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Behind the ethnic–civic distinction: Public attitudes towards immigrants' political rights in the Netherlands

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A R T I C L E   I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Public opinion research has sought to distinguish between ethnic and civic conceptions of citizenship and examined the differential associations of these conceptions with policy preferences in the realm of immigration. What has not been examined empirically is why exactly these conceptions are related to people's preferences. In two survey studies conducted among national samples of native Dutch we tested the proposition that the endorsement of ethnic citizenship is related to lower acceptance of Muslim immigrant rights (Study 1) and their political participation (Study 2) because of a weaker normative sense of common national belonging and higher adherence to autochthony (primo-occupancy) beliefs. In contrast, the endorsement of civic citizenship was expected to be associated with higher acceptance of Muslim immigrant rights and their political participation because of a stronger sense of common belonging and lower belief in autochthony. The findings of the two studies are similar and in support of these expectations.

1. Introduction

The distinction between ethnic and civic citizenship is widely used in the literature to differentiate between policies and legislation of nation-states (e.g., Brubaker, 1992; Koning, 2011; Smith, 1991). Survey research in different national contexts has shown that these alternative conceptions and criteria of national belonging also emerge side by side as contrasting normative images among the public (e.g., Hjerm, 1998; Jones and Smith, 2001; Levanon and Lewin-Epstein, 2010; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010). Furthermore, there is quite some empirical evidence that an ethnic conception of nationhood has negative consequences for attitudes towards immigration and support for immigrant rights, whereas a civic conception often, but not always, tends to have more positive consequences (e.g., Hjerm, 1998; Reijerse et al., 2013; Wright et al., 2012). Yet, the precise underlying reasons explaining why the endorsement of ethnic and civic representations differently affect attitudes towards immigration issues remains rather general in current theoretical discussions and has, to our knowledge, not been examined empirically. Ethnic and civic representations define membership criteria that can stimulate the endorsement of specific normative beliefs that provide a justification for the acceptance or rejection of immigrants. The aim of the current research is to set a first step in the direction of finding out why exactly these association exist by considering two mediating constructs – common dual belonging and autochthony – in the relationship between the endorsement of ethnic and civic citizenship conceptions and the acceptance of immigrants' rights and their political participation.

In two survey studies conducted among national samples of native Dutch we tested the proposition that the endorsement of ethnic citizenship is related to lower acceptance of immigrant minority rights and their political participation because of a

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weaker sense of common dual belonging and higher adherence to autochthony beliefs. In contrast, the endorsement of civic citizenship was expected to be associated with higher acceptance of immigrant rights and political participation because of a stronger sense of common belonging and lower belief in autochthony.

2. Common dual belonging

A key question for understanding the public's subjective definition of nationhood is how the line is drawn between the national ingroup ('us') and outsiders ('them'). This boundary demarcates the limits to fellow-feeling and loyalty within a diverse society (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000; Theiss-Morse, 2009; Transue, 2007). All citizenship criteria define 'outsiders' but there are large differences in how inclusive ethnic and civic citizenship criteria are.

Ethnic citizenship defines the national group as a community of people of shared descent. In terms of the 'common ingroup identity model' (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000) this implies a one-group representation whereby there is a preference for cultural homogeneity and conformity to the native majority. The implication is that immigrants who do not have native majority ancestry cannot fulfill the ascribed, fixed citizenship criteria and therefore do not (fully) belong. In accordance with this, research has consistently found that an ethnic citizenship understanding is associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants, immigration policies, minority rights and multiculturalism (e.g., Kunovich, 2009; Pehrson et al., 2009; Reijerse et al., 2013; Wright, 2011; Wright et al., 2012).

In contrast, a civic representation emphasizes respect for the basic civic principles of society, which makes it relatively easy for immigrants to be included. In principle, anyone can belong provided that certain fundamental norms, rules and institutions are accepted. Within a civic representation there is the possibility of a normative sense of common dual belonging (Dovidio et al., 2007) whereby cultural differences are acknowledged and accepted in the context of a shared national identity. Although there are some exceptions (e.g., Kunovich, 2009; Schildkraut, 2007), research in the European and the US context has found that measures of civic understanding are associated with positive attitudes towards immigrants, minority rights and multiculturalism (e.g., Meeus et al., 2010; Reijerse et al., 2013; Wright et al., 2012).

Whereas ethnic citizenship is exclusionary towards immigrants, civic citizenship can be seen as more inclusive. In an ethnic perspective, cultural differences are believed to undermine a sense of national unity, whereas these differences are acceptable in a civic perspective. These different beliefs about unity and cultural diversity can be assumed to underlie the relations between citizenship conceptions and the acceptance of immigrant rights and their political participation. The endorsement of an ethnic conceptualization can be expected to be associated with a lower normative sense of common dual belonging and therefore with lower acceptance of immigrant rights and their political participation. In contrast, the endorsement of a civic representation can be expected to be associated with a higher sense of common dual belonging and via belonging with higher acceptance of rights and political participation.

3. Autochthony

In anthropology the term autochthony is used for the belief that a place belongs to those who 'are from the soil' and therefore are entitled to it (Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005; Geschiere, 2009). This relates to ethnic nationhood in which the principle of territory is added to that of lineage which is central in ethnicity (Weber, 1968). Thus, while ethnicity and ethnic nationhood share an emphasis on common ancestry they differ in the fact that the latter implies territorial claims. For many people, nationhood is about homeland and being able to decide about homeland affairs. The term autochthony literally means being 'born from the soil', and 'the link with the land, central to the notion of autochthony, gives it a strong territorializing capacity, outlining – in a more or less symbolic way – a clearly defined "home"' (Geschiere, 2009, p. 29). Autochthony typically involves the claim of primo-occupancy with the related sense of ownership and entitlements, including the right to protection against newcomers: it has an 'implicit call for excluding strangers' ("allochthons"), whoever they may be' (Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005, p. 386).

In political theory the term 'historical right' refers to the right to a piece of land because of first occupancy (Gans, 2001; Murphy, 1990), and autochthony is a strong justification for territorial and nationalist sovereignty claims and a core issue in violent conflicts and war (Toft, 2014). Autochthony claims are also used to exclude newcomers and to justify prejudice towards immigrant-origin groups in Western Europe. The past 20 years have witnessed an upsurge of autochthony in countries, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Denmark (Ceuppens, 2011; Geschiere, 2009). Autochthony has become a key notion in discussions about immigration and minority rights among the far right and also for middle-of-the-road parties. In these countries arguments about primo-occupancy are increasingly evoked to exclude immigrants from full participation in the receiving society. Survey and experimental research has shown how autochthony is related to and causes opposition towards minority rights (Smeekes et al., 2014) and ethnic prejudice (Martinovic et al., 2015). The notion of autochthony is particularly salient in the Netherlands where it was introduced as a policy term in the 1980s.

Autochthony differs from ethnic conceptions of belonging that can be independent of territorial borders, as for example among the Roma or other nomadic people. Whereas ethnicity concerns belonging in terms of common origin and blood ties, autochthony and the related sense of ownership and entitlements define belonging as being historically rooted in place (Geschiere, 2009). Yet, we propose that an appeal to autochthony is particularly likely among people who endorse an ethnic conception of citizenship. Those who consider national belonging in terms of ancestry and blood are more likely to agree

with the notion of ownership based on primo-occupancy and the related entitlements. Thus, we expected that higher support for ethnic citizenship is related to stronger endorsement of autochthony and thereby to lower acceptance of immigrant rights and immigrants' political participation. In contrast, the voluntaristic, universalistic and liberal nature of civic citizenship goes against ownership claims based on historical notions of first arrival. This leads to the expectation that because of lower endorsement of autochthony, higher support for civic citizenship is associated with more acceptance of immigrant rights and political participation.

4. Overview of the research

The predictions were tested in two studies using national samples of native Dutch participants. In both studies we first expected that an empirical distinction between people's endorsement of ethnic and civic citizenship can be made. Factor analytical explorations of measures tapping this distinction have demonstrated the existence of two latent dimensions that are negatively correlated (Jones and Smith, 2001; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010; Reijerse et al., 2013). We expected a similar two-dimensional structure and negative association in our samples of native Dutch. Second, we predicted that ethnic citizenship will be associated with lower acceptance of immigrant rights and immigrant's political participation through a lower sense of common dual belonging and higher adherence to autochthony beliefs. In contrast, civic citizenship was expected to be associated to higher acceptance of rights and political participation through higher sense of common dual identity and lower adherence to autochthony.

In both studies we focused on Muslim immigrants who are at the heart of the current European debates on immigration and immigrants, particularly in relation to minority rights and immigrant political action (Aspinall and Song, 2013; Just et al., 2014). In the Netherlands, almost all Muslims are non-natives and predominantly of Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese origin but the public debate focuses on the overarching category of Muslims (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007). In Study 1 we examined native Dutch acceptance of expressive rights of Muslim immigrants (e.g., wearing a headscarf, building Mosques) and in Study 2 the focus was on acceptance of Muslims having a voice by organizing themselves and participating politically. We tested the expected association while taking the roles of national attachment, political orientation, and gender, age and education into account.

5. Study 1

In the first study we examined the relation between, on the one hand, ethnic and civic conceptions of nationhood, and on the other hand, support for Muslim expressive rights. Endorsement of an ethnic conception was expected to be related to less support for Muslim rights, whereas endorsement of a more civic conception was expected to relate positively to support for Muslim rights. Further, we hypothesized that these relationships could be explained by autochthony beliefs and a sense of belonging to a common, overarching group.

5.1. Data, method and measures

5.1.1. Data and participants
Participants for Study 1 (N = 469) were recruited in 2011 from a pool of adult native Dutch population.[1] The sample is representative for the population in terms of age, gender, education, household size and region of residence. Participants were drawn by a research consultancy company (TNS-NIPO), which maintains a database of Dutch people who are willing to take part in surveys. The questionnaire was distributed online. The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 88 years (M = 50.21, SD = 17.02), and 48% was female.

5.1.2. Measures
Unless mentioned otherwise, the items were measured on a scale ranging from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 7 (*completely agree*).

The method commonly used for measuring the normative content of national identity is to ask respondents to rate or rank a set of traits in terms of their (relative) importance for making someone a 'true' national. Yet, the battery of traits used for capturing the distinction between ethnic and civic citizenship is often problematic because traits such as language and religion can appear to have ethnic connotations but this does not have to be the case, particularly not in specific national contexts (Wright, 2011). In our research, we measured the endorsement of ethnic and civic representation by asking participants to indicate the importance of explicit statements about what makes someone a Dutch national (e.g., Wakefield et al., 2011). For *ethnic citizenship* the two items were: 'A real Dutch person is someone who is of Dutch origin', and 'A real Dutch person has Dutch ancestors' (r = .89). *Civic citizenship* was captured by the following two statements: 'Anyone who legally resides in the Netherlands is a real Dutch person', and 'A real Dutch person is anyone in possession of a Dutch passport' (r = .72).

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[1] Subsets of the datasets used in Study 1 and Study 2 have been used in other studies (Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2013; Verkuyten et al., 2014). Some of these studies have used the same measures of autochthony and common dual belonging, but none of these previous studies have examined the current associations and the acceptance of Muslim rights and their political participation. The data are stored in the safe data storing facility of the Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences at Utrecht University and are available upon request.

The first mediator *autochthony* referred to the normative idea of first comers "owning" the country more and being more entitled to decide on important national matters. It was captured by four questions developed by Martinovic and Verkuyten (2013). Sample items are 'Every country belongs to its original inhabitants' and '"We were here first" is an important principle for determining who decides on what happens in a country' (α = .94).

The second mediator *common dual belonging* was assessed with three items that emphasize national belonging in which both unity and subgroup cultural diversity are highlighted and cherished (Gaertner et al., 1994): 'Even though the Netherlands is a culturally diverse society, I have the feeling we all belong to one community', 'In spite of the cultural differences, all groups together make up Dutch society', and 'Despite all the differences, I often have the feeling that we are one country and that we work together' (α = .90).

The dependent variable *Muslim expressive rights* was measured with six items, used in previous Dutch studies (e.g., Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2014; Verkuyten and Yildiz, 2010), that assess support for Muslims to publicly express and confirm their identity. The items were: 'Muslim women in the Netherlands should have the right to wear a headscarf', 'Muslims in the Netherlands should have the right to found Islamic schools', 'Muslims in the Netherlands should have the right to build mosques', Muslims in the Netherlands should have the right to express and experience their religion in public life', 'Muslims in the Netherlands should have the right to celebrate their Islamic holidays in public', and 'On Dutch television there should be more programs of and for Muslims' (α = .91).

To account for the influence of possibly confounding constructs, we controlled for a number of established correlates of national identity and support for minority rights. In the political science literature there is some consensus that the content of national identity (criteria for belonging and values and beliefs) is related but distinctive from the affective sense of national belonging (see Schildkraut, 2014). To take this into account *national attachment* was assessed with four items commonly used to measure people's sense of national identification, e.g. 'I identify strongly as Dutch', 'Being Dutch is an important part of my identity' (α = .94). The well-known *political self-placement* scale (see Jost, 2006) was used for assessing participant's political orientation. On a 5-point scale ranging from far-left to far-right, 27.7% of the participants located themselves at the political left, 43.3% in the middle, and 29% at the right. We also controlled for gender, age, and education (an 8-point scale ranging from primary to the postgraduate level). The correlations, mean scores, and standard deviations for the main constructs are shown in Table 1. In general, the support for Muslim rights is significantly below the neutral mid-point of the scale, $t(468) = -4.45$, $p < .001$, and the endorsement of ethnic citizenship is stronger than of civic citizenship, $t(468) = 7.51$, $p < .001$. All correlations are significant and in the expected directions with a low negative association between ethnic and civic citizenship.

5.2. Results

5.2.1. Measurement model

We ran a confirmatory factor analysis in Mplus (version 7) and found that the items for ethnic and civic citizenship, autochthony, common dual belonging, national attachment, and acceptance of Muslim expressive rights, could all be separated empirically. A model with six latent factors was a good match to the data, $\chi^2(174) = 365.22$, $p < .001$, CFI = .976, TLI = .971, RMSEA = .048 (low = .041, high = .055).

Importantly, we confirmed that ethnic and civic conceptions represent two distinct constructs; a measurement model in which the four items measuring these constructs were forced to load on a common latent factor had a significantly worse fit than the original model, $\chi^2(179) = 778.36$, $p < .001$, CFI = .925, TLI = .912, RMSEA = .084 (low = .078, high = .090), as demonstrated by a significant chi-square difference test, $\Delta\chi^2 = 413.14$, $\Delta df = 5$, $p < .001$. Furthermore, we also verified that the two mediators – autochthony and common dual belonging – are empirically distinct. Forcing these items to load on a common factor resulted in a worse fit, $\chi^2(179) = 1189.28$, $p < .001$, CFI = .874, TLI = .852, RMSEA = .109 (low = .103, high = .115). The chi-square difference test was significant, $\Delta\chi^2 = 824.06$, $\Delta df = 5$, $p < .001$. Next, we tested whether autochthony and ethnic conception of nationhood are separate constructs, and whether common belonging and civic conception can be empirically distinguished. This was the case, as both the model that combined autochthony and ethnic conception ($\chi^2(179) = 957.50$, $p < .001$, CFI = .903, TLI = .886, RMSEA = .096 (low = .090, high = .102), $\Delta\chi^2 = 592.28$, $\Delta df = 5$, $p < .001$) and the model that combined common belonging and civic conception ($\chi^2(179) = 675.36$, $p < .001$, CFI = .938, TLI = .927, RMSEA = .077 (low = .071, high = .083), $\Delta\chi^2 = 310.14$, $\Delta df = 5$, $p < .001$) fitted the data much worse than the originally proposed six factor model. Lastly, we wanted to ensure that the two conceptions of citizenship are not measuring national attachment. Combining national attachment with either ethnic citizenship, $\chi^2(179) = 1162.49$, $p < .001$, CFI = .877, TLI = .856, RMSEA = .108 (low = .102, high = .114), or civic citizenship, $\chi^2(179) = 788.79$, $p < .001$, CFI = .924, TLI = .911, RMSEA = .085 (low = .079, high = .091), yielded a significantly worse fit.

5.2.2. Structural relations

Based on the measurement model we could confidently proceed with estimating a structural model for Muslim expressive rights that consists of two main independent variables and two distinct mediators, and that additionally controls for national attachment, age, gender, education and political orientation[2] in relation to the dependent variable and the two

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[2] The data used in this study come from a larger survey that included an (unrelated) experiment that was administered in one version of the questionnaire but not in the other. To ensure that this experimental manipulation did not interfere with the findings, we also controlled for the version of the questionnaire in the analysis.

Table 1
Correlations, means, and standard deviations of the main constructs. Study 1.

	1.	2.	3.	4.	Mean	SD
1. Support for Muslim rights					3.71	1.41
2. Ethnic citizenship	−.44[***]				4.64	1.66
3. Civic citizenship	.37[***]	−.13[**]			3.83	1.44
4. Autochthony	−.53[***]	.58[***]	−.28[***]		4.45	1.43
5. Common dual belonging	.61[***]	−.36[***]	.34[***]	−.42[***]	4.12	1.43

Note: All the variables are measured on a 7-point scale.
[**] $p < .01$.
[***] $p < .001$.

mediators. To test the mediation hypotheses we specified indirect paths from ethnic citizenship to acceptance of Muslim expressive rights via autochthony and common dual belonging. The same two indirect paths were also specified for civic citizenship. Following Preacher and Hayes (2008) we used bootstrapping with 1000 samples to obtain 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effects. A confidence interval that does not include zero is considered evidence for an indirect effect.

The structural model (see Fig. 1) fitted the data well, $\chi^2(264) = 552.23$, $p < .001$, *CFI* = .946, *TLI* = .957, *RMSEA* = .048 (low = .043, high = .054). The structural relationships were all in line with our expectations. Endorsing ethnic citizenship is positively related to autochthony and negatively to common dual belonging, whereas exactly the opposite pattern holds for civic citizenship. Furthermore, autochthony is negatively, and common dual belonging positively, related to acceptance of Muslim expressive rights.

Importantly, our hypotheses about mediation were confirmed. The indirect effect of ethnic citizenship on Muslim rights via autochthony was negative and significant, $\beta = -.114$, $t = -4.16$, $p < .001$ (lower CI = .−166, higher CI = −.063), and so was the indirect effect via common dual belonging, $\beta = -.128$, $t = -4.36$, $p < .001$ (lower CI = −.183, higher CI = −.073). In contrast, the indirect effect of civic citizenship was significant and positive both via autochthony, $\beta = .042$, $t = 2.80$, $p < .01$ (lower CI = .011, higher CI = .073), and via common dual belonging, $\beta = .131$, $t = 3.92$, $p < .001$ (lower CI = .073, higher CI = .189). The relationship between ethnic citizenship and Muslim rights, that was significant in a model without the mediators, $\beta = -.283$, $t = -5.20$, $p < .001$, is not significant in the mediation model, $\beta = -.073$, $t = -1.27$, $p > .10$, while the effect of civic citizenship, $\beta = .327$, $t = 7.50$, $p < .001$, became weaker but remained significant, $\beta = .150$, $t = 3.08$, $p = .002$, indicating full and partial mediation, respectively.[3]

5.2.3. Alternative models

We reversed the positions of the independent variables and the mediators to test whether there is empirical support for these alternative paths. The fit of the reversed model, with ethnic and civic conceptions mediating the associations of autochthony and common belonging with acceptance of Muslim expressive rights, was significantly worse: $\chi^2(264) = 586.41$, $p < .001$, $\Delta\chi^2 = 34.18$, $\Delta df = 0$, $p < .001$. The indirect effects from autochthony were both not significant, $ps > .10$. The indirect effect from common dual belonging via ethnic citizenship was also not significant, $\beta = .012$, $t = 1.26$, $p > .10$, because ethnic citizenship was not related to Muslim rights in this model, $\beta = -.076$, $t = -1.32$, $p > .10$. We only found a significant indirect path from common dual belonging via civic citizenship to Muslim rights, $\beta = .053$, $t = 2.82$, $p = .005$, but this effect was weaker than the reverse one. Altogether, there is stronger support for the originally proposed causal model.

Using a national sample of Dutch adults, we found that the endorsement of ethnic and civic conceptions of citizenship could be distinguished empirically and were negatively and weakly correlated. Further, we demonstrated that endorsement of ethnic criteria for determining national belonging is related to a lower acceptance of Muslim expressive rights, via a stronger sense of autochthony and a weaker sense of common dual belonging. In contrast, the more people rely on civic criteria for determining national belonging, the more they are in favor of granting expressive rights to Muslims, and this is because civic citizenship is related to a weaker advocacy of autochthony and stronger feelings of shared national belonging despite cultural group differences.

6. Study 2

The first aim of Study 2 was to replicate the findings of Study 1 in order to respond to major concerns about the lack of replication. These concerns have been raised in political science for already quite some time (King, 1995), and other social

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[3] Regarding the control variables, only higher educated participants supported Muslim expressive rights more, $\beta = .206$, $t = 4.94$, $p < .001$. Women and men did not differ, $\beta = .042$, $t = 1.14$, $p > .10$, and neither age differences nor political orientation differences were detected, $\beta = .059$, $t = 1.46$, $p > .10$ and $\beta = -.069$, $t = -1.86$, $p = .063$, respectively. Furthermore, right wing political orientation was associated with a stronger advocacy of autochthony, $\beta = .162$, $t = 4.23$, $p < .001$, and so was national attachment, $\beta = .106$, $t = 2.31$, $p = .021$. Older and higher educated participants showed lower autochthony belief, $\beta = -.144$, $t = -3.69$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = -.098$, $t = -2.32$, $p = .020$, respectively. Finally, higher educated participants perceived more common dual belonging, $\beta = .116$, $t = 2.42$, $p = .015$, and right wing political orientation was related to less common dual belonging, $\beta = -.208$, $t = -4.51$, $p < .001$.

Fig. 1. Common dual belonging and autochthony as separate mediators between the endorsement of ethnic and civic citizenship and support for Muslim expressive rights, Study 1. *Note*: Standardized coefficients presented; the correlations between the two mediators ($\beta = -.182$, $t = -3.14$, $p = .002$) and the two independent variables ($\beta = -.165$, $t = -2.78$, $p = .005$) were taken into account; ***$p < .001$, **$p < .01$.

and behavioral sciences also recognize the importance of replication studies that can improve precision and test robustness (Makel et al., 2012; Simons, 2014).

Furthermore, we tested the same propositions as in Study 1, but this time in relation to a more demanding outcome – support for normative political organization of Islam. The Netherlands has a great many political parties, thirteen of which are currently represented in the Parliament. Voters can choose from a range of parties that fit their beliefs and political orientation, including several small Christian parties and one-issue parties (e.g., 'Party for the Elderly', and 'Party for Animals'). These parties represent specific sections of the population and try to achieve their goals within the existing political system. In the municipality elections of March 2014 Islamic parties also participated in the ballots and tried to secure Muslim representation in local governments. Three of these Islamic parties won several seats in the cities of Rotterdam and The Hague and they provide a political voice to Muslim immigrants. Politics is about power and influence and the native Dutch tend be rather resistant to the idea of losing part of their power to Muslim political organizations and parties (Hindriks et al., 2015).

In Study 2, endorsement of ethnic citizenship was expected to be related to less, and endorsement of civic citizenship to more, support for normative political organization of Muslims. Again we hypothesized that these relationships could be explained by autochthony beliefs and a sense of common dual belonging.

6.1. Data, method and measures

6.1.1. Data and participants

In 2012 we recruited a new group of native Dutch participants for Study 2 ($N = 801$), using again the database maintained by TNS-NIPO. People who participated in Study 1 were not invited to participate in Study 2, thereby yielding two independent samples. The sample used in this study again reflected the adult native population in terms of age, gender, education, household size and the region of residence. The participants were between 18 and 87 years old ($M = 50.71$, $SD = 17.19$), and 50% was female. They completed an online version of the questionnaire.

6.1.2. Measures

Unless mentioned otherwise, the items were measured on a scale ranging from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 7 (*completely agree*).

Ethnic ($r = .86$) and civic ($r = .70$) *conceptions of citizenship* were each measured with the same two items as in Study 1. Autochthony was also measured using the same four items from Study 1 ($\alpha = .92$), and so was common belonging ($\alpha = .90$).

The dependent variable in this study is support for *political organization of Islam*. It was measured using three items, employed previously in Dutch studies on Muslims' political participation (e.g., Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2014; Verkuyten and Yildiz, 2010). The items were: 'It is important that an Islamic political party is established for Muslims in the Netherlands', 'Muslims have to start to work together in order to gain political influence in the Netherlands', and 'Islam must have a voice in political issues, just like other religions'. The items formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .85$).

We again controlled for *national attachment* (the same four items as in Study 1, $\alpha = .93$), *political self-placement* (a 5-point scale), gender, age, and education (an 8-point scale ranging from primary to the postgraduate level). The descriptive statistics for the core constructs are presented in Table 2. In general, the acceptance of political organization of Muslims is relatively

low, $t(800) = -21.10$, $p < .001$, and lower than the acceptance of Muslim expressive rights in Study 1. The endorsement of ethnic citizenship is again stronger than that of civic citizenship, $t(800) = 4.10$, $p < .001$. All correlations are significant, go in the expected directions and resemble those of Study 1. It should be noted that we again found a relatively low negative association between ethnic and civic citizenship.

6.2. Results

6.2.1. Measurement model

A confirmatory factor analysis in Mplus (version 7) verified that the proposed 6-factor structure – distinguishing between ethnic and civic citizenship, autochthony, common dual belonging, national attachment, and support for politically organized Islam adequately represents the data, $\chi^2(120) = 289.89$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .984$, $TLI = .980$, $RMSEA = .042$ (low = .036, high = .048). Moreover, this model had a better fit than the model that combined the items for civic and ethnic conceptions into one factor, $\chi^2(125) = 866.87$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .931$, $TLI = .916$, $RMSEA = .086$ (low = .080, high = .091), as demonstrated by a significant chi-square difference test, $\Delta\chi^2 = 576.98$, $\Delta df = 5$, $p < .001$. Furthermore, forcing autochthony and ethnic conception ($\chi^2(125) = 1198.55$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .909$, $TLI = .889$, $RMSEA = .099$ (low = .093, high = .104), $\Delta\chi^2 = 908.66$, $\Delta df = 5$, $p < .001$) or common belonging and civic conception ($\chi^2(125) = 755.39$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .942$, $TLI = .929$, $RMSEA = .079$ (low = .074, high = .084), $\Delta\chi^2 = 465.50$, $\Delta df = 5$, $p < .001$) to load on one factor resulted in significantly poorer model fits. Lastly, combining ethnic or civic citizenship with national attachment also worsens the model fit, respectively, $\chi^2(125) = 1527.76$, $p < .001$, $\Delta\chi^2 = 1237.87$, $\Delta df = 5$, $p < .001$, and $\chi^2(125) = 955.92$, $p < .001$, $\Delta\chi^2 = 666.03$, $\Delta df = 5$, $p < .001$, indicating that these are all separate constructs.

6.2.2. Structural relations

We proceeded estimating a structural model in which we regressed normative political organization of Islam on autochthony, common dual belonging, and ethnic and civic citizenship. Autochthony and common belonging were, in turn, also regressed on the two representations of nationhood. Controls for national attachment, age, gender, education and political orientation were added in relation to the dependent variable and the two mediators. Just like in Study 1, we specified indirect paths from ethnic and civic citizenship to political organization of Islam via autochthony and common dual belonging, and we used bootstrapping with 1000 replacement samples to estimate the indirect effects (Preacher and Hayes, 2008).

The structural model (see Fig. 2) had a good fit, $\chi^2(180) = 581.75$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .964$, $TLI = .954$, $RMSEA = .053$ (low = .048, high = .058). We found support for the hypothesized relationships. Ethnic citizenship was positively and civic citizenship negatively related to autochthony. Furthermore, the former was negatively and the latter positively related to common dual belonging. In turn, the association between autochthony and support for political organization of Islam was negative, and that between common belonging and political Islam positive.

We again found evidence for the predicted mediation paths. The indirect effect of ethnic citizenship on political organization of Islam via autochthony was negative and significant, $\beta = -.139$, $t = -4.65$, $p < .001$ (lower CI = .−195, higher CI = −.082), and so was the indirect effect via common belonging, $\beta = -.090$, $t = -4.32$, $p < .001$ (lower CI = −.130, higher CI = −.050). At the same time, the indirect effect of civic citizenship was significant and positive both via autochthony, $\beta = .061$, $t = 3.71$, $p < .001$ (lower CI = .028, higher CI = .094), and via common dual belonging, $\beta = .131$, $t = 5.38$, $p < .001$ (lower CI = .085, higher CI = .176). The direct effects of ethnic and civic conceptions that were significant in a model without the mediators ($\beta = -.239$, $t = -5.74$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = .176$, $t = 4.25$, $p < .001$) are not significant anymore ($\beta = -.011$, $t = -0.23$, $p > .10$ and $\beta = -.012$, $t = -0.27$, $p > .10$), indicating full mediation. This is in contrast to Study 1 where a direct effect of civic citizenship remained.[4]

6.2.3. Alternative models

The fit of the reversed model, with ethnic and civic conceptions mediating the associations of autochthony and common belonging with support for the political organization of Muslims, was significantly worse: $\chi^2(180) = 625.14$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .960$, $TLI = .949$, $RMSEA = .056$ (low = .051, high = .060); chi-square difference test was significant, $\Delta\chi^2 = 335.25$, $\Delta df = 0$, $p < .001$. Importantly, indirect paths were all not significant, $ps > .10$. This is because ethnic and civic conceptions were not related to support for political organization of Islam in this model, $\beta = -.011$, $t = -.24$, $p > .10$ and $\beta = -.012$, $t = -0.26$, $p > .10$. Moreover, common belonging and ethnic citizenship were also not related to each other, $\beta = -.058$, $t = -1.40$, $p > .10$. Again, we found more support for the proposed causal model.

Using another national sample of native Dutch adults and examining their acceptance of Muslim immigrants having their own organized political voice, we replicated the findings from Study 1. Our results show that the more people understand

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[4] None of the control variables was significantly directly related to support for the normative political organization and participation of Muslims: $ps > .10$. In contrast, all the control variables were related to autochthony. Strong Dutch identifiers were more in favor of autochthony, $\beta = .184$, $t = 4.54$, $p < .001$. Women endorsed autochthony less, $\beta = -.063$, $t = -2.10$, $p = .035$, and so did older and higher educated participants, $\beta = -.107$, $t = -3.63$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = -.121$, $t = -3.82$, $p < .001$. Right wing political orientation was associated with a stronger advocacy of autochthony, $\beta = .100$, $t = 2.98$, $p = .003$, and so was strong national attachment, $\beta = .184$, $t = 4.54$, $p < .001$. Furthermore, higher educated participants perceived more common belonging, $\beta = .212$, $t = 5.52$, $p < .001$, and right wing political orientation was related to less common belonging, $\beta = -.160$, $t = -4.00$, $p < .001$.

Table 2
Correlations, means, and standard deviations of the main constructs. Study 2.

	1.	2.	3.	4.	Mean	SD
1. Political organization of Islam					2.99	1.35
2. Ethnic citizenship	−.36***				4.32	1.75
3. Civic citizenship	.29***	−.28***			3.95	1.44
4. Autochthony	−.55***	.56***	−.36***		4.04	1.47
5. Common dual belonging	.56***	−.37***	.38***	−.54***	4.16	1.51

Note: All the variables are measured on a 7-point scale.
*** $p < .001$.

Fig. 2. Common dual belonging and autochthony as separate mediators between the endorsement of ethnic and civic citizenship and support for normative political organization and participation of Muslims, Study 2. *Note*: Standardized coefficients presented; the correlations between the two mediators ($\beta = -.362$, $t = -6.44$, $p < .001$) and the two independent variables ($\beta = -.318$, $t = -6.62$, $p < .001$) were taken into account; ***$p < .001$.

and define national belonging in ethnic terms, the more they oppose the idea of Muslims participating in politics as Muslims. This is because an ethnic conception of citizenship is associated with a stronger claim of ownership (autochthony) and a weaker sense of common dual belonging. In parallel, defining national belonging in more inclusive, civic terms is related to more willingness to accept Muslim having a voice by organizing politically. An explanation is that a civic understanding of citizenship subdues natives' autochthonous claims and fosters a sense of belonging to an overarching national community that recognizes and values subgroup differences.

7. General discussion and conclusions

A number of studies in different countries have demonstrated that ethnic and civic conceptions of national belonging exist side by side as two contrasting images in public opinion (Hjerm, 1998; Jones and Smith, 2001; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010; Reijerse et al., 2013). Furthermore, these two conceptions have different implications for policy preferences in the realm of immigration, particularly when immigrants are ethnically and religiously distinct from the native population, as with Muslim immigrants in Western Europe. The endorsement of ethnic citizenship has exclusionist implications for immigrants because it uses ancestry as a boundary criteria for national belonging and goes together with a preference for cultural homogeneity and conformity. In contrast, from the perspective of a civic representation, cultural differences are acceptable and equal rights for immigrants and their participation in society are encouraged.

What this body of work has not examined empirically, are the underlying subjective beliefs explaining how and why ethnic and civic conceptions differently affect attitudes towards immigrant policies. We tried to take a first step in this direction by considering common dual belonging and autochthony beliefs as two possible mediating constructs in the relation between the endorsement of ethnic and civic citizenship and the acceptance of Muslim immigrants' expressive rights and their normative political organization and participation. Our key assumption was that people's understanding of what it takes to be a member of the nation – ethnic or civic criteria – shapes whether they accept cultural diversity within national unity (common dual belonging) and whether they believe that primo-occupants are entitled to make important decisions and 'run' the country (autochthony). We tested this by considering people's acceptance of expressive rights of Muslim immigrants (Study 1) and their support for Muslims having a voice by politically organizing themselves (Study 2).

The findings of our two studies are similar and demonstrate that in the Dutch context an empirical distinction between ethnic and civic citizenship can be made, and that, although these are negatively correlated, the association is not very strong. This indicates that ethnic and civic citizenship understandings are not mutually exclusive but rather relatively independent ways of thinking about national belonging (Brubaker, 2004). Furthermore and in both studies, these understandings were found to be empirically distinctive from the sense of common dual belonging and autochthony. These results allowed us to examine the relevance of each conception for native majority's acceptance of Muslim expressive rights and their political organization. Similar to previous research, ethnic citizenship was associated with lower acceptance of Muslim rights and their normative political participation, whereas civic citizenship was related to higher acceptance. More importantly in both studies it was found that these associations were explained by the endorsement of common dual belonging and autochthony beliefs. The more people emphasized ethnic criteria for national belonging the less they supported a dual sense of common belonging that recognizes cultural diversity, and the more they adhered to the idea of primo-occupants owning the country more and therefore having the right to decide. In contrast, the more people emphasized civic criteria the less they supported common dual belonging and autochthony. In turn, common dual belonging was associated with higher acceptance of Muslims' expressive rights and political organization, and autochthony was associated with lower acceptance.

In both studies ethnic citizenship was more strongly related to autochthony than to common dual belonging and the effects of ethnic citizenship were fully mediated. This indicates that the principle of descent of ethnic nationhood tends to combine blood and soil. Ethnic nationhood describes a belief in boundaries based on ancestry which goes together with a claim of original land ownership (Geschiere, 2009). Ethnic citizenship appears to have exclusivist implications for immigrant-origin groups because of its emphasis on cultural homogeneity, but in particular because it triggers the belief that primo-occupants own the land and therefore can protect themselves against newcomers. In both studies, civic citizenship was more strongly associated with common dual belonging than with autochthony. In contrast to the historical focus of ethnicity, a civic representation defines a current community of people who adhere to a social contract: a contract that in principle is open to anyone who wishes to commit him/herself, irrespective of cultural, religious or ethnic background.

There are several limitations of the present work that offer opportunities for future research. First, we focused on people's attitudes towards Muslim immigrants in the context of the Netherlands. This makes it important to examine the associations for other immigrant groups and in other national contexts. Countries differ in many ways, such as in their political institutions, migration and integration policies, and formal boundaries for national membership (Citrin et al., 2014; Koopmans, 2013; Wright, 2011). These differences might be important for understanding the role of common dual belonging and autochthony in the relation between citizenship understandings and attitudes towards policies for immigrant-origin groups. For example, autochthony beliefs might be important in non-settler West European countries that have a large native majority population and a relatively short history of mass immigration. Yet, in immigration countries like the US, Canada and Australia autochthonous beliefs might be less pronounced and also less used as a justification for denying political rights to minorities (but see Martinovic et al., 2015). This would mean that ethnic nationhood that defines the criteria of group membership does not have to include the entitlement claim of primo-occupancy. Similarly the connection between civic nationhood and common dual belonging that we found does not have to exist in for example France where the Republic model tries to transcend cultural group differences and emphasizes individual citizens. Thus, the criteria for defining citizenship might be linked to different justifying beliefs in different countries.

Another limitation is that our correlational data preclude causal interpretations. Nevertheless, the analyses represented a valid and stringent test of the hypothesized processes that had theoretical rationales. Furthermore, the indirect effects for reversed mediation were in general not significant and the fit of the reversed causal model was much worse than of the originally model proposed. These findings do not, of course, provide evidence for causality but do suggest that the causal directions tested are reasonable and likely. Moreover, there is experimental evidence for the positive effects of common dual belonging (Gonzalez and Brown, 2003) and of autochthony (Martinovic et al., 2015) on the acceptance of immigrant's rights and prejudicial attitudes more generally. Yet, future studies should examine these processes further using experimental or longitudinal designs (e.g., Wright, 2011). In doing so, it might be useful to not only examine people's attitudes towards Muslim rights but also towards immigration and multiculturalism more generally. We have no clear reasons to expect that the current findings would not apply to the broader question of immigration and cultural diversity but it could be examined whether the relatively strong West European debate about Muslim immigrants is important.

Additionally, although we found evidence for full mediation there might be other subjective processes that are involved in the relation between citizenship understandings and the acceptance of rights and political participation of immigrant-origin groups. An example might be feelings of sociotropic threat because of the cultural impact that immigrants have on the nation and that are strongly related to immigration attitudes in the US, Canada and Western Europe (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Those who have an ethnic understanding of citizenship might be more concerned about collective cultural threats and therefore less supportive of immigrant expressive rights and political participation. It also would be interesting to not only study ethnic and civic understandings of citizenship but also cultural citizenship in which the emphasis is on national cultural values and traits. Research in six EU countries has shown that the latter is a separate dimension that is positively associated with ethnic citizenship but has an independent and stronger effect on anti-immigrant attitudes (Reijerse et al., 2013). Furthermore, we have focused on ethnic and civic citizenship as alternative criteria of national belonging but it is also possible to examine conceptions of national attachment such as patriotism and chauvinism. It has been demonstrated, for example, that patriotism is positively related to the willingness to endorse citizenship rights to immigrants in general. In contrast, chauvinist feel more threatened by immigrants and therefore reject such rights more strongly (Raijman et al.,

2008). Ethnic citizenship and national chauvinism as well as civic citizenship and patriotism, are likely to be related. This could mean that not only feelings of threat but also autochthony beliefs and perceptions of common dual belonging are involved in the relation between national attachments and people's willingness to support the rights of immigrants. This suggests an interesting avenue for future research on the differences and consequences of patriotic and chauvinistic sentiments.

In conclusion, the present research has tried to take the first steps in the direction of understanding why precisely ethnic and civic conceptions of citizenship are related to anti-immigrant attitudes. In two studies with national samples and for two political outcome measures, we found evidence that the endorsement of ethnic and civic citizenship are related to the acceptance of immigrants' rights and political participation, via a sense of common national belonging and adherence to autochthony belief. The present research provides a systematic and theoretical starting point for investigating these processes further using, for example, experimental or longitudinal designs. A deeper understanding of these processes can provide suggestions and guidelines for interventions that aim to improve the acceptance of immigrant groups without undermining social solidarity and civil peace that result from an inclusive conception of nationality.

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