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Thinking No-One's Thought

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What is it that dramaturgs do? Is there a dramaturg that has never been faced with this question? Contemplating possible answers, I am reminded of lists provided by former teachers of the activities performed by a dramaturg: background research, analysis, observing rehearsals, being a *first audience*, writing program notes and grant applications, and so on. While such lists may indeed provide an initial impression of the kind of activities with which dramaturgs often occupy their time, they do not offer insight into the specificities of the dramaturg's role in the creative process. Importantly, the use of the term specificities here does not in any way imply an argument for an essential or singular way of *doing* dramaturgy; on the contrary, we might suppose that there exist almost as many ways of doing dramaturgy as there are dramaturgs. Nonetheless, if we examine the dramaturg's function within the creative process, instead of considering the particular manner in which each dramaturg individually fulfills a preordained role, we can begin to distinguish some common characteristics that make an appearance time and again.

Asked about their, mostly long-term, collaborations, directors and choreographers often describe their dramaturg as a sparring partner, as someone who understands their particular mode of thinking and working and who contributes to the creative process from her or his expertise. Although this process may involve some of the activities mentioned above (and it often does encompass at least part of that list), these activities are not usually assumed to be definitive of the involvement of the dramaturg. Rather, the way in which the dramaturg fulfills such activities is dependent upon a sense of connection between the choreographer or director and the dramaturg. This

connection allows a particular dramaturg's modes of thinking and doing to inspire modes of working that meet the needs of a particular director or choreographer's creative process. In a previous text, I suggested that we might understand this sense of connection between dramaturg and choreographer or director in terms of friendship and thinking.¹

In *What is Philosophy?* (1994), Deleuze and Guattari propose a new understanding of thinking. They suggest that it is a process that transpires between people rather than an individual action. Thinking starts from what they call a certain *charme*, a spark that lights up between people, turning them into friends. This friendship is not based on sharing the same ideas, but instead inheres in and arises from the momentum of having something to say to one another; such momentums result not only in thought, but also in thoughts that move. Creative processes, I argued, can then be considered as being instances of collaborative thinking. What dramaturgs in particular bring to such collaborative thinking is a reflection that results from a specific mode of looking at the process at hand. In a collaborative creative process like making dance, all involved engage with the same creation, yet they do so in different ways, coming from different practices and having different aims within the process. The dramaturgical mode of looking can be characterised by two points of awareness that are informed by the dramaturg's complementary experience and training. The first is an awareness of the emerging potential of that which is being created. It involves an understanding of the directions in which the creation could potentially proceed that is based on the dramaturg's familiarity with creative processes and ways of structuring work, both historic and contemporary. This does not mean that these models are to be copied. Usually, they are not, and the *charme* lit up between the dramaturg and the choreographer or director as partners in collaborative thinking may very well take the shape of a challenge. The other awareness regards the implications and complications of the material being created. This awareness arises from the dramaturg's insight into how the material triggers associations and invites modes of looking and interpreting; insight into how these modes may be put to use, played with, or disrupted; and familiarity with a great number of analytical tools, along with the skills to use them; and a well developed general knowledge. With this mode of looking, the dramaturg is searching for

connections between elements of the creation and the multidimensional network of synchronic and diachronic relationships against which these elements of the performance may appear to an audience; thus, the dramaturgical mode of looking entails a commitment to investigating the ways in which elements of the performance may be seen and interpreted. I am referring here to the complex way in which elements of a performance are embedded within contexts of association and interpretation that add associative connections to experiences made outside the performance event and organise the potential readings and meanings a spectator may arrive at. Some of these readings, interpretations, and associations may be what the creators aimed for, but others will most certainly not be part of what was foreseen. Some of them may be helpful and trigger new ideas and open new horizons, while others may actually obstruct in some way.

Of course, the dramaturgical mode of looking is not exclusive to dramaturgs. At times, the choreographer or director, and others involved in the creative process, will also adopt this mode of looking. Inviting a dramaturg to enter the creative process means making space for an additional partner in dialogue (or multi-logue), a partner whose contribution, I will argue, is to think *no-one's thought*. This proposal to approach the creation of dance or performance in terms of thinking is not meant to intellectualise artistic creation, but rather to argue for the re-conceptualisation of thought as a process that takes place in and through material practice. At this point, current practices of creating dance and performance meet with current developments in the theory and philosophy of perception, cognitive science, neuroscience, and the philosophy of mind, invested in attempts at conceptualising thinking beyond representationalism and in terms of a material practice that proceeds through enactment.² Conceiving of dance and performance as processes of thinking through material practice acknowledges a similar tendency within dance and performance to conceive of creations not in terms of what they represent but how they enact ideas formulated in performative practice. Such developments are related in many ways to an understanding of artistic work in terms of research.

In the following, I elaborate on the relationship between dramaturgical practice and thinking, starting from the notion of process. First, though, I offer a few navigational markers for the thinking presented here. Process points to the connection between dramaturgical

practice and duration. Dramaturgs do not deal with things but with emergences, and time as duration is an integral part of what these emergences are. Thinking through these emergences requires engaging with them while they are happening and with how they are happening *in-between* the various collaborators in the process. Here, I argue, Deleuze and Guattari's idea of thinking as something happening in-between is useful in conceptualising such a mode of thinking. Furthermore, if thinking is something that happens between people, this also means that thinking happens through something else. That is, thinking would seem to take place, to emerge, through something that mediates between the people involved. This medium can be language, certainly, but Deleuze and Guattari explicitly allow for the possibility that thinking also takes place through media other than language. They discuss how thinking can take place through, for example, painting or sculpture, or through film (Deleuze *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2*; Deleuze and Guattari).³ Dance and performance can also be considered media of thinking, and the typical characteristics of these media, like their strong focus on movement and their being in constant transformation, makes them particularly interesting objects of research for current attempts at conceptualising thinking in terms of a material practice that proceeds through enactment.

A collaborative creative process like making dance or performance might be considered a process of thinking happening between people and between people and things. The question then is how to conceive of thought in relation to such practices of thinking. If thinking does not happen in the head of the autonomous thinker, but rather happens in-between and through the specificities of the medium, what emerges from this process (thought) can neither be considered exclusive to a thinker, nor as existing independently of the medium in which it takes shape. Here, I intend to turn to Hubert Damisch's account of painting as a mode of thinking (in his *The Origin of Perspective*, 1995) to argue for an understanding of thought in terms of sets of relationships that are materialised in a creation, in this case a painting, and re-activated by a viewer. Thought, here, is not an idea represented in the painting but the set of relationships between elements of the painting and between the painting and the viewer as proposed by the creation. By extension, understanding this thought is not decoding what is represented but grasping what is proposed by enacting the logic of the set of relationships proposed.

I therefore argue that dance or performance understood as a product of such collaborative practices of thinking consists of thoughts materialised in performance. These thoughts are not those of one of the individuals involved in the creation, but those which emerge from the collaborative process. They are no-one's thoughts. And precisely as such, they are the dramaturg's concern. Unlike many others partaking in the collective creation of dance and performance, the dramaturg's involvement in a creative process does not usually start from one particular aspect of the creation, such as dancing, costumes, light, or sound. Like the choreographer or director, the dramaturg engages with the totality. However, unlike the choreographer or director, the dramaturg does not do so from the position of an author or creator of the work, directing the development of the creation (in dialogue with others) according to her/his choice. Rather, the dramaturg relates to all these aspects, and to the relationships between them, as aspects of someone else's creation.

Damisch's example of perspective will be further examined to illustrate how thinking the thought as given in the constellation of relations – grasping it – is not a matter of recognising or decoding what is represented, but instead involves enacting the logic of what is presented. This logic, and how this logic takes the audience along in its engagement with the performance, is the subject of the dramaturgical mode of looking. Later in this chapter, I follow a suggestion by Alva Noë and propose Wittgenstein's language games as a model for the engagement of spectators. That is, their engagement with the performance as a complex and continuously changing set of relationships. Understood this way, performances open up perceptual cognitive spaces that emerge from the interaction between what is proposed by the performance and our abilities to engage, anticipate, and understand. Finally, I argue that this interaction and how this interaction unfolds – as a result of how spectators enact the thoughts that are the performance – are the subject of the dramaturgical mode of looking.

Process

The ability to think in terms of process is crucial for anyone involved in creating. This is not – or not initially – because it takes time to make something. Not every kind of making is creating. For example,

making an object from a pre-existing design is, in most instances, not thought of as creating; it is, rather, an execution of a predetermined plan. In such making, time is the projected trajectory from design to object. The time of creation on the other hand is the duration of the unfolding of that which is becoming. Creating is not about what something is now, or even about what it is not yet; it is about the process of becoming something that has not yet arrived. Being creative involves precisely this ability to recognise such potential. One of the first things to unlearn when creating performances is the tendency to look at rehearsals as if they were performances, measuring them against an imaginary already finished performance. That is, it is a mistake to look at the work of a rehearsal as if it were an unfinished version of an already existing design. Instead, creators must learn to look at the potential of that which appears, as becoming – in one week, two weeks, a month's time – something which is still, at present, unknown and unknowable. This requires a mode of thinking which does not stand outside the material, attempting to bend it towards preexisting ideas, but rather which emerges through it and through an interaction with its possibilities. It requires entering the logic of what emerges and moving along with it.

Thinking in-between

For Deleuze and Guattari themselves, writing was the medium in and through which their collaborative thinking took shape. Their co-authored books, including *What is Philosophy?*, are the products of a collaboration that Deleuze has described as: "We do not work together, we work between the two... We don't work, we negotiate. We were never in the same rhythm, we were always out of step." (*Deleuze and Guattari* viii) In the books resulting from their collaboration, however, such differences, in rhythm or otherwise, are not apparent. Although differences may have existed during the process of working and thinking together, and these differences may have been important in arriving at their texts, the outcome is not ostensibly about the differences. Together, these two independent thinkers produced texts through which they present a series of thoughts that are neither Deleuze's nor Guattari's. They are the materialisation of their collaborative thinking in and through the medium of writing. Similarly, one might argue, in other collaborative creative processes,

the thinking of the individuals involved in the creation materialises in thoughts that are no-one's, individually. Creating things together means producing thoughts that would not have been there without the thinking of all the individuals involved in the creative process. Yet, once created, these thoughts exist somehow independently from each of those individuals, and as a consequence of how the work has materialised between them.

How can we begin to conceive of thoughts as autonomous entities materialised in a medium? What is interesting here is Damisch's account of perspective as a paradigm or ground structure of modes of thinking, and painting as a mode of exploring the implications of these modes of thinking. Perspective, as Damisch argues throughout his book, is not merely a technique to represent three-dimensional space on a flat canvas. Rather, perspective in painting is a visual manifestation of modes of thinking that emerged in the early Renaissance. Since then, these modes of thinking have become so deeply engrained, and thus naturalised, that perspective is generally understood as merely a pictorial technique for reproducing adequate representations of space. However, as Damisch argues, in order to understand how paintings think, it is important to realise that what is presented by a perspectival painting is not a representation of space as it already exists outside the painting, but a proposition about space formulated in the medium of painting. Understanding what is being proposed is not a matter of recognising what is represented within the image, it is rather a matter of grasping what Damisch describes as the intellectual thrust of the image itself. This means grasping the logic in the proposition of which the image is merely a particular materialisation. This proposition consists of relationships between the various elements in the image, as well as between the image and the viewer. Grasping this logic of these relationships is grasping the thought about space that is represented by the painting.

This logic is part of the address presented to a viewer by the painting. It is part of how the painting speaks to us. This speaking is not the act of a painter as an individual addressing a viewer through the work; rather, this speaking is enacted by the painting through the way the work is constructed and the ways in which this construction addresses its audience. Although the paintings discussed by Damisch are (purportedly) created by single authors, his argument

would work equally well with works created by multiple authors. What matters is the proposition proffered through the logic of the relationships between the various elements that make up the painting. He writes:

The formal apparatus put in place by the perspective paradigm is equivalent to that of the sentence, in that it assigns the subject a place within a previously established network that gives it meaning, while at the same time opening up the possibility of something like a statement in painting: as Wittgenstein wrote, words are but points, while propositions are arrows that have meaning, which is to say direction. (Damisch 446)

Importantly, the comparison between perspective in painting and a proposition in language is not the proposal to understand painting as a text that can be decoded by pointing out what the individual elements in the picture represent. Rather, the structural similarity between a proposition in language and perspectival painting pointed out by Damisch draws attention to aspects of the functioning of each that are overlooked in accounts of how meaning comes into being (in language or painting) in terms of representation. What perspective and language share is that, in both, the subject is an effect of the structure of relations set up by it. Perspective:

has this in common with language that in and by itself it institutes and constitutes itself under the auspices of a point, a factor analogous to the “subject” or “person” in language, always posited in relation to a “here” or “there,” accruing all the possibilities for movement from one position to another that this entails. (53)

This is what, in language, is called deixis. Deixis refers to the aspect of language that sets up relationships between persons, as well as between persons and objects, here and there, earlier and later. Deixis is what allows us to enter language by taking up the position of I or you, here or there. It allows us to place ourselves in relation to what is expressed in language or vice versa, to place what is said in relation to oneself. For this reason, Emile Benveniste (to whom Damisch refers) calls deixis – and not reference – crucial to making communication in language possible (Damisch 20).⁴ It is through deixis that we enter

language and that we can begin participating in what Wittgenstein (discussed later in this text) calls language games. Similarly, Damisch (also referring to Wittgenstein) argues that perspective in painting addresses us with a set of relationships and that grasping the logic of what is presented to us implies entering this logic by taking up positions implied within this logic.

By analogy to Damisch's account of painting, we can think of choreographies and performances as presenting to their audience certain propositions comprised of complex sets of relationships among numerous elements within the work. These propositions address us as audience; they speak to us, inviting us to go along with them and accept their logic. As such they actively engage us with the thought that has emerged from the collaborative process of thinking through the medium of dance and performance and that, furthermore, has been materialised in the choreography or performance presented. Given the condition of its emergence, this thought cannot be traced to an individual, it is no-one's thought and yet it is the concern of all, and especially of the dramaturg.

Awareness

In dramaturgical work, the attempt to think no-one's thought as this thought materialises in the dance-in-becoming involves two subjects of awareness: (1) an awareness of how what is being created addresses the audience; and (2) an awareness of how this very address triggers the audience to think along with the performance – essentially producing yet another process of thinking-in-between. Thus, the dramaturgical form of thinking no-one's thought requires the understanding that what we think we see and hear on stage comes into being as a result of the interaction between the address presented by a performance and the response of the audience. This interaction involves more than merely understanding the meaning of what is shown and said. It involves our bodies, actively enacting the proposition presented to us and hallucinating what we perceive to be over there. What we perceive is always both more and less than what is there. The dramaturgical mode of looking involves a looking for how this happens as a result of how we are invited to enact the propositions presented to us by the performance.

Specific to how this happens in a performance is the radical relational character of the propositions presented on stage. What I mean by radical relational is that a performance is a special object of perception because, actually, it is not an object at all. A performance is not a thing but exists only as a dynamic set of relationships. It is from these relationships that what is usually considered the performance emerges. For example, as actors know, staging a dramatic clash between two people is not a matter of staging the clash itself, but of staging two irreconcilable trajectories which, precisely because of their contradictory nature, are bound to run into each other. The clash is what emerges when they do so. The process of creating performance entails setting up such trajectories and exploring their potential for interaction. Performances are dynamic sets of relations that transform over time: relations between performers, performers and space, performers and the audience, performers and their costumes, and so on. One might even argue that this set of transforming dynamic relationships extends to include the relationships between performers and themselves. A body in motion, Brian Massumi observes, does not coincide with itself. A body in motion:

coincides with its own transition: its own variation. The range of variations it can be implicated in is not present in any given movement, much less in any position it passes through. In motion, a body is in an immediate, unfolding relation to its own non-present potential to vary. (4)

Being in movement, a body is never simply there. Movement emerges as a trajectory in space, or as an action executed, only after the fact and as the result of the changing relationships of the body to itself. In each discrete moment there is no trajectory, only transition.

Creating a theatre or dance performance, therefore, is to stage a constantly shifting set of relationships from which the performance emerges. More than, say, a painting or a written text, the propositions that make up a dance or performance point to the observation by Wittgenstein (referred to by Damisch quoted above) that propositions are like arrows and are meaningful in a way that is intimately connected to them having direction. And this directedness becomes meaningful only after the fact of any individual action, movement, or relational encounter. Massumi captures this temporal condition

in the term *backformation*. Reflecting on Zeno's paradox of the arrow, he writes:

A path is not composed of positions. It is nondecomposable: a dynamic unity. That *continuity* of movement is of an order of reality other than the measurable, divisible space it can be confirmed as having crossed. It does not stop until it stops: when it hits the target. Then, and only then, is the arrow in position. It is only after the arrow hits the mark that its real trajectory may be plotted. The points or positions really appear *retrospectively*, working backwards from the movement's end. (6)

Backformation describes how movement patterns emerge from bodies in constant transition, or how the clash between two characters emerges from how they (literally or figuratively) run into one another. Backformation is situated. It is the moment that social and cultural determination feed back into the process of emergence and become part of how the clash, or the trajectory of the arrow, emerges to a viewer. In that moment a grid of movements and relationships take shape in the perception and memory of the viewer. Such grids from past perceptions of movement take part in the emergence that crystallises in-between moving and perceiving. The movement currently being perceived always appears to us against grids of movements seen before, it is informed by our understanding of movement as part of our culturally specific modes of thinking, and it is determined by the perceptual cognitive capacities and skills which we enlist in order to engage with what is presented. Or, as Alva Noë puts it, speaking from the perspective of philosophy of mind: "The world shows up for us in experience only insofar as we understand, that is, know or anticipate it." (Noë 207: 121)

Play

Noë's assertion that the world shows up for us in experience only insofar as we understand it is not a reduction of experience to what can be decoded and thus known, but rather an expansion of what it means to know in terms of an embodied practice, of engaging with that which we find ourselves confronted with. Yet, if the world shows up for us in experience only insofar as we understand, that is, know

or anticipate it, this also raises a question, a very old philosophical question, namely, how can we perceive anything at all if we must already know it in order to perceive it?

Noë sets out to answer this question through Wittgenstein's idea of language games from 1953. According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of a word is in its use. He explains this by comparing language to a game. The meaning of language is not an isolated property of the words themselves, but depends on the larger context of the players using the words and the game within which they are used. Getting to know or understand language involves entering this game, playing along, and in so doing discovering the meaning of words through use. In playing along, we learn to understand the language in the sense that we learn to know how it is used and what it is used for. By participating in the game, our experience gets restructured as we learn to anticipate and respond to the address presented to us. Language games thus open up intellectual spaces for us. These spaces are not something that pre-exist in the moment of our entering them. Rather, they emerge through the very use of language, through the ways in which language makes modes of engagement and interaction possible (Noë 2007: 123–125).

Similarly, Noë argues, when we look at dance, we contemplate a situation into which we can enter, into which, actually, we are being invited to enter: “[W]hen we look at dance, we look at *a situation in which we can, into which we are invited, into which we need to enter.*” (Noë 2007: 125, italics in the text) This invitation is staged beautifully in William Forsythe's well known creation *Artifact* (1984), in which a character referred to as The Woman in the Historical Costume addresses the audience directly, saying “step inside” and “welcome to what you think you see.” Watching *Artifact*, spectators find themselves literally in the situation of being invited to enter the world on stage and engage with what is presented there. By verbalising the invitation to “step inside,” *Artifact* not only makes explicit the address that usually remains implicit and unspoken, but it also highlights the embodied character of the audience's engagement with the performance; it foregrounds the fact that perceiving is a process of world-making that involves various perceptual systems simultaneously.⁵ Just as language games open up intellectual spaces that emerge from our engagement with language, so too does dance invite us to enter spaces that appear for us as experience only through our

engagement with what is being presented. How these spaces show up will depend on our ability to engage, anticipate, and understand. Finally, *Artifact* stages this engagement as a playful encounter that disrupts expectations and challenges us to play along in a game that looks familiar in some ways, but is not necessarily played according to the rules we know, not unlike the game of chess that Alice in *Through the Looking Glass* finds herself engaged in, the rules of which are not quite what she thought them to be, but that have to be discovered while playing:

"Don't let us quarrel," the White Queen said in an anxious tone. "What is the cause of lightning?" "The cause of lightning," Alice said very decidedly, for she felt quite certain about this, "is the thunder – no, no!" she hastily corrected herself. "I meant the other way."

"It's too late to correct it," said the Red Queen; "when you've once said a thing, that fixes it, and you must take the consequences."

"Which reminds me" – the White Queen said, looking down and nervously clasping and unclasping her hands, "we had *such* a thunderstorm last Tuesday – I mean one of the last set of Tuesdays, you know."

Alice was puzzled. "In our country," she remarked, "there is only one day at a time."

The Red Queen said: "That's a poor thin way of doing things. Now *here*, we mostly have days and nights two or three at a time, and sometimes in the winter we take as many as five nights together – for warmth, you know."

"Are five nights warmer than one night, then?" Alice ventured to ask.

"Five times as warm, of course".

"But they should be five times as *cold*, by the same rule – "

"Just so!" cried the Red Queen. "Five times as warm, *and* five times as cold – just as I am five times as rich as you are, *and* five times as clever!"

Alice sighed and gave it up. "It's exactly like a riddle with no answer!" she thought. (Carroll 151)

Having travelled through the looking glass, Alice partakes in a game that takes place outside her usual frame of reference. Here, not only chess but reality itself is quite a different game. These differences confront Alice with the grid of intelligibility through which she is used to making sense of her experiences. Even though behind the looking glass, chess (and by extension reality) is not exactly played according to the rules as she knows them, these rules do provide Alice with a perspective on what is happening. They provide her with a position from which to interact with the situation. Similarly, *Artifact* confronts its audience with a performance reminiscent of a 19th century story ballet, albeit one in which the rules of the game have been twisted and turned in such a way as to confront us playfully with our habituated modes of engaging with the performance – modes which are conditioned by the conventions of ballet, the proscenium stage, and theatrical performance in general. As such, in *Artifact*, our familiarity with these conventions provides us with a point of entry, with a mode of relating; at the same time, this relationship is also the very thing being questioned and played with. *Artifact* makes use of the means of theatre in order to expose and challenge the propositions presented by more conventional performances, while at the same time taking us along a playful rethinking of those very means.

Artifact is constructed around words. The words are arranged in a diagram and printed in the program. In the performance, words are used as a tool for deconstructing language; the language of words and the multimedia language of the stage. In *Artifact*, this language of the stage is what is at stake. In the program, the words are accompanied by dictionary definitions, as if to ensure their meaning. In the performance, they are spoken by The Woman in the Historical Costume and a man in a suit. They use the words of *Artifact* to produce grammatically correct sentences, and they use these sentences in ways that suggest that the phrases are meant to make sense of what is happening on stage. The degree to which the words relate to what is seen on the stage, however, is often difficult to grasp. The characters explore various possible combinations of words, as given in the diagram, using them again and again in different orders, or repeating the same syntactical structure using different words. While reference becomes increasingly problematic, discourse on stage becomes deictic to the extreme. The performance thus seems to prove Benveniste's point (discussed before) that

deixis, and not reference, is essential for communication in language to take place. Although it is often hard to say what the words on stage refer to, the use of these linguistic signs does make sense as an address, an address that invites a response, even though it is not clear what is meant. Meaning and subjectivity come across through the play between me and you as positions produced: as a function of linguistic signs; by means of an address through visual signs; through the directing of hands and eyes; through the choreography of bodies in space; and through the constructions of perspective and point of view.⁶ *Artifact* thus presents a self-reflexive analysis of dance performance as a dynamic set of relationships, where what we think we see and hear on stage comes into being as a result of the interaction between the address presented by performance and the response of the audience. In *Artifact*, this address is made explicit in a witty way by The Woman in the Historical Costume, who challenges the audience to grasp the logic of the proposition presented by the performance by means of a complex multi-sensory engagement:

Good evening. Remember me? Now, try not to forget what you are seeing, and you will think what I hear. Try not to remember what I am doing and I will say what you thought. Try not to forget what you are hearing and you will see what I think. Try not to remember what I am saying and I will hear what you do. Try not to forget what you are doing and you will hear what you say. Try not to remember what I am seeing and I will see what you think. Do you see what I mean?

Notes

1. Bleeker (2003).
2. We might think here of the influential work of Alain Berthoz (among others, *The Brain's Sense of Movement*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), Brian Rotman (*Becoming besides Ourselves. The Alphabet, Ghosts, and Distributed Human Being*. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2008), Katherine Hayles (in, among others, *How We Think. Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis*, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 2012), Brian Massumi (*Parables for the Virtual. Movement, Affect, Sensation.*), and Alva Noë (*Action in Perception*), discussed later on in this text. In his first chapter, Noë presents an overview of the emergence of the enactive approach to perception.

3. Deleuze and Guattari present an extensive elaboration of art as a mode of thinking.
4. The text Damisch is referring to is Benveniste's *Problems in General Linguistics*. Benveniste makes his remark on the importance of deixis on page 230.
5. I take this notion of perceptual systems from J.J.Gibson. *The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems*. Throughout this book Gibson develops an approach to sensory perception in which the senses do not function separately but as perceptual systems. Understood this way, they are neither passive sensors, not channels of sensory quality, but ways of paying attention. Furthermore, understood as perceptual systems, they are not mutually exclusive or separate systems for hearing, seeing, smelling, touching. Instead, they interact in the constitution of a world that is visible, audible, and touchable at the same time. The proposal to conceive of the senses as perceptual systems is part of an understanding as an active process of engagement with the world, an idea that would be further developed in what would come to be known as the enactive approach to perception.
6. For a more extensive version of this analysis, see Bleeker, *Visuality in the Theatre*, chapter 2.

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