

This is an important book that makes extensive use of British and US archival sources, including collections of personal papers. Eisenhower's correspondence with his long-time friend Swede Hazlett provides some particularly revealing insights into the president's thinking. The author's forcefully argued presentation of Eisenhower contrasts with more avuncular portrayals of 'Ike'. While coverage is weighted more heavily towards the US side, it still lucidly illustrates Anglo-American differences in approach to communism in the 1950s. The book will therefore be of interest to scholars of high-level diplomacy as well as US and British foreign policy.

Andrew Holt

The National Archives, UK

Eirini Karamouzi, *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974–1979: The Second Enlargement*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014; xi + 258 pp.; £60.00 hbk; ISBN 9781137331328

In the heat of recent debates about a possible exit of Greece from the European Union, the reasons why Greece was admitted to the European Economic Community (EEC) in the first place are easily overlooked. As Eirini Karamouzi states in her book *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1975–1979*, even 'former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing...dived into the fray to admit that supporting Greek membership had been a mistake' (p. 1). Giscard d'Estaing had, however, warmly welcomed Greece into the EEC in 1981. The temptation to interpret history with hindsight therefore makes a level-headed and sophisticated account of Greece's entry into the EEC even more imperative. This is exactly what Karamouzi's book on the Greek accession to the EEC offers its readers, while also focusing on the importance of the second enlargement for the EEC as a whole.

Karamouzi convincingly shows that the Greek application to the EEC in June 1975 made sense at the time. Drawing on a wide range of sources from the EEC, four EEC member states, Greece and the United States of America, the author explains the Greek motives for ardently desiring to join the EU as well as the diplomatic bargaining between Greece and the EEC. When Constantinos Karamanlis had become prime minister in late 1974 after the collapse of the military junta, he regarded Greek membership to the EEC as a lifeline to safeguard Greece's nascent democracy. The argument, nevertheless, worked both ways. On the one hand Karamanlis convinced the other EEC members that democracy might not survive in Greece if the country could not be tied to the Western Camp through joining the EEC. This was a particularly sensitive issue within the Cold War environment, since Greece had recently withdrawn from the military structures of NATO in order not to further inflame the dispute with Turkey over Cyprus. On the other hand, the EEC members felt a particular responsibility to Greece as the cradle of democracy. Karamouzi's account of the way in which

Karamanlis stimulated the other EEC members to identify the EEC with democratic rather than economic values, thus contributing to the EEC's transformation, is compelling. It also vindicates the refreshing emphasis on political manoeuvring rather than economic detail.

The negotiations *between* Greece and the EEC members, and *among* the EEC members themselves, which eventually lasted more than three years, form the core of this book. Karamouzi reveals the split between the apparent enthusiasm from the European community, whose (prime) ministers hastened to welcome Greece in the EEC-fold, and the European commission, which forced Greece to struggle with long-drawn-out procedures and technical details. The political will of the nine EEC members and the flexibility of Greece, whose negotiating team paid increasing attention to detail, ultimately led to the green light for Greek accession in December 1978. The Greek application to join the EEC nevertheless touched on a wide range of sensitive issues. The impending applications of the ex-dictatorships Spain and Portugal, for which Greek accession would form a precedent, were particularly controversial. This was hardly appealing to the existing Mediterranean EEC members, France and Italy, who needed to defend their own agricultural interests within the community. Defying the common image of France as Greece's staunchest supporter, Karamouzi shows that Germany was in fact instrumental in forcing the final break-through.

In her conclusion, Karamouzi really comes into her own by debunking a few conventional wisdoms on the Greek accession, and by drawing lessons for the present day. The author rightly stresses the merits of the 'community-centred approach', which enables her to treat the Greek accession in its full complexity. Although this approach has been pioneered by Piers Ludlow, Karamouzi is the first to apply it to Greece, whose accession has gained little attention to date, and, if so, only from a national perspective. The community-centred approach also highlights the importance of the second enlargement, which formed a kind of test-run for the enlargements to follow. It gave birth to ideas, which 'provided a reference point in the transformation of the EEC into the European Union' (p. 194). The process that Karamouzi traces is both multi-layered and dynamic, which prompts 'a reconsideration of the term "eurosclerosis"' (p. 195), as has become a trend in recent historiography.

Karamouzi's account therefore goes much further than offering an explanation of the Greek accession to the EEC. The Cold War, the Greek-Turkish dispute, the US role in Europe, and the impending accession of Portugal and Spain are all treated with due care. Karamouzi succeeds in dealing with all these questions at both the national and the institutional level, while also treating the tensions between the European Council and the European Commission as well as those between rhetoric and reality. Drawing the picture in its full complexity, the author still unravels all the threads and leaves the reader with an illuminating account. This is an account from which we can learn a lot today, not merely because it sheds a different light on Greece's place in the EU, which should not be solely linked with

economic aspects. It also shows how EU-enlargement is about more than just the accession of one individual new member state, since the accession will inadvertently transform the institution itself. This book is a contribution to new Cold War history as well as the history of European Integration, while also going to the roots of issues that are relevant for the present day.

Laurien Crump

University of Utrecht, the Netherlands