Article

The Social Psychology of Intergroup Toleration: A Roadmap for Theory and Research

Personality and Social Psychology Review
2017, Vol. 21(1) 72–96

DOI: 10.1177/1088868316640974
journals.sagepub.com/home/pspr
SAGE

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Abstract

The global increase in cultural and religious diversity has led to calls for toleration of group differences to achieve intergroup harmony. Although much social-psychological research has examined the nature of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, and its impact on targets of these biases, little research has examined the nature and impact of toleration for intergroup relations. Toleration does not require that people give up their objections to out-group norms and practices but rather mutual accommodation. Integrating research from various social sciences, we explore the nature of intergroup tolerance including its three components—objection, acceptance, and rejection—while drawing out its implications for future social-psychological research. We then explore some psychological consequences to social groups that are the object of toleration. By doing so, we consider the complex ways in which intergroup tolerance impacts both majority and minority groups and the dynamic interplay of both in pluralistic societies.

Keywords

toleration, cultural diversity, intergroup relations, tolerance

> It is widely agreed that the core of the concept of toleration is the refusal, where one has the power to do so, to prohibit or seriously interfere with conduct that one finds objectionable.
>
> —Horton (1996, p. 28)

> A shift in emphasis in the ethnic attitudes literature from prime concern with intergroup feelings (however measured) to equal concern with intergroup *tolerance* would broaden the scope of the literature from both a theoretical and a policy perspective, increasing both its sensitivity to and its relevance for the general problem of multigroup coexistence in a democratic society.
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> —Jackman (1977, p. 167, emphasis in original).

How do we manage cultural differences? This is a question hotly debated in many countries, cities, neighborhoods, organizations, and schools around the world. The topic has stimulated various empirical studies on the negative and positive effects of cultural diversity for intergroup relations. On the negative side, diversity would lead to categorizations of others into "us" versus "them" with feelings of out-group threat and group competition that can lead to intergroup conflict. On the positive side, diversity implies opportunities for intergroup contact, cultural learning, and cognitive adaptation that can lead to less stereotyping and higher out-group acceptance (Crisp & Turner, 2011).

Social-psychological research has examined the intergroup consequences of cultural diversity in terms of acculturation strategies (R. Brown & Zagefka, 2011), social categorization processes (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009), and diversity ideologies (Plaut, 2010). For example, various ideological frameworks for dealing with diversity have been proposed and examined. Diversity can be *ignored* in favor of individual characteristics (color blindness), or *rejected* with a focus on the dominant majority group (assimilation), or *acknowledged and celebrated* (multiculturalism). Research shows that these diversity ideologies can promote positive out-group attitudes, but also lead to lower acceptance of out-groups (see Deaux & Verkuyten, 2014; Rattan & Ambady, 2013, for reviews), and that the outcome depends on, for example, the national context (Guimond, de la Sablonnière, & Nugies, 2014), the level of intergroup conflict (Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008), in-group identification (Morrison, Plaut, & Ybarra, 2010), and whether the ideology is understood in abstract or concrete terms (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014).

In contrast to this body of work, there is very little systematic social-psychological theorizing and empirical investigation into toleration in which differences are

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endured. Vogt's (1997) assessment nearly 20 years ago is still accurate:

> Although social psychology has contributed crucially to our understanding of phenomena related to tolerance, such as stereotyping and prejudice, the theoretical work on tolerance itself in social psychology is so underdeveloped that almost any systematic investigation is likely to be productive. (p. 237)

As illustrated by the second quote heading this article, this lack of theorizing and research is unfortunate for several reasons. One is that mutual tolerance is critical because objection and disagreement about what is good and right are inevitable in pluralist societies. Social psychologists tend to focus on improving intergroup attitudes, but often this is very difficult (Paluck & Green, 2009) and not realistic. A diverse, egalitarian, and peaceful society does not require that we all like each other, but it does require that people at least tolerate one another. Tolerance is the necessary step toward living together: a barrier against discrimination, hostility, conflict, and a critical condition for citizenship and democracy (Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Walzer, 1997). It is an integrative principle across which basic forms of acceptance and peaceful coexistence between groups can be established despite controversial differences.

Second, a focus on tolerance draws attention to concrete norms and practices, and to the notion of citizenship which is a subject that is hardly addressed directly by psychological theory and research (Condor, 2011). Many social-psychological studies have examined people's stereotypes and general attitudes toward ethnic and religious out-groups, but few have focused on perceptions of concrete and controversial practices and actions of out-group members. Yet, in culturally diverse societies, the hotly debated questions and issues evolve around foreign dress code, language use, dietary requirements, Mosque building, freedom of speech (e.g., the drawings of Prophet Mohammed), gay marriage, and various other religious and cultural practices. It is around concrete issues that cultural diversity is put to the test, ways of life collide, and the need for toleration is discussed. People might support the general idea of tolerance, but react negatively when facing its practical consequences (Jackman, 1978; Lawrence, 1976).

Third, although in the context of cultural diversity tolerance is an intergroup phenomenon, social psychology has made little contribution to the understanding of toleration (e.g., Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). The prime theoretical and empirical concern has been with prejudicial attitudes rather than with intergroup tolerance. And the reverse is also true: Knowledge of intergroup processes and social-psychological theories are seldom considered in the extensive political science literature on political tolerance (see J. L. Gibson, 2006; J. L. Gibson & Gouws, 2000). This literature has focused on individual characteristics such as dogmatism and closed-mindedness, as well as political expertise, political participation, and commitment to democratic values, as determinants of tolerance (J. L. Gibson, 2006; Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Vogt, 1997). Yet, tolerance presupposes intergroup differences and typically implies that one group has the power to interfere with the dissenting beliefs and practices of the other.

The aim of this article is to discuss various aspects and paradoxes of intergroup toleration to raise novel questions for social-psychological theory and research. Our argument is that intergroup tolerance is critical for living together in a culturally diverse society: "Toleration makes difference possible; difference makes toleration necessary" (Walzer, 1997, p. xii). We will try to demonstrate that tolerance is more than the absence of intolerance, and its psychological processes involve moral disapproval ("strong tolerance") rather than simple dislike ("weak tolerance") (see Table 1). While "strong tolerance" raises many novel questions for social-psychological research, "weak tolerance" is more related to the phenomenon addressed in existing prejudice research. And finally, tolerance is not inherently good and intolerance is not inherently bad because not everything can and should be tolerated.

In the following sections, we will first discuss the concept of toleration and its three components: objection, acceptance, and rejection. This is followed by a discussion of the permission and respect understanding of toleration that relate to more vertical and horizontal intergroup relations, respectively. Then, we will consider the target's perspective by discussing the potential social-psychological consequences of being tolerated. Here, we consider the potential consequences of toleration for the target's sense of belonging, control, identity, (collective) self-esteem, desire for collective action, and the target's attitudes and behaviors toward those "tolerating" them. The article concludes with future directions for theoretical and empirical development.

In the present context, we are not concerned with the more interpersonal settings of tolerance such as parents tolerating particular behaviors of their children, but with intergroup situations in which the toleration of cultural and religious differences is at stake. This means that we will also not be directly concerned with political tolerance which is extensively studied in political science and focuses, for example, on different groups trying to gain influence on decision-making processes or how religion affects political intolerance (Djupe, 2015). Our focus here is on tolerance of different group practices that sustain and reproduce an identity and way of life among its group members.

Historically, the concept of tolerance evolved from efforts to deal with the harmful and violent effects of religious conflicts (Walzer, 1997). Immigration and globalization have led to an increased need for people to live besides ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity. For example, the presence of an increasing number of Muslims in Western countries has given a renewed urgency to the idea of tolerance as a mechanism for dealing with diversity. Islam has emerged as the focus of immigration and diversity debates in Europe (Cesari, 2013; Zolberg & Long, 1999) and increasingly in North

Table 1. Three Components of Weak and Strong Intergroup Toleration (Objection, Acceptance, and Rejection) and Their Related Psychology.

	Toleration	
Components	Weak	Strong
Objection		
Affective states	Dislike for out-group as a whole	Disapproval of specific practices of out-group
Acceptance		
Psychological processes	Suppression and compunction over negative sentiments	Balancing considerations of competing values
Rejection		
Behavioral outcomes	Discrimination: Justification of negative behaviors	Intolerance: Moral reasons for objection outweigh those for acceptance

America (Kalkan, Layman, & Uslaner, 2009; Shipler, 2015) and Australia (Fuller & Innis, 2014; Sparrow, 2015). Islam's presence in the West has also been at the heart of what is perceived as a "crisis of multiculturalism" (Modood, 2007). Islamic norms and values are often considered incompatible with Western values, and Muslims have been labeled as the "indigestible" minority (Huntington, 2004, p. 188). Several of our examples therefore relate to the (perceived) tension between Islamic and Western norms and values as this is part of much public and political discourse in Europe, North America, and Australasia today.

However, in addition to tolerance in the context of Islam in the West, intergroup tolerance can also be investigated in other social contexts where a minority group's norms and values are perceived to be incompatible with that of the dominant culture. For example, these principles may apply in the context of other ethnic and religious groups that have diverging beliefs, values, and practices from the dominant culture (e.g., the Roma people in Europe or Amish people in the United States). Similarly, these phenomena may also apply to various social and political groups, including hate groups (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan, European National Front, or the Abiding Truth Ministries) and extremist political parties (e.g., Golden Dawn in Greece, Maoist Communist Party of India, or the Australia First Party or New Zealand First political party). With that said, these principles would not apply in the context of all ethnic minority or immigrant groups, especially if their values, norms, and practices are not perceived as incompatible with the mainstream (e.g., Asian Americans in the United States; Germans in the Netherlands). Therefore, we are cautious to generalize these claims beyond cultural and religious groups whose values, practices, and norms are considered incompatible with the dominant culture, thereby leading to a (perceived) clash of worldviews.

The Concept of Tolerance

The concept of tolerance has a long history going back to antiquity. It was used in early Christianity when dealing with religious differences and conflicts, and it became a central concept after the Reformation, when Europe faced many religious–political conflicts. Philosophers such as Spinoza, Bayle, Locke, and Montesquieu developed toleration theories to reconcile religious differences, and in the 19th century, John Stuart Mill discussed toleration in relation to other forms of cultural and political plurality. The importance of tolerance for contemporary diverse societies is discussed by current thinkers such as W. Brown (2008), Forst (2012), Habermas (2004), and Walzer (1997).

All these scholars are concerned with situations in which people put up with or endure norms and practices that they object to. As stated in the first quote heading this article, the core of toleration "is the refusal, where one has the power to do so, to prohibit or seriously interfere with conduct that one finds objectionable" (Horton, 1996, p. 28). This means that tolerance is not indifference, neutrality, or refraining from acting out of fear, and it is also not the opposite of prejudice (e.g., Crawford, 2014; Jackman, 1977; Van der Noll, Poppe, & Verkuyten, 2010; Van Zalk & Kerr, 2014). In social psychology, tolerance is often equated with being nonjudgmental, open, and valuing diversity, or it is considered a generalized positive attitude toward out-groups (e.g., Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Yet, the concept of tolerance shares with prejudice the aspect of "negativity," but emphasizes forbearance and not begrudging other people their own ways. Tolerance, therefore, serves as a barrier against discrimination.

According to Forst (2012), this conceptualization has three components: the objection, the acceptance, and the rejection (see also Galeotti, 2002; Habermas, 2004). Tolerance requires (a) reasons to object to norms and practices of others, (b) reasons to nevertheless accept them and show self-restraint, and (c) reasons for the limits of tolerance and not accepting particular norms and practices. In the sections that follow, we unpack these different components of tolerance and explore how each of these can inform social-psychological research on intergroup relations. Table 1 summarizes the main aspects and differences that we will discuss.

The Objection Component

There are many situations in which people put up with something that they disapprove of. Religious believers tolerate homosexuality, gay marriage, and abortion; nonbelievers

tolerate religious teachings in schools, religious holidays, and ritual slaughter of animals. In some Western countries, female officials are allowed to wear a headscarf in public institutions, and in other countries, people with radical views are allowed to congregate and rally (e.g., White supremacists). The tolerated norms or practices are considered wrong or bad and evaluated negatively. The objection component implies a negative judgment for which a general distinction between *dislike* and *disapproval* can be made (Horton, 1996). The former implies (implicit) negative feelings of dislike, distaste, or hate toward categories of people or their practices. The latter involves normative and moral reasons for considering specific beliefs, norms, or practices wrong or bad. One can dislike Muslims, but that does not have to mean that one disapproves of all their religious practices, and vice versa. Similarly, people can disapprove of smoking, but that does not have to mean that they dislike smokers. The distinction between dislike and disapproval is, of course, not always clear-cut, but it features in debates about toleration (see Horton, 1996).[1] For some, the notion of toleration is only appropriate when there is disapproval, while others extend the notion to cases in which the objection takes the form of (implicit) feelings of dislike. The latter has many similarities with the thinking about prejudice and has been defined as toleration in a weak sense, whereas the former has been conceptualized as toleration in a stronger sense and implies virtuous conduct (Mendus, 1989; Pasamonik, 2004; Warnock, 1987). This distinction is important in terms of underlying psychological processes (Table 1) and is useful for explaining the nature and importance of strong toleration, which is our aim.

Out-group dislike. Tolerance is often examined in terms of disliked groups. For example, many studies in political science, and social psychology (e.g., Crawford, 2014), use the so-called "least liked group approach" to measure political tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1979). With this measure, people are first asked to indicate which group in society they dislike most. In a next step, they are asked whether members of this group should be allowed to hold public office, teach in schools, and hold public rallies. This approach allows one to examine political tolerance of groups that participants themselves dislike (Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002). Tolerance is considered to occur jointly with feelings of dislike: It is about how far one is willing to grant equal rights to disliked groups.

This approach has its limitations because not only feelings of dislike but also disapproval of practices can be involved in people's reactions (Petersen, Slothuus, Stubager, & Togeby, 2010).[2] With this approach, it is often difficult to make a distinction between the act and the actor (Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002). People can object to a particular practice of a group because they dislike the group or because they disapprove of the practice itself. For example, one can resist the idea of Muslims establishing Islamic schools or an Islamic political party—as happens in some European countries—because one feels negatively toward Muslims, or because one thinks that any religion has no place in education or in party politics (Van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015).

A focus on feelings of dislike or hate involves a limited understanding of toleration and leads to the paradox of the *tolerant racist*. A racist person showing self-restraint in the face of the racial category that he or she despises would be tolerant, and the more racist the person is, the more tolerant he or she would be (Horton, 1996; King, 1976). Higher tolerance would imply stronger dislike together with more endurance resulting from stronger self-restraint. This counterintuitive implication indicates that a focus on dislike, or (implicit) negative feelings more generally, passes over something important. The psychology of racial hatred is something other than objecting toward dissenting norms and practices that one disapproves of. The nature or grounds for the objection to what one tolerates is important. For example, whereas racial tolerance involves prejudicial beliefs and "unreasonable" feelings of dislike, religious tolerance typically involves the "reasonable" disapproval of conflicting beliefs and convictions. A racist person showing self-restraint can be considered tolerant, but it can be argued that he or she should not want to act on his or her racist beliefs in the first place. Addressing racism is not about increasing tolerance, but about recognizing the "intrinsic moral irrelevance of racial differences" (Horton, 1996, p. 34). Racists should be discouraged from having racist beliefs and feelings rather than be encouraged to be tolerant. In contrast, promoting religious tolerance is more about encouraging people to accept other religious beliefs and practices rather than discouraging them from having any objections toward things that contradict one's sacred beliefs.

Out-group disapproval. A religious believer can be convinced that "Jesus is the only way" and object toward humanism as a belief system, but one should be egalitarian toward humanists as a group of people. Criticizing a system of belief is more socially acceptable than stereotyping or dehumanizing a group of people. And defining a system of belief as being unequal to "our" norms and values is more acceptable than labeling a (racial) group of people inferior. The implication is that "the reasons for objection must be reasonable in a minimal sense" (Forst, 2012, p. 2). The disapproval interpretation of tolerance implies that the objection must not be rooted in feelings of fear or hatred, but rather must not be unreasonable (e.g., not arbitrary) or without value. It is much more difficult to recognize the value and reasonableness of racist belief and hatred than of secularists' concerns about the imposition of religious laws, or of antiabortionists' concern for the unborn life.[3] This raises the question of what subjectively these defensible reasons for disapproval might be, and this is an important topic for future research. Here we want to suggest that at least two types of reasons should be examined: shared norms and conventions, and values.

Norms and conventions. Toleration questions in pluralist societies are often about social standards, conventions, and customs. They stem from perceptions that dissenting beliefs and practices are "unduly upsetting the orderly social life based on ingrained and familiar conventions and stable expectations" (Galeotti, 2015, p. 98). In everyday life, individuals rely on the ideas they assume are socially shared to establish common ground (Kashima, Klein, & Clark, 2008). In communicating with in-group members, people draw on shared knowledge and implicit expectations which enable them to anticipate and comprehend the actions of others. People "think and act on ideas perceived to be consensual with little reservation" (Zou et al., 2009, p. 580), and in doing so reproduce the prevailing, cultural patterns: patterns that are seen as simple "common sense" and equated with normality (Verkuyten, 2001; Zou et al., 2009). As a result, objection to and condemnation of dissenting or "abnormal" norms and practices are considered reasonable and even "logical" (Billig, 1988).

Perceived cultural consensus implies a bias toward traditionality and does not have to implicate the self or require awareness of one's cultural group identity (Zou et al., 2009). Yet, rules of civility and propriety relating, for example, to dress code, collective celebrations, and religious rituals are often linked to notions of in-group identity and therefore considered legitimate reasons for disapproval. This is summarized in the maxim, "when in Rome, do as the Romans do." The self-evidence of this expectation is typically substantiated by the claim that one would, of course, adapt to the normative and customary ways of life when emigrating to another country (Verkuyten, 1997). Research has shown that the maintenance and adaptation to the established rules and standards that bind society together and defines the in-group identity is a central and independent reason for why people disapprove of disrupting out-group norms and practices (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).

Value pluralism. Very meaningful or sacred values lead people to act in terms of principles rather than prospects, and to strongly protect their own worldview (Ginges & Atran, 2011). People are extremely resistant to taboo trade-offs in which these values are compared with or transacted in market pricing (Tetlock, 1986). This resistance cannot fully be explained by an incommensurable objection that makes people confused, but rather implies a principle disapproval involving moral indignation and outrage (e.g., Tetlock, Kirstel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). These values and principles tend to be in-group defining but can also have a universalistic appeal (e.g., human rights).

For example, the lives of observant believers are organized around their religious beliefs, values, and practices that are considered binding and provide certainty and meaningfulness. Religions involve truth-claims and absolute moral principles that define what it means to be a believer of a particular religion. For a true believer, all religions are not equally right because one's own faith is the correct one, and the idea of making adjustments is an oxymoron. Religious belief is concerned with the moral good and divine truth, which are difficult to reconcile with moral and epistemic diversity (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). Trying to convert people to one's religious belief and punishing apostasy are aims, and even duties, in some religions.

A similar difficulty is involved in cultural value pluralism. The "culturalist" view of each human group having their own culture, and that the differences and boundaries between cultures can be specified, is very intuitive and powerful in its appeal (Morris, Chiu, & Liu, 2015). Culture deeply matters to people, and everyone would need his or her own culture to live a meaningful and free life. The attachment to one's cultural values implies that things that conflict with those values will be considered wrong or inferior. Because of their propositional content, all cultures cannot be considered as equal. Different cultural worldviews about what is right or wrong, true and false, cannot all be simultaneously confirmed, but they can be tolerated.

Principle reasoning, rejecting value pluralism, and having an ethnocentric worldview are not necessarily contradictory to toleration. Rejecting the idea that all religions or all cultures are equally right and valuable is something other than being intolerant. In social psychology, there is research on fundamentalist, orthodox, and strong beliefs as forms of intolerance and as underlying prejudice and discrimination. Empirical evidence reveals that these types of beliefs relate to out-group stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination (for a meta-analysis, see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Yet, being deeply convinced that one is right and following a strict set of beliefs and rules does not necessarily imply intolerance (Eisenstein, 2006). Rather, disapproval based on core beliefs and principles is an *aspect* of toleration, which additionally requires the component of acceptance. People may have rigid beliefs about the rightness of their own religion or their cultural group's norms and values, but yet accept other social groups as having a right to their own way and tolerate the diversity in people's values and belief systems.

Integrative thoughts on dislike and disapproval components of objection. The distinction between dislike and disapproval indicates that individuals can disapprove of out-group norms, values, and practices that are incompatible with their own, without necessarily disliking the category of out-group people (Rokeach, 1960). In a large study of the Netherlands, it was demonstrated that majority Dutch who object to what they consider unequal treatment of women and children among Muslim immigrants do not necessarily dislike Muslim people (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). They disapproved of certain practices based on their commitment to liberal values of gender equality and freedom of thought, and showed no dislike or hatred toward Muslims as a group (see also Imhoff & Recker, 2012). This is in line with research

that has demonstrated that intergroup prejudice and intolerance tend to be weakly or nonsignificantly associated (J. L. Gibson, 2006). Many majority members judge male–female relationships and the parenting style within Muslim immigrant communities as morally reprehensible, and similarly many Muslims reject the "liberal" practices of the majority or the Western world more generally (Norris & Inglehart, 2004).

Similarly, among national samples in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, it was found that a substantial portion of people with a positive attitude toward Muslims supported a ban on headscarves (Van der Noll, 2010). Analyzing data from six European countries, Helbling (2014) found that Europeans with liberal values were positive toward Muslims as a group, but felt torn regarding the legislation of religious practices such as the wearing of the headscarf. He concluded that "people in western Europe make a distinction between Muslims as a group and the Muslim headscarf" (p. 10). Similarly, political conservatives might oppose policies like affirmative action not because they are racially prejudiced but because they believe such programs violate core values of meritocracy and individualism (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986).

Although there is debate about the empirical evidence for this principled conservatism (e.g., Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2005; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996) and also for the belief incongruence proposition (R. Brown, 2010), the point is that objections toward out-group beliefs and practices can be based on perceived inconsistencies between in-group norms and values rather than generalized prejudice (e.g., Coenders, Scheepers, Sniderman, & Verberk, 2001; Son Hing, Chung-Yan, Hamilton, & Zanna, 2008). This is further supported by research showing that those on the political left and right are equally intolerant toward ideologically dissimilar groups (e.g., Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014; Crawford, 2014; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014), but that the political left is more tolerant toward immigrants as a category of people (e.g., Van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten, & Eendebak, 2015). Future social-psychological research would benefit from disentangling the influence of thoughts and feelings toward out-group practices and values from the people in particular. Moreover, social-psychological research would broadly benefit from exploring the distinction between dislike and disapproval in relation to (in)tolerance.

The Acceptance Component

Toleration involves acceptance of dissenting out-group norms and practices. This acceptance should be voluntary and not compelled. Although feelings of out-group threat and fear are among the most important determinants of intolerance (e.g., J. L. Gibson, 2006; McIntosh, Mac Iver, Abele, & Nolle, 1995), these do not form the basis of tolerance. Toleration begins where discrimination ends—It involves the intentional suppression of the inclination to oppress out-group norms and practices (Schuyt, 1997). Toleration always involves two sets of considerations, for objection and for acceptance, that should be examined in relation to each other. As shown in Table 1, we propose that depending on the type of objection (dislike or disapproval), other psychological processes are involved in showing self-restraint.

Dislike, and suppression and compunction. Accepting things that one disapproves of is challenging from an attitude–behavior perspective. It creates an inconsistency between one's attitude and behavioral intention, thereby eliciting dissonance and uneasiness (Festinger, 1962; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). Such dissonance may create obstacles for the achievement of toleration in an everyday context and means that tolerance may be much more fragile than intolerance (J. L. Gibson, 2006). The asymmetry of (in)tolerance refers to the finding that it is easier to convince tolerant people to give up their tolerance than to persuade intolerant people to become more tolerant (e.g., Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Peffley, Knigge, & Hurwitz, 2001). With intolerance, the negative judgment about a dissenting norm or practice is in agreement with rejecting those norms or practices: You reject what you object to. Being tolerant, on the contrary, implies putting up with actions and practices that you consider wrong: You accept what you object to.

Toleration in a weak sense implies that feelings of dislike are not translated into negative behavior. The justification–suppression model suggests that people simultaneously hold negative beliefs and unprejudiced values and norms that suppress the expression of these beliefs (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Relatedly, the dissociation model of prejudice proposes that conscious normative and moral beliefs can override implicit negative stereotypes and attitudes (e.g., Devine, 1989; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991), and the self-regulation of prejudice model argues that normative and moral standards make people internally motivated to control their prejudicial feelings (Monteith, Arthur, & McQueary Flynn, 2010; Plant & Devine, 1998). These models are typically based on the need to be viewed by oneself, or others, as unprejudiced. People might accept that they are perhaps less competent or sociable than others, but they want to have a sense of being a good person (Ellemers & Van den Bos, 2012). Such research examines how automatically activated negative stereotypes and prejudicial biases are self-monitored, inhibited, and controlled, and concludes that these processes of self-regulation are more effective than thought suppression (Monteith et al., 2010). In subtle or modern forms of prejudice, people regard their own prejudices as unjust and offensive because it goes against principles of equality and justice. Allport (1954) argued that prejudice with compunction is common because prejudicial attitudes often conflict with personally held values leading to inner conflicts and feelings of guilt.

Disapproval and psychological balancing. Toleration implies that it is preferable to accept disapproved out-group norms or

practices rather than to reject or ban them outright. Thus, the norms or practices are considered wrong but not intolerably wrong. In other words, tolerance based on disapproval implies a trade-off between contrasting reasons for objecting and for accepting the dissenting norms or practices: There need to be additional good reasons that trump the reasons for disapproval. The social-psychological processes involved here are different from what is described in the suppression and self-regulation models of prejudice. These are not processes of suppression and compunction but rather the balancing between competing considerations and reasons whereby there are more important reasons for accepting than rejecting the disapproved norms and practices.

One important reason for toleration is the endorsement of *civil equality and liberties* such as freedom of thought, expression, and equal opportunity. Although subjectively there are acceptable reasons for disapproval, it is simultaneously emphasized that every citizen has an equal right to practice his or her culture or religion. For example, in research on religious toleration among Muslims living in Germany, it was found that the disapproval of others' beliefs and practices was balanced by respect for them as fellow citizens (Simon & Schaefer, 2015). And a research in the Netherlands demonstrated that the endorsement of liberal values was associated with the acceptance of Muslim veils (Gustavsson, Van der Noll, & Sundberg, 2016). With toleration, there is a commitment to "agree to disagree" because the freedom and reasons of the other are acknowledged without giving up one's own convictions and beliefs. Research has demonstrated that support for civic and democratic values are among the most important predictors of political tolerance (see Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Furthermore, people tend to be more tolerant of dissenting speech than practices (Wainryb, Shaw, & Maianu, 1998). Laws often protect people from engaging in dissenting speech (e.g., public criticism of government or hate speech), but not actions against the same targets (e.g., actions against the government or attacks on specific groups). Tolerance toward the public expression of dissenting beliefs is consistent with the idea of freedom of speech and stimulates debate which is important for the democratic process.

Another reason for toleration is *prudential* and involves the costs of interference in comparison with the value of social order and civil peace. Dissenting practices, norms, and beliefs can be tolerated because these are part of living in a liberal democracy. Yet, the value of social order and peace can also be used to argue against tolerance. Questions of toleration tend to involve competing principles and values. For example, the debate over tolerance for political extreme groups contains a conflict between competing fundamental values (Tetlock, 1986). On one hand are the civil rights to free speech and assembly, and on the other hand are the values of the preservation of public order and safety. These differing values can conflict with each other, for example, when civil liberties put public order at risk. If both the reasons for disapproval and those for acceptance involve moral principles, then it becomes morally right or even required to tolerate what is morally wrong: "the paradox of moral tolerance" (Horton, 1994; Raphael, 1988).[4]

Paradox of moral tolerance. One psychological solution to this paradox is to distinguish between various kinds of principles, whereby the ones supporting toleration outweigh those that ground the disapproval. For example, majority groups in Western nations might object to some dissenting norms and practices of Muslim immigrants because they consider conformity to operative public values that are embodied in norms and rules that govern civic relations critical for a cohesive and just society (Parekh, 2000). Yet, maintaining established social rules and standards can be considered as less important than freedom of thought and the right to follow one's own way. In the context of the Netherlands, it was found that majority Dutch who strongly take exception to the perceived way in which Muslim immigrants treat women and children overwhelmingly support the right of Muslim immigrants to follow their own ways of life (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). This support was equal to those who had in every respect a favorable attitude toward Muslims.

Thus, the way people rank competing values (e.g., civil liberties or social order) plays an important role in tolerance judgments (Peffley et al., 2001), which raises the important psychological question of how people come to rank competing values and how this ranking affects tolerance judgments. For example, people can clearly prioritize one value over another, but experiences of value conflict are also possible because competing values are simultaneously considered equally important. Existing research, however, mainly focuses on the association between tolerance and separate values rather than investigating the relative importance of self-endorsed values (see Peffley et al., 2001). Yet, for understanding the balancing process involved in toleration, research should examine the relative importance of the values that are involved in the reasons for disapproval and self-restraint.

However, psychologically, there is another more dynamic solution to the paradox of moral tolerance whereby both the reasons for disapproval and those for acceptance involve valuable principles. This solution focuses on the situational, and thereby alternating, salience of values and is based on the assumption that whether a particular value guides one's actual judgment is dependent not only on the relative importance attached to it but also on the situational cues that make that value relevant. According to Fazio (1986), attitudes influence a person's interpretation of an event only when these attitudes are activated from memory. Feather (1990) argued that values are more readily activated when the cognitive or emotional associations in which they are embedded are triggered by an external stimulus. Most events and situations can be interpreted in multiple ways, and depending on the interpretation, competing values become temporarily relevant as standards of evaluation. For example, people may

strongly endorse freedom of speech, but for this value to influence their judgment, an event or situation should be interpreted as one in which freedom of speech is at stake. Focusing on the effects of media framing on tolerance, Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) found that when news regarding political actions of the Ku Klux Klan was framed in terms of the importance of freedom of speech, participants had higher levels of political tolerance for this group compared with a situation in which the importance of public order was emphasized. These and other results (e.g., Nelson & Oxley, 1999; Vescio & Biernat, 2003; Zilli Ramirez & Verkuyten, 2011) suggest an additive model which asserts that when a particular value is both strongly endorsed and situationally salient, people tend to evaluate an event in terms of that value (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001; Zaller & Feldman, 1992). Hence, the strength of the relationship between civil liberties and tolerance is influenced by the salience of equality and freedom values. When civil liberties are endorsed relatively strongly and made temporarily relevant, they will guide one's interpretation and judgment. And when the value of social order is endorsed relatively strongly and made relevant, this value will inform (in)tolerance judgments. Collectively, these varied themes suggest that future research on tolerance would benefit from examining both individual differences in value priorities and situational conditions that make particular values salient in contexts where toleration is relevant.

Perspective taking. The acceptance component of tolerance does not mean that the objection is removed but rather implies a dual form of thinking. On one hand, there is what one sincerely believes is true and right, but on the other hand, one must be able and willing to try to understand the perspective of the other. Tolerance is not the same as indifference or accepting anything blindly but involves comparing one's own worldview with that of others. The ability to entertain the perspective of another is a critical ingredient in the acceptance component of tolerance and distinguishes it from acceptance based on indifference, misunderstandings, or a lack of knowledge (Graumann, 1996). Tolerance is difficult when one does not understand the reasons behind dissenting beliefs and practices. One has to understand the self-defining meanings of out-group beliefs and customs to be able to accept the right to be different.

Perspective taking can reduce stereotyping and increase positive attitudes toward out-groups (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003; Wang, Ku, Tai, & Galinsky, 2014). It broadens people's horizons by recognizing the value of other cultures and thereby put their own taken-for-granted cultural standards into perspective, making them less in-group centric (Galinsky, 2002). However, perspective taking in the context of toleration is not concerned with improving out-group attitudes, but rather with the acceptance of what one objects to, while also trying to convince the other without force or oppressive means. Being able to think about controversies from more than one perspective encourages (political) tolerance (Habermas, 2003; Mutz, 2006). Taking the perspective of the other allows one to understand the legitimate rationale for dissenting beliefs and practices. This in itself can lead to greater tolerance and, importantly, forms the basis for dialogue. Understanding other's point of view is a central aspect of interaction and debate that is needed to maintain democratic citizenry (Mutz, 2006).

Future research should examine the importance of perspective taking for toleration and the related commitment to try to convince others to change their "misguided" beliefs and practices (Schuyt, 1997). In doing so, it is important to consider person-based factors. For example, although fundamentalist and orthodox beliefs do not necessarily imply intolerance, they do make it more likely (e.g., Burdette, Ellison, & Hill, 2005; Jelen & Wilcox, 1990). These beliefs make it more difficult to accept other beliefs and lifestyles that are considered contrary to in-group defining cultural values or the holy scripture. In addition, rigid *forms* of thinking can hinder perspective taking and the willingness to enter in debate. Cognitive inflexibility, closed-mindedness, and a desire for simplicity, certainty, and security (e.g., need for closure) not only make it likely that individuals object toward dissenting beliefs and practices but also that they are unwilling to accept or tolerate them (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). In addition, feelings of fear and uncertainty result in resistance to change and opposition to equality (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). This means that individuals higher on conservatism or authoritarianism, as indicators of traditionalism, and social dominance orientation, as an indicator of (in)equality, can be expected to be less tolerant of dissenting minority norms, beliefs, and practices (e.g., Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Whitley, 1999; but also see Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008).

The Rejection Component

Toleration is not without limits and thereby differs from relativism with its abstention of judgment toward the norms and practices of others. If we are to avoid tolerating everything, there must be norms and activities that we regard as intolerably wrong, for subjectively right reasons. For dislike-based or weak tolerance, these reasons justify the translation of one's prejudicial attitudes into discriminatory practices. The justification–suppression model suggests that people simultaneously can have negative feelings and endorse values and norms that suppress the expression of these beliefs (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). One implication of this model, and of related ones, is that the expression of prejudice in discrimination is facilitated by justifications such as legitimizing myths that support unequal social arrangements (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), threat perceptions (Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010), perceived procedural and distributive justice (Louis, Duck, Terry, Schuller, & Lalonde, 2007), and processes of

infra- and dehumanization (Haslam, 2006). For example, research shows that infra- and dehumanization alleviate moral concerns and thereby facilitate punishment and violence of out-groups (see Haslam, 2006; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014), and the availability of nonracist justification facilitates discrimination by aversive racists (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). These justifications resolve the psychological conflict that derives from, on one hand, the display of discriminatory behavior, and, on the other hand, the need to view oneself as a good person (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). In these models, intolerance has a negative connotation because it implies a motive for justification that makes people to look for beliefs that legitimize their prejudices and discriminatory behavior. With the proper justifications, racists will express their racist feelings in racist acts.

For strong tolerance based on disapproval, the psychological process is different. It is about balancing reasons for finding something objectionable with reasons for showing self-restraint. The limits of tolerance occur when reasons for rejection become stronger than the reasons for acceptance. The considerations for rejecting particular norms and practices outweigh the ones for acceptance either because of a more enduring ranking of competing values or because of the alternating salience of values. In both cases, there are moral reasons to regard out-group norms and activities as intolerably wrong, making intolerance (or zero tolerance) a positive rather than a negative response.

This means that the question of strong (in)tolerance does not apply to out-groups that are deprived of their humanity (Haslam, 2006). There is no need to tolerate those that are considered nonhuman or less than fully human because these groups are removed from moral concern and can simply be ignored, rejected, or excluded (Bandura, 1999). Self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) argues that people understand and interpret group differences and similarities within the context of a common identity. Intergroup comparisons are always made against the background of what is shared. It is the shared humanity that forms the moral basis for evaluating out-group norms, beliefs, or practices as going against basic human rights and therefore as not to be tolerated. And it is the shared identity as citizens that forms the basis for being intolerant toward those who reject society's core values and principles. So toleration implies shared (human, national) categorization. Strong intolerance does not imply that out-group members are dehumanized or excluded from the common category but rather requires that they are humanized and included. Future research should examine whether there is empirical support for this paradoxical implication.

Tolerance in its strong sense is not a value, but requires other values and principles, and the same is true for intolerance (Forst, 2004). This raises the question of what morally right reasons people can provide for rejection. We suggest that these reasons can be based, at least, on the harm and rights principle, the principle of identity continuity, and the self-defense principle. In the section that follows, we will elaborate on all three of these principles and future research that could systematically examine the role of each in the limits of tolerance.

Harm and rights principle. The moral domain is predominantly concerned with fairness, justice, and other's welfare; it is typically considered to apply anywhere and everywhere (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Turiel, 2002). Research with children demonstrates that they interpret issues of fairness, justice, and avoiding harm to others as unalterable, general, and not subject to authority jurisdiction (Wainryb, 2006). It is, of course, not always clear whether a particular practice is interpreted as belonging to the moral domain, but when it does, tolerance of the practice becomes difficult. Rozin (1999) described the process of moralization through which preferences are converted into moral values. In many Western countries, for example, cigarette smoking is not accepted anymore because it has changed from a preference to a moral violation related to health concerns (Rozin & Singh, 1999). Moralized entities and activities tend to lead to avoidance and rejection rather than toleration.

Similarly, the refusal to shake hands with someone of the opposite sex by Muslim civil servants and teachers has led to some uproar in Europe (Verkuyten, 2014). Critics construe the act of shaking hands as a matter of principle because it symbolizes the moral equality of men and women rather than a preference or social convention. If I say that I stand for gender equality, but that other people may think differently about it, then it becomes a matter of personal preference. But if I consider the equality of men and women a moral principle, I stand for gender equality everywhere and want everyone else to do so. If people from another community disagree, there is a problem, one that goes beyond differences in preferences and social conventions that can be solved with mutual understanding and reasonable accommodations.

One can argue about the interpretation and applicability of a moral principle but not about the principle itself. Research on moral emotions shows that people exhibit strong intuitive objection to the physical and psychological harm of others and to unfair treatment (Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987; also see Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). Furthermore, sacred values make people act in terms of moral principles and to react with moral outrage when the integrity of these values is challenged (Ginges & Atran, 2011; Tetlock et al., 2000). And people also tend to reject beliefs and practices that go against basic human capabilities (Turiel, 2002). From a human rights perspective, accepting honor killings, female genital mutilation, domestic violence, and forced marriage would imply culpable indulgence and not tolerance. In these cases, toleration would infringe on the harm principle and the rights of others. Thus, it is likely that tolerance will be harder to achieve if out-group practices are perceived as causing harm to others (e.g., hate groups) or as mistreating or threatening the freedom and rights of others (e.g., against

women and gay rights). Future work can systematically test whether framing out-group actions as causing harm or violating human rights reduces tolerance toward the out-group and increases restrictions for minority rights.

Identity continuity. Another reason for the limits of toleration has to do with the importance of maintaining one's cultural identity. In-group and out-group values can be experienced as conflicting and being irreconcilable because they contradict each other and therefore cannot be simultaneously pursued, or they may be mutually denunciatory whereby taking one seriously is to repudiate the other (Lukes, 2008). Perceptions of incompatible ways of life have been found to predict the feeling that one is not able to live by one's in-group identity (Sindic & Reicher, 2009) or not able to develop a sense of shared national belonging (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012). In addition, perceived violation of cherished in-group values is a predictor of negative out-group attitudes, often independent of group membership (e.g., Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; Marques & Paez, 1994; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Furthermore, research has demonstrated that people tend to oppose social developments and out-groups that undermine the continuation or future existence of their group identity (Jetten & Wohl, 2012; Wohl, Branscombe, & Reysen, 2010).

In a "culturalist" perspective, the idea of conflicting and incommensurable values is a key proposition (Morris et al., 2015; Wimmer, 2009). This idea is quite powerful and features in analyses and concerns about "colliding ways of life" (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007) and the confrontational clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996). It is also prominent in the way in which laypeople think about cultural differences. Self-defining core values tend to be seen as nonnegotiable (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997) providing a justifiable reason for rejecting those norms and practices that are grounded in different moral values (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Accommodations and changes that are perceived as undermining or destroying the core of one's group identity are almost impossible to accept (Kelman, 2001; Sindic & Reicher, 2009). Human beings would "have a right to culture—not just any culture, but their own" (Margalit & Halbertal, 1994, p. 491). For example, liberal principles of gender equality and individual freedoms would form the nonnegotiable core of American, British, French, or Dutch identity and thereby a justified basis for being intolerant of illiberal beliefs and practices that subvert this core (Schildkraut, 2007). The result is that Muslims in Western Europe, North America, or Australasia are criticized for their lack of allegiance to a set of "core national values" that their religion would reject (Kundnani, 2007).

The limits of tolerance can also be drawn in relation to in-group members. In fact, the rejection might even be stronger toward dissenting beliefs and practices within one's own community. Research on the black sheep effect convincingly demonstrates that normative deviant in-group members are evaluated more negatively than deviant out-group members (Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). Furthermore, when in-group members cannot agree about the defining characteristics or essence of their group identity, this will instigate schismatic processes (Sani, 2005, 2009). To tolerate dissenting beliefs and practices of out-group members living in the same society is one thing, but it is quite another thing to tolerate in-group members who put forward a contrasting understanding of the group identity. This directly undermines the continuity of the nature of the group and where it stands for. For example, Muslims in the United States have been found to be more intolerant of diverse interpretations of Islam than of dissenting beliefs of other groups (Djupe & Calfano, 2012). Similarly, members of the Church of England have left their own institution because of the ordination of women to priesthood (Sani & Reicher, 1999, 2000). The ordination of women priests was seen as subverting the group identity because it fundamentally denied core beliefs and values (i.e., apostolic succession). Here, the limits of tolerance are found in the threat to the continuation of the historically grounded principles that are considered to form the heart of the group identity. Taken together, future empirical research would benefit from examining how perceived threats to the in-group's identity continuity emerging from both in-group and out-group sources influence toleration (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015).

Self-defense principle. In addition to the harm and rights principle and to in-group continuity, there is the principle of self-defense of the liberal and democratic order. Toleration cannot constitute a virtue if it is at the expense of the collective security and persistence of the social and political order. What threatens the stability of liberal society is often a contested matter, and social-psychological research should examine why and when certain practices are considered to undermine the liberal order. In doing so, it is important to recognize that the principle of self-defense can also be used for strategic purposes.

Reciprocity, for example, is central to the idea of toleration. It implies the classical paradox that one cannot tolerate those who are intolerant. Walzer (1997) noted that some immigrant minorities are tolerated, but cannot practice intolerance in the society of settlement even though their fellow believers in other countries may be "brutally intolerant" (p. 81). Being tolerant toward forces that fail to reciprocate undermines the benefits of civil liberties and equality and therefore cannot be tolerated. The principle of reciprocity is essential for tolerance because otherwise the practice of toleration is destroyed.

However, the slogan "no toleration for the intolerant" is used by populist politicians in Europe to argue against Muslims (e.g., Verkuyten, 2013) suggesting that this proposition is not unproblematic. There is always the question of who draws the line against whom, for which reasons, and by what means. In liberal democracies, only political authorities have the legitimate power to interfere with people's liberties.

This means that majority members call on political authorities to reaffirm the boundaries for toleration. The implication is that social-psychological research on toleration should not only focus on the majority–minority relation but should also consider the perceived role of political authorities (Allport, 1954; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). Populist politicians emphasize the self-defining meaning of in-group tolerance to criticize Muslim immigrants for their intolerance and unwillingness to adapt (Kundnani, 2007; Verkuyten, 2013). It is argued by these politicians that we have been tolerant enough and that "our" tolerance has led to segregated and isolated communities that threaten to self-destroy our liberal society (see Blommaert & Verschueren, 1994; Vasta, 2007). This indicates that the notion of tolerance can be used to argue not only for acceptance of the beliefs and practices of immigrants but also for drawing a moral boundary between "us, the tolerant" and "them, the intolerant" (Van der Veer, 2006).

This discourse about the reversal of (in)tolerance tends to draw upon a disapproval rather than dislike conceptualization of toleration. Populist politicians argue that "our" tolerant and democratic values are threatened by particular ideologies (e.g., Islam) rather than by a certain group of people (see Mols & Jetten, 2014; Verkuyten, 2013). A distinction is made between disapproval of out-group ideology and dislike of out-group people, and this distinction mitigates against accusations of racism. A focus on Islam draws attention away from human groups, which makes populist proposals to limit and forbid Islamic schools, Mosques, the headscarf, and other visible signs of this religion understandable. Criticizing a system of belief is acceptable and is part of what is expected of a politician. In addition, defining a system of belief as being unequal to "our" norms and values is more acceptable than labeling a group of people inferior. Notions of tolerance depend on equality and, as populists argue, Islam is unequal to our liberal worldview, and therefore it is not intolerant to treat Islam in a different way (Verkuyten, 2013).

There is a further implication of this "reversal of tolerance." In their fight against the alleged Islamization of the West, populist politicians give a reified and essentialist representation of Islam as being intrinsically contradictory to "our" tolerant norms and values (Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Wood & Finlay, 2008). A representation of profound and inherent cultural differences is typical of a cultural racist discourse in which minority cultures are defined as subordinate, backward, or inferior, and the majority culture needs protection (Barker, 1981; Wieviorka, 1995). Yet, the notion of tolerance has also been criticized for reifying and essentializing group identities (W. Brown, 2008). A cultural essentialist discourse can be found among minority groups and proponents of diversity and toleration. They emphasize the self-defining importance of genuine cultural differences and therefore the need to tolerate these differences (Verkuyten, 2003). Cultural essentialism is an important political tool for ethnic and racial minority groups (Hodgson, 2002; Morin & Saladin d'Anglure, 1997). Culture is the socially right category on which to rest the claim for group rights and to argue for toleration of one's authentic identity.

The social-psychological implication is that cultural essentialism is not just oppressive but can have strategic advantages for minority groups. Essentialist beliefs are typically examined as supporting prejudice and discrimination against minorities and as rationalizing social hierarchies and existing social arrangements (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). However, for ethnic and racial minority groups, higher in-group essentialism can be expected to go together with stronger demands for group rights and toleration. Research has shown that minorities use essentialism to counter the denial of their identity (Morton & Postmes, 2009; Verkuyten, 2003), and that majority members reject essentialism when they argue against multiculturalism (Verkuyten, 2003) and when it is used to exclude them (Morton, Hornsey, & Postmes, 2009). Future research should examine the strategic aspects of cultural essentialism in relation to toleration.

The Intergroup Context of Tolerance

The aim of toleration is not to abolish the "us–them" distinction but rather to ensure peaceful coexistence between the two. Toleration refers to a relation between those who tolerate and those who are tolerated, between subjects and objects of toleration. This means that the relevant intergroup context needs to be taken into account to understand how toleration is experienced and practiced. This context can be characterized by a difference in power and status whereby the powerful majority permits dissenting minority groups to live according to their way of life. Alternatively, the intergroup context can be more equal in which there is mutual respect between the tolerating parties. In the former situation, the relation of toleration is vertical or hierarchical, whereas in the latter it is horizontal. This difference in intergroup context corresponds to the permission and respect understanding of toleration, respectively (Forst, 2012).

Permission Understanding

Toleration according to this conceptualization implies that the dominant majority has the power to interfere with the practices of a minority but nevertheless tolerate (some of) these practices.[5] Thus, the majority allows minorities certain privileges on conditions specified by them, such as allowing Muslims to pray at work, but not during office hours; and to allow political protests to take place outside government buildings, but only if they do not disrupt the daily functioning of the offices. The qualified permission to the minority group members to live according to their beliefs affirms the dominant position of the majority. As a corollary, the minority should accept its minority position and not claim equal

public and political status. A historical example of this is the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, which was characterized by religious and linguistic pluralism. The empire was very accommodating toward the different religious communities (the millets) that had a great deal of autonomy, but this relied on the official toleration position taken by the government for the sake of peace (Walzer, 1997).

The reasons for granting minority groups qualified permission to practice their own beliefs can be pragmatic or principled. *Pragmatically*, toleration can be considered the least costly way to accommodate diversity without disturbing existing social order and civil peace. A more *principled* reason is when one finds it morally problematic to force people to give up their identity-defining norms and practices as witnessed in the forced assimilation programs of indigenous populations in America (Heart & DeBruyn, 1998; Hoxie, 1984) and Australia (Haebich, 2008; Van Krieken, 1999).

These norms and practices are often tolerated as long as they are confined to the private realm of the minority community or do not interfere with public life. In line with this reasoning, research in the American context reveals that people show greater national exclusion and dislike for ethnic minorities (e.g., Chinese Americans and Native Americans) after exposure to six individuals from the ethnic group speaking a language other than English in public spaces relative to when these individuals speak the same language in the privacy of their home (Yogeeswaran, Adelman, Parker, & Dasgupta, 2014; Yogeeswaran, Dasgupta, Adelman, Eccleston, & Parker, 2011). However, seeing the same ethnic minority individuals speak a language other than English in the privacy of one's home had no effect on one's attitudes or national inclusion of the ethnic group relative to baseline controls suggesting that people specifically frown upon public expressions of ethnic identity. Such negative reactions toward public expressions of ethnic identity were especially strong among Americans who strongly identified with the nation (Yogeeswaran et al., 2014).

The permission form of toleration implies a strong "us–them" distinction whereby the majority is the subject of toleration and minorities the object of it. Because it confirms the dominant position of the majority, it is likely that it is endorsed more strongly among politically right-wing (compared with left-wing) individuals who tend to have antiegalitarian beliefs such as those high in social dominance orientation (Jost et al., 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For example, research has shown that political conservatives and those high in right-wing authoritarianism react especially negatively toward immigrants and ethnic minorities after exposure to diversity messages (Kauff, Asbrock, Thorner, & Wagner, 2013; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). A permission form of tolerance is also more likely in settings in which there is a stable and clear group-based hierarchy, whereas it is less likely when the intergroup context is rather insecure (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Giving qualified permission to minorities to live according to their beliefs is less threatening in a context in which the intergroup structure is perceived to be relatively stable and legitimate. Such a context makes it less likely that qualified permission is a stepping stone for minority groups to organize themselves and act collectively to challenge and change the status quo (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Future research should systematically examine the influence of these intergroup factors on toleration and its limits.

Respect Understanding

The respect understanding of toleration involves a more equal relationship between groups (Galeotti, 2002; Honneth, 1995). While groups hold very different beliefs about the good life and have different cultural or religious norms and practices, they recognize and respect each other as equal citizens with the same rights and liberties. Here the subjects of toleration are at the same time the objects of it. An example is the pillarization history in the Netherlands, a country often celebrated for its tolerance (Lechner, 2008). Traditionally, Roman Catholics lived in the southern part of the country, while Lutheran, Reformed, and Dutch Reformed lived in the northern part. These religious differences were institutionalized in the separate, "pillarized" state structure (together with a social democratic pillar) with parallel newspapers, broadcasting stations, labor unions, medical organizations, schools, and political parties. The different groups knew that they will not agree about the good life but accepted others as equal citizens. In practice, the respect understanding of toleration can take two different forms with different implications for intergroup relations (Forst, 2012): the formal equality model, and the qualitative equality model of toleration.

The *formal equality model* is based on a strict distinction between the public and private sphere. Beliefs and practices related to group identities are confined to the private domain, and the general citizenship values and principles apply to the public sphere. The French secular republicanism is a clear example. It implies, for example, that religious symbols are not tolerated in public schools in which children are educated to be autonomous citizens. As a result, Muslim students are not allowed to wear headscarves to school just as Christians are not allowed to wear a necklace with a cross. The formal equality model comes down to color blindness whereby a secular citizen identity has primacy.

Social-psychological research in the American context has shown that color-blind ideologies are endorsed more strongly by majority compared with minority group members, and that this ideology can be used to rationalize minority group disadvantages and leads to more negative attitudes toward minorities (e.g., Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2015; Rattan & Ambady, 2013). Yet, this ideology can be defined in different ways, and its understanding depends on the national context. For example, color blindness has quite a different meaning in France compared with the United States. In the former country, it is positively associated with multiculturalism because both reflect a commitment to equality

(Guimond et al., 2014; see also Hahn, Banchefsky, Park, & Judd, 2015). And because the shared citizenship identity is central, it is possible that color blindness does not lead to a more positive attitude toward a dissenting out-group but does have a positive effect on toleration. Similarly, multiculturalism which calls for the recognition of cultural differences may also promote greater toleration as people may recognize differences they may not agree with, but nevertheless accept. For example, multiculturalism in education does not have to discourage children from having any objections to things that conflict with what they strongly believe or value, but can focus on encouraging them to be tolerant. Future research should examine the importance of these different cultural diversity ideologies for toleration across varied national contexts. Although many studies have examined the effects of diversity ideologies on out-group attitudes (see Deaux & Verkuyten, 2014; Rattan & Ambady, 2013), little is known about their role in toleration and its limits.

A problem with the formal equality model is that it considers cultural identities as private affairs that do not require public enactment. Yet, a rigid distinction between the private and public realm can be quite difficult when identity-defining beliefs and practices are involved, such as with religion. Such a distinction would mean that a true believer can only be a Muslim, Christian, or Jew at home or in his or her own religious community. Social identities, however, are not like private beliefs but require social validation. They do not simply exist in people's head but are bound up with socially defined distinctions that position people in the world and have real social implications (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007; Verkuyten, 2005). For example, one's ethnic identity can be very present in one's thoughts, but that identity must be recognized and accepted by other people. Self-verification theory argues that individuals seek out external verification from others about their internally held identities, regardless of whether the self-view is positive or negative (see North & Swann, 2009, for a review). In addition, research on identity denial has demonstrated that denying one's social identity leads to negative emotions and attempts at proving one's belongingness in the group (Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Guendelman, Cheryan, & Monin, 2011; see also Huynh, Devos, & Smalarz, 2011). Therefore, it can be argued that not only the freedom of belief should be protected but also the freedom to publicly express one's belief in appropriate practices.

This problem with the formal equality model is acknowledged in the *qualitative equality model of toleration* (Forst, 2012). This model considers identity-defining beliefs and practices as sufficient grounds to exempt certain groups from the rules or behavioral codes that apply to everyone else. As a result, group members are respected as equals and also as having a distinct cultural identity that should be tolerated. For example, in some contexts, Sikhs have been exempt from wearing motorcycle helmets and being allowed to carry their kirpans (dagger) in public places. As such, tolerance denotes higher level unity (equal citizenship) rather than lower level uniformity.

In social-psychological terms, this latter understanding of toleration is similar to dual identity models of intergroup relations, but with some interesting twists. Dual identity models (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2009) propose that the combination of subgroup and superordinate identities is most promising for developing harmonious intergroup relations in plural societies. Dual identities would reduce subgroup identity threat, and the shared superordinate identity would stimulate positive attitudes and cooperation with other subgroups (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). Out-group members will be evaluated more positively when they are seen as part of a shared superordinate category through processes that involve pro-in-group bias (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This is especially likely when the superordinate category is represented as a dual identity that affirms subgroup distinctiveness in the context of common belonging (R. Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Dovidio et al., 2009; but see Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).

However, the *qualitative equality* understanding of toleration is different in at least three respects. First, this understanding is not concerned with the development of more positive intergroup attitudes but rather with accepting things that one continues to object to. Second, the basis for acceptance is not, for example, pro-in-group bias or increased cooperation because of reduced subgroup threat (Hewstone & Brown, 1986), but respect for others as equal citizens (Simon, Mommert, & Renger, 2015). This respect is a form of social recognition (Honneth, 1995) and balances people's objection, making it possible to tolerate out-group members' way of life. Thus, the social-psychological processes behind the dual identity model and the equality toleration understanding seem to be different, and this should be examined empirically.

Third, the nature of the dual identity representation differs. Specifically, the focus in the equality understanding of toleration is on equal citizenship or one's membership of a particular political unit. So the emphasis is on the combination of specific cultural identities with equal rights and liberties. In contrast, dual identity models in social psychology tend not to specify the identity content. To measure a sense of dual identity, people are asked about their level of ethnic and national sense of belonging ("I identify with my ethnic group," "I identify with the national category") or requested to indicate to what extent they identify with hyphenated labels such as African-American, Turkish-German, or British-Muslim (Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2015). Yet, it makes a difference whether individuals identify with a national community of people, a particular territory and history, mainstream cultural beliefs and practices, or rather with political institutions (S. Gibson & Condor, 2009). The content of the identity provides direction for how to perceive, evaluate, and behave in situations of identity salience (Turner et al., 1987). Citizenship implies membership of a particular polity and involves the acceptance of other group identities

as moral and political equals. The result is not the recognition and valuing of cultural differences, as in forms of multiculturalism, but rather the acceptance of other ways of life to which one continues to object to. Furthermore, the respect understanding of toleration implies that the limits of tolerance lie in the citizenship rights, duties, and liberties. One cannot tolerate illiberal practices when citizenship is defined in terms of liberal principles.

Integrative Thoughts on Permission and Respect Understanding of Toleration

The permission and respect understanding of toleration can be present in society at the same time and fuel conflicts about whether and to what extent certain practices should be accepted. From a permission understanding perspective, one can accept that a Muslim woman is a teacher at a public school but not with a headscarf. This is problematic from the perspective of a respect understanding because the headscarf might be an intrinsic part of her religious identity. A research example comes from a large-scale study of majority Germans where approximately 70% accepted the right of Muslim women to wear headscarves, and of Muslims to build Mosques and to have Islamic education at German public schools (Van der Noll, 2012). Yet, less than 6% accepted the idea of an important Islamic holiday becoming a national holiday in Germany. Accepting that Muslims can practice their religion similar to other religious groups is one thing, but symbolically incorporating them as equals with public recognition of their identity is something else. This finding illustrates that toleration has important implications for group identities and intergroup relations. And because much is at stake, strong debates exist. In several European countries, opponents of the headscarf argue it should be banned in public places because it is a sign of intolerance and gender inequality. In contrast, others argue that it would be an act of intolerance if Muslim women were not able to wear a headscarf (see Verkuyten, 2014).

Unfortunately, there is hardly any systematic theoretical and empirical research on the differences and relations between the permission and respect understanding of toleration. We do not know how people perceive and assess these different understandings and how these influence (in)tolerance judgments and behaviors. Therefore, empirical research would strongly benefit from examining how contexts that characterize the permission and respect understanding of tolerance impact out-group attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, as well as one's self-conceptions.

To Be Tolerated: The Targets' Perspective

Toleration is a necessity for living together and "to be the object of tolerance is a welcoming improvement on being the object of intolerance" (Horton, 1996, p. 35). Toleration has several positive consequences for minorities. It allows them to express their cultural identities, provides access to resources and rights, and protects them from violence. Toleration gives minority citizens the freedom and right to define and develop their own ways of life. Most ethnic, religious, sexual, and other minorities do not proselytize but rather try to convince others to expand the scope of acceptable positions or their latitudes of acceptance (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). In terms of minority influence research, these minorities try to increase the societal tolerance of diversity rather than seeking to convert society to their position. Experimental research has shown that minority members advocating tolerance (compared with seeking conversion) valued the group more, were more likely to consider themselves a member of the group, and were more loyal to the group (Prislin & Filson, 2009; Shaffer & Prislin, 2011).

However, toleration is only likely to fully satisfy minority members when they themselves accept that what they do is in some respect objectionable. If not, negative social-psychological implications are likely, especially in the context of the permission understanding of tolerance whereby toleration can be seen as "a word signifying power, domination and exclusion" (Forst, 2012, p. 3). A well-known quote from the German thinker and writer, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1829), states, "Tolerance should be a temporary attitude only: it must lead to recognition. To tolerate means to insult" (cited in Forst, 2012, p.3). It is argued that "mere" tolerance is not enough because toleration would be a poor substitute for the recognition and affirmation that minority members deserve and need (Parekh, 2000).

There is a sizable literature on the "target's perspective" that is concerned with the social-psychological implications of belonging to a devalued, discriminated, or stigmatized minority group (Major, Quinton, McCoy, & Schmader, 2000; Swim & Stangor, 1998). Such research examines the influence of negative stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination on minority members' psychological well-being (Pascoe & Richman, 2009; D. R. Williams, Spencer, & Jackson, 1999); academic adjustment (Major & O'Brien, 2005; Schmader, Major, & Gramzow, 2001); group identification (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999); and collective action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). With discrimination, social identities are at stake because people are treated unjustly on the basis of their group membership. Being the victim of discrimination implies a lack of control, lower status, and a lack of belonging. Psychologically, blaming outcomes on discrimination acknowledges that these are under the control of prejudiced others (Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). This may protect feelings of self-worth (e.g., "that employer discriminated against me and therefore it is not my fault that I did not get the job") and also threatens one's sense of control over personal outcomes (e.g., "not me, but the employer decides my life"; Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Major et al., 2002; Ruggiero & Taylor, 1997).

Publicly interpreting events in terms of discrimination also elicits negative social costs. Experimental research has demonstrated that individuals who report discrimination are perceived negatively by others (e.g., being "moaners" or embracing victimhood), even when discrimination was the clear cause of the event (Kaiser & Miller, 2001). In addition, it has been found that in the presence of majority group members, ethnic minorities are relatively unwilling to report that negative events occurring to them are the result of discrimination (Stangor, Van Allen, Swim, & Sechrist, 2002). Furthermore, coethnics can also react negatively toward individual group members, for example, when they fear that they themselves or their entire ethnic group will be labeled as moaners who avoid responsibility for their lives (Garcia, Reser, Amo, Redersdorff, & Branscombe, 2005).

By contrast to the rather large social-psychological literature on the effects of being a target of prejudice and discrimination, very little is known about the social-psychological implications of being the object of toleration. Toleration is the opposite of discrimination and implies that minority members are permitted or allowed to express and enact their group identity. However, being tolerated may still have negative consequences on the individual and their group. We propose that there are several possible negative consequences of the experience of toleration, especially in its permission understanding form that may help to understand why people often do not like to be tolerated. These consequences should be examined in future research.

Implications for Belonging, Self-Esteem, and Well-Being Among the Tolerated

First, toleration implies objection toward one's values, beliefs, and practices and can be experienced as noninterference based on a dismissive attitude: The majority grudgingly agrees to turn a blind eye or puts up with minorities. In doing so, the larger society's dislike and disapproval of minority identities and practices is implicitly affirmed. What is being tolerated transgresses or deviates from what is considered appropriate and normative and this implied deviance and inferiority thereby threatens a valued group membership among the tolerated. Such an identity threat may negatively impact (collective) self-esteem (Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994) and well-being (Branscombe et al., 1999) among the tolerated. In such a context, the tolerated may react with stronger in-group closure and out-group derogation, especially among higher identifiers and when the social structure is thought to be stable and legitimate (Branscombe et al., 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Relatedly, being tolerated may also undermine one's sense of belonging thereby impacting (collective) self-esteem and well-being. Tolerance can define minorities as second-class citizens and legitimizes and reinforces the power of those who extend the tolerance. There is no full inclusion on equal footing as the majority. This means that toleration can be perceived as an (implicit) form of unequal treatment whereby society itself is not considered just and worthwhile and the practices and policies of toleration are seen as confirming the lack of social recognition and respect (Honneth, 1995). Such a perspective may imply that the tolerated individual or group feel a decreased sense of belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) within society as their practices are merely being tolerated but not valued. Such a threat to belonging may lead the tolerated to experience a host of negative emotions, decreased well-being, and reduced (collective) self-esteem. Future work can thereby benefit from examining the consequences of being "tolerated" for the target's self-esteem, well-being, and sense of belonging within particular group contexts.

Implications for Social Distancing, Perceived Control, and Collective Action Among the Tolerated

One possible implication of being an object of toleration is that it will be more difficult to convince others of the negative implications of toleration, compared with the negative implications of discrimination. While people in many places recognize that it is wrong to discriminate (and it is illegal to do so in many countries), it is much more challenging to demonstrate the harm of being tolerated. The social accusations and possible costs of discussing tolerance are likely to be different. For example, rather than being seen as a moaner, one might be considered unreasonable and demanding. Minority and disadvantaged groups may, therefore, refrain from expressing their viewpoints on the topic to people in the majority or those belonging to privileged groups, which may promote greater social distancing.

A related implication of being "tolerated" is that it may undermine a perceived sense of control and feelings of (collective) efficacy. Tolerance affirms a relationship of inequality where the tolerated group is cast in an inferior position: "To tolerate someone else is an act of power; to be tolerated is an acceptance of weakness" (Walzer, 1997, p. 52). As tolerance implies that one has to rely on the self-restraint or "good grace" of the majority, tolerance can be experienced as an act of generosity whereby the object of tolerance should be thankful for being allowed to express their identity and are placed in a dependent and vulnerable position. One becomes dependent on the goodwill of the majority rather than to take control themselves. By feeling that one's standing and membership within the larger community is precarious and dependent on the good grace of those around, the tolerated can feel a decreased sense of control over their own lives (Crocker et al., 1991; Major et al., 2002). Such a lack of perceived control may undermine personal and group efficacy. Psychological research has shown that this is a difficult situation that can lead to feelings of depression and helplessness, and a reduced willingness to act collectively against social inequality (Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

The latter implication would be that politics of toleration can lead minority members to attend less to group-based disparities and to engage in collective action that challenge and change these disparities. This possibility is reminiscent of Marcuse's (1965) analysis of repressive tolerance as a subtle social mechanism contributing to domination: "what is proclaimed and practiced as tolerance today, is in many of its most effective manifestations serving the cause of oppression" (p. 81). This would mean that a focus on toleration can contribute to a further social-psychological understanding of why and when minority members' willingness to protest on behalf of minority groups is undermined. Research has shown that an emphasis on a shared national identity can have such an undermining effect (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Glasford & Dovidio, 2011; Ufkes, Dovidio, & Tel, 2015). In addition, it has been demonstrated that positive contact with the dominant group can reduce awareness of group inequality and discrimination, and decreases support for social policies that benefit minorities (e.g., Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2007; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Tropp, Hawi, Van Laar, & Levin, 2012). Future research could examine whether, when, and why a politics of toleration has a weakening effect on minority member's sense of control and collective action intentions or even feelings of personal efficacy in more everyday contexts.

Discussion

Toleration is a core feature of liberal democracy and a necessary condition for pluralistic societies. It makes difference possible by defining the conditions of peaceful coexistence. People inevitably and regularly object to ways of life other than their own, and despite such objection, they have to learn to live with it. Toleration does not require that people give up their objections of out-group norms, beliefs, and practices, which may in fact be very difficult, if not impossible, to do, but stimulates debate and mutual accommodation. However, the societal and everyday importance of toleration is ignored or underrated in social psychology, which has predominantly focused on the reduction of stereotypes and prejudices. Although the goal of reducing stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination is important, there are many situations where people may simply never see eye to eye or accept what are considered blasphemous, disastrous, or obscenely wrong out-group beliefs and practices; in such cases, members of these different groups should agree to peacefully coexist side by side.

We have tried to argue that toleration raises important and novel questions for social psychology and intergroup relations research in particular. We have discussed various implications, and for several of these implications there is empirical evidence. Yet, the different aspects should be examined more fully and systematically in future research. Thus, the suggested questions, paradoxes, and implications are meant as directions for further social-psychological theory and research on toleration. There are some additional issues that might be important for future work that we were not able to discuss thus far. We will briefly draw attention to three of these.

First, it is important to note that we have discussed toleration from a more cognitive, reflexive perspective that requires an active and principled balancing of different reasons for objection, acceptance, and rejection. The reason is that although the objection component of (weak) toleration might be based on gut feelings of dislike and related implicit, unconscious processes, this is less likely for the acceptance component that requires that people consider additional reasons to do so. Yet, it does mean that we did not consider more prereflexive forms of toleration whereby people habitually provide each other normative leeway. Future research examining automatic and controlled processes might be important to shed further light on these forms of toleration. It may be that toleration in its weak sense promotes lower levels of deliberate stereotyping and prejudice or lower levels of blatant discrimination as individuals self-regulate (Monteith et al., 2010) or control their negative sentiments. However, when it comes to automatic stereotyping and prejudice, it may be that people fail to refrain from discrimination (thereby failing to demonstrate toleration). By studying toleration using both explicit and implicit measures (e.g., Yogeeswaran, Devos, & Nash, 2016) as well as by using blatant and subtle discrimination paradigms (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Rooth, 2010), we may be able to better understand the nuanced ways in which toleration can impact intergroup relations.

Second, our aim was to provide a conceptual analysis that initiates new lines of intergroup and cultural diversity theory and research, rather than to develop a coherent theoretical framework or a particular conceptual model that can be tested empirically. This means that future work should examine possible social-psychological processes underlying tolerance as well as individual differences and social conditions that stimulate or hamper toleration. Future work could systematically examine, for example, why and when exactly people are tolerant and how they decide about the limits of toleration. In doing so, it is important to recognize that tolerance is not an all-or-none construct but depends on whom, what, and when people are asked to tolerate dissenting norms and practices (McClosky, & Brill, 1983; Sigelman & Toebben, 1992). People take into account various aspects of what they are asked to tolerate and the sense in which they should be tolerant. The type of actor, the nature of the social implication of the behavior, and the underlying belief type of the dissenting norm or practice, all make a difference (e.g., Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007). For example, the level of tolerance might depend on the type of social relationship. One might accept Muslim immigrants as co-nationals or co-residents in one's neighborhood, but reject them in one's sporting club or voluntary organization. There also are indications that people are more tolerant toward actions that are based on a different factual view of the world ("they think it is like that") than on different moral beliefs ("they think that it is right and good"; for example, Wainryb, 1993; Wainryb

et al., 1998). For example, in one study, Dutch majority group adolescents were found to be more tolerant of Muslim practices based on dissenting cultural beliefs than on dissenting moral beliefs (Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007). One reason for this was that the type of underlying belief could be used to infer intentions behind the practice that one objects to but is asked to accept. Ignorance and misinformation can be inferred from informational dissent, whereas badness or immorality is a more likely inference from moral dissent. Furthermore, it is important to examine different aspects of tolerance because accepting that people have different beliefs does not have to imply that one accepts that they act on those beliefs or that they try to persuade others to engage in such dissenting practices. Accepting that a religious group has a different religious belief is easier than accepting that they can enact their religious identity in public life (Yogeeswaran et al., 2011), and it becomes even more problematic when the group tries to mobilize others to also start practicing these beliefs in everyday life (e.g., by also wearing a headscarf or not shaking hands with someone of the opposite sex; Gieling, Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2010).

Third, we have discussed tolerance in terms of self-restraint and putting up with out-group norms and practices that one dislikes or disapproves of. This means that without objection, the question of tolerance does not arise. However, the distinction between dislike and disapproval indicates that the basis and strength of the objection can be different and might change. For example, people can gradually become acclimated to ideas and practices they once found very offensive (Chong, 1994). They can get used to living around groups with different cultural beliefs, customs, and practices, and become more inured to things that once bothered them (e.g., abortion, gay marriage). This does not mean that they no longer have objections, but these might be less strongly felt and less infused with fears and anxieties, and thus, there is less psychological balancing and tension and less need for self-restraint. Future research could examine tolerance in relation to the processes of psychological adaptation to changing norms and practices. People's feelings about the things that they tolerate can gradually change and the limits of their tolerance can alter. In this respect, it also may be fruitful to consider the impact of promoting toleration on majority group members' stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination toward minority group members and immigrants. Given that a message of tolerance has been a message promoted for years by authority figures, it is surprising that few social-psychological studies have directly examined the impact of toleration for people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors toward others.

Conclusion

In the past decade, social-psychological research on intergroup relations and cultural diversity has grown tremendously. While the great majority of studies on the topic have focused on negative stereotypes, prejudicial attitudes, and discriminatory tendencies, this work has not examined the importance of toleration in intergroup relations. Toleration emphasizes civic identity and individuals' freedom to define and develop their own identities, while offering crucial space for religious and cultural diversity. This means that it is important to consider and systematically investigate what the basis of the objection is, whether and when objectionable norms and practices should be tolerated or not, and what the social-psychological implications are of being tolerated.

In the present article, we have tried to offer an early mapping for a landscape that is largely unexplored by social psychologists. There is much to be discovered here, and our effort by no means is an adequate mapping of the whole terrain. We have identified some striking landmarks and put up some signpost that may be useful in further exploration. However, systematic attention for questions on tolerance is much needed as these can enhance the field's contribution to the development of positive intergroup relations in plural societies. It can contribute to our continuing effort of developing a dynamic, challenging, and societally relevant social psychology.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. Dislike and disapproval may interrelate in a variety of ways, and the distinction is not always easy to make. Here we use these terms to explain the importance of different grounds for objection for understanding forms of toleration. For example, the distinction has implications for understanding the difference between religious and racial tolerance, and to assess in how far it is meaningful to speak about the latter.
2. One criticism is that the least-liked group approach implies that in comparing levels of tolerance, it is unclear whether the target groups are equally disliked. Furthermore, different societies or different generations within the same society might be considered equally (in)tolerant despite clear country differences or societal changes in the direction of more (or less) acceptance of new groups, lifestyles, habits, and customs (Chong, 1994). Asking people about the groups they themselves dislike implies that the objection is taken into account, but this can result in overlooking the fact that historically a society has become more tolerant. Similarly, it may overlook the fact that people living in liberal democratic societies are generally more tolerant than those living in dictatorial societies.
3. Obviously, in many cases it will not be straightforward what the merit of the objection is because it can be opaque or mixed. There will be hard cases and many disputes and disagreements but the important point is that it must be possible to recognize some (intersubjective) value in the objection.

4. This paradox has also led to the argument that genuine tolerance is almost impossible. For a true believer, it is very hard to be tolerant because the views and practices of the other are considered blasphemous or obscenely wrong: "any conviction potentially precludes tolerance toward dissidence from that conviction" (B. Williams, 1999, p. 69).
5. Although the exercise of tolerance presupposes the power to interfere and therefore applies to the majority group in particular, there can be a disposition to be tolerant or intolerant among minorities. Minority members might have the intention to interfere or not interfere *if* they had the power to do so, and this can also be examined.

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