

HOSIOS
A semantic study of Greek piety

HOSIOS
Een semantische studie van Griekse vroomheid
(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

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Preface

When Odysseus in Polyphemus' cave fully realizes the predicament he has got himself into, he exclaims:

αἰᾶ, πόνους μὲν Τρωϊκοὺς ὑπεξέδυν
θαλασσίους τε, νῦν δ' ἐς ἀνδρὸς ἀνοσίου
ὠμὴν κατέσχον ἀλίμενόν τε καρδίαν.

‘Alas, I have escaped hardships at Troy
and on the sea, only to put in now at the fierce and
harbourless heart of an *anhosios* man!’¹

Polyphemus is hardly the only creature in fifth-century Greek literature who is disqualified as ἀνόσιος ‘impious’, ‘godless’. Orestes, Clytemnestra, Agamemnon, Aegisthus, Menelaus, Pylades, Oedipus, Antigone, Jocaste, Polymestor, Medea, Paris, Heracles, Odysseus himself, and many other mythological figures – with the addition of the gods Apollo and Zeus himself – suffer from the charge of being called ἀνόσιος at one point or another, and for very diverse reasons.

In the case of Polyphemeus, Odysseus had asked him not to gobble up any more of his friends, in the discussion directly preceding his lamentation. In particular, Odysseus had appealed to Polyphemus to honour the φιλία relationship that existed between them.² He had also asked Polyphemus to respect the rules of ξενία: Polyphemus should receive his guests and suppliants hospitably.³ But Polyphemus is not at all impressed by Odysseus' rhetoric. ‘If you are talking about gods’, he says ‘then Wealth is the god to worship’.⁴ And: ‘I do not care about the land on which my father Poseidon's temples are built, in fact, I do not understand why you put them in

¹ This passage is a quotation from Euripides' satyr play *Cyclops*, ll. 347-49.

² E. *Cyc.* 288-298. Odysseus claimed he kept the temples of Cyclops' father Poseidon safe in the Trojan war.

³ E. *Cyc.* 299-305.

⁴ E. *Cyc.* 316.

your speech at all.’ Polyphemos is not afraid of Zeus, nor does he see in what respect Zeus is superior as a god to himself.⁵ Thunder and lightning, rain and wind sent by Zeus do not affect him when he is sitting in his cave. There he eats and drinks milk and drums on his belly, making a noise that rivals Zeus’ thunder.⁶ In fact, his belly, to which he performs cultic service, should be considered the greatest divinity of all, and to guzzle and eat day by day: this is Zeus in the eyes of wise men.⁷ Rounding off his speech, Polyphemos assures his guest that he takes the demands of hospitality quite seriously and will give Odysseus and his men many hospitality gifts: a bronze pot (in which they will be cooked), a fire (to warm them) and salt (to season their meat).⁸

Which part of this bold speech makes Polyphemos ἀνόσιος? Is it mainly his attitude towards Zeus, the disrespect shown to his father Poseidon, the proposed treatment of his guests and suppliants, or in fact all of the elements in this speech together? What exactly did Odysseus express, when he wondered, upon his arrival, whether the island’s inhabitants would be ὄσιοι?⁹ And what do Polyphemos and all other individuals evaluated as ὄσιος or ἀνόσιος have in common?

⁵ E. Cyc. 318-21.

⁶ E. Cyc. 325-28.

⁷ E. Cyc. 334-37.

⁸ E. Cyc. 343-44.

⁹ E. Cyc. 125.

1

Introduction and method

In this dissertation I aim to elucidate the semantics of the Ancient Greek adjective ὄσιος and its cognates. Traditionally rendered ‘piety’, ὄσιος and its cognates were key notions in classical Greek religion and reflected a core value in Athenian democracy. Unfortunately, for different reasons, this term has been notoriously difficult to comprehend. To further our understanding of Greek religion, it is necessary to know what the Greeks meant with ὄσιος. The aim of this thesis is twofold. First, I set out to solve the scholarly debates on various aspects of the meaning and usage of ὄσιος and cognates, and to provide an understanding of the semantic relationship between these lexemes and their near-synonyms. An additional research question, addressed in one case study, concerns the persuasive value of referring to an action as ὄσιον in the historical context. Secondly, using insights from modern linguistic theory, I aim to improve our methods for researching lexical semantics in a dead language. The focus of the thesis is on lexical competition. Its main question is: under what semantic and pragmatic circumstances did speakers choose to employ the term ὄσιος and cognates in contrast to other ways they had of expressing a similar message? My investigation is based on literature and epigraphic material from Homer until the end of the Peloponnesian war, and its immediate aftermath, with an emphasis on the 5th century BC.

1. A theory of meaning

All theories of lexical semantics assume that lexical selection is competitive.¹ Whenever a speaker searches his mental lexicon for an appropriate word to express the message he intends to convey, semantically related candidates are co-activated along with the target word.² Thus, a speaker's choice for a particular lexeme is made after (unconsciously) considering lexical alternatives.




Figure 1: Lexical selection is competitive

It follows that we will learn more about the semantics of one term if we understand how it competes with its near synonyms. Such an understanding may be gained by examining those discourse situations in which one lexeme is (apparently) selected over semantically related competitors, and vice versa. Based on these scholarly assumptions, the main analytical principle in this thesis is lexical competition, or, rivalry between words. The meaning of *hosios and its cognates*³ is studied primarily by considering the semantic contrast between these lexemes and their near-synonyms.⁴

¹ SPALEK, DAMIAN & BÖLTE 2012:2.

² All existing word production models (i.e. models about how speakers select words) assume that word production involves access to a mental dictionary (or ‘encyclopaedia’). SPALEK, DAMIAN & BÖLTE 2012:1.

³ When I refer to ‘*hosios & cognates*’ I am referring to the lexeme ὅσιος (the adjective), its negations (οὐχ ὅσιος, μὴ ὅσιος), the antonym ἀνόσιος, the noun ὁσία and all attested derived denominative verbs (ὀσιώω, ἐξοσιώω, ἀφοσιώω, καθοσιώω).

⁴ Most semanticists agree that a lexical semantic study should be an analysis of the lexeme in its semantic field (FRITZ 2012:2632). This insight is the heritage of the earlier structuralist *semantic field theory* (developed by TRIER 1931, among others). A semantic field is ‘a set of lexemes which cover a certain semantic space’. Many aspects of this theory have been criticised (cf. LEHRER 1974:17-19, LEHRER 1985:284, FRITZ 2012:2632). But the basic idea that ‘the meanings of words must be understood, in part, in relation to other words that articulate a given content domain’ (LEHRER & KITTA 1992:3) is undisputed. The assumption is taken for granted in modern textbooks, for example AITCHISON 2012 [1987]:15.

To understand the nature of lexical competition, we should first have a view on the mental representation of meanings of individual words. In modern scholarship on lexical semantics we can distinguish two types of views.⁵ Broadly speaking, these are ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ approaches to lexical meaning.⁶ First of all, those in favour of a minimalist, or ‘monosemous’, approach to lexical semantics (for instance scholars such as JACKENDOFF and PUSTEJOVSKY) assume that entries in the mental lexicon are single, highly abstract, underspecified descriptions of the *meaning* of a lexeme.⁷ For example, in this view, as we see in Figure 2 below (next page), the meaning of the lexeme ‘clear’ may be mentally represented by the underdescriptive ‘somehow transparent’. A concrete and full interpretation of ‘clear’ is reached online (i.e., ad hoc) in specific discourse contexts. Minimalist approaches do not allow for lexical polysemy (i.e., words having more than one meaning stored in the lexical entry), viewing polysemy as a pragmatic phenomenon or the result of derivational rules,⁸ or describing such cases as instances of homonymy⁹ instead.¹⁰

⁵ All modern accounts of lexical meaning move away from the classical theory of meaning that goes back to Aristotle, and ‘dominated psychology, philosophy, and linguistics ... throughout much of the 20th century’ (TAYLOR 2003 [1989]:20). According to Aristotle’s model, each category (concept) can be defined in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. That is, concepts can be adequately described by a number of criteria, each of which is *required* to uniquely identify the concept in question; at the same time, passing all of these criteria is enough to *guarantee* category membership. For example, one may identify ‘humans’ as all BIPED, FEATHERLESS and ANIMATE beings, as opposed to, for example, four-footed or six-footed animate beings with or without feathers (TUGGY 2008:88; as RADEMAKER 2005:19 points out, the example derives from Arist. *Metaph.* 4.4.8). Although this view on word meaning is intuitively correct, it has been realised that such a theory only works for very simple concepts, but is unable to describe the large bulk of lexical entries in any given language.

⁶ CRUSE 2011 [1999]:94. As we will see (n. 10 and n. 19 in this section) the distinction partly coincides with the difference between two more general theories of human language: generative and cognitive linguistics.

⁷ JACKENDOFF 1990; PUSTEJOVSKY 1995.

⁸ i.e., as interpretations that hinge on specific contextual information or that derive from general rules for the use of words (e.g. metaphoric use).

⁹ i.e., two separate lexical entries that happen to have an identical phonological form.

¹⁰ Monosemous approaches to lexical semantics fit very well into the current dominant direction in generative linguistics, CHOMSKY’s so-called ‘Minimalist program’ (1995) in which it is assumed that the mental representation of the structure of language is as elegant and parsimonious as possible. According to generative linguists, a dedicated faculty of language (FL) is innate to humans and the goal of linguists is to model FL. The working hypothesis of the current research in the generative paradigm is that FL has an ‘Optimal Design’. In other words, the program takes as a starting point the assumption that FL is the optimal solution for the interface (cf. REINHART 2006:1-12). It is not *a priori* obvious what would count as an optimal design, but CHOMSKY interprets ‘optimal’ as ‘elegant’ and ‘parsimonious’, hence the term ‘Minimalist Program’. We can see how minimalist approaches to lexical semantics fit into this approach: the most parsimonious description

ENTRY IN MENTAL LEXICON	INTERPRETATION
Clear = ‘somehow transparent’	(ad hoc deductions) → transparent ‘clear water’ → easy to understand ‘clear instructions’ → not blocked ‘the road was clear’ ...

Figure 2: The minimalist approach to lexical meaning

In this dissertation I will take a maximalist, or ‘polysemous’ approach to lexical meaning (ENGELBERG, LANGACKER and TAYLOR).¹¹ This model has been very fruitfully applied in previous semantic studies in the field of Ancient Greek, such as RADEMAKER 2005.¹² In my thesis I will apply the same insights.

The maximalist view assumes that an entry in the mental lexicon is an inventory of situations in which one would use a lexeme. As is represented in Figure 3 below, language users¹³ hear lexemes being employed in different ways in different contexts and remember this information: storing individual options for the interpretation of a lexeme, accumulating them. Such lexical encounters with a lexeme form the basis of a user’s impression of ‘what a word means’.¹⁴ In this view, interpretation is a matter of accessing stored meanings.

of a word’s meaning in the mental lexicon seems to be a monosemous one. Note that CHOMSKY himself now seems to have abandoned his Minimalist Program, arguing for a different view (the so-called recursion-only hypothesis) in recent work (e.g. HAUSER, CHOMSKY & FITCH 2002). However, most generative linguists are still working with this theory. For a readable introduction to the Minimalist Program: HORNSTEIN, NUNES & GROHMANN 2005:1-16.

¹¹ ENGELBERG 2000, LANGACKER 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, TAYLOR 2003 [1989].

¹² RADEMAKER 2005 studied the semantics of another Ancient Greek evaluative term (σωφροσύνη). Other relevant studies are: ALLAN 2003 (verbal semantics); KOIER 2013 (the semantics of particles).

¹³ EVANS & GREEN 2006:109: ‘a language user is a member of a particular linguistic community who, in speaking (and, indeed, in signing or writing), attempts to achieve a particular interactional goal or set of goals using particular linguistic and non-linguistic strategies.’

¹⁴ TAYLOR 2003 [1989]:161.

ENTRY IN MENTAL LEXICON	INTERPRETATION
Clear = → transparent ('clear water') → easy to understand ('clear instructions') → not blocked ('the road was clear') ...	(accessing stored meanings)

Figure 3: The maximalist approach to lexical meaning

In other words, semantic knowledge about a lexeme is knowledge of its *distribution*: the variety of usages of a lexeme. Such knowledge is, naturally, influenced by the frequencies of encounters with various usages.¹⁵

A user may build up what LANGACKER calls a 'schema' – a more abstract idea of what all the various encountered usages of a lexeme have in common – *in addition to* the inventory of usages.¹⁶ However, it should be noted that this part of the mental representation of meaning is secondary and optional. Many users may not develop such an abstraction with respect to some or indeed any lexemes at all.¹⁷

Note that the cognitive view of lexical meaning entails that there is no principled distinction between 'semantics' (abstract meaning) and 'pragmatics' (concrete usages):¹⁸ knowledge about the meaning of a word *is* knowledge about how the word is used.¹⁹

¹⁵ As EVANS & GREEN 2006:114 explain: 'If the language system is a function of language use, then it follows that the relative frequency with which particular words or other kinds of constructions are encountered by the speaker will affect the nature of the language system. This is because cognitive linguists assume that linguistic units that are more frequently encountered become more entrenched (that is, established as a cognitive pattern or routine) in the language system. According to this view, the most entrenched linguistic units tend to shape the language system in terms of patterns of use, at the expense of less frequent and thus less well entrenched words or constructions.' Although frequency is thus part of the mental representation of a lexeme, it should be noted that 'frequency' is not a good measure of 'prototypicality', as will be discussed in the main text of this section below.

¹⁶ LANGACKER 1987:371. In a recent paraphrase by EVANS & GREEN 2006:216, the 'schema' is 'a skeletal representation of meaning abstracted from recurrent experience of language use.'

¹⁷ TAYLOR 2003 [1989]:71-72.

¹⁸ EVANS & GREEN 2006:171.

¹⁹ Polysemous approaches fit well into the ideas of Cognitive Linguists. An important claim of this approach is that knowledge of language emerges from language use: this is called the 'usage-based

Information on various usages of a lexeme is not only stored, but, importantly, this combined knowledge also influences the interpretation of individual encounters with the lexeme. As experimental research shows, when a listener recognises a word, he accesses the whole multiplicity of stored interpretative options.²⁰ Although a listener always hears and understands a word in a specific context in a specific usage (Figure 4a), during word recognition, all stored senses of a word are (temporarily) co-activated (Figure 4b). Thus, the understanding of a lexeme in a specific utterance is influenced by the other impressions a speaker has of the general usages of this lexeme.




Figure 4: Access to mental storage during interpretation of a lexeme

Returning to the notion of competition, this view of semantics entails that two lexemes, even with partially overlapping semantic fields, ‘mean’ something different. This is the case because individual usages of each lexeme activate the complete

thesis’. In such a view, the structure and content of individual lexical entries depends on the linguistic experience of the individual language user. But note that the most minimalistic approach to lexical meaning has in fact been put forward by cognitive linguists, in the so-called Construction Grammar. According to this theory, knowledge about the context in which an item occurs is essential to its cognitive representation. Lexical meaning itself is reduced to its bare minimum or zero: individual lexemes do not carry meaning at all, but constructions do. In view of the existence of such even more minimal approaches, JACKENDOFF’s and PUSTEJOVSKY’s theories have sometimes been referred to as ‘intermediate analyses’ (DÖLLING & HEYDE-ZYBATOW 2007:44). Paradoxically, the minimalist approach of Construction Grammar is the extreme consequence of the cognitive linguist’s maximalist approach, in which all sorts and types of information may be stored in the lexicon.

²⁰ SWINNEY 1979, TANENHAUS, LEIMAN & M. SEIDENBERG 1979, ONIFER & SWINNEY 1981.

inventory of usages of each and these colour the understanding of individual instances.

How are such rich lexical representations organised? To understand the cognitive linguistic view on this, we should first return briefly to the classical theory of meaning.²¹ A consequence of the classical theory of meaning (category membership is defined by a set of necessary and sufficient features) is that categories have clear boundaries: individual cases either belong, or do not belong, to the category. It also follows that all members of a category have an equal status, and that categories lack internal structure.²² Experimental work in psychology showed that this is not how humans actually conceive of categories.²³ It seems to be the case that category membership is not a yes/no question, but has various degrees. People consider some entities to be ‘better’ or ‘more prototypical’ examples of categories than others. For example, experimental subjects considered CHAIR a better example of the category ‘furniture’ than LAMP. Far-fetched instances such as TELEPHONE, were considered as belonging to the category ‘furniture’ by some, but not by others. Thus, categories have fuzzy boundaries, and people can debate whether some entity should be considered as belonging to the category in question.²⁴ Such semantic flexibility is necessary to account for actual language use. LANGACKER proposes that a word’s (categories’) ‘usages’ (examples) are stored in the user’s mind in a structured manner, as a semantic *network* of ‘central’, ‘prototypical’, and more marginal or ‘peripheral’ senses of a lexeme.²⁵ In LANGACKER’S view, this supposed mental organisation of the lexeme would reflect the way in which users actually experience word meaning.

We may, again, connect these insights to the notion of competition. Two words with partially overlapping usages may have different semantics when the internal organisation of their semantic networks is different. A usage that is ‘prototypical’ for one lexeme may be ‘marginal’ for the other lexeme.

²¹ Cf. n. 5 of this section.

²² For a summary of the classical approach to categorisation: TAYLOR 2003 [1989]:19-40.

²³ LABOV 1973, ROSCH 1973, 1975a, 1975b. The earliest theoretical criticism on the classical theory of meaning seems to have come from WITTGENSTEIN 1967 [1953]:48-9 in his now famous discussion of how to define the word ‘game’ (German: *Spiel*). The philosopher pointed out that various things we call ‘games’ do not share a single set of characteristics. For example, two of the most central characteristics of a ‘game’ seem to be that they are ‘non-serious’ and ‘fun’. But apparently it is not a problem to use this lexeme for events that are very serious and potentially not fun at all, like ‘political games’. Moreover, although most games are played with one or more other persons and involve an element of competition, it is perfectly possible to call the play of a child on its own, counting all yellow cars, a ‘game’.

²⁴ ROSCH 1975a.

²⁵ LANGACKER 1991:2.

One methodological problem for our current research arises here. Prototypical examples are those that are considered the ‘best examples’ of categories, and therefore, those that spring to mind first, those that experimental subjects immediately come up with. How can we find such cases in a dead language? Although, as was argued above, lexical semantic knowledge includes an impression of relative frequencies of types of usage,²⁶ the distinction between ‘prototypical’ and ‘marginal’ is not the same as that between ‘frequent’ and ‘infrequent’. Prototypicality sometimes correlates with frequency of occurrence, but not necessarily so.²⁷ Therefore, we cannot take frequency as a measure for prototypicality. RADEMAKER surveyed various criteria for prototypicality and concluded that the only useful measure of it is saliency: ‘a word may well be prototypical if it is easily activated, without a great deal of contextual preparations’.²⁸ Both RADEMAKER and SLUITER & ROSEN remarked that the early Platonic dialogues are a good starting point for discovering what actual average language users considered ‘prototypical cases’ of categories. When asked ‘what is x?’, Socrates’ conversation partners initially tend to propose simply what comes to their mind first. That is, they present what is in their view the ‘best example’ of X. Thus, studying these replies may actually help us understand something about the internal structure of these concepts’ mental representation for actual language users.²⁹

Finally, cognitive linguists propose that semantic knowledge cannot be separated from other experiences, ideas and concepts associated with the lexeme (‘world knowledge’). When a speaker recognises a lexeme, all this information on the word in question is activated, as well.³⁰ One aspect of this is the fact that words have ‘emotive’ or ‘stylistic’ meaning in addition to ‘referential meaning’. When a user has fully mastered the semantics of a lexeme, he or she has an insight into the register(s) (social settings) the lexeme is used in and into its affective charge. Another part of world knowledge concerns what has been referred to as the ‘frame’.³¹ A ‘frame’ is a

²⁶ cf. n. 15 of this section.

²⁷ This was already pointed out by ROSCH 1975b. Cf. the discussion in RADEMAKER 2005:34.

²⁸ RADEMAKER 2005:35.

²⁹ RADEMAKER 2005:35, SLUITER & ROSEN 2003:7-8.

³⁰ LANGACKER 1987:161-64, TAYLOR 2003 [1989]:85-87, EVANS & GREEN 2006:160, 207-209, 216, GEERAERTS & CUYCKENS 2008:5. In this sense, the mental storage of lexical meaning resembles the organisation of an encyclopaedia more than that of a dictionary.

³¹ Cognitive Linguists usually refer to the notion of ‘frame’ developed by FILLMORE e.g., 1976, 1982, 1987. Note that TAYLOR 2003 [1989]:87-93, CROFT & CRUSE 2004:17 and CIENKI 2008:173 have pointed out that various notions of the ‘frame’ and other notions very similar to it were developed independently and simultaneously by different scholars. These notions bear so much

‘structure of experience’.³² For example, for many Athenian citizens living in the 5th century BC, the term ἱερόν ‘temple’ probably did not only conjure up an image of a particular type of building, but also of attending religious ceremonies in a sanctuary, witnessing animals being slaughtered and receiving portions of the communal meal afterwards. The cultural frame or structure of experience to which ἱερόν belongs is that of the sacrificial ritual, with all associated religious and social connotations.

According to LANGACKER and FILLMORE, it is not possible to understand a word independently of the frame(s) it belongs to.³³ Words are inextricably associated with frames. Conversely, frames may be evoked by particular lexemes or combinations of lexemes.³⁴ Because of these characteristics of lexical storage, speakers may cleverly use words to activate a frame and so influence other people’s thoughts. In a law on tyrannicide, quoted for example in Andocides’ *De Mysteriis*, the person who threatens the institution of democracy (i.e. by overthrowing it or attempting to) is referred to as an enemy (πολέμιος).³⁵ Defining a fellow-citizen by means of this term evokes a frame: that of war. This frame comes with its own internal logic. The murder of an enemy is an expected event during war, and it is not a ‘bad’ action either. Moreover, in war an enemy may be murdered without incurring pollution. Because this law frames threats to the democracy in terms of ‘war’, it becomes understandable and reasonable that the law considers the person *killing* the πολέμιος, the one who causes the downfall of the democracy, to be καθαρός and ὄσιος.³⁶

Returning to the notion of competition, it follows that two words, even if they have a closely related or even identical ‘referential meaning’ (that is, referring to neighbouring or identical parts of conceptual space), may have different ‘semantics’. This is the case when they activate different sets of associated words, ideas and frames. Moreover, different usages of the same lexeme may fit into different frames.³⁷ We may connect these insights to what we discussed previously. Although a user always interprets a lexeme in a particular usage, in a particular context, all other

resemblance to one another that we can use them interchangeably. Among these are GOFFMAN’s ‘frame analysis’ (1974), LANGACKER’s ‘domain’ (1987) and SCHANK & ABELSON’s notion of the ‘script’ (1977).

³² FILLMORE 1987:31.

³³ e.g. FILLMORE 1987:31: ‘nobody can really understand the words in ... [a] domain who does not understand the social institutions or the structures of experience which they presuppose’.

³⁴ FILLMORE 1982:117: ‘the frame structures the word-meanings, and ... the word ‘evokes’ the frame’.

³⁵ And. *De Myst.* 96.

³⁶ And. *De Myst.* 95-97.

³⁷ FILLMORE 1982:124: ‘for many instances of polysemy it is possible to say that a given lexical item properly fits either of two different cognitive frames’.

stored usages of a lexeme are (temporally) co-activated *and so are the frames associated with these other usages.*

This outline of a theory of lexical semantics shows how we may proceed investigating ὄσιος and cognates and their near-synonyms.³⁸ When studying the ‘semantics’ of a lexeme, we should investigate

- A. its distribution across different types of discourse situations, that is, make an inventory of the different usages of the lexeme;
- B. the internal organisation of the semantic network, that is find out which usages are prototypical and which are more peripheral;
- C. the types of experiences and frame(s) the lexeme is and is not associated with.

The ‘semantic and pragmatic differences’ *between* two lexemes are found along the same lines. We do not expect two closely related words to have two distinct meanings between which we can draw a neat line. Rather, such words will differ in:

- A'. Their inventories of usages (partial overlap possible).
- B'. The internal organisation of their semantic networks.
- C'. The experiences and frame(s) with which they are associated.

Now that a method for assessing the semantics of lexemes has been clarified, we should turn to discussing the lexeme ὄσιος itself.

³⁸ As was stated in the main text above, I will take the maximalist approach to lexical meaning. Within the confines of this thesis, it is impossible to do justice to the linguistic debates between ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ theories of lexical meaning. Convincing arguments in favour of the cognitive approach have been summarised by, for example, TAYLOR 2003 [1989]:159-167 and CROFT 1998. These arguments bear on the nature of language change, language acquisition and psychological aspects of meaning representation. Two points of criticism are often aimed at the polysemous approach. The first of these concerns the amount of ‘meanings’ that a user should store of an average lexeme. Since words are used in endless shades of meaning, how many ‘usages’ should be stored? This is indeed not immediately obvious, but the problem has been addressed by cognitive linguists (cf. EVANS 2005:41 with further references, EVANS & GREEN 2006:242-44). On the one hand, if we were to take the minimalist approach as a starting point, it is not clear that users indeed arrive at a very abstract representation of meaning. Experiments show that native speakers have trouble providing a definition for even the simplest lexemes (JOHNSON-LAIRD 1987; TAYLOR 2003 [1989]:162). The second critique of the cognitive approach to lexical semantics concerns the supposed absence of ‘boundaries’ of semantic networks. According to the network model, categories may be extended just as users see fit. If categories have no boundary, this implies that the same thing could at the same time be ‘X’ and ‘non-X’ (e.g. CROFT & CRUSE 2004:89). This is a problem for logic, but it does not impair a theory of language use. Indeed, it is a psychological reality that different people might consider the same thing to be ‘X’ or ‘not-X’; and that a person may convince others that something we did not see as X before, is, in fact, an example of X. However, the absence of boundaries seems problematic when it has to account for ‘extended’ language use. I will explain and address this problem of the ‘no-boundaries’ hypothesis in Chapter 5, section 1.

2. *hosios* & cognates

2.1 Introduction

Both the adjective ὅσιος and the noun ἡ ὄσια are semantically elusive lexemes. Plato devoted a dialogue, the *Euthyphro*, to the search for a definition of τὸ ὄσιον. Not without reason: the term seemed to have featured prominently in the evaluative terminology of 5th and 4th century Greeks. Especially on the dramatic stage, moral debates frequently centred around what is ὄσιον. Did Antigone ‘commit a ὄσιον crime’ when burying her brother in perilous defiance of Creon’s decree? Was Orestes ὄσιος when he murdered his mother in revenge of Agamemnon, instructed to do so by Apollo? Was it ὄσιον to refuse a suppliant whose safety was in danger?³⁹

A common translation of ὄσιος is ‘pious’.⁴⁰ But as we can already tell from these examples, characters are referred to as ὄσιος (or the opposite) for highly diverging reasons. Sometimes the term addresses clearly religious matters. Pentheus’ refusal to acknowledge the god Dionysus is a ὕβρις that is not ὄσια.⁴¹ A chorus prays they will not ever rest from approaching the gods with offerings that are ὄσια.⁴² But other issues are described in this way, too. Another tragic chorus of young girls prays that in matters of love, their desires will be ὄσιοι.⁴³ Herodotus describes how a Panionius earned his living ‘by doing something most ἀνόσιον’, castrating boys and selling them as slaves.⁴⁴ And a Callias was accused of being ‘the most ἀνόσιος of all humans’, when he tried to interpret a law, which was a prerogative of the Eumolpidae alone.⁴⁵

In some contexts, it seems as if we should translate ὄσιος as one of its near-synonyms. For example, the boy Ion prides himself on being ‘ὄσιος from the bed’,⁴⁶ referring almost certainly to his chastity. Here ὄσιος seemingly acquires a meaning that is otherwise commonly expressed by the term ἀγνός.⁴⁷ The chorus in *Bacchants* urges the Thebans: νάρθηκας ὀσιοῦσθε.⁴⁸ The phrase was taken as describing a process in which profane objects (fennels) are consecrated, turning them into holy

³⁹ Antigone: S. *Ant.* 74; Orestes: E. *Or.* 546-47; suppliants: E. *Supp.* 40, E. *Hyps.* F 757.862 *TrGF*, S. *OC* 281, Hdt. 1.157-161.

⁴⁰ e.g., LSJ s.v. ὄσιος II.

⁴¹ E. *Ba.* 374.

⁴² A. *Pr.* 529.

⁴³ E. *IA* 555.

⁴⁴ Hdt. 8.105.1.

⁴⁵ And. *De Myst.* 116.

⁴⁶ E. *Ion* 150.

⁴⁷ LSJ s.v. ἀγνός I 2.

⁴⁸ E. *Ba.* 114.

objects (θύρσοι) of Dionysus' cult;⁴⁹ thus ὄσιοῦν seems a synonym of ἱεροῦν.⁵⁰ In a number of passages expressing a contrast between 'good' and 'bad' behaviour, ἀνόσιος is contrasted with δίκαιος or εὐσεβής; ὄσιος is opposed to δυσσεβεία etc. The juxtaposition of these terms as antonyms implies that they function as (near-)synonyms.⁵¹

Besides persons and actions, objects are sometimes also referred to as in terms of ὄσιος. Often these objects are somehow connected with persons, when the adjective qualifies the cities in which they live, the mouths from which they speak, the feet on which they walk.⁵² But ὄσιος qualifies other types of objects as well. In a famous example, a woman expresses the desire to go to a 'ὄσιον place' to give birth.⁵³ Money is regularly referred to as ὄσιον, too, for the first time in the accounts of the deme Ikarion (450-425 BC).⁵⁴

Perhaps the main reason why the noun ὄσια has caused slightly less problems of understanding than the adjective ὄσιος is that it occurs much less often. ἡ ὄσια is commonly taken as referring to '(what is permitted by) divine law'.⁵⁵ Still, some individual instances of ὄσια are less straightforward to understand. For example, in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*, the god Hermes wishes to 'enter upon the same ὄσιή' as his brother, Apollo and desires 'ὄσίη of the sacrificial meat'.⁵⁶ The meaning of ὄσίη in these examples is rather opaque. Note that the etymology of ὄσιος and ὄσια is unknown, and thus not of any help.⁵⁷

Being able to interpret the meaning of ὄσιος and ὄσια correctly in all of these cases is not only important to increase our understanding of these (mostly literary) texts, but also to answer historical questions. Most importantly, the religious vocabulary of the Ancient Greeks is the key to understanding Greek religion.⁵⁸

⁴⁹ ROUX 1972, *ad loc.*; SEAFORD 1996, *ad loc.*

⁵⁰ BOLKESTEIN 1936:45.

⁵¹ e.g. ὄσιος opposed to δυσσεβεία: E. *Hel.* 1021; ἀνόσιος opposed to δίκαιος and εὐσεβής: A. *Sept.* 610-11.

⁵² cities: E. *El.* 1319. E. *Antiope.* F 223.115-16 *TrGF*; mouths: Emp. fr. 3.7, S. *OC* 981; feet: E. *IT* 130, E. *Hel.* 869.

⁵³ Ar. *Lys.* 743.

⁵⁴ IG I³ 253, l. 13 and l. 17: ἀργυρίο ἠοσίο. A recent discussion of this text is BLOK 2010.

⁵⁵ e.g. LSJ s.v. ὄσια I.

⁵⁶ *h.Merc.* 170, 130.

⁵⁷ The scholarly discussions on the etymology of ὄσιος and ὄσια are the subject of Appendix 1.

⁵⁸ I subscribe to the view of RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:3-6, 2008:43-44, who said that to understand the Greeks and their religion – a "crazy" aspiration (2008:44) – the best one (he) could do is study the *vocabulary* pertaining to their perception of the divine. PIRENNE-DELFORGE (2008:31)

Moreover, acquiring a deeper insight into the semantics of *hosios & cognates* may also help us answer a more specific historical question. The lexeme ὄσιος appears to have played a role in defining how an individual should relate to the classical *polis*, when it appeared in the ancient conceptualisation of citizenship.⁵⁹ For example, the granting of citizenship to a mercenary is described in Demosthenes as: ‘It was we, men of Athens, who made Charidemus a citizen, and by that gift bestowed upon him a share in ἱερά and in ὄσια, in our tradition (νόμιμα) and in everything in which we ourselves are entitled to have a share (πάντων ὄσων περ αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν ἡμῖν).’⁶⁰ Apollodorus quotes a decree of 427 BC granting citizenship to a group of Plataeans,⁶¹ saying it was decided ‘...that the Plataeans shall be Athenians from this day

considered the (or at least RUDHARDT’s) lexical-semantic method to be one of the most promising ways in which to (start to) achieve such an ambition.

⁵⁹ In this way this dissertation is embedded in the larger group project ‘Citizenship in Classical Athens’ led by Prof. dr. J.H. BLOK (NWO VICI-project no. 277-50-001). This research program offers a fundamentally new approach to the connections between citizenship and religion in classical Athens, attributing a formative role to religion within the political domain. The notion of ‘citizenship’ is defined by modern political scientists as consisting of a legal and a communitarian element (KYMLICKA 2002:28; cf. BLOK *forthc.* b). With respect to the first element, in order to be considered a citizen of a particular community an individual should meet particular criteria. Having been accepted as a citizen, the person in question has a set of rights and duties belonging to this status. Regarding the second element, communities have a view of how their citizenship can and should be put into practice, of what citizens should *do* in order to be real, active and full-fledged members of their community. Previous scholarly discussions on citizenship in Ancient Greece have concentrated mostly on the first, legal aspect. Ancient Greek citizenship has been studied mostly in terms of the criteria that should be met in order to be considered a citizen at all. In particular, scholars have focused on the rights of male citizens to actively engage in political life of the *polis* (holding political offices, voting). By contrast, the project ‘Citizenship in Classical Athens’ is mainly concerned with the second, communitarian element, taking as a starting point what Athenians said about citizenship in their own community. When Athenians explicitly articulated what citizenship entailed, they never actually referred to active political life. This does not suggest that the active participation of all male citizens in politics was not crucially important to the ideological underpinnings of democracy, but it does mean that the Athenians may have primarily conceived of citizenship in a different way. Instead, as is explained in the main text, when overtly articulating what being a citizen really meant, Athenians sometimes captured this in the fixed expression μετεῖναι or μετέχειν ἱερῶν καὶ ὀσίων: ‘to have a share in’ or ‘to participate in ἱερά and ὄσια’. We find this expression alongside a vaguer, more general summary of what citizen status in Athens involved in the phrase μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως, ‘to participate in the *polis*’. In order to understand Athenian citizenship, we should also study the meaning and implications of these fixed expressions (BLOK 2007, esp. 316-17; BLOK 2009a:146, 158-162; BLOK 2009b: 264, BLOK 2011, esp. 233-35, BLOK *forthc.* a, *forthc.* b, *forthc.* c).

⁶⁰ D. 23.65. Cf. D. 57.3, Antipho 5.62.4.

⁶¹ These Plataeans had survived the sack of their city and were given refuge at Athens.

(Πλαταιέας εἶναι Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας),⁶² valued just like the other Athenians, and that they share in everything in which the Athenians share (μετεῖναι αὐτοῖς ὥνπερ Ἀθηναίους μέτεστι πάντων), both *ιερά* and *ῥοσια*.⁶³ Thus, in these fourth-century texts, Athenian citizenship was defined as ‘participating in’, or, ‘sharing in’ ‘*ιερά* καὶ *ῥοσια*’.⁶⁴ A better comprehension of the semantics of *ῥοσιος* could help us interpret this conceptualisation of citizenship.⁶⁵

2.2 Problems with the interpretation of *hosios* & *cognates*

At least five questions related to the interpretation of *hosios* & *cognates* have been posed in the scholarship.

Q1: What kind of evaluation is *ῥοσιος*? With respect to the usage of *hosios* & *cognates* for persons and their behaviour, there is a scholarly debate, first of all, about (a) the evaluative *nature* of *ῥοσιος* and *cognates*, and (b) where to place these terms on an evaluative *scale*. Furthermore, (c) the relationship between the usage of these terms for persons and for objects is unclear.

Q1a. Given the wide range of conducts that may be described as *ῥοσιος* or *ῥοσία* (or the opposite), it is controversial whether these terms are primarily a moral, ethical

⁶² Up until 229, decrees in which a person or group is granted citizenship do not include a lexeme for ‘citizenship’, but state that ‘it has been decided that so-and-so is now (for example) an Athenian’ (OSBORNE 1981-1983).

⁶³ Even though the authenticity of the fifth-century wording in this decree is debated, the very least we can say is that the expression was part of the fourth-century literary imagination of what citizenship entailed (cf. BLOK 2009a:166-167 with n. 106, summarising the scholarly discussion).

⁶⁴ The phrase *ιερά* καὶ *ῥοσια* also occurred in the ephebic oath, sworn by all adolescent males when ritually transformed into adult citizens: ‘I will not bring shame upon the sacred weapons, nor shall I desert the man beside me, wherever I stand in the line. I shall fight in defence of *ιερά* and *ῥοσια*’ (SEG 21.519, *RO* 88). The oath is also quoted in Lycurg. *Leocr.* 76-77. This is a fourth-century inscription, but it has been argued that the oath goes back to the archaic age, on the basis of several words, phrases and concepts in the inscription that predate the classical period (SIEWERT 1977 and *RO* 88, comm., cf. the discussion in BLOK 2011:244-45). The oath would have been orally transmitted and the wording could well have changed over time. Hence, it is uncertain whether the fixed expression *ιερά* καὶ *ῥοσια* were present in the text from the beginning, but that may have been the case. Cf. BLOK 2009a:159-60, BLOK 2011:244-12, BLOK *forthc.* c.

⁶⁵ The meaning of τὰ *ιερά* in this expression is clear. τὰ *ιερά*, ‘the things of the gods’, refers to possessions of the gods and things that have been dedicated to them by humans. More generally, τὰ *ιερά* refers to the entire process of gift giving in cults, festivals and other settings (cf. BLOK *forthc.* c). According to PARKER 2005a:61, τὰ *ιερά* is the Greek word that comes closest to ‘religion’. Thus, ‘participating in *ιερά*’ is taking part in the active religious life of the *polis*. The role of participation in *ιερά* for *polis* membership has been explored by SOURVINOU-INWOOD 1990, OSBORNE 1993, COLE 1995, BURKERT 1995, GEORGIOUDI 1998, PARKER 2005b, as BLOK 2011:235 n. 12 explains.

evaluation, i.e., assessing behaviour of humans amongst themselves, or a religious evaluation, i.e., judging action from the (supposed) perspective of the gods. The connection between these different applications was one of the most important issues in VAN DER VALK's seminal article on the semantics of ὄσιος.⁶⁶ According to VAN DER VALK, ὄσιος primarily and originally had a religious sense (like εὐσεβής) not an ethical sense.⁶⁷ But from the fifth century onwards, VAN DER VALK argues, we find ὄσιος in an enlarged sphere of meaning, used in non-religious and ethical applications. This expansion of the semantic range from the religious to the ethical served 'um eine Freveltat besonders grell zu beleuchten'.⁶⁸ We find such usage, according to VAN DER VALK, for example in Euripides, when Clytemnestra says that Agamemnon 'does godless things' (ἀνόσια πράσσει), by sacrificing Iphigenia,⁶⁹ and in the evaluation of Orestes' matricide as ἀνόσιον.⁷⁰

In later scholarship the usage of *hosios & cognates* to describe conduct among humans has been given a semantically more primary place. According to BENVENISTE, the usage of ὄσιος to describe interhuman behaviour is its most central application of this lexeme, as shows from his definition: 'ce qui est prescrit, permis par la loi divine (or: ce qui est prescrit ou permis par les dieux aux hommes), mais dans les rapports *humains*'.⁷¹ MAFFI objected that BENVENISTE's definition does not cover the entire semantic field of ὄσιος, because the term in fact quite often describes conduct directly aimed at gods (e.g. in the sphere of ritual).⁷²

RUDHARDT's definition covered both the religious and the ethical aspect: 'les actes ὄσιοι, ou conférant la qualité de ὄσιος à qui les accomplit, établissent entre les dieux et les hommes ou entre les hommes eux-mêmes, à l'intérieur de la famille ou de la cité, des relations conformes à certaines normes et qui s'intègrent dans un ordre permanent'.⁷³ RUDHARDT emphasised that this order is a *religious* order in a second

⁶⁶ VAN DER VALK 1942.

⁶⁷ Discussion in VAN DER VALK 113-117, with conclusion on p. 117: 'Angesichts dieser Tatsachen glaube ich, dass festgesetzt werden kann, dass ὄσιος dem religiösen Gebiet angehört. Die Meinung, dass es im Anfang ethische Bedeutung hatte, ist [*sic*] abzuweisen.' VAN DER VALK's work was a response to BOLKESTEIN (1936), who had argued that ὄσιος was in essence an ethical term. E.g. 1936:210: 'ὄσιος c.s. et εὐσεβής c.s. ... ont un sens religieux mais en premier lieu un sens moral'; Stellingen no. III: 'the words ὄσιος and εὐσεβής c.s. are repeatedly used of the relationships between humans among themselves: the translation 'pious' is in these cases incorrect' (my translation from Dutch).

⁶⁸ VAN DER VALK 1942:135.

⁶⁹ E. *IA* 1105. VAN DER VALK 1942:135.

⁷⁰ E. *Or.* 286, 374, 481, 546, 563. VAN DER VALK 1942:137.

⁷¹ BENVENISTE 1969:198-99 (italics in original text).

⁷² MAFFI 1982:41.

⁷³ RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]: 31-32.

definition, some pages further on: ‘ὄσιος ... signifie ... *conforme à l’ordre religieux selon lequel la puissance s’exerce normalement en assurant, dans les rapports qui les définissent, l’existence des êtres et des choses*’.⁷⁴

Similar definitions were given by JAY-ROBERT and BLOK more recently. JAY-ROBERT, taking BENVENISTE’s definition as a starting point, held that τὸ ὄσιον is ‘ce qui est prescrit et permis par la loi divine dans les rapports que nouent les êtres humains avec les dieux et par conséquent dans ceux qu’ils nouent entre eux’.⁷⁵ BLOK gave an interpretation of ὄσιον along the same lines as ‘a set of norms or rules of conduct either between humans sanctioned and controlled by the gods, or of humans towards the gods’.⁷⁶

Q1b. Although it is uncontroversial that οὐχ ὄσιος and ἀνόσιος express censure (these terms evaluate a person or action as ‘impious’), it is not certain what the antonym ὄσιος articulates. It is a matter of debate whether this term is a description of merely ‘religiously neutral’ ground, assessing something or someone as ‘acceptable’ to the gods, or conversely, is an evaluation that expresses praise. A proponent of the first view is Robert PARKER, according to whom the lexeme describes who or what is ‘religiously safe’,⁷⁷ ‘inoffensive to the gods’,⁷⁸ denoting ‘an enclave ... of safe normality, between the dangerous extremes of sacredness and pollution’.⁷⁹ Likewise, SCULLION describes τὸ ὄσιον as a ‘religiously neutral realm’,⁸⁰ while SAMONS paraphrases ὄσιος as ‘acceptable to the gods’.⁸¹ These views are based on VAN DER VALK 1942, according to whom (as will be discussed in more detail below) a person became ὄσιος when he or she had temporally fulfilled all obligations towards the

⁷⁴ RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]: 36, italics in original text. In the preface to the second (unchanged) 1992 edition of his *Notions Fondamentales*, RUDHARDT states that he does not change his analysis of ὄσιον but slightly adjusts it, now preferring the notion of “règle” to “ordre”. As RUDHARDT explains, ‘cela n’est pas sans importance. L’ordre suggère l’idée d’un état des choses définitivement acquis, tandis que la règle ne fige rien’. An uncompleted manuscript of a new book by RUDHARDT, *Essai sur la religion grecque*, was published posthumously by BORGEAUD & PIRENNE-DELFORGE (2008). It appears that RUDHARDT had planned (or indeed wrote) a chapter on ὄσιος, but unfortunately this text was not preserved (p. 99).

⁷⁵ JAY-ROBERT 1999:7, JAY-ROBERT 2009:28.

⁷⁶ BLOK *forthc.* a; cf. BLOK 2011:237-38.

⁷⁷ PARKER 1996a [1983]:12.

⁷⁸ PARKER 1996a [1983]:330, 338.

⁷⁹ PARKER 1996a [1983]:330.

⁸⁰ SCULLION 2005:114.

⁸¹ SAMONS 2000:326, 328.

gods, and hence the gods could no longer lay a claim on this person.⁸² By contrast, MOULINIER, CHADWICK and BLOK assume that ὄσιος has a much more positive value, signifying that an action is ‘good’ and ‘pleasing to gods’: referring to someone or something as ὄσιος is high praise.⁸³ RUDHARDT emphasized the same: ‘Le Grec la [i.e. the quality that ὄσιος expresses] recherche et loue ce qui la possède; il évite et blâme ce qui en est dépourvu.’⁸⁴ The difference between these views may be summarised as below:

Censure (referring to what is offensive, problematic, perceived by others as bad)		Neutral (referring to what is not offensive or problematic, but not particularly ‘good’ or pleasing either)		Praise (referring to what is pleasing to others, perceived by others as good)
<u>View A: censure vs. neutral</u>				
ἀνόσιος, οὐχ ὄσιος	↔	ὄσιος		
analogous example: parking your bicycle in someone else’s private yard		analogous example: parking your bicycle in a public bicycle rack on the street		
<u>View B: censure vs. praise</u>				
ἀνόσιος, οὐχ ὄσιος		↔		ὄσιος
analogous example: always travelling by car, thus polluting the environment				analogous example: travelling by bicycle to minimise one’s Ecological Footprint

One example of how the two different views result in different interpretations of specific textual passages is the law on tyrannicide quoted in Andocides’ *De Mysteriis*, discussed above. This law stipulated that anyone who killed an enemy of the democracy would be considered ὄσιος. In View A, the law intended to say as much as

⁸² VAN DER VALK 1942. This view will be discussed further on in the discussion of Q2a and in Chapter 7, section 1.

⁸³ CHADWICK 1996:221: ‘conduct pleasing to gods’; MOULINIER 1952:286: ‘Quelque chose qui leur [i.e., les dieux] agréé est ὄσιον’; 288: ‘ὄσιος voudrait dire que de tels gestes sont bons’. BLOK: [ὄσιος] ‘has strong positive values’ (2010:62) and is ‘what is pleasing to the gods’ (BLOK 2009a:161). Cf. BLOK *forthc.* a.

⁸⁴ RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:31.

‘such a murderer is not to worry: the action is inoffensive to the gods and other humans’. By contrast, in View B, the text made a much stronger statement, telling anyone who intended to commit such a murder that the gods and humans would positively approve of such an action.

Q1c. Finally, the fact that ὄσιος is so often used to describe persons and their behaviour invites the question what the significance of the adjective is when it qualifies an object. When objects are referred to as ὄσιος, such usage is sometimes translated as ‘profane’, as in the case of ὄσια χρήματα, sometimes as ‘pure’. We will discuss this question in more detail directly below, in the discussion of the relationship between ὄσιος and its near-synonyms.

Q2: What is the semantic relationship between ὄσιος and its near-synonyms? A second issue that has raised many concerns is the apparent polysemy of the adjective ὄσιος. Hesychius defined ὄσιος as ‘καθαρός, δίκαιος, εὐσεβής, ειρηνικός, ἀγνός’. VAN DER VALK took this polyvalent characterisation of ὄσιος as the starting point of his discussion. He distinguishes three semantic ‘spheres’ for ὄσιος – that of purity (καθαρός, ἀγνός), that of justice (δίκαιος) and that of piety (εὐσεβής) – while adding two other spheres: that of ‘human’ usage (as opposed to ἱερός) and of the funeral.⁸⁵ A bewildering multiplicity of views on the semantic relationship between ὄσιος and all these near-synonyms has been proposed both before and since VAN DER VALK. I summarise these views below. Full discussions of scholarly debates on each of these issues will be presented in the relevant chapters and an appendice of this thesis.

Q2a. The most difficult and most-debated issue is the alleged semantic paradox of ὄσιος and ὄσια.⁸⁶ It has been argued from very early onwards that the adjective ὄσιος should be translated as ‘profane’ (βέβηλος) in some particular cases, and as ‘holy’ or ‘consecrated’ (ἱερός) in other cases. In this view, ὄσιος has two opposite and contradictory meanings: ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’, besides its core meaning ‘pious’. The most influential solution to this puzzling state of affairs was presented by VAN DER VALK. According to VAN DER VALK, the semantic link between the purported meanings ‘pious’ and ‘profane’ of ὄσιος is that they represent two points on a temporal line of a man’s relationship to the gods.⁸⁷ VAN DER VALK argued that the man who is fulfilling his duties towards the gods is ὄσιος in the sense that he is ‘pious’, but he is also holy (ἱερός), because he is bound to the gods. When the worshipper has fulfilled his obligations towards the gods, he is ὄσιος in a different

⁸⁵ VAN DER VALK 1942:113-14.

⁸⁶ A full discussion of the *status quaestionis* on ὄσιος vs. ἱερός is provided in Chapter 7.

⁸⁷ ‘points on a temporal line’: MAFFI’S paraphrase (1982:39), not VAN DER VALK’S words.

sense: he is free from the gods, the gods do not have any claims on him. In other words: he is ‘profane’.⁸⁸ By analogy, objects or places that are ὄσια are those that are at the free disposal of humans: they are not in the possession of the gods or dedicated to them, and accordingly the gods do not need anything from him. In a later article, VAN DER VALK explained how the noun ὄσια may be understood in a similar way, on the basis of the dichotomy between what is ‘holy, sacred’ and what is or becomes ‘desacralised’.⁸⁹ VAN DER VALK’s theory has been followed by many (e.g. JEANMAIRE, BENVENISTE, PARKER, BURKERT, and to an extent, RUDHARDT); but has been firmly rejected by others (e.g. MOULINIER, MAFFI, CONNOR, CHADWICK and BLOK).⁹⁰

Q2b. ὄσιος and εὐσεβής frequently qualify the same or similar persons, behaviour, objects;⁹¹ regularly these two terms evaluate the same behaviour of the same person in the same text.⁹² Consequently, BOLKESTEIN saw the two notions as very near synonyms, noting that ‘these terms are used in more or less the same situations’.⁹³ Other authors, however, have tried to capture the semantic differences between the two. RUDHARDT held that εὐσέβεια is an inner disposition, while being ὄσιος means keeping to some objective religious order.⁹⁴ Similarly, according to MIKALSON, εὐσέβεια refers to an attitude (being respectful towards the gods) while ὀσιότης is about ‘religious correctness’ (obeying rules relating, for example, to when and where

⁸⁸ VAN DER VALK 1942:119-21. e.g. 119: ‘ὄσιος ist der Mensch, der alle seine geforderten Pflichten den Göttern gegenüber erfüllt hat oder erfüllen will, an dem die Götter also nichts aussetzen können, einer der *frei ist den Göttern gegenüber*. ... Der ὄσιος [Mensch] hat sich von seinen Pflichten den Göttern gegenüber losgemacht, er ist frei von ihnen, nicht-ἱερός.’

⁸⁹ VAN DER VALK 1951.

⁹⁰ JEANMAIRE 1945; BENVENISTE 1969:199; PARKER 1996a [1983]:330, 1996b:123; BURKERT 1985:269-70, 2011:176; RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:34-36 rejects the translation ‘profane’ but follows VAN DER VALK 1942 nevertheless; MOULINIER 1952:290; MAFFI 1982; CONNOR 1988; CHADWICK 1996:226; BLOK 2010. These scholars’ views are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.

⁹¹ A more elaborate discussion of the *status quaestionis* on ὄσιος vs. εὐσεβής is provided in Chapter 3, section 2.

⁹² a) in the same sentence/two subsequent sentences: Theoclymenus in E. *Hel.* 1021; Agamemnon in E. *Hec.* 1234-35; womankind in E. *Ion* 1094; people that dishonour suppliants (*in abstracto*) in S. *OC* 279-83; brother who fails to avenge his father in Antipho 1.5; the jury that makes the right judgment in Antiphon’s *Tetralogies*; b) throughout the literary work (ὄσιος versus εὐσεβής): e.g. the sons of Aegyptus in A. *Supp.*: 9 vs. 762; Clytemnestra in A. *Ch.*: 141 vs. 378; Medea in E. *Med.*: 796, 850, 1305 vs. 1287, 1328, 1383; Polyphemus in E. *Cyc.*: 310-11 vs. 26, 348; Pentheus in E. *Ba.*: 263 vs. 613, 374; Lycus in E. *HF*: 760 vs. 255, 567; S. *OT*. 1382, 1441, vs. 353. No such cases occur in Herodotus, Aristophanes and Thucydides.

⁹³ BOLKESTEIN 1936:210.

⁹⁴ RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:15.

one should sacrifice).⁹⁵ Conversely, JEANMAIRE, inspired by VAN DER VALK, held that a person could be εὐσεβής because of his or her character, but one could only *become* temporarily ὄσιος by performing certain actions (making one temporarily ‘free from the gods’).⁹⁶

Q2c. Discussions on the semantic relationship between ὄσιος and δίκαιος appeared already in ancient philosophy.⁹⁷ Most importantly, in Plato’s *Gorgias* it was argued that τὸ ὄσιον concerns one’s duties towards the gods, whereas τὸ δίκαιον regards one’s duties towards other humans.⁹⁸ This distinction was taken up by VAN DER VALK.⁹⁹ But ὄσιος and δίκαιος often refer to *the same things*: actions that are evaluated in terms of ὁσιότης are also often considered δίκαιος (or the opposite, ἄδικος) and vice versa.¹⁰⁰ Later scholarship tried to account for these facts. According to BENVENISTE, ὄσιος and δίκαιος differ in meaning even when referring to the same conduct, because ὄσιος expresses what is permitted by divine law, while δίκαιος articulates what is sanctioned by human law.¹⁰¹ RUDHARDT, MOTTE and CONNOR argue that the difference between these terms is that ὄσιος, as opposed to δίκαιος, gives the utterance a strong religious connotation.¹⁰²

Q2d. The field of applications that ὄσιος, καθαρός and ἄγνός mainly share is that of ritual purity.¹⁰³ Therefore, ὄσιος is sometimes translated as ‘pure’. It has been argued by some that ὄσιος, καθαρός and ἄγνός are often used as ‘virtual’ synonyms or used in a very closely related way,¹⁰⁴ although it is at the same time acknowledged that these terms have rather ‘dissimilar semantic fields’.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁵ MIKALSON 2010:23.

⁹⁶ JEANMAIRE 1945:74.

⁹⁷ A more elaborate discussion of the *status quaestionis* on ὄσιος vs. δίκαιος is given in Chapter 4, section 2.

⁹⁸ Pl. *Gorg.* 507a6-b4. A similar case is made in Pl. *Euthphr.* 11e8-12e5.

⁹⁹ VAN DER VALK 1942:114-15, 118.

¹⁰⁰ RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:32 (with references to examples): ‘les mots ὄσιος et δίκαιος sont très fréquemment associés, ou employés dans différents contextes de telle manière que leur étroite correspondance ne peut être mise en doute’.

¹⁰¹ BENVENISTE 1969:198. Cf. LSJ s.v. ὄσιος I 1: ‘opp. δίκαιος, *sanctioned by divine law*’.

¹⁰² RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:30, 33; MOTTE 1986:167; CONNOR 1988:163.

¹⁰³ A more elaborate discussion of the *status quaestionis* on ὄσιος vs. καθαρός and ἄγνός is provided in Appendix 8.

¹⁰⁴ CONNOR 1988:163; PARKER 1996a [1983]:330.

¹⁰⁵ PARKER 1996a [1983]:323; VON STADEN 1996:429; RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:33 ; Cf. BREMMER 2002.

Q3: What can we make of the usage of ὅσιος and ὁσία for gods? In one group of cases, which is particularly difficult to understand, ὅσιος or ὁσία refers to the behaviour of a god.¹⁰⁶ This is unexpected, because all previous-mentioned theories assume somehow that ὅσιος and ὁσία in essence expresses a divine perspective on human actions. Moreover, the usages of ὅσιος or ὁσία to describe the behaviour of a god are quite rare. These cases have not received attention as a group in the secondary scholarship.¹⁰⁷

Besides these *semantic* questions, the attestations of *hosios & cognates* give rise to at least two *historical* questions.

Q4: How can we understand the increasing popularity of the lexeme? The extant data invites speculation on the diachronic distribution of *hosios & cognates*. The noun ἡ ὁσία occurs twice in Homer but is completely absent in Hesiod. In other archaic literature, both ἡ ὁσία and ὅσιος are rare. In the fifth century, especially in the second half, the adjective ὅσιος becomes rather frequent in literary texts. Why did users start to choose this lexeme over others more often in the fifth century? What factor, if we can determine any, triggered this large increase in frequency of use? Perhaps, the increasing popularity of the lexeme ὅσιος reflected a gradual change of mentality in Greek thought from the archaic to the classical period.¹⁰⁸ In order to test this hypothesis, we may first find out what ‘mentality’ *hosios & cognates* articulated, and then investigate whether that ‘way of thinking’ was absent from or unpopular in the archaic sources. If this way of reasoning does not provide us with an answer, we may consider different explanations for the diachronic attestation of *hosios & cognates*.

Q5. How persuasive was the statement that something was ‘(not) ὅσιον/ὁσία’? The appearance of ὅσιος and ὁσία in the epigraphical evidence makes us curious about their value in the historical context. For example, some inscriptions forbade the entrance of foreigners and/or women on the grounds that this was ‘not ὁσία’.¹⁰⁹ How seriously would visitors to a sanctuary have taken such prohibitions? To what extent

¹⁰⁶ n=7. E. *Or.* 595, E. *Alc.* 10, P. *P.* 36, E. *Heracl.* 719, h.*Merc.* 130, 173, 470. In this count I did not include h.*Cer.* 211, which is about the goddess Demeter disguised as a human.

¹⁰⁷ The oddity of *individual* cases is sometimes discussed in commentaries (cf. Chapter 5 of this dissertation).

¹⁰⁸ JAY-ROBERT 2009. cf. Chapter 2, section 5.

¹⁰⁹ N. *Suppl. Epig. Rodio* 169a, Lindos II 26, ID 68.

would they have cared, when they read that these things were ‘not ὁσία’?¹¹⁰ The question is part of larger scholarly discussions about the supposed ‘rationalisation’ of Greek *poleis* in the Classical period.¹¹¹

3. Solving these problems by using a linguistic method: thesis outline

I have argued that a native speaker’s knowledge of a lexeme consists of a structured inventory of usages of this lexeme and relevant connections to other word knowledge. The user’s semantic awareness of a lexeme *is (obviously) based on* his linguistic experience but does not necessary rise far above individual pieces of knowledge on the distribution of the lexeme and associated frames.¹¹²

The only information we have for a user’s ‘linguistic experience’ with *hosios & cognates* and other terms, for example in the case of a native Greek speaker born in the fifth century B.C., are the extant texts. While these are probably not a very accurate model for every-day language input, we do not have anything else. Taking, for the sake of the argument, our extant texts as a model for the linguistic input to the Greek learner/user, we will attempt to determine the *semantics* of *hosios & cognates* and the *semantic differences* between *hosios & cognates* and its near-synonyms guided by the outlined view of semantics. We will focus on a hypothetical Greek speaker of the fifth century or early fourth century B.C., and assume, for the sake of the argument, that his linguistic input is all literature between Homer and the end of the fifth century.¹¹³

As was explained, the analytical principle of this dissertation is lexical competition. This tool will help us answer all five research questions. **Chapter 2** is a preliminary investigation into the semantics of *hosios & cognates*. This chapter is an analysis of the ‘inventory of usages’ (in other words: the distribution) as well as the internal structure of the semantic network, and the frames that were associated with *hosios & cognates*. In the course of the analysis, we will discuss **Q1a** and **Q1b**, regarding the evaluative *nature* of *hosios & cognates* and the question of where to place these lexemes on an evaluative *scale*. Finally, having determined what ‘way of

¹¹⁰ As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, PARKER (2004, 2005a:63) and DELLI PIZZI (2011) have commented on the performative force of this terminology in this type of inscriptions.

¹¹¹ e.g. VERNANT 1962. Cf. Chapter 7, section 1.

¹¹² A speaker being asked what a word ‘means’ typically comes up with *examples*, and adduces that ‘one would use the word in such-and-such a situation...’.

¹¹³ A description of authors and texts that were included in the corpus is given in APPENDIX 9. Because the relevant inscriptions in this period are so few in number, I will discuss these separately, and not include them into any statistical, distributional analyses.

thinking' *hosios & cognates* express, we will investigate whether this mentality is present or absent in the oldest extant literary works (Homer and Hesiod) (**Q4**).

Chapter 3 is a contrastive study of *hosios & cognates* and *eusebês & cognates* (**Q2b**).¹¹⁴ Comparing the 'inventories of usages', i.e. the distributions of both groups of lexemes, will tell us much about the differences in their 'semantics'. We will see that *hosios & cognates* and *eusebês & cognates* are extremely alike in almost all aspects of their patterns of usage. Consequently, it will be argued that there is insufficient support for the views on the contrast between these lexemes in the scholarship. On the contrary, the closeness in meaning of *hosios & cognates* and *eusebês & cognates* may help us understand more about the usage of the adjective ὅσιος, especially its usage for objects (**Q1c**). The second part of the chapter is a contrastive analysis of the disqualifications ἀνόσιος, δυσσεβής and ἀσεβής. We will see that ἀνόσιος is not found in the same discourse environments as δυσσεβής and ἀσεβής. It will be argued that these two groups of lexemes may differ in their emotive meaning. The contrastive analysis enlightens us about this aspect of the semantics of *hosios & cognates*.

Chapter 4 is a contrastive analysis of *hosios & cognates* and *dikaios & cognates* (**Q2c**). In this chapter, we will not compare distributions. Instead, the analysis is based two other linguistic starting points. As was explained (this chapter), a user in the process of interpreting a lexeme in a particular context with a particular meaning temporarily accesses all other stored usages of the lexeme. The frames that are associated with these usages are activated as well. In this chapter we will investigate the ways in which *hosios & cognates* and *dikaios & cognates* frame a particular message respectively. We will also look at the way in which the activation of multiple frames may interfere with the interpretation. The analysis is based on a case study: the usage of ὅσιος and δίκαιος with respect to ancient supplication. This study will highlight some aspects of the semantics of *hosios & cognates* that were previously unconsidered. Finally, this study leads us to propose a tentative answer to **Q4**, regarding the diachronic distribution of *hosios & cognates*.

The discussion is continued by a study of the rare usage of ὅσιος for gods (**Q3**) in **Chapter 5**. Our analysis of the semantic network of *hosios & cognates* and the comparison with near-synonyms (*eusebês & cognates* and *dikaios & cognates*) bring us in a good position to assess this group of applications. We can see now that these usages are inherently paradoxical; moreover, the usage of other terms instead would

¹¹⁴ A discussion of the semantic relationship between ὅσιος and ἱερός (**Q2a**) is postponed until the very end of the thesis. The semantic differences between ὅσιος vs. καθαρός and ἄγνός (**Q2d**) are treated more briefly in Appendix 8.

have made perfect sense. I suggest analysing these passages in terms of markedness, a notion that is essentially based on the idea of lexical competition. As I will argue, marked language usage is the application of a term slightly outside of its usual reference, *in the face of an available alternative*, with an (intended) effect. We will discuss attested cases in which ὅσιος is used for a god, and show that they can be very well understood as a group and on the basis of their markedness.

In **Chapter 6** we will address the question of the persuasive value of ὁσία and ὅσιος in their historical context (**Q5**) in a case study, by looking at lexical competition in a group of *leges sacrae*. Here we will contrast the usage of ὅσιος and ὁσία, not with the usage of another evaluative term, but with the *absence* of such an evaluation. How much value or importance would contemporary Greeks have attached to the claim that ‘something is ὅσιος/ ὁσία (or not)’? Would they have cared about such religious argumentation? We will focus our case study on cultic regulations that contain the terms ὅσιος or ὁσία. On the basis of the literary sources, we know that ὅσιος and ὁσία describe the who, what, where, when and how of cultic practice. Many ‘sacred laws’ in our extant corpus of inscriptions deal with such topics. They describe, for example, the type of animal that should be sacrificed to this or that god on such and such a day. However, the terms ὅσιος and ὁσία itself rarely occur in such laws. In *leges sacrae* prescriptions or prohibitions are usually given *without* an explicit valuation of certain cultic actions as ὅσιον or in accordance with ὁσία. In this chapter we will consider the circumstances under which the religious evaluations ὁσία or ὅσιος were *added* to some sacred laws (considering the fact that other sacred laws contain no such evaluation). This contrastive analysis of ὅσιος vs. ∅ will show us something of the persuasive force of ὅσιος and ὁσία in a rhetorical setting. I will argue that such additions of religious terminology are very serious enforcement strategies, used as an alternative or in addition to the imposition of a fine, with the intention to strengthen the law.

Finally, in **Chapter 7** we turn to the alleged paradox in the semantics of ὅσιος. As was explained, this is the hypothesis that the adjective can take two opposite, mutually exclusive meanings: ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’, besides its core meaning ‘pious’ (**Q2a**). As I will argue, this semantic state of affairs is *a priori* suspect both on linguistic and on historical grounds. After a discussion of the *status quaestionis* on this difficult matter, I will solve this puzzle. In the course of the discussion, we will apply the knowledge that we have gained in Chapters 1-6. I will show that some of the supposed occurrences of this alleged paradox can in fact be explained on the basis of the prototypical usage of ὅσιος and ὁσία elsewhere. To explain the set phrase ἱερὰ καὶ ὁσία (especially in the case of monies), we will use insights gained in previous

chapters concerning the usage of ὅσιος for objects, the rhetorical, persuasive function of *hosios & cognates* and the notion of ‘framing’. Another group of cases can be explained as *marked* usage of the adjective ὅσιος or the noun ὁσία. These highly unusual cases are not good examples of ὅσιος or ὁσία meaning ‘sacred’ or ‘profane’, but deliberate anomalies that have an intended effect.

2

The semantics of ὄσιος

A preliminary investigation

This chapter is a first investigation into the semantics of *hosios & cognates*. Based on the view of lexical semantics set out in Chapter 1, we will examine the ‘inventory of usages’ (the distribution), the internal organisation of the semantic network (prototypical and less prototypical cases), and the cultural frame(s) associated with ὄσιος, ἀνόσιος and ὀσία. We will investigate the evaluative nature of *hosios & cognates* (**Q1a**) and the question of where to place ὄσιος on an evaluative scale (**Q1b**). In the final part of the chapter, having determined what ‘way of thinking’ or ‘mentality’ *hosios & cognates* articulate, we will discuss whether this mentality was already present in the texts of Homer and Hesiod (**Q4**).

1. Distribution

It was argued that a user's understanding of the 'meaning' of a lexeme is equal to knowledge of how this lexeme is used. For an important part, this means having an insight into the different *situations* in which the lexeme is employed and the relative *frequencies* of those various occurrences. Therefore, if we want to understand the semantic nature of *hosios & cognates*, we should determine their distribution in more detail first.

1.1 General distribution

Between Homer and the end of the fifth century BC we find 277 literary occurrences¹ of *hosios & cognates*. These are the adjective, the corresponding adverb, forms of the comparative and superlative and all such forms of ἀνόσιος, the noun ἡ ὀσία, the personification/goddess Ὀσία and various denominative verb forms. Forms of the adjective ὄσιος occur 245 times in literary texts until the end of the fifth century BC. In addition there are 15 instances of ἡ ὀσία, three of the goddess Ὀσία and 11 of a simplex or composite denominative verb form.² Finally, 3 cases of *hosios & cognates* appear in fragmentary passages, in which it is unclear to which grammatical category these cases belong.³ In the epigraphic material, ὄσιος is rare. Only eleven inscriptions with ὄσιος or ὀσία can be more or less securely dated to the fifth century.⁴

1.2 Distribution: authors

In the archaic period *hosios & cognates* are rare. The noun ὀσίη (Ionic form of ὀσία) occurs twice in Homer and five times in the Homeric Hymns.⁵ The first instances of the adjective ὄσιος are found in Simonides and in Theognis (one occurrence in each author). No denominative verb forms are attested and no instances of a goddess Ὀσία.

In the fifth century, *hosios & cognates* are widespread throughout genres, but (at least in absolute terms) most frequent in **dramatic texts**. The adjective ὄσιος and its

¹ All statistics were obtained by counting occurrences of *hosios & cognates* in the online database *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*.

² ὀσιώω (n=3), ἀφοσιώω (n=4), καθοσιώω (n=3) or ἐξοσιώω (n=1).

³ Simon. fr. 14 P. Oxy 2430 subfr. 76, E. *Hel.* 1353, E. *Hyps.* F. 752k.373 *TrGF*.

⁴ These are: 1. IG IX I(2) 3:718. Locris, (500-450 BC); 2. N. Suppl. Epig. Rodio 169a. Rhodes, Lindos (c. 400 BC); 3. Lindos II 26. Rhodes, Lindos (c. 400 BC); 4. ID 68. Delos (5th cent.); 5. IvO 16; 6. IG I³ 253; 7. IG I³ 52; 8. IvO 27; 9. SEG 43:630. Selinus (5th cent.); 10. SEG 4:171; 11. SCHWYZER, *DGE* 679, MASSON 1983 [1961]:235ff. Inscription 1 will be discussed in more detail in Appendices 3 and 7. Inscriptions 2-4 will be discussed extensively in Chapter 6. Inscriptions 5-8 are discussed by BLOK (2009a and *forthc.* c). Inscriptions 9 and 10 are discussed briefly in the course of Chapter 6, inscription 11 in Appendix 1.

⁵ In my diachronic analyses in this dissertation I have assigned any occurrences of lexemes in the Homeric Hymns to the pre-classical period. Cf the discussion in Appendix 9.

antonym ἀνόσιος are found in tragedy (in Aeschylus, n=10, in Sophocles, n=15, and often in Euripides, n=100) as well as comedy (in Aristophanes, n=14, the comic fragments of Eupolis, n=1, and Epicharmus, n=1). ὄσιος and ἀνόσιος are also attested in the earliest **orators** (in Andocides’ *De Mysteriis*, n=7, in Lysias’ *In Eratosthenem* and *In Agoratum*, n=5, and frequently in Antiphon, n=49). In fifth-century **historiography**, ὄσιος and ἀνόσιος occur both in Herodotus (n=28) and in Thucydides (n=8). Finally, ὄσιος and ἀνόσιος occur (rarely) in **lyric poetry** and in **early philosophical and other texts**.⁶ The noun ὁσία remains infrequent in fifth-century texts. It occurs three times in Euripides, where, in addition, we find (the only) three occurrences of a personification/goddess Ὅσια. The noun is attested also in Aristophanes (n=1), Herodotus (n=2), the fragments of Empedocles (n=1) and Pindar (n=1). Moreover, a very small number of instances of four denominative verbs (ὀσιόω, καθοσιόω, ἐξοσιόω and ἀφοσιόω) are attested in fifth-century texts. Again, the main occurrences are in drama: Euripides (n=6), Sophocles (n=1) and Aristophanes (n=1); in addition there are three cases in Herodotus. Moreover, one instance in Simonides and two in Euripides are so fragmentary that it is unclear whether ὄσιος or ὁσία is intended.

Note that the occurrences of *hosios & cognates* are not evenly spread out across the corpus. These lexemes are relatively by far the most common in Antiphon, followed by Euripides, as is clear from the “Top 5” in Table (1) below, showing the amount of occurrences of *hosios & cognates* per 1000 words in individual authors.

Author	Words in corpus ⁷	<i>hosios & cognates</i>	#/1000w
1. Antiphon	19621	49	2.497
2. Euripides	193904	114	0.588
3. Andocides	19624	7	0.357
4. Sophocles	80062	16	0.200
5. Herodotus	189489	33	0.174

Table 1: Absolute and relative frequency of *hosios & cognates* in 5th century authors: Top 5.

⁶ ὄσιος and ἀνόσιος occur in the fragments of the sophist Gorgias (n=1), in Bacchylides (n=2), in a fragment of Democritus (n=1) and in Empedocles’ fragments (n=1).

⁷ A justification for the numbers in this figure is given in Appendix 9.

1.3 Distribution: grammatical configuration

In the literary sources ὄσιος and ἀνόσιος are most often the evaluation of a *person*. In two thirds of occurrences of adjectival and adverbial ὄσιος/ἀνόσιος in literary texts until the end of the fifth century, these lexemes refer unequivocally to a person, qualifying the person him/herself,⁸ his/her behaviour⁹ or a situation resulting from human behaviour¹⁰ (67% of the data). Thus, one says about someone that he or she ‘is ὄσιος (or not)’, that he or she acted ὀσιῶς or ἀνοσιῶς, or that the present state of affair ‘is ὄσιος’ or the opposite, because of some previous action.

In those cases in which ὄσιος or ἀνόσιος qualifies an *object* the phrase often quite obviously describes human behaviour, too (another 13% of all cases). When the human species or life, the ‘course’ individuals take, human actions, human emotions or other behavioural characteristics, human speech or the lack of it are referred to in

⁸ n=61. In 60 cases the adjective (ἀν)οσιος qualifies a personal name or a pronoun (cases of the type ‘Oedipus is ἀνόσιος’), or it is substantivised (cases of the type: ‘do not acquit ἀνοσίους’), or it modifies a word for a person: ἀνὴρ (n=7, e.g. *A. Sept.* 566), γυνή (n=2, *E. El.* 645, *E. Or.* 518), φῶς (n=1, *S. OC* 281), πατήρ (n=2, *E. IA* 1318, *E. Or.* 1213), μήτηρ (n=1, *E. Or.* 24), κάρα (n=1, *E. Or.* 481), ξένος (n=3, *E. Hec.* 790, 852, 1235), also: θιασώτης (n=1, *Ar. Ra.* 327), μύστις (n=1, *Ar. Ra.* 336), κληροδότης (n=1, *E. IT* 130), μιάστωρ (n=2, *S. OT* 353, *E. El.* 683), κνώδαλον (n=1, *A. Supp.* 762, qualification of the sons of Aegyptus), λαστήριος (n=1, *Epich. fr.* 44a.6). The adverb semantically qualifies a person in one case: ‘those who are in a state of being ὄσιος’ (τοὺς ὀσιῶς διακειμένους, *Antipho* 5.82.5).

⁹ n= 100. The adverb qualifies human behaviour in 22 cases e.g. Theseus killed his child ἀνοσιῶς (*E. Hipp.* 1287). Another 22 cases of the adjective ὄσιος (including cases of the antonym and the comparative and superlative) describe human behaviour as ‘(not) ὄσιον’ (etc.), e.g. it is not ὄσιον to acquit the defendant (*Lys.* 13.95). Furthermore, in one case praiseworthy human actions are described, then qualified in a new sentence ‘for these things (ταῦτα) are ὄσια’ (*Antipho* 6.10.9). Moreover, the substantivised plural adjective τὰ ὄσια (including cases of the antonym and the comparative and superlative) is used as the object of a verb to qualify human speech-acts or actions expressed by a verb (n=51). Humans do ὄσια or ἀνόσια (n=28, for example, *Antigone* burying her brother, *S. Ant.* 74 or *Orestes* killing his mother, *E. Or.* 563), ask ὄσια or ἀνόσια (n=2, for example, by making an appeal to receive the corpses of the Seven against Thebes back, *E. Supp.* 123), say ὄσια or ἀνόσια (n=3, for example, by proposing to treat a corpse well, *Hdt.* 9.79.9), think ὄσια (n=1, by thinking about marriage, *E. El.* 1203), decide ὄσια (n=2, for example by condemning a criminal, *Lys.* 13.96), or order ἀνόσια (n=1, by ordering to burn a corpse against the custom, *Hdt.* 3.16.2). Τὰ ὄσια and τὰ ἀνόσια can also refer to actions of others to which one responds. Characters hear or see ὄσια (n=2, for example, *Theseus’* decision to help retrieving the corpses of the Seven, *E. Supp.* 367), suffer ὄσια or ἀνόσια (n=8, for example the actions of one’s adversaries in court, *Antipho* 2.4.7.8), and Zeus will surely punish τὰ ἀνόσια (n=1, the action of entering the women-only festival of the Thesmophoria as a man, *Ar. Th.* 684). In all of these cases, τὰ ὄσια / ἀνόσια are human actions. The substantivised singular adjective, including cases of comparative and superlative occurs in similar constructions (n=5).

¹⁰ n=3. The adverb describes such a situation or event in 2 cases, e.g. *Agamemnon* lives ἀνοσιῶς under the earth, *E. El.* 677; the substantivised adjective does so in one case (*Antipho* 5.84.2).

terms of ὄσιος or ἀνόσιος, the whole phrase cannot be anything but an evaluation of what is expressed by that speech, emotion, action etc.¹¹ For example, Medea announces that she will leave the city once she will have murdered her children, having committed an ἔργον ἀνοσιώτατον. A comic chorus threatens Mnesilochus that the gods will punish him and then he will no longer laugh about his own ἀνοσίους λόγους (his plan to murder a human baby on an altar). Phaedra is being broken by οὐχ ὀσίων ἐρώτων, the sexual desire for her own son.¹² In these cases, although ὄσιος and ἀνόσιος syntactically qualify an object, they metaphorically refer to the person involved in the action (i.e., *semantically* they qualify the person).¹³

Both discussed types of construction taken together account for the large majority, 80% (= 67% +13%) of the data. In this large majority of cases ὄσιος and ἀνόσιος are evaluative terms associated with and referring to human behaviour. In 17% of the cases, ὄσιος and ἀνόσιος syntactically qualify an object, while it is not immediately obvious whether or how they semantically qualify the person involved or not.¹⁴ One frequently quoted case in which ὄσιον has been interpreted as providing some

¹¹ n=31: the human species or human life: βίος (n=1, E. *HF* 1302), γένος (n=1, Ar. *Av.* 333); the ‘course’ they take: κέλευθον (n=1, Simon. fr. 36 P. Oxy 2432 subfr. 1.12), δρόμος (n=1, E. *HF* 1213); human actions, generically: ἔργον (n=12, e.g. Hdt. 2.114.2), πρᾶγμα (n=1, Hdt. 3.120.1); human emotions or other behavioural characteristics: ὕβρις (n=1, E. *Ba.* 374), ἔρωτος (n=1, E. *Hipp.* 764), πόθος (n=1, E. *IA* 555), θυμός (n=1, Bacch. *Dith.* 3.21); human speech or the lack of it: λόγος (n=3, e.g. Ar. *Th.* 720), κόμπασμα (n=1, A. *Sept.* 551), φθέγμα (n=1, E. *HF* 926), ἀρά (n=2, E. *Med.* 607, E. *Ph.* 67), ἔγκλημα (n=1, Antipho 4.2.4.4.), μέλος (n=1, Ar. *Av.* 897-98). In one case the adverb semantically qualifies humans’ words, in Antipho 5.7.5 where the speaker says his ‘request’ is ὄσιος’ (ἢ αἰτήσις ... ὀσίως ἔχουσα).

¹² E. *Med.* 796, Ar. *Th.* 720, E. *Hipp.* 764.

¹³ To illustrate the difference between adjectives semantically qualifying either an object or the person involved in the action, while in both cases syntactically modifying the object, we can compare two examples in which the word κέλευθος (road, path) is syntactically modified by an adjective. Sentence (a) concerns a sea-journey: (a) Οἱ μὲν ἔπειτ’ ἀναβάντες ἐπέπλεον ὑγρά κέλευθα (*Il.* 1.312) ‘They then embarked and sailed on the watery ways.’ In this example the adjective ‘watery’ expresses a quality of the path – ὑγρά κέλευθα obviously referring to the sea – and says nothing about the people who sail on it: they are not ‘watery’. The statement in (b) below occurs inside a description of human morality. The narrator explains that it is granted to few people to be truly good and that humans can be overwhelmed by the desire for money, sex and feelings of revenge. A piece of advice follows: (b) [...] ἐ μὴ δι’ αἰῶνος ὅσταν | [...] θεῖν κέλευθον, | [] ἐς τὸ δυνατόν. (Simon. fr. 36. P.Oxy.2432 subfr. 1.12) ‘[if? he can]not through his whole life [follow?] a ὄσιος path, [then?] as much as he can.’ In the second example, the adjective ὄσιος clearly does not express a semantic quality of a physical path. Though syntactically qualifying κέλευθον, the adjective really describes a *person* on his ‘path of life’, trying to be as good as he can in the face of temptations (this passage is discussed in the main text below, section 1.7, and in Appendix 5). A comparable example to (b) occurs in E. *HF* 1212, in which Amphitryon asks Heracles to restrain his θυμός by which he is led astray on a murderous, ἀνόσιον course (δρόμον).

¹⁴ n=44.

description of the object occurs in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*, in which an allegedly pregnant woman expresses the wish to move to a ὄσιον place (χωρίον).¹⁵ Other famous examples are the ὄσια monies (χρήματα) that are referred to in fifth- and fourth-century inscriptions and fourth-century literary texts (fourth-century cases not in this corpus).¹⁶

This group of objects can be classified into a select number of types. First of all, ὄσιος and ἀνόσιος qualify body parts,¹⁷ the place where humans live,¹⁸ and the Cyclops' meal of Odysseus' comrades.¹⁹ Furthermore, ὄσιος evaluates murders²⁰ or deaths,²¹ things that pertain to the rituals of worship,²² marriage²³ or purity (or the opposite),²⁴ and sometimes other matters.²⁵ In this dissertation we will examine what kind of evaluation ὄσιος represents in these cases. We will take up this question in Chapter 3, in the contrastive analysis of ὄσιος and εὐσεβής.²⁶ The adjective rarely appears in other configurations.²⁷

The noun ὄσια occurs only in a few syntactic configurations. Sentences with ἡ ὄσια are usually evaluations or rules, stating that 'X (a particular course of action) is ὄσια' (or not). Sometimes it is said that humans should 'follow ὄσια'; or cultic actions are performed in a particular way 'because of ὄσια.'²⁸

¹⁵ Ar. *Lys.* 742, discussed in Chapter 7, section 2.3.

¹⁶ Cf. Chapter 7, section 3.

¹⁷ χεῖρ (n=2, A. *Ch.* 378, S. *OC* 470), κάρα (n=1, E. *HF* 255), κρᾶτα (n=1, E. *HF* 567), νέκυς (n=1, A. *Ant.* 1071), πούς (n=2, E. *IT* 130, E. *Hel.* 869), στόμα (n=2, Emp. fr. 3 l. 7, S. *OC* 981).

¹⁸ πόλις (n=2, E. *El.* 1319, E. *Antiop.* F 223.115-16), βασιλῆϊον (n=1, E. *Phaëth.* F 774.69 *TrGF*), ἔδεθλα (n=1, A. *Ag.* 778).

¹⁹ δεῖπνον (n=1, E. *Cyc.* 31), δαίς (n=1, E. *Cyc.* 693).

²⁰ φόνος (n=3, e.g. E. *Med.* 1305), σφαγή (n=2, E. *Tr.* 1316, E. *IA* 1318), προσφάγμα (n=1, E. *Tr.* 628).

²¹ ὄλεθρος (n=1, E. *IT* 871), μόρος (n=1, Hdt. 3.65.3), συμφορά (n=1, E. *Hipp.* 814).

²² θυσία (n=1, E. *IT* 465), θοῖνη (n=1, A. *Pr.* 529), χορός (n=1, E. *Tr.* 328).

²³ γάμος (n=5, e.g. E. *Ion* 1093), νύμφευμα (E. *El.* 1261), ὑμέναιος (n=1, E. *Phaëth.* F 773.64 *TrGF*).

²⁴ λουτρόν (n=1, S. *Aj.* 1405), μίασμα (n=1, E. *HF* 1233), καθαριμός (n=1, E. *Ba.* 77).

²⁵ δίκη (n=1, Thgn. 1.132), θέα (n=1, E. *HF* 323), νόμοι (n=1, Antipho 6.2.3), ὁσμή (n=1, S. *Ant.* 1083), ψῆφος (n=1, E. *IT* 944), ὄνειδος (n=1, Antipho 2.2.9.7).

²⁶ Chapter 1, section 3.

²⁷ In three cases the substantivised τὸ ὄσιον appears in a different construction. In Corcyra, people place their wish to take revenge above τοῦ ὄσιου (Th. 3.84.2). Priestess Iphigenia wishes to present only τὸ ὄσιον to the god for sacrifice (E. *IT* 1037). And Castor and Pollux save people to whom ὄσιον is dear in their lives (E. *El.* 1351). The three remaining cases (1%) are too fragmentary to classify.

²⁸ 'X=ὄσια': Od. 16.423, 22.412, h.*Ap.*237, Pi. *P.* 3.12, E. *Melanipp. Capt.* F 494.19-20 *TrGF*, Hdt. 2.171.2, 2.45.2; 'following ὄσια': E. *Or.* 501; 'because of ὄσια': h.*Cer.* 211, E. *IT* 1461. Moreover, worshippers in Emp. fr. 3.12 do not want to say 'more than ὄσια'. Different constructions occur in

Note that *hosios* & cognates almost always describe characteristics of *humans*. These terms are very rarely used in connection to the person or behaviour of a god.²⁹ Finally, in the inscriptions, ὄσιος and ὀσία occur only in a few configurations, too.³⁰

1.4 Distribution: self- and other attributed

Actions, rules, attitudes expressed by means of the adjective ὄσιος and the noun ὀσία are in a large majority of cases other-attributed: in 79% of the cases, speakers refer to what is ὄσιος or ἀνόσιος or (not) ὀσία about the actions, attitudes or objects belonging to someone else³¹ and only in 19% of the occurrences to their own behaviour, etc.³²

1.5 Distribution: argumentative orientation

The antonymic pair ὄσιος - ἀνόσιος is asymmetrical in frequency. I will use VERHAGEN's notion of *argumentative orientation* to discuss these asymmetries.³³ In the following, I will assume that the statement that 'X (someone or something) is ὄσιος' has a *positive* argumentative orientation: it orients the addressee towards a positive, affirmative inference concerning the ὀσιότης of X. I will assume that both the statements 'X is not ὄσιος' and 'X is ἀνόσιος' have a *negative* argumentative orientation: they orient the addressee towards a negative inference concerning the ὀσιότης of X. I will use the terms 'positive argumentative orientation' and 'negative argumentative orientation' in this way throughout my thesis.³⁴

h.Merc. 130, 173, 470 and in *Ar. Pl.* 682. These (exceptional) cases are discussed in detail in Chapter 7, section 5.

²⁹ n=7. *E. Or.* 595, *E. Alc.* 10, *P. P.* 36, *E. Heracl.* 719, *h.Merc.* 130, 173, 470. The first four cases are the topic of Chapter 5; the cases in *h.Merc.* are discussed in detail in Chapter 7, section 5.

³⁰ In five inscriptions (no. 1-4 and 9 in n. 4 of section 1.1 above) we find the noun ἡ ὀσία, which occurs in contexts where it is discussed *for whom* it is ὀσία to do things, such as enter a sanctuary, make sacrifice or receive part of the sacrificial meal. The other inscriptions feature the adjective ὄσιος. Three inscriptions (no. 5, 6, 8 in n. 4 of section 1.1 above) refer to ὄσιον money. In inscription no. 7 a group of appointed officials needs to solve a financial issue 'as within their power and as is ὄσιον'. In inscription 10 generals need to collect tax from their soldiers, but if they fail to do so, 'let it be ἀνόσιον'. Inscription 11 states that if someone offends against the terms set down in a law, 'let ἀνόσια happen to him'.

³¹ n=217.

³² n=51. Six remaining cases (2%) are too fragmentary to classify. I have excluded the three cases in which the text refers to the goddess Ὀσία.

³³ VERHAGEN 2008:317-20.

³⁴ I use these terms for disambiguation. Saying that ὄσιος is used in a 'positive way' is ambiguous because positive means 'affirmative' or 'expressing praise', negative means 'negated' or 'expressing censure'. N.B. One could stipulate that the statement 'X is ἀνόσιος' has a positive argumentative orientation, because it orients the addressee towards a positive inference concerning his ἀνοσιότης, but I will not do so.

Among the literary occurrences of ὄσιος and ὄσια 60% of the data (not counting verb forms) have a negative argumentative orientation,³⁵ while 36% have a positive argumentative orientation.³⁶ Moreover, in 8% of these cases with positive argumentative orientation, the evaluation ὄσιος does not appear independently, but in direct juxtaposition to a question or a negation containing either (ἀν)όσιος or a semantically related term.³⁷ That is, in over two thirds of all cases ὄσιος and ὄσια have a negative argumentative orientation, or they appear in immediate contrast to a (supposed) negatively oriented alternative (60% + 8%). It is thus by far the less common case to simply state in the affirmative, without any expectation, actuality or contradiction of the opposite being involved, that something or someone is ὄσιος.

In a few other cases, ὄσιος or ὄσια appear in a question or conditional statement.³⁸ Note that the distribution of ἡ ὄσια, when considered on its own is notably different: two thirds of the occurrences of ὄσια have a positive argumentative orientation (10 out of 15 cases).

1.6 Distribution across themes

As we saw in Chapter 1, ὄσιος and cognates may refer to very diverse issues. However, these terms in fact cluster around a small group of themes. This shows when we classify all occurrences of ὄσιος and cognates in the corpus on the basis of the topic to which they refer:

- 24% of all occurrences (n=67) revolve around **acknowledging gods as gods, keeping a proper relationship towards them (n=22) and honouring them in cult (n=45).**
- 23% of all cases (n=64) have to do with honouring those who are in one's *oikos*:

³⁵ n=158.

³⁶ n=95.

³⁷ n=21. For example, in a legal suit the defence party claims they would suffer 'not ὄσια, but ἀνόσια' if they are condemned as murderers (Antipho 3.3.11). In a tragedy, a slave boldly tells a local ruler that he is in charge, but only 'to do ὄσια, not ἔκδικα' (E. *Hel.* 1638). When Electra is contemplating marriage (instead of being preoccupied with murdering her mother) the chorus tells her that 'now you are thinking thoughts which are ὄσια again, unlike before' (E. *El.* 1203). ὄσιος with positive argumentative orientation is either (1) the answer to a question containing a semantically closely related term or idea, e.g. 'is it θέμις...?'; or (2) appears directly juxtaposed to (a) ἀνόσιος/οὐχ ὄσιος or to (b) a semantically closely related term or idea with negative argumentative orientation or (c) a general negation: e.g. 'not ἀνόσιος/ἀσεβής, but ὄσιος,' 'not ἄδικος, but ὄσιος,' 'now ὄσιος, not before'. Other examples: (1) S. *Phil.* 662; (2a): E. *Tr.* 1316, E. *Or.* 547; (2b): E. *HF* 773, E. *Hel.* 1021.

³⁸ question: n=3, conditional: n=3, together these cases account for 2% of the data. The four remaining cases (2%) are too fragmentary to classify.

behaving well towards one's **parents or children** (n=45), one's **brothers and sisters** (n=6), towards **other family members** (n=1) and **spouses** (n=12).

- 13% of all cases (n=35) have to do with honouring **the dead**, burying them and providing them with the appropriate honours afterwards.
- 14% of all occurrences (n=38) relate to behaviour towards **guests, hosts, and suppliants**.
- 13% of all occurrences (n=37) have to do with keeping an **oath**.
- 5%, a very small minority of all examined cases (n=14) is a **general, unspecific** evaluation of behaviour.

In many cases we cannot choose *one* (primary) option. In 38% of all occurrences speakers seem to qualify someone as ὄσιος (or the opposite) when multiple reasons to do so add up. Taking into account the fact that many passages belong to multiple categories, the cases listed above together account not for 92% of the data (= the added total of the percentages mentioned above) but for 81%.

- A remaining 19% (n=53) can be seen as a **rest category** in which ὄσιος is used to evaluate a wide variety of actions, attitudes and objects.³⁹

1.7 Distribution *within* themes

There are not many cases in which *hosios & cognates* literally express that humans **acknowledge gods as gods** and **keep a proper relationship towards them**, refraining from hubristic statements and actions.⁴⁰ More importantly, *hosios & cognates* discuss aspects of **cultic practice**. Some passages refer to the maltreatment of the gods' temples, altars and images or to the action of honouring a particular god in cultic service at all.⁴¹ But most often in this category, the noun ὁσία and the adjective ὄσιος regard the rules and customs at sanctuaries and their physical environment, describing the **who, what, where, when and how of ritual practice**. Often, it is stated that '[a certain action] is (not) ὁσία / ὄσιον', though more often expressing a prohibition. In other cases, human behaviour in respect to cult or sanctuary is evaluated by means of the adverb ὀσίως.

³⁹ Cases assigned to this rest category mention a specific, identifiable cause for the evaluation ὄσιος (or the opposite), which is not one of the topics listed above. By contrast, in cases assigned to the category of 'general, unspecific' behaviour there seem(s) no apparent *specific* cause(s) for evaluating someone/something in terms of *hosios & cognates*, and/or the utterance has a very wide scope. In these cases, the evaluation seems to express general praise or censure of a person.

⁴⁰ n=6. For example, Pentheus is not ὄσιος for his refusal to recognise Dionysus as a true god (E. *Ba.* 374, 613); and the hubristic attitude of five of the seven warriors in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes* is denounced as ἀνόσιος (A. *Sept.* 551, 566).

⁴¹ e.g. Ar. *Th.* 720, Hdt. 8.109.3.

Some of these rules are specific to a particular cultic group and to a particular cult. For example, Iphigenia, in Tauris, says it is only ὄσιον for her as priestess to touch the statue of Artemis; and a priest in Herodotus is upset when he finds out that some weapons, which are not ὄσιον for any human to touch, have been removed from a sanctuary of Delphi. Such rules relate to *who* should or must not perform particular ritual actions or who is allowed to handle particular sacred objects or obtain certain knowledge.⁴² Herodotus deals with the question of *what* is a proper gift to the gods in the eyes of particular cultic groups when explaining ‘it is not ὀσίη for the Egyptians to sacrifice animals other than sheep, bulls, male calves, which are ritually clean, and geese’.⁴³ Likewise, a tragic chorus accuses Helen of having burnt as a sacrifice ‘those things of which it is not θέμις or ὀσία [to sacrifice them]’.⁴⁴ The mothers of the seven against Thebes show a sensitivity to local temporal cultic restrictions (*when*), by admitting they are supplicating ‘in a manner that is not ὄσιος’, since their supplication is made during a festival.⁴⁵

Other rules about ἡ ὀσία represent Panhellenic customs. For example, a chorus of bacchants give the bystanders a well-known order on *how* to behave during the ritual, though in particularly fancy language, when telling them to ‘make themselves completely ὄσιος with respect to a reverently silent mouth’.⁴⁶

The second main application of *hosios & cognates* is in the reference of these terms to the **interaction with members of one’s oikos**: most notably, the relationship between **parents and children**, between **brothers and sisters** and between **husband and wife**. Here, *hosios & cognates* are used in a rather restricted manner. Disqualifications (οὐχ ὄσιος and ἀνόσιος) are by far the most common. Moreover, the types of actions that are evaluated is rather limited. Concerning the bond between parents and children, the Greek ‘cultural frame’ of this relationship between parents and children is elaborate, as is transparent from many discussions and reflections in archaic and classical literature and epigraphic evidence. When a child is small, its parents should feed, raise and protect it and preferably leave it a profitable *oikos* and a good reputation to enjoy as a grown up.⁴⁷ Then the balance of dependency turns. The grown-up child is expected to pay back his parents’ long-term investment by caring

⁴² E. *IT* 1045, Hdt. 8.37; cf. Ar. *Nu.* 140, E. *Hipp.* 81, E. *Med.* 1054, Hdt. 3.37, 5.73, Ar. *Th.* 1150.

⁴³ Hdt. 2.45.

⁴⁴ E. *Hel.* 1353 (N.B. the editions of *Helen* by BURIAN 2007 and OCT print ὀσία, n. pl. of ὄσιος, but I think ὀσία, f. sg. noun, is more plausible, with ALLAN 2008 and DALE 1978 [1967]); Cf. E. *IT* 1035, Ar. *Pax* 1018.

⁴⁵ E. *Supp.* 63.

⁴⁶ E. *Ba.* 70. This passage is discussed in Chapter 7, section 4.4, n. 122.

⁴⁷ Material wellbeing provided for children as part of parental care: H. *Il.* 19.328-32, E. *Alc.* 687-88, E. *Ion* 478-80.

for them when they are old,⁴⁸ burying them properly and continuing to honour them with religious rites for the dead.⁴⁹ Indeed, a few passages with *hosios & cognates* describe various ways of going against this script. Amphitryon agrees to die, but not *after* his children: seeing children die is an ἀνόσιον θέαν ‘sight’. What he means to say, it seems, is that this is unnatural, preventing both partners from acting ὄσιως in their future life.⁵⁰ But *hosios & cognates* most often evaluate one thing, the most definite and grave transgression imaginable: the (murder) of parent by child or vice versa.⁵¹ The same is true for the usage of *hosios & cognates* with respect to the bond between other members of an *oikos*: what is most frequently evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates* is murder or intended murder of a spouse⁵² or of sibling by sibling.⁵³

hosios & cognates evaluate the interaction between **guest and host** and towards **suppliants**. In general, the term may refer to treating a guest well or to accepting and helping a suppliant, sometimes a suppliant to whom one has given a pledge of protection. For example, Hypsipyle, when supplicating the seer Amphiaraus to help her, confidently declares: ‘you will do ὄσια since you are ὄσιος’.⁵⁴ However, the

⁴⁸ Discussions of children in terms of ‘profit’: When Hecuba finds out her son is dead she calls bearing him ἀνόνητος ‘unprofitable’ (E. *Hec.* 766); in E. *Ion* 475 they are καρποφόροι ‘fruitbearing’.

⁴⁹ The parent-child relationship is telescoped in one image in Euripides’ *Heracles*. Heracles compares his children to ἐφολκίδες, which are little boats attached to a large boat that tows it. Heracles is towing his ‘ἐφολκίδες’ who cannot ‘move’ on their own, along. But an ἐφολκίς is not just a small burden depending on the bigger ship: the word also means ‘life-boat’ (GRIFFITHS 2002:654 with n. 46). In this way, the metaphor looks ahead to the moment in which the balance will shift and the children become the old man’s ‘lifesavers’, caring for him when he is grey and helpless.

⁵⁰ E. *HF* 323. Other examples: in one of Antiphon’s speeches, the defendant claims that his death will mean him leaving ἀνόσια ὀνειδίη ‘reasons for censure’ to his children (Antipho 2.2.9.7): i.e., he will die instead of being able to leave his children a good reputation or material wellbeing, as he was supposed to do. Harming one’s parents or child by cursing them (E. *Ph.* 67) or by pressing charges against them (Pl. *Euthphr.* 4 E 1) is also framed as ‘not ὄσιος’ or ἀνόσιος.

⁵¹ The infanticides of Medea (E. *Med.* 796, 850, 1305) Heracles (E. *HF* 1213, 1233, 1282, 1302) and Agamemnon (E. *IA* 1105, 1318) are referred to as ἀνόσιος, and the Cretan king Etearchus is disqualified as such for the intended murder of his child (Hdt. 4.152). Orestes’ matricide and Oedipus’ murder of his father are repeatedly referred to in the same way (e.g. E. *Or.* 286, 374, 563; S. *OT* 353).

⁵² Electra says she is the daughter of a mother who is most ἀνόσια, one who killed her husband (E. *Or.* 24). Other examples of behaviour towards a lover or spouse evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates*: A. *Ch.* 378, E. *Heracl.* 719, Antipho 1.26.8.

⁵³ Herodotus narrates how Smerdis died by a ἀνόσιος fate, being murdered (accidentally) by his own brother Cambyses (Hdt. 3.65). Other examples of behaviour towards a sibling evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates*: E. *IT* 871, Hdt. 2.121e, E. *Hel.* 1638.

⁵⁴ E. *Hyps.* F 757.862 *TrGF*. This example is discussed below in section 3.

majority of cases of *hosios & cognates* that deal with ξενία and ικετεία are, again, the description of an offense. For example, it is said that Paris carried out an ἀνόσιον ἔργον (deed) when he seduced the wife of his own host (ξένος) and carried her off and also stole money.⁵⁵ Heracles wants to ‘cut off the ἀνόσιον head’ of Lycus, a tyrant threatening to kill his family while they are sitting as suppliants at an altar.⁵⁶

Various aspects of conduct towards **the dead** are described in terms of ὄσιος and cognates. Some cases refer to the requirement to bury the dead. For example, Antigone says she will have ‘committed a crime consisting of ὄσια’ having buried her Polynices in defiance of Creon’s decree. Rules concerning funeral regulations and the cult for the dead are also described in terms of ἡ ὄσια or ὄσιον. Thus, Herodotus tells us that it is not ὄσιον for the Egyptians to be buried in woollen clothes, as for the initiates of the Bacchic and Orphic mysteries.⁵⁷

Passages in which ὄσιος (seems to) refer(s) to **oath-keeping** are most prominent in forensic oratory. At homicide trials both the accuser and the defence swore to speak the truth; the jurors swore, among other things, to make judgments according to the law.⁵⁸ The term ὄσιος sometimes seems to refer to these oaths. For example, in Antiphon’s *De Choreuta* the defence argues that the accusers are not really convinced of his guilt but have been bribed to sue him. He wonders which oath these ἀνοσιώτατοι *would* hesitate to break (i.e., if apparently they did not give any heed to the oaths they swore in this court).⁵⁹ Sometimes ὄσιος refers to oath-keeping in other contexts.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ Hdt. 2.114-115. Other examples of misbehaviour towards guests evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates*: E. *Hec.* 790, E. *Cyc.* 378, 438, 693, Hdt. 2.119.2.

⁵⁶ E. *HF* 773. Other examples of behaviour towards suppliants evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates*: Hdt. 1.159, S. *OC* 281, 283, E. *Supp.* 40, *Od.* 16.423.

⁵⁷ S. *Ant.* 74; Hdt. 2.81. Other examples of conduct towards the dead evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates*: *Od.* 22.412, S. *Aj.* 1405, E. *Hel.* 1021, 1054, E. *Supp.* 123, Hdt. 3.16, 9.78-79, Th. 2.52.4 (the controversial last-mentioned case is discussed in Chapter 7, section 2.1).

⁵⁸ MACDOWELL 1978:44, 119.

⁵⁹ Antipho 5.51. Various cases of ὄσιος seem to refer more implicitly to the oath taken by accuser and defence and by the jurors. Sometimes one of the parties urge the jury to judge ὀσίως in favour of them, i.e. to honour the oath by which they are bound to decide cases in accordance with the law (e.g. Antipho 2.4.12.1). Sometimes the accused claim the accusers are ‘not doing ὄσια’ by prosecuting them (Antipho 4.2.2.10), which I interpret as ‘not honouring the oath by which you are bound’, or say they would ‘undergo ἀνόσια’ if they are convicted (although they are not guilty), which I interpret as a complaint that they would suffer the consequence of the ἀνόσιον action of those who falsely accuse him in defiance of the oath they swore (Antipho 2.4.7.8).

⁶⁰ Ar. *Av.* 327, E. *Ph.* 493, Th. 1.71.6.

In a small group of passages ὄσιος is used **generally, unspecifically or with a very wide scope** to evaluate behaviour. One early case occurs in a fragment of Simonides. This text seems to say that god gives merit to few continuously all the way to the end. Most people are oppressed by different forces that overwhelm them against their will: the irresistible desire for profit, the powerful sting of Aphrodite and the love of victory. The idea seems to be that Greed, Lust and Pride – three ‘deadly sins’ *avant la lettre* – may lead one to transgressions. The fragment continues to say that ‘(if) a man cannot (follow) a ὄσιον course throughout life, then (he should do so as much) as he can’. Thus, the advice to the reader is not to behave well in any particular interhuman relationship or field of activity. Instead the text identifies those negative influences that might harm *any* such relationship. The “ὄσιον route” seems to be quite a general ethical guideline.⁶¹

The **rest category** of remaining cases includes a variety of attitudes, actions and objects. Sexual behaviour is sometimes evaluated in terms of ὀσιότης,⁶² murder in general, attacking a city during a truce and defending oneself against an attacking enemy all are discussed in terms of (failing) ὀσιότης.⁶³ In some passages, merely *accusing* someone of having committed a transgression in one of the abovementioned spheres is considered ἀνόσιον.⁶⁴

As we have seen, three quarters of the occurrences of ὄσιος concern interaction *between* humans, mostly in a select number of themes. In the next section we will consider the connections between these various behavioural areas in more detail.

2. Internal organisation of the semantic network

The scholarly discussion on ὄσιος as a primarily ‘ethical’ and/or ‘religious’ evaluation can be seen as a debate over the internal semantic organisation of the lexeme. Which usage(s) would a user conceive of as ‘primary’, as ‘the best example’

⁶¹ Simon. fr. 36, P. Oxy 2432, subfr. 1.1-14. This fragmentary text is discussed in detail in Appendix 5.

⁶² The positively oriented adjective ὄσιος occasionally describes a prudent and modest sexual life that is not guided by excessive desires (E. *IA* 555). The antonym ἀνόσιος sometimes evaluates problematic behaviour relating to love, marriage and sex. But most of these examples describe a seriously disturbed relationship between parents and children (S. *OC* 946, 981, S. *OT* 1289, 1360, E. *Hipp.* 764), husband and wife (E. *El.* 600, 926) or guest and host (Hdt. 2.114-15 concerning Paris), and I have classified them under the categories of relations within the *oikos* and between guest and host. Examples in which ἀνόσιος describes problematic sexual behaviour outside of those typical relationships: B. *Dith.* 3.21, E. *El.* 1261, E. *Ion* 1093.

⁶³ Antipho 3.3.3.10; Th. 2.5.5.4; Th. 3.56.2.4.

⁶⁴ S. *OC* 981, And. *De Myst.* 19, 23.

of ὁσιότης, as ‘prototypical’? In Chapter 1, we discussed one way of finding the prototypical usage of a lexeme: by studying cases in which the lexeme is activated without much contextual preparation.⁶⁵

2.1 The prototypical case

In the following, we will analyse Euthyphro’s responses to Socrates’ question of ‘what is ὄσιον’. It was argued by RADEMAKER and by SLUITER & ROSEN (in the context of semantic studies of σωφροσύνη and ἀνδρεία) that one may sometimes find the prototypical usage of a lexeme by examining the first answers to Socrates’ ‘What is X’ questions in Plato’s dialogues.⁶⁶ We will examine Plato’s *Euthyphro* and analyse his first definitions of τὸ ὄσιον. Euthyphro’s initial response is inspired by his own current situation. Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for murder and his definition follows from that action:

Λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὄσιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ, τῷ ἀδικοῦντι ἢ περὶ φόνους ἢ περὶ ἱερῶν κλοπᾶς ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων ἐξαμαρτάνοντι ἐπεξιέναι, εἴαντε πατὴρ ὢν τυγχάνῃ εἴαντε μήτηρ εἴαντε ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι ἀνόσιον.

I say that *to hosion* is precisely what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrongdoer who commits murder or steals from the temples or does any of such things, whether he happens to be one’s father or one’s mother or anyone else, and not prosecuting him is *anhosion*.⁶⁷

Euthyphro’s first definition lies in the ethical *and* in the religious sphere. We have already seen that murder and disrespect of gods’ property are often evaluated as not ὄσιος, and we can imagine that pursuing those who commit such crimes *is* ὄσιος. But our previous analysis of the distribution also immediately shows us the problem of Euthyphro’s definition, and its probable shock effect on the audience. ‘Showing respect for one’s parents’ is frequently described as ὄσιος, too. Thus, Euthyphro both conforms to and breaches current usage in the same sentence.

Euthyphro’s second definition of τὸ ὄσιον is prompted by Socrates’ request to hear not an example of ὁσιότης but its essence. Note that although Socrates wants to hear an essentialist definition, in fact he is prompting Euthyphro to come up with a

⁶⁵ Chapter 1, section 1.

⁶⁶ RADEMAKER 2005:35, SLUITER & ROSEN 2003:7-8. Cf. Chapter 1, section 1.

⁶⁷ Pl. *Euthphr.* 5d8-e2.

‘schema’. He wants Euthyphro to think about an abstraction from the individual examples of ὀσιότης that he knows.⁶⁸ According to Euthyphro,

Ἔστι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλὲς ὄσιον, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλὲς ἀνόσιον.

What is pleasing to the gods is *hosion* and what is not pleasing is *anhosion*.⁶⁹

Euthyphro’s reasons for considering the prosecution of his father to be ὄσιος show from this second definition. He perceives his action as *a way of pleasing the gods*. Thus, in the *Euthyphro* τὸ ὄσιον not only has an ethical and a religious component, but these two are crucially connected. According to Euthyphro, behaving in a certain way towards one’s father is ὄσιος, because this is agreeable to the divine world. If we may take Euthyphro’s views as showing us the prototypical sense of ὄσιος, the evaluation seems to be prototypically ethical *and* religious in the classical period.

A related question to ask is how this synchronic situation came about. VAN DER VALK argued that ὀσίη *originally* had a religious sense, from which the ethical sense developed.⁷⁰ We may examine VAN DER VALK’s hypothesis by taking a diachronic perspective and examining the very first attestations of ὀσίη, in Homer’s *Odyssey*.⁷¹

In *Odyssey* 16, one of the suitors, Antinous, had previously suggested to kill Telemachus somewhere on a quiet road out of town and divide his possessions amongst the suitors – a plan which was not well received.⁷² When Penelope heard about Antinous’ scheme, she admonished him for showing *hybris* (ὕβριν ἔχων, 418) and denounced him as a ‘madman’:

μάργε, τίη δὲ σὺ Τηλεμάχῳ θάνατόν τε μόρον τε 421
 ῥάπτεις, οὐδ’ ἰκέτας ἐμπάζεις, οἷσιν ἄρα Ζεὺς
 μάρτυρος; οὐδ’ ὀσίη κακὰ ῥάπτειν ἀλλήλοισιν.⁷³

Madman, why do you contrive death and destruction for Telemachus? Do you not care about suppliants, for whom Zeus is a witness? It is not *hosiē* to plot evil against each other.

⁶⁸ On the notion of the ‘schema’, cf. Chapter 1, section 1.

⁶⁹ Pl. *Euthyphr.* 6d10-7a1.

⁷⁰ cf. Chapter 1, section 2.2, in the discussion of Q1a.

⁷¹ The adjective ὄσιος does not occur in Homer.

⁷² *Od.* 22.400-406.

⁷³ *Od.* 16.421-23.

In this passage, it is obvious that Penelope's warning is not about the plotting of harm against others *in general*. Rather, the sentence, 'do you not care about suppliants, for whom Zeus is a witness?' shows that her admonition has to do with the institution of supplication. Moreover, the reciprocal pronoun ἀλλήλοισιν makes it clear that she is referring to a *relationship* between two persons. But what exactly does *ικέτας* refer to? Telemachus is not, at the moment, a suppliant. Rather, as Penelope explains in 16.423-29, a reciprocal bond between the families of Telemachus and Antinous, established in the previous generation, causes them to be obliged to one another. Antinous' father once supplicated Odysseus successfully when he was being pursued. Odysseus protected him from his own people who wanted to kill him (16.423-29). That action gave rise, we infer from what Penelope says, to a hereditary long-term reciprocal relationship.⁷⁴ For, having stated the background facts, Penelope connects them to the present and emphasizes their current importance: 'of him now (τοῦ νῦν, i.e. 'of Odysseus') you devour and dishonour the household, woo the wife and kill the child (16.431-32).' MONRO has pointed out that ἐμπάζομαι 'care for' (l. 422) usually goes with a genitive, but here with the accusative, *ικέτας*. This scholar explains that 'as with ... μέμνημαι, the acc. is used when the existence of a person or thing constitutes the *fact* known or remembered.'⁷⁵ Thus *ικέτας* (422) does not refer to an *individual suppliant* but to the remembered fact that Antinous' father once supplicated Odysseus.

In this passage behaving in accordance with *όσίη* seems to be: honouring the long-term reciprocal bond that is sometimes the result of a successful act of supplication. As is explained in 421-422, Zeus is a 'witness' (μάρτυρος) of that relationship.⁷⁶ It seems that *όσίη* in this passage is not primarily either ethical or religious, but essentially both: the desirable *religious* behaviour *is* upholding the proper *ethical* norms. The negatively oriented evaluation οὐχ *όσίη* (as well as the accusation ὕβριν ἔχων, 418) targets the failure to behave properly towards gods and humans alike, by neglecting a relationship between humans that is especially sanctioned by Zeus.

In Book 22, Euryclea is on the verge of bursting out into cries of joy when seeing the suitors' corpses on the floor. Odysseus warns her:

⁷⁴ But this is not because supplication always leads to a long-term bond of *ξενία*, as NAIDEN 2006:118-20 explains: a successful act of supplication could also lead to a different tie, or the relationship between suppliant and the person who was supplicated could be discharged after the suppliant has been granted his request by a commercial transaction.

⁷⁵ MONRO 1914, *ad loc.* STANFORD 1965, *ad loc.* and HEUBECK & HOEKSTRA 1990, *ad loc.* read the passage in the same way.

⁷⁶ Often, though not here, the god is called Ζεὺς Ξένιος or Ζεὺς Ἰκέσιος in these contexts.

ἐν θυμῷ, γρηῦ, χαῖρε καὶ ἴσχεο μῆδ' ὀλόλυξε· 411
 οὐχ ὀσίη καταμένοισιν ἐπ' ἀνδράσιν εὐχετάσθαι.
 τοῦσδε δὲ μοῖρ' ἐδάμασσε θεῶν καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα.⁷⁷

Rejoice inside yourself, old lady, and be restrained and do not cheer out loud.
 It is not *hosie* to boast over slain men.
 The fate of the gods overcame them and their reckless deeds.

As far as we can tell from this passage, Odysseus thinks Euryclea should not cheer out loud, because he considers it an inappropriate act of ‘bragging’ (εὐχετάσθαι, 22.412). In Odysseus’ view, crying out of joy apparently implies praise of himself, which is out of place: the ‘fate of the gods’ (μοῖρα θεῶν, 411) overcame the suitors, and their own ‘wretched deeds’ (σχέτλια ἔργα, 413). Neither he nor Euryclea should take credit for the suitors’ death. Perhaps, Odysseus’ objections also concern the fact that Euryclea is cheering ‘over *murdered* men’ (καταμένοισιν ἐπ’ ἀνδράσιν, 412), this being disrespectful of the dead.⁷⁸ If this is the case, ὀσίη seems, again, to be an evaluation with two layers, though in a different way. Euryclea is admonished both for her attitude towards the gods *as well as* to the dead men.

Crucially, in both Homeric passages, there is a connection between two types of conduct: in order to be ὄσιος, one must honour the gods (show desirable religious behaviour) but also behave in the appropriate way in the interaction between humans (uphold ethical norms). A characterisation of ὄσιος as developing from a narrow ‘religious’ towards a broader ‘ethical’ usage – or vice versa – is incompatible with the data.

Thus, *hosios & cognates* seem to have been prototypically ‘ethical and religious’ from Homer onwards, as shows from in their very first attestations. Moreover, the connection between these two evaluative elements was essential to the semantic

⁷⁷ *Od.* 22.411-13. The authenticity of this speech has been disputed, because it would be out of tune with the ‘archaic ferocity of the rest of the book’ (RUSSO *et al.* 1992, *ad loc.*, and referring to HEUBECK 1987:83; ERBSE 1972:130-31; EISENBERGER 1973:142). For example, as DE JONG 2001:541-42 points out, Odysseus’ attitude has changed drastically compared to ‘ten years ago, when in very similar circumstances (after the punishment of an opponent, the Cyclops, who had perverted the rites of hospitality) he had exulted at his victory’. However, there are enough parallels to the sentiment expressed by Odysseus elsewhere in Homer, to defend the authenticity of these lines. For references, cf. the discussion in RUSSO *et al.* 1992, *ad loc.*

⁷⁸ The prohibition οὐχ ὀσίη was interpreted in this way by HAYMAN 1882, AMEIS *et al.* 1911 [1884], STANFORD 1965 and RUSSO *et al.* 1992. The scholion on *Od.* 22.412 already adduced the parallel of Archil. fr. 134 w οὐ γὰρ ἐσθλά κατθανοῦσι κερτομεῖν ἐπ’ ἀνδράσιν ‘it is not good to scoff at dead men’.

make-up of *hosios & cognates* in the classical period, as we may deduce from Euthyphro's off-the-top-of-one's-head definitions. Indeed, key themes that are evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates* in fifth-century texts (section 1.6 and 1.7) are bonds between humans but which have the special interest of the gods.⁷⁹

2.2 The schema

In Chapter 1 it was argued that language users' mental representations of a lexeme may include a schema.⁸⁰ This is an abstraction from the individual members of a category that shows what these members have in common. Based on the above, we may make a first inference about the 'schema' of ὅσιος. This is 'behaviour which pleases the gods, which is aimed either at the gods themselves or at other humans in those bonds that have gods' special interest'. It also contains all those other persons, actions and objects concerning which a speaker can convince others that they also belong to the category of τὸ ὅσιον.

3. ὅσιος on an evaluative scale

The previous investigation allowed us to determine the evaluative *nature* of the adjective ὅσιος (**Q1a**). A question that is still open is where to place the usage of the adjective ὅσιος with a positive argumentative orientation on an evaluative scale (**Q1b**). Does this usage of ὅσιος articulate that an object, behaviour or action is praiseworthy, 'pleasing to the gods'? Or does it refer to what is 'religiously neutral', what is merely 'acceptable' to gods?

One problem with answering this question is that there are many cases in which either translation of ὅσιος ('religiously neutral' or 'pleasing to gods') is defensible. For example, in Euripides' *Helen*, Theoclymenus plans to marry Helen, although he promised his father and the gods he would keep her safe until Menelaus returned for her.⁸¹ Theoclymenus' sister Theonoe wants to help Helen escape from Theoclymenus and so prevent him from marrying Helen. She says she will do her brother a good

⁷⁹ Specifically, Zeus. This shows, for example, from Zeus' epithets: Zeus Ξένιος (of the Guest), Ἰκέσιος (of the Suppliant), Ὀρκιος (of the Oath) and Ὅμαμος (of Kinship).

⁸⁰ Chapter 1, section 1.

⁸¹ This play gives an interesting twist to history: according to its plot, Helen never went to Troy, but when Paris came to collect his prize from Aphrodite, an angry Hera substituted her for an image. Paris took this 'phantom Helen' with him to Troy, but Zeus instructed Hermes to take the 'real Helen' to Egypt. She was to stay there at the court of Proteus, who promised to protect her until her husband Menelaus would come to collect her again. However, when Proteus' son Theoclymenus came to the throne, he did not respect the promise to Menelaus but wanted to marry Helen herself. This is all explained in the prologue. When the play begins, Helen has taken refuge as a suppliant at the tomb of Proteus (E. *Hel.* 63-65; 799) to escape Theoclymenus' advances.

turn, ‘if I make him ὄσιος out of his δυσσεβεία’.⁸² The context seems to support both suggested interpretations. The passage may express: ‘if I restore him to a state of safe normality, of neutrality with respect to the gods, turning him away from his religiously offensive behaviour (breaking his promise to parent and god and intending to marry someone else’s wife).’ But the passage may just as well express ‘if I make him a person deserving of religious praise, turning him from his impiety’.

As a second example, the general advice to follow ‘a ὄσιον route’ in life in Simonides’ fragment discussed above⁸³ may be taken as: ‘try to remain religiously inoffensive, avoiding dangers that loom everywhere’ (i.e., the almost inevitable transgressions that result from ambition and sexual and material desires). On the other hand, the phrase may also be interpreted as an incentive to be pious, to uphold a high moral standard in all matters.

However, in other cases in which a person is referred to as ὄσιος (positive argumentative orientation) or is urged to behave in such a manner it is very difficult to see how we can understand ὄσιος *other than* as an evaluation that expresses praise. We will consider two examples. In a fragment from Euripides’ *Hypsipyle*, the girl Hypsipyle supplicates the seer Amphiaraus.⁸⁴ Hypsipyle had agreed to guide the seer Amphiaraus to a spring to find water to make a libation.⁸⁵ Once there, a snake killed Opheltes, a little boy in the care of Hypsipyle. Opheltes’ mother Eurydice wanted to put Hypsipyle to death, convinced that the nurse had murdered her son on purpose,⁸⁶ which is why Hypsipyle appealed to Amphiaraus for help:

Ἵψ. [ρ]ῦσαί με· διὰ γὰρ σὴν ἀπόλλυμαι χάριν.
 μέλλω τε θνήσκειν, δεσμίαν τέ μ’ εἰσορᾶς 860
 πρὸς σοῖσι γόνασιν, ἢ τόθ’ εἰπόμεν ξένοις·
 ὄσια δὲ πράξεις ὄσιος ὄν· πρ[ο]δοῦς δέ με
 ὄνειδος Ἀργείοισιν Ἑλλησίν τ’ ἔση.⁸⁷

Hyps. Save me: I am undone because of the favour I showed you
 I am about to die, and you look upon me bound
 at your knees,⁸⁸ the woman who guided you strangers before:

⁸² ἐκ δυσσεβείας ὄσιον εἰ τίθῃμι νιν, E. *Hel.* 1021.

⁸³ section 1.7. Simon. fr. 36 P. Oxy 2432 subfr. 1.12.

⁸⁴ Hypsipyle served as a slave to Lycurgus, priest at the rural sanctuary of Zeus at Nemea and his wife Eurydice, nursing their son Opheltes. The seer Amphiaraus came to see this family.

⁸⁵ E. *Hyps.* F 752h-k *TrGF.*

⁸⁶ E. *Hyps.* F 753d-3, 754 *TrGF.*

⁸⁷ E. *Hyps.* F 757:859-63 *TrGF.*

You will do things that are *hosia* because you are *hosios*: by betraying me you will be a disgrace to the Argives and to all Greeks.

It is difficult to see how we can translate l. 862 as ‘you will do what is religiously neutral because you are religiously neutral’. Rather, it seems that Hypsipyle is actively urging the seer to perform a commendable action. In the immediately preceding lines, Hypsipyle has carefully built up the idea that there is a relationship of *χάρις* between herself and the seer. She is the one who escorted the visitors (ξένοις, 861) to the well. By doing so, she performed the first step in the exchange of favours. But her troubles originated there: ‘I die because of the favour I have done to you’ (διὰ γὰρ σὴν ἀπόλλυμαι χάριν, 859). The contention that Amphiarus will ‘do ὄσια’ is in fact an appeal to him to return *χάρις*, which is a positive, not a ‘neutral’ action.⁸⁹ Amphiarus should honour *two* relationships in which the gods have a particular interest: *ξενία* and *ικετία*. The first has been established by Hypsipyle’s guidance to the spring, the second is established there and then, when Hypsipyle falls to the seer’s knees as a suppliant. Furthermore, it seems that she is strengthening her request by *paying him a compliment*, not by calling him ‘neutral’, when she says you will do it ‘because you *are* ὄσιος’ (862). This assertion seems to operate on the inter-personal level as a clever rhetorical move. Hypsipyle’s statement more or less compels the seer to act in a certain way, i.e. he owes it to his own reputation of great piety⁹⁰ to help her. In short, it seems to me that we should translate: ‘you will act piously because you *are* pious’.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Grasping the seer’s knees, Hypsipyle establishes the proper ritual contact between herself and the person she is supplicating, which traditionally guaranteed the safety of the suppliant (GOULD 1973:76). This phenomenon is often referred to in the scholarship as *Kontaktmagie*, e.g. KOPPERSCHMIDT 1967:11-12.

⁸⁹ On *χάρις* in reciprocal relationships: VAN BERKEL 2013:55-102.

⁹⁰ The seer’s reputation for caring about the divine had been emphasised throughout the play, as far as we can tell from its fragments. Amphiarus attaches great importance to offering to the gods in the correct manner, as shown in E. *Hyps.* F 752h.29-32 *TrGF*. Furthermore, in F 752k.20-21 *TrGF* Hypsipyle asked Amphiarus why he needed to sacrifice if he was going to die anyway (referring to the fact that Amphiarus has foreseen his own death). Amphiarus answered, this was ‘better’ (ἄμεινον), and it was no labour to worship the gods (εὐσεβεῖν θεούς). The image we get here of Amphiarus is consistent with that in earlier plays, for example: A. *Sept.* 611, where Eteocles characterises Amphiarus as a ‘prudent, just, good, pious man’ (σώφρων δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς εὐσεβῆς ἀνὴρ) who, sadly, has to fight alongside ‘godless insolent men’ (ἀνοσίσοισι θρασυστόμοισιν ἀνδράσιν).

⁹¹ Amphiarus’ response is affirmative. He says he has come to help Hypsipyle, following τὸ εὐσεβές (E. *Hyps.* F 757.871 *TrGF*). The relationship between τὸ ὄσιον and τὸ εὐσεβές and the implications of this comparison for the interpretation of τὸ ὄσιον is the topic of Chapter 3.

A second example relates to the sphere of burial. In Sophocles' *Antigone*, Antigone tells a frightened (and in Antigone's view, cowardly) Ismene that she would not allow her to assist in the burial of Polynices, even if her sister wanted to. But, she says – in defiance of Creon's decree – :

Ἄν. ... κείνον δ' ἐγὼ 71
 θάψω. καλόν μοι τοῦτο ποιούσῃ θανεῖν.
 φίλη μετ' αὐτοῦ κείσομαι, φίλου μέτα,
 ὄσια πανουργήσασ'· ἐπεὶ πλείων χρόνος
 ὄν δεῖ μ' ἀρέσκειν τοῖς κάτω τῶν ἐνθάδε.⁹²

Ant. I
 will bury him. It is noble for me to die while doing this.
 I am his *philos* and I will lie with him, my *philos*,
 having committed *hosia* as a crime. For there will be a longer time
 in which I need to please those below than those here.

Here we cannot translate: 'having committed a "crime" that will nevertheless be considered acceptable by the gods'. The immediate context around the oxymoron ὄσια πανουργήσασα (74) shows us that we have to read ὄσια in a more positive way. Antigone evaluates her own envisaged action as 'noble' (καλόν, 72) and 'pleasing to those below (the gods)' (ἀρέσκειν τοῖς κάτω, 75). A comparable example, also relating to burial occurs in Euripides' *Suppliants*. The Argive Adrastus tells king Theseus of Athens that he asked for the return of the bodies of the Seven against Thebes, so that they could be buried. Theseus wonders: 'but what did they say, when being asked for ὄσια from your side?'⁹³ It seems that Adrastus did not ask for what was 'religiously neutral' or 'acceptable to the gods'. Rather, he seems to ask to perform a ritual that is both necessary and good.

In these three examples, the adjective ὄσιος definitely seem to express a *positive* value. I have not been able to find any passages in which such a reading is *not* possible. Cases such those discussed above seem to point us into the direction of interpreting ὄσιος with a positive argumentative orientation as articulating approval, appreciation of actions and attitudes. But the most important argument for considering ὄσιος with a positive argumentative orientation as expressing a positive value, in my view, comes from the main cultural frame in which this lexeme functions. We will

⁹² S. *Ant.* 71-75.

⁹³ E. *Supp.* 123.

turn to this topic next.

4. The cultural frame(s)

Based on the distribution analysis above, we may say that ὄσιος and cognates are associated with different frames: the scenario of sacrificing to the gods, the frame of receiving a guest, of hearing and perhaps accepting a suppliant, of swearing and keeping to an oath, of the long-term bond with one's parents and children, of burying the dead and caring for them subsequently. But all of these associations together also belong to one larger frame. Near the end of Plato's dialogue, Euthyphro states that

ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίστηται τοῖς θεοῖς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων, ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ ὄσια.⁹⁴

If someone knows what kind of pleasing things to say and to do when praying and sacrificing, these things are *ta hosia*.

After this, Euthyphro agrees with Socrates that sacrificing (τὸ θύειν) is the same as giving to the gods and praying (τὸ εὐχεσθαι) is asking from the gods.⁹⁵ Socrates and Euthyphro end up agreeing that ὀσιότης is, therefore, knowledge of giving to and asking from the gods.⁹⁶ In fact, as Socrates suggests, ὀσιότης may be called an ἐμπορικὴ τέχνη 'an art of commerce' which gods and men master: it is the art of doing business with one another.⁹⁷ Euthyphro agrees to that characterisation: 'yes, if you like to call it that.'⁹⁸

Socrates' final move is a cynical reduction of the main cultural frame to which ὀσιότης belongs. The concept of ὀσιότης should be interpreted in the context of the long-term reciprocal relationship between humans and the divine world.⁹⁹ Indeed,

⁹⁴ Pl. *Euthphr.* 14b2-4.

⁹⁵ 14c8-10.

⁹⁶ 14d1-3.

⁹⁷ 14e6-7.

⁹⁸ 14e8.

⁹⁹ Until fifteen years ago, the role of reciprocity in the Greek conceptualisation of religion was 'neglected' or 'undervalued' (PARKER 1998:105). However, various recent monographs and smaller studies assert that the mechanism of reciprocity is fundamental to the theological underpinnings of Greek popular religion (YUNIS 1988; PULLEYN 1997; BREMER 1998; PARKER 1998; FURLEY 2007), or actually, any religion. The central thesis in PULLEYN 1997 is the importance of χάρις in Greek prayer. In YUNIS 1988:50-58 reciprocity is taken to be one of the three fundamental religious beliefs of the Athenians, next to the belief that gods exist and that they have an interest in human action. PARKER 1998, BREMER 1998 and FURLEY 2007 are relevant shorter studies. Notwithstanding PARKER's assertion of the 'neglect' of reciprocity in Greek religion, of course the importance of

interaction with Greek gods often concerned the ‘exchange’ of goods and favours between humans and the divine world. Sacrifices were gifts to the divinities, but they were not intended as one-way traffic. In literary prayers, characters express the hope that in return for their gift they will receive the favour they asked for. When a wish had been granted, there were different ways of thanking the gods and perhaps asking for another favour.¹⁰⁰ In short, prayers, hymns, sacrifices and other gifts in literature were conceived of as part of a two-sided relationship between mortals and divinities, a relationship that was based upon mutual exchange. Indeed, the idea that gods should reciprocate favours was so central in the theology that it was even shared by the Greek gods themselves in their literary representations.¹⁰¹

We may take a brief closer look at the type of reciprocity characterising the relationship between gods and men, by exploring one example of a prayer in more detail. In *Iliad* 1, the priest Chryses offers a famous prayer to the god Apollo:

κλῦθί μευ, ἀργυρότοξ', ὃς Χρῦσῃν ἀμφιβέβηκας
 Κίλλαν τε ζαθέην Τενέδοιό τε Ἴφι ἀνάσσεις,
 Σμινθεῦ, εἴ ποτέ τοι χαρίεντ' ἐπὶ νηὸν ἔρεψα,
 ἦ εἰ δὴ ποτέ τοι κατὰ πύονα μηρί' ἔκηα

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exchange in Greek religion had been acknowledged before: e.g. FESTUGIÈRE 1976; VERSNEL 1981:56-57.

¹⁰⁰ An important study in this respect is Simon PULLEYN's, *Prayer in Greek Religion* (1997), which explores the structure of prayers in Greek literature. Recognising a *do-ut-des* 'I give, so that you will give' format in many prayers, PULLEYN also discussed a number of variations on this type. In literary texts, characters argue that gods should grant them a wish, because they had themselves offered things to the gods in the past (*da-quia-dedi*, cf. e.g. *A. Th.* 174-81), because the god had (not) granted a wish before (*da-quia-(non)-dedisti*, cf. e.g. *Il.* 1.450-56, *Od.* 6.323-27) or in order that they would (be able to) offer in the future, etc (*da-quia-dabo*, cf. e.g. *A. Ch.* 246-263, *E. El.* 805-08; *S. OT* 895-903). PULLEYN's categorisation of requests and prayers shows how strongly particular requests to gods were seen as being grounded in a long-term reciprocal relationship between humans and the immortals. WEST 1997:273 has argued that the absence of evidence in non-literary sources suggests that this is a purely literary motif. However, both PULLEYN 1997:2-3 and PARKER 1998:107 convincingly take an opposite stance, stressing that in these cases literary sources may be seen as a model for (or are at least not completely alien to) theological views in the *polis*. PARKER: 'the underlying mentality is so well attested in sources of other types (dedications above all) that it can scarcely be doubted that past sacrifices were seen as grounding claims on divine favour, whether or not prayers were commonly uttered in just this form.'

¹⁰¹ For example, in the Homeric epic Olympian gods are reluctant to let mortals perish who have given them many offerings, as when Zeus considers saving Hector (*Il.* 22.168-76) who is his φίλος (168) and has brought him many sacrifices (170-72). Although the text does not explicitly make a causal link between Hector's gifts and Zeus' unwillingness to let Hector die, such a connection is most definitely implied, and it would a very small step for a Greek reader to make the association. Similar passages: *Il.* 24-32-38; *Il.* 24.66-70; *Od.* 1.59.79.

ταύρων ἢ δ' αἰγῶν, τὸδε μοι κρήνην ἐέλδωρ·
τίσειαν Δαναοὶ ἐμὰ δάκρυα σοῖσι βέλεσσιν.¹⁰²

Hear me, Apollo of the silver bow, you who guard Chryse,
and most sacred Cilla and rule over Tenedus with your might,
destroyer of mice, if ever I covered a charming temple with a roof for you,
or if I ever burnt fat thighs for you
of bulls or of goats, then fulfil for me this wish:
may the Danaans pay for my tears through your arrows.

A significant characteristic of this prayer is the link that Chryses makes between his past favours towards Apollo and the hope/expectation that his wish will be fulfilled. This passage seems at first sight an example of the structure that appeals to the notion of divine reciprocity perhaps most urgently: *da-quia-dedi*.¹⁰³ But strictly speaking, the structure is not: 'you should give, because of my previous offerings to you'. Instead, Chryses entreats Apollo to fulfil his wish, *if ever* (εἴ ποτε, 40) he built a temple or gave the god any pleasing gifts (40-41). This non-committal way of phrasing the request seems intended to transfer the interpretation of past exchanges to the god. Chryses seems to say: 'I am not sure whether you will take my previous gifts seriously, but if you do, you might consider doing something for me in return.' In other words, it is up to Apollo to decide whether the first human turn in the reciprocal relationship 'counts', if not, the conditional clause in the request serves to give the god a 'way out'.

This way of phrasing a request reflects various aspects of the nature of the reciprocal bond between humans and gods. First of all, the material terms in which the notion of reciprocity in Greek religion has been discussed above may give the – wrong – impression that Greeks conceived of the reciprocity between themselves and their gods as a 'contractual' bond. As has often been observed, this view is an oversimplification; in PULLEYN's words it is 'to misunderstand the whole nature of reciprocity in Greece'.¹⁰⁴ Rather, texts represent the idea that, by giving gifts to divinities, Greeks worshippers could create a relationship of reciprocal χάρις with

¹⁰² *Il.* 1.37-42.

¹⁰³ PULLEYN 1997:16-38 emphasises that this structure is unique to Greek religion and does not occur in religions of the Near-East, but WEST 1997:273-74 quotes literary passages from oriental texts that prove the opposite.

¹⁰⁴ PULLEYN 1997:12.

gods, in which the gods *might* grant them in return the wishes they asked for.¹⁰⁵ In this sense, Socrates' characterisation is a sceptical misrepresentation of the mentality underlying religious actions and attitudes. Reciprocity in Greek religion is not a 'commercial contract', but the relationship of reciprocal χάρις is characterised by the voluntary exchange of gifts between the two partners. This type of relationship lends itself to more indirect ways of phrasing a request, as Chryses does.

It seems to me that, precisely because of this framing of the relationship between the human and divine world as one of reciprocal χάρις (voluntary gift-giving), we should consider ὄσιος as expressing a very positive value (not 'what is acceptable' or 'neutral'). In the Greek conceptualization of religion, doing τὰ ὄσια is, in fact, to give a present to the gods.

The Greek view on the reciprocal relationship with gods is the result of other aspects of their theology. The Greeks were well aware that there were fundamental imbalances between themselves and the gods, at least in power and in knowledge.¹⁰⁶ Due to these various asymmetries, the Greeks could not truly conceive of this relationship on a *do-ut-des* principle.¹⁰⁷ Perhaps the Greeks saw a third asymmetry, in

¹⁰⁵ On religion as a relationship of reciprocal χάρις, cf. FESTUGIÈRE 1976:413-418; YUNIS 1988:101-11; PULLEYN 1997, e.g. 4, 12-13, 37, 40-41, 93; PARKER 1998:118-122.

¹⁰⁶ The Greek worshipper was definitely not so simple-minded as to conceive of his interactions with the god as a straightforward one-to-one relationship in which one good turn deserves another. From many sources, starting with the Homeric epic, we can tell that the believer suspected that theodicy should be really viewed on the larger scale of the divine master plan, knowledge of which is unavailable to humans, and that different types of supernatural forces had a share in the development of events. On the perception of mortals of this relation, see e.g. A. *Ag.* 661-66; E. *Cyc.* 606-607; E. *Hec.* 488-91; E. *HF* 1393; E. *Heracl.* 934-35; S. *Ph.* 1316-20; Hdt. 1.91. A recent discussion of the difficult question of the relation between μοῖρα and the gods in literature is found in VERSNEL 2011:163-75. Moreover, the Greeks thought that gods might at times have conflicting interests between them, a point that is raised in Plato's *Euthyphro* (7b2-5, e1-5) but also in Greek tragedy. For example, in Euripides' *Hippolytus* (1327-34) the goddess Artemis states that she cannot help Hippolytus because she cannot oppose the will of Aphrodite. Apparently, the Greeks reflected on the problem that their many gods might at times want different things. We can see the *Hippolytus* as an expression of those reflections.

¹⁰⁷ There was a definite tension in the theology underlying these religious expressions. Both YUNIS 1988:53 and PARKER 1998:120-25 have commented on it. These scholars see the use of the notion of reciprocity as an attempt to get closer to the gods; as a way for the Greeks of allowing themselves to believe that the gods are not completely 'unintelligible', 'unpredictable', 'unreachable'. As PARKER argues: 'The language of *kharis* sustains, indeed creates, the fiction that the relation between human and god can be assimilated to that between human beings and so brought within a comprehensible pattern. The commercial view of *kharis* treats as a device to manipulate the gods what is more fundamentally a means of gaining access to them, of reaching the unreachable' (1998:120); 'The job of *kharis*, of gift and counter-gift, was to veil these differences, however temporarily and partially, to pretend that the gap between man and god was not too wide to be bridged, and to found that social relationship without which the gods and the world would be

the respective contributions to the relationship. The Greeks may have thought that the gifts they presented to gods (animals, wine, other small commodities) could never equal what gods gave to men (health, property, life itself).¹⁰⁸

It is in any case clear that they sometimes also took the opposite view. Humans had one very important gift to give to gods: not wine or animals, but τιμή. Many texts express the view that the status of a god is intrinsically bound up with whether he is honoured or not. Acknowledging a god and giving him the τιμή he deserves are two sides of the same coin. If humans do not wish to honour a particular god – and thus, sustain a reciprocal relationship with the divinity – this god may as well not be a god at all. Such a situation defies the entire purpose of being a Greek god. This is, in my perspective, where the evaluation ὄσιος comes into view.

We can see this well when examining a comic example. In Aristophanes' *Birds*, two humans, Pisistratus and Euelpides, convince a group of birds that they can regain their sovereignty over men and gods. The intended feathery revolution against the divine world is settled by the birds urging Pisistratus to 'be ὄσιος and attack the gods'.¹⁰⁹ The comic reversal of 'normal' Greek piety on which the plot of *Birds* is based is nicely captured in this paradoxical exhortation: humans must acknowledge the birds, not the Olympians, as their true gods from now on.¹¹⁰

Being ὄσιος starts with recognising the status of gods as gods. This crucially implies accepting that one can share a relationship based on the productive mutual exchange of goods and favours, which is precisely what the passage in *Birds* is about. In the preceding discussion, Pisistratus has successfully negotiated the possibility of such a relationship with the birds. When they ask him: 'how will humans acknowledge us as gods' (καὶ πῶς ἡμᾶς νομιοῦσι θεοὺς ἄνθρωποι;) ¹¹¹ Pisistratus establishes, in what seems to be a mild caricature of the notion of reciprocity in Greek religion, that the birds can indeed be gods, because they are able to give men wealth, health and old age.¹¹² He also established that the exchange with these new gods will prove an especially good trade-off for humans, because compared to the Olympians,

completely beyond our grasp' (1998:124-25). To borrow an expression used to describe the effects of narrative by Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Greek religion contained a 'willing suspension of disbelief', as it were, that made this conceptualisation work, despite its inherent tensions. In spite of the obvious asymmetries discussed above, there *was* a level on which the fiction was created that there was a more or less straightforward reciprocal exchange between humans and gods.

¹⁰⁸ FESTUGIÈRE 1976:418, PARKER 1998:122.

¹⁰⁹ Ar. Av. 631-32.

¹¹⁰ The exhortation to 'attack the gods' is clearly an overstatement, for the birds mean that humans should neglect their worship of the Olympic gods in favour of honouring birds.

¹¹¹ Ar. Av. 571.

¹¹² wealth: Ar. Av. 592-601; health: 602-14; old age: 605-10.

birds do not need elaborate gifts.¹¹³ Humans must be told to start sacrificing to the birds,¹¹⁴ because in this way they can start performing their part in the new mutual relationship and recognise birds as gods. This, it is to be expected, will repair the lack of τιμή which the birds have suffered up until this point.¹¹⁵

The exhortation to Pisistratus to be ὄσιος should be interpreted against the background of this discussion. What the birds are persuading Pisistratus of is to acknowledge them as gods, by initiating and then sustaining a long-term reciprocal relationship with these new gods, which will give them the τιμή that is due to them.

Believing in the gods is only the crucial first step of ὀσιότης, though. When this precondition has been met, there were continuous actions to perform. *hosios & cognates* concern all those positive actions that humans perform to sustain and feed their relationship of reciprocal χάρις with the gods. Such rules relate, first of all, to the direct relationship with the gods: acknowledging gods, honouring them in sacrifice and prayer). In the majority of cases, *hosios & cognates* were about respecting a small group of interhuman relationships that have the gods' special interest. We can now adjust our view of the 'schema' of this lexeme slightly, by saying that τὸ ὄσιον describes what humans must do to please the gods and give them the τιμή they deserve.¹¹⁶

5. The appearance of a mentality?

Now that we have a clear view on the way of thinking that *hosios & cognates* articulated, we may turn to research question 4 of Chapter one: when did this mentality appear? It is striking that *hosios & cognates* rarely appear in the oldest texts we have. As was discussed at the beginning of this chapter, *hosios & cognates* do not occur in Hesiod; ὄσιή is found in seven instances in Homer and the Homeric Hymns

¹¹³ The ludicrous character of this part of the discussion in *Birds* is evident from some bizarre arguments Pisistratus makes at this point to support the idea that birds can give wealth, health and old age, like gods. Another parodic aspect of the passage is the fact that in this play gods (whether the Olympians or the birds) are conceptualised as actually *needing* the sacrifices as sustenance. Cf. Ar. Av. 187-90 (the Olympians are sure to pay a tax on the smoke rising from altars, for they will starve without it); Ar. Av. 889-94 (Pisistratus fears that one kite will snatch away the sacrificial meat so the other bird-gods have nothing to eat).

¹¹⁴ Ar. Av. 561-65.

¹¹⁵ Ar. Av. 164; 542.

¹¹⁶ BLOK 2011:237-38 has the same view: '*Hosiê*, then, refers to norms of human agency sustaining human reciprocity with the gods, in harmony with the cosmic order that guides both gods and humans. Prescribing conduct that creates *charis* between both parties in the covenant, *hosiê* orders human life by rules, which for the sake of clarity can be distinguished into two components: 1) rules of conduct of humans towards the gods ... 2) Rules of conduct among humans valued particularly by the gods and guarded by them'.

together; ὄσιος and ὀσίη are rare in other archaic authors. By contrast, ὄσιος is a frequent evaluation of human behaviour in fifth-century (and fourth-century) literary sources. In Chapter 3, we will see that *eusebês & cognates* had a similar diachronic distribution. These terms are completely absent in Homer, the Homeric Hymns and Hesiod and rare in other archaic literature, but occur frequently in fifth-century literature. In this section we will examine whether the way of thinking that *hosios & cognates* articulated was perhaps alien to or unpopular in early Greek thought. JAY-ROBERT argued that the attested lexical development of *hosios & cognates* reflected the gradual appearance of a new way of thinking after Homer.¹¹⁷ We will test this hypothesis by investigating the usage of other lexemes somehow related to the interaction with the divine world in our earliest texts.

In epic there was no dedicated term to express the attitude on the part of humans with respect to the gods. One group of lexemes that articulates attitudes and feelings of humans towards the immortals (though not exclusively) is found in the vocabulary of fear and respect, in the verbs ἄζομαι, αἰδεῖσθαι and σέβεσθαι.¹¹⁸ Another group of terms connect religiosity and morality, in their expression of divine justice. In this section, I will focus on this second group and examine the earliest usages of the lexemes θέμις and δίκη.

In Homer, θέμις describes ‘what is customary, normal’ in general or with respect to a particular group. For example, Eumaeus says it is the way of a woman to cry (θέμις γυναικός) when her husband dies far away¹¹⁹ and Agamemnon assures Achilles that he did not sleep with Briseis, even though that is θέμις ἀνθρώπων.¹²⁰ But θέμις implies no strict separation between ‘how humans customarily do things’ and ‘how it should be’: the description often entails a prescription. For example, Agamemnon tells Odysseus in the underworld that he was killed by his own son, but Odysseus can expect a welcoming embrace from his child instead, ‘which is θέμις’ (ἦ θέμις

¹¹⁷ According to JAY-ROBERT, the attested diachronic distribution of *hosios & cognates* should be explained in terms of a *mentality shift*. In her view, the scarcity of occurrences of ὀσίη in Homer indicates that obeying a ‘divine’ law did not accord with the ideas of the time: people preferred to submit to the natural order of θέμις (28). The (slightly) increasing amount of attestations of the noun ὀσίη and especially the appearance of the adjective ὄσιος at the end of the archaic period must be seen as a reflection of the developing idea that humans should obey the Olympians. BRUIT-ZAIDMAN 2001:87-118 gave an explanation for the introduction of *eusebês & cognates* at the end of the fifth century that much resembles JAY-ROBERT’S view, explaining it in terms of a mentality shift, too.

¹¹⁸ BRUIT-ZAIDMAN 2001:97.

¹¹⁹ *Od.* 14.130.

¹²⁰ *Il.* 9.134. Similarly *Il.* 9.276, *Il.* 19.177 (θέμις ἦτ’ ἀνδρῶν ἦτε γυναικῶν). Another example in which θέμις refers to ‘what is customary, normal’ is *h.Ap.* 541.

ἔστιν).¹²¹ The phrase means more than ‘customary’: Agamemnon’s point is clearly that this is ‘as it should be’.¹²²

θέμις is a moral evaluation from its earliest occurrences. The sense of morality θέμις expresses is connected to the idea of order in the natural and political sphere.¹²³ Moreover, θέμις often has an explicit religious element. We can see this when looking at the genealogical background provided in archaic mythology. As was mentioned, Θέμις herself is a goddess.¹²⁴ An important one, for there is a close relationship between Zeus, Themis and Dikē. In the *Homeric Hymn to Zeus*, the king of the gods has intense discussions with Themis ‘sitting next to him, leaning close’.¹²⁵ In the *Theogony* it is explained that Themis, the child of Gaea and Uranus,¹²⁶ became Zeus’ second wife and gave birth to the Seasons (Ἔρραι), the Fates (Μοῖραι), to Justice (Δίκη), Peace (Εἰρήνη) and Good Order (Εὐνομία).¹²⁷ Themis’ children clearly show her to be a divine principle of natural and political order,¹²⁸ a principle humans and gods alike need to obey.¹²⁹ θέμις (lower case) is also often connected to Zeus and δίκη, a natural continuation of the mythological family relationships described above. θέμις and θέμιστες are said to be of or from Zeus.¹³⁰ Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail below, δίκη and θέμις sometimes express similar meanings, and regularly appear in close conjunction in the same expression.¹³¹

Sometimes θέμις is used in a moral sense, when characters support their argument for a *proposed* course of action by saying it is θέμις. In these examples, the argument is sometimes supported by an explicit mention of the gods. This is the case when Eumaeus says ‘it would not be θέμις for me (μοι) *not* to honour a guest ... because all guests and beggars are from Zeus’.¹³² The swineherd thinks he should respect guests because they are under the special protection of Zeus. In a similar example, Aeolus tells Odysseus ‘it would not be θέμις for me (μοι) to take care for or set a man on his

¹²¹ *Od.* 11.451.

¹²² RUDHARDT 1999:20-21.

¹²³ STAFFORD 1997:87-88, JAY-ROBERT 2009:15-23.

¹²⁴ e.g. *Il.* 15.87, *Hes. Th.* 16. *h.Ap.* 93, 124, *h.Ven.* 94.

¹²⁵ *h.Hom.* 23.2.

¹²⁶ *Hes. Th.* 135.

¹²⁷ *Hes. Th.* 900-05.

¹²⁸ STAFFORD 1997:87-88.

¹²⁹ e.g. *Il.* 5.761, *Hes. Sc.* 447.

¹³⁰ *Il.* 1.238: θέμιστας πρὸς Διὸς, *Il.* 2.206: δῶκε Κρόνου πάϊς ... | σκῆπτρον τ’ ἦδε θέμιστας, *Il.* 9.98-99: Ζεὺς ἐγγυάλιξε | σκῆπτρον τ’ ἦδε θέμιστας; *Od.* 16.403: Διὸς μέγαλοιο θέμιστες; *Hes. Sc.* 22: Διόθεν θέμις.

¹³¹ This remark implies a moral reading of δίκη in Homer and Hesiod (*contra*, for example GAGARIN 1973, 1974). I will argue for such an interpretation of δίκη below, section 5.

¹³² *Od.* 14.56-58. Other examples of θέμις relating to hospitality: *Il.* 11.779, *Od.* 9.268, *Od.* 24.286.

way who is hated by the blessed gods' (i.e. considering that *they* thwart your attempts to sail home).¹³³ In this example, οὐ θέμις seems to express the idea that humans should not (endeavour to) appropriate the position of a god by trying to overturn their decisions.

We see that θέμις in Homer and Hesiod sometimes shares key characteristics with *hosios & cognates*, being evaluations of human conduct that is authorised by gods. We will discuss two examples of this usage of θέμις in more detail. First of all, Hesiod explained that the silver race of people

παυρίδιον ζώεσκον ἐπὶ χρόνον, ἄλγε' ἔχοντες
 ἀφραδίας· ὕβριν γὰρ ἀτάσθαλον οὐκ ἐδύναντο
 ἀλλήλων ἀπέχειν, οὐδ' ἀθανάτους θεραπεύειν
 ἤθελον οὐδ' ἔρδειν μακάρων ἱεροῖς ἐπὶ βωμοῖς,
 ἧ̃ θέμις ἀνθρώποις κατὰ ἦθεα. τοὺς μὲν ἔπειτα
 Ζεὺς Κρονίδης ἔκρυψε χολούμενος, οὐνεκα τιμᾶς
 οὐκ ἔδιδον μακάρεσσι θεοῖς οἱ Ὀλυμπον ἔχουσιν.¹³⁴

lived only for a short time, suffering the pains of foolishness.
 For they could not keep themselves from committing wicked outrage
 against one another, and they did not want to worship the gods
 and offer sacrifice for the blessed ones on holy altars,
 which is *themis* for humans, each according to local custom.
 In time Zeus son of Cronus buried them in anger, because
 they denied the blessed gods on mount Olympus their due honours.

In this passage, the worship of gods (Hes. *Op.* 135-36) is presented as θέμις ἀνθρώποις 'customary for humans' (137). But this is also, clearly, the *appropriate* activity. Humans should maintain their part of the relationship with the gods by offering them τιμή through sacrifice. As the narrator tells us, the silver race's neglect of the gods caused the anger of Zeus and he destroyed their race accordingly (138), 'because they denied the blessed gods their dues' (τιμᾶς, 138).¹³⁵

¹³³ *Od.* 10.73-74. For a similar example cf. Thgn. 1.687.

¹³⁴ Hes. *Op.* 133-39.

¹³⁵ The distributive κατὰ ἦθεα 'each according to local customs' is interesting. We have seen above (section 1.7) that ὅσιον and ὁσία very often describe not *the fact that* humans honour gods in sacrifice, but the who, what, where, when and how of their cultic endeavours, i.e., their specific, local customs. θέμις evaluates the local specifics of cultic behaviour, too. In *h.Cer.* 207, Demeter claims that it is not θέμιτρον for her to drink wine. The story functions as an *aitia* for her cult, for the

Another relevant case is Homer's evaluation of the Cyclops Polyphemus in *Odyssey* 9. About the Cyclopes in general and Polyphemus in particular it is said that they do not have θέμιστες and are ἀθέμιστοι or ἀθεμίστιοι.¹³⁶ There often seems to be no moral content to the plural noun θέμιστες, when this term refers to 'decrees, decisions' or 'laws'.¹³⁷ More specifically, θέμιστες may be seen as those decisions that people take when assembling (in the *agora*): θέμις represents the order that arises when the people come together and solve matters through debate.¹³⁸ It is explained the Cyclopes do not convene; they do have neither ἀγοραί nor θέμιστες (*Od.* 9.112), but each man governs his own wife and children. In this way, the Cyclopes are literally ἀθέμιτοι or ἀθεμίστιοι,¹³⁹ which is at least an *indirect* negative evaluation, because it marks them out as uncivilised.

But in some cases the description that someone 'knows about θέμιστες (or not)' seems to be a positive or negative evaluation of someone's moral character. For example, when it is said about Nereus that 'he does not forget θέμιστες but he knows τὰ δίκαια',¹⁴⁰ θέμιστες itself seems to be the same as 'just decisions', and to be equalled to δίκη. The description of Polyphemus as not possessing θέμιστες and as ἀθεμίστιος likewise seems partly a negative evaluation of his character, as we infer from the context in which these terms appear. Odysseus introduces Polyphemus as a 'monstrous man' (ἄνηρ πελώριος, 9.187), 'versed in lawlessness' (ἀθεμίστια ἤδη, 9.189). Furthermore, Odysseus explains that when he and his comrades approached the cave, he already thought the Cyclops would be 'savage' (ἄγριον) and 'not knowing δίκας or θέμιστας' (9.215). At the end of the story, he again speaks about Polyphemus as a 'monster, skilled in lawlessness' (πέλωρ, ἀθεμίστια εἰδώς, 9.428). The main cause for the consistent negative evaluation of Polyphemus is, of course, his transgressions against ξενία. These transgressions are explicitly framed as religious offenses.¹⁴¹ In Homer's Cyclopeia Polyphemus' 'lack of θέμις (and δίκη)' was

cult of Demeter is generally wineless (LORD 1994:187; FOLEY 1994:47; ALLAN, HALLIDAY & SIKES 1936:152-53).

¹³⁶ *Od.* 9.106, 112, 189, 428.

¹³⁷ e.g. *Il.* 9.156, *Il.* 9.298. The morality may be expressed by additional expressions. Thus, corrupt people make decisions (θέμιστες) with 'crooked justice' (σκολιῆς δίκης, Hes. *Op.* 221); but a good king makes them with 'straight justice' (ἰθείησι δίκησιν, Hes. *Th.* 85); Zeus is angry when men make 'crooked decisions' (σκολιάς θέμιστας, Hom. *Il.* 387).

¹³⁸ For example in Homer, Themis is the goddess that calls together the meeting of the Olympians (*Il.* 20.4) but also of humans (*Od.* 2.68); and θέμις is characteristic of the *agora* (*Il.* 11.807).

¹³⁹ But note that the text says, at the same time, that each of the males θεμιστεύει 'declares law and right' over his own wife and children (*Od.* 9.114).

¹⁴⁰ Hes. *Th.* 235-36. Cf. Thgn. 1.1134-50, Archil. fr. 177 l. 3.

¹⁴¹ e.g. *Od.* 9.477-79.

apparently an appropriate way of evaluating his failure to honour this important interhuman relationship that was sanctioned by the gods.

Summarising the above, already in Homer and Hesiod the term θέμις can mean ‘usage’ or custom’ but often (also) seems to express a moral judgment of human actions that includes the imagined perspective of the gods. We have seen that this term evaluated whether humans honour the gods in cult (in a specific way), know their place with respect to the gods, and honour the relationships among themselves as those between parents and children and between guests and hosts.

The same case can be made for δίκη. According to the main dictionaries, δίκη is used in the sense of ‘custom, characteristic’¹⁴² and ‘right, justice’ from Homer onwards (while acquiring more specific senses relating to the court of law later).¹⁴³ Despite this characterisation of δίκη in the dictionaries, it should be noted there is an academic debate on whether δίκη in Homer, Hesiod and other archaic literature has a moral dimension to begin with.¹⁴⁴ One reason why this question has received much scholarly attention is because it plays a role in larger discussions on theodicy in Greek religion.¹⁴⁵ A single example may illustrate the difficulty of the debate about δίκη, as

¹⁴² This usage does not occur in the *Iliad*. In the *Odyssey*, δίκη, like θέμις, is used in the sense of ‘characteristic, normal way of acting’. Thus, it is ‘the way of slaves’ (δμῶων δίκη) to be afraid when young masters rule over them and to give a small gift (*Od.* 14.59-60) and the ‘way of old men’ (δίκη γερόντων) to sleep softly after they have bathed and eaten (*Od.* 24.254-55). Other examples of this usage in the *Odyssey*: 4.691, 11.218, 19.43, 19.168. This usage sometimes occurs elsewhere, for example, it is the ‘way of seafarers’ (δίκη ἀνδρῶν ἀλφηστάων), to long for food immediately when they come to land after a troublesome sea journey (*h.Ap.* 458-61). The usage of δίκη in these examples seems to be more descriptive than prescriptive: I agree with GAGARIN 1973:83 on this point, though not with the rest of his article, as I will discuss below.

¹⁴³ cf. e.g. LSJ s.v. δίκη IV 1-3.

¹⁴⁴ A number of scholars deny that δίκη in Homer and Hesiod is a moral term. For example, GAGARIN maintained that δίκη refers to ‘a process for the peaceful settlement of disputes’ (1973:81) but acquires the abstract sense of justice only much later (1973 and 1974); and NELSON 1996:30 argued that ‘*dikē* is not, for Hesiod, a moral rather than a practical question’. DICKIE 1978:91 provides a survey of early similar opinions expressed by LATTE 1946:65, PEARSON 1962:46, HAVELOCK 1969:51, RODGERS 1971. By contrast, for example DICKIE defended a moral sense of δίκη from the *Iliad* onwards, as we will see in the main text below; and according to LLOYD-JONES 1987:310, in Homer ‘the word δίκη connotes a universal order that the gods maintain: this order, though it is by no means moral in the sense in which Christianity believes in a moral order, cannot be said to be without a moral element.’

¹⁴⁵ The question of the morality of Homeric δίκη is part of a larger discussion on whether the Homeric gods are just. Influential scholars who answered that question in the negative were DODDS and ADKINS. The former claimed, for example ‘I find no indication in the *Iliad* that Zeus is concerned with justice as such’ (DODDS 1963 [1951]:32); while the latter held that ‘the gods are portrayed generally in the Greek poems as far from just’ (ADKINS 1960:62). Reacting to these scholars, LLOYD-JONES’ seminal monograph *The Justice of Zeus* is the most famous defence of the idea that the (Homeric) gods are concerned with justice (LLOYD-JONES 1983 [1971]). One aspect of

well as its part in larger argumentations about whether the Greek gods were just. In the *Odyssey* the loud breathing of Trojan horses under an attack by Patroclus is compared to a storm:

ὡς δ' ὑπὸ λαίλαπι πᾶσα κελαινὴ βέβριθε χθῶν
 ἤματ' ὀπωρινῷ ὅτε λαβρότατον χέει ὕδωρ 385
 Ζεὺς, ὅτε δὴ ῥ' ἄνδρεςσι κοτεσσάμενος χαλεπήνη,
 οἷ βίη εἰν ἀγορῇ σκολιὰς κρίνωσι θέμιστας,
 ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσσωσι θεῶν ὅπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες.¹⁴⁶

as when the whole black earth is weighed down by a furious storm
 on a late summer day on which Zeus sends pouring rain
 in a rage, angry at men
 who make crooked decisions in the *agora* with force,
 they drive *diké* out, not taking heed of the vengeance of the gods.

In this passage, GAGARIN takes δίκη to refer to a process of ‘peaceful arbitration’. This translation reflects GAGARIN’s general interpretation of archaic δίκη as the process whereby two parties settle a dispute through debating (or the outcome of that process).¹⁴⁷ GAGARIN argues, correctly, that there is no evidence in this passage itself that δίκη should mean ‘abstract justice’.¹⁴⁸ We may just as well assume that Zeus is angry, because humans have given up on peaceful ways to settle disagreements and act with violence (βίη, 387) instead, but not because they are ‘unjust’. This view is difficult to falsify, but so is the opposite view. DICKIE argued for a moral interpretation of these lines, but mainly on the basis of the more clearly moral context of a Hesiodic passage that is often compared to it;¹⁴⁹ and LLOYD-JONES defended a moral reading of δίκη, also not arguing with evidence in the passage itself, but seeing

the argumentation in this debate is an investigation of the usage of the term δίκη. Thus, according to GAGARIN 1973:81: ‘The search for a morality in Homer and Hesiod does not depend entirely upon the meaning of δίκη, but it is the single most important word in this area, and I believe that a satisfactory understanding of its meaning and function in these two poets is a necessary prerequisite for any discussion of early Greek morality.’

¹⁴⁶ *Il.* 18.284-88. This passage has been seen as an interpolation based on a very similar passage in Hesiod, *Op.* 218-224. For references about the debate cf. LLOYD-JONES 1983 [1971]:186 n. 26. LLOYD-JONES has defended the authenticity of these lines.

¹⁴⁷ GAGARIN 1973, 1974.

¹⁴⁸ GAGARIN 1973:86.

¹⁴⁹ DICKIE 1978:98. In Hes. *Op.* 218-224, there is a tumult when Δίκη is being dragged to where corrupt (‘gift-devouring’, δωροφάγοι, 221) men drag her, and make judgments (κρίνωσι θέμιστας, 221) with crooked δίκη (221).

it as ‘perfectly consistent with the theology of the *Iliad* as a whole’.¹⁵⁰ Indeed, in this passage as well as in other passages, it is difficult to see whether *δίκη* has a moral dimension.

Instead of trying to do full justice to this debate, I will focus on three selected passages in Homer and Hesiod in which, in my view, *δίκη* is quite clearly employed as a moral evaluation of behaviour. Moreover, in these cases the targeted behaviour is evaluated from the imagined perspective of the gods. For example, the swineherd Eumaeus complains to Odysseus

“ἔσθιτε νῦν, ὃ ξεῖνε, τὰ τε δμῶεσσι πάρεστι,
 χοίρε’· ἀτὰρ σιάλους γε σύας μνηστήρες ἔδουσιν,
 οὐκ ὄπιδα φρονέοντες ἐνὶ φρεσὶν οὐδ’ ἐλεητῶν
 οὐ μὲν σχέτλια ἔργα θεοὶ μάκαρες φιλέουσιν,
 ἀλλὰ δίκην τίουσιν καὶ αἴσιμα ἔργ’ ἀνθρώπων.¹⁵¹ 80

Eat now, stranger, what is at hand for slaves,
 young pigs, but the fat hogs and sows the suitors eat,
 who do not pay heed to the vengeance of the gods and have no
 compassion,¹⁵²
 for the blessed gods do not love wicked deeds
 but they honour *dikē* and fitting deeds.

As DICKIE rightly pointed out, first of all the *δίκη* which the gods honour is equalled to *αἴσιμα ἔργα*, a moral commendation in Homer,¹⁵³ and contrasted with *σχέτλια ἔργα*, a moral disqualification, in Homer denoting ‘wicked, morally corrupt deeds’.¹⁵⁴ Eumaeus makes a further point that even enemies whom Zeus has given booty are overcome by fear of the gods’ vengeance when they are sailing home (85-88). But the suitors are not:

οἶδε δέ τοι ἴσασι, θεοῦ δέ τιν’ ἔκλυον αὐδήν,
 κείνου λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον, ὃ τ’ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι δικαίως 90

¹⁵⁰ LLOYD-JONES 1983 [1971]:6.

¹⁵¹ *Od.* 14.80-84.

¹⁵² The word *ὄπις* is generally construed with *θεῶν* in Homer (e.g. *Il.* 16.388 quoted in the main text above, *Od.* 20.215, 21.28), and seems to refer to the ‘vengeance of the gods’ on its own here; the word *ἐλεητῶν* is less likely to have been construed as such (i.e. as compassion of the gods) by the ancient audience. MERRY 1901, *ad loc.*

¹⁵³ e.g. *Od.* 17.361 ff.

¹⁵⁴ e.g. *Od.* 9.295, *Od.* 22.413-15.

Are they insolent and savage and not *dikaioi*
or do they love strangers and do they have a god-fearing mind?

A moral interpretation of οὐδὲ δίκαιοι in 201 is strongly suggested by the evaluations in the immediate context. The qualification οὐ δίκαιος is placed on one line with ἄγριος and ὑβριστής, both descriptions of a-moral behaviour in Homer.¹⁵⁹ By contrast, we infer that just people would love guests and suppliants (be φιλόξενοι, 202) and fear gods (have a θεουδῆς νόος, 202) instead.¹⁶⁰ In the ironic lines that follow (209-14), the disqualification οὐ δίκαιος is connected to a specific guest-host relationship, that between Odysseus and the Phaeacians.¹⁶¹

ὦ πόποι, οὐκ ἄρα πάντα νοήμονες οὐδὲ δίκαιοι
ἦσαν Φαιήκων ἡγήτορες ἠδὲ μέδοντες, 210
οἳ μ' εἰς ἄλλην γαῖαν ἀπήγαγον· ἦ τέ μ' ἔφαντο
ἄξιν εἰς Ἰθάκην εὐδαιελον, οὐδ' ἐτέλεσαν.
Ζεὺς σφεας τείσαιτο Ἴκετήσιος, ὅς τε καὶ ἄλλους
ἀνθρώπους ἐφορᾷ καὶ τείνεται, ὅς τις ἀμάρτη¹⁶²

how awful, it turned out that they were not wholly thoughtful nor *dikaioi*,
the leaders and rulers of the Phaeacians,
who carried me off to a different land. Truly they told me
that they would lead me to sunny Ithaca, but they did not fulfil their promise.
May Zeus of the Suppliant punish them, who also
looks upon other men and punishes the one who transgresses.

According to Odysseus, the Phaeacians are not δίκαιοι (209). They betrayed their suppliant and guest, by not sending him home, even though they promised him to do so. Zeus of the Suppliant, who oversees this relationship, should punish them accordingly.¹⁶³ In this passage, δίκη and δίκαιος again function in the sphere of moral evaluation of interhuman conduct that has Zeus' special attention.

¹⁵⁹ LSJ s.v. ἄγριος II 1, e.g. *Il.* 8.96, *Od.* 1.199; LSJ s.v. ὑβριστής 1, e.g. *Il.* 13.633, *Od.* 6.120.

¹⁶⁰ Note that lines 201-202 are a formula, occurring on three other occasions (in descriptions of) when Odysseus arrives at an unknown place: *Od.* 6.120 8.575, 9.175.

¹⁶¹ The evaluation δίκαιος is connected to the treatment of guests elsewhere, in e.g. *Od.* 18.414, *Od.* 20.322.

¹⁶² *Od.* 13.209-214.

¹⁶³ Compare *Od.* 3.133, where it is said that Zeus obstructed the return journey of the Argives because they were 'not all of them were δίκαιος'.

Two similar relevant passages appear in Hesiod's *Works and Days*. In an exposition of morally inappropriate conduct displeasing to gods, human misconduct towards to a suppliant (ικέρτης, 327), a guest (ξεῖνος, 327), a brother (by sleeping with his wife, 328-29) and to a father (by insulting him with harsh words, 331-32) are discussed together, as if they form a logical and coherent group of behavioural patterns.¹⁶⁴ If someone (in this case, Perses) behaves badly in any of these relationships, Zeus will be angry and will punish him for his unjust deeds (ἔργων ἀδίκων, 333-34). This inventory of 'bad behaviour' is as a whole contrasted with a guideline for the proper religious behaviour: one should sacrifice to the gods 'purely' and pour them libations (336-38). The juxtaposition of this religious advice with the previous ἔργα ἄδικα reinforces the presentation of those offences as religious crimes. This passage give us the idea that not only the divine evaluation of interhuman moral issues, but also the grouping together of these behavioural patterns as part of one and the same concept of piety was a living idea in the community in which the *Works and Days* were written, which had perhaps been part and parcel of Greek thought for a longer time.

Finally, the so-called 'sermon on δίκη'¹⁶⁵ starts with the injunction to Perses to observe justice (δίκη, 213) and not to advance ὕβρις (213). The sermon follows the famous fable of the hawk and the nightingale and the story of the five races of men, which ends with the sketch of a grim future scenario for the present race. This is the iron race, which will be destroyed by Zeus when they hit a moral low point. Hesiod's vision, in which ὕβρις triumphs over δίκη (190-92), is of a society seeing the breakdown of proper interaction between guest and host (183), friends (183), brothers (184) and parents and children (185-89); of peace (189) and the sanctity of oaths (190). The injunction to Perses to change his ways now (213), which takes up the opposition of ὕβρις and δίκη, functions against the implicit background of this apocalyptic moral bankrupt. In this passage again, δίκη is an ethical guideline describing relations among humans, which must be followed in order to avoid the anger of the gods.

In the examples discussed in this section, θέμις, δίκη and δίκαιος are both ethical and religious evaluations, targeting human behaviour towards the gods directly and/or towards other humans in those relationships that have the gods' special attention.

¹⁶⁴ The passage occurs immediately after the advice not to 'seize wealth'. It has just been argued that the gods make a man who seizes wealth powerless and make his house small (πεῖα δέ μιν μαυροῦσι θεοί, μινύθουσι δὲ οἶκον ἀνέρι τῷ). This advice is followed by a description of other things the gods do not like.

¹⁶⁵ Hes. *Op.* 213-85, e.g. ATHANASSAKIS 2004 [1983], *ad loc.*, VERDENIUS 1985, *ad loc.*

These moral evaluations are very closely linked to the perceived opinion of the gods. It seems that, in these cases, θέμις, δίκη and δίκαιος articulate the notion that ὁσία and ὄσιος expresses in its rare pre-classical occurrences and in the classical period.

The next question to ask is if we can pinpoint any reason for the strongly increasing popularity of the adjective ὄσιος (and the introduction of *eusebês* & *cognates*), given that there were already other lexemes that expressed the same mentality. We will return to this question at the end of Chapter 4.¹⁶⁶

6. Conclusion

In this chapter we have made a preliminary analysis of the semantics of *hosios* & *cognates*. In the first section, different aspects of the distribution of *hosios* & *cognates* were investigated. By studying possible prototypical usages of *hosios* & *cognates* we were able to answer **Q1a**, concerning the evaluative nature of these lexemes. It was argued that *hosios* & *cognates* are religious or connect a religious and an ethical element. A person is ‘prototypically’ ὄσιος if he/she respects the gods by acknowledging them as gods, knows his/her place in respect to them and honours them in ritual practice. But crucially, in order to be considered ὄσιος, a person also had to honour those relationships that have the gods’ special interests. These were, for example, the relationship between parents and children, and with other core family members, between guest and host, between spouses, with suppliants, with those to whom one is bound by oath and towards the dead.

Furthermore, we discussed **Q1b**, the question of where to place ὄσιος with positive argumentative orientation on an evaluative scale. We examined some examples in which an interpretation of ὄσιος as expressing praise seems to be demanded by the direct textual context. But, as I argued, the most pressing reason for taking ὄσιος as articulating a positive value (not ‘what is neutral’ or ‘acceptable’) emerges from an investigation of the cultural frame to which this value is connected.

hosios & *cognates* belong in the frame of the ‘exchange between gods and men’. As was argued by others before me, the relationship between gods and men was conceptualised as a bond of reciprocal χάρις, characterized by the voluntary exchange of gifts. The most important gift that humans have to offer to gods is τιμή. If we were pressed to give a ‘schema’ of ὁσιότης we might say that this term refers to everything that humans do to give χάρις to gods, thereby pleasing them and giving them τιμή. To accomplish this, humans should not only honour the relationship with the gods, but also those relationships between humans among themselves in which the gods take a special interest. To ‘do ὁσία’, therefore, is to do something positive.

¹⁶⁶ Chapter 4, section 4.

The fifth section of this chapter was an analysis of the first part of **Q4**, concerning the steeply increasing usage of *hosios & cognates* after the archaic period. Should we assume that the mentality *hosios & cognates* articulated was alien to (or unpopular in) pre-classical Greek thought? In our study, we focused on the usage of two specific lexemes: θέμις and δίκη. We concluded that the mentality *hosios & cognates* express was frequently attested in Homer and Hesiod, but was articulated in other terms. In Chapter 4, we will return to **Q4** and come up with a tentative explanation for the increasing popularity of *hosios & cognates*.

By investigating the inventory of usages and the internal organisation of the semantic network of *hosios & cognates*, as well as the cultural frame(s) in which these lexemes belong, I have aimed to provide an initial characterisation of their meaning. In the next chapters we will solve residual difficulties and refine our insight into the meaning of *hosios & cognates* by applying the contrastive method.

3

ὄσιος vs. εὐσεβής

The differences in meaning and usage between *hosios*, *eusebês* and *their cognates* are especially difficult to capture. These two sets of lexemes often seem to be employed in highly comparable contexts, evaluating similar, or the same, religious actions and attitudes. Some scholars have expressed an opinion on the distinction in meaning between the two, others view them as synonyms. This chapter is a contrastive examination of the semantics of *eusebês* & *cognates* and *hosios* & *cognates*. The investigation has two main goals. The first aim is to determine the semantic / pragmatic relationship between these two terms. We will see that the patterns of distribution of ὄσιος and εὐσεβής do not support earlier characterisations of their differences. I will show that the main distinction in usage between *hosios*, *eusebês* and *their cognates* lies in their positive vs. negative argumentative orientation. Moreover, in the negatively oriented cases, the two sets of lexemes are found in different discourse environments, differing clearly in their affective quality. Secondly, the contrastive approach highlights specific semantic qualities of *hosios* & *cognates* that were not previously noted in the scholarship. A contrastive close reading of individual passages with either ἀνόσιος or ἀσεβής/δυσσεβής will show that ἀνόσιος has an emotional or aggressive connotation, as opposed to ἀσεβής and δυσσεβής. Moreover, the comparison between the adjectives ὄσιος, εὐσεβής and their antonyms may increase our understanding of the usage of ὄσιος for objects, and its supposed meanings ‘profane’ and ‘religiously neutral’.

1. Introductory remarks on *eusebês & cognates*

The term εὐσέβεια is generally translated as ‘piety’.¹ According to MOTTE, this lexeme gives the most complete expression to the notion of Greek piety in the classical period.²

The noun εὐσέβεια is derived from the root *seb-*. According to RUDHARDT, σέβειν (and σέβεσθαι) refer generally to showing honour or expressing deference through visible acts.³ All conduct inspired by σέβας proceeds from a complex feeling of respect. Fear, admiration and love underlie and complement this sentiment.⁴ We can see this multifaceted nature of *seb-* words in the earliest, Homeric occurrences. A Homeric stock phrase is σέβας μ’ἔχει εἰσορόωντα ‘a feeling of σέβας captures me as I behold’.⁵ Odysseus says it when viewing a group of dancers, and Helena when she sees Telemachus and is struck by how much he resembles his father.⁶ Although the awe-inspiring object does not need to have anything to do with religion, the Homeric sentiment of σέβας is very often linked to an experience of the divine.⁷ When Telemachus remarks on a beautiful room in the same words, he says Zeus’ house must look similarly; Odysseus, when he sees Nausicaa and says he is awe-struck by

¹ εὐσέβεια is interpreted as ‘piety’ by students of Greek religion (BURKERT 1985:273; MOTTE 1986:153, 157; RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:12; RUDHARDT 2008:69; BRUIT-ZAIDMAN 2001:11) and scholars of Greek lexical semantics (FRISK 1970:686; CHANTRAINE 1968-80:992; BEEKES 2010:1315) alike.

² MOTTE 1986:157.

³ Unlike ὄσιος, this term has a generally accepted etymology, which may help us understand its semantics better. The Greek verb σοβέω ‘to scare away, chase away’ is an old causative verb from the root of σέβομαι. This may indicate that σέβομαι originally meant ‘to run away, to flee’ *vel sim.* (compare: φοβέω/φοβοῦμαι). The verb σέβομαι is traditionally compared with Skt. *tyajati* ‘to desert, leave alone, abandon’ from an Indo-European root **tieg^w*- ‘leave alone, give up’ (FRISK 1970:686-87, referring to BRUGMANN 1906:301ff. and POKORNY 1949-59:1086). The same etymology is given by CHANTRAINE 1968-80:992-93 and BEEKES 2010:1315-16. BURKERT 1985:272 notes that ‘in the most various languages and cultures the expressions for dealing with the divine are taken from the word-field fear.’ Thus, the etymology of this root lies in the semantic field of fear. Note that in the first instances of the root *seb-*, occurring in Homer and the Homeric Hymns in the verb σέβεσθαι and the noun τὸ σέβας, the notions of reverence and admiration (perhaps, as resulting from fear) seem more prominent than danger and flight (BURKERT 1985:272).

⁴ RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:16, similarly MOTTE 1986:153: ‘les mots de la racine **seb* présentent ... une plus grande unité ... tous gravitent autour d’une notion de vénération, de crainte respectueuse inspirant la conduite.’ RUDHARDT on τὸ σέβας, σέβειν and εὐσέβεια: 1992 [1958]:12-17, 2008:69-99.

⁵ τὸ σέβας has both an objective and a subjective sense: it is the object that deserves respect and the feeling that brings a person to expressing respect (RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:17, 2008:72).

⁶ *Od.* 8.383, 4.142.

⁷ RUDHARDT 2008:70.

her appearance and beauty, thinks she might be the goddess Artemis.⁸ σέβας is a feeling or an attitude which potentially also moves one to *act*. Achilles is told he should experience a feeling of σέβας, which should induce him to start fighting; and when people feel respect (σέβεσθαι), they refrain from killing someone or stripping them of their weapons.⁹ The feeling of σέβας may strike humans and gods alike.¹⁰

After Homer, σέβειν, σέβεσθαι and τὸ σέβας occur regularly in a wide range of religious and non-religious applications. The object of awe can be a god, a spouse, guest, suppliant or the dead, but also a river, animal, object, an athlete in the competition, prosperous friends or the power that wealth brings, to name but a few examples.¹¹ Not only humans, but also gods are said to σέβειν.¹² By contrast, the later (post-Homeric) derivations εὐ- δυσ- and ἄ-σεβ-εἶα (and εὐ-σεβ-ης, εὐ-σεβ-εῖν etc.) seem focused on attitudes of *religious* awe or fear and to relate to the sphere of piety. The same is true for the less frequently occurring adjectives θεοσεβής, εὐσεπτος and ἄσεπτος. Therefore, the contrastive analysis in this chapter is aimed at these lexemes, because they express an evaluation of a religious action or attitude and are thus in clear competition with *hosios & cognates*. I will refer to this group of lexemes as *eusebês & cognates*.

2. *hosios & cognates vs. eusebês & cognates in the scholarship*

Opinions on the semantics of *eusebês & cognates* as opposed to the semantics of *hosios & cognates* differ. According to some, the two are synonyms.¹³ This suggestion is understandable from the fact that the types of actions, attitudes and objects that are sometimes evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates* are also regularly discussed in terms of εὐσεβεία.¹⁴ The two terms often even discuss the same

⁸ *Od.* 4.75, 6.161.

⁹ *Il.* 18.178; 6.167; 6.417.

¹⁰ Humans and gods experienced σέβας when seeing the narcissus that Gaea let spring forth (*h.Cer.* 10); and when Athena was born from the head of Zeus, a σέβας captured all the gods (σέβας ἔχε πάντας ὀρῶντας ἀθανάτους, *h.Hom.* 11.6).

¹¹ e.g., a god: *S. Ant.* 780, *S. Aj.* 713, *E. Med.* 395, *Hdt.* 5.7; spouse: *E. Alc.* 279; guest: ; suppliant: *A. Eu.* 151; the dead: *E. Alc.* 1060, *A. Pers.* 694, *S. Ant.* 872; river: *Hdt.* 1.138; animal: *Hdt.* 2.46; object: *Hdt.* 3.128; athlete in the competition: *S. El.* 685; prosperous friends: *A. Ag.* 833; the power that wealth brings: *A. Ag.* 779.

¹² e.g., *A. Ag.* 779, *A. Supp.* 814-15, *A. Eu.* 151, *E. Supp.* 595, *E. Hipp.* 896, 996.

¹³ This is argued by BOLKESTEIN 1936 and CONNOR 1988:163 and implied by VAN DER VALK 1942:33-34. For example, BOLKESTEIN 1936:210: 'ὄσιος c.s. et εὐσεβής c.s. s'emploient à peu près dans les mêmes cas ... si l'on ne peut pas, pour tous les cas où l'on se sert de ὄσιος, signaler un emploi parallèle d'εὐσεβής, il faudra le plus souvent attribuer au hasard l'absence d'un tel exemple.'

¹⁴ We will see this below, section 3.3.

behaviour of the same literary character(s)/persons in the same text.¹⁵ However, scholars have argued that true synonymy in natural language is rare.¹⁶ It is therefore unlikely that ὄσιος and εὐσεβής are synonymous in all respects.

Others have argued that εὐσεβής and ὄσιος have a different semantic scope. JEANMAIRE, building on to the work by VAN DER VALK, argued that εὐσέβεια is a disposition that a human can have. One can *be* εὐσεβής because of one's nature or character, while people can only *become* ὄσιος, after acquitting themselves of all their obligations towards the gods.¹⁷ In MIKALSON'S view, εὐσέβεια refers to a respectful attitude, while ὁσιότης refers to religious correctness:

Piety did, however, concern the gods greatly, and piety in the Greek tradition has two interrelated aspects: *eusebeia*, showing “proper respect” for the gods; and *hosiotēs*, “religious correctness,” acting in ways that conform to the religious laws and traditions of the community. As an example of the difference, not to sacrifice to the gods at all was an act of disrespect of them (*asebeia*), but to sacrifice at the wrong time or place or in the wrong manner was religiously incorrect (*anosion*).¹⁸

RUDHARDT (and MOTTE, following RUDHARDT) hold that while both terms denote ‘piety’ and at first sight seem to coincide, εὐσέβεια is the expression of an inner disposition, whereas being ὄσιος is keeping to an objective, social order:

Alors que la ὁσιότης, nous le verrons, définit ces comportements en considération d'un ordre objectif avec lequel ils s'harmonisent, l'εὐσέβεια les caractérise par leur accord avec une disposition intérieure dont ils procèdent.¹⁹

RUDHARDT'S description of εὐσέβεια follows from his study of τὸ σέβας and σέβειν.²⁰ As we have seen above, σέβας and σέβειν express an inner disposition.²¹

¹⁵ Cf. Chapter 1, section 2.2, n. 92.

¹⁶ e.g. LYONS 1981:148.

¹⁷ JEANMAIRE 1945:74, following the characterisation of ὄσιος in VAN DER VALK 1942.

¹⁸ MIKALSON 2010:23. This statement was not part of the first edition (*Ancient Greek Religion*. Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell 2005) yet: in that edition the text reads (p. 25): ‘...Piety did, however, concern the gods greatly, and piety in the Greek tradition is the offering of appropriate honors to the gods on appropriate occasions. Piety, for the Greeks, was a matter ...’.

¹⁹ RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:15. MOTTE 1986:157, 165, 168 following RUDHARDT.

²⁰ RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:15-17.

²¹ Section 1 above. In his preface to the second edition of the book, RUDHARDT states that his ideas on the difference between ὄσιος and εὐσεβής are unchanged (RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:2). Moreover,

Finally, other scholars who studied the semantics of ὄσιος and/or εὐσεβής have not commented on the semantic relationship of these two terms.²² A common characteristic of all these theories is that they seem to view εὐσέβεια as an internal value, saying something about one's character/disposition/attitude, while ὀσιότης does not (necessarily) have such a mental, inner component.

In the following we will study the differences in semantics between these two terms, paying special attention to the hypothesised difference discussed directly above.

3. *hosios & cognates vs. eusebês & cognates I : distribution*

3.1 General distribution

We will study general characteristics of the distribution of *eusebês & cognates* first. Examining its diachronic appearance, its spread across authors and genres and its general frequency will allow us to make some initial comparisons between *eusebês, hosios & their cognates*.

Between Homer and the end of the fifth century there are 240 literary occurrences of adjectives, nouns and verbs of the root σεβ- with a prefix. We find 126 occurrences of the adjectives εὐσεβής (n=72), ἀσεβής (n=15), δυσσεβής (n=26), θεοσεβής (n=7), εὔσεπτος (n=1) and ἄσεπτος (n=5). This count includes the adjectives, the corresponding adverbs and cases of the comparative and superlative. In addition we find 47 occurrences of the nouns εὐσέβεια (n=32), ἀσέβεια (n=6) and δυσσέβεια (n=9), and 67 occurrences of the verbs εὐσεβεῖν (n=31), ἀσεβεῖν (n=32) and δυσσεβεῖν (n=4).

Note that although the root σεβ- is much more productive than ὄσιος (recurring in different verbs, nouns, adjectives) the total number of occurrences of *eusebês & cognates* in this period is in the same order of magnitude (240 for *eusebês & cognates*

RUDHARDT mentioned that the fact that a god can be qualified as ὄσιος, but not as εὐσεβής confirms his theory: a god does not let himself be judged by his inner dispositions, but the order to which ὄσιος refers can sometimes situate itself above a god himself, in any case, above a particular god. In Chapter 5, I will give a different explanation on the usage of ὄσιος for gods. In my view, gods cannot normally be referred to as ὄσιος either, and the cases in which they are evaluated by this lexeme are examples of marked language usage.

²² Some authors who have worked on ὄσιος and/or εὐσεβής have not explicitly focused on any differences between the these terms: BRUIT-ZAIDMAN 1992, PARKER 1996a [1983], CHADWICK 1996, SAMONS 2000, SCULLION 2005, JAY-ROBERT 2009 and BLOK (2011, *forthc.* a) do not explicitly express a view on the semantic relation of ὄσιος and εὐσεβής. It is not obvious (to me) what conclusions should be drawn from the separate headings ὄσιος and εὐσεβής in the study of BURKERT 1985.

vs. 277 for *hosios & cognates*). Thus, it is not the case that either *hosios & cognates* or *eusebês & cognates* are relatively ‘common’ or ‘uncommon’, and that either one would be much more easily retrieved from the lexicon.

3.2 Distribution: authors

A notable aspect about the occurrences of *eusebês & cognates* is its similar diachronic distribution as compared to *hosios & cognates*. The forms with εὐ-, ἅ, and δυσ- do not occur in Homer, the Homeric Hymns and Hesiod and are infrequent in archaic literature. The first single instance of the adjective εὐσεβῆς occurs in a fragmentary poem of Simonides. Theognis uses the adjective εὐσεβῆς (n=1), the noun εὐσέβεια (n=1) and the verbs εὐσεβεῖν (n=2) and ἄσεβεῖν (n=1). In the fragments of the sixth-century historiographer Hecataeus the adjective ἄσεβῆς occurs twice, the noun ἄσέβεια and the verb ἄσεβεῖν once each. The adjective εὐσεβῆς occurs once in Pythagoras. In the fifth century, especially the second half of this century, *eusebês & cognates* become much more frequent, occurring in all genres, like *hosios & cognates*. Thus, it is not the case that these lexemes cover the same (or similar) semantic grounds, but in different periods of time.




Chart 1: Diachronic distribution of *eusebês & cognates* and *hosios & cognates*

In the fifth century, *eusebês & cognates* occur most often in tragedy and forensic oratory. These terms occurs in **drama**: in tragedy (in Aeschylus, n=25, in Sophocles,

n=41 and Euripides, n=91) as well as comedy (in Aristophanes, n=5, the comic fragments of Eupolis, n=1, and Epicharmus, n=2).²³ *eusebês & cognates* are also attested in **the earliest orators** (in Andocides' *De Mysteriis*, n=13, in Lysias' *In Eratosthenem* and *In Agoratum*, n=3, and frequently Antiphon, n=26). In fifth-century **historiography** we do not find *eusebês & cognates* often, occurring in Herodotus (n=7) in Thucydides (n=3), and in a few fragments.²⁴ Finally, *eusebês & cognates* are infrequent in **lyric poetry** and in **early philosophical and other texts**.²⁵ All in all, the distribution of *eusebês, hosios and their cognates* across genres in the fifth century is rather similar, but *eusebês & cognates* are even more concentrated in Greek drama.




Chart 2: Distribution of *eusebês, hosios and their cognates* across genres

The number of occurrences of *eusebês & cognates* per 1000 words in those authors in which these lexemes occur most frequently is shown in Table 1 below:

²³ The lexemes *δυσσεβής, δυσσέβεια* and *δυσσεβείν* are found only in tragedy, occurring for the first time in Aeschylus.

²⁴ These cases occur in the fragments of Hellanicus (n=1) and Xanthus (n=1).

²⁵ *eusebês & cognates* occur in Bacchylides (n=2), Pindar (n=4), the fragments of Empedocles (n=2), of Critias (n=1) and of Gorgias (n=1).

Author	Words in corpus	<i>eusebês & cogn.</i>	#/1000w
1. Antiphon	19621	26	1.33
2. Andocides	19624	13	0.66
3. Sophocles	80062	41	0.51
4. Euripides	193904	91	0.47
5. Aeschylus	93249	25	0.27

Table 1: Absolute and relative frequency of *eusebês & cognates* in 5th century authors: Top 5

The relative number of occurrences of *eusebês*, *hosios* and their *cognates* in individual authors are in the same order of magnitude, and the ‘Top 5’ of authors in which these lexeme occur most often differs only on one author.²⁶ Thus, it seems not to be the case that *hosios & cognates* are associated with a different register or style than *eusebês & cognates*.

3.3 Distribution: themes

We can order the occurrences of *eusebês & cognates* on the basis of the themes that the evaluation refers to.

- 27 % of all occurrences (n=65) revolves around **acknowledging gods as gods** and **keeping a proper relationship towards them** (n=24) and **honouring them in cult** (n=41)
- 25 % of all cases (n=60) has to do with honouring those who are in one’s *oikos* : behaving well towards one’s **parents or children** (n=40), one’s **brothers and sisters** (n=5), towards **other family members** (n=4) and **spouses** (n=11)
- 8 % of all cases (n=18) have to do with honouring **the dead**, burying them and providing them with the appropriate honours afterwards
- 14 % of all occurrences (n=33) relate to behaviour towards **guests, hosts, and suppliants**
- 13 % of all occurrences (n=32) have to do with keeping a promise or **oath**
- 14% of the examined cases (n=34) of *eusebês & cognates* seems a **general, unspecific** evaluation of behaviour pleasing to gods

²⁶ Compare the relative frequencies of *hosios & cognates* (Chapter 2, section 1.2). The top 5 of 5th century authors in which these lexemes occur relatively most frequently: 1. Antiphon (2.50/1000w), 2. Euripides (0.59/1000w), 3. Andocides (0.36/1000w), 4. Sophocles (0.20/1000w), 5. Herodotus (0.17/1000w).

As was the case for *hosios & cognates*, individuals and their actions are regularly evaluated as *eusebês & cognates* for more than one reason. 19% of the cases show such multiple motivation (n=45). Taking into account the fact that many passages belong to more than one category, the thematic areas listed above together account not for 101% of the data (= the added total of the percentages mentioned) but for 85%.

- a remaining 15% (n=43) can be seen as a **rest category** in which *eusebês & cognates* are used to evaluate a wide variety of actions, attitudes and objects.




Chart 3: The thematic distributions of *eusebês*, *hosios* and *their cognates*

As this analysis show us, not only do (over) four-fifths of the attested cases of *eusebês hosios and their cognates* evaluate the same limited set of attitudes and actions towards the gods and towards humans, the relative shares of these thematic areas are almost the same. Thus, the usages of *eusebês*, *hosios* and *their cognates* are extremely similar both in scope and in relative frequencies of occurrence. None of the differences in amounts of occurrences (of any of these themes) between *eusebês & cognates* and *hosios & cognates* are statistically significant.²⁷ The only significant difference is found between occurrences of the two terms as a general, unspecific evaluation of behaviour.²⁸

²⁷ Gods and cultic practice: $\chi^2 = 0.57$ p = 0.451; members of the *oikos*: $\chi^2 = 0.25$ p = 0.615; guests and suppliants: $\chi^2 = 0.00$ p = 0.991; oath keeping: $\chi^2 = 0.00$ p = 0.993; the dead: $\chi^2 = 3.69$ p = 0.054.

²⁸ $\chi^2 = 12.68$ p < 0.001.

A sub-question is whether *eusebês*, *hosios* and their cognates also evaluate the same issues *within* each of these thematic areas. The following observations are relevant:

1. *eusebês* and *cognates* do not seem to refer more or less often than *hosios* and *cognates* to acknowledging a god at all.²⁹ The two terms do have a different distribution when relating to ritual practice. In the case of *hosios* & *cognates*, most of the cases relate clearly to *who*, *what*, *where* *when* and *how* of ritual practice. The other occurrences refer to the maltreatment of the gods' temples, altars and images, and to honouring a particular god in cultic service at all. By contrast, *eusebês* & *cognates* refer to the *who*, *what*, *where*, *when* and *how* of ritual practice only in a minority of cases, while the other cases discuss the other above-mentioned sub-topics.³⁰
2. With respect to conduct towards members of the *oikos*, guests and suppliants, *eusebês* & *cognates* refer to a slightly wider variety of issues than *hosios* & *cognates*. Although *eusebês* & *cognates* and *hosios* & *cognates* equally frequently evaluate (intended) murder,³¹ the remaining cases of *eusebês* & *cognates* evaluate a range of commendable and blameworthy actions, while the large majority of the other cases of *hosios* & *cognates* refer to problematic behaviour only.
3. As we have seen *hosios* & *cognates* refer to conduct with respect to the dead slightly (but not significantly) more often.³² We have already discussed above (n. 2) that *hosios* & *cognates* are more frequent in discussions of the temporal, spatial and other requirement in ritual activities. When *hosios* & *cognates* refer to the cult of the dead, these lexemes sometimes discuss the *who*, *what*, *where* and *when* of the cult of the dead, unlike *eusebês* & *cognates*.³³ Other than this, the two lexemes refer to the

²⁹ 6/277 cases of *hosios* and 6/240 of *eusebês* & *cognates* refer to recognising a god as god. These numbers are too small to calculate the statistical significance of the difference. When describing whether an individual or a group acknowledges a particular god *at all*, words of the $\sigma\epsilon\beta$ - root are by far the more common way to do so. But these meanings are especially expressed by the verbs $\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\upsilon\upsilon$ and $\sigma\epsilon\beta\acute{\iota}\zeta\epsilon\upsilon\upsilon$. These verbs describe which god(s) an individual or a group select to engage with them in a relationship of mutual exchange, e.g., Hdt. 1.216, 5.7, E. *Andr.* 46, E. *Ba.* 1302.

³⁰ *hosios* & *cognates*: 35/45 cases; *eusebês* & *cognates*: 9/41 cases. The difference is significant: $\chi^2 = 26.76$ $p < 0.001$.

³¹ Concerning relationships within the *oikos*, 26/60 cases or 43% of *eusebês* & *cognates*, against 33/64 cases or 52% of *hosios* & *cognates* are about (intended) murder. The difference is not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 0.84$ $p = 0.359$). With respect to dealings between guests and hosts and with suppliants, 10/33 cases of *eusebês* & *cognates* against 19/38 of *hosios* & *cognates* are about (intended) murder. The difference is not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 2.84$ $p = 0.09$).

³² *hosios* & *cognates*: 25/277 cases, *eusebês* and *cognates*: 18/240 cases. The difference is not significant: $\chi^2 = 0.39$ $p = 0.531$.

³³ $n=7$.

same range of actions, most notably: burying the dead, taking care that corpses are not violated, honouring promises to a dead ancestor.

4. With respect to oath-keeping, *hosios & cognates* refer most often to oaths sworn by various parties in legal suits. *eusebês & cognates* occur frequently in the context of oaths sworn in court too, but also often refer to oaths sworn in personal interactions between people.³⁴

5. One fifth of the occurrences of *eusebês & cognates* can be seen as a rest category of evaluations of very diverse actions. There is a considerable overlap between *eusebês, hosios & their cognates* in recurring themes in these rest categories. For example, *eusebês & cognates* evaluate behaviour having to do with love, marriage and sex. Agamemnon will make Cassandra his mistress (instead of lawfully marrying her), neglecting τὸ εὐσεβές; Theoklymenus' intention to marry Helena (whom he is supposed to keep safe until Menelaus returns) is a δυσσεβεία.³⁵ Murders are sometimes referred to in terms of *eusebês & cognates* in other contexts than that of the above-mentioned interhuman relationships. For example, in an Euripidean fragment, someone argues that the gods do not exist: for tyrants who kill, steal and break oaths often prosper more than those who εὐσεβεῖν from day to day.³⁶

3.4 Distribution: grammatical configuration

As was mentioned the verbs εὐσεβεῖν, ἀσεβεῖν and δυσσεβεῖν occur 67 times in total. The construction is absolute,³⁷ or with an object³⁸ or a prepositional phrase³⁹ indicating whom the (im)pious attitude or conduct is aimed at.

The adjectives εὐ-/ἀ-/δυσ-σεβής (and εὐ/ἄ-σεπτος) occur 126 times in total. In more than half of the cases (56 %, n=70) these adjectives qualify a lexeme referring to a *person*.⁴⁰ Cases in which εὐσεβής etc. evaluate human *behaviour* are uncommon

³⁴ In 31/37 cases *hosios & cognates* occur in the context of the law court, referring to oaths sworn in personal interactions in 6 occurrences. By contrast, *eusebês and cognates* occur in the context of a lawsuit in 19 out of 32 cases, while being evoked in the context of another oath in the 13 remaining cases. The difference in distribution between *hosios & cognates* and *eusebês & cognates* in this respect is statistically significant: $\chi^2 = 5.12$ p < 0.05.

³⁵ E. Tr. 43, E. Hel. 1021.

³⁶ E. F 286.9 TrGF.

³⁷ e.g. Hdt. 1.159, Th. 6.53.1, E. Med. 755.

³⁸ e.g. A. Eu. 270-71, θεὸν ἢ ξένον .. ἢ τοκέας φίλους, E. Archel. F 252.3 TrGF, θεόν, E. Tr. 85, τᾶμ' ἀνάκτορ' ... θεοῦς τε τοὺς ἄλλους.

³⁹ e.g. ἐς τὸν θεόν, E. Ba. 490; εἰς ξένον, Hecat. fr. 1a, 1f, 6bis, a18.

⁴⁰ That is, the adjective qualifies a personal name or pronoun (n=24) or the substantivised adjective (n=11) or modifies a word for person (n=35): φώς (n=1), ἄλοχος (n=1), ἀνὴρ (n=17), ἄνθρωπος (n=1), βλαστώντες (n=1), βροτός (n=2), δικαστής (n=1), ξένος (n=1), παῖς (n=3), πατήρ (n=1), πρόξενος (n=1), σύγγονος (n=1), φίλος (n=2), κατήγορος (n=1), Κύκλωψ (n=1).

(10%, n=13),⁴¹ as are passages in which these adjectives evaluate a situation that is the result of someone's behaviour (1%, n=1). Constructions analogous to the frequently occurring 'to say/do *ἀνόσια/ῶσια*' are rare, perhaps because these messages are more commonly expressed by the corresponding verbs (*εὐσεβεῖν*, *ἀσεβεῖν*, *δυσσεβεῖν*). A few cases are instances of the substantivised adjective in other constructions (6%, n=8). Finally, in 2 cases (2%) its usage is unclear due to a fragmentary text.⁴²

In the remaining cases the adjectives *εὐ-*, *ἀ-*, *δυσ-**σεβής* qualify an object (25%, n=32). It seems that we need to assume such cases always *semantically* make a statement about a person and his/her attitudes/actions, even in those cases in which the adjective syntactically qualifies something other than a person. The semantic make-up of these adjectives itself (*εὐ-* 'well', *ἀ-* 'not' or *δυσ-* 'mis, un' + *σεβειν* 'show respect') hardly allows a different analysis. In many cases such an interpretation is also obvious from the accompanying noun, when the adjective qualifies an individual or group's life,⁴³ the course they take,⁴⁴ a state or change of mind,⁴⁵ their character,⁴⁶ speech,⁴⁷ their decisions⁴⁸ or their actions.⁴⁹ In these cases, the phrase clearly evaluates what disposition towards the gods is shown by such words, emotions or actions. But in those cases in which *εὐ-*, *ἀ-*, *δυσ-**σεβής* syntactically qualify a different object we need to assume they metaphorically refer to the person involved in the action (i.e., *semantically* qualify the person), too. We can see how this could be the case when *εὐσεβής* refers to body parts,⁵⁰ the place where people live⁵¹ or the Cyclops' meal of his guests⁵² as being '(im)pious': these should be seen as metonymic expressions. The same interpretation holds apparently for those

⁴¹ i.e. as an adverb modifying a verb (n=1), in the construction 'X is *εὐσεβέζ/εὐσεβῆ*' (n=4); or in constructions such as 'to do/say/think etc. *τὸ εὐσεβέζ/ἀσεβέζ*' or 'to hear/see/find etc. *τὸ εὐσεβέζ/ἀσεβέζ*' (n=6).

⁴² Simon. fr. 14.55.4, S. F. 52.1 *TrGF*.

⁴³ βίος (n=1, Epich. fr. 261 l. 1).

⁴⁴ ὁδός (n=1, E. *Andr.* 1125).

⁴⁵ δiάνοια (n=1, A. *Supp.* 9, A. *Sept.* 831), τροπαία φρενός (n=1, A. *Ag.* 219), γνώμη (n=1, Pi. *O.* 3.41), φρήν (n=1, E. *Hipp.* 1451).

⁴⁶ τρόπος (n=2, S. F. 944.1 *TrGF*, Ar. *Ra.* 456).

⁴⁷ μέλος (n=1, Ar. *Av.* 897), λόγος (n=1, A. *Supp.* 941), ὄρκος (n=1, E. *IT* 743).

⁴⁸ θέσις ψήφου (n=1, E. *El.* 1262).

⁴⁹ ἔργον (n=2, A. *Ag.* 758, E. *Med.* 1328), πρᾶξις (n=1, Pythag. fr. *Astr.* 11.2, 138.25), πόνος (n=1, E. *Supp.* 373).

⁵⁰ χεῖρ (n=1, E. *Hipp.* 83).

⁵¹ πόλις (n=1, E. F. 286.11 *TrGF*), Αθῆναι (n=1, S. *OC* 260), μέλαθρα (n=1, E. *IT* 694), δῶμα (n=1, E. F. 825.2 *TrGF*).

⁵² δεῖπνον (n=1, S. *Aj.* 1293), βορά (n=1, E. *Cyc.* 289).

cases in which εὐσεβής or its antonyms evaluate a murder,⁵³ a person's death or fate⁵⁴ or objects to do with the rituals of worship⁵⁵: here, it is really the murderer, the individual causing or suffering the unfortunate death or fate, or those carrying out the rituals that should be seen as εὐσεβής, ἀσεβής etc. We must assume a similar metaphoric interpretation in the remaining cases.⁵⁶

How do εὐσεβής, ὄσιος and their antonyms compare when referring to an object? Table 2 below is a schematic representation of types of objects which εὐ-, ἀ-, and δυσ-σεβής and ὄσιος/ἀνόσιος qualify respectively. This table shows that the types of objects which εὐσεβής, ὄσιος and their antonyms qualify overlap to a very large extent. The implications of this will be discussed in section 3.7 below.

<u>ὄσιος and ἀνόσιος (n=75)</u>	<u>εὐσεβής, ἀσεβής, δυσσεβής (n=33)</u>
- human species or life βίος (n=1), γένος (n=1)	- human species of life βίος (n=1)
- the 'course' individuals take κέλευθον (n=1), δρόμος (n=1)	- the 'course' individuals take ὁδός (n=1)
- human actions (generically) ἔργον (n=12), πρᾶγμα (n=1)	- human actions (generically) ἔργον (n=2), πρᾶξις (n=1), πόνος (n=1)
-	- state or change of mind διάνοια (n=1), τροπαία φρενός (n=1), γνώμη (n=1), φρήν (n=1)
-	- character, way of life τρόπος (n=2)
- human emotions, other behavioral characteristics ῥβρις (n=1), ἔρωσ (n=1), πόθος (n=1), θυμός (n=1)	-
- human speech or the lack of it λόγος (n=3), κόμπασμα (n=1), φθέγμα (n=1), ἀρά (n=2), ἔγκλημα (n=1),	- human speech or the lack of it μέλος (n=1), λόγος (n=1), ὄρκος (n=1)

⁵³ φόνος (n=2, E. Med. 1287, 1383).

⁵⁴ θάνατος (n=2, A. Ag. 1493, 1517).

⁵⁵ ἄγαλμα (n=1, Emp. fr. 128 l. 18).

⁵⁶ ψήφος (n=1, E. Or. 1651), ἀγνεία (n=1, S. OT 864), χάρις (n=1, S. Ant. 514), τὰμά (n=1, E. Ion 1290).

μέλος (n=1)	
- human body parts χείρ (n=2), κάρα (n=1), κρᾶτα (n=1), νέκυς (n=1), πούς (n=2), στόμα (n=2).	- human body parts χείρ (n=1)
- the place where humans live πόλις (n=2), βασιλήϊον (n=1), ἔδεθλα (n=1).	- the place where humans live πόλις (n=1), Ἀθῆναι (n=1), μέλαθρα (n=1), δῶμα (n=1)
- the Cyclops' meal of his guests δειπνον (n=1), δαίς (n=1)	- the Cyclops' meal of his guests δειπνον (n=1), βορά (n=1)
- murder φόνος (n=3), σφαγή (n=2), πρόσφαγμα (n=1)	- murder φόνος (n=2)
- a person's death ὄλεθρος (n=1), μόρος (n=1), συμφορά (n=1)	- a person's death θάνατος (n=2)
- things to do with the rituals of worship θυσία (n=1), θοίνη (n=1), χορός (n=1), ὕμναιος (n=1)	- things to do with the rituals of worship ἄγαλμα (n=1)
- marriage γάμος (n=5), νόμφευμα (n=1)	
- purity, purification or miasma λουτρόν (n=1), μίασμα (n=1), καθαρμός (n=1)	- purity, purification or miasma ἀγνεία (n=1)
- vote in the Areopagus/the court itself ψηφος (n=1)	- vote in the Areopagus/the court itself θέσις ψήφου (n=1), ψηφος (n=1)
- other matters δίκη (n=1), θέα (n=1), νόμοι (n=1), ὄσμη (n=1), ὄνειδος (n=1), χωρίον (n=1)	- other matters χάρις (n=1), τᾶμά (n=1)

Table 2: objects qualified by *hosios*, *eusebês* and their cognates

3.5 Distribution: self- or other attributed

eusebês & *cognates*, like *hosios* & *cognates*, are other-attributed in a large majority of cases. In 76% of the cases speakers refer to what is (not) εὐσεβής etc. about the actions, attitude etc. of others, and only in 23 % do they refer to their own behaviour or disposition.⁵⁷ The difference with the distribution of *hosios* & *cognates* is not significant.⁵⁸




Chart 4: Self- and other-attributed cases of *eusebês*, *hosios* and *their cognates*

3.6 Distribution: argumentative orientation

In the discussion of the various subthemes it was already clear that *eusebês* & *cognates* occur more often with a positive argumentative orientation than ὄσιος. The same difference in distribution shows when we take into account the corpus as a whole. Among the literary occurrences of *eusebês* & *cognates*, 56% of the data has a positive argumentative orientation,⁵⁹ while 41% has a negative argumentative orientation.⁶⁰ *eusebês* & *cognates* appear occasionally in a question or conditional statement.⁶¹ The differences in distribution between *eusebês* & *cognates* and *hosios* &

⁵⁷ Other-attributed: n=182; self-attributed: n=56. In two cases occurring in a fragmentary text it is unclear whether the utterance is self-attributed or other attributed (1%).

⁵⁸ $\chi^2 = 1.53$ p = 0.216.

⁵⁹ n=134.

⁶⁰ n=98.

⁶¹ question: n=4, conditional: n=4, together these cases account for 4% of the data.

cognates with respect to their argumentative orientations are statistically significant.⁶² In 6% of the cases, the evaluation *eusebês & cognates* used with a positive argumentative orientation does not appear independently, but in direct juxtaposition to a phrase in which the opposite is suggested.⁶³




Chart 5: Positive and negative cases of *eusebês*, *hosios* and *their cognates*

3.7 Discussion

We have examined the distributions of ὅσιος and εὐσεβής on a number of criteria, and have concluded that these two lexemes are extremely similar: in the total number of occurrences, in their diachronic distribution, the spread across authors and genres, their general thematic distribution, in the types of objects which these adjectives qualify and in whether these adjectives qualify someone else or oneself. We will consider now whether the differences between these lexemes support the analyses of εὐσέβεια vs. ὀσιότης in the scholarship. First of all, as was explained, it has been argued that εὐσέβεια expresses a disposition, an attitude (which results in actions). ὀσιότης would convey a more outward notion of piety, of ‘religious correctness’: performing the proper religious actions, and so keeping to a religious order.

hosios & cognates refer significantly more frequently to the who, what, where, when and how of ritual practice. In this respect, *hosios & cognates* are indeed more

⁶² $\chi^2 = 19.83$ $p < 0.001$. From this calculation questions, conditionals and unclear cases were excluded, for the sake of the argument.

⁶³ $n=15$.

about ‘religious correctness’ (sacrificing on the right day and at the right place, MIKALSON). Moreover, when referring to objects, two thematic areas that εὐσεβής and antonyms covers, but ὄσιος and antonyms do not, are those of words denoting a state or change of mind and a way of life. This is precisely the kind of information that would support the abovementioned hypothesis (εὐσέβεια referring to an attitude, ὁσιότης only to actions). However, it should be noted that the differential evidence is scanty. *hosios*, *eusebês* & *their cognates* only refer to cultic practice in a minority of their attested occurrences (around 16%). And although there are no parallels in which ὄσιος qualifies nouns that refer to an attitude/state of mind/character, there are actually only six such attested cases of εὐσεβής and antonyms in the corpus. Moreover, we do find one case of ‘ὄσια φρονεῖν’ ‘thinking thoughts that are ὄσια’.⁶⁴ In my view, the differences in distribution between *eusebês*, *hosios* & *their cognates* in these respects are insufficient to support the hypothesised distinction.

More generally, it seems impossible to make the distinction between religious attitude and actions in these texts in the first place. When εὐσέβεια expresses a state of mind, the expression is always linked to what a character *said* or *did*. For example, when Theseus tells his son Hippolytus that he has a mind (φρήν) that is εὐσεβής, he does so after Hippolytus has forgiven his father for cursing him. The chorus in *Agamemnon* sing that ‘anyone who said the gods do not take an interest in transgressions against what is important to them was not εὐσεβής.’⁶⁵ This person may have a wrong attitude about the Greek gods, but this attitude showed only from what he said. In the Greek texts on which our views are based, there is an essential link between attitudes and actions.

The similarity between ὄσιος, εὐσεβής and their antonyms in their reference to objects allows us to draw a conclusion with respect to the usage of ὄσιος for objects. Given that the two lexemes are used in such a comparable way for objects, (and as we previously saw, their distribution being highly comparable in almost all other respects), we may argue that ὄσιος and antonyms, like εὐσεβής and antonyms, are always used metaphorically. That is, these adjectives always *semantically* refer to the persons involved, even when syntactically qualifying an object. Like εὐσεβής, ὄσιος is never a characteristic of the object itself but always says something about the religious attitudes and actions of the humans involved. An εὐσεβές object is an object by which, using it, humans please the gods and fulfil their obligations to them. Given the almost complete semantic overlap between *hosios*, *eusebês* and *their cognates*, it

⁶⁴ E. *El.* 1203.

⁶⁵ A. *Ag.* 372.

seems that we can make the same inference for objects that are ὄσια.⁶⁶

Thus, when the chorus in Aeschylus' *Prometheus* prays they may never cease from approaching the gods with ὀσίαις θοίναϊς, it means that they, when bringing these sacrifices wish to be ὄσιος or 'pious'. This is because they want to honour the gods in general (by sacrificing at all and so giving them their dues), but also that they will respect the specific temporal, spatial and other prescriptions that apply to the sacrificial practice: the two go together. We may translate 'pious offerings'.

4. *hosios & cognates vs. eusebês & cognates with a negative argumentative orientation: affective charge*

We have seen that the distributions of ὄσιος and εὐσεβής differ mostly in their argumentative orientation: ὄσιος is employed much more often with a negative argumentative orientation than εὐσεβής. In this section we will analyse usages of the two lexemes with negative argumentative orientation more closely. In each of the next four sections a pair of scenes is evaluated, consisting of one passage that describes behaviour as ἀνόσιος / οὐχ ὄσιος, the other disqualifying the same or similar conduct as ἀσεβής / δυσσεβής.⁶⁷ I will argue that ἀνόσιος / οὐχ ὄσιος and ἀσεβής / δυσσεβής are contrastive mostly in their affective charge: the former is used more often as an emotional or aggressive (abusive) disqualification. Furthermore, we will study some other examples in which ἀνόσιος occurs in a similarly emotional setting.

4.1 Beating up Lycus

In Euripides' *Heracles*, different people evaluate the actions of the same character at two different points in the same play, as ἀνόσιος and δυσσεβής respectively. The chorus of old men of Thebes verbally abuses Lycus (usurper of the throne of Thebes)

⁶⁶ Here I fully agree with the brief statement by RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:3, who does not believe that objects that are ὄσια are 'profane' or 'desacralised'. Among other reasons this is, RUDHARDT states, because ὄσιος and εὐσεβής are often used synonymously, and he cannot imagine how to connect the synonymous adjective εὐσεβής to the meaning 'profane' or 'desacralised'.

⁶⁷ I will take δυσσεβής and ἀσεβής together. Euripides is the only author in the corpus in which a semantic distinction between ἀσεβ- and δυσσεβ- is made. In *E. Ba.* 476, 490, 502 ἀσεβ- refers to 'not acknowledging the god (Dionysus) at all', this term occurs only in two other passages (*E. Or.* 823 and *E. Antiop.* F 223.55 *TrGF*); Euripides uses δυσσεβ- for all other types of impiety. No such difference between ἀσεβής (ἀσεβεῖν, ἀσέβεια) and δυσσεβής (etc.) is found in Antiphon, Aristophanes, Thucydides, and Herodotus: in these authors δυσσεβής does not occur and ἀσεβεῖν is used in a more general sense than 'not acknowledging a god as god' (*Ar. Th.* 367, Hdt. 1.159, 2.139, 8.129, Th. 6.53.1, 4.98.7, Antipho: e.g. 3.3.8.6, 5.88.8). Neither ἀσεβ- nor δυσσεβ- occur in Pythagoras, Pindar or Bacchylides. There does not seem to be a clear difference between the usages of ἀσεβ- and δυσσεβ- in Aeschylus and Sophocles.

who is threatening to kill a group of suppliants seated at an altar. These suppliants are Heracles' wife Megara, his children and Amphitryon. Lycus wants to kill this family, fearing they will avenge his murder of Creon, and therefore, they have taken refuge at the altar of Zeus the Saviour, while Heracles is assumed to be dead. The chorus of old men of Thebes are appalled by the impious treatment of the suppliants. They propose to the Thebans to take up their staffs to Lycus and beat him up:

Χο. ὦ γῆς λοχεύμαθ', οὗς Ἄρης σπείρει ποτὲ
 λάβρον δράκοντος ἐξερημώσας γένυν,
 οὐ σκῆπτρα, χειρὸς δεξιᾶς ἐρείσματα,
 ἀρεῖτε καὶ τοῦδ' ἀνδρὸς ἀνόσιον κάρα 255
 καθαίματώσεθ', ὅστις οὐ Καδμείος ὢν
 ἄρχει κάκιστος τῶν ἐμῶν ἔπηλυς ὢν,⁶⁸

Ch. Son of earth, whom Ares once sowed
 when he had robbed the dragon's fierce jaw,
 will you not raise your staffs, your right hand's support,
 and bloody the *anhosion* head of this man,
 not a Theban but a vicious foreigner,
 who rules over my people?

Further on in the play, when Heracles returns from his labours and hears about his family's plight, Heracles expresses a similar sentiment, when he states his plans:

Ἡρ. ἐγὼ δέ, νῦν γὰρ τῆς ἐμῆς ἔργον χερὸς 565
 πρῶτον μὲν εἶμι καὶ κατασκάψω δόμους
 καινῶν τυράννων, κρᾶτα δ' ἀνόσιον τεμῶν
 ῥίψω κυνῶν ἔλκημα.⁶⁹

Her. As for me – for now there is work for my hand –
 first I will go and raze the palace to the ground
 of these new rulers, and when I have cut off his *anhosion* head
 I will throw it to the dogs as prey.

The affective charge in both statements is evident, as both characters propose a

⁶⁸ E. HF 252-57.

⁶⁹ E. HF 565-68.

throughout the holy city of Thebes
 the changing of our tears (to joy)
 the changing of our fortune
 has brought forth songs

The aggression of their previous statement has made way for delight and relief as the chorus start to dance and sing, and the emphasis of the choral song is on the expression of joy and gratitude towards the gods.

4.2 Teiresias in anger

In the previous section we have examined a case in which the same character(s) disqualified the behaviour of their opponents as impious at two different points in the dramatic text, first as ἀνόσιος and then as δυσσεβής. In this section, we will examine a pair of scenes in which two different characters evaluate the behaviour of the same person, once as ἀνόσιος and once as ἄσεβής.

Oedipus' grave transgressions against his father and his mother, exposed in Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*, more than justify that he is repeatedly described (or describes himself) as 'impious' by means of both these terms. Near the beginning of the action, when Oedipus is still looking for the murderer of Laius, he consults the seer Tiresias. The seer tells Oedipus that *he* is the 'impious polluter' (ἀνόσιος μιάστωρ) of the country. Tiresias' usage of the disqualification ἀνόσιος may be seen as a hint, an anticipation of the terrible truth Oedipus is as yet unaware of: calling Oedipus an ἀνόσιος μιάστωρ reveals not only that he is the murderer, who has brought a pollution on the city (as is communicated by the second word, μιάστωρ), but also suggests that he has committed crimes in the sphere of those inter-human relations that have the special interest of the god: in this case, towards his father and mother.

In this speech we can again sense an aggressive tone. The hostile atmosphere of the discussion between Tiresias and Oedipus is initiated by Oedipus. When Tiresias refuses to disclose the identity of the murderer, Oedipus accuses Tiresias of betraying (331) and disrespecting (340) the *polis*; he also addresses the seer as 'the worst of villains' (ὃ κακῶν κάκιστε, 334), claiming that Tiresias would even anger someone with a heart of stone (334-35). Tiresias, up until this point, has been composed and has persisted in his silence. But when Oedipus tells him once more how angry he is

(345) and even accuses Tiresias of having had a hand in the murder himself (346-47),⁷³ this triggers Tiresias' response:

Τε. ἄληθες; ἐννέπω σὲ τῷ κηρύγματι 350
 ὄπερ προεῖπας ἐμμένειν, κάφ' ἡμέρας
 τῆς νῦν προσαυδᾶν μήτε τούσδε μήτ' ἐμέ,
 ὡς ὄντι γῆς τῆσδ' ἀνοσίῳ μιάστορι.⁷⁴

Ti. Is that so? I bid you to stand by the announcement
 you made earlier, and from this day on
 not to speak to these men nor to me,
 because you are the *anhosios* polluter of this country.

We can *imagine* that Tiresias is upset by Oedipus' taunts, but there is also a textual clue that Tiresias is losing his calm. This is the question 'is that so?' (ἄληθες;). This question at the beginning of a sentence occurs in similar passages as a strong aggressive or emotional reaction to an earlier (aggressive) claim in a conversation. For example, in Euripides' *Cyclops*, when the servant Silenus has told Polyphemus in detail what kind of violence Odysseus is planning to use against him, Polyphemus answers: 'is that so?' and orders for his knives to be sharpened and a fire to be lit, saying he will slaughter the men and eat them all immediately. In Aristophanes' *Wealth*, Blesidemus and Chremylus do not recognise the personification of Poverty as a kind of deity. They speculate that she must be a shopkeeper of some kind, otherwise she would not shriek so loudly, who have done nothing wrong to her. Poverty, who is already in a state, replies: 'Is that so?' and exclaims they have done her the worst possible wrong, seeking to expel her from every country.⁷⁵

⁷³ Oedipus first accuses Tiresias of having assisted in planning the murder, and then adds: 'If you did not happen to be blind, I would have assumed you killed him with your own hands' (S. *OT* 345-49).

⁷⁴ S. *OT* 350-53.

⁷⁵ E. *Cyc.* 240-42; Ar. *Pl.* 429. The turn-initial question ἄληθες; occurs 4 other times in fifth-century literature. In Ar. *Av.* 1606 and Ar. *V.* 1223 this question does not introduce an aggressive or emotional reply, but in the other cases it does. In Ar. *Nu.*, Strepsiades has told Phidippides he must go and learn from Socrates and Chaerepho, and Phidippides wonders what good anyone could learn from them. Strepsiades replies: 'Is that so?' (841), and says they can teach all wisdom and that Phidippides will soon find out how ignorant and stupid he really is. In Sophocles' *Antigone*, Haemon and Creon are having a heated discussion in which Haemon tells Creon his views are unjust and impious and threatens to commit suicide; Creon is angry and has calls Haemon all sorts of names. When Haemon persists and claims Creon does not even listen to him, Creon's reply is: 'is that so?' (758), and he says he will bring out Antigone to die at once in the presence of her

It seems as if the question ἄληθες; initiates the same type of reaction here. By calling Oedipus ἀνόσιος, Tiresias does not state factually that ‘these are grave transgressions in the eyes of the gods’. Rather, ἀνόσιος occurs in an affectively all but neutral context and expresses a strong, all-out emotional rejection of Oedipus’ behaviour. Moreover, the disqualification is again triggered by a whole cluster of reasons at the same time: besides transgressions against his father and mother, the term also seems to be a direct reaction to Oedipus’ severe insults directed at the seer, the representative of the god.⁷⁶

The disqualification ἀσεβής occurs in a different discourse environment. Near the end of the play, after Oedipus has found out the truth and has blinded himself, he says it is quite right that he is blind: for how could he desire to look upon his children, now that he knows their (incestuous) origin (1375-77)? And how could he desire to look upon the city or its temples, from which he cut himself off (1378-81), ‘commanding with my own lips that all should drive away the impious one’ (αὐτὸς ἐννέπων | ὠθεῖν ἅπαντας τὸν ἀσεβῆ, 1382-83)? Oedipus refers to his previous proclamation to all the citizens, in which he had forbidden them to receive the killer once his identity became known. He had also ordered them to drive the murderer away from their houses.⁷⁷ The expression τὸν ἀσεβῆ ‘the impious one’ in 1383 is a general, non person-specific description of the murderer of King Laius, who now turns out to be Oedipus himself.

Some lines further on, Oedipus asks Creon for a favour, to expel him from the country as soon as possible:

- | | | |
|-----|--|------|
| Οι. | ῥίψόν με γῆς ἐκ τῆσδ’ ὅσον τάχισθ’, ὅπου
θνητῶν φανοῦμαι μηδενὸς προσήγορος. | 1436 |
| Κρ. | ἔδρασ’ ἂν εἴ τοῦτ’ ἴσθ’ ἂν, εἰ μὴ τοῦ θεοῦ
πρώτιστ’ ἔχρηζον ἐκμαθεῖν τί πρακτέον. ⁷⁸ | |
| Οε. | Cast me out of this land as soon as possible,
wherever I will find myself not addressed by any mortal. | |
| Cr. | I would have done so, be aware of that, if I did not
desire first of all to learn from the god what has to be done. | |

bridegroom.

⁷⁶ Greek seers, like priests, were mediators between the human and divine sphere, concerned as they were with ascertaining the will and intentions of the gods in relation to human actions (FLOWER 2008:189). Being representatives of the gods, any insult against them was indirectly an insult to the gods themselves.

⁷⁷ S. OT 236-43.

⁷⁸ S. OT 1436-39.

Creon hesitates, because he is uncertain what the gods want. Previously, Oedipus had sent Creon to Delphi to ask how he might protect the city (69-72). Creon had returned explaining that Apollo had told him that the Thebans should drive out a *μίασμα* from the country, caused by the killing of King Laius (95-107). Now Oedipus provides an explanation for him:

Οε. ἀλλ' ἢ γ' ἐκείνου πᾶσ' ἐδηλώθη φάτις, 1440
τὸν πατροφόντην, τὸν ἀσεβῆ μ' ἀπολλύναι.⁷⁹

But his oracle has been made completely manifest,
to let me, the parricide, the one who is *asebês*, perish.

The goal of Oedipus' statement (1440-41) is to identify the indefinite culprit (τὸν ἀσεβῆ) of Apollo's oracle with himself: he emphasizes that he himself is the murderer, and this fact should guide Creon's actions.⁸⁰ That is, Oedipus reinterprets Apollo's message in the light of the knowledge that the person meant was himself.⁸¹ Again, τὸν ἀσεβῆ in 1441 is a description of the criminal that the Thebans were looking for, not a term of abuse.

In sum, there seems to be a difference in this play, between Teiresias' aggressive disqualification ἀνόσιος and Oedipus' factual self-incriminating τὸν ἀσεβῆ.

4.3 Danaus' daughters in fear

In a third comparison between ἀσεβής/δυσσεβής and ἀνόσιος we will analyse two scenes in which the same characters evaluate the behaviour of the same protagonists, at two different points in the same play. In Aeschylus' *Suppliants*, the fifty daughters of Danaus, fleeing from a marriage with their cousins (the fifty sons of Aegyptus) supplicate king Pelasgus of Argos and ask him for protection. According to the Danaids, the marriages pursued by the Aegyptians show an impious way of thinking: they express this in their disqualification of their cousins as ἀσεβής and ἀνόσιος. The girls' point seems to be that these marriages will force them as unwilling partners into incestuous relationships.⁸² Moreover, the women expect (as it turns out, correctly,)

⁷⁹ S. *OT* 1440-41.

⁸⁰ JEBB 1885, *ad loc.*

⁸¹ KAMERBEEK 1967, *ad loc.*

⁸² Cf. A. *Supp.* 35-38, 122, 223-28. In 223-28 the impiety of the marriage between close relatives is explored through a metaphor: the marriages are compared to cannibalism of one bird eating another. The point seems to be that a marriage with a close relative perverts the normal relationship between

and leader, surveying the situation like a gameboard,⁸⁷
decided the following plan to be the best of evils ...

This part of the *parodos* is an exposition of the facts⁸⁸ and an explanation of the cause for the request they will make next. Having been advised by their father (11-13), the girls will ask Pelasgus to help and protect them. The first part of the play is on the whole characterised by a more or less rational discussion between the Danaids and Pelasgus, a debate in which the Danaids provide arguments for why the ruler should accept these suppliants. In the course of their speech, the girls show *some* signs of being agitated, displaying negative emotions towards the Egyptians and uttering some repeated interjections.⁸⁹ But these utterances are incomparable, both in concentration and in vehemence, to what we see further on in the second part of the play.

The atmosphere changes markedly after Danaus has seen the boat with the fifty sons of Egyptus, coming to pursue the Danaids, on the horizon. In ll. 710 onwards, after Danaus has told his daughters about the arrival of their cousins, the girls experience a fit of great fear. The text contains definite clues about the girls' altered state of mind. For example, as they signal in 734-38:

Xo. πάτερ, φοβοῦμαι, νῆες ὡς ὠκύπτεροι
 ἤκουσι, μῆκος δ' οὐδὲν ἐν μέσῳ χρόνου 735
 περίφοβόν μ' ἔχει τάρβος ἐτητύμως
 πολυδρόμου φυγᾶς ὄφελος εἴ τί μοι·
 παροίχομαι, πάτερ, δείματι.⁹⁰

Ch. Father, I am afraid, because the swift-winged ships
 have come, and there is no time remaining
 I am terrifyingly frightened, has my flight
 over such a long distance really been of any use?
 I am besides myself with fear, father.

⁸⁷ This is the translation of the participle *πεσσονομῶν* by SOMMERSTEIN 2008:293.

⁸⁸ HEATH 1987:175. In many tragedies the situation is explained in the prologue. In this tragedy the chorus enters the stage at the play's outset (as in Aeschylus' *Persians* and Euripides' *Rhesus*). In such cases the *parodos* has a clearer expository function (ADRADOS 1975:126).

⁸⁹ The girls pray for the destruction of their cousins (A. *Supp.* 29-36) and say their thoughts are crazy (*μαινόλι*, 109). A few repeated interjections also betray some emotionality on the part of the girls: *ἦ*, *ἦ* (115), *ἰὼ ἰὼ*, *ἰὼ* (125).

⁹⁰ A. *Supp.* 734-38.

Here, the tone, the way in which the chorus speak about their prospective husbands changes significantly. From this line onwards the girls' utterances are consistently characterised by great anxiety.⁹¹ It is also at this point that the Danaids start abusing the men violently:

Χο.	μόνην δὲ μὴ πρόλειπε, λίσσομαι, πάτερ· γυνὴ μονωθεῖσ' οὐδέν· οὐκ ἔνεστ' Ἄρης. οὐλόφρονες δ' ἐκεῖνοι, δολομήτιδες δυσάγνοις φρεσίν, κόρακες ὥστε, βω- μῶν ἀλέγοντες οὐδέν.	748
	...	
	οὐ μὴ τριαίνας τάσδε καὶ θεῶν σέβη δείσαντες ἡμῶν χεῖρ' ἀπόσχονται, πάτερ. περίφρονες δ' ἄγαν ἀνιέρωι μένει μεμαργωμένοι κυνοθρασεῖς, θεῶν οὐδὲν ἐπαῖοντες.	755
	...	
	ὡς αἱματηρῶν ἀνοσίων τε κνωδάλων ἔχοντος ὀργὰς χρῆ φυλάσσεσθαι κράτος. ⁹²	762
Ch.	Do not leave me alone, I beg you father A woman left on her own is nothing: there is no war spirit in her. those men mean harm, they are full of cunning deceit, with their dirty minds, like ravens, caring nothing for [the sanctity of] altars ... Father, they will not keep their hands off us in fear of these tridents or the awesomeness of the gods, ⁹³ they are all too arrogant, raging with an unholy rage, as shameless as dogs, they give no ear to the gods ...	

⁹¹ We can tell that their emotional state persists from different textual clues. Further on, the Danaids repeat their expression of fear (οἶχομαι φόβῳ, A. *Supp.* 786). Once the men actually arrive, their anguish becomes even more extreme: they start screaming 'ooooh! aaaah! (ὄ ὄ ὄ, ἄ ἄ ἄ, 825), "Aaaaaaah! Mother Earth!' (ὄτοτοτοτοῖ· | μᾶ Γᾶ, μᾶ Γᾶ ..., 889-890 = 899-900). They also employ other vicious animal metaphors, saying one of these men is as a spider (886), a viper (896), a beast (898). The girls' fear hangs over this entire scene.

⁹² A. *Supp.* 748-52, 757-59, 763-63.

⁹³ This is the translation of θεῶν σέβη by SOMMERSTEIN 2008:385.

Their tempers are like those of murderous and *anhosiōn* wild beasts: we need to watch out they don't get control of us.

The sons of Aegyptus are considered to have the tempers of godless wild beasts (ὡς αἰματηρῶν ἀνοσίων τε κνωδάλων ἔχοντος ὀργάς, 762-63), because the Danaids assume they would care nothing for the altars of the gods but would just drag them, suppliants, away from it (751-52, 755-56, 758-59). But these men have many other character problems, if we may believe the Danaids: they are deceitful (750), criminal (750) and shameless as dogs (758). Note also that the girls even use various novel disqualifications to make their point, when speaking about their cousins as those men 'with their dirty minds' (δυσάγνοις φρεσίν 751) who are 'raging with an unholy rage' (ἀνιερῶ μένει μεμαργωμένοι, 757-58).⁹⁴ As we see, the girls do everything in their power to put down their cousins as godless villains. This part of their speech contains no calm argumentation or rational contemplation at all. ἀνόσιος is found in the context of an all-out, aggressive rejection of these men, full of abusive terms.

The evaluation ἀνόσιος may be a continuation of the religious disqualification of the sons of Aegyptus in the parodos as ἀσεβής with respect to *content*. Both terms refer to these men's supposed religious transgressions. But although the Danaids' portrayal of their cousins as ἀνόσιος has the same referential value as their disqualification of them as ἀσεβής, the two adjectives seem to be different in affective charge. We can infer this from the different discourse environment in which the two terms appear.

4.4 The impious six of seven Against Thebes

Finally, we will analyse one character's evaluation of different antagonists showing similar impious conduct. In Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*, six of the seven men stationed at Thebe's city gates in this play show a range of direct offences against gods.⁹⁵ This becomes clear from the descriptions by a spy, reporting on each of these

⁹⁴ The term *δυσάγνος* does not appear anywhere else in the extant classical Greek literature; and this is the first occurrence of *ἀνιερός*, a term which does not become common at all.

⁹⁵ The first warrior insults the seer Amphiaraus, saying he is a coward (A. *Sept.* 382-83). Other warriors hubristically anticipate on their victory and appropriate it as their own achievement. For example, the second warrior has written on his shield that he will burn the city (434) and boasts that he will sack Thebes 'whether the god wants to or not, and not even the anger of Zeus crashing down to the earth will stand in his way or hold him back' (427-29). The third warrior has a shield on which a soldier climbs a ladder to the top of the enemy's wall, saying that not even Ares can throw him off (479). The fourth warrior, Hippomedon, portrays a different type of impiety by boastfully showing an enemy of Zeus (Tydon, a monster with fifty heads of snakes) on his shield, contesting Zeus' sovereignty in this way. The fifth warrior is convinced he should worship (σέβειν) his own

warriors to Eteocles. In this section we will study Eteocles' reactions to these reports. Specifically, we will examine three speeches in more detail: Eteocles' response to Capaneus (the second warrior), Parthenopaeus (the fifth one) and Amphiaraus. These are the three speeches by Eteocles in which piety and impiety are discussed most extensively.⁹⁶

First, Eteocles' reaction to Capaneus is as follows:

Ἐτ. Καπανεύς δ' ἀπειλεῖ δρᾶν παρεσκευασμένοις· 440
 θεοὺς ἀτίζων κάπογυμνάζων στόμα
 χαρᾶι ματαῖαι. Θνητὸς ὢν ἐς οὐρανὸν
 πέμπει γεγωνὰ Ζηνὶ κυμαίνοντ' ἔπη.
 πέποιθα δ' αὐτῶι ξὺν δίκῃι τὸν πυρφόρον
 ἤξειν κερανὸν οὐδὲν ἐξηκασμένον 445
 μεσημβρινοῖσι θάλαπσιν τοῖς ἡλίου.⁹⁷

Et. Capaneus is threatening men who are prepared to act,⁹⁸
 dishonouring the gods and taking a foolish joy in
 straining his tongue. Even though he is only a mortal,
 to heaven he sends seething words resounding in Zeus' ears.
 I am convinced that the fire-bearing thunderbolt
 will come to him with full justice, not
 a mere semblance to the mid-day heat of the sun.

Eteocles evaluates Capaneus' boasts as foolish (442) as well as religiously undesirable. That is, he refuses to give the gods the τιμή they deserve (θεοὺς ἀτίζων, 441) and does not know his place as a mortal, as is implied by the participial phrase 'being a mortal' (θνητὸς ὢν, 442), which I interpret concessively. Moreover, he

sphere more than a god (529-30); but note that the fact that he also swears by the sphere he holds (529) is not impious in itself, people could swear by a spear or another weapon or old possession, e.g. *h.Merc.* 460, *Il.* 1.234, *E. Ph.* 1677. Cf. TUCKER 1908, *ad loc.* The seer Amphiaraus is the only pious person. His fate is also different from that of the other six, as he is to become a healing heros.

⁹⁶ The reporting spy describes the behaviour of all men in a largely uniform manner, pointing out their arrogance and over-boastfulness. Echoing the scout's descriptions, Eteocles evaluates their claims mostly in terms of arrogance and boastfulness, too. However, he also disqualifies the claims of most of the Seven as impious, using different evaluations.

⁹⁷ *A. Sept.* 440-46.

⁹⁸ A contrast seems to be implied between mere words and actual deeds. This is a theme running throughout the description of these men and the reactions to them by the spy and Eteocles. As was mentioned in this section, the spy disqualifies all men as boastful, and Eteocles emphasizes this aspect, too.

expresses the confidence that Zeus will act, providing a matching response to Capaneus' big talk (444-46).⁹⁹

We find the same ingredients in Eteocles' response to the fifth warrior, Parthenopaeus:

Ἐτ. εἰ γὰρ τύχοιεν ὧν φρονοῦσι πρὸς θεῶν 550
 αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ἀνοσίοις κομπάσμασιν·
 ἦ τᾶν πανώλεις παγκάκως τ' ὀλοίατο.
 ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τῷιδ', ὃν λέγεις τὸν Ἀρκάδα,
 ἀνήρ ἄκομπος, χεῖρ δ' ὄρᾱι τὸ δράσιμον¹⁰⁰

Et. May the gods pay them in kind for what they are thinking
 With those *anhosiois* boasts and all
 Then surely would they perish in utter misery and be completely
 destroyed.
 But also for this man, the Arcadian you speak of,
 There is a man without boasts, but his hand sees what needs to be
 done

The gist of Eteocles' response in 550-2 is highly similar to the previously quoted passage with respect to its *content*:¹⁰¹ impious boasts (*ἀνόσια κομπάσματα*, 551) will (hopefully) lead to a divine response, and when Zeus acts, this should be with a punishment that matches the misbehaviour (550). But the discourse environment of this response and the one to Capaneus are different. Note that Eteocles' reaction to this fighter is a cumulative one: his initial response in 550-52 targets all the five warriors. This partly explains the outburst of built-up aggression against all of the men together that we see here. In fact, multiple aspects of the passage indicate that Eteocles has lost his calm. First of all, his expression of the punishment he envisages for his enemies is quite strong, when he speaks in alliterating disqualifying adjectives (*πανώλεις παγκάκως*) about their complete and entire destruction (552). Moreover, his description of the religiously undesirable conduct is vague, when he speaks about

⁹⁹ The phrase ξὺν δίκη indicates more than the justice in punishing impiety, the term δίκη also implies the notion of proportion, of matching kind with kind. Cf. Chapter 4, section 1, on δίκη as distributive justice. Since Capaneus' shield shows a fire-bearing warrior on it (*πυρφόρον*, 432) he will be repaid in kind by Zeus' fire-bearing (*πυρφόρον*) thunderbolt.

¹⁰⁰ A. *Sept.* 550-54.

¹⁰¹ One clear difference between the two speeches, though, is that this one is couched in the form of a prayer.

‘these men with their *anhosiois* boasts *and all*’ (αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ἀνοσίοις κομπάσμασιν, 551), in one sweeping statement. This phraseology is characteristic of an emotional outburst, not of a precise accusation. We may translate: ‘...with their godless boasts and all.’

The aggressive tone is sustained in the next part of the description, in which Eteocles says the envisaged defender, Actor,

Ἐτ. ... οὐκ ἐάσει γλῶσσαν ἐργμάτων ἄτερ
 ἔσω πυλῶν ῥέουσαν ἀλδαίνειν κακά,
 οὐδ’ εἰσαμεῖψαι τεῖχος ἐχθίστου δάκους
 εἰκῶ φέροντα πολεμίας ἐπ’ ἀσπίδος¹⁰² 559

Et. ... will not allow a mere tongue without deeds
 To flow inside the gates and breed trouble,
 Nor will he allow to enter the wall the semblance of a hateful beast,
 Someone carrying this on a hostile shield.¹⁰³

When Eteocles states that Actor will not allow ‘a mere tongue without deeds’ (γλῶσσαν ἐργμάτων ἄτερ, 556) to flow into the gates, nor ‘the likeness of a hateful beast’ (ἐχθίστου δάκους | εἰκῶ, 558-59) to enter the wall, this ‘beast’ will turn out to be an actual monster: the Sphinx on Parthenopaeus’ shield.¹⁰⁴ However, the structure of the preceding clause¹⁰⁵ with its metonymic subject (i.e. ‘tongue’, for Parthenopaeus and his big-mouthedness), the semantic ambiguity of the noun εἰκῶν (which can be ‘semblance’ or ‘image, portrait’) and the distribution of information units in 558-60 initially puts the listener on the wrong track: ἐχθίστου δάκους εἰκῶ is initially taken as the grammatical subject of the infinitive εἰσαμεῖψαι: ‘nor will he allow to enter the wall the semblance of a hateful beast’. The ‘beast’ seems to be Parthenopaeus,¹⁰⁶ in a

¹⁰² A. *Sept.* 556-59.

¹⁰³ I deliberately translated 558-59 in this slightly odd manner to capture the misleading effect of these lines, as I discuss in the main text in this section below.

¹⁰⁴ The Sphinx is ἐχθίστη because she did a lot of harm to Thebes before Oedipus answered her riddle, threatening anyone who wanted to enter the city and eating those who answered the riddle wrongly.

¹⁰⁵ i.e. the clause running from γλῶσσαν (A. *Sept.* 556) to κακά (557).

¹⁰⁶ τὸ δάκος is used in Aeschylus both to refer to real animals (A. *Pr.* 582, A. *Ch.* 530), but also as a pejorative description for humans (Clytemnestra in A. *Ag.* 1232, the sons of Aegyptus in A. *Supp.* 898).

continuation of the derogatory, aggressive language Eteocles is using.¹⁰⁷ The participle φέροντα forces a reconstruction of the sentence,¹⁰⁸ and the listener realises that εικόη is not a ‘living image’ but the image on the shield, carried by Parthenopaeus. But the idea of Parthenopaeus being a ‘beast’ himself is by then already activated.¹⁰⁹

In these two speeches, different descriptions of ‘impiety’ function in different discourse environments. In the calm and rational response to the figure of Capaneus, ‘dishonouring gods’ (θεοὺς ἀτίζων) is a factual description of wrongful religious behaviour, whereas the ‘impious boasts’ (ἀνόσια κομπάσματα) of the second speech occur in a textual environment full of emotional and aggressive features.

Again, there seems to be a difference with the disqualification δυσσεβής, occurring in Eteocles’ response to the sixth warrior: Amphiarus. The seer is the only pious warrior of the seven. As the spy explains, he is in serious doubt whether launching a military expedition against one’s own city and its native gods with the help of a foreign army is pleasing to the gods (προσφιλές θεοῖς, 580-84). In reaction to this description, Eteocles starts to make an elaborate abstract comment. He sighs for ‘the fate that links a just man (δίκαιον ἄνδρα, 598) to more impious ones (τοῖσι δυσσεβεστέροις, 598)’. He considers how a pious (εὐσεβής) man on a ship together with criminals may suffer shipwreck along with the god-detested kind (θεοπτύστωι γένει, 604); or how an upright (δίκαιος) man may be struck by the gods when he finds himself among fellow citizens ‘who hate strangers and give no heed to the gods’

¹⁰⁷ Sentences of this type, in which the listener initially parses the grammatical structure in the wrong way due to the linear distribution of information, and then has to make a ‘costly reanalysis’, are called ‘garden path sentences’ in linguistic literature, from the English expression ‘to be led up the garden path’, i.e. ‘to be misled, deceived’. Cf. PRITCHETT 1992.

¹⁰⁸ i.e. with φέροντα as subject of εἰσαμεῖψαι, and εικόη as the object of φέροντα. WEIL deletes A. *Sept.* 559, in which case there is no garden path, and the reinterpretation of the ‘beast’ (τὸ δάκος) as the Sphinx is not forced until the next sentence starting at 560 ‘but she will blame her bearer’. However, the deletion of the line is not convincing, because in this reading of the text it is not clear how the feminine participle τυγχάνουσα (561) should be constructed.

¹⁰⁹ Note that ἀνόσιος in the second speech is also the disqualification of the enemy who anticipates on a fratricide through the visual representation on his shield. Parthenopaeus has a Sphinx subduing a Theban on his shield. This depiction of a Theban on the shield is ominous: if the Thebans throw their spears at this enemy, they will hit this image of another Theban (THALMANN 1978:115; TRIESCHNIGG 2009:177-78). The visual representation on the enemy shield is symbolically unsettling, because it hints at the fact that Thebans are going to attack a fellow citizen (Polyneices), more specifically, that two brothers will take up arms against each other. Finally, note the scornful reaction of Eteocles (A. *Sept.* 553) to the fact that this warrior is an immigrant. This fact is apparently another reason for a negative evaluation of the man. As elsewhere, the disqualification ἀνόσιος is overdetermined: it is motivated by multiple reasons at the same time.

(ἐχθροζένοις τε καὶ θεῶν ἀμνήμοσιν, 606). That is, we find the term *δυσσεβής* in a gnomic statement that abstracts from the actual situation and from concrete persons. The term *ἀνόσιος* reappears once Eteocles connects his theoretical musings to Amphiaraus' predicament and the six impious warriors actually positioned at the gate. The switch to the present situation is marked by the phrase 'in this way, the seer' (οὕτω δ' ὁ μάντις ... 609ff), and then Eteocles continues: 'a virtuous, just, good and pious man' (σώφρων δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς εὐσεβὴς ἀνὴρ, 610) joined together with 'impious, insolent men' (ἀνοσίοισι θρασυστόμοισι τ' ἀνδράσιν, 611-12) against his wish, will perish along with them, Zeus willing (614).

Summarising the above, by studying three of Eteocles' speeches we have seen again that *δυσσεβής*, as well as the religious disqualification 'to dishonour the gods' (ἀτίζων θεούς), occurred in more detached, emotionally neutral discourse settings than *ἀνόσιος*.

4.5 Parallel cases

In the previous sections, it was argued that *ἀνόσιος* was found in specifically emotionally or aggressively charged contexts. In this section we will discuss three additional cases in which *ἀνόσιος* is found in similar contexts.

Aristophanes' *Wealth* is another example of a scene in which someone uses the term *ἀνόσιος* in the context of a violent threat to physically harm the other person, as in Euripides' *Heracles* (section 4.1 above).¹¹⁰ In Aristophanes' *Wealth*, two men (Chremylus and Blepsidemus) plan to restore the eyesight of the god Wealth, so that he can distribute wealth to everyone. The goddess Poverty fears for her position as a god in a world in which everyone is rich.¹¹¹ She accuses Chremylus and Blepsidemus: of 'daring to do what is *ἀνόσιον*'.¹¹² One of the most striking characteristics of the

¹¹⁰ BOWIE 1993:273-78.

¹¹¹ Aristophanes' *Wealth* is about a breakdown of *χάρις* between gods and worshippers (BOWIE 1993:273-78). In a world in which everyone is rich, no one sacrifices to the Olympians any more, because humans no longer need the gods. This threatens the position of the gods as gods. The 'goddess' Poverty suffers especially, for when abundant wealth has been distributed to all people, she ('poverty') will be banned from human life, or at least this is what she fears (430). Note that although Poverty was not a god in real life, having no cult or presence in art (SOMMERSTEIN 2001:169), she is portrayed as such within the fiction of this play (e.g. REVERMANN 2006:284). The introduction of a goddess Poverty in this comedy should be seen as a parody on the religious system (if there is a god Wealth, why not a goddess Poverty?).

¹¹² Ar. *Pl.* 415. Indeed, one sure way to be *ἀνόσιος* is by *terminating* the long-term reciprocal relationship with gods. Whether Poverty fears that she will no longer receive (apotropaic) worship from a *polis* full of rich people (on apotropaic worship in Greek religion: BURTON 2011, STAFFORD *forthc.*) or that she will be literally 'driven out' (as a personification of penury), is left in the middle, but in fact, these two options boil down to the same thing: a Greek god who received no worship, no

context in which the term ἀνόσιος appears is, again, the tone of this scene. Poverty cannot stop accusing and abusing the two men, addressing them as ‘evil little men’ (ὃ ... ἀνθρωπαρίω κακοδαίμονε, 415-16). She also tells Chremylus and Blepsidemus that their audacious enterprise is not to be tolerated (τόλμημα γὰρ τολμᾶτον οὐκ ἀνασχετόν, 419), that no god and no man has ever dared to do anything like this before (420-21) and that the two of them have done her a most appalling wrong (δεινότατα δεδράκατον, 429). In addition, she addresses the men as ‘scum’ (ὃ καθάρματα, 454) and even threatens Chremylus and Blepsidemus to personally put a miserable end to their miserable existence (ἐγὼ γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἐξολῶ κακοὺς κακῶς, 418) claiming they are both ‘dead men’ already (ἀπολώλατον, 421). In my view, the disqualification ἀνόσιος, being an abusive term, suits this context.¹¹³

Secondly, the seer Tiresias employs the term ἀνόσιος in response to a provocation (as in Sophocles’ *Oedipus Rex*, section 4.2) in Sophocles’ *Antigone*, too. This disqualification appears in an exposition in which the seer foretells Creon of the misfortune that will befall the *polis* as a result of Creon’s actions. In the preceding, Tiresias had told Creon that his burnt sacrifices had failed (1005-11). This is an alarming state of affairs, because gods’ refusal of man’s prayers and sacrifices (1019-20) signifies, in effect, their discontinuation of the exchange with humans. In such a situation, gods might do anything. The message to Creon was to take immediate action: bury Polyneices and set Antigone free. Creon refused to listen and accused the seer of being shameful (αἰσχρός, 1047) and providing false guidance in the pursuit of profit (κέρδους χάριν, 1047). Although Teiresias warned Creon that he was being rude,¹¹⁴ Creon went on to call him avaricious (φιλάργυρον, 1055), foolish (μη φρονεῖν) and prone to injustices (τάδικεῖν φιλῶν). When Teiresias then explicitly

sacrifice or prayers, was no real god at all. Making a plan that will result in that situation, as Chremylus and Blepsidemus did, is one sure way to counteract *δῶρα*, and Poverty is right to reject it as a ‘godless deed’ (ἀνόσιον ἔργον).

¹¹³ We may contrast the usage of ἀνόσιος to the only other passage in this play in which religiously undesirable conduct is addressed. This passage occurs in the same fictional conversation, in which Chremylus argues that ‘it is right and just that the virtuous among mankind should have prosperity, and the wicked and the godless (τοὺς ἀθέους) of course, the reverse of that. We may note that the discourse environment in which this religious disqualification occurs is quite different from the context of Poverty’s outburst. The impious persons in this scene (τοὺς ἀθέους) are no specific people, and the impiety that is attributed to them is not specified. This is a general, unspecific disqualification of their supposed negative religious attitude: Chremylus is making an abstract point.

¹¹⁴ *S. Ant.* 1053-154: Κρ. οὐ βούλομαι τὸν μάντιν ἀντειπεῖν κακῶς. | Τε. καὶ μὴν λέγεις, ψευδῆ με θεσπίζεις λέγων. | Cr. ‘I do not want to reply rudely to the prophet.’ | Ti. ‘But you do, by telling me my prophecies are false.’

asked Creon not to provoke him,¹¹⁵ Creon repeated his accusation that the seer only spoke for the sake of profit (ἐπὶ κέρδεσιν λέγων, 1061).

These taunts finally provoke Tiresias to start talking, indeed. Tiresias angrily sketches a grim future scenario for Creon, telling him that the Erinyes will wait for him and destroy him, and speaking about corpses

Τε. ὄσων σπαράγματ' ἢ κύνες καθήγνισαν 1081
 ἢ θῆρες, ἢ τις πτηνὸς οἰωνός, φέρων
ἀνόσιον ὀσμὴν ἐστιοῦχον ἐς πόλιν.¹¹⁶

Ti. of which dogs or wild animals consecrated
 fragments, or some winged bird, carrying
 an *anhosion* scent to the city with its hearths.

The smell of a decomposing corpse, being torn apart by animals and birds of prey that ‘consecrated’ (καθήγνισαν, 1081) it, instead of it receiving proper burial rites, is a terrible affront to the gods. Thus, the disqualification ἀνόσιος, referring metaphorically to those who refuse to bury the corpse (i.e. Creon) is referentially straightforward. But the term Tiresias has chosen is a term of abuse, which is supported by what he says next:

Τε. τοιαῦτά σοι, λυπεῖς γάρ, ὥστε τοξότης 1085
 ἀφῆκα θυμῷ καρδίας τοξεύματα
 βέβαια, τῶν σὺ θάλπος οὐχ ὑπεκδραμῆ.¹¹⁷

Ti. Such things I have shot, since you hurt me, like an archer.
 in anger at your heart, certain arrows
 of which you will not escape the sting.¹¹⁸

In this case we do not only get the *impression* that Tiresias, having been provoked, chooses an aggressive term, he says it right out. In my view, we may translate ἀνόσιον ὀσμὴν (1083) as ‘a goddamned scent’, or something like it.

¹¹⁵ S. *Ant.* 1060: Τε. ὄρσεις με τὰκίνητα διὰ φρενῶν φράσαι. Ti. ‘You will incite me to tell you things that should be kept secret.’

¹¹⁶ S. *Ant.* 1081-83.

¹¹⁷ S. *Ant.* 1084-86.

¹¹⁸ This is a reply to Creon’s previous complaint that everyone is shooting at him like archers at a target (S. *OC* 1033-34).

Finally, a parallel to the emotional usage of *ἀνόσιος* by a chorus of young, frightened, angry girls (as in Aeschylus' *Suppliants*, section 4.3) is found in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*. Hearing about the boasts of the Seven, these girls respond:

Χο. ἰκνεῖται λόγος διὰ στηθέων,
 τριχὸς δ' ὀρθίας πλόκαμος ἴσταται
 μέγ' ἀλα μεγαληγόρων κλυοῦσαι 565
 ἀνοσίων ἀνδρῶν· εἶθε < > θεοί¹¹⁹
 τοῦσδ' ὀλέσειαν ἐν γᾶι.¹²⁰

Ch. The words pierce through my breast,
 my braid formed of upright hair stands on end
 when I hear the big words of loud-mouthed
anhosíōn men: may the gods
 destroy them in my land.

TRIESCHNIGG has called this utterance is 'the most vehement expression of fear in the play.'¹²¹ The chorus have been in an emotionally heightened state throughout the drama, from their entrance on the stage onwards.¹²² In the *parodos*, the extreme state the girls are in is expressed verbally,¹²³ but also through the usage of *dochmiac* metre.¹²⁴ Although the girls seem to calm down somewhat as the play progresses,

¹¹⁹ I follow the edition of PAGE (OCT); some manuscripts read εἰ θεοὶ θεοὶ 'if the gods are gods ...' but the choice is immaterial to my argument here.

¹²⁰ A. *Sept.* 563-67.

¹²¹ TRIESCHNIGG 2009:174.

¹²² The group of girls were not called for, but presented themselves spontaneously and entirely in panic when they heard about the army that was being led against Thebes. As TRIESCHNIGG argued, we need to imagine a chorus of girls running around in a highly confused and noisy stage entrance (lacking the composure characteristic of most tragic choruses). Cf. the analysis in TRIESCHNIGG 2009:78-79 with further references.

¹²³ TRIESCHNIGG 2009:79 for an overview with further references: the chorus say they are afraid (A. *Sept.* 78, 121, 135, 203) and convey their panic through exclamations (ἰὼ : 87, 98, 166, 167 and 174; εἶε : 150 and 158), repetitions (e.g. 92, 100, 106, 135, 136, 156, 171) and sound-effects: through repetition of τ- and π- (78-80). Their emotional expressions of fear continue to be repeated in the first episode (e.g. 203, 214, 240, 249, 259).

¹²⁴ Normally, a chorus entering would start with an *astrophic* part consisting of *anapaests*, but this chorus enters singing in *astrophic dochmiac* metre in 78-107. This metre, as DALE 1968 [1948]:110 has described, 'to a much greater extent than any other metrical type appears to have a definite emotional connotation. All three tragedians use it freely to express strong feeling, grief, fear, despair, horror, excitement, occasionally triumph or joy.' The use of this metre in the *parodos*

their expressions of fear continue.¹²⁵ The reaction in 563-57 quoted above recalls precisely their previous emotional state, both in the recurrence of the dochmiac metre and because here, as previously, the girls' fear is specifically triggered (or fed) by what they hear.¹²⁶ Again, the term ἀνόσιος occurs specifically in the speech of very emotional characters, who remind us of the state the Danaids are in, in the second half of *Suppliants*.¹²⁷

4.6 Discussion

In the previous sections we have analysed a number of pairs or sets of speeches in which an arguably impious action was framed alternately as ἀνόσιος or as δυσσεβής / ἄσεβής. I have argued that, even though ἀνόσιος and δυσσεβής/ἄσεβής overlap to a large extent with respect to the *types* of religious behaviour they describe (i.e. their semantic range), these two evaluative adjectives differ crucially on the affective dimension (section 4.1-4.4). The conclusion one might formulate on the basis of these observations is that ἀνόσιος has strong negative, emotional connotations and functions as a term of abuse – a suitable translation, chosen in section 4.5, would be ‘godless’.¹²⁸

These differences between the two lexemes are not absolute. ἀνόσιος is not always (obviously) an emotional, aggressive disqualification. This term also emerges in abstract, general descriptions of problematic behaviour. For example, in Euripides' *Ion*, the chorus argues that minstrels may sing about the ἀνόσιους γάμους of women, but women ‘surpass the unjust race of men in εὐσέβεια’.¹²⁹ The term also occurs as a

perhaps indicates they enter out of formation and/or with frenzied movement. Cf. STEHLE 2005:104; TRIESCHNIGG 2009:77-78 with further references.

¹²⁵ The panicky impression these girls make remains throughout the second episode (in which the passage quoted above appears), as A. *Sept.* 419-21 testifies to. The dochmiac metre also resurfaces from time to time, e.g. 417-19, 452-54, 482-83, 522-23.

¹²⁶ TRIESCHNIGG 2009:174. Previous terrifying auditory experiences were the trampling of hooves (A. *Sept.* 84), the clattering of shields (100) and spears (103) and the rattle of chariots (151, 153). Here, the boasts of the enemy (565) produce the same effect.

¹²⁷ Perhaps this speech provides another example for the point made by STEHLE (2005), that Eteocles and the chorus clumsily keep on alienating the gods with various types of duspemetic speech. Goose-hair is elsewhere triggered by a fear/awe of the divine or something sent by a divinity (*Il.* 359, S. *OC* 1624-25). It seems rhetorically suboptimal for the chorus to proclaim, in their prayer, such a goose hair- causing awe or fear, when they say at the same time that their feeling is not triggered by gods, but by hubristic enemies whose fault is precisely that they think they are like the gods (I owe the collection of passages in which people have goose hair to TRIESCHNIGG 2009:174-45 n. 24-25).

¹²⁸ The dictionary by MONTANARI captures this pejorative sense most clearly, s.v. ἀνόσιος ‘empio, sacrilego, scellerato’ (impious, sacrilegious, wicked/evil).

¹²⁹ e.g. E. *Ion* 1092-95.

factual description of religiously problematic conduct. For example, in Euripides' *Helen*, a priestess asks her attendants to cleanse the path before her, in case anyone harmed it by treading with an ἀνοσίῳ ποδί.¹³⁰ In these examples, the supposed 'affective charge' is not present - or at least not evident. Secondly, as was established in Chapter 1 ἀνόσιος and ἀσεβής/δυσσεβής regularly occur in the same sentence (as in the *Ion* example quoted above). Within such sentences there is obviously no difference between the 'discourse environments' in which these terms occur.¹³¹ Finally, there are two counterexamples in the corpus, in which the term δυσσεβής / ἀσεβής appear in clearly emotionally charged contexts. In Euripides' *Medea*, when Jason discovers that Medea murdered their children, he exclaims

Ια. ὦ μῖσος, ὦ μέγιστον ἐχθίστη γόναι
 θεοῖς τε κάμοι παντί τ' ἀνθρώπων γένει,
 ἥτις τέκνοισι σοῖσιν ἐμβαλεῖν ξίφος
 1325 ἔτλης τεκοῦσα κάμ' ἄπαιδ' ἀπόλεσας.
 καὶ ταῦτα δράσασ' ἥλιόν τε προσβλέπεις
 καὶ γαῖαν, ἔργον τλᾶσα δυσσεβέστατον.¹³²

O detestable creature, o woman most utterly hated
 by the gods and me and every race of humankind
 one who brought herself to take the sword to your very own children
 and destroyed me, making me childless
 and although you have done this, do you still look on the sun
 and the earth, having dared a most *dussebestaton* deed?

In the following, he curses her with death (E. *Med.* 1329) and abuses her by calling her 'she-lion instead of woman, one with a disposition more savage than that of the monster Scylla' (1342-43). Then he realises that 'a thousand insults from his side could not hurt her,' impudent as she is 'by nature' (1344-45). In the final part of the speech says he never wants to see her again, and bewails the loss of his children (1346-50). The term δυσσεβής appears exactly in the affectively charged type of discourse environment in which we would have expected ἀνόσιος.

A second example occurs in Euripides' *Electra*. Aegisthus is dead and Electra makes a long speech to him, giving way to her desire to 'hurl abuse at him'

¹³⁰ e.g. E. *Hel.* 869.

¹³¹ for a list of examples cf. Chapter 1, section 2.2, n. 92.

¹³² E. *Med.* 1323-28.

(ὄνειδίζειν, 907), to ‘revile him’ (λέγειν κακά, 907, 913). That is, her address to the corpse is explicitly intended to insult him and here we have, again, a clearly affectively charged, aggressive context. Electra accuses Aigisthus of destroying her life and murdering her father (914). She tells him that not only did he contract this marriage ‘in a shameful manner’ (αἰσχρῶς, 916), but also that he was ‘foolish’ (ἐξ τοῦτο ἦλθεσ ἀμαθίας ὥστε..., 918) thinking her mother would make him a good wife, and that they were ‘both wicked’ (ἄμφω πονηρῶ, 928). This is the context in which she says that Aigisthus knew he had made an impious marriage (ἀνόσιον γάμον) and her mother knew she had obtained in him an impious man (ἄνδρα δυσσεβῆ). In this speech we find both ἀνόσιος *and* δυσσεβής as an emotionally charged disqualification of religiously offensive conduct.

Due to these counterexamples, I cannot prove that the term ἀνόσιος *on its own, without a context*, has emotional or aggressive connotations. Still, we have seen that there is a tendency for ἀνόσιος to appear in affectively charged contexts, while δυσσεβής and ἄσεβής seems to be more frequent in descriptive, affectively more neutral environments.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter we have made a contrastive analysis of the semantics of *eusebês & cognates* and *hosios & cognates*. As we have seen, the distributions of these lexemes are extremely alike in almost all respects. In my view the (small) differences that were found are insufficient to support the hypothesis that τὸ ὄσιον (only) refers to outward behaviour of religious correctness, performing the required religious actions, keeping to an order, whereas εὐσέβεια is (also) the expression of an inner disposition, a respectful attitude towards the gods.

On the contrary, given that the distributions of these lexemes are so similar, we need to conclude that the two were semantically extremely closely related (in the mind of a fifth-century language user). Consequently, we can use our knowledge of the semantics of εὐσέβεια to understand the nature of ὄσιότης better. If we assume that, when referring to objects, ὄσιος and antonyms expresses the same as εὐσεβής and antonyms, we need to say that a ὄσιον object is always an object by whose use a person shows he/she is ὄσιος or ‘pious’.

One attested difference between the two groups of lexemes is a division of labour between *eusebês & cognates* and *hosios & cognates* in their argumentative orientation. Whereas the former are used more often in positively oriented utterances, the latter are more often used to express something or someone is *not* ὄσιος. This is the only area in which there we can see there is a semantic differentiation between these lexemes. In the final part of this chapter we have discussed the usage of the

adjectives ἀνόσιος, δυσσεβής and ἀσεβής. I have shown that the disqualification ἀνόσιος tends to occur in discourse environments that are clearly charged with strong negative emotions: fear, anger or aggression. The contrastive analysis was complemented by a series of cases in which only ἀνόσιος appears, but in similar affectively charged environments. Thus, we have seen that the daughters of Danaus and the chorus of Theban girls are extremely frightened, Tiresias is provoked to aggression, and Heracles and the goddess Poverty are threatening with physical violence when they use the term ἀνόσιος. By contrast, ἀσεβής and δυσσεβής often occur in emotionally more neutral or positive discourse environments: in a factual description (Soph. *Oedipus the King*), in an exposition of a state of affairs (Aesch. *Suppliants*), in an abstract, general description of religious transgressions (Soph. *Seven Against Thebes*, Arist. *Wealth*) and in a relieved choral song on a happy outcome (Eur. *Heracles*).

4

ὅσιος vs. δίκαιος

This chapter is a contrastive analysis of the semantics of *hosios & cognates* and *dikaios & cognates* (Q2c). The investigation differs from the analyses in the previous chapters. In the previous chapters, we have looked at the diversity of contexts in which lexemes appeared, at the relative frequencies of the diverse occurrences, and at their prototypicality. In this chapter, we will not compare ‘structured inventories of usage’. Instead, we will focus on ‘cultural frames’. It was argued that lexemes are inextricably linked with frames. Lexemes differ from one another *semantically* when they evoke different frames and consequently have the ability to frame situations in different ways. The larger part of this chapter is a qualitative study focusing on one specific theme: we will examine the ways in which *hosios & cognates* and *dikaios & cognates* contrastively frame interactions with suppliants. In literary discussions, we get an image of supplication as a complex matter in which various types of considerations (legal, religious, social, political) could be put forward or highlighted in evaluating what to do with a suppliant. ὅσιος and δίκαιος could be selected by a speaker to support different types of such claims, and we will explore precisely how this is done. In the final part of the chapter we will return to our question regarding the diachronic attestation of *hosios & cognates* (Q4). I will present a tentative explanation for the strongly increasing frequency of usage of ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος in the course of the fifth century.

1. Introductory remarks on *dikaios* & *cognates*

Lexical competition between ὄσιος and δίκαιος consists in the fact that both terms are evaluations of the morality of attitudes and actions. Moreover, as RUDHARDT already pointed out: ‘les mots ὄσιος et δίκαιος sont très fréquemment associés, ou employés dans différents contextes de telle manière que leur étroite correspondance ne peut être mise en doute’.¹ From Hesiod onwards, δίκη is presented as a personification or goddess or as originating from Zeus.² This means that the moral judgment expressed by *dikaios* & *cognates* may have a religious element. Like *hosios* & *cognates*, *dikaios* & *cognates* often expressed what is right from the imagined point of view of the gods, or acting in according with the divine principle of Justice itself. Here, the semantic networks of the two sets of lexemes overlap: they may refer to the same thing. But *dikaios* & *cognates* have a number of other applications, too. To compare the semantic fields of *hosios*, *dikaios* & *cognates*, we will roughly establish the prototypical usages of *dikaios* & *cognates* in the fifth century first. Studying the distribution of δίκη and derived adjectives, nouns and verbs (δίκαιος, ἄδικος, ἔκδικος, δικαίω etc. etc.) by examining all individual cases in the corpus is in this case not advisable, due to the high frequency of occurrence of these lexemes. Since the general distribution of δίκαιος is well described, it will not be necessary to attempt such a comprehensive chart of its distribution either. The main spheres of meaning in the main dictionaries identified for δίκαιος and δίκη in the classical period are:

- what is characteristic, customary
- what is ‘right’ or ‘just’ from the supposed perspective of other humans or gods, who ‘point out’ the right direction
- what is ‘right’ or ‘just’ because it shows a fair division, a proper balance
- what is ‘right’ or ‘just’ because it conforms with what humans have legally committed to.³

The first three spheres of meaning may have been prototypical from the earliest attestations. In chapter 2 we have seen that δίκη was used in the sense of ‘what is

¹ RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:32.

² Goddess: Hes. *Op.* 220, 256, 902. Emanating from Zeus: e.g. *Op.* 36, 279.

³ What is characteristic, customary: LSJ s.v. δίκαιος A1, δίκη I 1, 2; BAILLY s.v. δίκη I; MONTANARI s.v. δίκη a. What is just (in the eyes of gods and men): LSJ s.v. δίκαιος A2, δίκη II, III; BAILLY s.v. δίκαιος A, δίκη II; MONTANARI s.v. δίκαιος a, δίκη b. What is just, showing a proper division, balance or order: LSJ s.v. δίκαιος B I 1a, δίκη II. What is just because humans have legally committed to it: LSJ s.v. δίκαιος B I 1b, 2, δίκη III, IV; BAILLY s.v. δίκαιος A II, δίκη: II, III; MONTANARI s.v. δίκαιος b, δίκη b, c. The dictionaries give some other senses of these lexemes, which seem less central: e.g. LSJ s.v. δίκη V: Pyth. name for *three* or *five*; BAILLY s.v. δίκαιος A 2 *humain, civilisé*, A3, *euph. of sacred snake*; B II 2 *real, genuine*; MONTANARI s.v. δίκαιος c *esatto, preciso* (of numbers).

characteristic, what is customary’ from Homer onwards.⁴ Furthermore, I argued that δίκη and δίκαιος were used in a moral sense in Homer and Hesiod already, and that this moral judgment was often linked to the divine perspective on events in these sources.⁵ The distributive idea of δίκη, prominent in the fifth century, seems to have been present from the earliest literature onwards, too. Consider, for example, the Homeric promise of two talents to the one who speaks δίκη in the ‘straightest way’ (ἰθύντατα). PALMER pointed out that ‘the underlying notion [is] ... the drawing of a line’.⁶ By contrast, deciding for a ‘crooked’ δίκη results in an unbalanced and therefore unfair situation.⁷ The term also surfaces in those situations in which characters discuss divisions in privileges and property, for example in the *Iliad*, where Odysseus says that Agamemnon should give a feast and other gifts to Achilles, ‘so that you (i.e. Achilles) may have nothing lacking of your due’ (ἵνα μή τι δίκης ἐπιδευῆς ἔχησθα). PALMER saw this passage as an instance of a sense ‘allotted portion, rightful portion, lot’ for δίκη.⁸

After Homer, δίκη and δίκαιος acquire a set of meanings related to legal proceedings. The term δίκη may refer (among other things) to a lawsuit, a trial, and legal penalty, and appeared in many set phrases in this semantic sphere;⁹ the adjective δίκαιος refers to what is ‘lawful’.¹⁰ Given the prominence of these usages in fifth-century texts, it seems fair to say that the usage of δίκαιος as what is ‘legally right’ becomes a new prototypical sense of this lexeme in the classical period.

It may or may not have been obvious to users what these various senses have in common. But if the ‘schema’ was part of the semantic representation of a fifth-century language user, he or she may have considered δίκη and δίκαιος to be ‘what is *in some sense* just or fair’.¹¹

⁴ As was argued in Chapter 2, section 5 this sense of δίκη is found in the *Odyssey* (e.g. *Od.* 14.59-60, 24.254-55) and in later in the construction genitive + δίκην ‘in the way of’ (e.g. *Pi. P.* 2.84, *S. F.* 659.1 *TrGF*).

⁵ Chapter 2, section 5. As I discussed, it is a matter of debate whether δίκη is a moral term in its earliest attestations.

⁶ *Hom. Il.* 18.508. PALMER 1950:158.

⁷ ROBBIANO 2005:189.

⁸ *Il.* 19.180. PALMER 1950:160-61, *contra* GAGARIN 1973:85. GAGARIN’s consequent translation (1973, 1974) of archaic δίκη as ‘settlement’ is based on the distributive idea, but according to GAGARIN this notion lacks moral content. I disagree, as I discussed in Chapter 2, section 5).

⁹ LSJ s.v. δίκη IV 1-3.

¹⁰ LSJ s.v. δίκαιος B I 2.

¹¹ The entry for *dikaios* of a fifth-century Greek language user in all probability did not contain an etymology of this term. Thus, this information would not have helped him or her to see the ‘schema’, to see what these various usages may have in common. But the etymology may help us (21st century scholars) understand the diverging semantics of δίκη and δίκαιος better. δίκη derives

Finally, these prototypical usages of *δίκη* and *δίκαιος* seem to be connected to particular cultural frames.

1. *δίκη* and *δίκαιος* fit within the cultural knowledge that a group of people living together in a group (in the classical period, in a *polis*) is held together by a set of norms and values.
2. *δίκη* and *δίκαιος* may activate the cultural frame that *hosios & cognates* activate: the notion that humans keep up a long-term relationship with gods, in which gods are interested in particular kinds of moral behaviour (i.e. towards other humans in those relationships that have their special interest).
3. *δίκη* and *δίκαιος* are linked to the frame of ‘legal justice’: the notion that humans have agreed upon a set of written rules, and that disputes are settled in an institutionalised manner, by reference to these rules, in a court of law.
4. *δίκη* and *δίκαιος* evoke a frame of ‘distributive justice’: the notion that, when people live together, the collective must achieve some distribution of goods and privileges that is motivated and accepted by its members.

I will elaborate on these cultural frames and provide examples in section 3 of this chapter, below.

2. *hosios & cognates* vs. *dikaios & cognates* in the scholarship

The semantic relationship between *hosios*, *dikaios* & *cognates* has been discussed by ancient and modern scholars. As was pointed out, the lexicographer Hesychius gave *δίκαιος* as one of five explanations of the meaning of *ὅσιος*, indicating that *ὅσιος* is sometimes used as a (near-)synonym of *δίκαιος*.¹² In the 20th century scholarship, BOLKESTEIN wrote that *ὅσιον* and *δίκαιον* are nearly synonymous in the majority of their occurrences.¹³ All other ancient and modern authors articulate a differential view of the semantics of these lexemes. Plato defined *τὸ ὅσιον* by contrasting it to *τὸ δίκαιον*, providing various views on the semantic connection between the two terms in different dialogues. In *Gorgias*, the ‘prudent’ person (*ὁ σώφρων*) is one who does

etymologically from *δείκνυμι* ‘to show’ or ‘to point out’ (CHANTRAINE 1968-80:284, FRISK 1960:394). The usage of *δίκη* in the sense of ‘what is characteristic, what is customary’ may originate from the idea of ‘what shows’ (CHANTRAINE 1968-80:284). The normative usage of *δίκη* may originate from the notion of ‘pointing out’ (i.e., a particular direction, CHANTRAINE 1968-80:284, GAGARIN 1973:82). Moreover, it has been put forward that the root *deik-* (of *δείκνυμι*) contains the notion of a ‘marked line’ (CHANTRAINE 1968-80:284, GAGARIN 1973:82). In this sense, *δίκη* may be seen as the ‘right, justice’ that emerges from the idea of the proper placement of a ‘dividing line’, which is the achievement of a proper balance. The normative aspect can be understood from the notion of the drawing of a line, too.

¹² Chapter 1, section 2.2.

¹³ BOLKESTEIN 1936:190.

what is fitting towards humans and towards gods. When he does what is fitting towards the gods, these actions are τὰ ὄσια. By contrast, in acting according to what is appropriate towards other humans, he does τὰ δίκαια.¹⁴ In Plato's *Euthyphro*, Socrates helps Euthyphro find a definition of τὸ ὄσιον. Socrates suggests that τὸ ὄσιον is *a part* (μέρος, μωρίον) of τὸ δίκαιον. Euthyphro goes on to define τὸ ὄσιον as that part of τὸ δίκαιον that concerns caring for (θεραπεία of) the gods. The part that concerns caring for other humans is 'the remaining part' of τὸ δίκαιον.¹⁵ In Plato's *Protagoras*, the question is raised whether perhaps τὸ δίκαιον is *identical to* τὸ ὄσιον. This suggestion is rejected, but no further attention is paid to solving this question.¹⁶

VAN DER VALK follows the semantic differentiation suggested in *Gorgias*, considering τὸ ὄσιον as concerning the duties towards the gods and τὸ δίκαιον as referring to obligations towards other humans. Someone who has fulfilled his/her duties towards the gods is ὄσιος, while a person who has discharged his/her obligations towards humans is δίκαιος.¹⁷ As was discussed in Chapter 2, VAN DER VALK (incorrectly, in my view) saw the usage of ὄσιος in a non-religious sense (regarding duties towards humans) as a secondary development.¹⁸ According to VAN DER VALK, due to this development ὄσιος came to be used almost as a synonym to δίκαιος, though keeping its own semantic 'residue' (of the religious).¹⁹ In the above-mentioned definitions, it is emphasized that τὸ ὄσιον is aimed at the gods, while τὸ δίκαιον is aimed at other humans. We have already seen that ὀσιότης is an ethical *and* religious term. Moreover, to see δίκαιοσύνη as a non-religious, ethical concept is also too restrictive, for as we have already seen, this term sometimes expresses the imagined perspective of the gods, too.

The usage of ὄσιος and δίκαιος was characterised differently by BENVENISTE, who acknowledged that *hosios, dikaios & cognates* each most often evaluate relationships among humans. According to BENVENISTE, ὄσιος is, then, what is prescribed/permitted by divine law and δίκαιος is what is prescribed/permitted by

¹⁴ Pl. *Grg.* 507a6-b4.

¹⁵ Pl. *Euthphr.* 11e8-12e5.

¹⁶ Pl. *Prt.* 329c-331e.

¹⁷ VAN DER VALK 1942:114-15, 118. JEANMAIRE 1945:68 follows his view.

¹⁸ Chapter 2, section 2. VAN DER VALK 1942:133-137. As we saw, VAN DER VALK argued that ὄσιος came to be used in a non-religious but ethical sense to intensify an evaluation. I have proposed the view (in accordance with RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:30, 33) that ὄσιος centrally concerns behaviour towards the gods *and* towards other humans.

¹⁹ EATOUGH 1971:240-41 supports VAN DER VALK's description, but emphasizes that ὄσιος and δίκαιος were never used truly synonymously, because ὄσιος always has a religious connotation. BURKERT 1985:270 follows VAN DER VALK.

human law.²⁰ MOTTE follows this characterisation, but notes that it does not work in every instance, because sometimes ὄσιος and ἄδικος are juxtaposed as *antonyms* and so it seems that ὄσιος and δίκαιος would be *synonyms*, and not to refer to different things at all.²¹ MOTTE states that in such cases the usage of the term ὄσιος still imposes ‘une connotation religieuse’ on the context.²² CONNOR likewise argues that ὄσιος and δίκαιος appear in close co-ordination in various passages, in these cases ‘the same action might be described as *dikaion* when viewed from a human perspective and *hosion* when the reactions of the gods are conjectured. Thus among the writers of this [i.e. classical Greek] society *hosios* may occur in close parallel to *dikaios*, but often with a hint of divine involvement or concern.’²³ Finally, RUDHARDT also stated similarly that ‘ὄσιος a pour le Grec une consonance spécifiquement religieuse, alors que δίκαιος, bien que la justice intéresse les dieux et complète la piété, paraît à cet égard moins nettement caractérisé’.²⁴

The definition by BENVENISTE is problematic. It assumes that we need to find some clear-cut difference between the two sets of lexemes that works for all cases. It was already argued by others, such as MOTTE, that we cannot find such a point blank distinction. The theory of semantics that was set out in Chapter 1 also shows it is not *necessary* to look for such a distinction, because that is not how competition between lexemes works. By contrast, the consensus among MOTTE, CONNOR and RUDHARDT seems correct, and we may re-phrase their views in the linguistic terms we have been working with. ὄσιος may refer to a diverse range of actions, attitudes, persons, but in the large majority of cases this term refers to a very select number of themes (dealings with gods and with humans in a small group of relationships), as was discussed. When a speaker says that something or someone is ὄσιος for some particular reason, his utterance activates in the speaker (at least) this small group of other usages. It was argued that these usages all connect to the same larger frame: (thinking and) acting in a way that sustains the long-term reciprocal relationship with gods. That is, usage of the term ὄσιος always activates a religious frame. By contrast, the terms δίκη and δίκαιος have a diverse range of usages, being connected to diverse cultural frames, as was described above. If a speaker says, for example, that something is δίκαιον, because it is in accordance with what humans have legally committed to, the listener

²⁰ BENVENISTE 1969:198. Similarly: LSJ: ὄσιος = ‘*sanctioned by divine law* ... the sense of ὄσιος often depends on its relation on the one hand to δίκαιος (*sanctioned by human law*)...’.

²¹ e.g. in A. *Supp.* 404, discussed below.

²² MOTTE 1986:167.

²³ CONNOR 1988:163.

²⁴ RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:30, 33.

understands the lexeme in this particular usage, but temporarily activates the other senses of δίκη and their associated frames. The ‘religious’ frame is one among these.

In the remaining part of this chapter I would like to examine more closely the notion that *hosios*, *dikaioi* & *cognates* differ in their *semantics* because they *frame* matters in a different way. We would like to know in what way precisely *hosios*, *dikaioi* & *cognates* frame situations differently; and to what extent they overlap in this extent. In which types of frames do each of these lexemes occur respectively, if we examine their respective usage in context of debate? How often is δίκαιος used in the sense of ‘doing things rights, because the gods will approve’?

3. *hosios* & *cognates* vs. *dikaioi* & *cognates* : framing

Given the frequency of lexemes of the root δικ- it will not be possible to address these questions in a quantitative study. Instead, we will choose a qualitative approach. In the following, we will make a comparative study of the usage of ὄσιος and δίκαιος in fifth-century contexts of supplication. As a corpus, we will take the five main ‘supplication plays’ as identified by BELFIORE,²⁵ complemented by all other passages in fifth-century texts in which claims about how to treat suppliants are made in terms of τὸ ὄσιον.²⁶

3.1 A case study: ancient supplication

Ancient supplication makes a good case study, because this theme had religious, moral and legal sides in classical Athens. Dealings with suppliants constituted one of the main areas of behaviour that had the particular interest of the gods, in particular ‘Zeus of the Stranger’ (Ξένιος) and ‘Zeus of the Suppliant’ (Ἰκέσιος), traditional protectors of suppliants.²⁷ GOULD argued that supplication was traditionally *a ritual*

²⁵ 1998:153. These are: Aeschylus’ *Suppliants* and *Eumenides*, Sophocles’ *Oedipus at Colonus* and Euripides’ *Heraclides* and *Suppliants* (as BELFIORE notes, BURIAN 1971:1 and LATTIMORE 1958:13 n.3 categorised the first four as suppliant plays, while TAPLIN added Aeschylus’ *Eumenides*). Euripides’ *Suppliants* is not useful for our purposes, because although Adrastus is a suppliant, the argumentation of Adrastus and his conversation partner Theseus is not really about the treatment of the suppliant Adrastus *as a suppliant*. The cases of *hosios* & *cognates* in this play do not refer to the dealings with a suppliant either. However, in the other plays I found good examples of speeches in which the treatment of a suppliant is framed in terms of *hosios* & *cognates* or *dikaioi* & *cognates*, or both.

²⁶ These are: Euripides’ *Cyclops* (the interaction between Odysseus and the Cyclops throughout the play); Euripides’ fragmentary play *Hypsipyle* (Hypsipyle’s supplication of Amphiaras, F 757.856-67 *TrGF*); Euripides’ *Orestes* (disqualification of Menelaus, 1213); the supplication of Pactyes in Herodotus’ *Histories* 1.157-160 and the Plataean debate in Thucydides’ *Histories* 3.52-68.

²⁷ Zeus Xenios: e.g. *Il.* 13.624-25, *Od.* 14.389, *Pi. O.* 8.21, *A. Ag.* 362, *E. Cyc.* 354; Zeus Hikesios: e.g. *A. Supp.* 347, *S. Ph.* 484, *E. Hec.* 345. Not surprisingly, as we have seen, the interaction with

act.²⁸ The most important condition for a successful supplication was to establish physical contact with the person or entity one supplicated. If the suppliant touched the knees, the chin, or the hands of the person supplicated, or an altar, his safety was guaranteed.²⁹ In these circumstances, according to GOULD, ‘there was no question but that any violence brought against a suppliant was a direct challenge, either to the power of the god whose sanctuary or altar was involved to protect his own suppliants or more generally to the power of Zeus *ικέσιος*’.³⁰ However, by the end of the fifth century, GOULD argues, the binding religious force of supplication ‘was weakening in face of the counter-strain of political realities’.³¹

A good account of the situation arising in the fifth century is given by CHANIOTIS. CHANIOTIS presents a multidimensional view on dealings with suppliants at public altars in Greece. First of all, CHANIOTIS takes the inviolability of suppliants at an altar at face value. In CHANIOTIS’ view, this ‘right, probably as old as the sanctuaries themselves’³² is still the norm in the classical period.³³ However, crucially, from the early fifth century onwards, various *poleis* realised there was a problem: the presence of suppliants at public altars threatened to get out of control. Sanctuaries became overcrowded with suppliants staying for longer periods of time. Moreover, many of these suppliants were native or foreign murderers, fugitives whose presence in a city could lead to aggression by their pursuer, or other unwanted figures, such as less serious criminals or runaway slaves.³⁴

As state institutions grew and developed and the solution of legal conflicts became an issue of public courts, law became an instrument, not so much to deal with this problem, as to work around it. As CHANIOTIS argues, ‘the persistence of sacred law prevented the formulation of clear, unequivocal, generally applicable rules for the acceptance or rejection of claims of supplication’.³⁵ The Greeks were ‘extremely

suppliants and guests was one of the central themes covered by the semantic scope of *hosios* & *cognates*.

²⁸ GOULD 1973:75.

²⁹ This phenomenon is referred to in the scholarship as *Kontaktmagie*, e.g. KOPPERSCHMIDT 1967:11-12.

³⁰ GOULD 1973:78.

³¹ GOULD 1973:101.

³² CHANIOTIS 1996:67.

³³ CHANIOTIS’ account differs from the theory proposed by NAIDEN 2006. This author has argued that supplication becomes a fully rational procedure, from which the religious dimension is removed altogether. In APPENDIX 4, I give a more complete explanation of the issue of supplication in classical Athens. There I also discuss the work of NAIDEN 2006 in some detail.

³⁴ CHANIOTIS 1996:69.

³⁵ CHANIOTIS 1996:70.

reluctant to introduce ... unambiguous limitations' to *asylia*.³⁶ Instead, the *polis* gained more control over supplication by making it legal procedure. In a process of double evaluation, suppliants were evaluated by the Council and the Assembly. Suppliants present at an altar were allowed a preliminary hearing. Here, the moral situation of the suppliant seems to have had some relevance.

Moreover, the documentary and literary evidence shows us that many individual laws were constructed, which were either intended to, or had the secondary effect of *circumventing* the problem by reducing the actual numbers of suppliants. These laws regulated where, when and with what requests one was allowed to supplicate at an altar, and they limited who was allowed to supplicate. For example, murderers could not approach public altars in the first place.³⁷ Runaway slaves were only allowed to supplicate at one sanctuary, the Theseion.³⁸ And suppliants were not allowed to ask for what the laws of the city had previously denied them.³⁹ Note that these written rules were all *ad hoc* reactions.⁴⁰ They did not have a moral or ethical-religious component. There was no inscribed stone set up at a prime location in Athens stating that 'one must accept suppliants' or that 'it was not necessary to accept suppliants.' Nor were there, at least until the Hellenistic age, any legal procedures against people who had violated *asylia*.⁴¹ The written rules are all external measures, procedural guidelines, evasive manoeuvres. These did not attack the traditional sanctity of suppliants, which remained the unwritten norm in the fifth century.

Thus, in CHANIOTIS'S account two different domains may be distinguished: an unwritten custom that one should assist suppliants, and a set of written rules, measures that aimed at limiting undesirable practical consequences of the religious norm. The inviolability of suppliants was still a very important religious idea in the 5th century. Referring to this inviolability, for example, by using the terms ὄσιος and ἀνόσιος, was a strong appeal. At the same time, adherence to this strong divine norm was not automatic. *Poleis* and individual worshippers often tried to find a way *around* it, in cases where they considered it impractical or politically dangerous to protect a

³⁶ CHANIOTIS 1996:71.

³⁷ CHANIOTIS 1996:74; NAIDEN 2006:178. Although such rules were aimed primarily at the avoidance of pollution, a secondary and not unwelcome effect was that they could not supplicate either.

³⁸ NAIDEN 2004:73. For the sources cf. CHRISTENSEN 1984.

³⁹ Once convicted of wrongdoing they could not supplicate asking for the verdict to be overturned or to reduce punishments such as fines. This is apparent from D.. 24.51-52. Cf. NAIDEN 2004:75, 2006:179.

⁴⁰ CHANIOTIS 1996:79-83 argues that there is one exception: the systematic legislation around supplication by runaway slaves.

⁴¹ CHANIOTIS 1996:70.

suppliant. The religious appeal became one of the possible arguments in a situation that was increasingly negotiable. As we will see, literary debates about the treatment of suppliants often find themselves in this field of tension between the divine norm and its practicability, between automaticity and morality, between religion, law and politics. We will see that all these different aspects of interacting with suppliants are debated in terms of *ὀσιότης*, (*εὐσέβεια*) and *δικαιοσύνη*.

3.2 Justice and piety equated

In Aeschylus' *Suppliants*, *ὄσιος* and *δίκαιος* evoke the same frame – behaving morally to uphold one's relationship with gods. In this play, the fifty daughters of Danaus seek to escape a marriage with their cousins, the fifty sons of Aegyptus. Having fled to Argos they supplicate the local ruler, Pelasgus, to protect them against such marriages. Upon their arrival in Argos, the girls take their seat at a shrine of the major gods of the city and invoke Zeus, the 'home protector (*οἰκοφύλαξ*) of pious men (*ὀσίων ἀνδρῶν*)'. The Danaids appealed to Zeus because he watched over and cared about who was respectful towards suppliants and who was not, protecting the homes of the first group, pious (*ὄσιος*) men, accordingly. Zeus is also portrayed as the instigator of human morality, when the girls pray to be received 'in a spirit of respect (*αἰδοίωι πνεύματι*) on the part of the country (*χώρας*)', i.e. for Zeus to make it so that the Argives will treat them with *αἰδῶς*, respect.

A similar thought is expressed more elaborately further on. This time the Danaids equate piety (*ὀσιότης*) and justice (*δίκη*). In a discussion with Pelasgus about whether he should accept these suppliants, the king cannot make up his mind. First, he considers abandoning his suppliants and 'take his chances' (*τυχὴν ἐλεῖν*, 380), that is, hoping that Zeus will not notice (or at least, not punish).⁴² Then he wants to consult his people, for he is imagining what will happen if he accepts the suppliants by his individual decision. Should the sons of Aegyptus attack the city, he will be the one to blame, and the people are bound to say afterwards that 'by honouring foreigners (*ἐπήλυδας τιμῶν*), he destroyed the city'.⁴³ That is, he is afraid that he would protect the Danaids, then see his city ravaged by their pursuers. But the Danaids respond:

Χο.	ἀμφοτέρ', ὡς ὀμαίμων, τάδ' ἐπισκοπεῖ Ζεὺς ἕτερορρεπής, νέμων εἰκότως <u>ἄδικα</u> μὲν κακοῖς, <u>ὄσια</u> δ' ἐννόμοις· τί τῶνδ' ἐξ ἴσου ρεπομένων μεταλ-	402 405
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⁴² A. *Supp.* 380.

⁴³ A. *Supp.* 398-401.

γεῖς τὸ δίκαιον ἔρξαι,⁴⁴

Zeus, guardian of family relationships,⁴⁵ watches over both of these: as is reasonable, he balances out each lot for each, distributing to wicked people *adika*, to the just *hosia*.
If these things are balanced out fairly, why
do you regret to do what is just?

The chorus reminds Pelasgus that Zeus watches over (ἐπισκοπεῖ, 402) both potential decisions, i.e. protecting and not protecting them (ἀμφοτέρα τάδε, 402). The implicit threat is that *not* helping them will also lead to the destruction of Argos, i.e. through the revenge of Zeus.⁴⁶

Zeus does more than watching over human morality (ἐπισκοπεῖ, 402). Again he is also its instigator, as seems to be expressed in the next two lines. Here, the Danaids claim that Zeus distributes (νέμων)⁴⁷ to wicked people that they commit or undergo

⁴⁴ A. *Supp.* 402-06. I use the edition of FRIIS JOHANSEN & WHITTLE 1980.

⁴⁵ FRIIS JOHANSEN & WHITTLE (1980, *ad loc.*) point out that the adjective ὀμαίμων (nom. sg.) is used only where the more common ὀμαιμος does not scan, except here and in A. *Sept.* 415. In these two passages ὀμαίμων is a divine epithet.

⁴⁶ Their argument is in fact more subtle, when they imply that Zeus, as ‘guardian of family relationships, is interested in their situation for reasons besides and above the mere fact that they are suppliants. The Danaids have quite elaborately established before that they are related to the Argives through ancestry (in the discussion with Pelasgos, A. *Supp.* 274-323); Pelasgos has accepted their claims (325-26) and has commented on their ambivalent status in this situation when calling them citizen-strangers (ἀστόξενοι, 366). But in Pelasgos’ deliberation immediately preceding this, Pelasgos has called them foreigners (ἐπίλυδας, 401). By invoking Ζεὺς Ὀμαίμων, the chorus corrects his views: Pelasgos should honour the family relationship between themselves and the Argives in order to honour Zeus, the ‘Patron of Family Relations’. The Danaids pick up this argument further on. After Pelasgos has finally accepted them, they use the adjective again to refer to their kinship with the Argives. The chorus praise the Argives because they ‘honour relatives’ (ἄζονται ὀμαίμους, 651) and express confidence that they are in a good relationship with the gods and will avoid divine punishment accordingly (646-55). Not only are the Danaids family of the Argives; the marriage the suppliants fear is also, according to them, a transgression of a normal family relationship. As the Danaids have argued (37, 223-26) that they do not want to marry their cousins because they are relatives (πατραδέλφεια, 37; ὀμαιμοι, 225). Their insistence that the marriage is an ἀσέβεια apparently holds the claim that such ‘incest’ is a transgression of proper relations between close relatives. I have discussed this part of the Danaids’ argumentation in more detail in Chapter 3, section 4.3.

⁴⁷ SOMMERSTEIN 2008:343 n. 81 supposes that l. 404 means that Zeus weighs up or keeps an account of men’s good and evil deeds. But in Aeschylus, the transitive verb νέμων, used with a god as agent, always refers to *giving* or *distributing* (talents, honours, goods or positive outcomes of events (A. *Pr.* 292 Oceanos distributes a share (μοῖρα) (of honour) to Prometheus; A. *Pr.* 229 Zeus gives privileges (γέρα) to the gods; A. *Pr.* 526: Zeus distributes everything (πάντα); A. *Supp.* 1068: may

injustices, and to the just that they achieve or meet with pious things (ἄδικα μὲν κακοῖς, ὅσια δ' ἐννόμοις, 403-4).⁴⁸ It is not clear whether ὅσια and ἄδικα should be read actively or passively or both. Perhaps, the chorus intends to say that the share of virtuous people is that they *act* in accordance with the wishes of the god, whereas unjust people keep on committing crimes. The phrase may also express that Zeus rewards and punishes, giving to just people that *others* act piously *towards them* and to wicked people that others will do them injustices.⁴⁹ In any case, note that τὰ ὅσια and τὰ ἄδικα are juxtaposed as antonyms and that both terms evaluate morality from the imagined perspective of the gods.

Given this state of affairs, Pelasgus should not hesitate to do 'what is right' (τὸ δίκαιον). Although this is articulated as a general exhortation, δίκη should be interpreted as 'honouring suppliants because that is the proper conduct towards the god'. Whereas Pelasgus seemed to see an opposition between the interest of the city and the religious aspect of the situation, the Danaids argue that these, in fact, coincide: doing τὸ δίκαιον is the same as doing what the gods want.

The suppliants in Aeschylus' *Suppliants* use ὅσιος and δίκαιος *synonymously*. In other literary sources ὅσιος and δίκαιος are often *not* interchangeable. In fact, as it will be argued below, the consequent equation of ὅσιος and the 'δίκη of Zeus' by the Danaids is an argumentative strategy, for the girls have a vested rhetorical interest in equating the two concepts. In order to understand their rhetoric, it will be useful to

Zeus distribute victory (κράτος) to the women; A. *Eu.* 401: the Achaeans distributed a piece of land to Athena; *Eu.* 716: Apollo will no longer distribute pure oracular responses). This usage of νέμω is also the most common in Aeschylus. νέμω elsewhere in Aeschylus is: 'to inhabit a place' (n=5), 'to enjoy something' (n=1), 'to consider' (n=1), 'to manage or govern' (n=4), but most frequently the meaning is 'to distribute' (n=7, the abovementioned passages plus A. *Supp.* 505, A. *Eu.* 401). I assume that νέμω in this passage also means 'to distribute.'

⁴⁸ The idea, expressed once more by the epithet ἐτερορρεπής (403) 'balancing out each lot for each', seems to be that humans can choose for themselves whether they want to be pious or wicked and Zeus will treat them accordingly. ἐτερ- = ἔτερα ἐτεροῖς implying the idea of weighing one lot for the one side, and the other for the other, FRIIS JOHANSEN & WHITTLE 1980, *ad loc.*

⁴⁹ The verb cannot refer to 'gifts' from Zeus, in the sense of punishments and rewards. It cannot mean that Zeus distributes to the wicked 'injustices' (bad unpleasant things) and to the just, 'things he considers ὅσια'. This is because τὰ ὅσια are not transferrable: humans do not 'possess' ὅσια nor 'receive them' or 'give them to somebody else'. As I showed in Chapter 2, section 1.3, τὰ ὅσια in archaic and 5th century literature usually refer to human actions. Mortals say, do or think ὅσια or ἀνόσια, and sometimes meet with or undergo ὅσια or ἀνόσια. Zeus does not distribute ὅσια (and ἄδικα) in the sense of 'giving' them, but the phrase must mean that he assigns to people that they commit or meet with injustices and ὅσια. BLOK (*forthc.* a) primarily gives these lines the second, passive interpretation. BLOK connects the usage of ὅσια in this phrase to a series of post-classical curse tablets from Knidos, in which people ask ὅσια for themselves (i.e. to meet with ὅσια from other people), e.g. Knidos 256, b-2, Knidos 260.11-13).

turn to other tragic contexts first, and examine debates about suppliants in which ὄσιος and δίκαιος frame an event differently.

3.3 Justice and piety in the Plataean debate

We will continue by evaluating a concise scene in which *hosios & cognates* and *dikaios & cognates* are used contrastively. In the fifth year of the Peloponnesian war, in a famous speech, the Plataeans implored the Spartans not to give them up to the Thebans (3.53-58).⁵⁰ They argued that the Spartans would ‘make a ὄσιον decision’ (ὄσια ἂν δικάζοιτε) by granting them freedom from fear of their lives (3.58.3), offering multiple reasons for their claim. First of all, they are not enemies (ἐχθρούς) on whom the Spartans could reasonably be expected to avenge themselves, but rather well-disposed (εὖνους) folk who were forced to fight.⁵¹ The Spartans should also consider that the Plataeans had surrendered voluntarily with their arms stretched forth (χεῖρας προϊσχυμένους) – a typical gesture defining the Plataeans as suppliants.⁵² As the Plataeans argue, it is the religious norm (νόμος)⁵³ among the Greeks not to kill those (τούτους).⁵⁴ Furthermore, many of the Spartans’ ancestors, slain by Persians (i.e. during the battle of Plataea), are buried in Plataea. The Plataeans point out that they are taking care of these graves – unlike the Thebans will. Surrendering Plataea to

⁵⁰ The background of the speech: The Plataeans were being besieged by the Thebans, when the Spartans intervened. They asked the Plataeans if they would surrender voluntarily to the Spartans and accept the Spartans as their judges. The Spartans would decide whether to allow the Thebans to destroy Plataea.

⁵¹ The grounds for this argument were explained in Th. 3.55: the Plataeans had asked the Spartans for help against the Thebans, but the Spartans told them to go to the Athenians instead, which is why they had fought against the Spartans later, as allies of the Athenians. The Plataeans reinforce the argument in 3.58.4, when they say that they ‘have always done the Spartans well’ (εὐεργέτας γεγεννημένους).

⁵² NAIDEN 2006:51. Other places where they stress they are suppliants are Th. 3.59.2, 3.59.4.

⁵³ The Plataeans refer to νόμος in the sense of a (religious) custom: as discussed above, it had traditionally been the custom or unwritten rule that one should not kill a suppliant at an altar. On the religious sense of νόμος: RUDHARDT 2008:49-68, 98-99. Or is this a more manipulative statement, a clever exploitation of the term νόμος? By the second half of the fifth century, νόμος had increasingly incorporated the notion of written law and the Plataeans may be playing on this new sense of νόμος suggestively - implying that there is a written law about not killing suppliants. We have already established that there was no such law in Athens; certainly there was no written law on killing suppliants among Greeks – individual *poleis* had their individual laws, and they had treaties with other individual *poleis* to deal with legal cases involving their own citizens in the other *polis* and vice versa, but there was no transcendent law code extending over the whole of Greece.

⁵⁴ Th. 3.58.3. Note that the speaker tacitly equals the rejection of the Plataeans’ case to an act of murder. This is a manipulative move. We may infer from other literary stories (e.g. Hdt 1.159, cf. Appendix 4) that the Greek attitude towards rejecting suppliants in danger of their lives was more ambivalent than their (without doubt negative) view of physically harming a suppliant at an altar.

the Thebans means that the Spartans would leave their fathers and kinsmen deprived of the gifts of honour (ἀτίμους γερῶν) they enjoy now (3.58.4). Moreover, if the Spartans make their territory Theban, the Plataeans argue, this would be equal to ‘abandoning’ the temples of the gods. In these temples, the Greeks prayed before they fought against the Persians, but the Thebans fought against the Spartans with the Persians (3.58.5).

As we see, there is not just one reason why helping the Plataeans is the most ὄσιον course of actions. The Plataeans present many motivations, which all coincide with frequent usages of *hosios & cognates*. They are not only *suppliants* one is not allowed to kill, but also *friends* who deserve to be spared in return for their good deeds, and they *take good care of the dead*, performing ancestral sacrifice for the Spartan deceased on their territory, and finally they *care for temples* in which the Greeks formerly prayed for victory against the Persians.

By contrast, the term δίκαιος and its antonyms in this speech⁵⁵ refer consistently to another aspect of the situation. This is the legal trial in which the Plataeans find themselves, the way in which this trial is conducted and to the judges’ decision-making process. As it was mentioned above, the Plataeans had agreed to a trial, in which it would be decided whether or not they should be surrendered to the Thebans. It was made clear that the Spartans would punish the unjust, but no one unjustly (παρὰ δίκην). However, when a group of judges arrived, they made no accusation (κατηγορία) but only asked the Plataeans whether they had done the Spartans any good in the war. The Plataeans had problems with this procedure, claiming that the Spartans had probably already made up their mind against them and the trial was a scam (3.54.1.1). In spite of the unfairness of the procedure, the Plataeans said they would nevertheless (ὁμῶς) offer a justification of their case (παρεχόμενοι δὲ ὁμῶς ἄ ἔχομεν δίκαια). I interpret his statement as: ‘in contrast with the way in which this whole trial is conducted, at least *we* want to make arguments under the presupposition that this *is* a real trial’ (3.54.1.1). The kinds of decisions the judges should make are evaluated in terms of δίκαιος vs. not δίκαιος as well. When judging the Plataeans, Sparta should not measure justice (τὸ δίκαιον, 3.56.3.3) by what is in their immediate present interest; it is also just that the Spartans weigh past actions of the Plataeans in a certain way (δίκαιον 3.56.5.1). Finally, at the end of their exposition, the Plataeans refer again to the *procedure* in the trial, saying that (if they have not persuaded the Spartans, it is just that the Spartans put them back in their original position (i.e. of

⁵⁵ cases of δίκη, δίκαιος, ἄδικος in this speech (which runs from 3.53-59): Th. 3.53.1.2, 3.54.1.1, 3.56.3.3, 3.56.5.1, 3.56.6.2; 3.59.3.6.

being besieged by the Thebans) and let them choose for themselves the risks they would subject themselves to (δίκαιον, 3.59.3.6).

To summarise the argument: when convincing the Spartans that saving them would be a ὄσιον decision, the Plataeans present themselves as suppliants and friends and argue that they are taking care of the Spartan graves in their city and of Greek temples. By contrast, the references to δίκη consistently draw on the legalistic sense of this term and refer to the legal trial in which the Plataeans find themselves, the way in which this trial is conducted and to the judges' decision-making process.

3.4 Justice and piety in Oedipus' supplication

We will now move on to discussing a more elaborate case, in which *hosios*, *dikaios* & *cognates* are used to refer to different frames throughout the dramatic action. When, at the end of his life, Oedipus arrives in Colonus (northwest of Athens) with his daughter Antigone, he takes a seat on a rock. After he learns that the rock is part of a sacred grove of the Eumenides, he decides to station himself there as a suppliant (S. *OC* 42-45).⁵⁶ However, this grove is inaccessible to humans (37, 39, 167) and a chorus of old men force Oedipus to move (150-69). He does so after having been given a pledge that he will not be harmed when abandoning physical contact with the sanctuary (173-76). However, almost as soon as Oedipus moves away from his seat as a suppliant and tells them his true identity, the chorus, frightened of his μῖασμα, send him away (226). Despite Oedipus' reminder of their promise (228) and a supplicatory speech by Antigone (237-54) the old men persist and 'do not dare to say any more, dreading what comes from the gods' (τὰ δ' ἐκ θεῶν τρέμοντες, 256).

At this point Oedipus makes a long supplication speech.⁵⁷ Its (implicit) main claim is that the old men's 'fear of the gods' is wrong. Countering what the old men have said, Oedipus argues that to honour the gods, one must help suppliants who have been given pledges of protection. Oedipus establishes that he is supplicating the old men of Colonus by the gods (275).⁵⁸ His request implicitly refers to the promise the old men gave him: 'just like you made me leave my seat, so save me now', in other words: 'I only moved away from the rock, because you promised me no harm would come to me' (276). He proceeds by appealing to the chorus for piety: 'honouring the gods'

⁵⁶ S. *OC* 42-45.

⁵⁷ S. *OC* 258-91. There are two other supplication speeches in S. *OC*: Antigone's speech to the chorus of old men (237-254) and Polyneices' speech to Oedipus (1284-1345). However, these do not contain any of the selected value terms and these speeches cannot be used for comparison.

⁵⁸ Previously Oedipus has appealed to the Athenian's reputation for piety (being θεοσεβεστάτας, S. *OC* 260), because of its history of saving suppliants who have been wronged (260). He also defends his moral situation (263-274) saying that he *suffered* rather than committed evils. He is not evil in nature, but was provoked by his father and moreover, he was ignorant of the truth.

(θεοὺς τιμῶντες, 277),⁵⁹ Oedipus says, they should not want to curtail that honour now.⁶⁰

The consequences of rejecting Oedipus are spelled out next: ‘consider that they (i.e., the gods) look upon pious mortals (βλέπειν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν εὐσεβῆ βροτῶν, 279), ‘and upon impious ones’ (βλέπειν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς δυσσεβεῖς, 280). When Greek gods, and humans, (should) look at something, this often involves that they also (should) *act*.⁶¹ Indeed, Oedipus continues: ‘.. and (consider) that no ἀνόσιος man has ever escaped’ (φυγῆν δέ του | μήπω γενέσθαι φωτὸς ἀνοσίου ποτέ, 280-81). Therefore, in accordance with the gods (ξὺν οἷς, 282), they should not cast a shadow over the happiness of Athens ‘by serving godless deeds’ (ἔργοις ἀνοσίοις ὑπηρετῶν, 283). Then the original request is repeated, so that the argument comes full circle: ‘just like you received the suppliant under your pledge, rescue me and watch over me carefully’ (284-85).

The term ἀνόσιος evokes the frame of honouring an interhuman relationship (that between suppliant and host) because it is important to the gods. Sending away a suppliant who has been given a promise of protection is the ἀνόσιον act (283) of an ἀνόσιος man (281). Oedipus claims that failing to honour the gods has resulted in divine punishment in other cases and may have the same consequence in this case.⁶²

We will now turn to the usage of δίκη and its cognates in this play. Theseus decides (631-641) that Oedipus can stay in Athens and that he will be protected. However, a new complication arises when Creon, ruler of Thebes, enters the stage (728). Because of the blessing Oedipus will give the country in which he is buried,⁶³ Creon has come to Athens to persuade Oedipus to return to Thebes. When Oedipus refuses, Creon tries to abduct Oedipus’ daughters Antigone and Ismene in order to

⁵⁹ Oedipus may be referring to the chorus’ remark about fearing what comes from the gods (S. *OC* 256) or further back, to their anxious protection of the sacred grove in e.g. 36-37 and 152-69, or to Athens’ reputation in general (260) or to all of these things together. Such appeals to reputation are made by suppliants elsewhere, e.g. by Hypsipyle to Amphiaraus: ‘you will do ὄσια because you are ὄσιος’ (E. *Hyps.* 757.862).

⁶⁰ τοὺς θεοὺς | ποιῆσθ’ ἀμαυροὺς μηδαμῶς ‘do not make the gods obscure in any way (S. *OC* 277-78). There is a textual problem in vs. 278. Different textual suggestions have been made. Besides OCT: ποιῆσθ’ ἀμαυροὺς μηδαμῶς, KAMERBEEK has μῶρους ποιεῖσθε · μηδαμῶς, following the reading of RK. JEBB has μοίραις ποιεῖσθε μηδαμῶς following Q (cf. his Appendix 1, 277-78).

⁶¹ In complaints by mortals to gods about injustice apparently overlooked by them, the verb ὀράω is sometimes used in a question (‘do you see this?’) or an admonition (‘look at this!’) both with an illocutionary force ‘do something about it’. E.g. E. *Hipp.* 1363, A. *Eu.* 110, E. *Cyc.* 353.

⁶² The antithesis εὐσεβῆς - δυσσεβῆς supports the same line of argumentation.

⁶³ Apollo has told Oedipus that he would become a blessing for the country in which he was buried (S. *OC* 84-93); Oedipus had already reminded the chorus of these ‘advantages’ he carried (ὄνησιν, 288).

force Oedipus to come with him. Theseus is not pleased and a discussion about the treatment of Oedipus and his daughters ensues. Unlike Oedipus' supplication speech, this discussion is mainly conducted in terms of δίκη and its cognates.

This new evaluative frame had already been established in Creon's initial words (728-60) to Oedipus, where he emphasises Oedipus' responsibility to his former city and its citizens. Creon claims that he had been ordered to fetch Oedipus by all the Cadmean people: they 'righteously' (δικαίως, 742) summon Oedipus to return to the home of his forefathers (δόμους τοὺς σοὺς πατρώους, 757-58). As Creon argues, Athens deserves a kind farewell, but his home city should in justice (δίκη, 760) be revered more, because it reared him (τρόφος οὔσα, 760). Even though Creon asks him this 'by his ancestral gods' (πρὸς θεῶν πατρώων, 756) the argument centres on obligations towards his fellow citizens. Discussions of duties within the *polis*, between citizens as citizens, are not commonly expressed in terms of ὄσιος or its antonyms. As was argued ὄσιος evokes the frame of honouring other citizens, not 'as citizens' but especially in one's special religious duties towards them when they are parents, children, family members, guests, hosts, suppliants, or dead ancestors. Here, where the emphasis is on responsibilities to citizens, it is not surprising that the evaluation δίκη is used instead. In his reply Oedipus agrees in the same terms: the request is – in theory – a rightful plea (λόγος δίκαιος, 762), but Creon just uses it as a cunning trick (μηχάνημα ποικίλον, 762).

When Oedipus bitterly refuses to oblige Creon, the atmosphere becomes grim. As a final means of 'persuasion', Creon abducts Oedipus' daughter Ismene and threatens to capture Antigone as well (818-19). A new discussion about the suppliants, this time between the Athenians and Oedipus' pursuer, starts in line 831ff, where the chorus exclaims: 'Oh, stranger, your actions are not just!' (ὦ ξέν', οὐ δίκαια δρᾶς) and a short conversation follows:

Cr. δίκαια. 832

Xo. πῶς δίκαια.

Cr. τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἄγω.⁶⁴

Cr. They [i.e. my actions] are just.

Ch. How can they be just?

Cr. I am taking those who are mine!

⁶⁴ S. OC 832-34.

Whatever the chorus means precisely with their appeal to *δίκη*, Creon chooses to understand this term in its distributive sense. As was discussed above, *δίκαιος* and antonyms are often used specifically to frame a situation in terms of entitlement, shares of portions and to discuss property, entitlement, borrowing, returning and stealing.⁶⁵ Here, Creon interprets *δίκαιος* in terms of what he is entitled to, in terms of property, when he says that removing the suppliants with him is ‘leading off those who are mine.’⁶⁶

Theseus understands and reverses these claims directly – the suppliants do not belong to Creon, but are rather the property of the *polis* and the gods. By bringing Oedipus back to Thebes, Creon would not ‘take back what is rightfully his’. On the contrary, he will plunder Theseus’ property and that of the gods (συλῶντα τὰμὰ καὶ τὰ τῶν θεῶν, 922), when he takes away unhappy suppliants by force (φωτῶν ἀθλίων ἰκτῆρια, 923).⁶⁷ Theseus equals the removal of the suppliant to *hierosylia*, comparable to stealing one of the holy objects in the temple.⁶⁸ Thebes would hardly praise Creon if they heard about this (920-23). The same claim is made both before and after this speech. Earlier, the Chorus had already complained that they had been ‘robbed’ of the girls (τῶνδὲ γ’ἔστερημένος, 857). A bit further on, Theseus says that ‘possessions gained by unjust deceit are not kept’ (τὰ γὰρ δόλω | τῶ μὴ δικαίῳ κτήματ’ οὐχὶ σῶζεται, 1026-27), again using a cognate of the term *δίκη*.

But the usage of *δίκη* also activates a legal frame in the mind of the listener. Theseus and the Chorus use this frame to attack Creon’s argument in another way. As we will see, they state that *Δίκη* is adherence to the laws in the *polis*, but abducting two girls and proposing to carry Oedipus off does not fall under that heading. It has been discussed that supplication at an altar was embedded in the legal system of the *polis*; such a suppliant was entitled to a preliminary hearing. The Chorus of old men have already said that if Creon takes the suppliants with him, they ‘will no longer consider this city a *polis*’ (τάνδ’ ἄρ’ οὐκέτι νεμῶ πόλιν, 879). Theseus elaborates on this unacceptable thought in a longer speech, when he tells Creon that he will never quit this country, until he has brought the girls back before his eyes (909-10). What

⁶⁵ The same argument, that one is entitled to a suppliant or even that the suppliant is one’s possession, and that carrying him away is thus *δίκαιος* or in accordance with *δίκη* is made by the messenger in E. *Heracl.* 139-40, discussed in section 3.7 of this chapter, and by the messenger in A. *Supp.* 916-18, 924, 932.

⁶⁶ Perhaps his argument is based on the fact that he is Oedipus’ uncle, and due to the family relationship he believes he can lay claim to them.

⁶⁷ lit. suppliant objects consisting in unhappy persons, JEBB 1907 [1903] *ad loc.*

⁶⁸ In A. *Supp.*, Pelasgos refutes the messenger’s argument that the suppliants are his possession in exactly the same way: ‘I do not extend hospitality to those who plunder the gods’ (οὐ γὰρ ξενοῦμαι τοὺς θεῶν σολήτορας, 927).

Creon has done is not worthy (οὐ κατάξια, 911) of Theseus, because he has come to a city that observes justice (δίκαι' ἀσκοῦσαν πόλιν, 913) and makes no decision without law (κᾶνευ νόμου κραίνουσαν οὐδέν, 914). Here, Theseus refers to the right of suppliants to get a hearing, once they are clinging to an altar. But now Creon comes here, taking what he likes (ἄγεις ἃ χρῆζεις, 916) and appropriating it with force (παρίστασαι βία, 915).⁶⁹ He must have thought he had come to a different type of community, 'some kind of city without men or an enslaved *polis*' (πόλιν κένανδρον ἢ δούλην τινά, 917).⁷⁰ In fact, Theseus cannot even believe that Thebes raised him in this way: this city is not used to raising unjust men (ἐκδίκους ἄνδρας, 920). In other words: Creon does not just fail to honour the rules in Athens. His behaviour is literally 'outside of justice (ἐκ + δίκη) in the sense that it does not belong in *any polis* that is based on the rule of law.

Summarising the argument above, the most important supplication speech in the play, made by Oedipus (258-291) frames the situation in terms of an obligation to the gods, in this specific case: *not to betray a suppliant who has been given a pledge*. Failing to do this is ἀνόσιος and δυσσεβής and will certainly result in divine retribution. When pursuer Creon asks Oedipus to return to Thebes, he first posits a kind request to the suppliant in terms of the latter's obligations to his fellow citizens. In the remainder of the play, Creon makes more aggressive claims to having δίκη on his side: in particular, he is entitled to (it is δίκαιος for him to) take the suppliant with him, because the suppliant is his property. In reply, Theseus and the Chorus of old men advance their own proposal about what is δίκαιος: acting in accordance with the laws of the *polis*. They also directly counter Creon's claims about 'possessing' Oedipus, by explaining that suppliants belong to the *polis* and the gods, and taking them away equals stealing holy property (the crime of *hierosylia*).

The employment of ὄσιος and δίκαιος in this play is distinct. ὄσιος refers to the religious side of dealings with suppliants, whereas δίκαιος explores what humans are entitled to (the 'distributional sense of δίκη') and that to which they have legally committed.

⁶⁹ Creon has indeed continuously spoken about Oedipus in this manner, announcing that he would seize this man and carry him off (τόνδε ἀπάξομαι λαβόν, S. OC 861) and take him away by force (ἄξω βία, 874); even after Theseus' speech he will proceed to do so, for example when saying that he has subdued his prey (ἐχειρούμηγ ἄγραν, 950).

⁷⁰ The term δούλος is frequently used of Persians and other nations subject to a despot e.g. by Hdt.; Aeschylus says of the Greeks: οὐ τινος δούλοι κέκληνται (A. Pers. 242). LSJ s.v. I. By contrast, Theseus' *polis* is an enlightened city, even if not a democracy. EASTERLING 2005:63 calls the characters "proto-democratic" citizens.

3.5 The rightful share

An analysis of a play in which only *dikaios* & *cognates* appear points to the same conclusion, regarding the types of frames that *dikaios* & *cognates* are linked to. In Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, Orestes is pursued by the Erinyes and sits at Apollo's Delphic shrine as a suppliant (προστρόπαιος, 41; ἰκέτης, 92). Since Apollo has persuaded him to commit the matricide, Orestes has turned to this god in his search for protection against the Erinyes. A debate in terms of δίκη on what should happen to this suppliant is central to the plot of this tragedy. For example, the Erinyes think it is not δίκαιος that Apollo protects Orestes as his suppliant (154), but they themselves follow straight justice (they are εὐθυδίκαιοι, 312) in pursuing matricides. Apollo, in his turn, claims Orestes is not justly pursued by the Erinyes (οὐ ... ἐνδίκως, 221); and Athena asks Orestes if he sits at her altar trusting in δίκη (439).

There are (at least) two factors that make *dikaios* & *cognates* especially felicitous over near-synonymous evaluative terms in this discussion. First, this play stages the first homicide trial on the Areopagus in history. This strong 'legal frame' activates a field of lexemes connected to this frame: *dikaios* & *cognates* are among these. Secondly, the discussion about the suppliant Orestes in *Eumenides* is set in a frame of distributive justice, revolving around entitlement, shares or portions. Orestes' moral position and his inviolability as a suppliant hardly come into play. Rather, the play revolves around a conflict between an older generation of goddesses (represented by the Erinyes) and a younger generation of gods (represented by Apollo). Orestes becomes the main 'issue' in this discussion about the respective position of these two groups: both parties feel entitled to him.

The Erinyes feel that Apollo, when holding on to his suppliant, prevents them from carrying out their main task, to pursue murderers. This 'lot' or 'appointed office' (λάχος) or 'divine ordinance' (θεσμόν) was 'assigned to them' (προστεταγμένον); or 'ordained by fate' (e.g. μοῖρ' ἐπέκλωσεν, μοιρόκραντον, πέπρωται, ἐκράνθη).⁷¹ All of these descriptions show that the goddesses feel that this is part of *their* portfolio, *their*

⁷¹ As the Erinyes say themselves, when Apollo tells them that it is not fit for them to enter his temple: 'but we have been ordered this ... to drive out mother murderers' (ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡμῖν τοῦτο προστεταγμένον A. Eu. 208 ... τοὺς μητραλοίας ἐκ δόμων ἐλαύνομεν 210). Elsewhere: 'this is the office that fate with her piercing stroke has ordained that I should hold fast' (τοῦτο γὰρ λάχος διανταία Μοῖρ' ἐπέκλωσεν ἐμπέδως ἔχειν, 334-35), 'at our birth these offices were ordained to us' (γίγνομέναισι λάχη τάδ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐκράνθη, 347-48). Also, they say that all mortals feel awe and dread, 'when they hear from me the divine ordinance, powerful, ordained by fate and granted by the gods' (ἐμοῦ κλύων θεσμόν, τὸν μοιρόκραντον ἐκ θεῶν δοθέντα τέλειον, 391-93). Other characters use the same terminology. Thus, Athena says the Erinyes 'have an allotted share, not easily dispensed with' (ἔχουσι μοῖραν οὐκ εὐπέπελον, 476) and Clytemnestra asks the sleeping Erinyes: 'what task is your destiny besides working evil?' (τί σοι πέπρωται πρᾶγμα πλὴν τεύχειν κακά, 125).

‘share’. These claimed push the discussion into a frame of ‘portions’ and ‘entitlement’. When the Erinyes say that they are just (εὐθυδίκαιοι δ’οιοῦμεθ’εἶναι, 320) this means: acting in accordance with what they are entitled to, even if that means ignoring the rights of a suppliant. In the eyes of the Erinyes, Apollo, by protecting Orestes as suppliant (τὸν ἰκέταν σέβων, 151) is precisely *not* acting in accordance with what he is entitled to. He is ‘destroying *moira*, which had been ordained long ago’ (παλαιγενεῖς δὲ μοίρας φθίσας, 173). In other words: by taking the Erinyes’ prey (ἄγρα, 148), he has *stolen away* (ἐξέκλεψας, 153) their share, thievish as he is (ἐπίκλοπος, 149). Which of these things, the goddesses ask, will anyone call ‘just’ (τί τῶνδ’ ἐρεῖ τις δικαίως ἔχειν, 155)?⁷²

In short, as we have seen, δίκαιος is used in a discussion on *what* belongs to *whom*, more broadly speaking, the term is used in a legal frame.

3.6. (Un)quantifiable claims

The previous analyses of *dikaios* & *cognates* in contexts of supplication may in addition teach us about the semantics of *hosios* & *cognates*, if we focus now on the dissimilarity of usages of the two sets of terms. In contrast to *dikaios* & *cognates*, *hosios* & *cognates* appear more than once in the context of non-quantifiable, interpersonal claims, as we have already seen. These are situations in which A (for example, the Plataeans) argues that B (for example, the Spartans) owe them ‘something’ due to some relationship between the two. Such appeals to friendships or the idea of ‘having been good’ to the other person do not have any exact support (in the sense of a written law, or in the idea of ownership, shares or entitlement), but defy claims in terms of shares and portions. We found argumentations quite similar to the Plataeans’ in other passages. The earliest example was *Odyssey* 16.423, in which Penelope denounces Antinous’ plans to harm Telemachos as ‘not ὁσίη’ on the basis of *philia* based on a successful supplication in the previous generation (discussed in Chapter 2).⁷³ A similar plea was made in a fragment from Euripides’ *Hypsipyle* (also

⁷² They complain that the younger gods have sovereign power, ‘beyond justice’ (δίκας πλέον, *A. Eu.* 163). They also claim that when they received these offices (λάχη, 347) it had been ordained that no one would join in and share in their feast (οὐδέ τις ἐστὶ συνδαίτωρ μετὰκοινος, 351). This is where Apollo goes wrong: he is ‘honouring bloody matters’ (αἰματηρὰ πράγματα σέβεις, 715) which *he* has not obtained as his portion (οὐ λαχόν, 715).

⁷³ As we discussed in detail in Chapter 2, section 2.1, in her explanation of this reproach Penelope focuses on the *long-term reciprocal relationship* between Odysseus’ and Antinous’ families, which resulted from Odysseus’ protection of a suppliant (Antinous’ father). ‘Not ὁσίη’ is in this case: not honouring the bond of *ξενία* that followed a successful act of supplication, in which the gods have a special interest.

discussed in Chapter 2)⁷⁴ Hypsipyle's appeal to Amphiaraus was staged in an informal, inter-personal setting. There was no legal or quasi-legal reason why Amphiaraus should help Hypsipyle. Rather, the appeal to Amphiaraus to act in a way that is ὄσιος appears in the wider context of a claim that Amphiaraus somehow 'owes' it to Hypsipyle to help her.

This characteristic of *hosios & cognates* can be linked to two other characteristics discussed previously: the 'emotional, aggressive' connotation of the disqualification ἀνόσιος and the fact that these lexemes often evaluate multiple issues at the same time. Recall that the Plataeans claimed that it would be ὄσιον to help them, not only because the Greek νόμος is not to kill suppliants, but also because they have a reciprocal relationship with those supplicated and because they will die otherwise, *and* because they took care of Spartan ancestral worship, *and* because they looked after the Greek temples. Similarly, Hypsipyle trusted that Amphiaraus would 'do ὄσιος things' and help her, because she was his suppliant *and* because Amphiaraus was her guest, and Amphiaraus owed a counter-favour to her, *and* because Amphiaraus already had a reputation for piety. In the absence of exact claims, it makes sense to accumulate as many reasons as one can think of to support one's plea. Precisely in such situations it is also opportune to invoke the notion that 'the gods have an interest in this relationship', to strengthen such a claim with *some* authority.

If arguments supported by *hosios & cognates* are fundamentally non-quantifiable, and relate to a feeling about what is right and proper in interpersonal relationships, we can also see how they may take the form of especially emotional or aggressive complaints when flipping to the negative side. An example occurs in Euripides' *Orestes*, where Orestes refers to Hermione (daughter of Menelaus and Helen) as the 'cub of a godless (ἀνόσιος) father'. In this play, Electra has come up with a plan to kidnap Hermione (Menelaus' daughter). Orestes thinks it is an excellent plan but wonders about practicalities:

Or. ἤξει δ' ἐς οἶκους Ἑρμιόνη τίνοσ χρόνου; 1211
 ὡς τᾶλλα γ' εἶπας, εἶπερ εὐτυχήσομεν,
 κάλλισθ', ἐλόντες σκύμνον ἀνοσίου πατρός.⁷⁵

Or. But when will Hermione come home?

⁷⁴ Hypsipyle served as a slave to Lycurgus, priest at the rural sanctuary of Zeus at Nemea and his wife Eurydice, nursing their son Opheltes. The seer Amphiaraus came to see this family.

⁷⁵ E. *Or.* 1211-13.

Because the other things you have said sound really good, if only we will succeed in catching this cub of a godless father.

I understand the reference to Menelaus as an ἀνόσιος πατήρ as grounded in Menelaus' previous refusal to help the suppliant Orestes. Earlier on in the play, Orestes had supplicated Menelaus (380ff.), drawing on the supposed reciprocal obligations Menelaus had towards him as Agamemnon's son.⁷⁶ But Menelaus refused (682-716), after which he was repeatedly called κακός.⁷⁷ Orestes' unfavourable designation of Menelaus as ἀνόσιος in 1211 is a more specific version of his earlier abuse of Menelaus as κακός. Orestes argues that Menelaus' refusal of him as a suppliant is not only 'bad' or 'cowardly'. Using the disqualification ἀνόσιος, Orestes does not make exact or legalistic claims (he has no grounds for them), but communicates point blank that he considers Menelaus' actions outside of *any* standard humans and especially gods have set. As was already argued, the disqualification probably should be interpreted as an emotionally charged – even aggressive, abusive – rejection of behaviour.

3.7. The ambiguity of δίκη

Having considered the ways in which *hosios & cognates* and *dikaios & cognates* frame situations in different ways (or are used to support different frames), we will now focus on *dikaios & cognates*, more specifically, on those instances in which these lexemes seemingly activate different frames at the same time. Euripides' *Children of Heracles* revolves around the children of Heracles, who are fleeing from Eurystheus, ruler of Argos. Eurystheus had been responsible for many of Heracles' hardships. Since he wanted to prevent the children of Heracles from taking revenge on him, he meant to kill them. This is why they escaped Argos under the protection of Iolaus, a good friend (and nephew) of their father's. A debate about the future of these suppliants is conducted between the suppliants themselves, their pursuer, a chorus of old men and king Theseus of Athens; this discussion is conducted in terms of what is δίκαιος and what is not.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Orestes proposed that Menelaus should accept some troubles and repay his debt to Agamemnon by 'paying a favour to those who deserved it' (χάριτας πατρώας ἐκτίνων ἐς οὓς σε δεῖ, 453), i.e.: to Orestes and his sister.

⁷⁷ Orestes calls him κάκιστος (E. *Or.* 718, 736), κακός to his φίλοι (740) and a κακός φίλος (748). Electra likewise calls him Μενέλαος ὁ κακός, ὁ προδότης τοῦμου πατρός (1057). As SLUITER (2008:4) has shown, the disqualification κακός is highly underspecified, leaving open an 'enormous interpretative range'. In this case the intention will be something between 'cowardly' and 'disloyal'.

⁷⁸ Religious terminology in this tragedy is rare. Besides the one occurrence of ὄσιος: no cases of ἀνόσιος, εὐσεβής, ἀσεβής, δυσσεβής. καθαρός occurs once (E. *Heracl.* 1055), ἄθεος occurs once

The starting point of the play is the situation we have described in section 3.1: the religious ideal of protecting suppliants was not always respected in the face of political reality, here a powerful enemy. As is explained in the prologue, the group had been driven away from every city they sought protection in, for Eurystheus had threatened all of these cities with war (15-24). As Iolaus says, the *poleis* who did not wish to accept the suppliants ‘are honoring the mightier’ (τοὺς κρείσσονας σέβοντες).⁷⁹

In the opening scene of the play we see Iolaus and the children of Heracles who have finally arrived at the altar of Zeus Agoraeus in Marathon (an Athenian deme) where they sit as suppliants. A messenger of Eurystheus is present and ready to drag them away from the altar. When a group of old men from Marathon (the Chorus) appears, Iolaus’ appeals to them for help:

Io. ὦ τὰς Ἀθήνας δαρὸν οἰκοῦντες χρόνον,
 ἀμύνεθ’· ἰκέται δ’ ὄντες ἀγοραίου Διὸς 70
 βιαζόμεσθα καὶ στέφη μαιίνεται
 πόλει τ’ ὄνειδος καὶ θεῶν ἀτιμίαν.⁸⁰

Io. Oh you, who have lived in Athens from old times,
 protect us. For we are being violently treated even though we are
 suppliants of Zeus Agoraeus and our wreaths are being defiled
 a disgrace to the city and a dishonour to the gods!

Although Iolaus invokes Zeus and appeals to the ‘dishonour’ the gods were facing,⁸¹ it is striking that Iolaus should claim that they are suppliants of Zeus Agoraios, instead of appealing to Zeus’ more common manifestations in contexts of supplication: ‘Zeus of the Stranger’ (Ξένιος), ‘Zeus of the Suppliant’ (Ίκέσιος), or

(107), *ἀγνός* occurs once (1011). By contrast, *δίκαιος* and *ἄδικος* occur 23 times. The evaluative term *ἴσιος* only appears once in the whole play, in a highly marked context. Here it is used by Alcmena to evaluate the behaviour of Zeus. *ἴσιος* used to evaluate the conduct of a god is very rare and this term is always chosen in such a context with a particular effect in mind. I discuss this case in detail in Chapter 5, section 2.4.

⁷⁹ This is ironic: the active verb *σέβειν* is used especially and mostly of gods, so the use of this verb activates the idea of the worship of divinities in the mind of the listener, and the phraseology *τοὺς κρείσσονας σέβοντες* reminds us of what these cities *should* be doing: honoring (*σέβειν*) the gods. Thus, in this brief utterance, Iolaus captures the clash between the demands of divine law and its practicability. Cf. the discussion on the semantics of *σέβειν* in Chapter 3, section 1.

⁸⁰ E. *Heracl.* 69-72.

⁸¹ He does the same further on in E. *Heracl.* 78.

‘Zeus the Saviour’ (Σωτήρ). Zeus Agoraeus was the god of assemblies and trials and symbolic for the Athenian democratic debate.⁸² By invoking Zeus Agoraeus, the suppliants appeal to the citizens and democratic institutions of the *polis*.⁸³ This sets the tone for the rest of the play, where almost no religious evaluative terminology enters the discussion.

But first there is the reaction of the Chorus of old men of Marathon, who interpret the situation in the light of the *religious* importance of protecting suppliants and do so quite seriously. The Chorus tells the messenger that it is fitting to respect suppliants of the gods (εἰκὸς θεῶν ἰκτῆρας αἰδεῖσθαι, 101); they should not leave the gods’ seats by force (μὴ βιαίωι χειρὶ δαιμόνων ἀπολιπεῖν σφ’ ἔδη, 102). As the chorus claims, ‘mighty Justice will not allow it.’ (πότνια γὰρ Δίκα τὰδ’ οὐ πείσεται, 103). The messenger suggests in response that they could expel the children of Heracles from the *polis*, and he will use no violence *inside* the city (105-6). But the chorus answers: ‘it is godless for a city to give up a suppliant band of strangers’ (ἄθεον ἰκεσίαν μεθεῖναι πόλει ξένων προστροπῶν, 107-8). As in Aeschylus’ *Suppliants*, the chorus’ appeal to justice (δίκη) is directly related to the divine interest in dealings with suppliants. In fact, the old men speak about a divine power Justice (πότνια Δίκη), honouring the rights of suppliants herself. The herald in his turn ignores the religious dimension of the situation altogether, when he replies: ‘yes, but it is nice to keep out of trouble’ (καλὸν δέ γ’ ἔξω πραγμάτων ἔχειν πόδα, 109).

In his next speech, too, the messenger blatantly refuses to take the sacrosanctity of suppliants into account:

Κη.	Ἄργεῖός εἰμι· τοῦτο γὰρ θέλεις μαθεῖν· ἐφ’ οἷσι δ’ ἦκω καὶ παρ’ οὗ λέγειν θέλω	135
	πέμπει Μυκηγῶν δεῦρό μ’ Εὐρυσθεὺς ἄναξ ἄξοντα τούσδε· πολλὰ δ’ ἦλθον, ὧ ξένε, <u>δίκαι</u> ’ ἀμαρτῆι δρᾶν τε καὶ λέγειν ἔχων. Ἄργεῖος ὦν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἄργείους ἄγω ἐκ τῆς ἐμαντοῦ τούσδε δραπέτας ἔχων,	140
	νόμοισι τοῖς ἐκεῖθεν ἐψηφισμένους θανεῖν· <u>δίκαιοι</u> δ’ ἐσμὲν οἰκοῦντες πόλιν αὐτοὶ καθ’ αὐτῶν κυρίουσ κραίνειν δίκας. ⁸⁴	

⁸² ALLAN 2001:48.

⁸³ WILKINS 1993:60.

⁸⁴ E. *Heracl.* 134-43.

Mess. I am an Argive, since you wanted to know that
 But I want to tell you for what purpose I've come and from whom
 Eurystheus, king of Mycene has sent me here
 to take these children with me. I have come with many just things
 to do and at the same time to say.
 Being an Argive myself, I take Argives with me
 these runaways from my own country
 who have been condemned to death by the laws
 there. We, living in this city, have the right
 to pass lawful judgments ourselves concerning ourselves.

In the messenger's argument, the religious dimension of the problem is not considered at all. But crucially, he *does* manage to counter the accusation 'Justice will not allow you to drag this suppliant from the altar'. Picking up the notion of δίκη from the claim of the Old Men, the messenger uses it throughout his own exposition, arguing that what he is doing *is* δίκαιος (138, 142). First of all, in a variant of Creon's 'I am taking those who are mine' (τοὺς ἐμοῦς ἄγω, S. OC 834), the messenger says he is leading away (ἄγω, 139) his runaway slaves (δραπέτας, 140): the message being here, too, that the children of Heracles are his personal property.

Turning the problem into a legal issue between *poleis* and making his argument in terms of who has the right to judge and pass sentences over whom, the messenger further exploits the semantic scope of δίκη in the fifth-century debate on supplication. When the messenger claims that he has come to say and do things that are δίκαιος, he argues not only that the suppliants are his property, but they also fall under the jurisdiction of his *polis*. He, being an Argive citizen (134, 139) wants to take the children, Argives themselves, from his own *polis* (139-40) and with regard to whom it has been decided by vote, by the laws which are in place in Argos, that they should die (141-42). It is δίκαιος, the messenger argues, for the Argives, living in their own city, to pass valid judgments themselves, concerning themselves (142-43).⁸⁵ Thus, the messenger in this speech cleverly uses the ambiguity in the term δίκη to answer the charges made against him.

Iolaus implicitly accepts the herald's line of thought when he replies in exactly the same terms. It is hard to tell whether Iolaus fully endorses the argumentation that an

⁸⁵ cf. GOLDHILL 1986, Chapter 3, for a similar appropriation of different usages of δίκη by different speakers to suit their own rhetorical purposes, in the Oresteia. GOLDHILL calls this a 'rhetoric of appropriation'.

Heraclides are strangers to the Argives, but guests of the Athenians. This frees them of Argos and buys them the entitlement to protection from the Athenians.

The validity of the herald's argument in the eyes of the contemporary audience is doubtful. Even if the representation of the Heraclides as runaway slaves is correct, neither in Athens nor in Samos could such "property", when taking refuge at (specified) sanctuaries, simply be removed by their masters. The slave had the right for his case to be heard in a legal procedure.⁸⁹ What happened if a slave from *polis* A escaped to the sanctuary at *polis* B and claimed asylum there – as is the case in the herald's interpretation of the situation – is more difficult to say. There is evidence to suggest that procedures differed from that regarding slaves escaping *within* their own *polis*.⁹⁰ CHANIOTIS assumes that these slaves stayed in the sanctuary and served as sacred slaves. Such a course of action would imply, too, that the herald could not simply take his slaves with him.⁹¹

Laws about the extradition of slaves could be captured in *symbola*, i.e. treaties between Greek *poleis* laying down the law and procedure to be followed in legal cases involving one Athenian and one non-Athenian.⁹² In a 4th-century *symbolon* between Stymphalos and Sikyon it was specified that the master in one of the *poleis* could regain his runaway slave in the other *polis* by paying a finder's reward.⁹³ It is

⁸⁹ In Athens, runaway slaves could take refuge at the Theseion. There they hoped to be resold to a better master. If the slave's original master objected, there would be a trial, conducted by the priests of the Theseion, on a charge of ὀβριζέειν. If the accused citizen was not found guilty of abusing his slave, the slave was returned to him (CHRISTENSEN 1984:25). A similar procedure was in place in Samos, where a somewhat later inscription (HABICHT 1957:226-231, 3rd century BC) about runaway slaves at the sanctuary also mentions a trial; if the master had stronger arguments the slave was returned to him (CHANIOTIS 1996:80-81). Crucially, in neither of these cases could the master take the law into his own hands and simply take the slave.

⁹⁰ For example, in a later mystery inscription of Andania (92-91 BC, *LSCG* 65.80-84) a priest decided whether a slave should be returned to his master – and the inscription specifies that this rule regards slaves 'from our own *polis*' (ἐκ τῆς ἀμετέρας πόλεως). This phraseology suggests the procedures differed from what happened to slaves from *other poleis*, but the inscription does not specify what happens to this second category of slaves. According to ALLAN (2001, *ad loc.*) 'in a slave-owning society like Athens runaways were a major problem and it made sense for slave-owners throughout Greece to cooperate in returning them to their 'native' cities'. In the absence of documentary evidence this is speculative.

⁹¹ CHANIOTIS 1996:80.

⁹² MACDOWELL 1978:221.

⁹³ *IPArk 17.135-40* 303-300 BC, discussed in ARNAOUTOGLU 1998:133-38. The rule seems to be (but the crucial passage has many letters which are difficult to read) that if a slave is caught the master can take possession of the slave if he carries with him a reward for bringing the slave back, different amounts specified for male, female and child slaves (εἰ κα δὲ ὁ δοῦλος ἢ ἡ δούλα ἀλ[ιτ]- | κηται, ἐξέστω τ[ῶ]ι δεσπότη ΛΥ.. | ΤΩ κρη[α]τεῖν, εἰ συν[ι]θειή· συνεπιφέ- | ρει μὲν ὁ δεσπότης τὰ σώστρα τ[οῦ] ἄ- | [ν]δρὸς ἵκατι δραχμαί, γυναικ[ὸς] | [πα]ιδὸς δέκα δραχμαί·). There is no mention

not clear how common such laws were.⁹⁴ No fifth-century *symbola* mentioning the extradition of slaves between Athens and Argos are known. This is obviously not to say such a treaty did not exist, but as far as we can tell, the herald's case does not seem very strong.

Still, even though the messenger's argument may not have been in accordance with the actual laws in Athens, the fact that he makes these arguments at all, and that Iolaus responds in the same terms is significant. Even if the messenger's attempts to drag the suppliant away represents the way in which the Athenians imagined less enlightened others dealt with suppliants, the debate between the messenger and the Heraclides confirms that questions about the juridical status of suppliants – especially when multiple *poleis* were involved – were present in the contemporary public debate. The rhetorical clash between Eurystheus' herald and the Athenians also shows us that speakers came to use the semantic field of δίκη to stake claims about this topic.

This passage illustrates the semantic ambiguity of δίκη in the context of the fifth-century debate on supplication, and the potential for (deliberate) misunderstanding. The old men of Athens framed the situation as part of the ongoing relationship with the gods (δίκη = respecting the religious inviolability of suppliants). But the messenger, ignoring the accusation of the old men, accessed a different part of the semantic field of δίκη, transporting the discussion to a debate about property and about who has the right to judge over whom in inter-*polis* affairs.⁹⁵

3.8. Ambiguity undermines

Finally, we return to Aeschylus' *Suppliants*. In this play, the discussion revolves around different notions of justice in a highly similar way as in Euripides' *Heraclides*. However, in the Danaids' case, the ambiguity of δίκη works against them. Their assertions of having δίκη (divine justice) and νόμος on their side provoke Pelasgus' continued preoccupation with the legal situation in their country. When they fail to

of refuge at a sanctuary in this rule, though.

⁹⁴ PHILLIPSON (1911) describing such rules in ancient societies does not mention any for classical Greece; and LONIS (1988:84) argues that even if there were such rules, actual cases of extradition were rare. According to PHILLIPSON (1911:359), sketching the historical development of laws providing for the delivery of foreign criminals runaway slaves, such laws occurred already in the 14th century BC in Egypt and were common in Roman times, but the only thing he says about Greece is that extradition was not clearly regulated but still doubtful in the time of Cyrus as, for example the Herodotean case of Pactyes (Hdt. 1.153-161) shows.

⁹⁵ Recall that the chorus and Theseus in *Oedipus Coloneus* did something similar when they replied to Creon's accusation (δίκη = taking my property with me) by juxtaposing their own interpretation of δίκη (respecting the laws in the *polis*) before answering Creon in his own terms.

show that their cause is *also* δίκαιος and ἔννομος in the way Pelasgus suggests, this finally undercuts their case.⁹⁶ In section 3.2 it has been argued that the Danaids use ὄσιος and δίκαιος not to frame situations differently, but in the same way. Below we will see that this semantic equation is a rhetorical choice: the Danaids have a vested interest in treating the two concepts as precisely the same.

Pelasgus wants to know from the very start of the discussion with the Danaids whether or not the Aegyptiads have the right to marry their cousins according to the customs or laws in Egypt.⁹⁷ When the Danaids state they are supplicating so they may not ‘become a slave to the sons of Aegyptus’ (335), Pelasgus asks an informative question (336): ‘is that because you hate them, or are you claiming this is not customary/lawful (μὴ θέμις)?’ The Danaids do not answer his question and their silence implies that the marriage is not unlawful in Egypt. Instead, they focus their persuasive speeches on divine Justice, which they claim to have on their side. This seems like a strong rhetorical move, but in fact, it is not, because every time they mention δίκη and νόμος, Pelasgus is reminded of the other framework in which these two concepts function: the *polis* and its laws. Thus, when the Danaids say that ‘Justice stands by those who fight for her’ (ἡ Δίκη γε ζυμμάχων ὑπερστατεῖ, 343), Pelasgus has already moved from the factual ignorance of l. 336 to scepticism: ‘Yes, if justice was an ally in your cause in the first place’ (εἴπερ γ’ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πραγμάτων κοινωνὸς ἦν, 344). Again, the Danaids fail to answer Pelasgus’ implicit question and the matter remains open for a while. In fact, it seems as if Pelasgus temporarily forgets about his previous line of questioning, when he ponders his two choices: helping the suppliants and risking war or not helping them and risking the anger of the gods and *miasma*.⁹⁸ After the discussion comes to an impasse in 377-380, the Danaids throw in another speech that should finally convince him, but which does exactly the opposite.

Χο. τὸν ὑπόθεν σκοπὸν ἐπισκόπει
φύλακα πολυπόνων

⁹⁶ His first decision is not to help them at all. He only changes his mind in response to the serious and imminent danger of μίασμα through the girls’ threatened suicide on the altar (A. *Supp.* 455-467).

⁹⁷ In *Suppliants*, we again see a reflection of the twofold attitude towards suppliants in a fifth-century democratic *polis* discussed above, projected on to Argos in the mythical past. On the one hand, the Danaids can convincingly assert that accepting them is compulsory in order not to anger the gods and incur a terrible μίασμα. On the other hand, the acceptance of the suppliants is not automatic, which we see reflected in the fact that Pelasgus questions the Danaids about the reasonableness of their request and wishes to refer the matter to the citizen body, in analogy to the historical fifth-century system of (double) evaluation of suppliants (by Assembly and Council).

⁹⁸ A. *Supp.* 345-380.

βροτῶν οἱ τοῖς πέλας προσήμενοι
δίκας οὐ τυγχάνουσιν ἐννόμου·
 μένει τοι Ζηνὸς ἰκταίου κότος 385
 δυσπαράθελκτος παθόντος οἴκτοις.⁹⁹

Ch. Look out for him who watches from above,
 the guardian of much-suffering mortals,
 who sit to supplicate their fellow creatures
 because they do not get lawful justice:
 the anger of Zeus god of suppliants is enduring
 it won't be placated by the wailings of the sufferer.

Unfortunately their choice of vocabulary reactivates the legal frame in the Argive ruler, causing him to resume his previous line of questioning. Pelasgus picks up on their notion of ἐννόμος δίκη (384) and wonders once more, but this time more insistently, about the reasonableness of their plea:

Πε. εἶ τοι κρατοῦσι παῖδες Αἰγύπτου σέθεν
νόμωι πόλεως, φάσκοντες ἐγγύτατα γένους
 εἶναι, τίς ἂν τοῖσδ' ἀντιωθῆναι θέλοι;
 δεῖ τοί σε φεύγειν κατὰ νόμους τοὺς οἴκοθεν, 390
 ὧς οὐκ ἔχουσιν κῦρος οὐδὲν ἄμφι σοῦ.¹⁰⁰

Pe. If it is the case that the sons of Aegyptos rule over you
 by the law of your *polis*, saying they are your nearest kin,
 who would want to oppose those claims?
 You must plead your defence and argue that they do not have any
 authority concerning you, according to the laws of your home
 country.

In fact, as we see, he assumes the marriage is actually in line with the law or custom of their *polis* (νόμος, 388), if not, they should prove that their cousins do *not* have the authority over them according to the laws at home (κατὰ νόμους τοὺς οἴκοθεν, 390).

This exchange seems to mark a turning point in the debate. The Danaids have no response for the third time and after this, they will try very hard to get the momentum

⁹⁹ A. Supp. 381-86.

¹⁰⁰ A. Supp. 387-91.

back. They seem to realise that their case has been undercut, and that the best strategy for them is to draw the attention away from the notion of δίκη as referring the laws of their city and the authority their cousins have over them. In the previous, Pelasgos has already been convinced he should honour the gods by treating suppliants right. Now, the Danaids start aggressively to argue that piety and τὸ δίκαιον are actually the same thing. Thus, they argue: ‘By choosing Justice as your ally, choose being respectful to the gods (ξύμμαχον δ’ ἐλόμενος Δίκαν κρῖνε σέβας τὸ πρὸς θεῶν, 395-96. A bit further on, in Il. 402-06, discussed extensively in section 3 above, τὸ δίκαιον is again equated to piety (τὸ ὄσιον). The important thing to note is that the usage of ὄσιος and δίκαιος as synonyms, to frame the situation in the same way, as opposed to what we saw in previous sections, is a conscious rhetorical choice: the girls deliberately make this semantic equation as part of their argumentative strategy.

In 418ff. the suppliants throw in a final plea in which they explicitly equate piety with τὸ δίκαιον once more: ‘become our pious *proxenos* with full justice (γενοῦ πανδίκως | εὐσεβῆς πρόξενος, 418-19) and emphasize again that δίκη is divine justice.¹⁰¹ However, their speeches are to no avail: after this, Pelasgos rejects them, saying he wants to have nothing to do with the matter anymore. It seems as if the polysemy of δίκη has undermined their argument to such an extent that they lose this plea.

4. The fine-tuning of evaluative vocabulary

Against the background of the preceding discussion we return to **Q4**: is it possible to determine a motivation for the strongly increasing frequency of usage of the adjective ὄσιος and its antonym ἀνόσιος, and the introduction of *eusebês* & *cognates* in the course of the fifth century? The motivation behind the introduction of a new word, or the increasing popularity of an existing rare word in general, seems to be: a mismatch between the conceptual space and the available words to cover it, on one level or another. Such a disparity can arise when a new ‘concept’ or ‘mentality’ is born. Our hypothesis might have been that some new mentality in the classical period came to be expressed by means of ὄσιος and ἀνόσιος and *eusebês* & *cognates*.¹⁰² However, my analysis in Chapter 2 showed that is this not what happened, because the mentality that *hosios*, *eusebês* & *cognates* articulate was frequently attested from our earliest literary sources.¹⁰³ Another scenario is that semantic movements in one place cause referential ‘gaps’ elsewhere. This may lead to the introduction of new words, or

¹⁰¹ ‘do not allow us to be dragged from the altar in spite of justice’ (βίαι δίκας, 430); ‘the Justice coming from Zeus rules’ (δίκαια Διόθεν κρατεῖ, 437).

¹⁰² This is the hypothesis of JAY-ROBERT 2009:28. Cf. Chapter 2, section 5.

¹⁰³ Chapter 2, section 5.

the rising popularity of existing rare words, to fill up those gaps. In the present case, perhaps the changing semantics of δίκη is relevant. δίκη is a highly central term in the Greek evaluative inventory, but, as we have seen in the previous case study, δίκη is rather ambiguous in the fifth century. Speakers occasionally used δίκη in the sense of ‘behaving in a way that other humans and the gods will perceive as just’. However such a usage activated other strong, prototypical applications of δίκη: ‘keeping to the law’ and ‘getting one’s rightful portion’. We have seen that such multiplicity of meaning led to (deliberate) misunderstandings in conversations. Perhaps the increasing popularity of ὄσιος and ἀνόσιος and the introduction of *eusebês* & *cognates* simply covered the need for more dedicated terms to articulate that actions, attitudes and persons were praiseworthy because they pleased the gods and thus helped sustain the reciprocal bond between the human and the divine world.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter we have made a contrastive study of the semantics of ὄσιος and δίκαιος. Our view of semantics entails, first of all, that we do not need to find a clear-cut ‘distinction in meaning’ between these terms. Rather, in the maximalist approach to meaning, it becomes possible to compare semantic networks. As we have seen, it is not just the case that ὄσιος and δίκαιος have different semantic fields with partial overlap, and that ὄσιος is a more specifically ‘religious term’ because it has a narrower, more focused network of usages (this was already described by MOTTE, RUDHARDT and CONNOR, though in different phraseology). Even when the two terms are used in the same way (both referring to moral behaviour sanctioned and approved of by gods), the interpretative process of the utterances as a whole differs because both terms have different sets of other applications and associations connected to their lexical entries.

As became clear in our case study, δίκαιος in the fifth century is so strongly associated with a ‘legal’ and ‘distributive’ frame, that it is difficult for a speaker to claim that something is ‘just’ because the gods approve and *not* activate the question of legality and of proper distribution in the mind of the listener. This polysemy of δίκη caused (deliberate) misunderstandings between conversation partners, and in one case (Aeschylus’ *Suppliants*) the inability to successfully frame a case as δίκαιος ‘showing divine justice’.

The contrastive analysis of *hosios* & *cognates* and *dikaios* & *cognates* also showed us more clearly the types of situations in which the former set of lexemes appear. *hosios* & *cognates* are used to support interpersonal, non-quantifiable claims, defying an analysis in terms of shares and portions

In the final part of the chapter we used this insight to give a tentative explanation for our question concerning the diachronic distribution of *hosios*, *eusebês* & *cognates*. We suggested that *hosios*, *eusebês* & *cognates* may have answered the need for more specific, dedicated terms to express that behaviour ‘pleases the gods’.

5

Pious gods

The marked usage of ὅσιος for divinities

In this chapter I will discuss a remarkable group of semantic outliers of ὅσιος and ὁσία. These are cases in which ὅσιος or ὁσία are used to describe the behaviour of a god (Q3). In the following analysis I will interpret these cases by explaining them in terms of markedness. In Chapters 3 and 4, we have compared the usage of ὅσιος to other ways a speaker had of conveying a similar message. We have determined the specific situations and rhetorical ‘frames’ in which *hosios & cognates* are *typically* used, as opposed to its near-synonyms. In this chapter we discuss a small group of cases in which *hosios & cognates* are employed in a marked way, that is, in highly *atypical*, unexpected situations, and in the face of readily available and much more plausible lexical alternatives. We will discuss the extant textual occurrences of ὅσιος / ὁσία used for a god. The aim of the chapter as a whole is to provide a view on the semantic/pragmatic status of the discussed ‘outliers’. I also aim to offer an insight into the interpretative steps that were taken by audiences: the listeners within the dramatic setting itself, and the real-life audience outside of the text. That is, I will explain how they made sense of such ‘marked’ language use.

1. Markedness

One of the main strengths of the cognitive linguistic model is its ability to deal with the semantic flexibility characteristic of real language use. As was explained in Chapter 1, according to LANGACKER categories are built up around prototypes (typical instances of a category). Other elements are assimilated to the category on the basis of their perceived resemblance to the prototype.¹ It is possible to add new ‘members’ of the category at the edges of the network – for example, when a speaker uses a word in a new sense, stretching or extending its general currency of usage. In theory *any* component(s) of meaning should be dissolvable when a new ‘member of the family’ is added (i.e. when a new concept is described with the same lexeme). Of course it is not always possible to extend a semantic network without any explanation. Interpretability may become an issue when more marginal members are added to a category and it may be necessary to help other language users understand the utterance.² But in principle the model of network semantics allows for what actually happens in language use: the addition of senses to a semantic network by integrating them at the periphery of the mental chart. As LANGACKER stated ‘there is no fixed limit on how far something can depart from the prototype and still be assimilated to the class, if the categoriser is perceptive or clever enough to find some point of resemblance to typical instances’.³ LANGACKER’s theory correctly predicts that any action or behavioural pattern could be evaluated, for example, in terms of *ὀσιότης*, providing that the speaker could convince his audience that this was the relevant evaluative category. But the strength of the model on this point is at the same time a weakness. The notion that mental categories have no boundaries potentially presents a problem that I wish to address in this chapter. The problem is that extended language use often has an (intended) effect, but this effect does not derive straightforwardly from the fact that they are marginal or peripheral instances of a lexeme.

To illustrate the problem, we will consider a modern and then an ancient example. Some time ago a Dutch newspaper reported on the death of a sheep: ‘Nasty wretches shot a sheep this weekend in a field along the Wantijdijk in Dordrecht. The police

¹ LANGACKER 1991:266.

² For example, when the word ‘mouse’ was introduced for the computer-mouse (which was called a ‘position indicator control’ before), explicit mention that this was a new usage of the word ‘mouse’ facilitated the introduction and entrenchment of the term. In the *New York Times* of 26 November 1982 (D1), it was explained that ‘instead of typing commands or code words to request information, users can point to words or symbols on the screen ... through manipulation of a hand-held device *known as a mouse*’ (italics for emphasis mine).

³ LANGACKER 1991:266.

have no idea who is responsible for the execution.’⁴ The word execution is normally used for the deliberate and planned killing of a human being ‘in pursuance of a judicial or authoritative sentence’.⁵ Describing the (perhaps accidental, and very probably not deeply motivated) shooting of an animal as an ‘execution’ is a clear case of stretching or extending the normal meaning of a term. As the network model predicts, we can *understand* the message. However, this choice of word also clearly has an *intended effect* that most users will signal. By choosing the term ‘execution’, the author apparently wishes to convey that the act is comparable to killing a person, and also, that it was certainly no accident. The reporter’s indignation, matching his interpretation of the event, is visible, when he refers to those responsible as ‘nasty wretches’.

Turning to antiquity, near the beginning of Sophocles’ *Antigone*, Ismene asks her sister a rhetorical question: ‘how much more miserably [than the rest of our family] will we be destroyed if we, in defiance of the law, transgress against the vote of the rulers (ψηφον τυράννων) or their power?’⁶ The usage of the term ψηφος in this context is unusual. This term has very strong democratic connotations and typically refers to ‘that which is decided by vote’. The term τύραννος does *not* belong in a democratic context. LSJ explains the usage of ψηφος in this passage as an extended use of its normal reference, namely as ‘any resolve or decree’.⁷ While that may be what we should understand, this suggestion does not do full justice to the *effect* of the utterance, which was perhaps intended by Sophocles. The oxymoronic combination of ψηφον and τυράννων will strike the listener as remarkable. This striking utterance prepares for the negative characterisation of Creon as a tyrant (in the pejorative sense of the word) who grossly transgresses against all democratic values.⁸

LANGACKER’s network model correctly accounts for the understandability of these examples, but does not enlighten us about the cause of their effect. To explain this effect, we need to return to the notion of lexical competition, and add two other, more

⁴ *Algemeen Dagblad*, 27/5/08: ‘Onverlaten hebben afgelopen weekeinde een schaap doodgeschoten in een weiland langs de Wantijdijk in Dordrecht. De politie heeft nog geen idee wie verantwoordelijk is voor de executie’.

⁵ OED s.v. execution 8b.

⁶ *S. Ant.* 59-60: ὄσφ κάκιστ’ ὀλούμεθ’, εἰ νόμου βία | ψηφον τυράννων ἢ κράτη παρέξιμεν.

⁷ s.v. ψηφος 2.5c.

⁸ The term τύραννος used for an absolute ruler does not always have the negative connotation of ‘tyrant’. The mythological setting of tragedy often involved pre-democratic societies in which monarchic rulers were anachronistically portrayed as upholding ideals with a clear positive democratic ring to them (e.g. Pelasgus in *A. Supp.*), but Creon in his interaction with Antigone does not show such high ideals.

general linguistic ideas. These are economy considerations and the social basis of language.

Effective communication depends crucially on the consistent employment of the principle of least effort and on second order theory of mind.⁹ As was discussed, when a speaker is selecting a lexeme, other lexical candidates are temporarily co-activated. The speaker chooses the optimal candidate for the meaning he wants to express. This is the most economical way for him to communicate. Thus, if a speaker, A, wants to refer to a ‘chair’ he says ‘chair’, not, for example, ‘couch’. Crucially, listeners are aware that speakers have to choose between alternatives, and they expect speakers to select optimal candidates. The listener, B, relies on A meaning ‘chair’ if he says ‘chair’, because he assumes A would not have chosen a suboptimal form-meaning pair, such as chair-couch, in the first place. A, finally, can rely on B reasoning like this. Hence, when A says ‘chair’ he can be fairly certain that B interprets ‘chair’. This is called ‘bidirectional optimisation’.¹⁰ Optimisation in lexical semantics means that speakers find the optimal form to express a given meaning; and that listeners find the optimal interpretation for a given form. But listeners optimise *bidirectionally* when, in the process of interpretation, they also take into account the considerations of the speaker. Therefore, the usage of a lexeme L_y to express meaning M_x strikes a listener as remarkable if there is a different lexeme (L_x) available that is much more commonly used for meaning M_x , because

- a) for the speaker, L_x is (one of) the default thing(s) to express M_x and for the hearer M_x is the (one of the) default interpretation(s) for L_x . Hence, the form-meaning pair $L_x - M_x$ is optimally economical.
- b) both speaker (or author putting words in the mouth of a fictional speaker) and interpreter are *mutually aware* (i.e. aware, and aware that both know they are both aware) of these facts and will therefore expect L_x in M_x .

⁹ second order theory of mind: speaker and hearer are both able to imagine what the other person is thinking and aware that both are aware of the other person’s perspective. On the social basis of language, see for example, TOMASELLO 2003 and especially TOMASELLO 2008, for a very readable introduction.

¹⁰ Cf. the Bidirectional Optimisation hypothesis (BLUTNER & ZEEVAT 2004) within Optimality Theory (PRINCE & SMOLENSKY 1993; MCCARTHY & PRINCE 1995; for introductions, see KAGER 1999 and MCCARTHY 2001). N.B. This idea is not new but was already captured in different terms (although perhaps slightly less explicitly) by GRICE’s cooperative principle and his notion of conversational implicatures (1989:22-40) as well as in SPERBER & WILSON’S (1986) Relevance Theory.

In the context of our first example, the words ‘death’ or ‘killing’ would have been available to the reporter; in the second example, Ismene could have used, for example, the term κρίσις. The usage of ‘execution’ and ‘ψῆφος’ respectively violate the economy principle and the frame of expectation that both users have. This principle underlies most every day language use. It is only because we are mutually aware of the normal context for words that using a word slightly out of its normal context often has an effect.

We can understand such extraordinary language use by referring to a more general mechanism: that of markedness. Markedness theory concerns binary distinctions and is intended to account for the asymmetries in these binary distinctions.¹¹ Some markedness relations are defined with respect to one another.¹² Other markedness relations are not fixed, but contextually determined. Aert KUIPERS summarises the contingent nature of markedness by means of a simple example:

If we write in black on a white background the black ‘stands out’ and is “marked”. That of which there is less, that which is less usual, will be experienced as “marked”. If we normally read roman type, italics are marked. In a text printed in italics, a word in roman type will stand out.¹³

In this case markedness is defined as abnormality of usage, but against a particular background, in a particular context.¹⁴ Note that this notion can be applied to phenomena that are not linguistic. For example, wearing an evening gown to the

¹¹ MURPHY 1993:2. The terms ‘marked’ and ‘unmarked’ originated in the so-called Prague School (also called Prague linguistic circle: TRUBETZKOY 1939, JAKOBSON e.g. 1941, 1949a,b, 1978). These notions were applied in typological research by GREENBERG 1966. Since then, markedness has been widely applied by linguists to describe a wide variety of phonological, syntactic, semantic, morphological and pragmatic phenomena. Markedness is used as a descriptive tool by scholars of different linguistic orientations: there are several competing theories of markedness set in different linguistic frameworks. Examples are the usage of markedness in Optimality Theory: e.g. PRINCE & SMOLENSKY 1993; and markedness in Underspecification Theory: e.g. KIPARSKY 1982; ARCHANGELI 1988. I owe these references to DE LACY 2006:3. Recently, HASPELMATH 2006 has provided an overview of twelve different senses in which markedness has been used.

¹² While masculine forms of professions in English are often gender-neutral (a director can be both male and female), the morphologically more complex feminine forms especially refer to women. Hence the masculine forms are unmarked (and preferred) but the feminine forms are marked: one does not use them, unless one specifically wants to discuss female professionals (and, in some cases, if you wish to emphasize that they are women). For some professions typically carried out by women the situation is the opposite: the feminine form is the unmarked case (e.g. ‘waitress’).

¹³ KUIPERS 1975:43, in BATTISTELLA 1990:5.

¹⁴ HASPELMATH’s senses 7-11.

supermarket is marked, but wearing it to the opera is unmarked.¹⁵ In the following I will analyze the usage of lexemes in context in terms of markedness as ‘abnormality’.

What are the advantages of using markedness theory in the cognitive model of lexical semantics, and how does it apply? Conceptual markedness is a relational concept: something is marked with respect to something else. Hence, ‘unmarked’ is not the same as ‘prototypical’: prototypicality is a concept-internal notion and captures the relation between different usages of the same word, whereas the concept of ‘markedness’ also takes the usage of a different word in the same context into account. I will argue that the sheep’s death being referred to as an execution, and Creon’s decision as a ψῆφος are marked in fact not because these passages show ‘marginal’ or ‘non-prototypical’ uses of these terms, but rather because other terms are available and less ‘marked’ in this context. Note that ‘marked’ is not the same as ‘strange’. I argue that the oxymoron ψῆφος τυραννῶν is not on its own responsible for the effect on the listeners, but ψῆφος is marked *because the speaker has other options*.

We will interpret some appearances of *hosios* & *cognates* in terms of markedness. These are examples in which these lexemes are used to evaluate the behaviour of a god. My assumption is that these cases are exceptional. Perhaps indicative of the ‘markedness’ of these cases is their frequency of usage: these cases are very rare.¹⁶ More importantly, as we have seen, ὅσιος essentially evaluates *human* actions and attitudes (towards other humans or gods) that are *pleasing to the gods and provide them with the timê they deserve* (Chapter 2). Hence, in my view the usage of ὅσιος for gods is inherently paradoxical.¹⁷ We will proceed to analysing the relevant cases one by one.¹⁸

¹⁵ BATTISTELLA 1990:5.

¹⁶ n=7. As HASPELMATH 2006:33 describes, GREENBERG 1966 was the most important early author to take frequency as a measure for markedness. Many authors, such as RADFORD 1988 and ARCHANGELI 1992 use this notion. HASPELMATH agrees that ‘frequency of use is an extremely important factor for explaining ... asymmetries in language structure’. Arguments *against* taking frequency as a criterion for neutrality or unmarkedness made by KIRK 2013 (mentioning earlier critiques) are not relevant to my investigation, because they relate specifically to syntactic assumptions of the theoretical framework (generative linguistics) in which KIRK’s research is set.

¹⁷ *contra* MOULINIER 1952:286-87, who noted that gods can be ὅσιος: ‘les dieux mêmes possèdent celle-là (i.e. the quality of being ὅσιος) quand ils pratiquent celle-ci (i.e. when they follow ὁσίη)’, and RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:2 who also held that gods can be ὅσιος.

¹⁸ We will discuss four out of seven extant occurrences in this chapter. Three highly debated passages in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* (130, 173, 470) are analyzed in terms of markedness in Chapter 7, because they have been part of the discussion on the alleged semantic paradox of ὅσιος.

2. An analysis of outliers in the corpus as ‘marked’ language usage

2.1 Impious Apollo

In Euripides’ *Orestes*, an increasingly desperate Orestes tries to deal with the accusations against him. Several characters in the play disqualify his matricide as ἀνόσιος (374, 481); Orestes himself in fact admits to this charge (286, 546). In a plea to his grandfather Tyndareus, Orestes pulls out all the stops in a spectacular defence. He emphasizes the impossibility of his situation: he had to choose between two terrible wrongs (murdering his mother or failing to avenge his father). He claims that he wanted to stop a practice in which women can just kill their husbands whenever they like (564-71).¹⁹ He points to Tyndareus as the ‘real culprit’, because he is the father of Clytemnestra (585-87). Finally, Orestes blames the god Apollo, claiming that people should ‘call *him* ἀνόσιος, and put him to death instead’ (595). Orestes’ argument is clearly a *reductio ad absurdum* of his opponents’ moral critique of the matricide. Orestes only committed his dreadful crime in obedience to the god (594). Therefore the god is, at least partly, responsible for it.²⁰ If one wishes to consider anyone ἀνόσιος, Orestes argues, it should be Apollo, and they should “kill” the god accordingly. But the disqualification of a divinity as ἀνόσιος is as incongruous as the plan to execute him.

Let us analyse the steps that a contemporary listener would have taken (unconsciously and in a very short amount of time) when interpreting this unusual utterance. When comparing what is said to his or her linguistic knowledge of ὄσιος, such a listener would first of all realise that this usage of ὄσιος is far from prototypical. Orestes’ qualification of Apollo by an evaluative term that is in essence inapplicable to a god is highly unusual. Such usage may be something the listener never encountered (or consciously registered) before.

The next interpretative step a listener would take is *to make sense of* the utterance. This is the case because in communicative settings listeners (in first instance) always apply the principle of charity: they always assume that the speaker is conveying a meaningful message and they will try to understand that message. Although the evaluation ἀνόσιος creates a semantic paradox, it is obviously still understandable in its context. This usage is an extension of the more frequently occurring usage of ἀνόσιος for Orestes in this play. Orestes *transfers* the accusation, which was aimed at him, to Apollo, because he considers the god to be the ‘true’ murderer. However, the realisation that this passage shows a ‘marginal’ use of the term ὄσιος – and the

¹⁹ KOVACS deletes these lines.

²⁰ E. *Or.* 285-87.

attempt to make sense of it nevertheless – are not enough to explain its full rhetorical punch. Orestes' unusual choice of the adjective has an effect that does not emerge from the above-mentioned explanation of its usage.

This is the case because, as we explained, listeners optimise bidirectionally. The listener realises that Orestes had other much-used evaluative terms at his disposal to describe Apollo's moral state (such as the adjective δίκαιος), but nevertheless chose this paradoxical term. Orestes' usage of the term ὄσιος is marked, not because this is an unusual application of the term itself, but importantly also because other lexical options were available. Thus, the audience interprets this usage of ὄσιος as marked when comparing it to the normal reference of the term, and taking into account the availability of alternatives to the speaker.

The final interpretative step taken by the listener is his assessment of the speaker's marked choice of words. That is, he will form a hypothesis as to *why* the speaker makes such a striking lexical choice in the face of more obvious alternatives. One of the listener's options is to suppose linguistic incompetence, naïveté or an abnormal world-view on the side of the speaker. In other words, the listener may conjecture that the speaker is not aware of the normal reference of the term ὄσιος. This is not the most charitable interpretation. Another option is to assume that speaker's choice was conscious and serves an intended effect. In this case, it is most likely that the audience takes Orestes' words as purposeful in the specific dramatic context in which they were (originally) uttered. As we have seen, Orestes, in this bombastic and despairing attempt to save himself, turns to ever new arguments. The final verbal attack against his accusers is a deliberate attempt to underscore the impossibility of his situation and thus brings to the fore that there was really no way in which he could have done right.

2.2 Pious Apollo

A second Euripidean passage can be explained in a similar way. In the prologue of *Alcestis*, the god Apollo enters the stage in the guise of a servant. As the god explains, Zeus condemned him to serve the mortal Admetus, as a punishment for his murder of the Cyclopes. The god says about himself and Admetus: 'being pious (ὄσιος), I met a pious man (ὄσιου ἀνδρός)'.²¹ This is one of very few cases in archaic and classical Greek in which a god refers to *himself* as ὄσιος.

²¹ E. *Alc.* 10.

Modern ‘listeners’ or interpreters (i.e. scholars commenting on this passage) have noted the exceptionality of the application of ὄσιος to a god.²² They have also tried to make sense of the utterance. Some commentators have argued that it is merely motivated by Euripides’ fondness of repetition of the same word (in different grammatical forms);²³ or that Apollo is referring to his human manifestation as Admetus’ slave.²⁴ Others have proposed a meaning extension from the more common, prototypical applications of ὄσιος used for humans, to make it meaningful in application to a god. In early scholarship it was supposed that ὄσιος has to do with Apollo’s purification from his murder of the Cyclopes.²⁵ CONACHER reasoned that ‘because Apollo is in a reciprocal guest-host relationship in which he wants to honour his host, he can use the term ὄσιος of himself referring to his status as guest.’²⁶ BEYE gave a more general moral interpretation to ὄσιος. He suggested that, because ὄσιος refers to scrupulousness mainly in the relationship of a human to a god, ‘perhaps “honourable” or “just” conveys the application when ὄσιος is applied to a god.’²⁷

Indeed, we must find some common characteristic (or multiple characteristics) of this situation and more prototypical situations in which ὄσιος is applied to make its usage in this situation interpretable. One of these common factors is the fact that Apollo has a human-like status in the play (being servant of Admetus), and so he can use the vocabulary normally used to evaluate human behaviour; another is Apollo’s position as a ξένος.²⁸ However, in the previous section we argued that such an explanation is not enough to understand the full rhetorical *effect* of such a passage. Again, in a process of bidirectional optimisation, a contemporary audience would have realised that the divine speaker could easily have described himself in other terms more commonly used for gods, whether wishing to refer to his moral state

²² HAYLEY 1898, DALE 1954, BEYE 1974, CONACHER 1988, LUSCHNIG & ROISMAN 2003, PARKER 2007, *ad loc.*

²³ HAYLEY 1898, PARKER 2007, *ad loc.* N.B. PARKER does not think the usage of ὄσιος for a god is really ‘meaningful’ in this passage, but he does comment on the effect of the ‘odd’ application of ὄσιος to a god in *Pi. P.* 9.3.

²⁴ DALE 1954, LUSCHNIG & ROISMAN 2003, *ad loc.*

²⁵ WÜSTEMANN 1823, HAYLEY 1898, HADLEY 1901 argued that it is strange for Apollo to call himself ὄσιος, having not been purified for the killing of the Cyclopes. In this train of thought we might think Apollo means that he *has* been purified (and consequently has restored his relation with the gods).

²⁶ CONACHER 1988.

²⁷ BEYE 1974, *ad loc.*

²⁸ As we have seen in Chapter 2, section 1.6 actions in a ξενία relationship are often evaluated in terms of ὀσιότης. Both guest and host need to act in a way that is ὄσιος. Hosts that are (not) ὄσιος: *E. Cyc.* 125, 693, *E. Hec.* 790, 792, 852, 1235; *Hdt.* 2.119.2; guests that are (not) ὄσιος: *Hdt.* 2.114.2-4, 2.115.4.

(using, for example, the term δίκαιος) or a state of ritual purity (by means of the terms καθαρός or ἄγνός). Again, they would have interpreted Apollo's choice of words as marked, not because this is a rare usage of the term itself, but because there were other good lexical options. In this case it is again likely that the audience perceived Apollo's marked utterance as deliberate, too: as I will show, we can see Apollo's utterance as part of the self-creation of a paradoxical image throughout this whole scene, both on the verbal and the visual level.

The juxtaposition of a human and divine identity for Apollo is all over this scene. On the textual level, Apollo's reference to himself as a serf (l. 6) appears alongside Apollo's explicit reminders of his divine status. Apollo emphasizes that he is a god, not only by explicitly saying it (θεός περ ὄν, 2) but also by emphasizing his position of divine influence and power, especially in his explanation of how he saved Admetus from death by tricking the Fates.²⁹ This clash is the verbal counterpart of the equally confusing *visual* impression that is created here. In accordance with his novel status as low-ranked labourer, Apollo is dressed in rags. But the god is also still wearing the bow that marks him out as Apollo.³⁰ Various commentators have pointed out that these clashes between Apollo-as-human and Apollo-as-god within the scene create a highly comical situation.³¹

In my view, the usage of the term ὄσιος contributes to the topsy-turvy image we get of the god in this prologue. Apollo does not simply apply the evaluative term ὄσιος to *refer* to his human manifestation. By choosing the marked term ὄσιος as opposed to, for example, the (in this situation more unmarked) term δίκαιος, Apollo contributes to *creating* the comical "partly god and partly human status" he has in this play. This effect is strengthened by the fact that he applies the same term to Admetus in the same line ('being ὄσιος I met a ὄσιος man'). The fact that the god places himself on the level of a human by using this 'human' word linguistically reflects the paradox of the situation in which Apollo finds himself, which is also expressed in the visual presentation of the scene.³²

²⁹ E. *Alc.* 12.

³⁰ Cf. E. *Alc.* 39, in which Death asks him why he's wearing a bow.

³¹ e.g. LUSCHNIG & ROISMAN 2003, *ad loc.* comment that Apollo's bow 'would add a strong visual element to his comic comedown'.

³² Note that the expression ὄσιου γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ὄσιος ὄν ἐτύγγανον (l. 10) presents not only a remarkable evaluation for Apollo. When Admetus is called ὄσιος here, seemingly in reference to his treatment of the stranger Apollo, the irony and paradox in this characterisation of Admetus become apparent almost immediately. Admetus may have treated a stranger well and have earned the qualification ὄσιος in this respect, but his behaviour towards his parents would sooner deserve the opposite evaluation. In l. 12 we learn that, when looking for a substitute person to die in his place,

2.3 Apollo in love

In Pindar's *Pythian* 9 a god (again, Apollo) wonders with respect to his own behaviour 'whether it is (in accordance with) ὄσία'. I will argue again that this paradoxical self-reference of the term ὄσία contributes to creating a highly anthropomorphic picture of the divinity in this scene, just like in Euripides' *Alcestis*.

Pythian 9, which was composed for the victory of Telesicrates of Cyrene in the hoplite race of 474 B.C., contains a long mythological exposition (5-70). When the god Apollo saw the virgin Cyrene wrestling with a lion on Mt. Pelion, he fell in love. He asked the Centaur Chiron for advice and upon his approval carried Cyrene off to Libya, where he had intercourse with her and installed her as local queen.³³ Apollo's question about ὄσία occurs in the conversation between Apollo and Chiron in this foundation myth. When Apollo had spotted Cyrene, he asked the Centaur in awe:

τίς νιν ἀνθρώπων τέκεν; ποί-	32
ας δ' ἀποσπασθεῖσα φύτλας	
ὀρέων κευθμῶνας ἔχει σκιοέντων,	
γεύεται δ' ἀλκᾶς ἀπειράντου;	35
<u>ὄσία</u> κλυτὰν χέρα οἱ προσενεγκεῖν	
ἦρα καὶ ἐκ λεχέων κείραι μελιαδέα ποίαν;	

Who of mankind bore her?
Torn off from which stock
does she now occupy the hiding places of shadowy mountains
and taste her infinite strength?
Is it *hosia* to lay my famous hand on her
and to cut from her bed the honey-sweet grass?

Admetus asked everyone he knew to die for him, including his mother and father. Obviously, that is not a ὄσιος way of treating one's parents. When a child has become an adult and his parents are ageing, the balance of reciprocity turns and the child is supposed to take care of his parents, not ask them to die for him (cf. Chapter 2, section 1.7). Moreover, further on in the play Admetus receives Heracles as guest, even though he had promised his wife that the house would remain in cheerless mourning. He wins her back through that hospitality, even though ironically (SMITH 1960:127) that action requires him to fail to be ὄσιος towards his dead wife.

³³ This tale is not only a foundation myth of the city of Cyrene, but as other scholars have explored, the story is also a foil for Telesicrates' victory. Cf. GRETHLEIN 2011:384-85 with n. 7 for references. GRETHLEIN argues that the contrast between the two narratives serves to emphasize the gap between the human and divine world.

Apollo's question whether it is *ὄσια* ('in accordance with the gods' wishes') to take the girl's virginity³⁴ is as remarkable as the characterisation of himself as *ὄσιος* in Euripides' *Alkestis*. Not only is Apollo among the gods, as god of prophecy he knows past, present and future and is therefore perfectly aware of the answer to his own question. What is more, individuals usually do not ask, with respect to *themselves*, whether a particular course of action they are about to take, or something they are about to say, is *ὄσια* or *ὄσιον*. Instead, for example the noun *θέμις* is more common in self-attributed statements.³⁵ *θέμις* is also much more common in deliberations in the form of conditional statements ('if X is *θέμις*...') and in questions ('is it *θέμις*?').³⁶

³⁴ 'to cut the honey-sweet grass from her bed' is clearly an euphemism for 'taking her virginity', as GIANNINI 1990:62 points out was already explained by the scholia (DRACHMANN 1910:225-26, *schol.* 61c & 64c). Cf. INSTONE 1996:126. The phrase continues the botanical metaphor in l. 33. Cf. e.g., BURTON 1962:44; CAREY 1981:75.

³⁵ *themis & cognates* are more often self-attributed than *hosios & cognates*, although the majority of cases still concerns an action or attitude of somebody else. In the archaic instances of *themis & cognates*, 31% are self-attributed (n=12) and 62% are other-attributed (n=24). In addition, one text (3%) is unclear (Hes. fr. 343.16), and in two cases (5%) it is ambiguous whether 'what is *θέμις*' is self- or other attributed (*Il.* 11.779, *Od.* 9.268). In the fifth-century evidence of *themis & cognates*, 40% concern the action or attitude of oneself (n=38), 57% that of somebody else (n=55). In addition, 3% is unclear (n=3). If we collapse the preclassical and classical evidence, 37% of the cases are descriptions of one's own action or attitude, 59% of the cases refer to somebody else. The difference between the distributions of *themis & cognates* and *hosios & cognates* (self: 19%, other: 79%, cf. Chapter 2, section 1.4) is statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 17.87$ p < 0.001). N.B. "*themis & cognates*": the singular noun *θέμις*, the adjectives *ἀθεμίσιος*, *ἀθεμι(σ)τος*, *θέμι(σ)τος* and corresponding adverbs. In calculating whether *themis & cognates* are used with respect to oneself or someone else, I have not taken into account those archaic/classical cases in which the text refers to the goddess/personification *Θέμις* (printed with a capital), n=34 or the plural form *θέμι(σ)τες*, n=19. The aim of the comparison is to assess the usage of *θέμις* in those cases in which this term evaluates actions and/or attitudes. This is not the case for the references to a goddess/personification or *θέμι(σ)τες* 'laws', 'decrees'.

³⁶ In the pre-classical evidence, 54% of occurrences of *themis & cognates* have a positive argumentative orientation (n=21) and 44% have a negative argumentative orientation (n=17), one case is unclear (Hes. fr. 343.16). In the fifth century, 16% of the cases have a positive argumentative orientation (n=15), 55% have a negative argumentative orientation (n=53). In the fifth century it becomes relatively common for characters to ask or wonder whether a particular action is *θέμις*, with 8% of the cases occurring in a question ('is it *θέμις*...', n=8), and 19% in a conditional statement ('if X is *θέμις*...', n=18). Two cases occur in a damaged/fragmentary text (P. fr. Paian 52i.16, A. *Ch.* 641). If we consider the evidence as a whole, 27% is positive and 52% is negative, while the remaining fifth of the cases occurs in a question (6%) or conditional (13%). By contrast, recall that *hosios & cognates* occur in a question or conditional statement in a very small minority of the cases (together accounting for 2% of the data, cf. Chapter 2, section 1.5). *themis & cognates* occur significantly more often in a question/conditional statement than *hosios & cognates* ($\chi^2 = 35.15$ p = 0). N.B. on "*themis & cognates*", cf. n. 35 above.

Moreover, both humans and gods reflect on the validity of planned courses of action or speech-acts, wondering whether or stating that these ‘are θέμις’.³⁷ In sum, the noun θέμις would have fitted better in Apollo’s utterance in three different respects: a *god* (not a human) is asking a *question* and this question regards *his own* behaviour.

A contemporary listener would have noted that the term ὅσια is highly unusual (because paradoxical) in this context. Moreover, he would have been aware of the availability of suitable lexical alternatives (such as θέμις). Therefore, such a listener would have interpreted ὅσια as a marked choice (with respect to, for example, θέμις) when optimising bidirectionally.

The speech is assessed as such not only by the audience of the ode, but also by the addressee *within* the narrative, Chiron. His reaction is interesting to us, because it shows us a contemporary audience response to a marked utterance (that we can otherwise only guess about). As we read, Chiron, smiling ‘greenly’ (or: indulgently)³⁸ with a gentle brow, answers Apollo that ‘the keys that clever Persuasion holds to sacred love(s) are hidden’ (κρυπταὶ κλαῖδες ἐντὶ σοφῶς Πειθοῦς ἱερῶν φιλοτάτων) and that ‘gods and humans alike experience αἰδώς when they obtain the pleasure of the marriage bed openly for the first time.’³⁹ Chiron also points out to Apollo that his sweet passion (μεῖλιχος ὄργα) causes him to make a deceptive speech (παρφάμεν

³⁷ *themis & cognates* referring to the behaviour and attitudes of gods: n=10 (*Il.* 5.761, 14.386, *Hes. Th.* 396, *Sc.* 447, *A. Eu.* 414, 471, *E. Hipp.* 1396, 1437, *E. HF* 1341, *Xenoph. fr.* 11.1; I did not include *Od.* 3.45 and *h.Cer.* 207 in this count, because in these cases a god appears in disguise, as a human). *themis & cognates* are used for a god significantly more often than *hosios & cognates* ($\chi^2 = 35.15$ p < 0.05). More importantly, unlike the application of *hosios & cognates* to a god’s behaviour, the usage of θέμις is *not* inherently paradoxical. θέμις refers to order in the religious, but also in the social, natural and political sphere (STAFFORD 1997:87-88). N.B. on “*themis & cognates*”, cf. n. 35 above.

³⁸ l. 38. The mss. offer χλιαρόν ‘luke-warmly’, or χλάρον ‘relaxed, cheerful, indulgent’ from χαλάω. The scholiast comments on the latter option: κεχάλασμένον ... προσηγνές και ἡδύ. FRANCIS 1972:291 and WOODBURY 1982:564 follow this reading and translate χλάρον as ‘indulgently’. For critique of the reading χλάρον cf. CAREY 1981, *ad loc.* SCHROEDER’s emendation to χλοαρόν (1900), Att. χλωρόν, lit. “greenly”, has been accepted by most other authors, but the interpretation of χλωρόν has been highly diverse. For example CAREY 1981, *ad loc.*, translates “gently”, while KIRKWOOD 1982, *ad loc.*, holds that ‘Chiron’s smile is vigorous’ because ‘it has the strength and liveliness of nature’. But INSTONE 1996, *ad loc.*, translates “subduedly” and explains ‘the expression “smiling subduedly” perhaps implies that Cheiron, though finding Apollo’s questioning amusing, was wary of laughing out aloud at a god.’ I will not attempt to solve this problem here. On Chiron’s smile, cf. also FOWLER 1983.

³⁹ *Pi. P.* 38-41.

τοῦτον λόγον, i.e., implying ignorance about what to do) for he is all-knowing⁴⁰ and has come to this place precisely to share the bed with Cyrene.⁴¹

Chiron's laughter and his response have presented many interpretative difficulties.⁴² However, two crucial aspects of the scene are undisputed among scholars. First, it is clear that Chiron thinks Apollo hesitates to seduce the girl (and so asks for advice) and in his hesitation forgets (or feigns to forget) his divine omniscience. Secondly, Apollo's behaviour is presented by Chiron as induced by his sudden passion for the girl. It is unclear whether (Chiron thinks that) Apollo is genuinely confused or is merely deliberately putting on a pose. In any case, Chiron suggests Apollo's infatuation causes him to (mistakenly) *assume the role of* a hesitant lover with the limited perspective of a mortal, who is uncertain how to act.⁴³ Moreover, Chiron's smile may imply that he considers this situation somehow comical or endearing, or both.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Pi. P. 44-49.

⁴¹ Pi. P. 51-53.

⁴² The first difficulty relates to Chiron's laughter, and most particularly, the meaning of the adjective *χλωρόν* (Cf. n. 38 above). The second concerns Chiron's principal point. Does he intend to say that Apollo should seduce Cyrene by *persuading* her rather than taking her with force? (WINNINGTON-INGRAM 1969:11, 13; BURTON 1962:40; ROBBINS 1978:104; CAREY 1981:78; GRETHLEIN 2011:386). And/or that the god should make love to her in a *private* 'hidden' place rather than in public, there and then on Mt. Pelion? (BURTON 1962:40; KÖHNKEN 1985:85-94; INSTONE 1996, *ad loc.*). Thirdly, it has been disputed whether the scene is a description of Apollo's loss of virginity (WOODBURY 1982; CAREY 1974:79; JAKOB 1994-95:429) or to something else.

⁴³ Various scholars have emphasized the 'humanity' of the god in this scene. SCHROEDER 1922:80: 'echt menschlich also, doch in vollkommenem Einklang mir der von Aphrodite über sein Liebeslager gebreiteten Scham'; BURTON 1962:41: 'We may be content to see Pindar here in a Homeric mood, pleased to display the deity of the Delphic oracle as a young man in love at first sight who turns for advice [to Cheiron]'; WOODBURY 1982:572-73: 'The picture of the god as a young and modest pupil of a wise teacher is refreshingly unselfconscious in its candid anthropomorphism. Apollo, though the god of prophecy, behaves with the circumspection of a well-bred youth who falls in love for the first time ... The full humanity of the god, I conceive, was as important to Pindar, and to traditional belief, as his august knowledge and power'; GIANNINI 1990:63-64: 'i due personaggi divini sono presentati qui in un aspetto fortemente umanizzato e l'intera scena costituisce un significativo esempio di genere serio-comico in Pindaro'; INSTONE 1996, *ad loc.*: 'Apollo is here acting as a mortal' (cf. note 45 below).

⁴⁴ Our assessment of the nature of Chiron's smile depends partly on the interpretation of *χλωρόν* (n. 38 above). But a humorous element in the dialogue has in any case been recognised: BURTON 1962:41: 'its delightful humour is obvious, and resides as much in the situation as in the language'; INSTONE 1996: 119: 'the Apollo-Chiron dialogue is told with gentle humour and irony'.

In sum, it seems that Chiron registers the markedness of Apollo's question, even if we do not know how precisely he (or, for that matter, the audience of the Pindaric Ode) assessed the nature of the utterance (as a deliberate choice with an intended effect or the result of Apollo's temporary confusion about his divine status). Either way, Apollo's paradoxical usage of the term ὄσια (in defiance of other available lexical alternatives) strongly *contributes to the creation* of the image of him as an uncertain young almost human lover, and to the comical effect of the scene as a whole.⁴⁵

2.4 Zeus knows ...

The analyses made above will help us interpret a final, less straightforward passage in which a human evaluates a god in terms of whether he is ὄσιος. In Euripides' *Children of Heracles*, King Eurystheus of Argos is in pursuit of Heracles' children, whom he wants to kill. Therefore, the Heraclides flee under the protection of Iolaus, Heracles' nephew, and Alcmene. When Iolaus decides to go out and fight, leaving Alcmene alone, he assures Alcmene that Zeus will be concerned about her and the grandchildren:

Αλ. τί χρῆμα μέλλεις σῶν φρενῶν οὐκ ἔνδον ὦν
λιπεῖν μ' ἔρημον σὺν <τέκνου> τέκνοις ἐμοῖς; 710

...

Ιο. καὶ Ζηνὶ τῶν σῶν, οἶδ' ἐγὼ, μέλει πόνων.

Alc. Why are you planning to leave me deserted, with my grandchildren,
are you out of your mind?

...

Io. Zeus, too, will be concerned about your troubles, I know that.

Alcmene answers:

⁴⁵ Only one scholar established a connection between the usage of ὄσιας and the creation of a human-like image of the god in this scene, this is INSTONE 1996, *ad loc.*, who commented: 'Do the gods permit me ...? ὄσια sc. ἐστὶ μοι; It is ironic that Apollo, a god, should ask if what he wants to do is right in the eyes of the gods ... The questions emphasize that Apollo is here acting as a mortal, and he wants, as any mortal in his position should want, to be sure that his act will be approved by the gods.'

Αλ. φεῦ· Ζεὺς ἐξ ἑμοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἀκούσεται κακῶς· 718
 εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὄσιος αὐτὸς οἶδεν εἰς ἐμέ.

Alc. Pheu! Zeus will hear no angry words from me.
 But he knows himself if he is *hosios* to me.

I take Alcmene's utterance in 718-719 as referring to the fact that Zeus slept with Alcmene, resulting in the fatherhood of Heracles.⁴⁶ I assume that Alcmene's statement, 'he knows himself whether he is ὄσιος towards me' is meant as a critical or even ironical statement: it is highly dubious whether Zeus is ὄσιος; perhaps, Zeus is *not* ὄσιος.⁴⁷ On the basis of the previous analyses it seems legitimate to assume that the paradoxical usage of ὄσιος for a god in this text is interpreted by the audience of the text as marked. Alcmene's utterance does not seem to be caused by linguistic naïveté or ignorance – it appears to be deliberate. Its intended effect seems to be to bring Zeus down to the level of a human.

But how does that help Alcmene in conveying the message she wants to bring across? In *Pythian* 9, the goal of humanising Apollo seemed to be: reinforcing the uncertainty he felt in his amorous adventures. In *Alcestis*, the main intended effect of the topsy-turvy image presented of Apollo as a human/god seemed to be: creating a ridiculous picture of the god as he entered the stage. And in *Orestes*, Orestes attempted a *reductio ad absurdum* to show there was no way in which he could have acted with justice. What does Alcmene want? I will argue that the uncommon usage of this evaluative term by Alcmene is a smart rhetorical move, a means of facilitating (highly unusual) criticism of a parent-god.

We will understand both the exceptionality of this utterance and its function better if we compare it to other literary instances in which humans blame gods. Literary passages in which humans are angry with gods and admonish them for their

⁴⁶ Cf. WILKINS 1993 and ALLAN 2001, *ad loc.*

⁴⁷ Such criticism or irony is understandable given all the hardships Alcmene has had to bear. Concentrating on the period after Heracles' death alone (narrated in this play), Alcmene and the children of Heracles have been pursued and threatened to death by Eurystheus, fleeing from city to city and their supplication has been denied everywhere. Now that they have finally been accepted by Athens, they have already endured the death of one of Heracles' daughters and at this specific point in the play there is an undecided war between Argos and Athens going on, in which the only other adult in Alcmene's party, Iolaus, is determined to join, old and infirm as he is. Divine assistance has not been in sight anywhere.

behaviour or governance are not infrequent.⁴⁸ However, as I show in more detail elsewhere,⁴⁹ cases in which mortals blame gods more specifically because they are disappointed in their expectations of reciprocity are quite rare.⁵⁰ In Chapter 2, we have discussed the notion of reciprocity as fundamental to the conceptualisation of Greek religion.⁵¹ As was discussed, the bond between gods and humans can be characterised as one of reciprocal χάρις, in which humans give gifts to the gods and in prayer express the hope that the gods will grant a wish in return. The primacy of the idea of reciprocity in Greek religion begs the question what humans do when they do *not* get what they hoped for. Perhaps not surprisingly, there is hardly any evidence of cases in which humans express disappointment or anger, when the gods have not met their wishes or hopes of a divine gift. The absence of such evidence is most probably due to the perceived fundamental asymmetries in the relationship between humans and gods, in power, in knowledge and perhaps in respective contribution to the relationship.⁵²

Significantly, there are two (rare) types of scenarios in which humans *do* sometimes explicitly blame the gods for thwarted hopes of reciprocity.⁵³ The first case is when the reproach is part of the contrastive characterisation of a person who takes an un-Greek or otherwise very odd perspective. Apparently, reproaching gods because they have not returned favours was so un-Greek, such a fundamental breach of the normal interaction with the divine world, that only non-Greeks and persons portrayed as having abnormal religious views are uttering such reproaches.⁵⁴ The other scenario is in mythological stories when specific humans are engaged with specific gods in a different kind and particularly intimate long-term reciprocal relationship: that of parent and child. Humans *do* blame gods about disappointed expectations of reciprocity, when a god has fathered a human child and has failed to take care of it.⁵⁵

To summarise the above, passages in which gods are confronted with their

⁴⁸ For discussions of cases in which Greeks criticise gods in general see SCHADEWALDT (1926:118-22, 128-38, DALE (1969), LABARBE (1980), VERSNEL (1981:37-42).

⁴⁹ PEELS *forthc.*

⁵⁰ What I think is ‘rare’ are cases in which disappointment *in reciprocity with gods* is made explicit. Here my approach differs from that of YUNIS (1988), who views *all* human complaints to gods as implicitly or explicitly expressing frustrated hopes of reciprocity.

⁵¹ Chapter 2, section 4.

⁵² On these asymmetries, cf. Chapter 2, section 4.

⁵³ PEELS *forthc.*

⁵⁴ Hdt. 1.86ff., Hdt. 7.35, E. *Ba.* 3.37-39, E. *Hipp.* 1363-70.

⁵⁵ A. *Supp.* 168-75, S. *Tr.* 993-95, 1264-71, E. *HF* 339-47, E. *Heracl.* 709-19 and E. *Ion* esp. 384-88, 905-22.

dysfunctional reciprocal behaviour towards humans are highly uncommon. The distribution and nature of such complaints when they *do* occur shows that reproaching gods about disappointed reciprocity was only acceptable within the mythological frame of family-relationship with a god, but was a very un-Greek thing to do otherwise. The passage from *Children of Heracles* discussed here is part of this pattern – although note that Alcmena still voices her criticism extremely carefully. In fact, she leaves it to Zeus himself (and to her audience) to decide whether or not he is “ὄσιος”.

In this case, Alcmena facilitates her careful and implicit criticism of the god by selecting an evaluative term (ὄσιος) that is usually applied to humans.⁵⁶ By choosing this particular evaluative term, Alcmena does not only bring down Zeus to the level of a human, she accesses the range of connotations attached to this term. We have seen that, in the large majority of literary cases, ὄσιος evaluates a small group of relationships between humans, and very important among those were the bonds between parents and children and between spouses.⁵⁷ By choosing the term ὄσιος, Alcmena activates the idea of honouring these sacred long-term reciprocal relationships among humans. Most particularly, she activates the notions of behaving well towards one’s children (i.e. Heracles) and towards a lover (i.e. Alcmena) and thus places the relationship she and Heracles have with Zeus within those special frames.

Alcmena’s highly unusual, compact utterance ‘he knows whether he is ὄσιος’ allows her to assess a special case of reciprocity between humans and gods. It enables her to say: ‘Zeus, by fathering our child, has brought himself down to a human level, and he is now in a relationship of mutual obligation with me in which he should look after me and my child. He knows himself whether or not he is honouring this mutual bond between us’ (in other words, he may not be).

⁵⁶ Note that it is not surprising that the utterance occurs within a scene that is marked within the tragedy itself: BURNETT (1976:18) characterises the whole scene as ‘light-weight parody’. About this passage BURNETT argues (18): ‘“Pheu!” says the old lady, disregarding reverence and metrics equally. Then she continues: “Zeus will not hear me speak open blasphemy, but he knows whether or not he has dealt reverently with me!” ... Even at this point her surly insinuations fall short of true solemnity; the “girl betrayed by a god” becomes inevitably comical when portrayed by an octogenarian.’ Other scholars have noted the humorous tone of lines 664-747: cf. ZUNTZ (1955:29); although WILKINS (1993, *ad loc.*) does not seem to be convinced of their comic character. In his recent commentary, ALLAN (2001:183-5) provides a discussion of these different views in the literature about whether this dialogue is part of a comic scene and in what way that would deprive the scene of serious tragic meaning. To me, the scene has parodic elements but that does not take away the serious tragic note of the scene.

⁵⁷ Chapter 2, sections 1.6 and 1.7.

3. Conclusion

Not only the selection of lexemes, but their interpretation, too, involves weighing lexical alternatives. I have argued that the highly un-prototypical, marginal use of lexeme A in a particular context is *marked* if there is a lexeme B that prototypically, centrally expresses the same meaning. Marked language usage is the surprising choice of a word outside of its usual context, in defiance of other suitable and available terms. Such deliberate or unintentional marked usage of lexemes always has an (intended or accidental) rhetorical punch. Although in the maximalist approach lexical meaning is highly flexible, it is not the case that ‘anything goes’. Semantic networks cannot simply be extended in any way.

In this chapter I have discussed one group of passages in which *hosios & cognates* are employed in a marked way. The usage of *hosios & cognates* for gods is highly un-prototypical, and inherently paradoxical, since ‘piety’ is a behavioural norm that gods set for humans. Actions and attitudes of Greek gods were usually evaluated in other terms. The effect of the evaluation of a god in terms of *hosios & cognates* in all studied passages is that it draws the god down to the level of a human. In Euripides’ *Orestes*, Orestes’ transferral of the accusation of being ἀνόσιος to Apollo is a deliberate rhetorical move, an attempt at *reductio ad absurdum* that underscores the impossibility of Orestes’ position. In Euripides’ *Alcestis*, Apollo’s self-application of ὅσιος is part of the incongruent image of the god as divinity *and* lowly worker, a presentation created on the verbal and visual level alike. We find a similarly paradoxical image of Apollo in Pindar’s *Pythian* 9, where Apollo asks ‘whether it is ὀσία’ for him to sleep with Cyrene. The remarkable choice of ὀσία contributes to Apollo’s self-presentation as a hesitant young lover with the limited perspective of a mortal. Finally, in Euripides’ *Children of Heracles* the usage of ὅσιος for Zeus is a clever rhetorical move by Alcmene that serves to facilitate her highly uncharacteristic criticism of the god as failing to live up to her expectations of reciprocity.

In Chapter 7, we will analyse a group of cases of ὀσίη in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* in a similar way. I have been able to recognize only one other example of marked usage of *hosios & cognates*, to be discussed in Appendix 8. In that case (E. *Ion* 150), ὅσιος is used where ἀγνός ‘pure, chaste’ would have been the unmarked and unsurprising choice. I will show that the passage in *Ion* is not evidence for a *meaning* ‘pure, chaste’ of ὅσιος, but, again, an extension of its normal reference that influences the interpretation of a larger stretch of speech. The main difficulty of identifying marked language usage in a dead language is that we often cannot *see* that certain usage had a particular effect. Still, I hope to have shown that such identification is (should be) part of the semanticist’s task of studying and comparing semantic networks of different closely related lexemes.

6

ὄσιος vs. ∅

Religious evaluation in sacred laws

In this chapter we will use the contrastive method to juxtapose the usage of *hosios* & cognates, *not* with the usage of a closely related term, but rather with the *absence* of an evaluation: ὄσιος vs. ∅. That is, we will compare similar texts in which we find either ὄσιος or no evaluative term at all. The approach serves to discuss a historical, rather than semantic question. To what extent would fifth-century Greeks have been impressed by the statement that a particular action is ‘offensive to the gods’? In other words, what is the persuasive value of this term? **(Q5)**

I will approach this issue in a specific case study that focuses on the epigraphical material, more specifically, on a group of so-called ‘sacred laws’. The research question of this chapter is: under which circumstances did sacred laws in classical Greek inscriptions explicitly frame offences as religious transgressions (as compared to similar inscriptions without any evaluative terminology)? In other words: under what circumstances was ‘failing to obey the rule’ explicitly labelled an impiety in these texts? Or, into what kind of sacred laws would authors insert an explicit appeal to religion in the first place?

1. Religious evaluation in sacred laws

A late-fifth or fourth-century law from Ialysos (Rhodes) deals with the purity of a local sanctuary and lists ‘things which are not ὄσιον to bring into the sanctuary’.¹ The catalogue includes: horses, donkeys, mules, other pack-animals, shoes and anything made from pig. It is stated that the transgressor (who introduces any of these animals or objects ‘against the law’, *παρὰ τὸν νόμον*) must purify the sanctuary and make a sacrifice, or else be ‘guilty of the ἀσεβεία’. If sheep and goats are brought in, the penalty is one obol per animal. These rules are laid down in the second half of this sacred law:²

νόμος ἃ οὐχ ὄσιον ἐσίμειν οὐδὲ	20
ἐσφέρειν ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸ τέ-	
μενος τᾶς Ἀλεκτρώνας· μὴ ἐσί-	
τω ἵππος ὄνος ἡμίονος γῖνος	
μηδὲ ἄλλο λόφουρον μηθὲν μη-	
δὲ ἐσαγέτω ἐς τὸ τέμενος μη-	25
θεις τούτων μηθὲν μηδὲ ὑποδή-	
ματα ἐσφερέτω μηδὲ ὕειον μη-	
θὲν, ὃ τι δὲ κά τις παρὰ τὸν νόμον	
ποιήσῃ, τό τε ἱερὸν καὶ τὸ τέμενος	
καθαίρετω καὶ ἐπιρᾶξέτω, ἢ ἔνο-	30
χος ἔστω <u>τᾶι ἀσεβείαι</u> · εἰ δὲ κα	
πρόβατα ἐσβάλῃ, ἀποτεισάτω ὑ-	
πὲρ ἐκάστου προβάτου ὀβολὸν	
ὃ ἐσβαλῶν· ποταγγελλέτω δὲ	

¹ NEWTON 1878:441-47; Syll.² 560; LGS II 145; IG XII 1 677; Syll.³ 338. Cf. *LSCG* 136, LE GUEN-POLLET no. 28; BRODERSEN no. 295; CHANDEZON no. 41; HELBING no. 19.

² I have called this and other inscriptions ‘sacred laws’ because the label signals that a text should be understood as part of a group of comparable texts, although PARKER (2004) has rightly argued that the term ‘sacred law’ is in many aspects a modern construct. PARKER pointed out that, by and large, we can present part of the extant corpus of inscriptions as a group and call them ‘sacred laws’, classifying them on the basis of their subject matter, but it is impossible to isolate clear criteria that define and mark out the group. LUPU (2005:4) and ROSTAD (2006:84-87) endorse PARKER’s view on the methodological difficulties of using the term ‘sacred laws’. However, note that LUPU did call his recent book *Greek sacred law: a collection of new documents*, because the term ‘sacred law’ is still useful for practical purposes: the term does say something about the subject matter of his texts (on the whole religious) and the type (for the most part of a tangibly legal character). My usage of the term ‘sacred laws’ is purely guided by the same pragmatic motivations. For further discussion of the problematic aspects of the designation ‘sacred laws’, cf. CARBON & PIRENNE-DELFORGE (2012).

τὸν τούτων τι ποιῶντα ὁ χρή-
ζων ἐς τοὺς μαστρούς.

35

Law regarding what is not *hosion* to enter or | bring into the shrine and the | precinct of Alectrona. A horse, | a donkey, a mule, hinny, | and any other animal with a long-haired tail³ must not enter, | and no one should lead into the sanctuary | any of these or bring in sandals | or anything made from pig. | If anyone does any of this against the law then | he must purify the shrine and the precinct | and offer a sacrifice afterwards, or he must be considered | guilty of the *asebeia*. If someone brings in | cattle, then he must pay | one obol for every animal, | the one who brings them in. Let the one | who wants it report him who does any of these things to the council.

The lexical content of the prohibition οὐχ ὄσιον in (l. 20) is not difficult to understand. It transmits a clear message: ‘the gods do not approve, and it is against the religious custom that these things are brought into the sanctuary.’ The intention is also evident. In this local sanctuary, the authorities were determined to put a stop to any disturbance of the sacred precinct caused by these various equids. Such animals would typically be brought by travellers, who came to visit a sanctuary from elsewhere, and may have been a real nuisance. The animals would not only destroy the grass and upset the general orderliness of the sanctuary, but also literally pollute it with their excrements. Correspondingly, the Ialysians advertised the message by means of a ‘no admittance’ notice, which they decided should be put up in three different places.⁴

³ Gr. λόφουρος. LSJ translates λόφουρος as a ‘pack-animal’. Literally, λόφος means ‘a head of hair’ (the meaning ‘neck’ of λόφος may originally be metonymic for ‘place where the hair grows’ in the case of animals), while οὐρά is ‘tail’. Hence the etymological dictionaries give as a meaning for λόφουρος (= λόφος + οὐρά) ‘animal with a longhaired tail’, e.g., CHANTRAINE 1968-80 s.v. λόφουρα ‘qui ont une queue à long crins’. What is the point of the usage of this rather inexact term? The other animals that are forbidden in the sanctuary are: horse, donkey, mule (usually: a cross of a male donkey with a female horse), hinny (offspring of female donkey and male horse). When the author forbids the λόφουρος as well, it seems as if he wants to say: ‘or any other animal with a long-haired tail’, as if he wants to cover every possible type of horse-like animal, any crossbreed that could be used as pack-animal (personal communication from L.C. van Beek).

⁴ Il. 14-18 of the law. Cf. section 4.1.1 of this chapter.

At the same time, this text raises a number of questions. If we compare this sacred law to inscriptions with a similar subject matter, we realise that it is fairly exceptional. The inscription belongs in a large group of sacred laws with purity regulations, prescribing that people should enter pure,⁵ or prohibiting things which and persons who would be likely to cause pollution, for example restricting access for a fixed number of days after funerals, sex or childbirth.⁶ Sometimes a breach of religious rules in general was framed as pollution (such as making the wrong type of sacrifice).⁷ In such cases of transgression, purification of the sanctuary is sometimes prescribed, seemingly a symbolic measure to restore order.⁸ In the Ialysian case, the requirement for purification seems both literal (taking out the animal dung) and symbolic (re-establishing order).

The prohibitions against the animals should also be seen in the context of a host of practical measures dealing with human and animal presence in sanctuaries throughout Greece. Practical problems would have been caused by the crowding of sacred sites with worshippers throughout the year and especially during religious festivals. We have plenty of laws against bringing animals into the sanctuary and against pasturing, as well as many other laws that more generally manage the natural environment of sanctuaries, i.e. by dealing with potential practical dangers posed by local inhabitants and perhaps crowds of worshippers at sanctuaries.⁹

⁵ e.g. *LSAM* 35.

⁶ e.g. *LSAM* 29.4-6.

⁷ *LSS* 115.26-31. *LSCG* 152. Cf. PARKER 1996a [1983]:144-45, 339.

⁸ *LSS* 115.26-31. *LSCG* 152.

⁹ Cf. DILLON 1997. Numerous inscriptions with rules for visitors to sanctuaries illustrate how we should picture the presence of these worshippers. For example, visitors coming to sacred sites brought animals with them that grazed, and carts that could also damage the grass and compact the soil (e.g. *IG IV*² 122, cf. SOKOLOWSKI 1960:79; DILLON 1997:123). Various sanctuaries also had prohibitions against dumping animal excrements (e.g. *LSCG* 57). Travellers coming from afar wanted to stay overnight and brought tents to sleep in, which may take up much space. One local law stipulates that the measurements of such tents should not exceed thirty feet in length (*LSCG* 65), another prohibits camping in the sanctuary altogether (*LSS* 81.8; *LSCG* 101). Especially numerous were rules against chopping down the trees in sanctuaries, cutting off their branches, picking leaves, and even against using brushwood lying around (e.g. *LSCG* 37; for an overview of relevant inscriptions, cf. e.g. JORDAN & PERLIN 1984; RAGONE 1998:18-22; ROSTAD 2006:117-23). Wood was in demand by the visitors, who naturally wanted to make fires for warmth and to wash and cook. Some cults prohibited campfires altogether, perhaps with a view to bushfires (e.g. *LSCG* 3.6, 67.21, 100, 111.12). Finally, besides the visitors, other people were around at the sanctuary, trying make a living out of the travellers. Prescriptions deal with merchants running shops inside the *temenos* (*SEG* 27.545); one law addressed those who – apparently – made a living by selling hot baths to the crowd (*LSCG* 65.108-09). In short, we can see that (religious) officials had to try hard to keep the

The difference between the Ialysian law and these other recorded messages is that similar offences are elsewhere hardly ever explicitly conceptualised as religiously undesirable behaviour (e.g. by means of the terms ἀσέβεια or ‘not ὄσιον’).¹⁰ The above-mentioned regulations in which purification is required usually just state the offence and the fact that purification is necessary. Laws concerning the protection of the sanctuary itself are usually enforced in a pragmatic manner, stipulating exact monetary penalties – or whippings, in the case of slaves.¹¹ Religious terminology does not enter the picture. But in the Rhodian law it does and we may well wonder why. Was there a special reason for the author to state the law in this way? Or is this variation no more than a mere coincidence?

A similar picture is evident on a more general level. As we have seen in Chapter 2, *hosios & cognates* often concern rules and customs that describe the who, what, where, when and how of ritual proceedings at sanctuaries and of their physical environment. The literary sources show us an impressive range and number of matters regarding sanctuary and cult that are explicitly described as ὄσιον or ὄσια: the favourite meal of a local god, the requirement to be silent at certain moments during the sacrificial ritual, permission to touch sacred objects, etc., etc.¹² We also have a large amount of 5th and 4th century epigraphical sources that deal with precisely these issues. However, very few inscriptions describing these rules of ritual practice and sanctuary actually label these rules as ὄσιος or ὄσια.¹³ Evidently, many more rules

environmental mark, which all of these visitors together left, within reasonable limits. The proliferation of these rules, in subject matter identical or similar to the Ialysian law, show us not only that the authorities were concerned about the sanctuaries, but also that such extensive regularisation was apparently necessary (DILLON 1997:115).

¹⁰ DILLON 1997:127 makes the same observation. One other such exception is *LSCG* 150, which I will discuss below, section 4.1.2.

¹¹ This is also true for the most common of environmental transgressions: the cutting of sacred wood. An illustrative example of the pragmatic tone of that genre is a law about cutting sacred wood that imposes a fine of 50 drachmas for a free man and 50 lashes for a slave, apparently equating these two punishments (IG II (2) 1362).

¹² Chapter 2, section 1.7.

¹³ As far as I know there are only 8 extant fifth- and fourth century inscriptions containing ὄσιη / ὄσιος that describe ritual practice. Four fifth-century inscriptions containing ὄσιος concern aspects of ritual practice. These are: 1. IG IX I(2) 3:718. Locris, (500-450 BC), cf. Appendix 7; 2. SEG 43:630. Sicily, Selinus (5th cent.); 3. Lindos II 26. Rhodes, Lindos (c. 400 BC); 4. ID 68. Delos (5th cent.). Four fourth-century inscriptions deal with aspects of ritual practice. These are: 1. IG XII 1 677 (the Ialysian inscription discussed here); 2. N. Suppl. Epig. Rodio 169a. Rhodes, Lindos; 3. IG V 2 4. Arcadia, Tegea; 4. SEG 9:72, Cyrene.

and sacred laws in the documentary sources *concern* what is ὄσιον / ὀσία than those that overtly *designate* rules as such.

In this chapter we will ask under which circumstances sacred laws in classical Greek inscriptions explicitly framed offences as religious transgressions (as compared to similar inscriptions without any evaluative terminology). Under what pragmatic circumstances was ‘failing to obey the rule’ labelled an impiety in these texts? Or, into what kind of sacred laws would authors insert such an explicit appeal to religion in the first place? In other words, as was stated, we compare the usage of ὄσιος, not with the usage of a near-synonym, but rather with the *absence* of an evaluation: ὄσιος vs. ∅. Because of the scarcity of the evidence, I also include some examples of θέμις and of *eusebês* and cognates in the analysis.¹⁴

2. Background

2.1 cultural knowledge of the unwritten norm

We should first of all be aware of one clear factor that partly explains why we may have only few inscriptions about ritual norms containing *hosios & cognates*. Crucial rules and customs, concerning treatment of sanctuary and cultic practice and perceived as ὄσιον or ὀσία were generally known to members of a community. Hence, there was no need to record them in stone in the first place.

Common general knowledge of the *form* of such rules is presupposed in, for example, Aristophanes’ *Wealth*, where the slave, Cario, makes jokes based on aspects of cultic practice. For example, when the starving god Hermes asks Cario to give him

¹⁴ *hosios & cognates* and θέμις are used in similar ways when referring to cultic practice. Like ὄσιος and ὀσία, θέμις frequently describe the ‘who, what, where, when and how’ of ritual practice, in literary texts and inscriptions. For example, in a statement concerning the *who* of ritual practice, Dionysos explains to an inquiring Pentheus that Bacchic rites are οὐ θέμις for the uninitiated to hear: secrecy was a common requirement of mystery cults (E. *Ba.* 474). Similar cases occur in Ar. *Nu.* 140, Ar. *Thesm.* 1150, Hdt 3.37, 5.72, E. *O.* 97, E. *Ion* 220. Referring to the *what* of ritual practice, Iphigenia in Tauris plans to say it is not θέμις to sacrifice Orestes to Artemis, because he is polluted (E. *IT* 1035). Similar examples: Ar. *Pax* 1018, E. *Hel.* 1353. With regard to the *where* and *when* of ritual practice, a chorus of Asian Bacchantes wants to go to Pieria, a place at which it is θέμις for them to celebrate their rites (E. *Ba.* 416). In a comic parody of these types of religious rules, an Aristophanic character who finds himself at a ritual or worship for the Clouds says he ‘needs to shit (there and then), whether it is θέμις or not’ (A. *Nu.* 295). Sometimes ὀσία and θέμις occur side by side, as when a tragic chorus accuses Helen of having burnt as a sacrifice ‘those things of which it is not θέμις or ὀσία [to sacrifice them]’ (E. *Hel.* 1353, this reading is uncertain, for the passage is highly corrupt. The editions of BURIAN and the OCT print ὀσία (n. pl. of ὄσιος), but I think ὀσία (f. sg. noun) is more plausible, if correct at all, with ALLAN and DALE). For examples of θέμις describing the ‘who and what’ of ritual practice in inscriptions, cf. section 4.2 of this chapter below.

some of the bread and some meat of the victims they are sacrificing in the house, the slave replies: ‘but they are not to be carried out’ (ἀλλ’οὐκ ἐκφορά).¹⁵ This joke assumes knowledge on the part of the audience about the occasional requirement to consume all the sacrificial meat on the spot (in such cases, the meat is οὐκ ἐκφορά: ‘no take-away’).¹⁶ Furthermore, when Cario sees a priest putting away the cakelets disposed on the sacrificial table in a sack, he takes this as stealing, and seizes the opportunity to appropriate and finish off a bowl of porridge himself, ‘because I believed there was much ὄσια in it’ (i.e. in stealing and eating whatever is on the sacred premises).¹⁷ In fact, it was a common religious practice that offerings deposited on a sacrificial table (τραπεζώματα: e.g., cakes or parts of the sacrificial animal) were consumed by the priest,¹⁸ as the audience was apparently aware.¹⁹ This is why the slave’s assumption characterises him as comically naïve or disingenuous, or as a foreigner,²⁰ and it functions as a joke.²¹ Finally, in a comparable example with θέμις, Medea, when she is about to kill her children says ‘and for whom it is not θέμις to attend my blood sacrifice, it will weigh upon his mind’.²² Medea’s utterance is a bitter parody on limitations that any cult might have, restricting attendance at (particular) sacrifices.²³ She also parodies another formula that sometimes appears in sacred law: ‘(if someone transgresses anyway), let it weigh upon his consciousness’:

¹⁵ Ar. *Pl.* 1138, bis.

¹⁶ I discuss this requirement in section 4.2.2 of this chapter. On the ungodly appetite of Hermes, cf. Chapter 7, section 5.

¹⁷ Ar. *Pl.* 682. On the unusual grammatical construction ‘much ὄσια’ cf. Chapter 7, section 5.

¹⁸ e.g. IGSK ii 205.23-25.

¹⁹ VAN STRATEN 1995:154 on this passage: ‘as a matter of fact, any Athenian would have known that what the priest here collected was nothing but his due’.

²⁰ Slaves were often named by a generic name that designated their origin. Καρίων is a diminutive of Κάρι, ‘Carian’. Another example is Θραῦττα for a Thracian slave girl, as in Ar. *Th.* 279-294.

²¹ It seems more likely that the slave’s utterance characterises him as disingenuous than as naïve. Throughout the play, he is talking in quite a sophisticated manner, with paratragic elements of speech: Ar. *Pl.* 9, 39, 660-61, 758-59, cf. SOMMERSTEIN 2001 *ad loc.*; also SILK 2000:25. Moreover, he also makes the linguistic joke (1138 bis) discussed in the main text, requiring knowledge of the customs of ritual practice. Based on these utterances, we do not get an impression of him as an unknowledgeable, naïve character who is not aware of this cult rule. He does, however, use ὄσια in an odd way. cf. Chapter 7, section 5.

²² E. *Med.* 1054.

²³ The impure should stay away from a sacrifice (e.g. S. *OT* 239-40, E. *IT* 1226-29, references from MASTRONARDE 2002:339) and admittance was sometimes restricted to particular social groups (as will be discussed extensively in section 4.2 of this chapter).

an implicit threat that the god will come after you.²⁴ Again, the tragedian plays on the collective cultural knowledge of these recurring rules and phrases in sacred laws.

It is not clear to what extent members of a particular cultic community would have been aware of the *more specific* rules concerning what is ὄσιον or not at particular sanctuaries: e.g. the specific animals to sacrifice, to particular gods at particular times, the role of various social groups in the sacrificial rituals. But here the epigraphic material is insightful: some inscriptions perhaps tacitly presuppose such awareness to a certain extent. In the fifth-century foundation decree of the colony Naupactus, a group of Locrian colonists receive the right to participate in the cults of their old community ‘where’ or ‘in the way in which it is (also) ὄσία for a ξένος’.²⁵ There may have been another inscription originally, put up near this law and explaining ‘where’ or ‘the way in which’ ξένοι could participate. But another option is that the authors of the decree assumed that those who read it would already be aware of these rules. A recently discovered inscription from Selinus prescribes that a sacrifice be made by those ‘for whom it is ὄσία’, again perhaps referring to rules explained in another contemporary law we are not aware of,²⁶ or (and this seems not unlikely) assuming that the worshippers would already know who these members of the community were.²⁷

Thus, we may restate our main research question. Against a background in which the most important rules considered ὄσία may have been unwritten knowledge, (what were the situations in which people actually recorded these laws in stone and) when did they explicitly state what is ὄσιον / ὄσία or not?

2.2 ὄσία and ὄσιος in the context of ritual practice in literary texts

Because the range of extant inscriptions containing the term ὄσιος is so restricted, it will be instructive to study the *possible* functions of overtly mentioning what is ὄσιον or ὄσία with respect to cultic practice by examining the usage of these terms in cultic matters in the literary passages, first.

One obvious occasion to discuss explicitly what is ἡ ὄσία is when newly instituting a custom or cult. Thus, Athena instructs Orestes that he will build a temple at Halae, and every time they celebrate the sacred rites, they must draw blood from a

²⁴ cf. n. 79 in section 4.1.2 of this chapter.

²⁵ This is IG IX 1 (2) 3:718. Appendix 7 is a discussion of this inscription.

²⁶ i.e., an inscription on stone we have not found, or perhaps, a law inscribed on perishable material.

²⁷ SEG 43:630, l. 12. On the interpretation of this inscription cf. JAMESON, JORDAN & KOTANSKY 1993, CLINTON 1996, SCULLION 2000, LUPU 2005:359-387.

man's neck 'because of ὄσία'.²⁸ Another reason to bring up what is ὄσιον is because an author can use it for characterisation of a people or an individual. Thus, Herodotus narrates what is ὄσιη / ὄσιον for the Egyptians (what animals they sacrifice, their burial customs) to show us their particularities and to define them as other. The expression shows us how, in the eyes of the historian, a people's identity was bound up with what they consider ὄσιος: cultic practice was an essential, defining aspect of any community.²⁹ Similarly, θέμις is used in a description of 'the most shameful of Babylonian customs': the explanation of that ritual is (partly) intended to show us the 'otherness' of non-Greeks.³⁰ By contrast, priests in Herodotus have to tell arriving foreigners that it is not ὄσιον or θεμιτόν for them to sacrifice at, or even to enter a local sanctuary³¹ - for an outsider cannot be expected to know what is considered ὄσιον in any place he visits.

On the level of the individual, Aristophanes used the 'mistake' of slave Carion regarding ἡ ὄσία for dramatic characterisation: someone who apparently does not know the sacred laws is at best naïve, at worst a fraud. An entirely different way in which an author employed the closely related notion of θέμις for characterisation is Medea's distorted and 'chillingly parodic'³² use of ritual language. Framing the murder of her children as an act of piety, a religious sacrifice, shows a rather perverted way of thinking in itself, but Medea's warning exposes her mental perversion especially well: how could there be a category of persons for whom it would be right (θέμις) to witness this murder?³³ Thus, Medea's metaphoric use of θέμις serves to flesh out her character.³⁴

²⁸ E. *IT* 1461. Gr: ὄσιας ἕκατι. The ritual means that the goddess will still receive human blood, but in an acceptable, non-polluting form. There is no other evidence for this religious practice: CROPP 2000, *ad loc.* Similarly, in *h.Cer.* 211 a disguised Demeter receives the κικεῶν (a mixed drink containing the grain that is sacred to this goddess) 'because of the rite' (ὄσιης ἔνεκεν). The story is also an *aetion*, namely for the practice of taking this drink during the preliminary rites of the Eleusinian Mysteries. Cf. FOLEY 1994, *ad loc.*

²⁹ A sustained irony in *Iphigenia in Tauris* is based on the fact that the Taurians' idea of ὄσιος behaviour is outrageous in Greek eyes, although the Taurians themselves seriously think they are very pious. Cf. Chapter 7, section 4.5.

³⁰ Hdt. 1.199. On the much-discussed construction ἀποσιωσαμένη τῇ θεῷ, cf. Chapter 7, section 4.2.

³¹ Hdt. 5.72 (οὐ θεμιτόν); 6.81 (οὐκ ὄσιον).

³² PARKER 2004:66.

³³ MOSSMAN 2011, *ad loc.* Moreover, as MOSSMAN also pointed out, her obscure way of expressing herself makes sure that the children do not understand her true meaning.

³⁴ A similarly distorted usage of religious language occurs in *Trojan Women*, where Cassandra celebrates her upcoming union with Agamemnon as a marriage by means of torches and dance, and says: 'the dance is ὄσιος, come, Apollo, lead it'. The statement is highly ironical and part of an inversion of values throughout this scene. The Greeks danced to express divine adoration, at feasts

Most of the comic and tragic contexts in which *hosios & cognates* are used with respect to cultic practice are in fact situations in which a person tries to *persuade* someone else that a particular course of action is the right one by claiming that it is ὅσιος: here, the term is employed as a rhetorical instrument.

Priestess Iphigenia in Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris*, when she is imagining how she will persuade Thoas of her eccentric plan to take Orestes and Pylades out to sea on a boat, thinks of a speech in which she will use many religious terms: she will say she has to wash them, since it is 'not θέμις' to sacrifice Orestes as he is, being 'not καθάρος', while she only gives 'what is ὄσιον' for sacrifice;³⁵ and she also intends to put forward, as mentioned above, that it is only ὄσιον for her (not for anyone else) to touch the holy statue.³⁶

In sharp contrast to this clever woman, the Argive king Adrastus and the mothers of the Seven, coming to supplicate Theseus to help them recover the bodies of their sons (who are lying unburied at Thebes), employ a very unfortunate rhetoric, although they, too, seem to appeal to τὸ ὄσιον in order to persuade. They concede that they

and choral competitions, at weddings and funerals – in this sense such dancing could be seen as ὄσιον, because it was part of honouring the gods, part of the ritual activity (LONSDALE 1993). At a marriage, this would be a dance to Hymenaeus. But Cassandra is a virgin priestess of Apollo (41-44) who intends to lead her life in that capacity (253-54). When she invokes the god to 'lead the dance that is ὄσιος', this is an apparent invitation to him to guide her ritual transition from being ὄσιος to Apollo (in her service to him as a virgin priestess) to becoming a wife. Celebrating the union with Agamemnon through a ritual dance that honours the god of marriage is an obvious misrepresentation of the facts, for Cassandra is a Trojan captive who will not get married, but will be forced to live as Agamemnon's concubine. Moreover, portraying that transition as having a divine sanction, guided by Apollo himself, is another distortion of reality: this is a 'marriage' of which Apollo is said to disapprove. Previously, Poseidon had said (42-44) that Agamemnon takes her away 'passing over the god (i.e. Apollo) and τὸ εὐσεβές' (note that it was in itself not uncommon at all for a virgin priestess to get married, as CONNELLY 2010:17-18 points out: 'priesthoods [for women] with a prerequisite of virginity were held for a short time, after which maidens were free to marry'; in this case, however, Apollo did not approve). Cassandra is aware of all of these facts and her acquiescence is only apparent (SCODEL 1998:147). As it turns out, the torch of 'marriage' turns out to be a symbol of revenge. The marriage will enable Cassandra to destroy Agamemnon, to harm the enemy that infringed on Apollo's τιμή by forcibly taking away his priestess. The characterisation of the dance as ὄσιος could only be interpreted as such in that it indirectly repairs the τιμή of the god. But since it is actually the symbolic representation of the step towards revenge, this is clearly a manipulative and distorted interpretation of ὀσιότης.

³⁵ E. *IT* 1035-37.

³⁶ E. *IT* 1045. When Thoas appears on the stage (1153 ff.), she successfully follows a similar strategy, but also (1161) solemnly invokes a personification or goddess Ὅσια (who is attested hardly anywhere else, only in E. *Ba.* 370-71). Here she goes too far, because Thoas cannot follow her anymore and says 'what kind of newfangled thing are you starting your speech with? Express yourself clearly!' (1162).

supplicate ‘not in a manner that is pious’ (οὐχ ὀσίως) but ‘through necessity’ (ὕπ’ ἀνάγκας).³⁷ Their point is that their supplication is interrupting a fertility festival for Demeter and Persephone, the Proerosia at Eleusis.³⁸ The women’s tearful appearance,³⁹ supplication boughs⁴⁰ and dark mourning clothes⁴¹ would have disturbed the festival and might offend the gods.⁴² It seems as if the women anticipate criticism on these scores and try to use their obvious offences to emphasize the urgency of the situation: ‘we are making this plea despite its not being ὄσιον (so you can imagine we had no choice).’ However, this is hardly a persuasive way of framing a supplication: suppliants usually said the exact opposite, arguing – in a strong rhetorical move – that their claim to protection was ὄσιος, thereby appealing to the gods’ special interest in their situation.⁴³ Thus it was particularly unhelpful to say a supplication was ‘not ὄσιος’ (*vel sim.*),⁴⁴ and the ‘argument’ may very well have contributed to Theseus’ initial rejection.⁴⁵ Note that the speech shows us one other thing: it gives us a clear indication of the perceived importance of temporal and spatial requirements of cultic practice. The mothers of the Seven show a great sensitivity to these questions of ‘where, when and how to approach the gods’, apologising for their transgression of these aspects of ἡ ὄσια, even if their plea itself is actually completely ὄσιον in all respects.

³⁷ E. *Supp.* 63.

³⁸ On the Proerosia, cf. DEUBNER 1932:68-69.

³⁹ E. *Supp.* 48-49, 71-86, 87-99.

⁴⁰ E. *Supp.* 10, 102.

⁴¹ E. *Supp.* 97.

⁴² MORWOOD 2007 *ad loc.*, MORWOOD 2012:555-56, SMITH 1967:154-55. Indications in the text that characters are concerned about this: Aethra thinks Theseus might remove the suppliants because of the distress they are causing (E. *Supp.* 38); Theseus remarks that their hairs and robes are not fit for a festival (οὐ θεωρικά, 97); Theseus implores the women not to weep at Demeter’s altar (289-90). Beside the women’s behaviour and appearance there may be reasons to assume that supplicating during a festival was considered generally problematic, e.g. And. *De Myst.* 110-116 which mentions a penalty for a supplication during festival time.

⁴³ On the role of religious argumentation in fifth-century supplications, cf. Appendix 4.

⁴⁴ The Argive women’s utterance seems even more inappropriate given the fact that their supplication is about recovering unburied bodies. Giving the dead a honourable funeral is one of the most important themes assessed in terms of the evaluation ὄσιος, and so these women would definitely be seen as ὄσιος by any Greek. Actually, a bit further on, Theseus himself says rather indignantly that they ‘were asking ὄσια when requesting the bodies back’ (E. *Supp.* 123).

⁴⁵ The analysis fits within MORWOOD’s argument (2012:553-54) concerning the generally weak rhetoric of the first supplication.

By studying the literary material we have been able to identify at least four reasons why one would spell out what is ὄσιον or ὄσια: at the institution of a new cult or the custom in question; when an insider explains a particular cult rule to a outsider; when these notions are used for dramatic characterisation; and to persuade another of the reasonability and importance of a particular action. In the epigraphic material, dramatic characterisation obviously does not apply, but we may hypothesise that the explicit inclusion of *hosios & cognates* (sometimes) has to do with any of these other three motivations, or a combination of them.⁴⁶ In the next section we will take a closer look at the last-mentioned reason: the employment of ὄσιος and ὄσια for persuasive purposes, to strengthen an appeal. According to Robert PARKER the usage of religious terms in sacred laws is rather an indication that they were *not* so serious, that adherence to these rules was not very important. Before analyzing the material, we will examine PARKER's theory in more detail.

3. Previous scholarship: PARKER's theory

PARKER has distinguished two 'ideal' types of sacred law. The first 'ideal' type of *lex sacra* identified by PARKER is the 'black-tie-will-be-worn'- or 'how to deal with a haunting'- rule.⁴⁷ PARKER quotes laws with the phrase οὐ θέμις, for example:

Χάρισιν αἴγα οὐ θέμις οὐδὲ χοῖρον

To the Graces (it is) not *themis* (to sacrifice) goat nor piglet.⁴⁸

The prohibitions οὐ θέμις and οὐχ ὄσια/ὄσιον are used in a highly similar way when referring to cultic practice.⁴⁹ Therefore, we may see laws with οὐχ ὄσια/ὄσιον as variants of this type. 'Revealingly', PARKER says, in this type 'the rule is sometimes framed not in the imperative but in the indicative'.⁵⁰ The rule then simply states that 'X is (not) done'.⁵¹ According to PARKER, such a syntactic form underlines that these

⁴⁶ The explicit usage of ὄσια may of course also be the result of chance variation or variation in local diction.

⁴⁷ 2004:62, 65. 'how to deal with a haunting': PARKER is referring to the Cyrenean Cathartic law (mentioned on p. 63 of his article) which describes dealings with 'suppliants' (ικέσιοι), a term which in this inscription seems to mean 'supernatural visitants'.

⁴⁸ IG XII 8.358, *LSCG* 114b, Thasos (5th century).

⁴⁹ cf. n. 14 in section 1 above.

⁵⁰ PARKER 2004:62.

⁵¹ 'Libations are made with honey' (*LSS* 62, cult of Zeus Elasterus). Other examples are sacred laws

rules express conventions, traditional practice, local custom. The aim of such rules is not to constrain, but rather to advise, to provide guidelines for the worshipper who wants to do things exactly right and ‘respect local ritual tradition in all its pernicky particularity.’ PARKER also argues that the general lack of sanctions in these texts indicates that they are not laws, lacking legal force.⁵² PARKER’s second ‘ideal’ type is the ‘true law’, issuing from the assembly. It aims to constrain and regulate behaviour, and contains a secular sanction and a procedure for enforcement. Although, PARKER argues, many laws are a mix between the two types or define a borderland, this does not ‘obliterate the distinction between the ideal types’.⁵³

One important diagnostic of classification between the first and the second type of sacred laws (as explained above) in PARKER’s work is the presence or absence of a secular sanction. This also seems to be a diagnostic of “seriousness”.⁵⁴ PARKER’s description, not in the least his characterisation of the first kind as the ‘what to do when a ghost comes’-type (my paraphrase) and as ‘exegetic lore’⁵⁵ implies that he sees the first type as not equally serious as the second.

Indicative of PARKER’s line of reasoning is the way in which he deals with a third-century funeral law from Gambreion in Asia Minor. This law states that a woman, if she violates the funeral regulations, is banned from participating in any sacrifice for ten years, on the grounds that this is not ὄσιον for her anymore, because she is ἀσεβής.⁵⁶ PARKER treats it as a borderland rule: it is a ‘real law’ that apparently envisages enforceability, but then, it does not contain a sanction. PARKER argues:

...The services of a state official, the ‘woman-controller’ (γυναικονόμος), are also called in. *But all the woman-controller is required to do* is to utter a prayer before the Thesmophoria that women who observe the rules shall prosper and those who do the opposite shall not. ‘And’ the law continues ‘it shall not be permitted by religion (μὴ ὄσιον εἶναι) for women who disobey,

stating that there is ‘no carrying away of portions of sacrifice’ (expressed as οὐ φορά, οὐκ ἀποφορά).

⁵² PARKER 2005a:63.

⁵³ PARKER 2004:65.

⁵⁴ NAIDEN has a similar view, stating that: ‘sanctions [in sacred laws] are rare because the community includes them only with regard to those practices on which it has staked its own survival or well-being’ (2008:126). But in the extant inscriptions in which access to shrines is forbidden to particular groups (the topic of the second half of this chapter, section 4.2), ‘the stakes are too low ... not ...[a] matter of civic survival’.

⁵⁵ PARKER 2004:65.

⁵⁶ LSA 16.

as being guilty of impiety,⁵⁷ to sacrifice to any god for ten years'. This text is complete, and *we can be sure that secular sanctions and modes of actions against offenders were not included*. The parallel section of Solon's funerary law was *similarly sanction-free* ... [italics for emphasis mine].

I infer from PARKER's text that he does not consider the threat of preclusion from future ritual actions, on the grounds that this is not ὄσιον, as a real sanction.⁵⁸

In this chapter I would like to propose a different interpretation of the effect of such threats in sacred laws. To start with, I do not think PARKER's analysis in terms of these two 'ideal types' is an optimal way of characterising the differences between various types of laws. Rather, I think a correct understanding of the difference between various *leges sacrae* should begin by distinguishing sentence type and speech act. Although cult regulations of the first type ('libations are made with honey') are often simple indicative sentences, straightforward expressions of states of affairs, they probably have the illocutionary force of a warning.⁵⁹ As both NAIDEN (2008) and DREHER (2008) have pointed out, such 'X is (not) done' rules implicitly contain the threat of a – strong – sanction, which is: divine punishment.⁶⁰ In this way, these rules, just like PARKER's second type of 'laws' with overt sanctions, probably have the perlocutionary effect of pressuring people into obeying.

The success of these illocutionary acts in both types of laws depends on their meeting a set of appropriateness conditions. The author must be capable of imposing the suggested sanction or believe the supposed enforcer (here: the gods) will do so. The hearer must understand the utterance as a warning, take its enforceability seriously, and actually fear the sanction. I will argue that adding the expression 'not

⁵⁷ μή ὄσιον αὐταῖς εἶναι, ὡς | ἀσεβούσαις, θύειν μηθεὶ θεῶν ἐπὶ δέικα ἔτη (II. 25-27).

⁵⁸ 2004:61. In fact, the preclusion from ritual action seems a severe punishment. Sacrifice was the most important means of communicating with the gods and (especially for a woman) an essential way of being part of the community. VERSNEL 1985 studied 5 (or 6, depending on the interpretation of the text discussed on his pp. 252-55) inscriptions (2nd-3rd cent. AD) cursing someone by saying something like 'may he not be able to sacrifice'. VERSNEL argued (p. 263) that such curses are quite serious because they are *variants* on the invocation of the wrath of the gods, which is central in Greek and Latin curse formulas.

⁵⁹ On the terminology used here and below (speech act, illocutionary, perlocutionary, appropriateness conditions) cf. ABRAMS 1999 [1957]:291-94.

⁶⁰ DREHER (2008:140-41) criticises NAIDEN (2008) for his contention that sanctions in sacred laws are rare, by pointing out that these sacred laws *do* contain a sanction, in the form of the threat of divine punishment. But this point is advanced by NAIDEN himself near the end of his article (2008:134), although at the beginning of the same article (126-31) he seemingly equals 'sanction' to 'fine'.

ὄσια/ὄσιον/θέμις' is an attempt to make sure these appropriateness conditions are met. The *leges sacrae* of PARKER's type 1 which express that something is not ὄσια or θέμις are the equivalent of rules stating that 'X is not done' with respect to their function: both aim at regulating the behaviour of worshippers regarding cultic activities. But rather than being mere variations, rules using the terms ὄσια/ὄσιον or θέμις may have been more likely to ensure the intended effect of the utterance (frightening the reader so that he will comply), because they are more explicitly constructed as important to the gods and so express the threat of a divine sanction more clearly.

As we have seen, in PARKER's view, the lack of a serious secular sanction more or less 'downscales' a law of the second type (a true law) to one of the first (exegetic lore) and, according to this scholar, we need to assume the matter was not very important for a community. This is one possible interpretation of the source material. However, as I have argued, the proposed nature of the distinction between the two types of laws seems problematic. Moreover, as I will argue next, the more general historical information available to us about these types of inscriptions makes it more likely that we should take a different stance. In the following, I will present an alternative analysis.

Before we can start, we need to address one more methodological question. How can we find out whether or not an explicit appeal to religion in a sacred law would convince the reader to obey the rule or avoid transgressions? In the previous chapters, we could often tell that ὄσιος or ὄσια was used with the *intention* to persuade, for example when the term appeared in the context of a debate. We could also determine just how persuasive appeals to τὸ ὄσιον *actually were*, by studying the effect of such an appeal on the interlocutor and on others. In the case of sacred laws in inscriptions, how can we discover their persuasive force? We have no way of finding out, for example, how much of a deterrent it was for a visitor to the Ialysian sanctuary to read that introducing certain animals was 'not ὄσιον'. The only thing we can try to infer is how much weight 'not ὄσιον' was *supposed* to carry, by investigating textual context, historical context and physical circumstances of these inscriptions (if known). From these clues we can try to deduct in what kind of laws authors would insert an appeal to τὸ ὄσιον in the first place. Taking two extremes, does 'not ὄσιον' appear in authoritative laws in which the survival of a community is at stake, or in regulations dealing with minor and trivial details of the cultic practice?

The organisation of the material is based on PARKER's classification of sacred laws. First, we will study texts in which a religious disqualification is *added* to another punishment. Next, we consider religious expressions in cult regulations that do not contain any sanctions.

4. An analysis of religious disqualifications in two types of laws

4.1 Religious disqualifications in laws with other sanctions

4.1.1 Animals in Alectrona's sanctuary

We may return to the sacred law from Ialysos first. To start with, it seems that the usage of οὐχ ὄσιον in this law may have functioned at the (re-)installation of the cult. The law belongs to the sanctuary of Alectrona, who was, according to myth, Helios' daughter. Her cult was originally widespread on the island of Rhodes, especially among the ancient inhabitants of Carian origin. But with the Dorian invasion the importance of the cult diminished. However, after the synoecism at Rhodes (408/7), the cult of Helios was adopted as a (combined) *polis* cult, and divinities affiliated to Helios in one way or another became well known. This is how the cult of Alectrona gained a renewed popularity.⁶¹ The inscription from Ialysos records an important moment in history, because it marks the decision to give the cult of Alectrona new life and to reinstate the old cult and the ancestral customs, which had been neglected, or perhaps wholly forgotten with the previous decline of the cult.⁶² ROSTAD has argued that the sanctuary came into disuse, and was in danger of becoming a pasture.⁶³ Precisely in this context, the authorities may have wanted to draw up a law against the presence of animals on the premises of the sanctuary, to make a very clear statement that this space was *not* a pasture, and to frame that law explicitly as part of the covenant with the gods.

⁶¹ LE GUEN-POLLET 1991:86.

⁶² LE GUEN-POLLET 1991:87. Cf. ll. 3-5 of the inscription: ὅπως τὸ ἱερόν καὶ τὸ τέμενος τῆς Ἀλεκτρονάς εὐαγῆται κατὰ τὰ πάτρια '[the council etc. have decided the following] so that the shrine and the precinct of Alectrona retains a state of purity according to the ancestral customs'. On the verb εὐαγεῖσθαι cf. PIRENNE-DELFORGE *forthc.*, who shows that its semantic range surpasses that of the notion of ritual purity and refers to the relationship between the cultic group and the gods: if the sanctuary is pure, this allows for a normal, functioning communication with the divine sphere. PIRENNE-DELFORGE suggests the corresponding translation: << afin que le sanctuaire et le domaine d'Alektrōna soient maintenus, selon les traditions, dans leur status d'interface adéquat...>>. On the importance of tradition in Greek religion cf. RUDHARDT 2008:55.

⁶³ ROSTAD 2006:116.

Moreover, the document itself suggests it was (partly) intended to explain cult rules to outsiders. The first part of the law (not quoted above) prescribes:

θέμειν δὲ

τὰς στάλας μίαιμ μὲν ἐπὶ τᾶς ἐσό-
 δου τᾶς ἐκ πόλιος ποτιπορευομέ-
 νοις, μίαν δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἱστιατόριον,
 ἄλλαν δὲ ἐπὶ τᾶς καταβάσιος τᾶ[ς]
 ἐξ Ἀχαΐας πόλιος.⁶⁴

15

And [it was decided] to set up the *stélai*, one at the entrance for those who approach from the city, one above the banqueting hall and an other one on the road down from the city of Achaea.

The set-up on the ‘road from Achaea’, a place nearby Ialysos,⁶⁵ suggest an influx of visitors, who needed to be informed about the local customs.

Furthermore, we should consider the persuasive force of this document. As was discussed, the best we can do is try to estimate what weight an author intended a document to have, by looking into its textual and historical context and the circumstances of its publication. The historical context described above implies that the rule was a matter of some importance to the local community, and the physical circumstances of the publication of the Ialysian law (or actually: what we are told about the physical circumstances) confirm that view. As we see, the decree states that the law is to be set up at three different strategic places. The multiple publication of a law was not exceptional, but the fact that the Ialysians took care to propagate visitors’ familiarity with the rule can be seen as indicative of its perceived importance.⁶⁶

With respect to the textual context of the law, we should find out what the phrase ‘let him be guilty of the impiety’ (ἔνοχος ἔστω τᾷ ἀσεβείαι, l. 29-30) means. What kind of sanction does it amount to? One possibility is that the phrase signals the transgressor will be tried in a case of ἀσεβεία. Such severe consequences of breaking the rules would certainly add to our impression of the perceived importance of the law. Impiety (ἀσεβεία) was a legal offence in classical Greece: you could bring someone who (according to you) had committed ἀσεβεία before a court, and if this

⁶⁴ IG XII 1 677, *LSCG* 136, ll. 13-18.

⁶⁵ CRAIK 1980:161.

⁶⁶ *LSA* 16 and ID 68 discussed below (section 3 and 4.2.1 respectively) were also published multiple times.

person was found guilty he was convicted on this charge.⁶⁷ The law about ἀσέβεια most probably did not have a precisely defined character, but may have been of the form: ‘if anyone commits impiety, let anyone who wishes submit a *graphê* ...’⁶⁸ It would be up to the accuser to decide that a particular action constituted an ἀσέβεια, and then to convince the jury of it.⁶⁹

Perhaps, the phrase ἔνοχος ἔστω τῷ ἀσεβείᾳ did precisely that: it categorised the mentioned offences as ἀσέβεια. However, it does not seem that this law stipulates that the offender will go to trial on the grounds that he has committed an ἀσέβεια. The phrase describes a specific ‘impiety’ connected to a specific situation, as indicated by the definite article (ἔνοχος τῷ ἀσεβείᾳ). Therefore, it probably means, in the first place, ‘guilty of this (particular) activity we consider impious’ or ‘liable’ to it,⁷⁰ not ‘answerable to (a charge of) ἀσέβεια (i.e. the legal category)’.⁷¹ Furthermore, the fact that there is no indication of the envisaged punishment connected to the impiety may be relevant. Because offences of different degrees of gravity could be brought under the rubric of ἀσέβεια, there was no fixed penalty for it. DELLI PIZZI argues that a law categorising a particular offence as an ἀσέβεια would also say something about the intended punishment.⁷² On the other hand, there are enough examples of ancient laws that do not stipulate punishments. In those cases, it was up to the prosecutor of a particular offender to suggest a punishment for that individual case.

⁶⁷ Discussions on ἀσέβεια as a legal offence: MACDOWELL (1978:192-202), TODD (1993: 307-315), PARKER 2005, BRUIT-ZAIDMAN & SCHMITT-PANTEL 1992:11-12, NAIDEN 2008. Note that almost all of our information on ἀσέβεια comes from Athens (PARKER 2005:63) but some epigraphical material from other *poleis* shows that people were tried and condemned on a charge of ἀσέβεια in other places, as well, e.g. I.Ephesos 2 (4th century); IG II² 2635 (Delos, 374/73). DELLI PIZZI 2011:69-72 discusses these inscriptions. There is no such evidence for Rhodes and Kos in the classical period, as far as I know.

⁶⁸ MACDOWELL 1978:199. Cf. PARKER 1996b p. 215 n.63; PARKER 2005:65, TODD 1993:310.

⁶⁹ The undefined charge of ἀσέβεια existed as a separate legal route alongside a number of other, more clearly demarcated religious offences on the grounds of which one could formally accuse someone. These other categories of religious offences included at least a) *hierosylia* (temple-robbing) and b) theft of sacred money, e.g. Ant. 2.1.6, D. 19.293; c) matters concerning olive trees, e.g. Lys. 7; and d) matters concerning conduct during public festivals, e.g. D. 21.175-80. Cf. MACDOWELL 1978:135, 149, 194-96, PARKER 2005:63-64. N.B. BRUIT-ZAIDMAN & SCHMITT-PANTEL 1992:11 consider offences concerning olive trees as ἀσέβεια, while MACDOWELL and PARKER treat such offences as a separate category.

⁷⁰ i.e., any consequences will be on his account.

⁷¹ DELLI PIZZI 2011:75. Cf. PARKER 2004:65; *contra* NAIDEN 2008:134-35, whose opinion on *LSCG* 150, discussed in section 4.1.2 of this chapter, is that ‘a trial for *asebeia* must have awaited those failing to pay the fine’. N.B. ἔνοχος + dat. can mean ‘guilty of’ (e.g. ἔνοχος τῷ φόνῳ, Ant. 1.11.9), or ‘liable/answerable to’ (e.g. ἔνοχος νόμοις, Pl. *Lg.* 869b).

⁷² DELLI PIZZI 2011:72.

If the phrase does not signal that the transgressor will be prosecuted in court, what *does* it do? Labelling an offence as an ‘impiety’ first and foremost seems an attempt to threaten the offender that his action will be considered an affront in the eyes of the gods, likely to disturb his relationship with the divine world. Framing the action as ‘not ὄσιον’ does exactly the same. But the term ἀσέβεια, unlike the prohibition ‘this is not ὄσιον’ implies a legal transgression and such a categorisation of the offence paves the way for a possible formal charge on these grounds, without entailing this will actually happen. This is another way in which the phrase ἔνοχος ἔστω τῆ ἀσεβείᾳ could frighten the reader into compliance.⁷³ Note that although ‘not ὄσιον’ and ἀσέβεια’ do not have exactly the same semantic reference, their illocutionary force is the same: both are deterrents.⁷⁴

Thus, it seems that we can infer from the historical circumstances, the textual context and the manner of publication of the law that the issue discussed was a matter of (some) importance to the community. Apparently, the Ialysians thought that using a layered system of religious threats would (seriously) help to achieve the (seriously) intended persuasive purpose: frightening the readers into compliance.

4.1.2 Cutting wood on Cos

If we compare the Ialysian law to a similarly exceptional case – the only known law in the classical period about cutting wood that employs religious terminology⁷⁵ – we

⁷³ DELLI PIZZI 2011 makes the same argument, understanding ἀσέβεια in the epigraphic evidence in the framework of social control, not just in a legal perspective. DELLI PIZZI also makes the interesting observation that ‘the idea that these expressions refer to being considered impious, whatever it means concretely, rather than more specific consequences such as a trial, is supported by the fact that we sometimes find νομιζέσθω instead of ἔστω in the case of other notions [such as ἐναγής, ἱερόσυλος]’ (2011:60 n. 29).

⁷⁴ This view entails the expectation that the second part of the law could also have been phrased as ‘ἀνόσιος ἔστω’ instead of ‘ἔνοχος ἔστω τῆ ἀσεβείᾳ’. Indeed, this is precisely the case in another sacred law of the fifth century (LSS 85, Rhodes (Lindos), end of 5th century). This law concerns a decision made in the *boulê* about a tax payable to the war-god Enyalios. Any soldier from Lindos should pay to Enyalios one-sixtieth of his wages. Those soldiers being in public service need to pay the tax to their general, who hands it over to the priest; those who serve voluntarily pay the contribution to the priest directly. The text states that if the generals do not collect the money from the soldiers, ‘let it be *anhosion* (ἀνόσιον ἔστω, 44) in the eyes of the god and let him be responsible (ὀπεύθυνος ἔστω, 45-46)’, and that the same goes for a voluntarily serving soldier who does not pay his tax to the priest.

⁷⁵ As was explained (section 1, n. 9 of this chapter), the ‘no cutting wood’ subtype is prominent in the larger group of sacred laws that try to manage the potential damage visitors could do to the sanctuary and its environment. Restrictions on animals, such as appear in the Ialysian regulation, were also part of this group of sacred laws.

get a similar impression. In a sanctuary on Cos (*LSCG* 150a, late fifth century) the officials put some effort into preventing the cutting of sacred wood. According to this law, someone who cut down the cypress trees or took wood from the holy grove had to pay a fine of one thousand drachmas, and must be considered as committing an impiety with regard to the sanctuary (τὸ ἱερὸν ἀσεβείτω, l. 6). Note that the fine is exceptionally high, if we compare it to contemporary inscriptions.⁷⁶ A subsequent decree, passed in the next century (*LSCG* 150b) confirms and strengthens the impression that this community really had a serious problem with deforestation. In this second decree it is again forbidden to cut down any of the trees. But whereas the first decree held an ‘escape clause’ – the only valid reason to use the wood was if the community decided they needed it for a public project – in the new situation, that was not possible anymore. The law silences those who might be considering it at all: ‘no one is allowed to make the proposal, or put to the vote, or [even] to voice the opinion that the cypress wood be used’.⁷⁷

The astronomic monetary penalty imposed in the first decree and the subsequent imposed censorship of the second imply that the situation was very urgent indeed. Both strong measures were apparently felt necessary to prevent further ‘environmental degradation’.⁷⁸ The exceptional procedure of threatening the transgressor with ἀσέβεια apparently fits into the general communicative strategy: the lawgiver seems to employ this term because he perceives it to be a similarly strong incentive to make people abide by this law. In fact, the high monetary sanction likewise seems intended more as a threat, a last resort, than as a regularly envisioned scenario. In this way, the imputation of impiety seems to function in a similar way as in the Ialysian law: as a (strong) deterrent.

4.1.3 Discussion

We can now summarise our previous analysis. Sacred laws regulating matters concerning the sanctuary, rituals and manageability of visitors generally dealt with transgressions in a pragmatic way. The laws from Ialysos and Kos are atypical in their

⁷⁶ The same offences lead to a fine of one hundred drachmas in a fourth-century inscription of Euboea (IG XII 9 90), or ‘only’ fifty drachmas in another fourth-century, Attic inscription (IG II² 1362). NAIDEN 2008:129 also finds this sum rather large.

⁷⁷ *LSCG* 150b 8-12: [π]ροστάτας μη-|δεις προτιθέτω μηδὲ ἐπιψαφ[ι]-|ζέτω μηδὲ γνώμων μηδεις | ἀγορ[ευ]έτ[ω] ὧ]ς δεῖ καταχρῆ[σθαι] τοῦ [κυπαρισσίνου] υ ζύ[λου].

⁷⁸ DILLON 1997:118 sees the serious measures in the second decree as an indication of ‘the progress of environmental degradation’; in my opinion, the first decree already strikes a rather urgent note.

explicit usage of religious evaluative terms (οὐχ ὄσιον, ἀσέβεια).⁷⁹ My study of the former law tentatively shows that the phrase οὐχ ὄσιον was not only an explanation of the religious rule, functioning at the re-instatement of the cult. It may also have been a rhetorical move, an attempt to strengthen a law that was considered very important to the community. Explicitly framing the offence as a religious transgression seems to have been a serious means of persuading the reader to keep his animals with longhaired tails out and preventing the area from becoming a pasture again. Our examination of the second law confirms the impression that religious terms were used as a strong deterrent in situations in which it mattered.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Note that the absence of these religious terms elsewhere does not necessarily entail the absence of a ‘religious’ way of framing of the offence. For example, in one fifth-century inscription, the notion that the god is displeased by a material transgression is expressed rather clearly: this is *CID I 3 (LS 76)*, 475-450 BC: τὸν <φ>οῖνον μὲ φάρην ἐς τοῦ δρ- | ὄμου. αἱ δὲ κα φάρῃι, *ηλιαξάστῳ* τὸν θεὸν *ἠδὲ* κα κεραῖεται καὶ | μεταθυσιάτῳ κάποτεισιάτῳ πέν- | τε δραχμάς, τοῦτου δὲ τῷ κατα- | γορέσαντι τὸ *ἡέμισσον*. | ‘You should not carry the wine from (ἐς is a dialect form for ἐκ) the race- | course. If someone carries it out, he must appease | the god for whom the wine is mixed [i.e. for making a libation in the context of the sacrificial ritual] | he must redo the offering and pay five | drachmas, of this half is for | the one who reports him.’ I am grateful to Folkert VAN STRATEN for bringing this inscription to my attention. This inscription shows exactly the same mentality expressed in the Ialysian text (a transgression in the context of the sanctuary will displease the god, and the upset balance between the human and divine world must be restored), but it happens to express this way of thinking in different terms. Also, PARKER 2004:69-70 n. 44, 47 points out that some sacred laws contain a phrase like ἐνθυμιστὸν αὐτῷ ἔστω (with ἐνθύμιον as an alternative): ‘let it weigh on his conscience’. Both PARKER 1996a [1983]:253 n. 105 and KARILA-COHEN 2010 view this as a religious phrase, denoting a feeling of unease towards the god. I have found one classical epigraphic example in which this term occurs: *LSS 64*, Thasos (end of 5th/beginning of 4th century). This inscription lays down rules for the funeral of dead soldiers. If someone does not oblige, ‘let it weigh upon his mind’ (ἐνθυμιστὸν αὐτῷ ἔστω, l. 5). Also, the responsible magistrates will punish him by the punishments of the law. In this chapter I have not taken such cases into account. Trying to collect other inscriptions that express this mentality in different ways would be an interesting research project in itself.

⁸⁰ Note that a similar analysis of the usage of evaluative terms in legal documents as social and religious deterrents was made by VAN ‘T WOUT (2011a, 2011b 2013), who focused (among other things) on the formula ἄτιμος ἔστω in the entrenchment clause (*sanctio legis*) of formal decrees. VAN ‘T WOUT interpreted this formula, occurring in statements of the type: ‘if anyone subverts the decisions in this decree, he must be ἄτιμος’, in a new way. According to VAN ‘T WOUT ἄτιμος is a social evaluative in all contexts. Against the *communis opinio* that ἄτιμία in legal documents refers to ‘disenfranchisement’ or ‘the loss of citizen rights’ (a standard account is HANSEN 1976:55-97) VAN ‘T WOUT argues that ἄτιμος ἔστω does not prescribe a future action that should be taken against offenders, which is, imposing the alleged legal penalty of ἄτιμία (VAN ‘T WOUT 2011a:151 = 2013:38). Rather, the formula ἄτιμος ἔστω should be seen as a performative, quasi-magical speech act that ‘construes a causal relationship between transgressing against the decree and becoming unable to fulfil one’s social role within the community’ (2011a:151 = 2013:38). The primary aim of

4.2 Religious disqualifications in laws *without* other sanctions

We will turn next to the discussion of inscriptions that explain ritual norms in religious terms, but without adding any threat of punishment for transgressors.

4.2.1 No entry for ξένοι

The first group concerns foreigners (ξένοι), who are barred from entering a sanctuary on the grounds that this is not *ὄσια* or *θέμις*. For example, two such cases originate from Delos, where two lintels were found, presumably with an identical text, containing a prohibition against a stranger:

Lintel A:

Ξένωι οὐχ ὄσῳ ἐσι[έναι].

Lintel B:

Ξένωι οὐχ ὄσῳ ἐσιέναι].⁸¹

The historical status of ξένοι in Greek sanctuaries is a matter of scholarly debate that I take up in Appendix 3. As I will argue in this appendix, my approach is that the Greek world in the fifth and fourth century was *not* characterised by principled (unqualified) openness towards foreigners with exceptional exclusions, nor by principled barring of foreigners. Rather, the manner and degree of integration of ξένοι in religious activities of the *polis* was decided on by individual communities on a case-by-case basis. Assuming such a system, cases in which foreigners were excluded (as in the Delian

the statement ἄτιμος ἔστω is to safeguard a communal decision, by threatening the reader – namely, with a complete *social death* – (2011a:157 = 2013:46, 2011b:132-33) and to coerce compliance in this way (2011a:152 = 2013:40). One could see this statement as the threat of a sanction, even if it is not a fine or penalty. If someone transgresses against the decisions in the decree, he can expect that no one will take heed of him any longer. Although the *consequence* of the loss of one's social position may be the loss of (some or all) citizenship rights, this is not the content of the formula. The formula ἄτιμος ἔστω does not mean that the transgressor should and will be tried in a suit and punished with ἀτιμία, just like ἀσεβῆς ἔστω does not prescribe that the offender will be taken to court on a charge of ἀσέβεια, even though these disqualifications paved the way for a *potential* legal suit.

⁸¹ *ID* 68A and B. BUTZ found the second inscription on the site of Delos and reunited these ‘epigraphical twins’, as she presumes them to be (BUTZ 1994). The second lintel is badly weathered, but the first nine letters can be distinguished. In this publication BUTZ also summarises the earlier scholarship on *ID* 68A and her article is the best starting point for any further study on this inscription. A related publication is BUTZ 1996, a study of the group of four inscriptions prohibiting ξένοι.

lintels, ID 68 A and B above), or in which their participation was otherwise limited, may not have been exceptional. But apparently, explicitly recording such rules (and stating they were ὄσια) was.⁸² If such rules were considered common knowledge among the local worshippers, what were the circumstances under which they were published on stone (*vel sim.*)? This is the question we will attempt to answer in this section.

The original provenance of the two lintels from Delos is uncertain. Although we cannot identify with confidence the doorway over which Lintel A would have been placed, many different scholars have assumed it was located over a door of the Delian Archegesion, presumably the east door (the principal entrance) of this sanctuary.⁸³ Anios, son and priest of Apollo, was believed to be the mythical ἀρχηγέτης of Delos, and the Delian Archegesion was his sanctuary.⁸⁴ This indigenous founder cult of Anios is attested archaeologically and epigraphically on Delos from the archaic period onwards and, presumably, strongly reflected the Delians' own local collective identity.⁸⁵ Concerning their date of composition, BUTZ placed these inscriptions in the late fifth or early fourth century, which gives them a very specific political context. The Delians would not always have had control over the Archegesion or the opportunity to set up this type of inscription: the most likely time they could have done this is during a period of independence. After the end of the Peloponnesian War, Delos enjoyed a short period of such independence. From this period we have a Spartan decree, presumably inscribed on Delos, granting independence to the Delians (ID 87). That text explicitly states that the control over the temple site and its religious activities is given back to the Delians. According to BUTZ the letters of ID 68 bear a striking similarity to those of this Spartan decree, suggesting they were

⁸² According to Patricia BUTZ, in the classical period, ID 68 A and B, IG XII 5 225 and IG XII 7 2 (discussed in the main text below) 'are the only examples found in the epigraphic record prohibiting access to a religious precinct or participation in a religious ritual by the ξένος' (1996:92).

⁸³ The reason to assume it was located over the east door is that the stone's dimensions accord with the dimensions of the doorway (BUTZ 1994:77-80). No consensus or convincing idea has been proposed for the location of the second stone, which is smaller (BUTZ 1994:81-86). Its shape suggests it was part of a keystone construction around a doorway, or a lintel block in its own right (BUTZ 1994:81) and its resemblance to stone A suggests it was part of the same construction. In any case, the fact that it was found in the same area as Lintel A (BUTZ 1994:70) means it would have been somewhere among the buildings belonging to the precinct.

⁸⁴ The term ἀρχηγέτης is an epithet of a hero or god, and refers to the founder or leader of a community (BUTZ 1996:78).

⁸⁵ Archaic archaeological evidence for the sanctuary: cf. the references in BUTZ 1994:88 n.47; archaic epigraphic evidence: ID 30, ID 35.

drawn up in the same context.⁸⁶ Under this interpretation, the law would have been directed against the Athenian ξένοϛ.⁸⁷

If this is the proper temporal placement for this inscription and if the attribution to this specific sanctuary is correct, the motivation for this inscription and its recording of what is ὁσία, then, seems to be a combination of the motivations discussed in section 2.2 above. The inscription may represent the establishment of a new rule after the granted independence. It is also a way of clearly communicating to the outsider, who may not be aware of the rules, that he is not welcome.

We may consider the persuasive force of the document next. The historical context as reconstructed suggests that the stakes were high. The exclusion of (this group of) foreigners at precisely this time, from precisely this sanctuary that represented Delian identity, would be especially understandable. The Delians would have been keen to symbolically assert their new-found independence by keeping the former oppressors out of their local founder's cult. As BUTZ adequately puts it: 'The assertion of Delian control at the Archegesion with an inscription informing of the exclusivity of the cult would be in keeping with this renewal of authority and prestige for the indigenous population and their desire to secure their independence.'⁸⁸

We can also *see* that the stakes were high, because of the way in which (and the care with which) the law was published and made visible in the sanctuary. *ID* 68 is an exceptional case. It was unusual for a Greek to see such a text on a lintel, for inscribed doorways were not a common architectural device in Greece.⁸⁹ The impression of exceptionality is strengthened by what we learn from the formal features of the document: the physiology of the stone itself seems to reflect the value this rule must have had for the community. Lintel A is quite a large stone⁹⁰ with letters that were not only 'beautifully formed' but also 'cut on a monumental scale'

⁸⁶ BUTZ 1994:93-96.

⁸⁷ An alternative dating places the inscription after 314 BC, during a much longer period of Delian independence (until 167 BC), when there was a large number of resident foreigners. This may have created the need to restrict access (BUTZ 1996:81). However, the letterforms 'certainly do not encourage such an interpretation' of putting it at the end of the 4th century or even later (BUTZ 1994:97).

⁸⁸ BUTZ 1996:80.

⁸⁹ BUTZ 1994:98. Lintels are no unusual archaeological findings; therefore the absence of other inscribed lintels among our findings is meaningful.

⁹⁰ The dimensions of the two joined fragments together are 2.60m length, 0.390m height, 0.275m depth.

(BUTZ 1994:71). The law on this large doorway would have been highly visible in the public domain in any case.⁹¹

If this analysis of *ID 68a* is correct, the explicit recording of this *lex sacra* and the usage of ὄσιη in it occur in a particular context in which the observance of the law was felt to be especially important. In the regulations discussed in the previous section of this chapter, religious disqualifications were added to a law that contained a sanction to bolster their persuasive force. But in the case of the Delian law, this way of framing a regulation seems to be an alternative enforcement strategy intended to work on its own, being strong enough in itself.⁹²

Note that the only other known classical law that regulates access for ξένοι, but not employing any religious terms, is of a distinctly different nature. This is a fourth-century law from Amorgos.⁹³ The inscription states that ‘it is not permitted for any foreigner to camp in the Heraion’, without making a religious statement.⁹⁴ This document is an antique version of crowd management. The issue is not the principled exclusion of the outsider on ideological grounds, but the practical manageability of visitors, who might crowd the sanctuary if they use it as a camping site too long. Rather than threatening the visitors with the anger of the gods, the matter is treated in as down-to-earth and pragmatic a way as the problem itself: an official, appointed to enforce the law, has to pay a fine if he fails to enforce it (ten drachmas per foreigner per day).⁹⁵

⁹¹ Finally, the double publication of the law may have been significant. As was argued in the main text above, instances in which multiple stones communicate the same law were not uncommon, but they may have occurred precisely in those cases where a rule carried special weight. Another interpretation is, of course, that the multiple set-up of the same rule was simply a consequence of the practical circumstances, for example, if the sanctuary had multiple entrance points.

⁹² The only other epigraphic case in which the entrance of foreigners is forbidden, but here on the grounds that it is not θέμις, allows for a similar analysis. This inscription (Paros IG XII 5 225, *LSCG* 110) stipulates that the Dorian stranger is excluded from entering a sanctuary belonging to a local cult (perhaps that of Κόρη Ἀστός, BUTZ 1996:82, SOKOLOWSKI, *LSCG ad loc.*). The inscription reads (I present the reading of BUTZ 1996:82): Ξένων Δωριῶν οὐ θέμι[ς ἐσιέναι] | οὔτε δ. . ωια Κό(υ)ρηι ἀστῶι ε[- - - -]. The inscription is cut in monumental letterforms, like *ID 68* (cf. BUTZ 1996:84), and it may likewise have been drawn up in a significant political identity-building context (SOKOLOWSKI, *LSCG ad loc.*).

⁹³ IG XII 7, 2.

⁹⁴ ll. 9-10: μὴ ἐξείναι κατὰ | [γ]εσθαι εἰς τὸ Ἡραῖον ξένων μηδενί. I read κατὰ[γ]εσθαι as ‘turn in and lodge’, following a suggestion made by ZIEHEN LGS II 96 p. 275. The verb occurs with the same meaning in IG V 2,3.

⁹⁵ ll. 12-13.

there was a widespread female exclusion from blood sacrifice, which would have been part and parcel of the religious fundament of Classical Greece, and expressed in terms of ὄσια. Given the wealth of positive evidence on the important roles of women in Greek religion, I will assume a situation of normal inclusion of women with exceptional exclusion. Assuming this view, then, it is logical that the exclusion of women in this cult is made explicit.

What, then, were the circumstances in which women were banned from the sacrificial practice, and in which their presence was explicitly labelled as being against the religious rules? For these texts we have no indication that they represent the installation of a new cult or that the targeted group, the women – insiders – were not aware of the rules and needed to be informed. In the following I will argue, instead, that the persuasive force of the religious language is the most probable reason for the explicit statement that women's participation is οὐχ ὄσια or οὐ θέμις. I will show that the textual contexts around the prohibitions give an indication that these inscriptions represent special, marked cultic situations. Again, overtly adding religious terminology occurs in circumstances in which there is something at stake.⁹⁹ I will analyse all extant cases one by one.

First of all, a prohibition against women occurs next to the announcement that 'no ninth parts are cut' (οὐ[δ']ένατεύεται, l. 4-5) in an early fifth-century *lex sacra* from Thasos, belonging to a cult of Hercules:¹⁰⁰

[Ἡρα]κλεῖ θασίωι
 [αἰγ]α οὐ θέμις οὐ-
 [δὲ] χοῖρον· οὐδὲ γ-
 [υ]νακὶ θέμις· οὐ-
 [δ']ένατεύεται· οὐ- 5
 δὲ γέρα τέμνετα-
 ι· οὐδ' ἀθλέται.¹⁰¹

To Thasian Hercules

It is not *themis* [to sacrifice] a goat

⁹⁹ Our findings will also support a historical analysis of women normally being *included* in the sacrificial ritual: the markedness of almost all other prohibitions surrounding the bans on women strongly implies that the exclusion of women is marked itself. Here I build on the brief point made by OSBORNE 1993:403 concerning LSS 63.

¹⁰⁰ IG XII, Suppl 414 = SEG 2.505. LSS 63.

¹⁰¹ ἀθλέται is commonly interpreted as ἀθλεῖται.

or a young pig. And it is not
themis for a woman [to participate]. No
 ninth parts are cut. No
 gifts of honours are cut.
 No contesting.

We do not know exactly what the rare rule against ‘ninth-parting’ entails. Many scholars think that ἐνατεύειν refers to performing a moirocaust: a sacrificial ritual in which gods receive a larger portion than normal of the sacrificial animal (here: one ninth of the meat),¹⁰² while the majority of the edible parts of the animal are still left for human consumption.¹⁰³ If this interpretation of ἐνατεύειν is correct,¹⁰⁴ the *prohibition* of the moirocaust stipulated in the inscription (the indicative statement οὐδ’ ἐνατεύεται has the illocutionary force of a prohibition) points to one of two things: a holocaust (in which the entire victim is burnt) or a ‘normal’, sacrifice (in which humans eat all the meat and the gods receive only their customary very small portion of the sacrificial animal). We lack the information to make a definite choice,¹⁰⁵ but note that both moirocausts and holocausts were rare, marginal features

¹⁰² CLINTON 1996:170, following earlier scholars, explains that a ninth part would have been a substantial part of the victim.

¹⁰³ The term ‘moirocaust’ was coined by SCULLION 2000:165.

¹⁰⁴ The verb ἐνατεύειν occurs in three other inscriptions, but these do not clarify its meaning. In the sacrificial calendar of Mykonos (*LSCG* 96.23-24) it is prescribed: Σεμέλι ἐτήσιον· τοῦτο ἐνατεύεται ‘A yearling for Semele. This is cut in nine parts’. In a damaged inscription, IG 12 Suppl. 353.9-10, the word [ἐ]νατευθῆι is preserved, too. These texts do not describe what is to be done with the ninth parts. SOKOLOWSKI (commentary to *LSS* 63) suggested that the ninth-sharing referred to cutting the victim into nine parts and putting them on the sacrificial table; one part would go to the cult officials as a kind of tax. A recently discovered fifth-century *lex sacra* from Selinus, Sicily has shed potential new light on the meaning of the verb ἐνατεύειν (*SEG* 43:630). Lines 9-12 of this inscription prescribe burning one of the ninth portions (τῶν μοιρῶν τῶν ἐνάταν κατακαίειν μίαν) for the so-called polluted Tripatores. Various authors have tentatively connected the usage of the verb ἐνατεύειν in this Sicilian inscription to the Thasian text, and suppose, on the basis of this connection, that the verb must refer to burning a ninth portion of a victim for a god. In other words: ἐνατεύειν refers to the practice of a moirocaust (SCULLION 2000:164-66, EKROTH 2007:390; this meaning had already been proposed by STENGEL 1910:132; on the basis of this new evidence, BERGQUIST 2005 has withdrawn her earlier view of ἐνατεύειν as a taxation term in BERGQUIST 1973:70-80). Whether the prohibition of ‘ninth-sharing’ in Thasos really refers to the same procedure as the burning of a ninth part in Sicily, at the other end of the Greek world, remains the question, but at the moment it is the best informed guess for the meaning of ἐνατεύειν on the market.

¹⁰⁵ Most scholars think the prohibition is a downscaling of the ritual of moirocaust into a ‘normal’ sacrifice (BERGQUIST 2005:64, LUPU 2005:373, PARKER 2011:144), but SCULLION 2000:166, with

of Greek cult.¹⁰⁶ Even if the prescription against ninth-parting downscales the ritual into a ‘normal’ sacrifice, this prohibition still functions against a seemingly marked background, in which the worshipper apparently expects he might have to ‘ninth-part’. Note that each of the *other* things this cult group does are also unusual: the prohibition against specific sacrificial animals;¹⁰⁷ the priest not receiving any perquisite (οὐδὲ γέρα τέμνεται);¹⁰⁸ and the prohibition against contesting (οὐδ’ ἄλλεῖται). All of such provisions would have added to the special character of the ritual.

In the sacred law from Lindos quoted above, and reprinted below, prescribing cultic practice for Athena Apotropaea, a prohibition against women on the grounds that their participation is οὐχ ὄσια occurs next to the requirement that the sacrificial meat must be consumed on the spot (expressed as τὰ θυθέντα | αὐτεῖ καταχρηῖσθαι, ll. 4-5).¹⁰⁹

SEYRIG 1927:193-98, thinks the prohibition of a moirocaust means that a holocaust should be performed instead. None of the arguments that has been advanced is really persuasive. Against the idea that this rule prescribes a holocaust, one might say that it could have been phrased more straightforwardly with the term ὀλόκαυτος, as is done in the sacrificial calendar of Erchia (SEG 21:541) and the sacrificial calendar of Thorikos (SEG 33:147). I am grateful to Folkert van Straten for making this suggestion to me. But perhaps people in Thasos did not use this phrase. Who knows? The argument of BERGQUIST 1973:71-2, that it makes no sense to prohibit perquisites in the case of a holocaust, because this is obvious (i.e. because no part of the animal remains to take perquisites from) does not hold. EKROTH 2008:89-90 explains that holocausts mostly involved the burning of a small victim (such as a piglet) entirely. This procedure would have been followed by an ‘ordinary’ *thysia* sacrifice of a larger animal, which was eaten by the worshippers (after the normal small share for the god had been burnt); perquisites and prizes in contests could come from this larger animal.

¹⁰⁶ EKROTH 2008:89-90.

¹⁰⁷ Other gods on Thasos, too, are quite particular when it comes to types of animal they dislike. Cf. IG XII 8.358, *LSCG* 114, found close to this sanctuary of Heracles (early 5th century).

¹⁰⁸ This is highly exceptional, for normally the priest would receive one: sacred laws abound in detailed regulations about these perquisites (VAN STRATEN 1995:154).

¹⁰⁹ Laws with the same gist occur elsewhere, although hardly a handful of similar prescriptions are known to us. I will give an inventory of the extant cases, assembled from examples in different authors. *LSS* 94, 13-14 (Kameiros, 3rd cent., Poseidon): the sacrificial meat is consumed on the spot (κρη αὐτεῖ ἀναλοῦται); *SEG* 35 923 A (Chios, Eileithuia, around 400): the priestess must consume her perquisites on the spot (τὰδε ἀναλ[ι]σκεσθαι αὐτῷ), discussed Appendix 2, n. 34; *LSCG* 96, 26 (Mycene, around 200, Zeus Chthonios and Ge Chthoniē, δαινύσθων αὐτοῦ), perhaps l. 40, but the stone is poorly preserved at this point; *SEG* 38:786 (Rhodes, 3rd cent.): the offerings are consumed on the spot, but note that one essential word (αὐτεῖ) is restored: τὰ θυθέντ[α αὐτεῖ] | καταχρηῖ[σθαι]. Cf. Pausanias 2.27.1, 10.4.10, 10.38.3. We find the same rule a bit more often phrased as a prohibition against carrying away sacrificial meat. 35 cases of this are known to us, but 28 of these are from two calendars. Among the phrases that are used are: οὐκ ἀποφορά, οὐ φορά, μὴ εἶναι

Vacat

[Αθήνα]ι Αποτροπαία[ι]

ῶις· θυέτω ἀρχιερο-

θύτας· τὰ θυθέντα

αὐτεῖ καταχρῆσθαι.

5

γυναῖξί οὐχ ὀσία *vacat*

*vacat*¹¹⁰

To Athena Apotropaia¹¹¹

a sheep. The highest priest must sacri-

fice it. The offerings must be

consumed on the spot.

For women not *hosia*.

The ‘on the spot’-rule is also a special, marked cultic feature. This prescription targets the custom at public sacrifices of distributing (some of) the meat among the participants so that they could consume it later, at home¹¹² stipulates its consumption

ἐκφορήν. VAN STRATEN 1995:145 n. 93 mentions: *LSCG* 18 (sacrificial calendar of Attic deme Erchia, 4th cent., 22 occurrences of οὐ φορά, for different gods among which Hera Thelchinia and Apollo Lyceius); *LSCG* 54, 10-11 (Attica, Asclepius and Hygieia, 1st cent. AD); *LSCG* 69, 31-32 (Oropos, Amphiaraus, 4th cent.); *LSCG* 132, 3 (Thera, Nymphs, 4th cent.); *LSCG* 151 (Cos, 4th century, sacrificial calendar), 6 cases: A 44-45, 57-58, 62 (Dionysos Scyllitas) 59-60 (Demeter); B 4 (Rhea), 24 (Athenaea Machanis); *LSCG* 157 A 5-7 (Cos, fragmentary). To this list SCULLION 2000 adds: *LSAM* 34.7 (Magnesia, Sarapis, late 3rd cent.). Finally, SEG 43:630, A 20 (Selinus, Zeus Meilichius, 5th cent.) belongs to this group as well. This type of rule was apparently well known enough in the classical period for Aristophanes to base a joke on it, discussed in section 2.2 above (Ar. *Pl.* 1138).

¹¹⁰ 4th century, N. Suppl. Epig. Rodio 169 20a; *LSS* 88. The stele was originally placed in front of the temple of Athena and Zeus and contains two cult regulations, one from the 4th and one from the 2nd century BC. The earlier text is quoted here in the main text.

¹¹¹ The name of the Athena is almost entirely restored, but we know this is the goddess involved because of the other, second-century text (*LSS* 88b) which reads: Σμυνθίου τρίται ἐπὶ δέκα· Ζηνὶ Αποτροπαίῳ κριός, | Αθήναι Αποτροπαίαι οἷς· | θύει ἀρχιεροθύτας· τὰ θυθέντα αὐτεῖ καταχρεῖσθαι[ι]. γυναῖξιν οὐκ ὀσία. The second text was the result of a reform in which the two independent cults were united by a single priesthood (*LSS* 88, commentary). The cult of Athena Apotropaia ‘Athena Averter of Evil’ may have been geared at warding off evil. This cult may have revolved around that fact that the relationship with the divine world was potentially disturbed, and the worshippers were dealing with negative natural or divine forces.

¹¹² VAN STRATEN 1995:145.

in the sanctuary after the sacrifice, instead.¹¹³

In a third inscription, the prohibition against women occurs in the context of an exclusive cult, which is also off-limits for the uninitiated. This fifth-century text originates from Paros:¹¹⁴

[᾽]Ὀ]ρος Ὑπατο· ἀτ[ε]-
 [λ]έστοι οὐ θέμ-
[ι]ς, οὐδὲ γυναι-
 [κ]ί.

This is the boundary (of the sanctuary of Zeus) Hypatus.

For an uninitiated person it is not *themis* [to enter]

Nor for a woman.

¹¹³ Why would the ‘on the spot’ rule be marked? The frequent finding of archaeological remains of banqueting halls on Greek *temenoi* (cf. SOKOLOWSKI, comm. on *LSS* 51) clearly show that consuming the meat together, during a communal banquet after the sacrifice, was a common aspect of the ritual. Thus, one could argue that this rule only serves to highlight standard procedure and makes obligatory in particular cases what was common practice anyway. On the other hand: why would the Lindians – and others – have taken the trouble to carve in stone something they would do anyway? Rather, the available epigraphical evidence on this rule shows a conscious and deliberate differentiation between cases in which meat may and must not be carried away; and in this differentiation, prohibitions against taking meat are the marked case. The fact that the prohibitions are marked can be seen especially in the legislation of sacrificial calendars. In such a calendar from the deme Erchia (*LSCG* 18, first half of 4th century) it is explicitly stated that the meat cannot be carried out (οὐ φορά) after some of the public sacrifices (e.g. the sacrifices to Apollo Lykeius (A 3-4) and Hera Thelchinia (A 7-8), whereas no prescription about consumption is made for other events in the same calendar (e.g. the sacrifices to Apollo Apotropaeus (A 32-33) or Athena Polias (A 62-63). In the calendar of Cos (*LSCG* 151, middle of 4th century) a young pig and a kid must be sacrificed to Dionysos Skyllitas, and it is expressly forbidden to carry away of the meat of the pig, but nothing is said about the consumption of the kid (ll. 44-45, and 57-58). The opposite, a φορά rule, stipulating that meat *can* be carried out, does not seem to occur. SCULLION 1994:101 mentions two alleged such cases in *LSCG* 151 B 8, D 2 and D4, but of these the first regards the perquisite of the priest, and in the second and third case, 12 to 14 letters before ἀποφορά are restored, so the text could have been a prohibition against carrying away as well as the explicit permission it is taken for now. Finally, note that evidence for banquets (in the form of banqueting halls) is not necessarily evidence against meat being taken out. Probably, portions of meat were normally distributed for home consumption even *after* communal banquets (PARKER 2011:284-85).

¹¹⁴ IG XII 5 183, *LSCG* 109. N.B. This inscription, a boundary stone, in contrast to (3-5) above, seems aimed at prohibiting the entrance of women to the sanctuary altogether.

Whatever kind of secret cult the law belonged to,¹¹⁵ as SOKOLOWSKI has pointed out, the cult of Zeus Hypatus was associated elsewhere with a number of other non-standard rules such as the prescription for wineless offerings. The ritualistic context for the ban on women here, too, may have been part of such a special context, though it is not explicit in the text.

With respect to these inscriptions, this is all the information that we have and we have to try and make inferences on this scarce basis. What kind of historical context do these inscriptions seem to have been part of? The stipulation of deviant and non-standard procedures, such as we see recurring in all of these short texts, could be part of a desire to create a special relationship between a local group of worshippers with their own god, and so promote the self-identity of the group as being tied to a particular god for whom a particular ritual is performed. In the case of the (supposed) religious sect of Zeus Hypatus the desire to create an exclusive group identity based on the opposition between in- and outsider is evident. In the cult of Athena Apotropaea, consuming all the meat in the sanctuary had at least two goals: it gave more significance to the ritual and strengthened social cohesion at the same time. Sitting down to the meal together in the presence of the god prolonged the ritual activity and may have been perceived as giving the ritual extra effectiveness; it also strengthened the ties between humans and the involved gods, as well as amongst themselves. If participants of the ritual did not each return to their individual homes (perhaps, after a quick post-sacrificial bite together) to eat privately, but instead sat down for a meal at the sanctuary premises, this must have had a positive community-building effect.¹¹⁶

The fourth inscription with a prohibition against women may be analysed in a similar way. This fourth-century law, a small marble *stèle* found on Rhodes, reads:

¹¹⁵ SOKOLOWSKI (*LSCG* 109, commentary) has connected the law to a Pythagorean sect, due to the influence of the Pythagoreans on Paros.

¹¹⁶ cf. EKROTH 2002:324, *contra* SCULLION 1994:101, who considered these enforced meals to make a ‘gloomy contrast to the relaxation of a festive dinner at home’. SCULLION said the οὐ φopά rule belonged to moirocaust rituals and supposed that people accepted such depressing dinners only because they were better than the holocaust (in which there was no food for the participants at all) that was the alternative to such moirocausts. But as was discussed above (n. 105 of this section), holocausts normally involved the burning of a smaller victim entirely, followed by the ‘regular’ sacrifice of a larger victim, of which the worshippers could eat the normal share. Besides, the evidentiary basis of SCULLION’s contention is not strong: it seems to be based to a large extent on one very ‘late and bizarre’ cult mentioned in the Orphic *Lithika* (SCULLION 1994:105-06).

Ἵακιν[θίο]υ ἐνδε-
 κάται Διὶ Ἀμαλῶ[ι]
 κάπρος ἐξάμην[ος].
 θύει ἱεροθύτας
 Αἰγίλιος.¹¹⁷ γυναίξι
 ὄκ (*sic*) ὄσία. *vacat*¹¹⁸

On the eleventh day of the month
 Hyacinthus to Zeus Amalus
 a boar of six months old.
 The sacrificing priest makes the offering,
 an Aegelian. For women
 not *hosia*.

In this *lex sacra*, the prohibition against women occurs next to a provision for the sacrifice of a wild boar. Given our lack of knowledge about this cult, it is difficult to tell why Zeus Amalus specifically wants a boar of six months,¹¹⁹ but what we do know is that this is hardly the standard choice of a sacrificial animal: the evidence for the sacrifices of boars seems limited to a handful of cases, very much spread out in time.¹²⁰ The relatively rare provisions for, or prohibitions against, more particular types of animal such as a wild boar here are marked, because such rules make the assumption that a particular god will be pleased with that highly specific type of animal over others. Articulating such knowledge of the god's special "favourite meal"

¹¹⁷ Αἰγίλιος refers to the name of a Rhodian local division (called κροίνα), which is similar to an Attic deme. WINAND 1990:58-59.

¹¹⁸ Lindos II 26, *LSS* 89.

¹¹⁹ The only thing we know is that this title of Zeus is connected with the young goat Amalthia, which suckled the young Zeus in Crete, but what (if anything) this has to do with the prescribed sacrificial animal is unclear. Cf. CRAIK 1980:155. In any case, it is likely that the meat of a half-year-old wild boar is especially good: this animal is born in the spring, its meat is the most fatty and tasty in winter. Moreover, younger boars (until around 4 months old) have a striped and speckled coat (<http://www.britishwildboar.org.uk/index.htm?Coats.html>) which may have impaired their perceived ritual 'purity', and of course, being smaller, they provide less meat.

¹²⁰ SEG 31.122 (Attica, to Heracles, 2nd cent. AD), *LSCG* 65.34, 69 (Andania, to Apollo Carneius, 92), *LSCG* 96.17 (Mykonos, to Kore, ca. 200), *LSS* 85.20-30 (Lindos, to Enyalios, 440-420, but partially restored: [κα][π]ρος), plus the inscription discussed here. I owe this collection to LUPU 2005:188 n. 39. The word κάπρος can refer to a domestic pig, but in that case we would rather expect ὄς.

could well be a strategy intended to consolidate such a special bond between the god and his worshippers, and consequently strengthen the identity of the group itself.

To conclude, the prohibitions against women may have been part of sets of exceptional, cult-specific arrangements designed to construe a contrastive, special identity and to establish an individual relationship for the community in question with a god.¹²¹ The analysis suggests an interpretation of these laws not as informing the diligent worshipper who wants to know about all the trivial minor details of cult, but rather as attempts at creating a special (religious) group-identity. This is an entirely different context for the prohibitions οὐχ ὄσια and οὐ θέμις than PARKER would suggest.

5. Conclusion

We started this chapter with a sacred law prohibiting the introduction of animals and certain objects into a local sanctuary on the grounds that this is ‘not ὅσιον’. This inscription is exceptional. In practical laws dealing with human and animal presence in sanctuaries, as well as in purity regulations, offences are hardly ever explicitly conceptualised as religiously undesirable behaviour (e.g. by means of the terms ἀσέβεια or ‘not ὅσιον’). Even though caring for purity and the protection of the sanctuary and its surroundings would be considered ὅσιος, threats to the sacred property and a religious site itself were hardly ever explicitly framed as impieties. More generally, we should note that ὄσια and ὅσιος occur quite infrequently in fifth- and fourth-century inscriptions. It was pointed out that although many extant sacred laws deal with the who, what, where, when and how of ritual practice, they do not

¹²¹ SOKOŁOWSKI gave an interpretation of the *lex sacra* for Heracles Thasios along similar lines, pointing out that each of the prescribed rules (no perquisite, no contesting, no ninth-parts, no women) is not only marked but has the specific result of making available shares of the victim normally not destined for human consumption (of course the prohibition against women can only be interpreted in this way if we assume that women normally shared in the meat). The prohibition against ‘contesting’ would entail that no part of the sacrificial victim needs to be given to the prize winner of such a contest, a procedure described e.g. in *LSCG* 98.32-6 and *LSS* 61.79-81. Thus, SOKOŁOWSKI saw this inscription as an “advertisement” for a cult in which (male) worshippers were attracted by the exclusiveness of the ritual and the promise of larger shares of food. If that strategy, as hypothesised by SOKOŁOWSKI, was successful, these measures would certainly have given a boost to the cult in question and would thus have helped to forge a stronger collective identity for the cult group. The exclusion of women in these inscriptions on the grounds that it displeases the god (not ὄσια or θέμις) may have been part of such self-fashioning of identity of the relevant cult groups. Moreover, the measure would have been more than a mere symbolic marker of contrastiveness: we can imagine that men-only rituals would have given these cults a special atmosphere and uniqueness.

refer to these rules as ὄσια. Thus, many more sacred laws could be claimed to concern ὄσια than those that overtly designate rules as such.

These observations beg the question of the weight which ‘not ὄσιον’ or ‘not ὄσια’ were supposed to carry in sacred laws. A question that has been posed in the scholarship is whether religious prohibitions appear in authoritative, important laws, or rather in regulations that present minor and trivial details of the cultic practice.

To create a background for studying these questions, we first discussed the usage of *hosios & cognates* when they relate to cult in the literary sources. We investigated the functions of explicitly mentioning what is ὄσιος or ὄσια with respect to cultic practice in these literary sources, and isolated four reasons for doing so. Speakers mention that a particular ritual action is ὄσιη or ὄσιος at the institution of a new cult or the custom in question; when an insider explains a particular cult rule to an outsider; when these notions are used for dramatic characterisation; and to persuade someone of the reasonability and importance of a particular action.

With this knowledge, we returned to the epigraphic sources in order to determine the function of the explicit mentioning of ὄσια in the inscriptions in which this term appears. We first studied the context of the Ialysian law and one other law from Cos in which a religious disqualification was added to another sanction. In the second part of the chapter we examined two groups of inscriptions without other explicit sanctions, which excluded either ξένοι or women from sanctuaries and/or the ritual activities, on the grounds that their presence or participation is not ὄσια.

My conclusion is that employing the religious terms ἀσέβεια and οὐχ ὄσιον / ὄσια in sacred laws is an alternative or additional strategy in laws, used occasionally in the classical period. When this strategy is used, this is not in situations of indifference. DELLI PIZZI has characterised the offences in the inscriptions from Ialysos and Kos as ‘trivial’.¹²² My conclusion is the contrary: the (exceptional) religious terminology in these and the other discussed texts is found when those who created the decrees for some reason *did* want to present committing these offences as serious.

When laws add the statement that a transgression is religiously undesirable to the imposition of a fine, these are serious attempts to strengthen its persuasive force. In my view, these mechanisms were intended to add to the enforceability of a decree. The studied laws against foreigners and women, in which (only) the explicit formula

¹²² DELLI PIZZI 2011:76; A similar statement occurs on p. 72: ‘in the case of trials involving an impiety, the offences are very serious and threaten the harmony of the city itself ... In the case of preventive laws, however, one can hardly assume that carrying away pieces of wood from a sanctuary or bringing in one’s cattle is such a threat to the society.’

οὐχ ὀσία / οὐ θέμις occurs, but no other sanction, are not ‘sanction-free’. Rather, they contain a strong implicit sanction (the threat of divine retribution). Just like in the literary sources, saying something is (not) ὀσία is a rhetorical instrument. That is, the word is used with the intention to persuade and the reasonable expectation of doing so. As I have argued in the second part of the chapter, these rules do not deal with trivial details, issues about which the Greeks did not feel the need to enforce them with secular sanctions. On the contrary: we can see the explicit statement that something is οὐχ ὀσία as a marker of the perceived high importance of a situation. The rituals described in this section sometimes included aspects that seemingly found their explanation in the social, political or practical context of the cult in question. By calling the rules ὀσία, they were framed as essential to the relevant god and to the community that identified itself by means of their covenant with the god, consisting of a collection of such rules.

7

The semantic paradox

In this chapter we will finally turn to one of most perplexing (alleged) semantic characteristics of ὅσιος: the supposition that this term can express two opposite, and mutually exclusive, meanings: ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’, besides the core meaning ‘pious’ (Q2a). This purported paradox was the starting point of VAN DER VALK (1942), in an influential article that forms the basis of many persistent modern misconceptions about the semantics of *hosios & cognates*. In this chapter I will examine VAN DER VALK’s theory and the history of scholarship on this matter. We will then solve this difficult issue.

In order to understand how the relevant passages work, it was necessary first to get a better insight into the semantic scope of *hosios & cognates*, into the similarities and differences between *hosios & cognates* and their near-synonyms (their distributions, the way they frame events and their (un)markedness in different contexts), and into the persuasive usage of these terms. Having considered all these matters in the previous chapters, we may return to the paradox now.

The organisation of the chapter is text-based: we will discuss all cases in our corpus that have been adduced by scholars, dictionaries and commentators as instances of ὅσιος as ‘sacred’ or ‘profane’.

1. *Status quaestionis* and analysis of the problem

The alleged semantic paradox of ὅσιος was firmly established by the end of the 19th century.¹ The scholarship on this aspect of the semantics of ὅσιος in the 20th and 21st century has been determined mostly by VAN DER VALK, who wrote two articles (1942 & 1951) on the usages of ὅσιος as ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’.

Perhaps the most well-known example of the supposed usage of ὅσιος as ‘profane’ is the case of money: in the fifth century, but more commonly in the fourth, public funds are referred to as ἱερά and ὅσια monies (χρήματα).² In this division, the first category denotes money that is the property of the gods. VAN DER VALK saw the second type as ‘profane’ money, i.e. money of which humans could freely dispose, because the gods could lay no claim to it.³ Another classic example where ὅσιος allegedly means ‘profane’ occurs in Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata*. In this comedy one of the women in a sex-strike claims she is about to give birth on the Acropolis (a place that is obviously holy, ἱερός). The woman expresses a wish to go to a ὄσιον χωρίον, according to VAN DER VALK a ‘profane spot’, instead.⁴ VAN DER VALK also discusses three Herodotean cases in which he argues that the verb ἀφοσιῦσθαι is used in the sense of ‘freeing oneself of one’s religious obligations’.⁵ In the best-known passage, Herodotus narrates how every Babylonian woman has sex with a stranger once in her life to serve Aphrodite. Afterwards, ἀποσιωσαμένη, according to VAN DER VALK, ‘having made herself ὄσιος, free with respect of her duties to the goddess’, she can go home.

As VAN DER VALK argued, ὄσιος was used in an exactly opposite sense, too, meaning ‘holy’ or ‘consecrated’, ‘dedicated to the gods’⁶ for example in the case of the ὄσιοι initiates (μύσται) in Aristophanes’ *Frogs*, who are ‘consecrated’ or ‘holy’.⁷ A second alleged example of this usage is found in Euripides’ *Iphigenia in Tauris*,

¹ For example, as BLOK 2010:62 points out, BUCK 1889 already assumed that the ὄσιον money in IG I³ 253 (the first mention of such money) was ‘secular’.

² e.g. D. 24 e.g. 9.9, 11.2, 111.6, Pl. *Lg.* 957b5, [Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 30.2.6.

³ VAN DER VALK 1942:114, 121. The formula ἱερά καὶ ὅσια is used in other ways in fourth century literary texts where, according to VAN DER VALK, the combination expresses a similar contrast.

⁴ VAN DER VALK 1942:120: ‘ὄσιον steht hier gegenüber ἱερόν und wird synonym mit βέβηλον verwendet.’ The other examples of ὄσιος as ‘profane’ from the classical period, as presented by VAN DER VALK are: X. *HG* 3.3.1, Hdt. 1.199, Hdt. 4.154, Aeschin. 1.23.

⁵ VAN DER VALK 1942:119-20.

⁶ VAN DER VALK 1942:125-26, e.g. ‘... fünf Bedeutungssphären ... wobei als merkwürdigste auffiel die Bedeutung nicht-heilig, profan, menschlich. Merkwürdiger jedoch wird der Sachverhalt, wenn wir ersehen, das ὄσιος auch in der entgegengesetzten Bedeutung verwendet wird. Es ist nämlich auffällig aber unanfechtbar, dass ὄσιον mit seinen Komposita nicht nur bedeutet reinmachen, von Befleckung befreien, sondern auch heiligen, weihen und also synonym mit ἱεροῦν u.s.w. ist.’ (125)

⁷ VAN DER VALK 1942:128. E. *IT* 1320.

where a messenger says that priestess Iphigenia ‘consecrated’ (καθωσιώσατο) a victim to the goddess Artemis.⁸

In the first article (1942), VAN DER VALK set out to *explain* the relationships in meaning between these apparently contradictory usages of ὅσιος as ‘sacred’, ‘pious’ and ‘profane’.⁹ As was briefly explained in Chapter 1 of this thesis, according to VAN DER VALK, first of all, the semantic link between the purported meanings ‘pious’ and ‘profane’ of ὅσιος is that they represent two points on a temporal line of a man’s relationship to the gods.¹⁰ VAN DER VALK argues that the man who is fulfilling his duties towards the gods is ὅσιος in the sense that he is ‘pious’, but he is also holy (ιερός), because he is bound to the gods. When the worshipper has fulfilled his obligations towards the gods, he is ὅσιος in a different sense: he is free from the gods, the gods do not have any claims on him. In other words: he is ‘profane’.¹¹ By analogy, objects or places that are ὅσιον are those that are at the free disposal of humans: they are ‘profane’ in the sense that they are not in the possession of the gods or dedicated to them, and accordingly the gods cannot lay any claims to them.¹² Secondly, VAN DER VALK argues that the origin of the alleged meaning ‘holy, sacred’ lies in the usage of ὅσιος for initiands of special cults. While being ὅσιος always entailed being ritually ‘pure’, followers of these cults had their own, more stringent criteria of purity. A special purification separated these worshippers from all other people. According to VAN DER VALK such a purification (ὁσιότης) was at the same time a consecration, and this is how the meaning ‘consecrated’ arises.¹³

As was mentioned, VAN DER VALK’s interpretation of ὅσιος has been extremely influential. Shortly after the appearance of VAN DER VALK’s article, JEANMAIRE reinterpreted the usage of ὁσίη in the Homeric Hymns on the basis of this semantic

⁸ VAN DER VALK 1942:126. The other examples from the classical period for this usage given by VAN DER VALK are: *Ar. Pl.* 660, *E. Cret.* 475 15, *E. Ba.* 113, *Ar. Ra.* 327, *Pl. Plt.* 363c.

⁹ In this antonymic pair, ‘sacred’ means set apart for, dedicated or exclusively appropriated to some religious purpose or a god/ the gods in general. Conversely, ‘profane’ is everything that does not relate to, or is not devoted to gods. What is ‘profane’ is secular, unconsecrated, lay, civil. N.B. in the scholarly discussion about ὅσιος, the term ‘profane’ is not used in the pejorative sense ‘irreverent, blasphemous, impious’, which is perhaps the common meaning of this word in modern English.

¹⁰ Chapter 1, section 2.2. ‘points on a temporal line’: MAFFI’s paraphrase (1982:39), not VAN DER VALK’s words.

¹¹ VAN DER VALK 1942:119-21. e.g. 119: ‘ὅσιος ist der Mensch, der alle seine geforderten Pflichten den Göttern gegenüber erfüllt hat oder erfüllen will, an dem die Götter also nichts aussetzen können, einer der *frei ist den Göttern gegenüber*. ... Der ὅσιος [Mensch] hat sich von seinen Pflichten den Göttern gegenüber losgemacht, er ist frei von ihnen, nicht-ιερός.’

¹² MAFFI 1982:38-39 explains how VAN DER VALK may have arrived at this theory. This idea may have depended on a mistaken reading of WILAMOWITZ 1920:42-43 through LATTE 1920 p. 55 n.16.

¹³ VAN DER VALK 1942:128-29.

description of ὄσιος.¹⁴ JEANMAIRE's argument was twofold. First, he argued that ὄσις is a 'rite d'affranchissement' or 'rite de désacralisation' in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, that is, it is a rite that makes someone or something ὄσιος: 'free (of obligations towards the gods)', 'profane'. Furthermore, JEANMAIRE argued that ὄσις is the *result* of such a rite, namely, the desacralised part of sacrificial meat in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*. VAN DER VALK responded to JEANMAIRE's article with some adjustments and a more sophisticated version of JEANMAIRE's proposal that suited his own views even more closely. VAN DER VALK 1951 proposed that ὄσις in the Homeric Hymns refers in some cases to a 'rite de désacralisation', but in other passages describes the opposite, a 'rite sacré/solemnel', 'usage religieux'.¹⁵

In later scholarship, VAN DER VALK's 1942/1951 reading of ὄσιος has been widely adopted. The reading 'profane' occurs in authoritative dictionaries¹⁶ and this view is found in the work of influential scholars of the 20th century, such as BENVENISTE, BURKERT and PARKER.¹⁷ Very recent studies, such as an article by SCULLION, still confidently embrace the semantic paradox.¹⁸

However, there are at least three reasons why this semantic paradox is suspect. I will present a general linguistic argument, a historical argument and an argument based on the lexical semantics of *hosios* & *cognates*. First, then, the linguistic argument. If we accept VAN DER VALK's interpretation of these famous passages, the term ὄσιος expresses both a removal from and an approximation to the divine: ὄσιος

¹⁴ JEANMAIRE 1945:72-74.

¹⁵ This, according to VAN DER VALK is similar to the way in which the verb ὀσιοῦν could signify 'to make something profane' but also 'to make something sacred' (1942:125).

¹⁶ CHANTRAINE 1968-80:831 mentions this usage; the reading profane also occurs in MONTANARI, the most important Italian dictionary (s.v. ὄσιος a) and in LSJ, the most important dictionary of Ancient Greek in the English language. According to the new (ninth) edition of LSJ (completed 1940), s.v. ὄσιος I 2 opp. ἱερός is 'permitted or not forbidden by divine law, profane, ἱερά καὶ ὄ. things sacred and profane.' The New Supplement added to LSJ in 1996 does not change the 'profane' part, although other additions have been made to the lemma.

¹⁷ BENVENISTE 1969:199, BURKERT 1985:269-70: '*hosios* is to be understood from its contrast to *hieros*. If the money which belongs to the gods is *hieros*, then all the rest is *hosion* – one may dispose of it. If festival days bring duties and prohibitions, the normal days are *hosiai*. etc. ... [in *h.Merc.* 130] *hosios* designates the desacralisation after sacralisation.' BURKERT 2011, 176: 'wer religiöse Pflichten absolviert hat, ist ... *hosios*.' PARKER 1996b:123: 'meetings of the assembly had a divided agenda, at which sacred matters (*hiera*) preceded profane (*hosia*),' with n. 9 on 123-24: 'ὄσια are "things which may be freely discussed or disposed of without offense to the gods"' (cf. Parker, *Miasma* 330).

¹⁸ SCULLION 2005:113: '... the Greeks made both a conceptual and a linguistic distinction between sacred and profane ... Greek ... *does* have a vocabulary of the profane. There is first of all the common phrase τὰ ἱερά καὶ τὰ ὄσια 'sacred matters and secular (or profane) matters ... ὄσια 'profane', varies in this polar pairing with ἴδια or δημόσια.'

means both ‘bound to the gods’ and ‘free from the gods’. In principle, it is not completely unthinkable that ὅσιος would have two such contradictory meanings. There are many cross-linguistic examples of words that allegedly mean *x* and the opposite of *x*; this phenomenon would be a facet of polysemy and is commonly referred to as auto-antonymy or contranymy.¹⁹ However, even if we accept the existence of such a phenomenon,²⁰ it is rare – obviously because such usage of language is extremely uneconomic. Therefore, on linguistic grounds we should *a priori* assume that ὅσιος is not an auto-antonym.²¹

Secondly, strong objections have been made to VAN DER VALK’s thesis on historical grounds. VAN DER VALK’s interpretation of the opposition between ἱερά and ὄσια rests on scholarship that takes the distinction between ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ as a fundamental organisational principle of religion. This contrast became firmly established as an organisational principle in religious studies from the early 20th century onwards.²² SÖDERBLOM stated that ‘there is no real religion without a distinction between holy and profane’; DURKHEIM that ‘cette division des choses en sacrées et en profanes ... on trouve à la base de toutes les religions’.²³ In later scholarship, building on those views, it was proposed that the secularisation and rationalisation of the early *polis* and its laws caused religion to become isolated as a distinct domain. This is how the realm of the ‘sacred’ (state religion, everything to do with the gods) and the realm of the ‘profane’ (*polis* government and laws) became separated.²⁴

¹⁹ Other terms for the same are: antagonym, Janus word. English examples include adjectives, nouns and verbs. For example, ‘bound’ can mean ‘moving’, e.g. ‘bound for Amsterdam’, but also ‘tied up, unable to move’. ‘Oversight’ is watchful control, but an oversight is something not noticed. The verb ‘to sanction’ means both ‘to authorise, permit’ and ‘to punish, penalise’ and when putting seeds into a field, one ‘seeds’ it, but when ‘seeding’ tomatoes before using them in a salad, one removes the seeds (examples from HERMAN 2013).

²⁰ The examples in the previous note are not completely convincing cases of auto-antonymy. If we assume that ‘to seed’ means ‘to do something with seeds’, there is no semantic paradox in the verb, although it may refer to dissimilar actions. If someone is ‘bound for Amsterdam’ he or she is determined to go to Amsterdam, and we could say the person is ‘unable to move’ from that determination.

²¹ RUDHARDT has also stated we cannot admit two opposite meanings for ὅσιος and rejects the translation ‘profane’. Still, he follows VAN DER VALK’s article (RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:33-34).

²² As BREMMER (1988:24-28) explains, we find this contrast first in SMITH’S 1889 *Lectures on The Religion of the Semites*, with further consolidation of the idea in work by (among others) SÖDERBLOM and DURKHEIM, see main text and n. 23 below.

²³ SÖDERBLOM 1918, lemma ‘holiness’; DURKHEIM 1914:217.

²⁴ Most importantly, VERNANT 1962, but he was influenced by a whole field of earlier scholars, such as GERNET 1951:21-119, GERNET 1968:175-260, BUSOLT, SWOBODA & JANDEBEUR 1920-26 and PAOLI (his views are summarised in BISCARDI-CANTARELLA 1974 [1961]:1-29, 151-69) and

MAFFI and CONNOR are the most important early opponents of this background to VAN DER VALK's work. MAFFI has shown that the reading of ὄσιος as 'sacred' vs. 'profane' rests on a fundamentally mistaken perception of the classical Greek *polis*. According to MAFFI, the abovementioned view of (the separation of) the 'sacred' and 'profane' in the classical *polis* is mistaken. Rather than dividing the world into two opposite realms, the Greeks saw their world as being permeated or suffused by the divine. There was no non-religious or 'profane' sphere.²⁵ CONNOR reached the same conclusion.²⁶ And as SAMONS put it more recently: 'the modern concept of a "secular" sphere – sanctioned by men but from which the gods are excluded – probably would have seemed to be a ludicrous concept to Athenians of the fifth century.'²⁷ Based on this historical view, we should expect that ὄσιος does not mean 'profane'.

Thirdly, in our study of the semantics of ὄσιος we have made observations related to the historical characterisation above. As we have seen in this thesis, the sense of 'piety' captured by τὸ ὄσιον entails performing beneficial actions towards gods and fellow humans throughout time, throughout one's life. This is because ὄσιος evaluates the long-term reciprocal relationships with gods and between humans in a small group of themes. Gift-giving to gods and being respectful and caring for, for example, one's parents is an ongoing business. As we saw, ὄσιος (and εὐσεβής) refer to individual actions within these long-term relationships, and it is hard to disconnect actions from the attitude of humans who are in the pious frame of mind that makes them carry out these continuous obligations (Chapters 3).²⁸ But it is not possible to 'pay off' all of one's obligations towards the gods or towards humans in those relations of special interest to gods, at a particular given moment. Persons who say of themselves or others that they are ὄσιος do not mean that they are free of the gods, but rather express their action as part of an ongoing relationship with gods (Chapter 2).²⁹ It is, therefore difficult to imagine a person who is 'profane', or 'free from the gods'. Moreover, it was argued that the close similarities between ὄσιος and εὐσεβής make a

FUSTEL DE COULANGES 1864:376. I owe these references to MAFFI 1982:35-36.

²⁵ In fact, VAN DER VALK observed in his own work (1942:121) that in the classical Greek world everything was considered to be permeated by the divine. MAFFI 1982:39 already noted this inconsistency in VAN DER VALK's argument.

²⁶ CONNOR 1988. I will discuss the views of MAFFI 1982 and CONNOR 1988 in more detail below, section 3 of this chapter. There I will also explain how these authors interpret the relationship of τὰ ἱερά and τὰ ὄσια.

²⁷ SAMONS 2000:327. Cf. BRUIT-ZAIDMAN & SCHMITT-PANTEL 1992:92.

²⁸ Chapter 3, section 3.7.

²⁹ Chapter 2, section 4.

translation of ὄσιος as ‘profane’ unlikely (Chapter 3).³⁰

Thus, we have at least three motivations to assume the alleged usages of ὄσιος as ‘profane’ and ‘holy’ should be explained in a different way instead. Indeed, accepting the historical argument of MAFFI and CONNOR, many scholars are now convinced that there is no inherent semantic tension in ὄσιος of the type VAN DER VALK presupposes. CHADWICK adequately summarised their view when he stated: ‘the meaning *profane* [for ὄσιος] may be safely banished from our lexica.’³¹ However, as we have seen, the acceptance of the paradox persists in other scholarship. In this chapter we will revisit this issue in a text-based treatment. I will analyse all supposed cases in which the meaning ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ manifests itself in our corpus and argue for a different analysis in each case.

2. The semantic paradox in three famous cases

We will start by analysing three passages that have often been quoted as examples of the paradoxical semantics of ὄσιος. As we will see, in these cases it is possible to explain the usage of ὄσιος on the basis of prototypical applications of this term elsewhere.

2.1 The Athenian plague

In Thucydides’ description of the Athenian plague (430-428 BC), it is explained how the plague caused the complete disruption of social order and the neglect of proper burial rituals (2.52.2-4). The author notes that

νεκροὶ ἐπ’ ἀλλήλοις <καὶ>³² ἀποθνήσκοντες ἕκειντο καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκαλινδοῦντο καὶ περὶ τὰς κρήνας ἀπάσας ἡμιθνήτες τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπιθυμία. τὰ τε ἱερὰ ἐν οἷς ἐσκήνηντο νεκρῶν πλέα ἦν, αὐτοῦ ἐναποθνησκόντων· ὑπερβιαζομένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅτι γένωνται, ἐς ὀλιγορίαν ἐτράποντο καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὀσίων ὁμοίως. νόμοι τε πάντες ξυνεταράχθησαν οἷς ἐχρῶντο πρότερον περὶ τὰς ταφάς, ἔθαπτον δὲ ὡς ἕκαστος ἐδύνατο.³³

³⁰ Chapter 3, section 3.7.

³¹ CHADWICK 1996:226. The same view is taken by e.g. RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:36 (although RUDHARDT still follows VAN DER VALK’s reading of being ‘free from the gods after fulfilling one’s obligations towards them’ on the same page), SAMONS 2000 (discussed in main text below), SAMONS 2004:221 n.21, 270, JAY-ROBERT 2009:12, BLOK 2009, 2010, 2011, *forthc. a, forthc. c.*

³² GOMME 1956.

³³ Th. 2.52.

corpses and dying men lay on top of one another and half dead men rolled about in the streets and around all the springs, in their desire for water. The sanctuaries in which people were camping were full of the dead, since they died right there. For when the disaster was oppressing them, humans, not knowing what would become of them, turned to contempt of *hiera* and *hosia* alike. All established customs which they had observed before that time with respect to burial were thrown into disorder, and they buried the dead in any way possible.

This is supposedly the first attested text in which the combination of τὰ ἱερά and τὰ ὄσια expresses a contrast between the ‘sacred and profane’, i.e. religious and non-religious matters. As MIKALSON observed well, Thucydides’ description reflects ‘the depth of the breakdown of the social fabric and of religious practices’ during this catastrophe.³⁴ Correspondingly, the phrase ἐς ὀλιγορίαν ἐτράποντο καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὀσίων has been interpreted by commentators as a general description of the religious and secular disintegration during the plague. That is to say, the phrase has been read as having a wide scope, expressing in general terms that, in this moral crisis, humans neglected every prescription, ‘divine and humans laws’,³⁵ ‘the sacred and the secular/profane’³⁶ alike.³⁷

However, rather than reading such a contrast into this phrase, we may also interpret τὰ ἱερά and τὰ ὄσια separately, on the basis of the attested ranges of usage of both terms in fifth-century texts. First, τὰ ἱερά are ‘the things of the gods’. The expression, interpreted in a wide sense, refers to the collective of festivals and cults for the dead and gods. Used in this way, τὰ ἱερά comes very close to our term ‘religion’.³⁸ Furthermore, τὰ ἱερά also refers to individual concrete objects, designating those items that humans have offered to the gods by placing them in a sacred area (by that act consecrating them). Thirdly, τὰ ἱερά is the plural of τὸ ἱερόν, and as such refers to ‘sanctuaries’. I suggest that τὰ ἱερά is used in the third sense here. By leaving corpses lying around in temples, the Athenians definitely showed a ‘contempt’ (ὀλιγορία) for the ‘sanctuaries’ (τὰ ἱερά). Birth and death in a sacred areas were impieties because they caused a μιάσμα in the holy place.³⁹

³⁴ MIKALSON 1984:218.

³⁵ CLASSEN & STEUP 1914 [1862], GOMME 1956, *ad loc.*

³⁶ EATOUGH 1971:243; RHODES 1988, RUSTEN 1989, HORNBLOWER 1991, *ad loc.*; LSJ s.v. I 2.

³⁷ CONNOR 1988:167-68.

³⁸ PARKER 2005a: 61, RUDHARDT 2008:132.

³⁹ e.g. Th. 1.134. Cf. PARKER 1984:33 n.5. MOULINIER 1952:205-12.

Moreover, by failing to perform the usual burial customs (νόμοι),⁴⁰ the Athenians neglected ὄσια (or ὄσια). As we have seen in Chapter 2, the care for the dead – both during the funeral and by the rites performed for them regularly afterwards – was frequently evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates*.⁴¹ Moreover, as Thucydides states, not only did people not observe the ritual norms for their own relatives, they also interfered with other people’s funerals by stealing the wood of their funeral pyres or heaping their own friends’ bodies on top of them.⁴² Thus, there is an explanation of ὄσια in the immediate context. People showed contempt of τὰ ὄσια by demonstrating a complete disrespect towards the dead and the established customs surrounding their burial and posthumous worship.

Read in this way, the combination *ἱερὰ καὶ ὄσια* can be understood well on the basis of the semantic knowledge we already have on these terms each individually. We may interpret: ‘people turned to equal contempt of sanctuaries and the care due to the dead’. It is not necessary to read a contrast between ‘the sacred and the profane’ into this passage.

2.2 The horse ritual at Onchestus

The interpretation ‘profane’ has also been given to an instance of ὄσιη in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*.⁴³ The Homeric Hymn to Apollo describes a procedure having to do with chariots, horses and their drivers at the sanctuary of Poseidon at Onchestus (229-238). At the end of his description, the poet emphasizes that this ‘is how it was ὄσιη from the beginning’ (ὥς γὰρ τὰ πρότισθ’ ὄσιη γένεθ’, 237). JEANMAIRE 1945 has given a specific interpretation of this passage, which assumes a reading of ὄσιος as ‘profane’. He builds on to a line of scholarship that sees the passage as the description of a ritual test imposed on horses who were being broken. JEANMAIRE stressed that breaking horses means they are transferred from the divine realm to the sphere of human activity (τὸ ὄσιον).⁴⁴ Thus, according to JEANMAIRE the ritual (ὄσιη) is a *rite*

⁴⁰ On the usage of the plural οἱ νόμοι as ‘religious customs’, cf. RUDHARDT 2008:49-57.

⁴¹ Chapter 2, sections 1.6 and 1.7.

⁴² After the passage quoted in (1), Thucydides explains how desperate people, ‘lacking any friends still alive (who could have helped them organise a proper burial, RHODES 1988, *ad loc.*) turned to shameless funeral modes’ (ἐς ἀναισχύντους θήκας), throwing their own dead on somebody else’s prepared funeral pyre and alight it or simply dumping the corpse in their care on someone else’s already burning pyre.

⁴³ I provide a full *status quaestionis* and discussion of this passage in APPENDIX 6. In my treatment in the main text here, I discussed only a few aspects relevant to the problem of the alleged semantic paradox of ὄσιος.

⁴⁴ JEANMAIRE 1945:75-77.

of de-sacralisation: its goal is to make the horse ὄσιος, or ‘desacralised’, ‘profane’.⁴⁵

However, it is not optimal to read such an interpretation into this passage. JEANMAIRE’s assumption that this ritual (ὄσίη) is intended to make the *object* of the ritual, the newly yoked horse, ὄσιος (in which ὄσιος is ‘profane, free for human usage, desacralised’) would make this case of *hosios & cognates* a semantic outlier. In the examples discussed in this thesis, *agent(s)*, the person(s) who carry out a religious ritual (observing ὄσίη) are ὄσιος, because ὄσίη is something humans must do in order to honour the gods. But it is not the case that the *objects* of a ritual *become* ὄσιος *as the result of humans carrying out the ritual*.⁴⁶

It is not necessary to interpret the passage in such a way, either. We may simply say that ὄσίη here, as elsewhere, refers to a religious ritual. As we have seen, ὄσίη, like ὄσιος, evaluates what humans must do in order to please the gods. The noun formalises this notion sometimes and then refers to a ‘religious ritual’. So it does here. The content of this ritual (described in this passage in some detail) is debated in the scholarship, but that discussion does not bear on the semantics of ὄσίη.⁴⁷

2.3 A ‘profane spot’ to give birth

Thirdly, a more straightforward interpretation may be provided for Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata* 743 without difficulty. The scene in which ὄσιος occurs is set halfway through this play, when various women involved in a sex-strike on the Athenian Acropolis are fed up with the strike, and start coming up with excuses to go back home to their husbands. One of these women pretends she is pregnant⁴⁸ and exclaims:

Γυ. ὦ πότνι’ Ἰλείθυ’, ἐπίσχες τοῦ τόκου 742
 ἕως ἂν εἰς ὄσιον μόλω ἴγῳ χωρίον.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ JEANMAIRE 1945:77. CHANTRAINE 1968-80:831 follows JEANMAIRE’s interpretation of this passage as ‘l’acte desacralisant’. MAFFI 1982:44-45 alludes to the scholarly debate about the meaning of ὄσίη in this hymn, but without giving a definite opinion: ‘Negli Inni omerici, ove compare cinque volte il termine ὄσίη, il riferimento alla sfera rituale mi sembra indubitabile (e ciò indipendentemente dal significato di sacrale o di desacralizzato che al termine stesso si attribuisca).’

⁴⁶ There are other more specific problems with JEANMAIRE’s interpretation, as I discuss in Appendix 6. The theory is problematic, because it is based on an impossible reading of key elements in the text, as was argued previously by ROUX.

⁴⁷ The scholarship on this passage (debating the *nature* of the described ritual) is complex. In my view, ROUX’s treatment of this episode (1964) is the most satisfactory and the best starting point for studying it. Cf. Appendix 6.

⁴⁸ The woman is not really pregnant, as the surprised reaction of someone on the scene – ‘What nonsense are you talking? ... You weren’t pregnant yesterday!’ (744-45) – clearly shows.

⁴⁹ Ar. *Lys.* 742-43.

Wom. Reverend Eileithya, hold back the child,
until I get to a *hosion* place.

Giving birth to a child on sacred ground (such as the Acropolis) is one of the most important taboos in Greek religion.⁵⁰ The term ὄσιος in this example obviously somehow refers to this panhellenic idea, but precisely how should we interpret it? According to VAN DER VALK: ‘ὄσιον steht hier gegenüber ἱερόν und wird synonym mit βέβηλον verwendet ... das ὄσιον χωρίον ... ist ... eine Stelle, worauf die Götter kein Anrecht haben, die nicht ihrer Weihe unterworfen ist, und nicht zu ihrem besonderen Eigentum gehört.’ Thus, VAN DER VALK claims that the ὄσιον χωρίον is a spot to which the gods can lay no claim, it is ‘profane’, allowed to be trodden (βέβηλον). By extension, if a person does anything on this spot, this person is ‘free from obligations towards the gods’ with respect the activity he carries out there: ‘Man kann es daher gewissermassen eine *menschliche* Stelle nennen, worüber die Menschen verfügen können.’⁵¹

It is questionable whether taking ὄσιον as a characteristic of χωρίον, part of VAN DER VALK’s reading, is an optimal interpretation of this passage. As I have shown in Chapter 2, ὄσιος is in the large majority of cases an evaluative rather than a descriptive term, dealing with moral issues and expressing a qualification of a human being or his behaviour.⁵² Furthermore, in an argument based on the semantic similarity between ὄσιος and εὐσεβής in Chapter 3 I proposed that the adjective ὄσιος *semantically* refers to the person involved in the action (through metaphorical usage) in those cases in which it *syntactically* qualifies an object.⁵³ Moreover, it was shown in Chapter 2 that in the cases in which the nouns τὸ ὄσιον or ἡ ὄσια refer to cultic matters, they usually refer to how humans must behave, what they must do. The statement that ‘{activity X} is ὄσιον’ means that ‘the worshipper must do X (at a certain place, at a certain time ...)’.⁵⁴ Given these characteristics of ὄσιος and ὄσια I believe it is most likely that ‘a ὄσιον χωρίον (to bear a child)’ is ‘a place where it is ὄσιον for the worshipper (to give birth)’.⁵⁵ That is, the woman will observe ἡ ὄσια /τὸ

⁵⁰ BREMMER 1994:71, PARKER 1996a [1983]:33.

⁵¹ VAN DER VALK 1942:120. The interpretation of the ὄσιον χωρίον (in Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata*) as βέβηλον goes back to a comment in the Suda (s.v. ὄσιον χωρίον, ADLER 688), which refers to this passage and states that such a place is: τὸ βέβηλον καὶ μὴ ἱερόν.

⁵² Chapter 2, section 1.3.

⁵³ Chapter 3, section 3.7.

⁵⁴ Chapter 2, sections 1.3 and 1.7.

⁵⁵ In fact, VAN DER VALK already correctly characterised the ὄσιον χωρίον as a place ‘wo ihnen freisteht (ὄσιον ist), was im ἱερόν verboten ist’ (1942:120), but this description occurs as an unconnected element within a larger interpretation that in my view as a whole does not work.

ὄσιον by moving to this other place. But ὄσιον does not semantically qualify χωρίον and the passage implies no geographical contrast between two types of places, ‘sacred’ and ‘non-sacred’/‘profane’.⁵⁶

A close parallel to the passage above also suggests that ὄσιον refers to the desirable conduct of the allegedly pregnant woman finding herself in these particular circumstances, rather than describing an inherent quality of the χωρίον. In Sophocles’ *Oedipus at Colonus* 189, the term εὐσεβεία is used with respect to a similar acknowledgement of a spatial restriction in Greek religion, in this case: the all-out inaccessibility of certain sanctuaries. This is a useful parallel, because, as I have shown in Chapter 3 on ὄσιος vs. εὐσεβής, these two terms have almost exactly the same semantic scope and can be expected to be used similarly in similar passages. In this Sophoclean passage, Oedipus has just found out that he is sitting in the holy grove of the Eumenides, which no one is allowed to enter⁵⁷ and he needs to move elsewhere. Oedipus tells Antigone:

Oi. ἄγε νυν σύ με, παῖς,
 ἴν’ ἄν εὐσεβείας ἐπιβαίνοντες
 τὸ μὲν εἴπομεν, τὸ δ’ ἀκούσαιμεν⁵⁸ 190

Oe. Now lead me child,
 to a place where we, setting foot on piety,
 may speak and listen.

Telling Antigone to lead him out of the untrodden grove and bring them to a place where they can ‘set foot on piety’ (εὐσεβείας ἐπιβαίνειν), Oedipus means, obviously, that he wants her to find a spot where they will be εὐσεβής, where their presence is in

⁵⁶ LATTE 1920:55 n. 16 translated a *horos*-inscription inscription (*IG IX*, 1 700, from Corcyra, text: ὄρθος ἱεροῦ καὶ ὀσίου) as the (geographical) ‘boundary between *hieron* and *hosion*’ in which *hieron* = sacred and *hosion* = profane. However, as BLOK *forthc.* c argues, this interpretation is wrong, because this is not an expression of two opposite and mutually exclusive categories of land: ‘in *horos*-inscriptions καὶ normally is not used to distinguish two items, but to join them as property marked by the *horos*, e.g. *IG II*² 2657, 2679, 2724, *SEG* 44.82: the *horos* of houses and (καὶ) lands, etc. and 2747: the *horos* of a workshop and (καὶ) slaves. On this evidence, the *horos* in Corcyra marks both *hieros* and *hosios* properties off from other territory/property.’ Thus, this *horos* inscription is not valid evidence for *hieros* and *hosios* separating two different geographical spaces, one called *hieros* and one called *hosios*.

⁵⁷ The grove is ‘not to be trodden’ (ἀστιβής, 120 and ἄβατος, 167).

⁵⁸ S. *OC*. 188-190.

accordance with εὐσέβεια.⁵⁹ Since, as we have seen, the term εὐσέβεια is unequivocally a description of a human attitude, and not a characteristic of objects,⁶⁰ we cannot interpret Oedipus' expression in any other way. Because of the semantic similarity of ὄσιος and εὐσεβής, it seems to me that we should interpret ὄσιον in the *Lysistrata* passage as a description of a human attitude, too. Assuming that Oedipus' utterance resembles the *Lysistrata* case, the 'pregnant' lady in *Lysistrata* argues that, being aware of the spatial restriction on childbirth, she wants to go to a place where the restriction does not apply. The utterance of the woman 'I want to go to a ὄσιον χωρίον' means: 'I want to go to a place where my presence is ὄσιον, i.e. where, by respecting the rules about places where childbirth is (not) permitted, I can follow ὄσια, the religious custom (and consequently, behave in a way that is ὄσιος)'. This interpretation is much more in line with the rest of our data than assuming ὄσιον means 'profane'.⁶¹

This is also a case of persuasive language usage, as we have seen on various occasions in this dissertation. By framing her intended flight from the Acropolis in this way, the 'pregnant' lady in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* intends to make a rhetorically stronger claim than her colleagues. In the lines directly preceding her speech, the other women did not successfully convey any sense of urgency with pragmatic, housewifery excuses about wool and flax that needed to be taken care of.⁶² By contrast, the 'pregnant' woman's flight, as she herself argues (by claiming it is ὄσιον) is not only urgent, but essential to her religious wellbeing and indeed, that of the whole *polis*. She implies that giving birth on the Acropolis would occasion a ritual pollution and so disturb the *polis*' relationship with the gods. In short, presenting her

⁵⁹ Indeed, the scholia explain the phrase: 'wherever treading in a way that is pious' (ὅπου ἄν εὐσεβῶς πατοῦντες).

⁶⁰ The semantics of the combination εὐ-σεβ (εὖ + σέβομαι 'I fearfully respect, venerate') itself entails this. Cf. my discussion on εὐσεβεία in Chapter 3, section 1.

⁶¹ BLOK *forthc.* c comments more extensively on another passage in which a place is called ὄσιον. This passage lends itself to an interpretation similar to our reading of Ar. *Lys.* In the lemma ὄσιον χωρίον of the *Suda* (referring to Ar. *Lys.* 743, cf. n. 51 above), it is stated that 'the Dionysion is also said [to be a ὄσιον χωρίον]. BLOK argues that this comment probably refers to the sanctuary of Dionysus in Limnais, and the usage of ὄσιος for this sanctuary is in line with our general interpretation of this term: 'On the second day of the Anthesteria (Choes), the only day every year when entrance into this sanctuary was allowed, a part of the *hieros gamos* of the Basilinna with the god took place there, in accordance with a *lex sacra* kept in the sanctuary. On this occasion, then, the sanctuary was the scene of actions normally not allowed in a *hieron*, but they were allowed on this single day as part of the ritual program of the festival. The Dionysion, therefore, although normally *hieros* (of the god), was used once a year by humans in an exceptional way that was *part of a ritual and followed the rules of this ritual laid down in (sacred) law.*'

⁶² Ar. *Lys.* 731-41.

act as ὄσιος is an act of framing and an attempt to lend a special weight and dignity to it.

We have analysed three passages that are frequently quoted to support an exceptional meaning ‘profane’ for ὄσιος. However, as we have seen, these cases can also be explained on the basis of the range of frequent usages of ὄσιος, as referring to the care for the dead and requirements of cultic practice. Moreover, in the third case, our previous conclusions on the semantic similarity of ὄσιος and εὐσεβής helped us interpret the passage.

3. The semantic paradox in the set phrase *ἱερὰ καὶ ὄσια*

Moving on to a more difficult group of cases, the meaning ‘profane’ of ὄσιος (supposedly) occurs most frequently in the set combination (τὰ) ἱερὰ καὶ (τὰ) ὄσια, for example in the reference to *ἱερὰ καὶ ὄσια χρήματα*. This is also the type of usage on which most scholarship about the semantic paradox has focused. It is therefore necessary to discuss the usage of ὄσια in this combination in more detail.⁶³ It has been convincingly argued by MAFFI, CONNOR, SAMONS and BLOK that these terms paired in fact do not express an opposition between ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’. The explanation given by these scholars is in line with our conclusion in Chapter 3 that ὄσιος, when used for objects, in fact refers to the piety of humans using this object.⁶⁴ Moreover, as we have seen, in these cases ὄσιος is used as a persuasive evaluative term, to

⁶³ ‘ἱερὰ καὶ ὄσια’ as a set combination occurs most frequently from the fourth century onwards, but was part of fifth-century discourse. The phrase occurs in two literary texts, besides Th. 2.52 discussed in section 2.1 above. In Antiphon 5, the speaker Euxitheus argues it is not likely that his friend Lycinus paid him to murder Herodes. Lycinus would have brought a legal charge against Herodes instead, instead of ordering this homicide that he knew would lead to Euxitheus’ exile and to Lycinus being robbed ‘of ἱερὰ καὶ ὄσια and all other things that are most significant and important to humans’ (Antiphon 5.62). Moreover, just after the turn of the century, the phrase occurs in Lysias 30.25 where Nicomachus, an official who had been appointed to make modifications in the law, is accused because although ‘he became ἀναγραφεὺς of ἱερὰ καὶ ὄσια, he made mistakes in the case of both’. The set combination *ἱερὰ καὶ ὄσια* may have occurred elsewhere. Pericles’ citizenship law may have stated that ‘no male or female bastard has any claim based on kinship to *hiera* and *hosia*, as of the archonship of Eucleides (403/2)’, as Is. 6.47, [Dem.] 47.51 tell us (cf. BLOK 2009a). We cannot be certain that this phrase was part of the original law, for the text of the original decree is lost. Moreover, in the fifth-century wording of the Epehebic Oath adolescent males may have sworn to fight ‘in defence of *hiera* and *hosia*’. The epehebic oath was transmitted in a 4th-century inscription (SEG 21.519, RO 88) but its phraseology may predate that period by far, cf. Chapter 1, section 2.1 n. 64.

⁶⁴ Chapter 3, section 3.7.

strengthen an appeal (e.g. Chapter 6). I will discuss the usage of ὄσια χρήματα in the light of these findings. My analysis in this section will be based on the scholarship.⁶⁵

MAFFI⁶⁶ argued that τὰ ἱερά and τὰ ὄσια combined in the same expression probably represented not two *opposite*, but two *coordinated* realms, expressing two levels of sacrality.⁶⁷ According to MAFFI τὰ ἱερά are possessions of the gods or things dedicated to them,⁶⁸ whereas τὰ ὄσια are institutions, buildings, objects or values, which the *polis* chooses to present as having a divine sanction.⁶⁹ By doing so, the classical *polis* established a conscious integration of the sacred in its institutions and ideological machinery.⁷⁰ We can express this differently. In MAFFI's view, designating things as ὄσιος was a rhetorical move, for by doing so, the *polis* bestowed a special religious dignity on them.⁷¹ Such acts of what we may call 'framing' were, according to MAFFI, especially useful for activities or things that were not otherwise governed under the jurisdiction of the *polis*.⁷² In this way, the *polis* made the sacred

⁶⁵ The usage of the adjective ὄσιος for money, and in the combination ἱερά καὶ ὄσια is discussed extensively in BLOK *forthc.* c. I have focused on other aspects of the semantics of ὄσιος in this dissertation.

⁶⁶ In my discussion of MAFFI 1982, I will not only provide references but also more extensive quotes, because his article has hardly been received in the scholarship and it may not be that easily accessible.

⁶⁷ 51: 'Anche in ambito pubblicistico *hosios* non significa dunque profano, non delimita la sfera del sacro identificata senza residui nello *hieron*; ciò che è definito *hosion* si colloca anch'esso in ambito sacrale'. 52: 'Ho sostenuto nel corso di questo studio: a) che *hieros* e *hosios* non costituiscano nel diritto e nell'ideologia dell'Atene classica una coppia di nozioni opposte bensì coordinate; b. che la sfera del sacro, articolata in questi due livelli, è stata resa dalla *polis* funzionale alla propria organizzazione pubblica e privata.' Note that the dictionary by BAILLY 2000 [1894] s.v. ὄσιος seems to express a similar view: 'I *en parl. de choses*: ... p. opp. à ἱερός, pour désigner des choses humaines, mais toutefois consacrées et permises par la costume, ἱερός au contr. désignant des choses divines'.

⁶⁸ This interpretation of τὰ ἱερά is uncontroversial, cf. section 2.1 of this chapter.

⁶⁹ 34: 'essa [= la *polis*] si attribuisce addirittura un autonomo potere religioso che utilizza ... per rafforzare la coesione delle proprie istituzioni pubbliche e private che vengono così proiettate tendenzialmente in blocco nella sfera dell'ordine divino (*hosion*).'

⁷⁰ 34: 'la *polis* ateniese, lungi dal respingere la sfera sacrale ... realizza una integrazione di essa nell'ambito dell'amministrazione pubblica più propriamente << politica >> ... non si tratti tanto di esorcizzare residui irrazionali quanto piuttosto di una consapevole integrazione delle forze soprannaturali nell'edificio della *polis* stessa.'

⁷¹ 46: 'si afferma l'idea che la *polis* possa utilizzare la qualifica di *hosion* per rafforzare con una sanzione sacrale lo statuto ideologico-normativo delle sue istituzioni politiche.' Cf. 50, 51.

⁷² 45 and 49: 'nello stesso tempo vengono posti sotto la garanzia di una qualificazione sacrale non più rapporti e comportamenti prescritti non altrimenti tutelati, bensì proprio quelli a cui la *polis* riconosce, tramite la qualifica di *hosios*, una rilevanza politica fondamentale.'

functional to the organisation of the *polis* itself.⁷³ One might say that MAFFI attributed the ‘pregnant’ lady’s rhetorical strategy in Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata* (discussed above) to the Athenian *polis* at large.

CONNOR, apparently not aware of MAFFI’s work, likewise established that τὰ ἱερά and τὰ ὄσια expressed parallel and co-ordinate realms,⁷⁴ drawing a distinction between ‘specifically sacred things, especially sacrifices and offerings to the gods (τὰ ἱερά)’ and ‘those of great importance to the order of society and the favour of the gods but not specifically sacral (τὰ ὄσια)’.⁷⁵ Together, τὰ ἱερά καὶ τὰ ὄσια encompassed anything essential in *polis* life and sometimes became a general expression for all those things that were most important in a man’s life.

I find the article by MAFFI 1982 more convincing than CONNOR 1988, although the latter is quoted much more often than the former. CONNOR is at times inexact, for example when he refers vaguely to τὸ ὄσιον as ‘the other realm’⁷⁶ and he does not abandon the notion of a ‘secular’ or ‘civil’ realm, even though his argumentation implies such a conclusion. Moreover, MAFFI made an important point CONNOR did not make, emphasizing that designating things as ὄσιος was an act of framing (though he does not call it framing himself): labelling things ὄσιος is to communicate that the gods find them important.

SAMONS and BLOK reached the same conclusion as CONNOR and MAFFI, but taking a different argumentative route. These scholars have investigated the case of ἱερά and ὄσια monies (χρήματα) and have posed more specific historical objections to the thesis that ὄσια can mean ‘profane’.

SAMONS examined the labels ἱερά and ὄσια for money through the lens of his historical account of Athenian finance. In the early fifth century in Athens there was no non-sacral public reserve but only the sacral treasury of Athena. In this treasury the Athenians placed large amounts of imperial money, as a gift to the goddess. They borrowed this money from Athena to pay for military actions (among other things) and repaid the money later, with interest. However, due to the huge expenses for the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians accumulated debts until their liabilities to Athena became large and unpayable. Somewhere in the mid-twenties the Athenians stopped donating all monies to Athena. Instead, they created a non-sacral reserve fund, a separate account that remained their own property and from which they could make

⁷³ 37: ‘La *polis* ha dunque posto sotto controllo l’elemento religioso ... rendendo così funzionale alla propria organizzazione quella che viene considerata la presenza diretta e immediata del sacro.’

⁷⁴ CONNOR 1988:164.

⁷⁵ CONNOR 1988:162.

⁷⁶ CONNOR 1988:164.

expenditures as they pleased, without incurring debt to the goddess.⁷⁷ This was the beginning of the coexistence of two different types of funds: money that was *ιερός* (the sacral treasury, in the possession of the god) and *δημόσιος* money (the non-sacral fund, in the possession of the *dēmos*). Note that the designations *ιερός* and *δημόσιος* refer to *ownership*, not to the *source* or the *goal* of the money. As SAMONS explains, the sacral treasury received payments from clearly non-sacral sources (like public fines) and it was used for non-sacral purposes (like waging war); similarly, the *δημόσιον* fund was used for example to pay for the priestess of Athena Nike, obviously a religious purpose.⁷⁸

But the *δημόσιον* fund was also called *ὄσιος*. What does this mean? SAMONS seems to say that by labelling the *δημόσιον* fund *ὄσιος*, the Athenians did exactly what MAFFI described (although this author does not mention MAFFI): they drew this fund into the religious sphere and communicated that the usage of this fund, too, was divinely sanctioned.⁷⁹ The categories of *ιερός* and *ὄσιος*, then together define two levels of sacrality or ‘express different levels of connection with the gods’.⁸⁰ SAMONS: ‘it seems that most (if not all) acceptable aspects of everyday Athenian society fell into one of two categories: those things that were actually owned by or closely associated with the gods (*ιερά*), and those things that were sanctioned by or acceptable to the gods (*ὄσια*) but not owned by or consecrated to them’.⁸¹

A new and more precise reading of *ὄσια χρήματα* was given by BLOK in her interpretation of the earliest Athenian documentary text that mentions *ὄσιος* money.⁸² *IG I³ 253* (450-425 BC) presents the accounts for the deme Ikarion during six

⁷⁷ SAMONS 2000:21. N.B. as SAMONS rightly points out, this development is not necessarily ‘evidence for a creeping “secularisation” in Athenian society’ (327). On the contrary: ‘some Athenians perhaps wished to move away from direct sacral funding (at least in part) in order to prevent the impious accumulation of massive and unpayable debts to their gods. ... That is, the change in Athenian financial practice could reflect Athenian piety and pragmatism as much as any nascent “secularism” (327-28).’

⁷⁸ SAMONS 2000:325.

⁷⁹ SAMONS 2000:21, 28. But SAMONS’ paraphrase of *ὄσιος* as ‘acceptable to the gods’ (repeated in SAMONS 2004:270) is in my view a too negative a reading of the positive connotations of *ὄσιος*. Cf. Chapter 2, section 3 of this thesis.

⁸⁰ SAMONS 2000:326 n. 117.

⁸¹ 326. It seems not unlikely that calling the *δημόσιον ὄσιον* was an attempt to overcome the uneasiness felt by the *dēmos* about keeping the money for themselves (putting monies in a separate money box belonging to the *dēmos*) instead of giving all monies to Athena. Branding certain monies *ὄσιον* gave them a special dignity. Such a designation conveyed the message that these *δήμοσιον* funds too, were sanctioned by the gods; that humans using them were in a good relationship to the divine world; that these monies had the gods’ special interest.

⁸² BLOK 2010. N.B. *IvO 16* and *27* from Elis, Olympia are presumably earlier non-Athenian counterparts mentioning *ὄσιον* money.

apparently successive years. The demarch accounts for the monies of the god Dionysos, of the eponymous hero Ikarion and for money labelled ὄσιος money (ἀργυρίο ἡοσίο). Having compared the account for Ikarion to other Attic financial accounts, BLOK concludes that the ὄσιον money in this account of Ikarion should be seen a subcategory of the δημόσιον. It is that part of the δημόσιον money which is used for purposes that will be especially pleasing to gods, in this case the organisation of a festival for the god Dionysos.

As BLOK argues, her conclusion is in line with two important observations in SAMONS' monograph: first of all, that the label ὄσιος when applied to money does not refer to ownership (as δημόσιον does) but says something about the gods' supposed attitude towards the usage of this fund.⁸³ Secondly, that all Athenian accounts published in stone regarded money that somehow had 'a sacral connection'.⁸⁴ BLOK combines these observations and takes the argument one step further, arguing that 'all *inscribed* public accounts concern monies to which the gods were somehow entitled: either as their own property (*hieros* money) ... or money owned by humans (*dêmosios* money) destined to be used for *hiera*'⁸⁵ and 'only *dêmosios* = *hosios* money was accounted for in stone; the rest of the *dêmosios* money, to be spent on other purposes, was not, but probably recorded only on ... ephemeral material'.⁸⁶ In the fourth century we see that the notion of ὄσιον money (owned by humans and used for purposes that pleased the gods) became more prominent. This was due to the expansion of sacrificial practices and the expenditures for Athenian festivals, notably the Dionysia. Moreover, speakers sometimes implied with respect to *other* expenditures that were less obviously 'religious' (such as expenses for the navy and cavalry) that these should be seen as ὄσια, too.⁸⁷ We could see such speech acts as examples of the type of 'rhetorical usage' of ὄσιος described in MAFFI 1982. Labelling expenses as ὄσιος was a way of putting them in a favourable light, i.e. the

⁸³ But note that a difference between SAMONS and BLOK's views is that the former considers ὄσιον as another designation of all δημόσιον money (according to him, all monies are either owned by the gods (ἱερὸν) or 'acceptable' (ὄσιον) to them), whereas BLOK sees the ὄσιον as a subset of the δημόσιον.

⁸⁴ SAMONS 2000, Appendix 3, 312-17. SAMONS observed that 'no certain "inventories" or "accounts" of the amalgated demosion/imperial purse managed by the Hellenotamiai ... have ever been discovered' (314) and that 'publication [in stone] of financial records in fifth-century documents depended to some degree ... on the "sacral connections" of particular documents ... Athenian piety obviously demanded careful accounting of funds that ... technically belonged to the gods' (316).

⁸⁵ BLOK 2010:83-84. Cf. CHADWICK 1996:225 who took ὄσιος money as 'money due for religious reasons' and gave IG I(3) 253 as an example. This seems to mean the same.

⁸⁶ BLOK 2010:88.

⁸⁷ Dem. 24.96-98. BLOK *forthc.* c.

designation was intended to convey the gods' supposed positive attitude towards them.

To summarise, in this section we have seen that the usage of ὄσιος in the juxtaposition 'ἱερὰ καὶ ὄσια χρήματα provides no evidence of its reference to the 'profane', but is an instance of persuasive language usage and designates the piety of humans using this money.

4. The semantic paradox in denominative verb forms

Another series of cases that is important in the scholarly discussion on the usage of ὄσιος as 'profane' and 'sacred' is the supposed manifestation of this paradox in the denominative verbs based on ὄσιος or ὄσια. As was pointed out in the introduction of this chapter, it has not only been argued that the verb ὀσιόω and composites sometimes mean 'to make free from the gods', 'to render profane', but also the opposite, 'to consecrate'.

In interpreting these cases we should realise first of all that any occurrences of the verb ὀσιόω and composites (ἀφ-οσιόω, καθ-οσιόω, ἐξοσιόω) are rare in fifth-century texts and are almost exclusively dramatic.⁸⁸ An exception is the verb (ἀφ)οσιοῦσθαι (Hdt. ἀποσιοῦσθαι) used, according to VAN DER VALK, in the sense of 'to make ὄσιος, free from religious binding'. This verb occurs in three Herodotean passages, in a fragment of Sophocles, in Xenophon's *Hellenica* and in later texts. For all we know, all other derivations are and remain dramatic neologisms. Because these forms are so rare but at the same time instrumental examples in our discussion, it will be helpful for us to look at the semantics of denominative verbs more closely, not only by investigating the context in which these examples appear, but also by establishing the *possible* meanings of such derivations in general. That is, we will examine the semantic operations at work in the systematic morphological conversion from a Greek noun or adjective to a denominative verb ending in -όω and composites, first.

⁸⁸ There are eleven cases of verb forms in the corpus: ἐξοσιόω (n=1, Euripides), ὀσιόω (n=3, Euripides), ἀφοσιόω (n=4, Herodotus, Sophocles), καθοσιόω (n=3, Euripides, Aristophanes). The cases are: E. *Cret.* F 472.15 *TrGF*, E. F 539.1 *TrGF*, E. *Ba.* 70 and 114, E. *Or.* 515, E. *IT* 1320, S. F. 253.1 *TrGF*, Hdt. 1.199, 4.154, 4.203, Ar. *Pl.* 661. Note that the verbs are used especially in those texts in which the adjective ὄσιος is frequent, such as, Euripides' *Bacchantes*, *Orestes* and *Iphigenia in Tauris*. In these texts, the lemma ὄσιος is heavily primed, and the occurrence of derived verbs is less surprising.

4.1 The derivation of ὀσιώ from ὀσιος or ὀσία

Denominative verbs are well described in the literature.⁸⁹ Denominative verbs in -οω may be derived from an adjective or a noun (of any stem). When derived from an adjective (x), they are usually transitive and have a factitive meaning: ‘to cause x’ or ‘to make something x (predicative)’.⁹⁰ An alternative meaning for these verbs is ‘to regard as x’ or ‘to treat in a way that is x’.⁹¹ Verbs on -οω derived from a noun (x) are not necessarily transitive and tend to fall under the heading ‘to do something using x’, which is rather a broad semantic description that is filled in in various ways.⁹² We do not know, *prima facie*, whether (for example) ἀφοσιῦσθαι was (perceived as being) derived from ὀσιος or ἡ ὀσία /τὸ ὀσιον. A verb ὀσιώ, derived from the adjective ὀσιος may mean ‘to make someone or something ὀσιος’, ‘to consider someone or something ὀσιος’, ‘to treat someone or something in a way that is ὀσιος’. A verb ὀσιώ from the noun ὀσία ‘religious rule, custom, ritual’ refers to ‘doing something with ὀσία’ and may denote, for example ‘to establish a religious rule or custom’, or ‘to observe a religious rule or custom’.

As was mentioned, the denominative verbs are rare, and may each of them have been a neologism. Because the understanding of each of these verb forms may have been a matter of ad-hoc, online interpretative processes, we do not have to assume that all these verb forms were (perceived as being) derived in the same way, either.

4.2 Babylonian prostitution, perverted oaths and oracles

The verb ἀφοσιῦσθαι appears first of all when Herodotus describes ‘the most despicable’ of Babylonian customs (νόμοι). Once in her life, every Babylonian woman must go to the temple of Aphrodite to have intercourse with a complete stranger. Sitting about on the sanctuary grounds, she waits until some man comes to

⁸⁹ KÜHNER-GERTH 1892:259-60; FRÄNKEL 1906:67-86; SMYTH 1956 [1920]:245; DEBRUNNER 1917:99-103; TUCKER 1990.

⁹⁰ TUCKER 1990:15. Some examples of the conversion *adj. (x) > verb (to make x)* are: δῆλος ‘clear, manifest’ > δηλόω ‘to make visible or clear’; πυκνός ‘close, compact’ > πυκνόω ‘to make close or solid, pack close’; ἀλαός ‘blind’ > ἀλαόω ‘to make blind’; δίκαιος ‘just’ > δικαιοῶ ‘to set right’; κακός ‘bad’ > κακώω ‘to destroy, ruin.

⁹¹ DEBRUNNER 1917:99. Some examples of the conversion *adj. (x) > verb (to consider x)* are: ἄξιος ‘worthy’ > ἀξιόω ‘to consider worthy’; δίκαιος ‘just’ > δικαιοῶ ‘to consider just’; examples of the conversion *adj. (x) > verb (treat in a way that is x)*: κακός ‘bad’ > κακώω ‘to maltreat’; δόλιος ‘treacherous’ > δολιόω ‘to deal treacherously with’.

⁹² TUCKER 1990:16. Some examples of the conversion *noun (x) > verb (to do something using x)* are:

ὀ πυργός ‘tower’ > πυργόω ‘I fortify, I equip with towers’; ὀ οἶνος ‘wine’ > οἰνόω ‘I make drunk, I cause to be affected by wine’; ἡ ζημία ‘punishment’ > ζημιόω ‘punish, fine’; ἡ ῥίζα ‘root’ > ῥιζόω ‘plant, fix firmly’. Note that a denominative verb on -οω can also be derived from a noun in -α.

her. After the sex the woman, ‘ἀποσιωσαμένη τῇ θεῷ’, goes away to her home.⁹³ VAN DER VALK translates: ‘nachdem sie sich όσία gemacht hat τῇ θεῷ, der Göttin gegenüber, ihre Pflicht ihr gegenüber nachgekommen is’.⁹⁴ In a second passage the author narrates the story of Themiso, who had sworn an oath to Etearchus that he would do whatever Etearchus asked of him, in return for guestfriendship (ξεινία). When Etearchus told Themiso to kill his (Etearchus’) daughter by throwing her into the sea, Themiso contrived a trick: ‘ἀποσιούμενος τὴν ἐξόρκωσιν’, he bound the daughter with ropes, let her down into the sea and drew her up again.⁹⁵ According to VAN DER VALK, ‘Wenn man die Vereidigung und den Eid jedoch erfüllt, löst man die religiöse Bindung, man wird frei von den Göttern, man macht sich όσιος’.⁹⁶ In the third case, Herodotus explains that the Cyrenaeans let the Persians through their city, λόγιόν τι ἀποσιούμενοι.⁹⁷

VAN DER VALK has clearly interpreted ἀποσιῶ as a transitive, factitive verb ‘to make όσιος’, with ἀποσιῶσθαι being used in a direct-reflexive sense ‘to make oneself όσιος’ (free from the gods), and taking any direct objects as accusatives of respect. VAN DER VALK assumes that the agent was previously ἱερός ‘bound to the gods’.⁹⁸ The prefix ἀπ(ο)- has several semantic functions, among which in these cases the sense of ‘finishing off, completing’ seems the most relevant.⁹⁹ Hence the prefix ἀπ- would signify the endpoint of the process of becoming όσιος from being ἱερός. Based on our analysis of the semantics of denominative verbs on -όω, this interpretation ‘to make oneself όσιος’ is plausible. Indeed, other denominative verbs of the form ἀπ- ... -όω seem to have the same semantic make-up.¹⁰⁰

However, as was pointed out earlier on, it is difficult to see how any human could make him/herself όσιος (‘free’ from the gods) at any particular point in time. Moreover, there seems to be no semantic parallel for this usage of όσιος in the corpus in which someone ‘becomes όσιος’ out of being ἱερός. In cases in which someone ‘makes (a person) όσιος’, or in which a person is urged to ‘become όσιος’, he or she

⁹³ Hdt 1.199, θεός.

⁹⁴ 1942:119.

⁹⁵ Hdt 4.154, ἡ ἐξόρκωσις: ‘binding by oath’.

⁹⁶ 1942:120.

⁹⁷ Hdt 4.203, τὸ λόγιον: ‘oracle’ (especially one with antiquity).

⁹⁸ VAN DER VALK 1942:127.

⁹⁹ LSJ s.v. ἀπό D 2.

¹⁰⁰ ἀνδρ-όω means ‘change someone into a man’, with ἀνδρόομαι ‘become a man’. ἀπανδρόομαι is translated in the same way but with (presumably) more emphasis on the moment when that process is completed: *become a man, come to maturity*. γλαυκόω means: to *dye blue-grey*; ἀπογλαυκόομαι is to *become grey-blue*, to be dyed blue, and refers to the point in which the dyeing process is completed (LSJ).

is not *ιερός* but *άνόσιος* or *άσεβής/δυσσεβής* previously.¹⁰¹ Instead, we may interpret the verb in a different way for which there *are* parallels: by considering *άπ-οσιούμαι* as deriving from *ή όσία / τή όσιον* instead.¹⁰² Such a denominative verb may refer to ‘observing (and completing, *άφ-*) *ή όσία / τή όσιον*’.¹⁰³ In this case, we may take the middle as indirect reflexive, denoting that the agent is beneficiary; the accusatives are direct objects.

Such a reading of *άφοσιούσθαι* does not necessarily change our translation much: ‘observing and completing *ή όσία / τή όσιον*’ may be rendered as ‘fulfilling a religious obligation’. However, our understanding of the underlying semantic structure of the verb is different. Moreover, our interpretation is more transparent given the emphasis on *όσία / όσιον* in these texts. For example, Herodotus introduces the story of Etearchus and Themiso by stating that Etearchus contrived ‘an impious act’ (*έργον ούκ όσιον*, 4.154.2). Etearchus’ plan is *άνόσιον* for more than one reason. Not only did Etearchus contrive to have his own daughter killed, he also grossly transgressed the norms of *ξενία* and oath-keeping by compelling his *ξένος*, who had sworn an oath, to carry out the murder. Zeus Horkios and Zeus Xenios guarding over oaths and guestfriendship were now supposed to oversee an infanticide under their *aegis*. This is definitely not *όσιον*. Not surprisingly, Themiso was angry at the ‘deceitfulness of the oath’ (*τῆ άπάτη τοῦ όρκου*) and ‘put an end to his friendship’ (*διαλυσάμενος τήν ξεινίην*) with Etearchus. Themiso’s action at the conclusion of the story seems to have a double meaning, being a verbal response to Etearchus’ ‘impious act’. Themiso ‘observed *τή όσιον*, his religious obligation’ fulfilling his promise (to the letter), but at the same time ‘he observed what was (*true*) piety (*τή όσιον*) with respect to his binding by oath’ (*άποσιούμενος τήν έξόρκωσιν*), when saving the daughter with his trick.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ For example, Theonoe says she will do her villainous brother a service ‘if I make him *όσιος* out of his impiety’ (*έκ δυσσεβείας όσιον ει τίθημί νυ*, E. *Hel.* 1021).

¹⁰² Such a derivation is understandable also from the fact that Herodotus frequently uses *όσία* and *όσιον* to refer to cultic requirements: e.g., 2.45.2, 2.81.1, 8.37.1.

¹⁰³ There are periphrastically expressed parallels for the first notion ‘observing the religious custom’, for example the passage in which Tyndareos says Orestes should have exiled his mother, thus ‘following the custom’ (*όσίαν διώκοντα*, E. *Or.* 501) or when people do something ‘because of *όσία*’ i.e. observing the ritual (*h. Cer* 211, E. *IT* 1461).

¹⁰⁴ With respect to Hdt. 1.199: as we have seen in Chapter 6, section 2.2, narrations of what is *όσιον* or *όσία* for particular groups serve to typify those groups: showing the traditional, authoritative and holy customs of a people tells us something about their collective character. In order to provide a negative characterisation of the Babylonians in 1.199, Herodotus emphasizes as often as he can that this ‘most shameful’ (*άίσχιστος*) practice at Aphrodite’s temple is not just some custom followed by a few people, but in fact, a religious activity in the eyes of the entire group. Thus Herodotus stresses that the man invites the woman ‘in the name of Mylitta’ (= Aphrodite’s local name); it is ‘not *θέμις*’

4.3 ὅσιοι initiates

The second part of the semantic paradox of ὅσιος consists in the fact that this term is sometimes supposed to denote the opposite of ‘profane’: ‘sacred, holy’. VAN DER VALK argues that we see this sense of ὅσιος first of all in the usage of ὅσιος for initiands of special mystery cults. Secondly, the meaning ‘sacred’ occurs in the verbs ὀσιοῦν, ἐξοσιοῦν and καθοσιοῦν, which function as synonyms of ἱεροῦν ‘to consecrate’. We will discuss and provide a different interpretation for the mentioned cases in the classical period.

First, according to VAN DER VALK, the origin of the semantic development of ὅσιος used as ἱερός is found in the application of ὅσιος to initiands of special, ‘mystery’ cults. In an Euripidean fragment, a follower of Cretan Zeus says he ‘became an initiand’ (μύστης, 10) of the god and ‘was made ὅσιος’ (ὀσιωθεῖς, 15).¹⁰⁵ In Aristophanes’ *Frogs*, a chorus consisting of people who were initiated while they were alive on earth and now exist as happy souls close to the palace of Pluto say that ‘Iacchus must come and dance for his ὀσίους θιασώτας’ (327) and further on refer to themselves as ὅσιοι μύσται (336). In VAN DER VALK’s view, we need to see these instances of ὅσιος as referring in the first place to ritual purity. According to this author, in the mainstream religious language of the *polis* the adjective ὅσιος is often connected to the notion of ‘freeing oneself of pollution’; but these cults take the notion of purity especially serious, and require special rites and purifications. Thus, VAN DER VALK argues ‘Bald konnte man sodann einen Schritt weiter gehen und meinen, dass der Mensch, der so besonders gereinigt wurde, hierdurch auch von den anderen unterschieden und infolgedessen geheiligt ist.’ Thus, according to VAN DER VALK ὅσιος assumes a ‘religiös schwerere Bedeutung’ and becomes synonymous with ἱερός. This is because the special purification is at the same time a consecration.

In my view, we should not translate ὅσιος as ‘ritually pure’.¹⁰⁶ In the corpus ὅσιος most refers to a limited set of actions, expressing what humans must do to please the gods and fulfil their obligations towards them. If we take this knowledge as a starting point, it seems more likely to me that these worshippers give a new interpretation to what piety, ὀσιότης entails. According to them, in order to be truly pious, what the *polis* considers to be sufficient does not suffice. To be ὅσιος still signifies ‘to do that

to refuse any man or any amount of money, the woman consecrates the sum to the goddess (it ‘becomes ἱερόν’); ugly women cannot ‘fulfil the (religious) custom’ (νόμος ἐκπλήσαι) and, finally, it is not until a woman has ‘observed the ritual for the goddess’ (ἀφοσησάμενος) that she may return home again.¹⁰⁴ The verb ἄποσιοῦμαι (from ὀσία) underscores the religious nature of these proceedings once more and as such helps to reinforce the characterisation of the Babylonians.

¹⁰⁵ E. *Cret.* F 472.15 *TrGF*.

¹⁰⁶ The semantic relationship between ὅσιος, ἄγνός and καθαρός is explored further in Appendix 8.

which pleases the gods' but these special cults have developed their own set of associated behaviour and thus given this term a new definition of ὀσιότης within their group. In other words, these seem cases of the *appropriation* of the religious term. Or at least, what we see here is the literary reflection of such a mechanism.¹⁰⁷

4.4 Becoming a worshipper of Dionysus

Furthermore, the meaning 'sacred' for ὀσιος has been read into the usage of the verb ὀσιόω. In Euripides' *Bacchants* we find two such occurrences of the denominative verb: once ὀσιόω and once a compound, ἐξοσιόω.¹⁰⁸ These verbs have been taken to mean 'to make (an object) sacred.'¹⁰⁹ I will examine these passages and offer a different interpretation.

Euripides' *Bacchants* plays out the opposition between King Pentheus of Thebes, who does not accept Dionysus as a god in his city, and a chorus of women who already worship Dionysus. They explain to others in what way one should serve and honour this god. In the parodos, the denominative verb ὀσιόω is used in the context of instruction to the Thebans how to act in connection to the religious service for Dionysus:

Χο.	ὦ Σεμέλας τροφοὶ Θῆ- βαι, στεφανοῦσθε κισσῶι· βρύετε βρύετε χλοήρει μίλακι καλλικάρπωι καὶ καταβακχιοῦσθε δρυὸς ἢ ἐλάτας κλάδοισι, στικτῶν τ' ἐνδυνὰ νεβρίδων στέφετε λευκοτρίχων πλοκάμων μαλλοῖς· ἀμφὶ δὲ νάρθηκας ὕβριστὰς <u>ὀσιοῦσθ'</u> · αὐτίκα γὰρ πᾶσα χορεύσει ¹¹⁰	105 110
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¹⁰⁷ Little is known about the use of religious language of the *polis* by mystery cults in the classical period, but STEINHAEUER 2013 described how voluntary religious associations in the post-classical Greek *poleis* use the mainstream religious language of the *polis* for their own purposes, and showed how such appropriation of religious terminology paved the way for communicating with individuals and *polis* officials.

¹⁰⁸ E. Ba. 70, 113.

¹⁰⁹ Besides VAN DER VALK's article this interpretation occurs in the commentaries by DODDS 1960, ROUX 1972 and SEAFORD 1996, *ad loc.*, as will be discussed below.

¹¹⁰ E. Ba. 105-14.

- Ch. Oh nurse of Semele, Thebes,
 crown yourself with ivy,
 abound with the fresh holm-oak
 that bears fine fruit,
 dedicate yourself completely to Dionysos
 with twigs of oak or fir, 110
 and gird your cloaks
 of dappled fawn skin with tresses of white wool.

 Immediately all [the people of] this land will dance.

I leave the phrase ἀμφὶ δὲ νάρθηκας ὑβριστάς ὀσιοῦσθ' (113-14) untranslated while we examine its meaning. ROUX takes the verb ὀσιόω as describing a process in which an object (νάρθηξ) is 'made ὀσιος', or 'consecrated'.¹¹¹ ROUX explains that the θύρσος, attribute in the Dionysiac cult, was actually a fennel which was in itself not a holy object at all.¹¹² In order to turn the νάρθηξ into a θύρσος one had to wrap ivy leaves around it. ROUX holds that the verb 'ὀσιόω 'to make ὀσιος' refers here to this act of consecration: turning a profane object (νάρθηξ) into a holy object (θύρσος) that is part of the cult. In this reading we should, by extension, interpret ὀσιος as 'holy', 'set apart for religious usage', one of the two alleged opposite meanings of ὀσιος.¹¹³ ROUX interprets the preposition ἀμφὶ δέ adverbially, meaning 'all around', and referring to the wrapping of the ivy leaves *around* the fennel. ὑβριστάς is interpreted proleptically. Thus, according to ROUX, the phrase means 'sanctifie pour toi ... un thyrses *en entourant* de guirlandes un narthex'. This action 'transformera les batons profanes en thyrses doués d'une violence magique et irrésistible (ὑβριστάς)'.

The most important reason why this interpretation does not work relates to the manner in which the audience would have made meaningful sense of the passage. As was argued, occurrences of the verb ὀσιόω and composites are rare in fifth-century texts. For all we know these forms are tragic neologisms. This means that the audience in the Athenian theatre would have had to try to make sense *on the spot* of this highly poetic phrase (with an internal clash of ὀσιος and ὑβριστής) in this highly poetic text, with ὀσιόω as an ad-hoc invention of the poet. To interpret the novel verb, the audience would have built on contextual knowledge and linguistic knowledge (awareness of the patterns of morphological conversion between adjective or noun

¹¹¹ ROUX 1972, *ad loc.*

¹¹² ROUX 1972, *ad loc.* It could be used for other purposes, too.

¹¹³ SEAFORD 1996, *ad loc.* has a similar reading.

and corresponding verb on –οω).

With respect to the context, this part of the maenads' song revolves around putting on the attire appropriate for the worship of Dionysus. The passage describes various aspects of the attire needed in the service of Dionysus, such as putting on a crown of ivy and a fawn skin. These are not insignificant activities: on the contrary, throughout the play, acknowledging Dionysus and worshipping him has been explicitly associated with, and even described in terms of putting on the required outfit, both by the god himself and by other characters in the play. For example, when Cadmus urges Pentheus to see Dionysus as a god or at least call him that, he says: 'but come on, I will crown your head | with ivy: honour the god together with us' (δεῦρό σου στέψω κάρα | κισσῶ· μεθ' ἡμῶν τῶ θεῶ τιμῆν δίδου').¹¹⁴ That is, the transition to honouring Dionysus as god and becoming included in his cult-group (μεθ' ἡμῶν) is marked by dressing up with these attributes.¹¹⁵

Lines 109-10 in this passage, 'dedicate yourself to Dionysus with twigs or oak or fir' (καὶ καταβακχιούσθε δρυὸς | ἢ ἐλάτας κλάδοισι) likewise express the crucial connection between worshipping the god (mental attitude) and dressing in the proper attire (physical actions). In other words, in order to dedicate yourself completely to Dionysus (καταβακχιόεσθαι) it is necessary to adorn oneself with these twigs.¹¹⁶ Note that this verb – also a neologism as far as we know¹¹⁷ – shows a slightly unusual usage of the middle voice. The Greek direct reflexive middle is most typically used with actions that are normally performed on oneself, often 'verbs of grooming', like λούεσθαι 'wash oneself', κοσμέεσθαι 'adorn oneself, or στεφανόεσθαι 'crown oneself' (as in l. 106). But the idea of direct reflexivity is far more commonly expressed by means of an active construction with a reflexive pronoun. This mode is by far the most customary for all verbs other than the 'grooming verbs' described above.¹¹⁸ Perhaps Euripides coined the uncustomary direct reflexive middle form καταβακχιούσθε precisely to symbolise and stress the main point the maenads are trying to make: that there is an essential link between performing these specific self-reflexive grooming activities and becoming a true worshipper of Dionysus.

I interpret l. 114, the phrase ἀμφι δὲ νάρθηκας ὑβριστὰς ὀσιοῦσθε as an extension of this thought and take ὀσιοῦσθε as a direct-reflexive form, like the preceding direct-

¹¹⁴ E. Ba. 341-342.

¹¹⁵ E. Ba. 35, 248-54, 312-13.

¹¹⁶ i.e. use them in a garland (DODDS 1960, *ad loc.*) or carry them in the hand (SEAFORD 1996, *ad loc.*).

¹¹⁷ The verbs καταβακχιόω/καταβακχιόομαι do not occur anywhere else until the 7th cent. AD, and whereas βακχιόω and βακχεύω do occur, these verbs are used in the active.

¹¹⁸ SMYTH 1984 [1920]:390-91, RIKSBARON 2002:144-45, ALLAN 2003:90-95.

reflexive middle forms στεφανοῦσθε and καταβακχιοῦσθε. The fact that this is (most probably) a rare verb, or even an invention, makes it likely that the listener's interpretation of the middle will hinge on context, too. The direct-reflexive interpretation of the previous middles almost forces the same reading on the verb form ὄσιοῦσθε, and a perceived change to indirect reflexive (as in ROUX's reading) is unlikely.

I argued above that in those situations in which an individual wants to 'make someone else ὄσιος' or someone is urged 'to become (make oneself) ὄσιος' that person is currently ἀνόσιος, δυσσεβής or ἄσεβής.¹¹⁹ In the present case, the addressee is literally ἄσεβής because he does not recognise Dionysus as a god. Here, in line with the rest of this passage, 'making oneself ὄσιος' probably means 'perform a self-reflexive activity so as to become a worshipper of Dionysus, acknowledging him as god.' This grooming activity is expressed in ἀμφὶ δὲ νάρθηκας ὑβριστὰς, which I take as a prepositional phrase denoting 'with respect to the violent *thyrsus*-staff', i.e. by carrying or brandishing it.¹²⁰ At this point, the chorus also make clear that they are proposing a new interpretation of piety: piety is what an unknowing person would perhaps see as ὕβρις.¹²¹

In short, I do not assume that ὀσιόω means 'to consecrate' as some others before me have done. Rather, the novel verb draws on the first requirement of being ὄσιος: acknowledging a god as god. The phrase ἀμφὶ δὲ νάρθηκας ὑβριστὰς ὀσιοῦσθε describes in what way the aspiring worshipper can give the god the τιμή he deserves.¹²² We may interpret: 'take up pious attire and carry the violent *thyrsus*'.

¹¹⁹ Section 4.2.

¹²⁰ Here I go with DODDS 1960 who takes the phrase to mean: 'be reverent in your handling of the violent wands', giving various parallels for a prepositional meaning of ἀμφὶ as 'with respect to': E. *Cyc.* 123 ὄσιοι περὶ ξένους 'scrupulous in their dealings with guests'; and E. *Hipp.* 145f. ἀμφὶ Δίκτυνναν ἀνίερος 'failing in your religious duty towards Dictynna'.

¹²¹ Another reason why ROUX's interpretation does not work is that there seems to be no semantic distinction between νάρθηξ (the fennel) and θύρσος (the same thing as a holy cult object) in *Bacchants*. The terms νάρθηξ and θύρσος are used interchangeably in 147, and when there are close alternations between the terms they seem to be motivated by a desire for stylistic variation (251/254, 704/706). The term νάρθηξ does not immediately signal to the internal and external audience an object that needs modification before it can serve in the context of the cult. Moreover, given the preciseness of the other instructions, the command to wrap leaves of ivy around the fennel being conveyed only by the rather vague instruction, the one word 'around' (ἀμφὶ) seems slightly out of tune.

¹²² We may interpret the occurrence of the verb ἐξοσιόω (a *hapax legomenon*) some 40 lines back in the same play, along the same lines. The verb appears in the parodos of the chorus, who urge everyone στόμα τ' εὐφημιον ἅπας ἐξοσιούσθω (70). The phrase must be a variant of a frequently occurring and customary instruction at the outset of a ritual utterance or performance to maintain a respectful (εὐφημία). The instruction in this play seems to be some poetical variation on such

4.5 Priestess Iphigeneia

A final case of a denominative verb (καθοσιώω) that supposedly means ‘to consecrate’ is found in Euripides’ *Iphigenia in Tauris*. In this play, Iphigenia finds herself in the far-away land of the Taurians, serving as a priestess of Artemis, to whom all human foreigners landing in the region are sacrificed.¹²³ When Orestes, pursued by the Erinyes, washes ashore in Tauris, Iphigenia discovers in the nick of time that the shipwrecked man is actually her brother. Iphigenia escapes having to sacrifice him to the goddess by means of a trick and the two siblings manage to get away on a ship. A messenger reports their flight to the local ruler, Thoas. He wants to know why Iphigenia ran away, and when he is answered ‘to save Orestes’, he wants to know who Orestes is:

Θο. τὸν ποῖον; ἄρ’ ὄν Τυνδαρις τίκτει κόρη;
 Αγ. ὄν τοῖσδε βρομοῖς θεᾷ καθωσιώσατο¹²⁴ 1320

Th. To save *whom*? The one whom the daughter of Tyndareus bore?
 Mess. The one whom she *kathōsiōsato* to the goddess at this altar.

The verb καθοσιόομαι in this passage has been interpreted as ‘to consecrate, to make ἱερός, sacred’.¹²⁵ But note that, for all we know, this verb is again a Euripidean neologism.¹²⁶ The original audience had to try and make sense of it as much as we do and understood the verb form καθωσιώσατο only by means of an ad-hoc interpretative process. Therefore, this is a particularly bad example to postulate a

invocations of silence. I suggest to take ἐξοσιούσθω as a direct-reflexive form, in line with our interpretation of ὀσιοῦσθε in l. 110, with στόμα as a second object and εὐφημον as the object-predicative, and prefix ἐξ- as an intensifier. The sentence reads: ‘let everyone make himself completely ὀσιος (making the transition to committing to the service of Dionysus) with respect to the mouth, (making it) reverently silent.’ The neologism ἐξοσιώω may have been coined by Euripides, in order to invoke an extra pious atmosphere and to say a familiar thing in a new, especially solemn way.

¹²³ E. *IT* 35-41.

¹²⁴ E. *IT* 1319-20. I follow MUSURUS’ emendation of θεά το θεᾷ. DIGGLE (1981:89-91) argued that this emendation is necessary on account of the following line (1321). Usually τὰ ὄσια and ἡ ὄσια refer to *human* actions, which is why it may be more likely that Iphigeneia is the agent (but since this verb is a neologism, we do not know).

¹²⁵ VAN DER VALK 1942:125-6: ‘es ist nämlich auffällig aber unanfechtbar, dass ὀσιοῦν mit seinen Komposita nicht nur bedeutet reinmachen, von Befleckung befreien, sondern auch heiligen, weihen und also synonym mit ἱεροῦν u.s.w. ist ... Ähnlich Eur. *I. T.* 1320.’

¹²⁶ It occurs in one other Euripidean fragment (F 539.1 *TrGF*) without context and in a few later texts: Ar. *Pl.* 661 (cf. n. 132 below). Thphr. fr. 13 l. 21 (from Porphy. *Abst.* II 26).

‘meaning’ or ‘usage’ to consecrate for the denominative verb καθοσιώω, depending on a meaning ‘sacred’ for ὅσιος. In order to interpret this verb form, the audience would, again, have drawn on their general knowledge of denominative verbs, the semantics of ὅσιος and related terms, and on what had happened previously in the play.

The verb form seems to be modelled on the verbs καθιερώω and καθαγίζω, both meaning, ‘to consecrate’. The similarity with these other verb forms is one of the reasons why the novel compound verb καθοσιώω can make any sense here in the first place.¹²⁷ But that obviously does not entail that καθοσιώω was interpreted as having the same semantic content as these other verbs. Rather, starting out from our knowledge of the meaning of ὅσιος and ἡ ὁσία, ‘making a sacrificial victim ὅσιον’ should mean something like ‘preparing the victim so that he is fit for the ritual (ὁσία)’.

Why did Euripides invent this novel verb, a case of marked language usage? More precisely: what effect did he try to achieve with it? In my view this is a joke, based on the sustained irony in the play concerning the Taurians’ dealings with ὁσία. The storyline of *Iphigenia in Tauris* hinges on the characterisation of the Taurians as barbarian others who, among other things, do not understand anything about religion. As was discussed above, in a ‘normal’ religious setting in Greece, if a mortal had had contact with bloodshed or childbirth or had been in touch with a corpse, he/she would be kept from the altars, being polluted. The Taurian ritual of regular human bloodshed on the altar for the sake of a god would make no sense from the divine perspective as perceived by the Greek internal and external audience. Consequently, Iphigenia does not believe at all that this religious custom is in accordance with the goddess’ will (380-91). Likewise, the chorus of Greek women (attendants of the priestess) in this play explicitly describe these human sacrifices as ‘not ὅσια’.¹²⁸

The irony in the characterisation of the Taurians is that they genuinely think their rituals do please the gods, and that they do give serious contemplation to what they should do to honour τὸ ὅσιον. For example, when Iphigenia announces she wants to wash the foreigners before sacrificing them, Thoas asks: ‘so that they will fall to the

¹²⁷ i.e. the newly coined verb is understandable from the analogy with existing verbs.

¹²⁸ E. *IT* 463-66: ὦ πότνι, εἴ σοι τάδ’ ἀρεσκόντως | πόλις ἦδε τελεῖ, δέξαι θυσίας, | ἄς ὁ παρ’ ἡμῖν νόμος οὐχ ὁσίας | ἀναφαίνει. ‘Reverent goddess, if these things are pleasing to you | that the city does this, receive the sacrifices, | which are impious according to the custom in our country (i.e. Greece).’ I follow the editions by COLLARD (2000) and KYRIAKOU (2006), both deleting, with BERGK, Ἐλλησι διδοῦς in 466.

goddess in a more ὄσιον manner?’¹²⁹ The passage under consideration here continues that irony. When the Taurian messenger loftily says the priestess ‘laid the victim out in a ὄσιον manner on the altar’ (1320) this is highly paradoxical: according to the Greek characters in the play, this is absolutely *not* ὄσιος. Thus, this choice of words underline once more what barbarians the Taurians and their King Thoas really are.¹³⁰

Summarising the above, in this passage the verb καθοσιώω is not a mere synonym of καθιερώω.¹³¹ The former is modelled on the latter but it does not *mean* the same, on the contrary: Euripides deliberately uses an invented verb that acquires its meaning during the interpretative process, and the author coined it to achieve an effect. The utterance would have been ironic if Euripides had used the verb καθιερώω, but this verb would not have had the same attention-catching effect. The marked usage of language plays out the sustained irony in the play, regarding the Taurians’ lack of religious know-how, even better.¹³²

5. Semantic paradox or marked language? Hermes confused

Finally, we will re-interpret the cases of ὀσίη occurring in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*, which have been seen as examples of the meaning ‘profane’. In the first passage the omniscient narrator recounts that the god Hermes ‘desired the ὀσίη of the meat’. The second passage is a dialogue in which Hermes boldly states that he will ‘enter upon the same ὀσίη’ as Apollo. In the third passage, Hermes tells Apollo: ‘Zeus loves you on the basis of every ὀσίη’. I will interpret these cases in terms of markedness. As was discussed in Chapter 5, the usage of ὄσιος for god is marked, in the sense that the lexeme is employed in these cases in a highly marginal way, in defiance of other available and better-fitting lexical options.

¹²⁹ E. *IT* 1194. Similarly Iphigenia invokes an (invented?) goddess Ὀσία to persuade Thoas (1161) of her actions.

¹³⁰ An extra level of irony is achieved through the fact that Iphigenia is about to sacrifice her brother - violence against siblings is also typically ἀνόσιος. Perhaps the irony is in line with the general tone of the scene. CROPP 2000:252 thinks this scene is humorous, although KYRIAKOU 2006:408-11 takes a different view.

¹³¹ VAN DER VALK 1942:125-26.

¹³² This verb occurs with similar usage on one other occasion, in Aristophanes’ *Wealth*, in a scene in which the slave Cario describes the arrival at the temple of Asclepius and explains ‘once the cakes and the preparatory offerings had been καθοσιώθη (661) on the altar ... we made Plutus lie on a couch.’ Here the scholion explain, ‘before the dedication barleycorns and frankincense were set up as votive gift in a ὄσιον manner’ (ὀσίως ἀνετέθη). As was explained (Chapter 6, section 2.1, n. 21) the slave intersperses his language with paratragic elements of speech throughout this comedy, these occur in the speech in which this utterance occurs (SOMMERSTEIN 2001 *ad loc.*; also SILK 2000:25). Perhaps Aristophanes deliberately inserted the ‘difficult’, poetic word καθοσιώθη, having remembered it from Euripides’ play.

As I will argue, in these cases it does not seem that the god deliberately uses a term for himself that is normally reserved for humans. On the contrary, the god appears to be confused about his human or divine status. My analysis below will build on to the more general characterisation by VERSNEL of the anthropomorphic character of the god Hermes.

In the first part of the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* it is recounted how baby Hermes invented the art of making a fire and stole the immortal cows of Apollo. He took two of the cows to perform a ritual. First, he killed two of the immortal (!) cows by piercing through their spine (117-18). He flayed the cows (123-25), cut up the meat (119) and roasted it together with the innards (120-22). He divided it into twelve portions (125-28), adding a token of honour to each (128). Then Hermes was tempted:

ἔνθ' ὄσις κρεάων ἠράσσατο κύδιμος Ἑρμῆς·
 ὀδμη γάρ μιν ἔτειρε καὶ ἀθάνατόν περ ἔοντα 130
 ἦδει· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὥς οἱ ἐπέιθετο θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ
 καὶ τε μάλ' ἰμείροντι περᾶν ἱερῆς κατὰ δειρῆς.¹³³

Then glorious Hermes desired *hosié* of the pieces of meat,
 for the smell, a sweet one, tormented him, even though he was immortal.
 But even so his heroic spirit did not yield to him,
 even though he greatly desired to swallow (it) down his holy throat.

Having thus overcome his desire, Hermes put away the meat (133-35) and burnt the hoofs and the heads (135-36). This episode has been the topic of much scholarly debate. Discussions have focused on the nature of the sacrificial ritual and on the meaning of ὄσις κρεάων (i.e., on what it is that Hermes desires).

The passage has been interpreted by some as a *thysia* sacrifice, perhaps marking the foundation of the cult of the Twelve Gods at Olympia. As JEANMAIRE argued, during a *thysia* all the meat would be consecrated to the gods, but part of the meat was afterwards de-sacralised (conceded by the gods to humans): this is the meat that humans ate. According to JEANMAIRE, the ὄσις κρεάων that Hermes longs for refers to precisely this 'desacralised' share of the meat.¹³⁴ VAN DER VALK and BURKERT

¹³³ *h.Merc.* 129-32.

¹³⁴ JEANMAIRE 1945:82: 'Ce n'est pas que toute la victime ne soit consacrée par le rite même du sacrifice, dont le propre est de la faire passer dans la catégorie des *hiera*, mais l'usage comportant, pour les sacrifices ordinaires, partage entre les dieux et les hommes, la part qui revient à ces derniers est par définition et en vertu du rite qui implique ici une désacralisation, ὄσια, profane.'

subscribed to this view.¹³⁵ Thus, according to these scholars ἡ ὄσια designates the ‘profane’ share and the passage is used to support this supposed meaning of ὄσια. However, whether or not the entire sacrificial animal at a *thysia* offering was, in the Greek view, first transferred to the divine sphere, after which part of the animal was ‘desacralised’ again for human consumption,¹³⁶ it has been realised that the ritual Hermes performs is very far from being an ordinary *thysia* offering. If interpreted as an Olympian sacrifice, about every aspect of the sacrifice is abnormal, as scholars have often pointed out. Therefore, such an interpretation of the ritual actions, and consequently of ὄσιη, is problematic.¹³⁷

Perhaps the most strikingly odd feature of Hermes’ actions is the fact that he *roasts* the meat for the gods. In a normal *thysia* sacrifice, the offerings to the gods (the *mêria*, wrapped in fat) were transferred to the divine sphere *by burning them*: what the gods received was the smoke, the *knisé*. As such, the sacrificial practice emphasized the difference and the distance between humans, who actually needed to eat, and the immortal gods, for whom the smoke sufficed.¹³⁸ VERSNEL concludes that ‘Hermes seems to be completely unaware of the prevailing dietary code, mixing them up by treating the Olympian gods to a *human* dinner.’¹³⁹ Hermes’ offering of roasted meat has led JAILLARD to dismiss the characterisation of his actions as an (extraordinary) *thysia* sacrifice. Instead, JAILLARD interpreted the events in the light of religious rituals in which gods were *actually* offered meat. Two types of such ceremonies are known in the archaic and classical periods. First, raw meat was sometimes placed on a table near the altar or inside the temple as a present for gods

¹³⁵ VAN DER VALK 1951:418, 421; BURKERT 1985:270.

¹³⁶ There seems to be no evidence for such a conceptualisation (F.T. VAN STRATEN, personal communication). Instead, it seems that worshippers assumed a division from the start between the part allocated to the gods and the part allocated to humans.

¹³⁷ Abnormal elements of this ‘sacrifice’ include: the fact that Hermes lights the fire with the candlesticks he invented (instead of taking them from an altar), the manner of killing the animals, piercing their spinal chords (instead of cutting their throats), and, as I will discuss in the main text, the fact that the gods receive the same share of the victim as humans do, i.e. portions of roasted meat (instead of *knisé*, product of the burnt *mêria* wrapped in fat). Moreover, common and expected elements of a usual sacrifice are missing in the description, such as the customary preliminary actions (libations, οὐλοχύται) and the roasting of the entrails to be consumed on the spot. For a complete inventory of unusual elements of the ‘ritual’ and elements missing compared to a normal Olympian sacrifice, with references to other scholarship: VERGADOS 2013:324-29. An attempt by BURKERT 1984: esp. 837-38 to save the interpretation of this passage as a *thysia* sacrifice, by adding parallels for all ritual features in cults in different parts of Greece, is flawed. As STRAUSS CLAY 1989:118 rightly objected, the *conjunction* of all these elements in one ritual remains odd, and VERSNEL 2011:313 and VERGADOS 2013:327 agree.

¹³⁸ EKROTH 2011:17 with references to earlier scholarship.

¹³⁹ VERSNEL 2011:372.

(offerings usually labelled ‘*trapezōmata*’). Second, in a ritual usually termed ‘*theoxenia*’, gods were invited to join the banquet of humans and were seated on a special throne as guests of honour.¹⁴⁰ Then cooked meat was offered to them. In opposition to JEANMAIRE (who argued that the ὀσίη κρεάων were those ‘profane’ pieces of meat that humans were free to eat) JAILLARD proposed that the ὀσίη κρεάων which Hermes desires are honorific gifts of meat to gods in a ritual resembling *theoxenia* or *trapezōmata*. He translates ὀσίη κρεάων correspondingly as: ‘la part qui, dans le sacrifice, constitue la timé des dieux’. In other words, Hermes’ desire is for τιμή, honour, and it marks his longing to become a fully fledged god. Thus, according to JAILLARD, we need to assume a special meaning of ὀσίη as ‘τιμή of the gods’ in this passage.¹⁴¹

As we see, different readings of the ritual have also resulted in opposite interpretations of the meaning of ὀσίη. However, to get on with interpreting this passage, it will not be useful to discuss in more detail the ‘bewildering confusion in the scholarly literature’¹⁴² concerning the ritual nature of this passage.¹⁴³ There are in any case three clear reasons why JAILLARD’S reading cannot work. First of all, the text presents an explicit contrast between desiring the meat (ὀσίης κρεάων ἠράσσατο ‘he desired ὀσίη of the pieces of meat’; ὀδμή γαρ μιν ἔτειρε ... ἡδέϊα ‘the sweet smell

¹⁴⁰ These cultic phenomena already occur in Homer but seem to become more widespread during the Archaic and most of all Classical period. Cf. EKROTH (2011) for a more complete description of these rituals, their motivation, origin and significance. EKROTH is convinced by JAILLARD’S characterisation of Hermes’ actions in the *Hymn to Hermes* in these terms (2011:21). JAILLARD’S interpretation is attractive, because it gives us a perspective on Hermes’ (initial) offer of roasted meat, although it should immediately be made clear that Hermes’ actions cannot be straightforwardly mapped on one of these rituals. For example, as EKROTH 2011:26 has shown, whereas *trapezōmata* rituals typically featured pieces of raw meat, the *theoxenia* rituals featured cooked meat. But the rituals in this Hymn, although the meat is prepared, resemble the *trapezōmata* ritual more.

¹⁴¹ JAILLARD 2007:108. Also according to HUMBERT 1937 (and cf. the commentaries by GEMOLL 1886 and RADERMACHER 1931) ὀσίη expresses the idea of sanctity, consecration. HUMBERT translates ὀσίη κρεάων ‘viandes consacrées’. This interpretation of ὀσίη conforms, too with JAY-ROBERT’S reading of ὀσίη in the Homeric Hymns as ‘τιμή of the gods’ (2009:33-38 = 1999:12-16). Note that JAILLARD does not base his theory on JAY-ROBERT’S work, although he mentions that his views coincide with JAY-ROBERT’S explanation of ὀσίη in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* (p. 89 n. 171).

¹⁴² VERSNEL 2011:314.

¹⁴³ For references to other views cf. VERSNEL 2011:309-377. The recent commentary by RICHARDSON 2010 does not give the problem due treatment. VERSNEL’S probably deliberate vagueness, when he argues that the passage ‘betrays features’ of the discussed rituals, though it ‘represents neither’ (2011:372), is perhaps indicative of our general poor understanding of this passage. Maybe the author of the Homeric hymn did not intend to describe a coherent ritual in the first place.

wore him down', 129-30) and being a god (καὶ ἀθάνατόν περ ἔόντα 'although he was an immortal', 130). Secondly, Hermes' 'desire' is a physical craving to consume the meat: it is triggered by the smell (ὄδμή); its content is 'to swallow (the meat) down the (his) holy throat' (περᾶν ἱερῆς κατὰ δειρήϊς, 132); and it is a continuation of a previous statement in which Hermes is said to be 'greedy after meat' (κρεῖων ἐπατίζων, 64) which is why he steals the immortal cows of Apollo in the first place. Thirdly, the passage implies that Hermes desires something he could obtain if he wanted to, but he successfully conquers his urge (the desire 'wore him down', ἔτειρε, 131; 'but his manly spirit did not yield' ἄλλ' οὐδ' ὥς οἱ ἐπειθετο θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ, 132). In my view, JAILLARD'S and JAY-ROBERT'S interpretations of ὁσίη as 'τιμὴ of the gods' for this passage become highly unlikely in the light of these observations. Hermes does not desire something metaphysical (τιμὴ) that he does not (yet) have in his incomplete status among the Olympian gods. He wants a concrete piece of meat that is right in front of him. This desire, unlike the desire for τιμὴ, does not befit a god, as the narrator makes clear.

Moreover, it should be noted that whatever ritual the passage represents (some kind of *thysia*, or some sort of *trapezōmata* or *theoxenia*), Hermes' physical desire for the meat is inappropriate for a god, for a simple reason. Greek gods, apart from Hermes, are *never* conceptualised as actually being hungry, as intending or wanting to eat human food – even in the above-mentioned rituals in which raw or cooked meat was offered. Such offerings did not aim to feed the gods, but offered them τιμὴ. Gods were merely *honoured* by the gifts of meat or entire meals deposited on a table (*trapezōmata*) or by the invitation to a banquet (*theoxenia*). But no one ever thought they actually wanted to eat their presents.¹⁴⁴ After the ritual, the portion of the god was consumed by humans, as was sometimes also explicitly laid down in the sacred law.¹⁴⁵ Thus, the inappropriateness of Hermes' appetite is independent of the type of ritual we assume the passage represents.¹⁴⁶

As we have seen, wanting to eat meat shows Hermes as a kind of 'human'. That characterisation is completely in line with the image the audience would have had of Hermes already. VERSNEL recently investigated the depiction of Hermes in literary

¹⁴⁴ EKROTH 2011:34-36; VERSNEL 2011:361.

¹⁴⁵ EKROTH 2011:37.

¹⁴⁶ Note that the passage is thus not necessarily, as VERSNEL 2011:311, 324, 371-72 supposes, a 'hermeneutic nightmare', containing an irresolvable 'inconsistency' (i.e. Hermes understands that he should not desire the meat because he is a god, at the same time he has served them a 'chateaubriand' (p. 371) apparently assuming that they would like to eat it). Hermes may have offered the roasted meat, not because he assumed they also wanted to eat it and was 'projecting his own predilection for a steak *à la humaine* onto the world of gods,' but to provide the gods with τιμὴ in a ritual *à la theoxenia* or as a kind of *trapezōmeta*.

sources (this hymn, fables, Aristophanic comedy), archaeological evidence (herms, vase paintings) and the cultic/ritual sphere (Hermaic aspects of sacrifice). VERSNEL has shown that a very consistent image of the god emerges: throughout these different media and over a long period of time the most typical feature of Hermes is ‘his thoroughly human nature’.¹⁴⁷ Notably, Hermes’ humanity shows especially clearly in his culinary preferences.¹⁴⁸ As VERSNEL argues:

From early archaic poetry ... via late archaic and early classical sources ... up to and including classical comedy and contemporary ritual, *all* descriptions or allusions share one central message, namely that from a culinary perspective Hermes never behaves in a decent Olympian fashion. On the contrary, he always seems to forget that he is a god, consistently crossing the border and landing on the human side.¹⁴⁹

I would like to argue that the term ὀσία, rather than expressing an idiosyncratic meaning ‘the profane part of the sacrificial meat’ or ‘τιμή of the gods’ is a marked utterance that *contributes to the creation of the anthropomorphic image of the god* in this passage. That is, in my view the usage of ὀσίη in this passage functions in the same way as ὀσίη in Pindarus’ *Pythian 9* and ὄσιος in Euripides’ *Alcestis* and *Heraclides*, analysed in Chapter 5. In these cases, the marked usage of ὀσία and ὄσιος for a god also helped creating an impression of the god as some kind of human.¹⁵⁰

Elsewhere the noun ὀσία is predominantly used in the syntactic construction ‘(to do) X is (not) ὀσίη’. Taking this knowledge as our starting point, the expression ὀσίης κρεάων ἠράσσατο ‘he desired for the ὀσίη of the meat’ probably means: ‘Hermes desired that part of the meat which (in his own eyes) was ὀσίη (sc. for him to desire)’. That way of thinking crucially betrays a human perspective. As has been argued (Chapter 2) in cases in which ὀσία and ὄσιος refer to cultic practice these terms regard

¹⁴⁷ p. 318. Cf. the extensive survey in VERSNEL 2011:319-370.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. VERSNEL 2011:352-70, e.g.: in cult, as a herm, he receives titbits of all kinds of human foodstuffs, but never burnt sacrifice. In comedy, he is insatiably hungry, not for *knisé*, as the other gods, but for the human portions of a sacrifice, such as the *splanchna* or the ham (e.g. Ar. *Pl.* 1114-32); p. 325: In the Hymn to Hermes, Hermes not only longs to eat roasted meat, but also corn, definitely associated with humans. Finally, ‘even in the one and only allusion to his partaking of a god’s portion, the *thulémata* (in Telecl. fr. *CAF* 33) he does not eat them processed according to divine taste. Mortally allergic to *knisé*, so it seems, Hermes gulps them down before they can be transformed into food for the gods’ (p. 371).

¹⁴⁹ VERSNEL 2011:370-1.

¹⁵⁰ Chapter 5, sections 2.2-2.4.

the ‘who, what, where, when and how’ of ritual actions.¹⁵¹ That is, when humans worry about ‘what is *όσία*’ in cult, they wonder what they should offer, when, how much, for which god, and what they are allowed to eat. The proper division of the meat by humans between ordinary human participants, special participants (such the priest) and the relevant god(s) is a crucial aspect of any sacrificial ritual, and guarantees the successful continuation of a positive relationship with the god(s).¹⁵²

As we have seen, the passage as a whole shows Hermes as a character who is evidently uncertain about his divine status, craving the roasted meat. The narrator’s characterisation of Hermes’ as ‘desiring the *όσίη* of the meat’ *contributes to creating* that picture of Hermes. The narrator *could* have written that Hermes desired a piece (*μοῖρα*), of the meat. He could have stated that Hermes wanted ‘what was allowed’ (*έξεστι*) for him to eat. These seem to be suitable lexical candidates. The marked choice for the term *όσίη* instead of these expected alternatives has an intended effect: to reinforce this ambiguous portrait of Hermes.

A second passage in the *Hymn to Hermes* lends itself to a similar analysis. After his sacrifice of Apollo’s immortal cows, Hermes returns to the far-off cave where he lives with his mother Maia. When she is upset with her infant son because he was out getting into mischief while he should be lying in his cradle, Hermes tells her their present situation is not as it should be: he and his mother should not bear to remain here, being (the only ones) among the gods that are without gifts and prayer (*άδώρητοι καί άλιστοι*, 168). No, Hermes says, it is

βέλτερον ήματα πάντα μετ’ άθανάτοις όαρίζειν	170
πλούσιον άφνειόν πολυλήϊον ή κατὰ δῶμα	
άντρω έν ήερόεντι θαασσέμεν· άμφι δέ τιμής	
κάγώ τής <u>όσίης</u> έπιβήσομαι ής περ Άπόλλων.	
εί δέ κε μη δώησι πατήρ έμός, ή τοι έγωγε	
πειρήσω, δύναμαι, φηλητέων όρχαμος εῖναι. ¹⁵³	175

better to be always conversing among the immortals,
rich, wealthy, and rich in land, than to sit about in our “palace”¹⁵⁴
- a gloomy cave. As far as honour is concerned,
I will enter upon the same *hosiē* that Apollo has.

¹⁵¹ Chapter 2, section 1.7.

¹⁵² Cf. VERGAGOS 2013 who briefly characterises *όσίης κρεάων* as ‘“his rightful share of meat,” i.e. what Hermes perceived to be his rightful share’.

¹⁵³ *h.Merc.* 170-75.

¹⁵⁴ For the sarcastic interpretation of *κατὰ δῶμα*, which I follow, cf. VERGADOS 2013, *ad loc.*

But if my father will not give it to me, mark my words: I will definitely go and try myself – and I am able to – to be a leader of thieves.

In the crucial phrase in this passage ἀμφὶ δὲ τιμῆς | κἀγὼ τῆς ὁσίης ἐπιβήσομαι ἧς περ Ἀπόλλων (172-73) ‘as far as honour is concerned, I will also enter upon the same *hosiê* that Apollo has’, ἐπιβαίνω is used in a metaphorical sense. The verb is used elsewhere to describe a figurative ‘path’ (of morality, of activity) that a person takes or intends to take.¹⁵⁵ What could ‘to enter upon a ὁσίη’ mean? As we saw, when concerning direct interaction with a god, the term ὁσίη describes a specific rite or ritual: ‘it is ὁσίη to do X’ means ‘it is the religious custom to do X’. More generally, ὁσίη is the set of rules that humans follow to sustain the reciprocal relationship with the gods (Chapter 2). When Hermes says that ‘as far as τιμή is concerned’ he intends to ‘set foot on (ἐπιβήσομαι) the same ὁσίη that Apollo enjoys’, he most probably means: ‘I want to achieve that the same (or a similar) set of rules will be operative for me that is also actual in the reciprocal relationship between Apollo and his worshippers, so that I will be honoured as he is.’ Concretely, Hermes is thinking at this point at the benefits for him: he no longer wants to be ἀδῶρητος (168) ‘without gifts’.¹⁵⁶

But Hermes’ expression is unusual, although we can understand its sense. The usage of the definite article with ὁσίη is rare: other texts do not refer to individual identifiable ὁσίαι.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, in other cases when someone ‘sets foot on something’ or, in causal use, someone else ‘turns him on the path of something’, the phrase expresses that the person taking the specified metaphorical path will do, be or have something *himself*.¹⁵⁸ By using the expression ὁσίης ἐπιβήσομαι, Hermes seems to

¹⁵⁵ For example, in *Od.* 22.424 Eurykleia tells Odysseus that in his absence, twelve female servants ‘went in the way of shamelessness’ (ἀναιδείης ἐπέβησαν); Penelope in *Od.* 23.13 remarks that the gods have sometimes ‘set a thoughtless man on the path of prudence’ (χαλιφρονέοντα σαοφροσύνης ἐπέβησαν; ἐπιβαίνω used in causative sense, cf. LSJ ἐπιβαίνω s.v. B), and previously in this passage (*h.Merc.* 166) Hermes says ‘I will turn on the path of *technê*, the one that is the best’ (τέχνης ἐπιβήσομαι ἢ τις ἀρίστη; On the metaphorical usage of ἐπιβαίνω cf. LSJ s.v. A 14.).

¹⁵⁶ Thus, the *intention* of Hermes’ speech probably boils down to the translation by JEANMAIRE 1945:83: ‘Quant aux privilèges, dirons-nous donc, j’entends, moi, que mon *casuel* égale celui d’Apollon’. But I reject JEANMAIRE’s semantic description of ὁσίη in this passage as a ‘lucrative rite’. ὁσίη may refer to a religious rite, but describes the perspective of humans (what they must do regarding the who, what, where, when and how), not the perspective of the gods (what they will get out of it). ὁσίη describes the specifics of ritual rather than gods’ profits.

¹⁵⁷ In no other extant passage is ὁσίη qualified by a definite article. Cf. my comments on the expression ἐκ πασῆς ὁσίης, in the main text below.

¹⁵⁸ For example, when Penelope’s ‘thoughtless man’ (n. 155 above) was set by the gods on the path of σαοφροσύνη, it means that *he* became σαόφρων; when Odysseus’ female servants turned on the

imply that *he* can engage in some activity concerning *ὄσιη*, himself. Such marked usage of *ὄσια* would have been noted by the contemporary audiences and have been interpreted by them as part of Hermes' continual confusion about his status (divine or not?); as an aspect of Hermes' stereotypical propensity to act, talk and present himself as if he were a human.¹⁵⁹

In a third passage in the *Hymn to Hermes*, Hermes shows a related confusion, when telling his brother Apollo:

πρῶτος γὰρ Διὸς υἱὲ μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θαάσσεις
 ἦϋς τε κρατερός τε· φιλεῖ δέ σε μητίετα Ζεὺς
 ἐκ πάσης ὄσιης, ἔπορεν δέ τοι ἀγλαὰ δῶρα.¹⁶⁰ 470

you sit foremost among the immortal gods, son of Zeus,
 and are good and strong. And all-wise Zeus loves you
 on the basis of every *hosiē* and has given you splendid gifts.

Different commentators probably rightly interpreted *ὄσιη* in this passage as 'what is divinely sanctioned' and translated ἐκ πάσης ὄσιης with an extended meaning 'as is right and proper'. This, indeed, must be the gist of what Hermes is trying to convey.¹⁶¹ But again the usage of *ὄσιη* is marked: *ὄσιη* is what is divinely sanctioned

path of ἀναιδεία', *they* engaged in the shameless activity of sleeping with the suitors, and Hermes, intending to set foot on the best τέχνη, is going to practice that art *himself*. When Zeus promises that any god who is ἄτιμος under Cronus 'will enter upon honour and privileges' (τιμῆς καὶ γεράων ἐπιβησέμεν) under his rule, he means that such a god will enjoy these things.

¹⁵⁹ There is no parallel, between Homer and the end of the fourth century, for JAY-ROBERT'S 2009:34-35 (= 1999:12-13) reading of *ὄσιη* in this passage as a referential equivalent of 'τιμῆ of the gods', a right that a god can possess. *ὄσιη* is not something that is elsewhere 'possessed' by gods. Moreover, there is no good reason to take ἐπιβαίνειν in a hostile sense, as this author does. Such usage of ἐπιβαίνειν is rare (LSJ), and also Hermes' hostile attack (the plan to steal Apollo's possessions in Delphi, ll. 176-81) is proposed as a last resort, the god wants in the first place that Zeus gives him *timē* similar to that of Apollo.

¹⁶⁰ *h.Merc.* 468-70.

¹⁶¹ CHADWICK 1996:222 'as is wholly proper'; RICHARDSON 2010 *ad loc.*: 'as is wholly right and proper ... here *ὄσιη* refers to what is divinely sanctioned'; VERGADOS 2013 *ad loc.*: 'according to every divine law'. By contrast, JEANMAIRE 1945:84 wrongly takes this usage to be a semantic extension of the notion that a ὄσιος human is 'free' from obligations towards the gods: by extension, Zeus loves Apollo because that is 'parfaitement libre à lui' (JEANMAIRE argues we should interpret the passage as such, rather than translating it 'ce n'est que justice'). I do not support JEANMAIRE and JAY-ROBERT'S (2009:35 = 1999:13-14) readings of this passage because in my view they are based on a misunderstanding of the semantics of *ὄσιη*, as I argued above. Finally, VAN DER VALK 1951, having argued that *ὄσιη* in the Hymn to Apollo refers to a solemn rite ('rite solennel', 421), finds a

about human activities, attitudes etc. not about Zeus' business. Moreover, the qualification ἐκ πασῆς is unexpected. Constructions with ἡ ὁσίη do not occur in the plural and ὁσίη does not take a quantifier like 'much' or 'little' or 'all' elsewhere.¹⁶² A similar usage of ὁσίη only occurs in one other context, in which the odd formulation seems deliberate.¹⁶³ Hermes' way of expressing himself, here assuming that Zeus should follow ὁσίη, seems little more than a re-emphasis of what we have seen before. Again, we are simply witnessing to Hermes' ongoing confusion about ὁσίη, and the distinction between the human and the divine world.

6. Conclusion

In this chapter I have provided an alternative interpretation for frequently quoted examples of an alleged most mysterious semantic characteristic of ὄσιος. This is the fact that this lexeme would have two opposite meanings, 'sacred' and 'profane'. It was explained that there are at least three reasons for being suspicious of such a paradox in the lexeme. We discussed a general historical and a semantic argument, as well as a more specific third, semantic argument based on our knowledge of ὄσιος. It was shown that although some scholars have recently rejected the paradox, this opinion on the meaning of ὄσιος is still very much entrenched in the literature.

I have argued first of all that some supposed occurrences of ὄσιος as 'sacred' and 'profane' can be straightforwardly explained in another way: as examples of prototypical usages of ὄσιος. We made use of our knowledge of the semantic similarities between ὄσιος and εὐσεβής (section 2). Furthermore, I have discussed the convincing reinterpretation by MAFFI and CONNOR of the set combination ἱερὰ καὶ ὄσια, which was complemented by SAMONS' and BLOK'S work on the ἱερά and ὄσια money. We saw that the reference to monies as ὄσια was an attempt by the *polis* to

'similar' meaning in this passage. According to VAN DER VALK, Apollo needs to give up some of the tasks appointed to him to Hermes. Hermes realises this and the phrase ὁσίης ἐπιβήσομαι means: 'J'acquerrai moi aussi une fonction solennelle comme celle d'Apollon.' Thus, in VAN DER VALK'S view ὁσίη is a 'solemn task'. However, in this interpretation there is a silent shift from 'solemn rite' (i.e. a task which humans carry out to honour the gods') to the 'tasks and functions of a god', which is definitely something else. VAN DER VALK does not motivate this interpretation by giving any parallels.

¹⁶² As we have seen rules state that a particular action 'is ὁσίη' (or not) (e.g. *Il.* 16.423, *Il.* 22.412, *Hdt.* 2.171.2, 2.45.2, *Pi. P.* 9.36; *h.Ap.* 237; and cf. the epigraphic material discussed in Chapter 6); or that humans should 'follow ὁσίη' (*E. Or.* 501); or cultic actions are performed in a particular way 'because of ὁσίη' (*E. IT* 1461, *h.Cer.* 211). In any case, things either are ὁσίη or not. In this respect, the word ὁσίη is comparable to, for example, the English word 'custom'. Something is 'the custom' or not, but one cannot say one does something 'on the grounds of every custom' or 'there is much custom in it'.

¹⁶³ *Ar. Pl.* 682. A discussion of this passage in Chapter 6, section 2.1.

communicate that the usage of a particular fund in a particular way was pleasing to the gods. In other words, labelling monies as ὄσια was an act of persuasive language usage, of ‘framing’. Such an explanation accords well with our impression of the persuasive usage of ὄσιος in fifth-century literature and epigraphy (section 3). We also examined denominative verbs derived from ὄσιος. In three passages in Herodotus, it was shown that we can interpret these verbs without resorting to a meaning ‘profane’. The usage of ὄσιος for initiands of mystery cults should be seen as appropriation of mainstream religious language of the *polis* by these groups, but these cases are no evidence for a meaning ‘sacred’. Moreover, it was argued that the Euripidean verb forms, being neologisms, should primarily be seen as instances of Euripides’ inventive language use, who coined or at least cleverly used these rare verb forms in each case to produce particular effects (section 4). In the final section, we analysed three passages in which the god Hermes applied the rules of ὀσίη to himself. Although these scenes have provoked much scholarly discussion, we can actually see the same pattern here as in similar cases in Chapter 5. These utterances are marked and contribute to the anthropomorphic image we get of Hermes in this *Hymn*. The analysis built on to previous scholarship (VERSANEL) on Hermes’ highly ambivalent status ‘between human and divinity’ throughout his visual and textual representations (section 5).

We must conclude that the semantic paradox of *hosios & cognates* does not exist.

Conclusion

In this thesis we set out to understand the meaning and usage of *hosios & cognates*. The study of the semantics and pragmatics of these terms has been surrounded by many controversies: *hosios & cognates* have been considered as notoriously difficult to understand.

The starting point of our analysis was a fundamental insight in the field of conceptual semantics, which is that lexical selection is competitive. A language user (speaker) always chooses a lexeme after (unconsciously) considering alternatives. A listener realizes that these alternatives were available to the speaker, but apparently the selected lexeme expresses the message he or she wishes to convey best. Based on this view of semantics, we studied the meaning and usage of *hosios & cognates* by examining the competition with near-synonymous semantic ‘rivals’. Moreover, using insights from the field of cognitive semantics, it was argued that the representation of ‘meaning’ of a lexeme in the mental lexicon consists of a structured inventory of usages and an awareness of the cultural framework to which the lexeme is connected. Consequently, we set out to study the distribution pattern and the associations connected to *hosios & cognates* and its near-synonyms. Moreover, it was necessary to confine the research to a short period in time. The usages, associations and cultural frames connected with lexemes change over time when the historical and textual contexts in which they are used and the mentalities of their users change as well. Studying ‘the semantics and pragmatics’ of a term can only be done by taking a slice of history and making an analysis for that period (or possibly, taking multiple slices and making multiple consecutive analyses). Our focus was the 5th century B.C..

Chapter 2 provided an initial analysis of the distribution of *hosios & cognates*, of the internal structure of the semantic network (prototypical and less prototypical usages) and the associated cultural frame(s). We have seen that *hosios & cognates* may be used to evaluate a wide variety of actions, attitudes and individuals. However, in the large majority of occurrences (80%) these lexemes are in fact limited to a very small group of applications. Confirming previous scholarly views, I argued that *hosios & cognates* evaluate conduct towards the gods *directly* (discussing whether

humans acknowledge gods as gods, keep a proper relationship to them, and honour them in cultic service) and *indirectly*, by evaluating conduct in those interhuman relationships that have the special interest of the gods (between parents and children and other member of the *oikos*, between guest and host, towards suppliants and the dead and in keeping oaths).

An analysis of the earliest attestations of *hosios & cognates* and of situations in which this evaluation is activated without much contextual preparation showed that *hosios & cognates* are essentially and primarily ethical and religious, and that there is a crucial connection between these. These evaluations access different cultural frames (of the long-term relationship with one's parents, of receiving and honouring guests, for example) but these are all subsumed under one larger frame: that of sustaining the reciprocal bond with the divine world. We have argued that *hosios & cognates* refer to what humans do to keep up this relationship. To 'do ὅσια' is to perform the human part in the exchange: to present the gods with gifts, the most important gift being τιμῆ. This characterisation of 'doing ὅσια' implies that ὅσιος (with positive argumentative orientation) articulates a positive value, not 'what is religiously neutral'. In the final part of this chapter, we investigated whether the way of thinking articulated by *hosios & cognates* was present in pre-classical literature, and concluded that it was. It is not the case that *hosios*, (*eusebês*) & *cognates* in the fifth century came to express a previously absent or unpopular mentality.

Chapters 3 and 4 were examples of analyses of competitive pairs, focusing on two most central terms to which *hosios & cognates* relate: εὐσέβεια 'piety' and δικαιοσύνη 'justice'. In Chapter 3, we examined the way in which lexemes have distinct semantics when the network of usage and the internal structure of the semantic network of one lexeme differ from those of other lexemes. Having studied the distribution of *eusebês & cognates*, and having compared the data to the distribution of *hosios & cognates*, we could determine only one significant difference between these two set of lexemes. Whereas *eusebês & cognates* are used more often with a positive argumentative orientation, *hosios & cognates* are more frequently negatively oriented. In all other respects, the two sets of lexemes were comparable to a high extent. We need to conclude that ὅσιος and εὐσεβής, as far as the language user is concerned (as far as we can tell) have the same meaning. There is no good argument to suppose that *hosios & cognates*, as opposed to *eusebês & cognates*, do not express attitudes or mental states. Moreover, the extremely close similarities in the usage of both terms when they refer to *objects* helped us understand those cases in which ὅσιος qualifies an object. Given the semantics of εὐσέβεια it is clear that an object is not εὐσεβές, but the person who handles it, or is otherwise involved. The

highly analogous distribution of ὄσιος for objects (and its generally extremely similar distribution pattern) may lead us to the inference that an object is not ὄσιον either, but a ὄσιον object is used in a way that is ὄσιον by its ὄσιος owner. It was argued that there is only one semantic difference between the two sets of lexemes. The disqualification ἀνόσιος may be affectively more charged than δυσσεβής and ἀσεβής, seemingly appearing in more clearly emotional or aggressive contexts. Thus, these lexemes may differ in their emotive meaning.

In Chapter 4, we examined the way in which different lexemes may *frame* a situation in different ways, focusing on the minimal pair *hosios & cognates* vs. *dikaios & cognates*. In a case study (supplication scenes in tragedy), it was shown that these two sets of lexemes, even though both may express what is ‘just in the eyes of the gods’, in practice often frame the same situation in a different way. Even in those cases in which *dikaios & cognates* did refer to what ‘pleases the gods’, the usage of *dikaios & cognates* with this particular reference accessed the other associations and usages of this lexeme on the part of the listener. This caused him or her to be reminded of other aspects of ‘justice’ (articulating there is a proper distribution or referring to what individuals have legally committed to). Based on this analysis, a tentative answer was given to a puzzle posed in chapter 1 regarding the diachronic distribution of *hosios & cognates*. It was suggested that *hosios & cognates* (and *eusebês & cognates*) in the fifth century covered users’ need for more dedicated, specific terms to express morality from the imagined perspective of gods, when *dikaios & cognates* became more specialized for other usages.

Having studied the sets of key applications of *hosios & cognates* and its near-synonyms, and the cultural frames that these terms accessed, we moved on to discussing clearly *non-prototypical* cases of *hosios & cognates* in Chapter 5. It was argued previously that semantic networks in the mental lexicon are essentially open and flexible. “ὄσιος” is anything of which a speaker could convince us that it belongs to this category. The usage of *hosios & cognates* for gods is a good example. Or not? In this chapter it was argued that the analysis of such very unprototypical cases does not stop with the realization that they are marginal examples, perhaps even extensions of the semantic network. To understand this, we needed to take into account two general principles of communication: the social basis of language and the principle of least effort. It was argued that using a term in a highly marginal way, in the face of available lexical alternatives that could have prototypically expressed the same meaning, is *marked*. Such usage strikes the listener, who will try to find an explanation for the unexpected choice of words. The result is that such usage has an *effect* on the listener. This effect does not emerge from an analysis of ‘more and less

prototypical' usage alone, and the notion of competition *between* lexemes is essential to explaining this effect.

In Chapter 6, we moved from semantics to a historical question. Knowing what ὅσιος and ὁσία *mean* is not enough to understand this lexeme in context. We also need to know its persuasive value in contexts of debate. How *relevant* was it to a 5th century Greek speaker to learn that something is or is not ὅσιον or ὁσία? In the literary sources, we found these terms in discussions of the most central social issues and the gravest transgressions. However, obviously, literature is – at best – an indirect reflection of social and religious values of a community. Therefore, we studied our historical question on the basis of the epigraphic material, being the most direct and secure historical data we have. Some sacred laws tell the worshipper that a particular action is 'not ὅσιον' or 'not ὁσία'. We cannot determine *directly* to what extent a typical worshipper would have cared about such a message. However, we can study this question in a roundabout way, asking in which situations authorities decided to include such an explicit appeal to piety *in the first place*. Most sacred laws do not contain any religious evaluations at all. In other words, we examined another competitive pair: ὅσιος vs. ∅. Taking two extremes, were laws containing ὅσιον / ὁσία the kinds of rules on which the survival of the community depended, or, by contrast, regulations about unimportant details of cultic practice? Having studied the historical context of these inscriptions, our conclusion was that explicit appeals to piety are made when obeying the rule mattered, when the rule was quite significant to the community in question. We may infer that ὅσιον and ὁσία were important values in 5th-century Greece, confirming our impression from the literary sources.

Finally, in Chapter 7, we solved a vexed and longstanding issue in scholarship on *hosios & cognates*: the supposition that these lexemes have two opposite meanings, referring to the 'sacred' and to the 'profane', in addition to their core significance in the realm of 'piety'. On the basis of our previous research it became possible to see that none of the alleged examples – contexts in which *hosios & cognates* would refer to the 'sacred' and 'profane' – need to be taken as evidence for such a paradox. A number of examples were in fact well explained as prototypical applications of various kinds. The historical dossier of ὅσια χρήματα was explained by scholars before me. In my view their analyses showed that the application of ὅσιος to monies is an example of 'framing': claiming that the usage of such monies is pleasing to gods. As we infer from our conclusions in Chapter 6, such a claim would have been understandable to others and had a good chance of being convincing, too. The remaining cases were *ad-hoc* inventions by a poet, and in some cases marked language usage. None of these constitute good reasons to postulate a 'meaning'

sacred or profane for *hosios & cognates*, since, as it was argued, ‘meaning’ in the mental lexicon is what emerges from a stored network of recurring usages of a lexeme.

Our conclusion is twofold. First, then, with regard to *hosios & cognates*. The adjective ὅσιος and the noun ὁσία have been considered semantically opaque and extremely polysemous lexemes. I have argued that the semantics of *hosios & cognates* are not complex at all. These terms are not more ‘polysemous’ than other typical evaluative terms and there is no semantic paradox. The attested occurrences of these lexemes in the fifth century and before can be very well understood, if we take as a starting point a small amount of prototypical usages in a focused semantic network. ὅσιος is what humans do to please the gods and gives them the τιμή they deserve, or anything of which the speaker can convince others that it belongs to that category. All seemingly different cases were explained as cases of framing, or as marked language usage, on-the-spot poetic inventions with an intended effect.

Secondly, with regard to studying the semantics of evaluative terms in a dead language, I have proposed a method for carrying out such a research. I have shown that isolating a short period in time and then analysing the usage of a lexeme in its semantic field is informative and productive. Lexical selection is always based on competition. When studying the meaning and usage of a lexeme, we need to ask in which semantic/pragmatic situations the studied lexeme wins synchronically over its near-synonymous lexical rivals, and why these competitors are selected in other occasions. A diachronic study should be the accumulation of different case studies of individual periods in time.

Finally, we may return to the question asked in the preface. Why, precisely, is Polyphemus ἀνόσιος? Now we can safely say: Euripides’ Polyphemus is as ἀνόσιος as it gets. His speech is marked by a total failure to respect gods (Zeus and Poseidon), parents (again, Poseidon) and his suppliants and guests (Odysseus and his companions). Moreover, his victims are (according to Odysseus) bound to him in a bond of φιλία, and would deny them proper funeral rituals, on top of it all, because they would end up in his belly. The Cyclops transgresses not only against the gods themselves, but also against almost all of the interhuman relationships that are most important to them. This is how the Greeks imagine a monster, the complete opposite to Greek culture and civilisation.

Appendix 1

The etymology of ὄσιος and ὄσῆ

There is no consensus on the linguistic ‘origin’ of ὄσιος.¹ The two most important suggestions for the etymology of ὄσιος were made by BRUGMANN.² While BRUGMANN’s first suggestion has been rejected in later scholarship,³ there is still debate over his second theory. BRUGMANN proposed that ὄσιος is some kind of transformation of a form *ἄτιος, deriving from PIE *snt-ǵo-, a zero-grade derivation from the participle of the verb ‘to be’. This is also the starting point of Skt. *satyá-* ‘true’.⁴ Such a derivation and association with *satyá-* is semantically attractive, because, in many Indo-European dialects, the participle of ‘to be’ is used with the meaning ‘true’, and also has a potential religious dimension. For example, Sanskrit

¹ All etymologies except the one proposed by WILLI 2008 are based on the adjective ὄσιος, not the noun ὄσια, because it has been assumed since FRISK 1945:220 that Hom. ὄσῆ is a derivation (ὄσῆ). SNELL & METTE 1955:830 correctly pointed out that the lack of the adjective in Homer and Hesiod does not prove the chronological primacy of the noun.

² Various proposals for the etymology have been rejected or not taken up at all. VAN WINDEKENS 1952:124-25 proposed that ὄσιος is a word of ‘Pelasgian’ origin, a reinforcement of a Pelasgian root ὄς which is to be connected to a root that means ‘law’ (from which also Latin *ius*). FRISK 1970:435 firmly dismissed this proposal, calling it ‘unerschrocken’. MERLINGEN 1955:18 proposed ὄσιος from *ιαγ* -ιος, identifying ὄσιος with ἄγιος. CHANTRAINE 1956:285 rejected this proposal on semantic grounds and MASTRELLI 1985:34 agreed; FRISK 1970:435 found this proposal ‘ebenso unerschrocken’. I did not find scholarly discussion on EHRlich’s proposal (1910:52), ὄσιος from *σφοθιο-ς and related to ἔθος / ἦθος (though it was mentioned by BOISACQ 1916:721 and MASTRELLI 1985:33); or on MASTRELLI 1985, who proposed to derive ὄσιος from an *o*-grade derivation -YO- of the root YET- ‘to stand at one’s place’, which is especially attested in indo-iranian.

³ BRUGMANN 1906:401 proposed that ὄσιος is an *io*-derivation of a verbal adjective **s-o-to-s* (from **es-* ‘to be’); the adjective ἐτέος ‘true’ would derive from a different variant of the same verbal adjective, **s-e-to-s*. This etymology was accepted by MÖLLER 1911:232 and BOISACQ 1916:721, but rejected in later scholarship: FRISK (1970:435), CHANTRAINE (1968-80:832) and MASTRELLI (1985:33). HINGE 2007:145 rejected the etymology as well, explaining that ‘the thematic derivation of this notoriously athematic stem and the peculiar ablaut of the theme vowel render this etymology improbable.’ VAN WINDEKENS 1952:124-25 rejected the theory on semantic grounds.

⁴ HINGE 2007:145.

satyá- is frequently associated with the concept of piety and there is a considerable overlap of the semantic fields of ὅσιος and *satyá-*.⁵ But there are two major phonological problems with the theory. The first is the irregular vocalisation of **η* in ὅσιος as /o/ instead of /a/. FRISK, CHANTRAINE and MASTRELLI have rejected the etymology for this reason, but others have tried to explain the unexpected vowel.⁶ A second problem that has emerged more recently is the fact that the root for ‘to be’ has now established as **h₁es-* (not *es-*). This makes the type of formation assumed in BRUGMANN untenable, for the expected form would be **ἐόσιος*.⁷ HINGE 2007:155, considering BRUGMANN’s second etymology the most promising, has recently presented a solution to this second objection, whether convincing I cannot judge.⁸

Two other theories have been proposed recently. First, DE LAMBERTERIE 1997:170, basing himself on earlier work of MEILLET 1910-11, suggested an etymology for ὅσιος from the root **set* ‘to be stable’. An *o*-grade derivation from this root **sot-īp*, would be the basis of ὅσιος, but also of *satyá-* ‘true’, while ἐτέος and ἔτυμος go back to an ablauting *-u-* extension of the root, **set-u* ~ **st-eu*. In the context of proposing a new etymology for ἔταρος, ἑταίρη, PETERS suggested the same derivation, only according to him the root **set* means ‘[to be] good, true’.⁹ While PINAULT defended this derivation, HINGE presented linguistic objections to various aspects of DE LAMBERTERIE’s theory.¹⁰ Secondly, WILLI connected the etymology of

⁵ HINGE 2007:147; PINAULT 1996 e.g. 43.

⁶ CHANTRAINE 1968-80:832, MASTRELLI 1985:33. SCHWYZER 1939:343-44 argued that vocalisations with /o/ instead of /a/ occur in the Arcadic-Cypriac and Aeolic dialects; in Ionic and Attic cases, the *o*-vocalisation is an adoption of solemn language. For example, βρότος (instead of regular *βρατός < *m₁tō*) is Aeolic, but becomes a general poetic word (on vocalisation of **m₁* **η* and **γ* as /o/ instead of /a/ cf. RUIJGH 1961). MEILLET 1910-11 assumed a fluctuation with indeterminable conditions. HINGE 2007:146 suggests that the *o* vocalism may have been the regular outcome of a syllabic nasal before a secondary sibilant. HINGE also argued that, even if this sound law is incorrect, ‘the general picture is that PIE **η* does in fact turn up as *o* in Greek in several cases, and therefore, the *o* vocalism cannot be used as evidence against a derivation of ὅσιος from PIE *h₁sytīpōs* (147).’ Still, BEEKES 2010:1117-18 (not mentioning HINGE) is firm in his conclusion: ‘the ...connection with Skt. *satya-* ‘true’ < IE **h₁s-nt-io-* fails because ... of the vocalisation **η* > *o*, which is not found in this environment in any dialect.’

⁷ BEEKES 2010:1117, HINGE 2007:147.

⁸ HINGE’s proposal (2007:157) is that a pre-consonantal laryngeal does not develop a prothetic vowel in Greek before a *closed* syllable containing a syllabic consonant, as for example in **h₁sum.nos* > ὕμνος (contrast **h₃li.gos* > ὀλίγος). Whether this solution is sound I cannot judge myself; BEEKES 2010 does not mention HINGE in the entry for ὅσιος; the reviews by BERENQUER SÁNCHEZ (2010) and GUNKEL (2011) of the volume in which HINGE’s article appears do not give a clear evaluation of his article.

⁹ PETERS 1980:185.

¹⁰ PINAULT 1996:43ff., HINGE 2007. BEEKES 2010:1117-18 does not respond to the proposals by PETERS and DE LAMBERTERIE.

ὄσιη and ὄσιος to that of νόσος ‘disease’, arguing that both forms eventually derive from **h₁ósu*, ‘well-being’.¹¹ However, as others have argued, WILLI’s analysis for νόσος should be rejected on linguistic grounds.¹² Therefore his story for ὄσιη cannot

¹¹ WILLI 2008. In the context of proposing a new rule for the cluster **sw*, WILLI suggested that νόσος derives from a reconstructed Proto-Greek word **h₁ósu* (no corresponding Greek word is attested). This word would mean ‘well-being, good treatment (from the gods)’, being derived from Hittite *āssu-* ‘favor, good treatment, good(ness), well-being.’ νόσος would be based on **h₁ósu* preceded by a privative element *n* and refer to the *lack* of well-being (as Homeric νόνημος ‘inglorious, nameless’ = *n* + ὄνημα). More precisely, νόσος should be analysed as a possessive adjective: **n-(h₁)ósw-os* ‘not having well-being’ (someone with a νόσος (sc. ψυχῆ/φύσις *vel sim.*) is ‘not well’); and we should assume the adjective acquired a separate substantival function and meaning later (as for example ἡ αὔλειος ‘house-door’ is originally a compound adjective in -ιος which accompanied θύρα ‘door’). In words like νόνημος, νήνεμος and νόφελής (cf. Myc. *no-pe-ra-a₂*, /nōp^heleha/), the privative alpha was often added to the original result at a later stage because it ‘had come to be felt as the negation marker *par excellence*’ (156). We see the result of such a process in the also attested forms ἀνόνημος, ἀνήνεμος and ἀνόφελής. With νόσ(φ)ος, a remade adjective **ἄνοσ(φ)ος* may have come into existence, and from that adjective, an abstract noun could have been formed, by means of addition of the suffix *ία*. If **ἄνοσ(φ)ος* ever existed, one might also postulate a feminine abstract noun based on it, which would have resulted in a lexeme **ἄνοσία*, Ionic **ἄνοσίη*. This, WILLI argues, is the origin of ὄσιη: there was originally only an abstract noun *ἄνοσία* ‘the state of not having **h₁ósu*, well-being.’ Because *ἄνοσίη* did not fit into a hexameter, it was replaced by the analytical form οὐχ ὄσιη for the sake of the Homeric epic. The usage of οὐχ ὄσιη in Homer ‘must have contributed to the spread of the retrograde simplex formation ὄσιη, in Attic ὄσιᾶ’ (164). According to WILLI, the adjective ὄσιος was later derived from the noun ὄσιη.

¹² BEEKES 2010:1024, 1118; L.C. VAN BEEK (personal correspondence): ‘A PIE neuter **h₁es-* (n.) ‘good treatment; well-being; goods, possessions’, also (adj.) ‘good, favorable’; it is usually analyzed as a derivative from the root **h₁es-* ‘be’. Departing from this reconstruction, WILLI derives νόσος ‘disease’ from PIE **n₂-h₁os_u-o-*, i.e. ‘without **h₁os_u*’. He then accepts a regular development of **n₂h₁os_uo-* to Proto-Greek **noswo-*, referring to FRITZ’s reconstruction (1996) of the PIE word for ‘nose’. In WILLI’s view, **noswo-* would then syllabify as /no.swo-/, as opposed to cases like Proto-Greek **naswo-* ‘temple’ which would syllabify as /nas.wo-/. This difference in syllabification, due to a morphological restoration assumed to be operative in the type **naswo-*, is supposed to have caused the retention of **s* in **noswo-*, as opposed to the loss of **s* with compensatory lengthening in **naswo-* > νῆός. After taking part in the third compensatory lengthening, Proto-Ionic **noswo-* would then yield the attested forms Hom. νοῦσος, class. νόσος. Later on in the same article, WILLI assumes that a pre-form **anoswo-* resulted in the abstract ἄνοσίη, which is supposed to underlie Hom. ὄσιη. This **anoswo-* would in his view contain the restored form *an-* of the negative prefix, whereas **noswo-* ‘disease’ would have escaped this restoration because it had become lexically isolated. There are several problems with this scenario. First of all, it is not quite easy to explain **n-* as the reflex of the negative prefix **n₂*. In the assumed reconstruction, **nh₁os-* would in principle be expected to vocalise as **n₂h₁os-*, and therefore to result in an unattested ***ἄνο(σ)-*. WILLI (2008: 156-7) tries to avoid this consequence by positing a PIE sound change **n₂HV-* > **nV-*, referring to FRITZ’s idea (1996) to reconstruct the word for ‘nose’ as an *s*-stem derived from the root for ‘breathe, blow’, **h₂enh₁-* (cf. ἄνεμος, Latin *animus*). If that sound change is correct, PGr. **noswo-* would indeed be the expected and regular outcome of PIE **n₂-h₁os_u-o-*. The reference to FRITZ’s etymology as a parallel case of **n₂HV-* is problematic,

hold either. Moreover, there is another crucial problem with WILLI's argument. In WILLI's account, the occurrence of a noun ἀνόσια is expected, in fact, the existence of such a noun is the basis of the entire theory for ὄσιος. As evidence for ἡ ἀνόσια, WILLI quotes one epigraphic source in which this noun seems to occur as a hapax. The last paragraph of a fifth-century BC sacred law from Idalium (Cyprus) written in the Cyprian linear script, states that whoever offends against the terms set down in the law, *a-no-si-ya-wo-i-ke-no-i-tu* (ἀνοσίγια φοι γένοιτο).¹³ MASSON reads ἀνόσια as a

however, given that the stem of the word for 'nose' comes in three different ablaut shapes PIE **Hneh₂-s-*, **Hnh₂-es-*, and **Hnh₂-s-*. The vocalisation of an onset **Hnh₂-s-* may have been different from that of **ηHV-*; furthermore, ablauting forms with the stem **Hneh₂-s-* (continued in e.g. Latin *nārēs*, Lithuanian *nósis*, Vedic Sanskrit *nāsā*, dual) may have influenced the outcome of the zero grade form **Hnh₂-s-*. This means that the vocalisation PIE **η₁hosu-o-* > PGr. **noswo-* would remain without a clear parallel. Secondly, there is possible counterevidence to the assumption that the development of PGr. **-sw-* was conditioned by its syllabification. Another word of the same phonological structure as νόσιος is Hom. ἰός (m.) 'arrow', plural ἰοί or ἰά. Its pre-form seems to be **iswo-*, which derives from a PIE **(H)isu-* (as seen in Skt. *īsu-* and Av. *išu-*, both 'arrow') by thematisation (cf. MEIER-BRÜGGER, 1988:75-77). To be sure, it is possible to argue that this thematisation took place after the lenition of intervocalic **s* to **h*, so that the Proto-Greek form would be **ihu-*, with subsequent thematisation to **ihwo-*. More problematic is the fact that, again apart from νόσιος, there is no other cogent reason to follow the above conditioning of the first compensatory lengthening; WILLI's only parallel with **sw* is ἴσος 'equal', Myc. *wi-so-wo* /*wiswo-*, but there are alternative explanations for the retention of *-σ-* in this word (see RUIJGH 1987) which WILLI dismisses far too easily. We may therefore conclude that the derivation of νόσιος from a form with Proto-Greek **-sw-* is problematic in itself. The same objections apply, of course, to the derivation of Cypr. ἀνοσία (whence ὀσίη would have arisen by decomposition) from a pre-form **an-osw-iiā*. A final problem is the fact that the reconstruction PIE **η₁hosu-o-* depends rather heavily on the possibility to reconstruct a PIE neuter **h₁osu_i*, in this concrete shape. The latter reconstruction is based merely on the Hittite neuter and adjective *āššu-* (WILLI's reference, 2008: 158, to Hom. οὔρος 'fair wind', which NUSSBAUM 1998 derived from a putative **h₁osu-ro-*, is questionable: the first syllable of οὔρος always occupies the arsis in Homer, which means that the diphthong can hardly be a contraction product of **ohu-*). It is important, however, that the Hittite form has a geminate *-šš-*, a problem which has puzzled previous scholars and led to several attempts at a solution. It deserves attention that KLOEKHORST, in his Etymological Dictionary of Hittite (2008, q.v.), explicitly rejects the reconstruction **h₁osu_i*, and argues that the geminate *-šš-* can only be explained from a reduplicated PIE pre-form **h₁o-h₁s-u-*. Moreover, according to KLOEKHORST it remains uncertain whether *āššu-* was originally a neuter substantive, or whether the adjective *āššu-* 'good, dear, favourable' is older; in the latter case, it would be impossible to reconstruct a possessive compound **η₁hosu-o-* 'without well-being' for PIE. In sum, we may conclude that the etymology proposed by WILLI requires that we accept two highly archaic sound changes for which there is no further evidence, as well as an old compound **η₁hosu-o-* of Proto-Indo-European date, derived from a stem PIE **h₁osu-* for which there is no unambiguous evidence. This renders the idea implausible'.

¹³ MASSON 1983 [1961]:235ff.

noun.¹⁴ But it is more probably the neuter plural of the substantivised adjective, which frequently occurs in the fifth century. Basing the etymology of ὄσιος on a noun ἀνόσια, which is never (or, at best, only once) actually attested, seems suboptimal.

To conclude, two proposals for the etymology of ὄσιος are still standing: to derive ὄσιος from a participle of the root **h₁es-* ‘to be’ (BRUGMANN), or to derive it from the root **set* ‘to be stable’ or ‘to be good, true’ (DE LAMBERTERIE, PETERS). Both proposals have been criticised but also find recent supporters: we cannot draw any definite conclusions. Either of these two etymologies could place ὄσιος in the domain of ethical and religious evaluation of behaviour. Both postulate a similar origin for ὄσιος with Sanskrit *satyá*, a term that has moral as well as religious connotations. Unfortunately, the study of the etymology is not more helpful than this.

¹⁴ MASSON 1983 [1961]:244 notes this is a ‘hapax dont le sens est clair’ and translates the word as ‘sacrilege’.

Appendix 2

Women's role in the sacrificial ritual

A group of sacred laws contain prohibitions against women on religious grounds (οὐχ ὁσία or οὐ θέμις).¹ For example, a fourth century text from Lindos, Rhodes reads:

Vacat

[Ἀθάνᾱ]ι Ἀποτροπαία[ι]

ῥις· θυέτω ἀρχιερο-

θύτας· τὰ θυθέντα

αὐτεῖ καταχρῆσθαι.

5

γυναῖξι οὐχ ὁσία *vacat*

*vacat*²

To Athena Apotropaea
a sheep. The highest priest must sacrifice it. The offerings must be consumed on the spot.
For women not *hosia*.

We do not know precisely what this and similar inscriptions prohibit, but because of their general focus on aspects of the sacrificial ritual, it is likely that they concern women's participation in sacrifice. In this appendix we will discuss the historical background of such inscriptions, by examining the scholarly debate on female participation in cultic practice and specifically sacrifice.

Our interpretation of the usage of ὁσία in these inscriptions depends crucially on the context of these texts. If it was ὁσία for women in the Greek world to be always

¹ A list of the relevant extant inscriptions is given in Chapter 6, section 4.2.2, n. 96.

² This is N. Suppl. Epig. Rodio 169 20a; *LSS* 88. I have quoted the complete text. For a discussion of this text, cf. Chapter 6, section 4.2.2.

excluded in these contexts, the sacred laws under investigation made a point of emphasizing (for some reason) what was anyway expected. Alternatively, if a system of differentiated participation³ extended to women, the rule communicated an individual community's choice with respect to a variable in practices. Finally, if women are normally *included*, these inscriptions represent exceptional situations. The circumstances in which we assume these laws were drawn up determine our perception of their rhetorical value, and we need to resolve this issue.

The scholarship on female participation in cultic practice and specifically sacrifice has been characterised by opposite views. A number of (predominantly French) students of Greek religion have assumed that women had a marginal role in the ritual of blood sacrifice and were excluded from sharing in the sacrificial meat.⁴ This view rests on the larger scholarly paradigm in which women are seen as spending most of their lives indoors, invisible and unnoticed in the public area of the *polis*. Exclusion of women from the sacrificial practice should be seen as analogous to their political incapacity.⁵ Even if some of the authors who endorse this view acknowledge the roles women occupy in many aspects of religious life, they still consider it significant that women were sidelined (as they assume) in sacrifice. This was the quintessential ritual that made visible, sustained and celebrated the bond between humans and gods and among human members of a group.⁶

In this paradigm, the quoted inscription from Lindos should be seen as a case in which the 'normal procedure' is made overt. That is, the *όσία* it presents is part and parcel of the covenant between humans and gods. By contrast, a number of other inscriptions that expressly *include* women in the ritual should be viewed as evidence that exclusion is the normal case.⁷

Other scholars have expressed the exact opposite view arguing (or taking for granted) that women were normally present during the sacrificial ritual and shared in the meat.⁸ According to these scholars, the inclusion of women in the religious sphere contrasts sharply and significantly with their non-participation in the political sphere. In this view epigraphic evidence to the contrary (such as the inscription quoted above)

³ cf. APPENDIX 3.

⁴ LORAUX 1981; BRUIT-ZAIDMAN 1994, recently GOFF 2004:43. These scholars are following DETIENNE 1989.

⁵ As DETIENNE 1989:131 puts it: 'By virtue of the homology between political power and sacrificial practice, the place reserved for women perfectly corresponds to the one they occupy – or rather, do not occupy – in the space of the city. Just as women are without the political rights reserved for male citizens, they are kept apart from the altars, blood and meat.'

⁶ e.g. BRUIT-ZAIDMAN 1992:338-39.

⁷ I discuss these inscriptions in this appendix below.

⁸ NILSSON 1940:96.

is deviant from the norm: these prohibitions show us that exclusion was, apparently, an exceptional case that had to be regulated explicitly. Such casuistic prohibitions against women were restricted to individual cults with particular rules of (and reasons for) exclusion.⁹ It was argued, for example, that women were excluded from many sanctuaries of Heracles, because they interfered with the male values (competition, battle) characteristic of Heracles and because Heracles, as one local epithet suggests, 'hated women'.¹⁰ For similar reasons, it has been argued, women were excluded from other typically 'masculine' cults.¹¹

The inference of the 'French' school – women did not participate in sacrifice because they did not participate in 'political' life – is problematic. As OSBORNE points out, the evidence actually shows no clear link between these two modes of integration in the public sphere. Those cults from which we see women expressly excluded in the epigraphic material tend *not* to be highly 'political', but are actually marginal to the city.¹² Thus, the 'political' argument provides a rather shaky ground for extending the idea of female exclusion to all those cases where they are not expressly *included*.¹³

Of course, sources other than these inscriptions are relevant to this discussion. There is archaeological, iconographical and textual evidence to suggest that women (and girls) were highly involved in many aspects of Athenian religion.¹⁴ A full discussion of these representations of women's religious identity is outside the scope of this thesis. However, we will examine the set of inscriptions most directly relevant

⁹ FARNELL 1921:162-63; SOKOLOWSKI 1956:157; BREMMER 1994:72; DILLON 2002:238, BLOK 2005:133.

¹⁰ COLE 1992:106: Heracles was called woman-hater (Μισογύνης) in Phocis.

¹¹ e.g. the cult of Poseidon Phycius in Mycene (*LSCG* 96.8-9). BREMMER 1994:18 argues that he is a 'macho god' and this is why the women are not welcome. It is not clear, though, why Poseidon Phycius 'god of Sea Wrack' would be more of a macho god than Poseidon Temenites 'god of the *temenos*', from whose cult on the same day of the same calendar (*LSCG* 96.5-8) women are not expressly excluded.

¹² OSBORNE 1993:402-3. By contrast, women were often priestesses (a central and active role) in precisely those cults that were central to the identity of the *polis*. So women *were* granted a role (even if they did not participate in sacrifice). But this, actually, is not something the 'French' school contested.

¹³ Female exclusion may also have been motivated, as DETIENNE thinks, by their physiology: the reason why women are excluded from shedding blood (sacrifice) is they themselves bleed (menstruation). OSBORNE rightly rejects this physiological along with the political hypothesis. Greek sanctuaries in the classical period have restrictions about entering after contact with the dead and after childbirth and sex, but menstruation is not an issue at all until the second century BC (COLE 1992:111). Therefore, privileging menstruation as *the* cause for female exclusion from sacrifice in the classical period seems ungrounded.

¹⁴ Cf. e.g. DILLON 2002, BORGERS 2008, BLOK 2009c.

to us (those texts excluding women on religious grounds, in comparison to the texts which expressly stipulate that they can participate) in more detail.

Note that both parties in the debate use the same logic when weighing their evidence: behind the sacred laws is a world of assumed knowledge about how things are normally done, and which does not need to be recorded; if rules are made overt, this points to a deviation from the norm. However, this is not a necessary conclusion, and the fact that we have both explicit in- and exclusions of women would seem to be another problem for this approach (because the two types of evidence would cancel each other out).

In fact it is not, because the nature of the in- and exclusions is very different. With regard to express inclusions of women, DETIENNE wrote:

When women have access to meat, the rules of the cult are careful to specify the precise terms and conditions. For these things are not self-evident. Thus, at Thasos in the ceremonies celebrated every other year in honor of Athena Patroa, who is connected with the families of the founders from Paros, ‘married women also take part in the distribution of the portions’.¹⁵

The scholar refers to a fifth-century inscription, quoted below.

Ἀθηναίηι Πατρ-
οιη ἔρδεται τῶ-
τερων ἕτως τέλ-
η καὶ γυνακες (*sic*) λα-
[γ]χάνωσιν.¹⁶

To Athena Patroea
sacrificial rites are performed
every other year.
women also obtain
a cut of the meat.¹⁷

This is a striking example, in which καί in l. 4 (which I interpret as a focus particle) definitely suggests that this is a contrastive rule, i.e., presupposing a normality in

¹⁵ DETIENNE 1989:131.

¹⁶ This is LSCG 113, Thasos (5th century).

¹⁷ This is the interpretation of λα[γ]χάνωσιν by CASABONA 1966, *contra* ROLLEY 1965:463, who interprets λαγγάνω as related to holding political office.

which women do not share in the meat. However, the Thasian rule that DETIENNE almost casually mentions here is in fact the only piece of such evidence. The other five explicit 'inclusions' of women in the sacrificial ritual known to us contain much more detailed rules, which cannot with any certainty be taken as contrastive. Two inscriptions refer to amount of shares of meat: perhaps these texts merely stipulate a larger or smaller share than normal, or they simply record explicitly what is standard procedure anyway.¹⁸ Two other rules assign a specific sacrificial victim to a specific group of participants (women), again not necessarily implying that in 'ordinary' circumstances, female participants received nothing.¹⁹ In the fifth case, it is highly uncertain that the text refers to the consumption of meat by the female worshippers at all.²⁰

¹⁸ In *LSA* 73.21-23 (Halicarnassus, 3rd century), the priestess of Artemis Pergaea and the wives of the prytaneis in one month are to have equal shares of the victim (ἰσόμοιρος τῶν θυομένων); in *LSS* 20.17-23 (Athens, 3rd century), the priest distributes the meat to the orgeones who are present, their wives get the same, and there are half shares for their daughters and half shares for one slave.

¹⁹ *LSCG* 18.144-51 and 433-40 (Erchia, 4th century). These lines state that a goat sacrificed to respectively Semele and Dionysus should be 'handed over' to women (αἰξ γυναιξὶ παραδόσιμος). Perhaps the term παραδόσιμος (instead of a form of λαγγάνειν) means that the men did not receive anything, and this is the special ritual feature regulated here. N.B. the fact that these goats need to be consumed on the spot (οὐ φορά) presupposes that these women were present inside the sanctuary and were taking part in the ritual.

²⁰ *SEG* 35 923 A (Chios, ca. 400) states that the priestess of the cult of Eleithuia is to consume her perquisites on the spot (τάδε ἀναλ[ί]σκεσθαι αὐτῷ), 'together with the women who made the sacrifice' (μ[ε]τὰ τῶν γυναικῶν τῶν π[ο]ι[η]σασ[έ]ων τὰ ἱρά). It seems unlikely that the inscription means the priestess needs to share the meat with these other 'women' and that they are the female worshippers, as OSBORNE 1993:403 supposes, for what is the point of a perquisite if you have to share it with the public? Perhaps the rule refers to cult personnel (LUPU 2005:311), in which case this rule is a kind of extension of the regulation about perquisites, and in fact says nothing about the status and rights of female worshippers without an official function. But the aorist (τῶν π[ο]ι[η]σασ[έ]ων) seems to preclude such an interpretation. I would like to suggest instead that μ[ε]τὰ τῶν γυναικῶν τῶν π[ο]ι[η]σασ[έ]ων τὰ ἱρά is a further clarification of τάδε ἀναλ[ί]σκεσθαι αὐτῷ. If we take μετὰ as 'in the midst of' the text reads: 'when she is (still) together with, in the presence of these women' (LSJ s.v. μετὰ A I). That is: the rule stipulates the priestess has to eat *during* the ritual, not afterwards, when everyone has gone home. Normally, rules stipulating consumption on the spot (Chapter 6, section 4.2.2, n. 109 and 113) refer to ordinary worshippers having to finish all the sacrificial meat on the premises of the sanctuary. This necessarily means during the ritual itself, because after the ceremony they would not be in the sanctuary anymore. But the priestess might have stayed 'on the spot' even after all the others had gone home. The on the spot requirement in general seems to have something to do with reinforcing a ritual, strengthening the ties between the human and divine world (Chapter 6, section 4.2.2). If the point of the 'eating on the spot' rule in this inscription, too, is to give extra significance to the ritual, it makes sense that it explicitly prescribes for the priestess to eat 'on the spot' in the presence of the other women, i.e. during the ritual. Because this is the only text in which a priestess is required to eat her perquisite on the spot (OSBORNE 2011:402 n. 45), we cannot compare the inscription to similar cases.

The fact that there is actually only one piece of evidence does not in itself destroy DETIENNE's argument, for it is legitimate to try and make the most of the data we have, but it is important to realise that he is working with only one source here. Moreover, given the weakness of the 'political argument' (the other cornerstone of the theory) and the available evidence to the contrary, there is not much solid ground left to convince us of DETIENNE's views.

The surviving material gives us no good reason to believe that there was a widespread female exclusion from blood sacrifice, which would have been part and parcel of the religious fundament of Classical Greece and expressed in terms of *όσά*. Given the wealth of positive evidence on the important roles of women in Greek religion, I assume a situation of normal inclusion of women with exceptional exclusion.

Appendix 3

ξένοι in Greek sanctuaries

A small number of inscriptions contain prohibitions against foreigners (ξένοι), who are barred from entering a sanctuary on the grounds that this is not *όσια*.¹ For example, two such cases originate from Delos, where two lintels were found, presumably with an identical text:

Lintel A:

Ξένωι οὐχ όσῆ ἐσι[έναι].

Lintel B:

Ξένωι οὐχ ό[σῆ] ἐσιέναι].²

If we want to understand what kind of prohibition *όσῆ* expresses in these inscriptions, we first need to find out what kind of historical reality they are a reflection of. Since there is no *communis opinio* on the status of foreigners in Greek sanctuaries and local cultic practice, we will study this question in some detail in this Appendix. There are hardly any inscriptions on the participation of strangers in cult. What is the status of these prohibitions?

If Greek sanctuaries were normally open to foreigners, it makes sense that situations in which their presence *is* forbidden are spelled out and advertised: a stranger cannot be expected to know the customs of all sanctuaries he happens to visit. FUNKE made a proposal along these lines. In FUNKE's view, Greek cults were characterised by a 'principled openness' towards strangers. Cases in which entrance is systematically denied to all ξένοι, as in ID 68 A and B above, were rare and

¹ This group is studied by BUTZ 1996.

² ID 68 A and B. BUTZ found the second inscription on the site of Delos and reunited these 'epigraphical twins', as she presumes them to be (BUTZ 1994). The second lintel is badly weathered, but the first nine letters can be distinguished. In this publication BUTZ also summarises the earlier scholarship on ID 68A and her article is the best starting point for any further study on this inscription. A related publication is BUTZ 1996, a study of the group of four inscriptions prohibiting ξένοι.

found their motivation in the specific individual case, without challenging the general principle of inclusivity.³ Earlier, KÖRNER argued similarly that these prohibitions are the exceptions and only confirm that inclusion is the norm.⁴ The scarcity of extant inscriptions that deal with the participation of foreigners tacitly supports the views of FUNKE and KÖRNER: if principled inclusivity is the standard, the default, we do not expect many explicit sources.

Even though such an argument from silence is legitimate, it is attractive to try and see if there are perhaps other sources that can help us. Another way of getting a better understanding of the role of ξένοι at Greek sanctuaries is studying a more general question: how different groups of non-citizens received a role in *polis* religion. An informative scholarly work here is WIJMA's monograph on the participation of metics (resident foreigners) in Athenian *polis* religion.⁵ Following previous research by SOURVINOU-INWOOD,⁶ WIJMA assumes that the identity of different social groups in Athenian society was articulated through participation in cult. WIJMA argues that participation in ritual activities was differentiated for different groups. Variables of differentiation were, for example, the place that groups occupied in the Panathenaic procession, the attributes they carried, the clothes they wore. The status and integration of various groups in the community was created, reflected and negotiated by the fact that each held their own (more or less) 'central' or 'prestigious' role in ritual activities. Thus, as WIJMA argues, such differentiated cult participation of groups within the own community was a way of articulating *polis* membership. WIJMA's research was focused on 'resident *xenoi*', metics. WIJMA showed that when the group of 'resident *xenoi*' (metics) became sufficiently large, the Athenians started to articulate a special status for this group, among other things by differentiated participation in *polis* cults.

Although WIJMA's research did not cover the non-resident foreigner (ξένος), the general mechanism WIJMA describes is instructive for our research. If we can project the Athenian situation on other *poleis*, it means that authorities made conscious choices about precisely *who* they allowed to participate and *how*, and these decisions also involved ξένοι. Is this true? And what did they decide? One hypothesis on the basis of WIJMA's analysis could be that *non*-resident foreigners

³ FUNKE (2006). But FUNKE also argued that the fact that ξένοι could participate did not necessarily mean they could also participate in the same way. This comment seems to qualify his optimistic-sounding statement of 'principled openness' somewhat.

⁴ KÖRNER p. 179. The opposite view - that these exclusions would reflect a general religious taboo, a perceived inherent dislike of the gods of ξένοι in their sanctuaries - is obviously not the solution: on the contrary, gods are the special protectors of ξένοι, especially at sanctuaries.

⁵ WIJMA, *forthc.*

⁶ SOURVINOU-INWOOD 1990.

did not have a place in ritual activities of a *polis*, reflecting their *non*-membership of that *polis*. Another hypothesis is that they were given a place in cult, but a well-defined one that somehow reflected their status as foreigner-guests.

We rely on coincidental shreds of documentary information to learn more about the status of ξένοι in Greek *polis* religion. One such valuable shred is the early fifth-century foundation decree of a new colony in Naupactus (on the northern shore of the Gulf of Corinth).⁷ This colony was formed by the so-called Hypocnemidian Locrians, who decided to send a group of their citizens to settle in Naucaktus. Among the issues settled in the decree were the rights and duties the colonists would have, not only in their new home city, but also in their old community, and the text starts by stating the rules about sharing in cult. The inscription states with respect to the Naupactian colonist visiting Locris, that it is allowed that he sacrifices and partakes in the sacrificial meal (λανχάνειν καὶ θύειν), in the manner in which this is ὁσία for a stranger (ἡόπο ξένον ὁσία), if he wants.⁸ He is allowed to do so on all levels of cultic organisation, the cults of the *polis* and the cults of the subgroups.⁹

This rule in the Naupactus decree is – apparently – based on another set of rules about what is ὁσία for ξένοι with respect to their role in cult. These other rules, of which knowledge is presupposed here, may have involved a restriction of *the extent* to which the ξένος could participate in individual cultic activities. For example, he may have received a smaller portion of the sacrificial meat than citizens did. An other possibility is that the restriction concerned matters such as the position in the procession, the seating plan, or his attributes of clothing. Instead of interpreting ἡόπο as ὅπω<ς> ‘in the manner in which’, we can also take ἡόπο as ὅπω, Doric for ὀπόθεν, ‘from where’, in which case the text restricts the participation of Naupactian colonists to those cultic places ‘from where (it is) ὁσία that a ξένος’ (sc. receives sacrificial meat and sacrifices).¹⁰ Under that interpretation, we can infer that ξένοι could participate in cult on all levels of the *polis* organisation, but not everywhere.

Even if we have not been able to solve this last issue, the law gives valuable information with either interpretation. In Locris, ξένοι were not always automatically excluded from all cults, but they were not simply assimilated to Locrian citizens either: apparently they could participate in at least *some* of the

⁷ This is IG IX 1 (2) 3:718, *Syll.* 47, *ML* 20, KÖRNER no. 49; *Nomima* I, 43. I provide a detailed interpretation of this difficult text in Appendix 7, and only present the relevant parts of my reading here.

⁸ Most scholars read ἡόπο as ὅπω[ς]. Cf. the discussion in Appendix 7.

⁹ ll. 1-5.

¹⁰ This was the proposal of MEISTER 1895.

rituals or at least in *some* way, i.e. there was a system of **differentiated participation**, as in WIJMA's description for Athens. Furthermore, the decree **presupposes common knowledge** of a set of laws (which may have been unwritten, or published on stones we did not find, or published on perishable material) dealing with these ways in which or the places where different groups (at least: one group of ξένοι and one group of non-ξένοι) could participate in the cults of the Locrians. Third, these rules, which had a social and political origin, were **considered or construed as sanctioned by divine authority**: they were *όσια*.

One other inscription points to the same pattern of differentiated participation between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' (although it does not use religious terminology). This is a slightly later law from Piraeus, in which the Piraeans have decided to honour Callidamas of the deme Chollidae. In the decree it is written that, 'when the Piraeans sacrifice in the communal *hiera*, Callidamas is to receive a share that is equal to that of the other Piraeans, and Callidamas is to dine together with the Piraeans in all the *hiera*,

πλὴν | εἴ που αὐτοῖς Πειραιεῦσιν νόμιμόν ἐστ-|ιν εἰσιέναι, ἄλλωι δὲ μή·

except if somewhere for the Piraeans themselves it is in accordance with the rules to enter, but not for anyone else.¹¹

This inscription implies not only a system of differentiated participation, but also, like the text from Naupactus, that people already knew the relevant local rules.

We are dealing with an extreme scarcity of sources, which makes it impossible to make definite inferences. However, these two inscriptions, combined with the more general notion of differentiated participation in religious activities sketched by WIJMA, may suggest that the Greek way of thinking was not one of principled (unqualified) openness towards foreigners with exceptional exclusions, nor one of principled exclusion of foreigners; rather, the manner and degree of integration of ξένοι in religious activities of the *polis* was decided on by individual communities on a case-by-case basis. Apparently, in the Delian community discussed at the start of this Appendix, the conscious choice was made *not* to include foreigners at all.

¹¹ IG II² 1214, ca. 280 BC, ll. 15-17. The fact that provisions were normally made for different groups also shows from the sacred law in Tegea (IG V 2, 3, ll. 11-12), which describes the conditions for entrance and makes an explicit statement about citizens as well as non-citizens: 'In Alea, neither stranger nor citizen is allowed to dwell in the sanctuary if he does not come for the sacrificial meal' (Ἴν Ἀλέαι μὲ νέμεν μέτε ξένον μέτε ραστόν | εἰ μὲ ἐπὶ θοῖναν *híkοντα*).

Appendix 4

Suppliants in fifth-century Greece

Suppliants in fifth-century literature claim that it is ὄσιον to protect them.¹ Sometimes they say explicitly that refusing them help will result in the anger of Zeus Xenios, Zeus Hikesios or the divine world in general.² What was the historical status of such claims? The religious dimension of supplication in the fifth century BC is subject to debate in the scholarship. The traditional sanctity and inviolability of suppliants is generally accepted, following GOULD, who explained supplication as a ritual with religiously binding force. However, a scholarly disagreement has arisen over status of suppliants in the classical period. According to NAIDEN, the religious factor was removed from the equation altogether, when supplication became a fully rational and institutionalised procedure;³ others, such as CHANIOTIS, did not accept this view.

The authoritative article by GOULD (1973), which became a standard reference for the subject of supplication in the Greek world, provided an account of supplication at an altar and of humans face to face as *a ritual act*.⁴ This means that supplication can be seen as a very serious version of a ‘game’, with a standard procedure and a set of rules by which one should play. The basic rule: as long as there was physical contact between suppliant and supplicandus⁵ – touching the knees, the chin, the hands or an altar – the safety of the suppliant was guaranteed.⁶ That is, as long as a suppliant was clinging to the supplicandus or an altar, ‘there was no question but that any violence brought against the suppliant was a direct challenge, either to the power of the god whose sanctuary or altar was involved to protect his own suppliants or more generally

¹ e.g. S. *OC* 281-83, A. *Supp.* 27, E. *Hyps.* F 757.862. Literary debates about suppliants with the terms *hosios*, *dikaios* & *cognates* were studied in Chapter 4, section 3 of this chapter.

² e.g. *Od.* 9.269-71, A. *Supp.* 478-79.

³ GOULD 1973, NAIDEN 2004, 2006.

⁴ GOULD 1973:75.

⁵ The term ‘supplicandus’ was coined by NAIDEN 2004:72, 2006:3 to denote the person to whom a supplication is addressed.

⁶ This phenomenon is often referred to in the scholarship as *Kontaktmagie*, e.g. KOPPERSCHMIDT 1967:11-12.

to the power of Zeus *ἱκέσιος*.⁷ Cases in which the ‘rules’ are broken by such violence occur, but more common are attempts to trick the suppliant into breaking contact. This was a way of circumventing the ritual, exploiting the ‘rules’ of the game without actually breaking them.⁸ As GOULD shows, Homeric examples in which someone killed a suppliant without incurring divine punishment were all cases in which there was no physical contact. In these cases the supplication was not a completed ritual act and so harming a suppliant was no direct insult to Zeus Hikesios.⁹ According to GOULD, honouring suppliants was a strong norm imposed by the gods. We should imagine Zeus Hikesios as a watchman over humans’ interactions with suppliants, ready to punish any wrongs committed.

NAIDEN (2004, 2006) recently presented a completely different and highly ‘rationalist’ account of ancient supplication in reaction to GOULD’s work, in which the gods are almost entirely taken out of the equation.¹⁰ NAIDEN sees supplication as a four-step process, in which, after the *approach* by the suppliant (step 1) and the use of a *gesture*, such as touching the knees of the supplicandus (step 2) the suppliant makes a *request*, accompanied by *arguments* (step 3), which are *evaluated* by the supplicandus, who then, finally, makes his *decision* about whether to accept or reject the suppliant (step 4). The last two steps are the most important parts of the process. Crucially, according to NAIDEN this shows us that supplication was not a ‘ritual’ but rather a rational, ‘quasi-legal’ procedure, brought into the sphere of law in the classical polis. There was no religious requirement that a supplicant’s case be accepted. The supplicandus was free to accept, reject or dismiss¹¹ the suppliant on the basis of rational choice,¹² even if this was a suppliant who had established the correct physical contact. The gods were not offended and did not punish this, and mortals ‘followed the gods’ lead’.¹³

⁷ GOULD 1973:78.

⁸ GOULD 1973:82-5. This happens for example in E. *HF* 319ff., where Lycus threatens suppliants with building a fire around the sanctuary, with the intent of inducing them to leave.

⁹ The suppliant is killed before he has made physical contact or he never tries to grasp the supplicandus’ knees (for example, because he is standing at a distance), or he has already given up and let go of the supplicandus. There is one exception: Odysseus killed Leodes in *Od.* 22.310ff. even though he clasped Odysseus’ knees.

¹⁰ Of these the most significant is NAIDEN’s monograph *Ancient Supplication* (2006).

¹¹ ‘To dismiss’ a suppliant means: not to accept or reject him, but to let him go (NAIDEN 2006:158).

¹² For example, one could reject a suppliant because he was an enemy (e.g. *Il.* 10.449-53), a hypocrite (e.g. *Isoc.* 4.59-60, 12.194-95) or a criminal (e.g. *Apollod.* 2.6.2).

¹³ As NAIDEN 2006:146 argues, supplicandi rejecting suppliants are punished only once by the gods, through a human helper (Agamemnon in A. *Ag.* 231-47) and only four times by humans in the entire timespan covered by this monograph (Timoleon’s brother in Plu. *Tim.* 4.5-6, Polyphemus in *Od.* 9.250-80/E. *Cyc.* 590-607, Menelaus in E. *Andr.* 537-40 and a Hebrew supplicandus in J. *BJ.*

There are literary cases that do not fit this model. NAIDEN mentions Aeschylus' *Suppliants*, in which the Danaids argue that they should be accepted because Zeus Xenios watches over them, and the assembly of Argos finally accepts this argument. NAIDEN's view is that these literary characters do not really understand how supplication works.¹⁴ In NAIDEN's view, there are only two matters that the gods care about: 1. one should not kill a suppliant at the altar – here, NAIDEN argues, the 'prevailing view' (i.e. GOULD) is correct; and 2. Once a suppliant has been accepted, the supplicandus must indeed help him. Keeping promises was a norm, whereas acceptance and rejection were optional;¹⁵ 'betrayal' was punished by the gods, or by humans as agents of the gods.¹⁶

NAIDEN shows that the institution of supplication became further rationalised by its embedding in official state matters. It became a legal procedure, where, in a process of double evaluation, suppliants were evaluated by the Council and the Assembly.¹⁷ Transposing the evaluation of suppliants to a legal setting was a way in which the Greeks tried to give concrete shape to the divine norm they perceived as preceding and underlying the law. When a suppliant came to the altar of the Athenian council he placed a suppliant bough on the council Altar, then presented his arguments. The council considered the suppliant's request first, and if they approved, they sent the suppliant to the Assembly, with or without a favourable

4.360/6.118-21). Note that of this total of five supplicandi all except one are punished for multiple crimes (like Polyphemus in *Od.* 9 and *E. Cyc.*).

¹⁴ 'The ... mistake committed by the Danaids (and, I think, by scholars naturally or theoretically sympathetic to suppliants) is that they assume that acceptance of a suppliant is compulsory and rejection is impious. What they do not understand is that although suppliants may comply with the requirements of the practice, they are not exempt from evaluation on legal and moral grounds ... The assembly of Argos also makes a mistake. Their mistake is in thinking that they have no choice. Because of this, they fail to examine the character of the suppliants' (NAIDEN 2004:87). This does not seem the best way of approaching this tragedy, as long as the text does not give us any clues or reasons to believe that the Danaids and the Council both obviously 'misunderstand' the way things are in the world. The most we can say about this is that it is in the Danaids' best interest to trust in the ritual blindly, or at least, to make the Council believe that they do, as a rhetorical move that is part of their persuasive speech, intended to put pressure on the Council.

¹⁵ NAIDEN 2006:124.

¹⁶ NAIDEN 2006:128.

¹⁷ In their imagination of how matters are regulated elsewhere, the Athenians even imposed this system of dual evaluation on other cities in the mythical past (*A. Eu.*, *A. Supp.*, *E. Supp.*, *E. Heracl.*). This is indirect evidence for double evaluation in Athens in the fifth century. NAIDEN (2006:177) sees these literary cases as an indication that this system was 'inherited' and not a democratic invention. However, we should see the legal system in these texts as a-chronological constructs in which characteristics of the Athenian *polis* were projected on the literary situation, as GOLDHILL (1986, e.g. 146-47, 167) argues for other aspects of Greek tragedy.

recommendation.¹⁸ The Assembly in its turn devoted regular and frequent meetings in every prytany to deal with supplications. A decree was published about the outcome.¹⁹ As we see, the acceptance of a suppliant, not only in private situations, but also by the state, was not automatic nor a religious necessity, but the outcome of a process of rational assessment.

Fifth-century literary sources do not present a clear picture that could help us choose between either of these accounts. The complexity of the problem may be illustrated by a single example in a Herodotean story. When the Lydian Pactyes, pursued by the Persians, fled to the city of Cyme, the Cymaeans were uncertain of what to do.²⁰ Protecting this suppliant surely meant trouble with the Persians. But simply dismissing Pactyes would undoubtedly lead to his death and, perhaps, the anger of the gods. The Cymaeans decided to refer the problem to the nearby oracle of Apollo at Branchidae.²¹ An envoy asked ‘by means of which action they would please the gods the most’ (ὁκοῖόν τι ποιέοντες θεοῖσι μέλλοιεν χαριεῖσθαι). Surprisingly, but to the relief of a majority of the Cymaeans, the oracle advised them to ‘surrender Pactyes to the Persians’ (ἐκδιδόναι Πακτύην Πέρσησι). However, one Cymaeian citizen, Aristodicus, insisted that a new group of sacred envoys including himself be appointed to ask the oracle a second time. Aristodicus ‘disbelieved the oracle’s response and thought the envoys were not telling the truth’ (ἀπιστέων τε τῷ χρησμῷ καὶ δοκέων τοὺς θεοπρόπους οὐ λέγειν ἀληθές).

And so Aristodicus revisited the oracle,²² this time asking explicitly whether to surrender Pactyes, ‘a suppliant’ who had come to the Cymaeans ‘fleeing a violent death at the hands of the Persians’ (ικέτης ... φεύγων θάνατον βίαιον πρὸς Περσέων).

¹⁸ NAIDEN 2006:174-75. In several Attic inscriptions the positive evaluation of a supplication is written down in a decree, stating that the Council considers the suppliant ἔννομα ἰκετεύειν ἐν τῇ βουλῇ. In this context, ἔννομος means that the suppliant is eligible to supplicate, that he has done so at the right time, and that he has made a lawful request.

¹⁹ NAIDEN 2004:81, *AthPol* 43.6. MACDOWELL 1978:228-29 explains this was a practical measure: in the Athenian Empire citizens of dependent *poleis* had to travel to Athens to do their legal business. It would be impractical if, having arrived in Athens, they had to wait for an undetermined period of time for their case to come on.

²⁰ Hdt. 1.157. The background of this story is narrated in Hdt. 1.153-56. After Cyrus had captured Sardis, he entrusted control of this city to Tabalus (a Persian) and left the management of the gold which had belonged to Croesus and the other Lydians to Pactyes (a Lydian). Then he left taking Croesus with him. However, as soon as Cyrus was away from Sardis, Pactyes used the gold in his care to hire troops and convince the Lydians to revolt against Cyrus and Tabalus. When Cyrus discovered what was happening, he planned to sell all the Lydians into slavery, but Croesus persuaded him to punish Pactyes alone. Cyrus sent an army against Pactyes, but Pactyes fled to Cyme. Messengers were then sent to the Cymaeans, ordering them to surrender Pactyes.

²¹ Hdt. 1.158. All Greek quotes in this paragraph are taken from Hdt. 1.158.

²² Hdt. 1.159. All Greek quotes in this paragraph are taken from Hdt. 1.159.

The oracle gave exactly the same advice. But Aristodicus had anticipated that, and carried out a premeditated plan (ἐκ προνοίας ἐποίηε τάδε). To the god's dismay, he removed the birds in Apollo's temple. 'You most godless of all men (ἀνοσιώτατε ἀνθρώπων), how dare you do this!' Apollo exclaimed, 'are you stripping my temple of its suppliants?' (τοὺς ἰκέτας μου ἐκ τοῦ νηοῦ κεραΐζεις;). As the story goes, Aristodicus 'wasn't put out' (οὐκ ἀπορήσαντα) by Apollo's rebuke and asked: 'do you yourself help your suppliants in this way, but order us to surrender ours?' The god answered, showing that his previous advice did not express his true feelings: 'Yes, I do order this, so that you, 'having committed an impiety' (ἀσεβήσαντες) will perish all the sooner, and never come here in the future to consult this oracle about the surrender of suppliants (ικετέων ἐκδόσιος).'²³

When Apollo calls Aristodicus ἀνοσιώτατε ἀνθρώπων, he seems to be angry for various reasons, all of which together account for his outburst.²³ Aristodicus deliberately provoked and tested the god.²⁴ Furthermore, when Aristodicus took the god to task for his actions ('then why do you protect your own suppliants...?'), this verbal challenge to the god had a clear element of ὕβρις to it: Aristodicus judged a god by the same evaluative standard as he would judge his fellow humans. On more than one occasion in archaic and classical literature *hybris* is connected to the disqualification ἀνόσιος.²⁵ But Apollo's most direct reason to be upset was, obviously Aristodicus' behaviour towards the birds, 'suppliants in his temple'. Aristodicus' action should be interpreted metaphorically: the Cymaeans' proposed rejection of Pactyes is symbolically realised by Aristodicus in his removal of the birds. Even though Apollo initially consents to the Cymaeans' request to surrender Pactyes, his outburst is a clue that their very suggestion of doing so in fact greatly angers him.²⁶

²³ The Herodotean example quite explicitly illustrates the usage of ὄσιος as an evaluation of human conduct of special concern to the gods, with the figure of a god shouting out to a human that he is ἀνοσιώτατος (even if in this case the situation was rather ironic, with Aristodicus actually wanting to do the right thing and when Apollo's denunciation of the bad treatment of suppliants was more about his own apparent consent than about Aristodicus' morality). Cases in which a god/personification evaluates human behaviour as ὄσιος or the opposite occur sometimes: B. *Ep.* 3.83 (Apollo), E. *HF* 853 (Madness), E. *Hipp.* 1287 (Artemis), Ar. *Pl.* 415 (Poverty: on the status of Poverty as a 'goddess' in this play cf. Chapter 2, section 4). In E. *IT* 1461 a goddess (Athena) explains a course of action as ἡ ὄσια.

²⁴ Removing the birds is something he had planned all along. He had even already prepared a response to Apollo's apparently expected rebuke. Testing gods was not approved by the Greeks. We may compare Aristodicus' action to Croesus' testing of the Greek oracles (Hdt. 1.46-48), which has been argued was a very un-Greek action (KLEES 1965: esp. 16-49 and 63-68).

²⁵ *Od.* 16.418-33, E. *Ba.* 370-78, A. *Th.* 668-85; Hdt. 4.146.1.

²⁶ It is not clear whether the certainty of the suppliant's death, if he was indeed surrendered, also played into Apollo's reaction.

This negative judgment runs parallel to the god's later more explicit disqualification of the surrender as committing an impiety (ἀσεβείν). Finally, the Cymeans' attempt to shift their moral dilemmas to the gods may be considered an additional problem, added to their (proposed) bad treatment of the suppliant itself.²⁷

Neither GOULD's nor NAIDEN's account makes the Herodotean passage straightforward to understand. Under the traditional view (GOULD), surrendering Pactyes to the Persians would be committing an impiety (ἀσεβείν). In this passage, even considering the surrender of Pactyes is construed by Apollo as a gross impiety.²⁸ But there is a tension in the passage: the idea that one should offer asylum to any suppliant by order of the gods is in fact challenged by events at every stage in the story. The Cymaeans could *imagine* not honouring the suppliant to the extent that they sent out an official embassy to the oracle to ask about this; the god himself has no scruples to surrender Pactyes just to teach the Cymaeans a lesson; the Cymaeans, having learnt from Apollo that surrendering Pactyes was not an option, shipped him off to Mytilene and then Chios, in this way still evading responsibility;²⁹ and finally, the Chians surrendered Pactyes to the Persians for a reward, though feeling uneasy about this towards the gods.³⁰ Nor does NAIDEN's approach 'solve' the passage: for if

²⁷ Various authors (BROWN 1978:72, FONTENROSE 1988:15, PELLING 2006:151 n.36), have compared the Cymaeans' consultation of the oracle to Glaucus' question to the oracle in Delphi (Hdt. 6.86γ). Glaucus had accepted money for safekeeping from a Milesian stranger, but when this man's sons asked for the return of the money, Glaucus pretended he could not remember the arrangement and travelled to Delphi to ask the oracle whether it was all right if, by swearing a solemn (but false) oath that the money was his, he could get away with keeping it for himself. The Pythia was very angry at this suggestion and cursed his family, saying that testing the god (τὸ περιηθῆναι τοῦ θεοῦ) and committing the crime was the same. But there is a clear difference between these passages. Glaucus asked to do something that was very clearly a crime. The Cymaeans had a difficult dilemma: helping Pactyes could lead to war and their own deaths. Should the protection of one man jeopardise the lives of an entire *polis*? This seems a valid problem.

²⁸ GOULD 1973:84 characterises what the Cymaeans end up doing as an example of exploiting, but not breaking the rules, when, by sending Pactyes off to Mytilene, they smuggle the suppliant 'off the field.'

²⁹ When it turned out (1.160) that the Mytileneans were planning to surrender Pactyes to the Persians for a bribe, the Cymaeans seem to have felt slightly responsible and intercepted their former suppliant, sending him to Chios instead (where the Chians end up dragging Pactyes from the sanctuary and returning him to the Persians after all).

³⁰ The Chians surrendered Pactyes to the Persians in exchange for Atarneus (a place in Persia), but 'it was a long time before any Chian would sprinkle a sacrificial offering of barley that came from Atarneus to any of the gods, nor would anyone bake wafers with flour that came from there. Indeed, they kept anything that might come from this place away from anything having to do with religion' (Ἦν δὲ χρόνος οὗτος οὐκ ὀλίγος γενόμενος, ὅτε Χίων οὐδεὶς ἐκ τοῦ Αταρνέος τούτου οὔτε οὐλὰς κριθέων πρόχυσιν, ἐποιέετο θεῶν οὐδενὶ οὔτε πέμματα ἐπέσσετο καρποῦ τοῦ ἐνθεῦτεν, ἀπειχέτο τε τῶν πάντων ἱρῶν τὰ πάντα ἐκ τῆς χώρας ταύτης γινόμενα, 1.160).

the gods do not punish the rejection of a suppliant, why would Herodotus' Apollo bother to get so angry in the first place? Playing down the religious dimension does not make interpreting the passage any easier.

We can understand this passage, and other literary stories that show the same dual perspective,³¹ if we accept the view proposed by CHANIOTIS (1996), instead. CHANIOTIS presented a multidimensional view on dealings with suppliants at public altars in Greece. CHANIOTIS took the inviolability of suppliants at an altar, as argued by GOULD, at face value. This 'right, probably as old as the sanctuaries themselves'³² is still the norm in the classical period. However, crucially, as CHANIOTIS shows, from the early fifth century onwards, various *poleis* realised there was a problem: the presence of suppliants at public altars threatened to get out of control.³³ Sanctuaries became crowded with suppliants staying for longer periods of time.³⁴ Some of these might be native or foreign murderers, fugitives whose presence in a city could lead to aggression by their pursuer,³⁵ or other unwanted figures, such as less serious criminals or runaway slaves. Moreover, as state institutions grew and developed and the solution of legal conflicts became an issue of public courts, law became an instrument, not so much to deal with this problem, as to work around it. As CHANIOTIS argues, 'the persistence of sacred law prevented the formulation of clear, unequivocal, generally applicable rules for the acceptance or rejection of claims of supplication';³⁶ the Greeks were 'extremely reluctant to introduce ... unambiguous limitations [to *asylia*]'.³⁷

What then *did* they do? The simplest way of getting rid of a suppliant was to send him away and hope that the gods would turn a blind eye.³⁸ One could try to get

³¹ Cf. Chapter 4, section 3.

³² CHANIOTIS 1996:67.

³³ In fact, GOULD ended his own article with a similar, very brief diachronic qualification to his theory: by the end of the fifth century 'supplication, though a living thing ... was becoming increasingly a ritual whose binding force was weakening in face of the counter-strain of political realities' (101).

³⁴ CHANIOTIS 1996:69. 'As Ulrich SINN has recently demonstrated, we must assume that from the classical period on large numbers of suppliants ran to Greek sanctuaries and sometimes remained there for a long time, so that installations for their lodging became necessary.'

³⁵ Tragic situations especially play out this scenario. In three of the five plays called 'suppliant tragedies' (BELFIORE 1998:153), i.e. *A. Supp.*, *E. Heracl.* and *S. OC*, the action centers around a suppliant seeking protection in a *polis* that is not his own; this brings that *polis* into trouble with an aggressive pursuer.

³⁶ CHANIOTIS 1996:70.

³⁷ CHANIOTIS 1996:71.

³⁸ The Greeks must have noticed that divine punishment (e.g. a thunderstorm, a plague) did not follow every time one denied help to a suppliant. But the decision to neglect the rights of suppliants would always remain open for potential future debate. Any calamity befalling the supplicandus or

around the rules for *asylia* in a clever way, for example by making a fire close to the altar so that the suppliants would have to leave or burn, or threatening to do so.³⁹ Another possibility was to ask the oracle for permission, as in the Herodotean example we have discussed above, in which the Cymaeans attempted to shift the responsibility to the oracle at Didyma.⁴⁰ But most importantly, the documentary and literary evidence shows us that many individual rules were constructed, which were either intended to or had the secondary effect of *circumventing* the problem by reducing the actual numbers of suppliants.⁴¹

These laws regulated where, when and with what requests one was allowed to supplicate at an altar, and they limited who was allowed to supplicate.⁴² I will present an overview of these measures.⁴³ The first are measures imposing restrictions on who might supplicate and where. *Persons*, such as murderers, were prohibited from approaching public altars. Though such rules were aimed primarily at the avoidance of pollution, a secondary and perhaps not unwelcome effect was that they could not supplicate either.⁴⁴ Another measure that would, among other things, discourage potential suppliants was asking entry fees to the sanctuary.⁴⁵ And even for those who

the *polis* later on could be interpreted retrospectively as an expression of divine anger after all. For example, in Thuc. 1.128, the Spartans had previously put to death a group of helots who had taken refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus. When a terrible earthquake ravaged the city later, the Spartans thought this was a divine punishment. A comparable case is Hdt. 6.75. In Aeschylus' *Suppliants*, Pelasgus wonders whether he should 'take his chances' (τυχήν ἐλεῖν, 380), i.e. not helping the suppliants and simply hoping he will escape divine punishment.

³⁹ e.g. Ar. *Th.* 726-77, 926-46; E. *HF* 319ff. I have not encountered any historical examples.

⁴⁰ Hdt. 1.159. Two other potential examples of asking an oracle, IG V 2 262 (Arcadia, 4th cent.) and *LSAM* 29 (Metropolis, 4th cent.) are discussed by CHANIOTIS 1996:75-79, but his interpretation of these documents is speculative.

⁴¹ Not only the rules described below, but also literary stories, such as Ion's attack on the institution of *asylia* that unrighteous persons should not be protected by an altar (E. *Ion* 1312-1320), show us that the Greeks reflected on the problems of the institute of supplication, even if (as BURNETT 1962:99 argued) Euripides distances himself from Ion's criticism. Cf. CHANIOTIS 1996:66-68.

⁴² These measurements can partly be seen in the light of practical measures dealing with human presence in a sanctuary, aimed at protecting sanctuaries from becoming overcrowded and incurring damage to the natural environment. There were for example regulations about camping out, cutting wood, commercial exploitation of a site, etc. For a discussion and references to the relevant inscriptions, cf. DILLON 1997 and Chapter 6, section 1, n. 9.

⁴³ Not all of these are mentioned by CHANIOTIS; I present a collection of measures from different sources.

⁴⁴ CHANIOTIS 1996:74, NAIDEN 2006:178. These were: murderers, *atimoi* (including male prostitutes, cowards, deserters, draft dodgers and impious persons) and felons (including kidnappers, thieves, robbers, burglars and assailants). E.g. *LSAM* 55 (Knidos, 4th cent.).

⁴⁵ This is the case at least at one healing shrine, Oropos (*LSS* 35.4-6, 4th cent.). Cf. NAIDEN 2006:187.

were allowed inside, regulations tried to make sure they could not stay indefinitely.⁴⁶ Furthermore, restrictions on supplicatory *location* occur for example in Athens, where runaway slaves were only allowed to supplicate at the Theseion;⁴⁷ and a drastic measure taken to keep them out of the Acropolis was the instruction for a wall to be built so that neither slaves nor thieves could enter.⁴⁸ The *timing* of placing suppliant boughs was regulated,⁴⁹ and finally, there were regulations that limited the *content* of supplications. Suppliants were not allowed to ask for what the laws of the city had denied him; once convicted of wrongdoing they could not supplicate asking for the verdict to be overturned or to reduce punishments.⁵⁰ In addition to these regulations dealing with supplications at public altars, some cases of private supplication were regulated,⁵¹ as were some cases of ‘international’ supplication.⁵²

Note that in CHANIOTIS’S account two different domains may be distinguished: an unwritten custom that one should assist suppliants, and a set of written rules providing a way around undesirable practical consequences of the divine norm. Note that these written rules were *ad hoc* reactions.⁵³ Moreover, they did not have a moral or ethical-religious component. There was no inscribed stone set up at a prime location in Athens stating that ‘one must accept suppliants’ or that ‘it was not necessary to accept suppliants.’ Nor were there, at least until the Hellenistic age, any legal procedures against people who had violated *asylia*.⁵⁴ The written rules are all external measures, procedural guidelines, evasive manoeuvres. These did not attack the traditional sanctity of suppliants, which remained the unwritten norm in the fifth century.

The reluctance which the Greeks felt to restrain the institution of *asylia* directly, and the circumventing measures to which they ended up resorting, sits uneasily with

⁴⁶ For example, in the Samian Heraion (HABICHT 1972:210-25, 3rd century) shopkeepers inside the sanctuary were not allowed to hire suppliants nor were they allowed to help or hide suppliants. Cf. NAIDEN 2006:185-91.

⁴⁷ NAIDEN 2004:73. For the sources cf. CHRISTENSEN 1984.

⁴⁸ This is IG i³ 45 dated c.432-31 BC. Cf. CHANIOTIS 1996:72; NAIDEN 2006:184.

⁴⁹ NAIDEN 2004:74. We can deduce this from Andocides 1.116 in which Andocides was accused of placing a suppliant bough on the altar of the Athenian Eleusinium, while there was a law against doing this when the Mysteries took place.

⁵⁰ This is apparent from D. 24.51-52. Cf. NAIDEN 2004:75, 2006:179.

⁵¹ Athenian law regulated that a murderer who had killed unwillingly was allowed to approach the dying victim or relatives of the victim, asking them for forgiveness and to be allowed to stay in Attica, as is apparent from D. 23.72, 38.22, 43.51. Cf. NAIDEN 2004:73, 2006:198-99.

⁵² Cf. Chapter 4, section 3.7.

⁵³ CHANIOTIS 1996:79-83 argues that there is one exception: the systematic legislation around supplication by runaway slaves, which perhaps emerged because the problem this group presented was the most pressing. But the evidence for such systematic regulation is patchy.

⁵⁴ CHANIOTIS 1996:70.

NAIDEN's empirical conclusion that there was no perceived divine pressure towards accepting suppliants. NAIDEN argues that 'of the seventy rejecting supplicandi in Greek sources, only one, Aeschylus' Agamemnon, faces punishment by the gods'.⁵⁵ In order to determine how to interpret this observation in the light of our questions, it is necessary to examine the evidence for ourselves. However, we will focus on those cases that appear in fifth-century and earlier texts. NAIDEN's broad diachronic span,⁵⁶ in other ways a strength of the book, may distort the picture when looking at a specific period.

All NAIDEN's Greek sources from the fifth century and earlier are literary stories or literary adaptations of (possibly) historical stories.⁵⁷ Thus, NAIDEN's findings would imply that in the Greek literary conceptualisation of the divine world in this period, the gods are portrayed as careless about violations against suppliants, even if this is in contrast with any claims human characters in the same texts might make. If NAIDEN's observations were correct, the theology emerging from these literary texts would be quite cynical indeed with respect to suppliants. Such a conclusion may be considered irreconcilable with CHANIOTIS' view that honouring suppliants was a strong religious norm in the classical period. However, if we focus on NAIDEN's data in more detail, it turns out that rejection of suppliants who established the established the appropriate physical contact – and thus made the event a completed ritual with binding religious force – is actually rare. Thus, it is not surprising that there are also very few cases, in which a rejecting supplicandus remains unpunished.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ NAIDEN 2006:146.

⁵⁶ The monograph has a diachronic span ranging from Homer to the end of the Roman Principate, focusing on Greek and Roman supplication with occasional reference to Hebrew and other Near Eastern acts of supplication. Cases of rejection in Greek literature (listed NAIDEN 2006:162-63) range from Homer to Himerius (4th cent. AD).

⁵⁷ Thirty out of NAIDEN's total of seventy cases of rejection in Greek literature are found in the period from Homer to the end of the fifth century. NAIDEN lists seven rejections in the *Iliad*, three in the *Odyssey*, two in Aeschylus, three in Sophocles, ten in Euripides, two in Aristophanes, one in Herodotus and three in Thucydides.

⁵⁸ Thirteen of the thirty suppliants establish the ritually required physical contact with the supplicandus or an altar. In the other cases the ritual would not have binding, religious force in the first place. Two of these supplicandi faced punishment (Agamemnon in *A. Ag.* and Polyphemus in *Od.* 9). So eleven literary cases remain in this period in which a suppliant was rejected (and sometimes killed), even though he performed the ritual correctly. Yet no divine punishment occurred. How much is this? NAIDEN 2006:301-388 lists a total of 168 acts of Greek supplication from Homer until the end of the fifth century. This means that 11/168 = 6.5% of all suppliants were rejected without punishment. Splitting up the data in individual authors: in the *Iliad*, there are four unpunished rejections out of a total of twenty-two supplications (19%); one out of twenty-three in the *Odyssey* (4%), one out of twelve in Sophocles (8%) and five out of forty-seven supplications in Euripides (11%). In other authors, no cases of unpunished rejections occur. We can conclude that in

With respect to the Herodotean example, CHANIOTIS' account explains perfectly well both Apollo's imagined divine perspective as well as the fact that humans try to see if there's a way around the strongly imposed divine norm. Appealing to τὸ ὄσιον in issues of supplication was a strong appeal in the second half of the fifth century, and not only when made from the mouth of a god (which was, in fact, pretty rare).⁵⁹ At the same time, adhering to this strong divine norm was not automatic: in face of political reality and due to the existence of circumventing strategies, the claim that accepting a suppliant was ὄσιος or that rejecting, betraying or harming him was ἀνόσιος became one of the possible arguments in a situation that was increasingly negotiable. Thus, τὸ ὄσιον does not refer to an absolute norm; the evaluation is a strong rhetorical means of persuading the other in the context of debate.

Finally, returning to the Herodotean case once more: if we take a closer look at the way in which this story may have originated, that is entirely in line with CHANIOTIS' account of fifth-century thinking about suppliants. We can understand why the Cymaeans may have appealed to the oracle, for when Pactyes appealed to Cyme, this put the Cymaeans in an especially awkward position. Protecting the suppliant would mean trouble with the Persians, which was bad enough in itself, but as matters stood it was in the Cymaeans' particular interest to work on a good relationship with Cyrus.⁶⁰ After Cyrus had conquered Lydia, the Asiatic Greek cities (among which Cyme) had sent messengers to Cyrus, asking to be ruled on the same terms they had enjoyed under Croesus.⁶¹ However, Cyrus had postponed a final decision. Surrendering Pactyes could perhaps improve the Cymaeans' diplomatic situation with Cyrus, even though it meant the suppliant's death. On the horns of this dilemma the Cymaeans appealed to the oracle of Branchidae, at that time dominated by the nearby city of Miletus. Notably, the position of the Milesians in relation to Persia was different from that of the other Greek states, for as soon as Cyrus had conquered Lydia, he agreed with Miletus that they could remain on the same friendly terms with him as previously with Croesus.⁶² It was thus not surprising that the oracle belonging to Miletus gave the pro-Persian advice to hand Pactyes over: here we see a supposedly

each individual author these cases are quite extraordinary and I think they do not represent, nor are formative for the dominating Greek theological view in this period. Literary texts confirm that *asylia* is important and not to be ignored, in a different way too: CHANIOTIS shows (1996:86) that literary criticism, such as Ion's (n. 86 in this appendix) in the end works to *confirm*, not undermine the divine norm of inviolability of suppliants: had this unwritten law not been in place, Ion would have killed his mother (who was supplicating at an altar) instead of complaining about the norm.

⁵⁹ cf. n. 68 of this appendix.

⁶⁰ BROWN 1978:69-70.

⁶¹ BROWN 1978:67.

⁶² BROWN 1978:74; PARKE 1985:17-8.

divine authority (the oracle of Apollo) act on the basis of political, rather than religious considerations.

The first answer of the oracle – to surrender Pactyes – may well have been the oracle's authentic response. But the Milesians may not have been happy with it, as it put their oracle in an unfavourable light, as if the god did not care about the sanctity of suppliants. Moreover, as Herodotus mentions (1.92.2), the Lydian king Croesus offered as many lavish gifts to the oracle at Branchidai as he offered to Delphi. Some loyalty to the Lydian subject Pactyes therefore seemed appropriate.⁶³ It has been argued by BROWN and FONTENROSE that the second part of the story, in which Aristodicus goes back to the oracle and Apollo reveals his previous answer to be ironic, was a later addition to the story, invented by the Milesians to repair the image of their oracle as impious as well as ungrateful.⁶⁴

If this account of the origin of the Herodotean story is correct, it shows us how Cymaeans and Milesians alike were guided by religious ideas (Milesians: an oracle had to stand up for suppliants to preserve a good reputation; Cymaeans: surrendering a suppliant should not be done without divine approval) and political motivations (Cymaeans: surrendering Pactyes might benefit diplomatic relations with the Persians; Milesians: advising them in the same way would keep those relations intact) alike.

To sum up. In the 5th century the inviolability of suppliants was still the religious norm. Nevertheless, worshippers often tried to find a way *around* it, when they considered it impractical or dangerous to protect a suppliant.

⁶³ BROWN 1978:74.

⁶⁴ FONTENROSE 1988:11; BROWN 1978:74.

Appendix 5

ὄσιος in a Simonidean fragment

Among the earliest attestations of the adjective ὄσιος are two cases in fragmentary texts ascribed to Simonides. Nothing can be made of the shorter fragment.¹ The second part of the longer fragment reads:

ἀλλ' ἰὸλίγοις ἀρετὰν ἔδωκεν ἔμπεδον	
ἐς τῆλος· οὐ γὰρ ἐλαφρὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι·	
ἢ γὰρ ἀέκοντά νιν βιᾶται	
κέρδος ἀμάχητον ἢ δολοπλόκου	
μεγασθενῆς οἴστρος Ἀφροδίτας	10
ἄρτι ἰθαλοῖ τε φιλονικίαι·	
ὥσ[τ] ἐ μὴ δι' αἰῶνος <u>όσιαν</u>	
]θεῖν κέλευθον·	
]ος ἐς τὸ δυνατὸν]	
]αγκυλαν[15
]δικαιος]	
ε]ὐθὺς ἀπο[
]θέοντι· τρο[
]ντρο[
]α]	20
]ο[²	
...	

¹ P. Oxy. 2430 in LOBEL & TURNER 1959, in PAGE 1962 fragment 519 subfragment 76. The text reads: ...]]οσιέ[]]μερφ[]].[] ...

² P. Oxy 2432 in LOBEL & TURNER 1959, in PAGE 1962 fragment no. 541. I print a new edition by HENRY 1998, based on a new inspection of the stone. This fragment is referred to hereafter as *PMG* 541. The text is widely attributed to Simonides: cf. LOBEL & TURNER 1959, TREU 1960, GENTILI 1961, GENTILI 1964, PAGE 1962, DONLAN 1969, BERESFORD 2008. The suggestion of LLOYD-JONES 1961 that the fragment may have belonged to Bacchylides was taken up by BOWRA 1963 but not followed by other scholars. The close similarities between this fragment and another Simonides fragment, *PMG* 542, discussed in the main text, make the attribution to Simonides very likely.

But he [god?]³ grants few of us goodness
 continuously all the way to the end: being good is no easy thing.
 Irresistible desire for gain can overwhelm
 a man, against his will, or the powerful sting
 of the weaver of tricks, Aphrodite,
 just blooming love of victory,
 so that he [can]not through the whole of life
 [follow?] a *hosian* course ;
 ... as he can be...⁴

The fragment (hereafter referred to as *PMG* 541) is usually connected to a longer fragment, *PMG* 542, the song of Simonides discussed in Plato's *Protagoras*,⁵ because it has been supposed that the two fragments express highly similar ideas. The main elements of *PMG* 542 seem to coincide with *PMG* 541 and may help us achieve a fuller understanding of the latter.⁶

Following the new reading of *PMG* 542 by BERESFORD (2008),⁷ the line of thought in that fragment is the following. The speaker states first that it is difficult for a man to become or be truly good,⁸ for to be like this is the privilege of a god. This expression of the impossibility of moral impeccability⁹ corresponds to lines 6-7 of

³ TREU 1960 suggested that the subject of this sentence is 'god'. DONLAN 1969 agrees that it is 'the obvious solution'. GENTILI 1964:303 read a θ into the traces of a letter after ἔδωκεν l. 6, and suggests θεός as the last word of this line.

⁴ 6.fin. WEST 1980, 11 suppl. TREU 1960, 12 suppl. HENRY 1998, cetera e.p. (LOBEL & TURNER 1959).

⁵ Pl. *Prt.* 339A-347A.

⁶ DONLAN 1969:92 'taken side by side the two poems illuminate each other', cf. 95.

⁷ Unfortunately *PMG* 542 is extremely incoherent and its interpretation has bewildered scholars for many years, without any consensus having been reached. For a complete bibliography of the many debates over this text until the (early) 1960s cf. GENTILI 1964:278-79 n.1 and DONLAN 1969:77 n. 13; three recent rival attempts at a reconstruction of the poem, also with a summary of more recent views, have been made by HUTCHINSON 2001, BERESFORD 2008 and SCHOFIELD 2010. The new green-yellow commentary on Plato's *Protagoras* follows BERESFORD's reordering of the lines (DENYER 2008:148). SCHOFIELD does not give arguments for his reconstruction, merely printing it in an Appendix. I will follow BERESFORD's reading: this scholar's reconstruction makes for the most coherent reading of the text on the basis of sound text-internal as well as external evidence.

⁸ ἀγαθὸν ἀλαθέως, l.1; ἐσθλόν, l. 13. Also: 'to be perfect in his hands and feet and mind without a flaw' χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόφ | τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου, l. 2-3; 'to be a completely blameless man' πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, l. 24. The line numbers of my quotations of *PMG* 542 refer to the 'new version' of *PMG* 1942 proposed by BERESFORD 2008:8-9.

⁹ I agree with BERESFORD that 'good' has an ethical sense throughout (against previous interpretations that see in this song an 'aristocratic' concept of goodness that is used, revised or

PMG 541, saying that ‘he [a god?] gives merit (ἀρετή) to few continuously all the way to the end’ (ἐμπεδον ἐς τέλος). *PMG* 542 goes on to explain that ‘a man cannot help being bad,¹⁰ when some crisis that he cannot fight against takes him down (ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη).’¹¹ In *PMG* 541, the factors that stand in the way of moral excellence and are too strong to resist, forcing him against his will (ἄεκοντά νιν βιᾶται, 8) are specified in more detail: these are ‘(the) irresistible (desire for) profit’ ([κέρ]δος ἀμάχητον, 9), the powerful sting of Aphrodite (με]γασθενῆς οἴστρος Ἀφροδί[τας, 9-10) and the love of victory (φιλονικία, 11). The speaker in *PMG* 542 continues to say that, instead of looking for a perfect human he takes a less elevated stance, ‘for me a man is good enough if he is not all too lawless¹² and is versed in justice that brings benefit to cities and is a healthy man.’¹³ Lines 12-14 in *PMG* 541 seem to be parallel to that thought: ‘so that if he [cannot follow?] a ὄσιος course throughout life, [then he should do so?] as much as he can’ (ὥστ’τὲ μὴ δι’ αἰῶνος ὄσιαν |]θεῖν κέλευθον· |]ος ἐς τὸ δυνατόν).¹⁴

If we assume that the two fragments are indeed in line with one another with respect to the ‘moral philosophy’ they express, then the ‘pious route’ (ὄσιαν κέλευθον) in *PMG* 541 seems to be quite a general ethical guideline or objective, seemingly corresponding to the broad description of morality in *PMG* 542. The injunctions are not specified for behaving well in (a) particular type(s) of interhuman relationship, simply stating negative influences that might harm *any* relationship. Moreover, *PMG* 541, as other early instances of *hosios* & *cognates*, seem to draw a connection between ethics and religion, though in a slightly different way. If we agree that ‘god’ is the grammatical subject of ἔδωκεν in l. 6, then the gods are the instigators of human morality. Again, humans must try to behave well in their interactions amongst one another, and this behaviour has the special interest of the god (who is, in this case, the origin of moral uprightness).

challenged). Evidence for the ethical sense of goodness in this song is found in the profusion of ethical terminology throughout (see main text).

¹⁰ κακόν, l. 5.

¹¹ l. 6. Also: ‘every man is good (ἀγαθός) when he is doing well (εὖ πράξας) and bad (κακός) when he is doing badly (κακῶς πράξας), l. 7-8.

¹² μὴτ’ ἀγὰν ἀπάλαμνος, l. 14.

¹³ εἰδῶς τ’ ὄνησίπολιν δίκαν, l. 14-15 ἐν ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ, l. 16. ὑγιῆς occurs once in Homer to denote ‘the soundness’ of an opinion (*Il.* 8.524) and is rare in archaic literature elsewhere.

¹⁴ The word δίκαιος which can be discerned in l. 16 may be seen as a continuation of the same thought; while *PMG* 542 seems to end differently, with the speaker saying that he loves and praise all men, as long as one does nothing shameful willingly (ἐκὼν ὄστις ἔρδη | μὴδὲν αἰσχρόν, l. 30).

Appendix 6

ὄσιη in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*

The interpretation of one instance of ὄσιη in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo (l. 237) has given rise to much debate. This appendix is a *status quaestionis* and full discussion of the problem.

The term ὄσιη occurs in this hymn in the context of Apollo's search for a place to establish his cult. Among other places, the god passes through the sanctuary of Poseidon at Onchestus (before finally settling on Delphi). Here the poet describes, in a short digression, an enigmatic ritual, centring around horses and chariots:

ἔνθεν δὲ προτέρω ἔκιες ἑκατηβόλ' Ἄπολλον,
Ὀγχηστὸν δ' ἴξες Ποσιδήϊον ἀγλαὸν ἄλσος 230
ἔνθα νεοδμῆς πῶλος ἀναπνέει ἀχθόμενός περ
ἔλκων ἄρματα καλά, χαμαὶ δ' ἔλατῆρ ἀγαθός περ
ἐκ δίφροιο θορῶν ὁδὸν ἔρχεται· οἱ δὲ τέως μὲν
κεῖν' ὄχεα κροτέουσιν ἀνακτορίην ἀφιέντες.
εἰ δέ κεν ἄρματ' ἀγῆσιν¹ ἐν ἄλσει δενδρήεντι, 235
ἵππους μὲν κομέουσι, τὰ δὲ κλίναντες ἐῶσιν·
ὥς γὰρ τὰ πρῶτισθ' ὄσιη γένεθ'· οἱ δὲ ἄνακτι
εὔχονται, δίφρον δὲ θεοῦ τότε μοῖρα φυλάσσειν.²

From there you went further, far-shooting Apollo,
and came to Onchestus, Poseidon's splendid grove,
where the newly-yoked foal catches his breath, though he still has to work,
drawing the beautiful chariot. And the charioteer, though an excellent driver,

¹ The manuscripts read ἄγῆσιν 'lead into' (Homeric form of the subjunctive); BARNES proposed the emendation ἄγωσιν. These readings are unlikely for reasons discussed below. I follow COBET's emendation ἀγῆσιν 'break'.

² The manuscripts read φυλάσσει, ROUX 1964:18 emends to φυλάσσειν. The suggestion to add a final ν to φυλάσσειν makes the sentence more understandable. μοῖρα in the sense of 'lot' > 'appointed task': see LSJ s.v. μοῖρα II 2. This usage of μοῖρα occurs for example in A. *Eu.* 172, 476 for the Eumenides' task to pursue matricides.

jumps down from the chariot on to the ground and goes his way. Meanwhile, they (i.e. the horses)³ make the empty chariot rattle, being rid of guidance.

If the vehicle breaks in the tree-filled grove,

they take care of the horses, but prop the chariot and leave it.

This is how it was *hosiê* from the very beginning. They pray

to the Master, and then the protection of the vehicle falls to the god's lot.

Of some importance to the interpretation of the passage, first of all, is the geographic location of the temple of Poseidon at Onchestus. As Strabo already wrote, the well-known sanctuary lay on a height (ἐν ὕψει κείμενος) west of Thebes.⁴ It is situated on what is now called the Sténi Pass, which crosses a ridge separating two plains (Lake Copais on the west from the Teneric Plain on the east), and the temple was on the top of the ridge itself. A young and inexperienced horse would have trouble taking the chariot up this hill.⁵ The question we should answer is what ὀσίη in l. 237 refers to. The semantics of ὀσίη are not problematic: it is clear that ὀσίη refers to some kind of prescribed ritual action. However, the nature of that ritual action is not clear. In my analysis, I will take the existing scholarship on this passage as a starting point. Ordering the literature on the basis of what they make of ὀσίη, we can distinguish three main kinds of explanations.

(1) According to the first type of explanation, ὀσίη refers to all the actions mentioned in 231-38 and describes an elaborate *religious rite or ritual* specific to the cult of Poseidon. However, the nature of this ritual is disputed. The rite may relate to: a) the testing of young, newly yoked horses, perhaps in the context of their future military usage;⁶ b) a kind of divination procedure or oracular practice;⁷ c) the

³ We can tell that οἱ δέ (l. 233) are the horses, because a similar formula occurs twice in Homer's *Iliad*, in situations in which a charioteer falls from his chariot during battle (or multiple charioteers do), and then the horse(s) are said to rattle(s) the empty chariot along: πολλοὶ .. ἵπποι | κείν' ὄχεα κροτάλιζον, *Il.* 11.159-60; οἱ ἵπποι | κείν' ὄχεα κροτέοντες, *Il.* 15.542.53. This reading is widely agreed upon by commentators, e.g. JEANMAIRE 1945:75, ROUX 1964:7, SCHACHTER 1976:112, RICHARDSON 2010:75.

⁴ Str. 9.2.33.3. Early literary references to this sanctuary at Onchestus: *Il.* 2.506, Hes. fr. 219, *h.Merc.* 185-87, Alc. fr. 7 (EDMONDS 1963), Pi. *I.* 1.33, 4.19.

⁵ Cf. E. *HF* 120-22 where the movements of the chorus of old men are compared to the trouble which young horses have in drawing a chariot up a hill (ROUX 1964:12).

⁶ ROUX 1964, followed by JAY-ROBERT 1999:16-19, TEFFETELLER 2001. These proposals will be discussed in more detail below.

⁷ BÖTTIGER (in a letter quoted in MATTHIAE 1800:157-59) and BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ 1879:150, 1880:367-69. The interpretation depends on accepting BARNES' emendation ἄγωσιν 'lead into' for ἀγῆσιν 'break' in l. 235. The idea is that, if the horse goes into the ἄλσος, this is to be considered a favourable omen.

transferral of these horses from the ‘divine’ into the ‘human’ sphere;⁸ d) some other religious ritual, perhaps originating from near-eastern religious tradition;⁹ or e) the offering of a chariot to the god, perhaps dedicated by the winner of the race at the festival of Poseidon at Onchestus.¹⁰ I will discuss these interpretations further on after having presented the second and third options.

(2) Secondly, SCHACHTER maintains that ὄσίη does not refer to the described actions, but only to the prayer itself, i.e. the phrase οἱ δὲ ἄνακτι εὐχονται (l. 237-38).¹¹ According to SCHACHTER, the digression in 231-37 mainly describes the journey of an ordinary traveller (the sanctuary being on a main route from Delphi to Thebes)¹² and some practical aspects of it. In order to help his newly yoked and inexperienced horse with the ascent to the sanctuary, the charioteer jumps down from the chariot before they reach the summit (231-33). The chariot without a driver is slightly unstable as a result (234). Should the cart be overthrown (235), the charioteer should try and calm the horse first, then set the chariot straight (236). Because Poseidon is the patron of horses, such an accident on his premises would be particularly awkward, and be taken as a bad omen. So, it was ὄσίη, the religious custom to pray to the god to avert the omen and protect the chariot later on (237-38).¹³

(3) In a third line of explanation, SOKOLOWSKI 1960 has argued that the actions described in ll. 231-38 reflect a *lex sacra* for ordinary travellers. This law regulated the traffic in the grove of Poseidon’s sanctuary. According to SOKOLOWSKI’s explanation, the grove is a pedestrian area, where chariots are not allowed.¹⁴ This passage describes how normally a charioteer arriving at the grove would jump down from his car and proceed on foot (232-33), parking the chariot somewhere around the

⁸ PEPPMÜLLER 1894, ALLEN & SIKES 1904, JEANMAIRE 1945, VAN DER VALK 1951. These proposals will be discussed in more detail below.

⁹ TEFFETELLER 2001:165-66 suggests that the passage perhaps reflects a Near Eastern religious ritual in the context of the Babylonian New Year’s festival (the Akîtu festival). During this festival, in an episode called ‘Marduk’s ordeal’, a chariot went to the temple of the god without a driver, and ‘rocked about’.

¹⁰ ALLAN, HALLIDAY AND SIKES 1936:236. This interpretation builds on the more general proposal of NILSSON 1906:70 who thinks the purpose of the ritual was to see whether the offering of a chariot was acceptable to Poseidon or not.

¹¹ SCHACHTER 1976.

¹² RICHARDSON 2010:117.

¹³ SCHACHTER 1976:113.

¹⁴ SOKOLOWSKI compares this supposed regulation to other sacred laws, in which the presence of animals in sanctuaries was regulated because they caused damage to the environment of the sanctuary (cf. Chapter 6, section 1, n. 9). The entrance of chariots and horses into the grove of Poseidon would impede traffic, bother pedestrians and damage the greenery (1960:378-79).

entrance (234).¹⁵ However, if a charioteer broke this rule by taking the chariot inside (235),¹⁶ there was a penalty. The transgressor had to dedicate the chariot to the god and leave it inside the sanctuary (236-38).¹⁷ We can imagine the inscription expressing the *lex sacra* being placed at the entrance: ‘It is not ὀσίη to bring in chariots. Let the one who brings in a vehicle anyway leave it in the sanctuary as a payment to the god.’

I will discuss these three lines of interpretation in reverse order. First, SOKOLOWSKI’s proposal would give us an early literary parallel for the 5th-century usage of ὀσίη in rules prescribing who or what is allowed to enter the *temenos*.¹⁸ However, there does not seem to be any evidence for sanctuaries barring *chariots*.¹⁹ Moreover, importantly, this interpretation depends on a problematic reading of key aspects of the text. First of all, SOKOLOWSKI’s interpretation depends on BARNES’ emendation ἀγῶσιν ‘lead into’ for ἀγῆσιν ‘break’ in l. 235.²⁰ This textual suggestion is very awkward with the following ἐν ἄλσει, for we would expect ἄγω εἰς + accusative, not ἄγω ἐν + dative.²¹ Secondly, the interpretation depends on taking φυλάσσω (l. 238) as ‘keep’: the god is said to keep the chariot (as a penalty).²² However, as ROUX showed, φυλάσσω in Homer and the Homeric Hymns never means ‘to keep for oneself, to appropriate’, but always something like ‘to guard, protect’.²³ The verb ἐῶσιν in 236 does not help either: ἐάω means ‘to leave something

¹⁵ SOKOLOWSKI 1960:380 argues that the rattling sound (when the horses κείν’ ὄχεα κροτέουσιν) does not necessarily refer to a fast motion, but ‘emphasizes rather the emptiness of the car’.

¹⁶ SOKOLOWSKI accepts BARNES’ emendation ἀγῶσιν in l. 235.

¹⁷ Such a penalty is in line with regulations in other sacred laws where objects, which are not allowed to be taken into the sanctuary but are brought in anyway, are confiscated and dedicated to the god (SOKOLOWSKI 1960:379).

¹⁸ This usage of ὀσίη is discussed at length in Chapter 6, section 4.2.

¹⁹ DILLON 1997:123 mentions that vehicles usually had to be left outside sanctuaries, but the only evidence he quotes for this type of rule, besides SOKOLOWSKI’s interpretation of this passage in the *Hymn to Apollo*, is one first-century-BC law from Eleusis (OLIVER 1941, no. 31 ll. 37-40). These lines are rather fragmentary, but may convey such a message in 38-39, if we accept the restoration: κ[αταβ]αίνε[ι]ν ἀπό τῶν [ὄχ]ημάτων [καὶ πεζῆ] | [ἄγεσθαι]. The motivation proposed by OLIVER for this part of the restoration is ‘common sense’: ‘Many of the restorations proposed in other passages of the inscription occur to one naturally enough when the extant letters are correctly read’ (p.71).

²⁰ Other interpreters depending on this emendation are: BÖTTIGER (in MATTHIAE 1800), BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ 1880:367-69 and PEPPIEMÜLLER 1894.

²¹ LSJ s.v. ἄγω I a; SCHACHTER 1976:108. SOKOLOWSKI rightly dismisses the unlikely alternative, taking ἐν ἄλσει with the next phrase ἵππους μὲν κομέουσι, as well.

²² Other interpreters who depend on reading φυλάσσω as ‘to keep for oneself, to appropriate’ are ALLEN & SIKES 1904:97; ALLEN, HALLIDAY & SIKES 1936, JEANMAIRE 1945, VAN DER VALK 1951 and RICHARDSON 2010.

²³ ROUX 1964:19-20.

alone', either temporarily or permanently (out of some disinterest), but not necessarily to *give* it (as a present, as a compensation) to someone else.²⁴

All in all, it is unlikely that the text intends to convey the meaning that the chariot is left to the god as a gift/payment (ἔῶσιν, 236), who then keeps it for himself (φυλάσσειν, 238). Another disadvantage of interpretation (3) is the fact that SOKOLOWSKI hardly makes optimal usage of the information that *is* given in these lines. The author supposes that the mention of a specific type of horse, the νεοδμής πῶλος (l. 231) is not significant,²⁵ nor does the cultic association of Poseidon with horsemanship and the training of horses²⁶ enter into his interpretation.

SCHACHTER's proposal, interpretation (2), taking ὄσιη only as the prayer, also makes sub-optimal use of elements in the text. Given the amount of space devoted to this digression and the emphasis on the antiquity of the rule (l. 237), the author of the hymn probably referred to some ritual that was important in the eyes of the involved community, and, as will have been supposed, in the eyes of the god(s). Taking ὄσιη to refer only to the prayer, but the rest of the description to ordinary travelling, seems rather too minimalistic. Making a prayer to a god if an awkward accident happened on his premises and involving the animals of which he was the patron would have been common sense to any Greek. By contrast, in what we have seen so far, ὄσιη in Homer referred to two of the most essential ethical-religious rules of the community (how to deal with supplication and the dead). In this text too, we may expect ὄσιη to refer to an issue that carried weight. These characteristics of the passage make it more likely for ὄσιη to refer to some special ritual or custom rather than, as SCHACHTER argues, a 'quick prayer on the road' (my paraphrase).

Moreover, SCHACHTER's account of the lines above (231-36) cannot be correct for another reason. He argues that the driver jumped down from the chariot before they reached the summit, to help the horse. However, ll. 232 onwards refer to what happens *at* (ἐνθα, l. 231) the sanctuary on top of the hill, *after* the ascent. The verb ἀναπνέει (l. 231) refers to the horse *recovering* his breath after climbing up (although he is still working hard, still drawing the wagon, 231-32); only then does the charioteer jump down from the chariot: this fact is presented as new action (δ', l. 232), with a new main verb ἔρχεται). But if the charioteer does not jump down before the summit (to help the horse), and not out of incompetence either (he is an excellent charioteer, ἀγαθός περ, l. 232), we must assume that the horse traversing the wood without a charioteer is a goal in itself. If the unguided journey of the animal through

²⁴ ROUX 1964:16-18.

²⁵ SOKOLOWSKI 1960:378.

²⁶ FARNELL 1907, 4.14-17 and 4.78.

the wood is a goal in itself, it is probably part of the ὄσῆ, the custom described. Thus, ὄσῆ refers to more than only the prayer. Under normal circumstances, in fact, it was not uncustomary for a horseman to jump down to help a horse make a steep ascent.²⁷ Possibly, the fact that the horse needs to climb up the hill with the charioteer inside the vehicle is part of the ritual as well. But what kind of religious ritual is performed in Poseidon's grove? We may now return to the first set of interpretative suggestions.

Most of the options presented as (a) - (e) above are problematic. Some are in need of elaboration to gain credibility;²⁸ others add crucial elements for which there is no support (in the main text or otherwise). There are no textual signals or other compelling reasons to think this ritual is part of some kind of oracular practice (option b); or that the ritual has to do with the dedication of a chariot by the winner of a race (option e).²⁹ Limiting ourselves to the facts we *do* firmly possess, the ritual is centred upon young and newly yoked horses and was connected to the nature of Poseidon (god of horses and associated with taming and training them).³⁰

Focusing on the connection of Poseidon with horses, various scholars have argued that the rite is a test to see how Poseidon felt about the horse being brought under the yoke. Since Poseidon was god of horses, he may be offended at and prohibit bringing a horse under the yoke. ALLEN & SIKES argued that the rite was performed precisely to find out the god's decision.³¹ If the horses drew the chariot through the sanctuary without causing an accident, it was a sign of the god's approval and they could remain yoked; conversely, if the chariot broke, it was a sign of the god's displeasure. In such a case, Poseidon reclaimed the chariot as a tribute; the horses could be kept by the charioteer, but not remain yoked.³² JEANMAIRE follows these interpretations, stressing

²⁷ X. *Eq.* 6.6.

²⁸ The suggestion made by TEFFETELLER 2001:165-66 (n. 132 above) is interesting, but we require more information. For example: what is the relationship between a (static) chariot in the Babylonian temple and the horses moving a chariot through the Greek grove? What is the point of the Babylonian ritual and how could it relate to the aim of the rite at Onchestus? What is the significance of the main correspondence between the two cases - the uncontrolled movement of the chariots, 'rocking about' in the one case, being 'rattled' in the other? The connection between the Babylonian ritual and the Onchestus passage is not clear.

²⁹ Moreover, with respect to (e), even besides a lack of evidence and the problematic interpretation of φιλάσσω that is presupposed there is another problem: if we assume that the ritual centres on the chariot and is really about the dedication of a chariot, why would the god receive a *broken* one?

³⁰ The god is called Ἴππιος 'of the horse' (B. 16.99, A. *Th.* 130, Ar. *Eq.* 551, Nu. 83, IG 12.310.142). Among his other epithets is Δαμαῖος 'the horse-tamer' (Pi. *O.* 13.69).

³¹ ALLEN & SIKES 1904:97.

³² An alternative suggestion was made by PEPPMÜLLER (1894). This scholar accepted BARNES' emendation ἀγῶσιν and proposed that horses wanting to show their unwillingness to being yoked went into the sacred wood, found asylum there and remained the property of the god, having been

that breaking horses means they are transferred to the sphere of human activity: τὸ ὄσιον.³³ According to JEANMAIRE the ritual is a rite of de-sacralisation: its goal is to make the horse ὄσιος.³⁴

As was discussed in the main text of this dissertation,³⁵ JEANMAIRE's theory is problematic for more than one reason. Importantly, his interpretation presupposes that the chariot is left in the sanctuary for Poseidon 'to keep' (φολάσσειν), but this is not a valid reading of φολάσσειν, as discussed above. VAN DER VALK presented a more general critique of ALLEN & SIKES and JEANMAIRE's hypothesis that the ritual was connected to the breaking of horses. VAN DER VALK rightly objected that the ritual makes no sense from a practical perspective: it would simply be far too expensive to jeopardise a chariot any time one wanted to break a young horse.³⁶ Besides these objections, JEANMAIRE's assumption that this ritual (ὄσῃ) is intended to make the *object* of the ritual, the newly yoked horse, ὄσιος ('profane, free for human usage, desacralised')³⁷ is *in principle* not impossible, but there are in any case no parallels in our corpus. In the examples discussed in this thesis, *agent(s)*, the person(s) who carry out a religious ritual (observing ὄσῃ) are ὄσιος, because ὄσῃ is something humans must do in order to honour the gods. But it is not the case that the *objects* of a ritual become ὄσιος as the result of humans carrying out the ritual. Finally, in Chapter 7, I hope to have shown that there is no need to assume an interpretation of ὄσιος as 'profane' in any other passage.

VAN DER VALK argued that the ritual had to do with the transferral of horses from the divine to the human sphere in a different way.³⁸ According to VAN DER VALK a charioteer traversing the sanctuary follows ὄσῃ (behaves in a manner that is ὄσιος, pays Poseidon due respect) by handing over the reins of a newly yoked horse to his 'old master' for the duration of the horse's stay in Poseidon's territory.³⁹ But this

freed of their obligation to serve. There is no good reason to assume that the horses remained in the sanctuary as the god's property.

³³ JEANMAIRE 1945:75-77. Note that ALLEN, HALLIDAY & SIKES themselves retracted this hypothesis in their later 1936 edition of this hymn.

³⁴ JEANMAIRE 1945:77.

³⁵ Chapter 7, section 2.2.

³⁶ VAN DER VALK 1951:419-421.

³⁷ JEANMAIRE takes this interpretation of ὄσιος from VAN DER VALK 1942 as I discuss in Chapter 7, section 1.

³⁸ VAN DER VALK 1951.

³⁹ Under this interpretation, a newly yoked horse has not completely transferred to the human sphere and the ritual is a matter of the driver showing respect to the god. When in the wood of Poseidon, the newly yoked horse will not accept the authority of anyone except for that of his old master, i.e. the god. And so the charioteer steps down from the chariot, while it is the god who conducts the wagon through the woods. Should the chariot break, it means Poseidon intends to keep it.

cannot be the case. Although the idea that the god sits on a horse without a driver and conducts it (invisibly) is attested elsewhere,⁴⁰ the point of this passage is obviously *not* the transfer of the reins to Poseidon to let him guide the animal. On the contrary: the passage stresses the fact that the wagon is out of control, emphasizing that the animal rattles the wagon along, being rid of guidance (*ἀνακτορίην ἀφιέντες*, 234). It is rather unlikely that the ritual would target ordinary travelers with young horses entering Poseidon's sanctuary (as VAN DER VALK thinks). This sanctuary would be a rather unpleasant and unsafe place to be in, if one could expect to encounter young horses running around with rattling chariots and no driver at any time.⁴¹

More probably, the procedure relates to a special ritual, performed during limited and pre-set timeslots. In my view the snippets of secure information we have (the ritual is centred upon young and newly yoked horses and was connected to the nature of Poseidon, god of horses and associated with taming and training them) privilege one hypothesis: that this was a ritual intended to round off the training of a young horse. ROUX's idea that the ritual relates somehow to the completion of the training of those young horses that would be used in the military (on the surrounding Boeotian fields), option (1a), is attractive. On the battlefield, a horse might get into the situation in which it had to proceed alone, without charioteer. If a horse's training had succeeded, the horse should be able to navigate the empty chariot without breaking it; if not, it meant that the horse was not ready.⁴² If we follow ROUX's interpretation, the *ὄσίη* may have been as follows: 1. The animal must make the ascent with chariot and charioteer (i.e. to see if it is strong enough); 2. In the woods, it must navigate the chariot without driver. The god Poseidon oversees the ritual and this is a rite in honour of him, the god being concerned with the breaking and training of horses. But the law also described *practical* aspects of the ritual: 3. Should the vehicle break,⁴³ one should calm down the horses first, prop up the chariot against the wall and pray to the god, so it will be his task to protect this chariot in the future. In my view *ὄσίη* most probably refers to such a ritual.

⁴⁰ Tac. *Ann.* 12.13 describes an Iranian ritual in a grove belonging to Heracles, in which priests are instructed by Heracles to equip horses for a nightly chase. On the instruction of the god, the horses are placed near the temple of Heracles. They scour the forest during the night, killing many animals with arrows, and return with empty quivers. BERNARD (1980:323) has argued that the god is the one who rides on and guides the animals during this ritual.

⁴¹ Moreover, taking up VAN DER VALK's own point (main text above, with n. 159) about costs: it seems equally uneconomic to have a rule that entails putting a chariot at risk on every occasion anyone wanted to travel through this sanctuary with a newly yoked horse.

⁴² ROUX 1964:6-22 (followed by JAY-ROBERT 1999:16-19 and TEFFETELLER 2001).

⁴³ The verb *ἄγνουμι* indicates that it is somehow broken, not that it has simply fallen over.

Appendix 7

ὁσία in the foundation decree of a new colony in Naupactus

In this appendix we will discuss the interpretation of the beginning of IG IX 1 (2) 718, an early fifth-century foundation decree of a new colony in Naupactus (on the northern shore of the Gulf of Corinth).¹ The colony was formed by the so-called Hypocnemidian Locrians,² who decided to send a group of their citizens to settle in Naupactus. The beginning of this document (which was inscribed in bronze) reads:

ἐν Ναύπακτον : καὶ(τ) τὸνδε : ἡἀπιφουκία. : Λοῦρον τὸν
ἡυποκναμίδιον : ἐπεὶ καὶ Ναυπάκτιος : γένηται : Ναυπάκτιον ἔοντα :
ἡόπο ξένον : ὁσία λανχάνειν : καὶ θύειν : ἐξεῖμεν : ἐπιτυχόντα : αἶ κα
δεῖλεται : αἶ κα δεῖλεται : θύειν καὶ λανχάνειν : κέ(δ) δάμο κέ(Ϛ)
Ῥοινάνον : αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ γένος : κατ' αἰφεί. : τέλος τοῦς : ἐπιφοίῤους
Λοῦρον : τὸν ἡυποκναμίδιον : μὲ φάρειν : ἐν Λοῦροῖς τοῖς
ἡυποκναμίδιοις : φρίν κ' αὖ τις Λοῦρὸς γένηται τὸν ἡυποκναμίδιον. :

‘The colony goes to Naupactus according to the following (guideline). It is allowed that a Hypocnemidian Locrian, when he has become a Naupactian, being a Naupactian, sacrifices and receives by lot in the way in which it is (or: from where it is) *hosia* that a stranger [sacrifices and receives by lot], when he happens to be [in his old city], if he wants. If he wants [it is allowed to] sacrifice and receive by lot from [cults of the] whole city and the

¹ This is IG IX 1 (2) 3:718, *Syll.* 47, *ML* 20, KÖRNER no. 49; *Nomima* I, 43.

² DAKORONIA (2006:483): ‘East Lokrians were known in the ancient literary sources as Opountians, named after the capital of the Lokrians. They are also known as Epiknemidians or *Hypoknemidians*, adjectives defining the inhabitants or the area of the low-lands and the hills around Knemis, a mountainous chain extending along the west and southwest border of East Lokris’ [italics mine].

subgroups, he and his descendants, for ever. The colonists among the Hypocnemidians Locrians do not pay tax to the Hypocnemidian Locrian, not until someone has become a Hypocnemidian Locrian again.’ (etc.)

This text provides us with important insights, because it represents a moment of consolidation.³ Among the issues settled in the decree were the rights and duties the colonists would have, not only in their new home city, but also in their old community, and the text started by stating the rules about sharing in cult. Whereas, as I mentioned, such issues would have been unwritten and traditional knowledge in already existing *poleis*,⁴ in this record belonging to the creation of a new city the rules were made explicit, we get a rare insight into the nature of such (usually unrecorded) laws. However, the interpretation of these first lines in general and the usage of the term ὄσια in particular has been disputed.

In the part running from Λοῦρον τὸν ὑποκναμίδιον (l. 1) to Κοινάνον (l. 4), the inscription states that if a Hypocnemidian Locrian is in his old city,⁵ it is permitted for him to *λόπο* ξένον ὄσια λανχάνειν καὶ θύειν, if he wants (αἴ κα δεῖλεται). Most editors have read ὄσια, which is τὰ ὄσια, the substantivised adjective in the accusative neuter plural.⁶ In this reading ὄσια is the direct object of λανχάνειν and the sentence reads: ‘that it is permitted (ἐξεῖμεν) that the Hypocnemidian Locrian receives by lot (λανχάνειν) sacrificial portions (ὄσια) and that he sacrifices (θύειν)’, in the way of (ὅπως) a stranger (ξένος).⁷ However, as my transcription and translation of the text above indicates, I do not think this reading makes sense, for more than one reason.

KÖRNER’s translation of ὄσια as sacrificial portions, ‘Opferportionen’ cannot be right, for sacrificial portions are not ὄσια, but ἱερά.⁸ There is a more general difficulty with this interpretation, which is that in archaic and early- and mid- fifth-century texts, τὰ ὄσια are never *concrete* objects or items that exist in the outside world such as sacrificial portions. They are always *abstractions*, denoting ‘those things that are

³ BLOK *forthc.* c.

⁴ Chapter 6, section 2.1.

⁵ ἐπιτυχόντα ‘if he happens to be there’ must refer to Locris. The inscription cannot refer to the situation in Naupactus, because the Locrian is now a citizen of Naupactus. The terminology used: ‘when he has become a Naupactian’ (Ναυπάκτιος γένηται), ‘being a Naupactian’ (Ναυπάκτιον ἔοντα...), until he ‘has become a Locrian’ (Λοῦρος γένηται) again, is the common terminology in this time to describe citizenship. Up until 229, decrees in which a person or group is granted citizenship do not include a lexeme for ‘citizenship’, but state that ‘it has been decided that so-and-so is now (for example) an Athenian’ (OSBORNE 1981-1983).

⁶ *ML*, KÖRNER, BECK 1999.

⁷ KÖRNER no. 49 translates: ‘...soll es wie einem Fremden gestattet sein Opferportionen zu erhalten und selbst zu opfern’.

⁸ BLOK *forthc.* c.

(i.e. that we consider) ὄσιος'.⁹ τὰ ὄσια are usually direct object of a verb. In this construction τὰ ὄσια may qualify the human speech-act or action expressed by the verb. For example, in Herodotus, a Pausanias rejects the proposal to mutilate a corpse as an act of revenge, but prefers to 'do and say ὄσια' instead.¹⁰ Τὰ ὄσια can also refer to human actions of others. When Adrastus explains to Theseus that he had asked for the bodies of the Seven to be returned (so they could be buried), Theseus thinks he 'asked ὄσια'.¹¹ In these cases, τὰ ὄσια refer to human actions, not concrete objects like sacrificial portions.¹²

The usage of τὰ ὄσια to denote rights (rights one possesses, receives, participates in, is entitled to or loses) does not occur until much later, from the mid-fourth century onwards. For example, a speaker in Demosthenes states: 'It was we, men of Athens, who made Charidemus a citizen, and by that gift bestowed upon him a share in ἱερά and ὄσια'.¹³ In this and similar cases, although τὰ ὄσια are perhaps no longer strictly 'human actions considered ὄσιος', they are still abstract concepts. Moreover, when ὄσια occurs in this sense, it almost exclusively occurs in the combination ἱερά καὶ ὄσια (as in the example above).

If the 'punctuation' on the stone (the three vertical dots at various places) had been more systematic and helpful, they might have been an argument to take ὄσια λανχάνειν as a grammatical unit i.e. to see ὄσια as direct object. But here, as often, the punctuation marks are impressionistic, at best, in their separation of grammatical or meaningful units, or we would have expected, for example, the phrase 'ἐπεὶ καὶ Ναυπάκτιος | γένεται |' to be one phrase, not two.

To conclude, translating τὰ ὄσια as those portions of the sacrifice a stranger would receive is not supported by the distribution pattern of the adjective ὄσιος. Reading ὄσια (the feminine noun in nom. sg. case solves these problems).¹⁴ The construction of

⁹ i.e., like τὰ δίκαια 'those things that are δίκαιος', but unlike τὸ ἱερόν, which is a temple, or τὰ ἱερά, which (often) refers to concrete items: offerings, victims, sacred objects, sacred rites. Chapter 2, section 1.3, n. 8.

¹⁰ Hdt 9.79.

¹¹ E. *Supp.* 123.

¹² There are two exceptions to the two types given above. In A. *Supp.* 404, it is said that Zeus distributes ἄδικα to the κακοῖς and ὄσια to the ἐννόμοις. The phrase does not mean that Zeus is ὄσιος because he gives, nor does the verb νέμω represent a *response*. Rather, this phrase seems to mean 'he gives to bad people that they commit or undergo unjust actions and to the just that they do or meet with pious actions'. In this case, τὰ ὄσια refers again to human conduct, nor to a concrete object. On this passage cf. Chapter 4, section 3.1. Furthermore, in E. *IT* 343 priestess Iphigenia says τὰ δ' ἐνθάδ' ἡμεῖς ὄσια φροντιούμεθα. She means she will take care of τὰ ὄσια in Tauris, the religious rules.

¹³ D. 23.65. Cf. D. 57.3, Antipho 5.62.4.

¹⁴ MEISTER 1895, GRAHAM 1964:50, BLOK *forthc.*

the phrase becomes ‘that it is permitted (ἐξεῖμεν) that the Hypocnemidian Locrian receives by lot and sacrifices (λαγχάνειν καὶ θύειν)’ + relative dependent clause ‘(from) where/as it is ὅσια that a ξένος [sc. receives by lot and sacrifices]’. This interpretation is attractive because it eliminates the problems with reading ὅσια. Moreover, it is in line with other usages of ἡ ὅσια in the corpus. The rule in the Naupactus decree relating to Locrians would be based on *already existing rules* in Locris (which may have been unwritten, or published on stones we did not find, or published on perishable material) about what is and is not ὅσια for ξένοι with respect to their participation in cult.¹⁵ In other words: ὅσια refers to a rule about the ‘who’ and ‘where’ of ritual practice, as it regularly does.¹⁶

What kind of rule, expressed in terms of ὅσια does the text presuppose? What is the Hypocnemidian ξένος entitled to? The verb λαγχάνειν is frequently used in connection to offices received by lot, such as priesthoods and magistracies. In this case, however, it makes much more sense if we interpret it as having a share in the sacrificial animal.¹⁷ Choosing this interpretation, when the colonist is invited to λαγχάνειν and θύειν, these two verbs together encompass the two most essential benefits of participating in the sacrificial ritual. θύειν refers to burning things for the gods for their honour and sustenance,¹⁸ whereas λαγχάνειν has to do with the food distributed *after* the sacrifice. Thus, being allowed to θύειν enabled the Locrian to keep up a relationship with the divinities of his old *polis*, while receiving part of the sacrificial meal meant he could sustain his relationship with his old family, friends and acquaintances. In principle, being granted permission to ‘λαγχάνειν and θύειν’ grants the ξένος the right to experience the full religious and social significance of the ritual: the establishment and continuation of his bond not only with the gods but also with the community.¹⁹

But the Locrian is only allowed to have these privileges *ἡπό* ὅσια (sc. ἐστὶ) ξένον (sc. λαγχάνειν καὶ θύειν). Most scholars have followed CAUER’s conjecture and read

¹⁵ Note that this would be the only text with the construction ‘AcI + ὅσια [sc. ἐστὶ]’, the more common construction being ‘ὅσια [sc. ἐστὶ] + Noun Phrase in dative case + Infinitival Clause’. In other words, we would expect ξενῶ, not ξένον. But the low frequency of ὅσια/ὅσιη in the corpus (Chapter 2, section 1.1) means that we cannot speak of a fixed pattern of usage. Thus, although the construction is unparalleled, there is no reason to assume it is ungrammatical or unlikely. This proposal in any case poses far less problems than the interpretation ὅσια λαγχάνειν.

¹⁶ Cf. Chapter 2, section 1.7, Chapter 6, section 4.2.

¹⁷ The verb occurs in this sense in SOKOŁOWSKI, *LSCG* 113 (*contra* ROLLEY, 1965:463) and *LSA* 50, 22-23 and 42 (*laxis*).

¹⁸ θύειν is the most general verb in Greek for consecrating an offering. It embraced rituals that differed both in their procedures and in their objectives. It could be applied equally to bloody and bloodless sacrifices (BRUIT-ZAIDMAN 1992:32-33).

¹⁹ The inversion of the two terms further on, too, implies the close connection in meaning.

ὄπω[ς]: ‘in the way that it is ὄσια that a stranger (sacrifices and receives a share of the sacrificial meat)’.²⁰ In order to interpret this phrase, we need to connect it to the next part. The Hypocnemidian Locrian, ‘if he wants’, can θύειν καὶ λανχάνειν both from the δάμο[υ] and from the Κοινάνων (=Κοινάνων, gen. pl.). In this phrase the *damos* must refer to the whole of Locris: sacrifice on the ‘polis’ level, as it were, for Locris did not have separate demes. The *koinanes* must be some kind of sub-groups, such as (the equivalent of) phratries, gentes or the like.²¹

MEYER thinks the sequence of twice αἶ κα δειλεται signals a *choice* for the Locrian, ‘If he wants to, he can θύειν καὶ λανχάνειν as it is ὄσια for a ξένος, but (an alternative option) if he wants to, he can θύειν καὶ λανχάνειν, from the *damos* and the *koinanes*.’ However, it is hard to see what the significance of such a choice would be. There *are* no other places to participate in the sacrificial rituals than on the level of the *polis* and the level of various sub-groups together. If the Locrian would participate anywhere in the manner of a ξένος, it would always involve either the *damos* or one of the *koinanes*. Rather, the part after the second αἶ κα δειλεται must *continue* the proposal made in the first part.²² In this reading the decree specifies two different things: *in what way* the Locrian can participate (as a ξένος) and in the rituals *of which groups* he can participate (all).

A final difficulty, which does not influence the interpretation of ὄσια, though, concerns *hόπο*. If we read *hόπο* as ὄπω[ς], the specification of the ‘manner of participation’ may have referred to *the extent* to which the ξένος could participate in the cultic activities. For example, he may have received a smaller portion of the sacrificial meat than citizens did. Another possibility is that the phrase *hόπο ὄσια* (sc. ἐστι) ξένον (sc. λαγχάνειν καὶ θύειν) referred to matters such as the position in the procession, the seating plan, or his attributes of clothing.

But instead of interpreting *hόπο* as ὄπω<ς> ‘in the manner in which’, we can also take *hόπο* as ὄπω, Doric for ὀπόθεν, ‘from where’. This was the proposal made by MEISTER (1895). According to MEISTER, the phrase starting with ὄπω is a relative clause preparing for the main clause starting with the second αἶ κα δειλεται, in which ἐκ (δάμου καὶ Κοινάνων) picks up ὄπω. In this interpretation, the phrase reads: ‘It is permitted that the Hypocnemidian Locrian sacrifices and receives by lot [sc.

²⁰ KÖRNER, GRAHAM, BECK, *ML. BLOK* *forthc.* c. leaves the question open.

²¹ KÖRNER hypothesises that the *koinanes* were some kind of exclusive cults for elite citizens, but there is no compelling reason to assume this is the case.

²² The distinction between *damos* and *koinanes* in the law is valuable because the right of participation of various social groups in cult practices could be different on the level of *polis* cults and the level of cults of *phylai* and phatries. For example, FUNKE 2006:6 argued that *metics* were (sometimes) excluded from cults below the *polis*-level. It makes sense that in this inscription both layers of society are explicitly mentioned.

sacrificial parts]; and *from where* (ὅπω) it is at all ὅσια that a ξένον [sc. sacrifices and receives], [*there*] he can sacrifice and receive [sacrificial parts], both from the *demos* and from the sub-groups.²³ In other words: the cultic gatherings where ξένοι are permitted on any of these levels of cultic activity, are open for the colonist Lokrian.

The inscription would make a similar statement as another law drawn up under analogous circumstances. I. Milet I 3, 136 specifies the cult participation for Milesians settling in the colony Olbia.²³ The beginning of this inscription states that the Milesian settling in the colony Olbia is allowed to sacrifice as a citizen of Olbias (ὡς Ὀλβιοπολίτην θύειν, l. 2-3). In principle, ὡς Ὀλβιοπολίτην could refer to the place, attributes or clothing of citizens of Olbias during the ritual. But the text shows that this is not the case, specifying that it means the Milesian can ‘sacrifice on the same altars and frequent the same public temples which citizens of Olbia frequent and sacrifice on as well’ (ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν βωμῶν καὶ εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ αὐτὰ φοιτᾶν τὰ δημόσια κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ Ὀλβιοπολίτας, l. 3-6). In this comparable inscription, the law specifies *where* colonists can participate, which may point us to reading ὅπω in the Naupactian decree.

²³ RO 93.

Appendix 8

ἀγνός and ὄσιος in the Epidaurian couplet

In the famous elegiac couplet above the entrance of the temple of Asclepius at Epidaurus, ‘purity’ is redefined as having a pious frame of mind:

Ἀγνὸν χρή ναοῖο θυωδέος ἐντὸς ἰόντα
ἔμμεναι· ἀγνεία δ’ ἐστὶ φρονεῖν ὄσια

‘He who goes into the sweet smelling temple must be pure.
Purity is to think pious thoughts.’¹

The identification of ἀγνεία and ὀσιότης in this presumably early fourth-century inscription² has been subject to many scholarly discussions. PARKER commented that the couplet ‘unites two concepts that in traditional usage were always liable to be drawn apart’.³ According to VON STADEN, identification is surprising because the two terms cover ‘partly unrelated, even dissimilar semantic fields’.⁴ RUDHARDT said that ‘one can’t be ὄσιος and ἀγνός at the same time’.⁵ CHANIOTIS pointed out that unlike this inscription, purity regulations in the archaic, classical and hellenistic period usually had no moral content.⁶ Finally, the equation of ὀσιότης and ἀγνεία seemed so unlikely to BREMMER that he suggested to date the inscription 500 years later, the first

¹ This inscription is quoted by Porph., *Abst.* 2.19.5 and Clem. Al., *Strom.* 5.1.13.3.

² The dating is based on the fact that Porphyry, through whose work the couplet was transmitted, was quoting from Theophrastus’ late-fourth-century (lost) text *On Piety*. Moreover, the temple of Epidaurus was built in the 4th century. Cf. CHANIOTIS 1997:152, VON STADEN 1996:429, PARKER 1996a [1983]:322-23.

³ PARKER 1996a [1983]:323.

⁴ VON STADEN 1996:429, cf. 430.

⁵ RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:41.

⁶ CHANIOTIS 1997:145.

century AD instead.⁷ As the same time, various scholars have argued that ὅσιος and ἄγνός are regularly used (almost) as synonyms in 5th- and 4th-century literary texts.⁸

These discussions raise (at least) two questions. First, what is the semantic relationship between ὅσιος and ἄγνός? How similar or dissimilar are the semantic fields of ὅσιος and ἄγνός in the 4th century BC and before? Second, is there any semantic or historical development that contributed to the identification of these two notions in the Epidaurian couplet?

The semantic dissimilarity between ἄγνός and ὅσιος shows just by comparing the distribution patterns of these lexemes with respect to syntactic configurations. As we have seen already, 67% of occurrences of ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος until the end of the fifth century refer to a person, qualifying him/herself, his/her behaviour or a situation resulting from human behaviour. In those cases in which ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος qualify an object, in 13% of the cases the phrase obviously refers to human behaviour. This is the case, for example, when ὅσιος refers to human actions, emotions or speech.⁹ In the remaining cases (20%) in which ὅσιος syntactically qualifies another object, we argued that the phrase as a whole semantically qualifies the person involved and is a moral evaluation of this person. This conclusion was drawn on the basis of a comparison between *hosios* & *cognates* and *eusebês* & *cognates*.¹⁰ For example, when a speaker refers to an ἀνόσιος πούς (foot), it is the person to whom the foot belongs that is ἀνόσιος, impious.¹¹ Finally, *hosios* & *cognates* are rarely used to qualify the behaviour or person of a god (3%).

By contrast, 26% of all occurrences of ἄγνός and ἀάγνός in this period refer to gods, and 55% to objects.¹² These objects are, first of all, things belonging to gods, such as their temples and altars;¹³ natural phenomena such as light,¹⁴ fire,¹⁵ water,¹⁶ heaven.¹⁷ As we have seen, ὅσιος never qualifies these types of objects.¹⁸ In a

⁷ BREMMER 2002.

⁸ CONNOR 1988:163 ‘in many cases the context makes it clear that *hosios* is being used as a near synonym for ... *hagnos*’; PARKER 1996a [1983]:330 ‘*hosios* is often a virtual synonym of *katharos* or *hagnos*’ with n. 18: e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 778, *Cho.* 378, Soph. *OC* 470, E. *Ion* 150, Andoc. 1.96’.

⁹ Chapter 2, section 1.3.

¹⁰ Chapter 3, section 3.7.

¹¹ E. *Hel.* 868-69, in a passage discussed in section 4 of this appendix below.

¹² total: n=138, gods: n=36, objects: n=76.

¹³ e.g., B. *Ep.* 10.29, A. *Sept.* 278, E. *Andr.* 427.

¹⁴ S. *El.* 86, P. fr. 153.2.

¹⁵ E. *El.* 812.

¹⁶ e.g., A. *Pers.* 497, P. *Pi.* 1.21.

¹⁷ A. *Pr.* 280.

¹⁸ Chapter 2, section 1.3; Chapter 3, section 3.4.

minority of the cases referring to objects (15%), ἀγνός/ ἀνάγνος and ὅσιος/ἀνόσιος qualify the same types of objects: things that are used for or belong to rituals of worship¹⁹ and things connected to humans, such as their actions, speech, body parts.²⁰ In the remaining cases (19%) ἀγνός and ἀνάγνος qualify humans and their behaviour.²¹

Thus, in 34% of the cases (19% qualifying humans + 15% qualifying the same types of objects), ὅσιος/ἀνόσιος and ἀγνός/ἀνάγνος refer to the same *types* of entities. Sometimes these two sets of lexemes also refer to identical objects, situations or persons. For example, Empedocles speaks about ‘singing from mouths that are *hosia*’, the chorus in Aeschylus’ *Suppliants* wants to sing from *hagnôn stomatôn*.²² Theseus’ hand, ‘stained’ by the murder of Hippolytus (through his curse) is *anhagnos*, the hands of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus are *anhosios*.²³ Hippolytus is *hagnos* from the marriage bed, Ion is *hosios* from the bed.²⁴ A holy grove in Sophocles’ *Oedipus at Colonus* is not *hagnos* to tread, but in various inscriptions temples it is not *hosiê* to enter.²⁵ Menelaus, after his refusal to help Orestes in Euripides’ eponymous play, is neither *hosios* nor *hagnos*, Oedipus is *anhosios* and *anhagnos* in the same play.²⁶ This (non-exhaustive) list of objects or persons described as either *hosios* or *hagnos* or both illustrates the overlap in applications of the two adjectives.

In order to understand the semantic similarity or difference between these sets of utterances (containing ὅσιος/ἀνόσιος and ἀγνός/ἀνάγνος respectively), we must first achieve a better understanding of the semantic field of ἀγνός. This, however, is problematic. The ‘schema’ of ἀγνός is not clear to scholars of Greek religion, especially, the question of how to connect the usage for humans and for gods. Moreover, it is a matter of debate whether ἀγνός originally, in its semantic essence and in its first attestations expressed the idea of ‘purity’. ἀγνός is etymologically connected to ἄζομαι, which means ‘to have a feeling of respectful awe’. ἀγνός was originally, in MOTTE’s words, ‘l’objet d’une sainte crainte’.²⁷ This ‘object’ was in the

¹⁹ e.g., A. *Pers.* 611, Ar. *Ra.* 386, S. *Tr.* 287.

²⁰ e.g., A. *Ag.* 245, E. *IA* 940, E. *Hipp.* e.g. 138, 1003, 1148, A. *Sept.* 752.

²¹ n=26, e.g. Hes. *Op.* 337, A. *Supp.* 228, Antipho 2.10.4, Ar. *Lys.* 912, 1315, E. *El.* 975, S. *Ant.* 889.

²² Emp. fr. 3, l. 7; A. *Supp.* 696.

²³ E. *Hipp.* 1148; A. *Ch.* 378.

²⁴ E. *Hipp.* 1003, E. *Ion* 150.

²⁵ S. *OC* 37, various inscriptions: cf. Chapter 6, section 4.2.

²⁶ E. *Or.* 1213, 1604, S. *OT* 353, 823, 1383.

²⁷ MOTTE 1986:138.

first occurrences of the term always a god.²⁸ According to RUDHARDT, then, ‘ἀγνός signifie la majesté des dieux, ce qui les élève au-dessus de l’humanité et commande aux hommes une vénération quelque peu craintive’.²⁹ The question rises what ἀγνός means when the term refers to humans. RUDHARDT argued that humans can possess the same quality ‘dans la mesure où il évite de s’engager dans un acte de génération ou de mort: dans la mesure par conséquent, où il s’abstrait de la vie effective’, and this is ‘une pureté extratemporelle’.³⁰ PARKER disagreed: ‘it is difficult ... to reconcile divine and human *hagneia* by saying that the mortal, by his heroic abstinence, comes to share in the divine awesomeness’. PARKER suggests that ἀγνός originates as a Janus-faced adjective, meaning ‘demanding respect’ (when applied to gods) and ‘showing respect’ (when applied to humans). In PARKER’s view, the notion of purity became attached to the lexeme because originally this was ‘merely the most distinctive aspect of that ‘respect’’.³¹ BENVÉNISTE also denies the notion of ‘purity’ in ἀγνός in its earliest occurrences.³² By contrast, MOTTE argues that, from its earliest appearances ἀγνός expresses a notion of purity: more precisely, the purity that emanates from gods.³³

We will not attempt to solve this problem here. Note that the ‘schema’ of ἀγνός may not have been obvious to Greeks of the 5th century themselves. Despite these insecurities it is uncontroversial that ἀγνός expressed the idea of ‘purity’ in the fifth century, which had become a prototypical and frequent usage of the lexeme.³⁴ In the following, we will focus on the fifth-century usage of ἀγνός as ‘pure’.³⁵

²⁸ In Homer, ἀγνός refers to Artemis (*Od.* 5.123, 18.202, 20.71), to Persephone (*Od.* 11.386) and to a festival (ἑορτή, *Od.* 21.259). In the Homeric Hymns, ἀγνός refers to Demeter (*h.Cer.* 203, 439), Persephone (*h.Cer.* 337), to a sacred grove (ἄλσος, *h.Merc.*187), and refers to the behaviour of goddesses: when Apollo was born, the goddesses present washed him ἀγνῶς καὶ καθαρῶς (*h.Ap.* 121).

²⁹ RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:40.

³⁰ RUDHARDT 1992 [1958]:41.

³¹ PARKER 1996a [1983]:149-50.

³² BENVENISTE 1969:203.

³³ MOTTE 1986:136-149, e.g. 139: ‘Le mot *hagnos* est bien anciennement lié au champ sémantique de l’idée de pureté’.

³⁴ LSJ s.v. ἀγνός: I. 2. of divine persons, *chaste, pure* ... II. after Hom., of persons, *undefiled, chaste*, of maidens, ... 2. *pure from blood, guiltless* ...; PARKER 1996a [1983]:147. *hagnos* [is] the standard term used to express the purity of the worshipper ...149: used without specification, *hagnos* indicates freedom from religious contamination of every kind; BENVENISTE 1969:203: ‘chez les Tragiques *hagnós* désigne un être human comme <<rituellement pur ... >>’. We see the usage of ἀγνός as ‘pure’ when ἀγνός appears with a noun in the genitive case (and sometimes the preposition ἀπό) denoting or expressing a polluting or contaminating influence from which one is free - blood, murder or sex (marriage/sex: E. *Hipp.* 1003: λέχους γὰρ ἀγνὸν ‘pure from the marriage

Taking this usage of ἀγνός as a starting point, ὄσιος, ἀγνός and καθάρως are semantically related in at least two different ways. First of all, being ritually pure was a prerequisite for interaction with the divine world. As is well-known, many *leges sacrae* are concerned with purity, often expressed by the lexeme ἀγνός. These texts state the necessity to be pure from various influences (sex, childbirth, death, murder) as a condition for entering the sanctuary, and consequently, for being able to be participate in the sacrificial ritual. Conversely, those who were polluted were unfit to engage in any relationship with gods. In this sense, to be ὄσιος is to be ‘pure’. However, ὄσιος and ὄσιον never express the notion of being ‘(ritually) pure’. Rather, the evaluation ὄσιος places ritual activities in the broader context of all those things one must do to maintain a good relationship with the gods.³⁶

For example, an Aeschylian chorus prays that ‘Zeus, who distributes everything, never set his power against my judgments and may I not cease from approaching the gods with pious feasts (ὀσίαις θοίνας) and may I not offend with words’.³⁷ The wish to approach the gods with ὀσίαις θοίνας entails the hope that these offerings are pure, but this evaluation primarily places the activity of sacrifice in the broader context of all those things one must do to maintain a good relationship with the gods. We can see this in the immediate context, too, since the chorus expresses the fear that the reciprocal bond with Zeus will be disturbed, and pray they will also not speak any words that will result in such an alarming scenario. Similarly, as was discussed in the main text, in Andocides’ *On the Mysteries* a law states that the one who kills an enemy of the democracy be ὄσιος.³⁸ The term ὄσιος indicates that such an murder is, in fact, a way of providing τιμή to the god. This entails but does not signify that there will be no pollution, and ὄσιος is not synonymous to καθάρως and ἀγνός.³⁹

The second way in which ὄσιος, καθάρως and ἀγνός are essentially related to one another is in the sense that these terms partake in the same metaphor. We will move on to this topic presently.

bed’; Pl. *Lg.* γάμων ἀγνός ‘pure from marriage’; blood/murder: E. *Hipp.* 316: ἀγνάς ... χεῖρας αἵματος ‘hands pure from blood’; Pl. *Lg.* 759c: ἀγνός φόνου ‘pure from murder’).

³⁵ It should be noted that unlike καθάρως, ἀγνός ‘is not in conceptual origin a matter of physical cleanliness’ (as MOTTE, 1986:149 and 1996a [1983]:150, points out).

³⁶ Chapter 2, section 4.

³⁷ A. *Pr.* 527-530.

³⁸ And. *De Myst.* 96.

³⁹ A similar explanation was already given by MOULINIER 1952:288, ‘καθάρως ... signifie exempt de souillure. ὄσιος voudrait dire que de tels gestes sont bons.’

The expression of morality in terms of cleanliness or purity is a prominent metaphor in English expressions. For example, we say that someone has a ‘spotless mind’ or conversely, that a person is ‘not exactly as pure as the driven snow’. Sometimes we consider a matter a ‘dirty business’, and we need to ‘wash our hands of it’ in order to start again ‘with a clean conscience’. These are examples of a psychological mechanism called ‘embodied cognition’. As LAKOFF & JOHNSON argued, humans understand experiences of an abstract nature (metaphysical, emotional, moral concepts) in terms of experiences of the body. We see affection as ‘warm’, good as ‘up’, bad as ‘down’, important as ‘heavy’ and immoral as ‘dirty’. According to LAKOFF and JOHNSON, these are more than just figures of speech. Humans *actually* conceptualise, reason about and comprehend the non-physical in terms of the physical, and these ways of thinking guide their actions.⁴⁰ LAKOFF & JOHNSON’s thesis was proven in many psychological studies. For example, it was shown that experimental subjects who discussed their sins during an interview with a experimenter were more inclined to wash their hands afterwards. Apparently, immorality leads to the desire for purification.⁴¹ Experimental subjects who washed their hands before being interviewed judged morally dubious actions (of themselves and of others) discussed during the interview more positively. Apparently, being psychically pure leads to perceiving things as moral.⁴² Finally, experimental subjects who were invited to wear someone else’s sweater often refused to do so if the owner of the sweater had been presented as a criminal. Apparently, in the eyes of these subjects, immorality equals dirtiness or disgust.⁴³

These experiments seem to show that humans understand morality *in terms of* purity. How does that happen? It was argued by JOHNSON that all embodied metaphors originate in infancy, because in this period the relevant abstract and physical experience are undifferentiated in experience. For example, for an infant the feelings of WARMTH and AFFECTION are conflated, because a child experiences affection when he is being held close to the warm body of his mother or father.⁴⁴ Similarly, MORALITY and PURITY are probably regularly undifferentiated in early childhood, because ‘being bad’ often involves spilling food or drink, getting one’s clothes dirty, or staining clean things with dirty little hands. According to FELDMAN & NARAYANAN such confluations in infancy lead to permanent neurological

⁴⁰ LAKOFF & JOHNSON 1980:3-5, 59, 115; LAKOFF & JOHNSON 1999:45, 50-54.

⁴¹ ZHONG & LILJENQUIST 2006.

⁴² SCHNALL, BENTON & HARVEY 2009.

⁴³ ROZIN & NEMEROFF 1990.

⁴⁴ LAKOFF & JOHNSON 1999:46-49.

connections between two domains.⁴⁵ In this view, the expression of morality in terms of purity is not simply a metaphor, but the connection between the two is hard-wired.

ὅσιος and ἀγνός in Greek literature partake in this deep-rooted, ingrained metaphor. In Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, it is said that 'Δικὴ honours the righteous man' (τὸν δ' ἐναίσιμον τίει, 775). This goddess

τὰ χρυσόπαστα δ' ἔδεθλα σὺν
 πίνωι χερῶν παλιντρόποις
 ὄμμασι λιποῦσ' ὄσια †προσέβα
 τοῦ†,⁴⁶ 776

left gold-spangled houses
 where people live with filth on their hands
 with averted eyes
 and went to pious ones instead.

Here injustice is metaphorically expressed in terms of people having filthy hands. Religious morality is contrasted with figurative dirt, in a metonymic expression in which ὄσια ἔδεθλα 'pious houses' refer to the inhabitants of these houses.

A passage in Euripides' *Helen* shows the opposite pattern. Here the priestess Theonoe tells one of her servants:

σὺ δ' αὖ κέλευθον εἴ τις ἔβλαψεν ποδὶ
 στεῖβων ἀνοσίῳι, δὸς καθαρσίῳι φλογί,
 κροῦσόν τε πεύκην, ἵνα διεξέλθω, πάρος.⁴⁷ 868

But you, in case someone harmed the path by
 treading with an impious foot, submit it to a purifying flame,
 and strike the torch against it in front of me, so that I may pass through.

Theonoe speaks of a hypothetical person with an ἀνόσιος foot (868). As was argued in this dissertation, in cases such as these, in which ὅσιος or ἀνόσιος *syntactically* qualify a body part, these evaluations *semantically* qualify the person involved. This

⁴⁵ LAKOFF & JOHNSON 1999:46, 49, 54-56. Cf. e.g. FELDMAN & NARAYANAN 2004.

⁴⁶ *A. Ag.* 776-79.

⁴⁷ *E. Hel.* 868-70.

person's religious immorality is presented in terms of physical impurity: he 'stained' (ἔβλαψεν, 868) the path by walking on it (στειβῶν, 869). The situation resembles that of the criminal who 'stains' the sweater he wears, so that other people refuse to wear it. Moreover, just like people who have discussed their sins want to wash themselves, in *Helen* the proposed solution is a physical cleaning: 'submit it to a purifying flame' (δὸς καθαρσίωι φλογί, 869). In both cases ἀνόσιος does not mean "impure" or "filthy" but is identified with it through metaphor.

ἀγνός is used in the same metaphor. In Euripides' *Orestes*, we find the following conversation:

Με. εὖ γοῦν θίγοις ἄν χερνίβων ... Ορ. τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ; 1602

Με. ... καὶ σφάγια πρὸ δορὸς καταβάλοις. Ορ. σὺ δ' ἄν καλῶς;

Με. ἀγνός γάρ εἰμι χεῖρας. Ορ. ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς φρένας.⁴⁸

Me. You would handle the holy water really well.

Or. Well, why not?

Me. And to slay victims before battle!

Or. But *you* would do it well?

Me. Yes, my hands are pure.

Or. But not your heart.

Menelaus implies that Orestes cannot function in public life because he is polluted through the matricide (1602). Orestes, in his turn tells Menelaus that his uncles' *hands* may be ἀγνός but his mind is not (1604). Menelaus had refused Orestes' suppliant plea to help him.⁴⁹ After this, Orestes referred to Menelaus as κακός and ἀνόσιος.⁵⁰ Menelaus' 'lack of mental purity' seems a metaphorical continuation of these moral disqualifications.⁵¹ Similarly, in Euripides' *Hippolytus* Phaedra tells the nurse that although her *hands* are pure, her 'mind has some pollution' (χεῖρες μὲν ἀγναί, φρήν δ' ἔχει μίασμά τι, 317). She is referring, of course, to her incestuous love for Hippolytus, an impious transgression of normal family relationships.⁵²

⁴⁸ E. *Or.* 1602-04.

⁴⁹ E. *Or.* 682-716.

⁵⁰ Orestes refers to him as κάκιστος (E. *Or.* 718, 736), κακός to his φίλοι (740) and a κακός φίλος (748). Electra likewise calls him Μενέλαος ὁ κακός, ὁ προδότης τοῦμου πατρός (1057). Orestes refers to Menelaus as ἀνόσιος in 1213. Cf. Chapter 4, section 3.6.

⁵¹ Previous discussions of this passage e.g. in MOULINIER 1952:183, PARKER 1996 [1983]:111.

⁵² Previous discussions of this passage e.g. in MOULINIER 1952:201-03, PARKER 1996 [1983]:323 n.11. The nurse's reaction shows that she fails to understand what Phaedra means: μὼν ἐξ ἐπακτοῦ πημονῆς ἐχθρῶν τινοσ; 'You don't mean through spells that have harmed you, from one of your

Furthermore, in the second stasimon of Sophocles' *Oedipus the King* the chorus prays 'may destiny find me carrying away a reverent purity in all words and deeds' (863-64). The ἀγνεῖα that the chorus envisages is set forth by divine laws (νόμοι) 'of which Olympus alone is the father' (867). However, these νόμοι are not, as we might expect, customary rules for ritual purity. Rather, they seem more similar to Antigone's divine ethical ἄγραπτα θεῶν νόμιμα.⁵³ This seems to show from the fact that ἀγνεῖα is juxtaposed only to moral disqualifications throughout the choral song. After discussing ὕβρις (in the first antistrophe, 873-79), the chorus focuses on Δίκη in the second strophe (883ff.). The chorus expresses the wish that a man who does not fear Justice (Δίκας ἀφόβητος, 885) or respect the images of the gods (δαιμόνων ἔδη σέβων, 886) be destroyed by a nasty fate. If, by contrast, (the gods should not punish and so apparently) such injustices are τίμαι (895), i.e. are considered as conferring τιμή to gods, the chorus wonders: 'why should I dance' (τί δεῖ με χορεύειν, 896)? These last words place this stasimon firmly in the frame that normally *hosios* & *cognates* activate. Here ἀγνεῖα metaphorically seems to stand for 'honouring the interhuman and religious obligations that enable one to continue one's reciprocal relationship with gods'.⁵⁴

Finally, an early metaphorical usage of ἀγνός and καθарός may be found, or is at least implied in a previously discussed passage of Hesiod's *Works and Days*. Perses is warned against inappropriate conduct in the small group of human relationships that have the special interests of the gods (327-32): wrongful conduct towards suppliant, guest, brother, and father. Zeus will punish him such unjust deeds (ἔργων ἀδίκων, 334). This inventory of bad behaviour is as a whole contrasted with advice for the proper religious behaviour: one should sacrifice to the gods 'purely and cleanly' (ἀγνῶς καὶ καθαρῶς). As was discussed in Chapter 2, the opposition of the religious advice and the previous ἔργα ἄδικα reinforces the perception of all mentioned offences as religious crimes.⁵⁵ At the same time, 'sacrificing ἀγνῶς and καθαρῶς' becomes a symbol of morally right behaviour by the fact that it is contrasted to

enemies, do you?' (E. *Hipp.* 318). This signals that the metaphorical use of ἀγνός as 'morally pure' is apparently a somewhat novel usage of the term.

⁵³ S. *Ant.* 454.

⁵⁴ In Sophocles' fragmentary play *The Tricking Satyrs* the antonym ἀνάγνος seems to function as a swear word. This term appears in a context where Silenus is hurling all kinds of abuse at the satyrs, for example calling them cowards (140) and 'worst of beasts' (147). In this context, Silenus also refers to the ἀναγνα σώματα (140) of the satyrs. This seems not a physical description of dirty bodies or something similar, but of the figurative 'filthiness' of these characters whose morality is rejected on the grounds of their cowardice.

⁵⁵ Chapter 2, section 5.

‘committing ἔργα ἄδικα’. This metaphorically draws the terms ἄγνός and καθαρός into the sphere of ethical-religious evaluation.⁵⁶

Dramatists draw implicitly on the metaphorical relatedness of *hagnos* and *hosios* (and *katharos*) when the association of purity and morality is the basis for irony or jokes. In the opening of Euripides’ *Ion*, the boy Ion describes his duties as a temple servant of Apollo in Delphi, which consist mainly of cleaning the premises.⁵⁷ He spends his days purifying the premises with water⁵⁸ sweeping the temple floor,⁵⁹ and chasing away the birds.⁶⁰ Ion is a particular figure. Critics have noted Ion’s obsessive attitude towards cleaning the sacred premises and his absurd idealisation of these housekeeping activities.⁶¹ Ion invokes his broom ‘come oh, instrument of service!’ (ἄγ, ὦ προπόλευμα, 112), then dedicates an entire stanza (112-27) to the glorification of the object.⁶² The comic character of the monody is intensified by the fact that the purity of the temple premises which Ion envisages is only possible through violence and bloodshed, as we see Ion with bow and quiver, ready to shoot down imaginary birds that will defile the sanctuary.⁶³

Towards the end of the monody (at the end of the fourth strophe), Ion sings

ὄσιος ἀπ’ εὐνᾶς ὄν. 150
 εἶθ’ οὕτως αἰεὶ Φοῖβῳ
 λατρεύων μὴ παυσαίμαν
 ἢ παυσαίμαν ἀγαθᾶ μοίρᾳ⁶⁴

⁵⁶ My interpretation of these usages of ἄγνός in Sophocles’ *Oedipus the King* and in Hesiod’s *Works and Days* differs from Robert PARKER’s argument. PARKER 1996a [1983]:150 suggests that ἄγνός originally had two sides, meaning ‘demanding respect’ (of gods) and ‘showing respect’ (of humans). In his view, purity may have been ‘merely the most distinctive aspect of that ‘respect’’.⁵⁶ Hence, PARKER interprets ἀγνεία in *Oedipus the King* 864 as ‘reverence’ and ἄγνός in *Works & Days* 337 as ‘reverently’. My suggestion is instead that ἄγνός means ‘pure’ in these cases but that ‘purity’ symbolises ‘(religious) morality’.

⁵⁷ Ion was abandoned in the sanctuary of Apollo in Delphi as an infant and has lived in Apollo’s temple ever since.

⁵⁸ E. *Ion* 105-106, 144-49.

⁵⁹ E. *Ion* 103-105, 112-27.

⁶⁰ E. *Ion* 154-80.

⁶¹ e.g. ZACHARIA 2003:13 ‘his concern for purity at any cost in a recurrent theme in the monody’; LEE 1997:170: ‘an obsession with ritual purity, both physical and verbal, is clear’; ‘Ion picks out with some pride the task regularly presented as the meanest of a slave’s duties’.

⁶² as LEE 1997, *ad loc.* coolly remarked: ‘it is obvious that Ion’s is no ordinary broom.’

⁶³ LEE 1997:37: ‘several scenes have been seen as amusing if not downright comical: ... Ion’s earnest activity with arrows and broom ...’.

⁶⁴ E. *Ion* 150-53.

Being *hosios* from the marriage-bed
 May I never cease to serve Phoebus
 in this manner,
 or if I do, may it be with a good fortune.

Ion's statement that he is ὄσιος ἀπ' εὐνᾶς 'from the marriage bed' in all likelihood refers to his chastity.⁶⁵ However, to express chastity or virginity, the adjective ἀγνός 'pure' would have been a much more obvious choice.⁶⁶

In the face of the readily available alternative ἀγνός ἀπ' εὐνᾶς (or something similar), the highly unusual construction ὄσιος ἀπ' εὐνᾶς is marked and the audience will interpret it as such.⁶⁷ What is the effect? To understand Ion's remark better, we may compare the ending of this strophe with the endings of the previous strophes. In all of these endings, Ion focuses on two facts. First, he considers the god Apollo a kind of parent (in fact, Apollo is his real parent but he does not know this at the moment). Secondly, since Apollo is as a father to him, he needs to take care of him in return for his upbringing.

At the end of the first strophe Ion sings 'for as I was born without a mother a father, | I take care of those who nurtured me, | the temple of Phoebus.'⁶⁸ Ion takes the personnel of the temple, and, it seems, the temple itself, as surrogate parents, whom he needs to take care of. θεραπεύειν is a verb that prototypically refers to the care of gods and parents.⁶⁹ In the third strophe, Ion takes this idea one step further,

⁶⁵ The phrase is also interpreted as such in the commentaries/translations of POTTER 1852, WECKLEIN 1912, HJUMANS 1991, LEE 1997.

⁶⁶ Ion's way of expressing himself is odd: ἀγνός would have fitted much better. ἀγνός is regularly used in similar constructions (with ἀπο and gen.) to denote the absence of a corrupting/polluting influence (cf. section 2 n. 223 of this appendix), but ὄσιος never is. Moreover, evaluations of proper or improper sexual behaviour are not typically framed in terms of τὸ ὄσιον. The adjective ὄσιος used with positive argumentative orientation occasionally describes a prudent and modest sexual life that is not guided by excessive desires (E. *IA* 555, Simon. P. Oxy 2432, fr. 36, subfr. 1, l. 6-14,), but not complete abstinence. The antonym ἀνόσιος sometimes evaluates problematic behaviour relating to love, marriage and sex, but most of these examples describe a seriously disturbed relationship between parents and children (S. *OC* 946, 981, S. *OT* 1289, 1360, E. *Hipp.* 764), husband and wife (E. *El.* 600, 926) or guest and host (Hdt. 2.114-15 concerning Paris). The fact that these examples evaluate a serious problem with those relationships that interest the gods the most seems to motivate a disqualification ἀνόσιος more than the sexual misconduct in itself. Examples in which ἀνόσιος describes problematic sexual behaviour outside of those typical relationships: B. *Dith.* 3.21, E. *El.* 1261, E. *Ion* 1093.

⁶⁷ On marked usage of language: Chapter 5.

⁶⁸ Ὡς γὰρ ἀμήτωρ ἀπάτωρ τε γεγώς | τοὺς θρέψαντας | Φοίβου ναοὺς θεραπεύω, 109-11.

⁶⁹ LSJ s.v. θεραπεύειν II.

identifying Phoebus himself as his father: ‘Phoebus is a begetter, a father to me ... I call by the name of father my benefactor’.⁷⁰ At the end of the fifth and last strophe, Ion identifies more specifically how he can ‘take care of’ this parent, namely, by performing his menial tasks as a temple servant: ‘But with the tasks I am engaged in | it is Phoebus I will serve, and I will never cease | to do service to those who nourish me’.⁷¹ By reading the endings of the first, third and fifth strophe together, we can see how Ion reinterprets his labour as a temple slave in terms of ‘taking care of’ (θεραπεύειν, 183) the ‘parent’ who nurtured him and brought him up: Apollo. According to LEE, this theme is a ‘seal’ pressing a stamp on every strophe.⁷²

We may now return to the ending of the fourth strophe quoted above and interpret it in this line of thought. Ion seems to say that in order to take of the god/parent properly (be ὄσιος), he must not only keep the temple ‘pure’, but also his body, by staying away from sex and marriage (ἀπ’εὐνᾶς). Ion chooses his words to be able to combine two notions. Whereas ἀγνός is a descriptive term, ὄσιος evaluates behaviour; by selecting the term ὄσιος instead of ἀγνός Ion focuses his statement on his *relationship* with Apollo.

What is the effect of the utterance? The problem with Ion’s standard of piety is that it was extraordinary. For male temple personnel, abstinence from sex was normally not necessary for more than a few days at a time, for example, at the time of a festival. Even for male priests, if sexual abstinence was required, this was likely to be restricted to a limited period. But there was nothing to stop most of them from getting married.⁷³ While Ion boasts of his chastity/piety, for the audience, Ion’s ‘piety’ probably was not exemplary for a lowly servant. On the contrary, Ion’s puritanism would characterise him as odd and idiosyncratic. This impression is consistent with the image we get of Ion throughout the monody. Euripides uses the marked expression ὄσιος ἀπ’εὐνᾶς cleverly with an intended effect: to subtly characterise Ion as someone with quite particular views on sexuality.

Recall from the Aeschylean example quoted above that ‘morality’ was metonymically expressed in terms of ‘pious houses’ (ὄσια ἔδεθλα). In other texts, morality is even more directly connected to the purity of a home. Orestes contrasts his own godless dwellings (δυσσεβεῖν μέλαθρα) with the καθαρὰ μέλαθρα in which

⁷⁰ Φοῖβός μοι γενέτωρ πατήρ | ... Τὸν δ’ ὠφέλιμον ἔμοι πατέρος ὄνομα λέγω, 136, 138.

⁷¹ Οἷς δ’ ἔγκειμαι μόχθοις | Φοῖβωι δουλεύσω κού λήξω | Τοὺς βόσκοντας θεραπεύων, 181-83.

⁷² LEE 1997:171.

⁷³ BRUIT-ZAIDMAN 1992:52, COLE 1992:112-13.

Pylades lives.⁷⁴ And a messenger in Sophocles' *Oedipus the King* thinks that whole rivers could not wash Oedipus' house clean, so many horrors has it seen.⁷⁵ The scene with Ion exploits precisely this figurative identification of physical cleanliness of a house and personal morality. Ion sees the temple of Apollo as his house, his home, as becomes clear from a discussion between Creusa and Ion:

Kρ. ναοῖσι δ' οἰκεῖς τοισίδ' ἢ κατὰ στέγας; 314
 Ἴων Ἄπαν θεοῦ μοι δῶμ', ἴν' ἂν λάβῃ μ' ὕπνος.⁷⁶

Kr. Do you live in this temple, or in a house?
 Ion. The whole home of the god is also my home, wherever I may sleep.

It seems as if Ion's obsession with cleaning Apollo's temple, his 'house', leads him to believe that he needs to keep a personal sublime 'purity' of permanent sexual abstinence, in order to be pious, morally right, ὄσιος to Apollo. This over-identification of piety and purity leads to irony, because it characterises Ion as someone with very strange beliefs.

A scene in Euripides' *Cyclops* exploits precisely this figurative identification of physical cleanliness of a house and personal morality, too. But Polyphemos makes the opposite mistake: Polyphemos' problem is that he does not identify the cleanliness of his 'home' with his own moral state *at all*. As we have already seen, hardly any character could be more impious than the Cyclops. Polyphemos violates against proper religious conduct by eating his suppliants and guests, and he transgresses against gods and parents in a total disrespect of Zeus and his father Poseidon.⁷⁷ It is not surprising that he is repeatedly called δυσσεβής and ἀνόσιος throughout this play.⁷⁸

In the introduction of the play, when Odysseus has just arrived on the island where the Cyclopes live, he starts talking with the satyr Silenus. Odysseus has many

⁷⁴ E. *IT* 693-94: σὺ δ' ὄλιβιός τ' εἶ, καθάρᾳ τ', οὐ νοσοῦντ', ἔχεις 693 | μέλαθρ', ἐγὼ δὲ δυσσεβῆ καὶ δυστυχῆ. 'You are prosperous, and you have a house that is pure, not diseased, | while mine is godless and unfortunate.'

⁷⁵ S. *OT* 1227-30: Οἶμαι γὰρ οὔτ' ἂν Ἰστρον οὔτε Φᾶσιν ἂν 1127 | νίγαι καθαρμῶ τήνδε τὴν στέγην, ὅσα | κεύθει, τὰ δ' αὐτίκ' εἰς τὸ φῶς φανεῖ κακὰ | ἐκόντα κοῦκ ἄκοντα· | 'I do not think that the Ister or the Phasis could | wash clean this house, such horrors | does it conceal, and some it will soon expose to the light | horrors willed and unwilled.'

⁷⁶ E. *Ion* 314-15.

⁷⁷ e.g. E. *Cyc.* 316-346.

⁷⁸ E. *Cyc.* 26, 30, 348, 378, 438.

questions, but Silenus cuts the conversation short. He needs to get on with his work, he says, because the Cyclops prefers to be received in a ‘clean cave’:

καὶ νῦν, τὰ προσταχθέντ', ἀναγκαίως ἔχει 32
σαίρειν σιδηρᾷ τῆιδέ μ' ἀπάγηι δόμους,
ὡς τόν τ' ἀπόντα δεσπότην Κύκλωπ' ἐμὸν
καθαροῖσιν ἄντροις μῆλά τ' ἐσδεχόμεθα.⁷⁹

And now – duty is duty – I must sweep
the house with this iron rake,
so that I may receive my absent master, the Cyclops,
and his sheep in a clean cave.

This must be a joke. As we saw, the moral situation of a person is in Greek thought frequently described in terms of how clean his mind, his hands, his house are. The Cyclops' wretched moral state stops him from being able to ever have a truly 'clean house'. Again, I think Euripides cleverly exploits the semantic interaction of different terms to get the audience to laugh.

In this appendix we have examined the semantic relationship between ὅσιος and ἀγνός (and καθαρός). We have examined two areas where the semantics of ὅσιος and ἀγνός (and καθαρός) intersect. First of all ritual purity is a precondition of being pious, of being able to interact with gods. However, as I have argued, when *hosios* & *cognates* address matters to do with cultic practice, these terms are not used synonymously to ἀγνός and καθαρός, and do not *mean* 'pure'. Usages of each lexeme activate the entire semantic fields of different these lexemes respectively, influencing the interpretation of each in different ways. Secondly, ὅσιος, καθαρός and ἀγνός are equated when both partake in a hard-wired embodied metaphor: PURITY = MORALITY. Such metaphorical usage of καθαρός and ἀγνός is found especially in the theatre. Perhaps this knowledge can help us understand the much-debated inscription from Epidaurus. In the light of the preceding analysis, perhaps this identification of ὅσιος and ἀγνός is not as unexpected as it seems. The theatre was a medium of mass communication. The metaphorical, moral usage of ἀγνός may have become part of language users' mental representation of ἀγνός in the course of the fifth century. In

⁷⁹ E. *Ion* 32-35.

this way the theatre may have helped prepare for the equation of piety and purity in Greek thought and in the Epidaurian couplet.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Obviously, if this suggestion is accepted, this is only one factor in a complex historical matter. CHANIOTIS 1997:148-49 traced various possible origins for a developing ‘moralisation of ritual purity’ in the archaic and early classical period. For example, CHANIOTIS mentions that various causes of pollution (such as homicide and adultery) became the topic of written law. Perhaps this development encouraged the Greeks to consider the conceptual link between purity and morality. Moreover, in increasingly popular mystery cults true piety was achieved by guarding a very high standard of purity, fostering the mental link between the two.

Appendix 9

Method and corpus

1. Method

In this dissertation I have argued that the distribution pattern of a lexeme may help us figure out its ‘semantics’. I have counted, for example, how often *hosios & cognates* are applied to *oneself* and how often to *someone else*. I have gathered such data in an MS Excel database. In my database I created different columns to represent different characteristics of individual usages of *hosios & cognates*, etc. Most of the gathered data is straightforward. In one case, however, the classification of occurrences was a subjective task, a matter of interpretation. This is the categorisation of passages into thematic groups. For each occurrence of, for example, *hosios & cognates*, I first noted what it referred to. Because a clear pattern (a small amount of recurring topics) emerged, I then coded whether the usage refers to one (or more)¹ of 15 themes. These themes were 1. acknowledging gods and keeping a proper relationship to them, 2. matters pertaining to cultic practice, 3. the relationship between parents and children, 4. the bond between brothers and sisters, 5. the relationship between spouses, 6. the relationship between other family members, 7. the interaction between guest and host, 8. the interaction with suppliants, 9. oath-keeping, 10. sexual relationships (other than between spouses), 11. the bond between φίλοι, 12. murder, 13. matters pertaining to legal practice, 14. matters pertaining to one’s duties as a citizen, 15. matters pertaining to honouring the dead. If the evaluation did not belong to one of the above-mentioned themes, I coded whether this instance seems a *general, unspecific* moral/religious evaluation, or refers to some other theme, or the reference is simply unclear (for example, in fragmentary texts).

The choice was based whenever possible on three **criteria: (1a) what the speaker himself supplies as a reason** for the evaluation, or on **(1b) what clues he immediately responds to**. In some cases it is made explicit on what grounds a speaker considers a particular action ὄσιος or ἀνόσιος. An example is a passages in

¹ As was already explained in the main text (Chapter 2, section 1.6) in many cases it was not possible to choose *one* option. Regularly, individuals judge others as ὄσιος, εὐσεβής or the opposite when multiple reasons to do so add up.

Euripides' *Orestes* in which Orestes says 'I am ἀνόσιος because I have killed my mother'.² In this case, Orestes' transgression of the relationship *between parent and child* is the obvious cause of the disqualification ἀνόσιος.

In other cases there was no such clear and unambiguous clue. For example, in Euripides' *Suppliants*, when the mothers of the Seven against Thebes say they are making their supplication to Theseus 'οὐχ ὁσίως', they do not explain why.³ In such cases, I have tried to find a clue in **(2) the text of the play itself** or **(3) in the (supposed) cultural collective knowledge** of contemporary listeners. In the case of *Suppliants*, it is explained elsewhere in the play that the supplication is made on a festival day. A contemporary listener would have known that supplications at altars were not allowed in Athens on festival days, because they interfered with the cultic practice. Thus, we can infer that in this particular instance the mothers consider their supplication 'not ὁσίως', because it is not in accordance with the who, what, where, when and how of *cultic practice*.⁴ A similar example occurs in Euripides' *Orestes*. Orestes refers to Menelaus as ἀνόσιος without providing any context or reason.⁵ However, in a preceding discussion in this play, Menelaus rejected Orestes as a suppliant and gave no ear to Orestes' plea to help his φίλος. I interpreted this case of ἀνόσιος as referring to Menelaus' earlier treatment of Orestes as suppliant and φίλος.⁶

I have applied **criteria (1) - (3)** in this order, because I considered this to be the order of reliability of judgment. This choice sometimes had a consequence on classification. At the start of Euripides' *Cyclops*, the servant Silenus says that he is herdsman of the flock of the ἀνόσιος Cyclops.⁷ Polyphemus' mythological transgressions against ξενία are firmly entrenched in the cultural knowledge of the audience. These associations may have been activated in their minds when they hear the term ἀνόσιος. However at this point in this play the speaker (Silenus) supplies a clear reason for his evaluation: the Cyclopes' murderous tendencies (they are ἀνδροκτόνοι, l. 22). Thus, I have classified the speaker' ground for calling Polyphemus ἀνόσιος at this point in the story as 'murder'.

These thematic classifications were by necessity subjective. A list of all occurrences of *hosios & cognates* and *eusebes & cognates*, specifying the theme and the criterion on which I have based my decision, is provided below.

² E. *Or.* 546.

³ E. *Supp.* 63.

⁴ My interpretation of this passage is discussed in some detail in Chapter 6, section 2.2.

⁵ E. *Or.* 1213.

⁶ My interpretation of this passage is discussed in some detail in Chapter 4, section 3.6.

⁷ E. *Cyc.* 26.

2. Word counts

I calculated the total ‘word count’ of the production of individual authors by adding up the word counts of their different extant works as given in *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*. I also included (collections of) fragmentary texts in the word count. Here I tried to avoid double counts, for example, in the case of Euripides, I included the collection of fragments edited by NAUCK (*TrGF*, 18,087), but I excluded DIGGLE’s edition of Euripides’ *Phaëthon* (1,328), because the same fragments are part of NAUCK’s collection.

3. Corpus

This dissertation focused on all literature and inscriptions between Homer and the end of the fifth century. The line for the in-/exclusion of sources was drawn more or less arbitrarily at the death of Socrates of 399 BC. All authors whose work was produced in this period were included. Of the orators who were active in the 5th and 4th centuries, those works produced before or in 399 were included:

- Lysias: On the murder of Eratosthenes, Against Eratosthenes, Against Agoratus, For Polystratus, Defence against a charge of taking bribes, For the Invalid, Defence against a charge of subverting the democracy, Against Philon, Against Diogeiton, Against the Subversion of the Ancestral constitution.

- Andocides: On the mysteries, On his return.

- Isocrates: Against Euthynus, Against Callimachus.

As an exception, the fourth-century productions of Aristophanes, *Assemblywomen* (no occurrences of *hosios & cognates, eusebês & cognates*) and *Wealth*, were included.

The classification of occurrences into ‘pre-classical’ and ‘classical’ (a division used in some analyses of diachronic attestations of lexemes) was in most cases uncontroversial. I have assigned any occurrences of lexemes in the Homeric Hymns to the pre-classical period.⁸ The Hymns in which ὄσιος, εὐσεβής, θέμις, καθαρός and/or ἄγνός occur are: the Hymns to Demeter, Hermes, Apollo, Athena, Aphrodite and Ares. It is generally agreed upon that the *Hymn to Aphrodite* is one of the oldest hymns. FAULKNER places its composition between the late eighth century and the early sixth century.⁹ The *Hymn to Demeter* was influenced by the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, providing a (relative) *terminus post quem*. FAULKNER places the *Hymn to Demeter*

⁸ My judgment was based on an overview of scholarship on the dating of the Homeric Hymns provided in FAULKNER’s *The Homeric Hymns: Interpretative Essays* (2011), both in the general introduction to this volume (pp. 7-16) and in discussions by individual contributors.

⁹ FAULKNER 2011:14. For further references to discussions on its date of composition, BRILLET-DUBOIS 2011:105-106 with n. 3-4.

between the second half of the seventh century and the mid-sixth century; RICHARDSON argues for a date in the late 7th century and provides references to earlier scholarship.¹⁰ The discussion on the *Hymn to Apollo* has been complicated by a debate about its unity. Several scholars think it consists of different parts that were joined together later. In any case, the composition (and potential subsequent joining of fragments) has been placed between the first half of the seventh century and the second half of the sixth century.¹¹ The *Hymn to Athena*, along with other shorter hymns, can probably be dated between 700 and 500 BC.¹² Concerning the *Hymn to Hermes*, it is generally agreed upon that this is the latest of the longer Homeric Hymns. The precise date, however, is debated. It should most probably be placed between the first half of the sixth century and the first half of the fifth century. FAULKNER finds a date in the late sixth century the most likely.¹³ For convenience I have classified the relevant occurrences in this text (ὄσίη: *h.Merc.* 130, 173, 470; ἄγνός: 187) as pre-classical along with cases in other Homeric hymns. Finally, the *Hymn to Ares* is clearly different from the other Homeric Hymns. It has been attributed to Proclus (5th century AD); if this attribution is wrong the hymn in any case does not predate the 3rd century AD.¹⁴ Hence, one occurrence of θέμις in this hymn (l. 4) has been excluded from the corpus because it is outside the dissertation's chronological scope.

¹⁰ FAULKNER 2011:10; RICHARDSON 2011:49 with n. 7.

¹¹ FAULKNER 2011:12; CHAPPELL 2011:59-81 gives an overview of previous scholarship.

¹² FAULKNER 2011:15.

¹³ FAULKNER 2011:12-13, with discussion of scholarship.

¹⁴ FAULKNER 2011:15, 176 with n. 4 for further references.

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Abbreviated sources

I have used the author-date system for most of the books and articles to which I refer. These are given in the bibliography. Abbreviations of ancient authors and works follow the standard of *Liddell & Scott Greek-English* lexicon. Furthermore, I have used abbreviations for some collections or studies of epigraphical sources. I have given the references to these abbreviations below. Abbreviations were also used in references to dictionaries. These references are listed below as well.

BAILLY	BAILLY, A., <i>Dictionnaire Grec - Français</i> , Paris 2000 [#] [1894].
BRODERSEN	BRODERSEN, K., W. GÜNTHER & H.H. SCHMITT, <i>Historische Griechische Inschriften in Übersetzung. I. Der archaische und klassische Zeit</i> (Texte zur Forschung 59), Darmstadt. 1992.
CHANDEZON	CHANDEZON, C., <i>L'élevage en Grèce (fin Ver-fin Ier s. a.C.). L'apport des sources épigraphiques</i> , Bordeaux [etc.] 2003.
CID I	ROUGEMENT, G. (ed.), <i>Corpus des inscriptions de Delphes. Vol. I, Lois sacrées et règlements religieux</i> , Paris 1977.
Syll.	DITTENBERGER, W & H. VON GAERTRINGEN, <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum I-IV</i> , Leipzig 1915-1924 ³ [1884].
HELBING	HELBING, R., <i>Auswahl aus griechischen Inschriften</i> , Berlin & Leipzig 1915.
LE POLLET	LE GUEN-POLLET, B., <i>La vie religieuse dans le monde grec du Ve au IIIe siècle avant notre ère: choix de documents épigraphiques traduits et commentés</i> , Toulouse 1991.
ID	PLASSART, A., <i>Inscriptions de Délos</i> 6, Paris 1950
IG	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> (1873-)
IGASMGI III	ARENA, R., <i>Iscrizioni greche arcaiche di Sicilia e Magna Grecia. 3. Iscrizioni delle colonie euboiche</i> , Pisa 1994.
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LSAM) SOKOLOWSKI, F., *Lois sacrées de l'Asie Mineure*, Paris 1955.
- (SOKOLOWSKI,
LSCG) SOKOLOWSKI, F., *Lois sacrées des cités grecques*, Paris 1969.
- LGS VON PROTT, H. & L. ZIEHEN, *Leges Graecorum Sacrae 1-2 et titulis collectae*, Leipzig 1896, 1906.
- LSJ LIDDELL, H.G., R. SCOTT & H.S. JONES, *A Greek-English Lexicon. With a revised supplement*, Oxford 1996⁹ [1843].
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Rodio PUGLIESE CARRATELLI, G., "Nuovo supplemento epigrafico rodio," *Iannuario della Scuola archeologica di Atene e delle*

missioni italiane in Oriente 17-18 (1955-1956), 157-181.

- OED* *The Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford University Press, online edition, www.oed.com)
- RO* RHODES, P.J. & R.O. OSBORNE (eds.), *Greek historical inscriptions 404-323 BC*, Oxford 2003.
- SEG* *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*, Leiden, 1923–1971, New Series ed. H.W. Pleket et al., Amsterdam 1979–)
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Nederlandse samenvatting

Mijn proefschrift is een semantisch onderzoek naar het Oud-Griekse woord *hosios*, een term die vaak naar het Nederlands wordt vertaald als ‘vroom’ of ‘rechtvaardig in de ogen van de goden’. *hosios* was in de klassieke periode van de Griekse oudheid (5^e – 4^e eeuw v. Chr.) een centraal godsdienstig begrip en een democratische kernwaarde. Ongelukkigerwijs is de betekenis van het woord al sinds de oudheid zelf een hoofdpijndossier. Ook voor moderne geleerden is de semantiek van *hosios* raadselachtig. Een deel van het probleem is dat *hosios* als synoniem voor een heel scala aan termen lijkt te worden gebruikt, en daarmee een zeer breed veld aan betekenissen schijnt te kunnen aannemen. Het meest onbegrijpelijke daarbij is dat *hosios* soms tegenovergestelde dingen lijkt te betekenen: soms zou het slaan op wie of wat ‘heilig’ is, maar in andere voorbeelden juist op het ‘profane’, het ‘niet-religieuze’.

In mijn dissertatie heb ik uitgelegd wat *hosios* betekent en hoe de semantische relatie tussen *hosios* en nauw verwante termen moet worden gezien. Het onderzoek verdiept daarmee ons inzicht in de Oud-Griekse religie en maatschappij. Tegelijkertijd is het onderzoek een *case study* van een (op taalkundige inzichten gebaseerde) methode om woordveldonderzoek in een dode taal te bedrijven.

Het uitgangspunt van mijn analyse was een inzicht in het onderzoeksveld van de conceptuele semantiek. Dit is de notie dat lexicale selectie competitief is. Een taalgebruiker (spreker) kiest een lexeem altijd nadat hij of zij (onbewust) lexicale alternatieven (andere mogelijk geschikte woorden) heeft afgewogen. Een luisteraar realiseert zich op zijn beurt dat deze alternatieven beschikbaar waren voor de spreker, maar dat het gekozen lexeem in de ogen van de spreker de boodschap blijkbaar het beste overbracht. Gebaseerd op dit inzicht heb ik de betekenis en de gebruikswijzen van *hosios* en haar *cognaten* (woorden die van *hosios* afgeleid zijn, zoals de ontkenning *anhosios* ‘on-*hosios*’, het werkwoord *hosioō* ‘*hosios* maken’ en andere vormen) onderzocht door de *competitie* met semantische ‘rivalen’ (woorden die qua betekenis erg dicht in de buurt komen) te bestuderen. Ik maakte verder gebruik van de taalkundige inzichten in het onderzoeksveld van de zgn. cognitieve linguïstiek. Volgens deze benadering van taalkunde bestaat de representatie van ‘betekenis’ van een lexeem in het mentale lexicon (het ‘woordenboek’ in het hoofd van een

taalgebruiker) uit een gestructureerde inventaris van gebruikswijzen van het woord en uit kennis over het culturele kader (of de culturele kaders) waarmee het lexeem geassocieerd wordt en waarbinnen het lexeem begrepen moet worden. Ik heb mij ten doel gesteld om een studie te maken van de gebruikswijzen en de associaties die de taalgebruiker had bij *hosios & cognaten* en semantisch nauw verwante termen. Het was daarbij noodzakelijk om het onderzoek in haar diachrone reikwijdte te beperken. De gebruikswijzen en associaties van een term en de culturele kaders waarin de term fungeert veranderen door de tijd heen, wanneer de historische en tekstuele contexten waarin het woord gebruikt wordt en de mentaliteit van de taalgebruikers ook veranderen. Het bestuderen van de semantiek en pragmatiek van een begrip is m.i. alleen mogelijk door één bepaalde afgebakende tijdsperiode uit de geschiedenis te kiezen en voor die periode een analyse te maken (of, mogelijkwijs, door verschillende tijdsdoorsnedes te nemen en meerdere achtereenvolgende analyses te maken). De focus van het onderzoek was de 5^e eeuw voor Christus.

In hoofdstuk twee gaf ik een voorlopige analyse van de gebruikswijzen van *hosios & cognaten*, het semantische netwerk van deze termen (prototypische en minder prototypische gevallen) en de geassocieerde culturele *frames*. Ik laat zien dat *hosios & cognaten* een grote variëteit aan gedragingen, houdingen en personen evalueren. Echter, in het overgrote merendeel van de geattesteerde gevallen (80%) is het gebruik van deze lexemen beperkt tot een kleine groep van toepassingen. Ik laat zien, daarmee eerder onderzoek bevestigend, dat *hosios & cognaten* ten eerste gedrag evalueren dat *direct* op de goden gericht is. Het gaat dan bijvoorbeeld om de vraag of mensen wel van bepaalde goden hun status als god erkennen, zich een juiste houding jegens de goden aanmeten, of goden eren in de cultus. Ten tweede evalueren *hosios & cognaten* gedrag dat *indirect* op de goden betrekking heeft, wanneer het die intermenselijke relaties betreft waarin de goden een bijzondere interesse hebben. Hier gaat het met name om de relatie tussen ouder en kind en tussen andere leden van een *oikos*, de band tussen gast en gastheer, de omgang met smekelingen en de doden, en om het zich houden aan eden.

Een analyse van de vroegste attestaties van *hosios & cognaten* en van situaties waarin deze termen geactiveerd worden zonder al te veel contextuele voorbereiding liet zien dat *hosios & cognaten* tegelijkertijd ethische en religieuze evaluaties zijn, en dat er een cruciale link is tussen die twee typen van evaluatie. De verschillende gebruikswijzen van *hosios & cognaten* activeren verschillende culturele *frames* (bijvoorbeeld, de lange termijnrelatie met je ouders, het ontvangen en eren van gasten, etc.). Echter, deze *frames* zijn allemaal ondergeschikt aan één overkoepelend kader: het onderhouden van de wederkerige relatie met de godenwereld. Ik heb

betoogd dat *hosios & cognaten* steeds betrekking hebben op wat mensen moeten doen om deze relatie te onderhouden. ‘Doen wat *hosios* is’ betekent dat mensen hun rol vervullen in de uitwisseling met de godenwereld en de goden daarmee eer (*timê*) verschaffen. De goden krijgen onder andere *timê* wanneer mensen hun relaties *onderling* respecteren en in stand houden. Deze karakterisering van ‘doen wat *hosios* is’ impliceert dat *hosios* (wanneer de term niet-ontkennend gebruikt wordt) echt een positieve waarde articuleert en niet, zoals in de wetenschappelijke literatuur wel wordt beweerd, ‘wat religieus neutraal is’.

In dit hoofdstuk ging ik tenslotte in op de diachrone distributie van *hosios & cognaten*. In verschillende perioden worden deze termen niet in gelijke mate gebruikt. *hosios & cognaten* komen in de pre-klassieke periode nauwelijks voor, maar het gebruik ervan neemt in de 5e eeuw ineens een hoge vlucht. Ik bestudeerde of de manier van denken waar de evaluaties *hosios & cognaten* blijk van geven wél al aanwezig was in pre-klassieke literatuur. Ik concludeerde dat dat inderdaad zo is. Het is dus niet het geval dat *hosios & cognaten* in de 5e eeuw hoogfrequent worden omdat zij een nieuwe mentaliteit gaan uitdrukken. Op deze diachrone attestatie kwamen we terug in hoofdstuk 4, zie hieronder.

In Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 analyseerde ik woordparen in competitie. Ik heb me gericht op twee begrippen waaraan *hosios* zeer verwant is: *eusebeia* ‘vroomheid’ en *dikaiosunê* ‘rechtvaardigheid’. In hoofdstuk 3 onderzocht ik de manier waarop twee lexemen een verschillende semantiek hebben wanneer het netwerk van gebruikswijzen en de interne structuur van het semantisch netwerk van het ene lexeme verschilt van dat van het andere. Na bestudering van de distributie van *eusebês & cognaten* en een vergelijk met de distributie van *hosios & cognaten* bleek dat er slechts één significant verschil tussen deze twee groepen lexemen te vinden was. Terwijl *eusebês & cognaten* vaker gebruikt worden met een positieve argumentatieve oriëntatie, zijn *hosios & cognaten* vaker negatief georiënteerd. Maar de twee groepen lexemen zijn in alle andere bestudeerde opzichten zeer vergelijkbaar. We moeten concluderen *hosios* en *eusebês* in de ogen van de taalgebruiker (voor zover als we kunnen vaststellen) dezelfde betekenis hadden. Er is wel beweerd in de wetenschappelijke literatuur dat *hosios & cognaten*, in tegenstelling tot *eusebês & cognaten*, géén houding of de mentale toestand van een persoon zouden uitdrukken. Uit mijn analyse blijkt dat er geen goede reden is om dit aan te nemen.

Bovendien is er een grote overeenkomst in de distributie van beide termen wanneer ze refereren aan objecten. Deze observatie hielp om die gevallen waarin *hosios* een object kwalificeert beter te begrijpen. Gegeven de semantiek van *eusebeia* (= *eu* ‘goed’ en *sebein* ‘eren’) is het duidelijk dat niet een *object* ‘*eusebes* is’, maar de

persoon die iets met het object doet of bij de handeling betrokken is. De grote vergelijkbaarheid in distributie van *hosios* en *eusebês* voor objecten leidt tot de voorzichtige conclusie dat een object zelf óók niet *hosios* is. Een object dat wordt aangeduid als *hosios* is een object dat gebruikt wordt op een manier die *hosios* is, door een eigenaar die zich gedraagt op een manier die *hosios* is. Ik heb betoogd dat er slechts één mogelijk semantisch verschil tussen de twee groepen lexemen is. De diskwalificatie *anhosios* ('on-*hosios*') is mogelijk affectief méér geladen dan *dusebês/asebês* ('niet-vroom' of 'goddeloos'). *anhosios* lijkt significant vaker op te duiken in emotionele of agressieve contexten. De lexemen verschillen mogelijk dus in in de ermee geassocieerde emotionele waarde.

In hoofdstuk 4 bestudeerde ik de manier waarop verschillende lexemen een situatie op een verschillende manier kunnen *framen*. We richtten ons in dit hoofdstuk op het competitieve paar *hosios & cognaten* vs. *dikaios & cognaten*. Door middel van een *case study* (tragische scènes over smekelingen) liet ik zien dat de twee groepen lexemen, hoewel zij allebei kunnen uitdrukken wat 'rechtvaardig is in de ogen van de goden' dezelfde situatie vaak op een andere manier weergeven. Zelfs in die gevallen waarin *dikaios & cognaten* refereerden aan 'wat de goden behaagt' leek het gebruik van dit woordveld steeds ook de *andere* associaties van *dikaios & cognaten* bij de luisteraar (i.e. een tragisch personage) te activeren. Aan het verloop van de relevante tragische dialogen leken we te kunnen zien, dat hij/zij werd herinnerd aan de andere aspecten van 'rechtvaardigheid', die in deze tijd regelmatig met *dikaios & cognaten* werden uitgedrukt. Voorbeelden waren het idee dat er een juiste verdeling is, of dat individuen zich wettelijk ergens aan hebben gecommitteerd. Gebaseerd op deze analyse werd een voorzichtig antwoord gepresenteerd op de vraag, opgeworpen in hoofdstuk 1 en 2, met betrekking tot de diachrone distributie van *hosios & cognaten*. We suggereerden dat *hosios & cognaten* (en overigens ook van *eusebês & cognaten*) in de 5^e eeuw méér gebruikt werden omdat taalgebruikers behoefte hadden aan preciezere en meer specifieke termen om moraliteit vanuit het voorgestelde perspectief van de goden uit te drukken, in een periode waarin *dikaios & cognaten* meer gespecialiseerd raakten voor andere gebruikswijzen.

Na deze studies van de belangrijkste gebruikswijzen van *hosios & cognaten* en semantisch nauw verwante termen en van de culturele kaders of *frames* waarmee de verschillende termen geassocieerd werden, richtten we ons in hoofdstuk 5 op duidelijk *niet*-prototypisch gebruik van *hosios & cognaten*. Eerder in de dissertatie werd betoogd dat een semantisch netwerk in het mentale lexicon (de inventaris van gebruikswijzen van een bepaald lexeem in het hoofd van een taalgebruiker) in principe altijd open en flexibel is. Iedere mogelijke gedraging, houding of persoon

zou betekenisvol als *hosios* kunnen worden aangeduid, gesteld dat de spreker anderen kan overtuigen dat deze evaluatie in het betreffende geval relevant is. Men zou kunnen stellen dat het vrij uitzonderlijke gebruik van *hosios & cognaten* voor het gedrag van *goden* (i.p.v. voor *mensen*) een goed voorbeeld is. Of niet? In dit hoofdstuk betoogde ik dat de interpretatie van dergelijke zeer on-prototypische gevallen niet stopt bij de realisatie gevallen (door de taalgebruiker) dat het om marginale gebruikswijzen gaat. Om dit goed te begrijpen betrokken we twee algemene principes van communicatie in de discussie: de sociale basis van taal en het principe van de minste inspanning. Ik betoogde dat het gebruik van een term in een zeer marginale gebruikswijze en terwijl andere beschikbare lexicale kandidaten dezelfde betekenis prototypisch hadden kunnen uitdrukken, *gemarkeerd* is. Dergelijk taalgebruik overtreedt het principe van de minste inspanning en is onverwacht binnen het idee van de sociale basis van taal. Dit soort taalgebruik valt de luisteraar daardoor op en hij/zij zal proberen de ongebruikelijke woordkeuze van de spreker te verklaren. Het resultaat is dat dergelijk taalgebruik een *effect* heeft op de luisteraar. Dit effect komt niet naar voren in een analyse van taalgebruik als ‘wel of niet prototypisch’: de notie van competitie is essentieel om dit effect te kunnen begrijpen. Door middel van deze analyse kwamen we tot een nieuwe interpretatie van die passages, waarin *goden* als *hosios* (of *anhosios*) worden aangeduid.

Hoofdstuk 6 was gericht op een meer historische vraag. *Kennis van de betekenis* van *hosios & cognaten* is nog altijd niet voldoende om het gebruik van deze lexemen *in context te begrijpen*. We moeten bijvoorbeeld ook weten wat de persuasieve waarde van de termen is in contexten van debat. Hoe relevant en overtuigend was het voor een 5^e eeuwse moedertaalspreker van het Grieks om te horen dat een gedraging wel of niet *hosios* was? In literaire bronnen vinden we deze termen in elk geval in discussies over de meest centrale sociale en maatschappelijke kwesties en evalueren zij zeer ernstige overtredingen. Dat impliceert dat *hosios & cognaten* evaluaties met een zeker gewicht waren. Maar literatuur blijft toch altijd – op zijn best – een indirecte reflectie van de sociale (en religieuze) waarden van een samenleving. Daarom bestudeerde ik deze historische vraag op basis van het epigrafische materiaal, het meest directe historische materiaal dat we bezitten. Sommige religieuze wetten stellen dat een bepaalde actie ‘niet *hosios*’ is (bijvoorbeeld voor vreemdelingen om een heiligdom binnen te gaan). We kunnen niet direct vaststellen in hoeverre de lezer zich iets zou hebben aangetrokken van een dergelijke boodschap. Maar we kunnen die vraag wel langs een omweg bestuderen, namelijk door te kijken in welke situaties autoriteiten überhaupt besloten om expliciet te appelleren aan religieuze waarden. De meeste zgn. ‘heilige wetten’ bevatten namelijk helemaal geen godsdienstige evaluatieve termen,

en de wetten met *hosios* erin zijn daarom opvallend. In dit hoofdstuk stond zo een ander competitief paar centraal: *hosios* vs. \emptyset ‘niks’. Als we twee extremen zouden nemen: waren wetten, die gedragingen als ‘niet *hosios*’ bestempelden, het type wetten waar het voortbestaan van de maatschappij vanaf hing (en deed de auteur een beroep op de religieuze scrupules van de lezer in een poging om de wet kracht bij te zetten)? Of, het andere uiterste, beschreven zij regeltjes over pietepeuterige details van de cultische praktijk (en beschreven de auteurs overtredingen als ‘goddeloos’ gedrag omdat ze het niet de moeite waard vonden om een ‘echte’ (bijv. geld-)straf uit te vaardigen)? Op basis van een studie naar de historische context van deze inscripties concludeerde ik dat een expliciet appèl aan vroomheid juist voorkwam in die situaties waarin het echt uit leek te maken dat de regel werd nageleefd: wanneer de regel echt van belang was voor de samenleving in kwestie. We kunnen uit die distributie voorzichtig afleiden dat *hosios* & *cognaten* belangrijke waarden waren in het 5e eeuwse Griekenland, en dat bevestigt onze indruk van de literaire bronnen.

In hoofdstuk 7 behandelden we tenslotte de lastigste puzzel in de wetenschappelijke literatuur over *hosios* & *cognaten*: de veronderstelling dat deze lexemen twee tegenovergestelde betekenissen zouden hebben (‘heilig’ en ‘profaan’, ‘niet-religieus’, naast de kernbetekenissen in de sfeer van ‘vroomheid’). Op basis van het onderzoek in deze dissertatie werd het mogelijk om te zien dat geen van de vermeende voorbeelden – dat wil zeggen, contexten waarin *hosios* & *cognaten* zouden refereren aan het ‘heilige’ of ‘profane’ – bewijs vormen voor een dergelijke paradox. Een aantal van de aangehaalde voorbeelden konden eigenlijk goed verklaard worden als prototypische toepassingen. Het historische dossier van de *hosia chrêmata* ‘*hosios* geld’ is al uitvoerig behandeld in recente wetenschappelijke literatuur. Naar mijn mening laten die analyses zien dat wanneer het adjectief *hosios* toegepast wordt op geld, dat een voorbeeld is van ‘framing’: het is een claim dat het gebruik van dergelijk geld de goden zal plezieren. Uit de conclusie van hoofdstuk 6 leid ik af dat een dergelijke claim begrijpelijk was voor anderen en ook een goede kans had overtuigend te zijn. De overige vermeende voorbeelden van de paradox waren *ad-hoc* uitgevonden toepassingen, en in sommige gevallen voorbeelden van (uitzonderlijk) gemarkeerd taalgebruik. Maar geen van deze voorbeelden vormde een goede reden om een betekenis ‘heilig’ of ‘profaan’ te postuleren, omdat, zoals eerder in dit proefschrift werd betoogd, ‘betekenis’ in het mentale lexicon neerkomt op kennis over terugkerende gebruikswijzen van een lexem.

Mijn conclusie is tweevoudig. Ten eerste, met betrekking tot *hosios & cognaten*. Het adjectief ὅσιος en het zelfstandig naamwoord ὁσία zijn in de wetenschappelijke literatuur vaak beschouwd als semantisch ongrijpbare en extreem polyseme lexemen. Ik heb betoogd dat de semantiek van *hosios & cognaten* helemaal niet complex is. Deze termen zijn niet méér ‘polyseem’ dan andere evaluatieve termen typisch zijn en er is ook geen paradox in de semantiek. De meeste geattesteerde gevallen van deze lexemen in de vijfde eeuw en eerder kunnen zeer goed begrepen worden als we uitgaan een klein aantal prototypische gebruikswijzen. *hosion* gedrag is steeds: dat wat mensen moeten doen om de goden te behagen en ze de eer (Gr. *timē*) te geven die ze toekomt, of alles waarvan een spreker anderen kan overtuigen dat het het tot die categorie behoort. Alle schijnbaar afwijkende gevallen werden verklaard als voorbeelden van framing, of als gemarkeerd taalgebruik, en/of als gebruikswijzen die ter plekke werden uitgevonden (vaak in poëzie).

Ten tweede, met betrekking tot de bestudering van de semantiek van evaluatieve termen in een dode taal illustreert mijn dissertatie een bepaalde methode. Ik heb willen laten zien dat het isoleren van een korte periode en het vervolgens analyseren van een lexeem *in zijn semantisch veld* productief is. Lexicale selectie is altijd gebaseerd op competitie. Wanneer we de betekenis en het gebruik van een lexeem bestuderen moeten we ons steeds afvragen onder welke semantische en pragmatische omstandigheden het bestudeerde lexeem synchroon ‘wint’ van bijna-synonieme lexicale rivalen, en waarom die rivalen in andere situaties wel geselecteerd worden. Een diachrone studie zou moeten bestaan uit de accumulatie van verschillende case studies over kortere tijdsperiodes.

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As I hope have shown, *hosios*-ness was as much about inter-human relationships as it was about the gods. I am not surprised. This thesis could not have been completed without the care, support and help of many, of whom I can name only a few here.

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Curriculum Vitae

Saskia Peels werd geboren op 27 oktober 1982 te Dordrecht. In 2000 behaalde zij haar VWO diploma aan het Titus Brandsma College te Dordrecht. In datzelfde jaar ging zij Leiden *Engelse Taal en Cultuur* studeren, en in 2001 begon zij daarnaast met *Griekse en Latijnse Taal en Cultuur*. Vanaf 2006 volgde Saskia tevens de tweejarige Research Master *Linguistics* in Utrecht. In het kader van haar doctoraal afstudeeronderzoek bij *Engelse Taal en Cultuur* verbleef zij in een half jaar aan University College Cork (Ierland), waar zij een scriptie schreef over identiteitvorming in de vroege middeleeuwen in Ierland. Voor dit onderzoek werd haar de *Janneke Fruin-Helb Prijs* toegekend. Begin 2007 studeerde zij af (*cum laude*). Bij het doctoraal *Griekse en Latijnse Taal en Cultuur* schreef zij een scriptie over het lange-afstandsreflexief bij Herodotus. Voor haar studieprestaties werd haar de *Prof. A.W. Grootendorst Prijs* toegekend. Begin 2008 behaalde zij haar diploma (*cum laude*).

In april 2008 begon Saskia met een promotieonderzoek aan de Universiteit Utrecht, in het NWO VICI-project *Citizenship in Classical Athens*, onder leiding van Prof. dr. Josine Blok (Universiteit Utrecht) en Prof. dr. Ineke Sluiter (Universiteit Leiden). In 2009 rondde zij daarnaast de Research Master *Linguistics* aan de Universiteit Utrecht af, met een scriptie over kindertaalverwerving (*cum laude*). Tijdens haar promotie was zij steeds als gastonderzoeker of met een kleine aanstelling aan de opleiding *Griekse en Latijnse Taal en Cultuur* te Leiden verbonden, waar zij ook verschillende colleges verzorgde. Tussen 2008 en 2010 was zij coördinator van de Nederlandse onderzoeksschool OIKOS. In het kader van haar promotieonderzoek verbleef Saskia in 2011 een half jaar in Cambridge, Trinity Hall; in het daaropvolgende voorjaar werkte zij een half jaar als Fellow aan het Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies te Wassenaar, waar zij deel uitmaakte van de themagroep ‘Mass Communication in Classical Antiquity’. In april 2012 kreeg Saskia vanuit het Spinozafonds een aanstelling bij de opleiding *Griekse en Latijnse Taal en Cultuur* in Leiden, waar zij haar promotieonderzoek afrondde en tevens diverse colleges gaf.

Saskia presenteerde haar onderzoek onder andere in Münster, Erfurt, Luik, Durham en Maynooth. Sinds januari 2014 zet zij haar carrière voort als postdoctoraal onderzoeker in de onderzoeksgroep van dr. Vinciane Pirenne-Delforge (Universiteit Luik).