Cultural Integration in the Muslim Second Generation in the Netherlands: The Case of Gender Ideology

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In the Netherlands, relations between Muslims and non-Muslims have become polarized around issues of religion and gender. On the basis of a dataset with 669 parent–child dyads, we assess attitudes among the second generation concerning the gendered division of paid work and family responsibilities, that is, gender ideology, as compared to their parents. The aggregate picture indicates movement toward more egalitarian attitudes, indicating mainstream assimilation. At the same time, a sizable subgroup turns out to be more traditional than their parents, indicative of reactive ethnicity. Embeddedness in the ethnic community and education are shown to explain part of these divergent patterns.

INTRODUCTION

The cultural integration of the second generation has become an increasingly important topic for research and policy in many European countries. Images of parallel societies under development are opposed in many accounts to notions of cultural assimilation into the receiving society over generations (Kelek 2005). The concern increasingly centers on Muslim groups in Western Europe (Leiken 2011). They are at the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy, and regarded as outsiders by host populations, even as the prototypical "other." It is not only in perception that the Muslim minority groups are somehow different. There is empirical evidence indicating that Muslims and non-Muslims in Western countries differ strongly in their values, and also frequently disapprove of each other's way

[Minor typographical changes have been made to this article since it was first published.]

of life (Gijsberts and Lubbers 2009). The Netherlands is a prototypical example of a country in which relations between Muslims and non-Muslims have become polarized. The Netherlands, like much of Europe originally Christian but increasingly secular, has seen an influx of immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries such as Turkey and Morocco since the 1960s. Almost all of the approximately 850,000 Muslims currently living in the Netherlands, around 5 percent of the population, have an immigration background (Van Herten 2009). Compared to the majority, this religious minority is relatively religious, in both institutional affiliation and practice (Te Riele 2009). The polarization between the majority and the Muslim minority mainly revolves around issues of religion, and gender ideology has become a focal point (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2008). A striking percentage of native Dutch for instance view Islam as associated with the suppression of women (in a nationally representative survey held in 2006, 92 percent of the native Dutch agreed that Muslim men dominate their wives — Gijsberts and Lubbers 2009, 272); Conversely, about half of Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch feel that Dutch women are too free (Gijsberts and Lubbers 2009, 274). Perceived differences in attitudes and values between Muslim minorities and the Dutch majority are regularly played out in politics and media, who increasingly frame Islam as a threat (Roggeband and Vliegenthart 2007). Parties with strong anti-immigrant agendas, who capitalize on ideas of incompatibility between majority and minorities, have grown explosively since the late 1990s, with far-right Party of Freedom becoming the third party in Dutch Parliament in 2010.

   In this polarized setting, the Moroccan and Turkish second generation (immigrants' children who were either born in the Netherlands or arrived at young ages) is currently coming of age. Mostly growing up with parents who have low socio-economic status and little or no education, the second generation is achieving higher levels of education and better positions in the workforce (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2010). Belonging to Dutch society, the second generation frequently comes into contact with the Dutch majority in the neighborhood, at school, and/or at work. However, given the large size of these minorities, subgroups may be embedded in co-ethnic communities in daily life, which are also frequently co-religious given the high level of religious membership among these groups (>90% consider themselves to be Muslim) (Maliepaard, Gijsberts, and Lubbers 2012). The potentially dual face of the second generation, oriented toward the secular majority and the ethno-religious minority, pro-

vides a strong rationale for studying the contested topic of gender ideology in the Netherlands. In this study, we focus on gender ideology as the belief in gendered social spheres, reflected in individuals' levels of support for a division of paid work and family responsibilities, following Davis and Greenstein (2009).

On the basis of a unique dataset consisting of parent–child dyads of immigrants and their offspring, we assess gender ideologies of youthful members of the Moroccan and Turkish second generation in the Netherlands, as compared to their Muslim parents. We consider how education and interethnic contacts, on the one hand, and the home environment and the ethnic and religious communities, on the other, influence the ways in which the second generation changes in comparison to its parents. Given the polarization between Muslims and non-Muslims on topics of religion and gender as discussed above, the Netherlands provides a critical test case. The study allows us to draw conclusions about the relative strength of cultural assimilation, ethno-religious conservatism, and reactive ethnicity for the second generation and about the forces at work in these forms of incorporation.

DIVERGENT FORMS OF INCORPORATION

In both sociological and social psychological literatures, volumes have been written about the ways by which immigrants and their offspring are incorporated into host societies after migration. The processes by which incorporation occurs, and the speed at which it happens, have been shown to differ across ethnic groups and host societies (Castles and Miller 2009). Children of immigrants often gradually move in the direction of the mainstream in domains such as education and the labor market, in line with expectations from assimilation theory. The well-developed theory of mainstream assimilation can serve to identify some key issues for an analysis of gender ideologies. The theory focuses on the degree to which immigrants and their children converge with the mainstream of the host society and identifies a series of mechanisms that can lead to a "decline, and at its endpoint the disappearance, of an ethnic/racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express it" (Alba and Nee 2003, 11). Mainstream assimilation is thought to be a gradual, partly unintended process, which takes place both within the individual life course and across generation, especially between the first and the second (Gans 1973; Lieberson 1973; Alba 1999, 2005).

The theory of segmented assimilation alerts us that all portions of the second generation may not be moving in the direction of the mainstream (Portes and Zhou 1993). In the US context, the theory posits the existence of two pathways that are alternatives to mainstream assimilation: a pluralist pathway associated with upward mobility; and a downward one of assimilation into a racialized minority status (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). The pluralist pathway suggests the attractiveness of the ethnic community and its culture for some members of the second generation. The last pathway, leading to a hardening minority status, entails encounters with prejudice and discrimination that stimulate a reactive and defiant assertion of ethnic difference.

In the European context, there is some evidence for reactive ethnicity of the second generation in the strengthening of Islam-based identities in confrontation with the prejudices of the majority (Fleischmann, Phalet, and Klein 2011), which also seems to be exemplified in such instances as the young second-generation men who follow a much more fundamental interpretation of Islam than their parents ever did (Buijs, Demant, and Hamdy 2006). The existence of reactive ethnicity indicates that an analysis of gender ideologies must acknowledge the possibility of intergenerational movement away from the mainstream and to less egalitarian norms.

Gender ideology is an appropriate domain for studying immigrant-group incorporation in Europe. World Values Surveys indicate that, on average, Muslims subscribe to less egalitarian gender ideologies than non-Muslims (Inglehart and Norris 2003), and this finding has also been supported for Muslim immigrants in Western Europe (Diehl, König, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Inglehart and Norris 2009). In the Netherlands, large differences can be observed between a number of immigrant groups and the majority when it comes to gender ideologies. Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch (the vast majority of which are Muslim) form the most conservative groups, and the native Dutch the least conservative. Other groups, such as migrants from the former colonies, are somewhere in-between. The Netherlands Institute for Social Research showed that in 2004, 28 percent of Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch agreed with the statement that "if a husband does not want his wife to work, she should accept this," whereas a mere 3 percent of the native Dutch agreed. This is not to say that the Dutch endorse a fully egalitarian worldview; when it comes to distribution of tasks, a third of the native Dutch feel that women should be responsible for the household. At the same time, the gap between the groups remains, because two-thirds of Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch

agree with this sentiment, a fraction that includes members of both the first and second generations (SCP 2005a). Assimilation toward the mainstream, in terms of value and attitudinal adaptation, would be expected to lead to more egalitarian gender ideology when second generation children are compared to their first generation parents. The conservative pluralist pathway would be followed by youngsters who adhere closely to their parents' views, while reactive ethnicity, by contrast, would mean that some parts of the second generation become not more, but less egalitarian when compared to their parents.

In an empirical analysis, a question arises: how can one distinguish this tripartite divergence from mere random scatter around the reference point given by parental gender ideology?[1] Obviously, random scatter occurs, but to the extent that the ideological divergence of the child generation is predictable from other variables according to theory one can be confident that distinct forms of incorporation have been observed.

The Ambiguous Role of Education

Empirical studies, mainly in the field of sociology, have provided evidence that the pace of assimilation depends on certain individual and contextual characteristics. One important catalyst of assimilation is held to be education, especially for the second generation. For young people of this generation, schools serve as the main representative of the mainstream society and culture. The more highly educated from immigrant backgrounds mix in the mainstream more easily (Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Nee 2003), and come into contact, if only in the school setting, with people outside the ethnic community. Education is expected to have a strong effect on gender ideology for two reasons. Firstly, higher education is generally associated with more egalitarian values, acceptance of difference, and openness on moral issues (Thornton and Freedman 1979; Fan and Marini 2000; Wang and Buffalo 2004). Thus, education is also expected to have an effect on gender ideologies. A second reason to expect a positive education effect is that partaking in the educational system of a coun-

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[1]That is to say, the more egalitarian their parents are, the less likely children will be to express more egalitarian attitudes than they do (and vice versa). This should be understood as a form of regression to the mean. In addition, when parents score extremely high or low on the attitudes scale, the children's difference from them will be constrained as a function of scale limits.

try gives students insights into the values of the host society. In the Dutch educational system, this should happen after primary school, when early tracking into (lower) vocational and (higher) academic tracks begins. This tracking sorts students by social characteristics as well as academic ones: An overrepresentation of immigrant-origin children is found in vocational schools, while pupils in academic tracks are much more likely to encounter children from native Dutch families in the classroom (Statistics Netherlands 2012). Thus, for migrant children in higher tracks, the educational effect may be enhanced because egalitarian values are reinforced by the system and by classmates. This would be in addition to the "reflexive" skills that are taught in the higher tracks.

However, an alternative conception of the role of education is possible. A substantial body of evidence establishes that higher status members of vulnerable minority groups come into greater contact with, and react more negatively to, the prejudice and discrimination of the majority. This is referred to as the integration paradox in the European literature (Buijs, Demant, and Hamdy 2006). Because the higher status members speak the mainstream's language and follow its media and politics, they are more aware of group differences and of prejudice and discrimination in society (Gijsberts and Vervoort 2009; Ten Teije, Coenders, and Verkuyten 2012). As a result, one could argue that this group is prone to reactive ethnicity or religiosity. This generalization accords with the journalistic observation that many of the most fervent Islamists of the European second generation have university educations (Baruma 2006; Leiken 2011). When facing the majority's gender ideologies, it may be particularly this group that responds by withdrawing into a reactive pattern or holding onto the conservative views of parents.

We therefore hold open our expectations about the relationship of education to more egalitarian gender ideologies. We expect that the three patterns posited by segmented assimilation are taking place in the second generation in the Netherlands, and the overall relationship of education to gender ideologies will reflect in large part the relative weight of these processes. A positive relationship — for example, higher education is linked to a more egalitarian ideology — will be evidence in support of a predominance of mainstream assimilation, while its absence will indicate the importance of other patterns of incorporation.

The Pivotal Role of the Family

Parents transmit attitudes and values to their children by explicitly teaching them about their culture, norms, and values. In addition, children internalize attitudes and learn through observation and imitation of parents' actions (Bandura 1986). For children therefore, parents form the main socializing agents (Glass, Bengtson, and Dunham 1986). Although not all attitudes are transmitted equally strongly from parents to children, gender ideologies have been found to be successfully transmitted from one generation to the next (Moen, Erickson, and Dempster-McClain 1997; Bucx, Raaijmakers, and van Wel 2010). Among minority populations, socialization practices serve the function of maintaining strong ethnic or religious group ties in the face of external pressures, and are therefore expected to be particularly strong in an immigration context (Bankston and Zhou 1997; Chong 1998). Given the deep imprint of parents on their children's gender ideology, we use their attitudes as the measuring stick for those of their children: When the children are noticeably more egalitarian than those of their parents, we view the children as shifting in the direction of the mainstream; when the children are noticeably more traditional, as shifting away from it, in a reactive stance. Alternatively, parents and children may be in agreement.

Parents can influence their children directly, by inculcating their values and living according to them, but a second route of influence can be described as "channeling" (Martin, White, and Perlman 2003). Parents exercise some choice over the environment in which the child is brought up and the activities the child engages in. One domain in which channeling occurs is religion. Religious parents may place their children into Qur'an classes and demand regular mosque attendance. Although gender egalitarianism is not itself part of religion in the narrow sense, more religious individuals (both Christian and Muslim) have been shown to hold on average more traditional gender ideologies. Muslim migrants are relatively successful in transmitting religious observance to their children (Güngör, Fleischmann, and Phalet 2011; Maliepaard and Lubbers 2012). Children of more religious parents are more likely to be religiously active themselves.

The choice of neighborhood (another form of channeling) also affects the circumstances in which children grow up, the people they meet, and to some extent the schools they go to (although, in the Nether-

lands, children are not required to attend school in their own neighborhood). Neighborhoods range from consisting of almost fully native Dutch residents to housing a population that is more than 90 percent non-Western immigrants and their children. The make-up of the neighborhood also affects what role models children are exposed to when growing up. In addition, in neighborhoods with more co-ethnics, there tends to be more social control, affecting behavioral outcomes (Van Kerckem, Van de Putte, and Stevens 2013).

Given the (average) difference in gender ideology between Muslim minorities and the native Dutch, being embedded in ethno-religious communities, either in the mosque or in the neighborhood, is likely to reinforce traditional ideas among second generation youth, making a shift to mainstream less likely.

A Critical Audience? The Role of Interethnic Contact

Peers are a potent force in the life of the youthful second generation, and the people adolescents choose to spend time with socially both indicate their views and open them to various influences. In addition to the ethnic communities in which the children from immigrant homes are embedded, they are also increasingly part of the host society and frequently come into sustained contact with native Dutch. From the perspective of assimilation theory, the entry of ethnic minorities into relationships with mainstream peers represents an especially significant form of assimilation (Gordon 1964). When children from immigration backgrounds come into sustained contact with host society peers, they are exposed to the values prevalent in the host society. We therefore expect that adolescents who spend more time with native Dutch peers will be more likely to shift toward the mainstream in terms of their gender ideology; by contrast, if social ties are limited to co-ethnics, this may be a sign of retreat in the face of societal hostility into a protective ethnic social life.

METHODS

To study the transmission of gender ideology, we stack two waves of the Social Positions and Use of Welfare Facilities by Ethnic Minorities surveys (SPVA 1998, 2002). These data were gathered in 1998 and 2002 among the four largest minority groups in the Netherlands, of Turkish, Moroccan, Antillean, and Surinamese descent. Larger cities were overrepresented

in the data, as this is where most migrants live. Migrants in the data are from 13 cities (including the four largest cities), in which 48 percent of migrants live (SCP 2005b). We use only the Turkish and Moroccan respondents, the vast majority of whom are Muslim (Maliepaard, Gijsberts, and Lubbers 2012). In the Dutch statistics, one is Turkish or Moroccan when one is either born in Turkey/Morocco, or when one is born in the Netherlands and has one or two parents from Turkey/Morocco. In our sample, the vast majority (>99%) of this cohort has parents who are both from Turkey or Morocco. Participants were interviewed face-to-face via computer-assisted personal interviewing. Only those participants who were foreign-born and not fluent in Dutch were interviewed in their native languages by bilingual interviewers. The response rate was around 50 percent for the Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch group. This is comparable to other research among ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands.

SPVA data were collected among heads of households, their spouses, and children over the age of 12. Not all respondents received the same questionnaire: In each household, one of the parents and one of the children received a longer questionnaire, including items on religion, intermarriage, and gender attitudes. Our analyses are based on the individuals who received the longer questionnaire (973 dyads). We chose to exclude children who migrated to the Netherlands after the age of six (20% of the sample), so that all second-generation respondents in the analysis attained their education and spent most of their formative period in the Netherlands. We think that the processes we theorize refer specifically to the experiences of the second generation being raised in the Netherlands, and apply to a lesser extent to individuals who migrated to the Netherlands after early childhood. Also excluded were respondents younger than 15 years, an age threshold selected to assure that the child's educational track had been determined. After these selections, we were left with 669 parent–child dyads. The number of missing values was generally low, except on education and social contacts.[2] Missing values on the independent variables were imputed by ICE in Stata.

[2]The higher percentage of missing data on these items (around 20%) is because these questions were asked in a part of a separate questionnaire that, accidentally, not all the respondents received. This happened about equally in both 1998 and 2002 among Turkish and Moroccan respondents. We therefore assume these values are missing at random. Analyses were run on both the imputed and the non-imputed data and the outcomes are very similar. We use the imputed data to preserve cases.

Due to data constraints, parental attitudes and neighborhood composition are measured at the same time as the child's attitudes.

Measures

Gender ideology was measured, both for parents and children, by using a scale of six items, concerning division of household tasks and participation in the labor market for men and women (see Appendix A). All items range from "completely agree" (traditional, high gender differentiation) to "completely disagree" (egalitarian, low differentiation) on a five-point Likert scale. The items form a scale, with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.74 for children and 0.73 for parents. The mean of the six items is taken, and higher scores indicate attitudes favoring more gender equality.

The dependent variable, intended to measure movement toward or away from the mainstream, is based on the gender ideology of the child relative to that of the parent, operationalized as the difference between the two. We treat the difference as a three-category variable measuring the shift of the child relative to the position of the parent. When the difference indicated that a respondent differed from the parent on the sum score by the value of a single response category or less (i.e., when the absolute value of the difference is no more than one-sixth, or 0.17, as the gender-ideology measure is a sum of six items), then the two are coded as similar (0). When a respondent holds more egalitarian attitudes than the parent (indicated by a positive difference score larger than -0.17), we code the child as deviating positively from the parent (1). When a respondent holds less egalitarian attitudes than the parent (indicated by a negative difference score below -0.17), we code the child as deviating negatively (-1).

We operationalize the *education* of the children to distinguish between the different secondary-school tracks in the Netherlands: the lower, vocational track and the higher tracks that prepare for tertiary education. We chose this approach because of the age of the respondents. The mean age of our second-generation respondents is 18, and 37 percent are still in school. Therefore, for a substantial part of the sample we cannot yet know their ultimate educational attainment. But secondary-school track is very determinative of the quantity and quality of education, as well as of the exposure to native Dutch peers in the classroom. The Dutch system separates students among educational

tracks in the first year of high school.[3] There are three tracks. The lowest is a four-year vocational lower secondary track (VMBO), preparing for higher vocational school (MBO) or the labor market. The second (five-year) and third (six-year) levels prepare students for tertiary education (either technical college or university). Upward mobility between tracks is possible, but is relatively unattractive, given that additional schooling is required (at least one additional year). The vocational secondary track is increasingly unattractive to native Dutch students — on the one hand because it channels them into less prosperous career paths and, on the other hand, because of the overrepresentation of minority children (see Stevens et al. 2011 for a review on ethnic inequality in education in the Netherlands). In our analyses, we differentiate between high education (intermediate or high level of high school, college and university) and lower education (vocational secondary school or higher vocational school).

Interethnic contact is measured among the children by combining two items: whether respondents ever spend their free time with native Dutch people (yes/no) and (if the answer is yes) the follow-up question "In your free time, do you have more contact with native Dutch people than with Turks/Moroccans, or do have more contact with Turks/Moroccans?", measured on a three-point scale. These two items were recoded into a four-point scale: 1 "no social contact with native Dutch people"; 2 "more contact with your own ethnic group than with Dutch people"; 3 "with Dutch and own ethnic group equally"; and 4 "more social contact with native Dutch people than with people of one's own ethnic group." The average score among the children is 2.6, both indicating that on average, Muslim minorities have more social contact within than outside their ethnic group.

Neighborhood composition is measured at the four-digit zip-code level. An average zip-code area has 3,800 inhabitants (Statistics Netherlands 2014). Our dataset includes 294 zip-code areas. The data on the ethnic composition of the neighborhood was derived from Statistics Netherlands and matched to the individuals in the dataset. We know the percentage of

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[3]In some schools, tracking occurs in the first year. In other schools, students are first tracked into either the lower/intermediate level or the intermediate/higher level, and are tracked into the lower, intermediate or higher level after the first year. In our analyses, students who were in mixed lower/intermediate tracks ($N = 19$) were classified into the low-education group.

TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	Range	Mean	SD
Turkish	0/1	0.59	0.49
Female	0/1	0.50	0.50
Age	15–39	18.23	3.31
Gender ideology	1–5	3.53	0.71
Gender ideology parents	1–5	3.06	0.75
Mosque attendance	1–4	2.18	0.99
Academic education track	0/1	0.26	0.44
Interethnic contact	1–4	2.58	0.83
% Native Dutch in neighborhood	12–88	50.38	20.41

Note: $N = 669$.

majority Dutch living in the neighborhood of each respondent at the year of survey. This percentage ranges from 12 percent to 88 percent. As all children questioned live with their parents, the neighborhood composition should be seen as a family characteristic.

Mosque attendance is measured among the children on a scale from one to four, where one indicates no attendance, and four (at least) weekly attendance. The small number of non-religious children in the data (2% non-religious) was given the value of one for attendance. All respondents have self-identified Muslim parents.[4]

In addition, we include the gender, age, and ethnic background of the child. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1.

## GENDER IDEOLOGIES OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN

We start by looking at some descriptive analyses (see Table 1) to determine the nature of the changes, if any, between the generations. Second-generation respondents score a 3.5 on average (SD 0.71), indicating a position between neutral and agreement with statements favoring egalitar-

[4]Mosque attendance may not be the ideal measure of religiosity among Muslim groups given the fact that it is not compulsory for women. In our data, women attend the mosque less frequently than men do ($M_{women} = 1.96$; $M_{men} = 2.37$), but 64 percent of women do attend the mosque. This, in addition to previous studies which have shown that mosque attendance forms a fitting scale with other indicators of religious practice (Maliepaard and Phalet 2012), indicates that attendance is a valid measure of religious involvement. Additional analyses indicate that attendance does not interact with gender in predicting gender ideology, supporting the position that the effect of mosque attendance is not gender-specific.

ian gender ideology. Parents take on average a more neutral position on the scale (Mean 3.1, SD 0.75). At the aggregate level, a shift toward more egalitarian gender attitudes between generations can thus be seen. At the individual level, we also see this shift: the majority, 58 percent, of respondents takes a more egalitarian stance than their parents, although a relatively large 20 percent are more traditional than their parents. Twenty-two percent score the same as parents (i.e., no more than one response category different in the aggregate). These numbers suggest that there is a moderate trend toward more egalitarian values. At the same time, there is a significant countertrend toward more traditional gender values, and an equally significant intergenerational stability.

These impressions are strengthened by a more detailed, graphical examination of distributions and simple relationships. Figure I shows the distribution of the attitudinal difference between parents and their children. This distribution is clearly asymmetrical: its mode, rising sharply above the rest of the distribution, contains the cases that we score as children similar to parents (scores within 0.17 of each other). Apparently, a substantial fraction of children reiterate their parents' views. But the mean of the distribution is well to the right of the mode, as more than half of the youth express more egalitarian attitudes than their parents. The bulk of the distribution, in other words, reflects the intergenerational trend toward more egalitarian attitudes.

Figure I.   **Deviation in Gender Ideology of Children from Their Parents (bar width 0.17)**

Also informative is the relationship between parental attitudes and children's differences from parents. The simple correlation between the attitudes of parents and children indicates a moderately positive relation between the two ($r = 0.25$). In other words, the more egalitarian the attitudes of parents, the more egalitarian are the attitudes of their children. However, when we examine the relationship between parental attitudes and the *difference* of children from their parents, we find a contrary pattern. To begin with, there is a pronounced negative relationship between the two variables: that is, the more (or less) liberal the attitudes of parents, the less (or more) likely children are to express more liberal attitudes than they do. This pattern can be understood as a form of regression to the mean. In addition, when the parents' score on the attitudes scale reach an extreme on the scale, it is obvious that the children's difference from them is constrained as a function of scale limits. Taking these effects into account requires controlling for the parental score in our analysis.[5]

In addition, there is evidence of a subgroup of children moving away from their parents in a decidedly less egalitarian direction, evidence that we take as a sign of reaction formation. In a diagram of data points, a substantial number of them fall well below the implicit regression line. The number of these points is in excess of what would happen by chance and is not balanced by an approximately equal number of points far away from the line in a positive direction.

In sum, the distributional and graphical evidence suggests that several patterns are involved: First, many children adhere to the gender ideology of their parents. Second, many youth have moved away from the parental milieu in the direction of more egalitarian attitudes; Third, a smaller number of children have adopted less egalitarian stances than their parents. Finally, there is considerable randomness in the children's expressions of gender attitudes, which pivot around the attitudes encountered at home. Given the random aspects, the test of the meaningfulness and

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[5]In the multinomial logistic regression analyses presented in Table 2, there is a negative relationship between the parental score on the gender-ideology index and the difference between children and parents; in other words, the more the parent scores toward either end of the index, the greater the chance that the child will score in the opposite direction. This effect is significant and strong in relation to each possible odds. To reiterate, it captures the regression to the mean that is part of the random dispersion of children's attitudes around those of their parents.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW

TABLE 2
MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSES

	Mainstream Assimilation versus Stability		Mainstream Assimilation versus Reactive Ethnicity		Stability versus Reactive Ethnicity	
	B (SE)	Exp (B)	B (SE)	Exp (B)	B (SE)	Exp (B)
Turkish	0.313 (0.236)	1.37	−0.213 (0.290)	0.81	−0.526 (0.283)[#]	0.59
Female	0.659 (0.235)**	1.93	1.299 (0.288)***	3.67	0.641 (0.298)	1.90
Age	−0.003 (0.035)[#]	1.00	0.008 (0.041)	1.01	0.011 (0.041)	1.01
% Native Dutch in neighborhood	0.006 (0.005)	1.00	0.010 (0.006)[#]	1.01	0.004 (0.006)	1.00
Mosque attendance	−0.286 (0.119)*	0.75	−0.475 (0.145)**	0.62	−0.189 (0.141)	0.83
Academic education track	0.125 (0.248)	1.13	0.681 (0.315)*	1.98	0.556 (0.325)	1.74
Interethnic contact	0.317 (0.143)*	1.37	0.608 (0.179)**	1.84	0.290 (0.178)	1.34

Notes: Parental gender ideology and the gender of the parent who completed the questionnaire are also controlled. $N = 666$; Pseudo $R^2 = 0.23$.
[#]$p < 0.10$, *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.

strength of the three patterns is whether we can predict them from the key independent variables we earlier identified.

EXPLAINING THE THREE PATTERNS

As we are interested in the heterogeneity within the second generation as compared to its parents, with some youth moving in a more egalitarian direction and others moving the opposite way, we employ multinomial logistic regression, where the independent variables predict the odds involving the three categories of parental–child difference described earlier. Table 2 presents the logistic regression coefficients for all three odds. The odds are arranged so that positive logistic coefficients indicate effects in the direction of more egalitarian attitudes.

One of the strongest effects in Table 2 is associated with gender itself. The young women of the second generation are substantially more likely than their brothers to be shifting away from parents toward more egalitarian gender attitudes (although descriptive analyses indicate that 59 percent of sons also shift to more egalitarian attitudes compared to their own parents). Being female has a significantly positive effect on each odds. For instance, compared with the young men, young women are almost twice as likely ($e^{0.66} = 1.93$) to hold more egalitarian attitudes than their parents than to agree with them. This finding, moreover, holds regardless of the parent whose attitudes were collected in the study; it is not weak-

ened, in other words, when young women are compared with their mothers instead of their fathers.[6]

Variables that reflect exposure to the mainstream Dutch society generally also are associated with attitudinal shift toward more egalitarian attitudes. The educational track in which the second generation is enrolled is one of these. Being on an academic track is especially important in reducing the latter risk, that is, the likelihood of deviating from parents in a less egalitarian direction. It is not consequential for the distinction between shifting toward the mainstream versus holding attitudes like those of parents. In comparison with youth educated on a vocational track, the youth on academic tracks have odds of holding more egalitarian attitudes than their parents (rather than more conservative attitudes) that are twice as great.

Another form of exposure to the mainstream is through the development of interethnic social contacts. Young Muslims who engage in more frequent contact with majority group members are more likely to shift in the direction of more egalitarian gender attitudes than parents have and are less likely to shift in a more traditional direction. To put the effect in its strongest form, each additional step on the four-point scale increases by 84 percent the odds of expressing more rather than less egalitarianism than parents. This implies that the socially most integrated respondents have odds more than six times higher ($e^{3*0.61} = 6.23$) than the least integrated respondents.

Finally, there is a modest effect of neighborhood context. Living in a more mixed neighborhood significantly influences only one odds: that of expressing a more, rather than less, egalitarian gender ideology than parents. The greater the percentage of native Dutch residents in the neighborhood, the higher the odds of expressing more egalitarian attitudes. The effect is modest, but not trivial. A standard deviation in neighborhood composition is 20 percentage points; an increase in the Dutch neighborhood percentage of this size raises the odds of holding more egalitarian attitudes by 22 percent ($e^{20*0.010} = 1.22$).

If exposure to the Dutch mainstream is associated with movement toward a more egalitarian gender ideology, or at least avoidance of a more traditional stance than parents, clearly the reverse direction on the expo-

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[6]Mothers are more egalitarian on average than fathers are, $M_{Fathers}$: 2.99; $M_{Mothers}$: 3.17; t (699) = 3.18, $p < 0.001$. But although the levels differ, the effects on the child do not depend on the gender of the parent.

sure variables has the opposite effects. One additional measure of embedd-
edness in the ethno-religious community connects to more traditional
gender attitudes. The frequency of mosque attendance is consistently asso-
ciated with deviations in a less egalitarian direction. The largest of these
effects occurs for the odds of being more rather than less egalitarian than
parents. Each step of increase in frequency reduces these odds by a factor
of 0.48; alternatively put, the least frequent mosque attenders are over
four times more likely than the most frequent attenders to express more
rather than less egalitarian attitudes than their parents.

  Demographic characteristics, such as age and ethnicity, seem to have
little or no effect on the way in which people deviate from their parents.

Additional Analyses of Subgroups

Given that we can predict meaningfully the direction of the relationship
of young persons' attitudes to those of their home environment, the ques-
tion that follows is whether we can predict more precisely where these
attitudes fall on the gender-ideology scale. It only makes sense to attempt
this analysis conditional on the category of the relationship between par-
ent's and child's attitudes, because the multinomial analysis has demon-
strated that the deviations of the children's attitudes from the parents'
display distinct patterns. This type of analysis is necessarily limited by the
smaller number of cases involved in each category and the constrained
variances of the variables, especially the dependent variable. Such an
analysis is most feasible for the youth who express more egalitarian atti-

TABLE 3
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON FILIAL GENDER IDEOLOGY AMONG EGALITARIAN YOUTH

	B (SE)
Constant	4.044 (0.179)***
Turkish	0.017 (0.055)
Female	0.213 (0.056)***
Age	0.002 (0.008)
Gender ideology parents	0.428 (0.040)***
% Native Dutch in neighborhood	−0.001 (0.001)
Father filled out questionnaire	−0.124 (0.052)*
Mosque attendance	−0.081 (0.028)**
Academic education track	0.005 (0.057)
Interethnic contact	0.010 (0.033)

Note: $R^2 = 0.38$, $N = 391$.
*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.

tudes than their parents because this group makes up more than half the sample ($N = 391$). Table 3 presents a regression analysis of their scores on the index of gender attitudes, as a function of key variables.

The results underscore the critical role of the home environment. The attitudinal score of the parent has the strongest effect on that of the child in the Table. For each increase of one point by their parents on the gender-ideology scale, children increase 0.43 points. The young women of the second generation within this subgroup hold more egalitarian gender ideologies than do the young men. The final influence of note evident in Table 3 is associated with religious practice. The more frequent the mosque attendance of youth, the more traditional gender ideologies they hold, even when, as in this case, their attitudes are more egalitarian than those of their parents. This effect suggests that although relatively religious youth may still be affected by the general drift in a more liberal direction of the majority of the second generation, the degree of liberalization of their attitudes is constrained by religious influences.

We use the final empirical piece of the puzzle to give additional support to the notion that reactive ethnicity is implicated in many of the cases of children holding more traditional gender attitudes than their parents. "Reactive ethnicity" is premised on the hypothesis that some members of the second generation, when confronted by prejudice and discrimination in the mainstream society, retreat into a more forceful affirmation of a minority identity as a way of achieving dignity in a hostile context. Regrettably, the SPVA surveys do not include data on the second-generation respondents' perceptions of prejudice and discrimination. In one survey year (2002), however, the parents were asked for their perceptions of the receptivity of Dutch society. The responses to these questions, then, tell us about the home environment of the second generation and whether parents may have emphasized Dutch prejudice and discrimination.

The results indicate that indeed, the home environment of reactive youth differs significantly from that of non-reactive youth. Parents of children in this group perceive significantly more discrimination (both personally and in society), $t(332) = -3.68$; $p < 0.01$. In addition, they more often perceive the Dutch to be unaccepting of minorities, $t(333) = 5.89$; $p < 0.001$. These analyses add to the existing ones, that in households where parents feel more discriminated and less accepted, children are more likely to become reactive in their attitudes. Feelings of exclusion and discrimination thus have a backlash across generations.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

In this paper, we have studied the intergenerational shift in the Muslim population in the Netherlands, toward socio-cultural assimilation, on the one hand and reactive ethnicity, on the other. The picture we have obtained of gender attitudes of second-generation Muslim youth is far from uniform. While the aggregate picture appears to be one of movement toward the more liberal Dutch mainstream, it proves to be a composite of diverse patterns. A majority of the second generation is in fact shifting from the attitudes inculcated at home toward the mainstream. At the same time, significant minorities are maintaining home attitudes or even moving in a more traditional direction. The patterns we find correspond to three pathways specified by segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou 1993); mainstream assimilation, the pluralist pathway, and reactive ethnicity. These are to be sure "noisy" patterns because of randomness in the expression of attitudes at a single moment, but our ability to predict them with measures of exposure to the Dutch mainstream and of embeddedness in an ethno-religious context demonstrates that this diversity of incorporation patterns exists.

Our empirical findings indicate that higher educated members of the second generation are overrepresented in the trend toward more egalitarian attitudes. Also those adolescents who have more interethnic contacts are more likely to be more egalitarian than their parents. Contrary to journalistic accounts of a Muslim elite taking the lead in reactive identity formation, our analyses show that in fact, it is the less advantaged and least socially integrated individuals who turn to less egalitarian gender ideologies. Higher educated Muslims in general are more egalitarian in their gender ideologies, and are more likely to move toward the mainstream in comparison to their parents. European literature on the integration paradox (Gijsberts and Vervoort 2009) highlights the fact that it is particularly the higher educated who feel discriminated against and experiences a lack of acceptance despite their efforts to integrate. It has been argued that as a consequence, structural integration in terms of attainment will not result in increasing cultural integration (Tolsma, Lubbers, and Gijsberts 2012). Our findings do not support this position. Higher educated Muslims are closer to the mainstream in terms of gender ideology, meaning that this group not only integrates structurally, but also in terms of values. These

findings support the notion that integration in certain life domains facilitates integration in other domains.

Parents channel children into certain lifestyles, for instance, by introducing them to a religious community, by choosing where to live, and by sending their children to certain schools. The results indicate that this has consequences for children's gender ideologies. Being more strongly embedded in ethnic networks and, to a lesser extent, living in neighborhoods with high concentrations of co-ethnic group members, increases the odds of taking a more reactive stance among the second generation. Religion also plays an important role in the formation of gender ideologies, which is a common finding across religious groups (Davis and Greenstein 2009). The high levels of religious involvement among Muslims are often used to explain the lower endorsement of egalitarian gender ideologies (Inglehart and Norris 2003), and we show that this also applies to the Muslim second generation in the Netherlands. Our study shows that those members of the second generation who frequently attend the mosque have higher odds of being less egalitarian than their parents. There are indications that in recent years, religious practice is on the rise among the second generation in the Netherlands (Maliepaard and Gijsberts 2012). Given the relation between religion and gender ideology, this aggregate trend toward more religious involvement may affect the aggregate shift in gender ideology between first and second generations uncovered here.

Given the low endorsement of egalitarian gender ideology among parents, and large existing discrepancy between majority and minority in terms of this ideology, it is striking that almost 20 percent of Muslim youngsters are more traditional than their parents. This appears to signal a retreat away from the mainstream and into a more ethno-religious world. It is most characteristic of young men who are not successful in school to live in more heavily immigrant neighborhoods, have mainly social ties within their ethnic group, and attend the mosque with some frequency. These are also individuals whose parents feel that the Dutch society is not accepting or open and perceive higher levels of discrimination. The reactive trend among the second generation toward less egalitarian attitudes is clearly not a statistical artifact, but occurs among a specific subgroup in the young Muslim population. Although we have a sizable total sample, analyzing this highly interesting subgroup in more detail turned out to be difficult given the small number of cases in this group. Additional research is needed to establish when/why some young Muslims

engage in reactive ethnicity. Particularly, we were unable to test whether this process is linked to feelings of exclusion or perceptions of discrimination in Dutch society.

Although men are overrepresented in the "reactive ethnicity" category, and women show a stronger shift to the mainstream in terms of their gender ideology, our analyses do indicate that on average, young Muslim men are also more egalitarian than parents. The shift among men is just less pronounced. This qualifies an earlier finding among German Muslims (Idema and Phalet 2007), that it is only second generation Muslim women (not men) who are becoming more egalitarian.[7]

Finally, this analysis of the European landscape expands upon the picture developed in the migration literature in the United States, which in the theory of segmented assimilation has sketched three possible forms of incorporation. We have shown that, for young Muslims in the Netherlands, cultural incorporation with respect to gender attitudes, a salient dimension of difference between the mainstream and major immigrant-origin groups, does not occur in a uniform manner. While the majority of youth are shifting in the direction of the mainstream, a substantial minority shows signs of reactive ethnicity and appears to be maintaining, or even lengthening, its distance from the mainstream. Although these contrasting developments within a single group probably represent a fairly general pattern for second generations, we suspect that they may be enhanced in Muslim groups and other immigrant groups that are religiously distinctive because religious institutions and ideologies offer a pre-existing cultural template to which youth who despair of their acceptance in the mainstream society can turn. This is an issue that future research on Muslim and non-Muslim second generations in North America and Europe can address.

Our findings also fit with the notion of growing heterogeneity within immigrant-origin groups, which Alba, Jiménez, and Marrow (2014) identify as a hallmark of the current era. These authors foresee an expansion of opportunity for the children of immigrants as the demography of the labor market shifts and, in particular, as the huge post-World War II baby boom cohorts exit from the ages of economic activity. But

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[7]Idema and Phalet studied same-sex dyads, whereas we have mixed-gender parent–child dyads. The fact that we find a shift among young men toward more egalitarian gender attitudes, also as compared to their mothers, indicates that there truly is a shift toward the mainstream.

this expansion will still leave many behind. Our findings potentially prefigure a development that could accompany such an expansion. For we find that gender-attitudinal shifts in the direction of the mainstream are associated with educational success and interethnic contacts, while gender conservatism is linked to lower educational attainment and ethnic closure in friendship. If an expansion of opportunity does indeed arise from predictable demographic changes, then the significance of the contrasting cultural changes we find among second-generation Moroccans and Turks in the Netherlands will grow.

APPENDIX A

ITEMS MEASURING GENDER IDEOLOGY

Do you agree with the following statements about a family? Answer categories range from 1 (completely agree) to 5 (completely disagree)

1   Decisions about major purchases in the end are best taken by the husband
2   Responsibility for the household should lie with the wife
3   It is best if the husband is responsible for the money
4   An education is more important for boys than for girls
5   It is more important for boys than for girls to generate their own income in later life
6   A woman should stop working once she has a child

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