treads familiar ground here. His own work, which in the 1990s began drifting away from bounded ethnographic projects, remains a major contribution to anthropology's quest to grasp "globalization" and the spectrum of processes it entails (Hannerz 1996). His early influential theorizing on the subject was supplemented later by an ethnography of foreign correspondents—people who write from expatriate microniches abroad, shaping attitudes and policies in the metropolis (Hannerz 2004). The project in hand, a self-conscious exercise in armchair anthropology and in many ways a direct continuation of the foreign-correspondents book, is as ambitious and perhaps more daring.

Hannerz's essay, written for his 2014 Eric Wolf memorial lecture, begins with an affectionate homage to Wolf's preoccupation with power. But it soon becomes apparent that Hannerz is less concerned with power than with culture—that boundless, nebulous idiom Wolf had been so skeptical about. It is at that point in the essay that the intratribal, Ulf-on-Wolf exchange gives way to Hannerz's main thrust: an extraverted look, from anthropology toward other spheres of knowledge, at how the C-word was mobilized, interpreted, and reintegrated into a discourse designed to fathom "who we are" and to predict where "we" are heading. Hannerz suggests that "global scenarios," as a genre, includes a good number of items, and then picks three for further scrutiny: Samuel Huntington's 1993 *Clash of Civilizations*, Benjamin Barber's *Jihad vs. McWorld*, published 2 years later, and Joseph Nye's notion of *Soft Power*, which first appeared in 1990.

In Hannerz's essay, it appears that this genre has three main characteristics. First is the object of inquiry. Global scenarios attempt to capture, analyze, and predict the macro processes that creep across continents, spheres of influence, and global institutions, redefining and remodeling our lives. For me, one of the compelling things about them—Huntington's, Barber's, and Nye's no exception—is the impression they create that the trajectories they analyze and index are under way even at the time of writing. So, contrary to Hannerz's suggestion that global scenarios are fundamentally about the future, I see them as bringing the future into the present. It is a powerful trope, one that instills the reader with a sense of urgency and persuasion. After all, failing to recognize a current already in flow might imply that one already lags behind it. These predictions, in other words, can hardly be ignored. Convincing or not—and some of them seemed very real upon first reading—their claim to represent systemic aspects of a fast-moving reality was irresistible. No wonder some of them soon became indispensable for a correct anticipation of the future.

Second is delivery. Writers in the genre, Hannerz says, may have been leading academics in their respective fields. But all of them chose to place their early musings on their new scenarios in nonacademic periodicals, like *Foreign Policy*, *Prospect*, or *The National Interest*. Unrestricted by academic peer review, these outlets facilitate detail and correspondence with earlier ideas by using quotes and references but reach larger, more varied and influential audiences. Later, once a piece had become iconic, it was expanded into book form, assuming a presence of its own.

Third is the ease with which global scenarios traverse disciplinary boundaries. Writers in the genre, Hannerz implies, maneuver between political theory, history, philosophy, international relations, economics, sociology, and more. And hovering above them, like a soothing, integrating harmony from an invisible accordion, is "culture."

Hannerz seems to accept—a tad wryly perhaps—that you do not have to be an anthropologist to embrace culture. Huntington, Barber, and Nye produce deep play with it, covering the four frames whereby, Hannerz asserts, "people now get together to handle meaning and meaningful forms": the state, the market, movements, and "consociality"—contexts in which space, ideas, and presence are being shared, including, recently, social media.

The Clash of Civilizations, *Jihad vs. McWorld*, and *Soft Power* are, no doubt, influential fin de siècle texts that appeared at a significant juncture in world history. But their preoccupation with culture is also somewhat anachronistic. It echoes the dichotomy that once defined modernity but now is often doubted, between culture (diverse yet ubiquitous and fateful for all civilizations) and nature (archaic and irrelevant, hence justifiably absent from global scenarios).

Two decades on, however, with climate change becoming the defining feature of our time, the absence of the biosphere from global scenarios is disturbing. Suddenly, 1990s scenarios that ignore the physical limitations of the planet seem inapt. The term "Anthropocene," a significant and troubling global scenario in its own right (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000), opened a floodgate of predictions that seem to shed new light on the texts reviewed by Hannerz and on the genre generally. Latour's exposure of the fallacies of the nature-culture divide (Latour 2004), Chakrabarti's call for a "species history" (Chakrabarti 2009), Davis's quest for those who might built the ark (Davis 2010), and my own suggestion that we have evolved to *Homo sapiens combustans* (Rabinowitz 2009) are all reminders that culture in itself can no longer encompass the drama awaiting the human race as postnormal climate conditions are upon us. Our complex relationship with the biosphere, hitherto subsumed under the sociocultural idioms of "the world," "the globe," or "history," must take central place as we attempt to prophesy the future.

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The late Gerald Berreman once wisecracked to a senior administrator of the University of California at Berkeley, who had remarked that social scientists had no impact on the

world whatsoever, "How about Karl Marx, for starters?" Eric Wolf would have certainly nodded in agreement, and I think Ulf Hannerz, too. Hannerz makes an insightful analysis of the work of public intellectuals who reduce the world's complexities to global scenarios that can become self-fulfilling prophecies when they suit the foreign-policy objectives of world leaders and resonate with people's anxieties about the future.

The American sociologist Robert Merton (1957:436) argued that such scenarios translate fears into reality. Merton based his conceptualization of the term "self-fulfilling prophecy" on the W. I. Thomas theorem: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (cited in Merton 1957:421). A self-fulfilling prophecy is, then, "a *false* definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false conception come *true*" (Merton 1957:423; emphasis in original). Whether false, true, imagined, or constructed, the definition of the situation creates a meaningful reality because, according to Alfred Schutz (1967:230), "it is the meaning of our experiences and not the ontological structure of the objects which constitutes reality. Hence we call a certain set of our experiences a finite province of meaning if all of them show a specific cognitive style." Our social universe consists thus of many realities (the world of everyday life, of dreams, of science), each with its own experiences, meanings, and cognitive style. Hannerz examines one particular province of meaning: future scenarios that may become self-fulfilling or self-destructive prophecies of presaging dystopic futures. In a critical move, he tries his hand at a future scenario of the world's globalized culture that is "more thoroughly grounded in the rich materials of world ethnography and in anthropological thought."

Hannerz conceptualizes four organizational frames that allow people to deal with the world's cultural diversity and its multiple meanings, frames that also guide influential scenario writers like Huntington, Barber, and Nye. Three frames were elaborated in his seminal book *Cultural Complexity* (Hannerz 1992), namely, states, markets, and movements. Here, he replaces the earlier frame "form of life" with "consociality" as the "first and most fundamental frame for cultural process." The neologism is inspired by Alfred Schutz's term "consociates," which applies to contemporaries "with whom I share, as long as the relation lasts, not only a community of time but also of space" (Schutz 1967:16).

I have no one quarrel with this, were it not that consociality reveals only part of the equation. The term consociality implies a deep interpersonal affinity with other human beings that is genetically wired into people and manifested in culturally shaped bonds. Yet consociality requires a complementary concept that contrasts people's "sheer physical copresence" and mediated communication with people's fear of "the touch of the unknown . . . a human propensity as deep-seated as it is alert and insidious" (Canetti 1963:15). People's face-to-face and mediated copresence is marred by this fundamental frame that makes people, communities, and states live apart together. Let me propose the neologism "dissociality" to describe this cultural organization of diversity. The We of consociality corresponds to the They of dissociality because people exist as consociates by the grace of being dissociates. Dissociality is not the antithesis of consociality, but the two constitute an ambidextrous frame. Consociality cannot exist without a counterpart that accommodates conflict and diversity. This conceptual ambidexterity may help explain why people were so attracted to the post–Cold War scenarios analyzed by Hannerz.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union made public intellectuals imagine the end of history, the hegemony of the market, and a homogenizing process of globalization. These visions were appealing after the collapse of totalitarian communist regimes and the thaw of a mutually assured destruction between the United States and the Soviet Union. Soon, however, doom scenarios appeared about unregulated flows of people, capital, and ideas from and to a Western world that claimed a global political and economic hegemony. The dynamic of consociality and dissociality fed into these post–Cold War fears, and future scenarios came to play a constitutive role, as when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke in 2006 about the violent conflict between Lebanon and Israel as the birth pangs of the new Middle East. A global scenario about the inevitable march of capitalism and democracy across the globe was hiding behind her remark. It added yet another future scenario to a province of meaning whose specific cognitive style is the presentation of scripts as reality. As Ulf Hannerz shows here convincingly, anthropology should contribute its own ethnographically informed scenario to public debates about the future and help demystify self-fulfilling prophecies that oversimplify the world's cultural diversity.

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The Dangers of the Global Genre

If I was asked to name the top 10 anthropological texts that fundamentally influenced my view of the world as a graduate student some two-and-a-half decades ago, Eric Wolf's *Europe and the People without History* (1982) would certainly count among them. Together with William Roseberry, June Nash, Gerald Sider, and others doing anthropological political economy, he offered a view of culture as shaped by history, power, and economic processes that simultaneously involved human agency. This was a direct challenge to what Wolf described as a "billiard-ball" theory of civilizations: "a world of sociocultural billiard balls, coursing on a global billiard table"