

Ashamed about the Past: The Case of Nazi Collaborators and Their Families in Post-war Dutch Society

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Shame and shaming have become key elements that dominate Dutch public discourse on the history of collaboration: people generally believe that after the Second World War ended, a vengeful society shamed, stigmatized and excluded former National-Socialists and their families. Pictures of shorn women or of men dragged through the streets on carts seem to provide evidence of this, followed many years later by autobiographical accounts by descendants of Dutch Nazi collaborators of their difficult childhood, feelings of shame and experiences with shaming and exclusion.¹ These accounts caused a shift in the public discourse. Since the 1980s Dutch society is supposed to be ashamed of how it dealt with this particular disturbing past: the legacies of collaboration.

This article draws on the research programme *Legacies of Collaboration: The Integration and Exclusion of Former National-Socialist Milieus in the Netherlands after the Second World War* conducted at the NIOD, Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies in Amsterdam.² It also builds on my previous research on the children of collaborators in the immediate post-war period.³ Within these research projects, shame and shaming were topics that interviewees and written sources referred to relatively frequently. All too often, however, these references were regarded as self-evident: neither the person involved nor the listener or reader would ask further questions to analyse and thus better understand the actual significance of these references to shame and shaming for either the speaker (writer), or the listener (reader). The narrative about shame and shaming seemed to fit in well with existing and prevailing ideas regarding the post-war period: the idea, commonly accepted since the late 1960s, of a narrow-minded society, obsessed with feelings of guilt regarding the almost complete destruction of its large Jewish population and looking for scapegoats, a role forced upon the former Nazi collaborators and their families.⁴

Stories about shame and shaming show us how the legacies of Nazi collaboration were and are dealt with in the Netherlands.⁵ In this chapter, I propose to view current

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narratives about shame and shaming as a development towards redemption and self-confirmation. Whereas in previous decades Dutch Nazi collaborators and their families were pressed, through (the threat of) shaming, to accept guilt and to conform to the dominant narrative about 'right' and 'wrong' in the Second World War, more recently the dominant narrative shifted towards expressions of a shared feeling of shame about a past nobody is actually personally responsible for. This may indicate that references to shame are becoming a way of using the disturbing past to confirm an integrating and redemptive narrative about oneself and the past.

'The war'

Seventy years after the liberation people in the Netherlands generally still refer to the Second World War, and more specifically the occupation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as 'the War'; thus demonstrating the lasting social impact of these five years. This impact of course results to a significant degree from what happened during this period: the brutal occupation that emphasized the powerlessness and vulnerability of the Dutch people; but also from the fact that 75 per cent of the Dutch-Jewish population was deported and killed, culminating in the death of over 100,000 people.⁶

Another reason for referring to the Second World War as 'the War' lies in the fact that for the Netherlands 1940 marked the end of a long period of neutrality that started after the Napoleonic period. In the late 1930s Nazi Germany was feared by many; few, however, seriously believed the Nazis would occupy the Netherlands. Unlike neighbouring small state Belgium, the Netherlands had no memory of modern war and its possible consequences. On the contrary, to the Dutch the First World War seemed to confirm their neutral status: if neutrality had been possible during such a war, surely it would be possible in any other.⁷

When in May 1940 Nazi Germany invaded the Netherlands, the Dutch people were stunned: war waged on their country; military defeat in only five days; the city centre of Rotterdam bombed to ashes; German military and officials taking over the country; the queen a refugee in Britain... people could not believe it. They felt offended and humiliated.⁸

These feelings of being offended were reinforced when the small minority of NSB (Dutch National-Socialist Movement) members took over the streets, wearing their uniforms again, displaying that their time had come. Before the war the NSB had been on the radical fringe of the political spectrum with – compared to fascist parties in many other European states – very limited success in elections.⁹ Neither fascism nor communism had ever been a serious threat to political stability. Dutch democracy was a truce between the large minorities: Protestants, Catholics, social democrats and liberals. None of them could dominate; they were forced to work together. This was later called the *verzuijing* or 'pillarization': a society organized from top to bottom and from cradle to grave along religious and ideological lines, held together by cooperating elites.¹⁰ This social-political structure of division to maintain stability was disrupted in 1940 and its core values were attacked when the tiny NSB minority claimed power. This went against everything the Dutch political and moral order stood for.

Initially, the German occupier – first military, soon replaced by civilian authorities – tried to make a friendly impression on their supposed ‘Germanic brother nation’. The Dutch hearts and minds were to be won over to National-Socialism. By the end of 1940, however, anti-Jewish measures were already being carried out and long-standing political freedoms were abolished. In the following years, Dutch Jews were to be isolated, outlawed, deported and most of them killed in Auschwitz and Sobibor. Political adversaries were arrested, sometimes executed. Ordinary people were restricted in all kinds of ways.

Wild rumours about the end of the war spread when the Allies liberated France, Belgium and the southern part of the Netherlands in the summer of 1944, and people in Amsterdam and other cities were waiting for their liberators; sometimes literally standing on the lookout, the national colours at hand. The Allied advance came to a halt, however, when Operation Market Garden failed and they were unable to cross the rivers that divide the Netherlands. The largest and in many respects most important part of the Netherlands remained in German hands. Nazi oppression radicalized from then on and so did resistance activities. Many NSB members fled during the chaotic days of early September when liberation was expected. NSB families ended up in the north and east of the country; others were sent on to Germany.¹¹ The winter of 1945 was a disaster in the Netherlands: in the cities, in the western part of the country, 20,000 people died of starvation and cold. It took until 5 May 1945 before the entire country was liberated. It was heavily damaged; there were shortages of food and basic goods and there was no functioning central government or executive power. Despite happiness about being liberated, many people felt ever more humiliated and hated both the external and the internal enemy.

These circumstances resulted in the arrest of tens of thousands of people suspected of being collaborators.¹² The way these arrests took place varied greatly due to the lack of coordination before the summer of 1945. Some arrests were made by resistance groups, some by the police, some by self-appointed community leaders. People suspected of collaboration were often simply carried off and locked up. Sometimes they were humiliated during their arrest, sometimes they were not. Some were physically ill-treated. Some were not. These differences were caused partly by the fact that many former-NSB members were arrested in the north or east where they had evacuated to after the summer of 1944, away from home. The public violence and shaming during the liberation may be regarded as an attempted ‘cleansing’ or ‘purification’ ritual by the community, but how the suspect was treated depended on their perceived role within the (local) community. Unlike people who had stayed in their original neighbourhoods, evacuated NSB members were often seen less as ‘traitors’ to the community and more as a problem of public order that needed to be dealt with (where to send them, how to feed them, how to start investigating their deeds). People arrested away from home, therefore, seem to have been treated differently; not necessarily better, as they were also prone to falling victim to the arbitrariness of those in more powerful positions. This is especially true for their children.

Regardless of when and where they were arrested, the suspected collaborators and their children generally ended up in the dreadful situation of internment camps and children’s homes. Here they were met with arbitrariness, lack of food and basic goods

and uncertainty about the future.¹³ From the autumn of 1945 onwards, the situation slowly started to improve when the state apparatus began to function again. Thousands of people, the so-called 'light cases', were released in 1945 and 1946. As soon as the state took control it wanted to move away from exclusion and towards reintegration of former collaborators.¹⁴

Shaming was clearly part of what happened during the liberation and the internment of collaborators: it was an integral part of the transition period from the terror regime of the Nazis to the moral and political order Dutch society tried to restore. Shaming the perpetrators and their helpers underscored the end of the wartime order. The message was that their fellow countrymen regarded their deeds as wrong and that the injustices done to the victims were precisely that: injustices that were now brought to an end and punished. The period in which these injustices had taken place was condemned and closed. This should bring closure to a disturbing past and open the future for the victims and the nation as a whole.¹⁵

Within this violated nation, however, the religious and political elites wanted the former collaborators to be reintegrated. As soon as the reconstructed state was able to, it therefore worked towards reintegration of former collaborators and restoration of their families.¹⁶ After arrest, internment and punishment, a quick return to society was deemed necessary. Dutch Nazi collaborators were not regarded as a 'different species', but as sinners gone astray that had to be led back to the herd. It is important to stress that in the Netherlands the phenomenon of collaboration was not restricted to a specific part of the population, be it a certain religious group or ethnic minority. Dutch Nazi collaborators came from every part of the country and every level of society. The fact that they stood out as collaborators therefore did not reinforce other or older cleavages.¹⁷

Collaborators were not to be shamed perpetually. On the contrary, on a public policy level they were made invisible: their reintegration was depoliticized and decentralized to local communities.¹⁸ Nazi collaborators were no longer defined as political enemies but as Dutchmen who had been 'stupid', 'weak', 'unstable' people who had lost their moral bearings. Many blamed the economic crisis of the 1930s for making them vulnerable to the promises and seductions of Nazism and the self-congratulatory aspects of 'Germanendom'. The religious and political elites viewed this as proof of their own shortcomings: they had lost contact with these citizens before the war and allowed them to fall victim to Nazi propaganda. In this time of emerging Cold War and the urgent threat of another totalitarian ideology, this could not happen again.¹⁹ Fear of communism thus prompted the elites to reintegrate Nazi collaborators.

It is striking that by depoliticizing the problem of collaboration political elites ignored National Socialism as an ideological contender or an alternative political order. The fact that former collaborators were made invisible meant that they were no longer singled out, but it also meant that they were not acknowledged as a minority or a group with their own shared identity. This sets them apart from, for instance, repatriates from the former Dutch East-Indies in the same period. Former Nazi collaborators were offered the chance to say sorry and on a local level assimilate into one of the main pillars of society. They were not supposed to reunite or to continue their lives openly as Nazis. Anyone who did was harshly condemned or even prosecuted.²⁰ Using (the threat of) shaming to force former collaborators to accept guilt and conform to the

dominant narrative of what was right and what was wrong during the war, was how the disturbing past was dealt with in the early post-war decades.

Many Dutch collaborators seized the opportunity and tried to assimilate: they distanced themselves from Nazism, conformed to the new circumstances or even converted to one of the religions. This is not to say that their lives were easy from then on: these people often felt vulnerable as knowledge of their ‘wrong past’ could remain a trump card in the hands of others. On the surface the disturbing past seemed overcome; but the people who knew about it kept silent only as long as they deemed it opportune.

The collaboration past could return in many guises and it affected many people: the war victims of course, but also the former collaborators themselves and their offspring in manifold and changing ways. The following paragraphs will outline various strategies undertaken by former collaborators and others and the role of shame and shaming. I will show how – after the initial decades of focusing on silence, assimilation or denying guilt – a shared narrative of shame came to dominate.

Withdrawal and silence

Former collaborators dealt with their pasts in a variety of ways. Many withdrew from social and political life altogether; a famous saying goes that they didn’t even want to join a musical society, such was their fear of getting involved in something potentially risky.

The ‘wrong past’ was locked up and stored away in the hope no one would ever mention it again. This often worked, although it took a heavy toll on the family concerned. It could mean that children growing up in such families were made more or less co-responsible for keeping the family secret, which could cause psychological stress and feelings of alienation from the rest of society.²¹ ‘Tessa’, interviewed for *Besmette Jeugd*, explained how she always felt anxious about the family secret. In class she feared someone would find out and her life would collapse; that she would be ‘unmasked’ as being co-responsible for the war dead remembered on the memorial tablet in the school hall. In retrospect ‘Tessa’ sees the secret her mother made her keep concerned more than her parents’ wartime collaboration and open adherence to SS-ideology: it was conflated with the secret about her father being away, her mother often going on foreign trips with a ‘rich uncle’, her parents’ divorce and subsequent fighting over the children. Thus socially ‘dangerous’ secrets aligned and accumulated and caused a sense of shame often referred to in stories of children of collaborators: the shame of being someone who ‘was not allowed’ to exist.²² It took her years until ‘Tessa’ was able to talk about her parents’ past and come to terms with her own youth.

Keeping the ‘wrong past’ a secret could function as a social strategy: normalcy seemed to have the upper hand. But it always came at the cost of the fear of being exposed. Under the surface, the past haunted the present. Others could find out about the past and tacitly let you know, which sometimes even led to blackmail. Or the knowledge was kept until a situation arose in which it was deemed necessary or opportune to be made public, for instance to prevent a former collaborator obtaining

a certain position at work, in church, in politics or in the community. The longer a war past was kept secret, the more venomous the secret became. Not 'only' the horrors of National Socialism blackened one's reputation, keeping the secret also meant trust was seriously undermined: who was this person really? What else had he or she lied about? For many, therefore, opening up about their (family's) war past did not become easier over time; on the contrary, it became increasingly difficult. This position of vulnerability and hiding caused feelings of shame, especially for the descendants: their family past ought not to exist, but keeping up the appearance that it did not made the past into an enduring present.

Religious conversions

Not all former collaborators turned to withdrawal and silence. Conversion was another integration strategy. Especially the route offered by the churches, both the Catholic Church and the Protestant churches, often proved successful. One of the reasons why religious conversion or a return to the church worked so well was because of the existing routes for forgiveness and conversion within religious practices. Like others, for example, thieves or prostitutes, who had sinned or fallen from grace former Nazi collaborators could fit their story into the established framework of the sinner who has found God. By doing so, the sins of the past could be addressed without damaging the individual's identity too much: he could distance himself from National Socialism and accept guilt and shame because his new religion did not deny his past; it gave it a different meaning. The wrong past served a purpose: it had been necessary for the individual to see the light. The old identity was disposed of and at the same time provided a basis for the new religious identity.²³

In *Doorn in het vleys*, I present various examples of former collaborators who converted. Many of them led quiet lives and are thus hard to trace in written or oral sources. Some examples, however, show that conversion was not always a clear-cut break with the past. Those stories show how the disturbing past surfaced at varying moments and was experienced differently by the various people involved. This can be illustrated by the example of Piet Cieraad, whose daughter I have spoken to and who had left a paper trail in the archives.²⁴ Cieraad's career had a troubled start in the 1930s. Born into a rich family, his expectations were high, but he failed to fulfil them. He left every job after quarrels and rows. Cieraad developed an interest in National Socialism and began to see Nazism as a solution to all problems. During the occupation his chances improved. He joined the police and pretty soon obtained a position in the *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD). He rounded up people, especially from the resistance. He did this personally, which made him a well-known figure in the various towns he was active in. During the final period of the war he married a German woman who worked as a secretary for the SD. She fell pregnant and had his child in the liberation period. Cieraad and his wife were arrested separately. His parents took the baby, but only to give it away again as soon as possible through an advertisement in the local papers.²⁵

The wife was taken care of by the Protestant pastor A. Keers who helped her find her child and gave her a job after she was released from prison. He did this because,

as Keers wrote in a letter, he wanted to make a 'true Christian out of a real Nazi'.²⁶ In other words: pastors like him were actively looking for former Nazis to bring (back) to the church.

Meanwhile, Cieraad was in custody and was regularly severely ill-treated, often by members of the former resistance who came to take revenge for the comrades they had lost due to him.²⁷ Cieraad was initially sentenced to death, but with the help of various pastors the court of revision became convinced that this young father understood his mistakes and was turning into a new person. One of the pastors explained to the court that 'God himself' was working on this man.²⁸ Cieraad wrote humble letters, asking for forgiveness, stating that he now realized that he had 'failed as a human being' and that he wanted to make amends to the country he had betrayed.²⁹

And so protestant social workers helped both Cieraad and his wife. Cieraad was released in the late 1950s because 'his family needed him', which was another way of saying his teenage daughter needed a firmer hand and his wife should stop working in order to be a fulltime mother. According to the daughter the father she hardly knew returning home marked the end of a relatively harmonious youth: the man was a disaster, according to her.³⁰ He took her from the gymnasium, tyrannized the family, contacted former Nazi comrades and constantly pulled the wool over the pastors' eyes.³¹ Meanwhile, official authorities were merely confirmed in their belief that this family was on track: the wife in her role as a mother, the husband relatively successful in a new career as a salesman, and – by that time – two children. To this day his daughter hates him and regrets the death penalty was never carried out.³²

This complicated family history shows that whether integration into society is viewed as a success or failure depends heavily on who you ask or what level you look at. To the pastors, the disturbing past had effectively become the past. For the daughter it never ended. For Cieraad himself his new life and professional success was not enough: in the 1960s and 1970s he wrote haughty letters to the Ministry of Justice and the Queen, claiming his full political rights (having received the death penalty meant he had lost his right to vote) and increasingly presenting himself as an innocent victim of the state. His narrative of guilt and shame about his wartime deeds evaporated, causing his daughter great distress, and state bureaucrats increasing irritation when yet another of his letters of complaint arrived.

Religious conversion, be it wholehearted or feigned or a mixture of both, meant a new starting point to many. It meant practical help and social benefits, but also the possibility to deal with a disturbing past without denying one's entire history and identity. It did not, however, always eliminate differences in narratives about and interpretations of the past.

Denial of guilt and shame

To some the route of conversion and religiosity was out of bounds: these former Nazi collaborators countered social demands for expressions of guilt and shame by repeating that their intentions had been good, they had been 'idealists' or that they were in fact the real victims, underscoring this notion by pointing out the bad conditions in the

internment camps. I have come across many examples of former Nazi collaborators who tried to justify their deeds and stress their noble and patriotic motives.³³ These were often meant attempts by people to evade the question of guilt. This evoked a particular dynamic: it made the past into present, a matter that was not closed and resolved, but needed revision and a departure from the dominant narratives that condemned National Socialism and its followers.

A telling example of a collaborator who looked for ways to revise the dominant interpretation of the war was G.P. Smis, a former NSB propagandist and novelist, who in the 1950s and 1960s wrote a manuscript about his life, focusing especially on the war and immediate post-war years. It provides us with a unique story, written down relatively soon after 1945, from the perspective of a former Nazi collaborator in which Smis is clearly struggling with the questions of guilt and shame.³⁴

G.P. Smis was born into a poor family in Amsterdam in 1898. He received very little education, suffered from colitis and was mentally unstable. In the late 1920s he was convicted for the attempted murder of his wife and placed in a psychiatric institution. He later remarried and was able to publish his first novel about the slums of Amsterdam. The novel was relatively successful and widely appreciated for its 'authenticity'.³⁵ The Smis family lived in great poverty, however, and when war broke out, Smis turned to NSB publisher George Kettmann in desperation. Kettmann offered him a good contract and the family was saved. Smis soon became fully engaged in Nazi radio-propaganda.

Smis was never a convinced National Socialist; he merely saw the Nazi takeover as a useful way to eliminate the injustices of the pre-war period. To him the anti-Semitism and brutal violence that Nazism also introduced were mere details he could easily turn a blind eye to. According to Smis, the occupation meant the reversal of power: finally the underdogs were on top. To him that was justice.

Smis and his family lived in a cramped apartment block where the neighbours hid several Jews. This knowledge caused Smis a headache: how could he, as an NSB propagandist, tolerate such a situation? What if someone found out he knew about the people in hiding and had kept quiet? Smis turned to his publisher Kettmann for advice and, presumably after some heavy drinking, told him everything. Kettmann, a shrewd man, telephoned his friend and SD-functionary Dahmen von Buchholz and kindly asked Smis to repeat his story. Smis took the phone and talked. The Jews were betrayed. After a few days, during which Smis, although heavily confused, did nothing to warn the people in hiding, the Jews were taken by the police and deported.³⁶ Smis struggled with his betrayal, but never accepted responsibility: to him Kettmann was the real culprit. Moreover, Smis claimed not to understand why the Jews had to be killed at all. What had they done to the Germans?

But each time Smis posed these questions in his manuscript, he also immediately takes another turn: as if the pre-war system had been fair. Didn't others make mistakes as well? According to Smis, the world was inhabited by good people and bad people, in his words the Rough and the Slick ('de Ruigen en de Gladden'). The Rough were the true, honest people, but also always the underdogs. The Slick exploited the honest and naïve Rough and were always keen on making a profit. It had been his mistake, Smis wrote after the war, that he had realized too late that the Nazi movement harboured

the same dangerous Slick people as the pre-war system. The revolution was therefore corrupted and ended in failure and disaster.

The real social cleavage was not between collaboration and resistance, or Nazism versus democracy, but between the Slick and the Rough: those who always profited versus the well-intentioned who were always on the losing side. Smis never defended National Socialism and he admitted he had made a mistake.³⁷ However, his mistake was not that he had betrayed people, profited from the war or supported Nazism. He had only failed in realizing that the Slick had taken over the Nazi movement. In other words: the guilt he was prepared to accept was not the kind of guilt that society demanded and expected from him. His way of framing his collaboration illustrates how he and many former NSB members experienced the world: they were the honest people, with the true ideals, but they were severely punished because others had ruined it and shifted the blame to them. From their point of view the real disturbing element of the past was that it was not correctly appreciated in the present.

Looking closely at Smis' manuscript and other ego-documents from the group of former Nazi collaborators, it is striking how the protagonists present themselves as honest and the victim of circumstances.³⁸ Smis never succeeded in putting his own position and deeds into perspective: his *j'accuse* against the injustices done to the 'little guy' was in fact a long tirade against everyone who had caused damage to *him*. This tendency was rather widespread among former Nazi collaborators' families: the ways in which the internment was talked about as punishment of the innocent by those who wanted revenge, how they had never been correctly understood as idealists who wanted to make a better country, etc.³⁹ They wanted to end pre-war social injustices, former NSB members claimed, but looking closer it is remarkable that many of them equated their own, indeed often miserable or at least disappointing social position with social injustices in general. Their own pursuit of a better social position was framed as a general struggle for social justice. That collaboration provided them with all kinds of benefits (career, better housing, power) was nothing short of justice ('Finally the roles had been reversed!'). That Nazism also made victims was deemed part of any revolution, part of war in general or ultimately someone else's fault. In any case: nothing they should feel guilty about.

Soon after the war this kind of reasoning, in a variety of ways and with varying degrees of intensity, was already quite common in former collaborator families. One problem that could not be solved by this explanation and justification of the past as an honest endeavour at creating a better future was the murder of the Jewish population. The Holocaust made it impossible to regard the Second World War as just another war with idealists fighting on both sides that was won by those with military superiority. How could they fit the Holocaust into the story that they had 'only wanted a better society'?

A solution was provided by one of the most radical representatives of this strategy of evading guilt, former Waffen SS officer Paul van Tienen.⁴⁰ Van Tienen, a true adherent of Nazism, publicly accepted that the Nazis had made mistakes, but he never failed to point out that the Allies and the resistance had also done many bad things. Moreover, he doubted the death of six million Jews and the existence of gas chambers. Where was the proof, he demanded, all we know about Auschwitz comes from Soviet

sources.⁴¹ Auschwitz and the 'tale of the six million' according to him were mere Soviet propaganda that nobody in his right mind should believe.

His activities and publications were met with outrage in the 1950s and 1960s. This outrage has often been depicted as evidence in support of the idea that the Dutch people want to think in black and white and reject the idea that the bulk of the population did not consist of heroic resistance fighters.⁴² Looking closely at the sources from the 1950s and 1960s, as I did in *Doorn in het vleys*, pointed me in the direction of another explanation: the moral outrage caused by people like Van Tienen was the result of the fact that by rejecting shame and guilt these collaborators did not comply with the new rules. They openly challenged, even rejected the post-war moral order. Thus they ignored the fact that they had lost the war and Nazism had been condemned as wrong. With the counter narrative that what they did during the war was basically right, and any failure was not unlike any other human mistake, they seemed to want to turn back time to the pre-1945 situation: the disturbing past returned as the present and a common morality was denied. The war had never ended.

Thus former Nazi collaborators who openly rejected guilt and shame and propagated a revision of the moral order based on right and wrong in the war revived the Nazi order in which they had been able to make their victims. In this light we should read the various public condemnations of what people like Van Tienen said. The victims, in those years regarded as the entire Dutch people, felt pushed back in their wartime position of humiliation and danger and reacted by again harshly condemning National Socialism and excluding everyone who seemed to defend it.

On an individual level we can also detect this mechanism. During my research I spoke to Mr P., a man of Jewish descent who survived the war as a child in hiding.⁴³ After the war he rebuilt his life, married and had a family. The years went by. Mr P. did well in his job and made a career for himself. He was on friendly terms with his manager and they used to play tennis together. Then, in the early 1970s, Mr P. accidentally found out his superior had been in the *Waffen SS*: after a game of tennis he saw the *SS* blood group mark.

Mr P. felt the past coming back to him, haunting him in the present: this man could have been his murderer in the war, he thought. The man had lied about his past. Who was he really? Mr P. lost trust, not only in his boss, but in society at large for not keeping the past away from him. His wartime vulnerability again engulfed him and he felt pushed back in the role of the persecuted. The war appeared not to be over. Mr P. had to be taken into psychiatric care.

After returning from the clinic, Mr P. tried to expose his boss as an *SS*-man. That was his way of trying to push back evil and of underscoring the post-war moral order. At work he exposed this manager as a former *SS*-man to his other colleagues, hoping to name and shame him. In this case, however, his approach backfired. Mr P. wrote to the political party his boss was engaged in (the Labour party) and asked them to throw him out. But the party refused and wrote back to him they did not regard a 'sin of youth' sufficient reason to kick this person out. Mr P. wrote letters to a variety of institutes and organizations in order to collect evidence against his boss. It was all in vain: the man indeed seemed no more than someone who had made a bad choice when he was young, but had later changed his life and taken a different turn.

What Mr P. did not do was try and talk to the man involved. He simply could not. In this individual example we see how, more than twenty years after the war, fear and distrust still loomed large; many had little trust in the true reversal of power after 1945 and the urge to force former collaborators to express shame and guilt was still acute. Sometimes this exposing and shaming worked, sometimes it did not, but it shows the ways in which the disturbing past to many in society remained or returned into the present.

Shame and shaming in later narratives

Contrary to Mr P's experiences, identifying someone as a (former) Nazi often was a highly effective way of singling people out and causing them serious problems in life and work.⁴⁴ Knowledge of someone's 'wrong past' was a trump card that could be played when he who held it thought it right or to his advantage.

This 'trump card effect' is a common aspect in the daily life of the families of former Nazi collaborators, especially in the stories told by their children. Over the past decades several of these descendants have published their stories, as books, through interviews or in online entries in the life story archive managed by the Dutch National Archives.⁴⁵ Through their testimonies we have come to hear many stories about how these children were bullied in school, how they were excluded in their neighbourhoods, or not allowed to play with some of the other children. These incidents were harsh and often repeated reminders of their family's wrong past.

'Marijke' in *Besmette Jeugd* talks about the time her father was imprisoned and they had to live with the father's family in a small village where everybody knew about their war past. While the headmaster of her school tried to protect her and assured her that nothing bad would happen to her at school, she feared the walk home from school: the children would be waiting for her to beat her up. When she came home black and blue, her mother looked away.⁴⁶

It is this discourse of the innocent child punished by society that is very well known in the Netherlands.⁴⁷ When I wrote my book on what happened to the children of Nazi collaborators in the early post-war years, this was also the framework into which people tried to fit my research. Many descendants of Dutch Nazi collaborators remember how they felt singled out or were physically ill-treated in school, by other pupils or even the teachers. They remember how they were afraid that someone might find out about their family's past and hold it against them. They often still feel the agony caused by this secret. These memories and feelings are as genuine as any other and I have no intention of marginalizing them in any way. However, the conclusion and emotional messages that often follow – namely that society punished the innocent by shamefully shaming the children – appear to be more complex. Scrutinizing the interviews, autobiographies and archival sources, it became increasingly clear to me that my conclusions did not fit neatly into this framework. Two additional aspects had to be taken into account: perspectives and families.

The issue of perspective comes into play when interviewing a broader variety of people and looking at multiple sources. Teachers I have spoken with, for instance, claim that they kept silent about the legacies of collaboration in a sincere attempt to

protect these children of NSB parents.⁴⁸ Their now outdated 1950s pedagogy taught them to just not bring up the past, and by not reviving the wounds of the past it would slowly fade away. They thought they were helping rather than leaving their pupil out in the cold. Some former schoolmates told me they remember who the 'NSB child' was in their class, but they all state that no one really brought it up. They also proclaim that the bullying (if there was any mention of it) had more to do with this specific child – for being arrogant or bossy or any other reasons usually given by onlookers or the bullies – than with the Nazi past of the parents. The different perspectives provide us with different stories: what it shows at the very least is that what and how people remember is closely related to how they understand their life stories and what makes sense to them. The emotional messages that all interviewees sent to the listener have one thing in common: I am a decent person and those who punished the children of NSB-members should be ashamed of themselves.

A similar complex picture emerged when I looked at the ways in which the older children of interned NSB members were 're-educated' in the early post-war years. In their memories, this re-education was a horrible and deliberate punishment: they were forced to hear that their parents were murderers and traitors; responsible for the concentration camps.⁴⁹ Some even had to look at pictures of the concentration camps or were confronted with former political prisoners who lectured them about right and wrong. Some were urged to condemn their parents' beliefs.

From the archives, however, it became clear that the people who were working with these youngsters were working within their usual framework: in the Netherlands in the 1940s it was normal for youths in state care to be harshly confronted with the wrongs of their families. Just as children of prostitutes or thieves were confronted with the alleged moral and social evils their parents had engaged in, now the same way of 'illumination' was tested on the children of Nazi collaborators. They were supposed to have been raised with a lie that needed to be countered: Nazism was not about a bright future, but about terror and murder.⁵⁰ Many social workers did not mean to traumatize them but worked within a framework of re-integrative shaming. What I saw in the documents and heard from some of them is that they thought this was the way to bring these children over to the right side: they needed to be confronted with the truth and only when they accepted the truth, could they be raised to be 'good citizens'.⁵¹ Only much later, when ideas about pedagogy and social work changed, it was recognized that this kind of re-education generally failed and was often counter effective since the older children in particular in order not to be crushed by feelings of shame and vulnerability could resort to fierce statements of loyalty to their parents and their ideology.

The second aspect I want to raise with regard to the framework of the innocent child punished by society refers to relations within the families. Closer scrutiny of what at first sight seems a problem between former Nazi families and society often reveals that it is – at least partially – a problem within the families. The topic of shame is often brought up by descendants of Nazi collaborators, shame being part of the socially accepted public discourse surrounding them since the late 1970s: the innocent child feeling shame for their parents' wartime behaviour and this shame being enhanced by how society looked upon them as 'wrong' as well.

But what kind of shame people feel and refer to appears to vary. Some were ashamed because they regarded their parents as accomplices in the Holocaust or traitors to their country, like 'Maarten' who felt shame for his mother's ongoing anti-Semitic rhetoric and so vowed to never have any prejudices himself and always help those in need.⁵² 'Tessa' told me about her feelings of shame when she found out her parents had announced her birth in the newspapers in full SS-style, including rune symbols. She felt so ashamed, because this announcement identified her as predestined to be part of the Germanic future her parents strived for.⁵³

But when we read or listen more closely, we find that some descendants felt shame because their parents were deemed social outcasts, had been socially degraded and humiliated after the war, were divorced or in low-status jobs.⁵⁴ Remember, for instance, how the secrets 'Tessa' tried to keep were a mixture of the secret of the Nazi past of her parents, and of her parents' divorce and her mother's new affair.

Some children of former Nazi collaborators felt shame for not being able to stand up for their parents: they felt unworthy because they could not or dared not restore their family's honour in public.⁵⁵ These descendants may downplay their parents' Nazi ideology, especially by stressing the pre-war economic crisis and emphasizing that their parents had nothing against Jews.⁵⁶ This claim is often substantiated by anecdotes with a strong emotional message for the listener or reader, thus proving the basic need of people to regard their next of kin as principally decent people.⁵⁷

Another issue that could arise within the families was that children of collaborators were shamed or morally blackmailed by their parents: 'We didn't hear you complain back then.' 'We did it for you.' 'Don't think you would have done differently.' 'Your name is in the files as well – no one will want you.' Or: 'You have to choose between us and them, your family or the outside world.'⁵⁸

To be accepted in society children of Nazi collaborators were urged to distance themselves from their parents' wartime deeds. Many did this by fiercely condemning National Socialism and everything it stood for. Sometimes this resulted in breaking off all relations with their parents (often for a combination of reasons).⁵⁹ Others felt cornered by the social pressures to condemn Nazism and, moreover, to distance themselves from their parents' war past. Some therefore stressed that it was morally wrong to hold them in any way responsible for the deeds of their parents or to ask them to accept shame and guilt for an ideology they had never chosen willingly. This is where the notion of the innocent child comes in again, and over time this plea was indeed met with increasing understanding and approval: the past should no longer be held against them.⁶⁰ The narrative of an innocent child punished for the sins of the fathers and suffering shame thus integrated the disturbing past into a shared identity of the descendants. The disturbing past became the foundation of a new, shared and by some cherished identity of innocence.

For some of the descendants the notion of innocence stretched further. For instance, they urged that a clear distinction be made between their parents as parents, and their parents as people engaged in National Socialism. This route was often combined with statements that their mother and father had been really nice parents. These children of collaborators ask for the possibility to remain loyal to their parents without being suspected of downplaying the horrors of National Socialism or covertly trying to

rehabilitate Nazism. Some of them are sincere in their request. To others it is a first step towards justifying their parents' deeds during the war by implying that nice people could not really have intended to do wrong and consequently their deeds could not be regarded as 'really wrong'. Like their parents often did, these descendants refer to shame as something they reject and they opt for a revision of the perceived dominant narrative of the past.

Conclusions

Social practices of shaming were part of strategies to deal with the disturbing past of occupation, collaboration and genocide. It was a harsh and brutal attempt to clarify the post-war division between right and wrong. Soon the Dutch state depoliticized the problem of Nazi collaboration, made Nazi collaborators invisible and let civil society deal with them on a local level. Integrating into society thus meant integrating into the dominant narrative about right and wrong during the war that was to keep the demons of the past at bay, but that also urged former Nazi collaborators and their families to accept guilt and express shame.

It follows from my research that for people whose identity had never had strong foundations in or connections with Nazism depoliticization of the legacies of collaboration did indeed pave the way to reintegration. Psychologically it was relatively easy for these former collaborators to distance themselves from their wartime past and to turn or return to another identity, for instance a religious one. Shame and guilt could be accepted, as it was the basis for a post war identity.

Many former collaborators, however, had invested heavily (socially) in National Socialism. Their political choices and actions might have been cause for family feuds, a marriage break up or the pursuit of an entirely new career under occupation. Their ties to a pre-National Socialist past were much more difficult to repair. To them it was more important to cling to their pre-1945 choices, beliefs and actions: if they lost this foundation, they would lose their sense of self-esteem. It required much more mental strength to accept guilt and shame, as that would undermine their core identity. Similarly, those who had lost wealth and possessions due to the purges had more difficulties: it was often easier to blame others ('society') for the end of their career, loss of social status or relative wealth than to confront their own failure. Thus many former Nazi collaborators felt a need for their wartime identity to be acknowledged, for instance, by the recognition of their 'noble motives' and of their humiliation after the war. They strived for a revision of the dominant narrative about National Socialism and the war. To them the real disturbing element about the past was that their own role was not correctly appreciated.

In the Netherlands, attempts at revision were met with outrage because society at large experienced this as a critical undermining of the post-war moral order about what was right and what was wrong: it revived the past and pushed the victims back into their 1940–45 position of vulnerability, humiliation and danger. It was not until the children of Nazi collaborators presented the redemptive narrative of the innocent child that was shamed and suffered shame to the wider public that it became possible

to escape from these dynamics and to take a next step towards taming the disturbing past. Over time this development opened up the possibility of a new self-confirming narrative for all those of later generations who felt shame about the disturbing past: both shame about the war past and how post-war society had dealt with the war's legacies. Instead of a powerful lever that pushed former collaborators and their families into accepting (or denying) guilt, referring to shame about the past became a signifier for declaring oneself an ethical person.

Notes

- 1 Harry van Beetem, *De eerste tien jaar van de oorlog 1940-'45. Van een oorlog die maar niet voorbij wil gaan*, unpublished manuscript, 2006, collection NIOD. Iet van Bekkum, *Vlucht naar Duitsland, 1944-1945. Verslag aan de hand van brieven van 2 kinderen*, unpublished manuscript 2003, collection NIOD; P. Berserk (pseudonym), *De tweede generatie. Herinneringen van een NSB-kind* (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1985); Duke Blaauwendraad-Doorduijn, *Niemandslaan* (Amsterdam: Amber, 1989), Corry Brokken, *Wat mij betreft. Memoires* (Amsterdam: Archipel, 2000); Corinne Falch, *Kinderen van... Interviews met de naoorlogse generatie* (Leiden: Stichting ICODO, 1999); Marius Flothuis et al. (eds), *Kinderen van de oorlog. Getuigenissen uit de emotionele nalatenschap van '40-'45* (Nijmegen: SUN, 1990); Jean Paul Franssens, *Een goede vader* (Amsterdam: De Harmonie, 1993); Jean Paul Franssens, *Een gouden kind* (Amsterdam: De Harmonie, 1991); Jac van Gool, *Foute boel* (Haarlem: De Pauw, 1981); Dick Kampman, *Verwerking* (Groningen: Private Edition, 2006); Frederike van Kemenade, *De blauwe vlinder* (Kampen: Kok, 1993); Bas Kromhout, *Fout geboren. Het verhaal van kinderen van foute ouders* (Amsterdam: Contact, 2004); Claudine Landgraf and Rosemarie Pfirschke (eds), *Unterwegs mit Koffer und Teddybär. Europas Kinder und der Zweite Weltkrieg* (Rheinbach: Inmerc, 2005); Martijn Lindt, *Als je wortels taboe zijn. Verwerking van levensproblemen bij kinderen van Nederlandse nationaal-socialisten* (Kampen: Kok, 1993); Ruud Luiks, 'Hebt U nog zo'n NSB-meisje voor ons? Opvang en reclassering van kinderen van NSB-ers en jeugdige politieke delinquenten', *Spiegel Historiael*, 24 (1989), 75-80, 99; Paul Mantel (ed.), *De Werkgroep Herkenning twintig jaar, 1982-2002* (Utrecht, 2002); Rinnus Rijke, *Niet de schuld, wel de straf. Herinneringen van een NSB-kind* (Bussum: Holkema & Warendorf, 1982); Rinnus Rijke, *Op zoek naar erkenning. De strijd van een NSB-kind om een plaats in de na-oorlogse samenleving* (Weesp: Holkema & Warendorf, 1985); Rietje Siebel, *Mijn verhaal had niet verteld mogen worden. Een zwijgende generatie sterft uit*, unpublished manuscript, 2006, collection NIOD; Gonda Scheffel-Baars and Paul Mantel, *NSB-kinderen in tehuizen. 'De oorlog' in 1988*, MA Thesis, Amsterdam, 1988; Inge Spruit, *Onder de vleugels van de partij. Kind van de Führer, levensverhaal van een Nederlandse ex-SS'er* (Bussum: Wereldvenster, 1983); Hanna Visser, *Het verleden voorbij* (Sliedrecht: Merweboek, 1989); Trees Vorst-Thijssen and Nico de Boer, *Daar praat je niet over! Kinderen van foute ouders en de hulpverlening* (Utrecht: NIZW, 1995), Sytze van der Zee, *Potgieterlaan 7. Een herinnering* (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1997).
- 2 *Legacies of Collaboration* was funded by NWO, Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, 2008-2012. Especially: Ismee Tames, *Doorn in het vlees. Foute Nederlanders in de jaren vijftig en zestig* (Amsterdam: Balans, 2013).

- 3 Ismee Tames, *Besmette Jeugd. Kinderen van NSB'ers na de oorlog* (Amsterdam: Balans, 2009). This project was co-financed by the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports.
- 4 See, for instance: Armando and Hans Sleutelaar, *De SS'ers. Nederlandse vrijwilligers in de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1967), Koos Groen, *Landverraders, wat deden we met ze? Een documentaire over de bestraffing en berechting van NSB-ers en kollaborateurs en de zuivering van pers, radio, kunst en bedrijfsleven na de tweede wereldoorlog* (Baarn: In den Toren, 1974); Chris van der Heijden, *Grijs verleden. Nederland en de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Amsterdam: Contact, 2001).
- 5 I refer to shame and shaming as culturally defined and changing emotions that can create or disrupt communities, in other words as concepts worthy of closer analysis especially in relation to disturbing pasts. See also Ute Frevert, *Emotions in History: Lost and Found* (Budapest [etc.]: Central European University Press, 2011), Jan Plamper, 'The History of Emotions: An Interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns', *History and Theory*, 49, 2 (2010), 237–265.
- 6 This is almost twice the percentage of Belgium or France.
- 7 Ismee Tames, "'War on Our Minds." War, Neutrality and Identity in Dutch Public Debate during the First World War', *Journal for First World War Studies*, 3 (2012), 201–216.
- 8 Lou de Jong, *De Duitse vijfde colonne in de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1953). Also Ismee Tames, 'War and Emotions at the Outbreak: The Dutch Cases of 1914 and 1940 as Example of How Emotions Shaped Expectations and Behavior', unpublished paper presented at the conference *Emotions and the Cultural History of the Two World Wars*, Helsinki, September 2014.
- 9 Josje Damsma, *Nazis in the Netherlands*, PhD Thesis. University of Amsterdam, 2013, Robin te Slaa and Edwin Klijin, *De NSB: ontstaan en opkomst van de Nationaal Socialistische Beweging, 1931–1935* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009), Gerrit Kooy, *Het echec van een 'volkse' beweging. Nazificatie en denazificatie in Nederland, 1931–1945* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1964).
- 10 See, for example, in English Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), James Kennedy and Jan Zwemer, 'Religion in the Modern Netherlands and the Problems of Pluralism', *BMGN Low Countries Historical Review*, 125, 2–3 (2010), 237–268.
- 11 Tames, *Besmette Jeugd*, 29, 35–40.
- 12 Helen Grevers, *Van landverraders tot goede vaderlanders? De opsluiting van collaborateurs in Nederland en België, 1944–1950* (Amsterdam: Balans, 2013); Peter Romijn, *Snel, streng en rechtvaardig. Politiek beleid inzake de bestraffing en reclassering van 'foute' Nederlanders* (Houten: De Haan, 1989).
- 13 See Grevers, *Van landverraders tot goede vaderlanders?* Romijn, *Snel, streng en rechtvaardig*.
- 14 Grevers, *Van landverraders tot goede vaderlanders?* Romijn, *Snel, streng en rechtvaardig*. Tames, *Besmette Jeugd*, Ch. 2.
- 15 It is important to stress here that victimhood in the early post-war Netherlands is not about the individual victimhood of resistance fighters or victims of the Holocaust; it refers to the victimhood of the nation as such: a collective victimhood. Hans Blom, 'Lijden als waarschuwing. Oorlogsverleden in Nederland', *Ons erfdeel*, 4 (1995), 531–541.

- 16 Tames, *Besmette Jeugd*. Also Grevers, *Van landverraders tot goede vaderlanders? Romijn, Snel, streng en rechtvaardig*.
- 17 Unlike, for instance, the situation in Belgium where Flemish collaboration could coincide with the Flemish struggle for more autonomy; thus collaboration deepened already existing cleavages.
- 18 Tames, *Besmette Jeugd*, Ch. 3 and 4. Tames, *Doorn in het vlees*, Ch. 2.
- 19 Tames, *Doorn in het vlees*, Ch. 2, 87–160.
- 20 Tames, *Doorn in het vlees*, Ch. 2 and 5, 87–160, 282–342.
- 21 Tames, *Besmette Jeugd*, 165–166.
- 22 Ibid., 165–166, Tames, *Doorn in het vlees*, Ch. 1.
- 23 Tames, *Doorn in het vlees*, Ch. 1.
- 24 Tames, *Doorn in het vlees*, 32–36.
- 25 Email daughter to author, 12 May 2012.
- 26 Arinus Keers to Jonker, Arnhem 13-1-1947, NL-Den Haag Nationaal Archief, Justitie/CA Bijzondere Rechtspleging, 2.09.09, inv.nr. 74909.
- 27 Various documents in NL-HaNA, Justitie/CA Bijzondere Rechtspleging, 2.09.09, inv. nr. 74909.
- 28 Pieter Stevens to Bijzonder Gerechtshof, Zwolle 17-10-1946 en Den Haag 18-11-1946, in NL-HaNA, Justitie/CA Bijzondere Rechtspleging, 2.09.09, inv.nr. 74909.
- 29 Piet Cieraad to Sandick, Breda 8-11-54, NL-HaNA, Justitie/Gratie Doodstraffen, 2.09.71, inv.nr. 82.
- 30 Email daughter to author, 12 May 2012.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 For example, Tames, *Doorn in het vlees*, 41–44.
- 34 The example of Godefridus Smis extensively: Tames, *Doorn in het vlees*, 46–59.
- 35 Godefridus Smis, *Het Spionnetje. Roman uit de Jordaan* (Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 1939).
- 36 Various statements in NL-HaNA, Justitie/CA Bijzondere Rechtspleging, 2.09.09, inv. nr. 64411.
- 37 *Manuscript Smis*, Collectie Letterkundig Museum, 223–224.
- 38 Frederik Harterink, *Verslag van mijn internering: Bergum, Wolvega, Leeuwarden, Ameland, Farmsum, 15 April 1945 – 17 januari 1947* (Leeuwarden: Fryske Akademy, 1997).
- 39 Also Catharina Gosewins, *Een licht geval* (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1980). Harterink, *Verslag van mijn internering; Alie Noorlag, Een leven lang gezwegen. Getuigenissen van voormalige NSB'ers en hun familie* (Bedum: Profiel, 2007). Johannes Houwink ten Cate and Nanno in 't Veld, *Fout. Getuigenissen van nsb'ers* ('s-Gravenhage: SDU, 1992).
- 40 Tames, *Doorn in het vlees*, Ch. 2 and 5.
- 41 Ibid., Ch. 5.
- 42 Groen, *Landverraders, wat deden we met ze?*; Van der Heijden, *Grijs verleden*.
- 43 Tames, *Doorn in het vlees*, 81–82.
- 44 In the 1970s, for instance, high ranking politician W. Aantjes was exposed as a former member of the SS. Although the allegations did not all prove correct, his career was finished.
- 45 See note 2. Also <http://hetverhalenarchief.nl/kinderen-van-foute-ouders>. For *Besmette jeugd*, I conducted extensive interviews with eighteen persons between 2006 and 2008; between 2008 and 2012, I interviewed approximately fifteen persons for

Doorn in het vleys, most of them from a collaborationist milieu. I let the interviewee talk to me about his or her life as much as possible. Based on a thematic guide, I made sure to bring up issues that were relevant for the study and I continued to ask questions about issues that remained unspecific (e.g., relating to perceived exclusion, or when the who/what/where/when remained unclear). The duration of the interviews was between three and six hours. The interviews were often preceded and/or followed by telephone conversations or e-mails. The gathered material (in addition to audio recordings and/or records of discussions, some of these interviewees also gave me e-mails or archival materials) is stored in the research archives *Besmette jeugd* and *Legacies of Collaboration* at the NIOD. I spoke to several dozen people about other aspects of the research topics, for example, about their role as teachers or staff members in a home for NSB children or about their mothers who were involved in the assistance shortly after the war. I also spoke to some people on the promise not to use their story for the books. This was often the case with people who contacted me by telephone because they had something to say (that this was a good study, that the study came too late, that they knew someone who was the child of NSB parents, that they were the child of NSB parents and were looking for information about their parents, etc.). In addition to interviews, I used published and unpublished autobiographies for *Besmette jeugd*. Most of the latter are part of the collection of the NIOD. For an exhaustive list, see *Besmette jeugd*, Bronnen en Literatuur.

- 46 Tames, *Besmette Jeugd*, 171–172.
- 47 See also Jolanda Vanderwal Taylor, *A Family Occupation. Children of the War and the Memory of World War II in Dutch Literature of the 1980s* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1980); Jolanda Vanderwal Taylor, 'Rinnes Rijke's Niet de schuld wel de straf, as a social phenomenon. An attempt to come to terms with a tragic past', *Canadian Journal of Netherlandic Studies* 12, 2 (1991), 28–32.
- 48 Tames, *Besmette Jeugd*, 166.
- 49 Tames, *Besmette Jeugd*, a.o. 226. Also Scheffel-Baars and Mantel, *NSB-kinderen in tehuizen*.
- 50 Tames, *Besmette Jeugd*, Ch. 4.
- 51 Tames, *Besmette Jeugd*, a.o. 226–229.
- 52 Tames, *Besmette Jeugd*, 180.
- 53 Interview 'Tessa Muller', 7 January 2007.
- 54 Tames, *Besmette Jeugd*, 181–182.
- 55 Various examples of people contacting the NIOD in 2008 after the launch of *Legacies of Collaboration*.
- 56 Interview H.R., 9 November 2007.
- 57 See also Harald Welzer et al. *Opa war kein Nazi. Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis* (Frankfurt am Main: Fisher, 2002).
- 58 Tames, *Besmette Jeugd*, a.o. 172–173, 176–177, 181.
- 59 Tames, *Besmette Jeugd*, 172–173.
- 60 Bram Enning, *Spreken over fout. Hoe de kinderen van foute ouders het zwijgen verbraken* (Amsterdam: Balans, 2014).