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Islam and the European Empires

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Anti-Imperialism and the Pan-Islamic Movement

Umar Ryad

INTRODUCTION

Much has been written about the role of pan-Islamism in confronting the European empires in the colonial era. In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, this political ideology fueled an international movement that denounced the deterioration of the Muslim world in general, and of the Ottoman empire in particular. Muslim reformers associated with it were confronted with a twofold challenge—namely the yoke of European colonialism and the perceived Muslim decline itself. Historians still differ on exactly when in modern times the term ‘pan-Islam’ emerged in Muslim politics. It has been argued that the term was first used in German and English in late 1877 and early 1878. Yet the first extensive use of the word occurred in the 1880s due to the French journalist Gabriel Charrier, who became particularly interested in the Ottoman empire and its policy of mobilizing Muslim public opinion across the world against the French takeover of Tunisia.¹ It is clear that the term ‘pan-Islamism’ was of European coinage and was adopted in imitation of ‘pan-Slavism’ or ‘pan-Germanism’, which had become current in the 1870s.² However, it is obvious that Muslim pan-Islamic thinkers and propagandists did not develop terms such as *al-jamīa al-islamiyya* or *al-ittihad al-islami* (‘pan-Islam’ or ‘Islamic unity’) as a simple translation or projection of Western concepts without any traditional basis in Islam. In fact, although pan-Islamism had its origins in nineteenth-century Ottoman political thought, it emerged—connoting Muslim unity and brotherhood—as a historical moment only once it had become connected to the *salafiyya* movement, which powerfully called for an immediate return to the first generations of Muslims who had rallied themselves behind the Prophet.³ It is therefore no coincidence that one of the earliest uses of

¹ Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization* (Oxford, 1990), 1–2.

² Dwight E. Lee, ‘The Origins of Pan-Islamism’, *American Historical Review* 47/2 (1942), 278–87, 280; and Nikki R. Keddie, ‘Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism’, *The Journal of Modern History*, 41/1 (1969), 17–28.

³ Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and*

the Arabic term *al-jamī'a al-Islāmiyya* (equivalent to 'pan-Islam') was made in one of the articles in the magazine *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa* (*The Firmest Bond*) by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh in 1884. Al-Afghani and 'Abduh must have been aware of the term 'pan-Islam', which was increasingly used in Europe by Charmes and others.⁴

This chapter addresses pan-Islamism as a global movement for Muslim reform and against European imperial domination. It focuses on anti-colonial discourse and the activities of the leading pan-Islamic proponents, most notably the triad of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–97), Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905), and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935), who sought to strengthen Islamic unity in order to confront the European penetration of Muslim lands. As one of the most important pan-Islamic agitators of his generation, al-Afghani was troubled by his experiences in British India, where Muslims were ruled by non-Muslims even though the *dar al-Islam*, in his view, should only be governed by the faithful. Islamic unity, he believed, was the strongest force to mobilize Muslims against imperial domination, an idea that was carried on by various Muslim activists and thinkers, most importantly by al-Afghani's follower Muhammad 'Abduh, who later became Mufti of Egypt, and 'Abduh's disciple, Rashid Rida.

This chapter discusses al-Afghani's and 'Abduh's revolutionary journal *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa*, which promoted not only Islamic renewal but also Muslim revolt against the British empire, and Rida's paper *al-Manar* (*The Lighthouse*). It argues that the colonial experience of these revolutionaries, their disillusionment with European intervention, and their varying visions of *Wahyūliyyah* determined their anti-imperialist intellectual and activist strategies. The first agitator of the three, al-Afghani, was shaped by his experience in colonial India, participation in Masonic lodges, dissatisfaction with the traditional *ulama*, confrontations with the Sublime Porte, and his exile in Paris. Al-Afghani advocated revolution from above. 'Abduh developed different ideas regarding the reformation of Islam and firmly believed in a revolution from below, brought about by a reform of religion and religious education. Rida, on the other hand, called for a pan-Islamic project on the twin basis of nostalgia for the Islamic caliphate and the reformation of Muslim activism. The following pages emphasize the diversity of the pan-Islamic movement. They also broach the question of the popular impact of their ideas and of the extent to which pan-Islamic ideas inspired anti-imperial uprisings such as the 'Urabi revolt in Egypt and the tobacco protests in Persia.

REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE

The impact of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's psychological, ethnic, and social background on pan-Islamism has long caused controversy among historians of the

Middle East (Fig. 6).⁵ Although his reformist political and religious career has been extensively studied, many passages of al-Afghani's life are still obscure. Nevertheless, it remains undisputed that he was widely regarded as a fervent defender of Islamic unity in the face of the expansion of the European empires. Due to the limited space available, this chapter does not describe the multifaceted contours of his life, political journeys, and exiles between Afghanistan, Persia, Istanbul, British India, Ottoman Egypt, St Petersburg, London, and Paris. Instead, the chapter focuses on al-Afghani's understanding of pan-Islamism as a 'revolutionary' concept, which, once put into practice, could bring about radical change in Muslim societies by liberating them from the shackles of European empires. In that sense, it is an undeniable fact that his life and 'revolutionary pan-Islamism... touched and deeply affected the whole Islamic world in the last quarter of the nineteenth century', as Albert Hourani once put it.⁶

Pan-Islamism was not al-Afghani's invention. Throughout the 1870s, pan-Islamic notions became appealing for a good number of Muslim thinkers. It was a concept that was born in a specific historical and political context. Before his arrival in Egypt in 1871, we know that al-Afghani did not clearly defend an all-purpose anti-colonial policy based on religious pan-Islamism.⁷ In his fiery speeches, he instead focused on local proto-nationalisms, especially in countries with mixed religious communities. In the late 1870s, for example, he stressed the significance of the Egyptian national unity by recalling the glories of Egypt's Pharaonic past.⁸ Due to a significant decline in the social, economic, political, and administrative system of Egypt under Khedive Isma'il as associated with the increase of European power, al-Afghani later combined this sense of proto-nationalism with pan-Islamism on the Egyptian scene.⁹ Combining religious zealotry with political activism, he saw religion as a powerful vehicle by which he could address the communal sentiments of Muslims everywhere beyond any ethnic or linguistic ties.

Al-Afghani's Egyptian years were the most fruitful in his career. In Egypt, he became involved in the intellectual and political discussions of his time and his influence was spreading across various parts of the Islamic world. During his time, he also established ties with Masonic lodges in Egypt. According to A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, al-Afghani used his Masonic activity 'as a ready-made agency for political mobilization and agitation against the Khedive Isma'il and the increasing

⁵ See, for example, Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din 'al-Afghani'* (Berkeley, 1968); Nikki R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal al-Din 'al-Afghani: A Political Biography* (Berkeley, 1972); Elie Kedourie, *Afghani and 'Abduh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Egypt* (London, 1966); Elie Kedourie, 'Further Light on Afghani', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1 (1965), 187–202; Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, 'Islamic Reform in Egypt: Some Observations on the Role of Afghani', *The Muslim World*, 61/1 (1971), 1–12; Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, *Sayyid Jamal al-Din 'al-Afghani: An Annotated Bibliography* (Leiden, 1970); and Anwar Moazzam, *Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: A Muslim Intellectual* (New Delhi, 1984).

⁶ Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939* (Cambridge, 1963), 128.

⁷ Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal al-Din 'al-Afghani'*, 94–5.



Fig. 6 Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97)
(Bodleian Library, Oxford).




Fig. 7 Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905)
(Egyptophilia Books).

European intervention in the affairs of Egypt.¹⁰ Al-Afghani's spirit of revolution in Egypt was sometimes militant. Generally, he had two aims in mind: to remove Khedive Ismail's authoritarian rule; and to oppose what he regarded as the superstition, ignorance, and lack of political awareness of the masses. This could only take place by means of mobilizing the crowd and organizing his followers to overthrow—and, if necessary, assassinate—the authoritarian khedive and establish a modern Islamic regime.¹¹ Wilfrid Scawen Blunt (1840-1922), a British poet and political writer, recounted that 'Abduh reported in 1903 that al-Afghani proposed to 'Abduh himself to assassinate Khedive Ismail as he passed in his carriage daily over the Qasr al-Nil bridge in Cairo, and 'Abduh seemed to have approved.¹² On the other hand, al-Afghani was on good terms with Crown Prince (and later Khedive) Tawfiq, who was also a prominent member of the Star of the East lodge, headed by al-Afghani himself. But al-Afghani's confrontational political mass speeches coupled with complaints from conservative 'ulama and European consuls negatively affected his relations with Tawfiq when the latter succeeded his father as Khedive



Fig. 8 Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935)
(Rida Family Archive, Cairo).



Fig. 9 Hasan al-Banna (1906-49) (Public Domain).

in June 1879. Al-Afghani and many Egyptian nationalists had high expectations of the reforms which Tawfiq had supported before his accession to the throne. They even put pressure on the new Khedive, and al-Afghani in particular urged him to keep foreigners out of the government and to get rid of his non-Egyptian entourage.¹³ Foreign consuls, especially the British, considered al-Afghani a serious threat to their relations with the new ruler. Consul-General Frank C. Lascelles (1841-1920) noted that al-Afghani became:

a man of considerable capacity and of great power as an orator, and he was gradually obtaining an amount of influence over his hearers which threatened to become dangerous. Last year [1878] he took an active part in stirring up ill feeling against the Europeans, and more especially the English, of whom he seems to entertain a profound hatred.¹⁴

Tawfiq became frightened, and al-Afghani was eventually seized by the police and deported to the Suez Canal. From Suez, he was sent to India, where he stayed till 1882. In the 1880s, Egypt was occupied by the British after the collapse of the 'Urbī revolt. Soon al-Afghani decided to move from India to France, which he saw as a suitable place to carry out his anti-British policies.

¹⁰ A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, 'Afghani and Freemasonry in Egypt', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 92/1 (1972), 25-35.

¹¹ Ahmed Ali Salem, 'Challenging Authoritarianism, Colonialism, and Dissunity: The Islamic

Al-Afghani was able to change his places of exile into platforms for the dissemination of his revolutionary ideas. His utilization of pan-Islam as a weapon against European encroachment became more significant in his short-lived, though influential, journal *al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa* (published from 13 March to 16 October 1884), which was closely connected to a secret society of the same name. This society and its journal recruited many Muslim scholars, political activists, and thinkers, such as the Egyptian revolutionary Saïd Zaghlul (1857–1927) and the eminent Egyptian journalist Ibrahim al-Muwayyihî (1846–1906), who had to take an oath of seeking every way to strengthen the unity of Islam and Muslims.¹⁵ Al-Afghani invited his Egyptian disciple 'Abduh to join him in Paris; 'Abduh had been living in exile in Beirut because of his active role in 'Urabi's uprising. In a small room on a roof situated in the Rue Marela in Paris, al-Afghani, assisted by 'Abduh as co-editor, penned many revolutionary articles for the journal, which was distributed free of charge across the Muslim world. Already during his time in Egypt, al-Afghani had advocated the power of the press in disseminating religious reform ideas and political resistance. He urged his Egyptian admirers to use journalism as a medium for that purpose. Throughout *al-'Urwat*'s articles, the editors proclaimed that the journal's program was to serve Orientals by dwelling on the causes of their deterioration and how they would reclaim their progress and power. Its main themes included hostility to British imperialism, advocacy of Islamic unity, and interpretation of Islamic notions in the light of urgent contemporary needs.¹⁶

It is remarkable that al-Afghani remained silent about French imperialism in North Africa. He tried to exploit Anglo-French rivalry by attempting to interest the French government in his anti-British enterprise.¹⁷ However, he was well aware that his pan-Islamic project was doomed to failure as long as Western colonialism (especially the British empire) and Eastern despotism continued to exist. He had therefore devoted most of his energy to confronting colonialism in all its intellectual, military, economic, and political aspects. The removal of European domination, he was convinced, would be a significant prelude to a renaissance based on Islamic tenets. Egypt occupied a central place in *al-'Urwat*. The deteriorating political state of the country became 'painful' for all Muslims because they considered it as a 'holy land' due to its central location as a gateway to the Holy Shrines in the Arabian peninsula.¹⁸

Furthermore, articles in *al-'Urwat* argued that Western military expansion was against the 'peaceful' tenets of Christianity. In contrast to the Gospel's admonition to leave personal, racial, and world conflicts aside, its Western adherents competed in seizing power in new colonies and in inventing devastating military machines and arms. Muslims, on the other hand, were urged by their Holy Scriptures to take the lead not only in professional military studies and arms, but in all fields of

science and arts, such as physics, engineering, and chemistry.¹⁹ The West accused the Orientals of 'religious fanaticism', but they wholeheartedly supported Christian missions in their spread of Christianity. *Al-'Urwat*, for example, pointed to William Ewart Gladstone, a British leader who, according to al-Afghani, should have been attached to the principles of Western 'liberty', but still 'breathes the spirit of St Paul' in his personal life and politics.²⁰

In al-Afghani's rhetoric, British colonial authority was merely 'illusion'. European states did not oppose the British expansion into the Islamic world because of its military powers and navy. They perceived Great Britain as a 'pale monster' or a 'tapeworm' that, despite its weakness, spoils health and ruins the environment.²¹ Elsewhere, al-Afghani called the Indian people to assemble their great number of millions and power against the British encroachment in their land:

If you [turned] into flies, he wrote, your buzzing would deafen the ears of Great Britain... And if God changed each one of you into a turtle, that would cross the sea and surround Great Britain, you could drag its islands to the depth [of water] and return back to your India being liberated.²²

Facing increasing financial problems, *al-'Urwat* was finally suspended. Al-Afghani changed his political tactics, when he finally recognized that none of his political goals had been achieved. Already during his stay in Paris, he had become involved in direct political discussions with British policy-makers concerning the Sudanese Mahdi and his resistance movement.²³ Al-Afghani was sometimes ambivalent in his political positions. At times, he encouraged the British to declare war on Russia, but in 1887 he asked the tsarist government to declare war on Britain.²⁴ Finally he felt obliged to cooperate with the existing Muslim regimes, some of which he had previously deemed as authoritarian and corrupt. He was invited by Shah Nasir al-Din to Persia to propose a political reform program. Once there, his relationship with the shah soon completely deteriorated. Al-Afghani hoped to establish an Islamic consultative regime in Persia, but soon realized that the shah was allowing more and more British influence in his country. Disillusioned, he was finally expelled from Persia. As al-Afghani had gained support from religious scholars and the pious across Persia, he submitted a plea to the famous Persian cleric Mirza Hasan Shirazi Shaykh al-Ra'is to issue a fatwa boycotting the tobacco trade with the British Tobacco Régie during the so-called Tobacco Protest in 1890. This revolt is considered to be the first mass movement in modern Persia. During the upheaval, some of the most respected Persian religious scholars employed anti-colonial pan-Islamic slogans to mobilize the masses. It was also one of the first times in modern Persian history that the religious elites were able to force

¹⁵ Rashid Rida, 'Faithar al-mujalid al-hadi wa al-thalathin' ('Preface to Volume 31'), *Al-Manar*, 31/1 (May 1930), 6–10.

¹⁶ Kaddûs, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din 'al-Afghani'*, 220.

¹⁷ Elie Kedourie, 'Afghani in Paris: A Note', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 8/1 (1972), 103.

¹⁹ al-Afghani, *Al-Athar al-kamila*, i, 118.

²⁰ al-Afghani, *Al-Athar al-kamila*, i, 138–9.

²¹ al-Afghani, *Al-Athar al-kamila*, i, 222.

²² Quoted in al-Afghani, *Al-Athar al-kamila*, i, 222.

the government to withdraw their policies. The revolt was a decisive victory for al-Afghani's plans.²⁵

In the end, al-Afghani succumbed to Sultan Abdülhamid II's invitation to Istanbul, where he stayed during the final years of his life under house arrest. Frustrated by the sultan's hesitancy towards his political ambition of establishing a Muslim league, al-Afghani harshly attacked him and renounced his allegiance to him as caliph because, according to al-Afghani, the sultan no longer deserved that title.²⁶ During al-Afghani's stay in Istanbul, Nasir al-Din Shah was assassinated by Mirza Riza Kirmani, a Babi sympathizer of al-Afghani. Although his real motives are not entirely known, during the interrogations Kirmani declared that he was enticed by al-Afghani's call to 'kill the tyrant'.²⁷ At this time, al-Afghani came to regret that he had abandoned his former revolutionary path by yielding to his new strategy of achieving pan-Islamism through the ruling Muslim leaders. In one of his final notes to the Persians, he plainly stated:

Would that I had sown all the seeds of my ideas in the receptive ground of the people's thought! Well would it have been had I not wasted this fruitful and beneficent seed of mine in the salt and sterile soil of that effete Sovereignty!... Nature is your friend, and the Creator of Nature your ally. The stream of renovation flows quickly towards the East. The edifice of despotic government totters to its fall. Strive so far as you can to destroy the foundations of this despotism, not to pluck up and cast out its individual agents. Strive so far as in you lies to abolish those practices which stand between the Persians and their happiness, not to annihilate those who employ these practices. If you merely strive to oppose individuals, your time will only be lost. If you seek only to prevail against them, the evil practice will draw to itself others. Endeavour to remove those obstacles which prevent your friendship with other nations.²⁸

A few years later, in 1897, al-Afghani died without achieving his plan of uniting Islam against the expansion of European empires, but he significantly popularized his pan-Islamic visions as well as other political, religious, and intellectual concepts for his followers.

REFORM FROM BELOW

Muhammad 'Abduh (Fig. 7), al-Afghani's close friend, remained involved in the Egyptian political nationalist movement and took an important part in the 'Urabi

revolt after al-Afghani's deportation from Egypt. He wrote numerous articles in the Egyptian daily *al-Ahram*, which reflected al-Afghani's political views. Khedive Tawfiq, who had earlier expelled al-Afghani from Egypt, put 'Abduh under house arrest in his village in northern Egypt because of his political opposition to British-controlled Egypt. In 1880, 'Abduh was appointed as one of the three editors of the Egyptian official journal, *al-Waqai' al-Misriyya* (*Egyptian Proceedings*), and later became its editor-in-chief.²⁹ Joining the 'Urabi revolt, he soon entered the political arena. In a number of articles, he expressed his views on constitutionalism and the importance of the rule of law in the Egyptian state as based on liberty and civil principles.³⁰ After the British occupation of Egypt, 'Abduh was arrested and maltreated in prison. Later, he was exiled for three years in Beirut before voluntarily joining al-Afghani in Paris. Their press collaboration in the French capital reveals that 'Abduh shared al-Afghani's revolutionary political attitudes during this period. Supporting al-Afghani's political ideas, 'Abduh visited the House of Commons in London in 1884 and discussed with the British Secretary of State for War, Lord Hartington, and others many political issues concerning British control over Egypt and Sudan, especially the mahdi uprising. It was reported that 'Abduh then entered Egypt in disguise, hoping to negotiate with the mahdi in Sudan at al-Afghani's request.³¹

Despite al-Afghani's tremendous influence on 'Abduh, the latter had already decided during his stay in Paris to distance himself from his mentor's political path by exerting more effort in the field of education, which he considered as a gradual, but more effective, instrument to reform religion and society.³² He now became persuaded that the revolution of the Islamic countries should take place from below through good education. It was futile, he now argued, to push people to seize their political rights from their leaders by force if they were not 'educated' about these rights. Rashid Rida, 'Abduh's Syrian student, recalled that, at their first meeting in Cairo in 1897, 'Abduh criticized al-Afghani and other Muslim intellectuals and papers for their involvement in politics. If al-Afghani had exploited his unique power in education and learning instead, he argued, it would have been much more beneficial for all Muslims. In Paris, al-Afghani and 'Abduh had already argued fiercely; 'Abduh had suggested to al-Afghani that it would be better to abandon politics by leaving for a far-off location, away from government surveillance and where they could teach a select group of students their reformist views. After ten years, these students could later return to their countries and disseminate such ideas. Al-Afghani regularly accused 'Abduh of timidity and dispirit-ness.³³ 'Abduh tried to convince his mentor that reforming corrupt rulers and

²⁵ Kaddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani*, 355; on the Tobacco Protest, see also Nikki R. Kaddie, *Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892* (London, 1966); and Mansoor Moadel, 'Shi'i Political Discourse and Class Mobilization in the Tobacco Movement of 1890-1892', *Sociological Forum*, 7/3 (1992), 447-68.

²⁶ Saleem, 'Challenging Authoritarianism, Colonialism, and Disunity', 32.

²⁷ Abbas Amanat, *Pirot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831-1896* (London, 1997), 441-3.

²⁹ Mark Sedgwick, *Muhammad 'Abduh* (Oxford, 2009), 29.

³⁰ Sedgwick, *Muhammad 'Abduh*, 33.

³¹ Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 134; see also Christopher Radler, *Eine Biographie des politischen Mittele: Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) und die Revolution des Ahmad 'Urabi in der Rezeption Tahir al-Fanalis (Shudakhat al-Inam Muhammad 'Abduh)* (Berlin, 2010).

their entourages was impossible. It would have been better for al-Afghani, 'Abduh claimed, to have improved education and the quality of religious preaching in mosques even if it sometimes involved political concession and the avoidance of direct attacks on rulers.³⁴

'Abduh openly argued that, since Muslim interests had become unavoidably interwoven with those of Europeans throughout the world, cooperation could prove more fruitful than confrontation and discord.³⁵ This easing of relations with existing rulers, including European politicians, proved tremendously beneficial to 'Abduh in his reform program. Although he had cooperated with the leaders of the 'Urabi revolt, his revolutionary ideas were more moderate than those of the military and populist leaders. Furthermore, he argued that 'the Orient could not improve unless it is led by a just dictator', which contradicted al-Afghani's saying that 'the leader should be just and powerful, not a dictator'.³⁶ Confronting al-Afghani's political position, 'Abduh was reported to have regularly said: 'when *al-siyasa* (politics) enters, it corrupts everything'. One of his most famous statements was: 'I totally agree with you, if you say that politics persecutes the intellect, science and religion. I seek refuge of God from... the word "*siyasa*", [its] meaning, [all its] letters, any thoughts of [it], each land where [it] is mentioned, and everybody who speaks or learns... about politics.'³⁷

In 1885, 'Abduh for the second time returned to Beirut, where he taught theology, history, and classical literature. His house became a center for scholars and writers, Christians, Druzes, and Muslims who visited him to discuss religious and literary issues.³⁸ In Beirut, 'Abduh evolved a systematic theoretical program for religious education in particular, which should be accessible to all strata of society. In his view, there should be a different type of education for each class in society. The ordinary people should be taught the broad principles of beliefs—but not the details of differences between religious sects—and Islamic history and Muslim global expansion. Government officials should be trained in logic and philosophy, doctrines with special emphasis on rational proofs, the avoidance of dissension between the different rites, ethics with the same emphasis on its rational basis and a study of the exemplary lives of the *salaf*, and religious history. Teachers and spiritual directors should master: the religious sciences; the Arabic language; the Qur'an with its commentary, which would take into account the customs, traditions, languages, and intellectual methodology of the Arabs at the time of the Revelation; the hadith sciences and the authentication of hadith; a complete system of ethics; theology and jurisprudence; the arts of persuasion and argument; and ancient and modern history.³⁹

In 1888, 'Abduh decided to return to his homeland. 'The Syrians', he wrote, 'are not like my own people, and a day spent here is not like a day spent at home.'⁴⁰ After his return, he did not resume teaching at al-Azhar as he had hoped, but started a career in public service as a judge in local Egyptian tribunals. A year later, he was appointed Mufti of Egypt, the highest religious office of the country, which enabled him to realize his hope for reform, not only in legal matters but also in religious education, law, and waqf endowments. The fame of 'Abduh's religious reformist views reached across the world and his ideas were soon discussed among Muslims in Africa, tsarist Russia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. Besides his significant role in establishing private schools, 'Abduh convinced the Khedive in 1895 to set up an administrative council for al-Azhar. For almost ten years, he served as one of this council's prominent members and managed to achieve essential educational reforms in that ancient university.⁴¹

In order to achieve his agenda for reform, 'Abduh cooperated with the British authorities in Egypt. He remained on excellent terms with the British Commissioner in Egypt, Lord Cromer (1841-1917), who had earlier supported 'Abduh's return to Egypt from Beirut. In his *Modern Egypt*, Cromer described 'Abduh as:

a very superior type... a man of broad and enlightened views... He recognised the necessity of European assistance in the work of reform. But he did not belong to the same category as the Europeanised Egyptian, whom he regarded as a bad copy of the original... In fact, Sheikh Mohammed Abdu was a somewhat dreamy and impractical but, nevertheless, genuine Egyptian patriot; it were perhaps well for the cause of Egyptian patriotism if there were more like him...⁴²

'Abduh believed that one of the reasons behind the perceived Muslim decline was that they, unlike the majority of Western people, did not work for the sake of the public interest of their countries. On one of his journeys to Europe on board an English vessel, 'Abduh tried assessing the social and intellectual status of ordinary English fellow-passengers. During a conversation with an English coal miner, he was surprised that this Englishman's regard for his country was part of his ambition in his work. His utmost aspiration was that his government would succeed in managing the national consumption of coal so his country could enrich its treasury, which in turn would benefit himself and his family.⁴³

'Abduh was impressed by Western science and technology, arguing in his writings that Muslims must not only be impressed by the outcome of European civilization and its benefits, but that they should also studiously search for Western sources of knowledge. Anxious about the 'dangers' of Westernization, 'Abduh struggled with the question of authenticity. Livingston correctly remarked that 'Abduh worried that unthinking importation of 'Western civilization' would lead to the opposite of the intended result: a restricted,

³⁴ Rida, *Tarikh al-ustadh al-imam al-shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh*, 896.

³⁵ Sedgwick, *Muhammad 'Abduh*, 8.

³⁶ Salem, 'Challenging Authoritarianism, Colonialism, and Disunity', 36.

³⁷ Rida, *Tarikh al-ustadh al-imam*, 891.

³⁸ Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 134.

³⁹ Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 154. see also David C. Waters, *Imperialism*, 197.

⁴⁰ Sedgwick, *Muhammad 'Abduh*, 71.

⁴¹ Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 135.

⁴² Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 117.

artificial ideology far removed from the real objectives of the reformers. In other words:

intellectual or institutional models had to be understood in their European context, then in their Islamic context, in order to achieve authenticity of the transformed versions. Otherwise, without radical critical analysis and cultural reconstitution, as it were, they would be alien transplants without roots, destined to wither in Muslim soil.⁴⁴

During his time as the Mufti of Egypt, 'Abduh regularly visited Europe and attended seminars and conferences of Orientalists. At the age of 40, he started to learn French and thus gained first-hand access to major European works on religion, philosophy, education, and history. 'Abduh admired Herbert Spencer, whom he visited in Britain in 1903. The reason for his various trips to Europe was to 'refresh' his spirit and thoughts. Remarkably enough, 'Abduh's stays in Europe, the continent of the colonizers, were a source of motivation. Every time he went there, it gave him new hope that the deteriorating state of Muslims could be reformed. 'When I come to Europe,' 'Abduh told his disciple Rida in early 1900, 'and stay there for one or two months, such hopes return to me. It becomes easy for me to believe in [the success] of what I have already thought to be impossible. Do not ask me what the reason for that is, as I cannot exemplify it. But this what such trips do with me.'⁴⁵

'Abduh believed that colonial expansion over the Islamic world meant the dissemination of Western values in place of Muslim traditions and values. In his eyes, blind imitation of the West would uproot Muslim morality, ethics, and values. European ideas should not be totally rejected, but were to be 'filtered, distilled and integrated in a society whose core is religious and whose religious leaders have their place in the intellectual *avant garde* creating the new from the old. This can be done without losing what is perceived as essentially Islamic.'⁴⁶

NOSTALGIA FOR THE CALIPHATE

While al-Afghani and 'Abduh had close personal contacts with a number of Europeans, and lived in Europe for years, their follower Rashid Rida (Fig. 8), in contrast, was a Muslim scholar, who, in the words of Albert Hourani, 'belonged to the last generation of those who could be fully educated and yet alive in a self-sufficient Islamic world of thought'.⁴⁷ In his influential journal *al-Manar*, Rida positioned himself as heir to their pan-Islamic thought. Within the realm of ideas regarding the caliphate and pan-Islamism, Rida raised a lengthy and complex array of questions related to Europe, its peoples, religion, ethics, and culture. Such views took various shapes throughout the years, primarily due to the changing political

situation and turmoil in the Muslim world during the first three decades of the twentieth century.⁴⁸

In his early years in Cairo, Rida did not only have an accommodating stance towards Britain, but also sketched an idealizing picture of it as a colonizer.⁴⁹ For Rida, if a Muslim country had to be ruled by a European power, it should preferably be Britain, since Muslims under British rule enjoyed freedom of religion. In these early years of his journal, Rida's tone was moderate, and he was sometimes even ready to defend the British empire against accusations. When many Eastern newspapers attacked the aggressive British policy during the Second Boer War (1899–1902), for example, he defended the British people as the nation furthest from cruelty in war, who always opted for peace. In his view, most of these journals blindly echoed the attacks made by the press in other 'jealous European nations, whose aim was to denigrate the British as deviating from the common path of human virtue. Rida concluded that the British attitude was 'natural', and the Transvaal reaction was not 'surprising'. In his eyes, Britain did not commit any improper actions:

All living bodies, animals or plants... demand nutrition from outside as long as they are alive. This nutrition allows their constitution to grow by preserving their existence and power from one stage to another. When the Maker of the universe allows the [body] to become dissolute and vanish, it will be unable to get sufficient food to preserve its existence. Factors of decomposition will assault it suddenly till it ends with its exhaustion and annihilation.⁵⁰

Influenced by Edmond Demolins (1852–1907) and his views on the superiority of the Anglo-Saxons, Rida became impressed by 'the English independent way of upbringing and education'. He even argued that, despite the spread of its colonies over a quarter of the world, Great Britain was less interested in wars than any other state. If the empire had established an alliance with the United States, Rida asserted, the Anglo-Saxons would have dominated half the world. Although many contemporary nations might outmatch the Anglo-Saxons in many aspects of ethics and virtue, the Anglo-Saxons' increasing moral and material progress primarily arose from their combination of dignity and supremacy, together with fundamentals of knowledge, virtue, and ethics in society. In the early 1900s, Rida argued that the link between ethical habits and military power as intertwined with economic and political success was the secret behind British progress and superiority over other European states.⁵¹

After Queen Victoria's death in January 1901, Rida published a positive obituary of her cultured manner and zeal for religiosity. He praised Great Britain as a nation rich in great politicians, adding that Queen Victoria was fortunate to be

⁴⁸ Ryad, 'Islamic Reformism and Great Britain'.

⁴⁹ Mahmoud Haddad, 'Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashid Rida's Ideas on the Caliphate', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 117 (1997), 277–297.

⁴⁴ John W. Livingston, 'Muhammad Abduh on Science', *Muslim World*, 85/3–4 (1995), 215–34, 223–4.

served by such great men as Lord Melbourne, Sir Robert Peel, Lord John Russell, the Earl of Derby, Gladstone, and Lord Salisbury. Rida defended the queen against critics who accused her of being a 'mute machine', who neither knew how to work on her own, nor was capable of administering her cabinet. Rida found that she used to look at things and express her views on issues as a whole. He was moreover impressed by her great influence within Europe, her age, and her strong family ties with other European rulers, namely the Russian tsar and the German kaiser. A hand-written letter from the queen, Rida wrote, would solve the most complicated political problems, which any men would fail to manage. 'Britain', he concluded, 'lost the sun of glory and the star of luck by losing her.'⁵²

Rida believed that one of the secrets of the success of the British empire was its endurance and ability to combine 'comfort and luxury' with 'strength and power'. On his way to India in 1912 on the Royal Mail ship, for instance, he made a favorable remark regarding the leanness of Englishmen on physical fitness and their 'unforgettable high manners and behavior'. Observing their habitual physical fitness, Rida now understood the secret of how their rulers and soldiers could bear the 'burning heat [of the Indian climate] without weariness, boredom or harm.'⁵³

On the other hand, like his pan-Islamic predecessors, Rida was absolutely convinced that there was a close connection between religion and European foreign policy. Europe would simply exploit religion as a political tool for mobilizing European Christians and for inflaming their 'fanatical' sentiments against Muslim countries. In Britain itself, religious strife between Catholics and Protestants was a symptom of deep-rooted fanaticism in Europe.⁵⁴ In his analysis of the linkage between Christian missionaries and colonial powers, Rida drew further historical parallels, such as the collaboration of the Church with the authorities in converting Muslims and Jews in medieval Spain. Like Afghani, he gave the example of Gladstone, who was deeply imbued with Christian theology and hatred for Islam. Another example was the English politician Lord Salisbury, who, according to Rida, was reported to have said: 'We should retrieve what the Crescent had taken from the Cross.'⁵⁵

Following 'Abdulah, Rida abandoned any involvement in politics early in his career. Before the First World War, he often stressed his loyalty to the Ottoman empire, which he saw as the necessary representative of Muslim political power. During the war, he took a different course by calling for the re-establishment of an Arab caliphate in order to achieve Islamic unity. As the downfall of the Ottoman empire was foreseeable, Rida proposed that the new caliphate should build up a commonwealth of Muslim states. In this period, Rida promoted an Anglo-Arab agreement that might guarantee Arab independence and save both the temporal and spiritual authority of Islam. With the war underway, Rida went even further by

appealing for a complete restoration of an Arab caliphate to replace the Ottoman one.⁵⁶ He made several attempts to obtain support for his plans from European colonial authorities in Egypt. In July 1915, he told Sir Mark Sykes (1879–1919), assistant secretary to the British war cabinet, that it was necessary to 'set up another Mohammedan state to maintain Mohammedan prestige.'⁵⁷ He also tried to persuade the British intelligence department in Cairo that his new organization, the Decentralization Party, could influence Arab officers in the Ottoman army and encourage them to rebel against their Turkish and German commanders.⁵⁸ Rida also approached Gilbert Clayton (1875–1929), the director of British intelligence in Cairo for negotiations in this regard. Clayton observed that Rida realized that his scheme for an independent Arab empire was 'unlikely to be fulfilled in his lifetime'. Skeptical regarding Rida's ambitions, British officials in Egypt considered him 'rather a visionary.'⁵⁹ However, at least for the purposes of propaganda, London supported the idea of an Arab caliphate and that King Hussein of the Hijaz should assume the title of caliph.⁶⁰

In 1911, Rida established the Society or Arab Association whose main objective was to unite the rulers of Arabia. His Arab nationalism was not meant to replace the Ottoman rule, but rather to integrate it within the Ottoman empire. In the eyes of European colonial officials and diplomats, though, it was apparent that Rida did not represent the opinions of the Arab world. Sir Mark Sykes (1879–1919) portrayed Rida after one of their meetings as a leader of Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic thought. In conversation he talks as much as he writes. He is a hard uncompromising fanatical Moslem, the mainspring of whose ideas is the desire to eliminate Christian influence and to make Islam a political power in as wide a field as possible.⁶¹ Rida's political activism and his pro-caliphate tone irritated British authorities in Egypt, who discussed sending him into exile in Malta during the First World War.⁶² In the end, as British officials in Egypt showed themselves increasingly uninterested in his plans, Rida's anti-British sentiments ran high. His above-mentioned tone of admiration regarding the tolerance in British colonial policy had now changed: 'England was trying to efface the Mohammedan authority and rule from the world.'⁶³

Rida's support of Britain was largely opportunistic. In fact, he also attempted to contact other European diplomats in Cairo during the First World War. A few

⁵⁶ Haddad, 'Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era', 263.

⁵⁷ Haddad, 'Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era', 263.

⁵⁸ Elizer Tauber, 'Rashid Rida's Political Activities During World War I', *The Muslim World*, 85/1–2 (1995), 107–22; and Elizer Tauber, 'Rashid Rida and Faysal's Kingdom in Syria', *The Muslim World*, 85/3–4 (1995), 235–46.

⁵⁹ Elizer Tauber, 'The Political Life of Rashid Rida', *Arabian Budget Studies in Arabic*, 19–20 (1998), 261–72, 265.

⁶⁰ S. O. Khan, 'The "Caliphate Question": British Views and Policy Toward Pan-Islamic Politics and the End of the Ottoman Caliphate', *American Journal of Social Sciences*, 24/4 (2007), 1–25.

⁶¹ Select reports and telegrams from Sir Mark Sykes', report no. 14, quoted in Haddad, 'Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era', 268.

⁵² Ryad, 'Islamic Reformism and Great Britain', 265.

⁵³ Ryad, 'Islamic Reformism and Great Britain', 266.

⁵⁴ Ryad, 'Islamic Reformism and Great Britain', 267.

years earlier, in 1912 and 1913, the German consulate in Cairo reported to Berlin about the activities of Syrian exiles in Cairo led by Rida. It was reported that Rida met with the German emissary in Cairo and discussed the possibility of establishing an independent Arab caliphate under the Khedive of Egypt ruling Syria and Arabia. Rida asked for German diplomatic support in acquiring armaments to use against Britain and France—a request which was quickly refused.⁶⁴

In Rida's eyes, the worst result of the First World War was the prospect that the European empires would make further efforts in the future to exert their military power.⁶⁵ For him, the war clearly demonstrated the 'beastly' and 'illusive' materialist character of European civilization which claimed to monopolize peace and justice.⁶⁶ Rida had anticipated that Britain was going to win the war, even though Germany was the foremost European nation in terms of its armaments and militarized order. Nevertheless, Rida believed that Britain was much cleverer in its 'political cunning', evident in its fueling of the sentiments of other governments against Germany.⁶⁷

After the war, inspired by Woodrow Wilson's call for self-determination for all nations, Egyptian nationalists started to press the British for independence. On the eve of the Paris Peace Conference, they formed a *wafd* (delegation) under the leadership of Luft al-Sayyid, Saïd Zaghlul, and others, to demand independence. When their request to travel to Paris was rejected, the American legation in Cairo received dozens of petitions against the British refusal and asking for Egyptian self-determination. In March 1919, Zaghlul and three other members of the *wafd* were arrested and were deported to Malta. This act provoked the popular uprising of spring 1919, which spread over the provincial cities of Lower and Upper Egypt.⁶⁸ At this point, Rida completely changed his views towards Britain. He declared that the Muslim world was sympathetic to Germany because of its alliance with the Ottoman empire, a symbol of Islamic sovereignty. He warned against the annexation of Iraq and Syria by Britain and France, warning that Great Britain should spare itself of the enmity of 300 million Muslims.⁶⁹ More than 50 years after the appointment of Gordon as the governor general of the Sudan, Rida cited Gordon as evidence of Britain's underhand dealings, claiming that Britain had sent a Christian clergyman on that mission purely in order to convert Muslims to Christianity and to monopolize their souls and bodies for the sake of its interests. Rida's former lofty rhetoric about religious freedom in British colonies had

changed into a diatribe against the 'British plot to colonize nations, to enslave people and to destroy their religions'.⁷⁰

Rida's antipathy towards European intervention in the Muslim world reached its peak in the 1920s when he formulated his comprehensive pan-Islamic thesis in his famous work *al-Khilafa aw al-Imama al-'Uzma* (*The Caliphate or the Exalted Imamat*)⁷¹ in which he addressed the political problem of Islamic unity following the Turkish National Assembly's decision to strip the Ottoman caliphate of political power, and the failure of the Syrian Arab Kingdom.⁷² Rida urged Muslims to make use of the international political changes after the war by creating a united political system on the basis of the bonds of their communal faith, rather than ethnicity and fragmented nationalism. Relying on a number of classical and medieval religious treatises, he argued the future caliph should be an independent *mujtahid* and an Arab Qurayshite by language and ethnicity.⁷³

In his treatise, Rida stressed the role and supremacy of Arabs in unifying Islam. He also made a close connection between the Hijaz and Islam where, according to one hadith, two religions could never co-exist within the borders of the Arabian peninsula. British imperialist goals and European intervention in the Arabian peninsula should be therefore resisted by all means. He discredited the Hashemite Sharif Hussein Ibn 'Ali (1854–1931) as candidate for the caliphate, as he was too dependent on the British and was not an eligible *mujtahid*. His rule was above all repressive and personal.⁷⁴ The Saudis were the most appropriate nominees for taking up this task, not only because they were entitled to protect the holy cities from imperialism, but also due to their political power to bring stability and security to the Hijaz and to facilitate the purposes of the annual hajj. Rida refuted all 'rumors', which he ascribed to British propaganda, that the Wahhabis had desecrated shrines and corpses and slaughtered women and children in their conquest of Mecca. In reality, Rida assured his followers, they had restored Islamic rule to the holy city and ensured that it would not suffer the oppression of despotic rulers in the future.⁷⁵ His stance towards the Turks was somehow ambivalent. In 1932, he wrote to his close associate, the Druze Prince Shakhb Arslan (1869–1946), that he would still prefer the rule of the Turks to the Europeans, despite the fact that the Turks had 'humiliated' the Arabs. He would even be ready to accept the rule of Turkish atheists, who primarily opposed the Arabic language and Salafi Islam, rather than be subject to European colonial rule.⁷⁶

⁶⁴ Donald M. McKale, *War by Revolution: Germany and Great Britain in the Middle East in the Era of World War I* (Kent, OH, 1998), 42–3.

⁶⁵ Rashid Rida, 'Al-haq wa al-quwwa' ('Truth and Power'), *Al-Manar* 18/2 (March 1915), 141–55.

⁶⁶ Rashid Rida, 'Harb al-madaniyya al-urubiyā' ('The War of European Civilization'), *Al-Manar* 18/3 (April 1915), 182–92.

⁶⁷ Rashid Rida, 'Aqibat harb al-madaniyya al-urubiyā' ('Consequences of the War of European Civilization'), *Al-Manar*, 21/7 (April 1920), 337–44.

⁶⁸ Feroz Manesh, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of*

⁷⁰ Ryad, 'Islamic Reformism and Great Britain', 271.

⁷¹ See, for example, Muhammad Rashid Rida, *Al-Khilafa aw al-Imama al-'Uzma* (*The Caliphate, or the Greater Imamat*) (Cairo, 1934); and Henri Laoust, *Traduction annotée de al-Hilafa au al-Imama al-'Uzma* (*La Califa ou l'Imama suprême*) (Paris, 1986).

⁷² John Willis, 'Debating the Caliphate: Islam and Nation in the Work of Rashid Rida and Abul Kalam Azad', *International History Review*, 32/4 (2010), 711–32, 717.

⁷³ Willis, 'Debating the Caliphate', 717–19; see also Haddad, 'Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era', 273.

⁷⁴ Ryad, 'Arab Deterioration: Nationalism in the Colonial Era', 372.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has analyzed three different voices of pan-Islamism. Although al-Afghani, 'Abduh, and Rida represent a single school of thought, namely the *salafiyya* movement, their responses to the age of imperialism were anything but homogeneous. Each of them molded different solutions to the perceived malaise of Islam. Western powers made several attempts to exploit pan-Islamism when circumstances seemed to favor their policies. It is true that their interpretations and application of pan-Islamism in their reform plans should be 'linked with the whole problem of the reaction of the Islamic world to the impact of the Occident... and the international relations of the great powers toward one another'.⁷⁷

The pan-Islamic ideologies we have discussed show the interplay between Islamic reformism, pan-Islam, and empire. They emerged in the period of the expansion of military and political colonialism on the one hand, and the social and intellectual transformation of the Muslim world on the other. The actors of pan-Islam theorized ideological instruments to challenge the imperial expansion of Europe. Above all, they stressed the significance of establishing a universal and central power, to which Muslims all over the world should owe loyalty and obedience. This central government would counteract the military, educational, political and economic weakness of the Muslim world. In so doing, the spokesmen of this movement adopted a largely defensive tone in their emphasis on early Islam and its viability as a model for Muslim unity. Nevertheless, the '*Wahnschauung* of pan-Islam', as Jacob M. Landau put it, 'has been throughout a mixture (in various dosages) of utopian romanticism and modern pragmatism'.⁷⁸

This chapter revolved around the actions and reactions of the three most eminent pan-Islamists who represent three different generations of global Muslim movements, networks, activists, and intellectuals who operated in the orbit of pan-Islam against imperialism. Many of these networks were entangled and had a transnational character. For example, in British India, the Khilafat Movement, which mobilized its pan-Islamic appeal for political gains in the broader context of the British policy towards Turkey and India, had solid connections with Rida in Egypt.⁷⁹ In the early twentieth century, pan-Islam was a crucial transitional moment of political nationalist resistance to imperialism in Morocco and North Africa.⁸⁰ As a zealous pan-Islamist Tatar intellectual, Abdurrahid Ibrahim (1857–1944) was able to establish direct contacts between pan-Islamist intellectuals and pan-Asianists in Asia and Japan.⁸¹ In interwar Europe, Shakib Arslan (1869–1946),

⁷⁷ Lee, 'The Origins of Pan-Islamism', 280.

⁷⁸ Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 307–8.

⁷⁹ M. Naem Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918–1924* (Leiden, 1999).

⁸⁰ Edmund Burke, 'Pan-Islam and Moroccan Resistance to French Colonial Penetration, 1900–1912', *Journal of African History*, 13/1 (1972), 97–118.

⁸¹ Sadia Satar, 'Old Friendships: Exploring the Historic Relationship Between Pan-Islamism and Japanese Pan-Asianism' (MA Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2008); Khalid Mawad, 'A. A. Salim: Pan-Asianism

one of 'Abduh's disciples and Rida's associate, made his place of exile Geneva 'the umbilical cord of the Islamic world'.⁸² As a community of intellectual and activists beyond national boundaries, they therefore attempted to increase the ethos of transnational pan-Islamism in the face of colonial powers.

The influence of al-Afghani, 'Abduh, and Rida on many Muslim thinkers and activists of the twentieth century cannot be overestimated. In attempting to examine the interplay of complex socio-political forces that defined the major contours of pan-Islamism and its struggle against imperialism, one can look afresh at the contemporary scene without resorting to a neatly tailored or exaggerated hypothesis. Even at the grassroots level, the ideas of these great reformers and modernists became influential. Muslims in the contemporary age are still riding the crest of the same pan-Islamist waves. Pan-Islamic networks, in which Rashid Rida and his associates assumed a central position, were on the fault line of later developments in contemporary Islamic thought. Rida can be seen as the exemplary intermediate figure between classic and vernacular discourse and between secular rulers and masses, whose intellectual and journalistic pattern is being followed with the advent of digital technologies today.⁸³ The Muslim Brotherhood, one of the most influential reformist movements, was established in 1928 in Egypt. Their activities coincided with the flourishing of the worldwide pan-Islamist activists. Hasan al-Banna (1906–49) (Fig. 9), its founder, was a disciple of Rida and published the journal of *al-Manar* after the latter's death. After the Second World War, the heirs of this religious intellectual heritage developed their ideas into two extremes of Islam, namely, a reformist Islam open to external influences, and another variant which represents radical and rigid world views.⁸⁴

⁸² William L. Cleveland, *Islam Against the West: Shakib Arslan and the Campaign for Islamic Nationalism* (Austin, TX, 1985), 67; Raja Adai, 'Shakib Arslan's Imagining of Europe: The Colonizer, the Inquisitor, the Islamic, the Virtuoso, and the Friend', in Nahalie Clayer and Eric Germain (eds), *Islam in Inter-War Europe* (London, 2008), 156–82; and Unar Ryad, 'New Episodes in Moroccan Nationalism under Colonial Rule: Reconsideration of Shakib Arslan's Centrality in Light of Unpublished Materials', *Journal of North African Studies*, 16/1 (2011), 117–42.

⁸³ Jon W. Anderson and Yves Gonzalez-Quijano, 'Technological Mediation and the Emergence of Transnational Muslim 'Publics'', in Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (eds), *Public Islam and*