

Meaning and use of causeless causative constructions with *laten* in Dutch

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1. Introduction

The Dutch language user has different ways to express causality. One of these ways is the so called analytic causative construction:

- (1) De leraar laat de kinderen hun huiswerk maken.
The teacher lets the children their homework do
'The teacher makes the children do their homework.'
- (2) De zon doet de temperatuur oplopen.
The sun does the temperature rise
'The sun makes the temperature rise.'

Analytic causative constructions in Dutch are constructions formed by an auxiliary, a form of the verbs *doen* or *laten*, in combination with a bare infinitive. *Doen* or *laten* forms the causal predicate that denotes the underlying cause; the bare infinitive forms the effected predicate that describes the effect or consequence. The analytic causative construction (from now on CC) has at least two participants: a *causer*, which is the subject of the construction, and a *causee*, which is the participant that 'carries out' the effected predicate.

The difference in form between the *doen*- en *laten*-construction corresponds to a crucial difference in meaning (Kemmer & Verhagen 1994; Verhagen & Kemmer 1992, 1997; Verhagen 2000). With *doen* the construction expresses direct causality: the effect of the causal event is inevitable, the result is the inevitable consequence of the underlying causing event. *Laten* marks indirect causality: the causing event is not a sufficient condition for the realization of the effected predicate, but there is another force active that is more directly involved in the realization of the effect. Both direct (with *doen*) and indirect causality (with *laten*) can be further divided in a number of causality subtypes. (Verhagen &

Kemmer 1992, 1997; Kemmer & Verhagen 1994; Talmy 1988; Croft 1991). These subtypes are related to the participants of the constructions and their properties, especially their animacy or inanimacy. Example (2) with inanimate causer and inanimate causee expresses physical causation, a subtype of direct causation. Example (1) with *laten* expresses indirect, inductive causation: both causer and causee are animate participants.

Indirect, inductive CCs (constructions with *laten*, and animate causer and causee) can be further categorized at a third level. Their meanings can be divided in permissive causation, meaning ‘to permit’ or ‘not hinder’ (contributing to the realization of an event by not interfering, (example (3)), and coercive causation, meaning ‘to cause’, ‘to force’ or ‘to coerce’ (example (1)).

- (3) De conducteur liet de hooligans de trein afbreken
The conductor let the hooligans the train demolish
‘The conductor let the hooligans demolish the train.’

The difference between both meanings can be described in terms of the conceptualization of the roles of the causer and the causee in the overall causal event. If the realization of the effected predicate is in accordance with the ‘wish’ of the causee, and the causer is neutral in this respect, then the construction gets a permissive meaning. In a prototypical coercive construction on the other hand, the causee carries out the effected predicate against his will, and is forced to act by the causer. Below, the differences between the constructions and the roles of the participants will be defined more precisely.

In some uses of the *laten*-CC, the causee remains unexpressed, as in (4) (the *affectee* is the object of the effected predicate):

- (4) De huiseigenaar [causer] laat zijn huis [affectee] overschilderen.
The home-owner lets his house repaint
‘The home-owner has his house repainted.’

The possibility to leave the causee implicit has first of all to do with the transitivity of the verb in the effected predicate: CCs with a transitive effected predicate and an explicit affectee can leave the causee unexpressed.

This property of the CC has often been described in the literature (Verhagen & Kemmer 1994; Degand 2001), but never fully in combination with the semantics of this causelessness. Which CCs actually do leave their causees implicit? It seems difficult for instance to conceptualize the expression of permission without the presence of a causee. In the light of Talmy's Force Dynamics (1988) it seems plausible to state that the force of the causee is a crucial force in the realization of the effected predicate in a permissive construction. The causer does not move in the direction of the causee, to make the causee realize the effected-predicate, but makes a way for the causee to carry out the effect by moving away. The causer leaves the scene so to speak, and by doing so he gives the causee the opportunity to continue his route. Because of this necessary force of the causee in the conceptualization of permission, one would expect the causee always to be expressed explicitly in a CC with permissive meaning. This in contrast to constructions that express coercive causation, where the force of the causer moves in the direction of the effected predicate, and where the opposing force of the causee is being overruled by the force of the causer. In these cases it should be possible to leave the causee implicit, as in example (4) above and also in (5):

- (5) Hij [causer] laat een omheining [affectee] om zijn tuin bouwen.
 He lets a fence around his garden build
 'He has a fence built around his garden.'

In other words, there has to be some relation between the non-expression of the causee of the construction on the one hand, and the interpretation of that construction on the other hand. The prediction that removal of the causee of the construction relates to a causal, non-permissive interpretation seems plausible.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the most important uses of the causative construction with *laten*, and to investigate which *laten*-CCs do leave their causees implicit and which do not. The expectation is that constructions with no explicit causee are less suitable for the expression of permission. On the other hand, causeless constructions are well suited for the expression of coercive causality. Testing these expectations and the investigation of the uses of the *laten*-construction will be done by means of corpus analysis, and by analysis of actual occurrences of the *laten* causative constructions. My analysis will show that the corpus data

fit the expectations in broad outlines. However, there are some identifiable groups of constructions whose behavior deviates systematically from the expectations. These groups of divergent constructions seem to have their own specific features, grammatically and semantically.

2.1 Interaction between participant semantics and overall construction meaning

In order to understand the consequences of the absence of the causee and the sole presence of the causer for the semantics of the different causative constructions, we have to understand the different roles the causer and the causee play in the different causal events expressed by the CCs. The causer is the subject of the construction and the underlying source of the causal event. The causee is the agent of the effected predicate, the actor that “carries out” the effect. The causer “does something”, expressed by the causal predicate, as a result of which the causee carries out the effected predicate. When the language user uses the CC, he presents (some action of) the causer as responsible for the realization of the effect by the causee. Degand formulates the roles of causer and causee in terms of control:

“Thus it seems that the Agent of the underlying causing event, which we will label causer [...], is given a special status in the overall causative situation: that of (a certain degree of) control of the situation, and especially over the agent of the underlying caused event, labeled the causee [...]. In other words, a speaker will use this type of construction only if he/she believes that the Causee is under control of the Causer or plays a minor role in the causal event.” (Degand 2001:176)

Kemmer & Verhagen (1994) explain the roles of the participants and the meaning of the construction in terms of transfer of energy: the causer is the source of energy, the causee absorbs this energy and carries out the effect. When there is an affectee present, the object of the transitive effected predicate, the stream of energy will be extended:

“The causer [...] is the entity viewed as causing the entire event [...]. The causee is the entity carrying out the activity designated by the effected predicate [...]. The Affectee, where present, is the entity that is the

endpoint of energy (literal or metaphorical) expended in the entire causative event [...]” (Kemmer & Verhagen 1994:119).

“We use the term ‘affectee’ because the participant in question is in the most prototypical cases affected by the causal event” (Kemmer & Verhagen 1994:149).

We have to further elaborate the description of the participants by looking at the different causality types that the CCs express, and the roles the participants play in the realization of the effected predicates in the different CCs. It is useful in this respect to look at the difference between direct causality (*doen*) and indirect causality (*laten*) in terms of the roles of the participants. In *direct* causation, the causer’s role is maximal, while the role of the causee is minimal. The causer’s energy is enough to produce the effect, although he is not the one who actually carries out the effected predicate. Because the action of the causer is seen as a sufficient condition to realize the effect, the causee’s role can be seen as minimal and not relevant in the realization of the effect, although the causee is in fact the one that “carries out” the activity. There is no intention needed from the side of the causee to carry out the effect, the effect happens beyond his consciousness or control. In *indirect* causation, the causer’s role is not a sufficient condition for the realization of the effect although he still is the source of the causal event. There is another force present that is more directly involved in the production of the effect. This can be a third force, as in (6), where it is gravity that is more directly involved in the water’s flowing out of the bathtub. The force can also be inside the causee, as in (7), where it is the causee itself that makes the last decision in carrying out the activity:

- (6) Hij laat het badwater weglopen.
He lets the bath water out flow
‘He lets the water flow out of the bathtub.’
- (7) Hij laat de kinderen het plein op rennen.
He lets the children the square up run
‘He lets the children run onto the square.’

All causees of indirect constructions have some degree of autonomy (Kemmer & Verhagen 1994; Stukker et al 1999; Degand 2001), that

enables them to move to some degree according to their own 'wish'. For animate causees, this autonomy is closely related to volition (Stukker et al. 1999), the will to carry out the effected predicate or not. In the end, the causees need to have at least some intention to carry out the effect. For inanimate causees the autonomy is related to the already mentioned third force, a force of nature, like for instance gravity.

The degree of autonomy of causees is variable, and differs according to the different subtypes of indirect causation. Since the causers in inductive constructions are animate, they too have some mental stance with respect to the effected predicate: the effected predicate can be their volitional goal, or it may be just the (unintended) consequence of their actions. Let us look at the roles of the participants in the following constructions:

- (8) De leraar laat de kinderen de hele middag buiten spelen.
The teacher lets the children the entire afternoon outside play
'The teacher lets the children play outside for the entire afternoon.'
- (9) De moeder laat de kinderen vroeg naar bed gaan.
The mother lets the children early to bed go
'The mother makes the children go to bed early.'
- (10) Hij zal het ons laten weten.
He will it us let know
'He will let us know.'

The example in (8) is of the subtype permissive causality: the teacher allows the children to play outside for the entire afternoon. The causees are autonomous to a high degree and act according to their own wishes. The goal of the causer does not seem to be the children's playing outside per se. The playing is just a consequence of his actions. (9) expresses coercive causality: the mother forces her children to go to bed. The causees are not very autonomous, carrying out the effected predicate probably does not correspond to their own wishes. Goal of the causer on the other hand is the realization of the effected predicate by the children. The meaning of example (10) is somewhere between permission and coercion. It is not clear whether we have to do with a causer giving permission or not. Is it the causer's wish, or is it the wish of the causee that 'we' know? It does not seem to be either a matter of coercion and force,

or a matter of permission in which the causer has to move a barrier. The causer takes care that the causee gets certain knowledge, he is going to report to 'us' on something. This example is an 'in-between-form' of inductive causation, where "it does not make much sense to try to decide between a permissive and a causative reading: the use of *laten*, categorizing an event as involving indirect causation, in itself simply leaves this undecided" (Verhagen & Kemmer 1997: 97). There are more of these 'in-between-forms', which cannot be categorized as either permissive or coercive.

Permissive meaning, as compared to coercive meaning, is the older meaning of the *laten*-construction. So-called in-between-cases did exist next to the permissive constructions in a period that the *laten*-construction did not express coercion yet. These in-between cases were mostly CCs with perception verbs and cognition verbs as effected predicates. Examples of these verbs are: *zien* 'to see', *horen* 'to hear', *merken* 'to notice', *lezen* 'to read' en *weten* 'to know' (Dik 1980). In modern Dutch, constructions with these effected predicates have a meaning in between permission and coercion too:

- (11) Kort voor het jaareinde hebben de politieke leiders van het land elkaar nog even laten weten hoe zij over elkaar denken. (EC: 2484)
 Shortly before the year end have the political leaders of the country each other just let know how they about each other think
 'Shortly before the end of the year the political leaders have let each other know how they feel about each other.'
- (12) [...] om hen in een werksituatie te laten merken dat het samen functioneren iets anders kan zijn dan alleen maar iets samen produceren. (EC: 2989)
 [...] to them in a work situation let notice that the together functioning something different can be than just something together produce
 '[...] to let them notice in a work situation that working together can be different from just producing something together.'

- (13) “Als je dit mooi vindt, moet je ook Dean Martin en Frank Sinatra mooi gaan vinden” zei iemand die ik het liet horen. (EC: 2526)
 ‘ “If you this like, have you also Dean Martin and Frank Sinatra go like” said someone that I it let hear
 ‘ “When you like this, you also have to like Dean Martin and Frank Sinatra,” said someone I played the music for.’

Effected predicates with perception verbs and cognition verbs seem to give the participants in the CCs specific roles, characteristic for constructions with just these effected predicates. The causees seem to be more or less passive, they do not have to ‘act’, but are just experiencers. The activity comes from the causer: with the effected predicate as his goal, he has to act to make it possible for the causee to realize the effect. Example (12) for instance, has an acting causer that wants the effected predicate to happen; the causee has a neutral wish and can stay passive. Example (11) is almost similar in this respect. The causers inform the causees on something; that is their goal, they perform the action of telling something. The causees are passive: they do not act but are just auditors, maybe even against their will.

On the one hand, one could speak about removing of a barrier by the causer, as in permission, but on the other hand, the realization of the effected predicate is the goal of the causer, unlike in permission, where it is more the consequence of the causer’s actions. The causee’s wish is not really to carry out the effected predicate, as it is in permissive causation. The autonomy of the causees is not very high either, the effected predicate can be realized without the causees’ volitional actions. Looking at these characteristics, the constructions seem to have properties of permissive constructions and of coercive constructions, but also properties of their own.

So far, we have looked mainly at the interaction of the different semantic factors within the causative constructions, and at the interaction between the semantic factors and the overall construction meaning. In the next section we will look more closely at how the different causality subtypes expressed by the constructions can be related to each other, in terms of degree of indirectness of causation (Kemmer & Verhagen 1994), and at possible implications thereof for the use of the different constructions, especially for the expression of the causee.

2.2 Continuum of indirectness

Verhagen and Kemmer say the following about the semantic relation between the indirect permissive and coercive constructions and the other inducive constructions (Verhagen & Kemmer 1997:69):

“In fact, what we find with *laten* is a continuum of indirectness. At one end (enablement/permission), there are cases with relatively great autonomy of the causee and some inherent tendency for it to carry out the effected predicate; [...]. At the other end (coercive-causative) are cases in which those factors are much more reduced and the causee would not normally carry out the effected predicate in the absence of an external force [...]. There are also in-between-cases.”

Laten-CCs can be placed on a continuum of indirectness on the basis of their overall meaning, which is based on and related to some features of parts of the construction, like participant roles. According to the quotation above, the notions indirectness, permissive causality and coercive causality are related as follows: the degree of indirectness of the construction is related directly to the degree of autonomy of the causee. At one end of the continuum, the maximal indirectness end, permissive CCs can be found: constructions with the most autonomous causees. At the other end of the continuum, the minimal indirectness end, we can find the coercive CCs: constructions with the least autonomous causees. In between these permissive and coercive CCs, in the middle of the continuum, we find all kinds of ‘in-between-cases’. In other words: the more autonomous the causee, the more permissive the construction, the more indirect the (causation expressed by the) construction.

According to this analysis, there is a clear relation between characteristics of the causee of a construction, and the place of that construction on the indirectness continuum. The question is: how can we fit constructions with no causee into this analysis? Where – and how – do we place constructions with no causee on the continuum; and how autonomous is an implicit causee? Let us look at some examples of causee-less causative constructions:

- (14) Ik laat de was doen.
 I let the laundry do
 ‘I have the laundry done.’

- (15) Ik laat de fiets maken.
 I let the bike repair
 'I have the bike repaired.'

Kemmer and Verhagen give the following description of causeless constructions (Kemmer & Verhagen 1994:139):

“[...] *Zij laten een huis bouwen* ‘They are having a house built’, [...]. In our view, causeless causatives constitute the extreme case of peripherality of the causee participant: here, rather than being elaborated in the clause with specific semantic content, the causee remains entirely schematic and is simply not expressed.”

An implicit causee can be seen as an extremely peripheral causee, according to this quotation. Highly relevant now is the question how we can relate peripherality of the causee to autonomy of the causee (and thus to the degree of indirectness):

“Our claim is that case-marked participants in general differ in degree of conceptual integration in the clausal event, with accusative most integrated, dative less integrated, and instrumental and or agentive least integrated, where high degree of integration correlates with high degree of affectedness and topicality and low degree of autonomy of the causee” (Kemmer & Verhagen 1994:138).

If anything, Kemmer and Verhagen state that high degree of integration and high degree of topicality of the causee correlate with low degree of autonomy of the causee. High degree of peripherality of the causee, as in causeless constructions, means absence from the event and no integration in the event and thus a non-affected autonomous causee. Highly autonomous causees, as we saw before, are causees of permissive constructions, so causees of permissive constructions should be good candidates for staying implicit. However, as we have seen, the initial expectation in this paper was just the opposite, namely that causees in permissive constructions, i.e. highly autonomous causees, are most likely expressed explicitly, and constructions with no causee are most likely to have a coercive meaning.

In the light of these conflicting expectations, and in order to investigate the most important uses of the *laten* CCs, we have to look at

actual occurrences of the causative constructions, and at the semantics of (causeeless) causative constructions as they can be found in actual language use.

3. Corpus analysis

I used corpus analysis to investigate the uses of the *laten* CCs, because corpus data will give the best insights in the form-meaning relations in real occurrences of this *laten*-causative construction. The corpus I used is the Eindhoven Corpus (Uit den Boogaart 1975), the same corpus that Kemmer & Verhagen (1992, 1994, 1997) used for their analysis of Dutch causative constructions. This corpus should give a representative picture of modern, mostly written Dutch. I collected only *laten* CCs from the corpus that are relevant for this survey. Because I want to see relations between causelessness and permission and coercion, only the constructions with animate causers and causees (inducive constructions) are relevant, since only these constructions allow permissive as well as coercive readings. From the inducive constructions we have to select the constructions with a transitive effected predicate and an affectee, because only these constructions have the possibility to leave the causee unexpressed. I looked at constructions with explicit causee and without explicit causee, so the semantics of both constructions can be compared.

The CCs that were selected on base of the above mentioned criteria were divided in three groups, according to their semantics: permission, coercion and 'in-between'; the judgements were checked by another native speaker, and disagreements were resolved by discussion. The 'in-between' group consists of the constructions with perception and cognition verbs in their effected predicates which cannot be called either permissive or coercive. Finally there is a fourth category, consisting of constructions that do not fit in one of the three other categories.

3.1 Results

Table 1 shows the results for the causeless constructions, compared with the results for constructions with three explicit participants. The first column gives the results for the CCs with explicit causee, the second column shows the results for the causeless constructions, and the third column gives the total of constructions in the different categories.

	<i>3 participants</i>		<i>Causeless</i>		<i>Total</i>	
Permissive	12	12%	18	11%	30	11%
In-between	31	31%	41	25%	72	27%
Coercive	44	44%	84	52%	128	49%
Rest	13	13%	20	12%	33	13%
Total	100	100%	163	100%	263	100%

Table 1. *Distribution of inductive CCs (with laten) with three participants and without causee*

At first sight, there seems to be no clear difference between CCs with explicit causee and causeless CCs with respect to the expression of permissive causality. The causeless constructions allow the expression of permission despite the expectations. Permission is not frequently expressed by either one of the constructions at all. The results in the third row show that coercive causality is expressed frequently by both types of constructions, with a preference for the causeless one. The results of the ‘in-between’-category given in the second row show that both constructions are well suited to express causality when they have a perception or cognition verb as their effected predicate.

The fourth row in the table mostly consists of *negative* CCs. The reason these constructions are categorized separately, is that negation seems to give the constructions ambiguous meanings. Compare the following examples (16) without negation and (17) with negation:

(16) Ik laat hem gaan.
‘I let him go’

(17) Ik laat hem niet gaan.
a. ‘I do not let him go’
b. ‘I make him stay’

(16) is just permissive: ‘he’ wants to go, and ‘I’ take away the barrier so ‘he’ actually can go. Example (17) can get a (negative) permissive interpretation: the ‘he’ wants to go and ‘asks’ for permission to do so, but the ‘I’ refuses to remove the barrier (a). The other possible interpretation is that the causer creates a barrier which *forces* the causee to stay in his

place, a more causal interpretation (b). This ambiguity makes it difficult to put these constructions in one category, so they are put in a separate category. 13% of the instances got a place in this category. In the next sections we will look at the results from Table 1 in more detail.

3.2 Coercive constructions

The expectation about the semantics of causeless constructions was motivated by the conceptualization of the roles the participants have in the events expressed by the constructions: coercive constructions have little autonomous causees, who act according to the wishes of the causer and whose own force is being overruled. This led to the hypothesis that coercive causality can be expressed especially easily by causeless constructions.

This expectation about the suitability of causeless constructions for the expression of coercion seems to be right: 84 of the 128 instances have an implicit causee. However, coercion is also frequently expressed by the CC with three explicit participants. Because the two constructions both express coercive meaning frequently, it is interesting to see if there is a difference in meaning between the causeless coercive constructions and the coercive constructions with three explicit participants, since a difference in form may be expected to correlate with some difference in meaning.

Verhagen and Kemmer give the following characterization of the causeless CC (1997:63):

(‘Hij heeft een rolstoel laten bouwen’)

“This sentence means that he caused someone, who is not identified any further, to build a wheelchair: thus the interpretation of the causee, being left out, is highly schematic: because the causee receives no independent linguistic expression, its interpretation is exhausted by the information provided by the effected predicate, which evokes the role of a ‘builder’ (of a wheelchair).”

The fact that the causee is not further specified implies that the identity of the causee is not relevant or unexpected. This in combination with the notion coercive causation leads to an interesting expectation as to which constructions have no explicit causee; they should be constructions where the causee has some tendency to carry out the effect, for instance,

constructions where the causee has the effected predicate as his job or profession. When we take a close look at the roles of the participants in the causeless CCs, the difference between the causeless (coercive) CCs and the CCs with explicit causee becomes visible.

The causer wants the effect expressed by the effected predicate to happen, his goal is that the wheelchair will be built. Obviously, the identity of the builder does not really matter. This causee, although not expressed, can be interpreted as a participant who is not unwilling to build the wheelchair, it might even be his job. He does not have to be forced to come into action, he just has to be told to do so (get an order from a client). We do not expect that there will be pressure involved. It is important to notice, however, that the causee is not going to act without a request of the causer.

Looking at the actual data from the Eindhoven Corpus, the coercive causeless constructions all seem to be precisely this kind of events, where the causee does the effected predicate more or less as its job or profession and where the causer's sole goal is the effected predicate to happen, regardless of the identity of the causee. Below are some examples:

- (18) Op een straathoek kan men nog steeds zijn schoen laten verzolen.
(EC: 2727)
At the corner of the street can one still his shoes let resole
'One can still have his shoes resoled at the corner of the street.'
- (19) Ik heb het buitenverblijf laten afschermen. (EC: 2886)
I have the countryhouse let screen
'I have had the countryhouse screened.'
- (20) Ik zal in ieder geval laten zingen psalm 119, vers 18. (EC: 2772)
I will in any case let sing psalm 119, verse 18
'I will in any case have psalm 119, verse 18 sung.'

Examples (18) and (19) describe events where the causer can indeed be interpreted as a participant who makes a request or can make a request for the effected predicate to be acted out, and where the causee does the action expressed by the effected predicate as a job. In example (20), the causer also makes a request, but in this case, the effected action, the singing, does not have to be a real job or profession. It is the institutional

role of the church choir, or the church community (or whatever the appropriate way to interpret the causees) to sing in the church. In this way their role is still closely related to a job or a profession.

The causer's goal in these CCs is the realization of the effected predicate only, the identity of the causee does not seem to matter, as it does in example (21), where it is highly relevant that it is the children that brush their teeth and not somebody else. The causer also expects that the effect will be carried out without any force. Therefore it is not surprising that the causee does not have to be expressed in the examples above.

It must be clear by now that the causeeless coercive constructions do not find themselves at the extreme end of the continuum of indirectness. The meaning of these constructions is not extremely coercive: the (implicit) causees are not forced by the causer to act out the effected predicate. The identity of the causees does not seem to matter, as long as the effected predicate will be realized. This in contrast to coercive constructions with explicit, non case-marked (i.e. zero-marked) causees (see Kemmer & Verhagen, 1994), like the following:

- (21) De moeder laat de kinderen hun tanden poetsen.
The mother lets the children their teeth brush
'The mother lets the children brush their teeth.'
- (22) U kunt ook uw man eens de boodschappen laten doen voor het weekend. (EC: 2707)
You can also your husband sometime the shopping let do for the weekend
'You may also have your husband do the shopping for the weekend.'

In these examples the identity of the causee is important. Example (21) does not even allow the causee to stay implicit. Example (22) gets a totally different meaning without causee, namely a meaning that is characteristic for the coercive causeeless CC, as was described above. This example also demonstrates the ambiguity that constructions with a zero-marked (non-case marked) causee sometimes can show: both a permissive and a coercive interpretation seem to fit in this example (see also example (1)).

So, coercive constructions do allow implicit causees: quite a large amount of the coercive constructions from the corpus have implicit causees. Since coercive constructions do not have highly autonomous causees, peripherality (implicitness) of the causee cannot correlate with autonomy of the causee. On the other hand, coercive meaning of the CC is not a sufficient condition for leaving the causee implicit: not all coercive meanings can be expressed with a causeeless construction (for instance, causal events in which causees are forced to realize the effect). Causeeless coercive CCs form a subgroup of coercive CCs and cannot be found at the extreme end of the indirectness continuum, where the explicit, zero-marked causees are found. They express a more moderate coercive meaning, and should be placed more towards the middle of the continuum.

3.3 Permissive constructions

Causees in permissive constructions are more autonomous than coerced causees are. Carrying out the effected predicate is the wish of the causee, and in order to do so, the causer has to leave the stage, thereby removing a barrier (Talmy 1988). The causee has to complete the effect on his own force so to speak. Because of this necessary force of the causee in the realization of the effect, the prediction was made that permissive constructions will not leave their causees implicit, and that causeeless constructions will probably not get a permissive interpretation.

However, from Table 1 it can be seen that there are causeeless constructions with permissive meaning: 18 of the 30 constructions. However, these constructions share a striking similarity that sets them apart from the other constructions found in the corpus: the permissive constructions that do not have explicit causees are all *reflexive* CCs: causer and affectee refer to the same entity. In the next section, I will show that the original hypothesis still holds: permissive constructions normally do not leave their causees implicit, but there are specific contexts that allow exceptions.

3.3.1 Middle voice

Some examples of the permissive causeeless constructions that are found in the data are the following:

- (23) Het lagerhuis eiste in 1621 dat hij in staat van beschuldiging zou worden gesteld, omdat hij [causer], naar het heette, zich [affectee] had laten omkopen. (EC: 2960)
 The Lower House demanded in 1621 that he in state of charge would be put, because he, as it was called, himself had let be bribed
 ‘In 1621 the Lower House demanded that he would be indicted, because he had excepted bribes.’
- (24) Men bestreed Hannah Arendts [...] ideeën over de houding van het joodse volk – waarom hebben de joden zich als schapen naar de slachtbank laten voeren? (EC: 2474)
 People fought Hannah Arendt’s [...] opinions about the attitude of the Jewish people – why have the Jews themselves like sheep to the slaughter let carry?
 ‘People disagreed with Hannah Arendt’s [...] view on the behavior of the Jewish people – why did the Jews let themselves be slaughtered like sheep?’
- (25) Want de landbewerkers laten zich niet langer zo bedriegen. (EC: 2496)
 Because the farmers let themselves no longer so deceive
 ‘Because the farmers won’t let themselves be deceived like that any longer.’

These examples, like the other causeless permissive constructions from the corpus, are *reflexive* constructions: causer and affectee refer to the same entity. Since “reflexive” constructions seem to have a special status in the data, I will look at their semantics and form in closer detail. Reflexive constructions with explicit causees will also be included in this analysis. Several kinds of CCs can be called reflexive, because different participant combinations can be coreferential. Consider example (26); here causer and *causee* are referring to the same entity:

- (26) Ik laat me gaan.
 ‘I let myself go’

In my data, the relevant coreference is the type occurring in examples such as (27); the coreferential participants are causer and *affectee*:

- (27) Ze verweten hem niet dat hij zich door ontactisch optreden uit de regering had laten verdrijven. (EC: 2414)
 They did blame him not that he himself by tactless behavior out of the government had let driven
 ‘They did not blame him for letting himself be excluded from the government because of his undiplomatic behavior.’

In the literature, not much can be found about the semantics of these constructions in Dutch (I will call these CCs “reflexive causative constructions” for the moment). Dik (1980) mentions the frequency of occurrence of the reflexive causatives, not only with actual coreference between causer and affectee, but also with other kinds of coreferential relations, like possessive relations. Concerning the semantics of this reflexive CC, the *Algemene Nederlandse Spraakkunst* (ANS) says the following:

“Bij dit laatste type [causatiefconstructie in wederkerende verbinding] kan opgemerkt worden dat de infinitief bij *laten* soms passieve betekenis heeft. Bevat de zin een door-bepaling [causee verbonden met door] dan is de betekenis “toelaten” nog duidelijk aanwezig [...]. Zonder door-bepaling kan de betekenis van *laten* + infinitief naderen tot: “...kunnen worden”.” (ANS 1983:187)

[Translation: For this last type [reflexive CC] it can be noticed that sometimes *laten* + infinitive has passive meaning. When the clause contains a causee with *door*, then the meaning “to allow” is still clearly present [...]. Without the presence of a causee with *door*, the meaning of *laten* + infinitive can approach the meaning “can be.”]

A paraphrase with ‘can be’, however, seems to be more suitable for inanimate CCs in which causer and affectee refer to inanimate entities, as in (28) and (29):

- (28) Rasproblemen laten zich moeilijk van verre beoordelen en oplossen. (EC: 35885)
 Racial problems let themselves hardly from a distance judge and solve
 ‘Racial problems are hard to be judge and hard to solve from a distance.’

- (29) Gezouten vlees laat zich langer bewaren. (ANS: 187)
 Salted meat lets itself longer conserve
 ‘Salted meat can be kept longer.’

Kemmer (Kemmer 1993), mentions these so-called passive-middle constructions, the semantics of which show similarity with the *facilitative* (Kemmer 1993:147), but which differ from constructions with animate causers in a number of ways.

In *inanimate* reflexive constructions, the emphasis is on some property or quality of the causer (and affectee), whereas reflexive CCs with animate causers refer to causal events in which the causer participates. *Inanimate* reflexive CCs do not have an explicit causee, but an implied causee which can be paraphrased as ‘people, in general’ (Fagan, 1992: 211). Many animate reflexive constructions on the other hand, do have an explicit causee, and when they don’t, the implied causees have specific interpretations.

Although the *Algemene Nederlandse Spraakkunst* suggests the same paraphrase for both the animate and the inanimate reflexive construction, the animate one does not seem to fit the paraphrase. Example (30a), for instance, cannot be just paraphrased with ‘can be’, as in (30b):

- (30) a. Ik betreur het, dat behalve de KNVB ook de FBO zich heeft laten intimideren. (EC: 2680)
 I regret it, that apart from the KNVB also the FBO himself has let intimidate
 ‘I regret that, besides the KNVB, the FBO also let itself be intimidated.’
- b. Ik betreur het, dat behalve de KNVB ook de FBO geïntimideerd heeft kunnen worden
 ‘I regret that, besides the KNVB, the FBO could also be intimidated.’

It should be clear that there is more to the meaning of (30a) than is present in a paraphrase with ‘can be’.

The other meaning giving by the ANS, ‘to allow’, is the same as the meaning of a normal prototypical, non-reflexive permissive CC. Although ‘to allow’, and the related meanings ‘to permit’ and ‘not-

interfere' can be used as a paraphrase of a normal permissive CC (see for instance (31a) and (31b)), they cannot cover the entire meaning of the (permissive) reflexive constructions. See for instance example (32a) and its paraphrase with 'to permit' in (32b).

- (31) a. Hij laat de kinderen de klas uitrennen.
 He lets the children the classroom out run
 b. Hij staat toe dat de kinderen de klas uitrennen.
 'He permits the children to run out of the classroom.'
- (32) a. Hij liet zich misbruiken.
 He let himself abuse
 b. Hij stond toe dat hij misbruikt werd.
 'He permitted himself to be abused.'

Permission is an important part of the semantics of the reflexive CCs, but there is more to their meaning, which becomes clear when we go back to the general characterization of causative constructions and their participants as was given by Kemmer and Verhagen:

"The causer [...] is the entity viewed as causing the entire event [...]. The causee is the entity carrying out the activity designated by the effected predicate [...]. The Affectee, where present, is the entity that is the endpoint of energy (literal or metaphorical) expended in the entire causative event [...]" (Kemmer & Verhagen 1994:119).

"We use the term 'affectee' because the participant in question is in the most prototypical cases affected by the causal event" (Kemmer & Verhagen 1994:149).

For reflexive causal events this means that the entity causing the entire event is the same as the endpoint of energy. In other words, the causer is affected by the causal event from which he himself is the source. And so the causer, being the same entity as the affectee, is this time self affected by the causal event over which he has (some) control. One could say that he is 'responsible' for his own affectedness. When this is combined with the notion permissive causation the picture becomes even clearer: the causer *allows* someone, or some force to affect him, he *allows* himself to be affected.

A causee in a prototypical permissive construction is a participant that wants the effected predicate to be realized. We might consequently hypothesize that effected predicates of prototypical permissive constructions are in the first place in the interest of the causees. Let us look at the effected predicates of the permissive reflexive constructions. From the 36 effected predicates (including those with explicit causee and with negation), 33 involve a clearly negative meaning, two are neutral in this respect and only one can be called positive:

Negative meaning

- met zich laten spotten ('to let o.s. be mocked')
- zich (naar de slachtbank) laten voeren ('to let o.s. be led to the slaughter')
- zich de kaas van het brood laten eten (2x) ([fig.:] 'to let o.s. be bullied')
- zich iets laten doen ([lit.:] 'to let o.s. be done something')
- zich iets laten gezeggen ([fig.:] 'to let o.s. be said what to do')
- zich iets laten verbieden ('to let o.s. be forbidden something')
- zich iets laten zeggen ([lit.:] 'to let o.s. be said something to')
- zich in de kaart laten kijken (3x) ([fig.:] 'to give one's hand away')
- zich in een hoek laten drijven ([lit.:] 'to let o.s. be forced into a corner')
- zich in een hoek laten drukken (idem.)
- zich in een positie laten manoeuvreren ('to let o.s. be manoeuvred into some position')
- zich laten bedriegen (2x) ('to let o.s. be fooled')
- zich laten bezwadden ('to let o.s. be defiled')
- zich laten intimideren (2x) ('to let o.s. be intimidated')
- zich laten kisten ([lit.:] 'to let oneself be boxed')
- zich laten leiden (door de duivel) ('to let o.s. be led by the devil')
- zich laten misbruiken ('to let o.s. be abused')
- zich laten omkopen ('to let o.s. be bribed')
- zich laten ompraten ([fig.:] 'to allow o.s. to be brought around')
- zich laten schilderen
(the complete sentence is '*Laat jij je zo schilderen?*' had zij ontsteld aan
Carla gevraagd ('to let o.s. be painted'))
- zich laten uitvreten ('to let o.s. be sponged on')
- zich laten verdrijven ('to let o.s. be excluded')
- zich onder druk laten zetten ('to let o.s. be put under pressure')
- zich op sleeptouw laten nemen ('to let o.s. be led by')
- zich van de bal laten dringen ([lit.:] 'to let o.s. be pushed away from the [soccer-] ball')
- zich laten fêteren ([lit.:] 'to let o.s. be lionized')
- zich laten verleiden ('to let o.s. be seduced')
- zich laten bepraten ('to let o.s. be talked into something')

neutral meaning

zich laten behandelen ('to let o.s. be treated')

zich laten bezoeken ('to let o.s. be visited')

positive meaning

zich laten vertroetelen ('to let o.s. be pampered')

From this table it can be concluded that reflexive permissive constructions have a striking preference for negative effected predicates. This means, that there has to be at least an association with a negative meaning. When this pejorative sense is combined with the notion of permission or allowance and the fact that in reflexive CCs the causer and causee are the same entity, we get the following. First, the strong correlation between permission and a negative effect is clearly motivated: one normally tries to prevent negative results. Second, the causer in a reflexive permissive construction allows himself to be affected (by someone or some force) in a negative way, and allowing yourself to be affected negatively, is negative in itself: Instead of protecting yourself or defending yourself, you allow someone to affect you in a negative way. By using this construction, the speaker can show his opinion that the causer is (in some way) responsible for his own state, and that he should have acted differently from what he did: he should have had protected himself.

An illustration of this meaning is the following view on the holocaust:

- (33) Men bestreed Hannah Arendts ideeën over de houding van het joodse volk – waarom hebben de joden zich als schapen naar de slachtbank laten voeren? [EC: 2474)
 'People disagreed with Hannah Arendt's [...] view on the attitude of the Jewish people – why did the Jews let themselves be slaughtered like sheep?'

From the use of the reflexive permissive CC in this context, we can infer that Hannah Arendt blames the Jews in a way for not defending themselves. Because they did not defend themselves against the Germans, they created an opportunity for the Germans, and contributed in a way to

the realization of the effect, while they should have done something, they should have stood up for themselves. If the speaker does not want to give some responsibility to the subject for his state, his negative affectedness, he will use a construction that is neutral in this respect, for instance a passive construction, instead of a causative construction.

3.3.2 Middle events

Reflexive constructions have yet another remarkable property. Affectees of ‘normal’ causative constructions can easily be replaced by another entity and still be part of a well-formed sentence, but affectees of permissive reflexive CCs cannot be so replaced. In *permissive* reflexive constructions, the coreference between causer and affectee has to stay intact, in order to have a well-formed sentence:

- (34) a. Ik betreur het, dat behalve de KNVB ook de FBO zich heeft laten intimideren [...]. (EC: 2680)
 ‘I regret it that, apart from the KNVB, the FBO has also let himself be intimidated.’
 b. [?] Ik betreur het, dat behalve de KNVB ook de FBO de spelers heeft laten intimideren
 ‘I regret that, apart from the KNVB, the FBO also let the players be intimidated.’
[?] ‘I regret that, apart from the KNVB, the FBO also let the players be intimidated.’
- (35) a. De grote Rik van Steenbergen, [...], heeft zich als een kleine jongen laten misbruiken als opiumkoerier. (EC: 2418)
 ‘The great Rik van Steenbergen [...] has let himself be exploited as drugs courier.’
 b. [?] De grote Rik van Steenbergen, [...], heeft een vriend als een kleine jongen laten misbruiken als opiumkoerier.
 ‘The great Rik van Steenbergen has let a friend be exploited as drugs courier.’

- (36) a. Zij lieten zich té gemakkelijk intimideren door de getruce Spaanse verdedigers. (EC: 2480)
 ‘They let themselves be intimidated too easy by the cunning Spanish defenders.’
- b. ?*Zij lieten de kinderen té gemakkelijk intimideren door de getruce Spaanse verdedigers
 ‘They let the children be intimidated too easy by the cunning Spanish defenders.’

Replacement of the affectee by a non-reflexive participant can sometimes lead to a grammatically well-formed sentence, but then we have to read the sentence as a (causeless) coercive CC: (34b) cannot be read as indicating permission, rather, it has to be read as denoting coercion. This implies a difference between the behavior of coercive reflexive constructions and permissive reflexive constructions: reflexive affectees of *coercive* CCs can be replaced.

The middle voice theory of Kemmer (1993) gives a good explanation for the relative difficulty in replacing the affectee in permissive reflexive constructions. Kemmer characterizes middle events as events in which there is *expected* coreference between the initiator and endpoint, or a *necessary* coreference between initiator and endpoint. According to Kemmer “the greater the participation or involvement of the endpoint self, the more likely the event is to be viewed as one that cannot be directed towards others” (p. 61 *ib.*). When Initiator and Endpoint must be the same entity, or when there is an expectation that they will be the same entity, *self-affectedness* is part of the meaning of the verb or construction (Kemmer 1993: 61).

So permissive reflexive CCs seem to denote middle events. Causer and affectee in reflexive permissive constructions have to be the same entity (the reflexive affectee cannot be replaced), so self-affectedness must be part of the meaning of this construction. Actions as denoted by the permissive reflexive CCs have become inherent self-directed actions, the kind of actions that cannot be directed towards others. Allowing someone else to be affected seems very strange. One has to have (some degree of) responsibility over the affectee, in order to be able to allow the affectedness of the affectee. This is closely connected with the pejorative meaning of most of these CCs. Allowing a negative effect is negative, but allowing a negative effect to happen to yourself is doubly negative. One has responsibility over oneself, and one should protect oneself. This

kind of negligence one can only have towards oneself (or towards affectees for which one is highly responsible), and this kind of events one can only “cause” at oneself.

The semantics of negated “middle” CCs, on the other hand, contain some positive judgement (see (37)).

- (37) Ik laat me niet intimideren!
 ‘I won't let myself be intimidated!’

Instead of letting oneself be affected negatively, one stood up for oneself.

As can be seen from examples (38) and (39), affectees from *coercive* reflexive constructions can be replaced.

- (38) a. Ze liet zich brengen naar gezinnen waar rouw heerste. (EC: 2755)
 She let herself bring to families were mourning was
 ‘She had herself taken to mourning families.’
 b. Ze liet haar zuster brengen naar gezinnen waar rouw heerste.
 ‘She had her sister taken to mourning families.’
- (40) a. Ook freule Poswick, de vroegere eigenaresse van de berg, heeft zich in houtskool laten vereeuwigen. (EC: 2733)
 Also freule Poswick, the former owner of the mountain has herself in charcoal let immortalize
 ‘Freule Poswick, the former owner of the mountain, also has had herself immortalized in charcoal.’
 b. Ook freule Poswick, de vroegere eigenaresse van de berg, heeft haar dochter in houtskool laten vereeuwigen.
 ‘Freule Poswick, the former owner of the mountain, also has had her daughter immortalized in charcoal.’

The explanation for this must lie in the fact that coercive reflexive constructions are no middle events and that self-affectedness (and expected coreference between initiator and endpoint) is not part of the meaning of these constructions. The distinction between middle events and reflexive events is crucial in Kemmer’s theory. Kemmer says that in reflexive events “the initiator acts on itself just as it would act on another entity; the reflexive marker is there simply to signal the unusual fact that the different participant roles happen to be filled by the same entity.” (p.

66 ib.). The type of coreference that exists between the causer and the affectee in reflexive coercive CCs is not different from the coreference in (40):

- (40) Ik zie mezelf in de spiegel.
 ‘I see myself in the mirror’

where initiator and endpoint do not have to refer to the same entity but can be replaced. This example and the coercive reflexive constructions can be interpreted as normal reflexive events.

Recall that the initial hypothesis of this paper predicts that permissive constructions have explicit causees. As we have seen, the corpus data did contain causeless permissive CCs, but they were all “middle” constructions; middle constructions are the only permissive constructions from the data with implicit causees. The reason for this deviant behavior of middle CCs might lie in the fact that focus is not on the activity of the causee, but on the negative self-affectedness of the causer. In this kind of events the causee has a marginal role, although he is autonomous. Not the causee is highly affected, but the causer is. The participant roles in the middle constructions are slightly different from the roles in normal permissive constructions. The responsibility of the causer for the realization of the effect is bigger, because he is also the (“participating”) endpoint in a negative event. The role of the causee automatically becomes smaller.

The identity of the causee can in some cases (instances of the middle CC) be irrelevant, and the focus can be on some property of the subject of the construction (as suggested by the ANS). However, this is not just any property, but some ‘bad’ property.

When the reflexive constructions are separated from the corpus data, the results from the corpus analysis give a different view. Table 2 shows the distributions in the different causeless CCs and the CCs with three participants in the corpus data, i.e. as in Table 1, but this time without the reflexive and middle CCs.

	<i>3 participants</i>		<i>Causeeless</i>		<i>Total</i>	
Permissive	7	8%	0	0%	7	3%
In-between	31	37%	39	33%	70	35%
Coercive	38	45%	73	62%	111	55%
Rest	8	10%	6	5%	14	7%
Total	84	100%	118	100%	202	100%

Table 2. *Distribution of inductive CCs (with laten) with three participants and without causee, without the reflexive and middle CCs*

When the reflexive and middle constructions are removed from the material, the corpus data confirm the expectation: the causeeless constructions are not found randomly in the material, the non-reflexive causeeless CCs from the corpus do not express permission.

3.4 Causeeless causative constructions with perception verbs in effected-predicates

Cognition and perception verbs as effects require actions from the causers of the construction, and not so much from the causees. The causees have a passive role, both in what they have to do to make the effected predicate happen, as in their wish for the effected-predicate to happen. Consequently, the causee does not seem to be an important participant in the conceptualization of the realization of the effected predicate. It is therefore not surprising that these constructions are well suited to leave the causee implicit: 41 out of the 72 constructions from the in-between group do not have an explicit causee. Some examples are:

- (41) Frankrijk heeft al laten weten, dat het tegen de uitbreiding geen bezwaren meer heeft [...]. (EC: 2449)
 France has already let know, that it against the expansion no objections anymore has
 ‘France already made known that it no longer objected to the expansion.’
- (42) De agent was kwaad, en liet dat duidelijk merken. (EC: 2734)
 The policeman was angry and let that clearly know
 ‘The policeman was angry, and made that very clear.’

- (43) Tien jaar geleden had ze een enorme hit met “the end of the world”, maar dat ze op die oude roem niet alleen hoeft te teren liet ze duidelijk horen en zien. (EC: 2400)

Ten years ago had she an enormous hit with “the end of the world, but that she on that old success not only has to live let she clearly hear and see

‘Ten years ago she had an enormous hit with “the end of the world”, but she clearly showed that she does not have to live on that success.’

Not only do constructions with perception or cognition verbs provide an opportunity for the causee to stay implicit, the constructions that actually do leave their causees implicit, get a somewhat separate meaning. Semantic properties that were already present in the instances with explicit causee have become stronger: the focus has moved more in the direction of the contact between the causer and the affectee, and has moved away from the causee, and from the actual realization of the effected-predicate. The focus is on the action of the causer. Whether there is actually someone who acts out the effected predicate, someone who “knows”, “sees” or “notices”, is unclear. Although experiencers are necessary participants in the conceptualization of cognition and perception verbs, in causative constructions with these verbs as effects, experiencers can be absent. Since we do not know if the effect is actually realized (and by who), it is not easy to add an implied causee. The examples can be best paraphrased as ‘to make known’ as in (41), ‘to make clear’ as in (42), and as ‘to show’ or even as ‘to prove’ (43).

So it seems that the constructions with cognition and perceptions verbs as their effected predicates have special characteristics (participant semantics) that allow them to leave the causee implicit. In turn, the constructions with implicit causees have developed their own semantics again.

3.5 Causelessness and the continuum of indirectness

Corpus analysis showed that the features coercive causation and permissive causation are not themselves sufficient conditions for leaving the causee implicit. As we have seen, all three distinct categories (permission, coercion and ‘in-between’) have possibilities for the causee to

stay implicit, but not to the same degree. It is some feature of the CC that allows the causee to stay implicit, and when the causee is indeed unexpressed, the causeless CCs seem to develop their own characteristic meaning. Causeless CCs in all three categories have their own semantics. In events expressed by coercive causeless CCs, causees don't have to be forced, and they don't act against their wish: they seem to have some inherent tendency to carry out the effect. The goal of the causer is the effect only, the identity of the causee is irrelevant.

Causeless CCs with perception or cognition verbs as their effected predicate do not need identifiable causees who actually carry out the effected predicates, and their effected predicates do not need to be realized. The focus is on some action of the causer, regardless of experiencers (causees). Permissive CCs show coreference between causer and affectee when the causee stays implicit. The causer refers to the same entity as the endpoint of the causal events, and its responsibility for the realization of the effect seems bigger than in normal permissive events, and the causee becomes less relevant.

How can these different CCs with and without causee be related to degree of indirectness (Kemmer & Verhagen 1994)? According to Kemmer and Verhagen:

“Directness vs indirectness of causation, we might notice, is closely related to the issue of which participant is more topical, the more indirect the causation, the more peripheral a participant the causee is, and peripherality normally would not cohere with topicality” (Kemmer & Verhagen 1994:133).

But the degree of indirectness of the CC does not seem to be directly related to (degree of) peripherality of the causee: the most indirect constructions (the ones with the most autonomous causees) are permissive constructions. Permissive constructions do not leave their causees easily implicit, as we should expect from constructions with peripheral causees. Coercive CCs on the other hand, easily leave their causees implicit, although these constructions are less indirect CCs, and their causees less autonomous.

However, the coercive CCs with implicit causees are not the most coercive constructions, in which the causees are forced to carry out the effect; causees that (for instance) have the effected predicates as their job have some inherent tendency to carry out the effect.

It might be the case that the constructions that leave their causees unexpressed can be found not at the ends of the continuum, but more towards the middle at both sides. Highly affected or integrated causees can be found at both edges of the continuum: at the least autonomous side, where the coercive constructions are placed, and at the most autonomous side, where the permissive constructions can be found. Here, causees are always expressed.

CCs that leave their causees implicit can be found more towards the middle of the continuum: these coercive constructions have more autonomous causees, and the permissive constructions less autonomous causees. Consequently, degree of autonomy cannot be related directly to degree of affectedness or peripherality. Highly integrated causees can be autonomous too, and causees of permissive constructions can be highly affected.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, I tried to find out which *laten*-CCs leave their causees implicit and which do not.

From Kemmer & Verhagen (1994) it could be concluded that implicit causees are extremely autonomous causees, and that explicit (zero marked) causees are the least autonomous causees. Least autonomous causees are part of a coercive construction, and highly autonomous causees are part of a permissive construction. Continuing this line of reasoning led to the expectation that causees of permissive CCs are most likely to be left implicit and causees of coercive CCs are least likely to be left implicit. The hypothesis of this paper was the opposite: causees of coercive constructions were most likely to be left implicit, and causees of permissive constructions are not left implicit, because they normally have a crucial role in a permissive (interpretation of the) event.

Data from the Eindhoven Corpus show that coercive constructions can easily leave their causees implicit, but coercive CCs that do, have their own specific semantics. Causees of these constructions have a strong tendency to carry out the effect, because it is their job or profession for instance. They do, however, have to get ‘an order’ from ‘a client’, who has the effect as his goal. Permissive constructions indeed do not leave their causees implicit easily, but the ones that do, do so under strict conditions, namely coreference between causer and affectee.

These “middle” CCs have their specific semantics too. Middle causative constructions express some pejorative sense, some negative value judgement towards the action of the subject of the construction. Initiator and endpoint (causer and affectee) refer to the same entity, and the effected predicate is most of the time negative. This means that the causer is negatively affected by an action he is the initiator of. The fact that the causer is “negatively self affected”, adds a negative value judgement to the content of the sentence: the subject should have acted differently, he should have had protected himself. Because self-affectedness is part of the semantics of the construction, the causer seems to get a bigger responsibility for the realization of the effect than in normal permissive events, and the role of the causee becomes smaller, or less autonomous.

CCs with perception or cognition verbs as their effected predicates can also leave their causees unexpressed, and get their own semantics when they have an implicit causee. The focus is on some action of the causer, an identifiable experiencer is no longer necessary in the conceptualization of the event. So, constructions from all three categories can have some special properties that allow the causee to be unexpressed, but the constructions that actually do have implicit causees seem to develop their own specific semantics and properties.

A related issue is how in general permissive or coercive meaning and the degree of autonomy of the causee have to be related to the degree of integration, affectedness and peripherality of the causee. According to Kemmer and Verhagen, coercive constructions have the most affected, integrated and topical causees, while permissive constructions have the least affected, integrated and topical causees. We have seen that this might not be the whole story. Zero marked causees are probably the most affected, integrated and focal causees (Kemmer & Verhagen 1994), but there seems to be no direct relation to autonomy of the causees, or to permission, or to indirect causation. Permissive causees of transitive causative constructions are zero marked too; after all, the constructions with ambiguous meanings (both permissive and coercive interpretations are possible) are the ones with zero marked causees. And so zero marked causees may very well be part of highly permissive constructions and thus be highly autonomous.

Coercive CCs that left their causees implicit were not the most coercive constructions, but the more moderate coercive ones. Consequently, the causees were not the least autonomous ones. On the conti-

num of indirectness, we would not put them at the end of one side, where we find the constructions with least autonomous causees, but more to the middle. Although it is probably the case that implicit causees can be characterized by a high degree of peripherality, and not being in focus, the relation with degree of autonomy cannot last. If there was a relation with autonomy, it would have been hardly possible to express some kind of coercive causation by causeless CCs, and causees of permissive constructions could not be highly affected or focal.

How then should we put the constructions on the continuum of indirectness, and how can we relate them to the different notions of affectedness autonomy and peripherality? On the continuum of indirectness, we find on one side the highly coercive constructions, and on the other side the permissive constructions, and in the middle the in-between-cases. The coercive constructions that leave the causees unexpressed are ‘moderately’ coercive (their causees are more autonomous), and can be found more in the middle of the continuum. The permissive constructions that leave their causees unexpressed, cannot be found at the end of the continuum either. Self-affectedness moves the focus (and affectedness) away from the causee, and the causee’s actions seem less autonomous. Consequently, they cannot be found at the end of the continuum either. Then we have the in-between CCs, which are located in the middle of the continuum anyway. It might be the case that the constructions with the most affected and integrated causees can be found at both ends of the continuum of indirectness, and that these values decrease when one goes to the middle of the continuum, by removing the causee, or by case marking of the causee. By placing highly affected causees on both sides of the continuum, the correlation with autonomy is no longer present. However, further research still has to be done on the conditions that determine affectedness of the causee, and that can give ultimate answers with respect to the relation between degree of affectedness of the causee and permissive/coercive causality.

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