

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Intelligence and National Security

ISSN: 0268-4527 (Print) 1743-9019 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fint20

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To cite this article: Eleni Braat (2016) Recurring Tensions between Secrecy and Democracy: Arguments about the Security Service in the Dutch Parliament, 1975–1995, Intelligence and National Security, 31:4, 532-555, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2015.1048991

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2015.1048991

Intelligence and National Security, 2016
Vol. 31, No. 4, 532–555, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2015.1048991

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ARTICLE

Recurring Tensions between Secrecy and Democracy: Arguments about the Security Service in the Dutch Parliament, 1975–1995

ELENI BRAAT*

ABSTRACT There is a recurring tension between secrecy and democracy. This article analyzes the continually ambiguous relations between intelligence and security agencies and their parliamentary principals. I present a novel conceptual framework to analyze political relations influenced by secrecy. I draw on Albert Hirschman's concepts of exit, voice and loyalty and Max Weber's ideal types of the ethics of conviction and responsibility. The focus is a case study of the Dutch parliament and Security Service between 1975 and 1995. The analysis demonstrates how parliament can deal constructively with the secret services. This depends both on party-political responses to secrecy and strategic responses on the part of the secret services to deteriorating relationships with parliament.

Secrecy evokes varied reactions; persons may refuse to accept it, be irritated or admiring, or display trust and compliance when faced with secrecy. Secrecy in parliament, more specifically, can lead to a range of responses vis-à-vis secret services. It complicates the relationship between parliament and the secret services. Democracy and secrecy do not make a happy match: secret government activities can only be partly controlled by citizens, and a democratic government – by means of citizen rights and constitutional principles – requires a certain degree of publicity. It is nonetheless the case that security and intelligence services both operate in secrecy and exist in democratic regimes.

This paradox arises from the fact that 'intelligence is, in some sense, the last frontier for attempts to democratise previously authoritarian regimes'[1]

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[1]Michael M. Andregg and Peter Gill, 'Comparing the Democratization of Intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security* 29/4 (2014) p.488.

and from the related tension between effective and democratic government. Whereas the former thrives in political regimes where secrecy is widespread, the latter thrives with publicity in an atmosphere of transparency. Secrecy shields agencies, policies or individuals from debate, control and law enforcement. It opens up a discretionary space in which actions may be taken regardless of whether they have received democratic support. In the field of national security, it is often not possible for certain actions to be completed in public. The rise and popularity of publicity is a typical consequence of democratic government. Whereas publicity or 'transparency' is accepted as a democratic virtue and a sign of cultural and moral authority,[2] secrecy has come to be identified with political corruption and immorality. This emerging tension between secrecy and democracy, especially around the end of the Cold War, has much to tell us about how parliament dealt with intelligence.

In order to analyze the tension 'secrecy' introduces to the relationship between parliament and the secret services we need a suitable conceptual framework. It is necessary to categorize and assess parliamentary arguments regarding intelligence and their changing nature over time. In what follows I draw on Albert Hirschman's *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and States* (1970) and Caryl Rusbult et al.'s additions to Hirschman's work, in order to develop such an analysis. Hirschman et al. distinguish four possible reactions to a deteriorating relationship, in the contexts of firms, organizations, states, romance and professions: exit, voice, loyalty or neglect. Assuming the relationship between parliament and secret services is inherently problematic, I adopt these four categories in order to assess how parliament related to the work and existence of secret services. By differentiating possible relations between parliament and secret services, I aim to contribute to our understanding of how secrecy and democracy manage to co-exist despite their apparent opposition. Moreover, through the specific conceptual framework I propose, adapted to document-based research, I aim to facilitate and encourage comparative research on the inherently difficult relations between parliament and intelligence during the period around the end of the Cold War (1975–95).

First, I explore the four categories of exit, voice, loyalty and neglect. Second, I outline my research design. My analysis concentrates on the relationship between the Dutch parliament and the Dutch Security Service (BVD) between 1975 and 1995. Around the end of the Cold War, the BVD attempted to transform itself from a rather inward-looking organization to a public service that actively tried to explain its aims and actions, within specific limits of confidentiality. This came to be known as a clear top-down transformation, not parliament initiated, imposed by the new head of service Arthur Docters van Leeuwen (1988–95), extravagant and self-confident, and

[2]Thomas Blanton, 'The World's Right to Know', *Foreign Policy* 131 (2002) pp.50–8; Clare Birchall, '"There's Too Much Secrecy in this City": The False Choice between Secrecy and Transparency in US Politics', *Cultural Politics* 7/1 (2011) p.134; Clare Birchall, 'Introduction to "Secrecy and Transparency". The Politics of Opacity and Openness', *Theory, Culture & Society* 28 (2011) p.9.



Figure 1. Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect as Active/Passive and Constructive/Destructive.[3]

his Minister of the Interior Ien Dales (1989–94). Television appearances, newspaper interviews and yearly public reports surprised and exceeded the expectations of even the most ardent opponents to secrecy. Thus, with the rise of transparency as a political ideal in the early 1990s, the Dutch Security Service became a typical product of its time. Over time, the rapid reduction of secrecy surrounding the Dutch Security Service caused variations in the interaction between government and parliament.

A. A Conceptual Framework of Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect

Assuming that relations between parliament and the secret services are inherently problematic and therefore constitute a 'deteriorating relationship', Hirschman's and Rusbult's categories of exit, voice, loyalty and neglect provide a suitable starting point to assess parliamentary reactions to secret services. Hirschman and Rusbult et al. employ the four categories to declining or problematic relationships in firms, organizations and states between the customer or citizen on the one hand and management or government on the other (Hirschman), in working relationships between employee and employer (Farrell and Rusbult) and in romance between individuals (Rusbult and Zembrodt). My research focuses instead on a public good and the tensions between parliament and the service's policies, which centre around the use of secrecy.

Rusbult and Zembrodt distinguish between constructive/destructive responses to deteriorating romantic relationships (see Figure 1) and note that they have different consequences for the quality of the relationship. These responses can equally be divided into active and more passive responses. In the context of Rusbult's and Zembrodt's research, the exit option means 'ending or actively abusing the relationship', voice is understood as 'actively attempting to improve conditions', loyalty as

[3]Caryl E. Rusbult and Isabella M. Zembrodt, 'Responses to Dissatisfaction in Romantic Involvements: A Multidimensional Scaling Analysis', *Journal of Experimental Psychology* 19 (1983) p.289; Dan Farrell and Caryl E. Rusbult, 'Exploring the Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect Typology: The Influence of Job Satisfaction, Quality of Alternatives, and Investment Size', *Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal* 5/3 (1992) p.203.

'passively waiting for conditions to improve' and the neglect option means 'passively allowing the relationship to deteriorate'.

When referring to the effectiveness or 'success' of the four responses to a problematic relationship, we refer to the degree to which, in our analysis, the secret service and responsible minister were responsive or accountable to parliament.

Hirschman considers the exit option the most likely to generate improvement in the quality of the relationship. Through exit the consumer forces the firm's management to improve the quality of its products in order to avoid a greater resort to exit. Hirschman pays particular attention to the exit option when applied to a public good. Different to a consumer-firm relationship in a competitive system, there is no possibility to get away from the public good entirely:[4] unless one abandons the national community in which one lives, one will remain exposed to the public good, the secret service in our case, to whose existence or work one objects. Under such circumstances, the exit option becomes instead an extreme form of protest (voice) after which the exiting person remains involved in improving the public good to which he or she objects. Through his resort to exit he continues to 'denounce and fight the organization from without instead of working for change from within'.[5] In the case of parliamentary control of secret services, the exit option would amount to denouncing the existence of the service and refusing to be part of any supervisory bodies. Since this precludes making the responsible minister or agency better accountable to parliament, it is destructive.

The voice option, Hirschman explains, is 'any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs'. Hirschman's frame of reference concerns dissatisfied consumers or members of an organization who can 'kick up a fuss' through individual or collective petition, appeal to a higher authority or through various types of protests and actions.[6] Voice is an active type of reaction through which, in our case, parliament takes the initiative to address a specific issue regarding intelligence. The resort to voice will increase if the exit option is less viable, or where the probability of a favourable outcome or a means to influence a decision is greater.[7] In terms of parliamentary reactions to secret services, the choice to use voice usually results from suspicion, distrust, speculation and curiosity vis-à-vis the secrecy surrounding the services.[8] It is connected to the relations between those who know (insiders) – the secret service and the responsible minister – and those who are not supposed to know (outsiders) –

[4]Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States* (New Haven: Harvard University Press 1970) pp.101–2, 104.
[5]Ibid., p.104.
[6]Ibid., p.30.
[7]Ibid., p.39 cites Edward Banfield, *Political Influence* (NY: Free Press of Glencoe 1961) p.333.
[8]Georg Simmel, 'The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies', *American Journal of Sociology* 11/4 (1906) p.463; Eva Horn, 'Logics of Political Secrecy', *Theory, Culture & Society* 28 (7–8) (2011) p.105.

parliament. These relations are structured around speculation or awareness that a secret exists,[9] irrespective of the actual existence or contents of the secret.[10] Consequently, conspiracy theorists are more likely to participate in debates around secrecy, underscoring the public's right to know, searching for the 'truth', doubting available data and believing there is always something more to be revealed.[11]

While the voice option in parliament usually leads to making secret services more accountable, voice may become destructive when it is used excessively. For example, in an atmosphere of suspicion and irritation, members of parliament may simply harass the secret services instead of addressing substantive issues constructively. In such cases, voice worsens the relationship between insiders and outsiders.[12] Consequently, Hirschman claims that democracy is best served by a combination of critical (voice) and supportive (loyalty) citizens. He illustrates this argument by switching over to an organizational context: 'Voice has the function of alerting a firm or organization to its failings, but it must then give management, old or new, some time to respond to the pressures that have been brought to bear on it'.[13] In this respect, too much voice, as is also the case with exit, corresponds to Max Weber's ideal type of an ethic of conviction (*Gesinnungsethik*), as opposed to an ethic of responsibility (*Verantwortungsethik*): the former is an ethic of romantic, value-driven, irrational conduct since it is indifferent to 'consequences'. It aims at the impossible. In our case an ethic of conviction would amount to claims to dissolve the secret service. The latter type of ethic weighs the available means and takes account of the prospects of action. It is characterized by a form of Realpolitik.[14] Hirschman's preferred combination of voice and loyalty for democracy corresponds to Weber's preferred combination of an ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility for 'a man who can have the calling for politics'.[15] This combination allows us to 'attain the possible', which could 'never be attained without reaching, always and incessantly, for the impossible'.[16] Adapting Weber's ideal types to the conceptual framework of this article – in other words – including irrational behaviour – we arrive at two distinct types of voice.

The third option, loyalty, is a special attachment to an organization, state ('our country, right or wrong') or, in this case, to the secret service and the

[9]Jacques Derrida, '"To do Justice to Freud": The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis', *Critical Inquiry* 20/2 (1994) pp.245–6.
[10]See also Jodi Dean, *Publicity's Secret. How Technoculture Capitalizes on Democracy* (Ithaca, United States: Cornell University Press 2002) p.10.
[11]Ibid., pp.12, 15.
[12]Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, p.31.
[13]Ibid., pp.32–3.
[14]Max Weber, 'Le métier et la vocation d'homme politique', in Max Weber, *Le savant et le politique* (Paris: Plon 1963) pp.199–222; Nicholas Gane, 'Max Weber on the Ethical Irrationality of Political Leadership', *Sociology* 31/3 (1997) pp.549–64.
[15]Weber, 'Le métier', p.219.
[16]Ibid., p.221.

secrecy that surrounds it. Hirschman defines loyalty in connection with voice: the greater the degree of loyalty, the greater the likelihood of voice will be.[17] In other words, if one feels committed or attached to an organization, one will be more inclined to increase one's influence and demand improvement in situations of decline than if one feels indifferent towards the same organization. Loyalty then, in Hirschman's understanding, is a (passive) attitude that fosters (the resourcefulness of) voice and raises the cost of exit. It is constructive because, especially in combination with voice, it contributes to a better relationship between the firm and customer, or between the minister and parliament.[18] Farrell and Rusbult use a definition of loyalty that is more independent of voice. In the context of working relationships they understand loyalty as 'a constructive yet passive reaction wherein employees stand by the organization, waiting for conditions to improve'.[19]

Problematic in Hirschman's, Farrell's and Rusbult's understanding of loyalty is that, as a (passive) attitude, it remains difficult both to detect its (unexpressed) presence and to recognize its possible expression under the guise of voice. Unless one can use interviews to detect loyalty as an unexpressed attitude or as an underlying incentive for voice, Hirschman's, Farrell's and Rusbult's understanding of loyalty is empirically difficult to apply to historical research. This is in part because we cannot, for example, use data such as interviews in a way that might be applicable for the study of contemporary phenomena. In the context of this research, interviews do not fit the purpose of the general hypothesis, which takes parliamentary argumentation as its source. Moreover, I see loyalty as a more active and substantial expression than a (passive) attitude that may be expressed as voice. Loyalty, in other words, has its proper behaviour and expression. In the particular case of parliamentary dealings with secret services, loyalty may be expressed as a defence of secrecy or as an acceptance that parliament, as an outsider, has limited knowledge on intelligence issues.

The reason for this 'sacrifice' lies, I argue, in the admiration that secrecy can elicit from outsiders. There is a natural tendency to think that what is withheld has a special value,[20] especially under norms of publicity according to which the secret appears an exception to the rule that everything should be made public. There is a tendency to wonder why the secret must remain hidden, what can be so vital, wonderful or horrific that it cannot be revealed?[21] Accordingly, outsiders often view secret-keepers as superior or exceptional. Secret-keepers are often (almost blindly) trusted, their efficiency, influence and power idealized.[22]

For Farrell and Rusbult neglect in working relationships is a reaction wherein 'the employee passively allows conditions to worsen'.[23] Hirschman

[17]Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, p.77.
[18]Ibid., pp.31–2, 80, 82.
[19]Farrell and Rusbult, *Exploring*, p.202.
[20]Simmel, 'The Sociology of Secrecy', p.464.
[21]Dean, *Publicity's Secret*, p.10.
[22]Simmel, 'The Sociology of Secrecy', pp.464–5.
[23]Farrell and Rusbult, *Exploring*, p.202.

refers in this context to loyalists (who do not use voice) who 'may simply refuse to exit and suffer in silence, confident that things will soon get better'.[24] In his frame of reference, these are, for example, customers of firm A who, out of loyalty, continue to buy products with the same firm in spite of a clearly better buy with firm B, silently hoping that the quality of the products of firm A will soon improve.

As with loyalty, the passive dimension of neglect is empirically problematic in document-based research. In parliament, I argue, the neglect option is actively expressed as active defeatism. Members of parliament who resort to neglect actively defend the futility of trying to disclose information and discourage fellow parliamentarians from practising their monitoring tasks. Those who resort to neglect typically argue that members of parliament should not bother or be surprised: 'that's just the way things are'.

Neglect gives rise to indifference, disengagement and distance concerning the contents of the supposed or imagined secret and the possible intentions of the related insiders. This is due, first, to the belief that once the concealed information is revealed, the barrier between insiders and outsiders will be repaired.[25] In other words, outsiders (parliament) may believe that secrecy is justifiable and necessary and therefore acceptable. They trust the reliability and competence of insiders (secret service and its minister). Second, outsiders' indifference, disengagement and distance can stem from the barrier that secrecy creates between insiders and outsiders. As Georg Simmel points out, distance toward the other can increase indifference regarding suspected or possible misconduct of the other.[26]

The tendency to neglect (the suspected existence of) secret information and the call for disclosure serve to mute parliamentary control on secret services. Reactions will be limited and debate will remain superficial. Through neglect, the secret remains respected even after it has been (partly) revealed.

Hirschman's and Rusbult's categories of exit, voice, loyalty and neglect provide a suitable conceptual framework to analyze the inherently difficult relationship between parliament and secret services. I have interpreted the passive categories of loyalty and neglect slightly differently than Hirschman and Rusbult, by attributing a specific type of active behaviour to these categories. As such, I made these categories of benefit to both this research and other documents-based research, which is primarily suitable at tracing active behaviour. In the following analysis I assess a number of ways in which parliament can articulate its relationship with secret services. I then explore how and why this may vary according to different contexts.

B. Methodology

The analysis focuses on the BVD. In addition to the BVD, the Netherlands had a Foreign Intelligence Service (IDB) that was disbanded suddenly in

[24]Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, p.38.
[25]Dean, *Publicity's Secret*, p.10.
[26]Simmel, 'The Sociology of Secrecy', p.446.

1994[27] and three intelligence services for the army (LAMID), navy (MARID) and air force (LUID). These merged into a single Military Intelligence Service in 1989.[28] Despite this considerable number of secret services, the prevailing political and journalistic focus has always been on the BVD.

The main source for my analysis of Dutch parliamentary debates on the Security Services is the online archive of the Dutch States General, which covers the period between 1815 and 1995.[29] The States General archive includes all reports, papers and questions from the Lower House, the principal legislative body, and the Upper House, the body that approves of new legislation. Nearly all documents that mention the Security Service come from the Lower House. For the sake of convenience I therefore refer to 'parliament' in general throughout this article. Further material is taken from specific media accounts on the BVD, which have triggered parliamentary debates and questions. Typical examples include newspaper articles on e.g. leaked data, and television and magazine interviews with heads of service.

For the period between 1975 and 1995, 537 States General documents mention the BVD. I categorized this material on the basis of (a) themes discussed, (b) contextual reasons to draw attention to the themes discussed, and (c) the (political affiliation of the) parliamentarian(s) that instigated the mention, question or debate on the BVD.

The specific categories according to which I coded the documents that mention the Security Service provide a structural, long-term overview of recurring issues related to the BVD. Accordingly, my analysis is based on three themes that recurred between 1975 and 1995 and engaged multiple political parties, accounting for 71 documents, which include the most extensive parliamentary debates on the service. The selected themes concern the questions of openness and secrecy, oversight of the Security Service, and the service's right to exist. Within these themes I assess how members of parliament dealt with their monitoring functions regarding the BVD and the secrecy that surrounded the service. I focus on statements made by members of parliament. I divide these according to the categories of exit, voice, loyalty and neglect. By a 'statement' I understand an argument made by a member of parliament. He or she can make several statements on the same topic. For example, the theme of parliamentary oversight may concern the fact that only a few political parties were represented in the parliamentary Standing Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services, the belief that the Standing Committee did not show sufficient initiative vis-à-vis the minister, and the fact that its reports were brief and irregular. However, when the same statement is made using different wordings twice or more within the same parliamentary address, this constitutes a single statement.

[27]Bob de Graaff and Cees Wiebes, *Villa Maarheeze* (The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers 1994).

[28]In 2002 the Dutch Security Service acquired an intelligence remit and was renamed as the Dutch Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). That same year the Military Intelligence Service also extended its remit and was renamed the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD).

[29]www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl (accessed August 2014).

C. Analysis

The analysis consists of an introductory, quantitative section, allowing for a general overview of the attention the BVD received in parliament between 1975 and 1995, and a qualitative part. This latter part focuses on the occurrence of the four categories of exit, voice, loyalty and neglect in parliament, and analyzes their fluctuation over time and topic.

Figure 2 shows the number of documents from the Lower and Upper Houses, between 1975 and 1995, which mention the BVD at least once. A document that mentions the BVD only once, for example in the enumeration of budgetary agreements, weighs as heavily in this figure as a document that mentions the BVD multiple times, for example in debates that focused on the service exclusively. This figure shows the total collection of documents, prior to selection of the main and recurring themes. Four specific peaks are notable.

At the end of the 1970s, the BVD was called into question because it was not able to prevent Moluccan activists from violently hijacking two trains.[30] The peak in the beginning of the 1980s concerned a number of leaks and ensuing scandals that raised suspicions that the BVD was operationally



Figure 2. Number of Documents with Mention(s) of BVD.

focusing on the Dutch peace movement, while the minister tried to convince parliament that this was not the case.

Towards the end of the 1990s there was increasing discussion in parliament on the topic of parliament's role in overseeing the actions of the BVD. These debates centred primarily on the Standing Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (*Vaste Kamercommissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten*), which had been installed in 1952. The leaders of the five largest political parties staffed the Standing Committee. The Communist Party (CPN) was prevented from becoming a member. Indeed, communists active during this period were a major operational point of interest to the BVD.[31]

Until the 1960s the cooperative-reserved approach of the head of service greatly determined the Committee's range of possibilities.[32] This changed gradually towards the end of 1960s, when the Standing Committee adopted a more critical stance, demanding information on current operational matters and continuing operational attention directed to the Communist Party. It also began to issue public reports from its meetings with the responsible minister of the Interior,[33] providing stimulus to parliamentary debate. This change was mostly due to the presence of the social democrat chairman Joop den Uyl (1967–73 and 1978–81) and Hans van Mierlo, leader of D66, a new socio-liberal, progressive political party.[34]

While the Standing Committee had the appearance of success in terms of parliamentary oversight, structural and recurring concerns meant that in practical terms its impact was limited. Members of the Committee were party political leaders with busy agendas. They lacked the time and will to acquire in-depth knowledge of intelligence policies and operational issues, since intelligence issues were rarely politically salient.[35] Moreover, since members

[30]In 1951, about 4000 Moluccans and their families were forcibly exiled by the Indonesian Republic to the Netherlands. It was intended that they would remain in the Netherlands only temporarily: the Dutch government had promised them their own independent republic, the Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS). As hopes for the RMS subsequently faded, younger Moluccans began a series of violent actions in order to draw attention to their grievances. The violence peaked in the 1970s. In December 1975, Moluccans hijacked a train in the north of the Netherlands and occupied the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam, causing four deaths in total. Between 23 May and 11 June 1977, Moluccans hijacked another train in the northeastern part of the Netherlands, eight people were killed, and hostages were taken in a nearby elementary school.

[31]Dick Engelen, *De BVD in de twintigste eeuw. Institutionele geschiedenis van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst 1945–2000* (Voorburg: Museumdrukkerij Die Haghe s.a.) pp.55–6. Constant Hijzen is currently writing a PhD thesis at Leiden University focusing in depth on parliamentary oversight.

[32]Constant Hijzen, 'More than a Ritual Dance. The Dutch Practice of Parliamentary Oversight and Control of the Intelligence Community', *Security and Human Rights* 24 (2013) pp.230–1.

[33]Engelen, *De BVD*, pp.97–8.

[34]Hijzen, 'More than a Ritual Dance', p.231.

[35]Hijzen cites Frits Bolkestein, leader of the conservative liberal party between 1990 and 1998 (Ibid., p.234).

of the Committee did not have any administrative or political staff, they could hardly prepare for meetings with the head of service or the minister. It was not uncommon for Committee members not to show up for meetings. Meetings were infrequent, at times only once every few years and reports of the Standing Committee were equally sporadic. A further difficulty restricting the amount of parliamentary oversight was the superficial nature of the Committee's reports. Due to the confidential character of the Committee's meetings, members were unable to act on the information they received. As a result, reports were short and superficial, often raising more questions than they answered. Finally, the Standing Committee had insufficient powers to perform regular checks on the Security Service. Instead, it reacted to incidents reported in the media and passively listened to whatever the minister had to tell them. The meetings of the Committee with the minister or the head of service were generally cheerful, casual and superficial.[36] These shortcomings were frequently subject to criticism in parliament.

The fourth wave of parliamentary attention directed to the BVD occurred at the beginning of the 1990s. Parliament reacted to the greater openness the new head of service Docters van Leeuwen and his minister Dales endorsed regarding the BVD. This new openness at the initiative of both the service and the minister was both radical and unusual, despite the fact that previous heads of service Andries Kuipers (1967–77) and Pieter de Haan (1977–85) had already carefully set in motion a trend toward greater openness.[37] Both men gave occasional television and newspaper interviews.[38] Docters van Leeuwen and Dales, however, announced a series of budget cuts and organizational reforms within the BVD. Both were determined to facilitate greater openness on the work of the service and to strengthen its ties with the public. As Docters van Leeuwen explained to the service's personnel in 1989:

> We're a submarine. That's what we'll remain. We shouldn't operate on the surface of society. But if you're a submarine you should make sure your breathing apparatus is in order, otherwise noxious substances may enter. Our breathing apparatus is not entirely in order and that's why harmful vapours are hanging around in the ship. I say: we should tackle this problem.[39]

According to Docters van Leeuwen, it would be preferable that openness became the rule, secrecy the exception. Under his management the service acquired a communications department, it began to issue annual public reports on its fields of interest, and commissioned an official history with

[36]Hijzen cites among others Ed van Thijn, leader of the social democratic party between 1973 and 1987, Frits Bolkestein, and Joris Voorhoeve, leader of the conservative liberal party between 1986 and 1989 (Ibid., p.235).
[37]Eleni Braat, *Van oude jongens, de dingen die voorbij gaan. Een sociale geschiedenis van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, 1945–1998* (Zoetermeer: AIVD 2012) pp.186–7.
[38]Interview Andries Kuipers in 'Inburgeren', *NTS*, 20 November 1968.
[39]Arthur Docters van Leeuwen as cited in Braat, *Oude jongens*, p.185.



Figure 3. Number of Statements on BVD per Parliamentary Year and Categorized along Type of Statement (Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect).

detailed information on the service's operational past.[40] Parliament reacted to this openness, positively and negatively, by means of both loyalty and voice.

Figure 3 illustrates the types of relationship between parliament and the BVD, in line with the four categories of exit, voice, loyalty and neglect. The figure shows the number of statements on the BVD concerning openness, parliamentary oversight and right of existence. The parliamentary years 1980–1, 1988–9 and 1994–5 did not include statements which would fall into one or more of the four categories. I have therefore omitted these years from the table.

Figure 3 shows that in the course of the period 1975–95 the 'exit' option, already relatively infrequent, decreases even further: 86% of the total resort to exit occurs between 1975 and 1988. The voice option increases, especially in the second half of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties: 52% of the total resort to voice occurs between 1987 and 1992. The loyalty option is also increasingly prevalent, interestingly, together with the voice option, especially in the beginning of the nineties: 55% of the total resort to loyalty occurs between 1990 and 1993. Finally, we see a slight increase in the neglect option together with the loyalty option: of the 13 times parties resorted to neglect, seven times were between 1989 and 1993. Consequently, the most interesting changes occur around the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties. A closer analysis of the contents of the arguments sheds further light on the connection between the changes in parliamentary argumentation on the one hand and the changes instigated by the service on the other. Below I assess (1) the decline of the exit option, (2) the rise of the voice option in

[40]Ibid., pp.189–90.

combination with the loyalty option, and (3) the rise of the neglect option. I evaluate these three developments in conjunction with changes in the service's policy on greater openness.

A. Decline of Exit

First, the exit option remains present until the mid-1980s and thereafter decreases in frequency. Resorting to exit meant refusing the service's right to exist. A recurring argument was that the service failed to fulfil its tasks,[41] for example, in failing to prevent the train hijackings by Moluccan activists in 1975 and 1977. A different argument used to justify exit was that the BVD posed a threat to democracy.[42] Occasionally members of parliament articulated the view that intelligence was incompatible with democracy, referring to its secret nature, the limited possibilities for overseeing its actions or its cultivation of hostile images of other states.

Other ways to exercise the exit option included voting against the service's budget,[43] refusing to take part in the Standing Committee[44] or voting against a new law aimed at regulating the competences of intelligence and security services.[45] In 1987, for example, the left-socialist PSP refused to support the new law on intelligence and security services. The party clarified its position: 'According to us, intelligence and security services do not belong in a democratic society. [...] The present bill forces us to choose the impossible: to bestow democratic legitimacy onto something that is undemocratic'.[46]

As noted above, Hirschman pays particular attention to the singular status of the exit option in case of public goods; one can protest against a public good, but one cannot really escape from it. When parliament resorts to exit, it is confronted with this fundamental ambiguity. 'We consider intelligence and security services [...] incompatible with a responsible implementation of the principles of a democratic constitutional state', Marius Ernsting from the communist CPN declared in 1985. He continued to explain that despite resorting to exit he would continue to make use of voice:

> We could suffice with this position. We could say: the story ends here. But I think that our position should not withhold us from [...] making some more tailored comments, considering the fact that our principled position will not be commonplace for the time being. We're not doing

[41]Van der Lek (PSP), Lower House (hereinafter referred to as LH), 12 February 1976, p.2827.
[42]For example Van der Spek (PSP), LH, 3 February 1982, p.1666; Ernsting (CPN), LH, 30 October 1985, p.959; Hoekstra (CPN), LH, 23 June 1977, p.183.
[43]For example Vogt (PSP), Upper House (hereinafter referred to as UH), 13 March 1979, p.541.
[44]For example see summary of position Groen Links in LH, 1992–1993, 22890, no. 2, p.2, and Willems (Groen Links), LH, 20 January 1993, p.3065.
[45]For example see the summary of statements by PSP and CPN in LH, 1983–1984, 17363, no. 6–7, p.7.
[46]Van Leeuwen (PSP), UH, 1 December 1987, p.208.

> this to give the functioning of intelligence and security services a semblance of legitimacy.[47]

Between 1975 and 1995, parties in parliament resorted to exit 14 times. Twelve of these exit options occurred between 1975 and 1987. The remaining two followed a reiteration of the refusal by Groen Links – after 1991 the successor of, among others, the communist CPN and the left-socialist PSP – to take part in the Standing Committee. The only parties that resorted to exit were the left-socialist PSP (57%), the communist CPN (29%) and Groen Links (14%). All were small, radical left-wing parties, in opposition at the time of opting for exit. The limited resort to exit did not coincide with any significant policy changes on the part of the BVD, such as and including greater openness or public explanation and justification of its tasks. In this respect, the exit option corresponds to Weber's ideal type of an ethic of conviction, which is irrational and indifferent to the consequences of its actions.

B. Rise of Voice and Loyalty

Parliament resorted most often to voice when referring to the BVD. Interestingly, an increase in voice was usually accompanied by an increase in loyalty, especially around 1990. I outline four periods between 1975 and 1995 during which parliament increasingly resorted to voice and loyalty: at the end of the 1970s when the competence of the BVD was questioned following the Moluccan train hijackings, between 1982 and 1987 when the BVD was affected by a number of leaks and scandals, at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s when attention to the quality of parliamentary oversight grew, and around the end of the Cold War when the BVD made substantial moves toward greater openness.

First, between 1975 and 1977 voice was primarily directed towards the fact that the BVD failed to prevent the Moluccan train hijackings. Criticism came from a broad political spectrum. The orthodox Protestant SGP asked 'whether vigilance was sufficient'.[48] The Christian left and green PPR also wondered whether the BVD should not have been 'more alert'.[49] The liberal-conservative VVD stated that it 'had expected the BVD to perform better'.[50] The communist CPN and the left-socialist PSP took their criticism one step further, casting doubt on the BVD's legitimacy in light of what they deemed to have been so serious a failure.[51] The Moluccan train hijackings also provided an occasion to express loyalty towards the BVD, with loyalists pointing to the hijackings as proof for the continuing need for the security service.[52]

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[47]Ernsting (CPN), LH, 30 October 1985, p.959.
[48]Abma (SGP), LH, 12 February 1976, p.2813.
[49]De Gaaij Fortman (PPR), LH, 12 February 1976, p.2822.
[50]Koning (VVD), LH, 23 June 1977, p.179.
[51]For example Hoekstra (CPN), LH, 23 June 1977, p.183.
[52]Van Schaik (KVP), LH, 12 February 1976, p.2809; De Gaaij Fortman (PPR), LH, 12 February 1976, p.2822.

During a second period, between roughly 1982 and 1987, the BVD was affected by a number of leaks and scandals that provoked comment and debate in parliament. In 1982 a confidential report from the BVD, entitled 'The Hidden Factor', was leaked to the media. It claimed the DDR was secretly supporting the Dutch peace movement financially. While the majority of the report had been published in the media, the Minister of the Interior Rietkerk refused to disclose the report in its entirety. The leak and the ministerial reaction triggered cross party parliamentary calls, for greater openness not only about this affair, but in general.[53] 'The force of democracy is openness', claimed Hans Janmaat, leader of the nationalist extreme right Centrumpartij.[54] 'Is the Minister going to publish this report? As far as I can see there really isn't anything secret to it', Gijs Schreuders (CPN) asked impatiently.[55] 'Shouldn't it be a goal of the government', Gert Schutte from the Christian reformed GPV asked, 'when there are developments that are suitable for publication, to give them the publicity they need, possibly unsolicited?'[56]

In April 1984, John Paul Gardiner (or John Wood) informed a pacifist association in the Dutch town of Woensdrecht that he had been spying on them over a period of several months on behalf of the BVD and an American intelligence service. This appeared to offer further confirmation of earlier charges that the BVD was investing operationally in the peace movement, despite the minister's repeated assurances that this was not the case. The incident triggered calls in parliament for greater openness regarding the surveillance operations in Woensdrecht.[57] The affair also provoked remarks on whether the BVD should focus on the peace movement, whether the service was responsible for the reliability of its agents, and whether current controls on its actions were sufficient.[58]

As a reaction to Gardiner's statements, head of service Pieter de Haan gave an interview to the national newspaper NRC Handelsblad.[59] In this rare interview,[60] De Haan maladroitly claimed that as long as agents worked for his service reliably, he was not interested in their motivation. Not surprisingly, this interview sparked remarks in parliament, primarily these related to the issue of public control of the service. Peter Lankhorst from the Christian left and green PPR observed:

> There is barely any public control on the intelligence services. If there is already some control, this occurs behind the closed doors of the

[53]For example Wagenaar (RPF), LH, 16 December 1982, p.1277.
[54]Janmaat (Centrumpartij), LH, 16 December 1982, p.1284.
[55]Schreuders (CPN), LH, 16 December 1982, p.1285.
[56]Schutte (GPV), LH, 16 December 1982, p.1287.
[57]For example Lankhorst (PPR), LH, 16 May 1984, p.4704.
[58]For example Ernsting (CPN), LH, 16 May 1984, p.4708.
[59]NRC Handelsblad, 22 December 1984.
[60]De Haan rarely gave interviews because, as he explained, the work of the BVD moved 'on the limits of democracy'.

> ministries, the Ministerial Council and the Standing Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services. Not only the services themselves, but also the ministers and the members of the Standing Committee have thereby received a good deal of confidence from Parliament. Increasingly, however, new information comes to light on the ins and outs within the services that, at least within my party, raises many questions and gives rise to an increasing amount of criticism.[61]

Simultaneously, the left-socialist PSP played a leading role in cultivating criticism of what some members of parliament believed to be an unnecessary degree of secrecy surrounding the BVD. Especially during the years 1985 and 1986, there was a significant increase in calls for greater openness.[62]

Another flashpoint occurred in April 1987 when a 45-strong police unit invaded the Amsterdam offices of the radical left-wing magazine 'Bluf!' The magazine, which published on squatters' movements, was about to publish a leaked quarterly report of the BVD. The police action and the possible role of the BVD triggered remarks in parliament on whether the service was curtailing freedom of speech and expression, and further strengthened calls for greater openness on the part of the BVD in general, and the publication of the quarterly report in particular.[63] Again the left-socialist PSP played a leading role in sparking the debate.

The rather tumultuous period between 1982 and 1987 that gave rise to an increased use of voice also saw a slight increase in the loyalty option. Only a limited number of political parties expressed loyalty, namely the liberal-conservatives (VVD) and the Christian-democrats (CDA).[64] On a couple of occasions they reiterated their acceptance and understanding of the use of secrecy and supported the existence of the BVD.[65] For example, in 1980 liberal-conservative Albert-Jan Evenhuis (VVD) stated that:

> the position of the BVD in society is complex because, in part, the service does not operate in the public sphere. Moreover, relations with the public are not easy. Often all kinds of publications lead to a lack of understanding while the BVD needs the cooperation of the public. [...] Those who are involved in the BVD generally work under difficult circumstances. As long as one thinks that a BVD can be of use to our society, one should show some understanding for the functioning of the service. Within our party there is such understanding.[66]

[61]Lankhorst (PPR), LH, 2 May 1985, p.4807.
[62]For example questions by Van Es and Willems (PSP), LH, 1985–1986, p.1093.
[63]For example Van Es (PSP), LH, 12 May 1987, p.3796; Vogt (PSP), LH, 16 June 1987, p.1620.
[64]The reformed SGP linked the need for the BVD to the continued existence of a 'sinful society'; Van Rossum (SGP), LH, 30 October 1985, p.964.
[65]Van der Sanden (CDA), LH, 16 May 1984, p.4707.
[66]Evenhuis (VVD), LH, 12 March 1980, pp.3801–2.

Similarly, the Christian-democrat Piet van der Sanden (CDA) noted that:

> efficient and well-functioning security services belong to the instruments of a democracy to maintain its legal order, internally and externally [...] Such services do not lend themselves to constant public debate.[67]

In 1985 the Christian left and green PPR were among the first to describe the BVD as 'a necessary evil'.[68] In the coming years, increasing numbers of parliamentarians would use similar statements to cautiously show their loyalty to the BVD.[69]

The third wave of voice I distinguish occurred at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. During these years parliament showed an increased interest in the quality of parliamentary oversight. Such interest was, of course, not new. Each new report of the Standing Committee had provided an occasion to discuss the matter anew. This happened, for example, in 1980 when a short report from the parliamentary oversight committee led to several remarks on the insufficiency and lack of openness in parliamentary oversight and the ensuing inadequate basis of existence of the BVD.

A comparable occasion occurred in 1985, when De Haan's newspaper interview on Gardiner's statements roughly coincided with a long-awaited and notably brief report from the Standing Committee. The report covered a relatively long period between 1981 and 1985. Parliamentary oversight of the BVD needed serious improvement, according to Christian left and green Lankhorst (PPR), left-socialist Andree van Es (PSP), social-democrat Piet Stoffelen (PvdA) and Christian-democrat Jan Krajenbrink (CDA). They found the reports of the Standing Committee too succinct, sporadic, secretive and superficial, and the Committee itself unable to structurally check upon the Service. The Committee remained too unanimous and too passive. 'I don't understand [this unanimity], I don't believe it and I think it's bad', was the response of Van Es. The Standing Committee, she added, was a plain 'cover-up' for parliamentary control.[70]

Criticism on the quality of parliamentary oversight peaked towards the end of the 1980s. In April 1988 parliament discussed another report from the Standing Committee, covering a period of 2.5 years. Criticism was nearly identical to three years earlier.[71] 'We cannot escape the conclusion that there still is too much snooping about and secretiveness surrounding the intelligence and security services', Stoffelen (PvdA) concluded his critique on the current state of parliamentary oversight.[72] The social-liberal Jacob

[67]Van der Sanden (CDA), LH, 12 March 1980, p.3802.
[68]Lankhorst (PPR), LH, 2 May 1985, p.4807.
[69]For example, Jacobse (VVD), LH, 30 October 1985, p.955 and Wessel-Tuinstra (D'66), LH, 30 October 1985, p.958.
[70]Lankhorst (PPR), Van Es (PSP), Stoffelen (PvdA), LH, 2 May 1985, pp.4807–12.
[71]Krajenbrink (CDA), Van Es (PSP), Stoffelen (PvdA), Dijkstal (VVD), Kohnstamm (D66), LH, 26 April 1988, pp.3700–11.
[72]Stoffelen (PvdA), LH, 26 April 1988, p.3707.

Kohnstamm (D66) added that 'by debating the report [of the Standing Committee] in plenary, we at least give the impression that the facts and actions of the concerned services can be discussed openly. That impression, however, runs counter to reality'.[73]

Increased voice regarding the quality of parliamentary oversight was closely connected to the presumed lack of openness provided by the minister, the BVD and the Standing Committee. For example, Kohnstamm deemed that the Standing Committee should only accept confidentiality on operational matters, not policy-matters.[74] This distinction between operational and policy secrecy would receive greater support in the following years.[75] It would contribute to the acceptance of operational secrecy and, consequently, of the functioning of both the Standing Committee and the BVD.

A new report from the Standing Committee appeared at the end of 1989 and was discussed in parliament on 24 January 1990. Even if most parliamentarians considered the report of slightly better quality than the previous examples, most questioned the need for the degree of confidentiality claimed necessary. 'The report raises more questions than it answers', social-liberal Olga Scheltema-de Nie (D66) claimed. 'It could be that the contents do not allow for greater openness. But as yet I do not want to start with such an assumption'.[76] Liberal-conservative Dijkstal (VVD) expressed similar doubts on whether the amount of confidentiality was justifiable.[77]

In 1991 criticism on the quality of parliamentary oversight led to greater support for an independent oversight committee.[78] Dijkstal was a notable champion of this idea. Members of such an independent committee, he argued, would be lower profile than the party leaders that staffed the Standing Committee. They would also be better equipped to control the intelligence and security services structurally rather than incidentally. During the years 1992–3 the idea of an independent oversight committee gained further ground among the liberal-conservatives (VVD) and the social-democrats (PvdA).

Simultaneously, criticism on the quality of parliamentary control continued. Following the publication of another report from the Standing Committee,[79] discussed in February 1994,[80] parliament discussed the matter again. Parliamentary control had remained 'on a shamelessly low level' and the Standing Committee had become 'a gentleman's club, that is concerned with all kinds of matters that, at least according to the Standing Committee

[73]Kohnstamm (D66), LH, 26 April 1988, p.3710.
[74]Kohnstamm (D66), LH, 26 April 1988, p.3727.
[75]For example, see Dijkstal (VVD), LH, 14 March 1991, p.3469.
[76]Scheltema-de Nie (D66), LH, 24 January 1990, p.1499.
[77]Dijkstal (VVD), LH, 24 January 1990, p.1495.
[78]Stoffelen (PvdA), LH, 14 March 1991, pp.3459–61.
[79]LH, 1992–1993, kamerstuknummer 23225, ondernummer 1.
[80]LH, 17 February 1994.

or the government, cannot bear the light of day'. It had become a 'buffer and filter between the government and parliament'.[81]

Despite the continuing, indeed increasingly critical, stance on the quality of parliamentary control, a quiet revolution took place in the early 1990s. The Standing Committee's reports had become increasingly frequent since the 1980s and acceptance of limited secrecy in parliament had not been as high since 1975. In the early 1990s even Groen Links had come to accept secrecy when applied to operational matters.[82] In other words, the successor of among others the communist CPN and the left-socialist PSP, previously responsible for the majority of exit and voice options regarding the BVD, had come to accept the existence of the BVD and even tolerated its use of operational secrecy.

The fourth and last wave of voice occurred around the end of the Cold War, at the beginning of the 1990s. It was prompted largely by the public appearances and announcements of the new head of service Docters van Leeuwen and Minister of the Interior Dales. This new openness surprised parliament, not always positively. A combination of voice, calling for even greater openness, and loyalty towards the BVD's existence and the use of secrecy, characterized the adjustment process to this new openness.

In September 1990 parliament received a detailed report titled *The New BVD. The Main Features of the Organisational Reform*. It was an unusually openhearted text claiming, for example, that 'the last couple of years it became increasingly clear that the BVD [...] had become too isolated'. Elsewhere it noted, 'personnel of the Service are desperate to get out of this isolated position and they would welcome greater openness toward society'.[83] This remarkable document led to an extensive debate in which voice, on the new tasks of the BVD and the possible shrinkage of the service now that the Cold War was approaching its end, and loyalty appeared simultaneously.[84] This signalled a turning point in the general debate on the BVD: the responsible minister of the Interior answered questions in detail and members of parliament, from a broad political spectrum, were generally pleased with the tone of the discussion. Wilbert Willems (Groen Links), who had never been shy in his criticism of the BVD, was the first to conclude that he was 'very positive' on the course of the debate. Stoffelen (PvdA) agreed that 'today we were present at a truly fruitful discussion between the government and the States General and between the various parties. The answers by the Minister and the president of the Standing Committee were largely satisfactory'. Scheltema-de Nie (social-liberal D66) agreed with both Willems (communist CPN) and Stoffelen (social-democrat PvdA) and

[81]Willems (Groen Links), LH, 17 February 1994, p.3950; Scheltema-de Nie (D66), LH, 17 February 1994, p.3963.
[82]Willems (Groen Links), LH, 24 March 1992, p.3986.
[83]Verslag van de Vaste Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten over haar werkzaamheden (juli 1989–juli 1990), LH, 1989–1990, 21819, no. 2, pp.7–8.
[84]For example, Verslag van de Vaste Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten over haar werkzaamheden (juli 1989–juli 1990), LH, 1990–1991, 21819, no. 3, Willems (Groen Links), LH, 14 March 1991, p.3455.

stressed her sense of 'a strong commitment with both the Minister and the president of the Standing Committee to consider in common agreement how we can arrive at a better procedure, at a better form of control'. She added that she was 'very pleased with this debate'. Christian-democrat Krajenbrink (CDA) remembered 'few debates with such a positive atmosphere as the one today'. And liberal-conservative Dijkstal (VVD) considered 'today's debate as a relief compared to previous debates on this topic. To an important degree this is thanks to the attitude of the Minister of the Interior and the President of the Standing Committee. We're on the right track', he concluded.[85] Around the same period, explicit acceptance of the BVD's existence became increasingly common, once again across a broad political spectrum.[86]

By 1990–2 the greater degree of openness that the BVD had promised appeared to be in full swing. Docters van Leeuwen regularly appeared on television, organized press conferences and gave newspaper interviews. To parliament's dismay he appeared to inform the public better than the minister informed parliament. Ria Beckers-de Bruijn (Groen Links) complained that parliament received too much information on the secret services via the media: 'this has reached intolerable levels'.[87] 'That's not how the government should treat parliament', Dijkstal (liberal-conservative VVD) lamented.[88] Indeed, according to Dijkstal, 'secret services shouldn't be on the radio, on television, and in newspapers day in and day out. I don't think such appearances belong to secret services'.[89] What followed were rather carefully expressed doubts on whether greater openness was to the benefit of the BVD. 'Is the Minister really convinced that making this information plainly public through television isn't harmful for the BVD's work?', Dijkstal asked.[90] And remarkably, Christian-democrat Krajenbrink (CDA) claimed, 'we should realise that [such openness] increases the vulnerability of the service'.[91] Consequently, when public openness on the BVD exceeded parliamentary openness on the service, parliament tended to support greater secrecy.

On the other hand, when parliament considered it was properly informed, openness on the BVD increased loyalty towards the service and the use of operational secrecy. For example, in February 1994 Stoffelen (PvdA) concluded:

> Since 1989 there has been [...] enormous progress. Without exaggerating I may say there's a world of difference between the 1980s when information on the BVD and other services was given

[85]Willems (Groen Links), LH, 14 March 1991, p.3490; Stoffelen (PvdA), p.3493; Scheltema-de Nie (D66), p.3495; Krajenbrink (CDA), p.3496; Dijkstal (VVD), pp.3497–8.
[86]For example, Stoffelen (PvdA), 24 January 1990, p.1500; Willems (Groen Links), LH, 14 March 1991, p.3453.
[87]Beckers-de Bruijn (Groen Links), LH, 7 November 1991, p.1205.
[88]Dijkstal (VVD), LH, 1991–1992, 22300 VI, no. 19, p.1. See also: Dijkstal (VVD), LH, 7 November 1991, p.1203.
[89]Dijkstal (VVD), LH, 24 March 1992, p.3993.
[90]Dijkstal (VVD), LH, 6 November 1990.
[91]Krajenbrink (CDA), Lowe House, 24 March 1992, p.4000.

> cautiously, almost fearfully by repeatedly almost not saying anything, and the last few years. There [...] has been a very large increase in openness, even open-heartedness; gone is the often unnecessary secretiveness. All this is without any doubt in the first place to the credit of minister Dales.[92]

C. Rise of Neglect

Until the 1990s the neglect option remained rare. It occurred when certain parliamentarians tried to brush aside questions by other members of parliaments on presumed DDR interest in the Dutch peace movement. The social-liberal party D66 did this in 1982, stating 'it is naïve to ask so many obvious questions to the Minister. [...] The BVD reports [state] that there have been certain contacts [between the Dutch peace movement and the DDR]. [...] Is that something to be shocked about? Doesn't a peace movement have international contacts by its nature'.[93] The extreme right Centrumpartij[94] and the progressive protestant EVP[95] made comparable attempts to downscale parliament's attention for DDR and Soviet interest in the Dutch peace movement.

More generally, the neglect option appeared in the form of a defeatist acceptance of secrecy. Christian left and green Lankhorst (PPR), for example, resorted to neglect when he claimed in 1987 that 'a real discussion on the BVD is of course difficult here [in parliament]. That's the nature of intelligence and security services'. In line with a number of other members of parliament, he noted that the leaked quarterly report revealed a rather one-sided interest in left-wing groups on the part of the BVD. 'But I must add immediately', he said, 'that this was not a full publication of the report, which makes me ignorant on what has possibly been left out. But I won't need to ask that question here because I won't get an answer anyway. That's the familiar road'.[96] In other words, Lankhorst diminished his monitoring role as a member of parliament because he presumed beforehand secrecy would thwart it. Another example of neglect occurred in 1992 when Dijkstal (liberal-conservative VVD) claimed, 'I actually find it enjoyable that I don't know much about all those secret things and that I can accordingly just ask questions about them'.[97]

D. Conclusions

In the case of the BVD and Dutch context the approaching end of the Cold War, the collapse of a number of authoritarian regimes around the world, and

[92]Stoffelen (PvdA), 17 February 1994, p.3960.
[93]Wessel-Tuinstra (D'66), LH, 16 December 1982, p.1283.
[94]Janmaat (Centrumpartij), LH, 16 December 1982, p.1284.
[95]Ubels-Veen (EVP), LH, 16 December 1982, p.1286.
[96]Lankhorst (PPR), LH, 12 May 1987, p.3801.
[97]Dijkstal (VVD), LH, 24 March 1992, p.3991. In 1993, Dijkstal makes an almost identical remark (LH, 19 January 1993, p.3010).

the subsequent rise of transparency as an ideal increased political attention on the current and future role of intelligence. Even if the Netherlands had not itself experienced an authoritarian past, a high proportion of the resorts to voice in Dutch parliament stemmed from the association between secret services and authoritarian regimes. It is in this light we should consider, for example, parliamentary concerns on operational attention directed toward the Communist Party and the peace movement (as possible political opposition and not as national security threats), calls for better independent oversight of the BVD, and demands for greater openness in general in order to diminish the potential for intelligence to degenerate through secrecy.

To the BVD and its minister, the increased frequency of voice towards the end of the Cold War was a period of crisis. As Andregg and Gill point out, albeit in another context of democratized states, an interesting question is whether such crises 'produced real change or whether agencies successfully resisted, perhaps with some minimal adaptation'.[98] In the Dutch case study the increase in voice produced change indeed with regard to the relations between parliament and intelligence. The ensuing greater degree of openness was the result of an interactive, mutually reinforcing, process between parliament and the security service.

Around the end of the Cold War political positions vis-à-vis intelligence were characterized by a combination of voice and loyalty in parliament and a greater responsiveness by the BVD and the minister to parliament's questions. Political parties along a broad political spectrum continued to demand (voice) better parliamentary oversight and greater openness. At the same time they continued to reiterate their support for the BVD and their acceptance of operational secrecy (loyalty). Voice actions in the beginning of the 1990s tended to emphasize policy matters instead of operational matters. Calls for unconditional openness had ceased. Different to the 1980s, parliament had by this point accepted and expressed loyalty vis-à-vis operational secrecy: a necessary step in the acceptance of secret services as such.

These constructive changes in the beginning of the 1990s were the result of an interactive process in which both parliament as outsiders and the BVD and the minister as insiders participated. When considering the sudden turn around the 1990s to an unexpected degree of openness on the BVD, it is useful to recall the increasing calls for greater openness that parliament had expressed in the 1980s. In this respect it seems that voice can be overdone with destructive effects in the short run, as Hirschman argues. Yet it may also reach some of its goals in the longer run. This research suggests, in other words, that 'management' is likely to respond to voice (or crisis) positively in the longer run. It shows, moreover, that insiders' and outsiders' actions and reactions strengthened each other: as Hirschman and Banfield argue, the greater the chances of a favourable outcome (e.g. better parliamentary oversight and greater openness), the greater effort (that parliament, in this case) will put into voice.

[98]Andregg and Gill, 'Comparing the Democratization', p.492.

This article analyzed means through which secrecy and democracy is able to co-exist despite their apparent oppositions. This coexistence, our case study shows, is most harmonious when insiders (the BVD and the minister in this case) and outsiders (parliament) interact cooperatively: in other words, when insiders are (of their own choice) responsive to outsiders' questions and demands, and outsiders demonstrate a combination of voice and loyalty regarding secrecy instead of opting for exit, voice, loyalty or neglect. This corresponds to Hirschman's supposition that democracy is best served by the combination of voice and loyalty. In constructive, fruitful and open debates on intelligence, members of parliament are little influenced by either admiration for secret services or suspicion regarding the contents of confidential information. They manage to combine, following Weber's argument, an ethic of conviction – always aiming, for example, for better oversight and greater openness – and an ethic of responsibility – accepting operational secrecy – complimenting and encouraging insiders upon (unsolicited) compliance with their requests.

Greater openness satisfied parliament and increased both its loyalty and involvement vis-à-vis the service and the minister, and its resort to voice. Or to use Hirschman's formulation, when a firm is responsive to its customers' needs, customers' will respond with greater involvement and loyalty to the firm as well as with an increased resort to voice. This corresponds to Hirschman's assumption that loyalty results from attachment to the firm and that it entails voice regarding the firm's policy, whether this policy develops in a satisfactory or dissatisfactory direction according to the customer.

In contrast, a constructive debating sphere does not occur when either exit, loyalty or neglect dominate. The (limited use of the) exit option did not contribute to making the BVD and the minister more responsive. Contrary to Hirschman's claims regarding firms, organizations and states, in parliamentary debate the exit option appears destructive. A good example is the position of the left-socialist PSP, which repeatedly claimed the BVD was undemocratic and should plainly cease to exist, much as Cato the Elder said of the destruction of Carthage. Its frequent resort to exit adhered to Weber's ideal type of an ethic of conviction: a romantic, value-based stance, indifferent to the feasibility of its demands. As this demonstrates, the combination of Hirschman's and Rusbult's four categories and Weber's ideal types is particularly useful when analyzing the relationship between parliament and secret services. This is because whereas Hirschman departs from rationally operating individuals, Weber includes the irrational ethic of conviction.

If, in the place of the exit option, loyalty or neglect dominate, then disclosed information may fall on deaf ears. Parliamentary reactions may remain infrequent and debates superficial. Disclosed information may thus remain unusable, unconsumed or simply un-secret.[99] This is likely to happen when outsiders idealize the insiders' efficiency, influence and power, when

[99]Birchall uses the term 'un-secret' (Birchall, '"There's Too Much Secrecy in this City", p.145).

they seem convinced of the rightfulness of secrecy (loyalty), or when they revert to active defeatism regarding their influence in the disclosure and usability of secret information (neglect).

Through the specific conceptual framework I propose, adapted to document-based research, this article has aimed to facilitate and encourage comparative research on the inherently difficult relations between parliament and intelligence around the end of the Cold War. Future comparative research, including case studies of non-Anglo-Saxon countries, could address how the approaching end of the Cold War influenced parliament in reassessing the current and future role of intelligence and whether this provoked a 'crisis' for intelligence. Ensuing questions could address how secret services responded to such crises: what consequences this had for the relations between parliament and intelligence, and for the role secrecy played and continues to play in these relations. A comparative approach to these questions will significantly enhance our understanding of how the end of the Cold War influenced relations between parliament and intelligence, and how secret services became embedded in democratic societies.

Notes on Contributor

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