

Michael Burke

**Rhetorical Pedagogy:
Shaping an intellectually critical citizenry**

Universiteit Utrecht
Faculteit Geesteswetenschappen

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Oratie

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Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus,
Leden van het Bestuur,
Decaan van de Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen,
Dean of the Roosevelt Academy,
Zeer hooggewaardeerde collegae,
Dear family and friends,
Dear students,

I

In this inaugural lecture I will put forward the contention that the pedagogy of ancient rhetoric has much to offer contemporary teaching and learning and that as such a ‘rediscovery of rhetoric’ should take place, particularly among those colleagues working in academe who are committed to improving their teaching methods and their students’ learning practices.¹ A systematic understanding of classical rhetoric will allow contemporary educators to discover the many rhetorical means of learning available and in doing so add considerably to the contemporary teaching and learning toolkit, and in particular to the toolkit of critical thinking, critical writing and critical speaking. What is needed is a conscious, systematic deployment of some of these ancient rhetorical methods of learning, not a subconscious and arbitrary approach, as now appears to be principally the case. Logically, some of these ancient methods will be obsolete, and others will need significant modification in order for them to meet the demands of our technological and digital age, but there is a wealth of learning methods and frameworks out there; tried and tested models used in the grammar schools, the rhetoric schools and the universities of Europe from antiquity right up to the nineteenth century. If we want to give our students the best learning opportunities and experiences possible, then I suggest we could do far worse than to look at what the ancients wrote on the subject of rhetorical pedagogy: ancients like Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian.² I will maintain further in this inaugural lecture that first-year undergraduate students should explicitly be taught how to communicate clearly and how to reason critically and that this is best facilitated by means of a freshman foundation module on critical thinking and communication.³ This is needed, I will lastly contend, in order to shape an intellectually critical youth citizenry; a citizenry that will help this country achieve its social and economic goals, but achieve them in a reflective, responsible and ethically accountable way. Before I explore these issues, allow me to first remind you of what rhetoric entails and hopefully remove some of the preconceptions that might surround it.

II

When I meet people and they ask me what I do in life I say, I teach. I then reflect a little and say, actually I am a linguist who tries to help young people to think critically and communicate clearly in order that they might achieve their goals in life and hopefully make the world a generally more agreeable place to live in. I add that on top of that I conduct

research on this topic of what might be called ‘rhetorical pedagogy’ or ‘rhetorical citizenship’ and also on the related themes of stylistics, discourse analysis and communication studies. More often than not, all this arouses further interest of my listener, prompting the person in question to inquire: what exactly do you teach and how do you do this research? It is at this point that I have to come clean: I am a professor of rhetoric, I say. There is almost always a long silence. The person then starts to look at me with a small measure of disregard, and even in some cases distaste, and he/she gradually starts to move ever so slightly away, adding “got to dash”. How did it get to this? Why are teachers of rhetoric so distrusted? Think of those great rhetorical educators of the ancient past just mentioned: Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian --- or think of those rhetoric teachers of the Renaissance and early modern period Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, Hugh Blair and more closer to home Erasmus, Vossius and Grotius. With an intellectual heritage like that, how did the word ‘rhetoric’ and the practice thereof become so seemingly tarnished?

Every time one opens a newspaper and comes across the use of the word ‘rhetoric’ it is almost always in a negative context. Rhetoric is often ‘hateful’ or ‘spurious’ or ‘empty’. Similarly, in Dutch newspapers it is ‘*pompeus*’ or ‘*flatterend*’ or ‘*xenofob*’. We cannot blame editors or newspaper owners for this tendency. Instead, the responsibility lies squarely with Plato and his unerring distrust of a group of teachers we know as the sophists. In many of his works, the sophists, and indeed any practitioner or teacher of rhetoric, comes in for some short Platonic shrift.⁴ In a nutshell, Plato thought that it cannot be right that there are two sides to every issue or that weaker arguments can win against those that represent the ‘truth’ by use of elements that he saw as manipulative such as style and emotion. Were he alive today, he would probably say that those who dazzle in their discourse have no right to win debates, because it is only objective truth that matters.

But rhetoric is not just about persuasion, it about education as well. Throughout history, rhetoric has always been closely linked with schooling: from the Roman schools that trained budding lawyers, to the mediaeval *trivium* and on to Renaissance humanists. We have to therefore conclude that there are at least two definitions of rhetoric. These can be supplied to us by most dictionaries. For instance, the two definitions that *The Oxford Concise English Dictionary* gives us are (1) the art of effective or persuasive speaking or writing, and (2) language designed to persuade or impress, often with an implication of insincerity or exaggeration.⁵ The main gist of my argument today pertains to the first definition, while the default popular notion of rhetoric is probably the second. Plato has won this argument against the sophists and as a result has influenced how we view the term ‘rhetoric’ today. However, the fact is we only have his side of the story; and a slippery side it is too. The sophists have not been able to represent themselves in the way Plato has. There is, however, a growing body of scholars who are now seeking to redress this balance.⁶ The irony, of course, of Plato’s immense dislike of rhetoricians for their presumed convoluted and illusive means of arguing, is that he himself in his works, though his character Socrates, and his deployment of elenchus as a didactic technique, is perhaps the most rhetorically persuasive character of all time. This seeming paradox is something that did not elude Cicero.⁷

Definitions of rhetoric in antiquity have varied somewhat. Aristotle in his *Art of Rhetoric* famously defined rhetoric as “the faculty of discerning the possible means of persuasion in each particular case”.⁸ This idea that rhetoric is the faculty of discovering in any

particular case all of the available means of persuasion firmly sees rhetoric as a skill or method.⁹ Cicero took a slightly different stance some three hundred years later when he demarcated rhetoric as a systematic theory known by the so-called ‘five canons of rhetoric’: a structured methodical process of invention, arrangement, stylization, memorization and delivery. He also believed that rhetoric had a tripartite function: to teach, to persuade and to delight.¹⁰

Rhetoric involves both nurture and nature.¹¹ It is about learning new strategies, new tools, new heuristics and then putting them into practice, but it is also about making that which was subconscious conscious, in order that it can be employed intentionally the next time you need it. Rhetoric is about skills, it about knowing who your audience is, it is about practicing, and then practicing again. When my new students ask, what is rhetoric I tell them every time you write an essay you use rhetoric; every time you give a presentation you use rhetoric; every time you explain your ideas to the people you meet you use rhetoric.

III

The contemporary academic world of education, and of teaching and learning, appears to have unknowingly reduplicated several of the effective learning exercises and methods that come from the antique world of classical rhetoric: *kairos*, *logos*, the *dissoi logoi*, to name but a few. It is interesting to note that when it comes to quality learning and education we humans appear to always discover those same best methods. Having such an intuitive approach, however, means that some educational models and ideas from classical rhetorical education are going to be omitted or be presented in an incomplete fashion. Reinventing the wheel can be a haphazard endeavor. This is unfortunate because there are going to be some delightful jewels of learning left behind. A fuller knowledge of ancient rhetorical techniques would, I believe, expand the teacher’s toolkit and enable him or her to facilitate a better learning environment for students.

Critical thinking and writing scholar John C. Bean, professor of English at Seattle University, describes a number of important teaching and learning strategies in his acclaimed work *Engaging Ideas*, a book written to help teachers integrate writing, critical thinking and active learning in the university classroom.¹² For example, he devotes one whole chapter to helping student writers to become more aware of their purpose and their audience.¹³ He asks them to reflect on four questions: (i) who are my intended readers, (ii) what do they already know about my topic and what is their stance towards it, (iii) what is my purpose for writing, and (vi) what genre is most appropriate for my context.¹⁴ These are all excellent pedagogical questions, but embedded in this exercise, and completely overlooked even though the word ‘rhetoric’ is used, are the key rhetorical notions of *kairos* and *ethos*.

Kairos is said to have been deployed effectively as far back as the times of Gorgias of Leontini, a well-known sophist from the fifth century BCE. It refers to a moment in time, an opportunity, an opening. It is special conception of space and time that is essentially non-chronological. This ‘carpe diem’ idea that a window of opportunity opens up where/when one must ‘strike while the iron is hot’ is linked in some ways to the modern philosophical concept of relativism. *Kairos* has many facets: the time, the place, the issue, the speaker, the audience,

the audience's relationship to both the speaker and the issue, the speaker's relationship to the issue, etc. The 1st century AD professor of rhetoric in Rome, Quintilian, sums this up nicely when he writes:

Before he speaks the student must consider, what, in whose presence, in whose defence, against whom, at what time and place, in what circumstances, and in what climate of opinion he has to speak; what the judge may be supposed to think before we start and finally what is that we want or want to avoid.¹⁵

Bean's earlier-mentioned four-point heuristic is embedded in here, for sure, but were students to be aware of the more protracted framework that *kairos* offers, then conceivably they would have a greater opportunity to generate even more material and investigate a discourse act even more thoroughly. They could also account for most of the communicative and cognitive factors that could go towards influencing the effectiveness of a discourse utterance be that a written or spoken piece of student work.

One of the elements in *kairos*, namely, 'what is the audiences' attitude towards the speaker', is fundamentally a question of ethos: one of the three proofs that Aristotle sets out in *Art of Rhetoric*. Indeed in that work Aristotle devotes an entire book to the concept of 'character', the term he used for ethos. Ethos essentially has two parts that operate on a cline rather than as mutually exclusive categories. The first is what we might call the speaker's 'situated' ethos. This depends on his or her reputation and how that person is regarded within the context of a certain audience and a certain moment in time. A speaker who is despised by an audience will not persuade them with his arguments no matter how soundly or clearly or factually they are presented. In fact, such is the distance that exists between them both that he may not even persuade them to listen to his arguments, let alone consider their persuasive worth. The second aspect of ethos is what we might call a speaker's 'invented' ethos.¹⁶ This is about what a speaker actually does linguistically, and in spoken discourse also para-linguistically, in the essay or paper itself. Cicero gave his students much advice on this matter. He writes in his maiden rhetorical work *de Inventione* about the opportunities for ethos creation in the introduction (the exordium) to a speech or paper:

An exordium is a passage which brings the mind of the auditor into a proper condition to receive the rest of the speech. This will be accomplished if he becomes well disposed, attentive and receptive. Therefore one who wishes his speech to have a good exordium must make a careful study beforehand of the kind of case which he has to present.¹⁷

Cicero goes on to explain how in his view there are five different types of audience: honorable, difficult, mean, ambiguous and obscure. In the honorable case the audience likes you and the issue you are going to speak or write on, i.e. you have a strong situated ethos and as such you can even consider not having an introduction at all and getting straight to the meat of the arguments. A difficult case is the opposite: you are disliked by an audience as is the issue about which you are going to speak. In such cases, Cicero says you have to employ a special kind of introduction called an 'insinuation'. Whereas a regular introduction is brief,

clear and seeks to make hearers well-disposed, attentive and receptive, an insinuation suppresses certain aspects and in doing so gains access to the minds of hearers.

The most common cases that affect our students in our classrooms fall into the other three categories. First of all, there the ‘mean’ case (mean in the sense of ‘median’ or ‘midway’, not ‘cruel’). Here, an audience finds the issue uninteresting or unimportant. Then there is the ambiguous case where the audience is unsure about the issue. Lastly we have the obscure case in which the audience finds it difficult to follow because it is too complex or they are not informed: “slow of wit” is the phrase Cicero uses; in the pseudonymic jargon of modern day psychologists, such audience would be described as having a ‘low need for cognition’. All three of these cases require that you make an audience well-disposed by securing their goodwill, while also making them attentive and receptive to your message. In a speech, you might secure goodwill by referring to what you have recently done for the community. You could make your auditors attentive by pointing out how the issue will affect everyone personally in the audience. Further, you could make an audience receptive by showing your respect for them. If we review Bean’s four points of advice again, we can see how a solid consideration of Cicero’s models would greatly expand what is possible for the contemporary critically thinking university student.

Kairos also make rhetorical supple. The fact is that rhetoric is not static and prescriptive, but mobile and descriptive and this is a wondrous thing. This flexibility is not some new post-modern addition, but is deeply-rooted in the very pragmatic nature of rhetoric itself. Quintilian, for instance, said that rhetoric cannot be bound by hard and fast rules. As he puts it, “rhetoric would be a very easy and trivial affair if it could be comprised in a single, short set of precepts. In fact, almost everything depends on causes, times, opportunity and necessity”.¹⁸

We saw how *kairos* embodies the idea of relativism. This is applicable to the concept of the *dissoi logoi* too. The *dissoi logoi* basically means countervailing arguments and it is widely believed that the sophist, Protagoras was the first to deploy this method of arguing on both sides of an issue. We cannot be sure of this as we only have Plato’s uncomplimentary depiction of him. You can, however, probably imagine why Plato disliked the idea that competing or contradictory statements could be made about the same issue, by the same person, in approximately the same period of time.¹⁹ By the time of the Roman rhetorical schools, where most students would go on to become lawyers, the pedagogical technique of being able to consecutively argue on both sides of an issue, both orally and in written form, had become an essential component of a student’s education, as indeed it should still be today, and especially for all law students wishing to become barristers.²⁰ Several exercises employed in the fourteen-stage *progymnasmata* (about which I will say more later) involved arguing on both sides of an issue: essentially the arts of confirmation and refutation. Some modern pedagogical scholars appear to have subconsciously deployed parts of this pedagogical strategy in their own models. There is for example Peter Elbows’ ‘believing and doubting’ game, which requires students to argue for the possible truth of any statement, only to then argue against it.²¹ Angelo and Cross do something similar, using a pros and cons grid that is then applied to a controversial thesis supplied by the instructor.²² The antique exercises in the *progymnasmata* that have developed from the *dissoi logoi* are far deeper and richer than anything I have read in modern education books. In light of this, it might be worth visiting or

revisiting them. Indeed, this idea of getting students out of their comfort zones and forcing them to take on a persona and argue against what they personally believe in, against their very values and subsequent attitudes, is a critical exercise that I believe all university students should engage in. In my classroom I get my socialist students to generate solid arguments as to why greed is good, my German students to argue why the National Socialist party of the 1920s and 30s produced some of the greatest orators of all time and my Barack Obama fans (of which there are many) to argue why Mitt Romney would have made a much better president both for the USA and the world. If the educated, and especially the intelligentsia of the student corps, are cognitively incapable of considering an alternative opinion in a classroom environment, without necessarily becoming persuaded by it, then who can? A university education is not about confirming who you are and why all the views you held before coming to university are virtuous, truthful and correct. It is about leaving your cognitive comfort zone and learning about what makes those people tick who happen to hold different views to the ones you hold.

In the earlier-mentioned *Engaging Ideas*, Bean suggests a number of innovative free-writing exercises to help students to think and write critically.²³ One example is writing stories from the perspective of another person (e.g. a student could write a poem from the perspective of an insomniac or a manic depressive). A second example is drawing on, or even creating, myths and parable to express or represent a contemporary situation (e.g. a student might use the fable of the hare and the tortoise to represent the economic development of the USA on the one hand and China on the other). A third example is writing essays from the perspective of different persons in history (e.g. a student might imagine he is Nelson Mandela and has been in prison for ten years; now he has to write a letter to the authorities arguing why his incarceration is unjust. Another exercise along these lines is to imagine you are a citizen in 17th century England and you have just read Milton's *Areopagitica* pamphlet, arguing for the freedom of unlicensed printing and you now respond with your own pamphlet arguing for limits on press freedom.²⁴ Similar creative free-writing exercises that Bean lists include writing a 'meeting of minds' dialogue where you bring together two people who hold opposite views.²⁵ Pairs might include Gandhi and Mussolini discussing the concept of personal freedom; Karl Marx and Jesus of Nazareth conversing on the ills of contemporary society or Homer and Homer Simpson deliberating on the virtues of travel, and in particular of island hopping in the Aegean. Using a heuristic Bean also advocates writing bio-poems on famous people. Examples he gives include Plato, Caesar, Osama Bin Laden and Rosa Parks.²⁶ Education scholars Angelo and Cross do something similar when they ask students to generate dialogues and argumentative scripts in role plays situations.

Invented dialogues provide rich information on student's ability to capture the essence of other people's personalities and style of expression - as well as on their understanding of theories, controversies and opinions of others. This technique provides a challenging way to assess - and to develop - students' skills at creativity synthesizing, adapting and even extrapolating beyond the material they have studied.²⁷

There are still other similar modern exercises like Brookfield and Preskills' circular response strategy and even, in some ways, Rogers' theory on empathic listening from the 1960s.²⁸

All of these are useful tools to enable teachers to facilitate a better quality of learning in the classroom, but none of them are wholly new. An educational system that several rhetoric teachers of the ancient Roman world used is known as the *progymnasmata* (loosely translated as ‘preliminary exercises’). This system entailed a series of rhetorical assignments that steadily grew in length and degree of difficulty. Usually, they employed a fourteen-level model. The students would start with something simple, like constructing and performing their own fable based on a traditional one. The assignments would then gradually get longer and more complex. The fourteenth and final assignment would often be something like writing and performing a defence speech and a prosecution speech in a court of law. So these boys, upon leaving the grammars schools and entering the rhetoric school, would be composing sample parts of orations, imitating famous speeches from history and mythology, recasting Aesop’s fables with contemporary political material, following and also diversifying from compositional heuristics in both speechmaking and writing and composing descriptions, invectives, encomia, confirmations, refutations, etc. They would do all this and much more. At least four ancient manuscripts that are devoted to varying versions of a *progymnasmata* pedagogical model have survived. The earliest is from the 1st century AD. The most complete of these was put together by Aphthonius who taught rhetoric in the city of Antioch around the 5th century AD. Once translated into Latin, these exercises became hugely popular in Europe during the Renaissance.²⁹ All the modern techniques mentioned above are in tangible ways related to the tasks of the rhetorical *progymnasmata* schools.³⁰ Once again I make the plea for a better knowledge of these ancient learning methods, as this will plausibly lead us to deploy models and strategies in our teaching that are more expansive and more thorough. We should, however, not follow any of these ancient models slavishly, as they will to a greater or lesser extent have become rigid and perhaps even redundant in some cases. Instead, we should blend and extend them, bringing in the relevant topics and using the appropriate technologies that are of our own time. It seems obvious to me that if this is done consciously and purposely; a deployed strategy, with an envisaged goal based on a sound rationale of previous experience, then this will be more beneficial than waiting for pedagogical inspiration to appear or simply flailing in the dark.

A final example, again from Bean, is that students need to use heuristics for exploratory writing that generate materials. This material might then develop into more formal arguments that may end up in a final draft of a paper.³¹ This is not a new idea at all; it is simply part of the first canon of rhetoric: invention. There have been several very detailed treatments of this ‘discovery stage’ of writing in antiquity. One of the most famous and most well-used heuristics was Aristotle’s notion of the common topics.³² A second popular and detailed heuristic of invention was stasis theory, said to have been developed by Hermagoras of Temnos in the 2nd century BCE. It was a system that was employed copiously in the later Roman law courts.³³ The ancients encouraged exploratory and free writing far more than is done so today. In short, and in summary of this section, there appears to be a wealth of educational material here just waiting to be rediscovered.

These strategies all seem to point in the direction of John Dewey’s idea that students need to engage with problems which evoke curiosity and that this leads to critical thinking and learning.³⁴ Contemporary books explain how critical thinking is a complex process of deliberation, which involves a wide range of skills and attitudes.³⁵ But if you look closely at

what critical thinking involves, you will see that it is essentially rhetorical pedagogy. For example, the ability to identify positions, arguments and conclusions has Aristotle's notion of enthymemic reasoning from his *Art of Rhetoric* embedded in it. The ability to evaluate evidence from alternative points of view, weighing opposing arguments fairly as you go, entails Protagoras' aforementioned notion of the *dissoi logo*, as well as the processes that take place in the first two canons of rhetoric: invention and arrangement. Presenting a point of view in a clear, well-reasoned, structured and convincing way contains strong elements of the third canon of 'style' blended with Aristotle's rhetorical notion of logos. Lastly, the skill to be able to reflect on an issue in a structured and logical way, while being open for the detection of fallacies and persuasive devices, comes close to Aristotle's ideas on both rhetorical and syllogistic reasoning.

Ken Bain, celebrated educationist and author of the best seller *What the Best College Teachers Do* informs us early on in his book that "highly effective teachers confront their students with intriguing, beautiful or important problems, authentic tasks that will challenge them to grapple with ideas, rethink their assumptions and examine their mental models of reality"³⁶. This message is then put into practice throughout the rest of his work. This claim of Bain's is very true, but I see nothing essentially new here that the sophists of Ancient Greece did not already say. Indeed the greatest practicing sophist of all time, Socrates, spent most of his adult life confronting people with intriguing tasks and then getting them to grapple with their ideas and rethink their assumptions. I am sure that Plato would not like to hear someone calling Socrates a sophist, but he most certainly was one, and there is nothing particularly wrong with that.³⁷

In light of this evidence, I think that it is reasonable for us to assume that a fair amount of what these days goes for critical thinking and effective speaking in the classroom has its roots in the educational models of antiquity; in rhetorical pedagogy, and that a conscious reassessment of these models will lead to an expansion of our current didactic possibilities.

IV

In this oration I am arguing for the implementation of what I term 'rhetorical pedagogy' across the board in first-year undergraduate education. I am not going to dictate a recipe that must be slavishly followed. Instead, I am merely going to show you the ingredients on the table; components that have been brought together by the scholars of 2,500 years of pedagogical learning. What I am doing is urging you to go out and search for additional ingredients and then decide what you are going to make and how you are going to make it. The gist of all this will be to encourage you to experiment in your own teaching.

Despite there being no prescription, we need to at least hypothetically consider what such a module might entail and who might teach it. Ideally, these courses would be taught by linguists, for it is linguists, and in particular applied and discourse linguistics, who are the logical and factual heirs of rhetorical pedagogy. Any module would ideally follow the coherent Ciceronian model of the five canons of rhetoric. In a fifteen-week semester, approximately the half the lessons would be spent on the first canon of rhetoric: invention.

Here, students will learn the joys of free writing and of generating materials to be used later in essays, while following heuristics that have perhaps been inspired by, or have taken their cues from, the common topics and/or stasis theory. Students will also explore the importance of intrinsic and extrinsic proofs, and learn about where they need to go and look in order to locate good, solid sources and arguments. They will study the three Aristotelian appeals: logos, ethos and pathos. They will learn how a person reasons deductively in rhetoric by means of the enthymeme and how one reasons inductively by means of the rhetorical example: examples drawn from fiction, history and analogy. They will learn all about invented and situated ethos as well as the power of pathos. Significantly, they will know how to detect fallacious reasoning both in their own discourse and that of others, and have the ability to rectify it through studious rhetorical-logical reasoning.

Next will come arrangement, the second canon, where students will learn standard models of discourse structure from antiquity, like, for example, the six-part system set out in the first century BCE treatise *Rhetorica ad Herennium* --- introduction, narrative, division, confirmation, refutation, conclusion.³⁸ Once students can show that they have internalized this kind of structural knowledge and can deploy it themselves, and also recognize it in the discourse of others through textual analysis, they can then start to experiment with all kinds of structural models, bearing in mind at all times that the *kairos* of a discourse situation will always determine what it is best to say, when, and in what order.

Afterwards will come the third canon: style. In addition to those key concepts of pragmatic usage, clarity and correctness, students will also learn to use appropriate discourse and register in fitting situations for the greatest rhetorical effect. They will also acquire knowledge about style figures, both schemes and tropes. They will learn how and why such figures deviate, either syntactically or semantically. They will also consciously appraise what persuasive effects such figures can have on a discourse. They will construct stylistic analyses on texts ranging from political speeches to poetry and finally they will reproduce their own stylized discourse, reproduce it consciously, knowing what techniques they are using, where, and why. It is here where rhetoric is at its closest to creative writing; a method of inventive discourse production based on the thoroughness of training, not on the serendipity of osmosis. Students will also analyze and indeed be capable of crafting digital, multimodal and pictorial rhetoric, for the rhetorician's toolbox has much to offer the digital age of humanities scholarship, especially when it comes to methodology.

Fourth and fifth will come memory and delivery together. This will take up the last few weeks of that 15-week module. Students will watch famous and effective speeches – and watch poor ones too. They will analyse what is happening both linguistically and para-linguistically, because it here where those other important persuasive factors come into play, facial expressions, posture, gestures, pitch, voice strength, intonation, aspiration, the use of pauses and the creation of a speaking persona that is somewhere on the cline between a person giving a simple presentation to someone acting. Students will finally compose their own speeches, drawing on all they have learned in the first three canons on generating materials, arranging and then stylizing them. Such a first year rhetoric and argumentation course does not have to look exactly like this, and indeed it should not, but if at all possible, it should involve some of these classical rhetorical phenomena.³⁹

Now some will say that teaching such speaking and thinking skills explicitly within a rhetoric course in a first-year foundation module is not the best method to teach skills. Instead, they should be imbedded in the content classes. This argument is not without its truths. However, it is almost always founded on a misconception and, furthermore, I believe that it is only part of what is needed. Let us first review the misconception. There are indeed universities in the world who have elected to explicitly teach skills like critical thinking and speaking, and even moral reasoning *across the curriculum*. These are pedagogically sound institutes of learning; universities that constantly pose questions like: “what do we do here?”, “why do we do it?”, and ultimately “what can we do to improve our students’ learning?” These institutions are also often new or small-scale liberal arts and sciences honors colleges. Places where young people go not to be trained for a profession, but to be schooled in how to think: think clearly, critically, ethically. To switch from a mainstream model of university education to this kind of pedagogical model requires a major overhaul in the mind-set of members of faculty and, if that does not work, regrettably in the faculty itself. Very few universities do this or indeed can do this. What usually happens is one of two scenarios. The first scenario most often occurs where an academic core or foundation core already exists. Here, either owing to budgetary restrictions and/or the desire of major departments to offer more content based modules, the academic core gets eaten up. In the second and most common scenario a large traditional university is undergoing a fiscal restructuring, but also has to improve its teaching methods because students are either not being taught well or are hanging around too long in the institution and not finishing their degrees on time. Here, a university will announce that instead of activating a real academic core that explicitly teaches critical speaking, writing and thinking skills, these will now be embedded in all courses. It is a very inexpensive way to solve a costly problem. But is the problem really solved? This is the misconception. Let us imagine for a moment that I am a sociology instructor and I teach a 12-week, second-year module on Durkheim and Marx. I have never taught academic writing, though I once took a course in it forty years ago as a student, and I have neither taught nor have explicitly been taught public speaking or critical reasoning or indeed any kind of informal logic in my life. Not only do I now have to teach and monitor these skills in my students, I also have to get rid of some of my existing course content in order to facilitate, what I, in my hypothetical role, will see as ‘non-academic’ activities, which I should not even be teaching in the first place. In the vast majority of cases, this idea of a non-thought-through, non-funded, non-taught ‘critical speaking and reasoning across the curriculum’ is a non-starter. Bureaucrats will say it exists and on the university advertising literature it most certainly will state this. But in reality it is illusory: an exercise in pedagogical cosmetics that will not only continue to disenfranchise students, but will, in all likelihood, demoralize the teaching faculty as well.

In addition to this being a misconception, I also said that it was only part of the solution. Ideally, if governments were to realize that funding education is essential for any nation with aspirations, students would be explicitly taught rhetoric and argumentation courses in first-year foundation modules and then these skills will be merely ‘refreshed’ in the first few weeks of any content module, and then applied throughout using problem-based learning by the teacher who is doing the content in the major. This, however, requires both funding and vision; the government says it does not have the former, and there are many in

education who feel it is implausible that it possess the latter ... And there is the problem in a nutshell: *voor een dubbeltje op de eerste rij*. We are a country of export: we sell cheese and vegetables, we sell gas and oil and we sell flower bulbs and light bulbs, but I would argue that this all pales into insignificance compared with what the Netherlands really has to offer both Europe and the world; her most precious commodity of all: the brains of her Dutch youth. In a time when higher education, and especially my faculty, the humanities, is increasingly under attack, now is the moment to invest in those skills of learning and of life. As Derek Bok, the former president of Harvard has argued, if you think education is expensive, try ignorance.⁴⁰ We need young people who can think: think both rationally and creativity, depending on the situation at hand, and we need those same people to be excellent communicators in Dutch and in English, in both spoken and written forms.

A call for a re-appreciation of rhetoric fits well into the times for she is a core humanities subject, and the humanities, as we all know, are under intense pressure right now, pressure that is as misplaced as it is misdirected. How useful are you to society? How is your research going to generate money to increase this country's GDP? In many cases these are incongruous questions, because they come from the discourse of science and engineering, posed by auditors, bookkeepers and accountants. I doubt whether Aristotle or Cicero or Erasmus had to worry about their impact factors. Indeed, if the likes of Erasmus had to worry about who was citing him, then there might not have been a second edition of *In Praise of Folly* and I certainly would not be using the works of all three of these scholars in my first year undergraduate course in Middelburg, works like *The Art of Rhetoric*, *De Inventione* and *De Copia* to facilitate the learning of my students.⁴¹ The fact of the matter is that "impact" in the humanities is often a *sustained diachronic* matter, not an *immediate synchronic* one. You cannot measure it in a five or ten year period and perhaps you might never be able to measure it at all no matter how long you wait. In the humanities, unlike elsewhere, not everything that counts is necessarily countable.

We have to be able to educate young people without being editorial; to be rhetorical without being retributive and to be critical thinkers with being criticizing speakers. We need to be able to act and think meta-cognitively and ask ourselves every day of our teaching lives are we still fanning the flames of learning or have we taken to filling the bucket, to evoke an adage that goes back to the days of Aristotle and Socrates. It is all too easy to slip back in old ways. Teaching puffs up the ego and some of us will find it difficult to settle for being 'the guide on the side' when you can continue being 'the sage on the stage'.⁴²

Does this sound familiar? It happens all over the world. The lecturer stands in the great auditorium and reads his same old notes, with the same jaded anecdotes, over and over again; semester in, semester out; year in, year out. The institution encourages this by allowing only limited time and budget for small workshop groups and the resulting active learning to exist and by allowing students to re-sit exam what seems like indefinitely. Students comply by not turning up for lectures or if they do by not really paying attention to what is going on. In this everyday pedagogical scenario there is a kind of clandestine pact between teachers, students and higher educational institutions not to engage in learning at all, but rather to hide behind the smoke screens of testability, grading and numbers. I contend that the history of university lecturing in auditoria has not been primarily about learning at all, but about a blend of acting, stenography and mnemonics. The lecturer plays his dramatic role, those students who are

bothering to listen copy the words of the sage on the stage verbatim, as a good stenographer should, and then they memorize and reproduce those words as closely to the original as possible in an exam setting ... to subsequently forget about them immediately after the exam, forever. Through the misuse in the system these young people become poor students and poor thinkers, but the good news is that they are all excellent stenographers; just what a country needs. What we must ask ourselves is just what has this ill-fated spectacle got to do with learning? The desire of the youth to work hard at university and succeed is not some kind of degenerate distortion. Students must be encouraged by us to break out of their cultural bonds, and rhetorical pedagogy can help them to do this. Although this a global educational problem, we must do our bit here too, so I call on all undergraduate students, both in my own college and throughout the university: *Durf je hoofd boven het maaiveld te steken, Wees regelmatig een hoge boom die veel wind vangt; Doe nooit normal of gewoon, want het zijn de anderen die gek zijn, niet jij.*

The idea of building a good communicating, critical youth for the future is as old as liberal education itself ... From Isocrates and Quintilian on to Newman and Dewey. In his seminal work on education *The Idea of a University* written in 1852 Newman concludes that if we are to ascribe some kind of practical aspect to university education, then it should be that universities train young people to be good and useful members of society.⁴³

It is the education which gives a man a clear, conscious view of his own opinions and judgements, a truth in developing them, an eloquence in expressing them, and a force in urging them. It teaches him to see things as they are, to go right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought to detect what is sophistical and to discard what is irrelevant.⁴⁴

Newman knew the value of learning in the university setting, and what he pleads for here is nothing less than a deployment of pure rhetorical pedagogy.

V

Let us finally examine why it is advantageous for a state to poses a critical citizenry. It seems to me self-evident that a confident State, with a listening ear, will appreciate a young and dynamic citizenry that can communicate clearly in written and spoken form and can think critically in situations both at university and perhaps more importantly after university in everyday life: in the home, in the workplace, in the community. Ordinarily, any thesis of this nature would now have to move forward and argue why such an educated citizenry is needed. I could take this as self-evident in a liberal democracy like the Netherlands, grounded as it is in the rich tradition of the Enlightenment with its principles of freedom of speech, tolerance and respect. Tertiary education does not, or should not, stupefy and make docile the student corps, as might happen elsewhere in more repressive states, rather it should invigorate and empower it, as happens here, albeit not as frequently as it perhaps should be.

These days governments tell us that good citizens keep the space in front of their houses clean, they pick up litter in the streets, they don't make too much noise in the evenings, they say good morning, good afternoon, and good evening to their neighbours when they meet them in the street. These are all admittedly valuable social acts that will probably lead to a better quality of public life for people in local communities, but they are all top-down accounts of citizenship that in some ways produce a happy, yet docile citizenship; civic marijuana for the masses. I believe fervently that rhetoric, in its pedagogical form, can help create an intellectual citizenry; a citizenry that thinks critically and speaks credibly, a citizenry that can hold those in power to account so that they can no longer get away with flawed logic and fallacious reasoning, a citizenry that by engaging in critical dialogues can make democracy function more optimally than it currently does in many democratic states. Democratic governments need their citizens to be guard dogs, not lap dogs. I believe further that in a democracy extremists must be heard, not silenced. They have a right to put forward their beliefs, no matter how morally repugnant or anti-humanistic we may feel they are or indeed they may be: as we have learned Protagoras has bequeathed us the *dissoi logoi*, the idea that we should generate countervailing argument on both sides of an issue in order to appraise them critically. In democratic states we must be able to argue without being argumentative. What we should do in response to such extreme propositions is explore them, probing them for contradiction and fuzzy thinking. Once those Aristotelian rhetorical tools of logos, ethos and pathos have been brought to bear on such opinions, we should then bring to light the very fallaciousness of such arguments for the speaker and his/her hearers to appraise and digest. Only this way can belief change take place. I know too that this is not an easy task. Oh, were it that but all men were persuaded by logical, rational reasoning, the world would be simpler and more honest place. Psychological and linguistic models of communication, however, have shown us that it is not reason that primarily persuades us but emotion. Take, for example, the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion, which has shown us how central, critical thinking is unavoidably but a seldom event; an episode constrained by intellectual capacity and motivation and the simple fact that even if we are intelligent and motivated we just cannot think in this active, central way all the time. The physicality of our brains just does not allow for it. The reality is that most of our discourse processing must be necessarily peripheral. It must unavoidably bypass core critical thalamic and hippocampal processing and strike at the heart of the amygdaloidal sub-cortical emotive processing areas. Such 'cognitive shortcuts', as psychologists refer to them, are the very stuff of Aristotelian pathos⁴⁵.

I believe that, just like in most of the best undergraduate colleges in the USA, all humanities and indeed all social sciences first-year undergraduate students here in The Netherlands should be explicitly taught a course on rhetoric and argumentation; a course that overtly trains critical thinking skills and hones written and spoken communication in both Dutch and English, for this will not only empower them to be better students in their undergraduate and graduates lives, but it will also allow them to become better individuals in their communities, better representatives of our Dutch nation and better human beings in life itself. Imagine that we had in this country lawyers and judges and politicians and journalists who had explicitly been taught critical thinking, rhetoric and communication skills. What a different world that would be. In that world when a far right-wing politician stands up and

makes yet another explicit argument based on flawed analogical reasoning that one of the great monotheistic holy books is akin to *Mein Kampf* someone can then stand up and say, that is all very good and well, but on what grounds is this analogical argument based: show me the many points of similarity that there are; let us systematically explore together the numerous points of difference and then when we are done let us do the same for those other great monotheistic holy books with regard to this particular analogical argument, because perhaps they are not that different in this respect. This is how such irrational and contrived fear appeals, produced all too regularly by those in power, can be held up to the light: by employing critical, rhetorical reasoning.

In the ancient world, law students and those interested in a role in politics made up the majority of pupils who took rhetoric classes. The ancients thought it was important that these young people, who will be running the country in the future, had at least the skills to reason through problems, articulate them in a lucid manner and reflect critically on their own moral and ethical thinking. We no longer really think this. In order to be a good lawyer or economist or politician you should preferably avoid modules at university like critical thinking or moral reasoning like the plague. These days law students have a moot court; if they are lucky. It is often an add-on course worth perhaps one or two credit points, while in law debating societies members are taught how to prepare random debate topics within five minutes and then perform aggressively to win the day. I am sure that these testosterone tests do hone certain skills, those of thinking on your feet, bluffing your way and continuous talking, but an equitable world is going to need much more than such temporal vacuity, if it is going to be served effectively for the benefit of the many, rather than the few.

Some people I hear speaking on the television or that I read about in newspapers appear surprised that Western banks and insurance institutions run by some of the supposedly best educated people in the world could pursue such amoral strategies in the last ten year or so that have consciously and deliberately resulted in the further impoverishment the world's poor, with no application of either critical or ethical reflection or reasoning. I am not surprised at all. These bankers are essentially morally bankrupt, they are ethically insolvent individuals. But one can argue that it is not their fault, for how can a person apply at will what one has never explicitly been taught at university, what one has never conscientiously learned and what one has never systematically been trained in or has not been given the opportunity to practice in a classroom setting. Critical thinking, speaking and writing abilities are not innate. Isocrates, Cicero and Quintilian could all tell you this. What is needed is instruction in theory, coupled with practice and further exercises in analysis, imitation and paraphrase. This is what is required. This is rhetorical pedagogy.

A *kennis maatschappij* (or 'knowledge society') like the Netherlands is, and wishes to remain, is all good and well, but I would argue that what the Netherlands needs now is an edge - and that edge is not going to be gained by merely 'knowing stuff'. The history of European higher education has been largely grounded in 'knowing stuff' (and then memorizing that same stuff to be repeated at certain later moments, like during exams or meetings). That is not learning; that is the antithesis of learning; a troika conspiracy by the institution, the teacher and the student not to engage in any learning whatsoever for fear of some misplaced embarrassment. All are guilty in this conspiracy of dunces: the students, the universities, but perhaps most of all, we the teachers. Young Dutch men and women need

more than knowledge, they also need transferable skills; the ability to speak well and think both critically and ethically in future real-life situations: whether that be in government, in business, in education or in many other social domains. The only hope of achieving this is by explicitly teaching such skills and by allowing students to practicing them in a safe classroom environment: knowledge, followed by practice and thereafter by application in the real world. This is the three-step vision of how things should be is not mine. It was espoused by Quintilian and by Isocrates before him; both professors and teachers of rhetoric and the founding fathers of the liberal arts tradition.

Rhetoric is a powerful tool. Plato was worried about rhetoric --- and his reservations were not unfounded. Once you have the power to move men's minds and change their opinions, you must do so for the right reasons. What 'right' actually means here will be heavily dependent on the context of the discourse situation; in effect the *kairos* of the rhetorical setting. As Quintilian writes,⁴⁶

I am prosing to educate the perfect orator, who cannot exist except in the person of the good man. We therefore demand of him not only exceptional powers of speech, but all the virtues of character as well. I cannot agree that the principle of upright and honorable living, as some have held, be left to the philosophers. The man who can really play his part as a citizen, who is fit for the management of public and private business, and who can guide cities by his counsel, give them a firm basis by his laws, and put them right by his judgements, is surely no other than our orator."

Quintilian defines the orator here as not only being a *dicendi peritus* (a skilled speaker) but crucially as a *vir bonus* (a good man). This moral orator, this 'good man speaking' (or indeed 'good woman speaking'), is the person we need in the university classrooms of today, both in the guise of instructor and student. Franklin D. Roosevelt once famously said that although we cannot always build the future for our youth, we can build our youth for the future; and it is this message that has become the motto of my college, Roosevelt Academy: *iuventutem futuro aedificare* ... 'building our youth for the future' or, if you will, 'shaping an intellectually critical citizenry', the subtitle of this oration on rhetorical pedagogy.⁴⁷

VI

With my chair of rhetoric a solid tradition is being reinstated in at Utrecht University. This fine academic institution has had some distinguished professors in this field in the distant past. Take for instance Dr. M. Schook appointed professor of eloquence and literature in 1638 or Dr. D. Berckringer appointed in 1640 as professor of practical philosophy and eloquence or Dr. P. Burman appointed professor of history and eloquence in 1696 or Dr. J. F. Reitz appointed professor of oratory and poetry in 1745 or finally, Dr. C. Saxe appointed professor of eloquence and history in 1752. The last four of these by the way went on to serve the university in the post of *rector magnificus*, so they were far from intellectual lightweights, and

their shared field of rhetoric was far from peripheral to student learning, indeed one might contend that it was central.⁴⁸

My chair is one of education (*een profileeringshoogleraar met toegespitste leeropdracht in onderwijs*), a teaching professor, but there will be many opportunities for research too that I will pursue in the coming years. The notion of a ‘critical citizenship’ ties in perfectly with rhetorical pedagogy. This idea of ‘rhetorical citizenship’ is what I intend to explore and test empirically in the coming years together with the people in my research team. The idea of rhetorical pedagogy also fits within the framework of three of the four strategic themes set out by our university for research in the coming years: ‘youth and identity’, which is at the very heart of undergraduate education, ‘sustainability’ when it comes to educational and intellectual durability, and lastly, ‘institutes’ in the sense of how does the university prepare its students for citizenship, and why – and how does it go about achieving that in terms of learning goals and general programme outcomes.

At Roosevelt Academy I have spent almost eight years as head of the department and almost five years as the director of the RA teaching and learning center. Despite this, I still have a lot to learn about learning. My credo though is that my students will be better than I am --- Better thinkers, better learners, better teachers, better academics, better intellectuals, better researchers, better citizens, better people. In fact, I’m proud to say that some of them already are. Could there be a more fitting epitaph for any teacher than to say “I helped my students to achieve more than I could”.

This is why we do what we do. This is what higher education can be. This is why learning matters.

Today, the 23rd of January, is an auspicious day, because of two important events. The first is that on this day in 1579, 434 years ago, the ‘Union of Utrecht’ treaty was signed in this very hall of what used to be the chapter house of the cathedral. That agreement unified the largely northern provinces of the Netherlands, which until then had been under the control of Habsburg Spain. It was signed by the provinces of Holland, Groningen, most of Utrecht and yes, by Zeeland too. She was less stubborn in those days. It is seen by many historians as the foundation of the Republic of the Seven United Provinces. It is not with a touch of irony that I read recently that this new government seeks to abolish the old provinces of Zeeland, Holland and Utrecht, and the others, and in their stead set up larger conglomerates with such romantic names as ‘north’, ‘north-west’, ‘south-west’, etc. I am no nationalist, but the administrative savings that there are to be made must be insignificant compared to the injury it will do to local democracy and local identity, not to mention history and culture. It is my aim to become a Dutch citizen in the course of this year, for The Netherlands have been kind beyond expectation to me, and within them I have found a true home. I am confident that the country I will be joining will still be made up of its twelve proud and ancient provinces for many years to come.

The second important event, perhaps less significant than the founding of the Netherlands, but nonetheless important for both Zeeland and Utrecht, is the fact that today is also the dies natalis of the Roosevelt Academy, founded in 2004, which as of today will no longer be known by that name but as 'University College Roosevelt' (UCR). UCR is the second liberal and sciences honors college of Utrecht University after University College Utrecht (UCU). About ten years ago I left the English department here --- and UCU, where I also taught --- to go and work in Middelburg. The founding Dean of UCU and of RA Prof. dr. Hans Adriaansens is one of two people to whom I will forever be grateful. He employed me, promoted me, took me to places like Harvard and Smith College in Massachusetts, where I observed how good classroom learning functioned. I took copious notes and learned a lot about learning and about myself; a linguist who found himself morphing into an educator. Hans also proposed this chair of rhetoric, which was then supported by the interim Dean of RA Prof. dr. Willem Hendrik Gispen, to whom I will also be infinitely grateful. Hans and I didn't always see eye to eye, but there is nothing wrong with that as every critical thinker will know. When it comes to tertiary schooling, he is a visionary who understands higher education and the value of students and their learning like no other. It is also his birthday today. Gefeliciteerd, Hans. The second person to whom I will forever be grateful is Prof. dr. Peter Verdonk, emeritus professor of stylistics at the University of Amsterdam. Peter introduced me to stylistics and in doing so to the pedagogical rhetoric of Quintilian. He taught me as an undergraduate student and went on to become one of my PhD thesis supervisors, together with Professor dr. John Neubauer. Without his guidance and gentle persuasion little of what I have accomplished would have been possible. Thank you, Peter.

I would like to thank my colleagues and indeed my students past and present from Roosevelt Academy, many of whom have travelled up from Middelburg today, for their constant intellectual inspiration. Several people are here from my own academic core department; a department I had the privilege to lead for almost eight years. I would particularly like to thank the current RA Dean, Professor dr. Barbara Oomen for her advice, support and encouragement. I am also a professor in the humanities faculty here in Utrecht and I am grateful to the Dean, Professor dr. Wiljan van den Akker for being so welcoming and for his sound advice already on a number of matters. I look forward to working closely with my colleagues in the linguistics research school UiL-OTS. It is an honor beyond articulation to be joining such a learned body of men and women that make up the professorial corps of the humanities faculty of Utrecht University. Ik beloof hard te werken en een goed collega te zijn.

In the audience today are also several members of the International Poetics and Linguistics Association (PALA) many of whom I have known since the 1990s. They have come from universities in England, Scotland and Spain and several of them are full professors themselves. PALA is an academic association like no other. I was elected chair in 2009 and served as its president for three years. It was a truly wonderful time. PALA is a place where young talent is nurtured, and long may that continue. I can predict with great certainty that I, and indeed many of my students, past, present and future, will be active members of PALA for many years to come. I also thank my colleagues in the newly founded Rhetoric Society of

Europe of which I am the secretary for their constant inspiration: our shared goal, to help others in Europe rediscover rhetoric.

I have two families one Dutch and one English which have become one. Thank you Doris and Oda - and thank you Mother, Andrew, Kyle and Julie. I wish my father were here now to see what has become of his son. I think he'd approve. There are two people though who will be mentioned last for a reason. The first is my two-year old daughter Louisa, who is waiting for me with her aunt in an adjacent room. It is for the best, believe me. Admittedly, she slows down my research and she eats into my teaching preparation and correction time, but I do get to become an expert in the life and times of Shawn the Sheep, not to mention The Gruffallo, Nijntje and Floddertje. All more than worthwhile, I can assure you. Finally, I address Helle, my wife, an amazing academic (an archaeologist and ancient art historian) and perhaps more important than that, a great teacher too. She thankfully also works in Middelburg. Helle is an accomplished critical rhetorician herself; a natural. On those long summer Zeeland evenings, when Louisa is tucked up in bed, we sit out in the back garden at home in the Nieuwstraat in Middelburg and we deliberate until the night has wrapped itself around us, on the merits of life, of love and of learning. Wat is er nog meer?

Ik heb gezegd

Notes

¹ Marrou's argument from the 1950s that "the history of education in antiquity is not without relevance to our modern culture ..." still rings true more than fifty years after it was written. Henri I. Marrou. *A History of Education in Antiquity*. [New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956], xi.

² Although less influential than his contemporary, Isocrates was the one who educated the democratic men of fourth-century Athens, not Plato. As Cicero puts it "Then behold, there arose Isocrates, the master of all rhetoricians, from whose school, as from the horse of troy, none but leaders emerged. *De Oratore. Books I and II*. Loeb Classical Library. Trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham. [Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1922], II, xxii, 94. A cogent case has recently been made by Muir that Isocrates should be reappraised for his role, not only as the founding father of the liberal arts and sciences, but also as a key educational theorist. James R. Muir. "Is our History of Educational Philosophy mostly Wrong? The Case of Isocrates." *Theory and Research in Education*. Vol. 3, No.2 [July 2005]: 165-195. For a response, see Charles Marsh. "Millennia of Discord: The Controversial Educational Program of Isocrates", *Theory and Research in Education* Vol. 8, No. 3 [November 2010]: 289-303.

³ This course, which will employ the central precepts of rhetorical pedagogy, would be called something like 'an introduction to rhetoric and argumentation'.

⁴ These works include *Gorgias, Protagoras and Phaedrus*.

⁵ This is taken from the 9th edition edited by D. Thompson, [Clarendon Press, Oxford], 1181. (Original editors (1911) H. W. Fowler and H.G. Fowler).

⁶ Within a classroom context, this has arguably been led by Sharon Crowley with her article "A Plea for the Revival of Sophistry." *Rhetoric Review* 7 (1989): 318-334.

⁷ Cicero, on discussing when he first read Plato's *Gorgias* observes "... and what impressed me most deeply about Plato in that book was, that it was when making fun of orators that he himself seemed to me to be the consummate orator". *De Oratore.*, I xi, 47.

⁸ Aristotle. *The Art of Rhetoric*. Loeb Classical Library. Trans. J. H. Freese, [Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1926], Book I, ii.

⁹ The Greek word used for such an 'art' is *techne*.

¹⁰ Etymologically, the English noun 'rhetoric' is derived from the Greek word *rhēma*, meaning 'a word' which is ultimately derived from the Greek verb *eirō*, meaning "I say".

¹¹ On the matter of nature and nurture Isocrates wrote "For ability, whether in speech or in any other activity, is found by those who are well-endowed by nature and have been schooled by practical experience. Formal training makes such men more skillful and more resourceful in discovering the possibilities of a subject; for it teaches them to take from a readier source the topics which they otherwise hit upon in haphazard fashion. But it cannot fully fashion men who are without natural aptitude into good debaters or writers, although it is capable of leading them on to self-improvement and to a greater degree of intelligence on many subjects. Isocrates. *Volume II*. "Against the Sophists" (Loeb Classical Library). Trans. George Norlin. [Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000] 15.

¹² John C. Bean., *Engaging Ideas: The Professor's Guide to Integrating Writing, Critical Thinking and Active Learning in the Classroom*. (2nd Ed). [San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2011].

¹³ Chapter 3, 39-51

¹⁴ This list occurs on page 40.

¹⁵ Quintilian. *The Orator's Education*. Books III-V (Loeb Classical Library), Trans. D. A. Russell. [Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001], Book 4. 1, 52-53.

¹⁶ Both terms 'situated' ethos and 'invented' ethos are taken from Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee, *Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students*. 5th ed. [New York: Pearson Education, 2012], 151-164.

¹⁷ *De Inventione* (Loeb Classical Library). Trans. H. M. Hubbell. [Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1976]. I. 20.

¹⁸ *The Orator's Education*, Book 2.13, ii.

¹⁹ Perhaps Protagoras with his famous dictum that 'man is the measure of all things' might even be considered the father of relativism.

²⁰ It is Quintilian who describes these exercises of refutation and confirmation (Book II . iv. 18-19)

²¹ Peter Elbow. *Writing without Teachers*. [New York: Oxford University Press, 1973] and *Embracing Contraries: Explorations in Learning and Teaching*. [New York: Oxford University Press, 1986].

²² Thomas A. Angelo, and K. Patricia Cross. *Classroom Assessment Techniques: A Handbook for College Teachers*. [San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993], 168-171.

²³ Bean. *Engaging Ideas* 118-119.

²⁴ Milton's *Areopagitica* (1644) is named after Isocrates' pamphlet 'Areopagiticus' from the fourth century BCE. John Milton *Areopagitica and On Education*. ed. G. H. Sabine. [Crofts' Classics, Wheeling, Ill: Harlan Davidson Inc. See also *Areopagiticus: Isocrates Volume II*. (Loeb Classical Library). Trans. George Norlin. [Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000].

²⁵ Bean. *Engaging Ideas*, 136.

²⁶ Bean. *Engaging Ideas*, 137.

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- ²⁷Angelo and Cross. *Classroom Assessment Techniques*, 203, (Invented Dialogues: ‘Purpose’ section).
- ²⁸Stephen D. Brookfield and S. Preskill, *Discussion as a way of Teaching: Tools and Techniques for Democratic Classrooms*. (2nd ed.) [San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005] and Carl R. Rogers *On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy*. [Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961].
- ²⁹ Much of this popularity was undoubtedly also due to their continued use in Greek speaking the Byzantine Empire.
- ³⁰ For an overview see George A. Kennedy. *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* [Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003].
- ³¹ Bean. *Engaging Ideas*, 138.
- ³² This was essentially a three-step procedure of conjecture, degree and possibility: (i) whether a thing had occurred or not or will occur or not; (ii) whether that thing is greater or smaller than anything else, and (iii) what is and what is not possible.
- ³³ This entailed a four-part procedure of conjecture, definition, quality and policy: (i) does something exist and/or did it happen? (ii) what kind of thing is it?, (iii) What is the value of the thing (is it right or wrong)?, and (iv) what should be done? It is Cicero who mentions that Hermagoras invented the stases. *De Inventione*. I. 8.
- ³⁴ John Dewey. *Democracy and Education*. [New York: Macmillan, 1916].
- ³⁵ See, for example, Stella Cottrell *Critical Thinking Skills*. [London: Palgrave, 2005], 2.
- ³⁶ Ken Bain *What the Best College Teachers Do*. [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004]. 18.
- ³⁷ See, for example, C. C. W. Taylor “Socrates the Sophist”, in Lindsay Judson & V. Karasmanēs (eds.), *Remembering Socrates: Philosophical Essays*. Oxford University Press (2006).
- ³⁸[Cicero]. *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*. (Loeb Classical Library). Trans. Harry Caplan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1977]. This work is ascribed to Cicero, as it was long thought that he wrote it as a young man. Scholars now agree that Cicero cannot be the author. In absence of a real author, it is sometimes referred to as ‘pseudo Cicero’ or simply ‘Anonymous’. It is still, however, often logged in bibliographies using Cicero’s name but in square brackets, as has been done here, to indicate that he is not likely to be the real author.
- ³⁹ The course I describe here I designed back in the spring of 2004 for the maiden semester of Roosevelt Academy. Together with my colleagues we have taught it several times every semester since, tweaking it and improving it every summer. Since fall 2004 many very hard working and grateful liberal arts and science students have taken it and hopefully many are still benefitting from the thinking, writing and speaking skills they learned there.
- ⁴⁰ See, for example, Bok’s works *Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization of Higher Education*. [Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2003] and especially *Our Underachieving Colleges. A Candid Look at how much Students Learn and Why they should be Learning More*. [Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2007].
- ⁴¹ Desiderius Erasmus. *On Copia of Words and Ideas (De Duplici Copia Verborum Acrerum)*. Ed and trans. Donald B. King and H. David Rix. [Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1963].
- ⁴² These terms come from Alison King “From Sage on Stage to Guide on Side,” *College Teaching* 41.1. (Winter 1993).
- ⁴³ John Henry Newman, *The Uses of Knowledge*. ed. L. L. Ward. [Crofts’ Classics. Wheeling, Ill: Harlan Davidson Inc, 1948].
- ⁴⁴ From Discourse VII “Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Professional Skill”, Section 10.
- ⁴⁵ Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo. “The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 19. [1986]: 123-162.
- ⁴⁶ Quintilian. *The Orator’s Education. Books I-II* (Loeb Classical Library), Trans. D. A. Russell. [Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001], I. *Prooemium*, ii.
- ⁴⁷ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Address at University of Pennsylvania," September 20, 1940. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15860>.
- ⁴⁸ Source “*Catalogus Professorum*” <http://profs.library.uu.nl>

Curriculum Vitae

Michael Burke (born in 1964 in Bacup, Lancashire) studied English language and literature at the University of Amsterdam. He went on to teach linguistics, discourse studies and stylistics in the English departments at Utrecht University and the Free University Amsterdam. He also taught in the Academic Core department at University College Utrecht. He earned his doctorate from the University of Amsterdam in 2008. Since 2004 he has taught rhetoric at all levels at Roosevelt Academy in Middelburg, one of the two liberal arts and sciences undergraduate honors colleges of Utrecht University. He has also held a number of administrative posts in Middelburg, including Head of the Academic Core department (2005-2012) and Director of the Teaching and Learning Center (2008-2012). He is currently the Chair of the College Board of Examiners at Roosevelt Academy, where he also still teaches lots of rhetoric modules, including many first-year introductory rhetoric courses, which he likes doing a lot. He is a former president of the International Poetics and Linguistics Association (PALA) 2009-2012 and is the current secretary of the Rhetoric Society of Europe. He is a Routledge Series Editor in Linguistics (rhetoric and stylistics) and an Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Glasgow. He holds both senior teaching and research university qualifications from Utrecht University. He has given several international keynote and plenary addresses and his publications include: *Literary Reading, Cognition and Emotion: An Exploration of the Oceanic Mind*. New York: Routledge, 2011; *Pedagogical Stylistics: Current trends in language, literature and ELT*. eds. (Burke, Csabi, Zerkowitz and Week) London: Continuum Press (2012) and 'Advertising Aristotle: A Preliminary Investigation into the Contemporary Relevance of Aristotle's Art of Rhetoric', *Foundations of Science*, Springer, 13/3, 2008. He is currently preparing a book on rhetoric, due out in 2014, and is editing a handbook on stylistics, also due out in 2014 (both Routledge). He is married to Helle, a classical archeologist and ancient art historian, who also teaches at Roosevelt Academy, and they have a two-year old daughter, Louisa, who is very fond of Shaun the Sheep. They all live in Middelburg.