodiversity governance can enhance each other. Most partnerships complement or support intergovernmental regimes (with varying success), and a few are able to reinvent biodiversity politics. No evidence has been found for partnerships eroding governmental authority. However, there are also limitations to the governance contributions of the partnership instrument.

If the current trend of most partnerships developing less rigorous standards continues, the contribution of certification as instrument for biodiversity governance and sustainable development will remain limited. Because the demands of these standards are low, the sustainability improvements made in order to become certified are relatively small. Furthermore, there is a risk that the proliferation of standards with different stringencies and scopes could undermine the position of the niche market standards which have more ambitious sustainability demands. They will have difficulties competing with mainstream standards, since the products certified according to these lower standards are cheaper. By depending solely on the market mechanism to establish the dominant approach towards sustainability, a race to the bottom may actually be enabled. Market regulation may therefore be needed in order to ensure a fair competition among the different certification schemes.

Several partnerships focus on export industries in developing countries. This is highly relevant work since there is a trend of increasing volumes of natural resources and basic products being produced in the South for Northern markets. These products include timber, soy, palm oil, fish, and sugar cane, which all have high impacts on biodiversity. However, by focusing on these commodities, the partnerships may be legitimizing sectors or trends that could in essence be unsustainable. Fundamental questions are being raised on whether export industries can contribute to the sustainable development of developing countries and on the potential sustainability of the commoditization of global production and consumption patterns in continuously rising volumes. Although these partnerships can contribute to stepwise improvements of commodities towards sustainability, biodiversity governance system participants should not expect most individual partnerships to cause broad paradigm shifts.

Although the high number of new biodiversity governance initiatives taken by different partnerships creates opportunities for innovative and additional contributions, they are not based on common strategies or analyses of what is needed most. This creates the risk of at random

choices, leaving governance gaps, for example when some issues are neglected by governance system participants, or when certain steering mechanisms, like certification standards become institutionalized and frequently used tools. This at random governance can lead to an unbalanced and less effective governance system.

Partnerships have contributed to the ongoing change in the manner in which biodiversity is governed; international intersectoral partnerships represent an important component in the process 'from government to governance' on the issue of halting biodiversity loss. The biodiversity governance system that has emerged since the beginning of the 1990s, when the first partnerships emerged, has developed into a solid and complex network of interacting (inter-) governmental regimes and (public-) private steering mechanisms. The political space in the governance system for intersectoral collaboration has expanded and is expected to continue growing. Intersectoral collaboration is becoming an autonomously growing and self-strengthening phenomenon, as partnerships work on enabling new partnerships throughout the world. The rule to work through intersectoral partnership is being 'exported' from the international biodiversity governance system to the regional, national, and local level, especially in developing countries where intersectoral collaboration is often still a novelty. Partnerships themselves thus contribute to the further institutionalization of the partnership approach.

A consequence of this further institutionalization of intersectoral governance could be that there will be less political space for more fundamental discussions since opposing views are usually put aside by partners due to the wish to collaborate in partnerships. The work of partnerships is focused on overlapping views and interests of partners, not on conflicting ones. Moreover, the increased use of intersectoral governance could create less attention for, and recognition of the 'classical' roles of governments, market actors, and civil society. So even though the research provides no evidence of single partnerships eroding governmental authority, the institutionalization of the partnership approach in the long term may have exactly this effect, not only for governments, but also for the other societal sectors. The effects of this development on civil society can already be noticed. There is increasing tension between the NGOs that represent more fundamental discourses and the more pragmatic NGOs. The question is how much political space will remain in the biodiversity governance system for the more fundamental discourses and, maybe just as important, for critique when partnership effectiveness remains limited.

Towards a more strategic use of the partnership instrument
The strengthened process 'from government to governance' increases the urgency of improving the effectiveness of partnerships' governance contributions and managing the potential negative consequences associated with contemporary governance. The potential contribution of partnership as instrument for sustainable development can become much greater, since the partnership instrument is still relatively new. Prerequisites for a strengthened contribution of partnerships in biodiversity governance are improved and increased metagovernance and interaction management, and a more proactive role by (inter-) governmental regimes.
Metagovernance measures can include supporting initiatives that are fulfilling unique, important governance functions, starting initiatives or convincing other actors to do so when gaps are found, or steering initiatives in a certain direction. Enhanced governance system interaction

management among several governance systems at the international level is also needed. Metagovernance and interaction management can be performed by all governance system participants.

(Inter-) governmental regimes have a special responsibility in metagovernance and interaction management, since they are expected to be able to have a general overview of all active steering mechanisms. Giving new responsibilities to governments is problematic, since the emergence of private steering mechanisms and the biodiversity governance system as it exists today is to a large extent a reaction to the lack of effective governmental action in the past. However, a more effective biodiversity governance system is not conceivable without a more proactive role for intergovernmental regimes. Increasingly, not only NGOs but also market actors are asking governments to take action, among others to create a level playing field in the market for sustainable products, and to develop stable long-term visions to enable better informed, solid and strategic decision-making for sustainable investment by companies.

Governments can improve the sustainability impacts of their own policies, and ensure that all (inter-) national policies are biodiversity-friendly and sustainable. They can also ensure fair competition among certification schemes, and take measures to ensure that the international biodiversity governance system as a whole is as effective as possible. Only when governments take up these roles in a proactive manner, an effective biodiversity governance system can be achieved.

Notes

1   Biodiversity is defined as the variability among living organisms from among others terrestrial and marine ecosystems; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems (MEA 2005a).
2   International intersectoral partnerships are defined as strategic alliances between governments, market actors, and/or civil society groups from more than one country.
3   The international biodiversity governance system is defined as the total of all public, public-private, and private international initiatives working on the conservation and/or sustainable use of biodiversity.

Samenvatting

Partnerships en biodiversiteitbeleid
Een analyse van de bijdragen van partnerships

Introductie
Ondanks het feit dat de eerste internationale milieuverdragen dateren uit de 18ᵉ eeuw, is het internationale milieubeleid zoals we dat vandaag de dag kennen voornamelijk tijdens de tweede helft van de 20ᵉ eeuw ontwikkeld. Deze ontwikkeling vond plaats in verschillende fasen, ieder met zijn eigen karakteristieken. De top van de Verenigde Naties over duurzame ontwikkeling (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002 kan worden beschouwd als het begin van een nieuwe fase in het moderne internationale milieubeleid, waarin het bedrijfsleven en maatschappelijke organisaties in toenemende mate een prominente en duidelijke rol in duurzame ontwikkeling wordt toebedeeld. Deze ontwikkeling wordt vaak de verschuiving van 'government to governance' genoemd (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Verwacht wordt dat in deze nieuwe fase het marktmechanisme en de samenwerking tussen publieke en private actoren in partnerships breed geaccepteerd worden als instrumenten voor duurzame ontwikkeling (Andresen and Hey 2005). Dit proefschrift richt zich op een aantal van de specifieke kenmerken van deze nieuwe fase in het moderne internationale milieubeleid. Het streeft ernaar om ons begrip van het relatief nieuwe instrument partnerships en haar bijdragen aan en gevolgen voor duurzame ontwikkeling te verbeteren.

Biodiversiteit
Bescherming en duurzaam gebruik van biodiversiteit[1] is gekozen als empirische focus aangezien biodiversiteit een van de belangrijke en gevestigde internationale milieuonderwerpen is. De internationale gemeenschap heeft de grootste moeite om de doelstellingen te realiseren die zij voor zichzelf heeft gesteld in het '2010 Biodiversity Target'. Het doel hiervan is om in 2010 een significante afname te realiseren van het huidige tempo van biodiversiteitverlies op mondiale, regionale en nationale schaal. Dit is besloten in het Biodiversiteitsverdrag (CBD) en onderschreven door de WSSD, de Algemene Vergadering van de VN, en geïntegreerd in de Millennium Ontwikkelingsdoelen (MDGs). Soorten worden bedreigd en sterven uit en veel ecosystemen zijn ingrijpend veranderd door menselijk handelen. Habitatverandering en conversie van natuur in bijvoorbeeld landbouwgrond vertegenwoordigen de belangrijkste oorzaak voor biodiversiteitverlies op land; overexploitatie (visserij) is de belangrijkste oorzaak voor mariene biodiversiteit. Een bedreiging van toenemend belang is klimaatverandering. Verwacht wordt dat deze invloeden in de toekomst significant zullen toenemen; hierdoor wordt de urgentie van effectief biodiversiteitbeleid aangetoond (MEA 2005a).

Deze urgentie wordt nog duidelijker wanneer de sociale, economische en politieke aspecten van biodiversiteit worden meegenomen. Vooral inheemse volkeren en arme bevolkingsgroepen die afhankelijk zijn van de diensten van ecosystemen, zoals de voorziening van voedsel of hout, worden benadeeld door biodiversiteitverlies. Economische en politieke aspecten hebben internationale onderhandelingen over biodiversiteit vaak overheerst: belangrijke thema's zijn de economische waarde van en eigendomsvraagstukken rond biodiversiteit, de autonomie van ontwikkelingslanden om te besluiten over de biodiversiteit op hun grondgebied, en de rechten van lokale bevolkingsgroepen die afhankelijk zijn van biodiversiteit (Hannigan 2006). Bescherming van biodiversiteit dient dus te worden beschouwd als een onderwerp van duurzame ontwikkeling, waarin ecologische, sociale en economische aspecten zijn verenigd.

Theoretische achtergrond
Dit proefschrift kan worden gezien als onderdeel van de huidige debatten in de sociale wetenschappen over de opkomst van private sturingsmechanismen in het internationale beleid ten aanzien van duurzame ontwikkeling en hun relaties met en consequenties voor intergouvernementele milieuregimes. De belangrijkste literatuurbestanden zijn de regime literatuur, die zich traditioneel richt op internationale regimes, en de governance literatuur, gericht op nieuwe sturingsmechanismen. Partnership literatuur wordt gezien als een gespecialiseerd deel van de governance literatuur. Ofschoon de grens tussen deze twee literatuurbestanden vervaagt, omdat regime auteurs in toenemende mate governance vraagstukken meenemen in hun onderzoek, kunnen zij nog steeds worden gezien als twee aparte literatuurbestanden.

Het onderzoek van dit proefschrift vindt plaats op het theoretische kruispunt van de regime en governance literatuur en levert een bijdrage aan de verdere ontwikkeling en huidige integratie van de twee bestanden. Het introduceert moderne governance vraagstukken in het regime debat, en breidt daarmee het debat uit met thema's als de effectiviteit van private sturingsmechanismen en hun interacties met regimes. Het onderzoek past bovendien de concepten van effectiviteit en institutionele interactie uit de regime literatuur toe op private sturingsmechanismen. Ook worden methodieken die zijn ontwikkeld door regime onderzoekers gebruikt om nieuwe governance instrumenten te analyseren.

Het doel van het proefschrift is om een beter begrip te verkrijgen van de bijdragen van partnerships aan het internationale milieubeleid, of meer specifiek aan het internationale biodiversiteitbeleid, en de consequenties voor het gehele biodiversiteit governance systeem[2]. De centrale onderzoeksvragen zijn als volgt geformuleerd:

I. *Wat zijn de bijdragen van internationale intersectorale partnerships[3] aan biodiversiteitbeleid, en hoe kunnen deze bijdragen worden verklaard?*

II. *Wat zijn de consequenties van deze rollen van partnerships voor (inter-) gouvernementele regimes en het biodiversiteit governance systeem als geheel?*

Door middel van het analyseren en bediscussiëren van de onderstaande drie centrale theoretische thema's worden de onderzoeksvragen beantwoord. Alle drie de theoretische thema's dragen bij aan de beantwoording van beide centrale onderzoeksvragen.

1. Functies
De bijdrage van partnerships wordt ten eerste geoperationaliseerd door de governance functies die zij vervullen. De volgende governance functies kunnen worden onderscheiden.

a. *Agenderen*
   Het debat over nieuwe thema's in het governance systeem opstarten
b. *Beleid ontwikkelen*
   Het ontwikkelen van publiek of privaat beleid, zoals duurzaamheidstandaarden
c. *Implementatie*
   Bijdragen aan of het mogelijk maken van het uitvoeren van duurzaamheidmaatregelen 'in het veld'
d. *Metagovernance*
   Strategische sturing en coördinatie in het governance systeem
e. *Waarborgen van good governance*
   Het verbeteren van transparantie, verantwoordelijkheid, aansprakelijkheid, participatie en/of openheid (UNHCHR 2000) in het governance systeem

2. Effectiviteit
Ten tweede wordt de bijdrage van partnerships aan biodiversiteitbeleid geoperationaliseerd door de effectiviteit waarmee zij deze governance functies vervullen. Effectiviteit wordt onder meer onderzocht in termen van 'output' en 'outcome' (Underdal 2002), waarbij 'impact' achterwege wordt gelaten.

3. Interactie
Tenslotte worden de bijdragen geoperationaliseerd door de wijze waarop partnerships interacteren met formele regimes wanneer zij governance functies vervullen.

De empirische hoofdstukken
Hoofdstuk 2, 'Partnerships in bossenbeleid' analyseert de bijdrage van partnerships aan de bescherming en het duurzame gebruik van bossen. Bossen vormen de habitat voor meer dan de helft van de plant- en diersoorten op land (MEA 2005b). Verschillende partnerships zijn gericht op één van de belangrijkste bedreigingen voor biodiversiteit in bossen, zoals niet duurzame houtkap, conversie en illegale houtkap, terwijl andere partnerships een meer integrale benadering hanteren. De volgende partnerships worden bestudeerd: de Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), Canadian Standards Association (CSA), Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), Malaysian Timber Certification Council (MTCC), Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification Schemes (PEFC), Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS), World Bank – WWF Alliance for Forest Conservation and Sustainable Use (WB-WWF), Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP), en het Asia Forest Partnership (AFP).

Het onderzoek toont aan dat partnerships de hiaten invullen die zijn ontstaan doordat overheden niet in staat of bereid zijn om maatregelen te nemen. Een van de belangrijkste problemen van de formele bosregimes is een gebrek aan implementatie van beleid. Verschillende partnerships hebben een complementaire rol vervuld ten opzichte van de regimes door standaarden voor duurzaam bosbeheer te ontwikkelen en toe te passen. Hierdoor leveren zij een tastbare bijdrage aan het behoud van biodiversiteit in bossen. Hun effectiviteit is echter wisselend, aangezien de standaarden verschillen in striktheid en omvang.

Het hoofdstuk levert bewijs voor de ontwikkeling van een complexe governance structuur voor biodiversiteit in bossen, met zowel publieke als private actoren. De belangrijkste verklaring voor de beperkte effectiviteit van partnerships kan worden gevonden in de publiek-private interactie, met name omdat publiek-private partnerships kiezen voor minder strikte en omvangrijke benaderingen voor duurzaamheid. Deze partnerships zijn door overheden en industrie ontwikkeld om te kunnen concurreren met een reeds bestaande, strengere standaard. Omdat overheden betrokken zijn bij deze partnerships is het certificeren van bos gepolitiseerd: bosrijke landen en hun bosbouwindustrie gebruiken de nieuwe sturingsmechanismen om hun belangen te verdedigen.

Hoofdstuk 3, 'Partnership als governance mechanisme in ontwikkelingssamenwerking: Intersectorale Noord-Zuid partnerships voor mariene biodiversiteit' verbetert ons begrip van partnerships in ontwikkelingssamenwerking en mariene biodiversiteit. Mariene biodiversiteit vertegenwoordigt een belangrijk onderdeel van de mondiale biodiversiteit aangezien kust- en mariene ecosystemen onderdeel zijn van de meest productieve ecosystemen op aarde (UNEP 2006). De prestatie van twee ontwikkelingssamenwerking partnerships wordt geanalyseerd: één gericht op duurzame aquacultuur van garnalen en één gericht op duurzame ansjovis visserij.

De partnerships hebben een bescheiden bijdrage geleverd aan het internationale visserijbeleid. Zij hebben de relevante stakeholders uit de verschillende maatschappelijke sectoren bijeen gebracht, waardoor de agendering van verschillende benaderingen voor duurzaamheid en een verbetering van het onderlinge begrip tussen de partijen mogelijk is gemaakt. De volgende verklaringen kunnen worden gegeven voor deze beperkte prestatie. Ten eerste is het moeilijk voor partnerships om een toegevoegde waarde te creëren in een omgeving waarin verschillende initiatieven al actief zijn. Tevens is het werken in partnerships voor actoren die verschillende discoursen (fundamentele visies) vertegenwoordigen zeer problematisch. Een gedeelde basisvisie tussen de partners over bijvoorbeeld strategieën voor duurzame ontwikkeling lijkt noodzakelijk voor een succesvol partnership. Dit betekent dat maatschappelijke organisaties (NGOs) met een meer pragmatische benadering van duurzaamheid, die overeenkomt met de benaderingen van het bedrijfsleven en overheden, meestal actief worden in partnerships. NGOs met meer fundamentele perspectieven op duurzaamheid worden over het algemeen geen partner. Daardoor worden sommige discoursen ondervertegenwoordigd in partnerships, met als consequentie dat hun potentieel om bepaalde problemen op te lossen vermindert. Een andere verklaring zijn de bestaande regels (gevestigde normen) voor intersectorale relaties. Het onderzoek toont aan dat de partnerships niet in staat zijn om deze relaties op een structurele wijze te verbeteren. De bestaande relatief zwakke positie van de Zuidelijke NGOs is door de partnerships bevestigd; zij zijn er niet in geslaagd een bijdrage te leveren aan de emancipatie

van Zuidelijke maatschappelijke organisaties. Bestaande onevenwichtige machtsverhoudingen tussen de partners hebben ook een belangrijke invloed op de effectiviteit van partnerships. In de onderzochte cases had het economische belang van de visserij en aquacultuur industrie een doorslaggevende invloed op de prestatie van de partnerships.

Hoofdstuk 4,'Natuurbeschermingspartnerships in biodiversiteitbeleid: Het vervullen van governance functies door middel van interactie' richt zich op het Great Apes Survival Project (GRASP), het Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF) en het International Coral Reef Action Network (ICRAN), die respectievelijk werken aan de bescherming van mensapen, hotspots en koraalriffen.

Het onderzoek levert een bijdrage aan het debat of private sturingsmechanismen publieke regimes herdefiniëren, complementeren of uithollen. De bestudeerde natuurbeschermingspartnerships herdefiniëren natuurbeschermingsbeleid doordat zij nieuwe discoursen agenderen in het governance systeem en belangrijke metagovernance functies vervullen. Ook versterken zij de rol van maatschappelijke organisaties in het mondiale, regionale en nationale natuurbeschermingsbeleid. De partnerships complementeren de formele regimes door implementatie functies te vervullen en financiering te vinden voor de implementatie van maatregelen. Ze ondersteunen ontwikkelingslanden bij de uitvoering van de afspraken die zij in de internationale regimes hebben gemaakt. De effectiviteit van de partnerships wordt beïnvloed door de politieke situatie in de regio's waar zij actief zijn en door de beperkte beschikbaarheid van middelen. De beschikbare middelen kunnen de intensiteit en duur van activiteiten die nodig zijn om ook op langere termijn verbeteringen te bewerkstelligen niet onderhouden. Daardoor is de effectiviteit van de vervulde functies significant maar fragiel.

Hoofdstuk 5, 'Interactie management door partnerships: De case van de interactie tussen de biodiversiteit en klimaatverandering governance systemen' beantwoordt de vraag welke rol partnerships spelen in het managen van de interactie tussen de biodiversiteit en klimaatverandering governance systemen. Het hoofdstuk richt zich op klimaatverandering, een van de belangrijkste bedreigingen voor mondiale biodiversiteit. De volgende partnerships worden bediscussieerd: het HSBC Climate Partnership, Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB), RSPO, Global Bioenergy Partnership (GBEP), Better Sugarcane Initiative (BSI), Global Partnership on Forest Landscape Restoration (GPFLR), BioCarbon Fund (BioCF), Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA), Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF), GRASP en CBFP.

Het hoofdstuk onderzoekt de functies die partnerships vervullen in het interactie management van de onderwerpen waarop de governance systemen intensief interacteren: 'climate change-integrated conservation strategies' (CCS), (her-)bebossing, biobrandstoffen en 'reducing emissions from avoided deforestation and forest degradation' (REDD). Zowel de partnerships als de formele regimes vervullen voornamelijk functies op het gebied van agendering en beleidontwikkeling, gevolgd door implementatie. De regimes, voornamelijk het Biodiversiteitsverdrag, managen de biodiversiteit-klimaat interactie op een proactieve wijze. De regimes houden zich vooral bezig met algemeen interactie management, terwijl de partnerships focussen op het managen van de interacties op een specifiek thema; ze vullen elkaar dus aan.

De governance systeem interacties op sommige onderwerpen worden vooral gemanaged door partnerships, en de partnerships zijn over het algemeen succesvoller in hun management activiteiten dan de regimes. Niettemin slagen zowel de regimes als de partnerships er niet in om de bestaande interacties tussen de biodiversiteit en klimaat governance systemen op een structurele manier te verbeteren. Partnerships spelen een unieke rol door pilot projecten te starten op nieuwe onderwerpen. Zodoende kunnen partnerships worden gezien als innovatieve instrumenten, die nieuwe methodieken ontwikkelen welke daarna op grotere schaal en ook door anderen kunnen worden toegepast. Omdat REDD door veel actoren, die actief zijn op het gebied van biodiversiteit in bossen wordt gezien als mogelijke nieuwe kans om bosbescherming te financieren, krijgt dit onderwerp relatief veel aandacht. Het gevaar hiervan is dat de bescherming van andere ecosystemen ondervertegenwoordigd zou kunnen worden in zowel het biodiversiteit als het klimaat governance systeem.

Conclusies

De bijdragen van partnerships aan biodiversiteitbeleid
De vierentwintig onderzochte partnerships dragen op verschillende manieren en met variërende effectiviteit bij aan biodiversiteitbeleid. Zeven partnerships (FSC, RSPO, GRASP, CEPF, BioCF, CCBA en de FPCF) leveren unieke en belangrijke bijdragen aan biodiversiteitbeleid; zij zijn de zogenaamde 'parels' van partnerships. De zeventien andere partnerships vervullen governance functies met een lagere effectiviteit en spelen een minder prominente rol. De volgende algemene conclusies over de bijdragen van de partnerships kunnen worden getrokken:

- Agenderen en beleid ontwikkelen zijn de functies die het meest effectief worden vervuld;
- Private partnerships (tussen het bedrijfsleven en maatschappelijke organisaties) zijn over het algemeen effectiever dan publiek-private partnerships;
- Private partnerships en overheid-NGO partnerships zijn de meest effectieve partnerships en partnerships tussen overheden en bedrijfsleven zijn minder succesvol;
- De effectiviteit van marktgerichte partnerships (die voornamelijk de markt als sturingsmechanisme gebruiken en meestal certificeringstandaarden ontwikkelen) is meer wisselend dan die van meer beleidgerichte partnerships.

Over het algemeen dient de bijdrage van partnerships aan biodiversiteitbeleid dus te worden geëvalueerd als variërend. De belangrijkste bijdrage is de innovatieve rol die partnerships spelen; zij vormen een belangrijke kracht voor governance systeem innovatie. Certificeringstandaarden vormen een andere belangrijke bijdrage van partnerships. In tegenstelling tot de verwachting die werd gewekt op de WSSD dat partnerships belangrijke instrumenten zouden kunnen worden voor de uitvoering van duurzaamheidmaatregelen, blijft hun bijdrage aan implementatie doorgaans beperkt. Daarnaast hebben partnerships over het algemeen niet de belofte waargemaakt dat zij de participatie zouden verbeteren van verschillende actoren in biodiversiteitbeleid.

De bijdragen verklaard
Een eerste belangrijke verklaring voor de governance bijdragen van de partnerships zijn de discoursen die de partnerships vertegenwoordigen. De 'parels' hebben een hoog ambitieniveau

voor duurzaamheid: zij vertegenwoordigen de meer strikte en omvangrijke discoursen voor duurzame ontwikkeling. Bovendien zien zij partnerships niet alleen als instrument om intersectorale samenwerking te verbeteren, maar zij willen ook tastbare resultaten behalen: zij vertegenwoordigen dus het resultaatgeoriënteerde discours op partnerships. De lage effectiviteit van de andere partnerships kan worden verklaard door hun minder strikte en/of omvangrijke discoursen voor duurzame ontwikkeling en/of hun meer procesgeoriënteerde discours ten aanzien van partnerships.

Partnerships worden ook geconfronteerd met de moeilijke thema's die de internationale regimes domineren, zoals de rechten van inheemse volkeren en de autonomie van landen om te besluiten over de biodiversiteit op hun grondgebied. Slechts een klein aantal partnerships is in staat gebleken om, zij het in beperkte mate, de situatie van inheemse volkeren en lokale gemeenschappen te verbeteren. Zij vermijden de gevestigde belangen en dominante discoursen in de formele regimes door een nieuwe arena te gebruiken, zoals de markt, die voor hun doeleinden gunstigere machtsverhoudingen heeft. Het is echter moeilijk om dit voordeel op de langere termijn te behouden, omdat de machtige actoren uit de regime arena snel actief worden op de markt om daar hun belangen te verdedigen.

Bestaande machtsverhoudingen tussen partners, regels in intersectorale relaties en de lokale politieke situatie kunnen de effectiviteit van partnerships ook verklaren. Deze factoren hebben vooral grote invloed op biodiversiteit partnerships, aangezien de meeste biodiversiteit in ontwikkelingslanden voorkomt, waar deze factoren vaak niet gunstig zijn voor partnership succes.

Partnerships zijn voor hun succes ook afhankelijk van effectief overheidsbeleid. Overheden kunnen een enorme invloed hebben op de bijdragen van partnerships, zowel door hun 'klassieke' overheidsbeleid, zoals ruimtelijke ordening of handhaving, maar ook door hun metagovernance rollen, bijvoorbeeld door het verzekeren van eerlijke concurrentie tussen certificeringsystemen. Partnership effectiviteit wordt over het algemeen juist niet bevorderd wanneer overheden actief worden als leden van partnerships.

De verschillen in het succes van de 'parels' en andere partnerships kan ook worden verklaard door hun strategische benadering. De 'parels' doorgronden de potentiële toegevoegde waarde van de partnership benadering en hun initiatiefnemers en partners hebben een duidelijke visie op de strategische rol van het partnership in het biodiversiteit governance systeem. Verschillende 'parels' maken op een succesvolle en strategische manier gebruik van de publiek-private interactie die binnen het partnership plaatsvindt. Andere minder succesvolle partnerships hebben geen duidelijke strategische governance rol geformuleerd.

De consequenties voor het governance systeem
De rollen van partnerships hebben belangrijke consequenties voor het gehele biodiversiteit governance systeem. Publieke en private sturingsmechanismen kunnen elkaar versterken. De meeste partnerships complementeren of ondersteunen de intergouvernementele regimes (met wisselend succes), en een klein aantal is in staat om biodiversiteitbeleid te herdefiniëren. Er is

geen bewijs gevonden voor partnerships die de autoriteit van overheden uithollen. Er zijn echter grenzen aan de governance bijdragen van het partnership instrument.

Als de huidige trend waarin het merendeel van de partnerships minder strenge standaarden ontwikkelt zich doorzet, zal de bijdrage van certificering als instrument voor biodiversiteitbeleid en duurzame ontwikkeling beperkt blijven. Omdat de eisen van deze standaarden laag zijn, zijn de duurzaamheidverbeteringen die worden doorgevoerd om gecertificeerd te kunnen worden relatief klein. Bovendien bestaat er een risico dat de ontwikkeling van standaarden met verschillende eisen de positie van de standaarden voor niche markten, met hogere duurzaamheideisen, ondermijnen. Zij zullen moeite hebben om te concurreren met standaarden voor mainstream markten, aangezien de producten die volgens die standaarden zijn gecertificeerd goedkoper zijn. Door volledig op het marktmechanisme te vertrouwen om de algemeen geaccepteerde benadering voor duurzaamheid te bepalen, kan een 'race to the bottom' worden veroorzaakt. Marktregulering kan daarom nodig zijn om eerlijke concurrentie tussen de verschillende certificeringschema's mogelijk te maken.

Verschillende partnerships richten zich op export industrieën in ontwikkelingslanden. Dit werk is relevant gezien de trend van toenemende volumes van natuurlijke hulpbronnen en basisproducten die worden geproduceerd in het Zuiden voor Noordelijke markten. Dit zijn bijvoorbeeld hout, soja, palmolie, vis en suikerriet, die allemaal een grote impact hebben op biodiversiteit. Maar door zich te richten op deze bulkproducten kunnen de partnerships sectoren of trends legitimeren die in essentie mogelijk niet duurzaam zijn. Over export industrieën wordt de fundamentele vraag gesteld of zij in staat zijn om bij te dragen aan de duurzame ontwikkeling van ontwikkelingslanden. Tevens worden vraagtekens gezet bij de potentiële duurzaamheid van de voortdurende 'verbulking' van mondiale productie en consumptie patronen. Ondanks dat deze partnerships een bijdrage kunnen leveren aan het met kleine stappen verbeteren van de duurzaamheid van deze bulkproducten, zouden biodiversiteit governance systeem deelnemers niet van individuele partnerships moeten verwachten dat zij grote paradigma veranderingen zullen bewerkstelligen.

Het grote aantal nieuwe biodiversiteit initiatieven dat wordt ontwikkeld door verschillende partnerships biedt kansen voor innovatieve en aanvullende bijdragen. Zij zijn echter niet gebaseerd op een gezamenlijke strategie of analyse van welke maatregelen het hardst nodig zijn. Hierdoor ontstaat het risico van willekeurige keuzes en goverance hiaten, bijvoorbeeld wanneer sommige onderwerpen worden veronachtzaamd of wanneer bepaalde sturingsmechanismen, zoals certificeringsystemen, geïnstitutionaliseerd worden en vaker worden toegepast. Deze 'at random governance' kan leiden tot een governance systeem dat uit balans en minder effectief is.

Partnerships hebben een bijdrage geleverd aan de huidige verandering van de manier waarop biodiversiteitbeleid wordt ontwikkeld en uitgevoerd; internationale intersectorale partnerships vormen een belangrijk onderdeel in het proces 'from government to governance' op het gebied van biodiversiteit. Het biodiversiteit governance systeem dat is ontstaan sinds het begin van de jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw toen de eerste partnerships ontstonden, heeft zich ontwikkeld als een solide en complex netwerk van interacterende (inter-) gouvernementele regimes en (publiek-) private sturingsmechanismen. De politieke ruimte in het governance systeem voor

intersectorale samenwerking is toegenomen en de verwachting is dat deze ruimte zal blijven groeien. Intersectorale samenwerking ontwikkelt zich als een autonoom groeiend en een zichzelf versterkend fenomeen, aangezien partnerships over de hele wereld nieuwe partnerships bewerkstelligen. De regel om met intersectorale partnerships te werken wordt als het ware geëxporteerd vanuit het internationale biodiversiteit governance systeem naar het regionale, nationale en lokale niveau, vooral in ontwikkelingslanden, waar intersectorale samenwerking vaak nog iets nieuws is. Partnerships dragen dus zelf bij aan de verdere institutionalisering van de partnership benadering.

Een consequentie van deze verdere institutionalisering van intersectorale governance zou kunnen zijn dat er minder politieke ruimte ontstaat voor meer fundamentele discussies, aangezien tegengestelde meningen vaak door de partners aan de kant worden geschoven als zij in partnerships willen samenwerken. Het werk van partnerships is gericht op de overlappende meningen en belangen van de partners, niet op de conflicterende. Bovendien zou de toegenomen toepassing van intersectorale governance minder aandacht voor en erkenning van de 'klassieke' rollen van overheden, bedrijfsleven en maatschappelijke organisaties kunnen veroorzaken. Ondanks dat het onderzoek geen bewijs levert voor individuele partnerships die de autoriteit van overheden uithollen, zou de institutionalisering van de partnership benadering op de langere termijn dit effect wel kunnen hebben, niet alleen voor overheden, maar ook voor de andere maatschappelijke sectoren. De effecten van deze ontwikkeling op maatschappelijke organisaties zijn nu al zichtbaar. Er ontstaat een toenemende spanning tussen de NGOs met meer fundamentele discoursen en de meer pragmatische NGOs. De vraag is hoeveel politieke ruimte er beschikbaar zal blijven in het biodiversiteit governance systeem voor de meer fundamentele discoursen en, wellicht net zo belangrijk, voor kritiek wanneer de effectiviteit van partnerships achterblijft.

Naar een meer strategische toepassing van het partnership instrument
Het versterkte proces 'from government to governance' vergroot de urgentie om de effectiviteit van de governance bijdragen van partnerships te verbeteren en om de potentiële negatieve consequenties verbonden met moderne governance te managen. De potentiële bijdrage van partnerships als instrument voor duurzame ontwikkeling kan aanzienlijk toenemen, aangezien het nog een relatief nieuw instrument is. Randvoorwaarden voor een versterkte bijdrage van partnerships in biodiversiteitbeleid zijn verbeterde en meer metagovernance en interactie management als ook een meer proactieve rol van intergouvernementele regimes.

Metagovernance maatregelen zijn bijvoorbeeld het ondersteunen van initiatieven die unieke en belangrijke governance functies vervullen, het opzetten van initiatieven of anderen overtuigen om nieuwe initiatieven te ontwikkelen wanneer hiaten worden gevonden, of initiatieven bijsturen in de gewenste richting. Daarnaast is versterkt management van governance system interacties tussen verschillende governance systemen op het internationale niveau nodig. Metagovernance en interactie management kunnen worden uitgevoerd door alle participanten van het governance systeem.

(Inter-)gouvernementele regimes hebben een bijzondere verantwoordelijkheid voor metagovernance en het managen van interacties, omdat wordt verwacht dat zij een

algemeen overzicht hebben van alle actieve sturingsmechanismen. Het leggen van nieuwe verantwoordelijkheden bij overheden is problematisch aangezien de opkomst van private sturingsmechanismen en het biodiversiteit governance systeem, zoals het vandaag de dag bestaat, grotendeels een reactie zijn op het gebrek aan effectief overheidsbeleid in het verleden. Toch is een effectief biodiversiteit governance systeem niet denkbaar zonder een meer proactieve rol voor overheden. In toenemende mate vragen niet alleen NGOs maar ook het bedrijfsleven om een actieve overheidsrol, onder meer om eerlijke concurrentie op de markt voor duurzame producten mogelijk te maken en om stabiele lange termijn visies te ontwikkelen. Zodoende zouden bedrijven beter geïnformeerde, solide en strategische keuzes kunnen maken voor duurzame investeringen.

Overheden kunnen de duurzaamheidimpacts van hun eigen beleid verbeteren en ervoor zorg dragen dat al het (inter-) nationale overheidsbeleid biodiversiteitvriendelijk en duurzaam is. Daarnaast kunnen zij eerlijke concurrentie tussen certificeringschema's mogelijk maken en maatregelen nemen om het biodiversiteit governance systeem als geheel zo effectief mogelijk te maken. Alleen indien overheden deze rollen op een proactieve manier oppakken, kan een effectief biodiversiteit governance systeem worden gerealiseerd.

Noten

1 Biodiversiteit of soortenrijkdom is de verscheidenheid van levende organismen, afkomstig van onder meer ecosystemen op land en in zee; dit omvat diversiteit binnen soorten, tussen soorten en van ecosystemen (MEA 2005a).
2 Het internationale biodiversiteit governance systeem is gedefinieerd als het totaal van publieke, publiek-private en private internationale initiatieven die werken aan de bescherming en/of het duurzaam gebruik van biodiversiteit.
3 Internationale intersectorale partnerships zijn gedefinieerd als strategische allianties tussen overheden, het bedrijfsleven en/of maatschappelijke organisaties afkomstig uit meerdere landen.

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Ingrid Visseren-Hamakers
Rotterdam, juli 2009

Curriculum Vitae

Ingrid Visseren-Hamakers was born in Brummen, the Netherlands on February 3, 1970. She completed her secondary education both at Grissom High School in Huntsville, Alabama, USA in 1987, and at Agnes College in Leiden, the Netherlands in 1989. She studied Business Administration at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, where she attained her Master degree in 1995. She also studied Environmental Studies at Utrecht University, where she attained her Master degree in 1996.

Since then, she has worked for different organizations, including the Dierenbescherming, a Dutch animal welfare organization, the Provincial government of Zuid-Holland, where she worked on the provincial environmental plan, and Greenpeace Netherlands, where she coordinated the forest campaign. In 2005 she started working on her dissertation at the Copernicus Institute for Sustainable Development and Innovation at Utrecht University. She currently works for Aidenvironment, a non-profit consultancy in Amsterdam, specialized in international sustainable development issues. She has been politically active throughout her career.

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