NATO Enlargement and Democratisation: Interlinked, or Not?

The Cases of Poland, Ukraine and Georgia

**A thesis submitted as part of the requirement for the
Master International Relations in Historical Perspective**

Bianca Szytniewski

October 2008

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

NATO Enlargement and Democratisation: Interlinked, or Not?
The Cases of Poland, Ukraine and Georgia

> [The Parties to this Treaty] are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.[1]
>
> - North Atlantic Treaty, 1949 –

The end of the Cold War has not only led to changes in the Western security organisation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), but also to a shift in the political systems in Central and Eastern Europe. As newly established democracies in Central and Eastern Europe became eager to join the Alliance, NATO transformation and enlargement became also topics of discussion among the Alliance members. These former Soviet satellites, however, had a long way to go in their democratisation process, which was a precondition to join NATO in the long run. In the past twenty years, democratisation flourished in Central and Eastern Europe and allowed NATO to enlarge. Both democratisation and enlargement are processes of continuation, and have changed and developed in the past twenty years. In addition, the relevance of these two processes is present in current discussions on NATO enlargement. Accordingly, this thesis will have a closer look at the two processes of enlargement and democratisation and examine to what extent a causal relation, if any, could be found between NATO membership (both the prospect of joining the Alliance and the actual membership) and democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe.

With the rise of communism in the Soviet Union, Western European states feared that the agreements made at the end of the Second World War would not guarantee the national sovereignty of democratic states. As a result, on 4 April 1949, the United States together with twelve other western nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty. This marked the beginning of the Western security alliance, NATO. In the years that followed, four other European states

---

[1] 'North Atlantic Treaty', *NATO* (Washington 1949).

became members of the security Alliance, respectively Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.

The establishment of NATO implied that the United States acknowledged the importance of their involvement in European security after the Second World War, and as a result, the Alliance was regarded as the transatlantic link, which tied North American security to the security of Europe. In addition to security, democracy was an important core feature of the Alliance, which implied that all NATO members were democracies. The Alliance members agreed on the common objective of establishing 'a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law'.[2] While NATO was considered to be an instrument of collective defence against its Soviet adversaries, the Soviet Union regarded NATO as a threat to its collective security. Therefore, as a response to West German rearmament and integration to NATO, the Soviet Union decided to create its own security organisation in 1955, also known as Warsaw Treaty Organisation or Warsaw Pact, which included Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania.[3] Consequently, the world became divided between an alliance of democracies and an alliance of communist republics.

Since the 1990s, NATO needed to adapt to the changes in world politics. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet Union led to the development of democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. As a result, NATO enlargement became a topic of academic discussion. In this thesis, I will discuss three theories, which all have different views on the relation between NATO enlargement and democratisation.

Firstly, there are authors who emphasise the importance of democracy in NATO enlargement. Both Harvey Waterman and Dessie Zagorcheva stress the fact that institutions such as NATO could be valuable in directing and facilitating democratic reform.[4] This opinion is also found in the thesis of Douglas M. Gibler and Jamil A. Sewell, which argues that 'the likelihood of democratic transition and democratic survival both increase as the

---

[2] *NATO Handbook* (Brussels 2001) 30.

[3] F. Rubin, 'The Theory and Concept of National Security in the Warsaw Pact Countries', *International Affairs* 58.4 (1982) 648.

[4] Harvey Waterman, Dessie Zagorcheva and Dan Reiter, 'Correspondence: NATO and Democracy', *International Security* 26.3 (2001-2002) 226-227.

level of external threat faced by the state decreases'. These two authors conclude that NATO is not a part of a direct causal mechanism for democratisation and democratic survival, but rather that NATO ties reduce external threat and therefore increase the probability of democratic transition or consolidation.[5]

According to Gibler and Sewell, a causal mechanism is found between the variables external threat and democratisation. In other words, external threat is considered as the independent variable that leads to the dependent variable of democratisation. NATO is not a direct part of this causal mechanism, but influences the process as an intervening variable. Thus, if the external threat diminishes, democratisation flourishes, and vis-versa, if the external threat increases, democratisation will be more likely to fail.

There are authors who challenge the role NATO enlargement plays in democratisation. The second theory introduces NATO as a security community; a concept which was firstly introduced by Karl W. Deutsch and his co-authors in 1957. In the work of Deutsch, a security community is introduced as a group of people with a sense of community, institutions and practices to contribute to a peaceful change, settling disputes in another way than war.[6]

After the Cold War, the theory was adapted by constructivist scholars, such as Emanuel Adler. Adler states that the successful expansion of a security community as NATO from a core of Western states to Central and Eastern European countries during the 1990s was facilitated by a 'cooperative-security' community of practice. A shared interest in learning and applying a common practice is one of the main elements of a community of practice. Adler argues that NATO's initial enlargement policy might have been aimed at strengthening the Alliance with former adversaries, promoting democracy and human rights. However, the main reason that enabled the Alliance to transform itself and its mission was 'NATO's partial adoption of cooperative security knowledge and practices, and a sense

---

[5] Douglas M. Gibler and Jamil A. Sewell, 'External Threat and Democracy: The Role of NATO Revisited', *Journal of Peace Research* 43.4 (2006) 416.
[6] Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience* (New Jersey 1968) 5.

of community and joint enterprise'.[7] With regards to the Alliance, Adler points out that the principle of practices are found in the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP), which was established in 1994 to facilitate cooperation and common action between NATO and non-members.[8]

This theory puts a causal mechanism forward, in which NATO's security practices lead to democratisation. In other words, shared identities, values and meanings between Alliance members and between NATO and its partners, which are incorporated in the Alliance's security practices, are essential for reproducing democratic values and their expansion.

NATO enlargement
And common practices ⟶ Democratisation

The last theory does not accept the relation between NATO and democratisation as a whole. In his research, Dan Reiter opposes the theory that NATO enlargement has contributed to the spread of democracy. He argues that NATO membership was not necessary for the democratisation of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in the first round of enlargement after 1989, because each of these states was already strongly committed to democracy.[9]

NATO enlargement ‖ Democratisation

Thus, there are differing arguments with regards to the correlation between NATO enlargement and democratisation. As a result of the ongoing academic discussion, the question arises: Which of these theories has got it right? What relation could be found between democratisation and NATO enlargement, if any? In other words, to what extent is it possible to identify a causal mechanism, in which NATO as an independent or intervening

---

[7] Emanuel Adler, 'The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post—Cold War Transformation', *European Journal of International Relations* 14.2 (2008) 197, 212-213.
[8] Adler, 'The Spread of Security Communities', 209-210.
[9] Dan Reiter, 'Why NATO Enlargement does not spread Democracy', *International Security* 25.4 (2001) 42, 60.

variable plays an initiating and/or stimulating role in the processes of democratisation of the new (and future) democracies in Central and Eastern Europe?

I will focus on three case studies: Poland, which obtained NATO membership in 1999, and Ukraine and Georgia, which both seek NATO membership, but at the same time struggle with their democratisation process. Although all three states have been under Soviet rule, their process of democratisation and roads to NATO membership differ. This has partly to do with national politics, but also with external influences, mainly Russia, in the Central and Eastern European region. Moreover, these case studies will give some insight on the transformation of NATO, which became a topic of discussion in the early 1990s, as the first Central European states made clear that they wished to join the Alliance. Transformation of NATO has become again a topic of discussion with the Ukrainian and Georgian call for membership at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008.

Each of the case studies will contain an analysis, in which I will put the causal mechanisms discussed in the three theories to the test. These analyses will include three criteria. Firstly, the level of external threat in relation to NATO ties will be evaluated. In what way do NATO ties influence the external threat of a state working on democratisation? In this case, I distinguish three levels of external threat, which include perceived external threat, external threat related to soft power, such as political, economic and cultural influence, and external threat in the form of hard power, thus military intervention.

Secondly, I will discuss the importance of practices in relation to NATO enlargement and democratisation. What practices are applicable on the case studies, and are these practices only related to security or do other practices play a role too?

The third criterion concerns democratisation itself. Is it possible to put forward a specific date which reflects the starting point of the democratisation process in the case studies? If this date is found to be before NATO enlargement, both the external threat and practices will lose their importance as a criterion. However, it is also important to keep in mind the distinction between NATO membership and the prospect of membership, because the prospect of NATO membership could motivate aspirant states to democratise, which would suggest that NATO does spread democracy.

In this thesis, I will focus on the recent history of Central and Eastern Europe, on states that struggled in their democratisation process after more than forty years of Soviet rule. The number of books in the Netherlands on the recent history of Poland, Ukraine and Georgia, is small. Therefore, I will use mostly articles in scientific journals, reports, and statements of presidents, ministers and other key actors that discuss NATO enlargement and democratisation. In some cases, the events have not come to an end, which means that the sources might adapt to the changes of the events.

The chapter outline is as follows: in the first chapter, I will introduce the words democracy and democratisation, which will be put in the context of American export of democracy and the role of democracy within NATO; in the following three chapters, I will focus respectively on the case studies Poland, Ukraine and Georgia, and analyse the connection between NATO enlargement and democracy by referring to the three theories introduced above. The three case studies will be followed by an overall conclusion and an answer to the main question of this thesis. In short, I will combine a timeframe of two decades, three case studies and three analytic criteria, which will give a new insight into the academic discussion on NATO enlargement in relation to democratisation.

Chapter 1
Democracy

The world must be made safe for democracy […] for the rights of nations, great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience.[10]

<div align="right">- Woodrow Wilson -</div>

Since the famous words of American President Woodrow Wilson in 1917, democracy has become one of the most frequently used words in international politics. After the Second World War, democracy was associated with the West, while communism connected the Soviet Union with Central and Eastern Europe. Both sides aimed at increasing their sphere of influence, and, as a result, promotion of democracy became an essential part of American foreign policy. After the fall of communism, the United States continued to focus on the spread of democracy, while democracy also became formally a requirement for NATO membership.

---

[10] Woodrow Wilson, 'War Messages 65th Congress, 1st Session', *Senate Document* 5.7264 (Washington 1917).

1.1 The United States and the Export of Democracy

Since the days of Woodrow Wilson, promoting democracy overseas has been an important part of the American foreign strategy. Because the export of democratic values was a part of American involvement in Europe and has influenced NATO, democracy will be explained from an American point of view.

1.1.1 Principles and Weaknesses of Democracies

When speaking of democracy, one usually refers to liberal democracy, which consists of two interwoven elements. Democracy in the most basic meaning refers to the rule of the people in the form of majority rule. Elections, referenda and petitioning provide citizens the opportunity to choose their representative and to influence the policies and practices of the government.[11] The liberal aspect of liberal democracy does not refer to the matter who rules, but to the question how the rule is exercised. It implies mainly that the government is limited in its powers and acts.[12] According to William A. Hay, '[r]eal democracy means liberal representative government under law, sustained by a political culture that accepts disagreement and demands accountability'.[13]

A sustainable democratic order, combines democratic institutions with a reinforcing political culture. Together, these two features guarantee the rule of law, while ensuring that policy follows the preferences of public sentiment. In addition, institutions connect governments to the people and enhance ties between these two entities, which in return give the state legitimacy.[14] Furthermore, power is shared with a vital, pluralistic civil society, which consists of organisations and groups, such as businesses, trade unions, professional associations, and other private institutions, that pursue their interests independently of the government and of each other.[15] In other words, the role of civil society is to act as a third party between public authorities and the citizens. Moreover, government rule is limited by indisputable rights of the citizens, which include civil and political rights, such as the right to life, equal protection by law, and freedom of expression. These rights are internationally

---

[11] Philip Mark, 'Access, Accountability and Authority: Corruption and the Democratic Process', *Crime, Law and Social Change* 36.4 (2001) 357.
[12] Marc F. Plattner, 'Liberalism and Democracy', *Foreign Affairs* 77.2 (1998) 172.
[13] William A. Hay, 'What is Democracy? Liberal Institutions and Stability in Changing Societies', *Orbis*, 135.
[14] Hay, 'What is Democracy? Liberal Institutions', 136.
[15] Michael Mandelbaum, 'Democracy without America', *Foreign Affairs* 86.5 (2007).

recognised by the members of United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.[16]

Although in theory, democracy seems to be a feasible system, there are always shortcomings when putting democracy into practice. Critics argue that democracy can lead on one hand to an institutional structure and political culture that promotes cohesion, but on the other hand, it can undermine stability in transitional societies by reducing consensus or increasing differences within a state.[17] New democracies need time to prepare themselves and to develop a sophisticated political culture. When only copying superficial aspects of democracy without the total framework, illiberal or unsustainable democracies arise.[18] Emerging democracies fall often into a semi-authoritarian grey zone in which they suffer from democratic deficits, such as poor representation of civilian interests, low level of political participation, abuse of law by the government and doubtful legitimacy of election outcomes. Consequently, these democracies find themselves in a transition in which they are neither dictatorial nor heading for democracy.[19] Another problem of spreading democracy is that new governments are not always regarded as legitimate to have political and military control over the state or the financial and human resources to govern it.[20] In short, '[p]romoting democracy does not mean exporting it' but it is about 'offering moral, political, diplomatic, and financial support to individuals and organisations that are struggling to open up authoritarian regimes'.[21]

1.1.2   Democratic Efforts in the Past

The United States has a long history of attempts to promote democratic transitions. Woodrow Wilson was mentioned earlier, but also former American President, Harry S. Truman, has become known for his speeches about American commitment to aid non-communist states against the expansion of the Soviet Union. In 1947, he stated that '[n]o government is perfect.' However, '[o]ne of the chief virtues of a democracy [...] is that its defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and

---

[16] 'What are Human Rights?', *United Nations Human Rights* (2008).
[17] Hay, 'What is Democracy? Liberal Institutions', 134.
[18] Ibidem, 150.
[19] Thomas Carothers, 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', *Journal of Democracy* (2002) 9-10.
[20] Marina Ottoway, 'Is Democracy the Answer?', in Chester A. Crocker et all. ed. *Leashing the Dogs of War, Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington 2007) 605.
[21] Larry Diamond, 'Promoting Democracy', *Foreign Policy* 87 (1992).

corrected'.[22] In some cases, the United States has been more successful in promoting democracy than others. Americans often consider Germany and Japan as examples of positive transition to democracy. Indeed history shows that these two states have transformed successfully from autocratic rule to liberal democracy. However, as Francis Fukuyama notes, although these countries were transformed into model democracies after 1945, they started out not only as highly developed societies, but also as thoroughly defeated societies that had turned against the political powers responsible for war.[23]

The United States has repeatedly intervened in countries, such as Cuba, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, but was not able to establish strong democratic institutions. One reason for these failures has to do with Cold War tensions that prevented the United States following a strong policy of promoting democracy. As a result of anti-communist preoccupation, the United States supported dictatorial regimes that were also fighting communism.[24] One of the most paradoxical examples is American support for the Taliban in the 1980s against the Soviet Union, which had intruded Afghan territory. Subsequently, the Taliban became more powerful and was able to impose a dictatorship in Afghanistan.[25]

However, with the tempering of the Cold War, the United States increased its support for democratic forces and changed its policies against autocratic dictators. Although hard power played an important role in the U.S. strategy to promote democracy, the United States also developed tools of soft power, such as monitoring elections through election observers, exit polls and media coverage.[26] From the 1990s onward, promotion of democracy became more apparent in American foreign policy and also in official statements of the American government, such as in the following account by former Secretary of State James Baker in April 1992:

> Our idea is to replace the dangerous period of the Cold War with a democratic
> peace - a peace built on the twin pillars of political and economic freedom. […]

---

[22] Harry S. Truman, 'Famous Speeches Harry S. Truman: The Truman Doctrine', *Inspirational Speakers Motivational Speakers* (1947).

[23] Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy* (New Haven 2006) 132.

[24] Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads*, 132-134.

[25] Gilles Kepel, 'The Origins and Development of the Jihadist Movement: from Anti-Communism to Terrorism', *Asian Affairs* 34.2 (2003) 92.

[26] Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads*, 134-135.

Shared democratic values can ensure an enduring and stable peace in a way the balance of terror never could.[27]

Moreover, the United States advanced relations with Central and Eastern Europe, expanding governmental and private contacts with the newly independent states. U.S. foreign policy emphasised on the continuance of American interests in securing the paths of these states to democracy and market economic systems, while expanding this trend eastward.[28]

It is important to note that most post-communist transitions to democracy were not engineered from abroad. The call for democracy grew from dissatisfaction among the people who wanted to replace corrupt regimes. However, support from abroad, and largely from the United States was important to realise the transition and to spread democracy.[29]

1.1.3 Why Export Democracy?

In 1917, American President Woodrow Wilson declared that 'a steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic states'.[30] The United States is one of the main proponents of the democratic-peace theory, which goes back to Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace* in 1795. In the 1970s, Dean Babst introduced this theory into contemporary politics, arguing in his article *Elective Governments: A Force for Peace* that democracy carries within itself pacifying powers.[31] The democratic-peace theory puts forward 'the idea that democratic or liberal states never or very rarely go to war with each other and that they are less likely to become involved in militarised disputes […] among themselves'.[32] In the last two decades, the American government, Democrat and Republican, has supported a pro-democratic foreign policy. In his speech in October 1992, Bill Clinton declared that democracies

> are more likely to respect civil liberties, property rights and the rule of law within their own borders; democracies provide the best foundation on which to

---

[27] James Baker, 'A Summons to Leadership', *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 3.17 (1992).
[28] Julie Kim, 'Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary: Recent Developments', *CRS Issue Brief* (1996).
[29] Mark R. Beissinger, 'Promoting Democracy', *Dissent* 53.1 (2006) 19-20.
[30] Wilson, 'War Messages 65th Congress, 1st Session'.
[31] See Babst in Piki Ish-Shalom, 'For a Democratic Peace of Mind: Politicisation of the Democratic Peace Theory', *Harvard International Review* (2007).
[32] Azar Gat, 'The Democratic Peace Theory Reframed: The Impact of Modernity', *World Politics* 58.1 (2006) 73.

build international order. Democracies make more reliable partners in diplomacy

and trade, in protecting the global environment.[33]

The current war in Iraq has led to the promotion of the democratic-peace theory by President George W. Bush, who stated in a conference that his reason to support democracy is that 'democracies don't go to war with each other [and that they have the ability] to promote peace'.[34]

In addition, it is believed that democracies are not only more peaceable inclined toward one another, but also better suited to make international agreements and constitutional institutions work. The reason for this last perception has to do with the fact that democracies are accustomed to the same principles, which make relations with other democracies easier. Furthermore, the democratic notion of transparency provides openness for potential partners, which can judge for themselves whether agreements and commitments are being kept.[35]

1.2 NATO: From Security to Democracy

During the Cold War, NATO's main focus was on maintaining allied unity against Soviet threat rather than on democratising its members. Undemocratic periods of dictatorship or military involvement are found in Portugal, Turkey, Spain and Greece.[36] Indeed, these cases illustrate that military necessity was considered more important than democratic preferences.[37] However, as the Cold War ended, the Alliance's common enemy, the Soviet Union, dissolved and NATO needed to adapt its goals and strategy as a security organisation. Subsequently, the Alliance decided to pay more attention to democratisation, which was soon linked to NATO enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. The changes that followed could be regarded as a transformation from a defensive and reactive

---

[33] Yehudah Mirsky, 'Democratic Politics, Democratic Culture', *Orbis* 37.4 (1993).

[34] George W. Bush, 'President and Prime Minister Blair Discussed Iraq, Middle East', *The White House* (2004).

[35] Mandelbaum, 'Democracy without America'.

[36] Dan Reiter, 'Why NATO Enlargement does not spread Democracy', *International Security* 25.4 (2001) 56-58.

[37] David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington 2001) 71.

approach with regards to security, to a more proactive one, focusing on spreading security and stability.[38]

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, threat perceptions reduced drastically, and as a result, the allies felt freer to incorporate democratisation as a requirement for NATO membership.[39] Consequently, democratisation became a part of the political dimension of the Alliance. On 5 and 6 July 1990, the members of the Atlantic Alliance came together in London and declared the beginning of NATO's transformation, stating that the

> Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance.[40]

The transformation of the Alliance became the main topic of discussion among its members. On one hand, NATO members argued that in order to remain relevant in the new security environment, the Alliance needed to develop its ability to promote democratic stability within Central and Eastern Europe. In December 1989, James Baker, then U.S. Secretary of State, declared that NATO needs to serve new collective purposes, stating that while 'the new security architecture […] maintains common defence, the non-military component' should also be emphasised. In addition, he stated that as part of NATO's new mission, NATO should consider initiatives 'to build economic and political ties with the East, to promote respect for human rights [and] to help build democratic institutions'.[41]

On the other hand, some European leaders argued that the Alliance was not going to be able to adapt its political mechanism to the changes in world politics. As NATO had been closely associated with the military confrontation during the Cold War, some states, for example France, argued that the Alliance was not the best option for dealing with intrastate

---

[38] Jonathan Parish, 'Examining NATO's Transformation: Remaining Relevant', *NATO Review* (2005).
[39] Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 72.
[40] 'London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance', *North Atlantic Council* (London 1990).
[41] James A. Baker, 'A New Europe, a New Atlanticism', *Vital Speeches of the Day* 56.7 (1990) 196.

instabilities and the specific security needs of the new Europe.[42] French hostility towards transformation focused on the possible expansion of NATO's political roles, which aroused a new wave of distrust towards American motives, as France was of opinion that the United States used NATO as a means to expand its influence in Europe.[43] In the case of France, however, it must be noted that France has never been a large supporter of NATO. This attitude is for instance found in the French withdrawal of NATO's integrated military commands in 1966, and the French focus on European security forms rather than NATO involvement.[44]

Despite the debate, the Alliance members agreed that contemporary European security did not rely on conventional military confrontation, but on risks which were associated with domestic instability that had a powerful impact on NATO's relations with Central and Eastern European states.[45] As a result, NATO sought to strengthen its ties with former Warsaw Pact members by establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991, which was intended 'to develop an institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues between NATO and its former adversaries'. Initially, NACC included all NATO members and nine Central and Eastern European states; however, within a year, all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States were included, and also Georgia and Albania joined the Council.[46]

In 1994, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) came into being with the main focus on defence related cooperation between the members of NACC to form a partnership between each partner country and NATO. PfP assists states 'to increase stability, to diminish threats to peace and to build strengthened security relationships based on the practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles which underpin the Alliance'.[47] In the 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement*, democratisation became formally a requirement for new NATO members. The conditions for NATO membership included a functioning democracy based on a market economy, no unresolved ethnic conflicts and a commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes with neighbours, a commitment to democratic civil-military relations

---

[42] Alexandra Gheciu, *NATO in the 'New Europe': The Politics of International Socialisation after the Cold War* (Stanford 2005) 63.
[43] Anand Menon, 'From Independence to Cooperation: France, NATO and European Security', *International Affairs* 71.1 (1995) 19.
[44] Menon, 'From Independence to Cooperation', 23.
[45] Gheciu, *NATO in the 'New Europe'*, 69.
[46] 'Fact sheet: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)', *US Department of State Dispatch* 3.52 (1992).
[47] *NATO Handbook*, 67.

and institutional structures, and the ability to contribute to common security.[48] Consequently, after the first enlargement in 1999, NATO launched the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to assist applicant states by providing advice, assistance and practical support on al aspects of NATO membership, ranging from military and security elements to political and economic fields to legal aspects.[49]

NATO became profoundly involved in the promotion of norms and their corresponding institutions with regards to democratic control over defence and security institutions. However, some authors, such as Alexandra Gheciu challenge NATO's role as an advocate of democratisation. Gheciu points out in her research that member states tacitly agree that 'international agencies other than NATO were better equipped to promote domestic reforms in non security-related areas such as democratic elections, the independence of the judiciary […], reform of judicial systems [and] privatisation'. Institutions such as the European Union, the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are considered to be more suitable with regards to enhancing the democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe.[50]

Over the last two decades, democracy has received a steadier place in both American foreign policy and NATO's strategy in establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. The Cold War and the tensions between the West and the Soviet Union prevented a strong policy of promoting democracy before 1989. The following chapters examine the transformation of NATO and its role in the democratisation of Poland, Ukraine and Georgia.

---

[48] 'Study on NATO Enlargement', *NATO* (1995).
[49] *NATO Handbook*, 65-67.
[50] Gheciu, *NATO in the 'New Europe'*, 69.

Chapter 2
Poland

> The purpose of enlargement is to give Central and Eastern Europe, a region whose future stability is key to the future of Europe as a whole, the same kind of security that has become commonplace in Western Europe.[51]
>
> — Madeleine Albright -

Polish security policies have been shaped by geopolitical history. Being crammed between Germany and Russia, Poland has always considered security as a main concern. In the past, Poland's position between these two states has proven to be a threat to the Polish state and a major reason for its collapse in the late eighteenth century and again in 1939.[52] When the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, a new dimension of security concerns emerged, in which Poland focused on safeguarding its security and sovereignty. As a result, Poland's foreign policy needed to adapt to both internal and international changes.

In the early 1990s, Poland focused, on one hand, on the transformation of its geopolitical situation, i.e. the break-up of the Soviet Union; while, on the other hand, it tried to maintain a steady course of foreign policy, balancing relations with Western institutions and its neighbour to the East, Russia.[53] NATO membership soon became an important goal for Poland, while at the same time the Alliance declared that 'the Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were […] adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship'.[54] Poland's progress towards democratisation and its aspirations to become a NATO member will be examined in this chapter.

---

[51] Madeleine Albright, 'Why Bigger is Better', *Economist* 342.8004 (1997).

[52] Marcin Zaborowski and Kerry Longhurst, 'America's Protégé in the East? The Emergence of Poland as a Regional Leader', *International Affairs* 79.5 (2003) 1013.

[53] Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, 'Poland's Foreign Policy since 1989: The Challenges of Independence', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 33.1 (2000) 8.

[54] 'London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance', *North Atlantic Council* (London 1990).

2.1 The First Steps towards Democratisation

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Polish society became increasingly dissatisfied with the political and economical order of the communist government of Poland. As a result, Polish civil society formed various autonomous organisations, which ranged from student associations to proto-parties to unions, of which Solidarity became the largest, comprising of ten million members.[55] However, this first wave of liberalisation was suppressed by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who became Party leader in 1981 and decided on a tougher approach to the political opposition by declaring martial law in December 1981. Until July 1983, the government restricted civil liberties by introducing censorship, closing schools and universities, de-legalising independent organisations, and imprisoning thousands of Solidarity activists, including Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa.[56]

The election of a new General-Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, in 1985, opened a new chapter in the history of Central and Eastern Europe. The absence of functioning market and political mechanisms in the Soviet system led to a growing dissatisfaction among the Soviet society. Gorbachev realised that the Soviet Union needed a drastic reconstruction of the economic base and the political structures, which he called *perestroika*. In order to make it work, he announced that the society needed to be involved in an open society of democratisation, *glasnost*.[57] Consequently, Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika* influenced Polish politics and led to the adoption of an amnesty law for political activities in 1986.

However, Solidarity continued to oppose the government by widespread strikes and demonstrations, which eventually led to negotiations between the government and the trade union. At the beginning of 1989, the Roundtable talks were held, in which the government agreed to re-legalise Solidarity and reform the electoral system allowing semi-free elections with 35 percent free seats in the parliament, and an entirely free election to the Senate.[58] In these elections, Solidarity won nearly all contested seats, and a close associate of Wałęsa, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, became the first non-communist prime minister. From that moment

---

[55] Hongsub Lee, 'Transition to Democracy in Poland', *East European Quarterly* 35.1 (2001) 89
[56] Glenn E. Curtis ed., *Poland: A Country Study* (Washington 1992).
[57] Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* (New York 2001) 263-264.
[58] Robert Pernetta, *General Wojciech Jaruzelski: A Biography against Contemporary Development in Poland* (Kraków 2000).

onward, the chain of changes was set in motion. Leszek Balcerowicz, Deputy Prime Minister, launched a 'shock therapy' programme to liberalise and privatise the Polish economy; while one year later, Wałęsa became the first freely elected president of Poland after the fall of communism.[59] The Solidarity government, however, was unprepared for power, and found itself caught by internal division. While the Solidarity party fragmented, various new parties were established, all having different ideas towards the reconstruction of the political and economical system in Poland. As a result, Poland has had five coalitions governing Poland in the first five years after the semi-free elections of 1989.[60] Although the country was missing some basic pillars of a democracy, it is possible to distinguish a consistent line in Poland's democratisation process.

2.2 From the Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact to NATO Membership

Being the first former Warsaw Pact member to democratise, Poland experienced not only the challenges of democratisation, but also the challenges connected to the adaptation to a new security situation. It was not until October 1992 that Russia pulled its former Soviet combat troops out of Poland.[61] Although Poland wished to join the Western institutions, it was cautious to apply for NATO membership because it realised that membership would be regarded as a hostile step by Russia. As a result, in the first year after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Poland emphasised that it did not want to be a neutral state nor part of a buffer zone between Western Europe and Russia. In military terms, Poland proclaimed to consider itself as 'an independent, armed, Western-oriented country, but not an alliance member' neither of the West nor the East.[62]

In addition, it must be noted that although Poland did have some aspirations to join NATO in the early 1990s, the Alliance was not ready to admit new members and refused to offer former Warsaw Pact members a concrete timetable for membership. There were some technical reasons for this stance, such as problems in standardising force structure, weapons and communication equipment. However, the two main reasons were of another nature. Firstly, NATO was not prepared to provide the same sort of security to the Central and

---

[59] Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, 265.
[60] 'Politics versus Policy', *Economist* 331.7859 (1994).
[61] 'Withdrawing from Poland', *Maclean's* 105.45 (1992).
[62] Howard E. Frost, 'Eastern Europe's Search for Security', *Orbis* 37.1 (1993) 43.

Eastern European countries as it did for its members, and, secondly, NATO's decision making process would be challenged by a group of member states with significantly different political, military and force-planning traditions.[63] Furthermore, the Alliance was reluctant to establish formal ties with Central and Eastern European states because it did not want to affront Russia and complicate ongoing arms control talks or distress the delicate balance of power in Moscow.[64]

Hence, in the early 1990s, Poland decided to focus on its regional relations and joined the Visegrad Triangle, a joint platform of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary for purposes of regional cooperation and coordination of relations with Russia and the West. Although this trilateral relation focused both on regional and European cooperation, Visegrad soon became a vehicle for Central Europe's 'return to Europe'.[65] The Visegrad states agreed on a number of common objectives: restoration of state independence, elimination of all aspects of the totalitarian system, construction of a parliamentary democracy and a modern free market economy, and full involvement in the European political and economical system, and also its system of security and legislation.[66]

By 1994, however, the members of Visegrad believed that individual efforts toward integration in the EU and NATO institutions would be more efficient.[67] As a result, the intensity of cooperation between the Visegrad members declined and the focus on the West increased. Poland saw importance in regional cooperation and security, but focused also on supporting American military, political and economic presence in Europe.[68] Consequently, NATO membership soon became an important goal for Poland and was seen as a step forward.

Poland decided to apply for NATO membership as early as 1992, while it remained sceptical towards other multilateral security institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Certain factors in the course of history, such as European and UN pacifism after the Second World War, leaving Poland on the wrong

---

[63] Frost, 'Eastern Europe's Search for Security'.
[64] Terry, 'Poland's Foreign Policy since 1989', 13-14.
[65] Ibidem, 12-14.
[66] 'Visegrad Declaration 1991', *Visegrad Group* (1991).
[67] **'**History of the Visegrad Group', *Visegrad Group* (2007).
[68] Oleg Mikhalev, 'Dilemmas of Polish Politics', *International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations* 52.1 (2006) 98.

side of the iron curtain, contributed to this sceptical position.[69] Former Minister of Defence, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, declared that Poland considered NATO not only as a military alliance, but also as a political organisation for strengthening stability and democracy among its own members and beyond the alliance.[70] For Poland, NATO membership was a means to align itself with the West, politically and militarily, while safeguarding its sovereignty in Central and Eastern Europe.

2.3 Road to the First NATO Enlargement

At the Madrid Summit in 1997, the United States and other member states agreed on NATO accession negotiations with Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. NATO enlargement had been a major foreign policy initiative of American President Bill Clinton. In 1994, Clinton met with the Visegrad states in Prague and declared that 'the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how'.[71] Although the Unites States had been involved in Central and Eastern Europe before 1994, it had not prioritised NATO enlargement. It was Germany that has played a significant role in the early stages of Poland's quest for NATO membership.

2.3.1   German Influence

After the Cold War, NATO facilitated the processes of German unification and the integration of a united Germany into Europe. Germany was aware that its size and power after the unification caused mistrust among its neighbouring states.[72] However, from Polish side, this suspicion soon began to disappear when the first steps towards Polish-German reconciliation were taken with the signing of two treaties in 1991 concerning the permanence of the existing border between Germany and Poland, and the mutual commitment of both states towards good neighbourly relations. These treaties were accompanied by Germany's clear commitment to work on the inclusion of Poland in both the European institutions and

---

[69] Zaborowski and Longhurst, 'America's Protégé in the East?', 1013-1014.
[70] See Onyszkiewicz in Terry, 'Poland's Foreign Policy since 1989', 30.
[71] Bill Clinton, 'The Visegrad States: Crossroads to Change in the Heart of Europe', *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 5.1 (1994).
[72] Shai Steinberg, 'German Interests in the Continuance of NATO after 1990: A Neoliberal Institutionalist Analysis', *Institute for European Studies* (2002) 49.

NATO, and, therefore, were considered as a first step in overcoming Poland's security concerns.[73]

Germany's foreign policy focused on the need to preserve the multinational framework of NATO to deal with stability issues in the East, without being suspected of hegemonic ambitions.[74] Former German Defence Minister Volker Rühe, who is considered to be one of the prominent advocates of NATO enlargement, stated in 1993 that the 'Atlantic Alliance must not become a "closed shop" [because there is not] one good reason for denying future members of the European Union membership in NATO'.[75] In addition, Rühe emphasised that NATO enlargement to the East was not only a vital German interest, but also a crucial factor for the stability of Europe.[76]

Consequently, the 1994 Brussels Declaration, which included the Partnership for Peace (PfP), stated to go 'beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership'. Additionally, NATO members declared to 'welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to [the] East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe'.[77]

2.3.2   American Support

Before the United States became one of the main supporters of NATO enlargement, it had already been an important contributor to Poland's democratisation process. In 1989, the U.S. Congress passed the Support for East European Democracy Act to promote political democracy and economic pluralism in Poland and Hungary, and, as a result, organisations focusing on the promotion of democracy, such as the independent federal government agency U.S. Agency for International Development, were able to assist Central and East European countries with their transformation into free market democracies.[78]

From 1994 onward, the American government also supported Poland financially to advance Poland's participation in the PfP programme and to make military reforms possible. In 1996,

---

[73] Andrew A. Michta, 'Poland: A Linchpin of Regional Security' in Andrew A. Michta ed., *America's New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO* (Seattle 1999) 43.

[74] Steinberg, 'German Interests in the Continuance of NATO after 1990', 49.

[75] Volker Rühe, 'Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era', *Speech on the Occasion of the 1993 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture* (1993) 16.

[76] David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington 2001) 111.

[77] 'The Brussels Summit Declaration', *NATO* (Brussels 1994).

[78] 'Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989', *USAID Mission to Poland* (1989).

Clinton declared that the first NATO enlargement should take place in 1999.[79] Prior to the accession of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary in 1999, Clinton stressed the reasons for NATO enlargement: 'NATO can do for Europe's east what it did for Europe's west – protect new democracies against aggression, prevent a return to local rivalries, create conditions in which prosperity can flourish'.[80]

Along with Clinton's motives to enlarge NATO, the Department of State gave four main reasons that supported enlargement. Firstly, it would increase American safety by preventing future conflicts in Europe; secondly, the Alliance would become stronger and better able to address security challenges; thirdly, it was seen as a means to consolidate democracy and stability in Central Europe; and, finally, enlargement could facilitate the means to erase the dividing line of the Cold War.[81] Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that the fundamental goal of NATO was to realise 'a peaceful and undivided Europe working in partnership with the United States that welcomes every one of the continent's new democracies into [the] transatlantic community'.[82]

Not only Clinton and Albright advocated NATO enlargement, but similarly NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana stated in his speech at the University of Warsaw in 1996 that 'NATO enlargement will happen'. Solana, however, was more cautious in naming possible candidates, and emphasised that before identifying specific candidates for membership, the focus needs to be put on dialogue between NATO and the interested parties.[83]

2.3.3   Russia's Reservations

Since Clinton's announcement that the United States was committed to NATO expansion toward Central and Eastern Europe, Russia's initial policy was to criticise enlargement, warn of its negative effects on Russian and Western relations, and threaten with counter measures, such as increasing defence spending, stationing nuclear weapons on Russia's western borders and forging alliances with China, Iran or other countries against the West.[84]

---

[79] Julie Kim, 'Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary: Recent Developments', *CRS Issue Brief* (1996).
[80] Bill Clinton, 'Remarks by the President on the National Interest for Enlarging NATO', *The White House* (1998).
[81] 'The Enlargement of NATO: Why adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO strengthens American National Security', *U.S. Department of State* (1998) 14-16.
[82] Albright, 'Why Bigger is Better'.
[83] Javier Solana, 'Speech by the Secretary General: NATO Speech to the Polish Euro-Atlantic Associations', NATO (Warsaw 1996).
[84] Steven Woehrel, 'NATO Enlargement and Russia', *CRS Report for Congress* (1998) 2.

However, it must be noted that after the break up of the Soviet Union, Russian military conventional forces were not configured for offensive action, as Russia was lacking a strong state and strong control mechanism. Russia's military weakness makes it questionable if Russia would have had the means to attack Poland.[85] NATO enlargement was regarded as a means to isolate and exclude Russia from Central Europe. Moreover, it was seen as a way not to bring democracy, stability and prosperity to Central and Eastern Europe, but as 'a political and strategic operation aimed at consolidating the West's victory in the Cold War'.[86] From Russian point of view, Russia would be excluded from having the power to influence major issues with regards to European security. Additionally, Russia emphasised that the Russian Federation was in the process of transformation from a communist state into a democracy with a market economy. With this goal ahead, former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev put forward that 'Russia sees cooperation with NATO as an effective mechanism for overcoming the division of Europe and for mutual adaptation across the continent'.[87]

As a result, and most likely because of the feeling of isolation, Russia developed closer relations with NATO on defence and security related issues and even joined the PfP programme in 1994, increasing the NATO-Russia dialogue.[88] Moreover, during the Russian presidency of Boris Yeltsin, Russian stance towards future Polish membership to NATO changed. On 25 August 1993, in a Polish-Russian joint statement Yeltsin declared that Poland's desire to join NATO did not go against the security interests of Russia.[89] However, internal politics led to a change in Yeltsin's policy arguing that former Soviet republics should only be allowed to join NATO when Russia joins at the same time.[90] Nevertheless, Yeltsin's statement opened up possibilities for Poland and NATO to intensify cooperation and to work towards Poland's NATO membership. In addition, Poland was aware of Russia's opposition with regards to its NATO membership, and although Poland stated to be open for Polish-Russian dialogue, former Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz

[85] Sherman W. Garnett, 'Poland: Bulwark or Bridge?', *Foreign Policy* 102 (1996).
[86] Alexei K. Pushkov, 'Russia and NATO: A Case for Binding Security Guarantees', *International Herald Tribune* (1997).
[87] Andrei Kozyrev, 'The New Russia and the Atlantic Alliance', *NATO Review* (1993).
[88] *NATO Handbook* (Brussels 2001) 80.
[89] Bruce George, 'The Alliance at the Flashpoint of a New Area', *NATO Review* 41.5 (1993).
[90] 'Your Policy or Mine?', *Economist* 329.7835 (1993).

underlined that 'Poland would not be diverted by foreign pressure from exercising the sovereign right to seek any alliance which we deem to be in our national interests'.[91]

On 27 May 1997, the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed by the members of NATO and the president of Russia. In this Act, the parties agreed on an enduring commitment at the highest political level to create a 'framework for a new security partnership and for building a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe'.[92] The United States considered it as the institutionalisation of the NATO-Russian relationship and as basis for increased cooperation.[93] In order to explain this partnership between NATO and Russia, it needed to be clear that Russia would not have the power to restrict NATO in any way. In the words of Clinton, the Act states that 'NATO retains independence of decision making and action at all times'.[94] From Russia's point of view, signing the Act was a means to make Russia's concerns on security and NATO enlargement clear to the NATO members.

2.4 Democratisation

> In joining the family of democratic states, Poland is determined to contribute to collective efforts to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of our peoples, founded on individual liberty and the rule of law. We do not want to be merely a consumer of NATO produced security. We believe that Poland could significantly contribute to it.[95]
>
> - Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz -

2.4.1   NATO

In the years prior to NATO membership, Poland had actively implemented the PfP programme. Former Prime Minister Cimoszewicz stated that Poland did not see PfP solely as a stepping stone to NATO membership, but as a significant partnership that contributes 'to

---

[91] Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 'Building Poland's Security: Membership of NATO a Key Objective', *NATO Review* 44 (1996).
[92] *NATO Handbook*, 82.
[93] Bill Clinton, 'President Clinton's Response to Senator's Questions on NATO Enlargement', *The White House* (1997).
[94] Clinton, 'President Clinton's Response to Senator's Questions on NATO Enlargement'.
[95] Cimoszewicz, 'Building Poland's Security'.

Europe's security [while having] an important confidence-building function'. In addition, he argued that military and political cooperation between NATO and non-members 'increases the transparency of military activities and supplements the existing regional and pan-European agreements on the exchange of military information and cooperation'.[96]

Additionally, military reform became part of the Polish democratisation process. Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Polish military system has undergone a series of organisational and personnel changes. Especially in the first few years after the Cold War, military reform was a topic of debate in Poland. By 1996, the relationship between the military and the government was settled and civilian control over military services had officially been reaffirmed.[97] As Andrew Michta argues, the political criteria of NATO membership outlined the boundaries of civil military relations, and, as a result, contributed to the establishment and strengthening of democracy in Poland.[98] In addition, the modernisation of the Polish military forces led to active participation in the PfP programme and significant contributions to NATO peacekeeping training and operations. In 1995, Poland contributed troops to the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia Herzegovina.[99] Moreover, Poland took part in the joint Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian battalion of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), and more recently, Poland has sent 1200 soldiers to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).[100]

2.4.2   European Union

NATO has not been the only framework, in which Poland worked on its democratisation process. Both the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have supported the transition of Poland from communism to democracy. Already in 1990, Bronisław Geremek, who was a member of Solidarity and played a crucial role during the Roundtable talks, stated that one of the most important elements with regards to democratisation and the forming of a democratic political culture is Poland's connection with Europe and its participation in European institutions. By adapting to higher standards in law, human rights, state structures, and the entry into the Council of Europe,

---

[96] Ibidem.
[97] Michta, 'Poland: A Linchpin of Regional Security', 50-51.
[98] Andrew A. Michta, 'Making the Pieces Fit' in Andrew A. Michta ed., *America's New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO* (Seattle 1999) 186.
[99] Michta, 'Poland: A Linchpin of Regional Security', 50-51.
[100] Franciszek Gągor, 'Polish Lessons learned from Operations – Defence Transformation', *General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces* (London 2008).

which he refers to as a 'club of democracies', Poland will be able to establish a standard essential for democratisation.[101] Thus already in the early 1990s, Poland was not only aiming at NATO membership, but also wished to become a member of the European Union.

In 1990, the so-called Europe Agreement was signed between Poland and the EU, which aimed at strengthening political and economic reform, and provided the eventual establishment of free trade areas, the gradual adoption of EU legislation on the single European market and the start of political dialogue.[102] At the Copenhagen Summit, in June 1993, the European Union outlined its criteria which candidate states need to fulfil in order to become an EU member. These criteria included the guarantee of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy, and the complete implementation of the acquis communautaire.[103]

In order to fulfil these criteria, Poland worked, throughout the 1990s, on strengthening the Polish state. Before Poland became a NATO and EU member, the country managed politically to establish a successful democratic system with free elections and growing political pluralism; while, economically, Poland became one of the most successful pioneers in establishing a market economy, in which most economic indicators, such as growth, inflation and foreign investment were moving in the right direction.[104]

Poland's quest for both NATO and EU membership could be regarded as complementary. Because many criteria, such as democracy, rule of law and market economy, were found in both international organisations, Poland was not only working towards NATO membership, but at the same time towards EU membership. For a state that needed to safeguard its security and sovereignty after more than two centuries dependence of other powers, the prospect of inclusion in both these two Western institutions was an important factor in Poland's democratic efforts. As former President Aleksander Kwasniewski stated in 1996,

---

[101] See Geremek in John Micgiel, 'The Road to Democracy and Pluralism in Poland: An Interview with Bronislaw Geremek', *Journal of International Affairs* 45.1 (1991) 70.
[102] Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration* (Hampshire 2005) 146.
[103] 'Conclusions of the Presidency', *European Council in Copenhagen* (Copenhagen 1993) 13.
[104] George Blazyca, 'Polish Socio-Economic Development in the 1990s and Scenarios for EU Accession', *Europe-Asia Studies* 51.5 (1999) 799.

'membership in the European Union and NATO is the next step, a necessary step, to organise and build a common Europe'.[105]

2.5 Analysis

Democratisation became an important criterion of NATO membership and influenced Poland's democratic transition. However, in what way did this happen? In this analysis, the three theories, described in the introduction, will be applied on the case study of Poland.

2.5.1   External threat

The geographic location of Poland between Germany and Russia has always influenced Poland's security concerns. Historically, both these states have imposed a security threat on Poland. After the Second World War, Germany was defeated and divided, while the Soviet Union became a superpower. However, in the early 1990s, the power status of Poland's neighbours changed: the Soviet Union fell apart, whereas Germany unified. Although Poland regarded the German unification and the continuing Russian presence in Central and Eastern Europe as a threat to the security and sovereignty of the Polish state, it is questionable if the theory of Gibler and Sewell, who argue that the likelihood of a democratic transition increases as the external threat faced by a state decreases, is entirely applicable on this case study.

On one hand, it could be argued that the external threat did not influence Poland's efforts to democratise. In the early 1990s, the Soviet Union had not yet been dissolved and Russian troops were still present in Poland, and the size and power of Germany after the unification caused also mistrust. However, although these forces were present in Poland, Poland had already committed itself to become a democracy. Free presidential elections had already taken place, new political parties which contributed to political pluralism in Poland were established, and economic reforms to liberalise and privatise the Polish economy had been set into motion. Thus, Poland was already working on its democratic transition, not only before the external threat diminished, but also before Poland applied for NATO and EU membership.

---

[105] See Kwasniewski in Gregory Piatt, 'Poland seeks Role as Europe's Stabilizer', *Christian Science Monitor* 88.146 (1996).

However, on the other hand, it could be argued that external threat did play a role in Poland's foreign policy. As a result of the external threat described above, Poland decided to focus first on regional relations in the form of the Visegrad Group, instead of applying directly for NATO membership. Moreover, the timing of Poland's declaration to join NATO, which was in 1992, corresponds with the year of the Russian withdrawal. Thus, when looking at the timeline, it could be concluded that the reduction of the external threat has contributed to an increase in Poland's manoeuvre possibilities in foreign politics, resulting in the Polish declaration to join both the NATO and the EU. In addition, NATO ties, which were institutionalised in 1994, did not particularly increase Poland's democratisation process with regards to political and economic level. However, on military level, it could be argued that the prospect of NATO membership contributed to establish civilian control over the military services in 1996, which led to the modernisation of the Poland's military forces and participation in NATO military trainings and operations.

Therefore, in the case of Poland, the external threat appears to have played mainly a role with regards to Poland's foreign policy and its military reforms, and to a lesser extent to its political democratisation process, which had already occurred earlier.

2.5.2 Practices

This case study puts forward that NATO and Poland had found a common ground of shared identities and values in the form of common practices, on which Poland was willing to enhance. Poland became an active partner in the PfP programme and contributed to NATO peace keeping training and operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. These security practices have played an important role in Poland's path to become a member of the Alliance.

However, in order to become a NATO member Poland needed to fulfil a number of criteria, which included democratic and market systems, civilian democratic control over the military and the ability to contribute to common security. It could be argued that Poland's commitment to the PfP programme contributed to the Polish democratisation process. A causal reaction could be found in Poland's efforts in contributing to the Partnership programme, and, therefore, to the common security practices. Poland's success did not depend only on the ability of modernising and reforming the military forces, but also on

putting Polish military services under civilian control. This, however, is only possible in a democracy. Therefore, as Poland was already politically and economically committed to democratisation, Poland was also able to democratise its military services, and expand the democratic values to a new level.

2.5.3   Democratisation

In this analysis, it has become clear that Poland had committed itself to democratisation, long before it became a NATO member. The first steps towards democratisation were already taken two decades before the fall of the Soviet Union, when the civil society was formed. Furthermore, during the 1990s, Poland worked on its democratisation process by keeping free elections, supporting the creation of new political parties, and introducing successful economic reforms. Thus, this case study supports Reiter's argument that NATO enlargement does not spread democracy. However, it must be noted that democratisation at military level took place after Poland committed itself to the PfP Programme and after NATO membership became an important foreign policy goal. Thus, NATO membership does not necessarily lead to democratic transition; however, it does contribute to the democratisation process that has already been established.

In conclusion, ten years after the fall of communism, Poland took part in the first NATO enlargement and became a full member of the Alliance. While one neighbour opposed Polish membership to NATO, the other neighbour supported Polish integration in Western institutions. It could be argued that German-Polish reconciliation was a crucial element of the expansion of the Alliance. It was only after that Germany intensified its relations with Poland that the United States changed its priorities, and became the main advocate of NATO enlargement.

NATO membership itself did not have a major impact on Poland's democratic transition, as democratisation already played a role since 1989. Poland established democratic institutions and took the first steps towards a market economy in the early 1990s. However, as concluded earlier, NATO membership did contribute to further democratisation of Poland.

Chapter 3
Ukraine

Our commitment to the Intensified Dialogue underscores that NATO's door remains open, and that Ukraine's aspirations are, ultimately, achievable. […] But ultimately, the primary responsibility for success rests with the Ukrainian people and their elected leaders.[106]

- NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer -

Ukraine has been ruled for more than two centuries by Russia, first by the Russian Tsars and later by the communist administration of the Soviet Union. Both democratisation and independence have been new concepts to the Ukrainians, mainly, because Ukraine has never had a period in which a political and cultural elite could emerge and develop a national idea of self-governance. As a result, the disintegration of the Soviet Union forced the Ukrainian political and intellectual elite to prioritise state building and legitimise the existence of an independent Ukrainian state.[107] Less attention was paid to democratisation, and therefore, Ukraine's democratic transition progressed slowly.

In addition, Ukraine's foreign policy has been one of irregularity. One on hand, Ukraine focused on its 'return to Europe' by stressing its independence and working on closer relations with NATO, while on the other hand, Ukraine never developed a pro-European drive as for example Poland, nor was it able to put economic and legal reforms effectively in place due to corruption.[108] As a result, Ukraine still has a long way to go to NATO membership; however, recent events, such as the Orange Revolution and the Alliance's Bucharest Summit in April 2008, have led to a sense of optimism on Ukraine becoming a NATO member in the near future.

---

[106] Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 'Introductory Remarks by NATO Secretary General: Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission', *NATO Speeches* (2006).
[107] Ilya Prizel, 'Ukraine between Proto-Democracy and 'Soft' Authoritarianism' in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot ed. *Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova* (Cambridge 1997) 331, 333.
[108] Mikhail A. Molchanov, 'Ukraine's European Choice: Pitfalls and Prospects', *NATO* (Ottawa 2003) 6.

3.1 From a Soviet Republic to an Independent State

Although Ukraine lacked historical parties and institutions, it did not mean that the Ukrainians agreed with Soviet politics. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Ukrainian dissident movement arose, and sought national rehabilitation and revival. Most of the dissidents worked within the legal framework and focused on reviving old Ukrainian cultural icons and styles; however, the conceptual bases of a Ukrainian national idea were not revived.[109] From 1989 onward, the first political opposition parties emerged, such as the People's movement of Ukraine (Rukh), which focused on Ukrainian nationalism and state independence, and the Ukrainian Democratic Party, which emphasised democratisation and market reform. As in Poland, Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika* in the mid 1980s also influenced Ukrainian politics. [110]

On 24 August 1991, the Ukrainian Soviet Parliament adopted the Act of Independence of Ukraine, which was confirmed by a popular referendum.[111] As a result, Ukraine took no longer part of a Russian-led security system, while at the same time Ukraine had no security guarantees from any other state or alliance. To avoid Russian interference, Ukraine declared itself to be a non-aligned neutral state.[112]

3.1.1   Neo-Soviet Politics

Although Ukraine declared its independence in 1991, it was difficult for the national and democratic opposition to displace former communists from power, partly because of internal divisions, and partly because support for former communists was also found in the opposition. As a result, the first presidential elections of Ukraine were won by Leonid Kravchuk, a former member of the Communist Party.[113] Kravchuk's main challenge was to create one national identity in a multinational society, since a division is found between western Ukrainians, who consider themselves culturally, linguistically and religiously part of Europe, and eastern and southern Ukrainians that relate more with Russia.[114] Ukraine consists of a large Russian minority and an even larger Russian speaking population. Russian cultural elements, such as religion, language, culture and historical identification,

---

[109] Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* (New Haven 2000) 153-155.
[110] Wilson, *The Ukrainians*, 157.
[111] 'Declaration of Independence of Ukraine', *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine* (June 2008).
[112] Molchanov, 'Ukraine's European Choice', 12-13.
[113] Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (New Haven 2005) 36, 31.
[114] Angela Stent, 'Ukraine's Fate', *World Policy Journal* 11.3 (1994) 83.

have acquired a vast place in the Ukrainian tradition, and play an important role in the Russian orientation in eastern and southern Ukraine.[115]

On a political and economical level, Russian, and mainly Soviet, influences are found in Ukraine throughout the 1990s. Politically and economically, Kravchuk governed Ukraine in neo-Soviet style, as many elected representatives were replaced by former communists, the press was controlled tightly by the government, and the Soviet-era constitution was still in place by 1994.[116] Moreover, not only the legacy of the Soviet economic system hindered Kravchuk attempts to introduce economic reforms, but also Ukraine's almost total reliance on Russian energy made it difficult to reform. Additionally, the government was unwilling to move against powerful economic interests to liberalise prices or start the process of privatisation.[117]

Militarily, Ukraine's approach to safeguard its independence after the break-up of the Soviet Union led to a rapid assertion of control over the Ukrainian military forces. Kravchuk decided to distance Ukraine from the newly established Commonwealth of States (CIS), a loose confederation of former Soviet satellites and Russia, in order to prevent Ukraine's presence in a joint post-Soviet command.[118] Although Ukraine was politically and economically run in a neo-Soviet style, Ukraine took significant steps to prevent renewed Russian rule over independent Ukraine. This resulted in Ukraine's orientation towards NATO.

3.1.2   Between East and West

As a result of the economic setbacks, Leonid Kuchma was elected president in the early elections of 1994. The elections were regarded as a historical moment for Ukrainian democracy, as for the first time in Ukrainian history a president left office by means of the electoral process.[119] However, the democratisation process was not carried on easily during Kuchma's presidency. In order to receive votes from eastern and southern Ukraine, Kuchma appeared to promote closer ties with Russia. However, after Kuchma took office, he moved

---

[115] Anatol Lieven, 'Restraining NATO: Ukraine, Russia, and the West', *The Washington Quarterly* 20.4 (1997) 60.
[116] Andrew Cowley, 'The Birth and Possible Death of a Country', *The Economist* 331.7862 (1994).
[117] Stent, 'Ukraine's Fate', 85.
[118] Andrea Chandler, 'State Building and Political Priorities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Role of the Military', *Armed Forces & Society* 22.4 (1996).
[119] Prizel, 'Ukraine between Proto-Democracy and 'Soft' Authoritarianism', 355.

towards the West by endorsing market reforms, and agreeing on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the dismantling of Ukraine's nuclear weapons.[120] Furthermore, with regards to Ukraine's territory, Kuchma pursued national interests in the Ukrainian-Russian dispute over the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, which was given by the Soviet Union to Ukraine in 1954. While Russia insisted that Sevastopol should be under Russian control as the Russian fleet is based there, Ukraine was only willing to allow Russian ships to share the port facilities, keeping the city under Ukrainian sovereignty.[121] Subsequently, the dispute was resolved with an agreement granting the Russian Black Fleet basing rights for twenty years.[122]

As a result of Kuchma's Western orientation and the promise of political and economic reform, the United States and European states sent billions of dollars in financial support to Ukraine. Ukraine became the third largest recipient of American foreign assistance, receiving 2.83 billion dollar between 1992 and 2001.[123] However, while Kuchma stressed the importance of economic recovery, it soon became clear that his proposed economic reforms were not carried out, or not to their full extent. Furthermore, in this period a small group of oligarchs acquired control over Ukraine's key sectors, which made it even more difficult to reform the Ukrainian economy. Nevertheless, from the mid 1990s onward, Ukraine experienced some economic growth for the first time since its independence.[124]

As Kuchma's presidency continued, an economic crisis re-emerged as a result of high inflation and corruption. Moreover, the presidential elections of 1999 were marred by fraud. Kuchma won the elections by manipulating the outcome.[125] As Kuchma started his presidential mandate, dissatisfaction arose among the Ukrainian people, which ultimately led to the events of the Orange Revolution in December 2004.

3.1.3   The Orange Revolution and Domestic Turmoil

The Orange Revolution is often regarded as a breaking point between Ukraine's Soviet past and its democratic future. The revolution was sparked by the presidential elections of 2004,

---

[120] Paul Kubicek, 'U.S.-Ukrainian Relations from Engagement to Estrangement', *Problems of Post-Communism* 50.6 (2003) 4.
[121] Peter Ford, 'Kiev, Kremlin Battle over Ships', *Christian Science Monitor* 87.136 (1995).
[122] Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*, 178.
[123] Kubicek, 'U.S.-Ukrainian Relations from Engagement to Estrangement', 4.
[124] Nienke de Deugd, *Ukraine and the Issue of Participation with the Euro-Atlantic Security Community* (Groningen 2005) 84-85.
[125] Kubicek, 'U.S.-Ukrainian Relations from Engagement to Estrangement', 5.

in which two opposite candidates were competing for president: Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, who was chosen by the powerful oligarchs, and the pro-reformist and pro-Western former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. Although Yanukovych was proclaimed the winner, the elections were criticised for not being free and fair, accusing Yanukovych of government-run media bias, abuse of absentee ballots and inaccurate voter lists. As a result, the Ukrainians staged nationwide protests, which became known as the Orange Revolution.[126]

Subsequently, a runoff election took place and the pro-Western Yushchenko became president. Yushchenko, however, faced many challenges to reform his country. The Ukrainian ethnic division became even more apparent during the elections, when it became clear that the majority in eastern and southern Ukraine, influenced by Russian President Vladimir Putin, supported Yanukovych. Furthermore, Yushchenko was confronted by rising budget deficit and a slowdown in Ukraine's economic growth rate. Moreover, media reforms were necessary to put an end to the propagandistic state television.[127] In the years that followed, however, Yushchenko also faced new political challenges.

On 23 January 2005, the parliament approved Yushchenko's appointment of Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister. However, Tymoshenko has been regarded as a controversial person. On one hand, she has been a reform minded supporter of Yushchenko during the presidential elections; while on the other hand, she has been accused of involvement in corrupt schemes as a businesswoman. Due to internal clashes in the coalition, Yushchenko dismissed the government of Tymoshenko in September 2005, and, subsequently, made a non-aggression pact with his opponent of the presidential elections, Viktor Yanukovych. However, when it became clear that the Yanukovich government was opposing Yushchenko's decrees, Yushchenko dissolved the Ukrainian parliament again in April 2007, and re-nominated Tymoshenko as his candidate for Prime Minister.[128]

The Orange Revolution is often regarded as a success in progressing Ukraine toward a democracy. In the years after the revolution, Ukraine's existing institutions were pushed toward democratisation; media and civil society were able to consolidate; and the Ukrainian economy took off. However, at the same time, Ukraine's leaders found challenges in the

---

[126] Steven Woehrel, 'Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy', *CRS Report for Congress* (2006) 1.

[127] Adrian Karatnycky, 'Ukraine's Orange Revolution', *Foreign Affairs* 84.2 (2005).

[128] Woehrel, 'Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy', 1-2.

persistence of corruption, slow policy-making processes, a decaying infrastructure, and economic problems for the weaker ones in society.[129] The Orange Revolution mainly confirmed Ukraine's desire to democratise, but did not take away the problems Ukraine was struggling with.

3.2 Ukrainian Quest for NATO Membership

> A sovereign Ukraine is a strategic player in forming Europe's security landscape. And the NATO-Ukraine distinctive partnership and its further development is a key building block in the construction of the new Europe, characterised by ever closer partnership and integration.[130]
>
> <div align="right">- NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson -</div>

Ukraine's politics have strongly been influenced by Russian and Soviet heritage. In the 1990s nationalisation was prioritised over democratisation and alliance building with the West. However, soon after its declaration of independence, Ukraine did work on establishing mutual cooperation and dialogue with NATO, which was part of Ukraine's policy to safeguard the sovereignty and security of Ukraine. In contrast to Poland's early aspirations to become a member of NATO, Ukraine worked for a long time on partnership level before it officially announced its wish to join the Alliance.

3.2.1   NATO-Ukraine Relations Institutionalised

As soon as 1991, Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which marked the beginning of formal relations between NATO and Ukraine. Subsequently, Ukraine sought deeper political and military cooperation with the West, and became the first applicant for the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1994.[131] However, it took four more years before Ukraine's President Kuchma approved a decree on cooperation with NATO within the framework of the Partnership programme.[132]

---

[129] Alexander J. Motyl, 'Three Years After', *Harvard International Review: European Edition* 29.4 (2008) 18-19.
[130] Lord Robertson, 'Opening Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson at the Ministerial Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission', *NATO* (2002).
[131] Molchanov, 'Ukraine's European Choice', 13-14.
[132] Jennifer D.P. Moroney, 'Frontier Dynamics and Ukraine's Ties to the West', *Problems of Post-Communism* 48.2 (2001), 17.

Political relations between NATO and Ukraine evolved with the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Charter in 1997, which advanced these relations to a higher level, formally recognising the importance of an independent, stable and democratic Ukraine. The Charter was seen as the basis for NATO-Ukrainian consultation and cooperation in the context of Euro-Atlantic security and stability in areas of conflict prevention, crisis management and humanitarian operations. In addition, the cooperative programmes focused on defence reform, civil-military relations, budgeting and resource planning.[133] Although the Charter did not refer to legal or military relations, it did imply a certain commitment of NATO members to the security of Ukraine.[134]

As the ties with NATO advanced, Kuchma stated in May 2002 that Ukraine's ultimate goal was to obtain NATO membership.[135] Subsequently, in November 2002, Ukraine adopted the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, which was regarded as another step forward, intensifying consultation and cooperation on political, economic, military and defence issues. As stated in the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan,

> [t]he purpose of the Action Plan is to identify clearly Ukraine's strategic objectives and priorities in pursuit of its aspirations towards full integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures and to provide a strategic framework for existing and future NATO-Ukraine cooperation under the Charter.[136]

Ukraine welcomed this document, and considered it as a new and important stage in NATO-Ukrainian relations. Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Anatoliy Zlenko, declared that by 'implementing this document Ukraine will start a process of practical preparation for a NATO membership'.[137]

As a result of the Orange Revolution and Ukraine's commitment to democratisation, NATO and Ukraine established closer ties. In February 2005, Yushchenko announced that the Ukrainians 'would like to see Ukraine being integrated into the European Union and into the

---

[133] *NATO Handbook* (Brussels 2001) 87.
[134] Moroney, 'Frontier Dynamics and Ukraine's Ties to the West', 17.
[135] 'NATO-Ukraine: A Distinctive Partnership', *NATO (*2007) 4.
[136] 'NATO-Ukraine Action Plan', *NATO Prague Summit* (2002).
[137] Anatoliy Zlenko, 'Press Conference by NATO Deputy Secretary General, Minuto Rizzo and Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Anatoliy Zlenko', *NATO Prague Summit* (2002).

North Atlantic Alliance'.[138] Consequently, in that same year, NATO launched an Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine's aspirations to NATO membership and relevant reforms. NATO's Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated that 'NATO supports the efforts of the Ukrainian authorities to strengthen democratic institutions, encourage respect for shared Euro-Atlantic values and accomplish wide-reaching reforms throughout the defence and security sectors'.[139]

Internal tensions between the pro-Western President Yushchenko and the pro-Russian Prime Minister Yanukovych moved to Ukraine's foreign policy level. A year after Yushchenko's declaration that Ukraine sought NATO membership, Yanukovych stated after a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council in 2006, that although Ukraine is committed to ongoing cooperation with NATO, the Ukrainian people are not ready yet to consider possible NATO membership.[140] This was considered as an oppositionist move by the Ukrainian prime minister; however, there is certainly some truth in Yanukovych's statement, as a 2005 survey indicated that only 22 percent of the Ukrainians would vote for NATO membership in a referendum.[141] In the three years that followed, this percentage did not increase, and became one of the reasons not to admit Ukraine to NATO at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit on NATO enlargement.

3.2.2   Military Democratisation and Cooperation

From 1998 onward, Ukraine became an active participant in the Partnership programme, focusing more on defence reform and cooperation in military-technical definition. Because Ukraine had mainly focused on political changes, one of the largest challenges became the establishment of a national defence planning system. With the organisation of a Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, NATO-Ukrainian relations became more structured with regards to military review and consultation.[142] In the 2002 NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, Ukraine recognised on democratising its military sector:

---

[138] Viktor Yushchenko, 'Opening Statement at the Press Conference following the Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council at the Level of Heads of State and Government', *NATO Speeches* (2005).
[139] Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 'Joint News Conference by the NATO Secretary General and the Foreign Minister of Ukraine', *NATO Meeting of Foreign Ministers* (2005).
[140] Viktor Yanukovych, 'Press Point with NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych', *NATO Speeches* (2006).
[141] Neil Munro, 'Which Way does Ukraine Face? Popular Orientations toward Russia and Western Europe', *Problems of Post-Communism* 54.6 (2007) 45.
[142] James Sherr, 'NATO's Strategic Partnerships: Edging Erratically Forward', *NATO Review* (2003).

Ukraine remains committed to carrying forward its defence and security sector reforms with the aim of restructuring and reorganising its national defence and security establishment into a democratically controlled and effective organisation able to ensure its sovereignty and territorial integrity and to contribute to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.[143]

Besides military reform, Ukraine contributed in the framework of PfP to various joint military exercises and hosted a number of PfP exercises on its own territory. Ukraine contributed troops to the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Ukrainian troops also participated in the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) which replaced IFOR. Furthermore, Ukraine contributed troops and equipment to the joint Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian battalion of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo.[144] More recently, Ukraine provided over-flight clearance for forces deployed in Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or as part of the coalition forces under the United States. Furthermore, since March 2005, Ukraine has also contributed troops to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq.[145]

3.3 Bucharest Summit: Ukrainian Hopes for NATO Membership

At the Bucharest summit in April 2008, Ukraine hoped to obtain the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which would lay out the specific steps Ukraine needs to take in order to become a full member of the Alliance. However, Ukraine's MAP was postponed as the Alliance members were divided over the new NATO applicants and NATO's relations with Russia. As a result, the Bucharest communiqué stated only that Ukraine and Georgia 'will become members of NATO' and that the Summit marked the beginning of 'a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications'.[146]

---

[143] 'NATO-Ukraine Action Plan'.
[144] *NATO Handbook*, 89.
[145] 'NATO-Ukraine: A Distinctive Partnership', 9.
[146] 'Bucharest Summit Declaration', *NATO* (2008).

3.3.1   The Main Supporters of NATO Enlargement

Since the mid 1990s, the United States has supported NATO's open-door policy of enlargement, and at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, this position did not change. In addition, the United States has also been one of the main supporters of Ukraine's efforts to become a democracy. Although American-Ukrainian relations declined during Kuchma's presidency because of undemocratic practices of the Ukrainian president, the Orange Revolution was seen as an important step towards democratisation, and, consequently, Ukraine received a positive signal with regards to its wish to join NATO membership.[147]

Shortly after the Orange Revolution, Ukrainian President Yushchenko visited Washington to find support for Ukraine's wish to join the Alliance. In a press conference, Bush stated that the United States supported Ukraine's NATO aspirations; however, in the words of Bush, 'there are things that the Ukrainian government must do in order to satisfy the requirements to be considered for NATO'.[148] Furthermore, prior to the Bucharest Summit, it became clear that the United States had been largely satisfied with Ukraine's democratic efforts, as Bush flew to Kiev to declare the American support for Ukraine's aspirations to join the Alliance. He emphasised the democratic progress Ukraine had made and Ukraine's commitment to free markets.[149]

The United States has not been the only major supporter of Ukraine's integration in the Western institutions. Central and Eastern European states, which have already obtained NATO membership, generally also support NATO enlargement. Poland especially has become known as an active supporter of Ukraine's entry to NATO. The role NATO has played in the security concerns of Poland and the region contributes to this position. In 2002, former Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski gave a speech, in which he stated that

> Poland believes that NATO enlargement, a more effective fight against terrorism, strengthened cooperation with partner countries, opening up to Russia, and devising a new framework of cooperation with Ukraine constitute the main

---

[147] Janusz Bugajski, 'The Eastern Dimension of America's New European Allies', *Strategic Studies Institute* (2007) 43.

[148] George W. Bush, 'President welcomes President Yushchenko to the White House', *The White House* (2005).

[149] George W. Bush, 'The President's News Conference with President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine in Kiev', *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 44.13 (2008) 454.

elements of the Alliance's evolution to enable it to maintain its key role in ensuring Euro-Atlantic and global security.[150]

Thus, in order to expand regional security, Poland supported NATO enlargement. Moreover, in the military sense, Poland, as a NATO member, has cooperated closely with Ukraine in a joint peacekeeping battalion in Kosovo, which was within the PfP framework, and more recently, Ukrainian forces served under Polish command in Iraq between 2003 and 2005.[151]

3.3.2 Opponents of Ukrainian Membership

The Bucharest Summit included not only supporters of Ukraine's NATO aspirations, but also opponents, such as Russia, and some of the Alliance members, which reckon that Ukraine was not ready to become a member of the Alliance.

Russia has never supported NATO enlargement. The previous enlargements with Central and Eastern European states have been heavily criticised by Russia. However, Ukrainian and also Georgian aspirations to join the Alliance have led to greater criticism towards NATO expansion, as both Ukraine and Georgia border Russia directly. Since the Orange Revolution, Russia has become more frustrated with Ukraine's pro-Western politics and Russia's inability to influence Ukraine's internal politics. In the past, Russia has used energy cuts to pressure Ukraine's pro-Western aspirations; however, Russia was not able to continue these pressure policies as the West collectively supported Ukraine in the dispute.[152]

Moreover, Ukraine's moves towards NATO are considered as a threat to the presence of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in the Ukrainian city Sevastopol. In 2005, Ukraine had protested against the temporary landing of Russian Special Forces from Chechnya in the Crimea, and led to a warning of Ukraine's Foreign Minister Tarasiuk that Ukraine would most likely not renew Russia's basing rights in Sevastopol.[153] Furthermore, Russia's former President, and present Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, stated that if Ukraine joined NATO and allowed missile defence infrastructure on its territory, Russia would be forced to take countermeasures in a way that 'Russia would have to target its nuclear offensive systems at

---

[150] Aleksander Kwaśniewski, 'Address by the President of the Republic of Poland', *NATO Speech* (2002).
[151] Bugajski, 'The Eastern Dimension of America's New European Allies', 79.
[152] Taras Kuzio, 'Russian-Ukrainian Relations reveal Deeper Problems', *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5.115 (2008).
[153] Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*, 178.

Ukraine'.[154] Under Putin, Russia had become a more powerful, nationalistic and less democratic state that is more challenging than in the past. As a result, Russia's readiness to use energy cuts as a political weapon has led to reluctance among European states to antagonise or to confront Russia over its anti-democratic behaviour.[155]

In Bucharest, it became clear that both Germany and France objected to invite Ukraine to NATO's Membership Action Plan. Part of Germany's objection is found in the argument that the majority of the Ukrainian population does not favour its government's aspirations to join the Alliance. According to the figures of February 2008, less than a quarter of Ukraine's population is in favour of NATO membership, while more than half is against. Germany argued that inviting Ukraine for the MAP would do more harm than good to Western-Ukrainian relations, as a current MAP might mobilise an anti-NATO force in Ukraine.[156] Additionally, Germany was also concerned about Russia's negative reaction of NATO pushing enlargement eastward and inviting neighbouring states of Russia to NATO.[157] For France, Russia's response to Ukrainian and Georgian membership also plays a role. A day before the Summit, the French Prime Minister, François Fillon, declared that France does not consider MAP invitations as a right response to the balance of power in Europe, and between Europe and Russia.[158]

3.4 Analysis

In this paragraph, the three theoretical frameworks of the introduction will be applied on the case study Ukraine. Which of the theories concerning external threat, practices or democratisation is the most applicable on Ukraine's efforts towards NATO enlargement and democratisation?

---

[154] Vladimir Putin, 'Press Conference following Talks with President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko and the Second Meeting of the Russian-Ukrainian Intergovernmental Commission', *President of Russia* (2008).
[155] Ronald D. Asmus, 'Europe's Eastern Promise', *Foreign Affairs* 87.1 (2008).
[156] Andreas Umland, 'Ukraine, NATO, and German Foreign Policy', *Global Politician* (2008).
[157] Gregor Peter Schmitz, 'Germany Puts the Brakes on US Expansion Plans', *Spiegel Online International* (2008).
[158] 'François Fillon annonce que la France est «opposée à L'Entrée de la Géorgie et de l'Ukraine dans l'OTAN»', *Le Monde* (1 April 2008).

3.4.1   External Threat

When Ukraine declared its independence after more than two centuries of Russian rule, it did not mean that Russia's interest in Ukraine disappeared. As Ukraine became an independent state, an external threat to Ukraine's democratisation process is found in Russia's political, economical, and military efforts to influence Ukraine's domestic affairs. However, as Ukraine is ethnically divided between western Ukraine and eastern and southern parts of the country, it must be noted that not all Ukrainians consider Russian influence as an external threat.

Politically, Russia has used its influence in the pro-Russian regions of eastern and southern Ukraine to persuade voters to vote for the pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, during the presidential elections of 2005. When it became clear that Yanukovych had manipulated the elections, Russia still considered him as the rightful winner. Economically, Russia has used energy cuts as a political weapon to discourage Ukrainian leaders in adapting pro-Western policies, while militarily, Russia has threatened to direct its missiles on Ukraine, when Ukraine would join NATO and allow missile defence infrastructure on its territory. Moreover, Russia's constant military presence in the Ukrainian port of Sebastopol represents a threat to Ukraine's sovereignty. It must be mentioned that not only external influences directed Ukraine's politics, but also domestic clashes between pro-western and pro-Russian politicians and the ethnic division have influenced Ukraine's pace with regards to democratisation.

Nevertheless, in spite of the Russian threat, Ukraine did manage to make efforts in its democratisation process. Before NATO membership became an issue, Ukraine understood that economic and political reforms were needed to put an independent Ukraine on the map. However, it was only after the Orange Revolution that Ukraine's leaders seemed more committed to put democratic institutions and economic reforms in place. Although these reforms progressed at a slow pace, Ukraine's foreign policy towards NATO membership increased in importance. Already in the early 1990s, Ukraine had distanced itself from military cooperation with Russia, which was established in the form of CIS. In addition, Ukraine's rapid agreement on NATO's Partnership programme and the commitment NATO had made to the security and national integrity of Ukraine by signing the 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter and the 2002 NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, gave Ukraine more confidence to move towards the West and towards democratisation in military sense.

Thus, Gibler and Sewell's theory that democratisation increases when the external threat decreases is found to a certain extent in the case study of Ukraine. Militarily, Ukraine managed to distance itself from Russia, and increase its own military strength, while working on democratic reforms in the military sector. In addition, the Orange Revolution demonstrated that Russia's influence in domestic affairs is not that strong after all. Efforts to institutionalise and expand relations with NATO have led to greater confidence in Ukraine's efforts to democratise and to become a NATO member.

3.4.2   Practices

Since the establishment of their relations in 1991, NATO and Ukraine developed a shared interest in learning and applying common practices. These common practices are initially found in the Partnership for Peace programme in which NATO-Ukraine relations evolved significantly over the past ten years. Ukraine has taken part in NATO missions in Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Iraq, and was able to start its military reforms within the PfP framework. In addition, common practices also evolved in the institutionalisation of relations between NATO and Ukraine within the NATO-Ukraine Charter, the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and the Intensified Dialogue. Results of the institutionalisation of NATO-Ukraine relations are mainly found in terms of security and military reform, which contributed to Ukraine's democratisation process in these areas.

Common practises on other levels are more difficult to distinguish; however, it could be argued that the prospect of NATO membership, contributed to a more active engagement of the Ukrainian government to democratise. Adler argues that there is a causal mechanism in which common practices lead to democratisation. Thus, an increase in common practices would lead to a growth in Ukraine's democratisation process. However, this might be problematic in the case of Ukraine, as Ukraine is ethnically divided, with a large part of the population supporting cooperation with Russia rather than with the West and NATO. Moreover, in a recent survey it became clear that less than a quarter of Ukraine's population supports the prospect of Ukraine becoming a NATO member. Thus, NATO and Ukraine will still need to work on the development of common practices on other levels than only military.

3.4.3 Democratisation

As Ukraine has not yet become a NATO member, Reiter's argument that NATO enlargement does not spread democracy cannot totally be applied on this case study. However, as mentioned in the introduction, it is important to make a distinction between NATO membership and the prospect of NATO membership. Although, democratisation and market reform were already a goal before Ukraine expressed its wish to join the Alliance, Ukraine democratised at a slow pace, falling in many of the traps democratisation brings, such as centralisation of power and corruption. In addition, Ukraine's relations with the West had declined during the last years of Kuchma's presidency. Therefore, in the first decade or so, NATO membership was not an active objective of Ukraine's foreign policy.

Since the Orange Revolution, Ukrainian leaders have increased their commitment to democratisation and economic reform. Moreover, Ukraine sought support for NATO membership, and used its progress with regards to democratisation as an argument for membership. However, it became clear that Ukraine still has to work on its democratisation. Therefore, the prospect of NATO membership motivates Ukraine in a certain way to continue its efforts to democratise.

In conclusion, Ukraine has gone a long way from its declaration of independence to the Bucharest Summit, where NATO members agreed that Ukraine will become an Alliance member in the future. In the past years, Ukraine has made progress with regards to democracy and economic reform, and has managed to pursue its own interests, regardless of Russian attempts to influence Ukraine's domestic affairs. However, it should be noted that not only Ukraine is divided when it comes to NATO membership, but also the Alliance members disagree on to question to provide Ukraine with MAP or not.

Chapter 4

Georgia

Georgia's security policies have been influenced by the state's history and geographic position. For more than two centuries, Georgia was absorbed by the Russian Empire. Although Georgia regained its independence for a brief period after the First World War, the country was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1922. With the decline of the Soviet Union, the Georgian independence movement arose, and since 1989, as a result of the strong opposition, the Communist Party in Georgia vanished from the political arena.[159] Although Georgia took its first steps towards multiparty elections before its declaration of independence, democratic institutions evolved slowly and inconsistently. The Rose Revolution in 2003 led to some optimism with regards to Georgia's democratisation process, but even then Georgia faced difficulties to democratise fully.

At the same time, Georgia's strong opposition to Russian influence led to a partnership between Georgia and NATO, which was already established in the early 1990s. In the years that followed, NATO-Georgia relations developed and led to Georgia's application for NATO membership. Although NATO decided to postpone Georgia's membership, the recent military conflict between Russia and Georgia has led to some reconsideration among NATO members on the relationship between Georgia and NATO.

---

[159] Jaba Devdariani, 'Georgia: Rise and Fall of the Facade Democracy', *Demokratizatsiya* (2004).

4.1 Georgia's Independence

In the early 1990s, Georgia declared its independence and soon democratisation became a priority for Georgia's government. However, the Soviet legacy, ethnical division and Russia's presence in Georgia's two separatist regions, made it a difficult task for Georgia's elected leaders to maintain the process of democratisation. Hence, Georgia's democratic transition is still continuing, and has increased in importance as Georgia centres its attention on joining the West.

4.1.1   First Steps towards Democratisation

As Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika* also influenced the Soviet Republic Georgia, the Georgians took the opportunity to launch their national independence movement, which mobilised the public. The protests against the Soviet Union, however, led to the invasion of the Soviet army, which dispersed a massive pro-independence rally in April 1989 and left twenty people dead.[160] Subsequently, the communists lost support in Georgia, and new political parties succeeded the Communist regime. Although former communists continued to have some influence and financial assets, they were not able to recover as an organisational entity.[161]

In October 1990, Georgia's first multiparty elections were held, in which the Round Table coalition of nationalist parties, led by anti-communist Zviad Gamsakhurdia, won the elections to the parliament, promising an end to Soviet rule. Subsequently, Gamsakhurdia was elected president in the presidential elections of May 1991.[162] The elections took already place before Georgia had officially declared its independence. Moreover, the new parliament decided to change the official Georgian flag and the national anthem, and took the first steps to remove militia and KGB from Soviet control, and to create a Georgian army. It was only on 9 April 1991, after a public referendum, that Georgia eventually proclaimed its independence.[163]

---

[160] Ghia Nodia and Álvaro Pinto Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape of Georgia: Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects* (Delft 2006) 8.
[161] Devdariani, 'Georgia: Rise and Fall of the Facade Democracy'.
[162] 'Georgia's Iron Fist of Independence', *Economist* 319.7709 (1991).
[163] Lynn D. Nelson and Paata Amonashvili, 'Voting and Political Attitudes in Soviet Georgia', *Soviet Studies* 44.4 (1992).

In the years that followed, Georgia's initial agenda was dominated by nationalism and democracy. However, the various political groups and ethnic communities failed to reach a consensus about the political agenda. Moreover, Gamsakhurdia, who was elected by popular vote, was soon denounced as authoritarian, as it became clear that the government regarded the opposition as irrelevant and closed down most of the independent media. In addition, ethnic tensions between Georgia and the separatist regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia also challenged the democratic transition of the newly independent state.[164]

Ethnic tensions led to a military confrontation, in which Gamsakhurdia was removed from power in January 1992. Consequently, former communist Eduard Shevardnadze became the head of the interim government, and was elected president in the elections of 1995.[165] On one hand, it could be argued that Shevardnadze gave a new impetus for democratic transition. Aggression towards ethnic minorities softened, the independent media grew, and the political parties were free as long they recognised the legitimacy of the government.[166] However, on the other hand, under Shevardnadze, political instability grew, and the economic and social situation worsened, as poverty, corruption and lawlessness fell over Georgia. In addition, the autonomous regions of Georgia continued to slip beyond the control of the president. As a result, Georgia became a pluralist, but not a democratic system, as it did not manage to move forward with democratisation, governance reform, and protection of human rights.[167]

4.1.2   The Rose Revolution and its Legacy

After the re-election of Shevardnadze in 2000, disagreement occurred within the ruling party, the Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG). At the same time, a group of young reformers emerged, and created a number of new political parties. In September 2001, then Minister of Justice Mikheil Saakashvili resigned and created an opposition party, called the National Movement. With the emergence of new parties, Shevardnadze was losing his popularity, which led to a crushing defeat of the government in the 2002 local elections.[168]

---

[164] Nodia and Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape of Georgia*, 8-9.

[165] Alec Rasizade, 'Georgia meets the Test of its Independence', *Contemporary Review* 284.1658 (2004) 139.

[166] Nodia and Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape of Georgia*, 11.

[167] Charles King, 'Potemkym Democracy: Four Myths about Post-Soviet Union', *The National Interest* 64 (2001) 101-103.

[168] Nodia and Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape of Georgia*, 18-19.

Subsequently, when Shevardnadze's party won the parliamentary elections on 2 November 2003, Saakashvili accused Shevardnadze of manipulating the official results, and organised a popular protest with the red rose as its symbol. The Rose Revolution reached its peak on 22 November, when some 30.000 opposition supporters assembled on one of the main squares of Georgia's capital, Tbilisi, and demanded Shevardnadze's resignation. Subsequently, demonstrators stormed the parliament, and Shevardnadze was pressured to withdraw from his functions.[169] During the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili's popularity had grown enormously, and resulted in an exceptional popular mandate, as he received 96 percent of the popular vote in the presidential elections of January 2004.[170]

In 2004, Saakashvili declared that Georgia 'is a democracy whose national identity and destiny is rooted in Europe, as a full and contributing Member to Euro-Atlantic institutions, to regional security, and economic development'.[171] However, Saakashvili inherited a state in decline, which was the result of state disintegration and loss of authority control, corruption, government budget deficits, lack of state capital investments, and the failure to provide basic humanitarian services. The loss of state power had resulted in a severe decrease in legitimacy.[172] For that reason, Saakashvili had still a long way to go in establishing a model of good governance.

Saakashvili decided to focus on two priorities, which were to establish rule of law, and restore central authority in Georgia, thus reasserting government control over Georgia's three autonomous regions.[173] The Georgian government booked some successes with regards to democracy, such as holding free and fair elections and reducing corruption through structural reforms.[174] Economically, Georgian authorities were successful in producing new budget revenues while at the same time reducing budget expenses, improving the investing climate and focusing on poverty decrease, and in re-establishing control over the autonomous region of Adjara [175] Georgia's reforms were financially supported by the United States and the European Union. In particular, the establishment of rule of law was

---

[169] Rasizade, 'Georgia meets the Test of its Independence', 140-141.
[170] Nodia and Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape of Georgia*, 21.
[171] Mikheil Saakashvili, 'Georgia after the Rose Revolution: Rebuilding Democracy and Stability', *Embassy of Georgia to the United States of America, Canada and Mexico* (2004).
[172] Rasizade, 'Georgia meets the Test of its Independence', 141-142.
[173] Whit Mason, 'Trouble in Tbilisi', *National Interest* 79 (2005) 139.
[174] Lincoln A. Mitchell, 'Democracy in Georgia since the Rose Revolution', *Orbis* 50.4 (2006) 674.
[175] Kurt Bodewig, 'Economic and Political Transition in Georgia', *NATO Parliamentary Assembly* (2007).

considered as the key to Georgia's stability and the security of the wider region, including the important pipelines that run through it.[176]

Although Saakashvili booked some successes, the new government still faced many challenges on democracy-related issues, such as building democratic institutions, ensuring government accountability, and developing a civil society.[177] Moreover, corruption in the judiciary system, lack of resources to create viable institutions on local level, weak opposition, and a media that still needed to develop open debates on public policies added to Georgia's challenges to become a democratic state.[178]

Accordingly, political instability worsened in November 2007, when several opposition parties launched demonstrations in the streets of Tbilisi. The protesters demanded legislative elections in early 2008 as originally called for instead of in late 2008 as set by the government.[179] As a reaction, Saakashvili sent riot police on the protesters, closed down the main television station of the opposition and declared a state of emergency. While the opposition called for the resignation of Saakashvili, Saakashvili decided to keep early presidential elections in January for which the opposition was unprepared. Although Saakashvili won the elections, the opposition received more votes in comparison to earlier elections.[180] Hence Georgia's politics are troublesome through internal division and democratic deficit; however, as will become clear, regional ethnic instability also causes problems to Georgia's democratisation process.

4.1.3 Abkhazia and South Ossetia

While Georgia progressed slowly in its democratisation process, the state was confronted by difficulties of ethnic tensions in Georgia's three ethnically different regions of Adjara, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In contrast to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Adjara was still officially committed to a unified Georgia. However, although the region did send deputies to the parliament in Tbilisi, Adjara was practically governed by one man, Aslan Abashidze.[181] Moreover, the autonomous region did not pay taxes to the central government, and survived

[176] Mason, 'Trouble in Tbilisi', 139, 142.
[177] Mitchell, 'Democracy in Georgia since the Rose Revolution', 672.
[178] Nodia and Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape of Georgia*, 28-29.
[179] Jim Nichol, 'Georgia's January 2008 Presidential Election: Outcome and Implications', *CRS Report for Congress* (2008) 1.
[180] 'Misha bounces Back', *Economist* 386.8562 (2008).
[181] King, 'Potemkym Democracy', 101.

economically by taking special fees for every oil shipment that past through Adjara. Only in 2004, after Saakashvili vowed to restore central authority in Georgia and reasserted government control over the region, Abashidze resigned and Adjara came under central control.[182]

With the emergence of Georgian nationalism, the two other separatist regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which had already obtained territorial autonomy under Soviet rule, developed their own counter-nationalist movements and demanded independence from Georgia.[183]

South Ossetia, which borders the Russian province of North Ossetia, called for the status of autonomous republic in 1989 and total independence in 1990. Georgia's President Gamsakhurdia was not ready to give up the region and responded with force, abolishing South Ossetia's autonomy and sending military forces to the region.[184] To restore central authority, the new President Shevardnadze launched another assault on both South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the first half of 1992. However, with the support of Russia's military forces, the Ossetian separatist movement was able to push the Georgian troops back.[185] After more than three years of armed conflict, Russia brokered a cease fire through the Sochi Agreement, which was signed by Russia and Georgia in June 1992. Consequently, most of South Ossetia remained under control of the separatist movement, and the parties agreed on a combined peacekeeping mission of Russian, Georgian and Ossetian forces.[186]

In contrast to South Ossetia, Abkhazia contains a distinct ethnic population, which speaks a language unrelated to Georgian. After the Georgian declaration of independence, Abkhazia also demanded greater local autonomy and more power in Georgian politics. However, hostilities broke out between Abkhaz and Georgians locals in Abkhazia, which was followed by a full-scale war as Georgian troops marched into the region. In September 1993, Abkhaz militia, assisted by Russian forces, offered military resistance, and pushed the Georgian troops back.[187] In April 1994, Russia brokered another cease fire, which would be upheld by

[182] Mason, 'Trouble in Tbilisi', 143.
[183] Nodia and Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape of Georgia*, 9.
[184] 'Conflict History: Georgia', *International Crisis Group* (2008).
[185] King, 'Potemkym Democracy', 95.
[186] Nodia and Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape of Georgia*, 12.
[187] Charles King, 'The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States', *World Politics* 53.4 (2001) 533.

peacekeeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In reality, this meant that the peacekeepers were composed of Russian troops.[188]

Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia are often called 'frozen conflicts', as there is no final agreement and the unstable peace is occasionally interrupted by episodes of low-level conflict. After regaining control over Adjara, Saakashvili decided to move toward South Ossetia. In 2004, the government closed down a legalised market for smugglers between Russia and Georgia in the South Ossetian town of Ergneti and started a 'humanitarian offensive', which was aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the South Ossetian people. The move had a contrary effect and led to the withdrawal of Georgian military forces.[189]

Russian influence in these breakaway regions makes it difficult for Georgia to solve these conflicts. The regions are economically tied to Russia. For example, while Georgia is paying massive energy debts to Russia, Russians supply the separatist regions with subsidised gas. Moreover, the Russian military base in Abkhazia provides security and employment for locals, and local goods and services are purchased by using the Russian rouble instead of the Georgian national currency.[190] In military and security terms, Russia has not only supplied both Abkhazia and South Ossetia with military equipment and support, but it has also granted many citizens of these regions with Russian citizenship. As a result, Russia has security interests in these two regions. In March 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that 'apart from general security in this neighbouring, important region for the stability of Russia's south, there is such an aspect as the existence of the tens of thousands of citizens of the Russian Federation in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We bear responsibility for them'.[191]

In the past few years, relations between Georgia's central government and its breakaway regions deteriorated, and escalated in a Georgian-Russian war in August 2008, which will be discussed later.

---

[188] Nodia and Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape of Georgia*, 12.
[189] Nodia and Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape of Georgia*, 12, 23.
[190] King, 'The Benefits of Ethnic War', 539-541.
[191] Sergey Lavrov, 'Interview of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, Published in the Newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta on February 21 and 28, 2007', *The Acronym Institute* (2007).

4.2 Georgia and NATO

> [A] young democracy needs strong partners. The North Atlantic Alliance has been one of those partners for Georgia. This is true on many levels. Perhaps above all, the Alliance gives confidence to the Georgian people that the reforms they are making—and the sacrifices these reforms entail—are leading them to a more secure future.[192]
>
> - Mikheil Saakashvili -

4.2.1   Regional Orientation

Since its independence, Georgia's foreign policy has been a stable one. Both Shevardnadze and Saakashvili prioritised obtaining political and economic support of the United States and Europe. In addition, cooperation with major international organisations, such as NATO and the EU, with membership as the ultimate goal, became a priority under these presidents.[193] Although Georgia was looking westward, the country was also engaged in regional cooperation, and became a member of both the Russian-led CIS and the Western-orientated GUUAM Group.

In 1991, Russia established the CIS, which was intended to advance ties among the former Soviet republics that had obtained their independence.[194] The ties focused mainly on a voluntary reintegration of the former Soviet republics into a new regional politico-economic-social space. In 1993, in the context of political instability in Georgia's separatists regions, Georgia became a CIS member. However, Georgia, as other former Soviet satellites, was suspicious of Russia's interests in CIS, mainly because Russia used the organisation as a means to interfere in the domestic affairs of its members. As a result, most of the CIS members did not want to turn the organisation into a security organisation as the Warsaw Pact, and attempted to limit the security relationship and to increase political independence.[195]

---

[192] Mikheil Saakashvili, 'Speech at the 44th Munich Conference on Security Policy', *Munich Conference on Sexurity Policy* (2008).
[193] Nodia and Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape of Georgia*, 33.
[194] Paul Kubicek, 'End of the Line for the Commonwealth of Independent States', *Problems of Post-Communism* 46.2 (1999) 15.
[195] Edward Marks, 'The CIS and the Caucasus', *INSS Strategic Forum* 90 (1996) 2, 4-5.

Subsequently, Georgia became part of the regional GUAM Group, which was established in 1996, and included Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. In 1999, Uzbekistan also joined the Group, which then became the GUUAM Group. This regional organisation did not include Russia, and was established as a political, economic and strategic alliance to strengthen the independence of these former Soviet republics.[196] These states had all been subjected to Russia's intervention in domestic affairs, and were consequently moving closer to the West, pushing for more involvement in the region by NATO and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[197]

Thus, on one hand Georgia was taken into the Russian-led CIS, while on the other hand, it developed relations with other pro-western states in the form of GUUAM. The pro-western focus grew in importance as Georgia also moved towards NATO, while Russian-Georgian relations deteriorated in the process.

4.2.2 NATO-Georgia Relations Institutionalised

NATO-Georgia relations were established in 1992, after Georgia's declaration of independence. Georgia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1992, and NATO and Georgia deepened and broadened their relations when Georgia joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1994.[198] NATO-Georgia relations evolved with Georgia's participation in the Planning and Review Process (PARP), which focused on the interoperability of the partner countries' armed forces with NATO standards. Consequently, within the framework of PfP, Georgia participated in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1999, and has sent a small division of Georgian troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2004, during the elections in Afghanistan.[199]

In November 2002, at the Prague Summit, Georgia's President Shevardnadze announced Georgia's aspiration to become an Alliance member, stating 'that Georgia is determined to be a full member of NATO and is resolved to work hard to prepare for this historic mission'.[200] Although Georgia declared that it was determined to become a member of the Alliance, the

---

[196] 'The GUAAM Group: History and Principles', *GUAAM Briefing Paper* (2000).

[197] Paul Kubicek, 'End of the Line for the Commonwealth of Independent States', *Problems of Post-Communism* 46.2 (1999) 21.

[198] 'NATO-Georgia Relations: How did Relations with Georgia evolve?', *NATO* (2008).

[199] 'NATO-Georgia', *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia* (2008).

[200] Eduard Shevardnadze, 'Statement by President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze at the EAPC Summit', *NATO Prague Summit* (2002).

Alliance itself was not ready to take Georgia in. Secretary General Lord Robertson declared in a speech in 2003 that 'Georgia has certainly already made encouraging steps. But it needs to pursue the work that still lies ahead with the same enthusiasm and determination it has demonstrated so far'.[201]

After the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili took further steps towards NATO membership by reinforcing civilian control over Georgia's military and intelligence bodies. Consequently, in October 2004, Georgia entered NATO's Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) that focused on reforms in the field of human rights, anti-corruption, rule of law, civil-military relations and science.[202] In September 2006, NATO-Georgia relations evolved when NATO offered an Intensified Dialogue to Georgia, which aimed at a deeper political exchange on NATO standards and the reforms Georgia needed to undertake to achieve NATO membership.[203]

Prior to the Bucharest Summit on NATO enlargement, Saakashvili made clear that Georgia sought NATO membership, stating that Georgia's 'aim is to receive full membership in NATO'. Furthermore, he declared that Georgia is a 'country with democratic and peace-loving values' and that 'NATO membership will create a fundamental guarantee for the territorial integrity and stabilization of Georgia, the guarantee that will attract a great number of economic interests and investments'.[204] Thus Saakashvili did not only see NATO membership as a guarantee to Georgia's security, but also as a means to improve Georgia's economy.

4.3 Bucharest Summit: Georgia's Call for NATO Membership

Georgia's goal at the Bucharest Summit was to obtain the Membership Action Plan, which would enable Georgia to become a NATO member in the near future. However, as in the case of Ukraine, Georgia's MAP was postponed. The Alliance members were divided and agreed only on a period of intensive engagement to address Georgia's remaining questions

---

[201] Lord Robertson, 'Speech by NATO Secretary General', *NATO Speeches* (2003).
[202] Sverre Myrli, 'Viewing NATO from the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia', *NATO Parliamentary Assembly* (2007).
[203] 'NATO's Relations with Georgia', *NATO* (2008).
[204] Mikheil Saakashvili, 'The President of Georgia made a Statement before his Departure to Bucharest', *President of Georgia* (2008).

related to the MAP application. Furthermore, NATO declared that decisions concerning Georgia's admission will be based on Georgia's performance with regards to the implementation of key reforms, which are laid out in the IPAP.[205]

4.3.1 Supporters of Georgia's Membership to NATO

As with the case of Ukraine, the United States, and also some Central and Eastern European states, support Georgia's aspirations to become a NATO member. Since the early 1990s, the United States is a major supporter of Georgia's democratisation process. Between 1992 and 2005, Georgia received 1.6 billion dollar in American foreign assistance, which was allocated to the development of democracy and market reform programmes, humanitarian aid, Peace Corps, and security assistance.[206] After the Rose Revolution, which the United States considered as a breakthrough in Georgia's democratic transition, Georgia played an even larger role in the American foreign policy of democracy promotion. In May 2005, American President George W. Bush made a visit to Georgia and emphasised American commitment to democracy, stating that the United States stands 'with young democracies and [wants] to help [to] build the institutions that outlast the moment, so that future generations of Georgians can grow up in a free society'.[207] Subsequently, the United States and Georgia agreed on a five year compact, consisting of an additional 295.3 million dollar in U.S. assistance to Georgia.[208]

Despite some inconsistencies in Georgia's democratisation process, the United States have continued to regard Saakashvili as a model democrat. By acknowledging that Georgia still needs to meet various democratic challenges, the United States tries to demonstrate its sincere desire to promote democracy. In addition, failure of democracy in Georgia would affect U.S. policy of democracy promotion and raise questions if democracy is applicable on all former Soviet republics.[209] Over the past years, the Bush administration has praised Georgia's democratic efforts, and as a result, the United States became a strong supporter of Georgia's aspirations to become a NATO member. On 24 March 2008, two weeks before the Bucharest Summit, Bush visited Tbilisi to demonstrate American support for Georgia's

---

[205] 'NATO-Georgia Relations: How did Relations with Georgia evolve?'.
[206] Jim Nichol, 'Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests', *CRS Report for Congress* (2008) 28, 38.
[207] George W. Bush, 'The President's News Conference with President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia in Tbilisi, Georgia', *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 41.19 (2005) 785.
[208] Mitchell, 'Democracy in Georgia since the Rose Revolution', 669.
[209] Ibidem, 670.

aspirations to join the Alliance, stating that 'NATO benefits with a Georgia membership [and] Georgia benefits from being a part of NATO'.[210]

4.3.2   Opponents of Georgian Membership

Some Alliance members made clear they did not support Georgian NATO membership. The reasons are, however, different than in the case of Ukraine. Some Alliance members have raised concerns about Georgia's uncertain democratisation and rise of political instability in November 2007. Secretary General De hoop Scheffer stated that the 'imposition of emergency rule, and the closure of media outlets in Georgia, a partner with which the Alliance has an Intensified Dialogue, are of particular concern and not in line with Euro-Atlantic values'.[211] Subsequently, at the Bucharest Summit, it became clear that Germany and France, and some other members, were not ready to provide Georgia with a Membership Action Plan. The main reasons were found in Georgia's democratisation process and its slow progress on resolving the two 'frozen conflicts' of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[212] As mentioned in the chapter of Ukraine, concerns about Russia's response to NATO enlargement with former Soviet republics played also a role in the cautious attitude of some Alliance members.

Russia is another barrier to Georgia's aspirations to become a NATO member. After its declaration of independence, Russia remained to influence Georgia in different ways. As discussed above, Russia has imposed energy embargoes on Georgia, and has supported Georgia's breakaway regions by economic and military means. Russia's position on Georgia and its NATO aspirations are found in a statement of the Russian ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin, who states that Russia 'cannot stand by idly [because] Abkhazia and South Ossetia share close ties with the Caucasian peoples in Russian territory. [Therefore], [t]he attempt to push Georgia into NATO is a provocation that could lead to bloodshed.[213] Thus, as the interview was taken in March 2008, Rogozin predicted already the bloodshed, which took place in the Russian-Georgia war of August 2008.

---

[210] George W. Bush, 'Remarks following Discussions with President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia', *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 44.11 (2008) 403.

[211] Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 'Statement by the Secretary General on the Situation in Georgia', *NATO Press Releases* (2007).

[212] Paul Gallis, The NATO Summit at Bucharest 2008', *CRS Report for Congress* (2008) 5.

[213] Dmitry Rogozin, 'Interview with Russia's Ambassador to NATO', *Spiegel* (2008).

4.4 Russian-Georgian War

In the months prior to the conflict, Russia became actively involved in the breakaway regions and started to perform some military exercises close to the Russian-Georgian border. At the beginning of August 2008, hostilities broke out between Ossetian separatists and Georgian military forces, and as these tensions escalated, the Russian-Georgian war began. On 7 August 2008, Georgia deployed a large military force into South Ossetia, reacting to an ill judged assault. One day later, Russia responded by attacking Georgia's military and pushing it back out of South Ossetia. Subsequently, Russia's military operation extended beyond South Ossetia and moved southwards on Georgia's territory. On 9 August, the conflict had also moved to Abkhazia as Abkhaz separatist launched military strikes on Georgian forces in eastern Abkhazia.[214]

The international community opposed Russia's military intervention. After five days of fighting, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in his present role of EU president, went to Moscow to negotiate on a peace plan. The plan included stopping violence; the withdrawal of both Russian and Georgian military forces to their pre-conflict positions; and the call for an international debate on the future status of Georgia's two separatist regions.[215] Subsequently, Russia withdrew its forces from some areas, but it maintained some military presence in other areas. In addition, on 26 August 2008, Medvedev declared the recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which was criticised among the international community.[216] Currently, Russia withdrew its troops from the buffer zones, which were set up on Georgian territory, but kept its forces inside South Ossetia and Abkhazia, stating that it protects these 'independent states'.[217]

Shortly after the Russian-Georgian war broke out, Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer called for an immediate ceasefire, the return to the status quo as it existed before the war, and the urgent need for full access for humanitarian organisations and others aid organisations.[218]

---

[214] 'Georgia', *Security Council Report* (2008) 1-2.

[215] 'Press Statement following Negotiations of the President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev with French President Nicolas Sarkozy', *UN* (2008).

[216] Jim Nichol, 'Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests', *CRS Report for Congress* (2008) 9-10.

[217] Dmitry Solovyov and Margarita Antidze, 'Russian Troops out of Georgia Buffer Zones', *International Herald Tribube* (2008).

[218] Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 'Press Point by NATO Secretary General following the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the Situation in Georgia', *NATO Speech* (2008).

On 19 August 2008, the North Atlantic Council came together in a special foreign ministerial session to discuss the situation in Georgia. NATO declared to continue its support for 'Georgia's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and agreed on a package of measures to assist the civilian population affected by the conflict'.[219]

In addition, the Alliance enhanced its cooperation and partnership with Georgia, as the Alliance members agreed to develop a NATO-Georgia Commission, which would be similar to the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Moreover, NATO agreed to put the NATO-Russia Council meetings on hold, until Russia withdraws from Georgia and commits itself to the principles to what NATO and Russia had agreed on.[220] Subsequently, on 15 September 2008, a Framework Document of the NATO-Georgia Commission was signed. This new body is designed to deepen the political dialogue between NATO and Georgia, to supervise the process set into motion at the Bucharest Summit, and to coordinate assistance for Georgia's recovery from the recent war.[221]

4.5 Analysis

In the past twenty years, Georgia has struggled with its democratisation process. In what way, if any, did NATO plays a role in Georgia's democratic transition? In this paragraph, the three theoretical frameworks, respectively external threat, practices and democratisation, will be applied on the case study of Georgia.

4.5.1 External Threat

Since Georgia's independence, Russian economic and military presence, in the form of 'peacekeeping' forces, in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have led to an increased threat to Georgia's sovereignty. Russian presence in these regions has contributed to an independent, pro-Russian economic environment and militarily support to the separatist movements. For many years, with the exception of some low-level conflicts between Georgia and the Russian supported separatist movements, Russian threat could be considered as an external threat of soft power, as Russia did not attack Georgia militarily. However, August 2008 changed Georgia's external threat, which was related to soft power

---

[219] 'NATO's Foreign Ministers reiterate their Support for Georgia', *NATO* (2008).
[220] Ibidem.
[221] 'NATO's Relations with Georgia', *NATO* (2008).

into one of military hard power, as Russia's 'peacekeeping' mission extended beyond Abkhazia and South Ossetia and moved southwards on Georgia's territory, launching military strikes on Georgian forces.

Gibler and Sewell's theory is that democratic transition and democratic survival both increase as the level of external threat decreases. This theory in reversed form could be applied on this case study of Georgia: democratisation decreases when external threat increases. Georgia has not been able to democratise fully as it has not managed to resolve its ethnic conflicts. Although Georgia has put a number of democratic and market reforms into practice, the two separatist regions were not reached by the central authorities.

With the support of Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have developed their own political structures and economies, which do not necessarily relate to Georgia's democratic ambitions. In addition, the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 has led to an emphasis on Georgia's sovereignty rather than its democratisation. Russia's military activities close to the Russian-Georgian border and hostilities between Ossetian separatists and Georgians led to the escalation of the conflict. As a result of the Russian-Georgian war, NATO intensified its relations with Georgia in the form of the NATO-Georgia Commission. Although this Commission will focus on a number of issues, the first priority will most likely be to establish stability in Georgia and to assist in the recovery from the recent war, rather than enhance democratisation.

Although the Russian threat has always been present, it could be argued that Georgia advanced to a certain extent in its democratisation process. Georgia has established free elections, reduced corruption in some public areas, and has managed to develop its economy through structural reforms. Russian influence makes it more difficult to democratise, but a certain progress in democratisation could be found in Georgia. However, although it is now too early to conclude, the Russian-Georgian war could negatively affect Georgia's democratic progress in the long run.

4.5.2   Practices

Since its independence in 1992, NATO and Georgia developed a base of common practices. These could be found in the institutionalisation of NATO-Georgia relations, which evolved through a number of cooperation programmes, such as the Partnership for Peace, Planning

and Review Process, the Individual Partnership Action Plan in 2004 and the Intensified Dialogue in 2006. More recently, due to the Russian-Georgian war, NATO has proposed the establishment of a NATO-Georgia Commission. However, this intensified cooperation has not so much to do with democratisation, but evolves on the current external threat that Georgia faces from Russia. As a PfP partner, Georgia has contributed to the NATO missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In addition, after the Rose Revolution, Georgia's government took further steps to link its military common practices to NATO members by advancing civilian control over Georgia's military and intelligence bodies. Comparable to Ukraine, common identities and values between NATO and Georgia could be found, which contribute to Georgia's democratisation process in terms of security and military reform.

On other levels, Georgia has worked on democratisation and has put market reforms in place. Although the institutionalisation of NATO-Georgia relations included a focus on human rights, anti-corruption and democratisation, primarily the common practices on military level have taken form. Georgia will need to focus on its democratisation process to increase common practices on other levels.

4.5.3   Democratisation

As in the case of Ukraine, Georgia has not yet become an Alliance member, which means that Reiter's argument that NATO enlargement does not spread democracy is not totally valid in the case of Georgia. It is true that Georgia started its democratisation process before it expressed its desire to become a NATO member. However, in the first decade after Georgia's declaration of independence, the democratic transition has been one of small successes and downfalls, without Georgia becoming a full democracy. It was only after the Rose Revolution that Georgia's leader Saakashvili increased Georgia's commitment to democratic transition and economic reform, while NATO membership became mainly a part of it.

It has become clear that Georgia is advancing, but the state will still need to work on its democratisation. Therefore, it could be argued that the prospect of NATO membership stimulates Georgia in a certain way to continue its efforts to democratise. This has, for example, become clear last November when Georgia's political instability increased and Saakashvili decided to end the protests by sending riot police, closing down the main television station of the opposition and declaring a state of emergency. International

criticism, which included NATO's Secretary General, pressured Saakashvili to rethink his steps and to solve the problem. To prevent further criticism from Alliance members before the Summit at Bucharest on enlargement, Saakashvili decided to demonstrate Georgia's democratic aspirations and called for early presidential elections. Thus, in a way the prospect of NATO membership influenced the decision of Georgia's leader to solve its domestic problems in a democratic way.

In conclusion, Georgia held its multiparty elections before it declared independence. However, as Georgians have learned, democracy consists of more than just keeping free elections. In the past twenty years Georgia's democratisation process has been one of inconsistencies. Elections, free media and structural reforms have been altered with weak opposition, corruption and episodes of low-level conflict between Georgia and its breakaway regions, which recently erupted in a full scale Russian-Georgia war.

At the same time, Georgia has repeatedly made clear that it has the desire to become a NATO member. However, as democratisation and the resolution of ethnic conflict are two of NATO's criteria, some Alliance members are hesitant to admit Georgia to the Alliance yet.

Conclusion

What is the correlation between NATO Enlargement and Democratisation?

After the Cold War, former Soviet republics regained their independence and struggled to become democracies. As a result of political, economical, geographical, historical and ethnical factors, democratisation has been a different challenge for every of these states. The impact of Russian rule had been immense; therefore, security concerns became of importance for these newly independent states. In the 1990s, regional cooperation was considered as a means to safeguard national security and sovereignty. Poland joined the Visegrad Group, while Ukraine and Georgia were part of the GUAAM Group. Most importantly, both these regional cooperation groups did not include Russia.

In response to the changes in world politics, NATO needed to adapt its goals and strategy as a security organisation. The Alliance opened up to Central and Eastern European countries and decided to 'extend the hand of friendship' to these former adversaries. Subsequently, with the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991 and the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994, NATO institutionalised its relations with Central and Eastern European states. While relations between NATO and these former Soviet republics evolved, Poland was the first to apply for NATO membership, which was even before the PfP had come to exist.

It is interesting to compare the three case studies and their development towards becoming democracies. The effects of Soviet rule have had an immense impact on all three states, and led to growing dissatisfaction among its populations. As a result, in the 1970s and 1980s, opposition movements arose, which tried to resist the political and economic order of their national governments. All three states experienced a breakthrough in the early 1990s; however, Poland was able to democratise in the short term, while democratisation in Ukraine and Georgia progressed at a slow pace and flourished in a later period of time.

External threat

One of the main reasons for Poland's early entry to the Alliance could be found in the fact that Russian influence in Poland was less substantial than in Ukraine and Georgia. Therefore, Poland felt freer in choosing its alliances. Moreover, contrary to Poland, both Ukraine and Georgia domestic issues have brought difficulties to the countries' national and foreign

policies: Ukraine's population is divided in pro-Russian and pro-Western regions, while Georgia has had problems with its breakaway regions, which have significantly been influenced by Russia.

Another reason could be found in timing. NATO enlargement with Central and Eastern European states has been spread over two decades, in which international relations changed. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia became a weak state, in political, economic and military terms. During the first enlargement, Russia was not strong enough to influence the outcome of NATO's enlargement negotiations in any way. However, under former President Putin, Russia became a more powerful state, which poses a challenge to the West. As a result, Russia has a stronger capability to oppose NATO enlargement with Ukraine and Georgia.

The case studies have demonstrated to contain every one of the three levels of external threat that were identified in the introduction. In the case of Poland, the Russian external threat has not been significant, and therefore could be recognised as a perceived external threat. The cases of Ukraine and Georgia, however, are of different kind. Both these countries have experienced actual intervention in their domestic politics. As has become clear, Russia has been able to influence Ukraine and Georgia in political, economic, cultural and military ways. These interventions were related to soft power in Ukraine, whereas Georgia has recently experienced external threat in the form of hard power.

However, it is still questionable if Gibler and Sewell's theory that democracy increases while external threat decreases is valid in this analysis. In all three case studies, it was possible to identify examples that both support and oppose this theory. The future of Georgia will be an interesting case study to examine if Russia's military intervention has led to a decrease in Georgia's already difficult democratisation process.

Practices

As NATO institutionalised its relations with former Soviet satellites, common practices were established between NATO and its former adversaries. By expanding these practices to other levels, Adler argues, the parties have more ground for cooperation, which increases democratisation. Promotion of democratic principles became an important means to bring aspirant states closer to the Alliance. In addition, aspirant states had to establish a democracy

based on a market economy before they could become an Alliance member. Currently, only Poland managed to fulfil NATO's criteria and became a member in 1999; while Ukraine and Georgia are still struggling with their democratisation process.

Although NATO increased its relations with Ukraine and Georgia in a number of agreements, which also referred to areas as democratisation, human rights and rule of law; in reality, the emphasis of common practices has been mainly on military and security cooperation. As has been argued in the analyses, these military and security practices have brought Ukraine and Georgia closer to NATO. However, to improve democratisation in these states, these common practices should expand to more levels than only security.

As introduced in the first chapter, Gheciu's argument that other international organisations than NATO might be better equipped to promote reforms in non security-related areas, could be added to this analysis. As has come forward, NATO's common practices focus mainly on security and military reforms, while organisations, such as the EU and the Council of Europe which are not security organisations in the way NATO is, focus more on developing support for democratisation processes.

Democratisation

It has become clear that Reiter's argument that NATO enlargement does not spread democracy is only applicable on Poland, as Poland managed to democratise before it became a NATO member in 1999, while Ukraine and Georgia have not become members of the Alliance yet. However, if Ukraine and Georgia fully fulfil NATO's criteria of membership, which also includes democracy based on a market economy, Reiter's theory will be valid on these case studies too.

Nevertheless, Reiter's theory is too simplistic, as it leaves out factors such as the influence the prospect of NATO membership has on the democratisation processes of Central and Eastern European states. Since the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the leaders of these two states have increased their commitment to democratisation and economic reform and have used its progress as an argument to become a NATO member. In addition, encouragement from NATO that democratisation will lead to membership, has motivated these two states to continue its democratic efforts.

Reflection

In conclusion, it is difficult to give one answer to the main question, which has been posed at the beginning of this thesis: To what extent is it possible to identify a causal mechanism, in which NATO as an independent or intervening variable plays an initiating and/or stimulating role in the processes of democratisation of the new (and future) democracies in Central and Eastern Europe?

I have argued that the main causal mechanism in these case studies is that the prospect of NATO membership has influenced the democratisation process in Poland, Ukraine and Georgia. By leaving the door open for new member states, which have to fulfil the Alliance's criteria of democratisation and market economy, applicant states are encouraged to commit to democracy and continue their democratic efforts. An additional factor in this is the external threat. The recent war in Georgia has demonstrated that when the external threat increases, not only democratisation becomes less important, but Georgia's desire to become a NATO member also grows. Thus, a higher external threat leads to a stronger need to be part of a security organisation.

What will happen next? At the Bucharest Summit, NATO has made clear that both Ukraine and Georgia will become Alliance members, and therefore, has an interest in maintaining Georgia's and Ukraine's course towards democratisation. In the aftermath of the Russian-Georgia war, the practical chances to become a NATO member might diminish as Georgia was not only involved in internal conflict, but also in a conflict with another country. On the other hand, in order to reduce Russia's power in the region, NATO and Georgia's efforts to admit Georgia to NATO might increase. Consequently, this could lead to an advancing pace of Ukraine's efforts to join the Alliance.

It is important to remember that the topic discussed in this thesis is one of continuation. Currently, the conflict in Georgia has not yet been resolved, while Poland and Ukraine, and also other neighbour states of Russia, such as the Baltic States which also have been occupied by Russia, feel threatened by Russia's military power. Therefore, Russia's intervention might influence the pace of NATO enlargement. Russia has intervened in a sovereign state, which desires NATO membership and has been working towards meeting the criteria of the Alliance. In addition, Russia's decision to use hard power in the form of a military occupation has caused a fear that Russia might cross the borders of other sovereign

neighbouring states, such as Ukraine. As a result, Central and Eastern European states will continue to consider NATO as the main institution to safeguard their security and sovereignty. From the Central and Eastern European perspective, NATO will still be regarded as a military and security organisation, rather than one that promotes democratisation.

Appendix

Map of Central and Eastern Europe

Source: http://www.mytravelguide.com/g/maps/Eastern-Europe-map.gif

Bibliography

Adler, Emanuel, 'The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post—Cold War Transformation', *European Journal of International Relations* 14.2 (2008) 195-230.

Albright, Madeleine, 'Why Bigger is Better', *Economist* 342.8004 (1997).

Asmus, Ronald D., 'Europe's Eastern Promise', *Foreign Affairs* 87.1 (2008).

Baker, James A., 'A New Europe, a New Atlanticism', *Vital Speeches of the Day* 56.7 (1990) 195-199.

Baker, James, 'A Summons to Leadership', *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 3.17 (1992).

Beissinger, Mark R., 'Promoting Democracy', *Dissent* 53.1 (2006) 18-24.

Blazyca, George, 'Polish Socio-economic Development in the 1990s and Scenarios for EU Accession', *Europe-Asia Studies* 51.5 (1999) 799-819.

Bodewig, Kurt, 'Economic and Political Transition in Georgia', *NATO Parliamentary Assembly* (2007), http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1171 (viewed on 27 August 2008).

Bugajski, Janusz, 'The Eastern Dimension of America's New European Allies', *Strategic Studies Institute* (2007) 1-197.

Bush, George W., 'President and Prime Minister Blair Discussed Iraq, Middle East', *The White House* (2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041112-5.html (12 November 2004, viewed on 20 July 2008).

Bush, George W., 'President Welcomes President Yushchenko to the White House', *The White House* (2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050404.html (4 April 2005, viewed on 20 August 2008).

Bush, George W., 'Remarks following Discussions with President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia', *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 44.11 (2008) 403-404.

Bush, George W., 'The President's News Conference with President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia in Tbilisi, Georgia', *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 41.19 (2005) 782-786.

Bush, George W., 'The President's News Conference with President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine in Kiev', *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 44.13 (2008) 453-458.

Carothers, Thomas, 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', *Journal of Democracy* (2002) 5-21.

Chandler, Andrea, 'State Building and Political Priorities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Role of the Military', *Armed Forces & Society* 22.4 (1996).

Cimoszewicz, Wlodzimierz, 'Building Poland's Security: Membership of NATO a Key
      Objective', *NATO Review* 44.3 (1996), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1996/9603-
      1.htm (May 1996, viewed on 27 July 2008).

Clinton, Bill, 'President Clinton's Response to Senator's Questions on NATO Enlargement',
      The White House (1997),
      www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/ClintonNATOEnlargement.htm (12 September 1997,
      viewed on 20 May 2008).

Clinton, Bill, 'Remarks by the President on the National Interest for Enlarging NATO', *The
      White House* (1998), www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/980320_clinton_nato.html (20
      March 1998, viewed on 20 May 2008).

Clinton, Bill, 'The Visegrad States: Crossroads to Change in the Heart of Europe', *U.S.
      Department of State Dispatch* 5.1 (1994).

Cowley, Andrew, 'The Birth and Possible Death of a Country', *The Economist* 331.7862 (1994).

Curtis, Glenn E. ed., *Poland: A Country Study* (Washington 1992),
      http://countrystudies.us/poland/ (October 1992, viewed on 22 July 2008).

Deugd, Nienke de, *Ukraine and the Issue of Participation with the Euro-Atlantic Security
      Community* (Groningen 2005).

Deutsch, Karl, et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation
      in the Light of Historical Experience* (New Jersey 1968).

Devdariani, Jaba, 'Georgia: Rise and Fall of the Facade Democracy', *Demokratizatsiya* (2004),
      http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200401/ai_n9358373/pg_1?tag=art
      Body;col1 (viewed on 20 August 2008).

Diamond, Larry, 'Promoting Democracy', *Foreign Policy* 87 (1992) 25-46.

Dinan, Desmond, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European* Integration (Hampshire
      2005).

'Georgia's Iron Fist of Independence', *Economist* 319.7709 (1991).

'Misha bounces Back', *Economist* 386.8562 (2008).

'Politics versus Policy', *Economist* 331.7859 (1994).

'Your Policy or Mine?', *Economist* 329.7835 (1993).

'Conclusions of the Presidency', *European Council in Copenhagen* (Copenhagen 1993),
      http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/72921.pdf (21-22 June
      1993, viewed on 13 August 2008).

Ford, Peter, 'Kiev, Kremlin Battle over ships', *Christian Science Monitor* 87.136 (1995).

Frost, Howard E., 'Eastern Europe's Search for Security', *Orbis* 37.1 (1993) 37-54.

Fukuyama, Francis, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy* (New Haven 2006).

Gągor, Franciszek, 'Polish Lessons learned from Operations – Defence Transformation', *General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces* (London 2008), http://www.sgwp.wp.mil.pl/en/publication3.php (5 February 2008, viewed on 14 August 2008).

Gallis, The NATO Summit at Bucharest 2008', *CRS Report for Congress* (2008) 1-6, http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22847.pdf (5 May 2008, viewed on 4 September 2008).

Garnett, Sherman W., 'Poland: Bulwark or Bridge?', *Foreign Policy* 102 (1996).

Gat, Azar, 'The Democratic Peace Theory Reframed: The Impact of Modernity', *World Politics* 58.1 (2006) 73-100.

George, Bruce, 'The Alliance at the Flashpoint of a New Area', *NATO Review* 41.5 (1993).

Gheciu, Alexandra, *NATO in the 'New Europe': The Politics of International Socialisation after the Cold War* (Stanford 2005).

Gibler, Douglas M., and Jamil A. Sewell, 'External threat and Democracy: The Role of NATO Revisited', *Journal of Peace Research* 43.4 (2006) 413-431.

'The GUUAM Group: History and Principles', *GUUAM Briefing Paper* (2000), http://www.guuam.org/general/browse.html (November 2000, viewed on 4 September 2008).

Hay, William A., 'What Is Democracy? Liberal Institutions and Stability in Changing Societies', *Orbis* 50.1 (2006) 133-151.

'Conflict History: Georgia', *International Crisis Group* (2008), http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=42 (viewed on 20 August 2008).

Ish-Shalom, Piki, 'For a Democratic Peace of Mind: Politicisation of the Democratic Peace Theory', *Harvard International Review* (2007), http://www.harvardir.org/articles/1503/1/ (May 2007, viewed on 17 July 2008).

Karatnycky, Adrian, 'Ukraine's Orange Revolution', *Foreign Affairs* 84.2 (2005).

Kepel, Gilles, 'The Origins and Development of the Jihadist Movement: from Anti-Communism to Terrorism', *Asian Affairs* 34.2 (2003) 91-108.

Kim, Julie, 'Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary: Recent Developments', *CRS Issue Brief* (1996), http://www.fas.org/man/crs/92-051.htm (20 November 1996, viewed on 15 May 2008).

King, Charles, 'Potemkym Democracy: Four Myths about Post-Soviet Union', *The National Interest* 64 (2001) 93-104.

King, Charles, 'The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States', *World Politics* 53.4 (2001) 524-552.

Kozyrev, Andrei, 'The New Russia and the Atlantic Alliance', *NATO Review* (1993) 3-6.

Kubicek, Paul, 'End of the Line for the Commonwealth of Independent States', *Problems of Post-Communism* 46.2 (1999) 15-24.

Kubicek, Paul, 'U.S.-Ukrainian Relations from Engagement to Estrangement', *Problems of Post-Communism* 50.6 (2003) 3-11.

Kuzio, Taras, 'Russian-Ukrainian Relations reveal Deeper Problems', *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5.115 (2008).

Kwaśniewski, Aleksander, 'Address by the President of the Republic of Poland', *NATO Speech* (2002), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020923b.htm (23 September 2002, viewed on 19 August 2008).

Lavrov, Sergey, 'Interview of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, Published in the Newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta on February 21 and 28, 2007', *The Acronym Institute* (2007), http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0703/doc12.htm (viewed on 20 August 2008).

Lee, Hongsub, 'Transition to Democracy in Poland', *East European Quarterly* 35.1 (2001) 87-107.

'François Fillon annonce que la France est «opposée à l'entrée de la Géorgie et de l'Ukraine dans l'OTAN»', *Le Monde* (1 April 2008).

Lieven, Anatol, 'Restraining NATO: Ukraine, Russia, and the West', *The Washington Quarterly* 20.4 (1997) 55-77.

'Withdrawing from Poland', *Maclean's* 105.45 (1992).

Mandelbaum, Michael, 'Democracy without America', *Foreign Affairs* 86.5 (2007).

Mark, Philip, 'Access, Accountability and Authority: Corruption and the Democratic Process', *Crime, Law and Social Change* 36.4 (2001) 357-377.

Marks, Edward, 'The CIS and the Caucasus', *INSS Strategic Forum* 90 (1996), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=25011&lng=en (November 1996, viewed on 4 September 2008).

Mason, Whit, 'Trouble in Tbilisi', *National Interest* 79 (2005) 139-144.

Menon, Anand, 'From Independence to Cooperation: France, NATO and European Security', *International* Affairs 71.1 (1995) 19-34.

Micgiel, John, 'The Road to Democracy and Pluralism in Poland: An Interview with Bronislaw Geremek', *Journal of International Affairs* 45.1 (1991) 67-70.

Michta, 'Making the Pieces Fit' in Andrew A. Michta ed., *America's New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO* (Seattle 1999) 185-203.

Michta, Andrew A., 'Poland: A Linchpin of Regional Security' in Andrew A. Michta ed., *America's New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO* (Seattle 1999) 40-73.

Mikhalev, Oleg, 'Dilemmas of Polish Politics', *International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations* 52.1 (2006) 96-104.

'NATO-Georgia', *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia* (2008), http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=88 (viewed on 24 August 2008).

'Declaration of Independence of Ukraine', *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine* (June 2008), http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/publication/content/6528.htm (June 2008, viewed on 6 August 2008).

Mirsky, Yehudah, 'Democratic Politics, Democratic Culture', *Orbis* 37.4 (1993).

Mitchell, Lincoln A., 'Democracy in Georgia since the Rose Revolution', *Orbis* 50.4 (2006) 669-676.

Molchanov, Mikhail A., 'Ukraine's European Choice: Pitfalls and Prospects', *NATO* (Ottawa 2003) 1-36, http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/molchanov.pdf (20 May 2003, viewed on 13 August 2008).

Moroney, Jennifer D.P., 'Frontier Dynamics and Ukraine's Ties to the West', *Problems of Post-Communism* 48.2 (2001) 15-24.

Motyl, Alexander J., 'Three Years After', *Harvard International Review: European Edition* 29.4 (2008) 16-19.

Munro, Neil, 'Which Way does Ukraine Face? Popular Orientations toward Russia and Western Europe', *Problems of Post-Communism* 54.6 (2007) 43-58.

Myrli, Sverre, 'Viewing NATO from the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia', *NATO Parliamentary Assembly* (2007), http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1283 (viewed on 30 August 2008).

'Bucharest Summit Declaration', *NATO* (2008), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html (3 April 2008, viewed on 20 August 2008).

'NATO's Foreign Ministers reiterate their Support for Georgia', *NATO* (2008), http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/08-august/e0819a.html (19 August 2008, viewed on 19 September 2008).

'NATO-Georgia Relations: How did Relations with Georgia evolve?', *NATO* (2008), http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-georgia/evolution.html (2 September 2008, viewed on 3 September 2008).

'NATO's Relations with Georgia', *NATO* (2008), http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-georgia/index.html (viewed on 19 September 2008).

'NATO-Ukraine: A Distinctive Partnership', *NATO* (2007) 1-18, http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-ukraine/nato-ukraine2007-e.pdf (viewed on 18 August 2008).

'NATO-Ukraine Action Plan', *NATO Prague Summit* (2002), http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122a.htm (22 November 2002, viewed on 18 August 2008).

'North Atlantic Treaty', *NATO* (Washington 1949), http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (4 April 1949, viewed on 17 July 2008).

'Study on NATO Enlargement', *NATO* (1995), http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm (September 1995, viewed on 18 August 2008).

'The Brussels Summit Declaration', *NATO* (Brussels 1994), http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940111a.htm (11 January 1994, viewed on 27 July 2008).

NATO Handbook (Brussels 2001) 1-536.

Nelson, Lynn D., and Paata Amonashvili, 'Voting and Political Attitudes in Soviet Georgia', *Soviet Studies* 44.4 (1992).

Nichol, Jim, 'Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests', *CRS Report for Congress* (2008) 1-39, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33453_20080813.pdf (13 August 2008, viewed on 4 September 2008).

Nichol, Jim, 'Georgia's January 2008 Presidential Election: Outcome and Implications', *CRS Report for Congress* (2008) 1-6, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22794.pdf (25 January 2008, viewed on 29 August 2008).

Nichol, 'Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests', *CRS Report for Congress* (2008) 1-27,

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34618.pdf (29 August 2008, viewed on 14 September 2008).

Nodia, Ghia, and Álvaro Pinto Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape of Georgia: Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects* (Delft 2006).

'London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance', *North Atlantic Council* (London 1990), http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm (last update 5-6 July 1990, viewed on 21 July 2008).

Ottoway, Marina, 'Is Democracy the Answer?', in Chester A. Crocker et all. ed. *Leashing the Dogs of War, Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington 2007) 603 – 617.

Parish, Jonathan, 'Examining NATO's Transformation: Remaining Relevant', *NATO Review* (2005), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/art1.html (viewed on 20 July 2008).

Pernetta, Robert, *General Wojciech Jaruzelski: A Biography against Contemporary Development in Poland* (Kraków 2000), http://www.grin.com/e-book/95058/ (viewed on 22 July 2008).

Piatt, Gregory, 'Poland seeks Role as Europe's Stabilizer', *Christian Science Monitor* 88.146 (1996).

Plattner, Marc F., 'Liberalism and Democracy', *Foreign Affairs* 77.2 (1998) 171-180.

Prizel, Ilya, 'Ukraine between Proto-Democracy and 'Soft' Authoritarianism' in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot ed. *Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova* (Cambridge 1997) 330-369.

Pushkov, Alexei K., 'Russia and NATO: A Case for Binding Security Guarantees', *International Herald Tribune* (1997), http://www.iht.com/articles/1997/04/02/edpush.t.php (2 April 1997, viewed on 30 May 2008).

Putin, Vladimir, 'Press Conference following Talks with President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko and the Second Meeting of the Russian-Ukrainian Intergovernmental Commission', *President of Russia* (2008), http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/02/12/2018_type82914type82915_160088.shtml (12 february 2008, viewed on 19 August 2008).

Rasizade, Alec, 'Georgia meets the Test of its Independence', *Contemporary Review* 284.1658 (2004) 139-148.

Reiter, Dan, 'Why NATO Enlargement does not spread Democracy', *International Security* 25.4 (2001) 41-67.

Robertson, Lord, 'Opening Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson at the Ministerial Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission', *NATO* (2002), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020515t.htm (15 May 2002, viewed on 18 August 2008).

Robertson, Lord, 'Speech by NATO Secretary General', *NATO Speeches* (2003), (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030514a.htm (14 May 2003, viewed on 28 August 2008).

Rogozin, Dmitry, 'Interview with Russia's Ambassador to NATO', *Spiegel* (2008), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,540426,00.html (11 March 2008, viewed on 15 October 2008).

Rubin, F., 'The Theory and Concept of National Security in the Warsaw Pact Countries', *International Affairs* 58.4 (1982) 648-657.

Rühe, Volker, 'Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era', *Speech on the Occasion of the 1993 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture* (1993) 1-23.

Saakashvili, Mikheil, 'Georgia after the Rose Revolution: Rebuilding Democracy and Stability', *Embassy of Georgia to the United States of America, Canada and Mexico* (2004), http://www.georgiaemb.org/DisplayDoc.asp?id=310 (24 February 2004, viewed on 27 August 2008).

Saakashvili, Mikheil, 'Speech at the 44th Munich Conference on Security Policy', *Munich Conference on Sexurity Policy* (2008), http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=en&id=214&%20> (9 February 2008, viewed on 21 August 2008).

Saakashvili, Mikheil, 'The President of Georgia made a Statement before his Departure to Bucharest', *President of Georgia* (2008), http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&st=150&id=2576 (1 April 2008, viewed on 4 September 2008).

Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop, 'Introductory Remarks by NATO Secretary General: Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission', *NATO Speeches* (2006), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060428a.htm (28 April 2006, viewed on 19 August 2008).

Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop, 'Joint News Conference by the NATO Secretary General and the Foreign Minister of Ukraine', *NATO Meeting of Foreign Ministers* (2005), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050421g.htm (21 April 2005, viewed on 19 August 2008).

Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop, 'Statement by the Secretary General on the Situation in Georgia', *NATO Press Releases* (2007), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-114e.html (8 November 2007, viewed on 11 September 2008).

Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop, 'Press Point by NATO Secretary General following the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the Situation in Georgia', *NATO Speech* (2008), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080812e.html (12 August 2008, viewed on 19 September 2008).

Schmitz, Gregor Peter, 'Germany Puts the Brakes on US Expansion Plans', *Spiegel* (2008), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,544109,00.html (28 March 2008, viewed on 20 August 2008).

'Georgia', *Security Council Report* (2008), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/{65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9}/Update%20Report%2012%20Augustl%202008_Georgia.pdf (12 August 2008, viewed on 24 August 2008).

Sherr, James, 'NATO's Strategic Partnerships: Edging Erratically Forward', *NATO Review* (2003), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue3/english/art4.html (viewed on 19 August 2008).

Shevardnadze, Eduard, 'Statement by President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze at the EAPC Summit', *NATO Prague Summit* (2002), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021122h.htm (22 November 2002, viewed on 28 August 2008).

Solana, Javier, 'Speech by the Secretary General: NATO Speech to the Polish Euro-Atlantic Associations', *NATO* (Warsaw 1996), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s960418a.htm (18 April 1996, viewed on 20 May 2008).

Solovyov, Dmitry, and Margarita Antidze, 'Russian Troops out of Georgia Buffer Zones', *International Herald Tribune* (2008), http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/10/08/europe/OUKWD-UK-GEORGIA-OSSETIA.php (8 October 2008, viewed on 12 October 2008).

Steinberg, Shai, 'German Interests in the Continuance of NATO after 1990: A Neoliberal Institutionalist Analysis', *Institute for European Studies* (2002), http://www.ef.huji.ac.il/ef/publications/Shai_Steinberg_2003.pdf (December 2002, viewed on 25 July 2008).

Stent, Angela, 'Ukraine's Fate', *World Policy Journal* 11.3 (1994) 83-87.

Terry, Sarah Meiklejohn, 'Poland's Foreign Policy since 1989: The Challenges of
      Independence', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 33.1 (2000) 7-47.

Truman, Harry S., 'Famous Speeches Harry S. Truman: The Truman Doctrine', *Inspirational*
      Speakers Motivational Speakers (1947),
      http://inspirationalspeakers.wordpress.com/2007/09/30/famous-speeches-harry-s-
      truman-the-truman-doctrine/ (12 March 1947, viewed on 17 July 2008).

Umland, Andreas, 'Ukraine, NATO, and German Foreign Policy', *Global Politician* (2008),
      http://www.globalpolitician.com/24639-ukraine-germany-nato (30 April 2008,
      viewed on 20 August 2008).

'Press Statement following Negotiations of the President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev with
      French President Nicolas Sarkozy', *UN* (2008),
      http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/warfare/statement120808en4.htm
      (12 August 2008, viewed on 6 September 2008).

'What are Human Rights?', *United Nations Human Rights* (2008),
      http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (viewed on
      14 August 2008).

'Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989', *USAID Mission to Poland* (1989),
      http://www.usaid.gov/pl/seedact.htm (last updated 13 March 2002, viewed on 27
      July 2008).

'The Enlargement of NATO: Why adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to
      NATO strengthens American National Security', *U.S. Department of State* (1998) 1-27.

'Fact sheet: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)', *US Department of State Dispatch* 3.52
      (1992) 930-932.

'History of the Visegrad Group'. *Visegrad Group* (2007),
      http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=938 (viewed on 20 May 2008).

'Visegrad Declaration 1991', *Visegrad Group* (1991),
      http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=940&articleID=3940&ctag=articl
      elist&iid=1 (15 February 1991, viewed on 22 July 2008).

Wandycz, Piotr S., *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to*
      the Present (New York 2001).

Waterman, Harvey, Dessie Zagorcheva and Dan Reiter, 'Correspondence: NATO and
      Democracy', *International Security* 26.3 (2001-2002) 221-235.

Wilson, Woodrow, 'War Messages 65th Congress, 1st Session', *Senate Document* 5.7264
      (Washington 1917),

http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Wilson%27s_War_Message_to_Congress (viewed on 16 July 2008).

Wilson, Andrew, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* (New Haven 2000).

Wilson, Andrew, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (New Haven 2005).

Woehrel, Steven, 'NATO Enlargement and Russia', *CRS Report for Congress* (1998) 1-6, https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/394/97-477_19980414.pdf?sequence=1 (14 April 1998, viewed on 21 May 2008).

Woehrel, Steven, 'Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy', *CRS Report for Congress* (2006) 1-13, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33460.pdf (23 August 2006, viewed on 12 August 2008).

Yanukovych, Viktor, 'Press point with NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych', *NATO Speeches* (2006), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060914b.htm (14 September 2006, viewed on 19 August 2008).

Yost, David S., *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington 2001).

Yushchenko, Viktor, 'Opening Statement at the Press Conference following the Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council at the level of Heads of State and Government', *NATO Speeches* (2005), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050222g.htm (22 February 2005, viewed on 19 August 2008).

Zaborowski, Marcin and Kerry Longhurst, 'America's Protégé in the East? The Emergence of Poland as a Regional Leader', *International Affairs* 79.5 (2003) 1009- 1028.

Zlenko, Anatoliy, 'Press Conference by NATO Deputy Secretary General, Minuto Rizzo and Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Anatoliy Zlenko', *NATO Prague Summit* (2002), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021122r.htm (22 November 2002, viewed on 18 August 2008).