

## Political Action in Conflict and Nonconflict Regions in Indonesia: The Role of Religious and National Identifications

Agnieszka Kanas

University of Amsterdam

Borja Martinovic

Utrecht University/Ercomer

---

*This study examined the relationship between group identification and political action in Indonesia. We made four contributions to the literature. First, we studied political action on behalf of religious groups and examined the role of religious identification alone and in combination with national identification. Second, we analyzed political action in a non-Western country where social cleavages occur primarily along religious lines and where a conflict and nonconflict region can be studied. Third, we compared Muslims and Christians, whose majority and minority status varies across the two regions, and fourth, we investigated both normative and nonnormative forms of political action (protest and violence). In line with the dual-identification model of politicization, we found that religious identification increased support for protest (but not violence) in the conflict region only and particularly among high national identifiers. In the nonconflict region, religious identification was not related to violence, and it was related to lower support for protest among high national identifiers. The patterns were largely similar for Muslims and Christians, but some differences were found depending on the majority-minority status. We conclude that particularities of the intergroup context should be taken into consideration when studying politicization.*

---

**KEY WORDS:** religious identification, national identification, politicization, normative and nonnormative action, conflict, Indonesia

Literature has consistently shown that, next to shared grievances and perceived efficacy, group identification is a critical ingredient of societal engagement and collective action (e.g., Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). In particular, there is an increasing interest in the role of dual identifications in stimulating political action on behalf of the ingroup. From a minority group perspective, having a dual identity—for example, ethnic and national—makes individuals feel that their minority group is part of the larger national society and gives them a political basis for claiming rights for the disadvantaged ingroup (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

Existing studies, conducted in Western European countries, have predominantly focused on immigrant-origin ethnic minorities and examined the role of ethnic identification alone and in combination with host-country national identification in determining political action. These studies have consistently shown that ethnic identification motivates first- and second-generation migrants to mobilize politically on behalf of their ethnic ingroup only when they also identify with the more inclusive

entity (the host-country), that is, in the presence of dual identification (Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). Our study is about nonmigrant groups in a religiously mixed national context, and it contributes to the growing research on the relationship between dual identification and political action in four ways.

First of all, we focus on political action on behalf of *religious groups*, and we examine the role of religious identification alone and in combination with national identification. Research has already highlighted the importance of religious identification in predicting religious political action (Fleischmann, Phalet, & Klein, 2011; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014). However, no studies have looked at whether the association between religious identification and political action on behalf of one's religious group is particularly pronounced when people also have a (strong) sense of belonging to the national group. Our aim is to find out if the theoretical arguments about dual identification among immigrant-origin minorities also apply to established religious groups and their political action.

Second, we focus on a non-Western country and examine political action of religious groups in Indonesia. Unlike the Western countries, in which the conflict between groups is primarily symbolic and revolves around particular values and norms, in Indonesia there are regions, such as the Moluccas, where armed conflict and violence take place (Sidel, 2006; Sterkens & Hadiwitanto, 2009). Our study contributes to previous research by focusing on this novel and different context, where social cleavages occur primarily along religious lines and where the relations between the two largest religious groups—Christians and Muslims—are tense. Specifically, we investigate whether the relationships between religious, national, and dual identification on the one hand, and political action on behalf of the religious ingroup on the other hand, differ in Ambon (the Moluccas)—a region with on-going violence—compared to a relatively peaceful region of Yogyakarta (Java).

Third, it has been shown that dual ethno-national identification is in particular useful for promoting political action among aggravated *minorities* (Klandermans, Van der Toorn, & Van Stekelenburg, 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). However, to the extent that shared grievances are experienced by numerical *majorities*, dual identification may promote political action among majority group members as well. We will test this among Christians and Muslims, whose power and group position alternate in conflict and nonconflict regions. In this context, finding out that identification with a superordinate political entity (i.e., national identification) strengthens the relationship between religious identification and politicization regardless of the religious denomination and regional power position would lend additional support for the dual identification hypothesis.

Fourth, following previous research (Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, & Bruder, 2009; Simon, Reichert, & Grabow, 2014), we make a distinction between support for normative and nonnormative actions. Normative political actions usually include voting at elections or referendum, participating in a campaign, signing a petition, and participating in peaceful protests. Nonnormative political actions refer to acts that are illegitimate, such as occupying buildings, participating in violent demonstrations, or damaging other people's property and compromising their physical safety. The focus on a variety of forms of political participation enables us to develop a qualified understanding of (support for) political activism in Indonesia. Normative and nonnormative political action can arise for different reasons and among different individuals and contexts (De Rooij, 2012; Tausch et al., 2011; Zaai, Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2011), and it is especially important to understand and disentangle the processes that generate such diverse forms of political involvement. The mobilizing role of religious and national identification and their interaction might differ depending on whether these are normative or nonnormative outcomes, and distinguishing between these two types of political action is therefore theoretically important. We will focus on support for protest, as a form of normative political action, and support for violence, as a form of nonnormative political action.

*The Indonesian Context*

Our study is located in two regions of Indonesia: the conflict region of Ambon and the relatively peaceful region of Yogyakarta. The focus of the study is on intergroup relations between the two largest religious groups in Indonesia—Christians and Muslims—who differ in power and status in these two regions. It is interesting to compare the processes that drive politicization among members of these two groups. For instance, Christians, who are on the national level a minority group with little political influence in Indonesia, may experience higher levels of shared grievances, and because of that support political action more than Muslims, who are a national majority group with the most political power. However, Muslims may also experience higher levels of shared grievances and politicize because they have on average lower socioeconomic status than Christians. Furthermore, Muslims are a regional minority group, albeit a large one, in the city of Ambon in the Moluccas, which has historically been mainly a Christian region.<sup>1</sup>

What sets the Indonesian context apart from other contexts in which dual identification and politicization were studied up till now is the presence of actual violence. Although the relations between Christians and Muslims have been relatively peaceful in most of the country, there have been incidents of clashes between religious communities, in which many people lost their properties and even their lives (Sidel, 2006). While Yogyakarta is a rather peaceful city, Ambon has experienced religious conflict and violence between 1999 and 2002 resulting in 5,000 deaths and roughly 500,000 displaced people (International Crisis Group, 2000). This outburst of violence was historically rooted in strong resentments between Christians and Muslims dating back hundreds of years and caused by marginalization of Muslims during the Dutch colonial period and subsequent marginalization of Christians under Suharto's presidency. Further, in 1950, after the Indonesian independence, a series of political conflicts took place between Christian separatists supporting the Republic of South Moluccas and Muslim nationalists supporting integration with the Republic of Indonesia. While the Christian separatist rebellion was violently suppressed by the Indonesian forces in the same year, the memory of it lingered and shaped intergroup relations in the region. Ambonese Christians are still often accused of lacking a sense of Indonesian national pride, while Muslims are being blamed for unconditionally supporting the Javanese rule. In addition, shifts in Ambon's population, namely an increased number of Muslims as a result of internal migration, also contributed to the tensions (Sterkens & Hadiwitanto, 2009). While the relations between Christians and Muslims in Ambon have been relatively peaceful since the signing of the peace settlement in 2002, incidents of clashes between religious communities still occur, with the latest resurgence in 2011, at the time of the data collection.<sup>2</sup>

*Theory and Hypotheses*

Identification with a disadvantaged ingroup is one of the main triggers of political action on behalf of that group (Klandermans et al., 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). According to social identity theory (SIT), participation in political action can be viewed as an identity management strategy that disadvantaged groups use to obtain positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). SIT assumes that individuals strive to achieve or maintain positive social identity associated with their group membership. When group membership fails to provide people with a positive social identity, as it may be the case with disadvantaged or low-status groups, people may disidentify or leave the ingroup. However, if leaving the ingroup is impossible or not desirable, which might especially hold for religious group membership, people may choose other

<sup>1</sup> The exact numbers are Christians 60% and Muslims 40% (Ambon); Christians 8% and Muslims 92% (Yogyakarta) (Statistics Indonesia, 2010).

<sup>2</sup> For a more detailed account of the situation in Ambon, see the reports of the International Crisis Group (2000, 2002, 2011).

strategies such as engaging in collective action on behalf of the disadvantaged ingroup (Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

According to an integrative social identity model of collective action (SIMCA), social identity is at the very heart of collective action, predicting it directly and indirectly, through a stronger perception and experience of injustice and a stronger sense of efficacy (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). With respect to religious identity, Fleischmann and colleagues (2011) have shown that Turkish and Moroccan Muslims who identified more strongly with their religious ingroup were more likely to support political Islam across three national contexts—Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden. There is also some evidence that identification with a disadvantaged ingroup is positively related to political radicalization on behalf of that ingroup. For instance, Simon and Ruhs (2008) have shown that Turks in Germany identifying with their ingroup were more likely to support radical ingroup organizations. Based on the foregoing, we expect religious identification to be positively related to support for both protest and violence.

Furthermore, Simon and Klandermans (2001) have pointed out the role of dual identification in promoting political action on behalf of the (disadvantaged) minority group. According to these authors, a politicized collective identity is typically “a dual identity that allows minorities to acknowledge or even stress their identity as a member of that society because only by virtue of their membership in this more inclusive group or community are they entitled to societal support for their claims” (2001, p. 326). To engage in political action, minority group members have to have a sense of belonging to the host nation. People have to believe that they are part of a community that recognizes them and have the feeling that there is room for them in this wider community to express discontent and work towards a social change. This proposition has been examined and confirmed mainly among ethnic minorities in Western European countries, namely, Germany and the Netherlands, using both cross-sectional and longitudinal studies (Klandermans et al., 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon et al., 2013; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). For instance, in the context of the Turkish minority in Germany, Simon and Ruhs (2008) have shown that minority Turks needed to identify both with their own ethnic group and with Germany to fight for the rights on behalf of the Turkish community in Germany. Likewise, in their study among Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands and Turks in New York, Klandermans and colleagues (2008) have shown that only dual identification (i.e., with a disadvantaged ethnic ingroup and the nation) could transform ingroup grievances into political action on behalf of that ingroup. Based on this theoretical reasoning and previous findings, we expect national identification to strengthen the positive relationship between religious identification and support for protest. Furthermore, and in contrast, we argue that with respect to nonnormative action, identifying with the overarching nation and feeling part of the national community should prevent people from getting involved in violent acts on behalf of their ingroup because they will think that it is not in the national interest that the conflict escalates. Therefore, we predict that national identification works as a buffer, thus weakening the positive relationship between religious identification and support for violence.

The context in which groups find themselves is one of the crucial determinants of intergroup relations (Reicher, 2004). Identification with an ingroup is known to increase dislike of outgroups when groups find themselves in a conflicting situation, where the identity of the ingroup is being threatened by outgroup (Brewer, 2001). In Indonesia, social cleavages along religious lines are deeper and more pronounced in conflict regions, and we expect that this is where religious identification will be most successful in mobilizing people to support normative and nonnormative political action on behalf of their religious ingroup. Based on the foregoing, our prediction is that the positive relationship between religious identification and support for protest and violence will be stronger in a conflict than nonconflict region.

Finally, we expect dual identification to play a different role in the two regions. When there is conflict, action is more needed in order to regain or improve the status of the ingroup, and this is why

we hypothesize that national identification will strengthen the positive relationship between religious identification and support for protest more in conflict than in nonconflict regions (Concluding Hypothesis 1). Moreover, dual identification prioritizes forms of political action that are accepted by the wider society as legitimate (Simon et al., 2013), and such forms of political action are more likely to be commonly accepted and used than nonnormative political action in a nonconflict rather than conflict region. This is why we expect national identification to weaken the positive relationship between religious identification and support for violence more in nonconflict than conflict region, that is, to work especially as a buffer against violent actions in the nonconflict region (Concluding Hypothesis 2).

Next to testing these two hypotheses about conditional effects of religious identification, we will explore whether they hold for Christians and Muslims alike and irrespective of the numerical size of the group (regional majority versus minority status).

## Method

### *Data and Participants*

We tested our predictions using a large and unique survey “Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Indonesia ERCI 2011” (Sterkens et al., 2014). The survey contains an extensive list of questions on religious identification, national identification, and political activism, differentiating between normative forms of activism—public criticism and demonstration—and nonnormative forms—violence. The value of the ERCI survey is that it allows us to compare and understand the processes that fuel political activism in a conflict and nonconflict region of Indonesia.

The participants were second- and third-year bachelor students in the cities of Ambon (the Moluccas) and Yogyakarta (central Java). Both in Yogyakarta and in Ambon the survey data were collected at three universities that differ with regards to the religious composition of the student body: an Islamic university with predominantly Muslim students, a Christian university with predominantly Christian students, and a public (state) university where the majority of the students were either Christians (Ambon) or Muslims (Yogyakarta), depending on the composition of the population. At each university, a random sample of 250 students was drawn from humanities, natural sciences, and medical sciences departments, resulting in a total of 1,500 respondents. The response rate was 63.1% in Ambon city and 55.3% in Yogyakarta. For the purpose of this study, we have selected only students who self-declared as Muslim or Christian (98.8% of the sample) and had valid observations on all variables included in the analysis. Participants with missing values (8.9% of the sample), mainly due to information missing on parental education and gender, were listwise deleted. The final sample consists of 1,367 participants, 58% of whom are Muslims. Women make up 47%.

### *Measures*

*Dependent Variables.* We distinguish between normative and nonnormative aspects of political activism: support for protest against oppressive actions committed by the religious outgroup and support for violent acts to secure the rights of the ingroup.

*Support for protest.* We constructed this measure combining five items that measured support for public criticism and five items that measured support for demonstrations. Public criticism items captured people’s willingness to support public debate and criticism of discriminatory actions committed towards their religious ingroup. These discriminatory actions referred to the economic, political, and cultural spheres of life: “I would support public criticism of (job discrimination of my religious group;

abuse of political power that threatens my religious group; actions that undermine political influence of my religious group; the lack of free access to education of my religious group; and disrespect for the values of my religious group),” measured on a 5-point scale, ranging from (1) “totally disagree” to (5) “totally agree.” Participants’ willingness to support demonstrations was assessed with five questions that again tapped into different domains of life where discrimination takes place: “I would support demonstrations against (job discrimination of my religious group; abuse of political power that threatens my religious group; the lack of free access to education of my religious group)” and “I would support demonstrations (to enforce the political influence of my religious group or to demand respect for the values of my religious group).” Participants could disagree or agree with these statements on the same 5-point Likert scale as for support for public criticism. Demonstrations do go one step further than public debates when it comes to political activism, but they still fall within the range of normative actions. Because of a high correlation between the constructs measuring support for public criticism and demonstrations ( $r = .67, p < .001$ ), we combined them into a reliable scale of support for protest:  $\alpha = .87$  ( $\alpha = .86$  in Yogyakarta;  $\alpha = .87$  in Ambon).

*Support for violence.* As a measure of endorsement of violence, two types of violent acts were assessed: damage to property and harm to persons. Ten items were used (5-point Likert scales), five for damage to property and five for damage to persons, again as a response to ingroup discrimination in the different domains of life. The wording was the following: “I would support the damaging of property/harm to persons (to get more jobs for my religious group; to fight abuse of political power against my religious group; to enforce the political influence of my religious group; to enforce free access to education for my religious group; and when my religion is deeply insulted).” These items formed a highly reliable scale:  $\alpha = .91$  ( $\alpha = .92$  in Yogyakarta;  $\alpha = .90$  in Ambon).

*Predictors.* *Religious identification* was measured by five items (5-point scales) capturing the importance of one’s religious identity (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006; Verkuyten, 2007): “My religious identity is very important to me”; “I see myself as a committed member of my religious group”; “My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence in my daily life”; “My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence on how I make important decisions”; and “My religious beliefs have a great deal of influence on how I relate with others.” The items formed a reliable scale:  $\alpha = .80$  ( $\alpha = .83$  in Yogyakarta;  $\alpha = .74$  in Ambon).

*National identification* was measured by five items (5-point scales) adapted from previous studies on national attachment (Coenders, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2004; Coenders & Scheepers, 2003): “I would rather be a citizen of Indonesia than of any other country in the world”; “My most important characteristics come from my nationality”; “I should respect my nation and its tradition”; “I should always put national interest above ethno-religious group interest”; and “Renewing national ideas is our national task.” The items formed a reasonably reliable scale:  $\alpha = .67$  ( $\alpha = .68$  in Yogyakarta;  $\alpha = .64$  in Ambon). Excluding any of the items did not increase scale reliability, so we calculated a mean score across all five items.

To test the hypotheses about the differential role of religious, national, and dual identification in the conflict and nonconflict regions, we included a dichotomous variable *conflict region* (1 = Ambon/conflict; 0 = Yogyakarta/nonconflict).

*Control Variables.* As men tend to be more politically active than women (Verba, Burns, & Scholzman, 1997), especially when it comes to nonnormative actions (Saha, 2000), we controlled for *gender* (1 = male; 0 = female). Similarly, we wanted to account for the general positive relationship between socioeconomic status (particularly education) and political engagement (Hillygus, 2005), so we included *parental educational level* as an additional control. It was measured by an ordinal variable ranging from (1) no formal education to (9) PhD. Because the focus is on second- and third-year bachelor students, we could not take their own educational level into account. Similarly, there was very little variation in age in our sample ( $M = 21.2, SD = 2.7$ ), which is why we did not control for



**Table 1.** Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Analysis, Broken Down by Region and Religious Group

	Range	Nonconflict Region (Yogyakarta)						Conflict Region (Ambon)					
		Muslims		Christians		Total		Muslims		Christians		Total	
		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
<i>Dependent Variable</i>													
Support for protest	1–5	3.51 <sup>b,c</sup>	.65	3.19	.65	3.40	.66	3.62 <sup>c</sup>	.69	3.22	.78	3.43	.76
Support for violence	1–5	1.98 <sup>b,c</sup>	.70	1.84	.66	1.93 <sup>a</sup>	.69	2.25 <sup>c</sup>	.69	2.05	.78	2.15	.74
<i>Predictors</i>													
Religious identification	1–5	4.20 <sup>b,c</sup>	.66	4.04	.67	4.15 <sup>a</sup>	.67	4.41	.61	4.35	.62	4.38	.62
National identification	1–5	3.93 <sup>b,c</sup>	.55	3.78	.55	3.88 <sup>a</sup>	.55	4.16 <sup>c</sup>	.53	4.03	.58	4.09	.56
<i>Control Variables</i>													
Male	0/1	.54 <sup>b</sup>		.59	.49	.56	.50	.47 <sup>c</sup>	.50	.55		.51	
Parental education	1–9	5.26 <sup>b,c</sup>	1.5	5.61	1.38	5.38 <sup>a</sup>	1.48	4.02 <sup>c</sup>	1.13	5.09	1.17	4.55	1.27
<i>N</i>	1381	461		249		710		339		332		671	

Source: ERCI (2011).

Note. The superscripts indicate that means differ significantly ( $p < .05$ ) between regions (<sup>a</sup>), between religious groups (<sup>b</sup>), and between religious groups within a region (<sup>c</sup>).

age differences. To account for the differences in political activism between Muslims and Christians, we controlled for religious denomination by including a dichotomous variable *Muslim* (1 = Muslims; 0 = Christians), and to take into consideration the numerical size and regional power position of the group, we controlled for *majority status* (1) as opposed to minority status (0).

## Results

### Descriptive Findings

Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for the main constructs per region and religious group. Several noteworthy findings should be mentioned. First, looking at the regional differences, it turns out that support for violence, that is, a more radical type of political activism, is significantly higher in the conflict region of Ambon than in the relatively peaceful Yogyakarta. In addition, the scores on the religious and national identification scales are higher in Ambon than in Yogyakarta. The latter result may come as a surprise given the earlier attempts to make the Moluccas separate and independent from Indonesia. However, a comparison between religious groups in Ambon shows that higher national identification is partly driven by Muslims, who are a large minority group in Ambon and support integration with Indonesia. In fact, Muslims have significantly higher scores on religious and national identification in both regions, and they also score significantly higher on support for all types of political action than Christians.<sup>3</sup>

Table 2 shows the correlations between the core constructs used in this study, separately for Christians and Muslims and Yogyakarta and Ambon. Among both Christians and Muslims, religious identification was positively related to support for protest in Ambon but not to support for violence. In contrast, religious identification was not significantly related to any form of political action in

<sup>3</sup> We also checked whether the response patterns differed between students from sole-religion versus mixed-religion universities, but we mostly did not find significant differences. The only exception is support for violence, which was a bit stronger among students from sole-religion universities as compared to mixed-religion universities:  $M = 2.11$  ( $SD = .73$ ) vs.  $M = 1.91$  ( $SD = .69$ );  $p < .001$

**Table 2.** Correlations Between the Variables Used, Broken Down by Region and Religious Group

	Nonconflict Region (Yogyakarta)				Conflict Region (Ambon)			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
1. Support for protest	1.00	.01	.01	.15*	1.00	.22***	.13*	.08
2. Support for violence	.07	1.00	.01	-.09	.11*	1.00	.10	-.06
3. Religious identification	.03	.05	1.00	.19*	.21***	-.07	1.00	.09
4. National identification	.20***	-.06	.15**	1.00	.15**	-.07	.15**	1.00

Source. ERCI (2011).

Note. Correlations for Christians are presented above the diagonal and for Muslims below the diagonal. Pearson's correlation coefficients.

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Yogyakarta, and this was for both Christians and Muslims. National identification, on the other hand, was positively related to support for protest among Muslims in both regions and among Christians in Yogyakarta. There was no relationship between national identification and support for violence for both religious groups and in any of the two regions.

#### Measurement Model

Confirmatory factor analysis in Mplus (version 7) was employed to determine whether an empirical distinction could be made between the four proposed latent constructs: religious identification, national identification, support for protest, and support for violence. A four-factor model had an acceptable fit, with  $\chi^2(384) = 2386.76$ ,  $p < .001$ , Comparative Fit Index ( $CFI$ ) = .91, Root Mean Square Error Of Approximation ( $RMSEA$ ) = .059, and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual ( $SRMR$ ) = .067. All the items loaded positively on the designated factor with the loadings in the range of .45–.80, the only exception being one item of support for protest with a loading of .37. As deleting this item did not improve the fit of the model, we decided to keep it in the analysis. A six-factor solution, distinguishing between two forms of normative action (criticism and demonstration) and two forms of nonnormative action (violence against property and violence against persons) fitted the data a bit better,  $\chi^2(993) = 1918.77$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $CFI = .93$ ,  $RMSEA = .053$ , and  $SRMR = .063$ . However, given the very high correlations within these two pairs of dependent variables (criticism and demonstration:  $r = .79$ ,  $p < .001$ ; violence against property and violence against persons:  $r = .94$ ,  $p < .001$ ), we proceeded with estimating a structural model with four factors. Importantly, distinguishing between the two normative and two nonnormative forms of political action did not change our conclusions. That is, the results were substantially the same for support for criticism and support for demonstrations on the one hand, and for support for damage to property and violence against people on the other hand.

A multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis also showed that a four-factor solution was supported in both conflict and nonconflict region. The same factor structure was found, and the factor loadings were positive and high for all the items. However, the model which constrained each factor loading to be equal across regions,  $\chi^2(794) = 3221.11$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $CFI = .89$ ,  $RMSEA = .064$ ,  $SRMR = .081$ , had a worse fit than the unconstrained model,  $\chi^2(768) = 2967.63$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $CFI = .90$ ,  $RMSEA = .062$ ,  $SRMR = .071$ ;  $\Delta\chi^2 = 253.48$ ,  $\Delta df = 26$ ,  $p < .001$ . This suggests that some of the item loadings differ in Yogyakarta and Ambon, raising the question of whether the latent constructs are measured equally well in both contexts and whether our structural model can be compared across regions. After relaxing the most divergent loadings—the ones on the first and second item of religious identification, fourth and fifth item of national identification, and the five items in the protest measure that refer to demonstrations—a fit similar to that of the unconstrained model was achieved,  $\chi^2(785) = 2992.30$ ,  $CFI = .90$ ,  $RMSEA = .062$ ,  $SRMR = .072$ ;  $\Delta\chi^2 = 24.67$ ,  $\Delta df = 17$ ,  $p > .05$ . This



**Table 3.** Predicting Support for Protest and Violence on Behalf of the Religious Ingroup

	Support for Protest		Support for Violence	
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 1b	Model 2b
Religious identification	0.082** (0.03)	-0.040 (0.04)	0.047 (0.03)	0.043 (0.04)
National identification	0.161*** (0.03)	0.190*** (0.05)	-0.094** (0.03)	-0.106* (0.05)
Religious ID * National ID		-0.170** (0.06)		-0.024 (0.07)
Religious ID * Conflict region		0.214*** (0.06)		-0.012 (0.06)
National ID *Conflict region		-0.093 (0.07)		0.000 (0.07)
Religious ID*National ID*Conflict		0.277** (0.10)		0.148 (0.11)
Muslim	0.323*** (0.04)	0.325*** (0.04)	0.140*** (0.04)	0.140*** (0.04)
Male	0.141*** (0.04)	0.146*** (0.04)	0.075* (0.04)	0.078* (0.04)
Parental education	-0.019 (0.01)	-0.020 (0.01)	-0.060*** (0.01)	-0.060*** (0.01)
Majority status	-0.039 (0.04)	-0.035 (0.04)	-0.007 (0.04)	-0.006 (0.04)
Conflict region	0.007 (0.04)	-0.004 (0.04)	0.202*** (0.04)	0.199*** (0.04)
Constant	3.263*** (0.09)	3.264*** (0.09)	2.125*** (0.10)	2.122*** (0.10)
Adjusted explained variance	0.093	0.104	0.053	0.060
N	1381	1381	1381	1381

Source. ERCI (2011).

Note. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$ .


means that the latent constructs of religious identification, national identification, and support for protest were partially invariant across the two contexts. Support for violence was fully invariant. It should be noted that the items that could not be constrained still had positive and high loadings in each region, albeit somewhat higher in the conflict region. Therefore, we are confident that we can proceed with constructing mean scores in STATA 13 and using these in the regression analyses.

### *Explaining Support for Protest and Violence*

We tested our hypotheses separately in relation to support for protest and violence. To avoid multicollinearity related to the inclusion of the interaction terms, all the continuous variables were mean-centered. The variance inflation factor (VIF) was smaller than 1.3 for each of the items, suggesting that multicollinearity was not a problem in our analyses.

Because our hypotheses were conditional, that is, we expected the role of religious identification in predicting support for protest and violence to depend on the strength of national identification and region, we ran hierarchical multiple regression analyses (Table 3). Model 1 presents the main effects of religious and national identification, net of control variables, and Model 2 adds two- and three-way interaction terms between religious identification, national identification, and region.

*Support for Protest.* As can be seen in Table 3 (Model 1a), religious identification was positively related to support for protest. This positive relationship was, however, qualified by the presence of a



**Figure 1.** Simple slopes of support for protest on religious identification at high and low values of national identification, by region. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals.

significant three-way interaction between religious identification, national identification, and conflict region (Table 3, Model 2a). We decomposed this interaction to obtain simple slopes for religious identification in the conflict and nonconflict region and among low and high national identifiers. Following Aiken and West (1991), high and low values of national identification were defined as the values 1SD above the mean and 1SD below the mean, respectively. These simple slopes are illustrated in Figure 1.

In the conflict region, religious identification was related to more support for protest but exclusively among high national identifiers ( $b = .234, p < .001$ ). Among low national identifiers, this relationship was still positive but weaker, and it did not reach significance ( $b = .113, p = .117$ ). In contrast, in the nonconflict region and among high national identifiers, the relationship between religious identification and support for protest was negative. Indonesians in Yogyakarta who care about their nation are less willing to support protest on behalf of their ingroup group the more they identify with their religious group ( $b = -.137, p = .028$ ). The relationship between religious identification and support for protest in the nonconflict region was positive but not significant for low national identifiers ( $b = .056, p = .213$ ). These findings are in line with our expectation that dual identifiers will be more willing to support normative political action and particularly in the conflict region. However, we expected the process to be comparable but only weaker in the nonconflict region. Instead, we found that particularly dual identifiers refrain from protesting in the peaceful region of Yogyakarta.

Although statistically significant, these conditional effects of religious identification have relatively little impact on support for protest in the studied region. This is because religious identification only matters among those who strongly identify with Indonesia (1SD above the mean), and these are not many (13% of our sample). Among this 13% of the population, the impact of religious identification on political action was not that small, however. For instance, among strong national identifiers in Yogyakarta, strong identification with the religious ingroup (compared to no religious identification) decreased support for protest by almost 0.7 points ( $-.137 \times 5 = .69$ ), which is a substantial change on a scale ranging from 1 to 5. Likewise, identifying strongly with both Indonesia and religious ingroup in Ambon increased support for protest by more than one point ( $.234 \times 5 = 1.17$ ). Taken together, these results suggest a context-dependent relationship between religious and national identification on the one hand and support for normative political action on the other hand.

*Support for Violence.* Regarding support for violence, none of the three- and two-way interaction terms were significant (Table 3, Model 2b).<sup>4</sup> Therefore, we interpret only the results of the main

<sup>4</sup> Also in a model without the three-way interaction (not shown), the two-way interactions were not significant.

effects. Model 1b shows that religious identification was not related to support for violence, and we can conclude that this was regardless of the strength of national identification and in both conflict and nonconflict regions. These results reject our hypothesis about national identification buffering the effect of religious identification on support for violence particularly in the nonconflict region. However, we did find a significant main effect of national identification. National identification significantly decreased support for violence, and this was the case in both regions, as can be seen from the nonsignificant interaction term.<sup>5</sup>

*Sensitivity Analyses with Alternative Measures of National Identification.* Considering the somewhat lower reliability of the national identification scale, we repeated our analyses using one item at the time. We started with the item showing the highest factor loading for Christians and Muslims and in both regions: “Renewing national ideas is our national task.” While the findings for support for protest were substantially the same, the effect of dual identification on support for violence turned significant and positive ( $b = .131, p = .003$ ). This implies that national identification might even mobilize people who strongly identify with the religious ingroup to support violence. There is also some evidence that the positive relationship between dual identification and support for violence was only significant in the conflict ( $b = .238, p < .001$ ) but not nonconflict region ( $b = .065, p = .246$ ), as further confirmed by a marginally significant three-way interaction between religious identification, national identification, and conflict region ( $b = .173, p = .058$ ). In contrast, when national identification was measured by the item “I would rather be a citizen of Indonesia than of any other country in the world,” we found that for higher national identifiers the relationship between religious identification and violence turned negative ( $b = -.088, p = .028$ ), and this applied to both regions. This latter finding is in line with our theoretical expectation that caring about the nation would attenuate religious identifiers’ support for violence, but it is in sharp contrast with the findings using the former item. Measuring national identification with any of the remaining three items yielded nonsignificant results, in line with the analysis based on the composite scale. These divergent findings point at the necessity to consider the specific content and conceptualization of national identification when examining its role in politicization, particularly regarding nonnormative actions.

*Exploring Differences Between Majority and Minority Status.* To see whether the role of religious, national, and dual identification in political action was the same for religious majorities and minorities, we reestimated all the models from Table 3 with additional interaction terms with majority status at the local level (Table 1 in the online supporting information). Because none of the four- and three-way interaction terms were significant, we present the results from a model with main effects and two-way interaction terms only.<sup>6</sup> For support for protest, the patterns were the same for local majorities and minorities. However, for support for violence, we obtained a significant interaction between religious identification and majority status. Religious identification was related to more support for violence among religious majorities ( $b = .100, p = .033$ ) but not among minorities ( $b = -.027, p = .642$ ). The effect of religious identification among majorities was not only statistically significant but also socially relevant. Specifically, among regional majority members who strongly identified with the religious ingroup (77%) support for violence was half a point higher than among those who weakly identify with the religious ingroup, which is a substantial change on a 5-point scale. Besides that, there was no evidence that national and dual identification related differently to support for violence among religious majorities than minorities.

<sup>5</sup> Regarding the control variables, Muslims scored significantly higher than Christians on support for protest and violence, and majority-minority status differences on the local level did not matter. Participants living in the conflict region of Ambon were more likely to support violence than those living in Yogyakarta, but the two regions did not differ in the level of support for protest. Males were more likely to support protest and violence than females, and finally, parental education was unrelated to support for protest, but it decreased support for violence.

<sup>6</sup> Note that we could not include a two-way interaction between conflict region and majority status because this coincides with the category “Christian” and shows perfect collinearity with the main effect of religious denomination.

*Exploring Differences Between Religious Groups.* We also tested whether the hypothesized relationships differed between religious groups, net of their majority status. None of the interaction terms between religious group membership and religious identification, national identification, and dual identification on support for protest or violence turned out significant (findings available upon request). This means that our conclusions regarding the role of religious and national identification in normative and nonnormative political action seem to apply to Muslims and Christians alike. In combination with the significant main effect of religious group, these results suggest that while Muslims are more likely than Christians to support any form of political action in Indonesia, there is no evidence that the processes of religious, national, and dual identification work differently for these two religious groups.

*Zooming in on Ambon and Yogyakarta.* It could be argued that identification with Indonesia may mean something different for Christians and Muslims in Ambon. For Christians there, who have a history of fighting for independence, identification with Indonesia will possibly mean that they are less supportive of separatism and consequently may be less supportive of political action, while for Muslims national identification may actually increase the likelihood of pronational political actions in this region. To see whether the role of national and thus dual identification differs between Ambonese Christians and Ambonese Muslims, we reestimated the models for the Ambonese sample only. Both the two-way (National ID  $\times$  Muslim) and three-way interactions (Religious ID  $\times$  National ID  $\times$  Muslim) were not significant, suggesting that national and dual identifications relate similarly to political action among Christians and Muslims in Ambon. Similar to our previous findings, religious identification was positively related to support for protest, and this was equally the case for Christians and Muslims. However, we found a negative and significant interaction between religious identification and Muslim denomination on support for violence ( $b = -.266, p = .006$ ). Taken together with the positive main effect of religious identification on support for violence ( $b = .139, p = .034$ ), these results suggest that in Ambon religious identification was related to more support for violence among majority Christians but not among minority Muslims, for whom the effect of religious identification on support for violence was even negative, though not significant ( $b = -.127, p = .074$ ). Separate analyses of the data from Yogyakarta revealed no such interaction there. In Yogyakarta, religious identification was unrelated to violence, and this was for Muslims and Christians alike. These separate findings from the two regions further qualify the previous finding obtained from the whole sample about religious identification being related to violence among majorities but not minorities. We can now conclude that religious identification is only related to support for violence among the Christian majority in the conflict region, but not among the Muslim majority in the nonconflict region.<sup>7</sup> This might have to do with the separatist tendencies of Ambonese Christians.

## Discussion

Previous research on political action has predominantly focused on immigrant-origin minorities in Western countries and examined the role of ethno-national identification (e.g., Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). While these studies provide relevant insights into the role of (dual) group identification in stimulating political action, it is unknown whether the same processes hold among nonimmigrant groups and in non-Western contexts. This study contributes to previous research by focusing on religious group members in Indonesia. We examine the role of religious identification alone and in combination with national identification in predicting political action on behalf of the disadvantaged religious ingroup. Indonesia is a country where social cleavages occur along religious

<sup>7</sup> Note, however, that the three-way interaction religious identification  $\times$  majority status  $\times$  conflict region was not significant. Still the two-way interaction religious identification  $\times$  majority status is only significant in the conflict but not nonconflict region, when tested separately.

lines and the relations between the two largest religious communities—Christians and Muslims—are tense. Moreover, whereas earlier work has predominantly focused on minority groups and normative forms of political action (but see Simon and colleagues' [2013] study on radicalization), we tested our hypotheses among minorities and majorities and considered normative and nonnormative political action.

Three important conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, in line with previous research (Fleischmann et al., 2011; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014; Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008), we found that also in Indonesia religious identification is an important predictor of *normative* political action. More specifically, religious identification is related to more support for protest on behalf of the religious ingroup among those who feel strongly attached to their Indonesian national identity. We expected this process to be comparable in the conflict and nonconflict regions, with weaker effects in the latter context. However, we found that dual identification only stimulates protest in the conflict region. In the nonconflict region, national identification instead works as a buffer: Religious identifiers in Yogyakarta were less willing to support normative forms of political activism to the extent that they cared about their national identity.

These findings are in line with qualitative research on Indonesia showing a strong politicization of religious identity in the Moluccas (Sterkens & Hadiwitanto, 2009). Importantly, our findings qualify the dual identity model of politicization (Simon & Klandermans, 2001): dual identification with religious and superordinate national group only stimulates support for normative political action in the context of actual conflict, whereas in more peaceful regions national identification can even work as a buffer and subdue religious identifiers' support for normative political actions. Thus, the relationship of religious and national identification with support for normative political action is highly context dependent.

Second, we expected religious identification to be related to more support for *nonnormative* political action, particularly in the conflict region and among weak national identity. In other words, dual identifiers in the peaceful region were expected to be least likely to support nonnormative political action. We found no evidence that religious identification was related to support for violence in either conflict or nonconflict region. While unexpected, this finding might be accounted for by the values of benevolence that are propagated by religion (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). While higher group identifiers might resort to more extreme and controversial means to achieve their ingroup's goals in a conflict, the normative content of religious identity might be an inhibiting factor in this particular case. In addition, violent conflicts labelled as "religious" are rarely motivated exclusively by religion but often coincide with ethnic and class divides. Identification with these other categories, as well as vested interests, might fuel violent political action more than religious identification does.

Further, there was no evidence for the buffering role of national identification, but we did find that higher national identifiers were less supportive of violence, and this was regardless of the region considered. These are probably the people who prioritize peaceful means of activism because it is in their national interest to keep the country stable. However, the conclusions about the role of national identification should be taken with reservation. Our measure of national identification primarily captured the glorification dimension of this identity instead of attachment (Roccas et al., 2006). Sensitivity analyses using separate items revealed that depending on the specific content, national identification might either work as a buffer or alternatively fuel violent acts of religious identifiers. Future studies should examine which dimensions of national identification motivate or discourage normative and more controversial political actions.

Interestingly, religious identification was positively related to support for violence among Christians in Ambon in particular. Christians, who are a national minority, form a numerical majority in this conflict region. Because numerical size is coupled with political influence on the local level, this finding implies that numerical size and usable power are necessary conditions for mobilizing radical action (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1990). The fact that we did not find the same process in Yogyakarta

among Muslims, who represent a regional majority there, suggests that this finding cannot be generalized to all regional majorities. Instead, the relationship between religious identification and support for violence is much more context dependent. In the Indonesian case, Christians in Ambon have had separatist tendencies since the declaration of Indonesian independence in mid twentieth century, and there has been an on-going religious conflict between them and Muslims (Sterkens & Hadiwitanto, 2009). This is probably why Christians in Ambon are particularly more willing to engage in violent actions to the extent that they attribute importance to their religious group membership.

Third, while we do find that religious identification is only related to support for violence among Ambonese Christians, our remaining results are very similar for the two religious groups and for regional majorities and minorities. This is particularly the case with respect to normative actions. This suggests that the social psychological mechanisms that are known to affect legitimate political participation among aggravated minorities largely apply to majorities as well. At the same time, looking at the actual levels of support, we found that even in the context where Muslims are a national majority group with an overall large political influence, they are more politicized and even radicalized than Christians. It could be that, as suggested by resource mobilization theory (Jenkins, 1983), shared grievances are less predictive of political action than is access to resources. There is an unbalanced political power distribution between Muslims and other religious groups in Indonesia, resulting in frequent events of harassment and intimidation of religious minorities in the country (Human Rights Watch, 2013). This could contribute to a weaker belief among Christians that their political action can make a difference, which then translates into lower support for political action.

A higher politicization of Muslims can also be explained in the context of a current controversy over Muslim identity in Western countries, which is depicted as “as threatened or threatening collective identity” (Simon & Grabow, 2010, p. 733). In line with this argument, Kanas, Scheepers, and Sterkens (2015) have shown that Muslims in Indonesia feel significantly more threatened by Christians than that Christians feel threatened by Muslims. This perception of group threat, be it realistic or symbolic, paired with majority status and political power, can contribute to a higher politicization of Muslims compared to Christians in Indonesia.

There are several limitations of our study. First of all, unlike in previous research (Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon et al., 2013; Simon & Ruhs, 2008), dual identification in our study is a function of the two component identifications (religious and national). As argued by Simon and Ruhs (2008), such a measurement of dual identification is rather restrictive as it assumes that political action will be particularly pronounced among those with a very strong religious and a very strong national identification. Simon and Ruhs (2008) have showed that a scale directly measuring dual identification had more explanatory power than the statistical interaction of the two component identifications. Future research should include a direct measure of dual religious-national belonging and test its relevance for religious minority and majority members in Indonesia but also in other national contexts. A related point is that our participants on average identified particularly strongly with their religious group, and national identification was also rather high in the conflict zone, resulting in a ceiling effect. Support for violence was, in general, very low. This lack of variance could be the reason why the detected effects were not very large. Yet, the fact that we found significant patterns with such limited variation suggests that identity processes might be quite relevant for politicization and that an inclusion of weaker identifiers would possibly yield stronger findings.

Second, we relied on cross-sectional data, which cannot prove the causality of the proposed associations. A reverse causal scenario cannot be excluded. Ethnographic studies (Drury & Reicher, 2000), as well as quantitative longitudinal research (Khan et al., in press), have shown that participation in collective gatherings can strengthen identification with the ingroup. However, other studies using longitudinal data (Blackwood & Louis, 2012; Simon et al., 2013; Simon & Ruhs, 2008) have also shown that, in line with our predictions, group identification processes can fuel political action. Still, future research relying on longitudinal data is needed for corroborating the causal processes.



Third, our analyses are based on a student sample in two regions of Indonesia, which limits the generalizability of the findings. We targeted students exactly because they are the segment of the population that plays a crucial role in political activism, including its more radicalized forms. However, we cannot claim that the levels of support for protest and violence reflect the actual support among a wider population of Indonesia. While violence is more supported in Ambon, protest is, contrary to our expectation, equally supported in both regions. Studies with representative samples are needed in order to describe more precisely the degree of politicization in the two contexts.

Fourth, future studies should also consider other forms of normative action. While in Indonesia public criticism and demonstrations are legal, the right to assembly is limited in the conflict regions. For instance, peaceful flag-raising ceremonies and independence rallies in Papua or Maluku islands are routinely and often violently stopped, and participants are sentenced to prison (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Expressing public criticism and demonstrating is not as benign in Indonesia as it is in the Western world. If we had measures of other types of action that are more commonly accepted and resorted to in Indonesia, maybe we would have found a stronger link with group identifications.

In sum, our results show that religious identification increases support for protest on behalf of the religious ingroup in the conflict region only, and particularly among high national identifiers. In the nonconflict region, national identification works as a buffer for the relationship between religious identification and support for protest. There is also some evidence that religious identification is positively related to support for violence but among religious majorities only. In contrast, identification with the nation as a superordinate political entity seems to discourage support for violence in both regions. These results underline the importance of intergroup context for studying how religious and national identification relate to support for normative and nonnormative political action. Future research is encouraged to examine to what extent our findings from Indonesia translate to other regions with religious conflicts, such as Northern Ireland.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Agnieszka Kanas, Department of Sociology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, 1018 WV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: a.m.kanas@uva.nl

## REFERENCES

- Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). *Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Blackwood, L. M., & Louis, W. R. (2012). If it matters for the group then it matters to me: Collective action outcomes for seasoned activists. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 51*(1), 72–92.
- Brewer, M. B. (2001). Ingroup identification and intergroup conflict: When does ingroup love become outgroup hate? In R. D. Ashmore, L. Jussim, & D. Wilder (Eds.), *Social identity, intergroup conflict, and conflict reduction (Rutgers Series on Self and Social Identity, Vol.3, pp. 17–41)*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Coenders M., Gijsberts M., & Scheepers P. (2004). Chauvinism and patriotism in 22 countries. In M. Gijsberts, L. Hagendoorn, & P. Scheepers (Eds.), *Nationalism and exclusion of migrants: Cross-national comparisons* (pp. 29–70). Ashgate, United Kingdom: Ashgate.
- Coenders, M., & Scheepers, P. (2003). The effect of education on nationalism and ethnic exclusionism: An international comparison. *Political Psychology, 24*, 313–343.
- De Rooij, E. A. (2012). Patterns of immigrant political participation: Explaining differences in types of political participation between immigrants and the majority population in Western Europe. *European Sociological Review, 28*, 455–481.
- Drury, J., & Reicher, S. (2000). Collective action and psychological change: The emergence of new social identities. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 39*, 579–604.

- Fleischmann, F., Phalet, K., & Klein, O. (2011). Religious identification and politicization in the face of discrimination: Support for political Islam and political action among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in Europe. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 50*, 628–648.
- Hillygus, D. S. (2005). The missing link: Exploring the relationship between higher education and political engagement. *Political Behavior, 27*, 25–47.
- Human Rights Watch. (2010). *Prosecuting political aspiration Indonesia's political prisoners*. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch.
- Human Rights Watch. (2013). *In religion's name. Abuses against religious minorities in Indonesia*. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch.
- International Crisis Group. (2000). *Indonesia: Overcoming murder and chaos in Maluku*. Jakarta, Indonesia: International Crisis Group.
- International Crisis Group. (2002). *Indonesia: The search for peace in Maluku. Executive Summary and Recommendations*. Jakarta, Indonesia: International Crisis Group.
- International Crisis Group. (2011). *Indonesia: Trouble again in Ambon*. Jakarta, Indonesia: International Crisis Group.
- Jenkins, J. C. (1983). Resource mobilization theory and the study of social movements. *Annual Review of Sociology, 9*, 527–553.
- Kanas, A., Scheepers, P., & Sterkens, C. (2015). Interreligious contact, perceived group threat, and perceived discrimination: Predicting negative attitudes among religious minorities and majorities in Indonesia. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 78*, 102–126.
- Khan, S. S., Hopkins, N., Reicher, S., Tewari, S., Srinivasan, N., & Stevenson, C. (in press). How collective participation impacts social identity: A longitudinal study from India. *Political Psychology*.
- Klandermans, B., Van der Toorn, J., & Van Stekelenburg, J. (2008). Embeddedness and identity: How immigrants turn grievances into action. *American Sociological Review, 73*, 992–1012.
- Livingstone, A. G., Spears, R., Manstead, A. S. R., & Bruder, M. (2009). Illegitimacy and identity threat in (inter)action: Predicting intergroup orientations among minority members. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 48*, 755–775.
- Martinovic, B., & Verkuyten, M. (2014). The political downside of dual identity: Group identifications and political mobilization of Muslim minorities. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 53*, 711–730.
- Reicher, S. (2004). The context of social identity: Domination, resistance, and change. *Political Psychology, 25*, 921–945.
- Roccas, S., Klar, Y., & Liviatan, I. (2006). The paradox of group-based guilt: Modes of national identification, conflict vehemence, and reactions to the in-group's moral violations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91*, 698–711.
- Sachdev, I., & Bourhis, R. Y. (1991). Power and status differentials in minority and majority group relations. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 21*, 1–24.
- Saha, L. J. (2000). Political activism and civic education among Australian secondary school students. *Australian Journal of Education, 44*, 155–174.
- Schwartz, S. H., & Huismans, S. (1995). Value priorities and religiosity in four western religions. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 58*, 88–107.
- Sidel, J. T. (2006). *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad. Religious Violence in Indonesia*. New York, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Simon, B., & Grabow, O. (2010). The politicization of migrants: Further evidence that politicized collective identity is a dual identity. *Political Psychology, 31*, 717–738.
- Simon, B., & Klandermans, B. (2001). Politicized collective identity: A social psychological analysis. *American Psychologist, 56*, 319–331.
- Simon, S., Reichert, F., & Grabow, O. (2013). When dual identity becomes a liability: Identity and political radicalism among migrants. *Psychological Science, 24*, 251–257.
- Simon, B., & Ruhs, D. (2008). Identity and politicization among Turkish migrants in Germany: The role of dual identification. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95*, 1354–1366.
- Statistics Indonesia. (2010). Population by region and religion. Retrieved from <http://bps.go.id>.
- Sterkens, C., & Hadiwitanto, H. (2009). From social to religious conflict in Ambon. An analysis of the origin of religious inspired violence. In C. Sterkens, M. Machasin, & F. Wijnen. *Religion, civil society and conflict in Indonesia* (pp. 59–86). Berlin, Germany: Lit Verlag.
- Sterkens, C., Kanas, A., Subagya, T., Pamungkas, C., Thijs, P., & Scheepers, P. (2014). *Ethno-religious Conflicts in Indonesia. Documentation of surveys on ethno-religious identity and latent intergroup conflict (DANS Data Guide 12)*. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

- Tausch, N., Becker, J., Spears, R., Christ, O., Saab, R., Singh, P., & Siddiqui, R. N. (2011). Explaining radical group behaviour: Developing emotion and efficacy routes to normative and non-normative collective action. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101*, 129–148.
- Van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2008). Toward an integrative social identity model of collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives. *Psychological Bulletin, 134*, 504–535.
- Verba, S., Burns, N., & Schlozman, K. L. (1997). Knowing and caring about politics: Gender and political engagement. *Journal of Politics, 59*, 1051–1072.
- Verkuyten, M. (2007). Religious group identification and inter-religious relations: A study among Turkish-Dutch Muslims. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 10*, 341–357.
- Zaal, M. P., Laar, C. V., Ståhl, T., Ellemers, N., & Derks, B. (2011). By any means necessary: The effects of regulatory focus and moral conviction on hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 50*, 670–689.

### Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

**Table A1.** Predicting Support for Protest and Violence on Behalf of the Religious Ingroup: Interactions with Majority Status