The presence of the past

Historical rooting of national identity and current group dynamics

Anouk Smeekes

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Historical rooting of national identity and current group dynamics

De aanwezigheid van het verleden

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Introduction

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1.1 Research problem

Ethnicity is, in its narrowest sense, a feeling of continuity with a real or imagined past, a feeling that is maintained as an essential part of one's self-definition (DeVos, 1995, p. 25),

The identities of places is very much bound up with the *histories* that are told of them, how these histories are told, and which history turns out to be dominant (Massey, 1995, p. 186).

The quotes above illustrate that the past is crucial for our sense of identity. Without the ability to recall our own past we are not able to understand who we are in the present. This does not only apply to our personal identities, but also to identities that we derive from our memberships in social groups. Awareness of collective history helps people to understand where 'we' come from and hence what constitutes 'our' shared cultural heritage, or as philosopher Simone Weil puts it "A collectivity has its roots in the past" (1971, p.8). The importance of history is particularly stressed in relation to national identity. Theorists have argued that a common history is necessary for the emergence of nations (e.g., Smith, 1998), and that a belief in origin and common descent is what underlies the notion of being 'a people' (DeVos, 1995; Weber, 1968). During the last decade, the historical rooting of national citizenship has become a key notion in Western European debates on cultural diversity. Politicians in various countries have argued that as a result of the increasing cultural diversification of Western European societies, people are less aware of their shared national culture and heritage, and therefore lack a sense of collective consciousness and belonging (see e.g., Duyvendak, 2011; Miller & Ali, 2013). This so called 'crisis of national identity' has contributed to a strong focus on the national past as a means to define who 'we' are as a national community, and what it means to be a national citizen. Historians have described this tendency to focus on the past as a means to symbolically recover national identity as a *heritage culture* and the related political discourses as *heritage politics* (Hewison, 1987).

Like other Western European societies, the Netherlands has developed a growing heritage culture and heritage politics during the last decade (Grever & Ribbens, 2007). The emergence of a Dutch nostalgia television channel, the development of a historical and cultural canon of the Netherlands for Dutch schools, and the expansion of national history museums, are some recent manifestations of this increased focus on national heritage. Dutch politicians and commentators have nourished this focus on the national past by claiming that greater knowledge of national history and heritage would strengthen the cohesiveness of Dutch society (e.g., Duyvendak, 2011). The philosophy behind this

heritage politics is that familiarity with shared national history and traditions would help both natives and immigrants to feel at home in a society that is becoming increasingly globalized, individualized and culturally diverse (WRR, 2007). However, the public discourse on the historical rooting of national identity and immigration has become quite nostalgic and exclusionary. Both left and right wing politicians have argued that native majority members have lost their national home to newcomers and therefore increasingly long for those good old days when it was 'just us'. In their view, making the Netherlands more Dutch would not only foster immigrant integration, but also help natives to feel less displaced and nostalgic. Although the focus on historical roots and cultural heritage may foster feelings of Dutchness among native majority members, it can form a problem for the inclusion and acceptance of immigrants, as they have no roots in the host country and are thus not part of this shared history. As such, the historical roots paradigm that is evoked in public discourses on national identity and immigration runs the risk of favoring those 'who have always been here', hereby marginalizing the position of immigrants.

These public debates raise new questions regarding the consequences of the historical rooting of national citizenship for current group dynamics in culturally diverse settings. In what ways, and why, is this historicization of national citizenship important in informing national identity? And what are the consequences of this historical rooting for intergroup relations? Against the background of these broad questions, I examine in this book how perceptions of national identity temporality affect current group dynamics among native majority members in the Netherlands. Combining a social psychological perspective with insights from other academic disciplines, such as history, anthropology and sociology, my research aims to better understand how the historical rooting of national citizenship affects psychological processes occurring within the national in-group (i.e., intragroup dynamics), as well as how it affects attitudes towards out-groups (i.e., intergroup dynamics). More specifically, the main aims of this dissertation are to examine the extent to which perceptions of national identity temporality among native majority members affect (1) their identification with the nation, and (2) their evaluation of out-groups and other social developments that potentially undermine national identity. In addition, I aim to provide insights in the processes and conditions that guide these relationships.

This dissertation presents two empirical chapters that include native majority members' *national identification* as an explanandum. This explanandum refers to identification *with* the nation, which is understood as the importance that native

majority members attach to their national group membership (Verkuyten, 2005, 2014). Furthermore, with one exception, the different empirical chapters focus on the attitudes of native Dutch towards *expressive rights for Muslim immigrants* as a measure of out-group attitudes. In most Western European countries, including the Netherlands, the debate about national identity and cultural diversity is mainly focused on the presence of immigrants with Muslim backgrounds, who form the majority of the immigrant population in Western Europe. Muslim immigrants are often portrayed as having ways of life that are incompatible with those of native populations and as forming a threat to national cohesion and identity (see Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). The changes that accompany the increasing religious and cultural diversification of Dutch society are particularly visible in the public environment. Therefore, the hotly debated questions evolve around concrete rights and expressions of Islamic religion in the public domain, such as the building of mosques and Islamic schools, and the use of religious symbols, such as the headscarf. I therefore focus on attitudes of native Dutch majority members towards these visible manifestations of Islam as an explanandum in this dissertation.

In addition, this dissertation includes one study (Study 3 in chapter 3) that examines temporal understandings of national identity in relation to (a) native Dutch' *opposition to European integration* and, (b) a more general endorsement of *national heritage protectionism*. Although the national heritage discourse in the Netherlands mainly revolves around religious and cultural diversification, it is also linked to European integration. The growing integration of Europe has been framed as a threat to the maintenance of national identity and sovereignty (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2010). Including these two additional explananda enables me to examine whether the historical rooting of national citizenship not only holds relevance for attitudes towards immigrant out-groups, but more generally affects native Dutch' tendency to protect their national identity against social forces that potentially undermine it.

The remainder of this introduction will be structured as follows. In the following two sections I will define national identity temporality and theoretically motivate the focus on this concept for the study of group dynamics. These two sections also discuss how the current project advances previous scientific work. Subsequently, I discuss in more detail the context of the Netherlands, which forms the setting of this dissertation. A discussion of the research questions guiding the empirical chapters will then follow. Finally, I present the data used in the empirical chapters, followed by a brief outline of the book.

1.2 National identity temporality

According to the social identity perspective (Turner & Reynolds, 2001), incorporating both Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), individual's self-concept can be defined along a continuum that ranges from self-definition in terms of personal identity to self-definition in terms of social identity. Personal identity refers to self-understandings which are unique to the individual, whereas social identity concerns the sense of self that one derives from membership in a social group. Moreover, there is a corresponding behavioral continuum, where personal identity is seen to motivate interpersonal behavior, while social identity is seen to underlie group behavior. It is furthermore proposed that individuals strive for a positive self-concept, and because part of the sense of self is derived from group membership, individuals seek to belong to groups that satisfy this need. One way to achieve a positive social identity is by positively differentiating one's own social group (the in-group) from other groups (out-groups). That is, through intergroup comparisons individuals seek to positively distinguish their in-group from relevant out-groups and this helps them to achieve or maintain a positive social identity. It has recently been argued that temporality of national identity is particularly well-suited to provide native majority members with a positive national identity (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011). The reason is that in reflecting on national history the unique heritage of the national in-group becomes salient, and this underscores how the in-group is different and distinct from other groups. Although social psychologists already pointed at the importance of incorporating temporal context in social psychological analysis more than thirty years ago (e.g., Armistead, 1974; Gergen, 1973; Harré & Secord, 1972; Ring, 1967), empirical work in the field has to date not devoted much attention to the role of identity temporality in guiding group processes and intergroup relations (Condor, 1996a). Given the increased focus on the historical roots of national citizenship in various Western European countries (Verkuyten, 2014), it is important to analyze how such temporal national self-understandings affect current group dynamics.

National identity temporality is understood in this dissertation as those representations of national identity that possess a time component. There are different ways in which group members can draw on time to construct their national identity (e.g., Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Lowe, 2012; Sani, 2008), and I make a broad distinction between *forms* and *contents* of national identity temporality. *Forms of national identity temporality* refer to the different ways in which national in-group members can temporally understand

their national group and identity, while the *contents of national identity* temporality refer to the narratives of the national in-group's origins, traditions and history. In the following, I will first elaborate on the different forms of national identity temporality and subsequently move on to the contents of national identity temporality.

Forms of national identity temporality

People tend to have an understanding of their ethnic and national identities as entities that possess a past, present and future (Sani et al., 2007). This capability to reflect on the past and to project oneself and the social groups to which one belongs in the future is uniquely human, and helps people to make sense of the world and the social contexts in which they live (Reicher, 2008). To put it more strongly, it would not be possible for people to have a sense of identity if they would lack the ability to experience it over time. Supporting this claim, there is research within clinical psychology showing that when people perceive disruptions between their past, present and future selves, this causes psychological discomfort and distress (e.g., Jetten, Haslam, Pugliese, Tonks, & Haslam, 2010; Lampinen, Odegard, & Leding, 2004). During the last few years, social psychological researchers started to examine the importance of a sense of continuity between the past, present and future for collective identities. A series of studies by Sani and colleagues (Sani et al., 2007; Sani, Bowe, & Herrera, 2008a, 2008b; Sani, Herrera, & Bowe, 2009) revealed that the perception that one's group has temporal endurance over time (i.e., perceived collective continuity) is associated with stronger attachment to one's in-group and bolsters social connectedness. Furthermore, recent studies found that in-group members tend to oppose social developments and out-groups that undermine group continuity (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Jetten & Wohl, 2012). However, this emerging body of research has hardly addressed the underlying psychological mechanisms that drive these relationships. Thus, the questions that have been left unanswered are: (a) why are people likely to identify with groups that are seen to possess collective continuity? and (b) why do people tend to oppose social developments and out-groups that potentially disturb this sense of collective continuity? I further extend this recent line of research by testing the explanatory role of feelings of *collective self-continuity* in relation to national identity.

Self-continuity refers to having a sense of connection between one's past, present and future self. Philosophers see this sense of temporal continuity as a defining property of identity (e.g., Taylor, 1989), because without the ability to consciously and reflectively experience time people would not be able to have a sense of identity. As such, the ability

to experience self-continuity allows people to have a sense of 'I' over time (Bluck & Liao, 2013). Yet, following the social identity perspective, people should also be able to derive a sense of self-continuity from their memberships in social groups. Thus, collective self-continuity refers to the feeling that the part of the self that is derived from group membership has temporal endurance. Collective self-continuity is different from the concept of perceived collective continuity as discussed by Sani and colleagues (e.g., 2007, 2008b). Whilst perceived collective continuity refers to the perception that one's group has temporal endurance, collective self-continuity refers to the feeling that being a group member connects one's past, present and future self. These two different forms of understanding one's social identity have been described by Ashmore and colleagues (2004) in their organizing framework for collective identity. They propose that individuals develop stories about themselves and their social identities, and distinguish between 'the story of my group' (*group story*) versus 'the story of me as a member of my group' (*collective identity story*). They define 'group story' as "the individual's mentally represented narrative of a particular social category," and 'collective identity story' as "the individual's mentally represented narrative of self as a member of a particular social category" (p. 96). In this dissertation, I consider perceived collective continuity as a group story and collective self-continuity as a collective identity story. Applied to national identity, this means that I distinguish between the following two forms of temporality: (1) the perception of one's national group as continuous over time (i.e., *national group continuity*), for example by passing on traditions to different generations, and (2) the feeling that one's national group membership affords a sense of self-continuity (i.e., *national self-continuity*).

The concept of collective self-continuity was initially not discussed within the social identity tradition, which predominantly focused on the assumption that individuals seek to maintain or enhance their self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). However, subsequent theorists have proposed motivational extensions of the social identity framework. This body of research takes a more functional approach to social identity (e.g., Aharpour & Brown, 2002; Breakwell, 1993; Brewer, 1991; Correll & Park, 2005; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006), which rests on the premise that group membership can have a diverse motivational basis. This means that people seek identification with groups to fulfill various motives or needs. This body of literature generally indicates that, next to self-esteem, people seek a sense of continuity, distinctiveness and belonging, which subsequently guide identity processes. However, this literature is fragmented as theorists from different disciplines have proposed a wide variety

of motivational constructs in relation to identity (Vignoles, 2011). Recently, an attempt has been made to integrate these insights into an integrative model of motivated identity construction (Vignoles, 2011).

Motivated Identity Construction Theory (MICT; Vignoles, 2011) proposes that next to basic needs, such as food and water, people also have psychological needs, called identity motives. The central idea is that both personal and social identities must satisfy certain requirements in order to be adaptive or useful, and that these requirements take on a motivational character in guiding processes of identity construction and maintenance. Specifically, integrating insights from previous work within the functional approach to social identity with new empirical evidence (Vignoles et al., 2006), MICT proposes that people are not only motivated to maintain a sense of self-esteem (the self-esteem motive), but also to perceive themselves as continuous over time (the continuity motive), as being different from other people (the distinctiveness motive), as being competent and capable (efficacy motive), as included and accepted within their social contexts (belonging motive), and as having a meaningful life (the meaning motive). While recent studies have pointed out that the continuity motive is an important and unique part of identity (e.g., Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2012; Vignoles et al., 2006), there have been no studies that have specifically examined the sense of self-continuity that people derive from their national group membership and how this guides processes of national identification and intergroup relations.

There are various groups that can provide people with a sense of self-continuity, but this is particularly likely for national groups. The reason is that nations are mainly defined and understood as communities that live together through time (e.g., Anderson, 1983, Bhaba, 1990), and are often perceived as having a shared culture and identity that is passed on from generation to generation (David & Bar-Tal, 2009; DeVos, 1995; Smith, 1998). In contemporary Western Europe, social developments, such as immigration and European integration, are often portrayed as undermining the continuity of national identity. In this dissertation I examine whether the psychological need for self-continuity forms a motivational explanation for why historicization of national identity bolsters identification with the nation and enhances negative out-group attitudes among native majority members. Thus, it is investigated whether natives identify with a temporally enduring national in-group and tend to reject threatening out-groups, because this satisfies their need for self-continuity. By examining feelings of national self-continuity as an explanation for current intra- and inter-group dynamics this research complements and extends work on identity motivation, group processes and intergroup relations.

In addition, it has been proposed that, next to the distinction between collective self-continuity and perceived collective continuity, the latter can also be divided into two different forms. That is, an *essentialist* understanding of collective identity continuity has been distinguished from a *narrativist* understanding (Sani et al., 2007, 2008b). The former refers to the perception that core features of the group's culture and identity are stable and continuous over time, and the latter to the perception that events in group history are interconnected and form a coherent and causal storyline. While it has been demonstrated that these two forms of perceived collective continuity are empirically distinct (see Sani et al., 2007, 2008b) it remains unknown whether both forms are equally important in informing current group dynamics. The reason is that previous studies have either combined the items of both forms into a single scale measuring 'perceived collective continuity' (Sani et al., 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009) or have only assessed one of the two forms (e.g., Jetten & Hutchison, 2011). However, I propose that it is unlikely that both forms of perceived collective continuity are equally important in guiding group identification and intergroup relations. The reason is that qualitative work has shown that people tend to perceive their national and ethnic groups as being immutable and possessing fixed cultural characteristics (Gill-White, 1999; Hutchison & Smith, 1996), and tend to represent their national identity in essentialist rather than narrativist terms (Condor, 1996a, 1996b). In addition, social psychologists have found that essentialist in-groups more strongly satisfy basic psychological needs related to group membership than groups that are more mutable (e.g., Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000), and that essentialist in-group perception is related to negative views of out-groups (Leyens et al., 2003). Hence, another added value of this dissertation is that I distinguish between these two forms of perceived collective continuity, and test whether they are differentially related to processes of group identification and intergroup relations.

Continuity is not the only way in which national in-group members can draw on time to understand their national identity. Lowenthal (1985) proposes that the national past is used to validate national identity in the present in two ways: by *preservation* and by *restoration*. Preservation connects to the concept of collective continuity as discussed within social psychological work (e.g., Sani et al., 2007; 2008b) and refers to the notion that people find comfort in the belief that their social identities have temporal endurance, and are therefore likely to believe that 'we' are (and should be) the way we have always been. This means that most people want to preserve their national ways of life, symbols, and practices in order to maintain a sense of collective continuity. However, in times of social change and transition, groups may get the feeling that they are losing their connection to

'who we were' in the past, and this is likely to result in attempts to restore a sense of collective continuity. Attempting to restore a national culture and identity that is perceived to be lost or undermined is another way in which the past validates the present. That is, people often refer back to the way things were done in the past, such as customs and traditions, in order to legitimize how things should be done in the present. Lowenthal (1985) suggests that preservation and restoration often exist simultaneously. Thus, people are likely to preserve their group identity by affirming its continuity over time and this is alternated with attempts to restore traditions and ways of life that are seen to be undermined by foreign flavors.

One manifestation of this alternation between preservation and restoration are feelings of *national nostalgia*. National nostalgia is understood in this dissertation as a sentimental longing for the good old days of the country. Scholars have proposed that national nostalgia emerges in times of social change and transition, because it has a restorative function (Boym, 2001; Hewison, 1987; Lowenthal, 1985). The reason is that in longing for those good old days of the national past group members become more aware of the importance of their original national culture and traditions as a basis for preserving their national identity (Stokols & Jacobi, 1984). However, in Western European contexts of increasing cultural diversity and immigration, the nostalgic sentiment that is observed among natives is often an expression of the mourning and regret over these changes that have taken place (Duyvendak, 2011). More specifically, in these contexts, a fond remembrance of the national past can serve as a painful reminder of the good things that are lost, and this is likely to result in attempts to restore 'the way we were'. In this dissertation, I examine whether feelings of national nostalgia among the native Dutch may have negative consequences for their evaluation of Muslim immigrants. Although the feelings of nostalgia that people may experience for their national past have been addressed by historians and sociologists, this concept has so far received no empirical attention in the social psychological literature. While social psychologists have extensively examined feelings of personal nostalgia (i.e., related to an individual's biography) (e.g., Sedikides, Wildschut, Arndt, & Routledge, 2008a; Wildschut, Sedikides, Arndt, & Routledge, 2006), there have been no studies that have specifically examined the feelings of nostalgia that can be experienced in relation to objects or symbols that are public and widely shared (such as national history and identity). As national nostalgia concerns a sentimental longing for the national past in response to changes in the present, I conceive the concept as another form of national identity temporality. More specifically, following work by Rubenstein (2001), I consider national nostalgia as a feeling of temporal separation from a fondly remembered national past.

Contents of national identity temporality

The focus on national history that is currently observed in public discourses in immigration in various Western European countries explicitly frames the national past as the rooted basis for national identity (Verkuyten, 2014). However, within these discourses there are different representations of what this national past looked like. This is in line with writings by Renan (1990), who suggested that the nation is dependent upon an act of imagination of commonality of which the contents may vary. In the Western European context, there are ongoing debates about the customs, symbols and traditions that constitute the shared national heritage. This means that people do not merely understand their national identity as a temporal entity, but also attribute *content* to its temporality. This latter aspect is relevant for the study of intergroup relations, because depending on the particular historical content that is seen to provide the roots of national identity, natives may position themselves favorably or unfavorably towards the presence of others. Thus, next to different forms of national identity temporality, this dissertation examines different contents that people can attribute to national identity temporality and how this may affect their attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. Throughout this dissertation, this latter aspect of national identity temporality is also referred to as *historical representations* of *national identity*.

Historical representations of national identity are socially shared as they are expressed in public and political discourses (Ashmore et al., 2004). However, in these discourses, the national past is often reconstructed and used flexibly to fit the interests of the present (Hewison, 1979; Lowenthal, 1985). That is, strategic representations of national history are often employed in heritage politics to justify present arrangements (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). For instance, politicians and commentators have publicly represented Western European national identities as being rooted in Christian heritage (e.g., Zolberg & Woon, 1999), while others have emphasized a national heritage of humanism and religious tolerance (e.g., Bowskill, Lyons, & Coyle, 2007). Following Reicher and Hopkins (2001), I do not distinguish between authentic (i.e., 'real') and invented versions of the national past or national identity, but rather focus on how different versions of the national past and identity that dominate current political discourses affect people's attitudes. The strategic use of historical representations of national identity figures prominently in Western European debates on immigration and cultural diversity (Duyvendak, 2011; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Verkuyten, 2014), and this book attempts to provide insights into how such historical representations affect intergroup attitudes among native majority members.

There have been few studies in social psychology that have focused on historical representations of national identity, but the historical perspective to group dynamics has not been absent from the field altogether (László, 2014; Lowe, 2012; Verkuyten, 2014). For instance, there is a considerable body of research that has looked at how representations of historical wrongdoings of in-groups, such as slavery, colonialism and genocide, impact current intergroup relations via group-based emotions (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Group-based emotions refer to the emotions that people can feel on account of their in-group's behavior towards others, such as guilt or shame, even when they were not personally involved in this intergroup conflict. Most studies within this line of research have examined whether experiencing group-based emotions for such historical wrongdoings impact current attitudes towards the harmed out-group. For instance, several studies have shown that feelings of group-based guilt for past in-group atrocities are related to reparation and compensation intentions towards the harmed out-group in the present (e.g., Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004; Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Swim & Miller, 1999). A related body of research has examined how group members, despite not being directly harmed, can experience themselves as victims of past group conflict (i.e., collective victimhood), and how this impacts current intergroup relations (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009).

Furthermore, there have been studies by Liu and colleagues (e.g., Liu et al., 2005; Liu & László, 2007; Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, & Khan, 2008) that have examined how representations of national history guide current socio-political attitudes, such as support for military action (Liu & Hilton, 2005), and legitimation of social inequality (Sibley et al., 2008). Although these two strands of research demonstrate that representations of national history influence current group dynamics, they have mainly focused on representations of historical intergroup conflict, and have not examined the different historical narratives that national in-group members may use to define their national identity. The historical representations that are examined in this dissertation pertain to representations of the in-group and no reference is made to an intergroup context. As such, another innovation of this dissertation is the focus on historical representations of national identity, and how this impacts current intergroup dynamics.

The social identity perspective (Turner & Reynolds, 2001), is an important theoretical paradigm for the study of intergroup dynamics within social psychology. As indicated earlier in this chapter, the social identity perspective proposes that people seek to achieve a positive social identity through a process of social comparison, by which they try to positively distinguish their in-group from relevant out-groups. However, it proposes that

this need for positive distinctiveness does not automatically lead to negative attitudes towards out-groups. One key proposition of the social identity perspective is that whether negative out-group attitudes occur is dependent on the extent to which people *identify with their social group* and the particular *content* of social categories. It is proposed that people have an understanding of what defines their group (i.e., the contents and meanings of their group identity), such as a shared ideology, and group norms. These specific meanings that people ascribe to group membership determine the particular ways in which group members behave. Moreover, different meanings of social identity can be used to achieve positive distinctiveness. For example, positive distinctiveness can be obtained by defining the in-group as more dominant and powerful than other groups, but also by defining it as more tolerant and charitable (e.g., Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Tarrant, Dazeley, & Cottom, 2009). These different meanings are likely to have different consequences for how in-group members behave towards out-groups. Furthermore, in-group identification is proposed to determine the likelihood of acting in terms of group membership and conforming to in-group norms. Specifically, studies have shown that people who strongly identify with their in-group are more likely to be concerned about their group and to act in accordance with group norms than people with lower levels of group identification (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1999; Haslam, Ellemers, Reicher, Reynolds, & Schmitt, 2010).

Although the social identity perspective was initially designed to include the socio-cultural context (Turner, 1999), most research conducted within this line of research has addressed how the level of group identification impacts group processes and intergroup relations, and has disregarded the particular meanings attached to group membership (László, 2014; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). It has been proposed that by ignoring the particular contents and contexts of social identity, identity has remained a 'black box' in these studies (Breakwell, 1993). Yet, during the last few years, empirical work within the social identity perspective started to examine how particular contents of national identity interact with national identification in guiding intergroup dynamics. Specifically, there has been an increasing amount of research that has looked at the difference between ethnic and civic understandings of national identity in predicting attitudes towards immigrants (e.g., Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2010; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009; Wakefield et al., 2011). The ethnic understanding refers to a definition of national identity in terms of ancestry, bloodlines, and cultural heritage, and has been shown to predict prejudice towards immigrants. The civic understanding, on the other hand, refers to a definition of national identity in terms of citizenship, participation and commitment, and this understanding has been shown to be related to more positive attitudes towards immigrants (e.g., Reijerse, Van

Acker, Vanbeselaere, Phalet, & Duriez, 2013). While these findings indicate that out-group attitudes depend on the content that people ascribe to national group membership, it has been argued that the ethnic versus civic dichotomy is limited in capturing the different versions of national ideologies that exist within societies (Billig, 1995; Brown, 1999). That is, the meanings of national identity may be specific for different countries as they depend on the situated historical and cultural context. By reducing these specific meanings of national identity to an ethnic versus civic dichotomy the particular cultural and historical context is not taken into account (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). In this dissertation, I apply the original propositions of the social identity perspective, by considering how specific historical representations of national identity interact with levels of national identification in predicting attitudes towards Muslim immigrants among Dutch natives. As such, I take into account the historical definitions of national identity that exist in the Dutch context.

Empirically, one innovation of this dissertation is the measurement of historical representations of national identity. The empirical literature that exists on this subject within social psychology is predominantly qualitative (e.g., Condor, 1996a), and there is hardly any quantitative empirical work that has developed measurements of historical representations of national identity. In order to gain an understanding of the different historical representations of national identity that are present in the Dutch context I have examined dominant political discourses on national identity and immigration. Thus, an important contribution is that our empirical measurements take the specific (historical) context and content of national identity into account (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). I designed and tested these new empirical constructs using multiple quantitative methods (i.e., cross-sectional and experimental). In addition, another consequence of the absence of quantitative work on this subject is that it has thus far remained unclear which *causal processes* are involved. The experimental data that I collected allowed me to test and make claims about the causal role of specific historical understandings of national identity for intergroup dynamics.

1.3 The setting of this book: The Netherlands

This dissertation focuses on group dynamics in the Netherlands. The Netherlands is considered to be one of the most secular countries in Europe (Becker & De Hart, 2006), where almost half of the population (46%) does not affiliate with any religion. Of the people who are religious, the majority is affiliated with one of the Christian denominations (58%), and a minority of 5% adheres to Islam (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012). Most of the

Muslims in the Netherlands have a Turkish or Moroccan background (70%), and came to the Netherlands as (family members of) immigrant workers in the 1960s and 1970s. More recently, the Muslim immigrant population became somewhat more diverse as a cause of the influx of refugees from countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq and Iran. An important characteristic of the Dutch Muslim population is that it consists almost entirely of people with an immigrant background (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012). While the presence of Muslims in the Netherlands is not new, they have become the focal topic of debates on immigration and are at the heart of what has been described as the 'crisis of multiculturalism' (Modood, 2007; Zolberg & Woon, 1999).

The Netherlands used to be one of the countries in Europe with the most extensive policies on multiculturalism, but there has been a retreat from multiculturalism in discourse and policy making since the 1980s (Joppke, 2004; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). While immigrants used to be allowed much space to preserve their own identities, cultural assimilation of immigrant minorities became preferred (Vasta, 2007). The main argument behind this shift was that multiculturalism was increasingly seen as emphasizing and promoting cultural differences at the expense of a shared national identity, hereby undermining the cohesiveness of Dutch society (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Verkuyten, 2014). Similar to other Western European countries, such as France and Great Britain, multiculturalism in the Netherlands was held responsible for minorities adhering to their own cultural identities instead of that of the host nation. Muslim immigrants became the main target of these debates, as they were perceived as the most culturally deviant immigrant group (Duyvendak, 2011). Islamic values and practices were portrayed as being incompatible with Western liberal values, and are still considered to form a problem for Muslim immigrant integration into Dutch society. The idea that Islam is deviant from Dutch culture is currently endorsed by almost 50% of the native majority members (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007), who's attitudes towards Muslims are among the most negative in Europe (Pew Research Center, 2005). Furthermore, Islamophobia in the Netherlands has risen sharply during the last decade (Van der Valk, 2012). According to some commentators there is an ongoing 'Dutch-Muslim cultural war', especially over issues of free speech and religious minority rights (e.g., Scroggins, 2005). Visible manifestations of Islam have been described in the media as part of the increasing 'Islamization of the Netherlands', and as corroding Dutch culture and identity (Uitermark, Rossi, & Van Houtum, 2005; Van der Valk, 2012). As such, the attitude towards expressive rights of Muslim immigrants among the native Dutch is a key issue for understanding intergroup relations in the country.

Related to these developments is the growing presence and popularity of the Dutch far right Party for Freedom (PVV). This party gained around 10% of the votes during the national elections in 2012 and their electorate is growing according to recent polls (Kester, 2013). The PVV has called for an immigration stop from Islamic countries, and is strongly opposed to public expressions of Islam, such as Mosques and Islamic schools. Next to anti-Muslim standpoints, opposition to the European Union is an important focus of the PVV. The PVV has been running an election campaign dominated by anti-European standpoints, titled "Their Brussels, our Netherlands", in which the European Union is framed as a threat to Dutch heritage and economy (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012). Compared to other European countries, the Dutch have shown the strongest increase in euroscepticism from 1994 to 2004 (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2010). While the Netherlands used to give the strongest support for the European Union and further integration (e.g., Deflem & Pampel, 1996; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005), the Dutch rejected the European Constitution in a 2005 referendum. One of the main controversies regarding the European Constitution was the reduction of the sovereignty of the nation-state in deciding on certain policy domains (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2010). As such, Muslim immigrants and European integration have become key topics in the national heritage discourse in the Netherlands.

This project focuses on the perspective of the native Dutch majority. Throughout this dissertation, the term native Dutch is applied to people who, next to possessing a Dutch passport, also have a Dutch ethnic background. Dutch ethnicity in public discourses is mostly understood as referring to those people who have a shared Dutch background in terms of history, customs, language and descent (Ghorashi, 2003). This understanding of Dutch ethnicity remains central to the *imagination of nationhood* among native Dutch majority members (Anderson, 1983; Renan, 1990). While the Netherlands, like most countries, allows people to acquire national citizenship (i.e., to naturalize), researchers have argued that there exists a strong representation of a historically rooted national community (Duyvendak, 2011; Ghorashi, 2003). This means that although ethnicity is not objectively determining the nation, the nation it still widely imagined and represented as a community based on common descent. As such, in the Dutch context, ethnic background functions as a boundary marker (Alba, 2005) of national identity. In most of the studies in the empirical chapters of this book, I labeled participants as native Dutch on the basis of a combination of relevant and available demographic characteristics, such as nationality and birthplace of the parents. When a measure of self-categorization in terms of ethnic background was available this was also taken into account. Although there are some social groups, for instance ethnic minorities, where external classification of group membership

can be problematic as it does not always match with self-labeling (see Fleischmann, 2011), this is not likely to be the case for native Dutch group membership.

Summing up, in this dissertation I analyze perceptions of national identity temporality and their relevance for understanding current group dynamics from a social psychological perspective. The core of this book consists of six empirical chapters that may be read as stand-alone research articles. These chapters were written as research papers with the purpose to be published in international journals. The considerations raised above led to the following book structure. In Part 1, *Forms of national identity temporality*, I examine continuity and nostalgia as two different temporal understandings of national identity, and investigate how and why they inform current group dynamics. In the first two empirical chapters, I look at the impact of perceptions of national (self-) continuity on national identification, and on attitudes towards Muslim immigrants and European integration. Then the focus shifts to national nostalgia, and how this feeling affects attitudes towards Muslim immigrants.

After having examined different ways in which people can temporally understand their national identity and how this impacts current group processes, Part 2, *Contents of national identity temporality*, zooms in on the particular historical contents of national identity. That is, the chapters in this part of the dissertation look at different historical representations of national identity that figure prominently in current discourses on immigration in the Netherlands, and investigate how these impact current intergroup relations. It is specifically examined how, why, and under what conditions, a Christian and religious tolerant historical representation of national identity impacts attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. In the following section, an overview will be provided of the empirical chapters of this book. A short description and explanation of the central research question for each chapter is presented. Subsequently, I describe the data sources used in order to provide information about the empirical basis of this project. The introduction concludes with an outline of this book and an overview of the empirical chapters.

1.4 Research questions and aims

1.4.1 Part 1: Forms of national identity temporality

Chapter 2: Perceived group continuity, collective self-continuity and in-group identification
Chapter 2 examines how and why essentialist and narrative forms of national group continuity affect identification with the national in-group. Although previous research has distinguished between these two forms of collective identity continuity (e.g., Sani et al., 2007),

there have hardly been studies examining whether these two forms are equally important in predicting national identification. Furthermore, while research on identity motivation has shown that the need for self-continuity is an important reason for why people identify with groups (e.g., Vignoles et al., 2006), research has not examined how groups can provide a sense of self-continuity. Drawing on research on perceptions of collective continuity (e.g., Sani et al., 2007; 2008a; 2008b) and identity motivation (Vignoles, 2011), it is hypothesized that people are particularly likely to identify with essentialist (rather than narrativist) continuous national in-groups, because essentialist in-groups more strongly satisfy the psychological need for self-continuity. Chapter 2 thus raises the questions:

> *To what extent do essentialist and narrativist perceptions of national group continuity influence identification with the national in-group? And can these influences be explained by the satisfaction of a sense of national self-continuity?*

Chapter 3: Collective self-continuity, group identification and in-group defense

Chapter 3 builds on the results of Chapter 2 and takes a closer look at the sense of self-continuity that people can derive from their national group membership (i.e., national self-continuity). Thus, I further investigate the relative importance of national self-continuity for group identity and group processes, by taking into account other identity motives that have been identified in the literature on functional approaches to social identification (for an overview see Vignoles, 2011). Specifically, Chapter 3 examines whether national self-continuity forms a unique basis for national identification, and whether it underlies the desire to defend the national in-group in the context of existential threats to national identity. Integrating insights on intergroup processes with research on identity motivation (Vignoles, 2011), it is hypothesized that national self-continuity not only forms a unique motive for identification with the national in-group, but also forms an explanation for why people tend to display in-group defensive reactions when the existence of their national identity is undermined. Chapter 3 extends research on identity motivation by examining national self-continuity simultaneously with other national identity motives. In addition, it complements work on intergroup relations by examining whether the in-group defensive reactions resulting from existential threats to national identity, are driven by an increased sense of national self-continuity. The research questions of Chapter 3 read:

> *Does national self-continuity form a unique and important motive for why people identify with their national in-group? And does this motive drive in-group defensive reactions in the context of existential group threat?*

Chapter 4: National nostalgia, autochthony and opposition to Muslim expressive rights

Against the background of a nostalgic sentiment that is observed in public discourses on national identity and immigration (Duyvendak, 2011), Chapter 4 examines how and why a sentimental longing for the country's good old days affects attitudes towards Muslim expressive rights among native Dutch majority members. Although historians, sociologists and anthropologists have pointed at the power of nostalgia to influence group dynamics (e.g., Boym, 2001; Davis, 1979; Hewison, 1987), social psychologists have mainly studied the consequences of nostalgia for individual lives (e.g., Sedikides et al., 2008a; Wildschut et al., 2006). Furthermore, the existing body of research on nostalgia in social psychology has mostly examined feelings of nostalgia that relate to people's personal past. Yet, nostalgia may also be experienced in relation to the national past, which is public and widely shared (Davis, 1971). Chapter 4 adds to the existing social psychological literature on nostalgia by examining national nostalgia as an explanation for negative attitudes towards immigrant out-groups.

In addition, Chapter 4 seeks to understand why feelings of national nostalgia relate to attitudes towards Muslim immigrants, and introduces autochthony beliefs as a mediator. Autochthony refers to the belief in entitlements for the first inhabitants ('owners') of a territory, and this concept has recently been introduced as a social psychological determinant of prejudice towards immigrants (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013). In Chapter 4, I argue that endorsing autochthony is one way to restore the lost national home for which native majority members long. The research questions of Chapter 4 read:

To what extent do feelings of national nostalgia result in more opposition to Muslim expressive rights? And can this effect be explained by endorsement of autochthony?

1.4.2 Part 2: Contents of national identity temporality

Chapter 5: National group continuity and opposition to Muslim immigrants

Chapter 5 forms a bridge between the first and second part of this dissertation, by examining different *forms* and *contents* of national group continuity, and how they influence the evaluation of Muslim immigrants. Applying the essentialist versus narrative form of collective continuity to the study of intergroup relations, it is firstly examined whether the essentialist understanding of national group continuity is more likely to be associated with negative attitudes towards Muslim immigrants than the narrativist understanding. Based on previous literature and research on group continuity, essentialism, and intergroup

relations (e.g., Condor, 1997; Haslam, 1998; Jetten & Hutchison, 2011), it is predicted that especially those who perceive their nation as possessing an enduring cultural essence are likely to oppose Muslim expressive rights. Furthermore, it is expected that this relationship can be explained by the perception that Muslim immigrants pose a threat to in-group stability and continuity (i.e., continuity threat).

A second research question in this chapter is concerned with the different contents of national identity that people perceive to be temporally enduring, and how these may impact perceptions of continuity threat and opposition to Muslim immigrants. Following SCT (Turner et al., 1987), the general hypothesis is that perceptions of essentialist continuity may have different consequences for the evaluation of Muslim immigrants depending on the historical content that people assign to these representations. I focus on two different historical representations of national identity that figure prominently in Dutch debates on cultural diversity and national identity; namely that of being a nation that is rooted in Christianity versus being a country that has its roots in a long tradition of religious tolerance. Within Dutch debates on national identity both historical representations of national identity are invoked in order to argue whether the increasing presence and visibility of Islam poses a threat to the continuation of national culture and identity. Some politicians and scholars have described European national identities as being deeply rooted in Christian heritage in relation to which Muslim immigrants constitute visible 'others' (Foner & Alba, 2008; Zolberg & Woon, 1999), whereas others have emphasized that the presence and visibility of Muslim immigrants is in line with national histories of religious diversity and tolerance, and hence with 'who we have always been' (Bowskill et al., 2007). Taking these public debates as a starting point, it is hypothesized that (a) stronger endorsement of the belief that the Netherlands is rooted in Christianity is related to stronger opposition to Muslim expressive rights, because it enhances the perception that Muslim immigrants constitute a continuity threat, and (b) that stronger endorsement of the belief that the Netherlands is traditionally a country with much room and tolerance for other religions is related to lower opposition to Muslim expressive rights, because it decreases the perception that they form a continuity threat. Summing up, the research questions of Chapter 5 read as follows:

> *Which forms and contents of national group continuity influence opposition towards Muslim expressive rights? And to what extent can these effects be explained by perceptions of continuity threat?*

Chapter 6: National identification and opposition to Muslim immigrants

Chapters 6 and 7 build on Chapter 5 by taking a closer look at the conditions under which these historical representations of national identity impact attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. Specifically, it is examined to what extent the effects of a Christian versus religious tolerant historical representation of national identity on attitudes towards Muslim immigrants are dependent on the extent to which people identify with the national in-group. Chapter 6 zooms in on the Christian representation, and examines whether making this representation salient can mobilize people who do not strongly identify with their national in-group (i.e., lower identifiers) to become more negative towards Muslim immigrants. Research within the social identity tradition has shown that, compared to lower identifiers, particularly those who strongly identify with their national in-group (i.e., higher identifiers) tend to be concerned about their group and engage in in-group defense mechanisms in the context of identity threat (Doosje et al., 1999; Haslam et al., 2010). However, in this chapter I contend that lower identifiers may also become mobilized to defend their in-group when identity conflict is associated with threats to the historical continuity of the national in-group. Previous research in the Netherlands has shown that lower national identifiers' support for restrictive immigration policies was equal to that of higher identifiers when their national identity was salient (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Likewise, the central hypothesis of Chapter 6 is that lower identifiers will increase their opposition to Muslim immigrants to similar levels to that of higher identifiers when a Christian representation is made salient. In other words, this chapter examines whether bringing considerations of a rooted Christian national identity to the fore enlarges the coalition of native majority members opposed to Muslim immigrants above and beyond those already predisposed to oppose them (i.e., higher identifiers). Thus, the research of Chapter 6 reads:

> *To what extent can people who do not feel strongly attached to their national group membership (i.e., lower identifiers) become mobilized against Muslim immigrants when a Christian historical representation of national identity is salient?*

Chapter 7: National identification and acceptance of Muslim immigrants

The final empirical chapter investigates a historical national identity representation of religious tolerance and examines whether and why the endorsement and salience of this representation can make higher national identifiers more positive towards Muslim immigrants. According to SCT, higher identifiers are more likely to act in accordance with

their in-group norms and beliefs than lower identifiers. This means that whether higher identifiers display positive or negative attitudes towards others is dependent on what they perceive to be the shared in-group norms and beliefs. Historical representations of national identity typically have strong normative properties. That is, in public discourses these representations often serve to justify how things are and ought to be based on the explanation of how it came to be that way (Liu & László, 2007; Southgate, 2005). Following SCT, I hypothesize that higher identifiers could become more accepting towards Muslim immigrants when they perceive their national identity to be rooted in a tradition of religious tolerance. This is an interesting prediction, as it goes against the well-established finding that higher national identifiers generally tend to display more negative attitudes toward immigrants than lower identifiers (e.g., Bourhis & Dayan, 2004; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).

In addition, Chapter 7 examines *why* this religious tolerant representation is related to more acceptance of Muslim expressive rights among higher identifiers, and introduces perceived identity incompatibility between the Dutch and Muslim way of life as an explanation. Research in the Netherlands has shown that many native Dutch consider Dutch culture to be incompatible with Islam (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). However, it is likely that natives who understand their national identity as being rooted in a tradition of religious tolerance and openness will have lower perceptions of identity incompatibility of Muslims, because this understanding implies that there has always been room for different religious sub-groups to express their identity at the same time. Thus, I hypothesize that (reduced) perceptions of identity incompatibility may explain the positive relationship between the historical representation of religious tolerance and acceptance of Muslim expressive rights for higher identifiers. Chapter 7 addresses the following research questions:

> *To what extent can people who feel strongly attached to their national group membership (i.e., higher identifiers) become more positive towards Muslim expressive rights when they perceive their national identity to be rooted in a tradition of religious tolerance? And can this effect be explained by (reduced) perceptions of identity incompatibility between the Dutch and Muslim way of life?*

1.5 Data sources

The empirical chapters of this book are based on different data sources. With the exception of Chapter 6, all data were collected during the process of writing this dissertation. This section describes the data that I employ for each of the empirical chapters, and elaborates on the data that were collected. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the data sources, participants and design, authors, and year of collection, for each study in the different empirical chapters. All data and codebooks are stored in the archive of the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER) of Utrecht University (UU), and are available on request.

Data chapter 2

Chapter 2 focuses on group continuity, collective self-continuity and national identification, and consists of three studies. For Study 1 and Study 2, we designed a survey experiment and a cross-sectional survey that respectively manipulated and measured different understandings of national group continuity. These are the Experiment of Group Continuity and the Group Continuity Survey. For Study 3, I use an experiment on group continuity that was embedded in the Dutch Society Survey. The Dutch Society Survey is a national survey (with 5 embedded experiments) that I designed in collaboration with colleagues from ERCOMER, and that was carried out by TNS NIPO among a representative sample of the native Dutch population of 18 years and older. TNS NIPO is a Dutch survey agency that has a database of thousands of respondents, and also maintains a representative panel of native Dutch respondents. Participants received the questionnaire by means of an e-mail sent by TNS NIPO, and completed the survey online. Of the participants that received this email, 57 percent participated and completed the questionnaire. Six different versions of the questionnaire were randomly assigned to this sample, and we selected the respondents that completed the two versions that were specifically designed for this study. For these specific versions of the questionnaire 567 people were invited and the response rate was 53 percent.

Data chapter 3

Chapter 3 aims to study the uniqueness and importance of national self-continuity in predicting national identification and in-group defense mechanisms, and consists of three studies. Study 1 relies on multiple samples, which vary in terms of demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender and education) in order to test the robustness of the

Table 1.1 Outline of data sources, participants and design, per study in each empirical chapter

Chapter	Study	Data source	Participants	Design	Authors	Year
2	1	Experiment of Group Continuity	UU students	Paper-and-pencil questionnaire in class	Smeekes & Verkuyten	2012
	2	Group Continuity Survey	UU students	Paper-and-pencil questionnaire in class	Smeekes & Verkuyten	2010
	3	Dutch Society Survey - TNS NIPO database	Dutch adults	Online Survey (with embedded experiments)	Verkuyten, Martinovic, & Smeekes	2011
3	1A	National Identity Motive and Continuity Survey	Secondary school pupils	Paper-and-pencil questionnaire in class	Smeekes & Verkuyten	2010
	1B	Utrecht Community Sample Survey	Dutch adults	Online Survey (with embedded experiments)	Smeekes & Verkuyten	2011
	1C	Historical Tolerance, Continuity and Cultural Diversity Survey	UU students	Online Survey (with one embedded experiment)	Smeekes & Verkuyten	2011
	2	Continuity Motive Experiment	Secondary school pupils	Paper-and-pencil questionnaire in class	Smeekes & Verkuyten	2011
	3	The Netherlands and Europe Survey - TNS NIPO database	Dutch adults	Online Survey (with embedded experiments)	Verkuyten, Martinovic, & Smeekes	2012
4	1	Dutch Society Survey - TNS NIPO database	Dutch adults	Online Survey (with embedded experiments)	Verkuyten, Martinovic, & Smeekes	2011
	2	Laboratory Experiment of National Nostalgia - ELSE database	UU students	Online Survey (with embedded experiments) in computer laboratory	Smeekes & Verkuyten	2013

Chapter	#	Survey	Sample	Method	Authors	Year
	1	Historical Tolerance, Continuity and Cultural Diversity Survey merged with Group Continuity Survey	UU students	Online Survey (with one embedded experiment)	Smeekes & Verkuyten	2011
			UU students	Paper-and-pencil questionnaire in class	Smeekes & Verkuyten	2010
5	2	Historical Representations Survey	UU students & Secondary school pupils	Paper-and-pencil questionnaire in class	Smeekes & Verkuyten	2011
	3	Dutch Society Survey - TNS NIPO database	Dutch adults	Online Survey (with embedded experiments)	Verkuyten, Martinovic, & Smeekes	2011
6	1-3	Historical Representations and Attitudes Towards Muslims Study	UU students & Secondary school pupils	Paper-and-pencil questionnaire in class	Verkuyten & Poppe	2009
	1A	Historical Tolerance Survey merged with Group Continuity Survey	UU students	Paper-and-pencil questionnaire in class	Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Poppe	2009
			UU students	Paper-and-pencil questionnaire in class	Smeekes & Verkuyten	2010
	1B	Historical Representations Survey	UU students	Paper-and-pencil questionnaire in class	Smeekes & Verkuyten	2011
7	2	National Identity Motive and Continuity Survey	High school pupils	Paper-and-pencil questionnaire in class	Smeekes & Verkuyten	2010
	3	Historical Tolerance, Continuity and Cultural Diversity Survey	UU students	Online Survey (with embedded experiments) in computer laboratory	Smeekes & Verkuyten	2011

prediction that national self-continuity is a unique and important motive for identification with the national in-group. For Study 1A, I designed the National Identity Motive and Continuity Survey, which is part of The Utrecht School Project that I set up during the first two years of my PhD research. In The Utrecht School Project I collected data among pupils (aged 13-19) from two secondary schools in the province of Utrecht.[1] In exchange for this data collection, I gave a series of introductory tutorials in both schools (in collaboration with their teachers) on research methods in the social sciences to pupils in the 5th and 6th grade.

For Study 1B, I designed the Utrecht Community Sample Survey as a component of The Utrecht School Project. During the series of tutorials for 5th and 6th grade secondary school pupils, they were asked to take home two of my questionnaires, and to select two adult family members or acquaintances who would complete these questionnaires. Being part of the introduction to social scientific research methods, pupils received specific instructions on how to collect social scientific data. Pupils were requested by their teacher to hand in the questionnaires within two weeks. The teacher gave me the questionnaires and I subsequently entered and analyzed the data. I discussed the results with the pupils in the second tutorial.

For Study 1C, I use the Historical Tolerance, Continuity and Cultural Diversity Survey. This was an online survey (with one embedded experiment) carried out among UU students in the Experimental Laboratory for Sociology and Economics (ELSE) of the Department of Sociology (ICS). ELSE is a computer lab consisting of 30 computers cubicles and has a database of more than 2000 students of UU. Students were invited by e-mail to come to the laboratory and participate in the research, and registered for different experimental sessions through an online system. In the invitation it was mentioned that people could only participate in this experiment if they could speak Dutch and had the Dutch nationality.

For Study 2, I designed the Continuity Motive Experiment, which was part of The Utrecht School Project. Next, for Study 3, I use an experiment on existential threat that was embedded in The Netherlands and Europe Survey. The Netherlands and Europe Survey is a national survey (with 5 embedded experiments) that I designed in collaboration with colleagues from ERCOMER, and that was carried out by TNS NIPO among a representative sample of the native Dutch population of 18 years and older. We selected the respondents that completed the two versions that were specifically designed for this study. For these specific versions of the questionnaire 718 people were invited and the response rate was 57 percent.

Data chapter 4

Chapter 4 aims to investigate how feelings of national nostalgia among native Dutch relate to their endorsement of autochthony beliefs and attitudes towards Muslim expressive rights. In order to examine the research questions of this chapter, I used the Dutch Society Survey for Study 1, and the Laboratory Experiment of National Nostalgia for Study 2. From the Dutch Society Survey I selected the respondents that completed the version that was specifically designed for this study. For this specific version of the questionnaire 276 people were invited and the response rate was 55 percent. Next, the Laboratory Experiment of National Nostalgia among UU Students is an experiment that that was carried out in the ELSE lab at UU.[2]

Data chapter 5

Chapter 5 is designed to study how and why forms and contents of national continuity perceptions affect attitudes to Muslim immigrants. For Study 1, I merged data from the Group Continuity Survey with data from The Historical Tolerance, Continuity and Cultural Diversity Survey. Specifically, we merged data on identical items assessing perceived collective continuity, continuity threat and opposition to Muslim rights. For Study 2, we designed the Historical Representations Survey, for which data was collected among high school pupils during the Utrecht School Project (63%), and among UU students (37%). For Study 3, I use an experiment on national continuity representations that was embedded in the Dutch Society Survey and selected the respondents that completed the three versions that were specifically designed for this study. For these specific versions of the questionnaire 822 people were invited and the response rate was 57 percent.

Data chapters 6 and 7

Chapters 6 and 7 focused on the conditional effects of Christian and religious tolerant historical representation of national identity on attitudes towards Muslims. For Chapter 6, I use data from the Historical Representations and Attitudes Towards Muslims Study, for all three studies. Chapter 7 consists of three studies, and Study 1 comprises two different samples. For Study 1A, I merged data from the Group Continuity Survey with data from the Historical Tolerance Survey that I designed earlier, but had not been used before. Both these datasets were collected among UU students, and I combined identical items on perceptions of religious tolerant continuity, national identification and attitudes towards

Muslim rights. For Study 1B, I use the aforementioned Historical Representations Survey, but only selected the UU students for the analyses. In order to examine the predictions of Studies 2 and 3, I respectively use the aforementioned National Identity Motive and Continuity Survey and the embedded experiment of the Historical Tolerance, Continuity and Cultural Diversity Survey.

1.6 Overview of the book

The empirical part of this dissertation consists of six chapters (chapters 2-7) that may be read as stand-alone articles, followed by a concluding chapter (chapter 8) in which I summarize the main findings and suggest directions for future research. The six empirical chapters are divided in two parts. The first part is concerned with forms of national identity temporality and their relation to current group dynamics. This part starts with questions on the role of collective self-continuity as an explanatory mechanism of national identification and in-group defense (chapters 2 and 3), and goes on with examining national nostalgia as another temporal understanding of national identity, and tests how and why this affects attitudes towards Muslim immigrants (chapter 4). The second part of this dissertation focuses on the contents of national identity temporality, and is specifically devoted to the particular historical contents that native Dutch majority members ascribe to their national identity, and how this affects their attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. Chapter 5 analyses how a Christian and religious tolerant historical understanding of national identity affect attitudes towards Muslim expressive rights. The final two empirical chapters focus on the moderating role of national identification in the relation between historical representations of national identity and attitudes towards Muslim expressive rights. Chapter 6 examines whether lower national identifiers can be mobilized to oppose Muslim expressive rights when a Christian historical representation of national identity is salient. Finally, chapter 7 investigates whether a religious tolerant historical representation of national identity can make highly identified nationals more positive towards Muslim expressive rights. Table 1.2 provides an overview of the research questions of the different empirical chapters, as well as whether the chapters focuses on forms or contents of national identity temporality, and the explananda.

Table 1.2 Outline of empirical chapters

| Chapter | Research question | National identity temporality | | National identification | Explanandum | |
		Forms	Contents		Attitude Muslim expressive rights	Opposition EU & national heritage protectionism
2	To what extent do essentialist and narrativist perceptions of national group continuity influence identification with the national in-group? And can these influences be explained by the satisfaction of a sense of national self-continuity?	X		X		
3	Does national self-continuity form a unique and important motive for why people identify with their national in-group? And does this motive drive in-group defensive reactions in the context of existential group threat?	X		X	X	X
4	To what extent do feelings of national nostalgia result in more opposition to Muslim expressive rights? And can this effect be explained by endorsement of autochthony?	X			X	
5	Which forms and contents of national group continuity influence opposition towards Muslim expressive rights? And to what extent can these effects be explained by perceptions of continuity threat?	X	X		X	
6	To what extent can people who do not feel strongly attached to their national group membership (i.e., lower identifiers) become mobilized against Muslim immigrants when a Christian historical representation of national identity is salient?		X		X	
7	To what extent can people who feel strongly attached to their national group membership (i.e., higher identifiers) become more positive towards Muslim expressive rights when they perceive their national identity to be rooted in a tradition of religious tolerance? And can this effect be explained by (reduced) perceptions of identity incompatibility between the Dutch and Muslim way of life?		X		X	

1.7 Notes

1. These schools were the Anna van Rijn College (Nieuwegein) and the Utrechts Stedelijk Gymnasium (Utrecht).

2. Like the other data collection in the ELSE lab students were invited by e-mail to come to the laboratory and participate in the research and registered for different experimental sessions through an online system. In the invitation it was again mentioned that people could only participate in this experiment if they could speak Dutch and had the Dutch nationality.

PART I

Forms of national identity temporality

Perceived group continuity, collective self-continuity and in-group identification

2

2.1 Introduction

Philosophers and psychologists have described the establishment of continuity over time as a defining property of identity (e.g., Erikson, 1963; Taylor, 1989). That is, in order to have a sense of identity it is necessary to see links between one's past, present and future self (Epstude & Peetz, 2012). Prior research has particularly studied the beneficial consequences of a sense of personal continuity for psychological well-being (for an overview see Sani, 2008). More recently, social psychologists have started to explore continuity at the group level, showing that perceptions of collective continuity are associated with stronger emotional attachment with one's group (Sani et al., 2008b). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that group continuity can be understood in two different ways (e.g., Sani et al., 2007, 2008b): (1) a cultural essentialist representation, in which the emphasis is on the continuation of core features of the group's identity over time, and (2) a historical narrative representation that focuses on the interconnectedness of events in group history.

The current research investigates whether these two understandings of group continuity are equally important in predicting in-group identification. Specifically, by integrating literature on collective continuity and essentialism with recent research on identity motivation (e.g., Sani et al., 2008b; Vignoles, 2011) we propose that particularly essentialist (compared to narrativist) continuous in-groups foster group identification, because they are most likely to satisfy the psychological need for self-continuity – that is, the feeling that one persists throughout time (Vignoles et al., 2006). As part of people's sense of self is derived from membership in social groups, these groups can provide them with a sense of self-continuity (i.e., collective self-continuity). Although it has been empirically demonstrated that perceived group continuity has a two dimensional structure (Sani et al., 2007, 2008b), previous studies have not examined whether these two dimensions are equally important in predicting group identification and satisfying the psychological need for self-continuity. Moreover, while research on identity motivation has shown that the need for self-continuity is an important reason for why people identify with groups (Vignoles et al., 2006), research has not examined how groups can provide a sense of self-continuity.

The central aim of this research is to examine whether people are particularly likely to identify with essentialist (rather than narrativist) continuous in-groups, because these groups most strongly satisfy the psychological need for self-continuity. We tested this prediction in three studies in the context of national identity. This context is particularly suitable to examine identity continuity, as nations are understood as 'imagined communities' that move together through time (Anderson, 1983) with a shared historical and cultural heritage (Bhabha, 1990).

Identity continuity

Theoretical accounts on identity by Erik Erikson (1963) and Breakwell (1986) consider self-continuity as a core dimension of identity and describe the absence of it as 'identity confusion' and 'identity threat', respectively. Initially, empirical research on the importance of self-continuity was mainly conducted by clinical psychologists and psychiatrists, who observed that disruptions of self-continuity are a source of discomfort and impaired psychological functioning (e.g., Scharfetter, 2003; Sims, 2003). More recently, continuity got broader scholarly interest within personality and social psychology. Studies have shown that self-continuity is a unique and important motivational principle for both personal and collective identity construction (Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2012; Sani, 2008; Vignoles et al., 2006). Moreover, it has been found that people desire possible future selves that satisfy a sense of self-continuity, and fear those who threaten it (Vignoles, Manzi, Regalia, Jemmolo, & Scabini, 2008). Thus, it is generally proposed that people are motivated to achieve and maintain a perception of the self as being temporally consistent (Vignoles, 2011).

It has been demonstrated that identity continuity is also relevant for group processes and intergroup relations. People who perceive continuity of their group identity report higher levels of in-group attachment (e.g., Sani et al., 2007, 2008b), and are more prone to oppose social developments and out-groups that undermine this feeling of group continuity (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Jetten & Wohl, 2012). The likely reason why feelings of group continuity foster attachment to the in-group and increase rejection of out-groups is because they strengthen people's sense of self-continuity. That is, group continuity gives people the feeling that the part of the self that is defined by their group membership will continue after their personal self ceases to exist (Sani et al., 2007; Reicher, 2008), which subsequently enhances their desire to defend the in-group. This idea is in line with research from the terror management perspective (e.g., Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000), which proposes that people seek identification with groups in order to maintain a sense of symbolic immortality (i.e., collective self-continuity) – a sense that one is part of entities larger and longer lasting than the self. Groups that are perceived as temporally enduring are especially likely to bolster this sense of collective self-continuity, and this may consequently foster attachment to the in-group (Sani et al., 2007, 2008b).

Different understandings of identity continuity

It has been proposed that people can understand identity continuity in different ways. This idea has first been described in research investigating the strategies of young people

to assert temporal continuity of personal identity in the face of inevitable change (for an overview see Chandler & Proulx, 2008). This body of research shows that although strategies to assert personal continuity become more sophisticated with age, adolescents generally use two broad approaches to construct identity continuity, termed *essentialist* and *narrativist*. In the essentialist approach, the personal self is understood as possessing a stable and enduring essential "core" that stays the same over time. Specifically, essentialist constructions of identity continuity deny or trivialize identity change. In the narrativist approach, continuity of the personal self is constructed as a coherent storyline that connects different parts of one's life together. This means that personal identity continuity can be obtained in the presence of change by binding together life's various changing moments into a coherent narrative.

Similar constructions of identity continuity have been observed at the group level. Matching work on personal continuity, Sani and colleagues (2007) have observed that the perceived continuity of groups is also based on an essentialist and narrativist understanding. Specifically, in the essentialist approach the group is seen to possess core cultural elements, such as values, beliefs and customs, that are not eroded by the passage of time and are passed on from generation to generation. In the narrativist approach, group continuity is constructed by referring to the causal connection between different events and phases in group history that form a coherent storyline. Sani and colleagues (2007) developed a two-dimensional measurement of 'perceived collective continuity' (PCC), which consists of the essentialist and narrativist sub-scales. These researchers validated this PCC scale in various European countries.

Subsequently, various studies have demonstrated that perceptions of collective continuity predict group identification (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Sani et al., 2007, 2008a, 2008b). For instance, research by Jetten and Hutchison (2011) showed that people are more willing to identify with a new (merged) group when they feel that the continuity of their original group is reassured. Furthermore, Sani and colleagues (2008b) have proposed that the reason for the relationship between PCC and group identification is that an in-group that is perceived as temporally enduring satisfies the need for self-continuity. Although this prediction has so far received no empirical support, feelings of self-continuity have been shown to predict identification with groups (e.g., Vignoles et al., 2006). Yet, it is unclear whether both dimensions of PCC are equally important in satisfying this need for self-continuity. There is some empirical support for the notion that essentialist group continuity is more important for national identity than narrativist group continuity. For example, Sani et al. (2007; Study 1) found that the essentialist sub-scale correlated more strongly

with national identification and feelings of national unity than the narrativist sub-scale. We extend this line of research in two ways. First, by using both survey and experimental designs, we seek to provide stronger empirical evidence for the relative importance of essentialist and narrativist group continuity in bolstering national identification. Second, we test the explanatory role of self-continuity in these relationships.

We propose that people are more likely to identify with groups that are perceived to possess essentialist (compared to narrativist) continuity, because these groups most strongly satisfy their need for self-continuity. The reason is that group members tend to feel particularly connected by their shared beliefs, values, customs and traditions that have persisted throughout time among different generations (Gezentsvey & Ward, 2008; Smith, 1998). Being part of a group that is seen to possess an enduring and stable cultural essence is likely to give people the feeling that the part of the self that is defined by this group membership has temporal endurance, and thus satisfies the need for self-continuity. Social psychological research has looked at the different components of essentialism (e.g., Haslam, Rotschild, & Ernst, 2000), and continuity has been identified as one of them (Haslam, 1998). This means that one way in which social categories are essentialized is by understanding them as historically stable, described by Haslam (1998, p.294) as the notion that "…despite developmental transformations in the outward appearance of their members and historical changes in human understandings of their nature, the essential sameness of the kind remains". Particularly this notion of stability and immutability in the essentialist account of group continuity is important in fostering a sense of collective self-continuity. The narrativist understanding of group continuity is less likely to fulfill this self-continuity function as it merely sees group members as connected by a series of related events in history, and hence does not discount change of group identity. This is in line with research showing that essentialist in-groups more strongly provide basic psychological needs related to group membership, than groups that are more mutable (e.g., Yzerbyt et al., 2000).

Present research

The present research tested the proposition that particularly the essentialist (compared to narrativist) understanding of in-group continuity fosters group identification, via the satisfaction of the psychological need for self-continuity. We designed three studies to empirically test our predictions, using the context of national identity. In Study 1, we experimentally induced an essentialist and narrativist representation of group continuity and tested (compared to a control condition) whether they were equally predictive of national

identification. In Study 2, we used a cross-sectional design to test the effect of these two representations on collective self-continuity and national identification. We hypothesized that particularly the essentialist (compared to narrativist) representation of group continuity would be related to a stronger sense of collective self-continuity, and subsequently to higher levels of national identification. Study 3 tested the same predictions as in Study 2, using an experimental design among a representative sample of the native Dutch population.

2.2 Study 1

We manipulated the salience of essentialist and narrativist understandings of group continuity among native Dutch participants and compared these conditions to a control condition. No previous studies have experimentally induced these two understandings of group continuity. We designed a manipulation for these two understandings on the basis of the two-dimensional scale (see Appendix 2A) developed by Sani et al. (2007). Specifically, in the essentialist continuity condition we asked participants to read and write about the continuity of the original Dutch culture and identity. In the narrativist condition participants were asked to read and write about the connectedness of events in Dutch history. In the control condition no text or writing task was given.

Method

Participants, design and procedure
One hundred forty-eight Utrecht University undergraduates participated for course credit (Experiment of Group Continuity, see Table 1.1). We only selected native Dutch participants, which resulted in a total sample of 135 (70.9% female). The ages ranged between 18 and 30 ($M = 20.69$, $SD = 1.88$). In a between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to the essentialist continuity, narrativist continuity or control condition. Participants completed all materials in a paper-and-pencil format in the order that follows. After participants completed the experiment they were debriefed by the instructor.

Based on the items of the essentialist dimension of the PCC scale (see Appendix 2A), participants in the *essentialist continuity* condition read the following:

> According to historians (Wilderink & Zwaan, 1992) a nation (i.e., a country) can be best described as a community that lives together through time. One of the most important characteristics of a national community is that national norms, values, customs and practices are inherited from previous generations and are transmitted to future

generations. By maintaining a shared culture and identity a national community persists throughout time. Despite societal changes, many key aspects of the Dutch culture and identity have been preserved over time. Recent longitudinal research (Onderzoeksbureau Burgerperspectieven, 2010) shows, for instance, that typical Dutch norms, values, customs and traditions (in adjusted form) are transmitted to younger generations. In this way, Dutch culture and identity persists throughout time.

Then a writing assignment followed in which participants were asked the following:

Give two examples of things from present-day Dutch society that show that the original Dutch culture and identity have been preserved. Explain for each example how we can see that they have been conserved. For instance, you can think about aspects like: Dutch language, Dutch literature/music, Dutch festivities, Dutch norms and practices.

Based on the items of the narrativist dimension of the PCC scale (see Appendix 2A), participants in the *narrativist continuity* condition read the following:

According to historians (Wilderink & Zwaan, 1992) a nation (i.e., a country) can be best described as a community that lives together through time. One of the most important characteristics of a national community is that inhabitants are part of a history in which important events are related to each other. National history is a sequence of interconnected events. These events influence later developments, and, in this way, determine the course of history. As such, in the Netherlands, events from the past determine the present. Recent historical research (Onderzoeksbureau Burgerperspectieven, 2010) shows that there is a causal link between different periods in Dutch history. The relationship between these periods and events in Dutch history are part of an unbroken chain.

Then a writing assignment followed:

Give two examples of events or periods in Dutch history that are clearly connected to one another. Explain for each example how we can see that they are linked. For instance, you can think about connections between events and periods like: the Golden Age, WWII, the 50s and 60s, independence of Surinam, Dutch involvement in Srebrenica.

In the control condition participants did not receive a text or writing assignment and only completed the measures of interest.

Measures

All items were rated on a 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) Likert-scale.

Manipulation check. In order to check whether our manipulation worked successfully, participants were asked to indicate their agreement with the following statement: "I have the feeling that Dutch culture and identity have been preserved over time".

National identification. Five items based on previous scales to measure group-identification (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995) were used to assess national identification (α = .85). Two sample items were: "I feel committed to the Netherlands", and "I identify with the Netherlands".

Results

Preliminary analyses

No significant main effects were observed for gender (p_s > .269) or age (p_s > .289), nor significant interaction effects of these variables with the manipulation (p_s > .197), on any of the measured variables. We therefore did not consider these demographic variables in the remaining analyses. A one-way ANOVA on the manipulation check revealed that the group continuity manipulation was successful, $F(2, 132) = 4.33$, $MSE = 1.34$, $p = .008$. Participants in the essentialist continuity condition ($M = 4.93$, $SD = 1.03$) were more likely to feel that Dutch culture and identity had been maintained over time than participants in the narrativist continuity condition ($M = 4.18$, $SD = 1.47$), $t(88) = 2.83$, $p = .003$, and participants in the control condition ($M = 4.27$, $SD = 1.45$), $t(88) = 2.51$, $p = .007$. Moreover, there were no differences with respect to this manipulation check item between the narrativist continuity condition and the control condition, $t(88) = -.29$, $p = .773$.

Analysis of variance

A one-way ANOVA on national identification revealed a significant effect of the group continuity manipulation, $F(2, 132) = 3.59$, $MSE = .981$, $p = .004$. Participants in the essentialist continuity condition ($M = 4.58$, $SD = 1.05$) reported significantly higher levels of national identification than participants in the control condition ($M = 4.03$, $SD = 1.04$), $t(88) = 2.52$, $p = .007$. Moreover, participants in the essentialist continuity condition also reported a higher score on national identification than participants in the narrativist continuity condition ($M = 4.28$, $SD = .85$), $t(88) = 1.52$, $p = .065$, but this difference was marginally significant. Importantly, there were no significant differences in national identification between participants in the narrativist continuity and control condition, $t(88) = 1.25$, $p = .217$. These results provide support for our causal model by showing that particularly essentialist continuity, and not narrativist continuity, enhances identification with the national in-group.

2.3 Study 2

Study 1 showed that reading and writing about national essentialist continuity (compared to a control condition) increased national identification whereas narrativist continuity did not elevate national identification (compared to a control condition). This supports our assumption that it is specifically the essentialist dimension of group continuity that provides the basis for identification with the national in-group. It has been suggested that the positive relationship between perceptions of group continuity and group identification can be explained by a need for self-continuity (Sani et al., 2007). We argue that it is particularly the essentialist (compared to narrativist) understanding of group continuity that satisfies the need for self-continuity and hereby enhances group identification. We examined this prediction in Studies 2 and 3.

Method

Participants, design and procedure
One hundred fourteen (75% female) Utrecht University undergraduates participated for course credit (Group Continuity Survey, see Table 1.1). All participants were native Dutch and they completed a paper-and-pencil questionnaire within a classroom setting. The ages ranged between 19 and 30 ($M = 21.15$, $SD = 2.08$).

Measures
We adapted an 8-item scale from Sani et al. (2007) to assess the two dimensions of perceived group continuity (see Appendix 2A). The essentialist continuity subscale has four items and refers to the idea that core national values and traditions have been, and will be, trans-generationally transmitted ($\alpha = .88$). The narrativist continuity subscale

Table 2.1 Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations for all measures, Study 2

	M	*SD*	1	2	3	4
1. Essentialist continuity	4.18	1.03	—	.48***	.29**	.36***
2. Narrativist continuity	4.52	.86		—	.26**	.31***
3. Collective self-continuity	3.10	1.19			—	.57***
4. National identification	4.42	.94				—

Note. ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

also has four items and concerns the representation that different events and ages in a national group's history are causally interconnected (α = .75). Based on previous research (see Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2012; Vignoles et al., 2006) we used three items to measure feelings of collective self-continuity (α = .80). These items were: "Being Dutch gives me a sense of continuity – between past, present, and future", "Being Dutch gives me a feeling of being connected with the past", and "Being Dutch gives me the feeling that I am part of a long tradition and history". National identification was assessed with four items similar to the ones used in Study 1 (α = .74). All items were rated on a 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) scale.

Results

Preliminary analyses

We ran multiple regressions on all measured variables with gender and age as predictors. Gender had no significant effects on any of the measures (p_s > .06), but age was significantly and negatively related to perceived essentialist continuity, β = -.34, $t(100)$ = -3.62, p < .001. We therefore controlled for age in the estimated path model.

Confirmatory factor analysis

CFA was conducted (using Mplus 6.0 software) to determine whether the items assessing essentialist and narrativist continuity, and collective self-continuity composed different factors. The proposed three factor structure had a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(40)$ = 51.21, p = .110; CFI = .98, RMSEA = .05.[1] The z-statistics obtained for all the factor loadings were statistically significant (p_s < .001) and the standardized factor loadings were between .73 and .87 for collective self-continuity, between .74 and .89 for essentialist continuity, and between .42 and .85 for narrativist continuity. Chi-square difference tests indicated that this three-factor model fit the data better than a one-factor model, $\chi^2(43)$ = 194.27, p < .001, $\Delta\chi^2(3)$ = 143.06, p < .001, and also better than a two-factor model in which the two perceived group continuity sub-scales were combined, $\chi^2(42)$ = 98.48, p < .001, $\Delta\chi^2(2)$ = 47.27, p < .001. This shows that, although significantly correlated, the three continuity measures were empirically distinct (see Table 2.1 for means and standard deviations, and correlations between the variables).

Figure 2.1 Path model: Influence of perceived essentialist and narrativist group continuity on national identification, via collective self-continuity (controlling for age), Study 2.
Note. Path-coefficients are standardized estimates (marked in boldface), and the path coefficients in parentheses reflect the mediator in the equation. *** $p < .001$, * $p < .05$. Non-significant paths are shown as broken arrows. The model is saturated and hence its fit is perfect.

Path model

To test our predictions regarding the direct and indirect effects of essentialist and narrativist continuity on national identification (controlling for age), we specified the path model illustrated in Figure 2.1, which also shows the standardized paths and explained variance (R^2). We estimated this path model (using Mplus 6.0 software) with manifest variables, as the sample size ($N = 114$) was not large enough to conduct structural equation modeling using latent variables (Kline, 2005). In this model, essentialist continuity significantly predicted collective self-continuity and national identification. Narrativist continuity was not significantly related to collective self-continuity and also showed no significant relationship with national identification. Importantly, there was a significant positive path from collective self-continuity to national identification.

    To test the indirect effect of essentialist continuity on national identification, via collective self-continuity, we carried out bootstrapping procedures. This involved generating 5000 random bootstrap samples with replacement from the dataset ($N = 114$) and testing the model with these samples. This analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of essentialist continuity, with a point estimate of .32 and a 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval of .058 to .589. This finding supports the notion that people are likely to identify with groups that are perceived as essentially continuous, because these groups bolster a sense of collective self-continuity.

Discussion

The results of Study 2 show that, when tested simultaneously, only perceived essentialist (and not narrativist) group continuity was positively related to collective self-continuity and national identification. Furthermore, collective self-continuity was only a significant mediator in the relationship between essentialist continuity and national identification. Hence, in line with our expectations, Study 2 provides support for the idea that people are more likely to identify with their national group when it is perceived to possess essentialist continuity, because this bolsters their need for self-continuity. Yet, essentialist continuity remained a significant predictor of national identification when collective self-continuity was included in the model, which means that only part of the effect is explained by collective self-continuity (i.e., partial mediation).

2.4 Study 3

In Study 3 we build on these findings in several ways. First, as Study 2 was based on a cross-sectional design we cannot make any claims about the causality of the proposed relationships. We therefore conducted a third study testing the same predictions using an experimental design. Second, researchers have raised concerns about the use of student samples in social psychology for the generality of group dynamics and for theoretical conclusions that can be drawn (Henry, 2008; Mitchell, 2012). Therefore, Study 3 was conducted among a nationally representative sample of the native Dutch adult population. Third, previous research has shown that perceptions of group continuity are positively correlated with the identity motive of belonging, and that belonging is positively correlated with national identification (Sani et al., 2007). Therefore, we examine whether the predicted effects via collective self-continuity remain significant when feelings of collective self-belonging are taken into account. We therefore included a measure of collective self-belonging in Study 3. We hypothesized that an increased sense of collective self-continuity would be a unique mechanism by which essentialist continuity elevates national identification.

Method

Participants, design and procedure

This experimental study ($N = 301$) was part of a larger data collection (collected in 2011) among a representative sample of the native Dutch population of 18 years and older

(Dutch Society Survey, see Table 1.1). Participants received the questionnaire by means of en e-mail sent by TNS NIPO Consult.[2] Respondents were drawn from a panel of native Dutch respondents maintained by TNS NIPO Consult. The characteristics of the panel and the sample closely match those of the native Dutch population. The sample consisted of 53.8% men and 46.2% women. The ages ranged between 18 and 86, and the mean age was 48.77 (SD = 16.88). Of the respondents, 4% completed primary education, 53.5% completed a lower level of secondary (20.6%) and tertiary education (32.9%), 41.5% completed a higher level of secondary (5.6%) and tertiary (higher applied and university) education (35.9%) and 1% did not report their educational level. Participants were randomly assigned to the essentialist or narrativist condition. They were informed that the study was about Dutch history and completed all materials in the online survey in the order that follows.

The manipulation of essentialist and narrativist group continuity was comparable to the manipulations used in Study 1. The aim was to contrast the essentialist continuity condition with the narrativist condition as a control, because this would show that it is not the mere salience of national history, but specifically national essentialist continuity, which drives feelings of collective self-continuity, belonging and national identification. Participants in the *essentialist continuity* condition read the following:

> Despite societal changes, many key aspects of Dutch culture and identity have been preserved over time. Recent longitudinal research (Onderzoeksbureau Burgerpespectie-ven, 2010) shows, for instance, that typical Dutch norms, values, customs and traditions (in adjusted form) are still being transmitted to the younger generations. In this way, Dutch culture and identity persists throughout time. Give two examples of things from present-day Dutch society that show that the original Dutch culture and identity have been preserved. For instance, you can think about aspects like: the Dutch language, Dutch literature/music, Dutch festivities, Dutch norms and practices.

Participants in the *narrativist continuity* condition read the following:

> Recent historical research (Onderzoeksbureau Historica, 2010) shows that there is a causal link between different periods in Dutch history. Important events from the past have been determining the present. The relationship between these periods and events determines the course of Dutch history. Give two examples of events or periods from the Dutch past that have been important for the course of our history.

Measures

Manipulation check. One item assessed the extent to which people perceived essentialist continuity: "I have the feeling that the Dutch culture and identity have been preserved over time". Participants completed this measure on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Collective self-continuity and belonging. The three-item measure for collective self-continuity (α = .87) was identical to the one used in Study 2, except that the last item was replaced with the item: "Being Dutch gives me the feeling that I am part of a shared future". Based on previous research (see Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2012; Vignoles et al., 2006), we used the following three items to assess feelings of collective self-belonging (α = .94): "Being Dutch gives me the feeling that I am close to other people", "Being Dutch gives me the feeling that I am at home with other people", and "Being Dutch gives me the feeling that I am connected with other people." Participants completed these measures on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

National identification. One item assessed the extent to which participants identified with the Netherlands: "How strongly do you feel Dutch?" This item was measured on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 10 (*very much*). Recent research by Postmes, Haslam, and Jans (2013) provides evidence for the reliability and validity of single-item group identification measures.

Results

Preliminary analyses

We ran multiple regressions on all measured variables with age, gender and educational level (a scale ranging from (1) *primary education* to (8) *university degree*) as predictors. There were no gender differences (p_s > .22) in any of these analyses and therefore gender was not considered further. Age was found to be significantly related to feelings of collective self-continuity, β = .16, $t(297)$ = 2.77, p = .006, and educational level was significantly predictive of national identification, β = -.12, $t(297)$ = -2.12, p = .035. We therefore controlled for age and education in the structural equation model.

Confirmatory factor analyses

CFA was conducted (using Mplus 6.0 software) to determine whether the items assessing collective self-continuity and belonging composed different factors. The proposed two-

factor structure had an acceptable fit to the data, $\chi^2(6) = 12.86$, $p = .045$; CFI = .99, RMSEA = .06.[3] The z-statistics obtained for all the factor loadings were statistically significant (p_s < .001) and the standardized factor loadings were between .78 and .91 for collective self-continuity, and between .91 and .96 for collective self-belonging. Chi-square difference tests indicated that this two-factor model fit the data better than a one-factor model, $\chi^2(7)$ = 137.01, $p < .001$, $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 124.15$, $p < .001$. These analyses show that these constructs are empirically distinct.

Manipulation check

A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) demonstrated that the experimental manipulation was successful, $F(1, 299) = 36.14$, MSE = 1.32, $p < .001$. Participants in the essentialist continuity condition ($M = 4.78$, $SD = 1.19$) reported significantly stronger perceptions of essentialist continuity than participants in the narrativist continuity condition ($M = 3.87$, $SD = 1.44$), $t(299) = 6.01$, $p < .001$.

Structural equation modeling

The sample size of the present study allowed us to conduct structural equation modeling (using Mplus 6.0 software) using latent variables, which provides more reliable results than path analyses using only manifest variables (Kline, 2005). To test our predictions regarding the effects of essentialist continuity on collective self-continuity (and collective self-belonging), as well as on national identification, we specified the model in Figure 2.2. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between all continuous manifest variables are presented in Table 2.2. The standardized paths, explained variance (R^2) and model fit statistics are shown in Figure 2.2. The group continuity manipulation had a significant effect on collective self-continuity and also on collective self-belonging. When essentialist group continuity was salient, participants reported stronger feelings of collective

Table 2.2 Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations for all continuous measures, Study 3

|	*M*	*SD*	1	2	3
1. Collective self-continuity	4.70	1.09	__	.72***	.50**
2. Collective self-belonging	4.65	1.18		__	.51**
3. National identification	7.69	1.71			__

Note. *** *p* < .001.

Figure 2.2 Structural equation model: Influence of essentialist vs. narrativist group continuity manipulation on national identification, via collective self-continuity and belonging (controlling for age and education), Study 3.

Note. Path-coefficients are standardized estimates (marked in boldface), and the path coefficients in parentheses reflect the mediators in the equation. Correlations between latent variables are standardized. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$. To simplify, indicators of latent variables are not shown. Model fit: $\chi^2(22) = 47.78$, $p = .001$; CFI = .98, RMSEA = .06.

self-continuity and belonging ($M = 4.85$, $SD = 1.06$, $M = 4.80$, $SD = 1.18$, respectively) than in the narrativist continuity condition ($M = 4.56$, $SD = 1.11$, $M = 4.50$, $SD = 1.16$, respectively). Moreover, the group continuity manipulation also exerted a significant effect on national identification. When essentialist continuity was salient people reported higher levels of national identification than in the narrativist continuity condition ($M = 7.86$, $SD = 1.68$, $M = 7.54$, $SD = 1.73$, respectively). Importantly, there was a significant positive path from collective self-continuity (and belonging) to national identification. Both collective self-continuity and belonging were related to higher levels of national identification when simultaneously estimated in the specified model (see Figure 2.2).

Analysis of indirect effects

We carried out bootstrapping procedures (using Mplus 6.0 software) to test the hypothesized indirect effects of the essentialist continuity manipulation on national identification, via collective self-continuity. In this model we also included the latent variable of collective self-belonging as a mediator. We generated 5000 random bootstrap samples with replacement from the dataset ($N = 301$) and testing the model with these samples. The analysis revealed significant indirect effects of the essentialist continuity manipulation on national identification via (a) collective self-continuity, with a point estimate of .077

and a 95% bias-corrected confidence interval of .023 to .166, and via (b) collective self-belonging, with a point estimate of .052 and a 95% bias-corrected confidence interval of .015 to .125. These results provide causal support for our prediction that the salience of essentialist continuity enhances national identification, via an increased sense of collective self-continuity. Importantly, by controlling for feelings of collective self-belonging as a mediator, these results furthermore demonstrate that collective self-continuity is a unique mechanism by which essentialist continuity elevates national identification.

2.5 General discussion

Following previous theorizing by Sani and colleagues (2007, 2008b) the findings of the current research are the first to provide empirical evidence for the proposition that people are likely to identify with temporally enduring in-groups, because these satisfy the psychological need for self-continuity (Vignoles et al., 2006). In addition, we extend this line of reasoning by showing that it is specifically the essentialist (vs. narrativist) understanding of group continuity that fosters in-group identification, because essentialist group continuity most strongly satisfies the need for self-continuity.

Social psychologists have only recently started to examine the importance of perceiving group continuity for current group processes (e.g., Jetten & Hutchison, 2011), and there are few studies that have disentangled the two dimensions of group continuity (i.e., essentialist and narrativist) in informing group dynamics. The experimental findings of Study 1 provided causal support for our prediction that it is particularly the essentialist (rather than narrativist) understanding of group continuity that fosters stronger identification with the in-group. Study 2 (survey) and Study 3 (experiment) replicated these findings, and were furthermore designed to test the mediational role of collective self-continuity. Although it has been suggested that the need for self-continuity may play an important role in group processes (Sani et al., 2007; Vignoles, 2011), there is little empirical research that supports this notion. Studies 2 and 3 showed that perceiving one's in-group as possessing an enduring and stable essence strengthens feelings of collective self-continuity, which subsequently enhance identification with the in-group. These findings indicate that one reason why people are likely to identify with groups that possess essentialist continuity is because they satisfy the psychological need for self-continuity.

In Studies 1 and 3, we used experimental designs to provide causal support for the prediction that essentialist rather than narrativist group continuity enhances national identification, via the satisfaction of a sense of self-continuity. In both studies, we had

a manipulation check item for the essentialist continuity manipulation, but not for the narrativist one. Therefore, in these studies we could not assess the effectiveness of the narrativist group continuity manipulation. As such, we could not rule out the possibility that the reason why the narrativist group continuity manipulation did not predict national identification was because the manipulation itself was unsuccessful. We therefore conducted a post-hoc pilot study, in which we used similar manipulations of essentialist and narrativist group continuity (and a baseline control condition), and included manipulation check items for both essentialist and narrativist continuity. The results (see Appendix 2B) showed that the narrativist manipulation increased perceptions of narrativist group continuity in comparison to the essentialist and control condition, and did not alter perceptions of essentialist continuity. Thus, there is post-hoc evidence that the findings obtained in Studies 1 and 3 are not the result of an ineffective narrativist group continuity manipulation, but are rather in line with our theoretical predictions.

Our research offers a novel connection to theories on group processes by linking collective self-continuity to notions of cultural essentialism. Essentialist thinking has been increasingly studied in social psychology (e.g., Haslam et al., 2000), and although it has been proposed that people are more likely to identify with essentialist in-groups because these satisfy motivational needs, such as uncertainty reduction (Hogg & Abrams, 1993), distinctiveness (Brewer & Roccas, 2001), and efficacy (Yzerbyt et al., 2000), the explanatory role of self-continuity has remained unexplored in this line of research. Moreover, while it has been proposed that essentialism consists of multiple elements (e.g., Haslam, 1998), the specific temporal component of in-group essentialism that we investigated has received relatively little attention in psychological research (but see Sani et al., 2007, 2008b), and has not been empirically investigated in relation to self-continuity motives. Hence, the present research adds to the literature on group essentialism by showing that the sense of self-continuity that people derive from essentialist enduring in-groups is another important reason for why these groups are so attractive.

Limitations and future directions

The present research has a number of limitations and also raises questions to address in future work. A first potential limitation is that we conducted our research looking at national identity, and therefore it is unclear whether similar findings would be observed for other social identities. National identity is particularly suitable to study perceptions of group continuity as it is rooted in collective history, but this temporality aspect may be less relevant

for other social identities. However, many group memberships are, at least occasionally, experienced as enduring identities to which one has a longer-term commitment, and previous work has shown that there is a wide spectrum of social identities from which people derive a sense of self-continuity (Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2012; Vignoles et al., 2006). Nevertheless, future work could investigate the connections between perceptions of group continuity, feelings of self-continuity and attachment to the in-group among different social groups.

Studies 2 and 3 showed that one way in which groups can provide a sense of self-continuity is by representing them as possessing essentialist endurance. However, there may be other ways in which groups can satisfy the need for collective self-continuity. For instance, it has been proposed that nostalgia serves as an enabler of self-continuity, because nostalgia connects people's present and past sense of self (Sedikides, Wildschut, Gaertner, Routledge, & Arndt, 2008b). Moreover, the ways in which groups can provide a sense of self-continuity may also depend on the specific group or culture concerned. For example, research has shown that European Canadians are more likely to use essentialist approaches when asked to reflect on their personal continuity, whereas indigenous Canadians use more narrative approaches (Chandler & Proulx, 2008). Further research is needed to examine a broader range of ways and contexts in which groups can warrant feelings of self-continuity.

2.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, the three studies reported here demonstrated that people are particularly likely to identify with essentialist (rather than narrativist) continuous in-groups, because these groups most strongly satisfy the psychological need for self-continuity. By examining the importance of these different understandings of group continuity for feelings of collective self-continuity and in-group identification, this research provides more insights into the interplay between perceptions of collective- and self-continuity, and their consequences for in-group attachment. In doing so, it integrates and extends research on collective continuity, group essentialism and identity motivation.

2.7 Notes

1. The model has 40 degrees of freedom because, as suggested by the modification indices, we allowed the errors between Item 2 and Item 4, for the narrativist sub-scale to correlate. This was necessary in order to reach acceptable fit.

2. For more information on TNS NIPO Consult, which is a consultancy company that conducts surveys and other studies among the Dutch population, see http://www. tns-nipo.com.

3. The model has 6 degrees of freedom because, as suggested by the modification indices, we allowed error term correlations between Item 2 and Item 3 of collective self-continuity, and between Item 1 and Item 3, and between Item 2 and Item 3, for the collective self-belonging scale. This was necessary in order to reach acceptable fit.

Collective self-continuity, group identification and in-group defense

3

3.1 Introduction

One of the central features of human identity involves a subjective sense of continued existence over time and space. Without a feeling that there is a link between past, present and future it is impossible to have a sense of personal identity. Promoting self-continuity is a core function of autobiographical memory (Bluck & Alea, 2008) and a weakened sense of self-continuity is associated with impaired psychological well-being (Jetten et al., 2010; Lampinen et al., 2004). These effects are not limited to personal continuity, but have also been observed at the collective identity level. People tend to attribute temporal endurance to the social groups to which they belong (Condor, 1996a; Sani et al., 2007, 2008b), and the perception of group continuity provides existential security (e.g., Sani et al., 2009) and plays a role in social well-being (e.g., Sani et al., 2008a).

While collective continuity has been a prominent topic of interest for historians, anthropologists and sociologists (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Lowenthal, 1985; Smith, 1998; Whitley, 1995), it started to receive attention in social psychology more recently (e.g., Sani, 2008; Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Jetten & Wohl, 2012). For instance, studies have shown that the perception of in-groups as historically and culturally enduring is associated with higher levels of group identification (Sani et al., 2007, 2008b). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that people tend to oppose social developments and out-groups that undermine group continuity (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Jetten & Wohl, 2012). It has been argued that these relationships are driven by the psychological need for self-continuity (Greenberg, Solomon, & Arndt, 2008; Sani et al., 2008b; Vignoles, 2011); that is, people identify with groups and tend to defend its beliefs and values, because this bolsters their sense of self-continuity. To date these propositions have not been empirically tested.

The present research investigates whether the sense of self-continuity that people derive from their group membership (i.e., collective self-continuity) provides a basis for group identification and underlies the desire to defend their in-group in the context of identity threat. Social psychologists have long been interested in motivations underlying identification with social groups and how these affect group processes. For example, it has been argued that group processes are driven by motivations for self-esteem (Social Identity Theory; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), distinctiveness and belonging (Optimal Distinctiveness Theory; Brewer, 1991), and subjective meaning (Uncertainty Reduction Theory; Hogg, 2000). Although researchers have pointed at the importance of self-continuity (in comparison to other motives) for identity construction (Vignoles et al., 2006; Vignoles, 2011), its significance for group dynamics has remained largely unexplored.

In order to show that a sense of collective self-continuity is important for group dynamics we first examined the uniqueness and relative importance of self-continuity for in-group identification, in comparison to other identity motives. A second way to demonstrate the importance of self-continuity for group identity is to test whether existential in-group threat instigates a sense of collective self-continuity. If self-continuity is an important source of group identity then people should recruit feelings of collective self-continuity when the existence of the in-group is endangered. Furthermore, if people indeed recruit collective self-continuity when the existence of the in-group is threatened, this, in turn, raises the question whether this heightened sense of collective self-continuity strengthens the desire to defend the in-group. People often respond defensively towards social developments and out-groups that threaten the maintenance of their group identity (e.g., Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Jetten & Wohl, 2012), and this may be driven by their increased sense of collective self-continuity.

Although many groups can provide a sense of self-continuity this is particularly likely for ethnic and national groups (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). These groups are mainly defined and understood as communities that live together through time and have a shared culture and identity that is passed on from generation to generation (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Bhabha, 1990). Furthermore, in contemporary Western Europe, social developments, such as immigration and European integration, are often portrayed as undermining the continuation of national identity. We therefore use the context of the nation to examine our predictions. We present three studies, conducted in the Netherlands, with the more general aim of demonstrating the importance of collective self-continuity for group dynamics.

Self-continuity and group identification

The functional approach to social identification proposes that group identification is guided by several general principles that have motivational or need-like properties (e.g., Breakwell, 1986; Brewer, 1991; Hogg, 2000; Riketta, 2008; Vignoles et al., 2006). This approach postulates that people identify with groups to the extent that these groups fulfill their identity needs. However, the literature on these needs is fragmented and different motivations have been proposed by theorists working from different perspectives (for an overview see Vignoles, 2011). A recent attempt to integrate these perspectives into a unified model of identity motives comes from Vignoles' (2011) Motivated Identity Construction Theory. This theory argues that any form of social identity must satisfy certain motivational

principles in order to be adaptive and useful. These identity motives guide identity construction and influence psychological well-being. Specifically, the theory proposes that people are motivated to adopt and construct social identities that allow them to think positively about themselves (*self-esteem motive*); give them the feeling that they belong to others (*belonging motive*); provide them with a sense of continuity over time (*continuity motive*); make them feel competent and capable of influencing their environment (*efficacy motive*); make them distinguishable from other people (*distinctiveness motive*); and give them a sense that their life is meaningful (*meaning motive*).

In a series of empirical studies, Vignoles and colleagues (2006) observed that particularly the motives of self-esteem, continuity, distinctiveness and meaning made a substantial and unique contribution to the subjective importance of collective identities. However, research suggests that the relative importance of these identity motives for group identification depends on the specific social category concerned (e.g., Capozza, Brown, Aharpour, & Falvo, 2006; Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2012). In the present research we focus on the relative importance of self-continuity, next to other identity motives, for identification with the nation. Nations play an important role in the lives of individuals, and because national identities are rooted in historical and cultural heritage it is likely that self-continuity forms an important reason for why people feel attached to their national group membership.

There is a large body of research within clinical psychology showing that disruptions of self-continuity are a source of psychological discomfort and distress (e.g., Jetten et al., 2010). People are therefore motivated to achieve and maintain a perception of the personal self as being temporally enduring. As part of people's sense of self is derived from membership in social groups, these groups can also provide them with a sense of self-continuity (Sani, 2008). That is, group membership can give people the feeling that the part of the self that is defined by this membership will continue after their personal self perishes (Sani et al., 2007, 2008b, Reicher, 2008). In line with this idea, terror management theorists (Pyszczynski et al., 2000) have proposed that people seek identification with groups in order to maintain a sense of symbolic immortality – a sense that one is part of entities larger and longer lasting than the self. In other words, an important reason why people are likely to invest in social groups is because this affords them a feeling of self-transcendence through time and space (i.e., collective self-continuity) and thus a sense of existential security (Castano, Yzerbyt, & Paladino, 2004).

When the continued existence of the in-group is threatened

Functional approaches to group identification have proposed that situations that elicit threats to identity motives will lead to intensified strivings to satisfy them (Breakwell, 1986; Vignoles, 2011). The sense of self-continuity that people derive from their group membership is not only based on a feeling of collective roots and ancestry, but also on a faith that "we" (and hence "I") will continue to be in the future (Condor, 1996b). Therefore, threats to the continued existence of the in-group are likely to result in an increased motivation to maintain a sense of collective self-continuity (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011). Moreover, it has been proposed that in the context of social identity threat the need for self-continuity is a driving force for enhanced in-group protectionism and out-group rejection (Breakwell, 1986; Vignoles, 2011). Experimental evidence shows that when threats to personal continuity are made salient people report more intergroup bias (McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001), and tend to more strongly affirm their national culture (Shepherd, Kay, Landau, & Keefer, 2011, Study 1). These findings suggest that an elevated sense of collective self-continuity may be one mechanism through which social identity threat increases in-group protectionism and out-group rejection.

The concept of identity threat is central in intergroup theorizing and research. Different forms of threat have been identified and different responses in coping with identity threats have been examined (see Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Breakwell, 1986; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). However, this body of research has neglected existential threats that emanate from the potential loss or disappearance of group continuity (but see Wohl, Branscombe, & Reysen, 2010). The consequences of existential threats at the individual level have been researched in existential psychology, mainly from a terror management perspective. Terror management theory (TMT; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991) proposes that identification with social groups and hostility towards dissenting others are mechanisms to cope with the existential anxiety that comes from the awareness of the inevitability of personal death (i.e., mortality salience). These effects, often referred to as worldview defenses in the terror management literature, have been observed in various studies. Much of the work in this domain proceeds from the hypothesis that if psychological structures buffer the consequences of awareness of personal death, then experimentally heightening mortality salience will result in elevated levels of investment in these buffering structures.

It has been postulated that collective self-continuity also serves such a buffering function (Sani et al., 2009). That is, it is proposed that mortality salience strengthens

the sense of permanence and transcendence that is afforded by group membership (i.e., symbolic immortality), which subsequently enhances the desire to engage in worldview defenses. Although groups are not mortal in the same way as individuals they can also cease to exist in the future. Therefore, the processes outlined by TMT may work in a similar way for existential threats at the group level. That is, people can be expected to report stronger feelings of collective self-continuity when facing threats to the continued existence of the in-group, and this is subsequently likely to strengthen their need to defend group identity. Previous studies have not examined whether existential group threats instigate feelings of collective self-continuity, nor have they empirically tested whether such strengthened feelings of collective self-continuity increase the need to defend the in-group. We propose that a threat to the continued existence of national identity will elevate a sense of national self-continuity (controlling for other national identity motives), which subsequently strengthens one's desire to defend national identity.

The present research

We examined the proposition that the feeling of self-continuity that people derive from their group membership provides an important basis of group identification and drives in-group defenses in the context of existential group threats. We tested this proposition in relation to national identity and by examining different convergent hypotheses. In Study 1 (survey), we examined in three different samples whether self-continuity can be empirically distinguished from other identity motives that have been shown to predict group identification (Vignoles et al., 2006), and whether feelings of self-continuity uniquely predict national identification when taking these other identity motives into account.

Subsequently, in Studies 2 and 3, we reasoned that if self-continuity is an important source of national identity, threats to the future existence of the nation will elevate a sense of national self-continuity (controlling for other national identity motives). This increased sense of national self-continuity is subsequently expected to strengthen the need to defend the national in-group. Previous studies have shown that there are different ways in which group members may attempt to defend their in-group identity. One way is to minimize the influence and presence of out-groups (e.g., Jetten & Wohl, 2012) and social developments (e.g., Jetten & Hutchison, 2011) that potentially undermine in-group identity. Another way is to maximize the protection of in-group culture and identity (Wohl et al., 2010). Thus, the present research examined in-group defenses in the form of opposition towards out-groups (Muslim immigrants; Study 2) and social developments (European integration;

Study 3) that may undermine the national in-group, and in the form of protectionism of national heritage (Study 3). Studies 2 and 3 used an experimental design.

3.2 Study 1

Our first study was designed to evaluate the uniqueness and relevance of collective self-continuity, compared to other identity motives, for national identification. Next to self-continuity, we focused on belonging, self-esteem, distinctiveness and efficacy (Vignoles et al., 2006). Participants completed a questionnaire with separate items for each identity motive and a separate scale for national identification. We tested our predictions among three different samples, in order to demonstrate the validity and robustness of the findings.

Method

Participants, design and procedure
A paper and pencil survey was carried out among three different samples. Study 1A (National Identity Motive and Continuity Survey, see Table 1.1) was conducted among 172 native Dutch adolescents and young adults (53.8% female). They participated on a voluntary basis and the anonymous questionnaires were administered within a classroom setting. In Study 1B (Utrecht Community Sample Survey, see Table 1.1) a convenience sample of 166 adults living in Utrecht was recruited by distributing questionnaires among adult family members and acquaintances of pupils from a high-school. In this sample we only selected native Dutch people (i.e., those who have a Dutch passport and have Dutch parents). This resulted in a sample of 102 participants (54.9% female). In Study 1C (Historical Tolerance, Continuity and Cultural Diversity Survey, see Table 1.1) the sample consisted of 113 Utrecht University students who were invited to participate in a study on Dutch society. We again only selected the ones who were native Dutch, which resulted in a total of 89 participants (64% female). The ages ranged between 13 and 27 in Study 1A ($M = 17.41$, $SD = 3.31$), between 19 and 69 in Study 1B ($M = 43.53$, $SD = 12.09$), and between 18 and 33 in Study 1C ($M = 23.39$, $SD = 2.93$).

Measures
All measures were rated on a 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) scale.

　　Identity motives. In Studies 1A and 1B each identity motive was assessed by a combination of two items, which were based on previous research (see Easterbrook &

Vignoles, 2012; Vignoles et al., 2006). For the continuity motive the items were: "Being Dutch gives me a sense of continuity – between past, present, and future", and "Being Dutch gives me the feeling that I am part of a long shared history" (Study 1A, $r = .64$, $p < .001$; Study 1B, $r = .74$, $p < .001$). For the belonging motive the items were: "Being Dutch gives me the feeling that I am close to other people", and "Being Dutch gives me the feeling that I am at home with other people" (Study 1A, $r = .75$, $p < .001$; Study 1B, $r = .70$, $p < .001$). For the self-esteem motive the items were: "Being Dutch gives me a positive feeling about myself", and "The fact that I am Dutch gives me a proud feeling" (Study 1A, $r = .72$, $p < .001$; Study 1B, $r = .65$, $p < .001$). For the efficacy motive the items were: "My Dutch identity provides me with confidence to achieve my goals", and "Being Dutch gives me a feeling of certainty that I am capable of doing the things I want to do" (Study 1A, $r = .78$, $p < .001$; Study 1B, $r = .75$, $p < .001$). Finally, the items for the distinctiveness motive were: "Being Dutch gives me the feeling that I am different from other people in the world", and "Being Dutch gives me the feeling that I am special" (Study 1A, $r = .60$, $p < .001$; Study 1B, $r = .66$, $p < .001$). For each motive, the two items were combined into a scale.

In Study 1C we only assessed the continuity ($\alpha = .74$), belonging ($\alpha = .88$), and self-esteem ($\alpha = .72$) motives. In this Study, each of these identity motives was measured with the same items as in Studies 1A and 1B plus one additional item. The additional item for the continuity motive was: "Being Dutch gives me the feeling that I am part of a shared future". For the self-esteem motive this additional item was: "Being Dutch gives me a satisfactory feeling", and for belonging this item was: "Being Dutch gives me the feeling that I am connected with other people."

National identification. Three items were used to assess how central national identity was for participants (Study 1A, $\alpha = .84$; Study 1B, $\alpha = .86$; Study 1C, $\alpha = .72$). The items were: "I identify with the Netherlands", "My Dutch background is an important part of my identity", and "Being Dutch is a very important part of how I see myself".

Results

Confirmatory factor analyses

We performed confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) using AMOS 18.0 software to determine whether the items assessing the national identity motives composed different factors. In Studies 1A and 1B, we compared the fit of a five-factor model with the fit of a three-, four-, and one-factor model. In the four-factor model the items of continuity and belonging loaded on one component, and in the three-factor model the motives of self-esteem and

distinctiveness were also collapsed (next to continuity and belonging). The reason is that these motives showed the highest correlations in both samples (see Table 3.1 for means, standard deviations and intercorrelations for all measures in the different samples). In Study 1C, we compared the fit of a three-factor (continuity, self-esteem, and belonging) to a two-factor (continuity and belonging), and a one-factor model. Items were permitted to load only on the motive they were expected to indicate and no item errors were allowed to correlate. The results of the analyses are shown in Table 3.2.

In Studies 1A and 1B, the five-factor model fitted the data significantly better than any of the alternative models. Moreover, in Study 1C the three-factor model fitted the data significantly better than the two- and one-factor models.[1] The z-statistics obtained for all the factor loadings were statistically significant ($p_s < .001$) and the standardized factor loadings were between .70 and .89 in Study 1A, between .79 and .95 in Study 1B, and between .44 and .98 in Study 1C. Taken together, these results show that, although significantly correlated (see Table 3.1), the identity motives were empirically distinct in the different samples.[2]

Table 3.1 Means, standard deviations and bivariate intercorrelations for all measures, Study 1

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
Study 1A								
1. Continuity motive	3.68	1.41	—	.57***	.57***	.46***	.52***	.58***
2. Belonging motive	4.24	1.43		—	.55***	.39***	.46***	.64***
3. Self-esteem motive	4.19	1.50			—	.71***	.61***	.58***
4. Distinctiveness motive	3.40	1.60				—	.47***	.39***
5. Efficacy motive	4.91	1.29					—	.38***
6. In-group identification	5.05	1.09						—
Study 1B								
1. Continuity motive	4.15	1.44	—	.24*	.63***	.21*	.22*	.55***
2. Belonging motive	4.20	1.38		—	.51***	.51***	.54***	.66***
3. Self-esteem motive	3.89	1.47			—	.66***	.61***	.42***
4. Distinctiveness motive	3.24	1.53				—	.67***	.24*
5. Efficacy motive	3.62	1.62					—	.31**
6. In-group identification	5.22	1.31						—
Study 1C								
1. Continuity motive	3.93	1.31	—	.58***	.39***	.56***		
2. Belonging motive	4.36	1.23		—	.47***	.59***		
3. Self-esteem motive	4.87	.90			—	.70***		
4. In-group identification	5.05	1.01				—		

Note. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$.

Table 3.2 Fit indices of competing measurement models of national identity motives, Study 1

	χ^2	df	p	$\Delta\chi^2$	CFI	RMSEA	AIC
Study 1A							
Identity motives							
5-factors	50.55	25	.002		.98	.08	99.46
4-factors	101.25	29	<.001	50.7***	.93	.12	153.25
3-factors	110.13	32	<.001	54.58***	.92	.12	156.13
1-factor	429.24	36	<.001	378.69***	.60	.25	467.24
Study 1B							
Identity motives							
5-factors	39.46	25	.033		.99	.04	106.34
4-factors	86.42	29	<.001	46.96***	.90	.14	138.42
3-factors	95.43	32	<.001	55.97***	.89	.14	141.43
1-factor	214.54	35	<.001	175.08***	.69	.23	254.54
Study 1C							
Identity motives							
3-factors	40.91	24	.017		.95	.09	82.91
2-factors	72.47	26	<.001	31.56***	.87	.14	110.47
1-factor	119.52	27	<.001	78.61***	.74	.20	155.52

Note. CFI: comparative fit index; RMSEA: root-mean-square error of approximation; AIC: Akaike information criterion. *** $p < .001$.

Regression analyses

We subsequently regressed national identification on the identity motives. The results for the three different samples are shown in Table 3.3. The results of Studies 1A and 1B show that when all five identity motives were entered in the equation simultaneously, only continuity, belonging, and self-esteem were unique significant predictors of national identification, whereas distinctiveness and efficacy had no significant effects. In Study 1C collective self-continuity, belonging and self-esteem all had a unique and significant effect on national identification. In all samples the identity motives explained a significant and high proportion of the variance in national identification (see Table 3.3). These findings indicate that feelings of self-continuity, self-esteem and belonging are important motivational principles of national identity and that they are empirically distinct. In line with our expectation, it was found among three different samples that feelings of collective self-continuity uniquely predicted national identification when controlling for other identity motives.

Table 3.3 Standardized regression coefficients (with standard errors in brackets) from multiple regression analyses with national identification as the dependent variable and identity motives as predictors, split by sample, Study 1

	Study 1A	Study 1B	Study 1C
Identity motives			
Continuity	.26*** (.07)	.21* (.09)	.24** (.08)
Belonging	.38*** (.06)	.51*** (.11)	.21* (.07)
Self-esteem	.35*** (.08)	.28** (.09)	.50*** (.09)
Distinctiveness	-.08 (.06)	-.21 (.10)	
Efficacy	-.11 (.06)	-.04 (.09)	
R^2	.52***	.54***	.61***

Note. ***$p < .001$, **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$

3.3 Study 2

The results of Study 1 provide support for our prediction that self-continuity forms an important and unique basis for national identification. As a next step, we examined the relationship between collective self-continuity and attachment to the in-group from the perspective of identity threat. We reasoned that if self-continuity is an important source of national identity, feelings of collective self-continuity should be strengthened when the existence of the national in-group is threatened. Furthermore, we proposed that these heightened feelings of collective self-continuity will enhance the need to defend group identity, and that one way in which group members may attempt to do this is by minimizing the presence and influence of out-groups. Thus, in Study 2 we examined in-group defense in the form of opposition towards a relevant out-group.

We conducted Study 2 within the context of strong negative sentiments towards Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). This context is relevant as Muslim immigrants are often portrayed and perceived as a threat to the continuation of national identity (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009; Verkuyten, 2013). Therefore, the increasing presence and visibility of Islam in public life often evokes opposition among the native Dutch population (Duyvendak, 2011). Thus, in Study 2 we assessed whether the heightened feelings of collective self-continuity that result from the salience of existential threats to national identity cause native Dutch participants to express more opposition to rights of Muslims to publicly confirm and express their identity (e.g., wearing a headscarf, building Mosques).

We manipulated existential national threat by asking participants to write and think about how they would feel when their country would no longer exist and hence no longer have a shared history and future. We compared this to a control condition in which no writing and imagination tasks were given. We hypothesized that existential threat would result in elevated feelings of collective self-continuity (controlling for belonging and self-esteem), and that this would subsequently induce opposition towards Muslim expressive rights.

Method

Participants, design and procedure

Participants were 103 Dutch adolescents from a high school in Utrecht who participated for course credit (Continuity Motive Experiment, see Table 1.1). We only selected the ones who were native Dutch, which resulted in a total of 89 participants (60.2% female). They participated on a voluntary basis and all questionnaires were completed within a classroom setting. The ages ranged between 15 and 17 ($M = 15.75$, $SD = .68$). All participants followed a pre-university track. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (existential national threat vs. control). Participants in the existential threat condition first read the following:

> For most people family is really important. Family provides people with a sense of rootedness and lineage. Therefore, many people want to know who they descend from and what their family history is. Just like a family the county one originates from also provides people with a sense of descent and origin. One is born and raised in a country, just like in a family. This is the reason why we use the words *father*land and *mother*land. Because you are part of the Netherlands you have a shared history and future with other Dutch people. This is why your country, just like your family, can give you a feeling that you continue to exist through time.

They were then asked to underline the two most important sentences in the text. Subsequently, participants received two assignments. The first assignment was a writing task, in which they were asked to respond to the following: "Think about your family, your family history, and the feeling of roots and heritage they give you. Imagine now that you would not know where you come from, who your parents and grandparents are, and hence have no family memory. Please briefly describe how you would feel." Participants then proceeded to the second task in which they were asked the following: "Think about the Netherlands as one big family with a shared heritage and future. Imagine that the

Netherlands would no longer exist, and hence that there would no longer be a shared national past and future. Try to imagine how you would feel." Participants then proceeded to the questions about national identity motives and attitudes towards Muslims. In the control (baseline) condition participants did not receive a text or writing task and only completed the measures of interest.

Measures

The measures of collective self-continuity (α = .77), belonging (α = .89), and self-esteem (α = .85) were identical to Study 1C. We used six items from previous research that assess the extent to which participants are opposed to Muslim expressive rights (e.g., Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2010). Two sample items are: "Muslims should have the right to not only celebrate their Islamic holidays at home, but also in public life", "Muslims should have the right to publicly express and show their religion". All items (α = .84) were reverse scored and therefore a higher score indicates stronger opposition to Muslim expressive rights.

Results

Confirmatory factor analyses

Again, CFA was conducted to determine whether the items assessing the identity motives of continuity, belonging and self-esteem form different factors. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 3.4. The proposed three factor structure had a good fit to the data. The z-statistics obtained for all the factor loadings were statistically significant ($p_s < .001$) and the standardized factor loadings were between .61 and .88 for self-continuity, between .83 and .89 for belonging, and between .69 and .97 for self-esteem. Similar to Study 1C, chi-square difference tests indicated that this three-factor model fit the data better than a two-factor model in which continuity and belonging were combined (Model 1b), and better than a one-factor model (Model 1c).[3]

In addition, we performed a CFA to test whether the identity motives are empirically distinct from the dependent measure: opposition to Muslim expressive rights (see Table 3.4). A four-factor model including the three scales measuring the three identity motives and opposition to Muslim expressive rights,[4] fit the data significantly better than any alternative model in which the latter is combined into one factor with the continuity motive (Model 2a), belonging motive (Model 2b), or self-esteem motive (Model 2c). Thus, the findings show that the dependent variable is empirically distinct from the identity motives and that the three motives are also distinct.

Table 3.4 Fit indices of models tested in confirmatory factor analyses, Study 2 and Study 3

	χ^2(df)	$\Delta\chi^2$	CFI	RMSEA	AIC
Study 2					
Identity motives					
1) 3-factors	38.88 (24)*		.97	.08	80.88
1a) 2-factors (continuity and belonging combined)	85.97 (26)***	47.09***	.87	.16	123.97
1b) 1-factor	133.04 (27)***	94.16***	.77	.21	196.04
Separate mediator					
2) 4-factors	110.27 (79)*		.96	.07	192.27
2a) 3-factor model 1 (continuity with opposition)	169.02 (82)***	58.75***	.88	.11	245.02
2b) 3-factor model 2 (belonging with opposition)	182.37 (82)***	72.10***	.86	.12	258.37
2c) 3-factor model 3 (self-esteem with opposition)	176.89 (82)***	66.62***	.87	.12	252.89
Study 3					
Identity motives					
1) 2-factors	100.89 (8)***		.96	.17	126.89
1a) 2-factors (excluding continuity item)	17.36 (4)**	83.53***	.99	.09	39.36
1b) 1-factor	180.31 (5)***	79.42***	.91	.29	200.31
Separate mediator					
2) 4-factors	90.94 (38)***		.99	.06	146.94
2a) 3-factor model 1 (continuity with opposition)	698.46 (41)***	607.52***	.81	.20	748.46
2b) 3-factor model 2 (belonging with opposition)	678.35 (41)***	587.41***	.82	.19	728.35
2c) 3-factor model 3 (continuity with protectionism)	563.50 (41)***	472.56***	.85	.18	613.50
2d) 3-factor model 4 (belonging with protectionism)	927.65 (41)***	836.71***	.75	.23	977.65

Note. CFI = Comparative Fit Index, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, AIC = Akaike Information Criterion. *** $p <.001$, ** $p <.01$, * $p <.05$.

Structural equation modeling

We conducted structural equation modeling (using AMOS 18.0) using latent variables, which provides more reliable results than path analyses using only manifest variables (Kline, 2005). To test our predictions regarding the effects of existential group threat on the continuity motive (controlling for belonging and self-esteem), and on opposition to Muslim expressive rights we specified the model in Figure 3.1. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between all continuous manifest variables are presented in Table 3.5. The standardized paths, explained variance (R^2) and model fit statistics are shown in Figure 3.1.[5]

All manifest items loaded significantly on their respective latent variable (ranging between .40 and .96). These analyses revealed that, as expected, the existential threat manipulation exerted a significant effect on the continuity motive. When existential in-group threat was salient, participants reported stronger feelings of collective self-continuity than in the control condition. Importantly, these feelings of collective self-continuity were subsequently related to stronger opposition to Muslim expressive rights. The existential threat manipulation positively predicted belonging but not self-esteem, and both these motives were unrelated to opposition to Muslim expressive rights when tested simultaneously in the specified model (see Figure 3.1).

These findings demonstrate the relative importance of the continuity motive in the relation between existential group threat and opposition to a relevant out-group. Surprisingly, there was no significant main effect of the existential threat manipulation on opposition to Muslim expressive rights. However, we proceeded to test the indirect

Table 3.5 Means, standard deviations and bivariate intercorrelations for all latent variables, Study 2 and Study 3

	M	SD	1	2	3	4
Study 2						
1. Continuity motive	4.08	1.20	__	.54***	.61***	.25*
2. Belonging motive	4.33	1.31		__	.63***	.21*
3. Self-esteem motive	4.83	1.28			__	.25
4. Opposition to Muslim expressive rights	3.76	1.02				__
Study 3						
1. Continuity motive	4.96	1.16	__	.71***	.28***	.50***
2. Belonging motive	4.73	1.23		__	.36***	.18*
3. Opposition to European Integration	5.65	.99			__	.54***
4. National heritage protectionism	4.86	1.37				__

*Note.* *** $p < .001$, * $p < .05$.

Figure 3.1 Structural equation model (Study 2): Influence of existential threat manipulation on opposition to Muslim expressive rights, via national identity motives of continuity, belonging and self-esteem.

Note. Path-coefficients are standardized estimates (marked in boldface), and the path coefficient in parenthesis reflects the mediators in the equation. Correlations between latent variables are standardized. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$. Non-significant paths are shown as broken arrows. To simplify, indicators of latent variables are not shown. Model fit: $\chi^2(90) = 122.06$, $p = .014$; CFI = .96, RMSEA = .06.

effect of the existential threat manipulation (via the continuity motive) on opposition to Muslim expressive rights, because exogenous variables can exert an effect on the endogenous variable(s) in the absence of a direct relation between them (see Hayes, 2009). That is, only the indirect effect of an exogenous variable on an endogenous variable needs to be significant in order to establish a causal connection between the two. It is worth pointing out that an indirect effect is different from what is generally understood as mediation, whereby exogenous (X) and endogenous (Y) variables must be associated in order for another variable to mediate that effect (Mathieu & Taylor, 2006). Therefore, some authors prefer to avoid the term 'mediator' and instead refer to the 'indirect effect' of X on Y through an intervening variable (for a discussion of the distinction between indirect effects and mediation, see Mathieu & Taylor, 2006). Importantly, establishing indirect effects provide strong support for one's hypothesized causal relationships (Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010).

Analysis of indirect effects

We tested the indirect effect of the existential threat manipulation on opposition to Muslim expressive rights, via collective self-continuity, using bootstrapping procedures in AMOS 18.0. In this model we included the latent variables of belonging and self-esteem as covariates (i.e., controlling for their correlation with all other latent variables). We generated 5000 random bootstrap samples with replacement from the dataset ($N = 89$) and tested the model with these samples. The analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of existential threat, with a point estimate of .146 and a 95% bias-corrected confidence interval of .042 to .328. These results are consistent with our predicted causal model. When existential threats to group identity are salient, individuals feel a stronger sense of collective self-continuity and are therefore more likely to oppose a relevant out-group.

3.4 Study 3

The results of Study 2 are consistent with the idea that when national group members are facing existential threat to their in-group, this increases their sense of collective self-continuity, which subsequently enhances opposition towards the presence and visibility of a relevant out-group (i.e., Muslim immigrants), as a means to defend in-group identity. More specifically, we observed that while existential threat did not directly lead to stronger out-group opposition, a significant indirect effect emerged via heightened feelings of collective self-continuity. This means that existential threat enhanced feelings of collective self-continuity, which in turn increased out-group opposition. Importantly, this indirect effect was significant when controlling for motives of collective self-esteem and belonging.

We wanted to build on these findings in several ways. First, as no manipulation check was assessed in Study 2 we cannot be certain that our manipulation actually elicited existential threat. We therefore included a manipulation check item in Study 3. Second, the manipulation in Study 2 consisted of two related parts that concerned existential threats to family and national identity. Therefore, strictly speaking, we cannot be sure that the salience of national rather than family existential threat caused enhanced feelings of national self-continuity. In addition, this two-part manipulation may be a reason why we only observed a significant indirect effect, and no total effect, on out-group opposition. That is, a significant indirect effect in the absence of a total effect could indicate that, next to collective self-continuity, there is another indirect path (not taken into account in our predicted model) that carries the effect from existential threat to out-group opposition

in the opposite direction (MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000; Hayes, 2009). More specifically, whereas thinking about the loss of national identity may have enhanced opposition to immigrant out-groups via increased national self-continuity, thinking about losing one's family may have reduced opposition to immigrant out-groups via, for example, stronger feelings of warmth for other people. In Study 3, we therefore examined the effects of an existential threat manipulation that only referred to national identity. A third methodological improvement concerns the samples we used in the previous studies. In social psychology, various concerns have been raised about the use of student samples for the generality of findings and theoretical conclusions (Henry, 2008; Mitchell, 2012). We therefore conducted Study 3 among a nationally representative sample of the native Dutch adult population.

We also wanted to strengthen and extend our theoretical contribution. Applying terror management theory to the group level, previous research has shown that existential threats to group identity do not only result in in-group defense in the form of hostility towards out-groups (e.g., Jetten & Wohl, 2012), but also in increased attempts to protect the future vitality of the in-group (Wohl et al., 2010). Furthermore, it has been observed that not only out-groups, but also social developments, such as mergers, can form an existential threat to in-group identity and consequently evoke resistance (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011). In Study 3, we therefore manipulated existential national threat in the context of European integration, and examined people's in-group defenses in the form of (a) opposition against European integration and (b) national heritage protectionism.

This context is of particular relevance as one of the central controversies of European integration concerns the threat to national identity and sovereignty. Although research on the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) proposes that intergroup bias can be reduced when superordinate category membership (such as European identity) is salient, attempts to replace a valued subgroup identity with a superordinate identity can produce identity threat, that subsequently enhances intergroup bias (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000) and resistance against this replacement (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011). Research has shown that resistance to further European integration is growing in various European countries, and that it is particularly strong in the Netherlands (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2010). In many European countries this issue has been increasingly framed and perceived as a threat to the continuation of national identity (Lubbers & Jaspers, 2011). Eurosceptic politicians and commentators have been warning for the creation of a European super state, in which different national identities would be lost.

In Study 3, we asked Dutch participants to read and write about how they would feel when their country would be merged, and hence disappear, in a larger European super state. We compared this to a control condition in which no writing and imagination tasks were given. We predicted that this existential threat to in-group identity would enhance national heritage protectionism and opposition to European integration, via an increased sense of collective self-continuity. As this experiment was part of a larger data collection on national and European identity we were limited in the amount of items that could be included in the questionnaire. We chose to leave out national self-esteem as this variable was not affected by the existential threat manipulation and did not independently predict out-group opposition in Study 2 (see Figure 3.1).

Method

Participants, design and procedure

This experimental study (N = 412) was part of a larger data collection (in 2012) among a representative sample of the native Dutch population of 18 years and older (The Netherlands and Europe Survey, see Table 1.1). Respondents were drawn from an online panel of native Dutch respondents maintained by TNS NIPO Consult.[6] The sample consisted of 48.1% men and 51.9% women. The ages ranged between 18 and 87, and the mean age was 50.98 (SD = 16.94). Of the respondents, 4.6% completed primary education, 59.7% completed a lower level of secondary (26.4%) and tertiary education (33.3%), 33.4% completed a higher level of secondary (8.0%) and tertiary (higher applied and university) education (26.5%), and 1.2% did not report their educational level. A between-subjects design was used, in which participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (corresponding to the existential threat or the control condition). Participants were informed that the study was about Dutch and European identity and completed all materials in the online survey in the order that follows. In the existential threat condition, participants read the following:

> Please try to envisage that the Netherlands no longer exists in the future, because it is merged within a European super state. Imagine that in this United Europe the Dutch culture and identity have mostly been lost, because there is an emphasis on European (instead of national) values and traditions. In this United Europe you no longer have a Dutch passport, but only a European passport. Typical Dutch achievements, such as the right to abortion and euthanasia, do no longer exist in this United Europe. Please write down below how you would feel about this loss (2 sentences max.).

Participants in the control condition did not receive any text and immediately proceeded to the remaining measures.

Measures

Participants completed all measures on a 7-point scale ranging from (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*).

Manipulation check. One item assessed the extent to which participants felt that the continuity of national identity was threatened by European integration: "The maintenance of traditional Dutch culture and identity is being threatened by increasing European integration".

Identity motives. The same three-items for assessing collective self-continuity (α = .89) and belonging (α = .95) as in Study 1C and Study 2 were used.

National heritage protectionism. Three items assessed the extent to which participants felt that the national heritage should be protected (α = .87): "It is important to protect traditional Dutch norms and values", "It is important to maintain Dutch culture and traditions", and "We should protect the Dutch way of life against groups and developments that threaten this identity".

Opposition to European integration. Participants' opposition towards European integration was assessed with three items (α = .84): "In general, European integration has more disadvantages than advantages for the Netherlands", "European integration causes the Dutch government to lose too much power", and "The Netherlands should first solve its own problems before we start talking about European integration".

Results

Confirmatory factor analysis

CFA was performed to determine whether the items assessing collective self-continuity and belonging composed distinct factors. All items loaded on the component they were expected to indicate and no error terms were allowed to correlate. The proposed two-factor structure had a bad fit to the data (see Table 3.4). Yet, the modification indices indicated that the model fit could be particularly improved by adding correlations between one continuity item (i.e., "Being Dutch gives me the feeling that I am part of a shared future") and the items of the belonging scale. Although this continuity item had a significant and substantial factor loading on the latent variable for continuity ($z = .88$, $p < .001$), these results demonstrate the

multidimensional nature of this particular item in this sample. Excluding this item from the measurement model significantly improved the model fit of the two-factor model (see Table 3.4, Study 3, Model 1a). We therefore excluded this continuity item from further analyses. In this new two-factor model the z-statistics obtained for all the factor loadings were statistically significant ($p_s < .001$) and the standardized factor loadings were between .86 and .86 for self-continuity, and between .92 and .96 for belonging. Chi-square difference tests indicated that this two-factor model fit the data better than a one factor model, $\chi^2(5) = 180.31$, $p < .001$, $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 162.95$, $p < .001$. This shows that although self-continuity and belonging were significantly correlated (see Table 3.5), they are empirically different constructs.

In addition, we performed a CFA on the items of national heritage protectionism and opposition to European integration to assess whether they composed distinct factors. The proposed two-factor structure had an acceptable fit to the data, $\chi^2(8) = 38.00$, $p < .000$; CFI = .98, RMSEA = .09. Moreover, the z-statistics obtained for all the factor loadings were statistically significant ($p_s < .001$) and the standardized factor loadings were between .74 and .96 for national heritage protectionism, and between .77 and .83 for opposition to European integration. Chi-square difference tests indicated that this two-factor model fit the data better than a one-factor model, $\chi^2(9) = 375.66$, $p < .001$, $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 337.66$, $p < .001$. Although national heritage protectionism and opposition to European integration were significantly correlated (see Table 3.5), these analyses show that they are empirically different constructs.

Finally, a last set of CFAs was run to confirm that the hypothesized mediator, national self-continuity, as well as the belonging motive, were empirically distinct from the two dependent variables: opposition to European integration and national heritage protectionism. The results are displayed at the bottom of Table 3.4. A four-factor model including the two identity motives, opposition to European integration and national heritage protectionism as separate factors fit the data significantly better than any alternative model in which self-continuity or belonging were combined into one-factor with opposition to European integration or national heritage protectionism. Results of these analyses thus supported the seperability of the measures.

Manipulation check

One-way ANOVA showed that there was a main effect of the existential threat manipulation on perceived national threat, $F(1, 419) = 4.87$, $p = .014$, $\eta_p^2 = .012$. Participants in the threat condition felt that their national identity was significantly more threatened by European integration ($M = 4.92$, $SD = 1.71$) than participants in the control condition ($M = 4.56$, $SD = 1.53$). This suggests that our manipulation of existential threat was successful.

Structural equation modeling

We again conducted structural equation modeling (using AMOS 18.0) using latent variables. To test our predictions regarding the effects of existential group threat on the continuity (and belonging) motive, as well as on opposition to European integration and national heritage protectionism, we specified the model in Figure 3.2. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between all continuous manifest variables are presented in Table 3.5. The standardized paths, explained variance (R^2) and model fit statistics are shown in Figure 3.2. All manifest items loaded significantly on their respective latent variable (ranging between .74 and .96). As expected, these analyses revealed that when existential threat to group identity was salient, participants reported stronger feelings of collective self-continuity than in the control condition. Importantly, feelings of collective self-continuity were subsequently related to stronger opposition to European integration and to stronger national heritage protectionism. In addition, there was a main effect of the existential threat manipulation on both national heritage protectionism and opposition to European integration in the specified path model. The existential threat manipulation also positively predicted belonging, but belonging was unrelated to both outcome measures when tested simultaneously with the continuity motive in the specified model (see Figure 3.2). Taken


Figure 3.2 Structural equation model (Study 3): Influence of existential threat manipulation on national heritage protectionism and opposition to European integration, via identity motives of continuity and belonging.
Note. Path-coefficients are standardized estimates (marked in boldface), and the path coefficients in parentheses reflect the mediators in the equation. Correlations between latent variables are standardized. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$. Non-significant paths are shown as broken arrows. To simplify, indicators of latent variables are not shown. Model fit: $\chi^2(45) = 100.53$, $p < .001$; CFI = .98, RMSEA = .06.

together, these results indicate the relative importance of the continuity motive in driving the relation between existential group threat and opposition to European integration and national heritage protectionism.

Analysis of indirect effects

Similar to Study 2, we carried out bootstrapping procedures to test the hypothesized indirect effects of the existential threat manipulation on opposition to European integration and national heritage protectionism, via collective self-continuity. In this model we included the latent variable of belonging as a covariate (i.e., controlling for its correlation with the other latent variables). We generated 5000 random bootstrap samples with replacement from the dataset ($N = 412$) and tested the model with these samples. The analysis revealed significant indirect effects of the existential threat manipulation on (a) opposition to European integration, with a point estimate of .063 and a 95% bias-corrected confidence interval of .024 to .119, and on (b) national heritage protectionism, with a point estimate of .085 and a 95% bias-corrected confidence interval of .032 to .144.

Since there was a main effect of the existential threat manipulation on both outcome measures, these results provide evidence for mediation by collective self-continuity. More specifically, as this main effect remained significant for opposition to European integration when collective self-continuity was included in the model (see Figure 3.2), this means that part of this effect is explained by collective self-continuity (i.e., partial mediation). In addition, the main effect of the manipulation was no longer significant for national heritage protectionism when collective self-continuity was included in the model (see Figure 3.2), indicating that this effect was fully explained by collective self-continuity (i.e., full mediation). Taken together, these results support our expectation that when people face existential threats to their national identity, they feel a stronger sense of collective self-continuity, which subsequently results in increased attempts to defend their in-group in the form of opposing European integration and protecting in-group culture and identity.

3.5 General discussion

The present research provides evidence for the proposition that the sense of self-continuity that people derive from their group membership provides a basis for group identification and drives the need to defend their in-group in the context of identity threat. Social psychologists have only recently started to examine the importance of perceiving continuity at the group level (e.g., Sani, 2008), and to date, the role of collective self-continuity in

group dynamics has remained largely unexplored. We conducted our research in the context of national identity, because nations are important in the lives of individuals and are understood as communities that live together through time (Anderson, 1983).

As a first step, we demonstrated that self-continuity is a distinct national identity motive that predicts national identification when controlling for other motives. The findings of Study 1 extend recent work on identity motivation (e.g., Vignoles et al., 2006; Vignoles, 2011) by showing (among three different samples) that, for national identity, only self-continuity, belonging and self-esteem were unique and significant predictors of group identification. In general, studies that have examined motivations for national identity are scarce (e.g., Sani et al., 2007), and no studies have systematically examined multiple motives of national identification.

In Studies 2 and 3 we used another vantage point to examine the connection between group identity and self-continuity, by examining whether existential threats to national identity instigate feelings of collective self-continuity. We reasoned that if self-continuity is an identity motive, then a sense of collective self-continuity should become more important and relevant when the continued existence of the in-group is undermined. Studies 2 and 3 both demonstrated that when existential threats to national identity were experimentally induced this strengthened the feeling of self-continuity (and belonging, but not self-esteem, Study 2) that people derive from their national group membership. This finding complements Study 1 and reaffirms that self-continuity provides an important basis for group identity (Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2012).

Importantly, our findings furthermore demonstrate that collective self-continuity plays a critical role in in-group defenses in the context of identity threat. Studies 2 and 3 showed that the elevated sense of self-continuity that resulted from existential group threat increased in-group defense in the form of opposition to threatening out-groups (Study 2, Muslim immigrants) and social developments (Study 3, European integration), and in the form of national heritage protectionism (Study 3). More specifically, it was found that existential group threats increased these in-group defensive reactions via enhanced feelings of collective self-continuity (controlling for self-esteem, Study 2, and belonging, Studies 2 and 3). Taken together, these findings offer convergent evidence for the importance of collective self-continuity for in-group defense mechanisms in the context of identity threat. We believe our findings to be robust and internally as well as externally valid, as we have demonstrated the effects of collective self-continuity by controlling for other identity motives, among a variety of samples (including a national one), and by using both survey and experimental designs.

Interestingly, Study 2 revealed that, next to national self-continuity, existential group threats elevated feelings of national belonging, but not national self-esteem. This indicates that when the very existence of the national in-group is at stake, collective self-continuity and belonging are more important considerations than self-esteem. This may be because existential threats primarily make group members aware of what binds them as a national community. Both collective self-continuity and belonging are concerned with common bonds. They relate to the feelings of (temporal) connectedness and relatedness that people derive from their group membership. Self-esteem, on the other hand, is concerned with feelings of positivity and status that group membership provides, and this may be less important and relevant when the very existence of the in-group is at stake.

Implications

The finding that the sense of collective self-continuity is important for understanding current group processes underlines the importance of taking temporal and historical aspects of social identities into account when examining intra- and intergroup dynamics. In general, questions related to temporal aspects of social identity have been largely neglected in social psychology (Condor, 1996a, 2006). Yet, a sense of identity – as individuals or as collectives – is not possible if we did not have some sense of our continuous existence over time. The capability to reflect on the past and to project oneself and the social groups to which one belongs in the future is uniquely human and helps us to make sense of the world and the social contexts in which we live. The present research indicates that a sense of self-continuity provides a unique basis for national identity, and drives in-group defensive reactions in the context of existential threats to group identity. These findings not only complement research on identity motives suggesting that continuity is an important motivation for why people identify with groups (e.g., Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2012; Vignoles et al., 2006; Vignoles, 2011), but also improve our understanding of when and why a sense of collective self-continuity is triggered and what its consequences are for different forms of in-group defense.

Our research also offers a novel connection to broader theories on group processes and intergroup relations. The current research complements work on TMT (Solomon et al., 1991) by showing that existential group threats result in in-group defense mechanisms (i.e., national heritage and opposition to out-groups and social developments), via an increased sense of collective self-continuity. Studies based on TMT have mainly focused on the consequences of personal mortality concerns and have hardly considered in-group (i.e.

worldview) defense that results from the potential loss or disappearance of group continuity (but see Wohl et al., 2010). Moreover, while terror management theorists (Pyszczynski et al., 2000) have proposed that people engage in group-level defenses in order to obtain a sense of symbolic immortality (i.e., self-continuity), research within this perspective has not empirically demonstrated that the sense of self-continuity that people derive from their group membership can provide these transcending properties.

Limitations and future directions

The present research has a number of limitations that provide directions for future work. A first limitation is that we only focused on national identity, which means that it is unclear to what extent our findings are generalizable to other social identities. Although not all groups necessarily provide a sense of self-continuity, many collectives do so, at least occasionally. For example, it has been shown that supporters of various British football teams often make references to the sense of self-continuity they gain from their allegiance to a particular club (Condor, 1996a). Nevertheless, future work should investigate the connections between collective self-continuity and intra- and intergroup processes among different social groups.

Furthermore, our research focused on the relationship between collective self-continuity and the cognitive, rather than affective, dimension of group identification. It has been argued that affective aspects of identification are more intimately linked to need fulfillment (Riketta, 2008). However, Vignoles and colleagues (2006) have shown that the cognitive dimension (i.e., perceived identity centrality) was more influenced by the motives for continuity, distinctiveness and meaning, whereas the affective dimension (i.e., positive affect) was more strongly related to self-esteem, efficacy, and belonging. Yet, continuity was a significant predictor of both the cognitive and affective dimension. Prospective work could further explore the relevance of collective self-continuity for both affective and cognitive dimensions of group identification.

In addition, in order to test the relative importance of self-continuity for group dynamics, we included several other identity motives in our analyses (i.e., belonging, self-esteem, efficacy and distinctiveness) that have been put forward in the social identity and intergroup literature. Although this list is not comprehensive, we feel that it represents a sufficient variety of motives to allow for a test of the relative importance of collective self-continuity in driving group identification and in-group defenses. In order to further explore this relative contribution, future research could include additional identity motives that might be relevant at the group level. For example, it has been shown that people are

likely to identify with groups that give them a sense of meaning in life (e.g., Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2012). Moreover, future studies could examine the role of individual dispositions that might be correlated with experiencing collective self-continuity, such as the desire for cognitive consistency and structure (Riketta, 2008), and subjective uncertainty (Van den Bos, 2009).

Another issue to address is that we measured people's identity motives by self-reported feelings of continuity, belonging, self-esteem, distinctiveness and efficacy. However, people are not necessarily aware of their identity motives and implicit and explicit measures of these motives may be unrelated (Vignoles, 2011). Nevertheless, these identity motives are likely to become explicit and salient once they are threatened or frustrated, and this activation is likely to result in responses that satisfy these motives. As such, the presence of identity motives can be inferred from their predictable effects on in-group defenses in the context of identity threat. For example, our findings (Studies 2 and 3) show that threats to the continuity of the in-group increase a sense of collective self-continuity that subsequently drives national heritage protectionism and out-group rejection. Thus, our measure of collective self-continuity has predictive utility, but future studies should examine self-continuity and other social identity motives using implicit measures.

3.6 Conclusion

In three studies, we demonstrated that a sense of collective self-continuity is an important aspect of group identity and plays a central role in in-group defense mechanisms. These findings go beyond familiar social psychological explanations of group dynamics. Social psychologists tend to focus on the synchronic dimension of social life and are much less concerned with the diachronic dimension. By examining the role of the sense of self-continuity that people derive from their national group membership, the present research sheds light on the interplay between temporal aspects of the collective self and their social psychological consequences in group settings. In doing so, it integrates insights from functional approaches to social identification with propositions from existential psychology.

3.7 Notes

1.   To compare models we used the following rule of thumb: an AIC difference of < 2 indicates no meaningful discrepancy between models; a difference between 4 and 7 indicates considerable evidence that the model with the lower AIC is better, and

a difference of > 10 indicates substantial support for the model with the lower AIC (Burnham & Anderson, 2002).

2. For Studies 1A and 1B, we also compared the five-factor model to all possible four-factor models. The results were in favor of the five-factor model (i.e., had a better model fit than any of the alternative models). Results are available on request. For Study 1C, we also compared the three factor model to two-factor models in which continuity was combined with self-esteem, and belonging with self-esteem. This revealed that the proposed three-factor model also fit the data better than a two-factor model in which continuity and self-esteem were combined, $\chi^2(19) = 73.32$, $p < .001$, $\Delta\chi^2(2) = 56.50$, $p < .001$, and better than a two-factor model in which belonging and self-esteem were combined, $\chi^2(19) = 66.34$, $p < .001$, $\Delta\chi^2(2) = 49.52$, $p < .001$.

3. We also compared this three-factor model to two-factor models in which continuity was combined with self-esteem, and belonging with self-esteem. This revealed that the proposed three-factor model also fit the data better than a two-factor model in which continuity and self-esteem were combined, $\chi^2(26) = 75.51$, $p < .001$, $\Delta\chi^2(2) = 36.63$, $p < .001$, and better than a two-factor model in which belonging and self-esteem were combined, $\chi^2(26) = 101.92$, $p < .001$, $\Delta\chi^2(2) = 63.04$, $p < .001$.

4. The model has 79 degrees of freedom because we allowed five error terms between the six items assessing opposition to Muslim expressive rights to correlate. This was necessary in order to reach acceptable model fit.

5. The model has 90 degrees of freedom because we allowed five error terms of the items assessing opposition to Muslim expressive rights to correlate. This was necessary in order to reach acceptable model fit.

6. For more information on TNS NIPO Consult, which is a consultancy company that conducts surveys and other studies among the Dutch population, see http://www.tns-nipo.com.

National nostalgia, autochthony and opposition to Muslim expressive rights

4.1 Introduction

> It is in times of danger, either from without or from within, that we come deeply conscious of our heritage… of a nostalgia… for what we think of as a happier world which we have lost (Strong, Binney, & Harris, 1974, p. 10).

> Collectively, nostalgia supplies the deep links that identify a particular generation; nationally it is the source of binding social myths. It secures, and it compensates, serving… as a kind of safety valve for disappointment and frustration suffered over the loss of prized values (Hewison, 1987, p. 46).

We live in a time of change. The mobility of people, goods and information has never been so extensive, and these developments are profoundly changing people's understanding of the world and their place in it (Morley & Robbins, 1995). Scholars have argued that one of the consequences of this enhanced mobility is that people increasingly experience feelings of homelessness and nostalgia: "…there is widespread nostalgia for a condition of being *at home* [italics added] in society, with oneself, and with the universe: for homes of the past that were socially homogeneous, communal, safe and secure" (Rapport & Dawson, 1998, p. 31). In Western Europe, this nostalgic sentiment is linked to public discourses on immigration. Politicians claim that native majority members no longer feel at home in their own country, and that they increasingly long for a time when it was 'just us' (see Duyvendak, 2011). This is particularly blamed on the growing presence and visibility of Muslim immigrants, who tend to be perceived as having ways of life that are incompatible with that of natives (e.g., Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).

Although social psychologists have examined the consequences of nostalgia for individual lives, there have hardly been studies on how feelings of nostalgia influence intergroup relations (yet see Turner, Wildschut, & Sedikides, 2012; Turner, Wildschut, Sedikides, & Gheorghiu, 2013). Furthermore, while historians, anthropologists and sociologists have described feelings of national nostalgia (e.g., Boym, 2001; Davis, 1979; Hewison, 1987), there have been no social psychological studies that have specifically examined how nostalgia for one's country's past is related to the evaluation of other groups. We propose that feelings of national nostalgia (i.e., a sentimental longing for the country's good old days) among native majority members can have negative consequences for the evaluation of immigrant out-groups, because it encourages the belief in entitlements for the first inhabitants ('owners') of a territory. This belief has been labeled autochthony and is considered to represent an authentic and primordial form of belonging, as it literally means 'to be born from the soil' (Geschiere, 2009). Arguments about autochthony are used in political discourses in various

countries to deny equal rights to immigrants and newcomers (Duyvendak, 2011; Geschiere, 2009). However, autochthony and its implication for intergroup relations have mainly been researched from an anthropological perspective (Adamczyk, 2011; Ceuppens, 2006, 2011; Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005; Gausset, Knrick, & Gibb, 2011; Geschiere, 2009; Geschiere & Jackson, 2006), and the concept has only been recently introduced in the social psychological literature as an important predictor of out-group prejudice (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013). The current research tests the proposition that national nostalgia strengthens beliefs of autochthony, which, in turn, enhance opposition to expressive rights for Muslims to publicly enact their identity (e.g., wearing a headscarf, building Mosques).

Conceptualizing nostalgia

The understanding of nostalgia (from the Greek words *nostos* – return home, and *algia* – longing/suffering) has changed substantively over the last 300 years (for reviews see Batcho, 2013; Sedikides et al., 2008a). Nostalgia was historically seen as a negative and maladaptive emotion characterized by feelings of loss and mourning (Sedikides, Wildschut, & Baden, 2004). Later it was discovered that people also associate nostalgia with happy memories of the past (Davis, 1979). The growing body of social psychological research that emerged in the 20th and 21st century has conceptualized nostalgia as a predominantly positive emotion and as a source of individual and social well-being (e.g., Gebauer & Sedikides, 2010; Sedikides et al., 2008a). Research has shown, for instance, that nostalgia elevates mood, increases self-esteem and bolsters social connectedness (e.g., Sedikides et al., 2004; Wildschut et al., 2006). However, most of this work has focused on the consequences of nostalgia for personal lives.

More recently, studies emerged that examined the implications of nostalgia for intergroup relations (Turner et al., 2012, 2013). This research focused on different out-groups (i.e., overweight people and the mentally ill, respectively), and showed that nostalgia about an encounter with an out-group member reduces negative attitudes towards this out-group. Turner and colleagues (2012, 2013) argue that their findings highlight the potential of nostalgia as a means to reduce prejudice towards stigmatized out-groups. Yet, they have focused on out-group nostalgia and did not look at feelings of nostalgia that people have on the basis of their own group membership. That is, individuals may express a sentimental longing for their in-group past and this may have different consequences for how they evaluate out-group members. To our knowledge, there have been no studies examining how nostalgia for the in-group affects current group dynamics.

Furthermore, while social psychologists have predominantly considered nostalgia as a positive emotion, it has recently been demonstrated that nostalgia may not always have positive consequences for individual functioning (Iyer & Jetten, 2011; see also Verplanken, 2013). Using the context of life transitions, Iyer and Jetten (2011) showed that nostalgia had positive consequences for individual's ability to cope with present challenges when people perceived high personal identity continuity, but had negative consequences when identity continuity was low. These researchers proposed that when individuals feel that they are no longer connected to who they were in the past, a nostalgic longing for this past serves as a painful reminder of the good things that are left behind, which impedes individual's ability to move on and face current challenges.

Similar to personal lives, in times of social change and transition, group members may get the feeling that they are losing their connection to 'who we were' in the past and nostalgia for this past may therefore function as a painful reminder of the good things that are lost. Scholars have proposed that, in the context of immigration and cultural diversity, nostalgia for the national past among natives mainly serves as a painful reminder of the good old days when it was 'just us' (see Duyvendak, 2011). Furthermore, it has been suggested that nostalgia for the national past typically emerges when group identity is threatened, because it serves a restorative function (Hewison, 1987). The reason is that in longing for the national past group members become more aware of the importance of their original culture and traditions as a basis for preserving their national identity (Stokols & Jacobi, 1984). In other words, national nostalgia provides a means for holding onto the past and reaffirming national identity in the context of inevitable change.

Furthermore, it has been argued that it is particularly this combined sense of collective loss and longing that is likely to result in attempts to restore 'the way we were' (Stokols & Jacobi, 1984). Boym (2001) has labeled this the restorative (as opposed to the reflective) form of nostalgia. People who experience restorative nostalgia not only long for past times when things were allegedly real, original and authentic, but also want to reconquer the past at the cost of the present. It has been argued that national nostalgia in West European countries, like the Netherlands, has a strong *restorative* character (Duyvendak, 2011). Many native majority members feel nostalgic about their national home that they have lost to newcomers, and therefore want to claim back the country, or neighborhood, that was originally theirs. One way of restoring this ownership of the country is by claiming entitlements on the basis of being primo-occupancy (i.e., autochthony).

Autochthony

Autochthony (from the Greek words *autos* – self, and *khthôn* – earth) can be defined as a belief that assigns ownership and the related rights and entitlements to the group that is considered the first inhabitant of a territory (i.e., primo-occupant) (Geschiere, 2009). Autochthony is theoretically and empirically distinct from the ethnic representation of national belonging (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013) that has been examined in the social psychological literature (e.g., Meeus et al., 2010; Pehrson et al., 2009; Wakefield et al., 2011). Whereas the latter concerns belonging in terms of common origin and blood ties, the former defines belonging as being historically rooted in place, with the related sense of ownership and group rights (Geschiere, 2009).

Specifically, just like first possession of an object is generally accepted as a basis for claiming ownership (Friedman, 2008), 'being here first' is considered a legitimate argument to claim ownership of the respective land. As ownership involves the right to forbid or allow other people from using one's property (Friedman & Ross, 2011; Snare, 1972), the notion of primo-occupancy is used by native inhabitants to exclude newcomers from equal participation in the host society (Geschiere, 2009). This means that groups who claim ownership on the basis of primo-occupancy are likely to feel most entitled to decide on important collective matters regarding their country.

Entitlement claims of native majority members on the basis of primo-occupancy have become an important notion in West European debates on immigration (Ceuppens, 2006; Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005; Geschiere, 2009). Anthropological research has described how the influx of immigrants and the accompanying diversification of districts and neighborhoods cause natives to assert their 'primoridal bonds' and 'rights to the ground' (Avila, 2004; Kasinitz & Hillyard, 1995). This indicates that autochthony implies a special form of group-ownership with an 'implicit call for excluding strangers' ("allochthons") (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005, p. 386). Recent social psychological research has shown that autochthony predicts prejudice towards immigrants over and above other well-known predictors of prejudice, such as social dominance orientation, conformity and the ethnic definition of belonging (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013). It has furthermore been observed that beliefs in autochthony are related to expressions of in-group nostalgia. For instance, ethnographic research by Kasinitz and Hillyard (1995) has described how nostalgia for communal solidarity among working-class White Americans helped them to claim that they, instead of the growing non-White population, represented the authentic voice of the community and were therefore more entitled to assert ownership of the neighborhood.

Moreover, earlier sociological work described this urban America's nostalgia for the 'old ethnic neighborhood' as causing the resurgence of primordial territorial groups (Suttles, 1972). A similar sentiment has been observed among native majority members in the Netherlands who live in neighborhoods that have become increasingly culturally diverse (Duyvendak, 2011). The nostalgic feeling about having lost one's national home to newcomers, makes natives want to claim back (i.e., restore) the country that was originally theirs and notions of autochthony can be used to legitimize this reclaim (Verkuyten, 1997).

Specifically, native majority members who feel nostalgic for their lost national home may endorse autochthony in order to restore the uneven distribution of power and status between primo-occupants ('us') and newcomers ('them'). Just as the owner of an object can prevent others from using it (Freedman & Ross, 2011; Snare, 1972), ownership and management of a territory by alleged primo-occupants goes together with the right to exclude other groups from equal entitlements. According to the group position model (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999), a condition for prejudice to arise is that the in-group must have a sense of proprietary claim over certain rights, statuses and resources which are denied to out-groups. Autochthony is an ideology that allocates such privileges to the primo-occupants of the country and has been shown to predict negative attitudes towards immigrants (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013). As such, when native majority members are seen to have rights to the ground this might leave less space for the public expression of other group cultures and identities. In many Western European countries, including the Netherlands, public expressions of Islam, such as wearing a headscarf and Mosques, are perceived as corroding national identity and culture (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009). We therefore expect that the stronger belief of autochthony that results from feelings of national nostalgia will enhance natives' opposition to rights for Muslim immigrants to publicly confirm and express their identity.

The present research

This research examines the consequences of national nostalgia for out-group evaluations. We look at national nostalgia among natives in the Dutch context, which is characterized by relatively strong negative sentiments towards Muslim immigrants (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007), and nostalgic feelings with a strong restorative character (Duyvendak, 2011). We hypothesized that national nostalgia is related to stronger opposition towards Muslim expressive rights, via stronger endorsement of autochthony beliefs. The reason is that one way to restore the lost 'national home' is by reclaiming ownership and entitlements

on the basis of primo-occupancy (i.e., autochthony). This prediction was tested in two studies. Study 1 was a survey study among a sample of the native Dutch population, and Study 2 was an experiment in which national nostalgia was manipulated.

4.2 Study 1

Study 1 was designed to test the associations between national nostalgia, autochthony and opposition to Muslim rights. As national nostalgia is a new construct we also examined whether it can be empirically distinguished from both autochthony and opposition, as well as from a general attachment towards the national in-group (i.e., national identification). Moreover, we investigated whether the proposed relationships between national nostalgia, autochthony and opposition would hold when controlling for demographic characteristics as well as for national identification.

Method

Participants, design and procedure
This survey study was part of a larger data collection (collected in 2011) among a representative sample (N = 933) of the native Dutch population of 18 years and older (Dutch Society Survey, see Table 1.1). Six different versions of the questionnaire were randomly assigned to this representative sample, and we only selected the respondents that completed the version that was specifically designed for this study (N = 162).[1] Participants received the questionnaire by means of en e-mail sent by TNS NIPO Consult.[2] Respondents were drawn from a panel of native Dutch respondents maintained by TNS NIPO Consult, and the characteristics of the panel and the sample closely match those of the general native Dutch population. Two respondents indicated that one of their parents had a non-native background and they were therefore excluded from the sample. This resulted in a sample of 160 native Dutch participants that consisted of 52.5% men and 47.5% women. The ages ranged between 18 and 88, and the mean age was 48.95 (SD = 17.19). Of the respondents, 5% completed primary education, 55.7% completed a lower level of secondary (26.3%) and tertiary education (29.4%), 38.7% completed a higher level of secondary (7.5%) and tertiary (higher applied and university) education (31.2%) and 0.6% did not report their educational level. Participants were informed that the study was about Dutch society and they were asked to complete all materials in the online survey.

Measures

National nostalgia. We developed four items to assess to what extent participants experienced national nostalgia ($\alpha = .90$): "How often do you experience nostalgia when you think about the Netherlands of the past?", "How often do you long for the good old days?", "How often do you long for the Netherlands of the past?", "How often do you feel nostalgic when you hear Dutch songs from the past?" Items were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (*very rarely*) to 7 (*very frequently*).

Autochthony. We used a four-item scale, developed by Martinovic and Verkuyten (2013), to measure the belief that the original native inhabitants of a country are more entitled to have a say in how the country is being run ($\alpha = .93$). The items were: "The original inhabitants of a country are more entitled than newcomers", "Every country belongs to its original inhabitants", "The original inhabitants of a country have the most right to define the rules of the game", and " 'We were here first', is an important principle for determining who decides on what happens in a country." Items were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Opposition to Muslim expressive rights. We used a six-item scale ($\alpha = .90$) to measure participants' opposition to rights and opportunities for Muslims to publicly express and confirm their identity. These items have been used in previous Dutch studies (e.g., Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2010) and were as follows: "Muslims in the Netherlands should have the right to express and experience their religion in public life", "Muslim women in the Netherlands should have the right to wear a headscarf everywhere", "Muslims in the Netherlands should have the right to not only celebrate their Islamic holidays at home, but also in public life", "Muslims in the Netherlands should have the right to start Islamic schools", "Muslims should have the right to build mosques in the Netherlands", "On Dutch television there should be room for programs by and for Muslims". Items were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*), and were reverse scored, so a higher score indicated more opposition to Muslim expressive rights.

National identification. Four items ($\alpha = .92$) were used to measure the extent to which participants identified with their nation (see Verkuyten, 2005). These items were: "My Dutch background is an important part of my identity", "I identify strongly with the Netherlands", "I feel really Dutch", and "My Dutch identity is important for how I see and feel myself".

Demographic characteristics. Four standard demographic characteristics were taken into account: gender (coded as 1 = *male*, 0 = *female*), age, education (a scale ranging from 1 (*primary education*) to 8 (*university degree*)), and the well-known political self-placement scale (Jost, 2006), ranging from 1 (*left*) to 5 (*right*).

Results

Preliminary analyses

Table 4.1 shows the descriptive findings for all variables, the bivariate correlations between the variables, as well as the partial correlations controlling for the covariates. National nostalgia was positively associated with autochthony and opposition to Muslim rights, and these correlations remained significant after controlling for the covariates. Gender was not related to any of the measures and was therefore not considered further. Education was negatively associated with the three core constructs. Age was not significantly correlated with national nostalgia,[3] and political orientation was positively associated with both autochthony and opposition, but showed no significant relation with national nostalgia. National identification was positively correlated with the three scales. In order to control for any potential confounding influences on our hypothesized relations, we included education, political orientation, and national identification as predictors of autochthony and opposition to Muslim expressive rights in the structural equation model.

Confirmatory factor analyses

We performed confirmatory factor analyses (CFA), using AMOS 18.0 software, to determine whether the items assessing national nostalgia, national identification, autochthony and opposition to Muslim expressive rights composed different factors. We compared the fit of a four-factor model with various three-factor models, and with the fit of a one-factor model.

Table 4.1 Partial and nonpartial correlations for all measures, Study 1

	M	*SD*	1	2	3
1. National nostalgia	2.69	.96	—	.40***	.40***
2. Autochthony	4.52	1.39	.32***	—	.47***
3. Opposition to Muslim rights	4.39	1.36	.19***	.40***	—
Covariates					
4. Gender	—	—	.01	-.06	.07
5. Age	48.95	17.19	.13	.03	-.04
6. Education	5.21	1.76	-.31***	-.18*	-.39***
7. Political orientation	2.98	1.10	.09	.19*	.19*
8. National identification	5.58	1.00	.26***	.26***	.20**

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. The correlations between the three core constructs are presented above the diagonal and were calculated without controlling for the covariates.

The results of the analyses are shown in Table 4.2. The proposed four factor structure had a good fit to the data.[4] The z-statistics obtained for all the factor loadings were statistically significant ($p_s < .001$) and the standardized factor loadings were between .62 and .94 for national nostalgia, between .84 and .89 for national identification, between .84 and .93 for autochthony, and between .62 and .92 for opposition to Muslim rights. Chi-square difference tests indicated that the proposed four factor structure fit the data better than any of the alternative models. This indicates that national nostalgia, national identification, autochthony and opposition to Muslim expressive rights are separate constructs.

Structural equation modeling

We conducted structural equation modeling (in AMOS 18.0) using latent variables for the three constructs (including education, political orientation and national identification as covariates). Missing values were mean-substituted.[5] To test our predictions regarding the effects of national nostalgia on autochthony and opposition to Muslim rights we specified the model in Figure 4.1, which shows the standardized paths, explained variance (R^2) and model fit statistics. All manifest items loaded significantly on their respective latent variable (ranging between .62 and .94). These analyses revealed that national nostalgia was significantly and positively related to autochthony beliefs and to opposition to Muslim expressive rights.

We subsequently tested the indirect effect of national nostalgia on opposition to Muslim expressive rights, via autochthony, using bootstrapping procedures in AMOS 18.0.


Figure 4.1 Structural equation model (Study 1): Influence of national nostalgia on opposition to Muslim expressive rights (controlling for effects of education, political orientation and national identification), via autochthony.
Note. Path-coefficients are standardized estimates (marked in boldface), and the path coefficient in parenthesis reflects the total effect. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$. To simplify, indicators of latent variables are not shown. Model fit: $\chi^2(154) = 182.43$, $p = .059$; CFI = .99, RMSEA = .03.

Table 4.2 Fit indices of models tested in confirmatory factor analyses, Study 1

	X^2(df)	$\Delta\chi^2$	CFI	RMSEA	AIC
Model 1					
1) 4-factors	158.59 (126)*		.99	.04	248.59
1a) 3-factor model 1 (nostalgia with identification)	638.12 (129)***	479.53***	.77	.16	722.12
1b) 3-factor model 2 (nostalgia with autochthony)	511.08 (129)***	352.49***	.82	.14	595.08
1c) 3-factor model 3 (nostalgia with opposition)	506.14 (129)***	347.55***	.83	.14	590.14
1d) 3-factor model 4 (autochthony with opposition)	464.62 (129)***	306.03***	.85	.13	548.62
1e) 1-factor	1278.14 (132)***	1119.55***	.47	.23	1356.14

Note. CFI = Comparative Fit Index, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, AIC = Akaike Information Criterion. *** p <.001, * p <.05.

In these analyses we also controlled for the abovementioned covariates. We generated 5000 random bootstrap samples with replacement from the dataset (N = 160) and tested the model with these samples. The analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of national nostalgia, with a point estimate of .190 and a 95% bias-corrected confidence interval of .076 to .386. As the main effect of national nostalgia on opposition to Muslim expressive rights remained significant when autochthony was included in the model (see Figure 4.1) this finding indicates that part of the effect was explained by autochthony (i.e., partial mediation). These results are consistent with our prediction that national nostalgia is related to more opposition to Muslim expressive rights, via stronger perceptions of autochthony. Importantly, this result was obtained while controlling for potential spurious correlates of national nostalgia, autochthony and opposition to Muslim rights (i.e., education, political orientation, and national identification) and therefore strengthens support for our theoretical prediction.

4.3 Study 2

The results of Study 1 provide support for our prediction that national nostalgia is related to more opposition to Muslim expressive rights via stronger endorsement of autochthony beliefs. However, the results of Study 1 were based on cross-sectional data and hence no causal conclusions can be drawn. Therefore, Study 2 used an experimental design in which national nostalgia was manipulated.

Method

Participants, design and procedure
Participants were 67 students at Utrecht University who received 7 Euros for their participation (Laboratory Experiment of National Nostalgia, see Table 1.1). We excluded participants who indicated to be Muslim or non-Dutch, which resulted in a total sample of 59 participants (62.7% women, 37.3% men). The ages ranged from 18 to 31 (M = 22.63, SD = 3.26).

Students were invited to the computer laboratory to participate in a study on current Dutch societal issues. A between-subjects design was used, in which participants were randomly assigned to a national nostalgia or control condition. Participants completed all materials in an online version of the questionnaire in the order presented below. Participants were debriefed by e-mail after all the experimental sessions had finished.

In the national nostalgia condition, participants first watched a short movie (about 3 minutes) about the Netherlands during the 90s, which is the period in which the participants grew up. The movie showed typical Dutch things from this time period, such as TV shows, the national coin the gilder (which was replaced by the Euro in 2002), and images of the last Eleven cities tour – a famous Dutch ice skating competition that has not been held anymore since 1997. This movie was included in order to strengthen feelings of national nostalgia among the student sample that is rather young and for whom nostalgic feelings might not be very salient in daily life. In addition, the movie provided examples of collective objects and events one can feel nostalgic about, to facilitate the reading and writing task on national nostalgia that followed. This reading and writing task was based on previous manipulations of personal nostalgia (see Iyer & Jetten, 2011; Sedikides et al., 2008a). Participants received and completed the following:

> According to Van Dale dictionary 'nostalgia' means a sentimental longing for the good old days. People sometimes sentimentally long for the Netherlands of the past: for those good old days. For instance, they long for the way Dutch society was and how daily life looked like. Do you sometimes long for the Netherlands of your past? Please bring to mind the good and nice things from the Netherlands of the past. Which things from the Dutch past evoke nostalgia in you? Please write down what you miss from the Netherlands of the past and how this makes you feel nostalgic (use 4 sentences max.).

On the basis of previous research on personal nostalgia (e.g., Iyer & Jetten, 2011; Sedikides et al., 2008a) we designed a control condition that allowed us to differentiate the effect of national nostalgia from that of a more general reflection on the national past, as well as from the mere salience of national identity. Specifically, in this control condition participants also watched a short movie of similar duration,[6] but this movie showed a short overview of things that had happened in the Netherlands and had made the news in 2012.[7] Similar to the national nostalgia condition, they then proceeded to a reading and writing task:

> Please try to envisage an event that made the news last year and that involved the Netherlands. Try to think about this event as if you were an eye witness. Specifically, try to envisage this event as if you were a historian who wants to know all facts about national history. Please write about this event below as factual, neutral and detailed as possible (use 4 sentences max.).

Measures

Participants completed all measures on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

National nostalgia manipulation check. Two items assessed the extent to which participants felt nostalgic about the Dutch past. These two items were: "I feel nostalgic when I think about the Netherlands of the past", and "I long for the Netherlands of the past." These two items were combined into a scale ($r = .55, p < .001$).

Autochthony. The same four-item measure of Study 1 was used to measure beliefs of autochthony ($\alpha = .89$).

Opposition to Muslim expressive rights. We used a four-item scale ($\alpha = .84$) to measure participants' opposition to rights and opportunities for Muslims to publicly express and confirm their identity. The items were similar to the ones used in Study 1, except that two items (i.e., about Islamic schools, and about building Mosques) were not measured in this experiment. Items were reverse scored, so a higher score indicated more opposition to Muslim expressive rights.

National identification. One item assessed the extent to which participants identified with the Netherlands: "How strongly do you feel Dutch?" This item was measured on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 10 (*very much*). Recent research by Postmes et al. (2013) provides evidence for the reliability and validity of single-item group identification measures.

Demographic characteristics. Gender (coded as 1 = *male*, 0 = *female*) was assessed with a dummy variable. Age was a continuous measure in years. Political orientation was again measured with the political self-placement scale (Jost, 2006), ranging from 1 (*left*) to 5 (*right*).

Results

Preliminary analyses

Gender and age produced no effects in any of the analyses and were therefore not considered further. National identification was positively correlated with autochthony ($r = .30, p = .020$) but not with opposition ($r = .12, p = .356$), and political orientation was positively correlated with autochthony ($r = .49, p < .001$) and opposition ($r = .33, p = .012$). We therefore included national identification and political orientation as covariates in the path model.

Manipulation check

One-way ANOVA showed that there was a main effect of the national nostalgia manipulation on feelings of national nostalgia, $F(1, 57) = 3.84, p = .028, \eta_p^2 = .063$. Participants displayed higher feelings of national nostalgia in the national nostalgia condition ($M = 4.19, SD = 1.05$) than in the control condition ($M = 3.61, SD = 1.16$).

Path model

To examine our predictions regarding the direct and indirect effects of the national nostalgia manipulation on opposition to Muslim expressive rights and autochthony, we specified the path model in Figure 4.2. We tested this model (in AMOS 18.0) using manifest variables, as the sample size was too small to test a structural equation model with latent variables (Kline, 2005). In this model, we included political orientation and national identification as covariates. The standardized paths and explained variance (R^2) are shown in Figure 4.2. As expected, the national nostalgia manipulation exerted a significant effect on autochthony. When national nostalgia was salient, participants reported a stronger belief in autochthony ($M = 3.61$, $SD = 1.12$) than in the control condition ($M = 3.11$, $SD = 1.02$). These perceptions of autochthony were subsequently related to stronger opposition to Muslim expressive rights. There was no significant main effect of the national nostalgia manipulation on opposition to Muslim expressive rights; the level of opposition did not significantly differ between the national nostalgia ($M = 3.22$, $SD = .96$) and the control condition ($M = 3.11$, $SD = .99$).

However, we tested the indirect effect of the national nostalgia manipulation on opposition to Muslim expressive rights, via autochthony, because exogenous variables can exert an effect on endogenous variables in the absence of a direct relation between them (Hayes, 2009). This means that only the indirect effect needs to be significant in order to establish a causal connection between the two (Zhao et al., 2010). We tested the indirect effect of the national nostalgia manipulation using bootstrapping procedures in AMOS

Figure 4.2 Path model (Study 2): Influence of national nostalgia manipulation on opposition to Muslim expressive rights, via autochthony (including national identification and political orientation as covariates).

Note. Path-coefficients are standardized estimates (marked in boldface), and the path coefficient in parenthesis reflects the total effect. Non-significant paths are shown as broken arrows. *** $p < .001$, * $p < .05$.

18.0. We generated 5000 bootstrap samples with replacement from the dataset ($N = 59$) and tested the model with these samples. The analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of national nostalgia, with a point estimate of .10 and a 95% bias-corrected confidence interval of .001 to .250. This result provides support for our predicted causal relationships. The salience of national nostalgia increased beliefs in autochthony, which subsequently resulted in stronger opposition to Muslim expressive rights. These findings replicate those of Study 1 in an experimental setting.

4.4 General discussion

The key finding of the current research is that national nostalgia strengthens negative attitudes towards Muslim immigrants via stronger endorsement of autochthony. Whereas previous social psychological research has predominantly considered nostalgia as a positive emotion with the potential to improve intergroup relations (Turner et al., 2012, 2013), the current findings indicate that feelings of national nostalgia can increase negative attitudes towards out-groups. In Study 1, we measured national nostalgia among a survey sample of the native Dutch population and showed that it is a positive predictor of endorsement of autochthony and opposition to Muslim rights. In Study 2, we used an experimental design in which we manipulated national nostalgia, and showed that the salience of national nostalgia enhanced opposition to Muslim expressive rights via stronger endorsement of autochthony beliefs.

To our knowledge, this research provides the first demonstration of the potential negative effects of nostalgia for intergroup relations. While there is quite some work on the consequences of nostalgia for personal functioning (e.g., Sedikides et al., 2008a; Wildschut et al., 2006) the implications of nostalgia in intergroup settings remain largely unexplored. Exceptions are two recent studies by Turner and colleagues (2012, 2013), which demonstrated that feeling nostalgic about an out-group member improved attitudes towards the out-group. However, these studies did not look at the feelings of nostalgia that people may experience on behalf of their in-group membership. We showed that individuals can have nostalgic feelings for their national in-group and that this can have negative consequences for the evaluation of out-groups. More specifically, we showed that national nostalgia among natives strengthened endorsement of autochthony, which subsequently enhanced their opposition to rights of Muslim immigrants to express their religious identity in the public space. By demonstrating the potential of nostalgia to increase rather than reduce negative attitudes towards out-groups, these findings represent

a theoretical advancement over previous research looking at the role of nostalgia in relation to out-group attitudes (Turner et al., 2012, 2013).

Another advancement of the present research is the introduction of autochthony as a mediator between national nostalgia and negative out-group attitudes. Although the concept of autochthony has received much attention in anthropology (Adamczyk, 2011; Ceuppens, 2006, 2011; Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005; Gausset, Knrick & Gibb, 2011; Geschiere, 2009; Geschiere & Jackson, 2006), it has not been introduced into the social psychological literature until recently (see Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013). Moreover, whereas the concept of autochthony has been linked to feelings of in-group nostalgia and the denial of rights for immigrant groups in theoretical and ethnographic work (e.g., Duyvendak, 2011; Kasinitz & Hillyard, 1995; Suttles, 1972), these relationships have thus far not received any quantitative empirical support. The findings of the present research highlight the importance of national nostalgia and autochthony for the social psychological study of intergroup relations.

Whereas national nostalgia was both directly and indirectly related to opposition to Muslim rights in our survey Study 1, we observed only an indirect experimental effect of national nostalgia on opposition via autochthony in Study 2. This finding suggests that, unlike the individual endorsement of national nostalgia, the situational salience of national nostalgia enhances negative attitudes towards immigrants only via a reevaluation of the position and entitlements of the in-group relative to newcomers (i.e., autochthony). This finding more generally indicates that the belief in autochthony may be a key psychological factor that drives negative attitudes towards out-groups when national nostalgia is salient.

Limitations and directions for future research

Notwithstanding the novel contributions of our work there are some limitations that provide directions for future work. First, it is important to note that we examined national nostalgia and autochthony in the context of the Netherlands, which is characterized by quite strong negative sentiments towards Muslim immigrants (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). This means that it is unclear whether our findings can be generalized to other contexts. Yet, as a comparable nostalgic discourse in relation to autochthony and immigration has been observed in both Western and non-western countries (Geschiere, 2009; Duyvendak, 2011), it is likely that similar mechanisms are at work. In addition, nostalgia for the 'old ethnic neighborhood' has also been linked to notions of autochthony and opposition to immigrants (Kasinitz & Hillyard, 1995; Verkuyten, 1997). Future

work could thus try to replicate and extend these findings in other countries and at the neighborhood level. In addition, in this research we only focused on a single out-group, but prospective studies should investigate whether the findings can also be generalized to other out-groups.

Another point that warrants discussion is that the effect of national nostalgia on opposition in Study 1 was only partially mediated by autochthony. This suggests that, next to autochthony, there are other processes that explain this effect. Historians, for example, have suggested that national nostalgia increases feelings of in-group cohesiveness (e.g., Hewison, 1987), and future studies could examine whether this might be another explanation for why national nostalgia is related to stronger opposition to immigrant out-groups. A related point is that we only observed a significant indirect effect, and no total effect, of the national nostalgia manipulation on opposition to Muslim rights in Study 2. A significant indirect effect in the absence of a total effect could indicate that, next to autochthony, there is another indirect path (not taken into account in our predicted model) that carries the effect from national nostalgia to opposition in the opposite direction (MacKinnon et al., 2000; Hayes, 2009). More specifically, whereas the salience of national nostalgia may have enhanced opposition to immigrant out-groups via endorsement of autochthony, reflecting on the good things of the national past may also have reduced out-group opposition via, for example, more pro-social attitudes. This would be in line with research showing that nostalgia can foster a communal orientation (e.g., Wildschut et al., 2006). Future work should further explore how the effects of national nostalgia on out-group evaluations can be explained.

Another limitation is that our results cannot completely support the causality in our theoretical model. That is, while the assumed causal sequence of national nostalgia on endorsement of autochthony is supported by our experimental Study 2, the data leave open the relationship of autochthony and opposition to Muslim expressive rights. However, it is likely that the suggested causal order applies as (a) we assessed autochthony beliefs before opposition in the items following the national nostalgia manipulation, and (b) as the nostalgia manipulation did not directly predict opposition, but only indirectly via autochthony. Regarding the latter point, this means that opposition could not have been a mediator between the nostalgia manipulation and autochthony in Study 2. Future studies could conduct experiments to examine whether autochthony causes negative out-group attitudes.

Furthermore, we argued that the reason why national nostalgia among Dutch natives is likely to predict negative attitudes towards immigrant out-groups is because it has a strong restorative character (Duyvendak, 2011). Yet, this restorative aspect was

not explicitly examined. That is, while we showed in Study 2 that the national nostalgia manipulation activated general sentimental longings for the national past, we did not assess whether these were restorative sentiments. As national nostalgia was related to stronger endorsement of autochthony and opposition to Muslim rights in both studies, it is likely that national nostalgia among native Dutch majority members takes on a restorative form. However, there may be other contexts in which national nostalgia takes on a more reflective form (Boym, 2001). People who experience reflective nostalgia consider the value of the (remembered) past for present purposes. That is, although they recognize that good things have been lost, they also see that much has been gained, and this experience might have different consequences for attitudes towards other groups. For instance, there may be neighborhoods or cities in which native majority members acknowledge losses and changes as a consequence of the increasing presence of newcomers, but at the same time feel that this cultural diversification has brought good things, such as a richer food culture and a wider variety of local shops. Prospective work could examine different types of national nostalgia and their consequences for intergroup relations.

4.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, this research has important implications for the understanding of intergroup relations in culturally diverse societies. We showed that native majority members who feel nostalgic for their national home of the past are more likely to endorse the belief that in being the primo-occupants of the country they are more entitled, which in turn fosters their opposition to rights for Muslims to publicly confirm and express their identity. As such, a political discourse that harbors this nostalgic sentiment among native populations could diminish the freedom for immigrant minorities to express their identities in the public space and can therefore lead to intergroup tensions and conflicts.

4.6 Notes

1. This specific version contained our measures of interest and was not preceded by any experimental manipulation.

2. For more information on TNS NIPO Consult, which is a consultancy company that conducts surveys and other studies among the Dutch population, see http://www. tns-nipo.com.

3.   We also examined whether the associations of national nostalgia with autochthony and opposition were moderated by age, but this was not the case ($p_s > .137$).

4.   The model has 126 degrees of freedom because, based on the modification indices, we allowed two error terms assessing opposition to Muslim rights to correlate, as well as two error terms assessing autochthony. These were necessary in order to reach acceptable fit.

5.   The number of missing values was well below 1% overall and not exceeding 3% per variable. No systematic pattern of missing values or correlations of missing values with any of the independent or dependent variables were found.

6.   Both movies are available through the authors on request.

7.   Data were collected in February and March 2013.

PART II

Contents of national identity temporality

National group continuity
and opposition to
Muslim immigrants

5

5.1 Introduction

Temporal continuity is an inherent feature of the human self. There is no sense of personal identity without a feeling that there is a link between past, present and future (Epstude & Peetz, 2012). When one's sense of self-continuity is disrupted this has various negative outcomes, for example in relation to mental health and well-being (e.g., Bluck & Alea, 2008; Chandler & Proulx, 2008). Next to the perception that one is temporally enduring as an individual, people are also inclined to see their groups – such as nations and ethnic communities – as being continuous over time (Sani et al., 2007; Sani, 2008). Collective continuity provides social identities with meaning, because it helps group members to understand where they come from and what constitutes their common and self-defining heritage (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Sani et al., 2007). Although collective continuity has been a prominent topic of interest for historians, anthropologists and sociologists (i.e., Hobsbawn & Ranger, 1983; Lowenthal, 1985; Smith, 1998), research on the social psychological functions of collective continuity and its consequences for current group dynamics is more recent (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Jetten & Wohl, 2012; Sani, 2008; Sani et al., 2007, 2008a, 2008b).

As discussed in chapter 2, it has been proposed that collective continuity can be understood in two different ways (Sani et al., 2007, 2008b): (1) an essentialist understanding, in which the group is seen to possess some deeply ingrained cultural elements, which are passed on from generation to generation, and (2) a narrativist understanding, in which group continuity is constructed by referring to the causal of historical phases and events that are represented in a coherent storyline. We propose that mainly essentialist continuity is important for current group dynamics. The reason is that it is primarily the essentialist understanding of in-group history that provides people with meaning to their collective identity and that stimulates strong group boundaries (Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 2006; Liu & Hilton, 2005). In addition, we argue that it is not only important to examine these different forms of collective continuity, but also the particular content of group identity that people see as temporally enduring. The content of group identity has normative properties that can have positive or negative consequences for intergroup relations, depending on what is seen as 'our' traditional culture.

To show that essentialist continuity rather than narrativist continuity is important for understanding current intergroup relations, we investigated responses towards Muslim immigrants among Dutch natives. Muslim immigrants are often portrayed and perceived as a threat to the continuation of national culture and identity in Western Europe (Caldwell,

2009; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Circumstances or changes that are perceived as being incompatible with 'who we have always been' disrupt a sense of essentialist continuity. Rights of Muslims to publicly express their religiousness may be rejected because these expressions are perceived as threatening the continuation of the traditional culture, making it no longer the 'same' national community. However, it is also possible to present the inclusion and acceptance of Muslim immigrants as a continuation of 'our' historical culture of religious tolerance. A tradition of religious tolerance implies that allowing Muslims to publicly express their religion is not a threat to, but rather a confirmation of, our traditional culture.

We present three studies to demonstrate the importance of essentialist continuity for current intergroup dynamics. The first idea we wish to test is whether the two proposed dimensions of collective continuity are related to attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. We expected that only essentialist continuity, and not narrativist continuity, predicts these attitudes. Second, we aim to demonstrate that natives who perceive high essentialist continuity will be more opposed to developments and groups that cause a rupture with the cultural past. More specifically, people who perceive high essentialist continuity are expected to be more concerned about the preservation of their national culture and identity, and therefore to perceive more continuity threats from Muslim immigrants. These higher perceptions of continuity threat are subsequently expected to result in more opposition to expressive rights for Muslims. Finally, we aim to show that this sense of continuity threat is contingent on the specific content of perceived essentialist continuity. We refer to these perceptions as historical representations of national identity. Following self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987), we expected that natives who endorse a Christian historical representation of national identity are more likely to perceive Muslims as a continuity threat, and will consequently be more opposed to Muslim rights. In contrast, people who endorse religious tolerant historical representation of national identity are expected to perceive less continuity threat, and consequently to display lower levels of opposition to Muslim rights.

Perceived collective continuity

Collective history is central in developing and shaping national identity. History provides people with an understanding of where they are coming from and what the foundations and contents of their national identity are (Liu & Hilton, 2005). Since collective history gives people a sense of identity and grounding, individuals find comfort in the belief that

their national group has temporal endurance. A growing body of research has shown that a sense of collective continuity provides existential security (Sani et al., 2007, 2008b, 2009). The reason is that even though individuals are aware that they themselves will ultimately die, collective continuity implies that the part of the self that is defined by group membership has transgenerational, temporal endurance – an eternal *us* (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Reicher, 2008).

Following work on personal continuity by Chandler and Proulx (2008), Sani and colleagues (2007, 2008b) have proposed that people's sense of collective continuity is grounded on two perceptions. Essentialist group continuity concerns the historical understanding of groups as possessing some core cultural elements that are not eroded by the passage of time, but transmitted from generation to generation. Narrativist group continuity refers to an understanding of group history in which different historical periods and events are causally linked to another, and thereby form a coherent narrative. Sani and colleagues (2007, 2008b) have developed a two-dimensional scale to measure these perceptions of collective continuity, which was found to be internally consistent and valid across various European countries.

Although it has been shown that perceived collective continuity has a two-dimensional structure, previous research has not disentangled the essentialist and narrativist dimension in predicting intergroup relations. We propose that mainly essentialist continuity is important for understanding current group dynamics. National group members feel particularly tied by the notion that they have shared beliefs, values, customs and traditions that have endured throughout time and are passed on from generation to generation (Smith, 1998). For example, Condor (1997) found that Anglo-Britons' representations of 'our national history' did not allude to chronological stories or historical events, but rather took the form of reified accounts often achieved with a reference to tradition. Furthermore, anthropologists speak about 'participant primordialism' (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996) and 'everyday primordialism' (Gil-White, 1999) to indicate that laypeople tend to understand their ethnic and national group in terms of immutable and fixed cultural characteristics. This tendency is referred to as 'essentialism' in psychology.

According to Haslam (1998), one of the components of essentialism is the understanding of social categories as historically stable and enduring. Essentialist group continuity contains this specific component of essentialism. In contrast, notions of essentialism are absent in the narrativist understanding of group history, as there are no references to the group's essential and unchanging traits (Chandler & Proulx, 2008). Social psychologists have shown that essentialist in-groups more strongly satisfy basic psychological needs

related to group membership, than groups that are more mutable (e.g., Yzerbyt et al., 2000). Moreover, group boundaries tend to be relatively strong and exclusive for essentialized groups (see Haslam et al., 2006), and essentialist in-group perception is a precondition of infra-humanization of out-groups (Leyens et al., 2003). Therefore, perceived essentialist group continuity is likely to be related to exclusionary attitudes towards out-groups, whereas this is less probable for a narrativist understanding of group continuity.

When essentialist group continuity is threatened

A sense of essentialist continuity not only involves the past, but also the belief that 'we' will continue to be in the future (Wohl et al., 2010). A rupture in essentialist continuity can be considered as a symbolic identity threat whereby group members are afraid that their cultural values and traditions will perish (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). However, whether group members will be concerned about continuity threat is likely to depend on the degree to which they perceive their in-group to possess essentialist continuity (Condor, 1997). Especially those who tend to perceive their in-group as culturally invariant and enduring should feel threatened by the increasing presence of cultural and religious newcomers. The reason is that these social changes undermine the feeling of in-group stability and continuity that provides group members with a sense of grounding and existential security. Specifically, the increasing presence and influence of cultural and religious out-groups represents a threat for people who perceive strong essentialist continuity, because these developments may change the nature and identity of the in-group, and hence, may subvert its very essence.

As demonstrated in chapter 3, when group members fear a rupture in the continuity of their identity they are likely to resist social changes in order to maintain and protect the cultural continuation of their in-group (see also Haslam, 1998). Recent studies have demonstrated that perceptions of collective continuity threat are associated with resistance to mergers (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011) and opposition to immigration (Jetten & Wohl, 2012). These findings illustrate that when people experience a threat to the continuity of their in-group identity they are likely to become negative towards developments and groups that are considered to be the source of this threat.

In the present research, we examined essentialist continuity in the context of debates about the presence and visibility of Muslim immigrants in Western Europe. The increasing number of Islamic schools, Mosques, veiled women and other visible signs of Islam are often represented as a threat to the traditional Western way of life, and as eroding "the

authenticity of the nation from within" (Triandafyllidou, 1998, p. 602). Natives who perceive high essentialist continuity should be especially opposed against expressive rights for Muslims, because they are prone to feel that Muslims represent a threat to the continuation of their national identity and culture.

Content of group continuity

The two dimensions of perceived collective continuity, as developed by Sani and colleagues (2007, 2008a), refer to the specific *form* in which the collective past is understood. However, this does not tell us anything about the particular *content* of group identity that people perceive to be temporally enduring. According to self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), group behavior is dependent on the beliefs, values and norms that define the in-group. SCT proposes that when group distinctions are salient, the norms and beliefs that define the in-group become part of the psychological self and consequently provide the guidelines for intergroup behavior. For example, it has been shown that the evaluation of immigrants depends on whether national identity is understood in ethnic or civic terms (e.g., Pehrson et al., 2009).

The content of national identity is typically defined in terms of the temporal endurance of core cultural characteristics (Condor, 1997; Verkuyten, 2003). However, this cultural content is not self-evident and can be defined in different ways with different normative implications. That is, different definitions of national culture are represented as invariant over time, in order to give authority to ideas about what the nation is like and hence how nationals should act (Reicher, 2008). Hence, in line with SCT, it can be predicted that whether people will experience continuity threats from immigrants is dependent on the particular content of national culture that is seen as continuous over time.

Within Europe, specific historical representations of national identity are invoked in order to argue whether the increasing presence and visibility of Muslims constitutes a threat to the continuation of national culture and identity. For example, some politicians and scholars have described European identity as being deeply rooted in the Christian tradition in relation to which Muslim immigrants constitute a visible 'other' (Foner & Alba, 2008; Zolberg & Woon, 1999) and Islam a "bright boundary" (Alba, 2005, p.33). Likewise, in the United States, the Christian roots and nature of American identity would make Muslims an "indigestible minority" (Huntington, 2004, p. 188). In such contexts, the perception and endorsement of Christian continuity may stand in the way of accepting Muslim immigrants, as they are seen as a threat to the continuation of 'our' Christian cultural heritage. However,

in various European countries, and the Netherlands in particular, there is also a strong emphasis on humanist values and a long tradition of religious tolerance (e.g., Bowskill et al., 2007; Smeekes, 2011). An emphasis on the tradition of religious tolerance implies that expressions of Islam do not threaten the continuation of national culture. Rather, allowing these expressions is in line with 'our' tradition of religious tolerance and hence forms a continuation of 'who we have always been'.

Overview of the present research

In three studies, we examined how forms and contents of national group continuity affect Dutch natives' attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. We firstly investigated the expectation that perceived essentialist group continuity rather than perceived narrativist group continuity predicts opposition to rights for Muslims to publicly express and confirm their religious identity (Study 1). Additionally, we tested the hypothesis that perceived essentialist continuity hampers the acceptance of expressive rights for Muslims, because it makes people more likely to see Muslims as a threat to the continuation of the national culture.

In Study 2, and following SCT, we investigated how different contents of essentialist continuity are related to opposition to Muslim expressive rights. We examined a Christian and a religious tolerant historical representation of national identity, and predicted that a stronger endorsement of the Christian representation is associated with more resistance to Muslim rights, via higher levels of continuity threat. Contrastingly, stronger endorsement of the religious tolerant representation was expected to be associated with less opposition to Muslim rights, via lower perceptions of continuity threat. Study 3 tested the same predictions with an experimental design, among a representative sample of the native Dutch adult population.

In our studies, we examined the unique predictive power of different forms and contents of national group continuity, by controlling for relevant demographic characteristics. Previous research within the European context has shown that older and lower educated individuals, as well as males and Christians, tend to display more prejudice towards Muslim immigrants than younger, higher educated, female and non-religious individuals (see Helbig, 2012). Age and being Christian are furthermore relevant covariates, as they may affect the endorsement of the Christian historical representation. We therefore took age, gender, being Christian, and educational level (only in Study 3), into account in our analyses.

5.2 Study 1

The aim of this study was twofold. First, we examined whether the two forms of group continuity (essentialist and narrativist) uniquely predict opposition to rights for Muslims to publicly confirm and express their identity. We expected that only essentialist continuity is related to opposition to Muslim rights. Second, we examined whether the predicted relationship between essentialist continuity and opposition to Muslim rights is mediated by the feeling that Muslims constitute a continuity threat.

Method

Participants, design and procedure

This study was conducted among 160 Utrecht University students (Historical Tolerance, Continuity and Cultural Diversity Survey, merged with Group Continuity Survey, see Table 1.1). They participated on a voluntary basis and the questionnaires were completed within a classroom setting. We assessed whether participants were native Dutch by firstly asking them to indicate whether they had a Dutch passport (*yes/no*). Subsequently, the participants were asked to report whether they were religious (*yes/no*), and if so, which religion they felt affiliated to (open question). We only selected the participants who had a Dutch passport and did not adhere to one of the immigrant religions (e.g., Islam, Hinduism).[1] This resulted in a total sample of 145 participants. This sample consisted of 24.4% men and 75.6% women. The ages ranged between 19 and 33 ($M = 21.84$, $SD = 2.65$). The sample was relatively non-religious (78.4%), and those who indicated to be religious (21.6%) were all Christian.

Measures

All responses were recorded on 7-point rating scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*), unless indicated otherwise.

     Group continuity. We used a 10-item scale from Sani et al. (2007) to assess perceptions of *essentialist* and *narrativist* group continuity. Both sub-scales consist of five items (see Table 5.1). We performed a confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) using AMOS 16.0 software to determine whether the items assessing these two sub-scales composed different factors. The proposed two factor structure had an acceptable fit to the data, $\chi^2(33) = 60.74$, $p = .002$; CFI = .95, RMSEA = .08. However, the factor loadings showed that both the first item of the essentialist and the narrativist sub-scale had a factor loading below .40 (see Table 5.1). Removing these items resulted in a good model fit, $\chi^2(17) = 27.14$, $p = .056$;

Table 5.1 Item content and factor loadings for the essentialist and narrativist dimension of group continuity, Study 1

	Factor 1	Factor 2
Essentialist group continuity		
Dutch people have passed on their traditions across different generations		
Shared values, beliefs and attitudes of Dutch people have endurance across time	.77	
Throughout history the members of the Dutch group have maintained their inclinations and mentality	.77	
Throughout history the Netherlands has maintained its own customs and traditions	.73	
Dutch people have maintained their values over time	.87	
Narrativist group continuity		
Dutch history is a sequence of interconnected events		
Major phases in Dutch history are linked to one another		.58
There is no connection between past, present and future events in the Netherlands (*r*)		.49
There is a causal link between different events in Dutch history		.74
The main events in Dutch history are part of an 'unbroken stream'		.83

Note. Loadings < .40 are not shown, (*r*), item is reverse scored.

CFI = .98, RMSEA = .06. We compared this model to a one-factor model in which the 8 items were combined. Chi-square difference tests indicated that the two-factor model fit the data better than a one-factor model, $\chi^2(18) = 76.46$, p < .001, $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 52.32$, $p < .001$. Hence, we computed a essentialist continuity scale ($\alpha = .86$) and a narrativist continuity scale ($\alpha = .75$), each based on 4 items.

Continuity threat. We used three items ($\alpha = .83$) to measure the extent to which participants perceived Muslim as a threat to the continuity of national culture: "Muslims in the Netherlands undermine the traditional Dutch way of life", "The maintenance of Dutch norms and values is threatened by the presence of Muslims", and "The Muslim way of life threatens the continuity of Dutch identity".

Opposition to Muslim expressive rights. We used a six-item scale ($\alpha = .75$) to assess participants' acceptance of the rights and opportunities for Muslims to publicly express and confirm their identity. These items have been used in previous chapters, and two sample items are: "Muslims should have the right to not only celebrate their Islamic holidays at home, but also in public life", and "In the Netherlands wearing a headscarf should not

be forbidden". Items were reverse scored, so a higher score indicated more opposition to Muslim expressive rights.

Demographic characteristics. Gender (coded as 1 = *male*, 0 = *female*) and being Christian (coded as 1 = *yes*, 0 = *no*) were assessed with two dummy variables. Age was a continuous measure in years.

Results

Preliminary analyses

Table 5.2 shows the descriptive findings for all variables, the bivariate correlations between the variables, as well as the partial correlations controlling for the demographic characteristics. Essentialist continuity was positively correlated with continuity threat and opposition to Muslim rights. These correlations remained significant after controlling for the demographic characteristics. Narrativist continuity was not significantly related to continuity threat and opposition to Muslim rights, and this did not change after including the demographics. This provides preliminary evidence that perceived essentialist continuity is a unique predictor of negative attitudes towards Muslims and that it predicts these outcomes over and above demographic characteristics that have been demonstrated to be associated with prejudice towards Muslims. Moreover, these preliminary results indicated that age and gender and were significantly correlated with essentialist continuity, but that being Christian was not related to any of the measured variables. We therefore collapsed for being Christian, and controlled for age and gender in the main analyses.

Table 5.2 Partial and nonpartial correlations for all measures, Study 1

	M	*SD*	1	2	3	4
1. Essentialist group continuity	4.23	1.02	—	.49***	.22**	.25**
2. Narrativist group continuity	4.54	.87	.53***	—	.13	.10
3. Continuity threat	2.80	1.26	.18*	.14	—	.47***
4. Opposition to Muslim rights	3.04	.96	.20*	.13	.47***	—
Covariates						
6. Age	21.84	2.65	-.31**	-.15	-.07	-.03
7. Gender	—	—	-.22**	-.10	-.06	.00
8. Christian	—	—	.08	.09	.01	.03

Note. * *p* < .05, ** *p* < .01, *** *p* < .001. The correlations above the diagonal were calculated without controlling for the covariates.

Main analyses

Continuity threat. A stepwise regression analysis was performed to determine the effects of essentialist and narrativist continuity on continuity threat. Essentialist and narrativist continuity were entered in Step 1, and age and gender were added in Step 2. As shown in Table 5.3, in Step 1, only essentialist and not narrativist continuity significantly predicted continuity threat. The inclusion of age and gender in Step 2 did not significantly add to the explained variance in continuity threat, and Step 2 yielded similar results for the effects of essentialist and narrativist continuity. Moreover, age and gender did not significantly predict continuity threat.

  Opposition to Muslim rights. A similar procedure was used for the analysis of opposition to Muslim rights. Table 5.3 shows that only essentialist and not narrativist group continuity predicted opposition in Step 1, and that these results remained similar after age and gender were included in Step 2. Step 2 did not add to the explained variance in opposition, and both age and gender showed no significant relationship with measure.

  Mediation analyses. As the previous analyses indicated, only essentialist and not narrativist continuity significantly predicted continuity threat and opposition to Muslim rights. We therefore tested a mediation model where continuity threat would mediate the effect of essentialist continuity on opposition. We conducted another stepwise regression on opposition, where essentialist continuity was entered in Step 1, and continuity threat in Step 2. Essentialist continuity significantly predicted opposition in Step 1, $\beta = .25$, $t(137) = 3.01$, $p = .002$, and although and the coefficient of essentialist continuity remained significant in Step 2, $\beta = .15$, $t(136) = 2.11$, $p = .023$, it was reduced with 40%. Importantly,

Table 5.3 Standardized β values for the stepwise regressions of opposition to Muslim rights and continuity threat on essentialist continuity, narrativist continuity, and demographic characteristics, Study 1

	Continuity threat		Opposition to Muslim rights	
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2
Essentialist group continuity	.19*	.19*	.21*	.23*
Narrativist group continuity	.05	.05	.03	.02
Age		.02		.06
Gender		-.03		.03
R^2	.05*	.05	.05*	.05
R^2 change		.00		.00

Note. *$p < .05$.

continuity threat significantly predicted opposition in Step 2, β = .44, $t(136)$ = 5.81, $p <$ .001. Moreover, Step 2 accounted for a significant portion of variance in opposition to Muslim rights, R^2 = .25, $F(2, 136)$ = 22.50, $p < .001$.[2]

We then used the Preacher and Hayes' (2008) bootstrapping macro for mediation, to test a model whereby continuity threat mediates the relationship between essentialist continuity and opposition to Muslim rights. In these analyses, mediation is significant if the 95% bias corrected confidence intervals for the indirect (mediated) effect do not include zero. Results based on 1000 bootstrapped samples indicated that zero was not included in the 95% confidence interval (lower CI = .0198, upper CI = .1836).[3] This provides evidence for mediation, whereby continuity threat mediates the positive relationship between essentialist continuity and opposition to Muslim rights.

Discussion

Study 1 showed that perceived essentialist group continuity, and not narrativist group continuity, is important for understanding responses towards Muslim immigrants. A higher perception of essentialist group continuity was associated with more opposition to Muslim expressive rights and this relationship was mediated by perceived continuity threat. Thus, in line with our expectations, the more natives perceived their national culture as stable and temporally enduring, the more likely they were to perceive Muslim immigrants as causing a rupture with their cultural past, and subsequently the more they opposed expressive rights for this out-group.

People often perceive their culture as being temporally stable, but they can have different understandings of which cultural values and traditions have endured. There are different representations of national history and culture and these can have implications for how people view immigrants and minority groups in the present (Sibley et al., 2008). We examined this possibility in a second study.

5.3 Study 2

In Dutch public debates about Islam different contents of national history and identity are evoked in order to argue for the inclusion or exclusion of Muslim immigrants. These different representations contain normative properties, as they serve to justify how 'we' should deal with Muslims ('them'), based on the understanding of who 'we' essentially were in the past, and hence, who 'we' should be in the future (Liu & László, 2007).

One important representation in the Dutch context is that of being a historically tolerant nation. Toleration of different worldviews and religions is often portrayed as a traditional, self-defining aspect of Dutch national identity, and this historical representation is sometimes invoked to argue for the acceptance of Muslim immigrants. At the same time there is also a representation that emphasizes the Christian roots of the Dutch culture and identity, and this is mostly used to argue for the exclusion of Muslim immigrants. Although adherence to Christianity is weak in the Netherlands compared to other European countries, there exists a national discourse that presents Muslims as a threat to the continued importance of Christian values, norms and practices.

In Study 2, we tested whether the endorsement of a (1) Christian, and (2) religious tolerant historical representation of national identity is differently related to opposition to Muslim expressive rights, via the perception of continuity threat. Following SCT, we predicted that stronger endorsement of the religious tolerant representation will be associated with lower opposition to Muslim rights, because this reduces perceptions of continuity threat. People who believe that their national in-group is historically characterized by religious tolerance should not feel threatened by Muslim immigrants, because the presence of this group represents a continuation of their national tolerant past. Contrastingly, natives who feel that Christian roots define the nation should be more likely to experience continuity threats from Muslims and therefore oppose them more strongly. This is because the increasing presence of religious others may subvert the Christian continuity of their national in-group.

Method

Participants, design and procedure

This study was conducted among 74 adolescents and young adults (Historical Representations Survey, see Table 1.1). Similar to Study 1, we only selected the participants who were Dutch (i.e., had a Dutch passport) and did not adhere to one of the immigrant religions (e.g., Islam, Hinduism).[4] This resulted in a total sample of 70 native Dutch participants. They took part in the study on a voluntary basis and the questionnaires were completed within a classroom setting. The sample consisted of 41.4% men and 58.6% women. The ages ranged between 15 and 28 ($M = 18.70$, $SD = 4.10$). Of all participants, 70% indicated to be non-religious, and 30% said they were religious, and these were all Christian. Moreover, the participants either followed a pre-university track in high school (62.9%) or already attended university (37.1%).

Measures

The measures for continuity threat (α = .82), opposition to Muslim expressive rights (α = .79), and demographic characteristics (i.e., age, gender and being Christian), were identical to Study 1.

   Tolerant historical representation (THR). We assessed the extent to which participants endorsed a religious tolerant historical representation of national identity with 5 items (α = .76). Since a sense of continuity not only involves the past but also the belief that we should continue to be in the future, we also included items in the scale that made reference to this future aspect. The items were: "Freedom of religion historically belongs to the Netherlands", "The Netherlands is traditionally an open and tolerant society where there is much room for other cultures and religions", "There has always been room for cultural and religious diversity in the Netherlands", "The Netherlands should remain a country where there is as much room for cultural diversity as possible", and "The Netherlands should remain a religious tolerant country". The items were recorded on 7-point rating scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

   Christian historical representation (CHR). The extent to which participants endorsed a Christian historical representation of national identity was measured with the following 5 items (α = .81): "The Dutch have passed on their Christian traditions to next generations", "The Dutch identity is rooted in Christianity", "Christian norms and values have always been part of the Dutch identity", "The Netherlands should remain a country where Christian norms and values prevail", and "The Christian faith and its traditions should remain dominant in the Netherlands". All responses were recorded on 7-point rating scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Results

Preliminary analyses

Table 5.4 shows the descriptive findings for all variables, the bivariate correlations between the variables, as well as the partial correlations controlling for the demographic characteristics. The correlation between THR and CHR was not significant indicating that these are separate constructs. Christian participants were more likely to endorse CHR, and CHR was positively correlated with continuity threat and opposition to Muslim rights. Contrastingly, THR was negatively correlated with continuity threat and opposition. These correlations remained significant after controlling for age, gender and being Christian. This provides preliminary evidence that both the Christian and religious tolerant historical representation

Table 5.4 Partial and nonpartial correlations for all measures, Study 2

	M	SD	1	2	3	4
1. Tolerant historical representation (THR)	4.91	1.01	—	-.15	-.24*	-.52***
2. Christian historical representation (CHR)	3.87	1.17	-.23	—	.33**	.30*
3. Continuity threat	3.74	1.31	-.30*	.29*	—	.65***
4. Opposition to Muslim rights	3.81	1.09	-.55***	.29*	.65***	—
Covariates						
5. Age	18.70	4.10	.12	.20	.20	.21
6. Gender	—	—	.06	-.14	-.09	-.17
7. Christian	—	—	.17	.34**	.18	.02

Note. * *p* < .05, ** *p* < .01, *** *p* < .001. The correlations above the diagonal were calculated without controlling for the covariates.

are unique (and opposite) predictors of continuity threat and opposition to Muslim rights, and predict these outcomes over and above relevant demographic characteristics. Moreover, these preliminary results showed that being Christian was significantly correlated with the Christian representation, but that age and gender were not related to any of the measured variables. We therefore collapsed across age and gender, and controlled for being Christian in the main analysis.

Main analyses

Continuity threat. A stepwise regression analysis was performed to determine the effects of THR and CHR on continuity threat. THR and CHR were entered in Step 1, and being Christian was added in Step 2. As shown in Table 5.5, in Step 1, both THR and CHR predicted continuity threat. The inclusion of being Christian in Step 2 did not significantly add to the explained variance in continuity threat, and Step 2 yielded similar results for the effects of THR and CHR. Moreover, being Christian did not exert a significant effect on continuity threat.

Opposition to Muslim rights. A similar procedure was used for the analysis of opposition to Muslim rights. Table 5.5 shows that both THR and CHR predicted opposition in Step 1, and that these results remained similar in Step 2. Step 2 did not add to the explained variance in opposition, and being Christian was not related to this measure.

Mediation analyses. As the previous analyses indicated, both THR and CHR significantly predicted continuity threat and opposition to Muslim rights. As a next step,

Table 5.5 Standardized β values for the stepwise regressions of opposition to Muslim rights and continuity threat on tolerant and Christian historical representations, and control variables, Study 2

	Continuity threat		Opposition to Muslim rights	
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2
1. Tolerant historical representation (THR)	-.20*	-.22*	-.49***	-.50***
2. Christian historical representation (CHR)	.31**	.26*	.22*	.21*
Christian		.13		.04
R^2	.15**	.16**	.32***	.32***
R^2 change		.01		.00

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

we tested a mediation model in which continuity threat mediated the effects of THR and CHR on opposition to Muslim rights (see Figure 5.1 for beta weights). When THR, CHR, and continuity threat were entered as predictors simultaneously, the regression equation accounted for a significant portion of variance in opposition to Muslim rights, $R^2 = .56$, $F(3, 66) = 28.46$, $p < .001$. Importantly, continuity threat significantly predicted opposition to Muslim rights. As shown in Figure 5.1, CHR was no longer predictive of opposition when continuity threat was entered into the equation. Although the coefficient of THR remained significant when continuity threat was entered into the equation it was reduced with 22.45%.[5]


Figure 5.1 Mediation model with tolerant and Christian historical representation as the independent variables, continuity threat as the mediator, and opposition to Muslim expressive rights as the dependent variable, Study 2.
Note. The direct effect coefficients shown in parentheses reflect the inclusion of the mediator in the equation. *** $p < .001$, * $p < .05$.

We then tested whether continuity threat mediated the effect of THR and CHR on opposition to Muslim rights using the Preacher and Hayes' (2008) bootstrapping macro for mediation. Results based on 1000 bootstrapped samples indicated that zero was not included in the 95% confidence interval for both the indirect effect of THR (lower CI = -.2660, upper CI = -.0300) and of CHR (lower CI = .0757, upper CI = .3197).[6] This supports our prediction of mediation, whereby the effects of Christian and tolerant continuity on opposition to Muslim rights are mediated by continuity threat.

Discussion

In line with self-categorization theory, the results of Study 2 indicate that whether natives experience continuity threat and express opposition to Muslim rights depends on the particular historical content of national identity that they endorse. The more people endorsed a religious tolerant historical representation, the less likely they were to oppose Muslim rights, whereas this effect was reversed for people who endorsed a Christian historical representation. Importantly, both these effects were mediated by continuity threat. A stronger endorsement of the Christian representation was associated with greater perceptions of continuity threat from Muslims, which subsequently resulted in more resistance to Muslim rights. Contrastingly, stronger endorsement of the religious tolerant representation was related to less opposition, via lower perceptions of continuity threat.

Since Study 2 was based on survey data we cannot make any claims about the causal order of the predicted effects. We therefore conducted a third study in which we manipulated the Christian and religious tolerant representation to investigate whether this affects perceptions of continuity threat, and consequently opposition to Muslim rights. Moreover, since the previous studies were conducted among samples that were relatively young and highly educated, Study 3 used a representative national sample of the native Dutch adult population. This allows us to examine the generalizability of the findings of the previous study.

5.4 Study 3

Study 3 tested the same predictions as in Study 2. In addition, since there are no previous studies that have examined historical representations of national identity among nationally representative samples, Study 3 was also designed to test whether the effects of the Christian and tolerant manipulations on attitudes towards Muslims would be dependent on relevant demographic characteristics of the respondents.

Following sociological studies on generations (Mannheim, 1964), we reasoned that it would be particularly important to examine whether historical understandings of national identity affect attitudes towards immigrant out-groups differently depending on the historical period in which the respondents grew up. Social scientists have argued and shown that individuals within a birth cohort experience similar societal circumstances during their formative years (Mannheim, 1964). They may be marked by these circumstances in such a way that the attitudes acquired in this crucial phase remain relatively stable throughout the rest of their lives. This notion has been adopted, among others, by Inglehart (1990) in his work on the diffusion of postmaterialism and a similar argument has been put forward by Sears (1993) in his symbolic politics theory. Additionally, research in the Netherlands has shown that cohorts that grew to maturity in times of large immigration waves or high unemployment rates display more widespread support for ethnic discrimination (Coenders, Lubbers, Scheepers, & Verkuyten, 2008). We therefore examined different age cohorts in Study 3. Moreover, we also investigated interactive effects of the historical identity manipulations and other demographic characteristics (i.e., gender, being Christian, and education) that have been shown to be associated with attitudes towards Muslims.

Method

Participants, design and procedure
This study was conducted among a representative sample (N = 469) of the native Dutch population of 18 years and older (Dutch Society Survey, see Table 1.1). Participants received the questionnaire by means of en e-mail sent by TNS NIPO Consult.[7] Respondents were drawn from a panel of respondents maintained by TNS NIPO Consult. On our request, this company only approached panel members who possess a Dutch passport and whose parents are both born in the Netherlands. The characteristics of this sample closely match those of the native Dutch population. The sample consisted of 52.2% men and 47.8% women. The ages ranged between 18 and 88, and the mean age was 50.28 (SD = 16.98). Of the respondents, 4.3% completed primary education, 58.9% completed a lower level of secondary (26.7%) and tertiary education (32.2%), 36.2% completed a higher level of secondary (8.7%) and tertiary (higher applied and university) education (27.5%), and 0.6% did not report their educational level.

A between-subjects design was used, in which participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: Christian, religious tolerance, or control. In the Christian and religious tolerant conditions, participants first read a short introductory paragraph that

was followed by a writing assignment. Participants in the control condition did not receive an introductory paragraph or writing task. In the *Christian* condition participants read the following:

> Historians have convincingly shown that the Netherlands is originally a Christian country. Christian norms and values have been a central part of Dutch identity since the Middle Ages. The Dutch have always been inspired by Christian traditions and Christian customs and traditions can still be found everywhere in present Dutch society. Christian inheritance is thus a historical key aspect of Dutch identity. Please describe in maximum 3 sentences why the maintenance of Christian customs and traditions is important for the continuity of Dutch culture and identity.

Participants in the *religious tolerant* condition received the following text:

> Historians have convincingly shown that in the Netherlands people from different religions have been living together for a very long time. Three hundred years ago the Dutch were already in favor of freedom of religion. In the 17th century, foreigners were impressed by the liberties that Catholics, Jews, Lutherans, Mennonites, and controversial writers (like Spinoza) enjoyed here. This history of religious tolerance provides the roots of Dutch identity. Please describe in maximum 3 sentences why the maintenance of the tradition of religious tolerance is important for the continuity of Dutch culture and identity.

After the writing task participants completed a questionnaire that contained the measures for continuity threat, opposition to Muslim rights and demographic variables.

Measures

The items assessing opposition to Muslim rights ($\alpha = .91$) were similar to Studies 1 and 2. Continuity threat ($\alpha = .90$) was measured with the same three items as used in the previous studies, plus one additional item: "Despite the growing number of Muslims, the Netherlands is able to maintain its original customs and traditions." This item was reverse scored. We focused on the same demographic variables as in the previous studies, and also included educational level, which was measured by asking people to indicate their highest obtained educational degree, ranging from 1 (*primary education*) to 8 (*university degree*). We divided participants into four age cohorts (18-35, 35-50, 50-65, 65+),[8] and created a dummy variable for each cohort. We constructed an additional variable to measure Christian religiosity by combining two measures: (1) being Christian or not (dummy coded), and (2) religiosity (7-point scale). This new scale ranged from 1 (*non-Christian*

and non-religious) to 7 (*Christian and highly religious*). Gender was again measured with a dummy variable (0 = *female*, 1 = *male*).

Results

All variables were analyzed using multiple regression procedures, whereby two separate dummy variables were created for the historical national identity manipulations (see Aiken & West, 1991). The first dummy variable concerned the Christian manipulation (coded as 1 = *Christian*, 0 = *tolerant*, 0 = *control*), and the second dummy the religious tolerant manipulation (coded as 1 = *tolerant*, 0 = *Christian*, 0 = *control*).

Preliminary analyses

We first examined whether the responses to the historical national identity manipulations differed by gender, age cohorts, Christian religiosity (centered), and educational level (centered). For each of these variables, interaction terms were created by multiplying them with the Christian and tolerant dummy variable (see Aiken & West, 1991). Both continuity threat and opposition to Muslim rights were regressed on each of these demographic variables and the experimental dummy variables, and subsequently on their interaction terms. Because the main (p_s > .33) and interaction effects of gender (p_s > .45) were not significant for any of the dependent variables, we collapsed across participant gender for all subsequent analyses. Christian religiosity had a significant main effect on opposition to Muslim rights, β = -.14, p = .003, but not on continuity threat, β = -.01, p = .795, and there were no interaction effects with the historical national identity manipulations on any of the dependent measures (p_s > .23). Education had significant main effects on continuity threat, β = -.25 p < .001, and opposition to Muslim rights, β = -.30 p < .001, but showed no significant interactions with the experimental manipulations (p_s > .23).

Finally, we examined the effects of the separate age cohort dummies, as well as their interactions with the Christian and tolerant manipulations. None of the interactions between the tolerant manipulation and age cohorts were significant for any of the dependent measures (p_s > .30). Although there were no main effects of the different age cohorts on any of the dependent measures, there were significant interactions between the Christian manipulation and the different age cohorts (see Table 5.6). These interactions revealed that the effect of the Christian manipulation tended to be somewhat stronger for the youngest age cohort compared to the older age cohorts.[9] Moreover, looking at the effects of the Christian manipulation versus the control condition (on both dependent measures)

Table 5.6 Standardized β values for the regression of continuity threat and opposition to Muslim rights on the experimental manipulations, age cohort, and the Christian manipulation by age cohort interactions, Study 3

	Continuity threat		Opposition to Muslim rights	
	β	p	β	p
Experimental manipulation				
Christian condition	.24	.023	.28	.008
Tolerant condition	-.09	.077	-.12	.022
Age cohorts (18-35 = ref)				
35-50	.09	.202	.10	.150
50-65	.13	.062	.06	.376
65+	.06	.352	-.06	.373
Interaction effects (18-35 = ref)				
35-50 * Christian condition	-.23	.006	-.25	.002
50-65 * Christian condition	-.10	.234	-.16	.067
65+ * Christian condition	-.19	.013	-.15	.053

Note. Two-sided *p*-values are reported.

within each age cohort revealed that there were only significant differences within the youngest age cohort and not within the older ones (see Table 5.7 for means and standard deviations of continuity threat and opposition to Muslim rights by Christian vs. control condition within each age cohort).

These preliminary results indicate that educational level and Christian religiosity were related to attitudes towards Muslims, and that the effect of the Christian manipulation was only significant within the youngest age cohort. We therefore performed the main analysis in two steps. In Step 1 the two dummy variables for the Christian and tolerant manipulation were entered, and in Step 2 we added Christian religiosity, education, age cohort (dummy coded as: 1 = *youngest age cohort*, 0 = *older age cohorts*), and the interaction between age cohort and the Christian manipulation.[10]

Main analyses

Continuity threat. In Step 1, R^2 = .01, $F(2, 466)$ = 2.33, p = .049, there was a main effect of the religious tolerant manipulation, showing that participants in the tolerant condition reported less continuity threat than participants in the control condition, β = -.09, $t(466)$ = -1.70, p = .045. The Christian manipulation had no significant effect on continuity threat,

Table 5.7 Mean levels of continuity threat and opposition to Muslim rights by Christian vs. control condition and age cohort, Study 3

	Christian condition			Control condition		
	M	*SD*	*n*	*M*	*SD*	*n*
Continuity threat						
Age cohort (18-35)	4.58_a	1.21	29	3.87_b	1.41	43
Age cohort (35-50)	3.69_a	1.46	41	4.32_a	1.37	34
Age cohort (50-65)	4.51_a	1.61	51	4.13_a	1.50	54
Age cohort (65+)	3.68_a	1.68	31	4.01_a	1.38	29
Opposition to Muslim rights						
Age cohort (18-35)	5.13_a	1.33	29	4.38_b	1.32	43
Age cohort (35-50)	4.20_a	1.45	41	4.77_a	1.31	34
Age cohort (50-65)	4.61_a	1.54	51	4.43_a	1.45	54
Age cohort (65+)	4.09_a	1.46	31	3.91_a	1.24	29

Note. Comparisons in each row with differing subscripts are significantly different at $p < .05$ (two-sided).

$\beta = .017$, $t(466) = .33$, $p = .372$. Step 2 significantly added to the explained variance in continuity threat, $\Delta R^2 = .07$, $\Delta F(4, 462) = 9.06$, $p < .001$. Education was significantly related to continuity threat, $\beta = -.24$, $t(462) = -5.45$, $p < .001$, but Christian religiosity was not, $\beta = -.01$, $t(462) = -.18$, $p = .859$. Moreover, Step 2 yielded similar results for the effects of the experimental manipulations. The effect of the tolerant manipulation remained significant, $\beta = -.10$, $t(462) = -1.97$, $p = .025$, and the effect of the Christian manipulation remained non-significant, $\beta = -.04$, $t(462) = -.67$, $p = .253$. There was no significant main effect of age cohort, $\beta = -.07$, $t(462) = -1.32$, $p = .188$, but the Christian manipulation by age cohort interaction was significant, $\beta = .12$, $t(462) = 2.15$, $p = .032$. Looking at the simple slopes revealed that the Christian manipulation had a significant positive effect for the youngest age cohort, $\beta = .22$, $t(99) = 2.06$, $p = .042$, but did not significantly change continuity threat for the older cohorts, $\beta = -.04$, $t(364) = -.66$, $p = .509$.

Opposition to Muslim rights. The same procedure was used for examining opposition to Muslim rights. In Step 1, $R^2 = .02$, $F(2, 466) = 4.65$, $p = .005$, there was a main effect of the religious tolerant manipulation, showing that participants in the tolerant condition reported less opposition than participants in the control condition, $\beta = -.12$, $t(466) = -2.31$, $p = .011$. The Christian manipulation had no significant effect on opposition, $\beta = .03$, $t(466) = .61$, $p = .273$. Step 2 significantly added to the explained variance in opposition, $\Delta R^2 = .12$, $\Delta F(4, 462) = 15.62$, $p < .001$. Both education and Christian religiosity were negatively

related to opposition, $\beta = -.29$, $t(462) = -6.64$, $p < .001$, $\beta = -.13$, $t(462) = -2.93$, $p = .004$, respectively. Importantly, Step 2 yielded similar results for the effects of the experimental manipulations. The effect of the tolerant manipulation remained significant, $\beta = -.12$, $t(462) = -2.35$, $p = .010$, and the effect of the Christian manipulation remained non-significant, $\beta = -.02$, $t(462) = -.37$, $p = .357$. There was no significant main effect of age cohort, $\beta = -.02$, $t(462) = -.43$, $p = .667$, but the Christian manipulation by age cohort interaction was significant, $\beta = .13$, $t(462) = 2.36$, $p = .019$. Looking at the simple slopes revealed that the Christian manipulation had a significant positive effect for the youngest age cohort, $\beta = .23$, $t(99) = 2.24$, $p = .027$, but did not significantly change opposition for the older cohorts, $\beta = -.02$, $t(364) = -.33$, $p = .739$.

Mediation analyses. The previous analyses showed that there was a significant effect of the tolerant manipulation, and of the Christian manipulation by age cohort interaction, on continuity threat and opposition to Muslim rights. As a next step, we added continuity threat to the equation that was conducted in Step 2 for opposition to Muslim rights (see analyses above), $R^2 = .53$, $F(7, 461) = 74.37$, $p < .001$. Importantly, continuity threat significantly predicted opposition to Muslim rights, $\beta = .66$, $t(461) = 19.67$, $p < .001$. When continuity threat was entered into the equation, the effect of the tolerant manipulation, $\beta = -.05$, $t(461) = -1.37$, $p = .085$, and the Christian manipulation by age cohort interaction, $\beta = .05$, $t(461) = 1.23$, $p = .110$, were no longer significant.

We then tested whether continuity threat mediated the main effect of the tolerant manipulation (coded as: 1 = *tolerant*, 0 = *Christian*, 0 = *control*), as well as the interactive effect of the Christian manipulation (coded as: 1 = *Christian*, 0 = *tolerant*, 0 = *control*) and age cohort (coded as: 1 = *youngest age cohort*, 0 = *older age cohorts*), on opposition to Muslim rights (controlling for the unique effects of the Christian manipulation and age cohort). We tested this prediction with bootstrapping, using Preacher and Hayes' (2008) macro for mediation. Results based on 1000 bootstrapped samples indicated that zero was not included in the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of the tolerant manipulation (lower CI = -.3690, upper CI = -.0139). This provides evidence for mediation, where (reduced levels of) continuity threat mediated the negative effect of the tolerant manipulation on opposition to Muslim rights. Moreover, this analysis also revealed a significant positive indirect effect of Christian manipulation by age cohort interaction on opposition (lower CI = .1187, upper CI = 1.0612).[11] This provides evidence for mediated moderation, where continuity threat mediated the interactive effect of age cohort (youngest vs. older) and the Christian manipulation on opposition to Muslim rights.

Discussion

Consistent with the results of Study 2, Study 3 indicated that whether people experience continuity threat and express opposition to Muslim rights is dependent on the perceived historical content of national identity. When a historical representation emphasizing the Dutch tradition of religious tolerance was salient, participants displayed lower opposition to Muslim expressive rights, because they perceived less continuity threat. Furthermore, the salience of a historically Christian national identity representation resulted in higher perceptions of continuity threat, and more opposition to Muslim rights among the youngest age cohort (18-35), but not among the older ones. These findings provide an interesting addition to Study 2, because they illustrate that whereas the effect of a religious tolerant representation on attitudes towards Muslims can be generalized across different age cohorts, this is not the case for the Christian representation.

A possible explanation for this cohort effect is that the meaning ascribed to Christian cultural heritage, as well as its associations with the evaluation of ethnic and religious out-groups, such as Muslims, vary between the different generations. This interpretation is in line with sociological theories and findings on generations (Coenders et al., 2008; Mannheim, 1964; Inglehart, 1990), which propose that age cohorts have different attitudes, because of the different societal circumstances during their formative years. In the Netherlands, Christian religiosity was very strong until the beginning of the 1970s, but has sharply declined since the mid 1970s (Dekker, 2007). This means that people in the oldest age cohorts are likely to have (had) more personal experiences with Christianity (e.g., have often been raised in a Christian fashion) than the younger generations, and therefore may have a different interpretation of what constitutes Christian cultural heritage. For the older generations, thinking about Christian cultural heritage might activate pro-social norms of solidarity, care and love for fellow human beings, which are likely to have more positive implications for the acceptance of immigrant groups (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). For the youngest generation, the salience of Christian cultural heritage may be more strongly linked to the current political discourse on immigration, in which the continuation of 'our' Christian cultural heritage is discussed in relation to the alleged continuity threats posed by Muslim immigrants (Foner & Alba, 2008; Zolberg & Woon, 1999).

5.5 General discussion

The main aim of our research was to demonstrate the importance of forms and contents of national group continuity for current group processes and intergroup relations. We examined our expectations in the context of the increasing presence and visibility of Muslim immigrants in Western Europe and the negative sentiments of the native populations that accompany this development (Caldwell, 2009; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). In social psychology, there have been few studies on how perceptions of collective continuity inform current intergroup processes (see Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Jetten & Wohl, 2012), and to our knowledge, no previous studies have disentangled the roles of the two forms of group continuity (Sani et al., 2007, 2008b). We predicted that essentialist, rather than narrativist continuity would be associated with feelings of continuity threat and opposition to Muslim immigrants. This is because, in contrast to narrativist continuity, perceived essentialist continuity contains a component of essentialism that discounts the notion of cultural change and fluidity (Haslam, 1998), which hinders acceptance of the increasing presence of cultural and religious others. As expected, Study 1 showed that perceived essentialist (and not narrative) group continuity was associated with a stronger belief that Muslim immigrants constitute a threat to the continuation of national identity, and this, in turn, predicted stronger opposition to Muslim rights.

These different dimensions of perceived collective continuity concern the form in which people understand their collective past. Yet, this does not tell us anything about the particular content of group identity that people consider to be temporally enduring. According to SCT, the content of group identity guides intergroup attitudes and behavior (Turner et al., 1987), and we therefore expected that different contents of essentialist continuity are important for attitudes towards out-groups. We focused on a Christian and religious tolerant historical representation of national identity, and found that the endorsement of the religious tolerant representation was associated with lower opposition to Muslim rights via reduced perceptions of continuity threat. In contrast, stronger endorsement of the Christian representation was associated with higher perceived continuity threat and this resulted into stronger opposition to Muslim rights (Study 2). In Study 3, we experimentally manipulated the salience of the Christian versus religious tolerant representation among a representative sample of the native Dutch population, in order to examine the causality and generalizability of these findings. In line with Study 2, the salience of the religious tolerant representation decreased opposition of Muslim immigrants via lower feelings of continuity threat. In addition, Study 3 revealed that the

salience of the Christian representation only increased opposition to Muslim rights, via enhanced continuity threat, among the youngest age cohort (18-35) and not among the older ones.

Implications, limitations and directions for future research

The finding that perceptions and representations of the collective past are related to how natives evaluate immigrants in the present, underlines the importance of taking group history and a sense of continuity into account when examining current intergroup relations. Group members understand their shared identity in terms of their collective history and culture (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Sani et al., 2007, 2008b, 2009), and this affects how they evaluate future developments, such as the presence of cultural and religious others (Jetten & Wohl, 2012). Importantly, there can be different, often contested, representations of what constitutes 'our shared cultural heritage' and this is important for whether group members evaluate social developments as forming a rupture or continuation of their identity. As such, these different representations of essentialist continuity can be strategically used by politicians to mobilize the electorate in favor, or against, the presence of immigrant out-groups (Reicher, 2008; Sibley et al., 2008).

Haslam (1998) has argued that the perception of social categories as historically stable is a component of essentialism, but studies on cultural essentialism have tended to ignore this temporal aspect (e.g., Fisher, 2011). In addition, previous research has typically looked at the different ways in which out-groups (e.g., women, black people, gay men, liberals) are essentialized and how this relates to prejudice towards these groups (e.g., Haslam, 1998; Haslam et al., 2006). Fewer studies have looked at the distinct ways in which the in-group is essentialized and how this informs current intergroup relations (Leyens et al., 2003; Verkuyten, 2003). The concept of essentialist continuity can be understood as the temporal dimension of in-group essentialism. It is likely that this dimension correlates with other components of essentialism (e.g., immutability, naturalness, entativity), and future studies should examine how these components of in-group essentialism are related to out-group evaluations.

The few experimental studies that have been conducted in relation to in-group continuity and intergroup processes (e.g., Jetten & Wohl, 2012) have only used relatively young and highly educated samples, and have not examined different contents of essentialist group continuity. Hence, an interesting and novel finding of the present research (Studies 2 and 3) is that the salience of a Christian historical representation of national identity

triggered more negative attitudes towards Muslims among the youngest age cohort (18-35), but not among the older ones. This finding was not predicted and we therefore encourage future research to more closely examine the different meanings that people ascribe to Christian cultural heritage, how this relates to current group evaluations, and whether this differs across generations. More generally, these findings underline the importance for social psychological research to look at diverse age cohorts when examining perceptions of group history and identity in relation to intergroup processes.

Another notable finding of Study 3 is that a higher level of Christian religiosity was associated with lower opposition towards Muslim expressive rights. This result may indicate that being religious makes people more likely to support the right to live according to one's religion, even if this concerns a religious out-group. The Netherlands is one of the most secular countries in Europe (with about 50% being non-religious), and religious groups have a minority position. Although there have been recent tensions between different religious communities in the Netherlands, these communities have also defended the general right to practice one's religion and to establish religious schools. This means that Christians may display lower opposition to Muslim rights, because such religious minority rights also allow them to maintain their Christian way of life. Future studies should more closely examine the interplay between Christian religiosity, the endorsement of a Christian national identity representation and attitudes towards Muslim rights.

A further important result of the current research is that the endorsement and salience of a religious tolerant historical representation of national identity was associated with less negative attitudes towards Muslim immigrants (Studies 2 and 3). One implication of this finding is that a representation of a continuing cultural tradition of religious tolerance can make natives more accepting towards Muslim immigrants. However, it must be noted that this national tradition of tolerance can also be used to argue for, and justify, discrimination of immigrant out-groups (Verkuyten, 2013). Muslim immigrants are sometimes portrayed as being intolerant themselves and therefore as a threat to 'our' national tradition of tolerance. We focused on a more inclusive representation of religious tolerance, but it is important for future work to study both inclusive and exclusive uses and consequences of tolerant national identity representations.

The present research demonstrated the importance of perceptions of essentialist group continuity in the context of relatively strong negative sentiments towards Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). It is likely that these findings are not limited to this setting but apply to other countries and to other social developments that are considered a threat to the continuity of a collective identity, such

as increasing European integration or mergers between organizations. Yet, there may be limits in the extent to which these findings can be generalized to countries or groups with a relatively young history (e.g., Australia) in which perceptions of essentialist continuity may be less important in defining national identity. Likewise, other findings could be observed among groups and countries with a strong negative history, such as Germany. In these countries natives might be inclined to emphasize cultural discontinuity in order to distance themselves from the past and to maintain a positive sense of national group membership (Bilewicz, 2007; Sahdra & Ross, 2007).

5.6 Conclusion

In three studies, we demonstrated that perceptions and representations of essentialist group continuity are important for current attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. Importantly, and in line with SCT, we showed that whether people perceive continuity threat, and consequently oppose expressive rights for Muslim immigrants, depends on the specific contents of national culture that are seen as temporally enduring. These findings are relevant, as they go beyond the familiar social psychological explanations of out-group attitudes and attitudes towards immigrants in particular (Brown, 2010; Wagner, Christ, & Heitmeyer, 2010). In studying intergroup relations, social psychologists tend to focus on the synchronic dimension of social life, and are much less concerned with the diachronic (i.e., temporal) dimension. However, current intergroup perceptions, feelings and behaviors are often influenced by thoughts of past times and by feelings of in-group continuity (Condor, 1996a; Epstude & Peetz, 2012; Jetten & Wohl, 2012). By showing that temporal understandings of national culture and identity guide attitudes towards immigrants this research more generally illustrates that perceptions of group history are important for understanding current group dynamics.

5.7 Notes

1. We only had a measure of Dutch nationality and not of ethnic origin. Hence, it is possible that some participants in the sample had a non-native background. However, Utrecht University has a very low percentage of Dutch students with such a background (8%). Moreover, with the question on religious affiliation we could filter out the participants who adhered to an immigrant religion (e.g., Islam, Hinduism). Therefore, the amount of non-native Dutch participants in this sample is negligible.

2. We repeated the analysis including age and gender and this yielded similar results for essentialist continuity ($\beta = .14$, $p = .045$) and continuity threat ($\beta = .47$, $p < .001$). Age and gender were not significantly related to opposition in this analysis ($p_s > .57$).

3. When repeating this analysis including age and gender this yielded similar results (lower CI = .0185, upper CI = .1900).

4. See Note 1.

5. We repeated the analysis including the dummy variable for being Christian and this yielded similar results for THR ($\beta = -.37$, $p < .001$), CHR ($\beta = .07$, $p = .458$), and continuity threat ($\beta = .54$, $p < .001$). Being Christian was not significantly related to opposition in this analysis ($p = .719$).

6. When repeating this analysis including being Christian as a covariate this yielded similar results for the indirect effect of THR (lower CI = -.2988, upper CI = -.0466) and of CHR (lower CI = .0622, upper CI = .3054).

7. For more information on TNS NIPO Consult, which is a consultancy company that conducts surveys and other studies among the Dutch population, see http://www.tns-nipo.com.

8. We chose to divide participants into four age cohorts (with approximately 15 years in between) in order to ensure that we had a sufficient amount of participants within each age cohort to assess the differences between the experimental conditions.

9. We performed these analyses using different age cohorts as the reference category. These analyses showed that there were no differences in the effect of the Christian manipulation between the three older age cohorts at p (two-tailed) $< .05$.

10. To facilitate further interpretations, we conducted our main analyses using a single dummy variable contrasting the youngest to the older age cohorts.

11. We repeated the analyses including education and Christian religiosity as covariates, and this yielded similar results for the indirect effect of the tolerant manipulation (lower CI = -.3627, upper CI = -.0249), as well as for the indirect effect of the Christian manipulation by age cohort interaction (lower CI = .0492, upper CI = .9047).

National identification and opposition to Muslim immigrants

6.1 Introduction

> It is five minutes to twelve. If we carry on like this, the continuing Islamisation will sooner or later result in the end of western civilization and the [Jewish-Christian] Dutch culture as we know it. … I make a personal appeal to the Prime Minister on behalf of many Dutch people. Stop the Islamisation of the Netherlands… Do not allow any new mosques. Close the Islamic schools. Prohibit the burqa. Prohibit the Koran… Take your responsibility. Stop the Islamisation. Enough is enough, Mister Balkenende, enough is enough. (Dutch Parliamentary Debate, 6 September 2007).

This quote is from Geert Wilders, the political leader of the Dutch far-right Party for Freedom (PVV). According to Wilders, the problems of Dutch multicultural society can be mainly attributed to Islam, which is why his focal political standpoint concerns the 'Islamisation of the Netherlands'. He holds a fiercely negative position on Islam, which he states, is a backward and fascist religion. He has called the prophet Mohammed a barbarian, compared the Koran to Hitler's 'Mein Kampf', has asked for a legal ban of this 'fascist book', and has proposed, in parliament, a special tax for wearing a headscarf because 'the polluter pays'.

There are two notable issues about this quote and the PVV. First, Wilders argues that Islam seriously threatens the Judeo-Christian roots of Dutch society and culture. Increasing numbers of Islamic schools, mosques, veiled women and other visible signs of Islam would undermine the traditional Dutch way of life (Sleegers, 2007). Consequently, Wilders has argued for including the phrase 'the Christian tradition' as defining the nation, in the Dutch constitution. There are similar developments in other countries (Judt, 2005). According to Zolberg and Woon (1999), the focus on Islam in political debates in Europe is related to the fact that the European identity, despite national variations, remains deeply embedded in the Christian tradition in relation to which Muslim immigrants constitute a visible 'other' and Islam a 'bright boundary' (Alba, 2005). Furthermore, research has shown that Christianity is more salient to national identity in European countries with larger Muslim populations (Kunovich, 2006). Likewise, in the United States, the Christian roots and nature of American identity would make Muslims an 'indigestible' minority (Huntington, 2004, p. 188).

The second remarkable issue about Wilders is that, despite his, what some would call, racist views, he is quite successful in mobilizing public support. The PVV was established in early 2006, and gained nine of the 150 parliamentary seats in the national elections of November 2006. In January 2010, the PVV had become the top-scoring party in two leading opinion polls. According to these polls, the party would win around 30 seats in the

next national elections, which would make it the largest party in the Netherlands. How is it possible that this party gains so much electoral support?

From a social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), it can be argued that especially those individuals who strongly identify with their national in-group are likely to show negative attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. In the case of Wilders, however, it seems that people who are normally not very concerned about their national identity are also willing to respond to circumstances that are defined as undermining the traditional national way of life. In social psychological terms this means that not only higher national identifiers, but also lower identifiers, are mobilized against Muslim immigrants.

We will test this idea in three experimental studies, in which opposition of the national majority to rights and opportunities for Muslims to publicly express and confirm their identity is examined in relation to historical representations of Dutch national identity. The main prediction is that lower identifiers will show comparable levels of opposition towards Muslim expressive rights to that of higher identifiers, when Dutch identity is defined as rooted in Christianity.

Historical continuity

Temporal and historical narratives are largely ignored in social psychology (see Condor, 1996a, 2006; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Spears, 2008), but they provide a sense of collective continuity that is central in national self-understandings (see Sani, 2008). The importance of historical imagery is emphasized in theoretical accounts of nationhood that define the nation as a community that moves together through time (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Bhabha, 1990).

Continuity of national identity is not self-evident but constructed, for example, by political elites who try to mobilize the public. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) argue and show that national history is contested between different politicians, because historical continuity is an important source of authority (Reicher, 2008). National history is the story of the creation of an in-group and serves an important function in mobilizing support, for example, for public policies regarding cultural diversity (e.g., Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999; Sibley et al., 2008). Although historical continuity refers to the past, the political usage of it is oriented to the future. In the quote above, Wilders defines a particular historical continuity for dismissing a future direction that would imply a rupture with the past, by stating that the continuing 'Islamisation' would mean the end of the Jewish-Christian 'Dutch culture as we know it'.

Research has shown that people tend to pursue collective identities that satisfy a need for self continuity (Vignoles et al., 2006). This means that people are likely to perceive their national in-group as an entity that endures across time and space (Sani et al., 2007, 2008b). A sense of continuity is maintained, for example, by constructing a narrative account of the enduring and essential nature of one's nation. The structure of a historical narrative 'invites those in the present to see themselves as participants in an ongoing drama' (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p. 150). Historical continuity provides a sense of timelessness and, in general, people are more likely to invest in a national identity that is defined as continuous (Sani, et al., 2008b). Therefore, developments that cause a rupture with the national past are likely to be perceived as a threat to the continuity of the national identity. Perceptions of collective continuity threat can develop as a cause of changes that are seen as going against the historically defining features of the nation (Iyer, Jetten, & Tsivrikos, 2008; Sindic & Reicher, 2009). As evident in Wilder's quote, Islam can be presented as threatening the Christian continuity of the Dutch nation. Thus, it can be expected that a relatively large part of the public will express opposition towards Muslim expressive rights when Dutch identity is defined as rooted in Christianity.

National identification

Research within the social identity tradition has shown that, compared to lower identifiers, those with higher levels of in-group identification are more likely to be concerned about their group, especially when the position and value of the group identity is at stake (see Riek, et al., 2006). Lower identifiers, on the other hand, are found to psychologically dissociate themselves from their in-group in cases of intergroup conflict, thereby dividing rather than uniting the group (e.g., Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997). However, lower identifiers may be brought 'on board' when conflict is associated with threats to the historical continuity of the in-group.

There are some studies that have shown that not only higher identifiers, but also lower identifiers, can be mobilized against out-groups (e.g., Fosh, 1993). For instance, in a study on the willingness to participate in industrial protest, Veenstra and Haslam (2000) found that in a situation of intergroup conflict lower identifiers were less willing to participate in collective activities. Yet, these participants showed a marked increase in willingness to protect their in-group when the out-group (government) was additionally construed as threatening the welfare of in-group members (union). Moreover, in the context of New Zealand, Sibley and colleagues (2008, Study 3) used extracts adapted from political

speeches to experimentally manipulate negation (versus recognition) of the historical basis of claims for reparation for past injustices suffered by the Maoris. A comparison was made between liberal and conservative voters, and the former have, in general, lower national identification than the latter. It was found that the liberal voters expressed lower levels of opposition towards pro-bicultural policy in the control and historical recognition condition. However, in the historical negation condition they showed increased levels of opposition, comparable to those of conservative voters. Furthermore, in a representative survey in the Netherlands, Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) found that lower national identifiers were equally supportive of immigration restrictions as higher identifiers when their national identity was made salient. This means that "bringing considerations of collective identity to the fore enlarges the coalition opposed to immigration – above and beyond those already predisposed to oppose it" (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007, p. 120).

We live in a world of nations where most citizens care about their country's national identity and culture, although not on a continuous basis, and not necessarily in the form of patriotic or nationalist sentiments. As argued by Billig (1995), nationalism is an endemic condition that is indicated on a daily basis in the lives of its citizenry and deeply ingrained in contemporary consciousness. National solidarity is likely at times of an (inter)national crisis or when a concern about the country's traditional way of life becomes salient. This situation might be perceived by many nationals, also lower identifiers, as necessitating solidarity-based action. Hence, most members of the national community should be willing to respond to circumstances that are defined as undermining the historical continuity of the nation. Islamic schools, mosques, veiled women, Islamic public holidays, and other visible signs of Islam are typically presented as being incompatible with a traditional Christian identity. Thus, the alleged threats that Muslims pose to the continuity of the traditional Dutch identity might also lead lower identifiers to recognize that some form of in-group protection is needed.

The three experimental studies presented here focus on the question whether the relationship between national identification and opposition towards Muslim expressive rights is moderated by different historical representations of the national category. The main prediction is that lower identifiers will express equal levels of opposition towards Muslim expressive rights as higher identifiers, when national identity is defined as rooted in Christianity.

6.2 Study 1

Study 1 was designed to examine whether the relationship between national identification and opposition towards Muslim expressive rights is moderated by a Christian representation of national history. We expected a significant positive relationship in a control condition, but not in the context in which Dutch identity is presented as rooted in Christianity.

Method

Participants, design and procedure

The study was conducted in 2007, among 75 students at Utrecht University (Historical Representations and Attitudes Towards Muslims Study, see Table 1.1). Students participated on a voluntary basis and all of them were native Dutch. The sample consisted of 37.3% men and 62.7% women. The ages ranged between 17 and 28 years ($M = 19.69$, $SD = 2.03$). Participants' religiosity was assessed with a 5-point scale ranging from 'not religious at all' to 'very religious'. The sample was relatively non-religious ($M = 2.11$, $SD = 1.56$).

An experimental between-subjects design was used, in which participants were randomly presented with one of two passages about Dutch historical identity. One passage emphasized that Dutch identity is rooted in Christianity and that Christianity continues to define the national identity in present days (see Appendix 6A). In the control version the participants read an extract of comparable length that argued that water maintenance is a key aspect of Dutch history and identity (see Appendix 6A). Participants were asked to underline the most important sentences of the text and to summarize the text in five words. Subsequently, they were presented with five statements on the importance of history for understanding the present.

Participants then completed a measure of opposition towards Muslim expressive rights. There were seven statements adopted from earlier work (Verkuyten, 2007; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2009), and four sample items were: "The right to establish Islamic schools should always exist in the Netherlands", "Some Islamic holidays should become official Dutch holidays", "Dutch TV should broadcast more programs by and for Muslims", and "In the Netherlands the wearing of a headscarf should not be forbidden". Items were measured on scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*), and Cronbach's alpha was .78. The scores were recoded so that a higher score indicated stronger opposition to Muslim expressive rights.

National identification was subsequently assessed by asking the participants to respond to six items taken from previous studies in the Netherlands (see Verkuyten, 2005). The items were: "My Dutch identity is an important part of my self", "I feel a sense of commitment to the Dutch", "I identify with the Netherlands", "I am proud to be Dutch", "Being Dutch is a very important part of how I see myself", and "I have a strong sense of belonging to the Dutch". The items were measured on 7-point scales, and a higher score indicated stronger national identification. Cronbach's alpha for this six-item scale was .92.

Results

Preliminary analyses
Opposition towards Muslim rights was not significantly related to religiosity, $F(1, 73) = .01$, $p > .10$, and there was no significant interaction effect between religiosity and experimental condition, $F(1, 73) = .012$, $p > .10$.

The mean score of national identification was a little above the neutral midpoint of the scale ($M = 4.40$, $SD = 1.16$). National identification was measured after the experimental manipulation, and we examined whether identification differed between the two conditions, but this was not the case, $t(73) = .16$, $p > .10$.

Opposition towards Muslim expressive rights
On a 7-point scale, participants indicated a relatively moderate level of opposition towards Muslim expressive rights ($M = 3.54$, $SD = .95$). The mean score was significantly below the neutral midpoint of the scale, $t(74) = -4.22$, $p < .001$. We predicted that national identification would be positively related to opposition to expressive rights in the control condition, but not in the Christian condition. Considering the experimental design, differences in opposition were examined using the general linear model (GLM) univariate procedure. The general linear model is a flexible generalization of regression analysis and analysis of variance (Rutherford, 2001; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Between-subjects analyses were conducted, in which experimental condition was included as a categorical variable, and national identification a continuous centered variable. Significant interaction effects were further examined by testing the relationship between national identification and opposition to expressive rights within each of the two experimental conditions.

National identification was significantly related to the level of opposition, indicating that higher identifiers were more against Muslim expressive rights than lower identifiers, $F(1, 74) = 3.27$, $p = .038$. The main effect of condition was not significant, $F(1, 74) = .00$, $p > .10$, but the predicted interaction with identification was significant, $F(1, 74) = 8.14$, $p = .003$. This interaction is displayed in Figure 6.1. As expected, analyses within the experimental conditions indicated that the relationship between national identification and opposition to Muslim expressive rights was not significant in the Christian condition ($\beta = -.14$, $t = -.84$, $p > .10$). However, in the control condition, this relationship was significant, with higher identifiers expressing more opposition than lower identifiers ($\beta = .50$, $t = 3.39$, $p = .001$). Thus, as expected, in the control condition, higher identifiers showed more opposition to Muslim expressive rights than lower identifiers, whereas in the Christian condition there was no significant difference in opposition between these groups. These results indicate that lower identifiers can be mobilized against Muslim immigrants when a Christian representation of their national identity is made salient.


Figure 6.1 Mean levels of opposition towards Muslim expressive rights as a function of national identification and experimental condition, Study 1.

6.3 Study 2

We conducted a second study to examine whether these findings were reliable and could be generalized to another sample. Moreover, since no manipulation checks were included in Study 1, we could not assess whether participants interpreted the texts as intended. Therefore, these were included in Study 2. Furthermore, we included an additional experimental condition that emphasizes religious tolerance as historically defining the nation.

We have argued that lower identifiers can be mobilized against Muslim immigrants, because Muslims would be perceived as undermining the historical continuity of the nation. This interpretation implies that lower identifiers should be more positive towards Muslim expressive rights when Muslim practices are not considered a rupture with the national past. National identity can be defined in various ways and different narratives of history can be told. In the Netherlands, there is not only an emphasis on the Christian roots of the country, but also on humanist values and the long tradition of religious tolerance. An emphasis on the national tradition of tolerance implies that expressions of Islam are not threatening the historical continuity of the Dutch identity. Rather, the acceptance of Muslim expressive rights fits and confirms the defining historical narrative of religious tolerance. Thus, when the nation's history of religious tolerance is made salient, lower identifiers should be more supportive of Muslim expressive rights than higher identifiers. In contrast, in the Christian condition we again expected no difference between higher and lower identifiers.

Method

Participants, design and procedure

This study was conducted in 2008, among 103 students of Utrecht University (Historical Representations and Attitudes Towards Muslims Study, see Table 1.1). The students participated on a voluntary basis, and all participants were native Dutch. The sample consisted of 18.4% men and 81.6% women. The participants were between 19 and 46 years old ($M = 22.33$, $SD = 3.91$).

An experimental between-subjects design was used in which 'tolerance' was added as a third condition. The experimental manipulations were induced in exactly the same way as in Study 1, and the order of the questionnaire was also similar. In the tolerant condition participants were presented with a passage of comparable length that

emphasized religious tolerance as the central aspect of the Dutch history and identity (see Appendix 6A).

Opposition towards Muslim expressive rights (α = .73) and national identification (α = .90) were measured with the same questions as in Study 1. In addition, to assess whether participants perceived the framing manipulations as intended, they were asked (at the end of the questionnaire) to indicate their level of agreement with two statements (7-point scales) about Dutch history, namely "The Netherlands is originally a Christian country", and "In the Netherlands there has always been room for various religions".

Results

Preliminary analyses

The main effect of condition on the manipulation checks was significant, $F(2, 75) = 3.68$, $p = .003$. Participants in the Christian condition were more likely to agree with the statement that the Netherlands is originally a Christian country ($M = 5.53$, $SD = .26$), than in the tolerant condition ($M = 4.66$, $SD = .25$), $F(1, 66) = 7.17$, $t = 2.68$, $p = .005$, and the control condition ($M = 4.61$, $SD = .21$), $F(1, 67) = 7.04$, $t = 2.65$, $p = .005$. Participants in the tolerant and control condition did not differ in their agreement with this proposition, $F(1, 70) = .015$, $t = .12$, $p > .10$. Furthermore, participants in the tolerant condition were more likely to agree with the statement that the Netherlands has always been open to various religions ($M = 4.94$, $SD = .21$), compared to the Christian ($M = 4.31$, $SD = .28$), $F(1, 66) = 2.69$, $t = 1.64$, $p = .053$, and the control condition ($M = 4.00$, $SD = .26$), $F(1, 70) = 7.04$, $t = 2.45$, $p = .009$.

The mean score of national identification was similar to Study 1, and a little above the neutral midpoint of the scale ($M = 4.43$, $SD = 1.20$). The experimental condition had no effect on participants' level of national identification, $F(2, 102) = 1.71$, $p > .05$.

Opposition towards Muslim expressive rights

Similar to Study 1, participants indicated relatively low opposition towards Muslim expressive rights ($M = 3.31$, $SD = .85$). The mean score was significantly below the neutral midpoint of the scale, $t(102) = -8.25$, $p < .001$.

As in Study 1, a two-way analysis of variance (GLM) was performed with experimental condition as a between-subjects factor and national identification as a centered continuous variable. The opposition to Muslim expressive rights served as the dependent variable. National identification was positively associated with opposition towards Muslim expressive rights, $F(1, 102) = 3.11$, $p = .041$. The main effect of experimental condition was not

significant, $F(2, 102) = .55$, $p > .10$, but the predicted interaction with identification was significant, $F(2, 102) = 3.04$, $p = .027$. This interaction is displayed in Figure 6.2.

In agreement with Study 1, the within-condition analyses revealed that the relationship between national identification and opposition towards Muslim expressive rights was not significant in the Christian condition ($\beta = -.15$, $t = -.85$, $p > .10$), whereas in the control condition, there was a significant difference between lower and higher identifiers ($\beta = .44$, $t = 2.88$, $p = .004$). In addition, the relationship between national identification and opposition was marginally significant in the tolerant condition ($\beta = .26$, $t = 1.54$, $p = .067$). In the tolerant and control condition, lower identifiers tended to show less opposition towards Muslims expressive rights than higher identifiers.

Thus, similar to Study 1, higher identifiers showed more opposition to Muslim rights than lower identifiers when a tolerant or neutral Dutch historical identity representation was made salient. However, lower identifiers expressed similar levels of opposition towards Muslim expressive rights as higher identifiers in the Christian condition.

Figure 6.2 Mean levels of opposition towards Muslim expressive rights as a function of national identification and experimental condition, Study 2.

6.4 Study 3

Studies 1 and 2 showed that a historical narrative that defines national identity as rooted in Christianity can trigger opposition towards Muslims among people who ordinarily do not view their national identity as being very important. The likely reason is that Islamic schools, mosques, Islamic public holidays, veiled women, and other public signs of Islam are seen as undermining the historical continuity of the nation. In Study 3 we examine this interpretation further by using an additional mixed condition.

In Studies 1 and 2, a one-sided image of the national history was presented. However, a nation's history can be told in many different ways and often there is a mixture of discourses. For example, debates on European and national identity tend to emphasize not only their Christian, but also their humanist roots. In Study 3 we included an experimental condition in which Dutch identity was presented as a debatable issue, whereby some people argue that it is rooted in Christianity whereas others claim that religious tolerance forms the historical essence of Dutch nationhood.

We reasoned that for lower identifiers Islam poses less of a threat to the collective continuity of their national identity, when not only the Christian but also the religious tolerant aspects of their national history are introduced. Namely, when different, and contrasting, interpretations of their national past are made salient at the same time it is less clear what defines their national identity, and which aspects of this identity are continuous over time. Hence, it is also less apparent in this condition whether the increasing visibility of Islam would imply a rupture with the national past. Therefore, in this condition we expected lower identifiers to show less resistance toward Muslim expressive rights than higher identifiers.

Another reason for including the mixed condition in Study 3 is that it could be argued that the opposition of lower identifiers in the Christian condition (Studies 1 and 2) is not so much due to the feeling that national continuity is undermined, but rather to the increased salience of the intergroup context (Christianity versus Islam). By including the mixed condition we can (partly) examine this possibility, because Christian aspects of Dutch national history are also, and firstly, made salient in this condition. When the salience of the intergroup context is driving the effect in the Christian condition, we would also expect a difference in levels of opposition between lower and higher identifiers in the mixed condition. Yet, when this mobilisation effect only occurs within the Christian and not in the mixed condition, this would be more supportive of the collective continuity interpretation.

Method

Participants, design and procedure

This study was conducted in 2008, among 173 native Dutch high school pupils from a pre-university secondary education school in the city of Alkmaar (Historical Representations and Attitudes Towards Muslims Study, see Table 1.1). The students participated on a voluntary basis. The sample consisted of 53% men and 47% women. Ages ranged between 14 and 19 ($M = 16.15$, $SD = .98$).

A similar between-subjects design with the same measures as in Studies 1 and 2 was used. The tolerant condition was not examined, because in Study 2 no significant differences in opposition towards Muslim expressive rights were observed between the tolerant and control condition. Thus, the focus was on a mixed condition, next to the Christian and control condition. The new passage emphasized that there is a debate on whether Dutch identity is rooted in Christianity or rather in humanism and religious tolerance (see Appendix 6A). Opposition towards Muslim expressive rights was measured with the same items as in Study 1 and 2, and Cronbach's alpha was .82. The alpha for national identification was .92.

Results

Preliminary analyses

Participants in the Christian condition were more likely to agree with the statement that the Netherlands originally is a Christian country, ($M = 5.16$, $SD = 1.32$), than in the control condition ($M = 4.37$, $SD = 1.73$), $F(1, 114) = 7.54$, $t = 2.75$, $p = .004$, and the mixed condition ($M = 4.36$, $SD = 1.66$), $F(1, 114) = 8.25$, $t = 2.87$, $p = .003$. Participants in the mixed and in the control condition did not differ in their agreement with this proposition, $F(1, 113) = .003$, $t = -.055$, $p > .10$. Moreover, for the proposition that the Netherlands has always been open to various religions, responses of participants in the mixed ($M = 4.74$, $SD = 1.56$), and in the control condition ($M = 4.45$, $SD = 1.89$), also did not differ, $F(1, 113) = .945$, $t = .97$, $p > .10$.   The fact that participants in the mixed condition did not differ in their response to the Christian and tolerant manipulation questions, compared to the control condition, indicates that they interpreted the framing manipulation as intended. The mean score for national identification was similar to Studies 1 and 2, and a little above the neutral midpoint of the scale ($M = 4.36$, $SD = 1.30$). Again, there was no significant effect of the experimental condition on national identification, $F(2, 172) = 1.63$, $p = .10$.

Opposition towards Muslim expressive rights

Participants were relatively neutral towards Muslim expressive rights ($M = 4.06$, $SD = 1.13$). The GLM analysis showed that higher levels of national identification were associated with more opposition, $F(1, 172) = 7.24$, $p = .004$. The main effect of condition was not significant, $F(2, 172) = .765$, $p > .10$. More importantly, and as predicted, the interaction between condition and national identification was significant, $F(2, 172) = 2.50$, $p = .043$. This interaction is displayed in Figure 6.3.

In agreement with Studies 1 and 2, the within-condition analyses indicated that the relationship between national identification and opposition towards Muslim expressive rights was significant in the control condition ($\beta = .23$, $t = 1.74$, $p = .044$), but not in the Christian condition ($\beta = -.01$, $t = -.07$, $p > .10$). In addition, a significant effect of national identification was found in the mixed condition ($\beta = .36$, $t = 2.88$, $p = .003$). In this condition, lower identifiers expressed less opposition than higher identifiers.


Figure 6.3 Mean levels of opposition towards Muslim expressive rights as a function of national identification and experimental condition, Study 3.

We again found that lower identifiers enhanced their opposition towards Muslim expressive rights when Dutch national identity was presented as historically ingrained in Christianity. Moreover, the results confirmed that, compared to higher identifiers, lower identifiers expressed significantly less resistance in the mixed, and in the control condition. Hence, the equal resistance to Muslim rights of lower and higher identifiers was restricted to the condition in which a one-sided Christian historical representation of the Netherlands was provided.

This pattern of results suggests that it is not so much the salience of the intergroup context (Christianity vs. Islam) that drives the mobilizing effect in the Christian condition, but rather the threat to national continuity. In the debatable condition the focus was also on the Christian roots of the Netherlands, but in this condition lower identifiers displayed lower levels of opposition to Muslim expressive rights than higher identifiers. In addition, compared to the Christian condition, participants in the debatable condition agreed less with the statement that the Netherlands is originally a Christian country. Thus, in this condition Muslim expressive rights and practices are probably less threatening to the historical continuity of the nation.

6.5 General discussion

Taken together, these three studies highlight the important role of representations of national history for intergroup relations. They illustrate that the association between national identification and opposition towards Muslim immigrants' expressive rights, is contingent on how national history is represented. The findings demonstrate that a historical narrative which emphasizes the Christian roots of the Netherlands can mobilize people without a strong commitment to their national identity to increase their opposition towards the right of Muslims to publicly confirm and express their identity.

Typically, in social psychology it is argued and shown that, compared to lower identifiers, higher identifiers tend to be more concerned about their in-group and react more negatively to outsiders that are perceived as threatening or undermining one's own way of life (see Riek et al., 2006). Politics, however, is about enlarging the portion of the public in support of a particular viewpoint. Some politicians are trying to broaden the circle of opposition to immigrants above and beyond those who already identify strongly with the nation. This means that those who have a low commitment to their national identity should also be persuaded to become opposed to this particular issue (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007), and our findings show that historical narratives are useful for doing so.

Expressions of Muslim identity, like veiled women, mosques, Islamic schools, and Islamic public holidays, are typically seen as undermining the Christian traditions of the nation (Sleegers, 2007). Furthermore, most citizens care about their country's national identity and culture, and also those who do not think that their national identity is important will probably have an underlying concern and sense of solidarity with their nation (Billig, 1995). In addition, historical narratives make all nationals part of an ongoing national drama (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Thus, it is understandable that also lower identifiers are willing to respond to circumstances that are defined as undermining the continuity of the nation's traditional way of life.

A few other studies have also found that lower identifiers can be mobilized to assert the in-group, particularly when there is out-group threat (e.g., Fosh, 1993; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000). Hence, bringing considerations of national continuity to the fore can enlarge the coalition opposed to immigration (see also Sibley et al., 2008; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). However, the fact that lower identifiers are responsive to particular historical representations of their national identity may also sway them in an opposite direction. Lower identifiers, for example, may be persuaded to show higher acceptance of minority rights when past injustices towards these groups are made salient. Doosje and colleagues (1998) found that, compared to higher identifiers, lower national identifiers are more likely to acknowledge the negative aspects of their own nation's history, and experience more feelings of group-based guilt about their collective past (see also Swim & Miller, 1999).

National history can be formulated in different ways and various traditions can be presented as self-defining. In the Netherlands the emphasis is not only on Christianity, but also on the long liberal tradition of religious tolerance. Study 2 showed that lower identifiers displayed less opposition towards Muslim expressive rights than higher identifiers, when religious tolerance was presented as historically defining the nation. This indicates that lower identifiers ordinarily tend to think about the issue of Muslim immigrants from a more tolerant perspective. Furthermore, in Study 3 lower identifiers also expressed lower levels of opposition than higher identifiers, when the history of the nation was presented as a debatable issue. Thus, only when the Christian roots of the nation were emphasized lower identifiers expressed similar levels of opposition towards Muslim expressive rights as higher identifiers. In this condition, Muslim rights most clearly undermine the ongoing Christian nature of the nation. This is in line with the findings of chapter 5 as well as other research (e.g., Verkuyten & Poppe, 2009), which showed that the relationship between a Christian historical representation and opposition to Muslim expressive rights is mediated by the perception that Muslims threaten the continuation of the national identity and culture.

However, future studies could examine whether historical representations of national identity are also linked to the need for self-continuity (see chapters 2 and 3). It could be the case that some historical representations of national identity more strongly satisfy the need for self-continuity than others. In addition, future studies could examine the moderating role of the level of religiosity more closely. In Study 1, no evidence for the role of religiosity was found but it might be the case that those who explicitly define themselves as 'atheist' are not sensitive to the representation of the Christian roots of the nation. Furthermore, future studies could use other experimental procedures, like priming techniques, which reduce the likelihood of demand characteristics (see Bargh & Chatrand, 2000).

In conclusion, we have shown that the relationship between national identification and the opposition towards Muslim expressive rights depends on the way that national identity is historically defined. A national identity represented as rooted in Christianity leads to similar levels of opposition among higher and lower identifiers. This paper is one of the few that shows that not only those who identify strongly with the national in-group, but also those with low levels of commitment to their national identity, can be mobilized against immigrants (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). This might be related to the fact that questions on immigration and diversity are hotly debated in the Netherlands and public opinion is quite fluid and thereby susceptible to change (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). The findings help us to understand why far-right politicians, who express negative views about immigrants, are sometimes able to attract a relatively broad audience, including those who normally do not find their national identity very important.

National identification
and acceptance of
Muslim immigrants

7

7.1 Introduction

> The Netherlands is characterized by a tradition of religious tolerance, respect and responsibility. The needless offending of certain convictions and communities does not belong to this. ... The Dutch government will honor this tradition and issues an appeal to everyone to do the same. (Dutch Ministry of General Affairs, 2008).

This quote is from Jan Peter Balkenende, the former Dutch prime minister. He made this statement during a press conference about the anti-Islam movie 'Fitna' that was released in the Netherlands by MP Geert Wilders. Balkenende invokes a representation of Dutch national history as one of tolerance and respect, to argue for acceptance of cultural and religious diversity in the present. In public debates in Western Europe, Islam and Muslims are often presented as undermining national identity and culture (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009), and many West Europeans perceive their way of life and that of Muslims as incompatible (Pew Research Centre, 2005). However, Balkenende argues that the Dutch should respect migrant groups, because this is in agreement with "our" history of religious tolerance.

Representations of national history are central to the creation and maintenance of national identity (Liu & Hilton, 2005). Yet, research on attitudes toward immigrants and ethnic minorities has tended to ignore the implications of socially shared representations of history for intergroup relations (Liu & László, 2007; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Recently, some studies have shown that representations of national history can be used by politicians to legitimize social inequality of ethnic groups (Sibley et al., 2008). Furthermore, research has shown that a stronger genealogical, or ethnic, conception of national identity is related to more negative attitudes toward immigrants (Meeus et al., 2010; Pehrson et al., 2009; Wakefield et al., 2011). However, there are few studies investigating whether historical identity representations can promote greater acceptance of immigrants and minority groups (e.g., Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006).

Following self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987), the present research investigates the extent to which attitudes of Dutch natives towards Muslim immigrants depend on a religious tolerant representation of national history. SCT proposes that people who highly identify with an in-group are more likely to act in accordance with in-group norms and beliefs. This means that when historical norms and beliefs prescribe tolerance of immigrants, especially highly identified group members should behave accordingly. This prediction is interesting and important because it goes against the well-established finding that higher national identifiers tend to display more negative attitudes towards immigrants (e.g., Bourhis & Dayan, 2004; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).

National identity and self-categorization

A considerable body of social psychological research has examined the relationship between national identification and attitudes towards immigrants (e.g., Bourhis & Dayan, 2004; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). However, it has been argued that investigations of a generic relationship between national identification and prejudice are misguided, because they disregard the content and historical context of national identity. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) propose that different understandings of national identity exist, and that these identity representations are dynamically constructed in the context of societal and political debates. The proposition that group behavior should be understood in relation to the content and context of social identity is emphasized in self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987).

SCT proposes that self-categorization in terms of a particular group membership implies a process of depersonalization in which people stereotype themselves in terms of what defines and characterizes the in-group compared to a salient out-group. Through this process of self-stereotyping, the norms and beliefs of the in-group become part of the psychological self and thereby provide the guidelines for appropriate intergroup behavior. In line with SCT, research has shown that in-group norms and beliefs can have exclusionary, but also pro-social, implications for attitudes towards out-groups. For instance, Tarrant et al. (2009) found that when an in-group norm of empathy for out-group members was made salient, participants reported more positive out-group attitudes than those exposed to an in-group norm of detachment towards the out-group. Moreover, several studies have shown that attitudes of native majority members towards ethnic and religious minority groups are dependent on whether national identity is defined in ethnic (e.g., ancestry) or civic (e.g., community engagement) terms (e.g., Meeus et al., 2010; Pehrson et al., 2009; Wakefield et al., 2011). Specifically, these studies demonstrate that civic conceptions of national identity result in more positive attitudes and behaviors towards ethnic and religious minority groups than ethnic understandings.

National history and tolerance

In discourses on national identity people often appeal to historical origin and lineage (Condor, 2006). The reason is that "national history provides us with narratives that tell us who we are, where we came from, and where we should be going. It defines a trajectory which helps construct the essence of a group's identity, how it relates to other groups,

and ascertains what its options are for facing the present" (Liu & Hilton, 2005, p. 537). National history is the story of the making of a national in-group and is therefore central in the construction and maintenance of the national community (Condor, 2006; Renan, 1990; Sani, 2008). The national in-group typically creates a historical self-narrative that has strong normative properties. This narrative serves to justify how things are and ought to be, based on the explanation how it came to be that way (Liu & László, 2007; Southgate, 2005). For natives, national history defines who 'we' are, how 'we' differ from 'them', and how 'we' should relate and react to 'them'.

National history can be represented in various ways (see Doosje et al., 1998; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001), and previous research has shown that representations of national history can be used to justify the exclusion of immigrants and ethnic out-groups (Sibley et al., 2008). Few studies have examined whether representations of national history can also increase acceptance of immigrants. Following SCT, historical representations that emphasize inclusion and openness can be expected to translate into greater acceptance. For instance, a study by Reicher and colleagues (2006) demonstrated that the mobilization of Bulgarians against the deportation of Jews in World War II was related to their historical national self-understanding of tolerance. A content analysis of historical documents indicated that during the war Bulgarians defined their identity by referring to their 'traditions of religious tolerance and humanity', which made them inclined to oppose oppression and to protect minorities.

In the Netherlands, an important historical self-representation is that of being a tolerant nation. Toleration of different worldviews and religions is often portrayed as a self-defining aspect of Dutch national history and identity. However, the meaning of tolerance is not self-evident. Tolerance implies putting up with something that one disapproves of or is prejudiced against (Sullivan & Transue, 1999), and is therefore considered an ideological dilemma (Billig et al., 1988). It prescribes the acceptance of beliefs and practices that one considers as dissenting. This dilemma is reflected in the contemporary discourses about national identity and increasing ethno-cultural diversification, in which historical tolerance is invoked to promote the inclusion as well as exclusion of immigrant out-groups. In the latter discourse, tolerance is considered as a historic national value of 'us' that is threatened by the presence of 'them' (Billig et al., 1988). Here, majority members and populist politicians emphasize the self-defining meaning of in-group tolerance in order to criticize Muslim immigrants for their intolerance and their unwillingness to adapt (Bowskill et al., 2007; Verkuyten, 2004, 2013). In portraying Muslim immigrants as transgressing 'our' traditional tolerant way of life, they are positioned as outsiders to the national in-group.

However, tolerance can also be used to argue for acceptance of cultural and religious diversity (Billig et al., 1988), and to promote the inclusion of immigrant out-groups. In this discourse, tolerance is portrayed as providing room for cultural and religious diversity, and this is considered a tradition that also existed in the country's past. Historically, the concept of tolerance evolved from efforts to deal with the harmful and violent effects of religious conflicts (Walzer, 1997). The presence of a great number of Muslims in western European countries has given a renewed urgency to the idea of tolerance as a mechanism for dealing with diversity. In this paper, we focus on the historical representation of national tolerance of religious diversity.

Group identification

Not everyone within the national in-group will be equally affected by a historical tolerant national identity representation. SCT argues that, next to in-group norms and beliefs, group identification is important for understanding people's reactions towards out-groups (Turner et al., 1987; Turner, 1999). Individual differences in social identification determine the extent to which the stereotypical group understandings are used as a standard for appropriate group behavior. When people strongly identify with a group they are more inclined to act and interpret the world according to the group's norms, values and ideological beliefs (Doosje et al., 1999; Haslam et al., 2010). Within an intergroup context, studies have typically focused on how group understandings interact with group identification in predicting intergroup discrimination and prejudice. For example, research has examined how national in-group understandings interact with national identification in predicting prejudice towards migrant groups (Meeus et al., 2010; Pehrson et al., 2009).

To our knowledge, there is no research showing that representations of a national history of tolerance can translate into a more accepting attitude towards immigrants among high national identifiers. There is generally little empirical evidence for the hypothesis that highly identified nationals can become more positive towards immigrant out-groups when pro-social in-group norms and beliefs are salient. An exception is an experimental study by Butz, Plant, and Doerr (2007), which showed that high nationalistic individuals became more positive towards Arabs and Muslims when egalitarian national values were made salient, whereas this manipulation did not influence attitudes of low nationalistic participants. Moreover, this study observed that whereas high nationalistic individuals generally had more negative attitudes towards Arabs and Muslims than low nationalistic individuals, the activation of egalitarian values resulted in similar attitudes among both

groups. These results indicate that highly identified nationals are not only more likely to act in accordance with salient group norms than lower identifiers, but are also more inclined to display prejudice towards immigrant out-groups as a means of protecting positive distinctiveness (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Yet, and in line with SCT, when the meaning of national identity is shared, national in-group members tend to act in accordance with this meaning and this reduces the differences between higher and lower identifiers' out-group evaluations. For our research this means that, while higher identifiers may generally be less positive about Muslims than lower identifiers, when a representation of national historical tolerance is salient this would result in similar levels of acceptance of Muslim expressive rights among higher and lower identifiers.

Perceived incompatibility

Whereas inclusive understandings of national identity provide room for immigrants to become part of the national in-group, exclusive understandings contribute to the idea that only certain ethnic or religious groups are compatible with national group membership. In the current European socio-political context, especially the compatibility of national identities with those related to Islam is questioned. Even when Muslim immigrants have acquired citizenship (and are thus nationals), there is still debate about whether they can be 'true' members of the national in-group and whether 'their' and 'our' ways of life are compatible (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Incompatibility is typically seen as identity undermining and this perception might make natives more negative towards migrant groups (Sindic & Reicher, 2009).

Research on incompatibility has mainly examined the extent to which present day identities are perceived as incompatible and how this perception translates into intergroup attitudes (e.g., Sindic & Reicher, 2009). However, whether people perceive their way of life to be incompatible with that of an out-group will depend on how they define their national identity, which is anchored in their representations of national history. There have been very few studies examining the extent to which representations of national history influence perceptions of incompatibility (e.g., Liu, Lawrence, Ward, & Abraham, 2002). Furthermore, the perception of incompatibility by majority members has not been examined in relation to their acceptance of Muslim expressive rights.

Research in the Netherlands has shown that 41% of the native Dutch population considers Muslim and West European ways of life to be incompatible (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009). More specifically, many Dutch people consider Islam as incompatible with Dutch

culture and as undermining Dutch identity (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). However, it is likely that those who understand Dutch national history and identity as one of religious tolerance and openness will have lower perceptions of identity incompatibility and, as a result, show more acceptance of Muslim expressive rights. A self-defining history of tolerance implies that different subgroups have always been able to express their identity at the same time. Hence, (reduced) perceptions of identity incompatibility might explain the expected positive relationship between historical tolerance and acceptance of Muslim rights, particularly for higher national identifiers.

Overview of the present research

We examined the relationship between representations of historical tolerance, national identification, perceptions of identity incompatibility and the acceptance of Muslim expressive rights. Following self-categorization theory, we predicted that the influence of historical representations on out-group evaluations is particularly strong for higher identifiers, since they are more inclined to act in accordance with their in-group understandings than lower identifiers. Therefore, the main prediction was that a historical representation of national religious tolerance is positively related to acceptance of Muslim expressive rights, particularly for people who feel strongly committed to their national group membership. Second, since religious tolerance relates to the acceptance of different co-existing worldviews, it was predicted that the positive effect of historical tolerance on acceptance of Muslim rights for higher identifiers could be explained by their reduced perceptions of identity incompatibility. In addition, since higher national identifiers are generally found to be more negative about relevant out-groups than lower identifiers (e.g., Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007), a historical representation of religious tolerance was hypothesized to result in equal levels of perceived identity incompatibility and acceptance of Muslim rights among higher and lower identifiers.

We tested these predictions in three studies in the Netherlands. Study 1 was a survey study, conducted in two different subsamples. Study 1A examined whether endorsement of historical tolerance was related to acceptance of Muslim expressive rights, and whether this relationship was moderated by national identification. Study 1B was designed to replicate these findings in a different sample, and by using a more extensive measure of historical tolerance. Study 2 was a survey study, in which we examined the role of perceived incompatibility as an explanation for the expected interaction effect of historical tolerance and national identification on acceptance of Muslim expressive rights. Study 3 examined

the same predictions in an experimental design, in order to test the situational effects of being encouraged to think in terms of national historical tolerance. More specifically, this study tried to show that the activation of a national history of religious tolerance causes higher national identifiers to perceive less identity incompatibility, and therefore to display more acceptance of Muslim expressive rights. Thus, whereas Studies 1 and 2 were concerned with individual differences in the endorsement of historical tolerance, Study 3 followed principles of cultural knowledge and lay theories activation (e.g., Levy, West, Ramirez, & Karafantis, 2006).

7.2 Study 1

Method

Participants, design and procedure
The study was conducted among two samples of Utrecht University students. At the start of their regular class meetings, students were asked to participate in a study on attitudes towards Dutch society. The anonymous questionnaires were administered in the classroom under supervision. Study 1A was conducted among 300 social science students (Historical Tolerance Survey merged with Group Continuity Survey, see Table 1.1), and the sample consisted of 30.3% men and 65.0% women (4.7% missing). The ages ranged between 17 and 30 ($M = 20.20$, $SD = 2.13$). In Study 1B, participants were 68 pharmacy students (Historical Representations Survey, see Table 1.1), and the sample consisted of 26.5% men and 64.7% women (8.8% missing). The ages ranged between 18 and 28 ($M = 21.36$, $SD = 2.73$). In both samples all participants were native Dutch.

Measures
All items were rated on a 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) scale.

   Historical tolerance. The extent to which participants endorsed a historical representation of religious tolerance was assessed by two items in Study 1A: "The Netherlands has a long history of religious tolerance", and "In the Netherlands there has always been room for various religions" ($r = .66$, $p < .001$). In Study 1B, historical tolerance was assessed with five items. The three additional items were: "Traditionally, the Netherlands is an open and tolerable society where there is much room for other cultures and religions", "Freedom of religion historically belongs to the Netherlands", and

"Tolerance is a historical achievement that the Netherlands should continue to fulfill". A principal component analysis yielded a one-factor solution accounting for 65.2% of the variance. The loadings of the individual items were all higher than .70. Alpha for the 5-item scale in Study 1B was .87.

National identification. The extent to which participants identified as Dutch was assessed by four items taken from previous studies in the Netherlands (Verkuyten, 2005). Two sample items were: "I feel committed to the Netherlands", and "I identify with the Netherlands". A higher score indicated stronger national identification, and Cronbach's alpha for this 4-item scale was .85 in Study 1A, and .81 in Study 1B.

Acceptance of Muslim expressive rights. Six items were used to assess acceptance of rights and opportunities for Muslims to publicly express and confirm their identity. These items have been used in previous chapters and two sample items were: "Muslims should have the right to not only celebrate their Islamic holidays at home, but also in public life", and "In the Netherlands wearing a headscarf should not be forbidden". Cronbach's alpha for this scale was .76 in Study 1A, and .72 in Study 1B.

Results

Preliminary analyses

In Study 1A, participants indicated a moderate level of acceptance of Muslim expressive rights ($M = 4.67$, $SD = 1.04$). The mean score was significantly above the neutral midpoint of the scale, $t(299) = 11.28$, $p < .001$. The mean score of historical tolerance ($M = 4.94$, $SD = 1.53$) was also significantly above the neutral midpoint of the scale showing that participants on average endorsed the idea that the Netherlands is a historically tolerant country, $t(299) = 10.50$, $p < .001$. Furthermore, the mean score for national identification ($M = 4.46$, $SD = 1.05$) was significantly above the neutral midpoint of the scale, $t(299) = 7.55$, $p < .001$. In Study 1B, participants also indicated moderate acceptance of Muslim expressive rights ($M = 4.11$, $SD = .12$). Yet, the mean score was not significantly above the neutral midpoint of the scale, $t(67) = .88$, p = .19. The mean score of historical tolerance ($M = 4.93$, $SD = .15$) was again significantly above the neutral midpoint of the scale, $t(67) = 6.41$, $p < .001$, and the mean score for national identification ($M = 4.99$, $SD = 1.05$) was also significantly above the midpoint of the scale, $t(67) = 6.74$, $p < .001$. In both studies, no significant gender differences were observed for the dependent variable ($p_s > .45$).

Acceptance of Muslim expressive rights

For both samples, acceptance of Muslim expressive rights was subjected to a moderated multiple regression (MMR). The MMR strategy tests whether there is a significant interaction between a moderator variable (Z) and an independent variable (X) in predicting a particular outcome (Y), by using ordinary least squares regression. MMR is considered to be an adequate method for detecting moderating effects in survey and experimental designs (Aiken, West, & Krull, 1996; Stone-Romero & Anderson, 1994). In both samples, the acceptance of Muslim rights was regressed on historical tolerance (centered), national identification (centered), and their interaction term.

In Study 1A, historical tolerance predicted acceptance only marginally significantly, β = .08, $t(286)$ = 1.30, p = .097. Yet, identification was a significant predictor, β = -.18, $t(286)$ = -3.11, p = .001. Importantly, the historical tolerance by national identification interaction term was significant, β = .16, $t(286)$ = 2.69, p = .004. In Study 1B, both national identification, β = -.21, $t(64)$ = -1.90, p = .031, and historical tolerance, β = .44, $t(64)$ = 3.98, p < .001, predicted acceptance. More importantly, and similar to Study 1A, the interaction term between historical tolerance and national identification had a significant effect on acceptance, β = .31, $t(64)$ = 2.81, p = .004. The total explained variance in acceptance of Muslim expressive rights was greater in Study 1B (R^2 = .27, p < .001) than in Study 1A (R^2 = .05, p < .001).[1]

To probe the interactions, simple slopes were calculated for the relationship between historical tolerance and acceptance of Muslim expressive rights at two levels of national identification (one standard deviation above and below the centered mean). As predicted, in Study 1A, this analysis showed that representations of historical tolerance positively and significantly predicted acceptance at 1 *SD* above the mean of identification, β = .34, $t(35)$ = 2.10, p = .022, but not at 1 *SD* below the mean of identification, β = -.20, $t(41)$ = -1.28, p = .11. In Study 1B, simple slope analysis also confirmed the finding that historical tolerance positively and significantly predicted acceptance at 1 *SD* above, β = .43, $t(16)$ = 3.65, p = .04, but not at 1 *SD* below the mean of identification, β = -.23, $t(10)$ = -.76, p = .24.

We conducted additional analyses to compare the acceptance levels of higher and lower identifiers (one standard deviation above and below the centered mean, Aiken & West, 1991), based on median splits of historical tolerance. The results are presented in Table 7.1. In Study 1A, higher and lower identifiers who strongly endorsed historical tolerance (*Mdn* = 5.00) displayed similar levels of acceptance of Muslim expressive rights, $t(56)$ = 1.02, p = .16. Among those who weakly endorsed historical tolerance, higher identifiers were significantly less accepting than lower identifiers, $t(20)$ = 1.97, p = .032. Likewise,

Table 7.1 Mean levels of acceptance of Muslim expressive rights by level of historical tolerance and level of national identification, Study 1A and Study 1B

| Level of national identification | Historical tolerance | | | |
| | High | | Low | |
	M	SD	M	SD
Study 1A				
High	4.67$_a$	1.14	4.02$_b$	1.35
Low	4.95$_a$	.97	5.04$_a$	1.02
Study 1B				
High	4.12$_a$	1.27	3.54$_b$	.93
Low	4.36$_a$	.56	4.44$_a$	.39

Note. Scores could range from 1 to 7, with higher numbers reflecting more acceptance of Muslim expressive rights. Means that do not share subscripts differ at $p < .05$.

in Study 1B, for higher and lower identifiers who strongly endorsed historical tolerance (*Mdn* = 5.20) no differences appeared in their levels of acceptance of Muslim expressive rights, $t(14) = .44$, $p = .33$. Among those who weakly endorsed historical tolerance, higher identifiers were significantly less accepting than lower identifiers, $t(12) = 2.34$, $p = .023$.

The results of Study 1 support the hypothesis that the relationship between historical tolerance and the acceptance of Muslim expressive rights is moderated by national identification. In line with SCT, endorsement of historical tolerance was related to more acceptance of Muslim expressive rights for individuals who relatively strongly identified with the national category. This suggests that acceptance of immigrants can be consistent with the national identity of higher identifiers when this identity is defined in terms of a historical tradition of religious and cultural tolerance. For these individuals, the acceptance of public expressions of Islam confirms the historical Dutch identity of religious tolerance. Importantly, when historical tolerance was strongly endorsed, higher identifiers did not display more acceptance compared to lower identifiers. Yet, when this identity content was weakly endorsed higher identifiers tended to express less acceptance of Muslim expressive rights than lower identifiers. These findings are in line with SCT and show that when the historical tolerant meaning of national identity is shared among group members, the differences between higher and lower identifiers' acceptance levels are reduced.

7.3 Study 2

We conducted a second study to further examine whether the findings of the first study were reliable and could be generalized to a sample of younger participants from different educational levels. More importantly, Study 2 was designed to test whether the historical tolerance by identification interaction effect on acceptance of Muslim expressive rights could be explained by perceptions of incompatibility between Dutch and Muslim identity.

We predicted that a representation of historical tolerance interacts with national identification in affecting perceived incompatibility, which, in turn, would be related to the acceptance of Muslim expressive rights. Specifically, historical tolerance was expected to be associated with lower perceived identity incompatibility, but only for individuals high in national identification. Individuals who feel committed to their national in-group and at the same time subscribe to a religious tolerant national history should not perceive the acceptance of Islamic schools, Mosques, Islamic holidays, and other visible signs of Islam as incompatible with 'who we traditionally are'. Importantly, we expected that the positive indirect effect of endorsing a representation of historical tolerance on acceptance, via reduced perceptions of incompatibility, would only exist for higher identifiers.

Method

Participants, design and procedure
Study 2 was conducted among students at secondary and higher education (National Identity Motive and Continuity Survey, see Table 1.1). At the start of regular classroom meetings, the students were asked to participate in a study on attitudes towards Dutch society. The questionnaires were anonymous and administered in the classroom under supervision. There were 172 native Dutch adolescents and young adult participants. The sample consisted of 45.3% men and 52.9 % women (1.7% missing). The ages ranged between 13 and 25 ($M = 17.42$, $SD = 3.31$). The participants differed in their educational level. Of all participants, 59.9% followed a high level of education, 26.7% a middle level of education, and 11% a low level of education (2.3% missing).

Measures
Since the findings of Studies 1A and 1B were similar, and because of practical reasons, we assessed participants' representation of historical tolerance again with two items: "Freedom of religion historically belongs to the Netherlands", and "Room for other religions and

cultures has always been part of the Netherlands". These two items were combined into a scale ($r = .57$, $p < .001$). The items assessing national identification ($α = .89$) and acceptance of Muslim rights ($α = .87$) were identical to Study 1. Three items taken from previous research (Sindic & Reicher, 2009) were used to measure perceptions of incompatibility between the Dutch and Muslim way of life ($α = .77$). These items were: "Muslims and the Dutch are like a jigsaw puzzle. They may differ, but they fit together well", "The fact that the Dutch and Muslim way of life differ does not mean that they are necessarily in opposition", and "Muslims and the Dutch are like members of a team where the different qualities of each member combine together to make a coherent whole". The items were recoded so that a higher score indicated a stronger perception of incompatibility. All items were rated on a 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) scale.

Results

Preliminary analyses

Participants' gender produced no significant effects in any of the analyses, and was therefore not considered further. Moreover, since this sample was varied in terms of age and educational level, we assessed the possibility of variation in levels of acceptance of Muslim rights for these two predictors. Using analysis of covariance, educational level was entered as an ordinal variable (1 = *low*, 2 = *middle*, 3 = *high*), and age was included as a continuous predictor. Results indicated that there were no significant age differences, $B = .02$, $F(2, 167) = .29$, $p = .59$, but education significantly predicted acceptance of Muslim expressive rights, $F(2, 167) = 2.97$, $p = .042$. We therefore controlled for educational level in the remaining analyses. Table 7.2 shows the means, standard deviations and intercorrelations for the different measures.

Table 7.2 Means, standard deviations and correlations between the variables, Study 2

	M	SD	1	2	3
1. Historical tolerance	5.11	1.29	–		
2. National identification	4.98	1.19	.05	–	
3. Perceived incompatibility	4.28	1.35	-.27***	.01	–
4. Acceptance of Muslim expressive rights	3.69	1.30	.15*	-.10†	-.66***

Note. † $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Acceptance of Muslim expressive rights

Similar to Study 1, acceptance of Muslim rights was subjected to a MMR analysis in which acceptance scores were regressed on educational level (control), the centered historical tolerance and identification measures, and their interaction term, $R^2 = .08$, $F(4, 163) = 3.70$, $p = .007$. Both national identification, $\beta = -.15$, $t(163) = -1.96$, $p = .025$, and historical tolerance, $\beta = .17$, $t(163) = 2.17$, $p = .015$, predicted acceptance of Muslim rights. Education was also a significant predictor, $\beta = .17$, $t(163) = 2.17$, $p = .014$. Similar to Study 1, the main effect of historical tolerance was qualified by a significant historical tolerance by identification interaction, $\beta = .15$, $t(163) = 1.85$, $p = .033$. Analysis of the simple slopes showed that historical tolerance positively and significantly predicted acceptance of Muslim expressive rights at 1 SD above, $\beta = .45$, $t(25) = 2.66$, $p = .007$, but not below the mean of identification, $\beta = -.11$, $t(23) = -.52$, $p = .304$.

Furthermore, comparison of acceptance levels of higher and lower identifiers in relation to their endorsement of historical tolerance (median split; $Mdn = 5.00$) revealed that higher and lower identifiers who strongly endorsed historical tolerance displayed similar levels of acceptance of Muslim expressive rights ($M = 3.59$, $SD = 1.13$, and $M = 3.43$, $SD = 1.86$, respectively), $t(30) = -.31$, $p = .38$. Among those who weakly endorsed historical tolerance, higher identifiers tended to be less accepting than lower identifiers ($M = 2.83$, $SD = 1.24$, and $M = 4.05$, $SD = 1.70$, respectively), $t(16) = 1.76$, $p = .049$.

Perceived incompatibility

We next regressed perceived incompatibility on educational level (control), the centered historical tolerance and identification variables, and their interaction term, $R^2 = .20$, $F(4, 163) = 10.20$, $p < .001$. Historical tolerance significantly predicted incompatibility, $\beta = -.30$, $t(163) = -4.00$, $p < .001$, but the effect of identification was not significant, $\beta = .07$, $t(163) = .94$, $p = .18$. Education had a significant main effect on incompatibility, $\beta = -.28$, $t(163) = -3.94$, $p < .001$. Importantly, the interaction between historical tolerance and national identification was significant, $\beta = -.27$, $t(163) = -3.66$, $p < .001$. Analysis of the simple slopes showed that historical tolerance decreased perceptions of incompatibility at 1 SD above, $\beta = -.64$, $t(24) = -4.13$, $p < .001$, but not below the mean of identification, $\beta = .13$, $t(22) = .60$, $p = .278$. In other words, only for higher identifiers, stronger endorsement of historical religious tolerance was related to lower perceptions of incompatibility between Dutch and Muslim identity.

Tests of indirect effects

Our next aim was to test the indirect effect of the interaction term on acceptance, through perceived incompatibility. The previous analyses confirmed that the interaction between historical tolerance and national identification predicted both perceived incompatibility and acceptance of Muslim expressive rights. In addition, a regression analysis showed that, controlling for education, perceived incompatibility was a significant negative predictor of acceptance of Muslim expressive rights, $\beta = -.66$, $t(165) = -10.78$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .43$. When perceived incompatibility was added to the MMR model predicting acceptance of Muslim rights, $R^2 = .44$, $F(5, 168) = 25.46$, $p < .001$, the historical tolerance by identification interaction no longer predicted acceptance of Muslim rights, $B = -.01$, $t(168) = .28$, $p = -.27$, but incompatibility remained a significant predictor of acceptance of Muslim rights, $B = -.63$, $t(168) = -10.18$, $p < .001$.[2]

We subsequently used the Preacher and Hayes (2008) bootstrapping macro with 1000 iterations to test a model whereby perceived incompatibility mediates the interaction effect of historical tolerance and identification on acceptance of Muslim expressive rights (controlling for the unique effects of education, historical tolerance and national identification). In these analyses, the mediation is significant if the 95% Bias Corrected confidence intervals for the indirect effect do not include zero. The indirect effect of the interaction term through perceived incompatibility ($B = .13$, $SE = .05$) was estimated to lie between .04 and .24 with 95% confidence. Because zero is not in the 95% confidence interval, this indirect effect is significantly different from zero at $p < .05$. This provides evidence for our hypothesis that perceived incompatibility accounts for the interactive effect of historical tolerance and national identification on acceptance of Muslim expressive rights.

Study 2 replicated and extended the findings of Study 1 among a more varied sample. Specifically, results confirmed that stronger endorsement of historical tolerance was related to more acceptance of Muslim expressive rights among higher but not lower national identifiers. Furthermore, higher and lower identifiers showed similar levels of acceptance when they endorsed a national representation of historical tolerance.

More importantly, the results of Study 2 supported the hypothesis on the indirect effect of historical tolerance on acceptance, via perceived incompatibility, for higher identifiers. In line with our prediction, for highly identified nationals the endorsement of historical tolerance was negatively associated with perceptions of identity incompatibility, and this subsequently translated into more acceptance of Muslim expressive rights. Thus, higher identifiers who perceived the Netherlands as a traditionally open and religious tolerant society did not tend to see Muslim identity as incompatible with 'our' way of life.

As a result, they were inclined to be more accepting of Muslims expressing their religion in public life. For lower national identifiers, historical tolerance was not associated with perceived incompatibility and acceptance.

7.4 Study 3

Although the results of the first two studies are similar and provide support for our predictions, they leave room for alternative causal explanations. It is possible that participants endorsed a tolerant historical representation of their national in-group because this fits with their current views on religious and cultural diversity, rather than vice versa. Hence, the results of these studies do not show that a representation of historical tolerance actually causes higher identifiers to have more positive attitudes towards Muslims. Therefore, the third study used an experimental design to examine the causal effects of inducing a representation of historical religious tolerance on acceptance of Muslim expressive rights and perceived identity incompatibility. Study 3 tried to show that encouraging people to think in terms of a national history of religious tolerance has an impact on perceptions of identity incompatibility and acceptance of Muslim expressive rights, but only for higher and not for lower national identifiers. Research on lay theories and ideologies has shown that studies that experimentally activate theories or ideologies provide similar findings as when the endorsement of lay theories are measured by self-report (e.g., Levy et al., 2006).

Method

Participants, design and procedure
Participants were 113 students at Utrecht University who received 6 Euros for their participation (Historical Tolerance, Continuity and Cultural Diversity Survey, see Table 1.1). Of these, 16 participants were excluded from the analyses because they indicated that they were Muslim or non-Dutch, leaving a total of 97 participants (38.1% men, 61.9% women). The ages ranged between 18 and 42 ($M = 23.60$, $SD = 3.54$).

Students at Utrecht University were invited to the laboratory to participate in a study on societal issues. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: (1) Dutch history of religious tolerance, or (2) Dutch historical concern with water maintenance. The latter condition acted as a control, because Dutch national history was made salient, but this representation has no relevance for intergroup relations. In order to minimize

demand effects, the experiment was presented to participants as two separate studies: 'Study 1' on writing about history and 'Study 2' on cultural diversity. In both conditions, participants started with a writing assignment in which they were asked to type in a separate box on the computer screen their responses (maximum three sentences) to the following: "Please describe why you feel that national history is important for a national identity". Subsequently, they were told that four short quotes from speeches and interviews about Dutch culture and history would follow. They were instructed to carefully read these quotes, as a second writing assignment about these quotes would follow. In the historical tolerance condition, these quotes emphasized the importance of the Dutch history of religious tolerance whereas in the control condition the Dutch history of water maintenance was highlighted. After the quotes, participants received a second writing assignment in which they were asked to type in a separate box on the screen their responses (maximum three sentences) to the following: "Please describe why you feel that the Dutch history of religious tolerance [water maintenance] is an important part of Dutch national identity". After this, all participants were told that they had completed 'Study 1' and would proceed to 'Study 2'. In 'Study 2' participants completed the measures of national identification, perceived incompatibility, acceptance of Muslim expressive rights, and demographics.

Measures

All items were rated on a 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) scale.

Manipulation check. The experimental manipulation was checked by asking participants to respond to the following two statements: "The Netherlands is traditionally an open and tolerant country with much room for other cultures and religions", and "Freedom of religion historically belongs to the Netherlands". The items were combined into a scale ($r = .64$, $p < .001$).

National identification. The four items that were used to assess Dutch identification were identical to the ones used in the previous studies ($\alpha = .80$).

Perceived incompatibility. We used the same three items as in Study 2 (reverse scored), plus three additional items to measure perceptions of incompatibility between the Dutch and Muslim way of life ($\alpha = .78$). Since the three items used in Study 2 were worded in the direction of compatibility we added three items that assessed incompatibility directly: "The traditional Dutch culture clashes with that of Muslims", "Muslims in the Netherlands undermine the Dutch way of life", and "The maintenance of Dutch norms and values is threatened by the presence of Muslims".

Acceptance of Muslim expressive rights. The extent to which participants accepted Muslim rights was measured with the same six items as in Studies 1 and 2 (α = .73).

Results

Manipulation check
One-way ANOVA revealed that the experimental manipulation was successful. Participants in the historical tolerance condition were more likely to agree with the idea that the Netherlands has a history of religious tolerance and openness ($M = 4.97$, $SD = 1.45$) than participants in the control condition ($M = 4.49$, $SD = 1.42$), $F(1, 96) = 2.71$, $p = .050$. The mean level of national identification did not differ between the two conditions (see Table 7.3 for means and standard deviations by condition for each measured variable).

Preliminary analyses
We assessed the possibility of variation in responding to the experimental manipulation by participant gender, age, and political orientation (ranging from 1 = *left*, to 5 = *right*). We conducted a MANOVA on the dependent measures, in which we examined the main effects of these control variables, as well as their interactions with the experimental manipulation. Because the main effect of gender was not significant for any of the dependent variables ($p_s > .56$) nor were the interactions ($p_s > .16$), we collapsed across participant gender for all subsequent analyses. Although there were no significant interactions between the experimental manipulation and political orientation ($p_s > .24$) and age ($p_s > .22$), political orientation, $B = -.27$, $F(1, 93) = 28.40$, $p < .001$, and age, $B = -.12$, $F(1, 93) = 5.93$, $p = .013$, both exerted a significant main effect on acceptance of Muslim rights. We therefore controlled for these variables in all subsequent analyses.

Table 7.3 Means and standard deviations for measured variables by condition, Study 3

	Historical tolerance		Control	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
National identification	4.92$_a$	1.07	5.14$_a$	.91
Perceived incompatibility	3.11$_a$	.92	3.47$_b$	.84
Acceptance of Muslim expressive rights	5.01$_a$	.84	4.71$_b$	1.12

Note. Comparisons in a different row with different subscripts are significantly different at $p \leq .05$.

Perceived incompatibility

The incompatibility score was regressed on the experimental manipulation variable (coded as -1 = *control*, 1 = *historical tolerance*), the centered national identification score, and the manipulation by identification interaction term (controlling for political orientation and age), R^2 = .22, $F(5, 88)$ = 4.99, $p < .001$. The experimental manipulation significantly predicted incompatibility, β = -.21, $t(88)$ = -2.10, p = .04, but identification did not, β = -.07, $t(88)$ = -.76, p = .45. Political orientation was a significant predictor of incompatibility, β = .33, $t(88)$ = 3.48, $p < .001$, and age was a marginal significant predictor, β = .18, $t(88)$ = 1.85, p = .07. Importantly, the main effect of experimental manipulation was qualified by a significant experimental manipulation by identification interaction, β = -.16, $t(88)$ = -1.62, p = .05. Analyses of the simple slopes of identification showed that the experimental manipulation significantly decreased incompatibility at 1 *SD* above, β = -.42, $t(16)$ = -1.78, p = .048, but not at 1 *SD* below the mean of identification, β = -.03, $t(17)$ = -.14, p = .45.

In addition, further analyses (controlling for political orientation and age) showed that, in the historical tolerance condition, higher identifiers and lower identifiers did not significantly differ in their levels of incompatibility (*M* = 2.84, *SD* = 1.27, and *M* = 3.34, *SD* = .80, respectively), $t(16)$ = .97, p = .18. In contrast, in the control condition, higher identifiers perceived more incompatibility compared than lower identifiers (*M* = 3.48, *SD* = .93, and *M* = 2.81, *SD* = .86, respectively), $t(16)$ = 1.45, p = .04.

Acceptance of Muslim expressive rights

The same analytical approach was used for acceptance of Muslim expressive rights, R^2 = .32, $F(5, 88)$ = 8.39, $p < .001$. The experimental manipulation significantly predicted acceptance, β = .20, $t(88)$ = 2.17, p = .03, but identification was not a significant predictor, β = .14, $t(88)$ = 1.56, p = .12. Political orientation, β = -.49, $t(88)$ = -5.47, $p < .001$, and age, β = -.22, $t(88)$ = -2.45, p = .02, were also significantly related to acceptance. However, the experimental manipulation by national identification interaction exerted no significant direct effect on acceptance, β = -.03, $t(88)$ = -.31, p = .76.

Tests of indirect effects

The previous analyses established that the interaction between experimental manipulation and identification predicted incompatibility, but had no direct effect on acceptance. However, it is possible that this interaction exerts an indirect influence on acceptance through incompatibility (Hayes, 2009; Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005). A regression analysis confirmed that incompatibility predicted acceptance of Muslim rights, β = -.54, $t(86)$ = 6.66,

$p < .001$, $R^2 = .44$. We subsequently used Preacher and Hayes' (2008) bootstrapping macro with 1000 iterations for testing the indirect effect of the interaction term on acceptance through incompatibility (controlling for the unique effects of political orientation, age, the manipulation, and identification). The indirect effect of the interaction term through incompatibility on acceptance ($B = .11$, $SE = .06$) was estimated to lie between .01 and .24 with 95% confidence, which is significantly different from zero. This shows that for higher identifiers the salience of historical religious tolerance increases acceptance of Muslim expressive rights, via (reduced) perceptions of incompatibility.

The results of Study 3 provide further support for our hypothesis that making a representation of historical tolerance salient can increase highly identified group members' support for Muslim expressive rights through a reduction of perceived identity incompatibility. The analysis showed that, compared to a control condition, highly identified individuals experienced less identity incompatibility with Muslims when their country's history of religious tolerance was salient. This, in turn, resulted in increased support for Muslim expressive rights. For lower identifiers, the experimental manipulation did not change their perceptions of incompatibility, and hence no such indirect effect was observed.

7.5 General discussion

The key finding of the current research is that a representation of historical religious tolerance is associated with a more positive attitude towards Muslim immigrants, especially among individuals who find their national identity important. This result was found in three different studies, among different samples, and when historical representations of religious tolerance were measured and manipulated. This indicates the generalizeability and robustness of this finding.

Whereas previous research has shown that representations of national history and identity can be used to justify exclusion of immigrants and ethnic minorities (e.g., Bourhis & Dayan, 2004; Pehrson et al., 2009; Sibley et al., 2008), the current findings indicate that tolerant representations of national history can elevate acceptance of immigrants, particularly among higher national identifiers. Study 1 showed that highly identified Dutch natives tended to be more accepting of Muslims publicly expressing their religious identity when they perceived religious tolerance as historically defining their nation. Results from Study 2 replicated these findings. In addition, this study showed that the stronger highly identified natives endorsed historical tolerance, the less they perceived their way of life and

that of Muslims to be incompatible and this, in turn, was associated with more acceptance of Muslim expressive rights. Furthermore, the experimental findings in Study 3 provided causal support for the prediction that, for higher identifiers, the positive effect of a tolerant representation of national history on acceptance of Muslims could be explained by reduced perceptions of identity incompatibility.

Importantly, in all studies, the positive (indirect) effect of a representation of historical tolerance on acceptance of Muslims was only observed for higher identified nationals. This finding indicates that high levels of national identification do not inevitably lead to the rejection of immigrants, but can actually go together with acceptance. In line with self-categorization theory, this shows that the attitude towards immigrant out-groups is determined by the interplay between the strength to which people feel committed to their national group membership and the norms and beliefs they ascribe to it (Haslam et al., 2010). In the current research, highly identified nationals displayed more positive out-group attitudes when historical tolerant norms and beliefs defined the national category.

However, we observed in all studies that, compared to lower identifiers, higher identifiers were more negative about Muslims when the salience of historical tolerance was low, and displayed similar attitudes when the salience of historical tolerance was high. In line with the social identity perspective this indicates that higher compared to lower identifiers are not only more likely to act in accordance with in-group norms, but are also more inclined to display negative out-group attitudes as a means of enhancing positive distinctiveness (Jetten et al., 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This pattern of findings provides support for SCT, because it shows that when the meaning of national identity is shared among group members, differences in out-group evaluations between higher and lower identifiers are reduced. Similar findings have been observed in other research on intergroup relations (Butz et al., 2007; Jetten et al., 1997), which indicates the generalizeability of these social identity processes.

The findings of Studies 2 and 3 show that, for higher national identifiers, the reduction of perceptions of incompatibility between the Dutch and Muslim ways of life is one of the mechanisms through which the salience of historical tolerance improves attitudes towards Muslims. Previous research has shown that perceived incompatibility is a powerful predictor of attitudes towards immigrants (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007) and other nationals (Sindic & Reicher, 2009). The current research provides an important addition by showing that perceptions of incompatibility depend on people's historical understanding of their national identity and their level of national identification.

Implications and directions for future research

We showed that representations of national history have implications for current attitudes towards Muslim immigrants and the extent to which group identities are considered compatible. This indicates that, in order to develop a better understanding of intergroup attitudes, it is important to focus on the contents that people ascribe to their group identity, and not only on the extent to which people feel attached to it. More specifically, these findings underscore the importance of taking representations of a group's history into account when studying national identity and intergroup relations (Sibley et al., 2008). It is by interpreting national history that people define and understand their national identity, and this relates to and determines how they perceive religious and ethnic out-groups (Smeekes, 2011). When tolerance of cultural and religious diversity defines 'who we traditionally are', national majority members are more likely to accept public expressions of immigrant identities. Hence, as illustrated by Balkenende's quote at the beginning of this article, representations of historical tolerance can serve to improve current attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. Importantly, this is particularly likely for natives who have a relatively strong sense of belonging to the nation.

It is important to note, however, that representations of national tolerance can also be employed to justify a policy of exclusion. In this discourse, Muslims are presented as being intolerant of 'our' liberal principles and ways of life, and thereby as a threat to the tolerant tradition of the country (Bowskill et al., 2007; Verkuyten, 2013). Hence, the notion of tolerance is not positive by definition. It is likely that people who subscribe to this exclusionist interpretation of tolerance perceive high incompatibility between the Muslim and Dutch ways of life. Moreover, this use of tolerance can be linked to assimilationist beliefs, which emphasize the identity of the national in-group by demanding ethnic and religious minority groups to fully adjust to the dominant national norms and values (Verkuyten, 2011). It has been shown that those in favor of assimilation employ this discourse of tolerance to justify the exclusion of immigrants from the insider status (i.e., true nationals) and to argue for conformity to the national way of life (e.g., Bowskill et al., 2007; Verkuyten, 2004, 2013). The present study examined the stereotypical representation of Dutch history as being one of religious tolerance and openness. This conceptualization of tolerance can be linked to the ideology of multiculturalism, which holds that cultural and religious differences should be publicly affirmed, recognized and valued (Modood, 2007). Those in favor of multiculturalism have been found to employ this discourse of tolerance to argue for the inclusion of immigrants (Verkuyten, 2004). Future studies should look at

multiple and co-existing meanings of tolerance, and examine how these are strategically used to promote and justify ideas of inclusion and multiculturalism or rather exclusion and assimilation of immigrants.

There is also the question whether our findings are specific to the Dutch context or have broader relevance. The Netherlands is generally considered a historically tolerant society and most participants in our studies endorsed this collective representation. It is likely that historical representations of tolerance are less self-defining in other nations. However, with rising levels of immigration in many European countries, the question of national identity maintenance and the incompatibility between national and ethno-religious identities is not confined to the Dutch context. Studies in other countries should examine how majority members' representations of national history are related to their attitudes towards immigrants. Additionally, future studies could examine whether our proposed relationships can be generalized to other out-groups, and whether other pro-social national norms and beliefs can foster greater acceptance of immigrant and minority groups.

7.6 Conclusion

The main aim of our research was to determine whether a religious tolerant representation of national history results in more acceptance of Muslims among highly identified nationals, and whether this effect could be explained by (reduced) perceptions of identity incompatibility between the Dutch and Muslim way of life. The findings of our studies provide support for these relationships. More generally, this research shows (1) the necessity of considering representations of national history for understanding majority members' attitudes towards immigrants, and (2) the need to explain how pro-social norms and beliefs interact with national identification in fostering greater acceptance of migrant groups.

7.7 Notes

1.   One possible explanation for the relatively low explained variance in Study 1A is the reliability of the measurement of historical tolerance, which contained only two items. The other is the sample of social science students who tend to be quite similar in their political orientation and attitudes towards multicultural society. Study 1B was conducted among a different student sample and historical tolerance was measured with more items. This resulted in a higher explained variance in acceptance of Muslim rights.

2. The Preacher and Hayes (2008) macro for indirect effects only produces unstandardized (B), but not standardized (β), regression weights. Therefore, we report the unstandardized regression weights for this analysis.

Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

The historicization of national identity has become a focal point in Western European debates on cultural diversity, immigration and European integration. In various countries, including the Netherlands, there has been a renewed emphasis on national heritage and traditions in debates about the presence and influence of Muslim immigrants and European unification. Politicians have argued that people lack a sense of collective consciousness and belonging (see e.g., Duyvendak, 2011) and that greater knowledge of national history would strengthen the cohesiveness of Western European societies. Like other Western European countries, the public discourse on the historical rooting of national identity and immigration in the Netherlands has become rather nostalgic and exclusionary. Both left and right wing politicians have argued that native majority members have lost their national home to newcomers and therefore increasingly long for those good old days when it was 'just us'. It has been suggested that making the Netherlands more Dutch would not only foster immigrant integration, but also help natives to feel less displaced and nostalgic (Duyvendak, 2011). As such, in Dutch debates on national identity and cultural diversity the national past is put forward as a means to define who 'we' are as a national community, and what it means to be a national citizen.

These public debates raise new questions about the consequences of this historical rooting of national citizenship for current group dynamics in culturally diverse settings. In this book, I took a social psychological perspective and analyzed how temporal understandings of national identity affect current group dynamics among native majority members in the Netherlands. The main aims of this project were to examine the extent to which temporal understandings of national identity among natives affect (1) their identification with the nation, and (2) their evaluation of out-groups (i.e., Muslim immigrants) and other social developments (i.e., European integration) that potentially undermine national identity. In this final chapter, I first provide an overview of the research questions and the findings of the six empirical chapters. Subsequently, I discuss the empirical and theoretical contributions of this dissertation, followed by the societal relevance of this project. Then the limitations and suggestions for future research will be discussed. I conclude with the core insights of this dissertation.

8.2 Overview of findings

In six empirical chapters, I sought to answer research questions about the extent to which temporality of national identity affects identification with the nation, and the evaluation of out-groups and other social developments that potentially undermine national identity. I divided the empirical chapters into two parts, based on a distinction between forms and contents of national identity temporality. In Part 1, *Forms of national identity temporality* (chapters 2-4), I examined continuity and nostalgia as two different temporal understandings of national identity, and investigated how and why they inform current group dynamics. Next, in Part 2, *Contents of national identity temporality* (chapters 5-7), I focused on the particular historical contents that people attribute to national group understandings. Specifically, the empirical chapters in this part of the dissertation addressed how, when and why a Christian- and religious tolerant historical representation of national identity affect attitudes towards Muslim immigrants.

The first two empirical chapters were concerned with different ways in which natives perceive national identity continuity and tested how these perceptions influence current group dynamics. Chapter 2 consisted of three empirical studies and focused on the previously identified distinction between an essentialist versus narrativist form of perceived collective continuity (Sani et al., 2007, 2008b). The research questions were: *To what extent do essentialist and narrativist perceptions of national group continuity influence identification with the national in-group? And can these influences be explained by the satisfaction of a sense of national self-continuity?* I discussed and empirically compared two forms of perceived collective continuity: (1) a cultural essentialist representation, which emphasizes the continuation of core features of the group's identity over time, and (2) a historical narrative representation, which focuses on the interconnectedness of events in group history. Study 1 was an experiment and provided causal support for the hypothesis that the salience of essentialist (rather than narrativist) group continuity enhances identification with the national in-group. Study 2 (survey) and Study 3 (experiment) replicated these findings, and were furthermore designed to test the mediational role of collective self-continuity. Both these studies showed that perceiving essentialist group continuity strengthens feelings of collective self-continuity, which subsequently enhances identification with the national in-group. These findings indicated that one reason why people are likely to identify with groups that possess essentialist continuity is because they satisfy the psychological need for self-continuity. However, research within the functional approach to group identification has shown that next to self-continuity, there are various other identity motives that are important in guiding processes of group identification (Vignoles, 2011).

Therefore, chapter 3 investigated the relative importance of national self-continuity in guiding national identification by taking into account other identity motives that have been identified in the literature (see Vignoles, 2011). In addition, chapter 3 examined whether national self-continuity drives the desire to defend the national in-group in the context of existential threats to national identity. This chapter consisted of three empirical studies and the research questions were: *Does national self-continuity form a unique and important motive for why people identify with their national in-group? And does this motive drive in-group defensive reactions in the context of existential group threat?* Applying Motivated Identity Construction Theory (MICT; Vignoles, 2011) to the study of national identity, I hypothesized that self-continuity forms a unique and relevant motive for why people identify with their national in-group. This prediction was examined in Study 1, using a cross-sectional design in three different sub-samples. The results of Study 1 revealed that self-continuity is empirically distinct from other national identity motives, and that it predicts national identification when these motives are controlled for.

The second research question of chapter 3 took a different vantage point to examine the importance of national self-continuity for current group dynamics. Based on research within the domain of terror management theory (Pyszczynski et al., 2000; Solomon et al., 1991) and identity motivation (e.g., Vignoles, 2011), I hypothesized that if self-continuity is a national identity motive, then a sense of national self-continuity should become more important and relevant when the continued existence of the national in-group is undermined (i.e., existential threat). In addition, previous studies have shown that people tend to respond defensively towards social developments and out-groups that threaten the continuity of group identity (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Jetten & Wohl, 2012). I predicted that this tendency is driven by their need for national self-continuity. Thus, it was hypothesized that existential threats to national identity heighten a sense of national self-continuity, which, in turn, strengthens the desire to defend the national in-group. This prediction was examined in Studies 2 and 3 using experimental designs, and I controlled for national identity motives of self-esteem (Study 2) and belonging (Studies 2 and 3). These two studies demonstrated that experimentally inducing existential threats to national identity strengthens feelings of national self-continuity, which subsequently result in stronger in-group defensive reactions in the form of opposition towards threatening out-groups (i.e. Muslim immigrants, Study 2) and social developments (i.e. European integration, Study 3), and in the form of national heritage protectionism (Study 3). Taken together, these findings provide support for the notion that national self-continuity forms an important basis for national identification, and drives in-group defensive reactions in the context of existential threat.

Chapter 4 introduced national nostalgia as another form of national identity temporality, and connected it to recent research on autochthony and prejudice towards immigrants (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013). The research questions that were addressed in this chapter were: *To what extent do feelings of national nostalgia result in more opposition to Muslim expressive rights? And can this effect be explained by endorsement of autochthony?* To derive hypotheses, I integrated insights from recent social psychological research on personal nostalgia (Iyer & Jetten, 2011) with insights from historical, anthropological and sociological studies on national nostalgia (Boym, 2001; Duyvendak, 2011; Kasinitz & Hillyard, 1995). I predicted that a sentimental longing for the country's good old days (i.e., national nostalgia) is likely to have negative consequences for the acceptance of Muslim immigrants, because it strengthens the belief that a country belongs to its original inhabitants and that they are therefore more entitled (i.e., autochthony). It has been proposed that, in culturally diverse settings such as the Netherlands, a sentimental longing for the national home of the past not only serves as a painful reminder of the good old days that are lost, but also makes natives want to claim back the country that was originally theirs (Duyvendak, 2011). I argued that one way to restore the lost 'national home' is by reclaiming ownership and entitlements on the basis of primo-occupancy (i.e., autochthony), and that this is likely to have negative consequences for the acceptance of Muslim expressive rights. This prediction was tested in two studies. Study 1 was a survey study, and Study 2 was an experiment in which national nostalgia was manipulated. Both studies evidenced that national nostalgia is related to stronger opposition towards Muslim expressive rights, because it strengthens endorsement of autochthony beliefs. Taken together, the three empirical chapters that compromised the first part of this dissertation have demonstrated that there are different forms of national identity temporality and that these forms have added value and provide new insights into how and why historicization of national identity informs current group dynamics.

Chapter 5 formed a bridge between the first and second part of this dissertation by examining how different forms and contents of national identity temporality affected attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. I asked: *Which forms and contents of national group continuity influence opposition towards Muslim expressive rights? And to what extent can these effects be explained by perceptions of continuity threat?* Applying the essentialist versus narrative form of group continuity to the study of intergroup relations, it was firstly examined whether the essentialist understanding of national identity continuity is more likely to be associated with negative attitudes towards Muslim immigrants than the narrativist understanding. Based on the findings of chapter 2, as well as on literature on collective continuity, essentialism,

and intergroup relations (e.g., Condor, 1997; Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Haslam, 1998), I hypothesized that perceptions of essentialist rather than narrativist group continuity, would be positively related to opposition to Muslim expressive rights, because perceiving essentialist group continuity makes natives more likely to feel that Muslim immigrants threaten in-group stability and continuity (i.e., continuity threat). The reason for this prediction was that natives who tend to see their national in-group as culturally invariant and stable are more likely to feel threatened by cultural change, as this may subvert the very essence of their national in-group (Condor, 1997). This prediction was examined in three studies. Study 1 showed that only perceptions of essentialist and not narrativist group continuity were associated with more opposition to Muslim expressive rights, and this effect was found to be mediated by the perception that Muslim immigrants form a continuity threat to national identity. The results of this study indicated that the distinction between essentialist and narrativist forms of national continuity also holds relevance for natives' evaluation of out-groups. Taken together, the findings of chapters 2 and 5 suggest that the essentialist form of national continuity is more likely to influence current group dynamics than the narrativist form. Moreover, following self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987), I predicted that whether essentialist group continuity affects attitudes towards Muslim immigrants is dependent on the particular historical content of national culture that is seen as stable and enduring over time.

Subsequently, Study 2 (survey) and Study 3 (experiment) in chapter 5 were concerned with the contents of national group continuity. Specifically, these studies examined a Christian and religious tolerant historical representation of national identity and tested how they affect attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. In line with expectations derived from SCT, I found in Study 2 that a stronger endorsement of the Christian representation is associated with more opposition to Muslim expressive rights, via stronger perceptions of continuity threat. Study 2 also showed that the more natives endorse the religious tolerant representation, the less they oppose to Muslim expressive rights, and this effect was found to be mediated by (lower) perceived continuity threat. In Study 3, these two historical representations of national identity were experimentally manipulated. In line with Study 2, I found that the salience of the religious tolerant representation decreases opposition to Muslim expressive rights via lower perceived continuity threat. The salience of the Christian representation, however, increased opposition to Muslim expressive rights via continuity threat, but only among the youngest age cohort (18-35) and not among older ones. These results indicated that perceptions of national identity temporality can have positive and negative consequences for natives' evaluation of Muslim immigrants depending on what people perceive to be the particular historical content. Yet, research within the social

identity tradition has shown that the level of group identification determines whether group members act and interpret the world according to the group's norms, values and ideological beliefs (e.g., Doosje et al., 1999; Haslam et al., 2010). Although the social identity perspective (Turner & Reynolds, 2001) proposes that particularly people who strongly identify with their in-group (higher identifiers) are likely to be concerned about their in-group and act in line with in-group norms, there have been some studies showing that lower identifiers can be mobilized to protect their in-group against social forces and groups that potentially undermine it (e.g., Fosh, 1993; Sibley et al., 2008; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000).

Therefore, chapter 6 investigated whether lower national identifiers can become more opposed towards Muslim immigrants when particular historical representations of their national identity are salient. Specifically, chapter 6 focused on a Christian historical representation of national identity and the research questions were: *To what extent can people who do not feel strongly attached to their national group membership (i.e., lower identifiers) become mobilized against Muslim immigrants when a Christian historical representation of national identity is salient?* Based on previous research on national identity and attitudes towards immigrants in the Netherlands (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007), I argued that low national identifiers can be mobilized against Muslim immigrants when the continuity of their national way of life is at stake. Visible expressions of Islam have been portrayed by the Dutch far-right party (PVV) as undermining the continuity of the traditional Christian Dutch identity. This party has furthermore mobilized considerable electoral support over the last decade. I hypothesized that the salience of a Christian historical representation of national identity would increase lower identifiers' desire to protect their national in-group against Muslim immigrants. This prediction was examined in three experimental studies. All studies showed that lower identifiers increased their opposition to Muslim expressive rights to equal levels of higher identifiers when national identity was framed as rooted in a tradition of Christianity. For higher identifiers, the salience of this representation did not alter their level of opposition to Muslim rights. The likely reason for this finding is that higher national identifiers are generally more negative towards immigrants than lower identifiers (e.g., Wagner et al., 2010) as a means to maintain positive distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). That is, as this Christian representation positively distinguishes their national in-group from Muslim immigrants it does not alter their levels of opposition towards this out-group. However, according to SCT, higher identifiers are more likely to act in accordance with in-group norms than lower identifiers. This means that higher national identifiers should be more positive towards Muslim immigrants when their national in-group is defined by norms of tolerance and respect for others.

8

Conclusion

Chapter 7 therefore zoomed in on a representation of Dutch national identity as rooted in a tradition of religious tolerance, and examined whether this historical representation would result in more acceptance of Muslim expressive rights among higher national identifiers. In addition, I also investigated how this relationship could be explained. The research questions in this final empirical chapter were: *To what extent can people who feel strongly attached to their national group membership (i.e., higher identifiers) become more positive towards Muslim expressive rights when they perceive their national identity to be rooted in a tradition of religious tolerance? And can this effect be explained by (reduced) perceptions of identity incompatibility between the Dutch and Muslim way of life?* Following SCT, I hypothesized that higher national identifiers would be more positive towards Muslim immigrants when they perceive their national identity to be rooted in a tradition of religious tolerance. I argued that toleration of different worldviews and religions is often portrayed as a self-defining aspect of Dutch national history and identity, and that this representation implies that different cultural and religious groups have historically coexisted in the Netherlands. Therefore, a second prediction of this chapter was that a historical representation of religious tolerance is likely to enhance higher identifiers' acceptance of Muslim expressive rights, because it reduces their perceptions of identity incompatibility between the Dutch and Muslim way of life. These predictions were tested in three studies. Study 1 was a survey study collected among two subsamples, and showed that higher national identifiers indeed display stronger acceptance of Muslim expressive rights when they perceive religious tolerance as historically defining the nation. Study 2 replicated these findings, and additionally showed that the positive effect of this historical representation on acceptance of Muslim expressive rights for higher identifiers is due to lower perceptions of identity incompatibility. In order to provide causal support for these relationships, Study 3 used an experimental design in which a historical representation of religious tolerance was manipulated. In line with the findings of Study 2, Study 3 evidenced that, for higher identifiers, the positive effect of this tolerant historical representation of national identity could be explained by reduced perceptions of identity incompatibility. Furthermore, and in line with the findings of the previous chapter, all studies showed that, compared to lower identifiers, higher identifiers were more negative about Muslims when the salience and endorsement of this historical tolerant representation was low. Yet, both groups of identifiers displayed comparable attitudes towards Muslims when the salience and endorsement of this tolerant historical representation was high.

The results of chapters 6 and 7 underline the importance of the interplay between historical representations of national identity and national identification in guiding

current attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. Taken together, these chapters indicated that historical representations of national identity can mobilize: (a) people who are not ordinarily concerned about their national identity (i.e., lower identifiers) to become more opposed to Muslim immigrants, as well as (b) people who are concerned about their national identity (i.e., higher identifiers) to become more accepting of Muslim immigrants. More specifically, these results showed that rather than increasing the intensity of their initial position towards Muslim immigrants (i.e., galvanizing), historical representations of national identity were able to mobilize lower and higher identifiers respectively against or in favor of immigrants (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). This implies that bringing historical representations of national identity to the fore can spark a reaction among natives who are predisposed to be concerned about their national identity as well as among those who are not ordinarily concerned about it.

8.3 Contributions

This dissertation aimed to contribute to existing theory and research on national identity temporality and current group dynamics. Empirically, the main innovative aspects of the research presented concern the measurements of national identity temporality, and the combination of research designs and samples used to study its relationship with current group dynamics. Theoretically, the main contributions lie in extending social psychological research within the social identity tradition with a temporal approach to national identity. More specifically, by combining social psychological theories of group identity and intergroup relations with insights from history, anthropology and sociology, I aimed to theoretically advance our understanding of how perceptions of national identity temporality guide current group dynamics. In the following, I first discuss the empirical contributions of this research and then proceed the theoretical contributions. In addition, the societal relevance of the current research will be discussed.

Empirical contributions

The first empirical contribution of this dissertation concerns the measurements and research designs used to assess forms (Part 1) and contents (Part 2) of national identity temporality and their relevance for current group dynamics. I will start with discussing these contributions in relation to Part 1, and subsequently move on to Part 2.

First, while previous research has looked at perceptions of collective continuity and group processes (e.g., Sani et al., 2007, 2008b; Jetten & Hutchison, 2011) these studies have hardly focused on disentangling the essentialist and narrativist form of collective continuity in relation to current group dynamics. Moreover, these studies have scarcely applied experimental methodologies. The research presented in this dissertation confirmed the finding that these two forms of collective continuity are empirically distinct (e.g., Sani et al., 2007), but also advanced this previous work in two ways. First, using both survey and experimental methodologies, I showed that these two forms have different consequences for current group dynamics. Second, while researchers have suggested that motivations and concerns about self-continuity may underlie the desire to identify with temporally enduring in-groups (e.g., Sani et al., 2007; 2008b) and to reject threatening out-groups (e.g., Vignoles, 2011), the research presented in this dissertation is the first to provide empirical evidence for these predictions. Furthermore, I examined feelings of national nostalgia as another form of national identity temporality. Whilst there is a considerable body of research on nostalgia in social psychology, the measures that have been used mainly assessed the extent to which people generally experience this emotion rather than in relation to specific targets (e.g., Routledge, Arndt, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2008; Wildschut et al., 2006). In addition, these studies predominantly focused on feelings of nostalgia that people may experience in relation to their individual biography and not in relation to their social identities. Past research may therefore have overlooked the potential relationships that exist between experiencing nostalgia for specific social identities, such as national identity, and individual and social functioning. Chapter 4 introduced national nostalgia as an empirical concept, and showed that the endorsement of national nostalgia (measured with multiple survey items that formed a reliable scale) as well as the salience of national nostalgia (manipulated in an experiment) predicted stronger opposition to Muslim immigrants.

Second, within social psychology there is relatively little empirical work that has examined different historical representations of national identity in relation to current group dynamics, and the few studies that have been conducted have taken a qualitative approach (e.g., Condor, 1996a). Furthermore, until recently, social psychological studies on national identity and attitudes towards immigrant out-groups mainly looked at people's levels of national identification, or distinguished between ethnic and civic understandings of national identity (e.g., Meeus et al., 2010; Pehrson et al., 2009; Wakefield et al., 2011). Although there are various ways in which national identity may be historically represented and understood, the results of the empirical chapters in the second part of this dissertation have revealed that the particular historical contents that people attribute to their national

identity have consequences for their evaluation of Muslim immigrants. These chapters also relied on both survey and experimental methodologies, and showed that the scales and experimental manipulations that were designed for these historical national identity representations were respectively reliable and worked as intended (i.e., on the manipulation checks). Moreover, as similar results were obtained in studies using survey or experimental designs this points at the construct validity of the proposed relationships. In addition, as each of the empirical chapters in this part of the dissertation included at least one experimental study that confirmed the predictions, this contributes to the internal validity of the relationship between historical representations of national identity on attitudes towards Muslim immigrants.

A third empirical contribution of this dissertation is that I did not only apply a combination of survey and experimental methodologies to study the relation between perceptions of national identity temporality and current group dynamics, but also tested this relation among different samples. The external validity of social psychological research has been criticized, because of its widespread use of student samples (e.g., McGuire, 1967; Sears, 1986). In these critical accounts, the use of student samples has not been dismissed, but it is emphasized that researchers should be more cautious in making broad generalizations about human psychology on the basis of such samples, as students differ in many important ways from the general public. Although these accounts encouraged broader sampling practices, Henry (2008) has shown that, during the last decades, empirical social psychological literature on prejudice and cultural diversity still predominantly relied on student samples. Following suggestions by Henry (2008), I also tested my predictions beyond the context of students in university settings. That is, while several studies in the different empirical chapters used student samples, I also relied on broader samples of the native Dutch adult population as well as on samples of secondary school students. Moreover, while experimental methodology is often equated with student sample usage in social psychology, I also used experimental methods among these broader samples (for an overview of research designs and samples in each empirical chapter see Table 1.1). This combination of student samples with broader sample sources contributes to the external validity of the empirical findings presented in this dissertation.

Theoretical contributions

Regarding the theoretical contributions of this dissertation, the six empirical chapters generally aimed to contribute to existing social psychological theories on social identity

and current group dynamics by focusing on the role of national identity temporality. Although the absence of the temporal context within social psychological analysis was highlighted by early theorists (e.g., Armistead, 1974; Gergen, 1973; Harré & Secord, 1972; Ring, 1967), it has been argued that social psychology is still mainly concentrated on artificially created groups and on documenting synchronic group processes, in which the historical or temporal perspective of groups is missing (e.g., Condor, 1996a, 2006). However, a historical perspective on group dynamics has gained attention in empirical social psychological work during the last decades (see László, 2014; Lowe, 2012; Verkuyten, 2014). For instance, there is a considerable body of research within the social identity tradition that has highlighted the role of representations of historical events in relation to group-based emotions, collective victimhood, and current socio-political attitudes (e.g., Bar-Tal et al., 2009; Branscombe et al., 2004; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Sibley et al., 2008; Smeekes, Van Acker, Verkuyten, & Vanbeselaere, 2013). More recently, empirical work emerged that highlighted the importance of identity temporality (e.g., Sani, 2008; Vignoles, 2011). That is, studies within the social identity tradition have shown that group members tend to see their group as an entity that moves through time and that this has consequences for their evaluation of in- and out-groups (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Sani et al., 2008a, 2008b, 2009). Moreover, research within the functional approach to social identification highlighted the importance of a sense of self-continuity for individual and social identities (Vignoles et al., 2006; Vignoles, 2011). The empirical work described in this dissertation aimed to contribute to these recent lines of research by looking at different ways in which group members perceive national identity continuity, and how and why this affected their attitudes toward their own group as well as towards out-groups. The results in chapters 2 and 3 highlight the importance of a sense of collective self-continuity as (i) an explanation for why natives tend to identify with national in-groups that are seen to possess essentialist (rather than narrativist) continuity, (ii) an explanation for why natives tend to reject out-groups and developments that potentially undermine the continuity of national identity. Thus, these findings suggest that the sense of self-continuity that natives derive from their national group membership is a relevant factor to consider when we want to understand current intra- and intergroup dynamics.

A second form of national identity temporality that was introduced in the first empirical part of this dissertation was national nostalgia. While the feelings of nostalgia that people may experience for their national past have been addressed by historians and sociologists (e.g., Boym, 2001; Davis, 1979; Hewison, 1987), this is a novel theoretical concept in the social psychological literature. Within social psychology, research focusing on

nostalgia has been mainly concerned with the sentimental longing that people experience for things related to their individual biography, and has predominantly emphasized the positive consequences of nostalgia for individual and social well-being (e.g., Sedikides et al., 2008a; Wildschut et al., 2006). While there are recent studies showing a positive effect of nostalgia on intergroup evaluations (Turner et al., 2012, 2013), these studies examined out-group nostalgia and did not look at the feelings of nostalgia that people may have for their national in-group. Furthermore, recent work by Iyer and Jetten (2011) has shown that nostalgia can have negative consequences for individuals' ability to cope with present challenges when they perceive low identity continuity. The empirical work presented in chapter 4 extended this recent line of research by showing that, in a context that is characterized by cultural change and discontinuity, feelings of national nostalgia among natives were related to stronger opposition to Muslim immigrants. These results indicate that in-group nostalgia can have negative consequences for out-group evaluations. These findings extend recent work by Iyer and Jetten (2011) to the group level, by showing that nostalgia for the in-group past may have negative consequences for intergroup relations when the continuity of in-group identity is at stake. In such settings, nostalgia may represent a feeling of temporal separation from a fondly remembered past, which impedes people's ability to move on and face current challenges.

Next to the examination of different forms of national identity temporality, I focused on the particular historical contents that people ascribe to their national group understandings and investigated how they inform attitudes towards out-groups. Whilst social identity theorists have stressed the importance of incorporating identity content and context in the analyses of group behavior (e.g., Turner, 1999), most empirical work within this tradition has focused on cognitive and motivational processes in relation to out-group attitudes (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). During the last few years, studies within the social identity tradition have emerged that stress the importance of identity content in guiding out-group attitudes. Specifically, this body of work has shown that ethnic and civic understandings of national identity have different consequences for how people evaluate immigrant out-groups (e.g., Meeus et al., 2010; Pehrson et al., 2009; Wakefield et al., 2011). While these studies point at the importance of identity content in guiding out-group attitudes, the ethnic versus civic dichotomy is limited in capturing the different versions of national ideologies that exist within societies, as they do not take into account the particular cultural and historical context (Billig, 1995; Brown, 1999). The research presented in the second part of this dissertation advanced this recent line of research by showing that the particular historical definitions of national identity that prevail in a given

cultural context affected attitudes towards immigrant out-groups. It has been suggested that a focus on the content and context of group identity in relation to various outcome variables is an important future avenue for psychological research on collective identity (Ashmore et al., 2004). This dissertation took a step in this direction by providing insights into how the perceived historical content of national identity among Dutch natives affected their attitudes towards Muslim immigrants.

Furthermore, the research presented in this book extends social psychological theories on intergroup relations by focusing on attitudes of natives towards Muslim expressive rights as an explanandum. Social psychological research on intergroup relations has predominantly focused on prejudice, discrimination and stereotyping (yet see Gieling, 2012). However, it has been shown that a general negative attitude towards an out-group is not the same as denying them basic rights (e.g., Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Van der Noll, Poppe & Verkuyten, 2010). Moreover, it has been argued that it is quite difficult to improve intergroup relations by trying to reduce stereotypes and prejudices, as these as hard to change (Vogt, 1997). Furthermore, the hotly debated questions in multicultural societies evolve around concrete civil liberties and practices of immigrant minorities. In order to have harmonious intergroup relations it is not necessary that all groups think positively about one another. Rather, it is important that groups are willing to provide room for each other's identity based rights and practices (Sindic & Reicher, 2009). In line with research from anthropology, sociology and discourse analysis (see Verkuyten, 2005), social psychologists have put forward the notion that social identities are performed (e.g., Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007), which means that they are expressed and affirmed in social practices. For Muslims in the Netherlands, their rights to freely express their religion in the public domain serves an identity consolidation function, meaning that it allows them to symbolically affirm and bolster their religious identity within the social structure (Klein et al., 2007; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2010). Although research has focused on the endorsement of the rights and opportunities for Muslims to consolidate their identity (see Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2010), there is hardly empirical work that has examined attitudes towards these rights from the perspective of the native majority (yet see Gieling, 2012; Van der Noll et al., 2010). Whilst some previous research suggests that the social identity perspective is useful for studying support for concrete rights and practices of Muslim immigrants among natives (Gieling, 2012), this work only focused on adolescents, and did not examine support for these rights in relation to perceptions of national identity temporality. This dissertation aimed to extend this line of research by combining theoretical insights from the social identity perspective with literature on identity motivation and collective continuity, in order

to investigate how attitudes towards Muslim expressive rights are affected by perceptions of national identity temporality among diverse samples of the native Dutch population. The results highlight the importance of perceptions of collective (self-) continuity, and continuity threat, as predictors of opposition towards Muslim rights. Thus, from the perspective of the native majority, the findings suggest that the perception that Muslims undermine their identity consolidation (i.e., continuity) can contribute to more negativity towards concrete civil liberties and rights for Muslim immigrants. As such, these findings extend a combination of social psychological theories to the study of attitudes towards concrete identity based rights and practices. In doing so, this advances our understanding of intergroup dynamics.

Another theoretical insight of this dissertation concerns the role of national identification in relation to perceptions of national identity temporality and current group dynamics. The findings suggest that national identification can be both a cause and consequence of perceptions of national identity temporality. This is in line with propositions from social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), which suggests that social identity and group identification are not simply products of existing intergroup relations (dependent variables) or just determinants of group attitudes and behavior (independent variables). The theory rather argues that the interplay between the two contributes to group dynamics. In line with this proposition, social psychological research has demonstrated that group identification can be both a cause and consequence of intra- and intergroup processes (e.g., Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1999; Verkuyten, 2014). This means that, on the one hand, group identification can be considered a dependent variable as it may depend on the social situation. However, on the other hand, group identification can also have a more sustained and permanent character for individuals, causing their group identity to become central to their self-understandings. That is, higher identifiers tend to be more concerned about their group than lower identifiers, and therefore group identification conditions people's responses in social settings (Doosje et al., 1999; Haslam et al., 2010). For instance, it has been shown that when an intergroup situation is salient, group identification tends to function as a *moderator* of the effect of social psychological contextual variables (e.g., shared ideology, relative group size) on intergroup evaluations (e.g., Kinket & Verkuyten, 1999; Jackson, 2002; Jackson & Smith, 1999). This means that group identification can also be considered an independent (moderator) variable as it may influence people's perception of the social context (Doosje et al., 2002). National identification is a widely studied form of group identification in social psychology, and research has shown that national identification

can function as a moderator between perceptions of the social context and evaluations of immigrant out-groups (e.g., Gieling, 2012). However, there is not much research that has examined how national identification be both a moderator and consequence of current group dynamics (yet see Doosje et al., 2002; Verkuyten, 2014). Moreover, there are hardly studies that have examined the dynamic role of national identification in relation to perceptions of national identity temporality. The results of this dissertation suggest that national identification among natives is driven by perceptions of identity temporality (chapters 2 and 3), but also functions as a moderator of the historical content of these perceptions in relation to intergroup attitudes (chapters 6 and 7). By demonstrating that national identification is both a cause and consequence of perceptions of national identity temporality, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of the dynamic role of this concept in group processes and intergroup relations.

A final theoretical contribution of this dissertation concerns the multidimensional conceptualization of national identity and national identity temporality. First, and in line with the proposed framework for studying collective identity of Ashmore et al. (2004), I focused on multiple elements of national identity and also studied the interplay between these elements. That is, I have examined national identification and perceptions of national identity temporality, and the ways they relate to each other. These two elements of national identity respectively fall under what Ashmore et al. (2004) have labeled as the collective identity elements of (a) importance, and (b) content and meaning. Yet, this dissertation not only studied these two broad elements of national identity, but also conceptualized national identity temporality as a multidimensional construct. That is, I have made a distinction between different forms and contents of national identity temporality, and examined how these different elements are related to diverse group processes and intergroup evaluations, such as national identification, the evaluation of European integration and Muslim immigrants. The role of temporality of group identity has so far received little attention in social psychology, and by taking a multidimensional approach this book provides an extensive perspective on the role of perceptions of national identity temporality for current group dynamics.

Societal relevance

Next to the theoretical and empirical contributions, the current research also has societal relevance. In various Western European countries, including the Netherlands, politicians and commentators have argued that there is a loss of national consciousness and belonging,

and they have pointed at the lack of historical knowledge as an important cause of this 'crisis' of national identity (e.g., Duyvendak, 2011; Grever & Ribbens, 2007). As a consequence, there has been a growing emphasis on the conservation and transmission of national culture and heritage. In the Netherlands, for instance, historical monuments have been restored, museums of national history have expanded, and a historical cultural canon of the Netherlands has been developed for Dutch school education. The idea behind this emphasis on national culture and heritage is that knowledge of a shared history would bolster feelings national belonging and thereby foster national cohesion. This dissertation offers some insights into how and why perceptions of the national past are important for national attachment and how it can affect socio-political attitudes.

The findings indicate that a sense of temporality is important for feelings of attachment to the nation among natives. Specifically, I found that particularly the perception of continuity of a shared national culture and tradition (i.e., essentialist group continuity) is important in fostering their attachment to the nation, and the reason is that this essentialist historical understanding satisfies their psychological need for self-continuity. In other words, these findings imply that a historically cultural essentialist understanding of the nation is important in nurturing feelings of national cohesiveness and attachment among native majority members. However, both politicians and scientists have argued that propagating such essentialist notions of culture run the risk of fostering a climate of exclusion for immigrants (see Duyvendak, 2011; Grever & Ribbens, 2007). The reason is that immigrants have no roots in the host country and are thus not part of this shared history and cultural heritage. This relates to findings of recent research showing that whereas native Dutch adolescents felt proud and connected to the history of the Netherlands, adolescents with an immigrant background hardly felt any of this (Grever & Ribbens, 2007). Taken together, this implies that while a focus on national history may help to foster feelings of national unity and cohesion among natives, it may be problematic for feelings of belonging of immigrants.

However, the findings of my research suggest that a representation of Dutch history as rooted in a tradition of religious tolerance and openness fosters acceptance of Muslim immigrants among natives. This means that a focus on historical roots and cultural heritage does not necessarily have exclusionary implications for immigrants, as long as this representation of national history emphasizes room for other cultures and religions. This is a relevant finding as Islamophobia in the Netherlands has risen sharply during the last decade and as there have been growing conflicts about issues of free speech and religious minority rights (Van der Valk, 2012). My findings suggest that emphasizing 'our' historical tradition of religious tolerance and openness may help to reduce Islamophobia among the

native Dutch majority, as it reduces their perception that the Dutch and Muslim ways of life are incompatible. As such, this tolerant representation of national history may help to improve current intergroup relations. This relates to recent suggestions from Dutch historians, who proposed that, in order to enable immigrants to identify with the host country, representations of national history, such as historical national canons, should incorporate elements that relate to the collective memories of both natives and immigrants as well as to the multicultural and colonial history of the Netherlands (Grever, Jonker, Ribbens, & Stuurman, 2006; Ribbens, 2004). More specifically, they plead for a focus on an exchange of historical memories of immigrants and natives in order to facilitate a 'multicultural historical culture' (see Ribbens, 2006). Although they argue that it is important for newcomers to learn the national language and to develop an understanding of national culture and its institutions in order to be able to participate in the host society, they propose that a more open and extended version of national history and identity could aid their feelings of attachment to the nation.

8.4 Limitations and future directions

The research presented in this book has a number of limitations and provides directions for future research. In this section, I focus on more general limitations of the research project, rather than repeating the specific limitations of each empirical chapter. This also applies to the suggestions for future work.

The first limitation lies in the use of survey and experimental methodologies, which cannot fully capture a complex phenomenon such as national identity temporality. Although I tried to avoid a simplistic representation of national identity temporality by examining multiple forms and contents, it is likely that these representations are more multifaceted and complex in people's minds. Furthermore, these representations are not self-evident, but are constantly disputed, challenged and redefined in public debates. Moreover, these representations are often used to bolster existing status and power differentials by highlighting and hiding aspects of national history (Ashmore et al., 2004). This means that historical representations of national identity are constructed and shaped in social reality (Liu & Hilton, 2005), and are flexibly and strategically employed in debates on national identity and cultural diversity (e.g., Condor, 2006; Verkuyten, 2014). In this dissertation, I focused on a Christian and religious tolerant historical representation of national identity and examined how they affected attitudes towards Muslims, but there may be different and more complex ways in which such historical representations of national identity are

constructed to draw group boundaries, and to legitimize current intergroup status relations. Furthermore, while I designed the measures of these representations on the basis of current political discourses on national identity, I did not analyze how politicians strategically frame these historical representations to mobilize people for their standpoints (see e.g., Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher, 2008). It requires a qualitative approach, such as discourse analysis, to be able to investigate the ways in which these representations are constructed by both lay people and politicians, and how they are used to legitimize current social arrangements. Scholars have argued that social psychological research requires methodological flexibility when addressing issues of temporality, and should therefore use qualitative methodologies alongside more common quantitative research techniques (e.g., Cinirella, 1998; Lowe, 2012). Recently, scientific narrative psychology has been introduced as a scientific approach in which qualitative and quantitative research techniques are combined (see László, 2014). The leading methodology of scientific narrative psychology is narrative psychological content analysis, which starts with qualitative analyses to attribute psychological meaning to social constructs, and then proceeds to give codes to the observed contents in order to create psychological variables that are quantifiable and which can be analyzed statistically. One avenue for future work within social psychology would be to use this new approach in order to provide additional insights into the multifaceted ways in which national identity temporality is constructed, and how these constructions are strategically employed in debates about immigration and cultural diversity.

The findings in this book provide support for the notion that perceptions of the national past influence how the native Dutch view current developments and out-groups. However, in recent years, there have been studies showing that the reverse relation also applies. That is, research has shown that current ideological and political standpoints influence people's representations and perceptions of the past (e.g., Boyer & Wertsch, 2009; László, 2014). This means that people's ideological standpoints towards cultural and religious diversity may influence their historical representations of national identity. For instance, those who strongly support multiculturalism may be more likely to endorse a tolerant historical representation of national identity, whereas those who endorse assimilation may be more likely to endorse a Christian historical representation of national identity. For instance, Condor (2006) has shown that, in interviews, native British majority members used notions of time and history as a vehicle for establishing notions of legitimacy in intergroup settings. Therefore future work could further investigate the dynamic interplay between historical representations of national identity and ideological and political standpoints towards cultural diversity.

In this dissertation, I looked at native Dutch' attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. Although the public debates about national heritage and cultural diversity have been mainly targeted at Muslims, there are several other immigrant groups in the Netherlands, with different backgrounds and characteristics. For example, during the last few years an increasing amount of Polish immigrants has come to the Netherlands, and more than 95% of this immigrant group is Christian (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2013). It is therefore likely that endorsing a Christian representation of national identity does not result in exclusionary attitudes towards Polish immigrants. Furthermore, historical representations of national identity may also influence feelings of immigrant groups towards the host country and the national majority. For instance, a representation of national identity that emphasizes its roots in a tradition of religious tolerance and openness may provide Muslim immigrants with stronger feelings of national belonging than a representation that emphasizes its Christian roots. Again, this may be different for immigrant groups with other religious backgrounds. Future studies could examine how different historical representations of national identity affect intergroup attitudes and feelings of national belonging among both natives' and various immigrant groups.

Another limitation of this dissertation concerns the focus on a single national context. It is likely that different historical representations of national identity are salient in other countries and may hence have different consequences for current group dynamics. Although this means that it is not clear to what extent these findings can be generalized to other contexts, focusing on a single context can also be considered a strength, as it did allow me to take into account the particular historical understandings of national identity that exist in this cultural setting and to investigate how they relate to current attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. Furthermore, while the particular historical definitions of national identity may be different in other countries, there have been similar debates on national heritage and cultural diversity in countries outside the Netherlands. For instance, in France, Belgium, Great Britain, and Germany, there has also been a renewed emphasis on national heritage and traditions in debates on immigration, in which particularly Muslim immigrants are described as undermining core traditions and values (see Verkuyten, 2014). As such, it is likely that perceptions of national identity temporality also have relevance for the understanding of group dynamics in other countries, but this remains to be explored in prospective work.

A final limitation of the research presented in this dissertation lies in taking a single disciplinary focus in studying historical representations of national identity. Although I have relied on theoretical and empirical accounts from historians, sociologists and

anthropologists, this dissertation took a social psychological perspective and has mainly derived hypotheses on the basis of theoretical frameworks and empirical findings from this field. However, if we want to broaden our understanding of national identity temporality in relation to current group dynamics, it is necessary to cross disciplinary borders and foster systematic and innovative interdisciplinary collaborations between social psychologists, historians, sociologists, political scientists and anthropologists. For instance, historians can provide insights on national identity temporality by examining how understandings of national culture and identity (also in relation to newcomers and other countries) have changed over time, for instance by examining how national identity has been portrayed in literature, religion and art during the course of national history. Furthermore, sociologists and anthropologists can provide more insights into how historical representations of national identity are socially constructed in public discourses on immigration and globalization, and how they are embedded in societal institutions, such as in history textbook in schools. In addition, political scientists can enhance our understanding of how historical representations of national identity are strategically used by politicians to justify current social arrangements in the country. Integration of the insights from these different disciplines as well as interdisciplinary collaboration has so far been lacking and deserves attention in future scholarly work.

8.5 Conclusions

The main aim of the research presented in this book was to advance our understanding of the role of national identity temporality for current group dynamics. This is a relevant topic, as an emphasis on historical roots of national identity has become central in debates on cultural diversity and European unification in various countries in Western Europe, including the Netherlands. This book focused on the Dutch context, taking the perspective from the native Dutch majority. Conceptualizing national identity temporality as a multidimensional construct, the findings showed that natives can perceive different forms and contents of national identity temporality, and that these perceptions have consequences for their identification with the national in-group as well as for their evaluation of out-groups (i.e., Muslim immigrants) and social developments (i.e., European integration) that potentially undermine national identity. These findings highlight the importance of identity temporality for national self-understandings and for the analysis of intergroup dynamics. Native majority members draw on the national past to understand 'who we are', and this subsequently informs their attitudes towards social

developments in the present. As such, analyzing the presence of the past is important for understanding national identity and group dynamics in contemporary multicultural Western European societies.

Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)

Inleiding

In de laatste jaren zien we in Nederland een toenemende aandacht voor het thema 'nationale identiteit' in het publieke en politieke debat. Niet alleen in Nederland, maar ook in andere West-Europese landen, wordt gesproken over een crisis van nationale identiteit. De toegenomen pluriformiteit in leefstijlen en opvattingen – aangewakkerd door ontwikkelingen als Europese eenwording, immigratie en toenemende culturele diversiteit – zou tot gevolg hebben dat inwoners minder 'collectief bewustzijn' hebben en minder verbondenheid met elkaar voelen (Duyvendak, 2011; Grever & Ribbens, 2007). Als belangrijke oorzaak voor deze crisis van nationale identiteit is door politici en opiniemakers een gebrek aan kennis van de nationale cultuur en geschiedenis aangewezen. In Nederland is het belang van historisch besef onderdeel geworden van het debat over de multiculturele samenleving en de zoektocht naar nationale identiteit. Politici stellen dat het vergroten van historisch besef gevoelens van nationale verbondenheid kan versterken onder zowel de autochtone als allochtone Nederlandse bevolking. Maar zowel in Nederland als in andere West-Europese landen is het publieke debat over de historische wortels van nationale identiteit op het moment tamelijk nostalgisch en negatief ten aanzien van minderheden. Zowel links als rechts georiënteerde politici hebben gezegd dat autochtone Nederlanders hun land verliezen aan nieuwkomers en daarom steeds meer terugverlangen naar die goede oude tijd toen er nog geen migranten waren (Duyvendak, 2011). Volgens de visie van deze politici zou een vergroting van het historisch besef niet alleen bijdragen aan de integratie van nieuwkomers, maar ook helpen om de autochtone bevolking zich minder verdreven en nostalgisch te laten voelen.

Deze publieke debatten roepen nieuwe vragen op over wat de gevolgen zijn van deze nadruk op de historische wortels van nationale identiteit voor hedendaagse groepsprocessen in cultureel diverse samenlevingen. Op welke manieren en waarom is historische worteling belangrijk voor een nationale identiteit? En wat zijn de consequenties van deze historische worteling voor intergroepsrelaties? Tegen de achtergrond van deze brede vragen bestudeer ik in deze dissertatie hoe temporeel besef van nationale identiteit van invloed is op hedendaagse groepsprocessen onder autochtone Nederlanders. Ik vertrek vanuit een sociaal-psychologisch perspectief en combineer dit met inzichten vanuit andere academische disciplines, zoals geschiedkunde, antropologie en sociologie. Op deze manier probeer ik in deze dissertatie inzicht te geven in hoe de historische worteling van nationale identiteit van invloed is op psychologische processen in de eigen groep (i.e., intragroepsprocessen) alsmede op attituden ten aanzien van andere groepen

(i.e., intergroepsprocessen). Twee specifieke onderzoeksvragen staan hierbij centraal. Er wordt onderzocht in welke mate temporeel besef van nationale identiteit onder autochtone Nederlanders van invloed is op: (1) hun identificatie met Nederland en (2) hun evaluatie van andere groepen (i.e., moslims) en sociale ontwikkelingen die een potentiële bedreiging vormen voor de nationale identiteit (i.e., Europese integratie).

Deze vragen worden onderzocht in zes empirische hoofdstukken (hoofdstuk 2-7), die geschreven zijn in de vorm van onderzoeksartikelen voor internationale vaktijdschriften. Hierbij wordt gebruik gemaakt van experimenten en vragenlijsten, die zijn afgenomen onder verschillende steekproeven van de autochtone Nederlandse bevolking. Het eerste en laatste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift (i.e., introductie en conclusie) zijn bedoeld om de empirische hoofdstukken te integreren en functioneren tevens als een uiteenzetting van zowel de wetenschappelijke als maatschappelijke relevantie van dit proefschrift.

In dit proefschrift wordt temporeel besef van nationale identiteit opgevat als representaties van nationale identiteit die een tijdscomponent bevatten. Wetenschappers hebben aangetoond dat er verschillende manieren zijn waarop groepen zich tot tijd kunnen verhouden om zo hun nationale identiteit te begrijpen en vorm te geven (e.g., Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Lowe, 2012; Sani, 2008). Gebaseerd op deze literatuur maak ik in dit proefschrift een onderscheid tussen *vorm* en *inhoud* van temporeel besef van nationale identiteit. *Vorm van temporeel nationaal identiteitsbesef* verwijst naar de verschillende manieren waarop groepen hun nationale groep en identiteit temporeel kunnen begrijpen. *Inhoud van temporeel nationaal identiteitsbesef* verwijst naar de verhalen en vertellingen over de oorsprong, tradities en geschiedenis van de eigen nationale groep.

Op basis van dit onderscheid heb ik een tweedeling gemaakt in de empirische hoofdstukken. In Deel 1, *Vorm van temporeel nationaal identiteitsbesef* (hoofdstuk 2-4), bestudeer ik percepties van nationale continuïteit en gevoelens van nationale nostalgie en bekijk ik hoe en waarom zij hedendaagse groepsprocessen beïnvloeden. In de eerste twee empirische hoofdstukken (hoofdstuk 2 en 3) bestudeer ik de invloed van percepties van nationale continuïteit op nationale identificatie en op attituden ten aanzien van moslims en Europese integratie. Vervolgens verschuift in hoofdstuk 4 de focus naar nationale nostalgie en wordt bekeken hoe deze gevoelens attituden ten aanzien van moslims beïnvloeden. In Deel 2, *Inhoud van temporeel nationaal identiteitsbesef* (hoofdstuk 5-7), richt ik me op de specifieke historische inhoud die mensen aan hun nationale identiteit kunnen toeschrijven. De empirische hoofdstukken in dit deel van het proefschrift bestuderen hoe, wanneer en waarom een christelijke en een religieus tolerante historische representatie van nationale identiteit attituden ten aanzien van moslims beïnvloeden.

Deel 1: Vorm van temporeel nationaal identiteitsbesef

Percepties van nationale continuïteit

De eerste twee empirische hoofdstukken hebben betrekking op de verschillende manieren (i.e., vormen) waarop autochtone Nederlanders continuïteit van hun nationale identiteit kunnen begrijpen en hoe dit van invloed is op hedendaagse groepsprocessen. Op basis van sociaal-psychologische literatuur over continuïteit (e.g., Sani et al., 2007; Vignoles, 2011) wordt er in deze hoofdstukken een onderscheid gemaakt tussen percepties van nationale *groepscontinuïteit* en percepties van nationale *zelfcontinuïteit*. Het eerste verwijst naar de gewaarwording van mensen dat hun nationale groep voortbestaat door de tijd. Het laatste refereert naar het gevoel van mensen dat het onderdeel zijn van een nationale groep een verbinding verschaft tussen het verleden, heden en de toekomst. Daarnaast is er in de sociaal-psychologische literatuur over continuïteit (e.g., Sani et al., 2007) een onderscheid gemaakt tussen twee verschillende vormen van nationale *groepscontinuïteit*: (1) een cultureel *essentialistische* representatie en (2) een *verhalende* representatie. Het eerste verwijst naar de idee dat kernonderdelen van de groepscultuur en identiteit stabiel zijn en blijven voortbestaan door de tijd. Het tweede refereert naar de idee dat bepaalde gebeurtenissen in het groepsverleden met elkaar verbonden zijn en zo een coherent en causaal verhaal vormen. Hoewel eerder onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat deze twee vormen van groepscontinuïteit empirisch te onderscheiden zijn (zie Sani et al., 2007, 2008b), zijn er weinig studies die hebben bekeken of beide vormen even belangrijk zijn voor nationale identificatie. Daarnaast heeft eerder onderzoek aangetoond dat een gevoel van zelfcontinuïteit een belangrijke voorspeller is van identificatie met groepen (e.g., Vignoles et al., 2006), maar is nog niet eerder onderzocht op welke manieren groepen een gevoel van zelfcontinuïteit aan mensen kunnen geven.

In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik daarom de invloed van de twee bovengenoemde vormen van groepscontinuïteit op gevoelens van nationale zelfcontinuïteit en nationale identificatie. Dit hoofdstuk bestaat uit drie empirische studies. Studie 1 is een experiment waarin beide vormen van groepscontinuïteit gemanipuleerd worden. Dit experiment laat zien dat enkel essentialistische (en niet verhalende) representaties van groepscontinuïteit nationale identificatie versterken. Studie 2 (vragenlijst) en Studie 3 (experiment) bevestigen deze bevinding en analyseren ook de rol van nationale zelfcontinuïteit. Beide studies tonen aan dat percepties van essentialistische groepscontinuïteit gevoelens van nationale zelfcontinuïteit versterken en dat deze gevoelens vervolgens identificatie met

de nationale groep versterken. Deze bevindingen tonen aan dat mensen geneigd zijn zich met essentialistische groepen te identificeren omdat deze groepen hen een gevoel van zelfcontinuïteit verschaffen. Onderzoek heeft echter laten zien dat er naast zelfcontinuïteit ook nog andere motieven zijn voor mensen om zich te identificeren met groepen (Vignoles, 2011).

Om deze reden heb ik in hoofdstuk 3 naar de relatieve invloed van nationale zelfcontinuïteit op nationale identificatie gekeken. Ik heb hierbij rekening gehouden met andere identiteitsmotieven die besproken worden in de literatuur, zoals gevoelens van eigenwaarde en thuishoren (zie Vignoles, 2011). Daarnaast onderzoek ik in dit hoofdstuk of een gevoel van nationale zelfcontinuïteit de neiging oproept om de nationale groep te verdedigen als deze geconfronteerd wordt met existentiële dreiging. Hoofdstuk 3 bestaat uit drie empirische studies. Studie 1 is gebaseerd op vragenlijsten afgenomen onder verschillende steekproeven en laat zien dat nationale zelfcontinuïteit empirisch te onderscheiden is van andere nationale identiteitsmotieven en dat het een unieke en relevante voorspeller is van nationale identificatie als er rekening gehouden wordt met deze andere identiteitsmotieven. Studies 2 en 3 zijn experimenten waarin wordt aangetoond dat existentiële bedreigingen voor nationale identiteit gevoelens van nationale zelfcontinuïteit versterken. Deze gevoelens resulteren vervolgens in defensieve reacties in de vorm van negatieve houdingen ten aanzien van bedreigende groepen (i.e., moslims, Studie 2) en sociale ontwikkelingen (i.e., Europese integratie), en in de vorm van protectionisme van het nationale erfgoed (Studie 3). Bij elkaar genomen tonen deze bevindingen aan dat nationale zelfcontinuïteit een belangrijke basis is voor nationale identificatie en dat deze gevoelens de neiging oproepen om de eigen nationale groep te beschermen wanneer die in zijn voortbestaan bedreigd wordt.

Nationale nostalgie

In hoofdstuk 4 wordt het concept van *nationale nostalgie* geïntroduceerd als andere vorm van temporaliteit van nationale identiteit. Nationale nostalgie wordt in deze dissertatie gedefinieerd als een sentimenteel verlangen naar de goede oude tijd van het land. Wetenschappers hebben betoogd dat nationale nostalgie de kop op steekt in tijden van sociale verandering en transitie, omdat het een herstellend vermogen heeft (Boym, 2001; Hewison, 1987; Lowenthal, 1985). Het argument is dat door het verlangen naar de goede oude tijd van het land een nationale groep zich meer bewust wordt van het belang van zijn oorspronkelijke cultuur en tradities voor het behoud (i.e., continuïteit) van de

groepsidentiteit. In West-Europa wordt het nostalgische sentiment onder de autochtone bevolking echter vooral gezien als een expressie van verlies door de sociaal-culturele veranderingen die hebben plaatsgevonden door immigratie. Nationale nostalgie onder autochtonen wordt opgevat als een verlangen naar de tijd toen er nog geen migranten waren (Duyvendak, 2011). Gebaseerd op werk van Rubenstein (2001) en Iyer en Jetten (2011), stel ik dat, in deze context, een sentimenteel verlangen naar een positief herinnerd nationaal verleden vooral functioneert als een pijnlijke herinnering aan de mooie dingen die verloren zijn gegaan en dat dit mogelijk resulteert in pogingen om te herstellen 'hoe wij van oorsprong waren'. Hoewel nationale nostalgie eerder besproken is door geschiedkundigen en sociologen bestaat er tot dusver geen empirisch onderzoek naar dit fenomeen binnen de sociale psychologie. Sociaal-psychologen hebben vooral gekeken naar de gevoelens van nostalgie die mensen kunnen ervaren over dingen uit hun persoonlijk verleden (e.g., Sedikides et al., 2008a; Wildschut et al., 2006), maar niet specifiek naar gevoelens van nostalgie over het land van vroeger.

In hoofdstuk 4 bestudeer ik of gevoelens van nationale nostalgie onder autochtone Nederlanders negatieve gevolgen hebben voor hun evaluatie van moslims. Dit concept wordt vervolgens verbonden aan recent onderzoek naar percepties van autochtonie en vooroordelen over etnische minderheden (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013). In dit hoofdstuk stel ik dat een manier waarop het 'verloren land van vroeger' door autochtonen hersteld kan worden is door eigendom en recht op het land (opnieuw) te claimen op basis van hun status als oorspronkelijke bewoners (i.e., *autochtonie*). Mijn hypothese is dat gevoelens van nationale nostalgie negatieve gevolgen hebben voor attituden ten aanzien van expressieve rechten voor moslims (e.g., dragen van hoofddoekje, bouwen van Moskeeën), omdat nationale nostalgie het gevoel van autochtonie oproept. Deze hypothese wordt getest in twee empirische studies. Studie 1 is een vragenlijst en Studie 2 een experiment waarin nationale nostalgie wordt gemanipuleerd. Beide studies ondersteunen bovenstaande hypothese.

Samenvattend laten de eerste drie empirische hoofdstukken van het eerste deel van deze dissertatie zien dat er verschillende vormen van temporeel nationaal identiteitsbesef zijn en dat het bestuderen van deze verschillende vormen nieuwe inzichten verschaft in hoe en waarom historische worteling van nationale identiteit van invloed is op hedendaagse groepsprocessen.

Deel 2: Inhoud van temporeel nationaal identiteitsbesef

In publieke debatten over immigratie in West-Europese landen wordt het belang van het nationale verleden als een basis voor nationale eenheid en identiteit expliciet benadrukt (Verkuyten, 2014). Er bestaan echter verschillende representaties van hoe dit nationale verleden eruit zag en er zijn dan ook aanhoudende debatten over wat het gezamenlijk cultureel erfgoed is. Dit betekent dat mensen hun nationale identiteit niet alleen temporeel begrijpen maar er ook inhoud aan toevoegen. Dit laatste is belangrijk voor het bestuderen van hedendaagse intergroepsrelaties, omdat attituden ten aanzien van nieuwkomers kunnen afhangen van wat beschouwd wordt als de historische inhoud van nationale identiteit. Er zijn echter maar weinig sociale-psychologische studies die systematisch hebben gekeken naar hoe dergelijke historische representaties van invloed zijn op intergroepsrelaties. In het tweede deel van deze dissertatie kijk ik naar verschillende soorten inhoud van temporeel nationaal identiteitsbesef (i.e., *historische representaties van nationale identiteit*) en bestudeer ik hoe zij van invloed zijn op attituden ten aanzien van moslims.

In het hedendaagse West-Europese debat over toenemende culturele diversiteit en nationale identiteit verwijzen politici vaak naar het nationale verleden om zo te legitimeren hoe we met deze diversiteit om moeten gaan in het heden. Dit zien we vaak terugkomen in de Nederlandse discussie over de multiculturele samenleving. Zo zei voormalig minister-president Balkenende in een Kamerdebat in 2007: "Nederland is van oorsprong een land van tolerantie en respect. Mensen verdienen daarom alle respect voor hun overtuigingen, geloof en identiteit." Geert Wilders refereert in zijn toespraken vaak aan de oorspronkelijk 'joods-christelijke Nederlandse cultuur' die bedreigd zou worden door de verdergaande 'islamisering' van de Nederlandse samenleving. Zowel Wilders als Balkenende verwijzen naar de historische wortels en continuïteit van de Nederlandse cultuur, maar de inhoud van hun representaties heeft hele andere implicaties voor hun visie en beleidsadviezen betreffende culturele en religieuze diversiteit. Waar Balkenende continuïteit van de Nederlandse traditie van religieuze tolerantie gebruikt als argument voor acceptatie van andersdenkenden in het heden, posteert Wilders dat verdergaande 'islamisering' de continuïteit van de joods-christelijke Nederlandse cultuur bedreigt.

Groepscontinuïteit en attituden ten aanzien van moslims

Hoofdstuk 5 vormt een brug tussen het eerste en het tweede deel van deze dissertatie. In dit hoofdstuk wordt gekeken naar zowel de vorm als de inhoud van groepscontinuïteit en

hoe dit van invloed is op attituden ten aanzien van moslims. Er wordt in dit hoofdstuk eerst gekeken naar hoe de twee eerder besproken vormen van nationale groepscontinuïteit (i.e., essentialistische vs. verhalende) van invloed zijn op attituden ten aanzien van moslims. Gebaseerd op de bevindingen van hoofdstuk 2 en op literatuur over groepscontinuïteit, essentialisme en intergroepsrelaties (e.g., Condor, 1997; Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Haslam, 1998) is de hypothese in dit hoofdstuk dat enkel essentialistische (en niet verhalende) representaties van groepscontinuïteit geassocieerd zijn met negatieve houdingen ten aanzien van expressieve rechten voor moslims. De reden is dat de essentialistische representatie het gevoel versterkt dat moslims het voorbestaan van de oorspronkelijke Nederlandse identiteit bedreigen (i.e., *continuïteitsdreiging*). Autochtonen die geneigd zijn om hun nationale groep te zien als een entiteit die cultureel stabiel en onveranderbaar is zullen ook eerder geneigd zijn om zich bedreigd te voelen door groepen die deze culturele stabiliteit ondermijnen en daarom meer weerstand tegen deze groepen hebben. De resultaten van Studie 1 (vragenlijsten) in hoofdstuk 5 bevestigen bovenstaande hypothese.

Studies 2 en 3 in dit hoofdstuk gaan vervolgens over verschillende soorten inhoud van groepscontinuïteit die mensen kunnen waarnemen en hoe dit van invloed is op percepties van continuïteitsdreiging en weerstand tegen expressieve rechten voor moslims. Gebaseerd op de zelfcategoriseringstheorie van Turner et al. (1987) is de algemene verwachting dat percepties van essentialistische groepscontinuïteit niet noodzakelijk leiden tot negatieve attituden ten aanzien van moslims, maar dat dit afhangt van de historische inhoud die mensen toeschrijven aan deze groepscontinuïteit. Ik richt me hierbij op twee historische representaties van nationale identiteit die prominent aanwezig zijn in debatten over culturele diversiteit in Nederland, namelijk (1) dat van een land dat zijn wortels heeft in een *christelijke traditie* en (2) dat van een land dat geworteld is in een *traditie van religieuze tolerantie*. Studie 2 is gebaseerd op vragenlijsten en laat zien dat hoe meer mensen het eens zijn met de christelijke representatie, hoe meer continuïteitsdreiging zij ervaren van moslims en hoe meer weerstand zij vervolgens tegen expressieve rechten voor moslims vertonen. Studie 2 laat daarnaast ook zien dat hoe meer mensen het eens zijn met de religieus tolerante representatie van nationale identiteit, hoe minder continuïteitsdreiging zij ervaren van moslims en hoe minder weerstand zij vervolgens tegen expressieve rechten voor moslims vertonen. In Studie 3 worden deze twee historische representaties experimenteel gemanipuleerd en wordt hetzelfde resultaat voor de religieuze tolerante representatie gevonden. De christelijke representatie blijkt echter alleen gevoelens van continuïteitsdreiging en weerstand tegen rechten te verhogen voor de jongste leeftijdscohort (18-35) en niet voor de oudere cohorten. Een mogelijke verklaring hiervoor is dat een

historisch christelijke representatie van nationale identiteit voor jongere leeftijdscohorten een andere betekenis heeft dan voor oudere cohorten. Waarschijnlijk is deze representatie voor jongeren sterker verbonden aan het hedendaagse discours over de islam en minder aan christelijke normen en waarden, zoals naastenliefde. Dit laatste is mogelijk sterker aanwezig bij ouderen.

Tezamen genomen laten deze resultaten zien dat temporeel nationaal identiteitsbesef zowel positieve als negatieve gevolgen kan hebben voor hoe autochtone Nederlanders moslims evalueren, omdat het afhankelijk is van wat zij beschouwen als de historische inhoud van hun nationale identiteit.

Nationale identificatie en attituden ten aanzien van moslims

Hoofdstuk 6 en 7 bouwen voort op hoofdstuk 5 door te kijken naar condities waaronder de twee bovengenoemde historische representaties van nationale identiteit attituden ten aanzien van moslims beïnvloeden. Er wordt in deze hoofdstukken onderzocht of de invloed van de christelijke en religieus tolerante representatie op attituden ten aanzien van moslims afhangt van hoe sterk mensen zich met hun nationale groep identificeren (i.e., *nationale identificatie*). Zoals hierboven beschreven, is de zichtbare aanwezigheid van de islam door Geert Wilders neergezet als een gevaar voor de continuïteit van de oorspronkelijk christelijke Nederlandse cultuur en identiteit. Zijn partij, de PVV, heeft sterke anti-islamitische standpunten en is behoorlijk gegroeid in populariteit gedurende de laatste jaren. In hoofdstuk 6 richt ik me op deze *christelijke historische representatie van nationale identiteit* en bestudeer ik of het oproepen van deze representatie mensen die zich niet zo sterk met Nederland identificeren (i.e., *laag identificeerders*) kan mobiliseren tegen moslims.

Hoewel sociaal-psychologisch onderzoek binnen het sociale identiteitsperspectief (Turner & Reynolds, 2001) laat zien dat mensen die zich sterk identificeren met hun groep (i.e., hoog idenficeerders) zich meer druk maken om hun groep en meer geneigd zijn om de groep te beschermen dan laag identificeerders, zijn er ook een enkele studies die laten zien dat laag identificeerders gemobiliseerd kunnen worden om hun groep te beschermen als deze bedreigd wordt (e.g., Fosh, 1993; Sibley et al., 2008; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000). Onderzoek onder de autochtone Nederlandse bevolking heeft bijvoorbeeld aangetoond dat steun voor strenger immigratiebeleid hetzelfde is onder hoog en laag identificeerders als hun nationale identiteit wordt opgeroepen (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Hoofdstuk 6 laat in drie experimentele studies zien dat de weerstand tegen expressieve

rechten voor moslims onder laag identificeerders sterker wordt als de nadruk ligt op een historisch christelijke representatie van hun nationale identiteit (in vergelijking met een controleconditie). Voor hoog identificeerders had deze manipulatie geen effect op hun attituden ten aanzien van moslims. De meest plausibele verklaring voor deze laatste bevinding is dat hoog identificeerders over het algemeen meer geneigd zijn om negatieve attituden te hebben over immigranten dan laag identificeerders en dat deze christelijke representatie daar verder niets aan verandert. Met andere woorden, deze representatie is in lijn met hun negatieve houding ten aanzien van moslims.

Volgens de zelfcategoriseringstheorie van Turner et al. (1987) is het tegelijkertijd wel zo dat hoog identificeerders meer geneigd zijn om hun groep te volgen en zich te gedragen naar de normen en waarden van hun groep dan laag identificeerders. Dit houdt in dat de houding van hoog identificeerders ten aanzien van andere groepen afhankelijk is van wat zij beschouwen als de gedeelde groepsnormen en overtuigingen. Toegepast op het onderzoek in deze dissertatie betekent dit dat hoog identificeerders positiever zouden moeten zijn over moslims als hun nationale groep gedefinieerd wordt door normen en waarden van religieuze tolerantie en respect voor andere culturen. Hoofdstuk 7 richt zich daarom op de *historische representatie van religieuze tolerantie* en bestudeert of deze representatie *hoog identificeerders* positiever maakt over moslims. Tolerantie van verschillende wereldbeelden en religies in het publieke debat wordt vaak neergezet als een wezenlijk onderdeel van de Nederlandse geschiedenis en eigenheid. De verwachting is dat hoog identificeerders positiever zijn over expressieve rechten voor moslims als zij het idee hebben dat deze historische representatie van religieuze tolerantie een belangrijk onderdeel is van hun nationale identiteit.

Daarnaast wordt er in dit hoofdstuk bekeken of deze relatie verklaard kan worden door veranderende *percepties van onverenigbaarheid* tussen de manier van leven van moslims en die van autochtone Nederlanders. De verwachting is dat hoog identificeerders die het idee hebben dat hun nationale identiteit geworteld is in een traditie van religieuze tolerantie en openheid minder geneigd zullen zijn om onverenigbaarheid te zien. Deze tolerante traditie impliceert immers dat er van oorsprong verschillende manieren van leven naast elkaar hebben bestaan in Nederland. Met andere woorden, voor deze mensen is het accepteren van andere manieren van leven onderdeel van 'wie wij van oorsprong zijn'.

Hoofdstuk 7 bestaat uit drie studies. Studie 1 (vragenlijsten) laat zien dat hoog identificeerders positiever zijn over expressieve rechten voor moslims als ze het idee hebben dat hun nationale identiteit geworteld is in een traditie van religieuze tolerantie. Studie 2 (vragenlijst) en Studie 3 (experiment) bevestigen deze bevinding en laten verder

zien dat dit positieve effect verklaard kan worden door een afname aan percepties van onverenigbaarheid tussen de manier van leven van moslims en die van autochtonen. In lijn met de bevindingen uit hoofdstuk 6 kwam in alle studies naar voren dat hoog identificeerders over het algemeen negatiever zijn over moslims dan laag identificeerders, maar dat ze even positief zijn als laag identificeerders als ze het idee hebben dat een traditie van religieuze tolerantie hun nationale identiteit definieert.

Samenvattend laten de resultaten van hoofdstuk 6 en 7 zien dat er een samenspel is tussen historische representaties van nationale identiteit en nationale identificatie voor de houding ten aanzien van moslims. Deze hoofdstukken demonstreren dat: (a) mensen die geneigd zijn zich niet zo te bekommeren om hun nationale identiteit (i.e., laag identificeerders) negatiever kunnen worden over moslims, en dat (b) mensen die geneigd zijn om zich druk te maken over hun nationale identiteit (i.e., hoog identificeerders) positiever kunnen worden over moslims. Deze resultaten tonen aan dat historische representaties van nationale identiteit in staat zijn om mensen zowel voor als tegen moslims te mobiliseren.

Conclusie

Het doel van het onderzoek in deze dissertatie was om meer inzicht te krijgen in de invloed van temporeel nationaal identiteitsbesef voor hedendaagse groepsprocessen. Dit is een relevant onderwerp aangezien de nadruk op historische wortels van nationale identiteit een belangrijk onderdeel is in debatten over immigratie en Europese eenwording in diverse West-Europese landen, waaronder ook Nederland. Deze dissertatie is een van de eerste empirische studies binnen de sociale psychologie die inzicht verschaft in hoe en waarom deze historische worteling zo belangrijk is voor nationale identiteit en wat de consequenties kunnen zijn voor hedendaagse intergroepsrelaties. In dit onderzoek heb ik mij gericht op de Nederlandse context en het perspectief van de autochtone Nederlandse bevolking. Ik heb temporeel nationaal identiteitsbesef behandeld als een multidimensionaal concept. De empirische hoofdstukken laten zien dat autochtonen hun nationale identiteit temporeel kunnen begrijpen in verschillende vormen en met een verschillende inhoud, en dat deze percepties consequenties hebben voor hun identificatie met Nederland en hun evaluatie van groepen (moslims) en sociale ontwikkelingen (Europese integratie) die nationale identiteit potentieel ondermijnen. Dit illustreert dat autochtonen teruggrijpen naar het verleden om te begrijpen 'wie wij zijn' en dat dit vervolgens van belang is voor hun houding ten aanzien van sociaal-culturele ontwikkelingen in het heden.

De belangrijkste theoretische bijdrage van deze dissertatie is dat bestaand sociaal-psychologisch onderzoek binnen de sociale identiteitstraditie (Turner & Reynolds, 2001) wordt uitgebreid met een temporele benadering van nationale identiteit. Ik heb hiervoor sociaal-psychologische theorieën over groepsidentiteit en intergroepsrelaties gecombineerd met inzichten vanuit de geschiedkunde, sociologie en antropologie. De empirische bijdrage van deze dissertatie is gestoeld op de introductie van nieuwe metingen voor temporeel identiteitsbesef en de combinatie van verschillende soorten steekproeven en methoden om hypothesen te toetsen.

Daarnaast heeft deze dissertatie maatschappelijke relevantie, omdat het aansluit bij het hedendaagse debat over nationale identiteit en culturele diversiteit. De bevindingen laten zien dat voor autochtone Nederlanders een gevoel van historische worteling een belangrijke basis vormt voor hun identificatie met het land, maar dat dit tegelijkertijd ook een obstakel kan vormen voor hun acceptatie van moslims. Echter zoals ik ook heb laten zien hoeft de perceptie van historische worteling geen probleem te vormen voor de acceptatie van moslims als deze begrepen wordt in termen van een traditie van religieuze tolerantie.

Tot slot zijn er in deze dissertatie ook een aantal punten onderbelicht gebleven die aandacht verdienen in vervolgonderzoek. Ten eerste is het relevant om het debat over historische worteling en culturele diversiteit verder te analyseren met behulp van kwalitatieve onderzoekstechnieken, zoals discoursanalyse. Ten tweede is het interessant om te kijken of temporaliteit naast nationale identiteit ook relevantie heeft voor andere groepsidentiteiten en processen. Tot slot moedig ik interdisciplinair onderzoek naar en samenwerking op dit onderwerp aan, om zo een completer beeld te krijgen van de invloed van historische worteling in het maatschappelijk debat over nationale identiteit en culturele diversiteit.

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
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Appendices

Appendix 2A Perceived group continuity scale (based on Sani et al., 2007)

1. Shared values and beliefs of Dutch people have endurance across times.

2. Major phases in Dutch history are linked to one another.

3. Throughout history the members of the Dutch group have maintained their inclinations and mentality.

4. There is no connection between past, present, and future events in the Netherlands.

5. There is a causal link between different events in Dutch history.

6. The Netherlands has preserved its traditions and customs throughout history.

7. The main events in Dutch history are part of an 'unbroken stream'.

8. Dutch people have maintained their values across time.

Note. The essentialist sub-scale consists of items 1, 3, 6, and 8. The narrative sub-scale consists of items 2, 4, 5, and 7. Item 4 was reverse scored in the construction of the narrativist sub-scale.

Appendix 2B Post-hoc pilot study

This experimental study (*N* = 233) was part of a larger data collection among a sample of the native Dutch population of 16 years and older. Participants received the questionnaire by means of en e-mail sent by a survey company (Thesistools.be), and were drawn from a panel of native Dutch respondents maintained by this company. Four different versions of the questionnaire were randomly assigned to this sample, and we only selected the respondents that completed the three versions that were specifically designed for this study (*N* = 172). The sample consisted of 53.2% men and 46.8% women. The ages ranged between 16 and 83, and the mean age was 48.94 (*SD* = 14.61). The manipulations and writing tasks were identical to Study 1.

In order to check whether the group continuity manipulations worked successfully, participants were asked to indicate their agreement with two items from both the essentialist and narrativist sub-scales of the PCC scale as designed by Sani et al. (2007). For essentialist continuity these items were: "Shared values and beliefs of Dutch people have endurance across times", and "Throughout history the members of the Dutch group have maintained their inclinations and mentality." These two items were combined into a scale (*r* = .53, *p* < .001). For narrativist continuity we used the following two items: "Important events in Dutch history are part of an unbroken stream", and "There is no connection between past, present and future events in the Netherlands." This last item was recoded so that a higher score indicated a stronger perception of narrativist group continuity, and was then combined into a scale with the other item (*r* = .33, *p* < .001). All items were rated on a 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) Likert-scale.

For the essentialist manipulation to be successful (a) participants in the essentialist condition should score higher on the essentialist manipulation check than those in the narrativist and control conditions, and (b) these two latter conditions should not differ from one another. To test these predictions, the essentialist manipulation check was submitted to a regression analysis using contrast coded variables (Aiken & West, 1991). The first contrast variable represented the difference between the essentialist condition and the narrativist and control conditions (coded as *essentialist continuity* = 2, *narrativist continuity* = -1, *control* = -1). The second contrast variable represented the difference between the narrativist and control condition (coded as *essentialist continuity* = 0, *narrativist continuity* = 1, *control* = -1). This coding procedure is appropriate when one group is predicted to differ from the others, which should, in turn, not differ from one another (Aiken & West, 1991). The effect of the essentialist contrast variable was significant (β = .14, *t* = 1.85, *p* = .033) whereas the effect of the narrativist contrast variable was not (β = -.01, *t* = -.12, *p* = .908). These results confirmed requirements (a) and (b). In addition, a separate t-test showed that people in the essentialist continuity condition tended to score higher on this manipulation check item (*M* = 4.83, *SD* = .96) than people in the control condition (*M* = 4.50, *SD* = 1.35), *t*(110) = 1.51, *p* = .067.

Next, for a successful narrativist manipulation (c) participants in the narrativist condition should score higher on the narrativist manipulation check than those in the essentialist and control condition, and (d) these two latter conditions should not differ from one another. The narrativist manipulation check was submitted to a regression analysis using two new contrast coded variables for the experimental conditions. The first contrast variable represented the difference between the narrativist condition and the essentialist and control conditions (coded as, *narrativist continuity* = 2, *essentialist continuity* = -1, *control* = -1), and the second contrast variable represented the difference between the essentialist and control condition (coded as, *narrativist continuity* = 0, *essentialist continuity* = 1, *control* = -1). The effect of the narrativist contrast variable was significant (β = .14, *t* = 1.79, *p* = .038) whereas the effect of the essentialist contrast variable was not (β = .11, *t* = 1.47, *p* = .144). These results confirmed requirements (c) and (d). In addition, a separate t-test showed that people in the narrativist condition scored higher on this manipulation check item (*M* = 5.10, *SD* = .98) than people in the control condition (*M* = 4.64, *SD* = 1.22), *t*(112) = 2.26, *p* = .013.

Appendix 6A The four cover stories about Dutch national history used in the three experiments

Christian condition
Historians have convincingly shown that the Netherlands is originally a Christian country. Christian norms and values have been a central part of the Dutch identity since the Middle Ages. The Dutch have always been inspired by Christian traditions. Social scientists have shown that Christian norms and values are still very important, and can still be found everywhere in present Dutch society. Christian inheritance has shown to increase social cohesion and remains an important part of the Dutch identity.

Control condition
Historians have convincingly shown that the Netherlands knows a long tradition of 'battle' against nature. The Netherlands has been conquered on water and water maintenance has been a subject of concern for ages. As a cause of global warming, the attention for water maintenance will increase even more. The Netherlands is one of the most watery countries in the world and the battle against water is part of the traditional Dutch identity. The concern with 'water' can be found in Dutch society in many ways.

Tolerant condition
Historians have convincingly shown that in the Netherlands, people from different religions have been living together for a very long time. Three hundred years ago the Dutch were already in favour of freedom of religion. People coming from other countries chose the Dutch cities to build up a new life in their own way, with freedom of religion. The acceptance of other religions has always been a central aspect of the Netherlands. This acceptance and openness has shown to increase social cohesion and remains an important part of the Dutch identity.

Mixed condition
Some people say that the Netherlands is originally a Christian country. They claim Christian norms and values have been a central part of the Dutch identity since the Middle Ages. Christian inheritance is argued to cause social cohesion and is an important part of the Dutch identity. However, others disagree with this view and argue that the Netherlands is originally a country with different religions and various influences from all over the world. They point at tolerance for different religions and humanism as central parts of the Dutch identity.

Dankwoord
(Acknowledgements)

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Curriculum Vitae

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
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