

Exploraciones/Explorations

Presidential and Congressional Elections in Chile, December 2009 and January 2010

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Abstract: Sebastián Piñera's presidential victory marks the end of the institutional transition process that began in 1989, and the electoral alternation clearly demonstrates that the Chilean democracy has matured. Nevertheless, some systematic problems still persist, for example the term limits on incumbent presidents from seeking another term arguably deprives citizens the right to re-elect an esteemed president. Moreover, the presidential and congressional majorities from different coalitions remain the distinctive feature of Chilean political and institutional system. The binominal electoral system significantly reduces the possibility of minor parties to be represented in Parliament, yet at the same time, the bipolar system is greatly weakened by intra-coalition fragmentation (because coalitions allow minor parties the possibility to overcome voting thresholds and get representation in parliament). At the institutional level the relationship between the executive and the legislature causes the president to confront the parties. The struggle between these actors could produce a stalemate. The article analyses the 2010 presidential and congressional elections, and furnishes many elements to enlighten the functioning of a distinctive party system, which operates through a unique electoral system in a highly centralized institutional framework. *Keywords:* Chile, presidentialism, divided government, party system, Piñera.

For the first time since the General Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship, a right-wing candidate has won the Presidential elections in Chile. Sebastián Piñera defeated left-wing Concertación candidate Edoardo Frei in the second round of balloting, following a contentious first round that served as a primary of sorts for the left. Frei advanced to the second round only after defeating Marco Enriquez-Ominami of the Independent Left and Communist candidate Jorge Arrate. The December 13, 2009 elections also saw the replacement of half the Senate, as well as the Chamber of Deputies in its entirety. The new president however did not manage to secure a majority in either the Senate or the Chamber, thus confirming that the 'coherent majorities' during the first year of presidency of outgoing President Michelle Bachelet was an 'exceptional case'.

Elections in democratic Chile

Since Pinochet's defeat in the referendum/plebiscite on an eight-year presidential term revision in October 1988 (Huneus 2007), the Chilean centre-left has occupied the presidency. The *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (Coalition of Parties for Democracy) – a coalition of 21 parties – was founded in 1983 when Pinochet lifted the prohibition on political parties. The coalition serves as the core of the centre-left, bringing together socialists, Christian democrats, and radicals in an effort to alienate the Chilean right, which was still perceived to be closely linked to the country's authoritarian past. Concertación has successfully backed the winning candidate in each election: Patricio Aylwin (1990-94, PDC – *Partido Demócrata Cristiano*), Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000, PDC), Ricardo Lagos

(2000-06, PS – *Partido Socialista de Chile*, and PPD – *Partido por la Democracia*), and finally Michelle Bachelet (2006-10, PS). Chilean presidents are elected to a four-year term by popular vote through a plurality majority.¹ If any candidate does not reach a 50 per cent threshold in the first round, then the two candidates with the highest percentage of the votes go to a second round for a run-off. Incumbent presidents cannot run for re-election.

Members of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies are elected to four-year terms. There are one-hundred twenty seats in total, divided into sixty two-member electoral districts. The Chilean Senate (*Senado*) has thirty-eight seats representing nineteen two-member electoral districts, and senators are elected to eight-year terms. Half of the Senate is renewed every four years (Siavelis 2000a; Huneecus 2010).² Unlike the presidency, senators and deputies can serve consecutive terms.³ Candidates may be members of an inter-party alliance or independents not affiliated with any party, and each coalition may present two candidates in each district (Rahat and Sznajder 1998). Seat allocation in the Chilean legislature is unique. It is a binomial electoral system wherein the first seat is won by the coalition or party with the highest number of district votes and the second seat is only granted to the winner if they have won double the number of votes over their opponents. If the first placed candidate fails to meet this threshold, the opposing party is automatically granted the seat. As a result, candidates affiliated with the two most popular political parties most often win representation in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

Presidential candidates and parties

As in 2006, four candidates competed in the first round of the presidential election in 2009. Sebastian Piñera was nominated by the right-wing coalition named *Por el Cambio*, (For Change) made up of the UDI – *Unión Demócrata Independiente*, and RN – *Renovación Nacional*. He is a successful tycoon, entrepreneur, and one of Chile's richest men. He is also a former Senator (for East Santiago, 1990-98) who lost his last presidential bid to Bachelet in 2005.⁴ The Concertación's candidate was the Christian Democrat Edoardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle. He was a former president (1994-2000), incumbent Senator and the son of Edoardo Frei Montalva, head of the State before the Allende presidency and supporter turned opponent of Pinochet who died under suspicious circumstances.

The third candidate, Marco Enríquez-Ominami, represented the independent left and was supported by socialist and communist dissidents. His father was Miguel Enríquez, the historical leader of the MIR – *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* who was assassinated during the dictatorship. Representing the far left, the last candidate, Jorge Arrate, was a former minister under the *Unidad Popular* government led by Allende who oversaw some of the nationalization policies during the 1970s. Elections for the Chamber of Deputies and half of the Senate coincided⁵ with the 2009 presidential election. Parliamentary elections were mainly contested by the candidates of the four main coalitions: the Concertación together with *Juntos Podemos por más Democracia* (Together We Can Do More); the *Coalición por el Cambio* (Coalition for Change); the *Nueva Mayoría para Chile* (New Majority for Chile); and the *Chile Limpio Vote Feliz* (Clean Chile, Vote Happy); plus the Independents. For the Chamber election there were a total of 429 candi-

dates: 120 for Concertación – Juntos Podemos, 120 for the Coalición por el Cambio, 79 for the Nueva Mayoría, 92 for Chile Limpio, and only 18 coming from the Independents. For the Senate, there was a total 53 candidates: Concertación – Juntos Podemos (18), the Coalición por el Cambio (17), the Nueva Mayoría (7), Chile Limpio (10), and only one from the Independents.

Electoral campaigns

Both presidential and parliamentary campaigns began in September 2009, far before the official date outlined by the Constitution, which calls for campaigns to being a month before the date of the election itself. The presidential campaign was of particular interest because of the intricate candidate nomination process. Piñera was re-nominated by the Coalición por el Cambio as his position as the leader of the Renovación Nacional coupled with his strong electoral showing in 2005 and high standing in public opinion polls made him a strong choice. On the left, the two most important players in the Concertación coalition, the PDC and the PS, decided to support Frei as a potential successor to Bachelet in early 2009. However, in a break from the Coalition's leaders, José Antonio Gómez called for a primary on behalf of the radical party to choose the centre-left's candidate. As Gómez did not withdraw, a primary was scheduled for 5 April 2009. The Concertación national committee established that the primaries would be held at the regional level (starting in the Maule and Libertador General Bernardo O'Higgins districts), and that if the winner received at least 20 percentage points more than the challenger, he/she would receive the nomination for the coalition. Frei in fact reached 65 per cent of the votes compared to Gómez's only 35 per cent.

The most important consequence of Frei's nomination was that it provoked Arrate and Enríquez-Ominami to align with the socialists and run alone, outside of Concertación. Arrate created and led a far-left coalition, Junto Podemos Más, and after defeating Tomas Hirsch, the leader of the PH – *Partido Humanista Chileno* (Humanist Party), at a convention held on 25 April 2009. Marco Enríquez-Ominami's break from Concertación to run as an independent candidate also had important repercussions for Piñera's eventual success. It also hurt the political re-organization of the centre-left parties and coalition by undermining Concertación's precedent of always backing the winning candidate of the primaries. Enríquez-Ominami's decision to break up with the centre-left in December 2008 came after stating that he was available to compete against José Miguel Insulza and Eduardo Frei in the Concertación presidential primaries. However, he soon became convinced that Concertación's leadership had changed the primary rules in a concerted effort to bar him from the process. Therefore, his decision stemmed in part from an internal crisis of the PS. His electoral campaign subsequently focused on internal politics, mostly against Concertación's candidate, and in opposition to the centre-left parties as a whole. At the time of the primary, Enríquez-Ominami held the position of deputy from the district of Valparaíso and had to resign from the PS in order to collect the 36,000 signatures needed to register his independent candidacy in July.

Concertación's campaign focused on continuing the policies of the Bachelet presidency, specifically those concerning welfare and creating job opportunities for the middle class. Frei's campaign slogan was *Vamos a vivir mejor*, (We will live

better), a product of his effort to keep leftward leaning voters but also to attract more voters in light of the deteriorating popularity of Concertación. Frei also tried to attract centre-left voters by promising a more active state government, as well as legalizing the use of the day-after pill. Piñera, on the other hand, started his electoral campaign shortly after his defeat in 2006, and argued that it was time for a change in Concertación's long hold on government. Piñera pointed to President Bachelet's backing of Frei as evidence of the left's attempt to continue its oligarchic grasp on power. Piñera's proposals focused on economics, privatization, and more liberalism in order to create 1 million new jobs. The Piñera campaign drew from Barack Obama's presidential campaign slogan that emphasized 'Change' and combined it with Nicolas Sarkozy's strategy to define himself as a new and modern image of the right-wing, using slogans like '*Un Chile así*' (A Chile like this) and '*Así queremos Chile*' (How we want Chile). Similarly, Enríquez-Ominami's campaign also drew from the 'Change' communications constructs (*Chile cambió* – Chile Changed) in reference to both generational terms and of the centre-left (socialist) ruling class.⁶ His campaign was more modern, relied heavily upon the internet and used a highly personalized political message by drawing from his personal history and his experience (*Marco por ti*, Marco for you).

Arrate's campaign was mired with difficulties in fund-raising, and his message focused on emphasizing the relevance of leftist and socialist values by campaigning for improvements in workers' rights. He also explicitly referred to the *Unidad Popular* (Popular Unity) coalition government of Allende's presidency. Obviously, he clearly targeted the socialist voters who did not support Frei's candidacy. Arrate's break from the PS in 2009 significantly hurt Concertación, as the Partido Humanista soon left the coalition and threw its support behind Enríquez-Ominami. Arrate began the Junto Podemos Más electoral coalition. He officially became the Partido Comunista's candidate primarily motivated by the need to overcome electoral law requirements, but soon after left the party.

Generally speaking, the electoral campaign was rather opaque regarding policy specifics. There were little candid debates on policies regarding Chile's most pressing problems of unemployment, social disparity, welfare, and public services (issues that are traditionally the bastion of the left). Though most of candidates promoted virtually the same social-economic platform, oriented to a more liberal economy, it is possible to differentiate their positions by analysing some discrepancies. Piñera, consistent with his 'new conservative' image, proposed a social agenda to address poverty but avoided referring to inequality and temporary jobs. Concertación, meanwhile, put an emphasis on economic growth and macroeconomic equilibrium at the expense of promoting progressive policies. Enríquez-Ominami and to a lesser degree Arrate demonstrated a generalist, borderline 'social democratic' agenda in the first case, and an updated reference to the *Unidad Popular* experience in the second. Among the candidates, Piñera consistently led in the opinion polls throughout the campaign, but it is worth noting that his poll numbers were already high before the election officially began. As reported by Chile's most popular newspapers, including *El Mercurio* and *La Tercera*, the Coalición por el Cambio's candidate had always led Concertación. This trend was particularly accentuated during the second half of 2009, and polls demonstrate that little changed between the first and the second round. The last presidential debate, organized by Anatel TV on 11 January 2010 (among the two candidates at the *ballottage*, Piñera and Frei) was characterized by moderate tones, especially in comparison to three

previous debates held during the first round of the electoral campaign. Similar to his approach in 2005, Piñera presented himself as a candidate who would modernize the country, and strayed from the politically volatile issue of being linked to Chile's right-wing past. He therefore undermined the centre-left's main offensive argument against him. Piñera emphasized a conservative approach to populist social and economic proposals and supported creating a pension for housewives coupled with more assistance for small business owners in order to appeal to moderate left voters. He simultaneously stressed a reduction in the state's intervention in the economy – particularly in public services and welfare –, as well as the guarantee of an expanded access to natural resources by private companies. Frei's electoral platform represented a continuation of the policies of outgoing President Bachelet including combating unemployment, improving pensions and social security benefits, reducing the gap between the rich and poor, and improving health care and education. Frei tried to deflect criticism that he represented just more of the 'old style' oligarchic model in an effort to keep voters who had previously supported Arrate, and Enríquez-Ominami in particular, as attractive options at the polls. Coalitions on the congressional electorate level proposed policy platforms similar to their respective presidential candidates, indicating the salience of the presidential contest as a 'first order election'.

Election results

By international standards, the turnout in 2009 Chile's election was high. While voter registration is not compulsory, voting is indeed mandatory once a citizen is registered to vote. In the first round, 87.2 per cent of registered voters turned out, close to the same amount of the *ballotage* (86.7).⁷ Of the 8,220,897 Chilean voters, 6,937,519 voted in the first round of the presidential contest and 7,179,762 voted in parliamentary elections. Piñera won 44.05 per cent of the vote, followed by Frei at 29.6 per cent, Enríquez-Ominami at 20.13 per cent, and Arrate at 6.21 per cent. Together, the centre-left accounted for more than 50 per cent (55.94 per cent) in the first round, receiving more votes than Piñera. However, Piñera won in the second round.

The split between Piñera and Frei was mostly affected by Enríquez-Ominami's performance, which most likely siphoned unsatisfied leftward leaning voters off from Frei. There were, however, some signs of an attempt by Frei, Enríquez-Ominami and Arrate to present a unified front before the second round held on 17 January 2010. As predicted by most polls, however, Piñera won the run-off with 51.6 per cent of the vote to Frei's 48.4 per cent. From a geopolitical point of view, Piñera won 10 of Chile's 15 regions, including the metropolitan region of Santiago, the most populous area of the country, as well as the two regions of Bío-Bío and Magallanes, which have a long left-wing tradition of voting. At the regional and city levels it is evident that there is a territorial cleavage between left/right, running from north-to-south. Frei won the regions of Antofagasta, Atacama, and Coquimbo regions that are heavily industrial and the home of the country's mining region. The gender breakdown demonstrated that Piñera confirmed the best electoral scores of the first ballot, *vis à vis* Frei, both among women and men. As for the parliamentary election, a far-left wing party won seats in the Chamber of Deputies, largely due to a political agreement with the Concertación coalition in order to end the exclusion of the PC (*Partido Comunista de Chile*) from parliament due to the

binomial system, and also to secure communist support for Frei in the second round. Nevertheless, this deal did not produce its intended results. There was disappointment regarding the inability to win both seats in some districts.

In the newly elected parliament, the *Coalición por Cambio* holds 58 seats in the Chamber and 17 seats in the Senate, in contrast to the 57 and 18 seats held by the *Concertación* coalition. Three seats are held by *Chile Limpio*, (a coalition also affiliated with *Enríquez-Ominami*). As neither coalition holds a majority in either house of parliament, Piñera may experience difficulty passing legislation through Congress.⁸ The situation may lead to an institutional stalemate or gridlock between the legislative and executive branches of government and may even negatively affect the head of state's ability to appoint justices to the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal. Undoubtedly, Piñera will have ample opportunity to test the consensus-building aspect of Chilean politics.

Perspectives

Piñera's victory marks the end of the institutional transition process that began in 1989, and the electoral alternation clearly demonstrates that the Chilean democracy has matured. A simple overview of the facts and data is not sufficient to clearly understand the complicated dynamics that are affecting the Chilean political and institutional systems. Though the Chilean presidential system displays a capacity to maintain institutional equilibrium, it in part poses a strong challenge to the *de facto* interpretation of the 'failure of presidentialism' presented by Linz and Valenzuela (1994). Some systemic problems still persist, as for example the term limits on Chilean incumbent presidents from seeking another term arguably deprive citizens the right to re-elected an esteemed president – or at least the most popular politician – as in the exceptional case of Bachelet.

Not having to face re-election after assuming the presidency has two political consequences: The first is the lack of accountability for the executive agenda. The second is that without a looming re-election, the presidency has little control over political parties, thus magnifying the power of parliament's autonomy, and the latter is a reflection of the structure of the institutional framework. In fact, since the return to democracy, 'divided government' has been the rule in Chile. If the run-off method ensures that the President is elected with a majority of votes (in contrast to Allende who was elected by the Congress having only a sharp minority of votes), the diverse presidential and congressional majorities from different coalitions (Elgie 2001) remain the distinctive feature of Chilean political and institutional system. As the Senate was previously a right-wing majority, it frequently was at odds with Bachelet's centre-left presidency, making it the key chamber for many decisions. Furthermore, the relevance of the Senate is also underscored by the fact that ten of Chile's twelve democratically elected presidents since 1932 were previously senators. Finally, one should keep in mind that up until 2006, there were nine senate seats appointed by the president who could, in theory, shift the political leaning of the chamber.⁹ The bicameral legislature facilitates the ability to consider constitutional reform by introducing a federalist or regionalist mechanism in a highly centralized institutional framework. The Chilean political system (Carey 2002) is mostly affected by the presence of the above-mentioned binominal electoral system in two ways. The first is that the system significantly reduces the possibility of minor parties to be represented in Parliament. The second is that the bipolar effect is strongly weakened by intra-coalition

fragmentation (because coalitions allow minor parties the ability to overcome threshold restraints and to get representation in parliament).

In particular, the configuration of the Chilean party system has changed significantly from before 1973 to the current post-transition period, leading to an unusually stable political arena. Chile's previous party system (1958-1973) before the collapse of democracy was characterized by a competitive dynamic between three ideological blocs along a particularly wide left-right spectrum, and was described as an extreme multipartism (Sartori 1976, 129). Different features contributed in producing a new pattern of the party system at this time: in particular the reduction of the ideological distance between parties and blocs on a reduced left-right spectrum, and the new binominal electoral system. Even though the analyses on the latter element are not always unanimous in terms of limits to party system fractionalization and increasing centripetal competition (Siavelis 1997), the binomial formula has increased the incentives for coalition formation and maintenance around the two biggest parties. Indeed, the organizational structures of the political parties in Chile are stronger than in most Latin American cases, though less entrenched than in some West European countries. This framework – that leads Sartori (1976, 173) to describe Chile's party system as 'the most significant one in terms of structural consolidation of the party systems in Latin America' – seems to be plausible today as well.

Looking at the institutional level of the political system, it would seem that the executive branch's relationship with the legislature pits the president against the parties (Siavelis 2000b). The fact that there is no presidential re-election implies that the incumbent president has little control over parties, nor can he/she affect parliamentary groups. In the same vein, political parties have little ability to influence the president as the president is only accountable to voters; a reality that is oftentimes used as the legitimacy to overcome any party pressure. Moreover, the party system's structure and the fragmentation (particularly in the coalitions) make it difficult for parties to act as a unique actor to challenge the president. This reality became particularly evident with the centre-left coalition (Concertación) from 1990 to 2010. However, the ascension of Piñera to the presidency – who previously served as the president of his party¹⁰ – coupled with the smaller size of the right-wing coalition could signal a change in the status quo. Piñera may even be able to control, at the very least, the coalition's second larger force (Renovación Nacional). The party system fragmentation also affects the coalition bargaining, which is closely related to the candidate selection process (Navia 2008), while a process of primaries for presidential candidates has been used only by the Concertación (Altman 2008). The number of parties of each coalition implies differences between the centre-left and the right coalitions in terms of bargaining. Finally, concerning the presidential bargaining with parties, it is evident that it takes place in reference to the political platform rather than in manifesting itself at the executive or cabinet level.

The newly elected President Piñera, like almost all the other presidents before him, except Bachelet for a short while, does not hold a majority in the legislative branch. Accordingly, one could question whether Piñera will use his power of decree to overcome parliamentary impasses. There exists a divergent path between the parsimonious use of the decree power by Chilean presidents (Huneeus 2010) and the so-called *decretismo* with which the Latin American presidents (and particularly those in Brazil) *pass* in parliament (Sartori 1994). Another unresolved

problem lies in the legacy of the ever-present memory of the authoritarian regime. The binomial system was designed to encourage party coalitions, but has been criticized for the possibility that a candidate who placed second can win a seat (the second one) with a smaller percentage of votes than the second candidate on the list who reached the highest number of votes. As a result, the two biggest coalitions from the centre-left and right-wing win almost all the seats, taking at least one seat each in the districts. Until the 2009 deal to help consolidate support for Frei, the far-left parties did not have any representatives.

Piñera vowed to sell his shares in corporations before being sworn in on 11 March 2010 in order to ward off any conflicts of interests. On the other hand Bachelet's post-presidential political legacy has made a strong mark on the centre-left parties. This point may suggest some centre-left's political immaturity regarding the broadening of inner-party competition, the selection of candidates, and not granting access to a younger and newer generation of politicians. Having three candidates inevitably divided the progressive field, and demonstrated that Concertación did not understand the logic behind the two ballots system: unity.¹¹ The centre-left electoral deception, or *derrota*, was clear for a number of reasons. First, the significant division among the candidates, coupled with voters' mistrust of the PS's leadership, was exacerbated by Bachelet's departure. This situation was masterly described by Patricio Navia, a leading columnist of the daily national paper *La Tercera* (2010). The journalist posted a comment on his popular blog saying (in between the two rounds) that it was a voter's valid option to cast the ballot in favour of Sebastián Piñera at the ballottage, despite previously voting for Enríquez-Ominami. This caused quite a stir among centre-left voters, particularly the socialists. Navia's sentiment was consistent with Enríquez-Ominami's statement that, in the second round, he would vote for the 'candidate of 29 per cent' (referring to Frei), but that he expected his electors to choose freely.

Given the fracture of the Chilean left-wing, it seems that Chileans voted more against Concertación's candidate than actively choosing the right-wing candidate, as outgoing president Bachelet's popularity was commendably high – yet it did not translate into an advantage for the centre-left.

Piñera was inaugurated on 11 March 2010 as the first right-wing President of Chile, ending two consecutive presidents from the Partido Socialista. Piñera appointed 22 ministers, six of whom are women (Employment, Home and Urbanism, Environment), as well as the general secretary of the presidency. Among the cabinet members, eight appointments are affiliated with the UDI including Alfredo Moreno as Foreign Minister, four are from the RN (President Piñera is RN), and eight are considered independents or *técnicos* (technocrats). The UDI has a broader portfolio than the RN, which is different in that in prior presidencies the president's party was always stronger than others in the Concertación. The fact that Piñera in this cabinet has more ministers from the UDI than from his own party demonstrates the unilateral ability of the president to appoint the ministers of his choice.

However, Piñera attempted to appoint ministers that belonged to Concertación but largely failed in his efforts. He appointed only one, the Minister of Defence Jaime Ravinet de la Fuente (former minister of Housing and later of Defence under President Lagos), a Christian Democrat who resigned from the party. A high number of 'Independents' have no party affiliation, because the Chilean right has no open party attachment or affiliation as the case in Western European democracies.¹² This implies that, like his predecessors, Piñera might have more freedom being in

charge of the cabinet branches, but at the same time, he could face political instability due to potentially less cohesion and discipline of the coalitions.

The new President not only faces the challenge of implementing the agenda he campaigned on, but also the crisis following the destructive earthquake in February. The centre-left's opposition is not exploiting the political difficulties stemming from the disaster; nevertheless, once the 'honeymoon' period ends, the divided government structure could negatively hurt Piñera. His future ability to overcome vetoes from the opposing political parties rests on his ability to rise to the occasion and promote unity among the right-wing coalition.

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Notes

1. The term's length was equal to six years for the 1993 and 2000 elections.
2. Up to the constitutional reforms of 2005 that abolished them, the Senate included nine appointed Senators and Senators for Life.
3. The percentage of incumbents' re-election is around 80 per cent. Thus the most important part of Chilean political class is formed by representatives, due to the high turnout level on the executive branch.
4. Piñera was also a candidate as an Independent in 1993, obtaining 6.2 per cent of vote.
5. It was a constitutional choice in order to make having coherent majorities more probable (Shugart and Carey 1992).
6. According to the Barometer CERC (May and September 2010) 24 per cent of Enríquez-Ominami's votes came from PS electors.
7. At the presidential elections, turnout was 5.3 in 1989, 8.7 in 1993, 12.7 in 1999, and 12.9 in 2005.
8. The President of the Senate is the Christian Democrat Jorge Pizarro.
9. Amendments to the Constitution, approved almost unanimously by a joint session of Congress on 16 August 2005, eliminated non-directly elected senators from 11 March 2006 onwards. Previously, according to the Constitution of 1980, 'designated' or 'institutional' senators were appointed to the chamber. Four senators were appointed by the *Consejo de Seguridad Nacional*, three by the Supreme Court, and two by the president of the republic. Two former heads of state, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle and Augusto Pinochet, were installed as senators for life.
10. The RN (from 2001 to 2004).
11. The centre-left had four candidates (of six) in 1993, as well as in 1999.
12. Only a few ministers have party affiliation. UDI has no party members in the cabinet, whereas the

RN has the influential Minister of the Interior, Rodrigo Hinzpeter, who was previously the general secretary of the party; as well as Felipe Bulnes, Minister of Justice, member of the RN's General Council.

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