

Negotiating Urban Citizenship

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The Urban Poor, Brokers and the State in Mexico City and Khartoum

*Onderhandelen over Stedelijk Burgerschap:
Stedelijke Armen, Tussenpersonen en de Staat in Mexico City en Khartoum
(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)*

*Negociando la Ciudadanía Urbana:
Los Pobres Urbanos, Intermediarios y el Estado en la Ciudad de México y Khartoum
(con un resumen en español)*

التفاوض على المواطنة الحضرية:
فقراء الحضر ، الوسطاء ، والدولة في كل من ميكسكو سيتي والخرطوم
(مع ملخص باللغة العربية)

Proefschrift

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Institutions are shaped through human interaction. Although this might seem an obvious truth, my awareness of it increased during my years as a civil servant. It was this growing awareness that led me, a political scientist with a specialisation in international relations, to become increasingly interested in political sociology. This book is the result of my search for understanding political agency and socio-political interaction in relation to one of the greatest problems of our times: the profound inequalities between people, and particularly in urban contexts. During this search, I realized that like institutions, doctoral dissertations evolve in interaction: this book would not be possible without the support of numerous inspiring persons from places all around the world. This study started in 2007 and took me from The Hague to Utrecht, Mexico City, Khartoum and Berlin. In all these places, I have more people to thank than I could possibly mention.

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During this journey, I have been a researcher, a policy maker and a diplomat. I was driven into this project not only by academic curiosity, but also by the search for better ways to reduce poverty and exclusion. With this project, I have felt accountable to the academic and policy worlds, both of which I consider myself part. It was a continuous challenge to keep the balance. The question that respondents asked me, about what it would bring them to participate in my study, has always accompanied me during the various stages of this research project. I have not included concrete policy recommendations in this book because I have not investigated or evaluated concrete policies. With this study I aim to provide empirical evidence that can contribute to a fruitful debate about future policies in the fields of poverty reduction, governance and urbanization. To my respondents I would also like to say that I hope you can derive something from the mirror that I present you with as an outside observer, which might contribute to the shaping of your own political agency. I hope we continue this conversation. Naturally however, the responsibility for all that is written in this book remains fully mine.

Prologue

Mexico City, 26 June 2008: “We are merchants, not criminals”. These words mark the banners of the protestors on Mexico City’s central square (Zócalo). Hundreds of merchants from the “El Salado” market in Iztapalapa have come in busses to protest against the government operations in their market. A month earlier, the authorities had entered the market with more than 500 police officers to check the licences of the merchants and forcing them to register.¹ The authorities claimed that around eighty percent of the merchandise was stolen or pirated, including stolen car parts and even weapons.² Merchants claimed their right to work. Although the Department of Public Security’s main reason for the operation was to promote security in the area, that of the local government was “to break with the corporativism that ruled the market and to have the merchants pay taxes to the government instead of fees to their local leaders”.³

Khartoum, 8 May 2008: dozens of army vehicles entered the squatter area of Soba Aradi to relocate the population without prior notice. Riots broke out in the neighbourhood as the residents refused to mount the vehicles. After a police officer posted in the area accidentally shot a child, the police office was set on fire by an angry crowd, killing at least eight police officers. Twenty-four people died because of the riots, and many were held in prison without due process. Public outrage particularly turned against the popular committee in the neighbourhood, with the official body of citizen representation seen as complicit in the government relocation plan.⁴

These stories about the interaction between governments and the urban poor in two megacities across the globe illustrate a few issues that are central to this study. First, the lives of the urban poor are often characterised by informality, whether in relation to work or housing. Second, as a result of this informal and often semi-legal existence, the poor cannot easily claim their rights. Third, local leaders play a pivotal role in mediating between governments and the urban poor. The present study is essentially concerned with how the claim making of the urban poor unfolds as part of the dynamics of state-society relations in a global context of liberalisation, rapid urbanisation and informalisation. Although I recognise that informalisation is by no means limited to a segment of the population, namely the urban poor, I argue that the ways in which the urban poor shape political agency is marked by the informality that deeply penetrates their lives. This study aims to contribute to the understanding of struggles for citizenship in megacities around the world as these cities, which are rapidly increasing in numbers, are increasingly important points of reference for our understanding of the evolution of democracy and citizenship worldwide.

1 La Jornada, “Chocan policías y comerciantes en el tianguis de El Salado; 12 detenidos”, 8 May 2008.

2 La Jornada, “El tianguis de El Salado, tierra sin ley”, Saturday 28th April 2007

3 La Jornada, “Hoy vence el plazo para que comerciantes aseguren un lugar en el tianguis El Salado”, 21 May 2008.

4 Interview UN-habitat, December 2010

1. The Challenges of Urban Citizenship

The year 2007 marked the point in history when the world started to be predominantly urban, with half of the urban population in the world living in cities. Furthermore, all figures and projections on population growth confirm that this proportion will continue to increase. Cities have absorbed almost two-thirds of the global population explosion since 1950⁵ and are expected to account for virtually all future world population growth. The UN predicts that by half of this century, all regions in the world will be predominantly urban (UN-habitat 2010: IX). Moreover, not only will there be more cities, but they will also grow bigger. In its 'States of the Worlds Cities' report 2010-2011, UN-habitat identifies two main urbanisation trends: cities are merging together to create urban settlements on a massive scale; and cities are expanding spatially (UN-habitat 2010: IX). Various indications confirm this trend; for example, there were 86 cities with over one million inhabitants in 1950, whereas the UN expects this number to have risen to 669 cities by 2025.⁶ In 2004, there were already 24 cities with more than eight million inhabitants, of which six approached or exceeded the impressive number of 20 million (Davis 2006: 5).

Much of the urban growth in the world will occur in so-called developing countries (Yeung 1997: 93). It is in the largest cities of Latin America, Africa and Asia where most of the world's slum population resides and where urban poverty acquires alarming dimensions.⁷ UN-habitat defines a slum according to several operational characteristics: overcrowding, poor or informal housing, inadequate access to water and sanitation, and insecurity of tenure (UN-habitat "The challenge of Slums", revision 2010). Despite the proportion of the urban population living in slums in the developing world having declined over the last ten years⁸, it is still increasing in absolute terms (UN-habitat 2010: XII). Partly owing to the rapid growth of slums, worldwide poverty will increasingly acquire an urban rather than rural face (Davis 2006; Koonings and Kruijt 2009).⁹

5 Population Information Programme of Johns Hopkins University, consulted on <http://infosuite.welch.jhmi.edu/PopCenter/>.

6 "Highlights", World Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. In 2025 there will be 37 cities with over 10 million inhabitants, 59 cities with between 5 and 10 million inhabitants and 573 cities with between 1 and 5 million inhabitants. Consulted on http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/pdf/WUP2011_Highlights.pdf, October 2013.

7 According to this definition, 31.6% of the world's urban population lived in slums in 2001. Of those slum dwellers, most resided in Sub-Saharan Africa, Northern-Africa, East-, South-East, West and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and Oceania. In these regions, 43% of the urban population lived in slums, as opposed to only 6% in developed regions (UN-Habitat 2003: introduction p.25).

8 By 2010, the proportion of the urban population living in slums in the developing world had been reduced to 32%. However, in absolute terms, the number of slum dwellers has continued to grow (UN-Habitat 2010: 12).

9 In the 1980s critics of the postcolonial so-called 'developmental states' assumed that these had an urban bias, which did not address the real poverty issues that were to be found in the rural areas. These critics assumed the existence of an 'urban labour aristocracy', and therefore development actors moved the focus from the urban to rural areas. Rakodi argued already 15 years ago that if this 'urban advantage' had ever existed at all, it certainly existed no longer (Rakodi et al 1998).

The most extreme forms of inequality between groups of inhabitants become visible in the cities of these regions (Heller and Evans 2010: 433). Although inequality is also an increasing feature of European and North American cities (Wacquant 2008), UN-habitat argues that social heterogeneity and mixed uses of spaces remain widespread in Europe and North America. By contrast, the separation of uses of spaces in Africa, Latin America and Asia is so extreme that one can speak of an 'urban divide'. Particularly in the global South, cities are far from offering equal conditions and opportunities to the resident communities (UN-habitat 2010: VIII). Urban citizens who have legitimate entitlements in the context of the Southern metropolis often have only limited access to the city in terms of housing, work and social services.¹⁰ Because they increasingly claim those entitlements as rights, Appadurai labels them 'citizens without cities' (Appadurai 2002). In this context, Heller and Evans point out that *the* social question of the 21st century is that of the Southern metropolis (Heller and Evans 2010: 435).

At the same time, (capital) cities offer specific opportunities for political mobilisation. Recent history has emphasised that cities with large concentrations of people living close to the power centre are often the scenes of social protest.¹¹ In the 1940s, Wirth wrote that urbanisation in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century brought profound changes to the social and economic life of nations. According to him, the central issue in studying the city was to discover the "forms of social action and organization that emerge among individuals under these conditions of density, heterogeneity and anonymity" (Wirth, quoted in Roy and Alsayyad 2004: 7). Castells initially opposed the thought of the 'urban as a specific form'¹², rather considering the urban as one of the forms of expression of capitalism. However, cities were also sites of specific forms of mobilisation in his view. In the 1970s, Castells developed a theory concerning the specific role of the city in capitalist society, arguing that the city had to be understood as the historical manifestation of power and production in capitalism. He considered the city as the place where the labour force was concentrated and reproduced, while the state intervened in the distribution of collective means of consumption (urban services such as housing, water and transport). Consequently, cities became redefined as the points of contradiction and conflict between capital accumulation and social redistribution, as well as between state control and people's autonomy (Castells 1977; 2002). In his later work, Castells highlighted the rise of urban social movements that cut across class divisions based on the struggle over collective consumption and a new kind of 'urban identity' (Castells 1983). These urban social movements emerged as new civil society actors of social conflict and political power.

¹⁰ A discussion started by Henry Lefebvre in 1968 with his 'right to the city'. His concept of 'le droit a la ville' eventually served as the inspiration for the World Charter on the Right to the City developed by several social movements under the auspices of UN-habitat and UNESCO in 2004.

¹¹ Think of for example the student protests in Mexico City on Tlatelolco square in 1968; the Tiananmen square protest in Beijing in 1989; Tahrir square in Cairo since 2011 and most recently, Taksim square in Istanbul in 2013, only to name a few.

¹² Adhered to by Lefebvre and his followers, see Lefebvre (1970).

He argued that beyond their specific economic functions, cities also possess a certain social structure that lends itself for mobilisation.¹³ Heller and Evans argue that the harshest struggles for citizenship take place precisely in the cities of the global South, in conditions of extreme inequalities.

In this book, I investigate how citizenship comes about for poor inhabitants of megacities, which are characterised by a dense population on the one hand and the scarcity of resources to satisfy their livelihood needs on the other. Citizenship refers to the relation between a government and those who fall under its authority (Tilly 1998). However, citizenship is not a static given: it is developed in the constant interaction between citizens and the state. The exercise of citizenship involves the political agency of both the state and members of society. Understanding citizenship of the urban poor thus requires studying the ways in which the urban poor exert political agency in interaction with the state. I thereby consider the political agency of the urban poor to be much broader than the way in which they engage in party-politics: I understand political agency of the urban poor as the ways in which poor inhabitants of cities make claims towards the state in an attempt to change their social and material conditions.¹⁴

The most advanced analytical tools for understanding political agency 'from below' come from social movement studies. Indeed, such studies have taught that for understanding political mobilisation from below, it is important to consider the interests, resources, mobilisation repertoires and opportunities of the actors involved (Della Porta and Diani 2006; Roberts and Portes 2006). Social movement scholars developed the concept of political opportunity structures in order to grasp the interaction between social mobilisations and the state. Political opportunity structures are defined by the configurations of power at the national level and the changes in those configurations. The main explanation for the rise and demise of social movements within this approach lies in the nature of the regime involved, with the main contrasts found between democratic and authoritarian regimes. Democracies are thought to generate social movements, whereas closed authoritarian regimes are believed to produce silent forms of resistance (Tilly and Tarrow 2007).

Influenced by this political process approach, descriptions of the political agency of the urban poor have produced a range of typologies that have attributed the differences in types of mobilisation to the nature of the regime in place.

¹³ Nicholls for example builds on the insights of network theorists Granovetter (1973) by arguing that because cities are sites of many 'strong ties' (groups in which individuals have many overlapping connections) that are needed for mobilization, and 'weak ties' (the availability of many groups that exist in close proximity to one another) that provide opportunities for resource sharing, they become sites for mobilization (Nicholls 2008).

¹⁴ Cornelius (1974) defined political demand-making as "individual or collective activities aimed at extracting certain types of benefits from the political system by influencing incumbent officials." I broaden this definition beyond 'extracting benefits', given that I do not want to exclude the possibility that the political agency of the urban poor is also aimed at changing the conditions for political participation and challenging the political system itself (i.e. that it includes participating in political opposition).

Whereas older studies on the politics of the urban poor have often focused on clientelism (Lomnitz 1971; Cornelius 1975; Barnes 1989), following in the footsteps of Castells, much of what has been written on the political agency of the urban poor since the 1980s has concentrated on social movements. Particularly in Latin America, following the transitions from authoritarian rule, these studies have focussed on self-help initiatives of squatter communities (Foweraker and Craig 1990, Stokes 1991, Eckstein 1998). Moreover, innovative forms of claim making such as the famous example of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre have also been extensively documented (Avrizer 2002; Baiocchi 2003; Koonings 2004). In contrast with collective, outspoken mobilisations in Latin America, AlSayyad (1996) and Bayat (1997; 2000; 2001; 2004) have described claim making in the Middle-East as less politicised and more individualistic. Such differences were attributed to cultural repertoires, as well as differences in regime types.

Notwithstanding, these notions are challenged by current-day struggles for citizenship, particularly in the world's largest cities. There are increasingly indications that different forms of (informal) political mobilisation co-exist in cities and can occur in both democracies and authoritarian regimes alike. Since the 1990s, many studies have emerged from large cities in democracies demonstrating the prevalence of clientelism. Moreover, they have pointed out that in the context of democracies urban clientelism co-exists with other forms of claim-making such as social movements and also with violence, which has gained increased attention in studies from Latin America since the past decade.¹⁵ The Arab Spring in 2011 has shown the world once again that social mobilisations can also occur under authoritarian regimes. Therefore, there is a concrete and a theoretical need to examine in greater depth how state-society interaction actually comes about in the megacity.

My perspective is that citizenship struggles in megacities have to be understood against the background of rising urban informality, which has been associated with urban poverty since the 1970s. Although it was originally considered as a temporary phenomenon, recent publications highlight that 'informality' in cities has become more rather than less important. Studies indicate that informality is a dominant feature of different aspects of life in contemporary megacities. It does not only affect the living conditions of the urban poor (housing, employment and protection¹⁶) as the conditions for their political claim-making; moreover, it also affects political interaction itself. Roy and Alsayyad (2004: 26) even go as far as suggesting that informality has become the organising logic of urban society.

The current phenomenon of urban informality is primarily an effect of rapid urbanisation. In many countries, urbanisation takes place on a scale and in a way that government regulations simply cannot keep up with, whereby government resources and capacity are insufficient to cater for the needs of the expanding populations and people thus having to find other ways to satisfy their interests.

¹⁵ See Hellman 1995; 2008; Arias 2006; Rodgers 2006; Auyero 2007; Holston 2008; and Auyero et al 2009.

¹⁶ UN-Habitat (2010).

Notwithstanding, explicit policy objectives of deregulation and privatisation are also said to have contributed to urban informality. In the past three decades, development efforts and growth strategies across the globe, and particularly in developing countries, have been characterised by economic and political liberalisation programmes. Economic liberalisation has entailed operations of deregulating and privatising social services, with the state having slowly withdrawn from the social sphere in many developing countries.¹⁷ Non-state actors such as private companies and NGOs have jumped into this gap and assumed tasks in the provision of 'public goods'. In the meantime, political liberalisation has entailed a transition to (electoral) democracy and, in many countries, extensive decentralisation programmes. As such, economic and political competition has been encouraged, while the field of public service provision has become increasingly heterogeneous and complex. Although the link between liberalisation and informalisation is far from straightforward (Gilbert 2004), academics suggest that the aforementioned developments have contributed to the present economic, social and political landscape in rapidly expanding cities in developing countries characterised by informality. In this context, informality is not confined to the lives of the poor. AlSaiyyad underlines that the informalisation of the living spaces of the rich particularly becomes increasingly important for the production of urban space (AlSaiyyad 2003: 25). Whereas informality works as a benefit for some, it leads to exclusion for others. This goes precisely against the idea of a publicly established (and formalised) set of mutual rights and obligations that characterise the relations between people and their government under the notion of citizenship (Tilly 1998). Poverty and informality can be expected to have similar consequences for the exercise of citizenship in the urban domain across cities worldwide. In the context of rising urban informality, citizenship becomes a matter of negotiation.

While the academic debate on informality originally concentrated on the economy, it has also taken root in political science. Whereas the debate initially concentrated on the identification of informal institutions that undermined the functioning of new democracies (O'Donnell 1996; Pansters 2009), it is increasingly recognised that formal and informal political practices coexist in various ways, inside and outside the state. The debate on political informality has gradually moved in the direction of highlighting the hybridisation of formal and informal practices as the norm for economic and political interaction. In particular, the pertinence of actors simultaneously to two domains and the co-existence of formal and informal practices within state institutions has drawn recent academic attention. Whereas Roy and AlSaiyyad point to the existence of a new form of informality whereby individuals belong to both the formal and informal (economic) sector (Roy and AlSaiyyad 2004: 25), it is increasingly recognised in the political field that state actors switch between public and particularistic logics (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Auyero 2007; Pansters 2009). In order to shed light on this hybridisation

¹⁷ Although the world seems to have moved beyond the so-called 'Washington Consensus' and global financial institutions (IMF and Worldbank) have come back on some of the premises behind the Structural Adjustment Programmes that they promoted in the 1980s, states in developing countries have not necessarily returned to older levels of investment in social services such as health care and education.

of politics, various concepts have been introduced in different geographical contexts: grey zones in Latin America (Auyero 2007), neo-patrimonialism in Africa (Erdman and Engel 2006) and blurred boundaries in Asia (Gupta 1996; Chatterjee 2004; Sharma and Gupta 2006).

With this study, I intend to contribute to a more in-depth understanding of the exercise of citizenship in megacities and the thinking about the hybridisation of state-power and state-society interaction. The question of whether informality has generalised consequences for the ways in which poor residents of urban areas can exercise their citizenship is best answered through a study of contrasting cases. For this reason, I have selected two Southern megacities with different cultural and socio-political features: one on the Latin American continent (Mexico City) and one situated on the boundaries between Africa and the Middle-East (Khartoum). A study on poor people's practices in contrasting settings across the globe can teach us about possible patterns or mechanisms that are generated for the political agency of the urban poor. Moreover, an 'out of the box' contrast comparison might be thought-provoking and offers the advantage of engaging different continents in a direct dialogue on the related topics of poverty, political agency and urban informality, which has remained largely absent until now (Bayat 2001; Roy and Alssayad 2004). Therefore, the central research problem that this study seeks to address is:

“How do poor inhabitants of Mexico City and Khartoum negotiate their citizenship with the local state?”

1.1 Research design and methodology

The design for this study builds on to the notion that interests, resources, repertoires and (political) opportunities greatly matter for political mobilization. The question on whether rising urban informality in diverse cities across the globe has comparable consequences for political mobilization required a study of these elements in contrasting cases. While any comparison between megacities with a significant amount of urban poor would have been fit for this purpose, a comparison between Mexico City and Khartoum is particularly interesting because they are contrasting in the extreme. Situated at the crossroads between the Middle-East and Africa, Khartoum is not only culturally alienated from Mexico, but is also considered a contrasting case within theories of political mobilisation, and particularly the political process approach within social movement studies. Mexico City is considered by the main advocates of this approach as the political centre of a middle-to-high capacity democratic regime, whereas Khartoum is considered the political centre of a low-capacity undemocratic regime (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Yet despite these obvious differences, Mexico City and Khartoum are both multi-million cities with a significant number of urban poor. They both figure in the top 100 of largest urban agglomerations in the world: Mexico City ranking 6th and Khartoum 70th, being the fourth largest city in Africa behind Cairo, Lagos and Kinshasa, and before Johannesburg and Nairobi (Economist 2012), and it is also

amongst the top 20 largest slum populations in the world (see Davis 2006: 24).¹⁸ Mexico City and Khartoum also share important characteristics regarding the dimensions of urban poverty and informality: they both have a large informal economic sector, with large concentrations of poor people close to the power centre¹⁹ marking them both as interesting sites for a study on political participation. Besides, both cities share in common that they are the capitals of federal yet highly centralised government systems that have known one-party rule for many years.

This cross-continental comparison fits in a trend that calls a halt to distinguishing the large cities of the world into separate categories ('global cities' versus postcolonial and post-socialist cities). Robinson and Gugler argue towards embracing the concept of 'worlding cities', which amounts to the idea that cities across the world are all increasingly interconnected and have developed similar characteristics under globalisation (Robinson 2006; Gugler 2004). While some pioneer scholars already made comparisons between the characteristics of the economies of countries such as Mexico and India in the late-1980s (Baud 1989), it has only recently become more common to conduct comparisons between cities that were formerly categorised differently. Comparisons have been made among others between Cairo and New York (Abu Lughod 1990); Chicago, Paris and Rio de Janeiro (Waquant 2004); Mexico City, Moskow and Johannesburg (Davis 2009) and Mumbai, São Paulo and Johannesburg (Heller and Evans 2010). In addition, several authors have pleaded for comparisons between political processes in Latin America and the Middle East (Alsayyad: 1993; Kamrava and O Mora: 1998; and Bayat: 2001). Moreover, political sociologists such as Tilly and Tarrow have advocated for comparative studies on specific mechanisms that play a role in contentious politics (Tilly and Tarrow 2001: 312; 2011: 4).

Furthermore, with this study I want to make a case for a dialogue between the different social sciences. In my way of interpreting urban informality I have borrowed from conceptual work from political science, political sociology and, albeit to a lesser extent, economics and anthropology. A study on informal claim-making practices necessarily relies to great extent on ethnographic fieldwork. The fact that it might not be common for anthropologists, who have until now been the main protagonists of studies on political participation 'from below', to combine cross-continental comparisons with the method of in-depth fieldwork does not mean that it should not be undertaken. Anthropological field studies tend to focus more frequently on a single region of which the researcher has a profound understanding, concentrating on the specificity of individual cases rather than possible similarities with other cases.

¹⁸ Mexico City and Khartoum both formed part of the 37 originally prepared case studies for the 2003 UN-Habitat report 'The Challenge of Slums' (2003, rev. 2010).

¹⁹ A large involvement of Chinese traders and products in the informal economies of both cities (Tepito in Mexico City and Soukh Libya in Khartoum) also suggests that they are more closely connected in an 'alternative' global economy than visible at first hand; see Alba Vega (2012) and Guibert (2008: 131).

The reasons for this are largely practical, given that it is more difficult and time-consuming to specialise into different regions in the world. However, by focusing on the specificities of a single case, they are in fact also comparing, albeit implicitly (Sartori 1991). Qualitative studies undertaken by political scientists often include different cases across the globe, yet they do so mostly based on literature focused on (national) institutions. Accordingly, they are necessarily limited in generating understanding concerning the political behaviour of (groups of) people. I actually had the opportunity to engage in two in-depth case studies, and by comparing two non-obvious cases, I believe that interesting patterns can be revealed about political behaviour and interaction that would otherwise remain untouched. Obviously this approach implied various practical challenges, to which I will turn in the next paragraphs. Owing to the choice for a comparison, I had to limit myself in terms of the in-depth and historical analysis of both cases. Although history is invoked through the narratives of the residents, this study focuses on the contemporary political situation in both cities. In Mexico City, the current political context dates back to the introduction of elections at the city level in 1997, while in Khartoum the context of the fieldwork was mainly determined by the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Northern and Southern Sudan (2005-2011).

I have followed the same research strategy for both cases. Because my interest in the relation between the state and the urban poor in the *megacity* and ‘the urban’ was my main entry point for a comparison between two contrasting cases, I chose to focus on the places where people *lived*. I wanted to identify the neighbourhoods that suffered the largest social conflicts and the greatest stigmatisation by other inhabitants of the city, given that stigmatisation has been identified by various authors as the main characteristic of current day social exclusion.²⁰ Wacquant highlights the current day importance of *territorial* stigmatisation, more than occupational stigmatisation, as a main feature of advanced marginality (Wacquant 2010: 237). In both Mexico City and Khartoum, I have concentrated on popular neighbourhoods that were known to be generally poor, conflictive, stigmatised and home to a wide variety of social organisations.²¹

I spent one month in Mexico City during the summer of 2007, interviewing resource persons (academics, NGO workers, policy makers) about the different parts of the city and the characteristics of the popular neighbourhoods. Based on these interviews, which stressed the poor, stigmatised and political character of Iztapalapa, I decided to select Iztapalapa as my case study for Mexico City. However, Iztapalapa is large and hosts significant diversity; therefore, I had to limit myself to the study of a couple of neighbourhoods. My entry points were diverse: coincidentally, the cleaning lady in the house of friends where I rented a room came from Iztapalapa.

²⁰ Tilly (1998); Caldeira (2000); Wacquant (2010).

²¹ Both Iztapalapa and Mayo fall under the city administration and are in that sense already incorporated into the urban fabric, as opposed to more recent squatter areas that lie just behind the city boundaries: Al Rasheed or Al Fatih in Khartoum or Chalco in Mexico City. I focused on popular neighbourhoods and not on recent squatter areas because political processes have a longer history and are therefore more clearly observable.

She actually gave me my first introduction to the neighbourhood and subsequently also to different aspects of life in Iztapalapa, such as the '*Passion of the Christ*²²' and the local cinema. Simultaneously, through contacts with academics from the UNAM who had studied the formation of youth gangs, I followed another trace that led me to the Unidad Habitacional Vicente Guerrero. I established formal contacts with help of the then Netherlands Ambassador in Mexico, such a former head of the borough of Iztapalapa and an NGO, Equipo Pueblo, which had worked for years with de Unión de Colonos in San Miguel Teotongo and other social movements in the Sierra de Santa Catarina. These contacts introduced me to the inhabitants of San Miguel Teotongo and the neighbourhood leaders of other areas: Miravalle and El Molino. In Miravalle, I started interviewing community workers in the local health centre, when an opportunity presented itself to rent a room in the *vecindad* of the family of one of the volunteers. I rented a room and spend much time in the neighbourhood for four months, and the fact that I did not have the opportunity to cook in my room meant that my landlords soon offered me full pension. The daily meals that we had together perhaps taught me the most about what it meant to be living in the outskirts of Iztapalapa.

During the course of my empirical research, I gradually learned to understand and appreciate the diversity in Iztapalapa between pueblos, barrios, Unidades Habitacionales and colonias. I became aware that the ways in which these different neighbourhoods had been formed actually greatly mattered for the degree of social organisation in the areas and the relations between the inhabitants and government. This is when I intensified my contacts in the Unidad Habitacional Vicente Guerrero through as many channels as possible: Mexican academics, German researchers who were studying public insecurity in Iztapalapa and friends of the members of the Unión de Colonos in San Miguel Teotongo.

I tried to triangulate by interviewing a broad spectrum of people within the different neighbourhoods, not only those pertaining to the neighbourhood associations but also their dissidents (people who had left the association and in some cases had started working for other political sides) and common unorganised people within the neighbourhoods. I asked people for the presence of those with power and authority within the neighbourhoods and succeeded in interviewing most of these informal power holders. I interviewed Church leaders, party members, leaders of associations and teachers (two categories that often overlapped). I also invested much time in interviewing people of different government levels that were said to 'belong' to different political factions.

²² The '*Passion of the Christ*' is a main cultural event that attracts a million visitors to Iztapalapa each year. On the last day of the Holy Week (on Good Friday), the crucifixion of Jesus is being interpreted by local community members.

In Khartoum, I spent an entire year before selecting my case study: during the second half of 2008 and the first half of 2009, I took the time to learn some basic Arabic and establish links with the university, and also became acquainted with Sudanese politics and the different conflicts in the country. Based on discussions with Sudanese and foreign academics around similar questions as I had posed in Mexico, I initially selected two neighbourhoods: Mayo in Jebel Awlia Locality and Dar El Salaam in Um Baddha Locality. Based on my Mexican experience, I selected these areas due to their different urbanisation histories: Mayo had predominantly developed as a squatter settlement, whereas Dar El Salaam was established as a 'site and service' location by the government. Both areas found themselves on different sides of Khartoum's periphery: Um Baddha is part of Omdurman and Mayo belongs to Khartoum.

Researchers at Khartoum University put me in contact with some of its best students in cultural anthropology, who I first asked to conduct a diagnostic in both Mayo and Dar El Salaam, and who later accompanied me as translators during my own interviews. In the stage of interviewing, I decided to concentrate my fieldwork on a single neighbourhood (Mayo) because this would enable me to gather more in-depth information and gain a better understanding about the relations between the different actors in the area, as well as gaining greater trust from the respondents, because I could meet them several times.

One of my research assistants had written her MA dissertation on public service delivery Mayo, and based on her connections she introduced me to many people in the area. Each time we interviewed someone, we asked if he or she could introduce us to people they had mentioned and who could complement their perspective. We frequently returned to the administrative unit in Mayo to interview people of the different offices in the unit. In the end, Mayo proved itself to be much smaller than Iztapalapa: most of the community leaders and government representatives in the area know each other and I met many people on different occasions. In Mayo, I also tried to triangulate by aiming for as much diversity among the respondents as possible: In the end, we interviewed around eighty people from different tribal backgrounds (Dinka, Haussa, Nuba, Darfuri, Misseriya), men and women, members of different political parties (DUP, UMMA, NCP, SPLM), people with different religious backgrounds (Imams and Priests, visitors of mosques and churches), different professional backgrounds (teachers, nurses), government officials from a broad range of government institutions (the health and education offices, basic health centres, the police headquarters, the security service), UN agencies and employees in local and international NGOs, both Western and Islamic ones.

Drawing upon insights from social movement studies, the design of the topic list for the interviews was established around the assumption that political strategies are largely determined by interests, resources and opportunities available to the two key interaction agents in the reproduction of citizenship: the state and the

urban poor (see annexes I and II). In both Iztapalapa and Mayo, I initially conducted a diagnostic of the most important issues of interest to the inhabitants based on interviews. After having identified the main issues of concern for their inhabitants, I diagnosed the resources of the urban poor in terms of their social differentiation and socio-political organisation. I subsequently explored the opportunities at their disposal in terms of the organisation of state and other forms of authority. Finally, I assessed the strategies that the poor employed to approach the authorities and make their claims. I paid specific attention to the role of third parties and the construction of leadership.

In Mexico, I taped most of the interviews and had them transcribed. Taping the interviews in Khartoum was impossible, apart from the interviews with people with whom I had already developed a trust relationship (either because I knew them already or because they had a positive esteem of – Western - foreigners). In Mayo and Dar El Salaam, students first conducted interviews in Arabic before handing over their transcripts to me, which I subsequently had translated in order that as little information as possible would get lost. When I conducted interviews myself with a translator, I took notes in English during the interview, which I edited as soon as I returned home. I transcribed the few recorded interviews myself, before coding all the interviews with a qualitative data program (Atlas.ti) according to the main concepts in my research design (see Annexes III and IV for the code list). I adapted the code lists for Mexico City and Khartoum, which enabled me to maintain an overview of the different responses in relation to the main themes in my research.

Interviews provide the main share of my empirical data, particularly for the case of Khartoum. Naturally, interviewing people about their own behaviour mainly provides insights into what they want to present to the outside world or the researcher: it only presents a partial picture of what they actually do. I tried to compensate for this through triangulation and participant observation. In Iztapalapa, I assisted in events such as citizen assemblies for the 'proyecto de mejoramiento barrial' and security reunion (in the UHVG, Miravalle, and an area in Xalpa), festivities (anniversario de la Unión de Colonos in San Miguel Teotongo, the Passion of the Christ), the internal PRD elections and a police patrol in the area. Furthermore, I had the experience of living in the area, of going shopping in the market and spending time with a local family. In Mayo, I attended some religious gatherings (a service in a Church and a session in a Qur'an School for women) and was invited by the local government to attend the popular committee elections that took place in the early evenings. I also assisted in the inauguration of the 'judia' (or traditional court) within the police headquarters. Conversations with my research assistants concerning what we were seeing and hearing greatly helped to improve my understanding. Besides the interviews and participant observation, I also gathered press clippings, policy reports, took pictures, filmed some events and read most of the available empirical literature on both cases.

Methodological challenges

Stating that my research strategy created methodological challenges would be putting it mildly. In Mexico City, I was able to conduct ethnographic fieldwork in the classical sense of the word, including renting a room in one of the neighbourhoods under study and engaging in participant observation to complement my in-depth interviews. My knowledge of the Spanish language enabled me to conduct all interviews myself. My fieldwork in Khartoum posed a much greater challenge. First, I did not speak the local language(s). Although I learned some basic Arabic that allowed me to introduce myself and to have small conversations, I needed to rely on translators who accompanied me during my interviews. Although a better knowledge of Arabic would certainly have helped me with some respondents (particularly those of the government and Islamic NGOs), it would not have helped me with all however. Many of the IDPs in Mayo (the poorest of the poor) do not speak Arabic but local languages (Nuba dialects, local Darfuri languages or dialects from Southern Sudan). With their leaders I could best converse in English, a language that also has a more positive connotation for them than Arabic as I will explain later. Second, accurate statistical information about the socio-economic situation in Mayo proved hard to gather; for example, I did not even manage to acquire an official map of the area. Therefore, I will provide background information to statements highlighted by the inhabitants based on interviews and field observations, as well as studies undertaken by ODI and UN-habitat (Pantuliano et al 2011, Murillo et al 2009) and (UN and World Bank) data that Abdalla used for her insightful recent work on poverty in urban Sudan (Abdalla 2008). Third, conducting research in Mayo was not easy for a ‘Westerner’ during the period of rising political tensions when the government was distrustful of Westerners in particular: the ICC indictment of the President, the elections, the upcoming referendum on the (possible) separation of the South and the outbursts of new conflicts in the Nuba Mountains all did not help. Although the distrust was mainly against government officials and NGO workers, it also affected researchers to the extent that it became more difficult for them in that period to obtain research permits. I finally managed to obtain a permit for the squatter areas and planned areas after having lived in Sudan for two and a half years.

A note on (in)security is appropriate, because I undertook fieldwork in two urban areas that were generally considered dangerous, albeit for very different reasons. Perspectives on the dangers involved differed considerably between outsiders and insiders in both cases. I had to deal with these inconsistencies as I went along in my fieldwork.²³ I quickly learned that the views of the outsiders hardly corresponded with the realities that I encountered on the ground. In Mexico, I was warned that my hand could be cut off in the subway in Iztapalapa by people who would want to steal my watch. These stories evidently circulated among people who had never taken the metro.

²³ Nordstrom and Robben argue that “like power, violence is essentially contested – everyone knows it exists, but no one agrees on what actually constitutes the phenomenon” (Nordstrom and Robben 1995: 5). The same can be said about insecurity.

In Khartoum, my research assistant was frequently warned by her university colleagues about the criminals and rebels present in the area. In both areas, I initially carefully selected and approached some key interlocutors prior to going to the field. However, in the end, I went to both Iztapalapa and Mayo by public transport on my own without any problems, including at night (drinking a coke on the sidewalk with the niece of my landlords at 10pm and going out in the nearest discotheque in Miravalle and attending popular committee elections at dusk in Mayo).

On the other hand, the inhabitants themselves, and particularly in Iztapalapa, also warned me to be careful as a female foreigner walking around alone. I found these issues more complicated to assess and questioned myself greatly about objective versus subjective security. First of all, people were thinking *for* me as a foreigner, and the fact that their concerns were not based on their own experience made it difficult for me to assess their validity. Second, some of the things that they were afraid of did not scare me, and vice versa. For example, *marihuaneros* (junkies) or *borrachos* (drunks) did not intimidate me that much, because I was used to seeing them in my own city. I never saw the youth gangs that people made mention of, or any armed actor besides the security forces (who were armed with automatic guns in both cases; something I was definitely *not* accustomed to), neither in Iztapalapa nor in Mayo; I only saw young men roaming around in the streets. However, the fact that people so frequently talked about 'micros' (minibuses) that were being robbed – something which they almost seem to consider normal – made me reluctant to bring my laptop containing my research material to Miravalle. In some cases, I also had no other choice than to take illegal taxis in the evening in Iztapalapa, because there were simply no legal ones around. Several times I crossed my fingers thinking of the warnings at the Mexico City airport and in the travel guides, but then I surmounted my fear by thinking of all the family fathers I knew who were working as informal taxi drivers. I did not limit my movements most of the time, and only once rejected an invitation of a young police officer to join him in a night patrol in the weekend in the outskirts of Iztapalapa, based on the recommendation of a senior Mexican researcher.

In Mayo, security was predominantly defined in terms of national security, where the national security service was omnipresent. I was asked for my research permit on an almost daily basis, not only by people I intended to interview but also by people in the streets who later emerged to be security officials in the local popular committees. In the IDP camps, the security service even has the power to overrule any other government agency, holding control of the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC). For example, one day a coordinator of the state ministry of health invited us to visit an NGO-run health centre in Mayo. Not knowing that the centre was situated in an IDP camp (the border between the camp and the rest of Mayo is invisible to an outsider) and having been invited by a government official, we had not applied for a special permit. However, when we arrived, the security officer of the NGO running the camp blocked us, insisting that we needed a permit from HAC. The fact that the state health coordinator had invited us to the centre could not alter his stance.

While he did give us a quick tour, he did not allow us to speak to the residents or staff in the health centre. Our contact at the state ministry was furious when he heard about the incident, but he could not arrange another visit for us. The prevalence of national security was also felt outside the IDP camps in Mayo, particularly in times of crisis. For the sake of transparency I always used to meet my research assistant in front of the police station in Mayo. This worked perfectly fine until the outbreak of the crisis in the Nuba Mountains in June 2011. When my research assistant got into my car, she was suddenly ordered to report to the HAC officials inside the police station and we were no longer allowed to enter Mayo. The fact that the local police knew who we were and what we did failed to alter their viewpoint: the HAC officers did not want any foreigners roaming around in Mayo, where many new IDPs were arriving by the day. Luckily, this only happened at the end of my research period.

In both Mayo and Iztapalapa, fear then was an important constituent of the lives of the people that I interviewed. In Mexico, people were afraid to walk on the streets and through the parks, to send their children to the shop around the corner or to engage with the government. In Sudan, (specific groups of) people were afraid of their neighbours and representatives, given that all could be related to an institution that had the power to arrest and detain them: the national intelligence and security service. Accordingly, I will use pseudonyms for all the people interviewed in the remainder of this book, apart from those who spoke to me 'on the record' in their public function, for whom I will use their full names. Further information about the background of the respondents can be provided upon request.

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Finally, because my main research strategy consisted of ethnographic fieldwork, it is appropriate to reflect upon my own position as a researcher. I went to the field as a relatively young woman from a Western country, working for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Khartoum as a diplomat even. I felt that being a woman had more advantages than disadvantages, particularly in Khartoum (where shari'a law prevails). It was relatively easy for me to gain trust from respondents in Iztapalapa and particularly in Mayo because I was not perceived so much as a threat. Being a woman also allowed me to visit certain sites that were inaccessible for men, such as a Qur'an school for women, whereas the domains that were usually accessible for men were also accessible for me. Moreover, because I was a foreign woman, men talked to me about issues that they might not have discussed in the same way with local women; for example, I remember my discussion with members of the Da'awa al Islamiya on marriage. In one of the cases, I could fully carry out the research myself, whereas in the other I had to rely on research assistants due to my lack of knowledge of the local language. It was more challenging for me to gain an understanding of the situation in Mayo, yet I believe that the fact that I conducted research in both areas myself and that I could exchange views with my research assistants largely compensated for this disadvantage in Khartoum. The fact that I worked for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs during my fieldwork in Mexico and that I was posted as a diplomat at the Netherlands embassy in Khar-

toum implied several specific challenges and advantages. Given that did not have any predecessors that I knew of, I had to invent the ‘researcher-diplomat’ as I went along during my fieldwork. Considering this unique experience, it is worthwhile to reflect on the resulting dilemmas for a moment.

The researcher diplomat

As a researcher and a diplomat, I constantly had to creatively define and negotiate my own position. When I carried out my fieldwork in Mexico City in 2008 I was not posted as a diplomat in country. I was formally seconded to the University of Utrecht at the time, based on a cooperation agreement between the University and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, I remained a staff member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had great advantages: it gave me special access to the embassy and, more importantly, to its network. The outgoing Ambassador, who was still in office when I carried out my introductory visit to Mexico City in the summer of 2007, for example, introduced me to a former head of the borough of Iztapalapa and a young member of parliament of the PRD Nueva Izquierda current. These people subsequently proved to be key informants for my research, because they led me to some of the main political leaders in Iztapalapa. In this sense, the embassy actually put me on track and helped me to accomplish things that would have probably taken me much longer otherwise.

Nonetheless, my ‘status’ also implied some difficulties. By the time I started my actual fieldwork, the Ambassador had changed. The new Ambassador was not yet as familiar with the city as her predecessor was and had known Iztapalapa mainly from stories, the majority of which were negative. The fact that I intended to undertake fieldwork in an area known as one of the most dangerous in the city invoked a dilemma for her. She not only felt a responsibility towards me as a Dutch citizen, but also as employer of a staff member of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nonetheless, she also intended to honour the cooperation agreement with the University of Utrecht. Therefore, I set up a meeting between the Ambassador and my thesis supervisor when he visited Mexico City during the initial stage of my fieldwork. I remember them holding diametrically opposed views: the Ambassador agreed with me conducting the fieldwork in Iztapalapa as long as I did not live in the research area and would not spend time there at night. By contrast, based on his experience with research in Latin American slums, my thesis supervisor argued that the best way for me to successfully carry out the research was to actually go and live in Iztapalapa. There I was, caught in the middle, and I only had six-month period available for gathering my data. Eventually, we agreed that the university was formally responsible for me and that I would start my research activities in Iztapalapa during day time.

I had already rented a small room in the building where Mexican friends lived in one of the upper-middle class areas in the city. This was not a bad place to start from, given that it allowed me to appreciate the nice aspects of life in Mexico City; moreover, in this place I also met Lola, who worked with my friends as a cleaning lady.

Lola came from Iztapalapa and proved to be my best introduction to the borough. We came to spend several precious moments together, including visits to official cultural events in Iztapalapa, as well as unofficial family events. As I proceeded with my fieldwork, the opportunity presented itself to rent a room in one of the neighbourhoods in the far outskirts of Iztapalapa with a family that I had come to know. By that time I decided that I could do both, namely keep the room in Coyocacan as a fall-out base and rent the room in the vecindad in order to prevent having to travel back 1.5 hours to the city during the evening time. I reckoned that I could convince the Dutch Ambassador that it was actually safer for me, and that in this way I could reconcile her view with that of my thesis supervisor.

Generally, I moved around in the research areas as any PhD-student: I travelled to the neighbourhoods by bus, carrying nothing but a bag with a voice-recorder, notebook and pen. Ultimately, this proved less dangerous than spending time in the more affluent neighbourhood or driving around the city by car: during my six-month research period, three of my embassy colleagues were robbed (two experienced an armed robbery on the streets and one had her house broken into), whereas I did not encounter any such problems. What might have rendered me slightly different from any PhD studies vis-à-vis some of my respondents was that I came to them via contacts of the embassy. The embassy had indirectly supported local NGO projects in one of the neighbourhoods in the past. In several neighbourhoods, I had to request the neighbourhood association for permission to carry out my research, but in this particular neighbourhood some members of the association expected me to financially contribute to the association's projects and mobilise funds from donors. However, when I explained that this was beyond my possibilities and that I could only promise to provide them feedback on the results of my research, they approved. They have never come back to the financial support issue and I had the impression that, over time, they saw me as any student arriving by bus and leaving on foot. Moreover, the same problem might also apply to 'regular' PhD students, given that they contact neighbourhood associations through NGOs from (perceived) donor countries. Therefore, I consider the impact of my being a researcher-diplomat on my research findings minimal.

In Sudan, my situation was different, likewise the dilemmas involved. Here, I was posted as a diplomat for the Netherlands government from 2008-2011. Relations between Sudan and Western countries had never been generous under the current regime, but around 2009 the relations became particularly tense as a result of the ICC indictment of the President. At that time, it was not uncommon for Western NGO workers to be expelled (I remember at least three cases who had been or almost been expelled during my posting). In March 2009, several Western NGOs who were active in Darfur were expelled from the country in its entirety. My Ambassador was officially reprimanded twice for the explicit support of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, which had just indicted the Sudanese president. I still remember sitting next to my Ambassador in the embassy car heading towards the Sudanese

Ministry of Foreign Affairs while he was expressing regret that this would probably be the early end of his posting in Sudan.

Moreover, as embassy staff we constantly faced the security service in several ways. For example, we always had to apply for permits when leaving the capital city and even when visiting the IDP camps²⁴ within the capital; there was no freedom of movement for (Western) diplomats.²⁵ Several of us were interrogated by the security service: I once spent two hours in the security office at an airport in Darfur explaining the reasons for my visit, despite having a travel permit. Towards the Southern referendum and the renewed break-out of the crisis in the Nuba Mountains, the security service also became more active in relation to those areas. An external advisor we hired as a donor group for the Three Areas was threatened with expulsion, but even more disturbing was the intimidation of local staff of embassies and (local and international) staff of international organisations with whom I had become close with over the years and who feared more serious threats. Until then, researchers had been less a focus of the security service than NGO workers and official representatives of the international community, but it was increasingly difficult even for them to obtain research permits, particularly for the IDP camps.

In this general climate, it was not unthinkable that a diplomat carrying out research on state-society relations in a politically sensitive neighbourhood of the capital city could be considered a spy. Indeed, it took some courage to agree with an embassy staff member carrying out this research, as my Ambassador did. He only asked me to be fully transparent in my proceedings. Of course, I agreed on this condition, but I would not have guessed at the beginning that it would take me two full years before I conducted my first interview in the field. I was very careful in all the steps that I undertook, out of fear that the position of the Dutch embassy would fall under risk. Perhaps I was even too careful, but the point was that I did not know, given the unpredictability of the situation. This is where I realised how paralysing a climate of fear and arbitrariness can be. In Khartoum, fear of expulsion had already led to foreigners generally staying in their own circles, remaining confined to the middle and upper class areas, even if they were not certain about sanctions. How much worse are the effects of random repression when personal life and health are at (perceived) risk? This was an important, perhaps by far the most important, lesson for me in starting to understand the conditions for the political agency of the urban poor.

In more practical terms, with help of my Ambassador I started discussing my research intentions with the Institute for Strategic Planning, as well as the then Wali of Khartoum State.

²⁴ In Khartoum there are four official camps for Internally Displaced People, or IDPs. The camps fall under special regulations (particularly security measures) but are not distinguishable from surrounding squatter areas with the bare eye.

²⁵ Egyptian colleagues could travel to Darfur without having to apply for a permit, something that was unimaginable for us.

Although they reacted positively to my research topic²⁶, this did not mean that I could actually start my field research. The main bottleneck appeared to lie in obtaining an official permit: it was entirely unclear how I should go about this. My Ambassador had consulted our contact person in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who suggested that I establish linkages with Sudanese research institutes. Through a befriended Sudanese researcher, I came into contact with the Anthropology Department of Khartoum University. The department head perfectly understood the objective of linking academic research to policy as being central in the cooperation agreement between the University of Utrecht and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences accepted me as a visiting researcher to his institute. When I asked whether I would have to apply for a research permit, I was first advised not to because I already had a residence permit: applying for a second permit might only complicate things. The head of the Anthropology Department put me in touch with his best research assistants, who carried out some exploratory research for me in the field. I first intended to accompany them but they advised me not to, because several Western researchers had been unable to obtain permits during that period.

At the same time, I started looking for respondents through different channels. As I proceeded, I found that they would not willingly help me without a research permit because this might put them at risk, so I went back to Khartoum University. It took some time to ascertain at what administrative level I would have to apply for a research permit (Khartoum State or the locality); however, after consulting with his student assistant, the head of department thought that it would be best to go straight to the locality offices. To my luck, a good acquaintance of his worked as the head of the locality office in one of the areas where I wanted to start my research. When he explained the question and my position, I was welcomed to the office to obtain my permit. Furthermore, the head of this office contacted me with her administrative counterpart in my other desired research area, Mayo. Both heads of administration held masters degrees and stood favourably towards academic research. Moreover, they were also genuinely interested in the content of my research proposal, particularly because it involved the challenges of urbanisation.

Although I was greatly relieved to have obtained both permits, this was not yet the end of the story. With the permits of the localities in hand, I had to visit the policy offices and the security offices in the neighbourhoods to inform them of my presence and to (implicitly) also gain their permission. In Mayo, I eventually had an interview with the head of the security service, who said that he believed in the virtue of academic research (he held a doctorate in human rights from Khartoum University) and that he would thus allow me to carry out my project.

²⁶ I was invited by the Institute for Strategic Studies to participate in the discussion on a center of urban studies which the Institute was considering to set up, whereas the Wali invited me to 'go knock on the doors of families in Mayo' to ask what their experiences were with urbanization.

He generously offered the assistance of his employee who could arrange interviews and accompany us during our field visits: an offer we could not refuse because the security service was present at every street corner and in each popular committee. After the security officer had accompanied us several times and seen the content of our work, he let us move around independently.

Besides the research permit, there were some other challenges involved in with my position. Because I was posted as a diplomat, I could not go and live in Mayo as I had done in Iztapalapa. Although as diplomats we were free to choose our living area, it had to correspond to certain standards in terms of safety and representativeness. In the framework of the embassy evacuation plan,²⁷ we had to live between the Niles at a relatively close distance to the embassy. Furthermore, as embassy staff we were supposed to host events (dinners and receptions) in our houses. Although it would have surely been instructive to do this in Mayo, both for foreigners and Sudanese upper middle class guests, this would be hardly realistic. Therefore, together with my research assistants, I moved around by bus, in rickshaws and occasionally also by car, with diplomatic license plates. For most respondents, I was simply a Westerner, with the license plates in themselves not adding much to that status. Some respondents in women's groups or NGOs who had experience with donors expected some funds to come their way as a result of my linkage to the embassy, although for the general public this was not often a topic of direct discussion. I neither hid nor promoted that I worked for the Dutch government, because ultimately I visited Mayo as a researcher.

Above I have described the challenges of being a researcher diplomat in Sudan. However, my diplomatic work also provided me the great advantage of spending three years in the country, becoming acquainted with Sudanese politics in the broadest sense and becoming acquainted with the many worlds beyond the capital – Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and Blue Nile²⁸: the worlds from which many of my respondents in Mayo came. My familiarisation with the broader political context enabled me to relate to the inhabitants of Mayo, enriching my ability to interpret the data I had gathered in the field, despite my Arabic remaining limited. In addition, the tension in the relation between Western countries and the government was inversely correlated to the trust that Western countries had among IDPs in Mayo: the poorest of the poor were generally open to talk, although they were disappointed in what Western countries (diplomats, NGO workers or researchers alike) had done for them in the past.

²⁷ A scenario developed in the face of the ICC-indictment, the elections and the Southern referendum.

²⁸ Particularly the Dutch chairmanship of one of the working groups under the monitoring mechanism for CPA implementation (the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, or AEC), which I helped preparing was greatly instructive. On average I travelled around 4-5 days a month to the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Abyei on the border between what is now Sudan and South Sudan in order to prepare the meetings of the AEC Three Areas Working Group.

Overall, I consider the fact that I had to negotiate my own position with the Sudanese (local) state as a benefit. It provided me a unique insight in the functioning of that state, which I would never had known if I had been exclusively a diplomat or researcher. I consider that the personal trust that was ultimately required to obtain a permit and to be actually able to carry out my research was indicative of the way in which the Sudanese state operates. Furthermore, I was also confronted with the issue of state fragmentation in the process of securing the research permit. First of all, as I mentioned the university did not know where to best apply for research permits for foreigners, because there was no standard practice. Second, my permits from the locality proved insufficient when I wanted to interview people from the official health centres and the education office and I again needed separate permits from the line ministries at the level of Khartoum State. Third, line ministries were sometimes overruled by the security service, as the earlier examples about the state health ministry and the state police have shown. In fact, my own encounters with the Sudanese state proved to be a very useful form of participant observation.

1.2 Outline of the book

This study aims to contribute to debates on the exercise of citizenship and to the theoretical understanding of the hybridisation of power and politics by exploring the ways poor inhabitants of two contrasting megacities negotiate with their local state. This central question invokes discussing a number of topics that are addressed in the empirical chapters of this book (chapters four to six). Political mobilisation is generally thought to be determined by interests, resources and (political) opportunities (Roberts and Portes 2006: 59). The first theme that I will therefore address is who the urban poor are and what urban poverty actually consists of in both Mexico and Khartoum, focusing on what their main claims are vis-à-vis the public authorities. The second theme relates to the resources and opportunities for claim making in both cities, including the nature of formal and informal leadership, while the third theme deals with claim-making strategies as such. Prior to addressing these topics however, the second and third chapters of this book set the stage.

In the second chapter, I will develop a conceptual framework for understanding the negotiation of citizenship in the context of the hybridisation of formal and informal politics in two contrasting cases. In the first section of this chapter, I will explore the role of informality in the daily lives of the urban poor in megacities. I will explain how the informality, violence and inequality that affect the lives of the urban poor stand in sharp contrast with the dominant notion of citizenship that refers to the relation between a government and its people, based on the principles of equality of all citizens before the law and equal access to the resources of the state. Exclusion of access to entitlements as land, housing and employment, also sets the conditions for their political citizenship. In order to understand how the struggle concerning citizenship rights takes shape, it is also necessary to analyse the role of the 'receiving end' of poor people's claim-making practices: the state.

Accordingly, I will examine how informality affects urban governance in the second section of this chapter, distinguishing two forms of hybridity within urban governance: vertical and horizontal hybridity. Horizontal and vertical hybridity are interconnected because 'informal' authorities mediate between the state and citizens, together forming a 'grey zone' of state power. In the third section, I explore what this means for the political agency of the urban poor. I return to social movement studies' ideas on the importance of motives, resources and opportunities for the political strategies of both power holders and subaltern (Dellaporta and Diani 1998:1-19). I argue that the grey zone of vertical and horizontal hybridity represents the political opportunity structure in which the urban poor can make their claims towards the state, and assume that brokers occupy central positions within this grey zone. Therefore, the study focuses on the role of brokers in the way in which the urban poor shape their political agency.

The third chapter aims to provide the reader with a historical and political background of both cases. In this chapter, I present a general context for each of the cases in terms of the research problem, discussing urbanisation (including popular neighbourhood formation), national political developments and the general features of contemporary urban governance. I argue that urbanisation and politics are intrinsically interlinked: in both cases, the way in which urbanisation of the capital has taken shape is an expression of the political relations within the country at large. In both cases, the development of the city has been largely characterised by urban sprawl, through either the illegal selling of communal land or squatting. The efforts of both governments to accept the presence of the urban migrants and legalise these situations have largely been prompted by political considerations, as I will discuss in this chapter. In the third chapter, I also discuss the formation and nature of the regimes that are currently in place, as well as the urban governance systems that they have set up. From this chapter, it will become evident that Mexico City and Khartoum differ in important aspects: Mexico City can be considered a consolidated urban area, while Khartoum is still very much developing. Moreover, Mexico has witnessed a democratic transition, whereas Khartoum is ruled by an authoritarian regime. Nonetheless, both cities also have several issues in common, particularly in terms of patterns of exclusion.

These patterns of exclusion reflect the topic of the fourth chapter, in which I intend to show who the urban poor are, including their main issues of concern and what their claims vis-à-vis the public authorities actually consist of. I will highlight that exclusion in the case of Iztapalapa mainly refers to a lack of access to good quality public services, employment and security, while in Mayo, exclusion relates to access to land and housing, public services, employment and protection. In both cases, most residents gain their income in the informal economy, and inhabitants of the marginalised areas are stigmatised by the inhabitants of other parts of the city. The inhabitants of Iztapalapa are regularly depicted as 'criminals', whereas residents of Mayo are often considered as 'rebels'. Moreover, in both cases, access to citizenship rights largely depends on their political relations.

Despite the residents of Iztapalapa and Mayo being formally entitled to protection, public services and political participation, in practice their access reflects the outcome of negotiations with the state.

In chapter five, I explore the urban excluded's opportunities in terms of claim-making vis-à-vis the state. How can we understand the spaces for claim-making by the urban poor in both Iztapalapa and Mayo? In this chapter, I will first consider the players involved in the negotiation over public goods and services. I will show that the state is not the only provider of goods and services, with authority bearers such as NGOs, religious organisations and private individuals also playing an important role. Therefore, I argue that in both cases 'fields of claim-making' are thoroughly hybrid, consisting of state institutions and private organisations and actors alike. I will highlight that there is an important role for brokers who pertain to different institutions at a time in both Mexico City and Khartoum. They often occupy double functions between the government, political parties and social organisations, thereby contributing to horizontal and vertical informality. The way in which the relations between the government and other organisations take shape depends on the power configurations in both cases.

In chapter six, I analyse how the opportunities described in the previous chapter are actually being used by the urban poor, the state and their intermediaries. This chapter provides an account of political agency and centres on the 'how' question. It explores when the different strategies are employed by the urban poor, how the governments of Iztapalapa and Mayo react to these strategies and what the outcomes of this interaction are. In this chapter, I seek to analyse patterns of claim-making by tracing down differences and similarities between Iztapalapa and Mayo. I will argue that despite there being significantly less space for formalised political opposition in Mayo than in Iztapalapa, the claim-making strategies of the urban poor are still predominantly collective in nature in both cases. While the stakes are different, strategies in both Iztapalapa and Mayo are ultimately intended to lead to negotiations with the government. In the second section of the chapter, I explore the responses of both governments, who employ different means to enhance their legitimacy and maintain control.

The seventh chapter concludes this study and consists of two parts. In the first section, I will draw several conclusions regarding the ways in which poor residents of Mexico City and Khartoum can and do claim access to public goods and services. Subsequently, in the second section of this chapter, I will explore the theoretical implications of my findings, assessing the extent to which the concept of a grey zone constituted by horizontal and vertical hybridity helps our thinking about the relations between the urban poor and their governments. Furthermore, I will place this within the wider debates on political mobilisation and citizenship.

2. Informality and citizenship: a conceptual framework

Many residents of megacities live their lives in informal circumstances and cannot make direct claims regarding housing, employment or public services through formal state institutions. In this chapter, I will theoretically explore how ‘urban informality’ relates to the exercise of citizenship of the urban poor, focusing on three elements: poverty (the interests of the urban poor), the political opportunity structures (which I also consider as resources) and political agency. In section 2.1, I will elaborate on poverty and exclusion in the megacity, arguing that poverty in contemporary metropolises in the global South is characterised by the interrelated phenomena of informality, violence and inequality. This affects the quality of the social dimensions of citizenship and it determines the conditions for the exercise of political citizenship by the urban poor. For a deeper understanding of political citizenship however one should not only take into account the living conditions of the citizens but also the characteristics of the state. In section 2.2, I therefore explore the relation between informality and the state. I argue why I believe that state worldwide are increasingly characterised by the intermingling of formal and informal political relations and practices. I will suggest analysing this generalised hybridisation of state authority through the lenses of vertical and horizontal hybridity. In section 2.3, I zoom in to political agency in the context of this hybridisation of state power and I will advocate for attention to brokerage in understanding the political agency of the urban poor. Finally, in section 2.4, I will operationalise my conceptual framework for understanding the development of the relation between the urban poor and the state in Mexico City and Khartoum, stressing the importance of studying brokerage for understanding the quality of citizenship for the urban poor.

2.1 Poverty and exclusion in the megacity

Various authors have argued that understanding the characteristics of urbanisation in the global South should not involve a definition of the megacity based only on numbers. Although there are few cities in Africa with over eight million inhabitants, they share common characteristics with their bigger brothers in Latin America and Asia (Rakodi et al 1997: 2). Accordingly, Koonings and Kruijt advocate for a qualitative definition of the megacity that emphasises a certain kind of urban pathology: “a systematic disjuncture between opportunity structures for livelihood, service provision, security and overall urban planning and regulation on the one hand, and the size and the composition of the urban population on the other.” (Kruijt and Koonings 2009: 10). With this definition, they emphasise that urban poverty is an inherent characteristic of the megacity.

Definitions of poverty are subject to on-going debate. Classic poverty definitions usually stress the income-related aspects of poverty, with the one-dollar-a-day threshold long used by organisations such as the World Bank and the United Nations to measure poverty in developing countries. However, over the past two to three decades, there has been a growing recognition of the multi-dimensionality

and political dimensions of poverty. Inspired by the work on freedoms and capabilities developed in the work of Nobel Prize laureate Sen and Nussbaum (Sen and Nussbaum 1993; Sen 1999), among others, the United Nations have developed the Human Development Index, which not only includes income levels as indicators for poverty but also access to social services such as health care and education. The OECD development assistance committee has developed a poverty definition based on five different kinds of assets or 'capabilities' that people need to ensure their livelihoods: human, social, political, cultural and protective capabilities (OECD 2001: 18). The livelihood approach, which has strongly influenced policy circles in the United Kingdom, centres on the issue of access to capabilities (De Haan en Zoomers 2005).

Explanations of poverty range from the macro- to the micro-level. At the macro-level, discussions centre on the need for growth and its distribution, in which the state is supposed to play a central – albeit heavily contested - role. Development sociologists, who generally focus on the micro-level, stress that access to capabilities or resources is ultimately rooted in social processes in which power and conflicts of interests are involved (De Haan en Zoomers 2005). They draw attention to the phenomenon of social in- and exclusion. Tilly (1998; 2007) stresses that social exclusion lies at the heart of inequality-generating processes and that exclusion itself promotes poverty, with some groups excluding others from access to resources with the objective of maximising their own returns. In Tilly's view, social exclusion is shaped through a continuous process of the domination of certain groups of people over others, based on the institutionalisation of categories that resistant to change, such as gender, ethnicity and religion. How do these processes of social in- and exclusion relate to informality in the megacity?

Informality, violence and inequality

Urban poverty has been closely associated with informality since the 1970s, which remains a topic of intense debate. It originated in the economic sphere, where it was mainly associated with economic activities that were not regulated by the state. A landmark study conducted for the ILO in Ghana argued that urban migrants engaged in self-employment activities because they were denied access to the formal labour market (Hart 1973). Later debates have concentrated on the Latin American experience, with the ILO in Latin America (PREALC) having long sustained the dualistic view on the informal economy, considering the informal economy as an alternative to the formal economy and as having formed a safety net for urban marginals. Informal economic activities were considered to have their origins in the labour market. A radically different view on economic informality emerged in the 1980s, with the Peruvian economist De Soto arguing that informal economic activities emerged as a 'bottom-up' response to the overregulation by the (Latin American) state, which essentially protected elite interests (De Soto 1989). In this view, informal economic activities represented the irruption of 'real market forces'. Both approaches have triggered interventions by NGOs and multilateral agencies to address informal economic activities and enterprises as such. Castells and Portes

(1989) advocated yet another perspective, the so-called 'structuralist' view, which closely ties the informal economy to the formal capitalist economy. Castells and Portes also saw the origins of informal economic activities in 'excess labour supply'; however, they did not consider them as marginal, but rather as an integral part of the modern economy. They did not perceive informal economic activities as the 'irruption of true market forces', but rather as part of the normal operation of capitalism, in which private capitalists seek ways to subordinate petty producers and traders (Portes and Schauffler 1992).¹ Advocates of the structuralist view stress that the informal economy also exists in industrialised cities under the influence of neo-liberal globalisation (Portes and Sassen 1987; Sassen 1990).

Based on the aforementioned contrasting views on the informal economy, economic activities have been described as informal based on different characteristics: the nature of the activity (different kinds of enterprises that do not comply with regulation requirements); employment categories (self-employed, employees and employers of informal enterprises); the location of employment (home-based, street-based or temporal workers) or income and employment enhancing potential (Gilbert 2004; Flodman Becker 2004: 11-15). Owing to these multiple definitions and the lack of available data on unregistered and unregulated activities, the measurement of the informal economy has represented a challenge to date. Notwithstanding, it is unmistakable that many inhabitants of slums in Africa, Asia and Latin America work as day labourers, whether in construction or domestic work, as carriers at the market, from home for large textile manufacturers or as self-employed taxi-drivers or street vendors (Bayat 2001; Chatterjee 2004). Indeed, estimates suggest that the informal economy accounts for 45% of the urban labour force in Khartoum, Sudan's capital (Abdalla 2008: 39).

The notion of informality has not remained confined to the economy, with Moser (1978) described the informal sector in the late-1970s as "the urban poor, or as the people living in slums or squatter settlements." Again, this concerned unregulated settlements. In 2003, UN-Habitat published a report calling attention for the growing phenomenon of slums. The UN defines slums as being characterised by a lack of access for its inhabitants to improved water and sanitation, sufficient living area, durable housing and secure tenure.² Millions of those who live in metropolises around the world nowadays live on land where they have no tenure security, and this number will further increase in the coming decades. However, this does not mean that all those who live on informally or illegally acquired land are poor, and Roy and Alsayyad emphasise the increasing informality in land and real estate markets in urban areas throughout the world (Roy and Alsayyad 2004: 2). Nonetheless, informality in the form of tenure insecurity is often associated with urban poverty, because governments usually do not provide basic and social services in unregulated areas.

¹ Rakowski (1994) divides the debate between the structuralist view based in the ILO dualistic view and also includes the later neo-Marxist and dependency 'underground' views; and the legalist view that includes the view of De Soto and the micro-enterprise view.

² UN-habitat Global Report on Human Settlements: The Challenge of Slums, revision 2010.

Informality borders illegality and violence, with alternative means of social regulation that exist beyond the control of the state often challenging the state's monopoly on violence. An increasing number of studies, particularly concerning Latin America, have pointed out that life in Southern metropolises is affected by widespread insecurity and violence.³ While the physical threat from authoritarian regimes has disappeared in Latin American countries, it has been substituted with a blatant rise in crime and the presence of violent actors, particularly in the urban domain. For example, in the case of Colombia, such actors are former paramilitaries who have continued their careers as private security operators or drug traffickers. In some of Latin America's largest cities, alternative power holders such as drug lords have established their own local authorities in parts of the urban territory (Leeds 1996; Arias 2004). Moreover, in other cases, new violent actors are members of newly-founded youth gangs that occupy the streets of many of the metropolises (Jones and Rodgers 2009). Rotker (2002) and Moser and McIlwaine (2004) have drawn attention to the fact that many inhabitants of Latin American metropolises live their lives in fear, while Beall (2009) and Rodgers (2010) even speak of 'urban civic wars' and 'slum wars'.

This phenomenon of increasing urban violence is not only known in Latin America, but also in Africa and Asia. For instance, South African townships have experienced a dramatic increase of physical violence following the end of apartheid (Chabedi 2003). Violence ranges from criminal violence to outright civil wars that are fought out in urban domains (Bayart 2010: xxxi).⁴ In parts of the Sudanese and other African capitals, militias and released army soldiers are exercising their power as war lords (Young 2007). Moreover, Asian cities such as Karachi, Mumbai and Ahmedabad have witnessed scenes of communal violence (Blom Hansen 2001; Verkaarik 2004; Berenschot 2011). Middle Eastern cities had shown a somewhat different trajectory prior to the Arab Spring, in the sense that violence was almost exclusively in the hands of the state. However, the question remains as to what developments we will see in the urban centres of the regime once the dust of the Arab Spring has settled.

Increasing informality co-exists with increasing inequality, with megacities in the global South playing host to both abject poverty and incredible wealth (Appaduraj 2002; UN-Habitat 2004; Heller and Evans 2010). Since the 1970s, inequality in cities has taken such extreme forms that authors have pointed at the rise of 'divided cities' (Walton 1976). Although inequality has particularly reflected a feature of Latin American societies, it is also increasingly occurring in Africa and Asia.⁵

³ See for example Caldeira (2001); Rotker (2002); Moser and McIlwaine (2004); Arias (2004); Davis (2006); Auyero (2007); Koonings and Kruijt (2007).

⁴ Beall, Goodfellow and Rodgers (2011) make a useful distinction between sovereign conflicts (urban conflicts where international actors are involved), civil conflicts (where one of the parties is the government) and civic conflicts (conflicts between communities, such as gang wars) in this respect.

⁵ Bayart points at increasing polarisation within African societies (Bayart 2010: 69).

There are good reasons to assume that inequality will become particularly manifest in African and Asian cities, given that is where wealth tends to accumulate, yet also where masses of rural migrants will arrive to find work. Inequality is related to informality through the issue of access: formal housing and employment opportunities are only accessible to a limited number of urban inhabitants. Consequently, those excluded from such opportunities often resort to informal alternatives. Like informality, inequality has only increased in the urban sphere.

Already in 1976, Perlman criticised the modernist thesis that inequality would disappear with urbanisation: based on her study on Brazil's urban poor, she argued that inequality was not a matter of the temporary marginalisation of groups of inhabitants that related to a lack of integration into the urban fabric (Perlman 1976). By contrast, she argued that the poor were in fact fully integrated in urban economy and society from their arrival, albeit in a dependent way, with their exclusion being reproduced in social interaction. In her revision of the 'myth of marginality' in 2005, she found that this phenomenon was likely to endure (Perlman 2005). Indeed, the same is now being said about informality. Whereas the main belief in the 1970s was that informality was a temporary phenomenon, recent publications highlight that 'informality' in cities is not about to disappear, and has become more rather than less important. Studies indicate that informality is a dominant feature of different aspects of urban life in contemporary (mega)cities (Roy and Alsayyad 2004).

The relation between informality, poverty and violence is not straightforward. Informality is not confined to the lives of the urban poor and formality does not guarantee wealth. Indeed, people who are formally employed can still be poorly paid (Perlman 2005), whereas people living in formal housing can very well engage in informal income activities and be rich. The illegal economy, which is usually also considered as a part of the informal economy, produces both poverty and wealth. Moreover, Roy and Alsayyad indicate that urban residents are increasingly working both in the formal and informal sectors; for example, government workers having to earn an extra living as (informal) taxi drivers (Roy and Alsayyad 2004: 25). Informality can be a result of social exclusion, because due to a lack of access to formal opportunities people resort to informal alternatives. However, under the premise that state regulation is intended to guarantee equal access to public benefits for all members of a political community, informality can also foster processes of in- and exclusion that benefit some and deprive others. It enhances alternative forms of social regulation that also incorporate alternative forms of violence. Therefore, informality is likely to enlarge inequality and reduce the quality of citizenship.

The paradox of urban citizenship

Citizenship is generally understood as referring to the relation between the members of a political community and their government.⁶

⁶ Different definitions stress different elements of that relation: rights derived from a certain legal status, identification with a community or political participation (Leydet 2011).

Our present concept has historically developed in Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world and is closely tied to the democratic nation-state. In this historical context, the individual has transformed from a political subject into a rights-bearing individual who has agency.⁷ Citizenship not only includes the equal right to participate in the main political institutions such as elections and political parties, but also to benefit from collective goods and enjoy the protection of the government under the rule of law, in turn for obligations such as taxpaying, fulfilling military service, etc. (Tilly 1998: 198). The sorts of rights associated with citizenship developed in parallel with the human rights agenda in the 20th century, namely: civil, political and social rights.⁸ These different rights have been incorporated into the notions of civic citizenship, political citizenship and social citizenship, whereby civic citizenship refers to the right to life and physical protection and the freedom of speech, the freedom to organise, etc. Political citizenship refers to the right to participate, both actively and passively, in public decision-making through the regular political channels, whereas social citizenship refers to the right to benefit from collective goods or social welfare.

For Tilly, citizenship is intrinsically linked to equality. He argues that citizenship consists of mutual rights and obligations binding governmental agents to categories of people who are subject to the government's authority. The centrality of equality to his understanding of citizenship is expressed in the following quote: "those categories are chiefly or exclusively defined by relations to the government rather than reference to particular connections with rulers or membership in categories based on imputed durable traits such race, ethnicity, gender or religion." In other words, in the relations of those groups of people to the government, collective differences in terms of race, ethnicity etcetera do not matter. Citizenship institutionalises regular, categorical relations between subjects and their governments (Tilly 2004: 128). Moreover, according to Tilly, the quality of citizenship concerns the (institutionalised) quality of a subject relation to government and its authority...[this] in turn exists in inverse proportion to the degree to which a subject's relations to government are mediated by categorical inequalities (Heller and Evans 2010). The more inequalities influence the relation between governments and those subject to their authority, the less the quality of citizenship.

Kabeer (2005) offers a complementary perspective on the aforementioned political-legalistic interpretation of citizenship from the view of the poor themselves. She proposes a broad definition of citizenship that extends far beyond the legalistic approach, stressing values upon which the relation between the state and citizens should be shaped according to the poor, namely justice, recognition, self-determination and solidarity, even if it happens in non-institutionalised, non-legal

⁷ According to different authors, the rise of the nation-state and the rise of citizenship as a central concept for understanding the relation between a government and the people living under its authority were intimately connected to the rise of capitalism (rooted in the expropriation of the modes of production and its separation from labour), because the delinking of individual mobility and choice of traditional confines defined by birth and status was central to both. See O'Donnell (2004:16-28) and Chatterjee (2004: 30-31).

⁸ In his famous essay on citizenship, T.H. Marshall developed the argument that social rights should be considered as the right to welfare. See Marshall (1950).

ways. Experiences of exclusion run counter to their own expectations of citizenship, within which a certain degree of 'equality' also plays a central role.

It becomes clear from the description of exclusion in the Southern megacity that I provided earlier, that despite political citizenship being formally acknowledged in most countries, its quality is significantly reduced by a lack of social and civic citizenship. Chatterjee points out that while many urban residents have 'entitlements', they have difficulties in claiming citizenship rights (Chatterjee 2004). Given that the urban poor have limited access to justice, good health care and education, they are also deprived of the tools to actively participate in politics.⁹ In order to capture these tensions between the different dimensions of citizenship, some distinguish between formal and substantive citizenship (Holston and Appaduraj 1996: 190). Formal citizenship merely refers to the membership of a political community, with all the attached formal rights (the right to participate in public decision-making), whereas substantive citizenship refers to the civic and social rights that are supportive to the exercise of political rights. In many Southern megacities, formal citizenship is not sustained by substantive citizenship.

Citizenship in the urban arena is thus heavily compromised. However, urban sociologists such as Castells (1983) have long argued that cities represent the stage for new forms of political mobilisation. Indeed, Castells argues that the relationship between the state and the popular masses in the 'Third World' in general is increasingly shaped by the new forms of interaction between the city and grassroots (Castells 1983: 175). Moreover, Holston and Appaduraj (1996) have stressed that this is particularly the case for large cities. It is at the fringes of the large cities in the global South where the most innovative forms of claim-making arise (Appaduraj 2002; Chatterjee 2004). The complexity of citizenship in megacities is intensified by residents lacking equal access to protection and social services provided for by the state, while they can participate in elections and cities worldwide are characterised as sites where political mobilisation occurs. Accordingly, due to such paradoxes, authors have stressed that struggles for citizenship are ubiquitous in Southern megacities (Heller and Evans 2010). This apparent contradiction raises the question of how processes of urban exclusion and political agency interact. How is citizenship shaped in a context of increasing urban informality? If we want to understand how this struggle for citizenship is shaped in practice, we also have to consider informality in relation to the role of the state.

2.2 Informality and the state

Informality in the political sphere has been studied from various perspectives, one of which involves the political practices of the informals. Such studies have focused on how people living in informal (housing and employment) conditions have engaged in claim-making vis-à-vis authorities, with examples including the works of Cross (1994) on street vendors in Mexico City, Eckstein (1990b) on struggles for housing in Mexico City or Bayat on the politics of the urban poor in Teheran and

⁹ Also see O'Donnell (1996) and Kruijt et al (2002).

Cairo (Bayat 1997; 1997b). These studies place emphasis on the unregulated aspects of people's livelihoods. A second perspective focuses on informal politics as political practices based on principles other than those anchored in the institutions of the democratic nation-state. These practices are not necessarily targeted at or enhanced by the poor; instead, they can very well be developed by powerful individuals within the state. In this perspective, the emphasis lies on the particularistic character of political relations (O'Donnell 1996; Helmke and Levitsky 2006). While both perspectives focus on the relations between the state and citizens, a third perspective concentrates on alternative governance arrangements set-up and managed by non-state actors. Chatterjee (2004) provides the example of squatters who cannot receive electricity from government institutions, yet are able to negotiate a rental contract with a private company because that benefits the company more than when people steal electricity (Chatterjee 2004: 56). While such arrangements are not necessarily particularistic, they are shaped outside the sphere of the state, which is normally seen as the embodiment and main protagonist of the 'public good'. Geographical areas (in and outside the urban domain) in which territorial and functional state presence is limited and where its functions are taken over by local privatised power arrangements have been described by O'Donnell as 'brown areas' (O'Donnell 1993: 11), while Leeds (1996) pointed at the existence of 'parallel authorities' in Brazilian favelas. Overall, all such perspectives point at some form of informal politics.

It has been increasingly underlined that even in areas where state authority is limited or contested, it is hardly ever absent. Therefore, the notion of 'parallel authorities' has been criticised by scholars emphasising that other forms of (illegal) authority often co-exist and even interact with state authority (see, for example Arias 2005). Actors within the state are being said to apply particularistic and universalistic logics interchangeably (Pansters 2009: 15), and the urban 'informals' can very well participate in formal political processes such as elections. Therefore, authority and politics are increasingly understood in hybrid terms: in mixed forms of formal and informal governance, whereby formal governance refers to governance according to the rules of the state and informal governance refers to other forms of social and political regularisation.

Different continents have generated different analytical concepts for the understanding of informality and the mixture of formal and informal authority. Recent studies on urban violence from Latin America have introduced the concept "grey zones" of state power in the study of the relations between the state and the urban poor. This concept reflects an elaboration of the term "brown areas" that refer to geographical locations where territorial and functional state presence is minimal and local 'privatised' power arrangements take over in the presence of state organisations (O'Donnell 1993: 11). Auyero (2007) uses the term "grey zones" to describe the blurring of boundaries between the universalistic and particularistic, or even criminal, behaviour of state actors (Auyero 2007).

In Africanist literature¹⁰, the discussion on hybridity between formality and informality in the political sphere has elaborated on the concept of neo-patrimonialism, which is described by Erdmann and Engel (2006: 18) as a mixture of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. In Asian literature, the phenomenon of informality in public governance is dealt with in the context of 'the anthropology of the state', which calls attention for the blurring boundaries of the state's institutions in a context of neo-liberal globalisation and liberalisation (Gupta 1996; Chatterjee 2004; Sharma and Gupta 2006). In terms of understanding the hybridisation of authority, I argue that it is helpful to take a closer look at interrelated yet different forms of political informality and the subsequent intermingling of formal and informal forms of authority. For the sake of analytical clarity, I will distinguish between vertical and horizontal hybridity.

Vertical and horizontal hybridity

A discussion on vertical and horizontal hybridity necessitates a further exploration of different forms of informality, drawing on the perspectives that I have introduced earlier. The first two perspectives that I mentioned ('the politics of the informals' and 'particularistic politics') both concentrate on the relations between citizens and the state. These relations have long formed the centre of attention for political anthropologists and sociologists who have concentrated on studying 'politics from below'. Since the 1950s, their attention has focused on clientelism: a means of integrating constituencies to the political system through dyadic relations between a political patron and client or group of clients.¹¹ Clientelism is mostly associated with vertical power relations in which powerful actors at the top (within the state) are linked to powerless actors at the bottom (the clients). A wave of democratic transitions between the decolonisation of Africa in the 1950s and the fall of authoritarian regimes in Latin America in the 1980s, and particularly their unmet expectations, has also placed this kind of informal politics on the agenda of political scientists (O'Donnell 1996; Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Pansters 2009).

Political scientists have usually explained the limited success of democratic institutions (in terms of guaranteeing equal access) by means of pointing at the continuing existence of informal, 'pre-democratic', political practices. In this context, 'informal politics' has come to refer to a particularistic political logic that runs contrary to the logic of democratic citizenship, in which all citizens are bound to the nation-state in an equal way. The 'informal' logic persists within the institutions of the nation-state, because this logic depends on the behaviour of individual actors within the state. For example, Helmke and Levitsky argue that informal institutions can be substitutive, competitive, complementary or accommodating to formal (democratic) institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). Erdmann and Engel, along with other academics studying African politics, refer to this intermingling of political 'logics' with neo-patrimonialism: a mixture of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination (Erdman and Engel 2006: 18).

¹⁰ See for example Chabal and Daloz (1999).

¹¹ See for example Wolf (1956); Lemarchand and Legg (1972); Schmidt, Scott, Landé and Guasti (1977); Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984).

Accordingly, these forms of informality can be considered as vertical, while the mixture that arises between these informal (particularistic) and formal political practices can be considered as vertical hybridity.

However, I contend that another form of hybridity in the political sphere has arisen in the context of active politics of deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation. This 'horizontal hybridity' is rooted in the increasing role of non-state actors (that can be officially sanctioned or regularised, although do not necessarily have to be) in public governance and the consequential intermingling of tasks and roles between public and private institutions. While this does not necessarily undermine the 'public interest' in terms of equal access to public goods for all members of a political community, it undermines the role of the state as the main guarantor of that public interest.

The observation that state authority co-exists with other forms of authority is not new. In fact, different views have emerged at different times within social sciences concerning whether or not it was justified to treat the state as an autonomous object of study.¹² A current compromise is found in the view that the state is an autonomous object of study but that it should not be considered a homogenous structure or even a homogenous actor. The 'anthropology of the state' stresses that the state should be conceptualised as an accumulation of practices, struggles and negotiated outcomes that can only be produced in interaction with groups in society.¹³ More broadly, authors have pointed out that the state is not alone in producing (political) authority (Mitchell 1991; Rose and Miller 1992; Migdal 2001). Migdal argues that the state has to continuously compete with different groups in society for the power to set the rules for guiding people's behaviour (Migdal 2001). Authoritative and autonomous forces in society shape the state as much as they have been shaped by it (Migdal 2001: 107).

Two evident examples of alternative authority bearers that are mostly considered informal are ethnic and religious leaders. Ethnicity and religion as powerful community identifications necessarily interact with the state. The state and ethnic identification are mutually constitutive, with ethnic identification based on a belief or conviction to pertain to a certain community that can compete with the nation as an imagined community (Anderson 1983; 2006). Bayart for example points out that ethnicity in Africa is of recent creation, having not existed much longer than the state itself (Bayart 2010: 47). He argues that ethnicity in Africa is largely mingled with the phenomenon of the state (Bayart 2010: 49). Roy and Alsayyad (2004) emphasise a distinctive feature of Middle-Eastern politics and state-society relations being the role played by religion. Religious organisations are often the main providers of social services in poor areas, either in alliance with or in opposition to the state (Turam 2004; Harmsen 2008).

¹² It was 'put on stage' by Weber, subsequently taken off by the political systems approach (Almond), reintroduced by Evans, Ruschmeyer and Skocpol in 1985 and then problematised again in the current-day anthropology of the state.

¹³ See for example Joseph and Nugent (1994); Hansen and Stepputat (2001); Sharma and Gupta (2006).

The rise of populist fundamentalism in the Middle-East (for example, Hezbollah in Libanon, Hamas in the Palestine Territories, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) is important for service provision to the urban poor (Roy and Alsayyad 2004: 3). While these religious organizations perform state tasks, they contribute to horizontal hybridity.

I argue that despite the idea of the state competing for power with other authority bearers in society not being new, it has intensified in a context of rapid urbanisation and liberalisation. Owing to the disjuncture between the needs of the growing population and the limited capacities of many governments, new forms of leadership and authority arise in a context of rapid urbanisation, operating within the framework of formal state authority. The state actually depends on these other authorities for the provision of public services and the maintenance of its own authority. In some cases, private institutions such as NGOs, companies, traditional leaders or religious organisations work according to the state's demand, whereas in other cases they carry out public tasks on their own initiative under the auspices of the state. When state tasks are handed over to private companies NGOs or informal authority bearers, 'the public' is increasingly being shaped outside the state. Lund captures the private institutions that carry out public tasks by the notion of 'twilight institutions': institutions that operate in the twilight between state and society, between public and private and between the formal and informal (Lund 2006a: 678). The organisations involved are not necessarily informal in nature (although they can be, in the case of traditional or religious leaders for example), while their operations are not necessarily particularistic. However, the fact that public and private entities and their operations are intermingled can be considered hybrid, given that it challenges common distinctions between 'the private' and 'the public' and 'state' and 'non-state'. In the context of the present study, I consider it useful to interpret this development as increasing 'horizontal hybridity', drawing attention to the relation between the state and the urban poor in the megacity being increasingly influenced by other powerful non-state actors.

I make the assumption that vertical and horizontal hybridity reinforce each other in the context of contemporary megacities. The particularistic in politics is more likely to increase than decrease in the context of rapid and large scale urbanisation, given that the state has to rely on other authority bearers to provide services to the population. Vertical and horizontal hybridity become interlinked when 'informal' authorities start acting as mediators between the state and the urban poor. However, these authorities cannot simply be seen as positioned between the state and the urban poor, because they also derive their power and authority from independent sources such as third governments, international religious associations or private philanthropists. Furthermore, they can also provide public goods in accordance with a universalistic logic, although this does not make them part of the state. Any examination of the claim-making practices of the urban poor in the Southern megacity cannot succeed without taking these actors into account.

Therefore, I argue that imagining the field of claim-making as a 'grey zone' between the state and other authority bearers and between the state, other authority bearers and society offers the best possibility for achieving this.

The grey zone: a myriad of connections

As already mentioned, several studies from Latin America have portrayed the hybridisation of formal and informal politics through the concept of a 'grey zone'. I believe that this concept provides a useful lens for understanding the context for political agency in the megacity, given that it gives room to incorporate different forms of 'hybridity'. Moreover, it allows for the incorporation of alternative authority bearers. The "grey zone" has not only been used in Latin America, with various authors having used the concept to indicate similar, yet not identical, developments. For example, Yiftachel (2009) treats grey zones merely as geographical expressions of urban informality. For him, the concept of 'grey space' refers to developments, enclaves, populations and transactions positioned between the 'lightness' of legality/approval/safety and the 'darkness' of eviction/destruction/death. He argues that 'grey spaces' are often tolerated by urban planners, and sometimes even explicitly promoted. Moreover, "grey spacing" can also be used in the active form as a form of "oppressive politics" (Yiftachel 2009:247-250). Yiftachel points at informalisation as a strategy of exclusion in the context of 'grey spaces' in which Bedouin Arabs in the Southern regions of Israel/Palestine have been forced by the Israeli state through their denial indigenous of land rights, reflecting a "hyper example of structural relations unfolding in thousands of cities across the globe" (Yiftachel 2009: 250).

Auyero does not employ the term "grey zone" in the sense of a geographical location, but rather as a relational phenomenon in which alliances between the state and clandestine actors stand out. He formulates the grey zones as "[an area of] clandestine relationships where routine politics converges with extraordinary violence" (Auyero 2007: 19, 25). He conceives the grey zone as "both an empirical object and an analytical lens that draws our attention to a murky area where normative boundaries dissolve, where state actors and political elites promote and/or actively tolerate and/or participate in damage-making" (Auyero 2007: 32). Therefore, Auyero points specifically at the existence of a grey zone of *clandestinity* (Auyero 2007: 20-21, my emphasis). Furthermore, he also draws attention to a study on multiparty politics in sub-Saharan Africa to highlight that the grey zone also exists there, where "ruling elites, when threatened by local opposition and forced into reform by external actors [...] resort to informal repression" - that is, "covert violations sponsored by government authorities but carried out by third actors" (Auyero 2007: 34).

However, Auyero's notion of the "grey zone" is not based on the element of clandestinity; rather, he claims himself that it is an elaboration of O'Donnell's 'brown areas'. Despite Auyero pointing to the role of the state in damage making, he also uses examples from a variety of cases. In fact, when describing the grey zone,

Auyero is also talking about the ‘outsourcing’ of a core state task (security) to a third actor. He considers the ‘grey zone’ situated within the zone of clientelism that connects routine party politics with survival practices in everyday life (Auyero 2007: 48), or in other words, when clientelism produces collective violence, it occurs within the grey zone. From his perspective, the grey zone refers to “a set of clandestine and routinised relations between actors within that zone: residents, brokers and repressive forces (of the state)” (Auyero 2007: 49). Koonings and Kruijt use the concept of ‘grey areas’, where the boundaries between the formal and the informal, the legal and the illegal, the lawful and the unlawful and the civil and the uncivil generally become blurred (Koonings and Kruijt 2009: 20). With different contexts in mind, all such authors point to the importance of informality and stress the need to understand how power operates within grey zones.

I consider the principle of dissolving boundaries and changing roles more important than the nature of those boundaries in terms of the explanation of politics within the megacity. Therefore, I suggest expanding the notion of the “grey zone” beyond the sphere of clandestinity and violence to include not only clandestine connections between residents, party agents and brokers, but also connections between residents and party agents with non-state non-clandestine actors and institutions that operate with double logics: particularistic and universalistic (vertical hybridity) or private and public (horizontal hybridity). Many states have engaged in outsourcing tasks formally or informally to non-public institutions or individuals, or in making community leaders and traditional administrators co-responsible for the execution of their tasks. I expect that double functions and logics of actors positioned between state and society, either within or outside the state institutions, are crucial for understanding the claim-making practices of the urban poor in megacities. Finally, I will take a closer look at what these assertions imply for an understanding of political agency.

2.3 Political agency in the grey zone

Urban informality touches upon the economic and living standards of the urban excluded, as well as urban governance arrangements. As argued above, state authority is increasingly hybrid in the sense that boundaries between the state and other authority bearers become blurred with other authority bearers also engaging in the performance of state tasks. Moreover, the boundaries between particularistic and universalistic state-society relations also become blurred. Let me then return to the issue of political agency. In the context described above, how does political agency of the urban poor come about? How do the mobilisation repertoires of the urban poor interact with those of other actors involved, and particularly with those employed by the state?

I have already pointed out that the political process approach in social movement studies analyses the opportunities (a combination of incentives and constraints) that arise for social movements based on the configuration of regimes. Political opportunity structures refer to “features of regimes and institutions (e.g. splits in

the ruling class) that facilitate or inhibit a political actor's collective action" and to "changes in those features" (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 49).¹⁴ In 'open political opportunity structures' – i.e. structures where many changes occur – mobilization is more likely to occur than in 'closed political opportunity structures'. Furthermore, Tilly and Tarrow argue that regimes principally differ in their degrees of governmental capacity¹⁵ and democracy (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 22).¹⁶ These differences among regimes matter most in terms of the *sorts of claim-making* (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 55). Put briefly, Tilly and Tarrow assume that social movements are likely to prevail in high-capacity democracies, while low-capacity undemocratic regimes are most frequently the stage of civil wars. The idea of political opportunity structure incorporates a notion of agency in the sense that it assumes 'feedback loops' between strategies of the urban poor and strategies of the government: the urban poor do not only react to the framework set by the government but they also anticipate on what the government is likely to employ as a strategy.¹⁷

These premises have inspired many studies from different continents that have related political mobilisation of the (urban) poor to the regime in place. However, the view on political opportunities that attributes the main differences between forms of mobilization to regime types is being challenged by current-day citizenship struggles in the urban global South. Indeed, recent empirical evidence suggests that different strategies can be combined over time and space, according to the interests and opportunities provided by the context, with the assumption that certain regimes only feature certain types of collective action having proven too simplistic. For example, Bayat (2001) has pointed out that strategies under authoritarian regimes can be both individual and offensive at the same time. Moreover, Auyero and others (2009) have demonstrated that different strategies, in this case clientelism and social movements, can occur within the same political context at different points in time. I therefore contend that despite the concept of political opportunity structures still holding importance in our thinking about state-society interaction, it is important to acknowledge a few important limitations to it. For example, the concept has been criticised for being too elite-centred, focusing on regimes, understood as the relations among governments, established political actors, challengers and outside political actors, including other governments (Nicholls 2008). Moreover, it is also state-centred in the narrow sense of the word, not taking into account the influence of non-state actors on political configurations. Furthermore, it does not explicitate the relation between formal and informal political mobilisation.

14 Political opportunity structures include six properties of a regime: 1) the multiplicity of independent centres of power within it; 2) its openness to new actors; 3) the instability of current political alignments; 4) the availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers; 5) the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim-making; and 6) decisive changes in items 1 to 5 (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 57).

15 Defined as "the extent to which governmental action affects the character and the distribution of population, activity and resources within the government's territory" (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 55)

16 In the political process approach within social movement studies, but also in the perspective of for example Bayat who suggests that differences in mobilisation repertoires between Latin-America and the Middle-East can be largely explained by the characteristics of the regime in power. AlSayyad explains them in terms of cultural differences (AlSayyad 1996).

17 Corresponding to Giddens' notion of structuration whereby structures are continuously being shaped by agency and agency is shaped by structures (Giddens 1986).

Perhaps the most overarching limitation is that it fails to explain how the interaction between the state and society actually works. Studies from Latin America, Asia and the Middle East point out that the daily claim-making of the urban poor often takes place outside the (state) institutions created for political participation.¹⁸ I will strive to overcome this limitation by understanding the grey zone of state power as the political opportunity structure in which the urban poor can make their claims. As previously explained, I interpret the grey zone as a zone of actors and institutions that operate with double (or multiple) logics in vertical and horizontal directions: between the state and the urban poor and between the state and other authority bearers.

Looking through agency in the grey zone, where boundaries are blurred and roles overlap, implies paying specific attention to brokerage. Brokerage can be conceived as “the linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet other sites” (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 2001). In politics, brokerage has been predominantly considered a means of connecting constituents to the state, mostly through clientelistic patterns. Eric Wolf introduced the term brokerage into the socio-political sphere (Wolf 1956), calling for a study on the mechanisms that connected community-oriented groups with nation-oriented groups, in order to increase our understanding of politics in complex societies. In Wolf’s view, political brokerage is almost hierarchical by definition, loaded with power asymmetries and competition. Wolf considered brokers between community- and nation-oriented groups as *political entrepreneurs*, as agents operate with a Janus-head. Brokers are individuals who improve their status through the judicious manipulation of social ties and are able to operate both in terms of community- and nation-oriented groups. He stressed the power maximisation aspect of these practices, whereby the broker would mediate in these conflicts without reconciling them, because that would undermine his own position.¹⁹ Wolf argued that these entrepreneurs exist in every complex society. Adding to Wolf’s argument, complex societies can be considered as a political market place²⁰ where political elites compete for the population’s loyalty. It was only the way in which their manipulative behaviour was expressed or organised that is culturally patterned. In his later work, particularly on Mexico, his orientation developed to the commonly-known form of hierarchical brokerage: patronage or clientelism (Wolf 1977). As the archetype of the clientelist broker in Mexico, he studied the *cacique* (Wolf 1967).

Brokerage and clientelism has been described for all continents. In the Middle-Eastern context, attention has been drawn to ‘ethnic clientelism’ and the system of *wasta*²¹ (Cunningham and Sarayrah 1993).

18 See for example Bayat (2001); Appaduraj (2002); Chatterjee (2004); Holston (2008).

19 These refer more to the brokers occupying ‘structural holes’.

20 A term borrowed from De Waal (2009).

21 This phenomenon exists throughout the globe, see the different words used for it: ‘Piston’ in French, ‘Palanca’ in Spanish, ‘guanxi’ in Chinese. See Pansters (2009).

It was originally a conflict mediation tool within the tribal system, yet has subsequently evolved into a practice of the distribution of resources (Ronsin 2010). The modern meaning of *wasta* refers to both the act and the person who mediates or intercedes in specific situations. Nowadays, any person in power, mostly in the public sector, can be considered a potential *wasta* for their family and friends. Ronsin (2010) argues that the modern use of *wasta* reflects a combination of both tribal practice and modernisation. In her studied case of Jordan, *wasta* is deeply intertwined with state development. This resulted from the imposition of central authority on the tribal system, triggering the appearance of individuals (again, political entrepreneurs) capable of acting as intermediaries between tribesmen and the growing administration (Ronsin 2010: 2). Despite being detrimental for the costs of economic transactions, *wasta* also serves to legitimise both the state and the mediator (Ronsin 2010: 4).

In Africa, political literature has been dominated over the last thirty years by the phenomenon of the “Big Man”, a term originally stemming from a study on Melanesia (Sahlins 1963). Within that study, Sahlins argued that the main characteristic of the Big-Man was his personal style of rule, which comes close to the Weberian ideal type of patrimonial rule. Médard argues that, more than the original description by Sahlins, the Big Man in contemporary Africa should be seen as a *political entrepreneur* who accumulates power through the activity of brokerage between different positions (Medard 1992). Intermediation becomes his central feature. Despite the ‘Big Man’ being somewhat tied to the specific case of politics in Africa, he can be roughly compared to the Mexican *caudillo*: the main characteristics of the Big Man are his personalised, symbolic power and his function as an intermediary (Pansters 2005; Utas 2012).

Most of these interpretations of brokerage and resource exchange have thus stressed aspects of vertical domination, and have often been closely associated to the study of clientelism. I argue that this view might require revision in the context of the Southern megacity. First, not all forms of brokerage in the megacity are necessarily linked to the state. Bierschenk et al (2002) highlight that a new type of broker has emerged in the context of the withdrawal of the developmental state and the proliferation of (public and private, multilateral and bilateral) development aid in parts of Africa: the local development broker. They are “the social actors implanted in a local arena (in whose politics they are directly or indirectly involved) and who serve as intermediaries who drain off (in the direction of the social space corresponding this area) external resources in the form of development cooperation” (Bierschenk et al 2002: 4). These development brokers can also be supposed to function between the urban poor and urban alternative authority bearers, such as international NGOs funded by other governments, as well as religious organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

Second, brokerage is not necessarily vertical. It can also be horizontal.²² For example, social movement studies have been much more associated with horizontal networks and information exchange than with vertical brokerage. Brokerage is important for social movements in order to organise and mobilise, and particularly to broaden the scope and impact of social movements. Nicholls (2008) uses this as an explanation for why social movements often arise in cities: he argues that because cities are sites of many 'strong ties' (groups in which individuals have many overlapping connections) that are required for mobilization, and 'weak ties' (the availability of many groups that exist in close proximity to one another) that provide opportunities for resource sharing, they become sites for mobilisation.

Given that social movements have been associated more with horizontal and cooperative networks, they have often been portrayed as the anti-thesis of clientelism. Clientelism was often considered as a form of informal politics in the developing world, even as a remnant of the traditional past that would disappear with political modernization. Social movements on the contrary were often considered as 'modern' forms of contestation, because they mostly existed within democracies. However, literature from different corners of the world now suggests that clientelism in its different forms is not about to disappear (Fox 1994; Chabal and Daloz 1997; Lust 2009). Moreover, within social movements horizontal and vertical brokerage can very well coincide (Auyero 2007²³). Hellman for example points out that so-called new social movements in Latin America, and particularly in Mexico, often function based on clientelistic logics (Hellman 2008). This suggests that brokerage might actually remain much more central in explaining contemporary state-society interaction than is often assumed, particularly in the Southern megacity. I therefore align with authors of the contentious politics group who advocate for employing a relational approach towards understanding political mobilisation, stressing the importance of the studies of mechanisms such as brokerage (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2008; McAdam and Tarrow 2011). Despite many practices of brokerage rooted in history, I expect that they acquire new meaning in the context of rapid and unequal urbanisation. In a context where government regulation cannot keep up with the growing demands of the population, a 'political market' arises whereby the daily needs of the urban poor and the need for popular support of political leaders are connected through political 'entrepreneurs'. However, the resources of these brokers extend beyond the urban poor and the state. Indeed, brokers form connections between the state and the urban poor and between the state and other authority bearers.

22 This has extensively been debated in social network theory. 'Vertical' brokers that occupy monopoly positions between networks occupy so-called 'structural holes' as identified by Burt (1992). Horizontal brokerage relates to the 'weak ties' thesis of Granovetter (1973): weak ties facilitate the spread of information between different networks.

23 Kilduff (2012) offers a compelling argument for why the often considered opposed network theories of 'structural holes' (related to vertical brokerage based on monopoly positions) and 'strong and weak ties' (related to horizontal information exchange and mobilization) can actually be very well complementary.

2.4 Operationalising the grey zone

My conceptual framework starts with the commonly accepted assumption that the political agency of the urban poor depends on interests, resources and opportunities. In the previous sections, I have argued how the interests, resources and opportunities for the claim-making for the urban poor are affected by informality. Moreover, I have also argued that I consider the “grey zone” as the opportunity structure in which the urban poor can claim their citizenship rights. In this grey zone, brokers operate between the state and the urban poor, as well as between the state and other authority bearers. The question emerges of how this works in practice: how do the actors in the grey zone shape the political agency of the urban poor? This requires a further exploration of the actors involved, their relations and practices. I will offer a preliminary exploration here, before subsequently elaborating upon the issue in the empirical chapters that follow.


I argue that the crux of the grey zone involves actors continuously switching between different roles and different logics in different directions: between representing the state and representing particularistic interests on the one hand (which leads to vertical hybridity), and between the state and other authority bearers on the other (which leads to horizontal hybridity). When state functionaries act according to a particularistic logic (or partial interest), or when the urban poor address state functionaries according to a particularistic logic (for example, asking for a favour to a state functionary they know), this can be considered vertical hybridity. Vertical hybridity concerns state actors and citizens adopting a particularistic rather than universalistic logic, and it depends on the rules of the game according to which actors play their roles.

State institutions are responsible for the provision of public goods and services in poor areas of megacities. They are supposed to arrange the regulation of land and housing, whilst also being responsible for the provision of services such as water, electricity and drainage, as well as health and education. States sometimes outsource the execution of their tasks to other actors such as private companies or NGOs. Furthermore, NGOs or religious organisations also engage in the provision of health care and education on their own behalf, either with external funds or on invitation of the state. Moreover, residents can also organise themselves for services, typically on the basis of community organisations. As NGOs, religious organisations or community organisations acquire power and authority they can be considered alternative ‘authority bearers’. Horizontal hybridity expresses the intermingling between the state and these other authority bearers. The vertical and horizontal intermingling of logics and roles is interlinked. Alternative authority bearers may end up mediating between the state and the urban poor, when they carry out public tasks.

Indeed, the grey zone is characterised by double overlaps in functions. Political parties represent communities and the state, while NGOs can function as advocacy groups for the population, as well as providing services for the state. While

religious and ethnic organisations might be mainly involved in social events, they may also fulfil a role in interest representation for (parts of) the population. When organisations play double or even triple roles, they form part of the grey zone. The following figure that represents the grey zone as political opportunity structure for the citizenship strategies of the urban poor:

Figure 1. The grey zone as political opportunity structure



The grey zone consists of the dark blue parts that show overlap between the different spheres. Arrangements between the state and alternative authority bearers such as religious or ethnic organisations or NGOs can contain different degrees of ‘hybridity’, including autonomous institutions providing a service in a self-instigated manner, institutions supporting the state, organisations co-opted by the state or a full overlap of functions.

Organisations in the grey zone are often connected to each other through the practices of individuals occupying a broker position, these are expressed by the letter A-D. For example, these can be social movement leaders who occupy state functions, presidents of mosque committees who collect taxes, or tribal leaders sitting in security committees. Brokers in the grey zone have multiple simultaneous connections: to the state, the urban poor (either through political parties or neighbourhood or ethnic associations), and often also to other organisations involved in claim-making, such as NGOs, religious organisations, private companies involved in service delivery and even criminal organisations that can be considered as alternative authority bearers. Brokers switch roles between different domains: between the state and the urban poor (vertical: actor A), between the urban poor and other authority bearers (vertical: actor B) and other authority bearers and the state (horizontal: actors C). A special category of brokers comprises the

so-called 'political entrepreneurs': informal power holders who maximise the benefit from their position by occupying 'structural holes'²⁴ between different networks and acting as gate-keepers. Proxies and brokers in political mobilisation and interaction exploit their multiple linkages to state agents on the one hand and (external) opportunity networks on the other, and attempt to maintain in this position. Actor D is likely to be such a political entrepreneur: he occupies positions among the (organised) urban poor, the state and alternative authority bearers. Often actor D will be a member of a political party.

In a way, all state representatives are socially embedded and consequently act as brokers between public and private spheres. However, there is a difference in the degree to which they respond more to incentives in their non-state networks than to incentives stemming from the 'public' sphere of the state. In the grey zone these loyalties are traded off against each other and strategies are developed in order to not only reconcile different positions but also to gain power and autonomy.

What does this imply for the political agency of the urban poor? I have already discussed that regime types do not provide a sufficient explanation for different types of mobilization and its outcomes for the urban poor. I expect that there are more forms of mobilization than on the horizon within democracies than collective action, and much more under authoritarian regimes than civil war and silent resistance. In order to understand how this works we have to look at strategies developed in the grey zone. I expect that the urban poor negotiate in a variety of ways with the state in its multiple forms, through their representatives or through representatives of the state and other authority bearers (brokers). I expect that the opportunity structures for the participation of the urban poor in the grey zone are equally determined by the power relations between the institutions in the grey zone (within and outside the organisation of the state) as by the formal channels for political participation under any given regime. The urban poor constantly have to navigate between these different domains, and how this works out in practice reflects the topic of the coming chapters.

In order to gain a better understanding on the shaping of citizenship of megacities' poor residents, I have explored the interests, the opportunities and the claim-making practices of the urban poor in two contrasting megacities. I first identified marginalised groups within both cities and assessed what their main needs were. The needs of the inhabitants form the 'currencies of political exchange' (Walton 1998) for the authorities and other power holders, and this (the 'what') is the topic of chapter four. Moreover, the inhabitants themselves also dispose of resources or 'bargaining chips' (such as voting weight and nuisance power). I have also assessed what kinds of resources they had at their disposal in terms of their own organisation and the support they received, as well as the political opportunities provided by the context in which they operate. I have focussed on formal and informal opportunities.

²⁴ See Burt (1992).

Together, these resources and opportunities constitute the fields of negotiation that exist between the urban poor and the authorities, which I will discuss in chapter five (the 'where'). I will particularly look to identify relations between power holders within these fields. Finally, in chapter six, I will focus on the strategies for claim-making of the urban poor and the mechanisms of control exercised by the authorities (the 'how'). However, in order to contextualise these findings and do justice to the historical and specificities of both cases, I will first describe the urbanisation processes in their contemporary political contexts in Mexico City and Khartoum.

3. Background: Mexico City and Khartoum

Mexico City and Khartoum are two capital cities on two different continents, with different histories and different political situations. Yet they are also similar in several respects. Both can be considered as megacities, based on their population size: the greater Mexico City has around 20 million inhabitants, while Khartoum is currently estimated to have between 5 and 7 million inhabitants (Al Tayeb 2003; Abdalla 2008). This actually makes Khartoum the fourth largest city in Africa, after Lagos, Cairo and Kinshasa, and before Johannesburg and Nairobi.¹ However, Mexico City and Khartoum are also megacities in the other sense of the word: both are characterised by the disjuncture between livelihood opportunities in terms of income, security and urban planning on the one hand, and the size and the composition of the urban population on the other. Both areas are marked by the scarcity of resources in comparison to their populations: scarcity of land, water, income opportunities and government resources (and capacity) among others. Both cities have significant popular neighbourhoods and squatter areas, where large numbers of urban dwellers gather their income through the informal economy. In this chapter, I will describe the historical and national political contexts of both cities. In this respect, I not only intend to do justice to the specific developments that are important contributors to the shaping of poor people's politics in both cities, but also to present a rough outline for the differences and similarities between both cases, which I will explore in greater detail in later chapters. For each city, I will first describe its urbanisation history, emphasising that urban growth has always had important political dimensions in both cases. Furthermore, the surge of popular neighbourhoods carried specific demands by the urban population. In order to shed some provisional light on the political opportunity structures for demand-making towards the public authorities, I will describe the main national political developments in Mexico and Sudan over recent decades.

3.1 Mexico City: advanced urbanism

It is hard to imagine that any government in the world would plan an agglomeration with 20 million inhabitants as its capital city.² Indeed, Mexico City in its present form was never planned. Its growth was merely the result of a particular model of economic development, based on political struggles between city oriented groups and nation oriented groups; between those focused on the development of local entrepreneurs and containment of the city and those whose (national) economic and political success depended on the city's growth (Davis 1994). This struggle has resulted in a megalopolis of almost 1500 square kilometres at the time of writing, stretching between various ranges of volcanoes in the centre of the Federal Republic of Mexican States.

¹ Ledgard, J. (2012). "Huddled masses – Africa's cities take centre stage." In: *The World in 2013*. The Economist, December 2012.

² Governments have always been keen to control city populations, see Scott (1998).

The greater Mexico City consists of an inner city area, the “Federal District”, which is an autonomous political entity within the Republic of Mexican States, and a larger surrounding urbanised zone that belongs to another political entity, namely the State of Mexico.³ The federal district and adjacent urban zone are closely interconnected: it is impossible for the average visitor to observe the border between them. Together, they officially form the greater Mexico City region (the Zona Metropolitana de la Ciudad de Mexico or ZMCM), which currently counts almost 20 million inhabitants and is among the largest metropolitan conglomerates in the world. At present, the Federal District is losing inhabitants to the adjacent municipalities of the ZMCM and beyond in the wider Valley of Mexico. Garza expects that the formation of the urban agglomeration in the wider central Valley of Mexico will continue throughout the 21st century (Garza 1999: 154). In the forthcoming sections, I will explore deeper into the economic and political trends that have contributed to the formation of this megalopolis, also discussing the ways in which Mexican government has attempted to come to grips with its management.

Urbanisation and popular neighbourhood formation

The formation of Mexico City dates back almost 700 years to the foundation of Tenochtitlan, which was constructed on an island in the Texcoco Lake in the central valley of Mexico. At the time in which the Spaniards made their entry into the city, it had over 200,000 inhabitants and was already one of the biggest cities in the world. Mexico City became one of the capital cities of the Spanish domination of the Latin American continent; however, it was only when it became the centre of the post-revolutionary industrialisation policies in independent Mexico during the second half of the 20th century that its population virtually exploded. Within half a century, the city’s population increased more than tenfold until it exceeded the impressive number of 20 million inhabitants.

The centrality of the capital in the country’s economy and politics has been reinforced in the past century. According to Davis (1994), the recent history of Mexico City is closely tied to the economic development vision of the leaders of the Mexican Revolution (1914-1917), who prioritised industrial over rural development in the country (Davis 1994: 19). The aim was to reach this industrial development (including the modernisation of the agriculture and livestock sector) through an import substitution model that was in vigour until the beginning of the 1980s (Garza 1999: 149, 158). Mexico City served as the main centre for this economic model.⁴ The revolutionary leadership tied the goals of national industrialisation to those of the urban economy’s revival, not only for industry but also commerce and services for the middle classes, and sought the support of the city’s inhabitants (Davis 1994: 21-23). The concentration of industrial development in the capital in the 1950s and 1960s led to exponential migration and environmental contamination. In 1960, Mexico City absorbed 37.6% of the national urban population and was 6.2 times bigger than the second largest city (Garza 1999: 151).

³ The Federal Republic of Mexican States consists of 31 states, among which are the State of Mexico, and 1 Federal District.

⁴ Although other urban centers like Monterrey have also served as main industrial centers in the 20th century.

Economic growth in Mexico declined significantly during the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s (Garza 1999: 150), and the import substitution model was gradually replaced by a neo-liberal model focused on trade and international investment during this period, culminating in the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 (Garza 1999: 150). During this time, the population of Mexico City continued to increase: from slightly before the initiation of the import substitution model until the signing of NAFTA (approximately from 1940 to 1995), Mexico City’s population increased almost tenfold. From a population of 1.6 million in 1940, it increased to 9.1 million in 1970 and around 15.6 million in 1995.⁵ Although much of the migration to Mexico City can be ascribed to rural-urban migration, the significance of natural population growth should not be underestimated according to Ward (2004: 107). The fact that many young men migrated to the capital to find work also implied that they founded their families there. Despite its relative size having somewhat diminished over the years⁶, the greater Mexico City remains the dominant urban conglomerate in Mexico, as well as one of the largest in the world.

The Mexican government has long recognised that an urban agglomerate of this size becomes almost impossible to manage from a social, economic and environmental perspective. Its growth occurred in spite of the government’s policies that had aimed to contribute to the deconcentration of Mexico City and reducing of regional inequalities since the 1940s (Garza 1999: 156). Garza and others attribute this to the fact that urban planning was always secondary to broader economic planning, whilst also identifying a lack of a coherent centralised urban planning system.⁷ Indeed, the first National Urban Development Plan was only written in 1978. According to Garza, urban and regional planning in Mexico throughout the twentieth century can be broken down into five stages: the emergence of pioneer actions (1915-1940); policies of isolated territorial impact (1940-1970); territorial policies in the national economic strategy (1970-1976); the institutionalisation of spatial planning (1977-1988); and the abdication and devolution of urban and regional policies (1989-1998). Therefore, urban policies moved from pioneer actions to a relatively short period of federal centralization to laissez-faire neo-liberalism (Garza 1999: 156). In fact, the OECD concluded in 1997 that “Mexico does not, strictly speaking, have a regional (read: urban, ID) policy but national policies with strong territorial implications, such as social, training or research and development policies.” (OECD 1997:9)

⁵ *The Challenge of Urbanisation: The World’s Largest Cities*, UN Publications, Sales Number: E.96.XIII.4

⁶ In 1980 the difference separating the largest city from the second one (Guadalajara) decreased to 5.7 times and its growth rate became less than the rest of the metropolises (Garza 1999:153)

⁷ Ward argues that traditionally in Mexico, planning meant economic planning. He also argued that central planning has never worked due to political and bureaucratic competition (Ward 2004: 289). This is in line with Davis’ argument: she relates the particular development of Mexico City as an urban area to the historically grounded conflicts and alliances between state and class actors that are specified because the city is the national capital in which interests are not only local but also national (Davis 1994a:4; Davis 1994b). The development of a central planning module for the city was inhibited by the fact that within the PRI itself, different opinions existed about the economic development model that was to be followed. These different opinions in turn were fed by the alliances between politicians and their main political constituencies at the national or the local level (Davis 2004).

The lack of centralised urban planning had an impact on the physical expansion of the city. Along with the population growth, the demand for available land and housing increased. From the 1940s onwards, all social classes in the city sought land and housing, albeit in different directions (Ward 2004: 120). The richer populations concentrated in the areas West and South-West of the city centre, whereas the poorer populations mostly moved East, in the old Lake Texcoco basin (Gilbert and Ward 1985: 65). The spatial expansion of the city became mainly based on the (initially illegal) privatization of communal land. Ward claims that the dynamics of the expansion of the urban area were composed of opportunities for financial capital throughout the twentieth century, to make profit by investing in the built environment; of public policies that favoured profit-making (the state actually actively and passively participated in the privatization of communal land); and the presence of agents who promoted the selling of land (Ward 2004: 123). Particularly from the 1950s onwards, large territories of communal land have been privatised, especially in the areas under the jurisdiction of the state of Mexico, given that a prohibition to sell did not exist there. Many of these territories have been converted in residential areas for the city's middle classes. The urban poor also participated in the illegal buying of communal land (Cornelius 1975; Duhau and Schteingart 2002: Ward 2004). According to Cornelius, newcomers to the city essentially had two options: low-income subdivisions (*'fraccionamientos'*) or squatting. Most of the poor, particularly those who already lived in the city, engaged in the buying of communal land (Cornelius 1975: 30-35). While squatting occurred in Mexico City,⁸ it was always a minor strategy because although it was cheaper, it was a less secure strategy than the illegal buying of land (Ward 2004: 133). Whatever the method of land acquisition (squatting or illegal subdivisions), in both cases this resulted in land without services.⁹ Popular communities employed their own means to force the government to deliver services; for example, hijacking busses regularly occurred during the 1970s and 1980s (Davis 1994: 237).

In the 1970s, the government started to respond with the regularization of land, the establishment of site and services schemes and eventually social housing projects. Most of the land regularisations were carried out in the phase that Garza terms as 'policies with territorial impact under economic planning'. Davis links this to political reforms in the country, and the need for the ruling party to grant some concessions to the population after the Tlatelolco massacre in 1968. The PRI subsequently appointed president Echeverría who created housing programmes for workers with formal jobs and bureaucrats with a medium income (Infonavit and Fovissste). Furthermore, he brought about the "Ley General de Asentamientos Humanos" in 1976, which invited illegal or informal settlers to demand land tenancy and the infrastructural services that generally accompanied regularisation. This also gave a boost to urban social movements in the squatter areas (Davis 2004: 236).

⁸ As has been extensively document in the realm of studies on social movements in Mexico City, see for example Eckstein (1990; 1990b; 1998).

⁹ Legalisation and the provision of services usually occurred *post hoc* (Ward 2004: 133).

However, it was only under Echeverría's successors Lopez Portillo and de la Madrid that FONAPHO (Fondo Nacional para la Habitación Popular) was created to promote housing for the urban poor (Ward 2004: 129). Since this time, the inner city – what is known as the Federal District – can be said to have been relatively consolidated.

As Cornelius already argued in 1975, the way in which the land has been acquired and communities formed has important consequences for (informal) social and political relations in the city nowadays, because it has generated different forms of community organisation.¹⁰ These consequences can be felt until today. I will return to this point in chapter 5, when discussing neighbourhood organisations in Mexico City. For now, it is important to recall that the popular neighbourhoods in the city thus consist of combinations of planned areas (many of which were originally set up to offer low cost housing for government workers) and spontaneously developed areas that have later been regularised. In the following paragraph, I will provide greater detail concerning the history of one of the largest and most densely populated areas of Mexico's Federal District: Iztapalapa.

Iztapalapa: 'traspatio de la ciudad'

Cornelius and Gilbert and Ward characterise the popular neighbourhoods in the Eastern part of the Federal District through the existence of 'dust storms' (Cornelius 1975: 40-49; Gilbert and Ward 1985: 65). By now, most of this dust has settled, and the entire eastern fringe of the city, including Iztapalapa, is covered by one big grey housing mass.¹¹ During a period of six months, I frequently travelled by bus between Iztapalapa and the city centre, describing in my field notes the physical features of the popular neighbourhoods as they appeared to me as a newcomer in 2008:

Seen from within, it is as if Mexico City consists of at least twenty different cities. When I take the bus from Coyoacan to Iztapalapa the differences grow bigger with every kilometre. The bus ride takes about two hours, and the bus crawls slowly from the luxurious shopping mall in Coyoacan through big avenues to the calle Ermita-Iztapalapa. When we reach the centre of Iztapalapa we are welcomed by the sign "Bienvenidos en Iztapalapa, cumbre de Mexicanidad". This refers to the strong folkloric traditions of the centre of the borough, which are a mix between indigenous and catholic rituals. Indeed, soon we pass under a bridge with a statue of Jesus carrying a cross, referring to the famous tradition of the 'Passion Play' in Iztapalapa. Always when we pass by one of the small chapels along the road (of which there are so many in this area), virtually all bus passengers pay tribute by making the sign of a cross. It happened more than once that the bus had to take a detour because the main avenue was closed for a Mariachi band that played in a 'Fiesta Patronal'.

¹⁰ Cornelius already observed this in 1975, in a study on 'community socialisation and political learning' among the migrant poor in three neighbourhoods in Mexico City.

¹¹ Except for the ecological zones in the area that have been created by decree.

Beyond the centre of Iztapalapa the bus reaches the first social housing blocks, big square complexes with red brick buildings, which actually make me think of the suburbs of larger European cities. Then we approach the eastern ring road, followed by a few kilometres of car parts shops along the main avenue. The further away from the city centre, the poorer the housing conditions and the narrower the side streets. At the end of the calle Ermita-Iztapalapa the surrounding hills are covered by a grey housing mass, which from a distance hardly seems to have any streets in between at all. Just before it finally approaches the highway to Puebla that separates the federal district from the state of Mexico, the bus reaches the prison. This is where I have to change to a 'micro' or a 'pesero'¹² to get up the volcano. The 'pesero' is driven by a young guy in his early twenties, and slowly encroaches upon the hills through steep narrow streets and endless curves, hitting 'topes' (speed bumps) built by the inhabitants themselves every ten meters or so and emitting heavy bass tunes via its personalised sound system.¹³

Map 1. Boroughs of Mexico City



Source: government of Iztapalapa,
downloaded from www.iztapalap.gob.mx on 13 May 2013

12 These small vans are called 'peseros' because a ride costs 1 Mexican peso.

13 Compilation of field notes of visits to Iztapalapa, February-July 2008

Iztapalapa is the most populated borough of the Federal District, with around 2 million inhabitants¹⁴ representing approximately ten percent of the population of greater Mexico City and twenty percent of the population of the Federal District. Iztapalapa is undeniably one of the poorest areas of the Federal District, with 81.4% of its population considered by the authorities to live in conditions of “very high marginality”, “high marginality” or “medium marginality”.¹⁵

The borough of Iztapalapa was created in 1928. During the first half of the twentieth century, the space between 250 year old *barrios*¹⁶ and *pueblos*¹⁷ within the territory was still filled with agricultural fields¹⁸ and swamps; however, by the 1940s urban sprawl¹⁹ had also reached Iztapalapa. In 1948, the government opened the legendary waste dump of Santa Cruz Meyehualco in the eastern part of Iztapalapa²⁰, which soon attracted the workers of the waste dump (the *pepenadores*) who started living in the area. In 1970, a part of the communal land was expropriated to build the ‘*Central de Abastos*’, the main food market in Mexico City, which remains an important economic motor within the centre of Iztapalapa. The government subsequently increasingly started to use the area to house low income government workers and relocate people from the city centre in order to make more space for large thoroughfares.²¹ In December 1972, as one of the biggest social housing projects of Latin America at the time, the *Unidad Habitacional Vicente Guerrero* was inaugurated by the Chilean President Salvador Allende during his visit to Mexico on the invitation of President Echeverría (1970-1976). The project, containing nine thousand housing units intended for fifteen thousand workers, was built on 1.710.000 m² (Lopez Orozco 2005: 1). Although the project had originally been destined for low income government workers, many apartments remained empty because people did not want to live so close to the garbage belt. They were later sold for lower prices to low-income population groups. After the 1985 earthquake many former residents from the city centre (mainly Tepito and Tlatelolco, well known popular areas) moved to the Vicente Guerrero.

14 In the year 2000, Iztapalapa had 1,773,343 inhabitants and its population was then expected to grow to 1,925,163 by 2030. See Rosales Ortega et al (2003: 23).

15 Coordinación de la Planeación del Desarrollo Territorial del Gobierno del DF (COPLADE 2003), downloaded at www.sideso.df.gob.mx/index.php?id=35 in May 2008. Also see www.iztapalapa.df.gob.mx/pdf/SIBDSI/MARGINALIDAD/map_iztp.pdf, most recently consulted in February 2013. The marginality index is based on indicators related to income, employment, health care, education and the quality of housing.

16 The eight ‘*barrios*’ of which the centre of Iztapalapa consists are: Santa Barbara, San Pedro, San Pablo, San Miguel, San Lucas, San José, Asunción and San Ignacio. Their existence has been documented since the end of the 19th century.

17 The five ‘*pueblos originarios*’ of Iztapalapa are: Sta. Cruz Meyehualco, Sta. Maria Aztahuacan (both appr. 350 years of existence), San Sebastian, Sta. Martha and San Lorenzo Tezonco. They have about 250 years of existence.

18 These fields were based on *chinampas*, floating ‘gardens’ on the lake, used by the Aztecs already to cultivate in a context of scarcity of land. They were connected by channels that until the second half of the twentieth century were still the main provision of water to Iztapalapa’s agriculture. These chinampas were communal lands, or *ejidos*. On land acquisition in Mexico City also see Gilbert and Ward (1985: 61-130).

19 With urban sprawl I mean rapid, unorganised horizontal urban expansion.

20 The waste dump was closed in 1983 and because of negotiations between the government and the leader of the waste collectors union it was moved in 1984 to the Sierra de Santa Catarina (Castillo Berthier 2006: 17).

21 Particularly under Delegado Carlos Hank Gonzales (1969-1975) it is estimated that around 25,000 families were displaced from the city centre because of the construction of *ejes viales* (Davis 1994: 248).

The outer parts of Iztapalapa became populated spontaneously, starting in the 1950-60s, but more intensely in the 1970s. Migrants came predominantly from the Southern states of the Republic: Oaxaca, Guerrero and the states surrounding the capital city (Estado de Mexico, Hidalgo and Puebla) (Moctezuma 1999: 27; Ward 2004: 109). The migrants bought their land from *'fraccionadores'*, people who sold illegal subdivisions, *'fraccionamientos'* of communal land. By then, parts of the area were still part of the State of Mexico and fell under the municipality of Los Reyes La Paz. The inhabitants themselves demanded to fall under the government of the Federal District, which they eventually succeeded in 1976 (Moctezuma 1999: 57, 64). When the first inhabitants arrived in the Sierra, it was *'tierra abierta'*. There were no roads, urban services and public security. The inhabitants started to organise, first, to formally become part of the city; and second, to establish basic services such as water, sewage, electricity and street pavement in the area. They organised services themselves with external aid (the establishment of schools and health centres), whilst also placing pressure on the government to deliver (by hijacking busses and cooperating with architects from the university to design a water system).²² Iztapalapa was later also populated by people from the city centre who had lost their houses in the 1985 earthquake, owing to the available and affordable land in the area.²³

Although the annual growth rate of the Federal District is currently negative, the population of Iztapalapa is still slightly increasing according to data from the Mexican National Institute for Statistics (INEGI).²⁴ With almost two million inhabitants at present, Iztapalapa necessarily hosts a great internal diversity. There is both poverty and wealth within Iztapalapa, although the real upper classes live elsewhere in the city, and there are ample middle class areas near the borders with Coyoacan, where the Iztapalapan entrepreneurs reside. In the old barrios, there are people who are relatively wealthy. One can find old ranchos – where large animals are still being kept – in the middle of the old *'pueblos'*. Iztapalapa has served as an industrial corridor and is host to what people call *'the second Mexican stock market'*: the Central de Abastos. Some of the inhabitants have demonstrated knowledge how to take advantage of Iztapalapa's economic assets. Notwithstanding, other parts of Iztapalapa have served (and do so until nowadays) as the *'traspatio de la ciudad'* (*'the backyard of the city'*): these were the areas in which the city's garbage was deposited and the city's largest prisons built, where the living-conditions were worse and the poorest part of the population went, because the land was cheapest. These areas are also known within the city for the presence of organised crime.

22 See Cornelius (1975), *'the politics of protest'*, although these politics have changed over the years. Cornelius' work was written during the Echeverría period and before the earthquake. Cornelius for example states that women were hardly politically engaged, but it is known that they were important actors in the social movements after the 1980s.


23 During the last few decades, prices in Iztapalapa, including the Sierra de Santa Catarina, have increased about 400%. Doña Sandra stated that she had paid 20.000 old pesos for her plot in 1973 (which based on the fixed exchange rate at the time – 12,50 MXN for 1 USD – would be equivalent to 1600 USD), whereas during a conversation in a bus, on one of my trips to Iztapalapa centres, I learned that nowadays the prices for a plot in the area are between 8000 and 9000 USD.

24 The annual growth rate of the Federal District was expected to be -0.01% in 2010, whereas for Iztapalapa it was expected to be 0.40%. See INEGI, *XII censo poblacional*, adapted by ICESI (2005); Rosales Ortega et al (2005).

Iztapalapa not only hosts the largest share of the car-parts industry in the city, of which a significant part is said to deal in stolen car parts²⁵, while it is also said to host ‘ghost houses’, where victims of ever-more occurring kidnappings are being held hostage. One can generally say that the further away from the centre of the Federal District, the more popular the neighbourhoods of Iztapalapa become.

My field work mainly concentrated on the more conflictive and the poorest neighbourhoods of Iztapalapa: the housing units ‘Vicente Guerrero’ (a government social housing project) and ‘Piraña Cananea’ in El Molino (designed and built by the inhabitants themselves, with support from the local government); and the popular settlements of ‘San Miguel Teotongo’ and ‘Miravalle’ (both in the Sierra de Santa Catarina). The government characterizes the degree of marginalisation of the Vicente Guerrero as medium, El Molino as high, and San Miguel Teotongo and Miravalle as very high.²⁶ The way in which urbanisation took shape in these areas and the opportunities for claim-making in these areas are closely connected to recent political transformations at the national level. Therefore, in the remainder of this section, I will go back to describe the democratic transition that has taken place at the national level over recent decades, as well as its consequences for the city.

Map 2. Neighborhoods under study



Source: government of Iztapalapa

²⁵ In March 2007 a terrain of approximately 500 square meters, called La Ford, was expropriated by the department for Public Security, on the allegation of selling without proper licenses. Also see Recomendación 14/2007 with number CDHDF/122/07/IZP/D-1590-III by the Comisión de Derechos Humanos del DF (CDH-DF).

²⁶ Coordinación de la Planeación del Desarrollo Territorial del Gobierno del DF (COPLADE 2003), downloaded at www.sideso.df.gob.mx/index.php?id=35 in May 2008.

The democratic transition

Urbanisation in Mexico and particularly the development of its capital city cannot be understood without an analysis of the national political context, which was characterised for most of the twentieth century by one-party rule that has left its traces on the political landscape in the city until today. One-party rule collapsed towards the end of the century, and a transition to multi-party politics materialised. Among others, this resulted in greater autonomy for the Federal District and more spaces for political participation for the capital's population. This political process followed on the expansion of urban social movements in Mexico City in the 1970s and particularly after the earthquake that hit Mexico City in 1985 (Davis 1994b). Much has been written about the Mexican political system and the democratic transition, and it is beyond the scope of this work to provide an original account of these developments; consequently, in the coming paragraphs I will limit myself to summarising the system's main historical characteristics that are relevant for the political relations, given that they still exist in the poor neighbourhoods of the capital city.

Since the Mexican Revolution and the subsequent transitional era that ended in 1929, the country was governed by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)²⁷ for 71 consecutive years. During that time, the Mexican system was known as an exceptional party-based authoritarian regime (Langston 2006). Mexico has often been treated as a unique case within Latin America, because its political landscape supposedly remained relatively free of violence and stable after the revolution, compared to other Latin American countries that have known violent (changes of) rule through military coups and dictatorships. The stability of the regime has often been explained by the adaptation of a mixture of social policies and the (corporate) co-optation of the major social forces in society. In the course of its reign, the party developed institutional linkages to the peasant organisations and the unions, to a certain extent the military and also the popular sector.²⁸

This corporatist system was also strongly anchored in the capital city (Álvarez Velasquez 2004: 76-77). Indeed, stability and political support in the capital were particularly important to the party leadership; therefore, it designed various strategies to pacify the population, based on a combination of economic policies and mechanisms designed for political integration in a controlled way. Following the abolishment of elections and the function of the Mayor of Mexico City in 1929, the city level interests were represented in a 'Consultative Council' with thirteen representatives from different organised and vocal population groups in the city, including property owners, renters, neighbourhood associations, *madres de familia*, peasants, workers, commerce and industry.

27 Originally it was called the Partido Revolucionario Nacional (PNR), in 1938 under Lázaro Cárdenas the name was changed into the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano; it was only called the PRI with reforms under Manuel Ávila Camacho in 1946.

28 Only recently, with the increasing violence that has entered the Mexican political stage, authors have started to question these views on the non-violent and exceptional character of Mexican political stability. Pansters for example argues that even one-party rule in Mexico was already based on a combination of 'soft' and 'hard' rule, which he describes as combination of a 'zone of hegemony' and a 'zone of coercion'. He argues that this style of ruling continued into the 21st century (Pansters 2012).

However, this only presented limited options for negotiation for various sectors of the population.²⁹ In 1938, then President Lazaro Cárdenas also started to develop linkages with the *inquilinario* (resident) movement, which he had mobilised for rent control, through the establishment of a 'Consejo de Colonos'. This consejo was later expanded with other organisations – including the *Federacion de Colonias Proletarias del Distrito Federal* (Álvarez Velasquez 2004: 77) - and in 1941 turned into the 'Confederación de Organizaciones Populares' or COP (Davis 1994: 100), which would be incorporated in the national CNOP in 1942.³⁰ However, such structures only presented limited space for the participation of the urban poor.³¹

Simultaneously, the PRI as a political party was also organised to the lowest levels of society; every neighbourhood in Mexico City had its local PRI-office. Opposition parties developed in two ways: either as offspring from the ruling party, or parties created in opposition to the ruling party (Álvarez Velasquez 2004: 62). The foundation of the *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN) in 1939 and other political opposition parties such as the *Partido Popular Socialista* (PPS) and the Communist Party shows that the PRI hegemony was never absolute. At the same time however, the presence of these parties never succeeded in developing a strong party system, owing to the implicit rules of the regime (Álvarez Velasquez 2004: 62). The PAN never had a strong national structure to mobilise votes. Its main support base consists of the larger entrepreneurs and the conservative rural and urban middle classes (Loeza 1999).

Notwithstanding this elaborate system of rule, the corporatist system was not as strong as it appeared from the outside, and the hegemony of the PRI eventually started to destabilise, through a combination of external and internal pressures. According to Davis, the first cracks in the stable hegemony of the PRI rule related to disagreements over the management of the capital city, which started to appear as early as the 1950s (Davis 1994: 184). She argues that national and local PRI leaders were linked to different class interests in the capital city, and they competed with each other as a result of conflicts between these interests (for example, over land and the introduction of the metro). The internal conflicts in the PRI intensified with the massacre in Tlatelolco square in 1968, when army troops shot at unarmed civilians (mostly students who demonstrated for reforms in the run-up to the Olympics) at the President's instruction. Growing popular discontent among poor and middle classes in Mexico City in the 1970s³² encouraged the ruling party to adopt some appeasing measures in order to retain its legitimacy. Consequently, following the Tlatelolco massacre, the government started to give some concessions to the population.

29 They were considered as 'auxiliaries' for the city administration (Álvarez Velasquez 2004: 79).


30 The CNOP not only included the popular organisations but also the military and the bureaucratic sectors. The *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) that was founded in 1946, thus relied on a corporatist system with three main pillars of organised social representation: the CNOP, labour (de 'Consejo de Trabajadores Mexicanos' or CTM) and the peasantry (the 'Consejo Nacional de Campesinos' or CNC). The business sector developed relatively autonomous from the PRI (Álvarez Velasquez 2004: 70).

31 The means of participation were largely conditioned by the government, also see Álvarez Velasquez (2004: 57-58).

32 Support for the PRI in the capital started shrinking dramatically in the 1970s (Davis 1994: 191).

Under the Presidency of Echeverría, several reforms were introduced that particularly aimed to appease the population of Mexico City.³³ In 1970, the 'Ley Orgánica del Departamento del Distrito Federal' was adapted and established a reform of the 'Consejo Consultativo' and introduced the 'Juntas de Vecinos'. De 'Consejo' was now no longer based on thirteen representatives per sector but rather on citizen participation in the elected 'juntas' per borough. In 1978, the channels for citizen participation expanded following the introduction of the resident associations and the 'comités de manzana' at the most local levels. Together, this formed the pyramidal structure for citizen participation until 1986 (Álvarez Velazquez 2004: 81).

Figure 2. Organisation of citizen participation in Mexico's Federal District, 1978-1986



Source: the author

³³ Political reforms initiated in 1973 and in 1977 (la Reforma Política Federal): new parties could register and the congress was expanded. In 1977 the 'Junta de Vecinos' was created (Ward 2004: 177) and the Ley Federal de Organizaciones Políticas y Procedimientos Electorales' was accepted (Álvarez 2004: 67).

During the period after the reforms, the space for social movements also expanded, with numerous autonomous social movements arising in the capital: from the student and feminist movements to resident organisations and those committed to armed resistance (Álvarez Velasquez 2004: 85). Initially, most of these movements and organisations were issue-based, dispersed and rarely institutionalised (Álvarez Velasquez 2004: 86), but over the years they increasingly formed coordination units. In fact, during the development phase of autonomous social organisations in Mexico City, the student movement joined up with resident associations.

Box 1. Social movements in Iztapalapa

Following the political reforms and the openings that they offered, several autonomous organisations and movements originated in the capital city in the late-1970s: resident associations (such as the Frente Popular Independiente, the Union de Colonias Populares del Valle de Mexico and the Coordinadora Nacional del Plan de Ayala – organisations that would later form part of the Movimiento Urbano Popular (MUP) in the capital); feminist groups and student organisations (Álvarez Velasquez 2004: 83-85). Some of the resident and student associations pertained to the Maoist '*Organización de Izquierda Revolucionaria – Línea de Masas*': one of the main currents of the organised left in the 1970s. This current gave primary importance to popular and local organisation rather than political party activism, and based its strategy in the work in the popular neighbourhoods, recognising the need to leave the universities and engage with 'the people' (Álvarez Velasquez 2004: 83).

This is how the student movement and the popular movements became interlinked. In his book '*Despertares*', Moctezuma describes how he and other students from middle class areas members from the OIR Línea de Masas increasingly became involved in the struggle for land, housing and services of the colonias populares in Iztapalapa. In 1974, he was put in touch with the colonos of San Miguel Teotongo through somebody he met during a strike (Moctezuma 1999: 36), and helped to found the Unión in 1975. In 1979, various coordination mechanisms were created (Moctezuma 1999: 90); in 1980, the urban popular movements met for the first time in Monterrey; and in 1981, the Coordinadora Nacional del Movimiento Urbano Popular was formally created. A few months later, its regional coordination point for the Valle de México was established in San Miguel Teotongo together by the students and residents (Moctezuma 1999: 92), and would remain very active until 1984.

During the economic crisis of the 1980s, the social movements mainly articulated material demands in response to the economic

situation, mostly through the sindicalist movement and the urban popular movement (Álvarez Velazquez 2004: 88). In 1985, the Mexico City earthquake had a dramatic impact on the political landscape of the city, given that the government proved incapable of responding to the population's needs after the earthquake. It was actually the MUP who played an important role in organising relief and rehabilitation in the city through organisations such as the *Asamblea de Barrios*, the *Coordinadora Única de Damnificados* and the '*Unión de Colonos, Inquilinos y Sollicitantes de Vivienda (UCISV Libertad, Cananea)*' (Álvarez Velasquez 2004: 94-95).

In 1987, the *Unión Popular Revolucionario Emiliano Zapata (UPREZ)* was formed by student leaders in cooperation with *Uniones de Colonos* in San Miguel Teotongo and elsewhere (Moctezuma 1999: 350). In 1988, soon after its establishment, the UPREZ decided to support Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas in his quest for political power. This is where some ruptures occurred between those organisations pertaining loyal to the old standpoints of the OIR and those – such as the UPREZ – that became engaged in party politics.

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The political reforms introduced in the 1970s and the openings provided for the social movements did not return the support that the ruling party had hoped for. Most of the aforementioned movements were not institutionalised and sought confrontation with the government (Álvarez 2004: 86). At the same time, internal tensions within the ruling party increased, with disagreement over economic policies in response to the (oil) crisis in the 1980s added fuel to the fire. The PRI followed a more neo-liberal course under Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) and later Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994). Salinas intensified Mexico's ties with the IMF and prepared the signing of a free-trade agreement with the United States and Canada (NAFTA) in 1994. In 1986, leftists groups split away from the PRI, and participated in the presidential elections of 1988 under the banner of the '*National Democratic Front*' with Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas, who would later become the first elected mayor of Mexico City, as their presidential candidate. At this time, many of the social movements in Mexico City decided to support Cárdenas in his political struggle. While he lost the elections, together with leaders from the Communist Party and the Mexican Socialist Party he formed the *Partido de la Revolución Democrática* in 1989.³⁴ The PRD is currently one of the three largest contemporary political parties in Mexico, with its major support in the poorest districts of Mexico City, particularly in Iztapalapa.

³⁴ The PRD was founded by Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas, son of the former president Lázaro Cárdenas, Heberto Castillo, Marco Rascón Córdoba (also known as 'superbarrio'), Gilberto Rincón Gallardo, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo and Jesús Ortega. Among those who left the PRI and joined Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas were Andrés Manuel López Obrador and Marcelo Ebrard, both future Mayors of Mexico City. See Borjas Benavente (2003).

During the worst years of the economic crisis (in 1985), Mexico City was hit by a devastating earthquake. Various analysts concur that this had a major impact on the political landscape in the city and provided a further boost to the social movements, with the government appearing unable to cater for the needs of the population in this humanitarian catastrophe. With help from many international agencies the local organisations took charge of rebuilding the urban services in the outskirts of the city.³⁵ In particular, the Movimiento Urbano Popular (MUP), the feminist movement and the student movement stood out in this respect. The earthquake contributed to the further erosion of the ruling party's legitimacy in the capital. In its aftermath, social programmes were set up to compensate for the harsh austerity measures³⁶, although this could not prevent the end of one-party rule coming into sight. Eventually, the take-over of the presidency by the PAN in 2000 marked the end of 71 years of national one-party rule in Mexico. In the following paragraph, I will consider the urban governance system that originated as a result of the political transition at the national level.

Urban governance framework

What were the implications of this transition to multi-party politics for urban governance? As described above, political reforms were to a large extent intended to appease the national capital's population. Furthermore, electoral reform under Presidents Salinas and Zedillo also went hand-in-hand with decentralisation efforts (Ward 2004: 172). This gradually translated into greater political autonomy for the city government, both in the field of the legislative and the executive. In 1987, the (elected) Assembly of Representatives of Mexico City was set up under President de la Madrid to replace the 'Consejo Consultativo'. In 1993, the capital gained its actual status of Federal District with its executive, legislative and judicial powers, although the President still appointed the head of government. In 1994, the Assembly of Representatives was converted into the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District, based on a much larger mandate than its predecessor. The structures for citizen participation were also further adapted following the creation of the 'Junta de Vecinos'. The CNOP was finally abolished in 1989, which gave more space to the 'Junta de Vecinos' as the principal structure for routine citizen participation. Moreover, the figure of 'Consejeros Ciudadanos' was introduced in the first 'Ley de Participación Ciudadana' of the Federal District in 1995. Together, the Consejeros from the neighbourhoods formed one 'Consejo Ciudadano' per borough (in Iztapalapa there were 42 consejeros that together formed the Consejo of Iztapalapa in 1995³⁷). The figure of consejo ciudadano was maintained in the law reform of 1998. At the most local level, 'comités vecinales' replaced the earlier comités de manzana.

³⁵ For a detailed description see Álvarez (2004: 88-90).

³⁶ President Salinas introduced the PRONASOL programme in 1989, which gave communities throughout the country the possibility to participate in the development of their communities. Because this programme went straight to the municipalities it provoked resistance from many state governors (Ward 2004: 172). In the Federal District, 5830 'solidarity committees' were created, representing around 20% of the lower income families. One of its effects was that the PRI regained support in the capital in 1991 that it had lost to the PRD in 1988 (Álvarez 2004: 111).

³⁷ Interview 33, 9 March 2008 and interview 39, 11 June 2008


From 1997, the Mexico City Mayor became democratically elected again and acquired decision making power³⁸, followed by the heads of the boroughs in Mexico City in 2000. With the most important posts in the city becoming based on popular vote, the PRI was voted out at the city level in 1997 by the centre leftist PRD, which still governs Mexico City today.

Organisation and mandates of the city administration

The Mexican constitution that dates from 1917 establishes three levels of administration: the federal state, the states (or the federal district) and the municipalities (in the case of the federal district: the boroughs). In the remaining of this book, I will refer to the federal government as ‘the national government’, to the government of the Federal District as ‘the city government’ and to the borough of Iztapalapa as the ‘local government’.

The city government is nowadays governed based on an ‘Estatuto de Gobierno del Distrito Federal’, which is somewhat different from the ‘constitutions’ of the other states. Although the federal district has gained much more autonomy than it used to have before the reforms in 1997, the presidency retains specific competencies in relation to the capital’s budget and public security governance.³⁹

Figure 3. Mexico’s federal system



Source: the author


³⁸ From 1929 until 1997 the federal government had always appointed the Mexico City mayor. For the political struggle around the election of the Mexico City Mayor see Davis 1994 and Davis 1994b.

³⁹ The President for example retains the responsibility for the security forces in the capital; he appoints the person in charge of the security department in cooperation with the head of the central government and has the faculty to replace him, see article 34 of the ‘Estatuto de Gobierno del Distrito Federal’.

The 'Ley orgánica de la administración pública del D.F.' further stipulates the organisation and mandates of the public administration in the capital city. The city government consists of the office of the Mayor, the policy departments (economic development, social development, sports, culture, health, education, security, etc.⁴⁰), the Public Prosecutor, the '*Oficialía Mayor*' (a department concerned with the internal functioning of the central government), an auditing department and a legal department. The Department of Social Development and the Prosecutor's Office have their own territorial coordination units in Iztapalapa. Furthermore, the city government has a number of deconcentrated and parastatal institutions.

In addition, the city government has deconcentrated political administrative organs in the different territories, namely the 'boroughs', which have functional autonomy in government activities.⁴¹ The boroughs are those mainly in charge of the provision of urban services. The organisation of the boroughs is similar to that of the central city administration. The boroughs are headed by a 'Jefe Delegacional', who disposes of several central general departments and operational units across the territory. The boroughs are headed by a 'Jefe Delegacional', who disposes of several central general departments and operational units across the territory. The territorial coordination units are the executive bodies of the borough within smaller units of the territory. Besides channelling the citizens' demands to the general departments within the borough, these territorial coordination units also have some capacity to respond to concrete cases (such as a broken water pipe or street lighting).

Figure 4. Organisation of the government of Iztapalapa



Source: government of Iztapalapa, www.iztapalapa.gob.mx

⁴⁰ Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública del D.F., Article 15.

⁴¹ Ley Orgánica, Article 2.

Both the city government and boroughs are accountable to the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District, which has existed since 1994 and consists of 66 seats, 40 of which are directly elected through a first-past-the-post system based on (local) constituencies, while 26 are directly elected based on proportional representation. The Legislative Assembly has the mandate to initiate and approve legislation for the Federal District, as well as approving the budget of the Federal District (within the framework set by the National Congress) and the boroughs.

Financing of the local administration

As previously argued, the President retains some competencies regarding Mexico City's budget: he has to present an annual proposal for maximum level of indebtedment regarding the expenditures of the Federal District to the Congress and has to render accounts of its execution.⁴² At a lower level, the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District decides on the annual budget for the local authorities, based on a budget-proposal that the boroughs themselves elaborate. If approved, the borough's budget is funded with resources from the federal level and city government, based on its number of inhabitants.⁴³ The budget of the borough revolved between 3 and 3,5 million pesos (240.000-280.000 USD) in the past few years.⁴⁴

The local authorities do not raise taxes for the higher authorities, nor do they have their own independent income; they are only allowed to make money by giving out licenses or permits. Furthermore, the borough has the possibility to levy taxes through '*entes autogeneradores*'; for example, the borough can charge sports clubs for services that it renders to them (such as stadiums, or security officers for sports events). This is managed through the borough's administrative department or general legal section.⁴⁵ When the borough imposes fines, these are paid to the central treasury of the central city government rather than the borough itself.⁴⁶

In the paragraphs above, I have briefly described the urbanisation of Mexico City and the formation of a popular neighbourhood like Iztapalapa, as well as the democratic transition and its consequences for the governance of the capital. In turn, I will now consider the same issues for Khartoum.

3.2 Khartoum: a megacity in the making

Khartoum is well on its way to becoming a megacity.⁴⁷ It is currently one of the fastest growing cities in Africa and the fourth city on the continent, after Lagos, Cairo and Kinshasa.

42 Estatuto de Gobierno, Article 32

43 Interview 59, 7 May 2008

44 Interview 56 with Elio Villaseñor, ex-delegado of Iztapalapa, 6 May 2008, also see "Presupuesto histórico para Iztapalapa: 3 mil 447 mdp" in *El Universal* of 1 januari 2013, <http://www.eluniversaldf.mx/home/nota55232.html> and "Presupuesto 2013 para las Delegaciones", on <http://www.maspormas.com/noticias/df/presupuesto-2013-para-las-delegaciones> which states that Iztapalapa receives 3 mil 390 MXN.

45 Interview 61, 23 April 2008

46 Interview 62, 9 May 2008

47 According to some definitions based on population density or the disjuncture between urban management and the needs of the population (see chapter 2), it already is.

As with any megacity, Khartoum is characterised by a high degree of diversity: on the one hand, big shiny commercial buildings and five star hotels arise on the banks of the Nile, while on the other, hundreds of thousands of IDPs live in tents at the desert-like fringes of the city⁴⁸; traditional farmers cultivate their crops on Tuti Island and modern merchants sell everything from electronics to camels at the overcrowded Soukh Libya⁴⁹; moreover, private drivers behind the wheels of fancy 4x4 Toyotas claxon their way through the increasing traffic jams in the city centre, whereas young rickshaw drivers compete for the loudest sound systems in the streets of the popular neighbourhoods. The overwhelming climatic circumstances (the average temperature in Khartoum is around 40 degrees Celsius and most of its streets are permanently covered in (desert) dust) do not inhibit the movement of seasonal migrants, IDPs and students to the economic and political centre of the until-recently largest country in Africa.⁵⁰ As Abdalla says, its multi-ethnic character gives the city a cosmopolitan flavour (Abdalla 2008: 32).

Khartoum was founded in 1821 as an army camp, and developed as a trade centre. It soon became the main administrative and religious city of the country, which was still under Turkish-Egyptian rule at the time. Under Mahdist rule (1885-1898), Khartoum's twin city Omdurman became the national capital, although Khartoum was soon re-installed by the British-Egyptian rulers as the administrative capital in 1898. With the creation of the Blue Nile and the White Nile bridges in 1909 and 1928 respectively, the cities of Omdurman, Khartoum and Bahri were definitively interconnected and now together form the greater Khartoum (Abdalla 2008: 32). Driving from North to South and from East to West Khartoum proves that this city, like Mexico City, covers a surface of approximately 40 by 60 kilometres – 2400 square kilometres - although its planned area comprises 1650 square kilometres.⁵¹ Despite part of Khartoum's population having left the capital following the separation between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan on 9th July 2011, it is expected to continue growing. The explanations for this lie in a combination of economic and political factors, which I will discuss in the next subsections. Moreover, I will also discuss the ways in which the respective governments have attempted to deal with this urban growth in the context of national political developments.

Urbanisation and popular neighbourhood formation

Khartoum is the main urban centre of Sudan. Already in 1983, the capital city accounted for thirty five percent of the country's total urban population. With a population of 1.5 million, it was more than seven times bigger than Port Sudan, the second largest city (El Sammani et al 1989: 248). However, most of Khartoum's growth has actually occurred during the last thirty years (Al Tayeb 2003: 2-3).

48 El Sammani et al already spoke of the increasing polarisation of the city twenty years ago (El Sammani et al 1989: 254). Today I would say that differences have become more extreme, among others because of the oil-boom in the 1980s and 1990s that has generated much (visible) wealth for particular sectors within the city.

49 A main known trade node in the cross-Saharan commodity trade with increasing international traits, see Guibert (2008).

50 Until 2011 this applied to Sudan as a whole; nowadays it is the center of the Republic of Sudan.

51 Khartoum Master plan 2007; see Murillo et al (2009: 19).

Only in the 1990s is the capital said to have received another 1.5 million inhabitants (Guibert 2008: 119). Khartoum's annual growth rate was estimated at 4% in 2008 (Abdalla 2008: 32). According to the last population census in 2009, the three cities or greater Khartoum together have 5.27 million inhabitants. However, when counting the figures of inhabitants of all localities, it even adds up to 7.14 million.⁵² The city grew vertically, but primarily horizontally. By 2000, the city was almost 50 times larger than it had been during the mid-twentieth century (Al Tayeb 2003: 2).

Part of Khartoum's growth can be attributed, like in Mexico City, to the fact that the city has always been the centre of the national economic development model. A centralised national development model has determined the characteristics of the city since colonial times. Most businesses, government buildings and universities are found in the capital (El Sammani et al 1989: 254; El Tayeb 2003: 5), which has attracted rural-urban migration throughout the twentieth century.⁵³ Nonetheless, much of this migration used to be seasonal. Much of the more permanent population influx in Khartoum, and particularly the boom between 1980 and 2000, can be explained by land policies, environmental hazards and related conflicts in different parts of the country (first in the South and the Centre-West and more recently Darfur). In response to a demand from oil-producing Arab countries in the 1970s, Sudan started to facilitate agro-business by selling huge plots of land for mechanised farming schemes. The resulting 'ecological marginalisation' (Salih 1990), particularly in the centre of the country (Nuba Mountains), drove many small farmers off their lands and into the capital (Salih 1999; Al Zain 2008; Guibert 2008). Subsequently, the Centre and West of the country (Darfur) were particularly hit hard by droughts in the 1970s and 1980s, which produced another migration flow into Khartoum. The (arable) land scarcity that resulted from both the national government's land policies and environmental hazards added to the tensions and conflicts between different population groups who were mobilised in distinct national civil wars (see Salih 1990; De Waal 1997; Johnson 2003). The two civil wars between the North and the South (1963-1972 and 1983-2005) and the war in Darfur (2003-present) have provoked an additional huge wave of migration to the capital, particularly of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

The United Nations estimated in 2006 that there were about 2 million IDPs in greater Khartoum, more than one third of the total number in the country (Abdalla 2008: 14). In addition, many refugees from neighbouring countries (particularly Ethiopia and Eritrea) have found their way to the Sudanese capital, thus also rendering Khartoum a multi-ethnic city (Al Zain 2008).

52 These numbers appear in consultations for the strategic plan Khartoum 2030 (in possession of the author). The European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab cooperation also estimates the population of greater Khartoum to be 6.7 million inhabitants (Abdalla 2008: 32).

53 This did not only have to do with the concentration of industry in the capital since colonial times, but also with the policies towards the rural areas. The "spearhead" development strategy of picking areas of high potential in order to serve the interests of foreign investors in agro-industries displaced large population groups into the urban areas. After 1970 at least sixty percent of the Khartoum population consisted of first generation migrants. The effects of major droughts in the 1980s were added to this (El Sammani et al 1989: 248).

Many of the newcomers have settled on the borders of the city, either in designated IDP camps or so-called squatter settlements. Southerners have mainly settled in the South of the capital, whereas Darfuris have typically settled in the West and Easterners in the North.⁵⁴ People in the squatter areas are locally referred to as '*shamasa*', or 'people under the sun', and their presence largely determines the outlook of the city, particularly at its borders.⁵⁵

Therefore, the recent history of Khartoum is characterised by urban sprawl: rapid, unorganised and sometimes unauthorised urban growth (Al Tayeb 2003: 1). During the 1990s, the squatter areas had increased to 60 percent of the greater Khartoum territory (Hamid 2001: 143; UN Habitat 2009: 26), constituting a belt around the city beyond governmental control. The unplanned settlements counted with inadequate services and infrastructure, as well as problematic sanitation (Abusin 2003: 36-37; Abdalla 2008: 33).

Urbanisation in Sudan has always had important political connotations. Political power in Sudan is territorially based: the main political parties in Sudan have their power bases in specific regions that are dominated by specific tribes (Ahmed and Al Nagger 2003: 98). Therefore, migration to the capital has changed the city's political geography and challenged the existing balance of power. This is even more the case with the IDPs from rebel controlled territories at the fringes of the city. Consecutive governments of parties that had their stronghold in the capital did not want the political geography of the city to change, and have long tried to prevent the rural migrants from permanent settlement.⁵⁶ Furthermore, planning of the city has been limited due to the fact that the structure of the administration in which planning had to function was utterly complex (El Sammani et al 1989: 255). The planning efforts undertaken were initially based on the colonial concepts of zoning and dividing the land into different classes.⁵⁷ The government has invited different consultancy firms to develop master plans for Khartoum, the first and the second master plans of which were overtaken by rapid population growth (Al Sammani et al 1989: 256). Therefore, urban policies have developed in bits and pieces. Settlement in designated areas (site and services locations) has been encouraged through the provision of financial mechanisms for the population on the one hand (the Housing Development Fund for example), and the establishment of Public Service Corporations on the other, which would have to render public services more efficient and affordable.⁵⁸ However, such measures have failed to reach their objectives in its implementation. Notwithstanding, Khartoum's squatter population has been significantly reduced in recent decades.

⁵⁴ Hence the name of a shanty-town in Bahri called 'Karton Kassala', referring to the East-Sudanese city of Kassala (Abdalla 2008).

⁵⁵ Sometimes referred to as the 'Black Belt'; a parody on the 'Green Belt' that used to separate the inner city from the rural hinterland until the late 1980s (De Waal 2007).

⁵⁶ Interview Mohammed Salih, July 2011.

⁵⁷ Each class had specific regulations tied to it for construction (such as materials to be used, and maximum duration of the construction period), and were monitored by different levels of government.

⁵⁸ UN Habitat (2009: 14-23).

In 1992, the State Government endorsed a plan to regularise the squatter settlements, with the State Ministry of Housing and Engineering Affairs having subsequently regularised around 80 percent of the squatter settlements (Hamid 2001: 143).⁵⁹

Given that most of the city was already built upon, government planning efforts had to be realised through a combination of demolition operations, relocation, re-planning and incorporation. Some authors argue that many of the (re)planning efforts have featured a coercive character and have been executed without significant popular participation. UN Habitat mentions that: “for decades urban planning in greater Khartoum has even been associated with the violations of human rights”.⁶⁰ It refers to demolitions and forced relocations to which people have been subjected, without offering them compensation or alternative livelihoods. The government argues that this only happened in isolated cases, while critics suggest that urban planning measures have been used to weaken the position of political opponents.⁶¹ In 2007, the government of Khartoum State reached an agreement with the international community⁶² on guidelines for demolitions and displacements, among others stipulating that the affected had to be warned in advance, and that alternative living space had to be offered.

Regularisation has not automatically led to the provision of services. The combination of hyper-urbanisation with general economic hardship, the retreat of international assistance after Sudanese non-compliance with reform programmes and the placement of Sudan of a US of states sponsoring international terrorism, have prompted the government to introduce a policy of self-help, lifting subsidies on basic foods, liberalising the economy and reducing government spending on services and development programmes. People have come to almost entirely rely on locally-generated funds for service provision and socio-economic development (Al Sammani et al 1989: 253; Hamid 2001: 145). One of the popular neighbourhoods that stands as a symbol for all of the aforementioned developments mentioned is Mayo. In the forthcoming paragraphs, I will describe the development and the main characteristics of this area South of the city centre, which was estimated to have several hundred thousand inhabitants prior to the separation between North and South Sudan.⁶³

59 Nowadays, the living conditions of Khartoum's poor population can be subdivided into the following categories: 38 percent live in low density areas, typically sites and services schemes (the so-called 'Dar El Salaam'), 23 percent live in squatter areas, 16.6 percent live in old villages incorporated into the urban fabric, 11.08 percent live in higher density areas and 8.52 percent live in formally designated IDP camps (2.5 percent is unaccounted for), see UN Habitat 2009: 27. The estimations are made on the basis of a spatial analysis through Google earth and field surveys, complemented with assessment reports that estimated IDP populations in camps.

60 UN Habitat (2009: 20).

61 UN Habitat (2009: 20).

62 The agreement is monitored by the 'Khartoum Protection Working Group' (KPWG). The KPWG is chaired by UNHCR, and includes UN agencies with a protection/human rights/rule of law mandate (UNMIS, UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, UNDP) and NGOs supporting IDPs and other urban poor in Khartoum (Pantuliano et al 2011: 20).

63 In the run-up to the referendum on separation, held on 9 January 2011, many Southern Sudanese returned to their places of origin as I will discuss under national political developments.

Mayo: small Africa⁶⁴

A bus ride from the city centre to Mayo only takes about thirty minutes and costs 1 SDG (0,10 USD). It takes along Africa Road, along the airport and the neighbouring Rotana Hotel - one of the two five star hotels in the city, Emirati owned - and along the biggest wholesale vegetable and fruit market of the city (Soukh Al Merqazi). Although there are some pedestrian bridges, most people just cross Africa Road on foot like they were always used to. At the numerous traffic lights mostly 'West-African' children (in the words of the Sudanese⁶⁵) are offering their services as chewing gum vendors, shoe polishers or car cleaners.

Officially it is forbidden for the many rickshaws and donkey carts that occupy the city streets, mostly driven by Southerners, Darfuri or by Eritreans and Ethiopians, to use Africa Road. Approaching Mayo however, these are the main means of transport available. Like in Mexico City, most of the drivers of these rickshaws and micro-buses are young men who treat their rickshaws as if they were status symbols, with personal decorations and sound systems whose music fills the entire streets. Only the main road in Mayo is paved. The entire area – even the regularised parts of it – is covered in brownish dust. Houses are made of mud-brick and there are electricity cables everywhere...Further away from the main street and the market there are ever more improvised shelters, made of cardboards and tents. People are selling water at individual houses with donkey carts and bricks are drying in the sun, just like at the edges of IDP camps in Darfur. There are electricity cables in these areas, that lead to a privately owned generator. The population looks different in Mayo than in Khartoum central: although the dress of the women is predominantly the typical Sudanese 'tobe' and many men wear jellabiyas, the street view is characterised by many young black men with Bob Marley t-shirts and women in Southern Sudanese dress.

Although Mayo, with its share of improvised housing and visible lack of public services⁶⁶, corresponds more to the common image of 'a slum' than Iztapalapa, a closer look from within also reveals more similarities with Iztapalapa than observed at first hand. For instance, an entire lack of recreational space is just as characteristic for Mayo as Iztapalapa. Once more familiar with the area, the internal diversity also becomes visible: one easily starts to recognise the differences between the planned and unplanned parts.


⁶⁴ Mayo is also called 'small Africa', for the many foreign migrants (Ethiopians, Eritreans but also West-Africans) that have found refuge there.

⁶⁵ Many Sudanese refer to them as "West-African" because they speak Hausa or Fulani, but they can be second or third generation immigrants. Many West-Africans stayed in Sudan while on their way to Mecca for a pilgrimage.

⁶⁶ The lack of street pavement and lightning are also common to the richer areas of Khartoum.

“Mayo” is one of the largest and most contentious suburbs in Khartoum, around 15 kilometres south of the city centre.⁶⁷ Its actual surface is about 15 km²⁶⁸ and its estimated number of inhabitants prior the separation of the South ranged from 150.000 according to international NGOs (Pantuliano 2011: 5) to 500.000 according to a member of the municipal council.⁶⁹ Mayo is actually the popular name for one of the administrative units under the Jebel Awlia locality, which is in turn one of the seven localities of the greater Khartoum (I will return to these administrative divisions in greater detail later in this chapter). Mayo gained its popular name from the fact that a group of people was relocated from Khartoum centre to this area under the Nimeiry regime (1969-1985) in May 1971. At the time, what is now Mayo used to be a combination of old villages and squatter settlements. Just like in Mexico City, these villages have been slowly absorbed by the expanding city.

Map 3. Mayo in greater Khartoum



Source: adapted from Abdalla (2008)

⁶⁷ Mayo is the popular name that was given to the area under the former regime in memory of the coming to power of Jaffar Nimeiry on 25 May 1969 referred to as the ‘May revolution’ (‘Mayo’ is Arabic for ‘May’). Under the current regime the name of the area has been changed to Al Nasr, which means Victory.

⁶⁸ Estimate based on fieldwork.

⁶⁹ Interview 80, 11 April 2011. This corresponds with data Abdalla has obtained from the locality (Abdalla 2008: 97). The population of the entire Jebel Awlia locality, of which Mayo forms part, was said by officials to be 938.000. Interview 38, December 2010.

In the early-1970s, then-president Nimeiry had planned a part of Mayo as a residential area for former military and government workers. However, according to respondents, many of them refused to come because the area was too far away from the city, situated behind the so-called 'green belt' that separated the city from the surrounding villages.⁷⁰ The area was subsequently sold to anyone interested for 31 SDG per plot, and rapidly became populated. This specific part of Mayo, that was closest to the city centre and is home to the main market of the area, is still called "area 31" ("*Wahid-wa-talateen*").

During the 1980s, the population of Mayo, just as in other suburbs in the city, rapidly increased due to the drought in the West of the country (Darfur and Nuba Mountains) and the civil war in the South.⁷¹ The population of the area is said to have doubled in the 1990s (Abdalla 2008: 97). Many of the newcomers already had a history of circular migration to the city, where they were hosted by their tribesmen. When they stayed, either as economic migrants or IDPs, they initially clustered around their tribesmen. Moreover, sometimes entire communities migrated. Nuba women tell:

"We came because of the war and built our *racubas* (improvised shelters). At first I had arrived in Kalakla and then I came to Mayo. I had some relatives in Khartoum but not many, most of them came after the war."

Another woman said:

"We all came in different periods...everybody took his chance when they had the chance to leave; there was no public transport during that time"... "Most of us already knew each other before coming to Khartoum, because we came from the same place, but others came from other places"... "Most of us are from one tribe, we speak the same language and have the same church."⁷²

The newcomers were not only Sudanese: respondents pointed out that Mayo is a representation of the African continent, given that it also hosts many foreign refugees and immigrants: from Eritrean refugees to Ethiopian economic migrants and Nigerian Hausa and Fellata tribes that got stuck on their way to Mecca during their pilgrimage and stayed in Sudan for generations. There is still an area in Mayo known as 'Fariq Fellata', which means 'area of the Fellata'. As exemplified above, many of the migrants were single mothers with their children. Indeed, the number of female-headed households in areas such as Mayo is relatively high (Pantuliano et al 2010: 31).

⁷⁰ Interview 63, 3 April 2011

⁷¹ See f.e. Salih (1989).

⁷² Interview 75, April 2011

The regularisation of squatter settlements has intensified under the current regime (1989-present), with important effects in Mayo. The government first made a case of removing the so-called 'green belt'. A political representative from Mayo recounted that the government wanted to prevent a 'criminal belt' from being formed around the city by planning the connecting the area to the rest of the city.⁷³ Inhabitants of the area recounted that they had pushed the government for planning⁷⁴. The area's name was also changed in 'Al Nasr', or 'victory', which refers to the 'victory' over the Nimeiry times.⁷⁵

Roughly said, three major methods of urban planning have been applied in Khartoum: village organisation, relocation and replanning of squatter areas. The planning of Mayo consisted of a combination of village organisation and the replanning of squatter areas. The complexity of replanning the squatter areas lay in the fact that the areas were often overcrowded, necessitating a choice between people who were allowed to stay and those who would be assigned plots elsewhere. These decisions were made based upon either the duration of people's stay in the area, the size of their plots or simply a lottery system. The decision was placed in the hands of local committees representing the inhabitants, who acquired significant influence over the planning process through controlling desired assets, and as such held a powerful tool. However, owing to numerous allegations of corruption, this power over the assignment of plots was retransferred to the state level in the 2003 local governance act.⁷⁶

Most of the areas in Mayo are currently planned, although urban planning in about 20 percent of it (areas together called 'Al Wehdaath', see map below) remains uncompleted.⁷⁷ This implies that besides formal land titles, there are still no roads, sewage systems or public water and electricity networks. In addition, the official IDP camps were created in Khartoum in 1991, one of which is south of Mayo. Most international organisations concentrate in these IDP camps; many of them have recently withdrawn from Khartoum. My research concentrated on all planned and unplanned areas of Mayo, apart from the IDP camps,⁷⁸ because the administrative situation in these camps is not representative of the rest of the city, and nothing comparable exists in Mexico City.⁷⁹

73 Interview 85, July 2011

74 Interview 29, March 2010

75 It remained unclear to me to what extent the administrative unit Al Nasr and Mayo overlap, among others because I could not get access to an official map of the area. The locality manager said that Al Nasr administrative unit covers the areas of Mayo, Mandela, Mansoura but also Soba (interview 38, December 2010), but the acting manager of the Administrative Unit itself claimed that Al Nasr was subdivided into three geographical units: Al Nasr, Al Wehdaat and Bashair Shahinaat (interview 68, March 2011). In the popular discourse the name Mayo refers to the entire area of Al Nasr (east and west), Al Wehda, Mansoura and Mandela, but not Soba (see MSF map).

76 Interview UN Habitat Sudan, December 2010


77 According to the government, 20 percent of the population is still squatting (Abdalla 2008: 98). This roughly fits with my field observations.

78 A list of areas where interviews were held can be obtained on request.

79 In addition, access for foreign researchers was severely restricted in the time of elections and the referendum (2010 and 2011).

However, many IDPs also reside in other parts of Mayo, and as such they were included in the study.⁸⁰

Map 4. Unofficial map of Mayo



Source: the author

One-party rule and the politics of survival⁸¹

Like in Mexico, the development of the capital city and its popular areas is framed by national politics. On the one hand, Khartoum is ‘the elite fortress’ from which the authoritarian regime extends its control over the rest of the country. On the other hand, this fortress is no longer uniquely the seat of the ruling party and its support base, owing to the influx of large numbers of IDPs in recent decades (Al Zain 2008). This paradox between tight control and diversity is particularly visible in Mayo. In the following paragraphs, I will first describe the rise to power and main features of the current regime⁸², followed by an overview of the main conflicts that it has had to deal with during its reign.

⁸⁰ The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement define IDPs as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border” (UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 17 April 1998. As Al Battahani (1998), De Geofroy (2009) and others indicate, it is complicated to distinguish between IDPs and non-IDPs because many people migrated for a combination of reasons, which were directly, or more indirectly related to environmental hazards or conflicts.

⁸¹ The term ‘survival strategies’ is used by Migdal to refer to strategies that attempt to weaken any group in society that seems to be building extensive mobilisation strength, including the institutions of the state itself (Migdal 2001: 71-84). These are defensive strategies primarily aimed at the survival of the state as a first priority.

⁸² For this part, I will largely draw upon Collins (2008: 94-178).

These conflicts have led to significant migration flows of different population groups into the capital city, each having a different relation with the ruling party. I will conclude with a note on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was still in place during my time of study and provided a window of opportunity for the participation of those population groups (particularly non-Muslim IDPs) in the capital.

Sudan is a federal state with the main powers vested in the executive, particularly in the Presidency. Since independence, the political history of Sudan has been characterised by the domination of one-party rule and the politics of survival. The current regime is generally characterised as authoritarian (Ahmed and Al Nagar 2003: 97; Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 55). Its rise can be traced back to the late-1970s, when the Muslim Brotherhood that was founded in Sudan in 1928 (Collins 2008: 28) started figuring as a strategic ally of the Nimeiry Regime (1969-1985) and expanded its grip on political and economic forces in the country.

Nimeiry was initially committed to a secular socialist political project. He had come to power by a military coup plotted by army officers related to the Sudanese Communist Party, aiming to transform Sudan into a socialist, non-sectarian and secular republic. While the Muslim Brothers and other religious groups were his natural enemies, shortly after his rise to power, Nimeiry came into conflict with the communists, moved away from the political left and established himself more in the centre of (political) society through the creation of the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU). Based on Nimeiry's admiration of pan-Arabist socialism (and his hunger for power), the SSU was intended to replace all political parties and transcend tribal, sectarian, regional and ideological boundaries, and became the sole permitted organisation in Sudan to mobilise popular participation in government. It was based on a massive pyramid with basic units committees at the bottom and four hierarchical levels, culminating in the National Congress at the top. This structure was actually quite similar to the way the PRI was organised in Mexico (see section 3.1). In 1973, a secular constitution was presented, including an article on the Freedom of Religion. However, it was merely dismantled only a few years later to reinforce the autocracy of President Nimeiry.

Nimeiry gradually shifted his course towards the establishment of a religious state. In 1976, Sadiq Al Mahdi, the leader of the Umma party and former Prime Minister, planned a coup against him. After this coup failed, Al Mahdi retreated in exile in Tripoli, where he founded the National Islamic Front (NIF). Recognising the strength of the NIF, Nimeiry soon invited Al Mahdi to return and set up a reconciliation effort that resulted in an alliance between the regime and the NIF. More eagerly than Sadiq Al Mahdi himself, Hassan Al Turabi (one of the NIF main intellectual leaders at the time) took advantage of this opportunity and committed himself to the regime in order to rebuild the Muslim Brothers under its patronage.⁸³

⁸³ The Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1949 by students returning from Egypt) had been incorporated into the NIF through the person of Hassan al Turabi. Sadiq Al Mahdi and Hassan Al Turabi not only differed in their approach towards the Nimeiry regime but they also differed in their interpretation of what an Islamic state should look like. Al Mahdi was open to incorporate the Sudanese Sufi traditions into a Sudanese version of Islam, whereas Al Turabi based himself in a more 'puritan' version (Collins 2008: 130, 150).

He infiltrated the Brotherhood into the SSU and established a broad financial network, including financiers from the Gulf and the Islamic Banks. Nimeiry displayed increasing signs of religiosity throughout the 1970s, linked by some to his superstitious nature that increased after he had survived a number of coups. He slowly set the Sudanese government on a course of Arabisation and Islamisation that it has pursued ever since. In September 1983, he surprised everyone, including the Muslim Brothers, by suddenly announcing the implementation of Shari'a accompanied by '*hudud*' (corporal) punishments (Collins 2008: 137-46). Hundreds of people in Khartoum, mostly from the Southern and Western tribes, had their limbs amputated in the first months after its introduction.

In the meantime, the economic crisis in Sudan had deepened. Despite the discovery of oil in the late-1970s, the economic situation was a mess. Nimeiry had surrounded himself with megalomalous advisors with ambiguous private interests (Collins 2001: 126), while ambitious development schemes were mainly financed with borrowed money. External debt became an ever-heavier burden on the national treasury, and was also felt by the ordinary Sudanese. During the 1980s, stringent conditions had been placed on Sudan by the International Financial Institutions and structural adjustment programmes were introduced. While liberalisation policies created a conducive environment for local businesses and foreign investors, the effects on the local population were mainly negative, with budgets on services cut and the responsibility for services handed over to local communities without compensation (Abdalla 2008: 6, 19).

By 1985, Nimeiry blamed most of what went wrong on the Muslim Brothers, turning against them. However, the Muslim Brotherhood had since secured the most important political and economic powers in the country (Al Zain 2008: 5), gaining broad popular support. As a response to the arrest of several leaders including Hassan El Turabi, large demonstrations erupted in Khartoum and culminated in a general strike on 4 April 1985. Following a short period in which a transitional military council led the country, the third parliamentary government after independence was installed through elections in 1986.⁸⁴ However, Sadiq Al Mahdi, the elected President, soon came into conflict with the fundamentalist Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood, led by Al Turabi, who eventually masterminded a coup against him in 1989, and subsequently installed General Omar Al Bashir as the President of the '*Ingaz* [Salvation] Regime'.

The aim of the *Ingaz* coup was to install an Islamist regime, and soon after the 1989 coup, all political parties, trade unions and independent media were banned. A tight security regime was established, attempting everything to discourage opponents.

⁸⁴ Sudan has only known parliamentary governments for a total of ten years since 1956: from 1956-1958; from 1964-1969 and from 1986-1989.

The national security act of 1990 introduced a new intelligence apparatus (IS-SOR, or NISS⁸⁵), whose autonomy was expanded with arbitrary powers in 1991 and 1992 (Collins 188). Infamous ‘ghost houses’ were operated by a special branch of NISS, and political opponents were intimidated by orders to report to security repeatedly, while relatives of exiled opposition leaders were also harassed. The Islamists soon dominated the military, the executive and the judiciary (Collins 2008: 187-190). Arabic was introduced as the official language, including in higher education. Under the banner of a ‘civilisation project’, the politics of Islamisation and Arabisation lead to the army’s increased involvement in the entire country (Collins 2008: 192). In 1989, the Popular Defence Forces (PFD) were created to discipline the tribal militia formerly used in the Southern conflict (the ‘*murahileen*’), to secure the regime and expand the faith. The expanding military and security costs placed the limited Sudanese economy under serious strain. It was also during this period that the government started advancing a strategy of ‘self-help’ by shifting the responsibility for development to local communities (Abdalla 2008: 19; Hamid 2001: 153).

During the 1990s, when, under the guidance of Turabi, the NIF attempted to be the centre of a worldwide Islamist Revolution⁸⁶, Sudan became increasingly isolated from the Western World. In 1994, the US suspended its development aid when Sudan was placed on the list of states sponsoring terrorism, while UN sanctions were introduced when Sudan refused to hand over the suspects of the attempted assassination of the Egyptian President Mubarak in 1995. Relations with the International Financial Institutions were not good either. Each regime inherits the economic successes and failures of its predecessor, and the inherited debt of the Nimeiry regime was huge, although the relations did not improve with the new regime in power. In 1990, the IMF issued a warning and in 1993 the World Bank suspended its loans and Sudan was expelled from the IMF (see box below).

Box 2. Sudan and the International Financial Institutions

The relation between Sudan and the international financial institutions have been complicated over recent decades. Sudan’s economic policies in the 1970s were focused on an export-led, agro-industrial strategy that favoured large-scale agricultural enterprises, with these strategies mainly funded by oil-rich Arab countries that counted on Sudan for their food security. However, owing to several factors, including consequent droughts, this strategy failed to comply with its objectives (Abdalla 2008: 18). Following this crisis, Sudan negotiated a structural adjustment programme with the IMF in 1978, characterised by liberalisation, privatisation, anti-inflationary policies and an adjustment and reduction of the exchange rate, which led to

85 IS-SOR stood for Security of the Revolution – Revolutionary Intelligence Agency in Arabic, the National Security and Intelligence Service (NISS) in English. The NISS does not fall under the Minister of Interior (like the pre-Ingaz Sudan Security Service did) but it falls directly under the Presidential Guard.

86 Khartoum was the headquarters of Al Qaida leader Osama Bin Laden by 1996.

increased taxation and reduced access to services (Abdalla 2008: 18). Sudan failed to comply with the reform programmes, and consequently relations with the IMF and World Bank soured.

The World Bank still does not have an active lending portfolio in Sudan, although it did manage two large reconstruction and development funds for North and South Sudan under the comprehensive peace agreement (2006-2011). Simultaneously, it has kept an office in Sudan that engages in economic analysis and advisory services. The World Bank produces recommendations for a Sudanese growth strategy focused on macro-economic stability and fiscal management, private-sector led growth, the agricultural sector as the highest potential engine of growth and poverty reduction, reconstruction and technocratic reforms with good governance.⁸⁷ However, it does not have a partnership agreement with the Sudanese government, like that with Mexico.

The degree to which the Sudanese government is willing to follow-up on World Bank and IMF recommendations remains to be seen, given its partnerships with other – bilateral and private – donors. According to the World Bank, the external debt of both North and South Sudan stood at approximately US\$ 36.8 billion at the end of 2010, of which US\$ 30.8 billion was in arrears. However, most of the debts were to bilateral creditors, split roughly equally between Paris club and non-Paris club members.⁸⁸ Multilateral debts (with the World Bank and IMF) only comprised 15% of the total, with the remaining debts owed to private creditors. Particularly countries such as China, India and members of the Arab League are important allies for the (Northern) Sudanese government.

Notwithstanding the problematic relations with the IFIs, slow economic recovery set in from 1995, as an effect of oil exploration and favourable world market prices for other Sudanese export goods such as gum Arabic, cotton and sugar (Collins 2008: 23). From the late-1990s, President Bashir attempted to improve Sudan's international image by widening democracy without sacrificing his authority or power. For example, elections were organised for the Presidency in 1996, with little more than half of the seats in the National Assembly (these elections were naturally tightly controlled by the NIF, and Bashir won with 76% of the votes). In 1998, the Political Association Act restored Sudan to multi-party politics, which had been banned since July 1989 (Collins 2008: 224-225).

⁸⁷ World Bank, "Sudan: the road toward sustainable and broad-based growth", December 2009, downloaded at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679&entityID=000334955_20100527064142&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679.

⁸⁸ According to Collins, by the end of the 1980s most debts were with Arab countries (non-Paris club members) and the Soviet bloc (included in the Paris club). See Collings (2008: 182).

In turn, Turabi attempted to maintain control, among others by transforming the NIF into the National Congress Party (NCP). He soon entered into major confrontations with Bashir, who dismissed him as the speaker of the parliament in 1999. In 2000, Turabi left the NCP and founded his own Popular Congress Party (PCP), which remains one of the strongest opponents to the NCP today.

The rule of Bashir since 2000 has been characterised as more pragmatic and economically- rather than religiously-oriented. Collins speaks of a 'gentlemen's agreement' between the Bashir government and a Khartoum business elite that surged in the 1990s: the business elite does not engage in political opposition, while the government does not harass them with its security apparatus (Collins 2008: 237). Nonetheless, the regime's firm grip is constantly being put to the test, in the peripheries, and since the separation of the South, increasingly also the capital.

Armed resistance

Although the current ruling party did not start the conflict with the South, the war has put a severe mark on its government project and consumed many of its resources. Furthermore, the regime has been confronted with armed opposition from Darfur and the East. It is beyond the scope of this study to go into these different conflicts in detail⁸⁹; rather, I will concentrate on the fact that despite these forms of resistance related to claims concerning marginalisation, they involve different populations that have different relations with the ruling party. This also translated into the different treatment of the populations from these regions in the capital city.

In fact, since Sudan gained independence from the British-Egyptian condominium, managing its vast territory and diverse ethnic composition has represented a major challenge for subsequent governments. Over the last half a century, the centre has been in continuous tension with its periphery. Opposition from the South to Northern domination had its origins in separate policies for both regions in colonial times, and already started soon after Sudan became a united republic. The Southerners felt marginalised by the centre, which was 3,000 kilometres away, with the political and economic marginalisation of the Southern region reinvigorating resentments based upon the history of slavery. In 1963, the first civil war erupted when a group of insurgents that called itself Anya-Nya started attacking the Sudanese army. This war lasted until 1972, when the Addis Abeba Agreement granted a degree of political autonomy to the South. However, in the meantime, resentment grew in the border areas among communities that were driven away from their lands in order to make a place for large mechanised farming schemes and oil exploitation. Furthermore, the Nimeiry government started to impose an Islamist ideology on non-Muslims; for example, with the introduction of 'hudud' punishments in 1983.

⁸⁹ For an overview of the conflict in the Nuba Mountains see for example Salih, M. (1989; 1990); for Darfur see De Waal, A. (1997); De Waal, A. and Flint, J. (2005); and for conflict with the South see Johnson, D. (2003).

Full scale war erupted again in 1983, with the Southern People's Liberation Army (SPLM) now under command of John Garang and with the participation of people from the border areas (mainly in the Nuba Mountains and in Blue Nile state), many of whom had fought with the Sudanese army against the Southerners during the first war. The government increasingly made use of tribal militias, which drew an ever larger segment of the population into the conflict and gave it increasingly ethnic dimensions. The conflict intensified under the 'civilisation' project and creation of the PDF under the Ingaz Regime, prior to a peace deal being reached in 2005. By that time, the decennia long civil war between the North and the South had resulted in more than 2 million deaths and a further 5 million internally displaced people according to the UN, many of whom settled in the capital, Khartoum.

The Darfur conflict erupted in 2004. The relation of the Darfuri to the central regime has always been different from the relation with the South, among others because of the Darfuri population being ninety percent Muslim. Seasonal migration from Darfur to the capital was common for years, Jebel Marra used to be a holiday resort for the Khartoum elite and intermarriage was more or less common. However, like the Southerners, the Westerners also had their grievances about marginalisation by the centre. An attack of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) on the airport of El Fashir provoked a counterinsurgency campaign by the government, particularly against the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit tribes, with an intensity that shocked the world and has led to the ICC indictment of President Bashir. Like the Southern conflict, the Darfuri conflict soon acquired an ethnic dimension. Notwithstanding, Darfuris in the capital are generally more 'integrated' than the Nuba or Southerners, and more frequently live in planned areas and occupy government positions or those of Imams. Importantly, they are not referred to with the word '*abid*', or slave (Collins 2008: 8). Only since the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked the capital in 2008 has the position of Darfuri in the capital become more vulnerable, and particularly for the tribe associated with the JEM, the Zaghawa.

The current government has become caught in a paradoxical situation: while it initially sought to overcome ethnic differences by installing an Islamic, all-encompassing societal project, ethnic strife has emerged as a key characteristic of social relations under its rule. Al Zain (2008) argues that the government has increasingly taken refuge to the ethnic in order to combat the ethnic. He refers to the fact that the government is using ethnic identifications to divide and rule in order to control the ethnically-oriented rebel movements. In Khartoum, current relations between the urban poor and the government are mainly framed in ethnic terms, whereby the livelihood practices of non-Muslims (such as alcohol brewing) are criminalised and Southerners, Nuba and (some) Darfurians are predominantly seen in terms of a security risk.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement: a short window of opportunity

Under the auspices of the international community⁹⁰, a peace deal was brokered between the North and the South in 2005, with the current President Omar Al Bashir and John Garang the main guarantors. This 'Comprehensive Peace Agreement' (CPA) stipulated that during a period of six years the unity of the country would be made attractive through measures of power and wealth sharing between the North and South. Following that six year interim period, the Southern population would be allowed to vote in a referendum on whether they opted for unity or the separation of the South.

The CPA had several specific consequences for the Sudanese capital. In the first place, it recognised the particular position of the estimated two million IDPs, including many Southerners and Nuba who lived in the capital. Based upon concerns about their equal treatment, a 'Commission on the status of non-Muslims in the capital' was put in place. In the second place, the CPA enhanced efforts of a democratisation and decentralisation scheme within the framework of the power-sharing arrangements. Four levels of government were introduced that would all become subject to elections: the federal level, the semi-autonomous region of Southern Sudan, 26 states and their subdivisions in localities. The wealth-sharing stipulations further ensured budget transfers to each of these government levels. In theory, the CPA thus also provided greater possibilities for autonomous political decision-making in Khartoum State. Third, the CPA made the SPLM join the government of national unity, which meant that many of the residents of Mayo, and particularly the IDPs, were officially represented in the national government during the CPA. That this hardly materialised in an improvement of their living circumstances will become clear in chapter 4.

The implementation of the CPA during the six-year interim period has not proved convincing for the Southern population, who almost unanimously voted for separation on 9 January 2011, resulting in the independence of Southern Sudan on 9th July 2011. In the months leading to the referendum, tens if not of hundreds of thousands of Southerners who had moved to the North since the start of the civil war returned to the lands of their ancestors, because they were either encouraged and facilitated by the SPLM to go and vote for the referendum while being the South or were sensitive to threats of the North concerning Southerners losing their citizenship status (including access to jobs, health care and education) after an eventual separation. The SPLM closed its offices in Mayo some months prior to the referendum, and those who had joined the SPLM yet were not Southerners (and were forced to stay in the North) lost their main spokesperson after having been exposed and identified as opposition supporters.

The signing of the CPA and separation of the South did not mean an end to political tensions within Northern Sudan. Many people in the North (for example,


⁹⁰ Particularly the East-African Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), but other international partners like the UN, the African Union, the European Union, the Arab League and several bilaterals also co-signed the agreement.

the Nuba in Western-Central Sudan) had fought with the SPLM during the civil war and were afraid of losing the protection granted to them during the interim period, now that the South was gone. Many Nuba still live in Khartoum, and the recent outbursts of conflict in the border areas have provoked new migration streams from the Nuba Mountains to the capital. Moreover, the Darfur conflict has not been resolved to date. Before considering the consequences of these tensions, let us first look at the current urban governance framework.

Urban governance framework

Hamid argues that decentralisation has long been part of Sudan's governance model, if only because the enormous territory has always been difficult to manage from the centre (Hamid 2001: 150-151). A significant measure for the current governance framework was the establishment of the Sudanese federal government system with the constitution of 1991, and its amendment that subdivided Sudan into 26 states in 1993 (Hamid 2001; Hamid 2002: 3). The federal system was confirmed in the constitution of 1998 and the interim-constitution of 2005, with the latter also confirming the special autonomous status to Southern Sudan, which had been developed in the peace agreement that ended the Anya-Nya war in 1972 (Hamid 2001: 150). Since 2003, the decentralised system has comprised four levels of local government, including the semi-autonomous government of Southern Sudan. The latter level is not incorporated into the figure below, but it is situated between the federal government and the state governments.

Figure 5. Sudan's federal system



Source: Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005)

In practice this decentralization refers more to the administrative deconcentration of the government service, than to a transfer of decision-making power and financial means. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement actually tried to ensure a basic revenue for the states to be able to take on responsibility for local development⁹¹ but during the entire interim-period the CPA the implementation of the Protocol, particularly in the conflict areas around the border (the oil states) this remained a struggle between the government and the SPLM.

Organisation and mandates of the local government

Since the Local Governance Act 2003, the so-called local (non-federal) government has officially consisted of three levels⁹²: the state government or *Wilaya*, the locality or *Mahaliya* with its administrative units and the popular committee or *Liaan shaabia*. The status of the latter is unclear: although it is created through the Local Governance Act it is a body of citizen representation. As such, broad in clarity exists on whether the popular committees should actually be considered as a part of the government administration or as autonomous bodies of citizen participation (opinions naturally differing between the ruling party and the opposition parties). The state of Khartoum has a Legislative Assembly comprising 48 members, who are elected directly based on constituency voting. Since 2005, the function of State Governor has been an elected post: governors throughout Sudan were directly elected for the first time in the general elections of 2010.⁹³ The Governor presides over a cabinet of state ministers that each dispose of (deconcentrated) territorial representations. The Governor of Khartoum State also presides over seven territorial administrative divisions or 'localities': Jebel Awlia, Omdurman, Khartoum, Bahri (Khartoum North), Sharag Al Nile (East Nile), Kerrari and Um Baddha.⁹⁴


91 See Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005-2011, wealth sharing protocol.

92 See Awadalla Ali (2008). Before 2003, there used to be four levels of local government: the state, the 'province' (or Muhafezia), the locality and the popular committee (Hamid 2002: 6).

93 Before they were elected by the State Legislative Council from a list of four nominees proposed by the president of the republic in consultation with elites and community leaders in the state (Hamid 2002: 5).

94 Interview 78, UN-Habitat Sudan, April 2011

Figure 6. Organisation of Khartoum State




Source: document of consultancy firm (2008), in possession of the author

The localities are headed by 'commissioners' ('Muattamad'), who are appointed by the State Governor in consultation with the President. The commissioner is the primary responsible for the follow-up of state policies in the locality and represents the state ministers; he is an observer in the state cabinet; coordinator of all security organs in the locality and the head of the locality's security committee; approves and supervises the popular committees; and represents the locality in religious and national events, among others (Local Governance Act 2003: 6). He is less engaged in day-to-day operational matters (Hamid 2001: 147). Furthermore, each locality has


a chief executive ('Mudir') and seven other department managers who represent the state ministries at the local level and are appointed by the state Governor (they are often seconded from the different line ministries). The organisation of the Jebel Awlia locality, to which Mayo belongs, was as follows in 2011:

Figure 7. Organisation of Jebel Awlia Locality



Source: fieldwork 2011

The localities are the main responsible for service provision (such as primary education, basic health services and environmental sanitation, urban services, etc.) and security in their territory. To implement these tasks, the localities dispose of administrative units. The locality of Jebel Awlia presents consists of four such units: Jebel Awlia, Al Nasr (the official name for the area popularly known as Mayo), Al Azhari and Kalakla. As shown in figure 9, each administrative unit is divided into thematic units that correspond with the departments in the localities.

Figure 8. Organisation of Al Nasr Administrative Unit

Source: fieldwork 2011

The localities also comprise a legislative body, namely the local councils, which consist of 20-30 members, ninety percent of whom are directly elected from geographic constituencies, with the remaining 10 percent directly elected in a 'special election' to ensure the representation of women (Local Governance Act 2003: 3). Although locality councils should be elected every three years, they had been dissolved and not re-elected for a longer period at the time of my research. Respondents told me that the election of their local council would follow the popular committee elections that took place in May 2011. The regulations for the election of the local council are not further specified in the Local Governance Act 2003, which mentions that if the local council does not function properly for any reason, the state government can decide on how to handle the affairs of the locality (Local Governance Act 2003: 4).

Although the locality is theoretically accountable to the local council, in practice its departments respond more to the ministries at the state level, with the executive chiefs or commissioners of the localities mainly functioning as advisors to the state ministers. The locality is controlled by the central government through the state level and has very limited space for autonomous political decision-making (Abdalla 2008: 104). During my fieldwork, it appeared that the locality mainly served as a support function to the state ministries and their representations at the locality level (which existed in parallel and referred to 'the locality' as 'the political locality'⁹⁵), in terms of the payment of salaries and other administrative duties.

The Local Governance Act 2003 suggests that the '*liaan shaabia*', or popular committees also pertain to the local government, although they are also a body of citizen representation.⁹⁶ Popular committees are crucial for understanding state-society interaction in Mayo, for this is the channel through which interaction predominantly takes place. A popular committee consists of 15 members elected among residents of designated neighbourhoods. Mayo has 42 such popular committees. The Local Government Act 2003 assigns specific tasks to these popular committees such as: 'purifying the community of negative behaviours'; monitoring services; issuing residency certificates, certificates of good conduct and confirmations of death; regulating local markets and the informal sector; assisting the police; mobilising the community for self-help and ensuring community participation in political events; and collecting local taxes, Zakaath and license fees, among others (Local Governance Act 2003; Hamid 2001: 149).

Despite the localities and the administrative units being the primary responsible for service delivery in the localities, the task divisions and authority relations between them and the state ministries are not so clear in practice (Abdalla 2008: 104). Furthermore, the popular committees have been superimposed upon existing forms of community organisation such as neighbourhood charitable organisations, NGOs, social and sports clubs and cooperative societies (Hamid 2001: 153). This renders the governance system complicated to grasp, for ordinary people and researchers alike. In practice, the functioning of the local levels of administration is also compromised by their financial position.

Financing of the local administration

The main responsibility for services has increasingly been handed over to the localities, their administrative units and the popular committees; however, this has not been accompanied by increasing budgets. Khartoum State's expenditures revolved around 112 million USD in 2001⁹⁷, but it seems that very little of this has been transferred to more local levels of government.

⁹⁵ Interview with the coordinator of the health unit at locality level of the state ministry of health that exists besides the locality (which has its own health unit that is only active in preventive health care and more particularly in environmental health), Interview 59, March 2011.

⁹⁶ Although it is up to debate whether the popular committees should be considered as government bodies or organs of citizen representation as I will explain later.

⁹⁷ World Bank and Government of Sudan (2003).

Hamid says that over the years considerable responsibilities have been shifted to institutions that are virtually bankrupt (Hamid 2001: 153). Officially, the localities dispose of at least 13 own funding sources, such as taxes on buildings; 60% of agriculture and livestock taxes (of which 40% has to be handed over to Khartoum state); fees levied on ground and river transport; grants and loans (approved by the state ministries); local and commercial licences; and ‘other local revenues’.⁹⁸ However, in practice, several funds have dried up in the face of economic hardship, and other state institutions such as the state ministries have encroached upon these funding sources (Abdalla 2008: 104-107), meaning that the localities have to rely on the community’s contributions.

Consequently, popular committees have increasingly endeavoured to mobilise ‘juhud as shaabi’ or self-help activities by the communities, based on tradition of ‘Nafeer’ or community organisation (Hamid 2001: 152). According to the Local Governance Act 2003, popular committees on their turn are financed through a percentage of their resources collected within the community; their fees collected through the administration of certificates; donations; and public support. Particularly in the poorer areas, the communities do not have additional resources that they can render to the popular committees. Popular committees (and localities) also used to supplement their income by adding fees to subsidised goods that were sold through household ration cards; however, the abolishment of these subsidies in the 1990s has led to a decline in revenues and the authority of the popular committees for a while (Hamid 2001: 152; Abdalla 2008: 107). Service delivery has therefore largely become a matter of international aid agencies, who have returned to Khartoum after the signing of the CPA. In the absence of funds moreover, the committees’ focus has shifted from the implementation of services to social and political mobilisation and security (Hamid 2001: 153).

3.3 Conclusion: comparing poor people’s politics in Mexico City and Khartoum

In this chapter, I have shown that both Khartoum and Mexico City share features that are characteristic of megacities: uncontrolled urban growth resulting in vast popular neighbourhoods with a large part of the population dependent on an income from the informal sector. Needless to say, there are some important differences between Mexico City and Khartoum. First of all, both cities find themselves in different stages of urbanisation. Related to this point, Iztapalapa and Mayo differ significantly in size. Iztapalapa hosts around 2 million people and has a population larger than some of Mexico’s federal states, and is one of the 16 boroughs (decentralised levels of government) of Mexico City. By contrast, Mayo has ‘only’ a few hundred thousand inhabitants and is a subunit of one of Khartoum’s seven localities. There is also a qualitative difference: the character and governance in Mayo is also heavily affected by the fact that many residents are internally displaced as a consequence of conflicts between the government and rebel forces, which continue to date.

⁹⁸ Local Governance Act (2003).

A third important difference is that both areas differ significantly in terms of their (contemporary) national political contexts: in Mexico, a democratic transition has been set in motion in the 1980s and the city is currently governed based on multi-party elections, whereas the political situation in Sudan has been characterised since the end of the 1980s by one-party rule. Since 1986 two nation-wide elections have been held, of which only the latter counted on the real participation of opposition parties.⁹⁹ Opposition parties are officially allowed to exist, but in practice, they hardly have access to resources and their members feel forced to meet in secret. Even the SPLM, that was officially part of the government during 2005-2011, had difficulties obtaining access to funds and to the administrative apparatus of the government.¹⁰⁰

Notwithstanding, there are some important similarities between both capital cities in respect the issues that are most relevant for this study at the urban level. First, in terms of administrative structures, both countries and cities are relatively similarly organised, with both Mexico and Sudan federal republics with a history of domination of the executive over the legislative. Moreover, both capital cities have an elected ‘Mayor’, while the local governments are also elected and have administrative offices in each territorial unit. Furthermore, both cities have institutionalised structures for citizen participation.

Table 1. Political-administrative structures Mexico-Sudan

	Mexico	Sudan
Country level	Federation of 31 states and 1 federal district	Federation of 26 states, including Khartoum State
City level	Mexico D.F. (Mayor elected)	Khartoum State (Wali – elected)
Local level	16 boroughs (Jefe Delegacional – elected)	7 localities (Moattamat or commissioner, elected)
Neighborhood level	Territorial coordination units (head – appointed)	Administrative Units (managers – appointed)
Citizen representation	Citizen committees	Popular Committees

Second, urbanisation has been characterised by similar processes; in both cases, the origins of the popular neighbourhoods lay in urban sprawl, rather than urban planning. They initially incorporated large illegal settlements that have subsequently been legalised by the government. Both governments first attempted to limit rural-urban migration and waited relatively long before acknowledging the neighbourhoods as part of the urban area, with livelihood strategies thus having (long had) an informal character.

⁹⁹ And still, SPLM-North had withdrawn from the elections because it judged the preparations unfair.

¹⁰⁰ The political and administrative representation of the SPLM was the core element of the power sharing protocol under the CPA. Their representation was complicated by the fact that very few SPLM members were educated. The government stressed that certain qualifications were necessary to enter into administrative functions (in the judiciary for example), whereas the SPLM pleaded for on-the-job training.

Third, both popular neighbourhoods are politically significant, with both governments having been reluctant to accept the new urban dwellers for political considerations. Particularly in Khartoum, the rural-urban migration has changed the political geography of the city. The populations of both popular areas currently represent a significant share of the urban population that supports political opposition. Iztapalapa represents around 10% of the entire urban area and is an important constituency for the PRD, whereas Mayo represents around 5% of the population of greater Khartoum and delivers much support to the SPLM.

Fourth, in the popular neighbourhoods in Mexico City and the squatter areas of Mayo there are indications for the presence of social organisations that may take the positions of alternative authority bearers: Iztapalapa is characterised by the historical presence of social movements and Mayo was initially formed based on ethnic organisations. Furthermore, state tasks in Mayo are to a significant extent provided for by international aid agencies and NGOs.

I contend that the aforementioned factors provide sufficient grounds for a comparison of the urban poor's political strategies in both megacities. The socio-political and institutional context in both cases provides sufficient ground for assuming that political opportunity structures take the shape of a grey zone where organisations and their representatives perform double roles and mediate between the state and alternative authority bearers, the state and the residents, or both. If it is true that (mega) urbanisation provides particular conditions for the participation of the urban poor, this should become evident in both cities, albeit perhaps in different ways. If Mexico City and Khartoum show similarities in this respect, this could add to our understanding on how *urban informality* operates as a factor influencing political participation in Southern megacities, independent from the regime in place. In the next chapter, I will take a closer look at how urban exclusion works out in both Mexico City and Khartoum, before moving to the political participation of the urban excluded.

4. Urban exclusion in Mexico City and Khartoum

“Unfortunately we find ourselves in a very abandoned neighbourhood, it is the biggest...and the most marginalised and abandoned by all authorities...” (Doña Sandra, artisan, 65, Iztapalapa)

“If you look at us here and there, there is a difference. But we’re all Sudanese! [...] We are marginalised by our government...” (William, teacher, 45, Mayo)

A lot has been written about poverty and the elements that it constitute, but what matters most for a discussion about citizenship is the unequal distribution of access or relative deprivation. Citizenship assumes at least a minimum degree of equality in terms of access to basic entitlements and to the resources of the state. The observations of Sandra and William above show that relative deprivation is precisely what city dwellers in Iztapalapa and Mayo blame their governments for. In the previous chapters, I argued that a lack of access to different assets and relative deprivation is rooted in processes of social exclusion. Accordingly, this chapter deals with the questions of how processes of exclusion unfold in Mexico City and Khartoum. In the coming sections, I attempt to unravel who the excluded are in both cases and why. I will analyse how exclusion from supposedly ‘public’ goods¹ such as urban services, work (or the permission to work) and protection occur in the context of the city. I will treat the different concerns of the residents in the order of importance as they appeared from my conversations with ordinary people. It is not the purpose of this chapter to explore each of the issues in detail²; rather, the main purpose is to distil some general impressions on how processes of exclusion operate in both cases. With this goal in mind, I will first describe exclusion in Iztapalapa and subsequently in Mayo.

4.1 Being poor in Iztapalapa

“...Today we can observe that in Iztapalapa there is not a single square meter left to build upon, services can no longer be introduced, there is no water left, in many neighbourhoods in the borough there is no water left, there are no more public services to be given to Iztapalapa.”³

¹ I use the general term ‘public goods’ because they not only include urban services, but also the provision of health insurance, or the issuing of identity documents and licenses (for economic activities for example). I do not refer to the term in the classical economic sense (that considers ‘public goods’ as goods that are non-exclusive and that will (therefore) not be provided for by the market).

² On each of these issues entire books have been written. On land and housing in Mexico City see for example Cornelius (1975); Lomnitz (1978); Ward and Gilbert (1985); Alsayyad (1993); Schteingardt (1998). On services in Mexico City see for example Schteingardt (2002); on the informal economy and employment in Mexico City see for example Cross (1998); Alba Vega (2012); and on security in Mexico City see for example ICESI (2005); Pansters and Castillo Berthier (2007); Müller (2009); Davis (2010); Alvarado (2012).

³ Interview 30, local politician, 14 May 2008

“...Unfortunately we find ourselves in a very abandoned neighbourhood, it is the biggest in Iztapalapa, and the most marginalised and abandoned by all authorities, in terms of security to start with...The youth has become so involved in drugs that they are no longer interested in culture or anything...there are people who lose their lives in drinking alcohol, drug use, they live without any aspirations because of the enormous poverty, unemployment, there is a lot of it here...”⁴

“...There is...a lack of work ... it is really low, principally [...] the salaries, they pay very little, the minimum, I think it is a lie that the President where ever he goes says that in Mexico employment is on the rise, that there is no poverty in Mexico, yes there is, there are people who live in misery, not all of us because some of us already have a house, but those who rent? And when they have children in school? I know many people and we often chat, they pay rent with 2 or 3 children in school, it's not enough, they are really tight because the wages are so low, they are really poor...”⁵

These are quotes from inhabitants of the most marginalised neighbourhoods of Iztapalapa, indicating various aspects of poverty that mark their lives. In a way, Iztapalapa is an ‘advanced’ popular neighbourhood that is fully incorporated into the urban fabric. Issues of land and housing have been largely resolved, with most people in Iztapalapa being legal owners of their plots and houses. Urban services such as transport, street pavements, lightning, water and sewage have all reached the outer ends of the Federal District. Nonetheless, the number of inhabitants exerts significant pressure on public services, public space, as well as income and employment opportunities. The situation of many residents is characterised by a limited quality of services; insecurity in the (scarcely available) public space and an unstable income situation. In the coming paragraphs, I will elaborate on access to such issues in the poorest areas of Iztapalapa.

Water scarcity

From a series of interviews in the poorest areas of Iztapalapa, it emerged that inhabitants experienced access to good quality public services, and particularly water, as an immediate concern.⁶ In terms of the mere presence of urban services, Iztapalapa is almost at the same level as the averages of the entire Federal District, as the following table shows. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, most streets in Iztapalapa are paved and have lightning, and most compounds are connected to the water, electricity and drainage networks.

4 Interview 112, 18 March 2008

5 Interview 104, 25 February 2008

6 Research by Müller (2009a: 4) in neighbouring areas sustains this finding.

Table 2. Access to urban services in Iztapalapa, compared to city average

	Iztapalapa	Mexico City
Water	97,8%	97,6%
Electricity	99,5%	99,5%
Drainage	98,5%	98,2%

Source: Rosales Ortega (2005:69), based on data from the XII population census by INEGI (2000).

However, the fact that compounds generally have a connection to the public water net does not guarantee the constant availability of water, nor does it guarantee its quality. The availability of clean water is a huge concern that directly influences upon the inhabitants' quality of life. For example, Patricia, who lives in a social housing unit established by the government, recounted that her family regularly makes use of the toilet in the nearby shopping centre, owing to a lack of water. Furthermore, the lack of water also prevented her from inviting visitors to her house, because she cannot offer them use of the bathroom.⁷ The quality of water is such that Rosales et al (2005: 135) point at public health risks involved with the water provision in Iztapalapa. In the *vecindad* (typically Mexican residential construction with shared utilities), where I rented a room, we usually received fresh water through the network about twice a week, and it was often of a brownish colour and smelled of sulphur. In fact, most houses in the area disposed of a water tank not to collect rain water, but rather to collect the water when it arrives through the network.

A local government official argued that Iztapalapa should receive 22% of the water resources of the city, based on the number of inhabitants; however, in practice this is not the case.⁸ The distribution of water to Iztapalapa poses various technical challenges that actually extend (far) beyond the local governments' capacity to solve. The hydraulic system – an affair of the federal government - is not sufficiently equipped to cater for the needs of the dense population in the South-Eastern parts of the city (Jacoco et al 2005: 140).⁹ However, some aspects of access to water and other urban services are regulated at the local level; for example, the water deficit is partly compensated for by the distribution of water from tanks by the local government (Rosales Ortega et al 2005: 44). This service does not cover the entire need of the population, with Patricia stating:

“Yes, the city government gives free water to the borough, but mostly it gives only one or two full trucks for the entire housing unit, this is by far not enough. So we buy our water from companies. ... We go and buy it, for about 40 pesos per week [almost 4 USD, ID]. We accept it because we don't have a choice.”¹⁰

⁷ Interview 127, 7 February 2008.

⁸ Interview 60, 20 May 2008

⁹ Interview 60, official in the Department for Urban Services in the local government, 20 May 2008

¹⁰ Interview 127, 7 February 2008.

Given the insufficient resources for the full coverage of the population's needs, choices between areas have to be made, which renders the service sensitive to (political) manipulation.¹¹ Furthermore, the distribution system has been affected by corruption, with a former head of the borough of Iztapalapa recounting how he found that the water distribution system had been turned into a business between tank owners and local leaders.¹² Tank owners had agreed with local leaders to sell the water for a higher price than officially agreed upon, thereby increasing their own revenues and enlarging the political support for the local leader (because more water was distributed in his/her area). The fact that people have to pay more for government distributed water than officially agreed upon, further reduces access to water for the parts of the local population.

Another aspect of access to services at the local level lies in the maintenance of the water and drainage system and other public infrastructure in Iztapalapa, which is the responsibility of the (local) government. In fact, some residents complained about the maintenance of the urban services (the water net, street lightning), with residents of particular areas suspecting that the local government was politicised and did not respond to their requests because they supported opposing political leaders. In other areas, people did not express such complaints. Therefore, problems of access to services had a large structural component (over-crowdedness in relation to the technical possibilities and resources available), yet were also related to the relations between the residents and the local government. The same counts for another concern of the residents: the lack of public space.

Competition over space

Including the outskirts, Mexico City is relatively consolidated as an urban area: in 2000, over 70% of the inhabitants of Iztapalapa were the legal owners of their plots and no more than 15% were renting (Rosales Ortega et al 2005: 69). In the outskirts, the percentage of owners is even higher than in the centre of Iztapalapa.¹³ However, this plot allocation in the outskirts of the city was not planned in advance; it was primarily the result of the *post hoc* legalisation of urban sprawl. Owing to a combination of a lack of urban planning in combination and urbanisation pressures, green spaces are extremely scarce in Iztapalapa.¹⁴ Even areas that had been intended for the public in planned social housing projects have been 'privatised' over the years; for example, inhabitants have illegally expanded their houses into public areas to include private parking spaces.

¹¹ Interview 60, official in the Department for Urban Services in the local government, 20 May 2008

¹² Interview 56, 6 May 2008

¹³ Data from the city government (COPLADE 2003) show that in Miravalle, one of the most recent settlements in the Sierra de Santa Catarina, 80% of the residents owned their plots.

¹⁴ Jacobo argues that whereas international standards establish that green spaces should amount to 12,5 square meter per inhabitant, in the Federal District this is 5,3 square meters and in Iztapalapa on average 3,7 square meter (Jacobo et al 2005: 141).

Picture 1. Expansion of houses in the Vicente Guerrero



Source: fieldwork 2008

While the land use in Iztapalapa is nowadays almost entirely regulated, the struggle for the scarcely available ‘public space’ persists (Jacobo et al 2005: 142). People engaged in land invasions are no longer rural migrants but rather city residents who are looking for nearby housing opportunities for their children. Owing to this demand, squatting practices remain a lucrative enterprise. One day, I visited the mother of a friend in one of the social housing projects of the borough. While we looked down from her window on a square kilometre with improvised shelters, she told how people were earning money with this kind of business:

“They invaded the area 6 or 7 years ago...There is one gentleman who is no longer there ...[he] and his mother lived in the corner of Cartonlandia¹⁵...There are many claims in the delegation because he abused of many people. He took the land that he promised people and did not return them a penny. For example he sold someone this piece of land and that person put his bricks, built your room etcetera, but then he says I need 5000 pesos as a caution and the person doesn't have them, he will just take the terrain and sell it to another person and he will not return the money that the first person has already invested. Well, yes, he lets him rest for a while and then he comes back to ask, not that much but still, when he sees that people have money he will ask them more.”¹⁶

¹⁵ The area was locally called ‘cartonlandia’ because of the fact that the houses were initially made out of cardboard.

¹⁶ Interview 130, 22 February 2008

Not only private 'entrepreneurs', but also politicians benefit from this activity. From various interviews with inhabitants, politicians and social movement leaders, it became clear that current land invasions in the outskirts of Iztapalapa were used in the on-going political struggle between the different party currents active in the area.¹⁷ Land invasions were protected in exchange for political support, as exemplified below:

"...the lady of the newspapers...also has houses in other parts because this lady has always been involved in these kinds of things when she sees that there is an event somewhere and people go and support a certain candidate, she goes and she knows when they are planning an invasion, she is there and she wants a piece in every part...so her children were living far away but her daughters sold their land and then they came here, whatever they had earned they invested it in bricks, in building their rooms...they say that they are already paying electricity and [predial] but I don't know...they said they were going to evacuate the place but they are still here."¹⁸

In fact, this is a known old practice in Mexico City.¹⁹ Indeed, what is interesting is that it continues in a context of almost complete regulation of land use in Iztapalapa. Residents of San Miguel Teotongo recounted how they invoked the mediation of their political leader to counter the planned invasion by a social movement in an ecological zone (protected area) within their neighbourhood:

"They invaded a piece of land....Last Saturday, they were about to set up their houses...this was like the fifth time...they were about 400 [persons] I believe. Public transport, trucks, cars, busses, it was heavy...But we won...We called the police and at the same time, between neighbours, we said no, no and no...." *Ay no, fue un relajó.*"... The group that came to invade, came to negotiate....[...] the borough was supposed to solve the problem. But we don't have a relation with the borough...Unfortunately we didn't do anything until *el compañero* Victor [member of the national parliament from the area, ID] arrived, it was he who started to negotiate...because the borough didn't do anything..."²⁰

As the residents say, their political representative was not formally responsible, yet they called on him because they did not trust the local authorities. As a result of these practices, access to public space is constantly politicised.

¹⁷ Interview 98, 30 April 2008; interview 27, 26 July 2007; Interview 37, 17 and 21 June 2008 and interview 80, 20 June 2008.

¹⁸ Interview 130, 22 February 2008

¹⁹ Alsayyad (1993) identified this form of squatting as 'mobilised' or 'generated', meaning that it is "instigated by political parties or agents with the intention of social mobilisation". I argue that it often happens with the intention of *political* mobilisation, in the interest of party politics.

²⁰ Interview 98, 11 March 008

Moreover, the political struggle does not only involve land invasions, but also the daily use of public spaces assigned by the government in planned urban areas, such as social housing projects. Groups of inhabitants in these areas have appropriated small areas that were once designated for public use, under the tutelage of the local authorities. For example, Señor Paco had been invited by the local government to form a 'group' of elderly in his neighbourhood, which met on a weekly basis in a small park on a street corner. In response to my question concerning whether his group was the only one to use the park, he said: "yes, because I have signed documents from the territorial coordination unit and the borough of Iztapalapa...I am in charge for the opening and the closure [of the park]." In exchange, he recounts that the group has to support the borough in political events.²¹ Others in the neighbourhood (from opposed political groups) related how they had to literally force themselves into some of the public areas by breaking through the gates.²² In fact, public areas are thus being appropriated, often under the auspices of politicians by groups of elderly and squatters, and also by youth gangs. Indeed, the latter contributes to a general sense of insecurity in the borough.

(In)security as 'el mejor gancho' ²³

Insecurity in Mexico and in Mexico City in particular, has drawn much scholarly attention in the past decade.²⁴ Although official numbers do not indicate an increase in crime in the Federal District during that period (Alvarado 2012: 88, 94), insecurity has recently been identified as a major concern of local residents.²⁵ Within Mexico City, Iztapalapa has a reputation of being one of the most 'dangerous' areas, and is among the delegations with the highest crime rates in terms of absolute numbers (Favela Garcia 2005: 313; Alvarado 2012: 186-193), although when crime rates are compared to the number of inhabitants, Iztapalapa ranks only twelfth out of the sixteen delegations (Arango Durán and Lara Medina 2005: 4; Favela Garcia 2005: 308; Yáñez Romero 2005: 15²⁶). The same observation counts for the various neighbourhoods within Iztapalapa: those that rank highest on the list with the absolute crime rates rank much lower relative to the number of inhabitants, because they are so densely populated (Arango Durán and Lara Medina 2005b: 15-16; Favela Gavia 2005: 320-322). In this section, I will concentrate on perceptions of insecurity among the urban poor concerning this situation.

²¹ Interview 78, 20 June 2008

²² Interview 17, 3 February and 4 March 2008, and interview 77, 22 May 2008

²³ In this context, 'gancho' means 'attractor'. A police commander referred to security as 'el mejor gancho', the main attractor of votes, because politicians expected to be able to win votes with the issue. Interview 51, police commander, 29 April 2008.

²⁴ See for example Pansters and Castillo Berthier (2007); Müller (2009a, 2009b); Davis (2010); Pansters (2012); Alvarado (2012).

²⁵ On the one hand, there might be a discrepancy between official crime rates and actual crime rates, the unknown figures (*cifra negra*). On the other hand, official crime rates went up dramatically in the mid-1990s (Alvarado 2012: 94), which has most probably had an impact on people's perceptions of insecurity that lasts until today.

²⁶ Based on data from INEGI and the Public Prosecutor's office.

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I undertook fieldwork in areas with the highest absolute crime rates in Iztapalapa. Although the relative (official) crime rate was lower than in other areas of the borough, respondents frequently mentioned insecurity as one of the main problems in the neighbourhoods.²⁷ Interviews highlighted that the people's perception of insecurity had roughly two components: the actual experience with crime and the sense of a lack of protection by the authorities and particularly the police.

Concerning the concrete experience of crime, many respondents related this feeling of insecurity to the presence of drugs and drug trafficking in the area.²⁸ As Doña Gloria says:

“We are living alright, easy, although there are problems. We can't say that everything is fine because there is a lot of drug addiction, here in San Miguel drugs are being sold, it is not coming to a halt and it won't either, it is very complicated this drug issue...where I am living I am right in the middle of it, here are drugs, there are drugs, and across the street are drugs....”²⁹

Drugs were known to be sold at bus stops, in parks and in so-called 'tienditas' (tents; improvised shops) on the streets, as well as sometimes at the entrance of social housing units. Drug trafficking and drug use carry several side-effects that also represent a hassle for the inhabitants, such as robberies. One resident explained:

“What has increased a lot ultimately is street robbing, of those who walk in the streets, working people but there are other criminals who assault them or who go to their houses, in the 'green areas' we have asked for more security, because in the park we have had attacks on women and girls who pass through --- so these people who are then drug addicts, they attack men and women, whom they have also raped.”³⁰

Inhabitants did not only become the victims of mugging, insults and other forms of harassment by youth gangs, but also of more professional criminal activities. Ignacio recounted how his brother and son had been almost kidnapped in clear daylight:

²⁷ A survey conducted by a community organisation in one of the areas had also highlighted insecurity as the main problem in that neighbourhood. Interview 75, community leader, 24 June 2008.

²⁸ This corresponds to what Müller found in Iztapalapa (Müller 2009a: 10).

²⁹ Interview 114, 10 April 2008

³⁰ Interview 105, 18 April 2008

“...Certainly there are big problems here with insecurity, drug addictions, here we have a place where they sell you everything, high school students using drugs and selling it as well, the community has gone out although there is also fear of many things, suddenly you will see that those guys are armed, I had an experience lately where they kidnapped one of my children and my brother, it’s only a very short while ago, the situation emerged, they took them, [...] they took their trailer including the load...”³¹

A member of one of the neighbourhood associations actually had had her granddaughter kidnapped in a so-called ‘*secuestro exprés*’ (short term kidnapping) within the neighbourhood. In fact, my landlords’ five year-old son carried an ID-card to school, while the person who went to pick him up also had to carry an ID-card on the instruction of the police, because children had been abducted from the area. Moreover, as a result of direct experiences with crime, many people lived in constant fear during their daily activities, such as going to a shop, crossing the park or letting their children go to school.

What made people’s experience of insecurity even more intense is a lack of protection by the authorities, with residents generally recounting not trusting the police. First, they suspected collaboration between the police and criminals. Many stories circulated in the neighbourhoods about former police officers having joined organised crime, and people indicated in numerous interviews that they suspected the police of cooperating with the drug traffickers.³² This suspected collaboration between the police and criminals rendered people in the neighbourhoods reluctant to denounce crimes, as Doña Gloria explains:

“We know the people [who sell drugs] but you can’t just risk your life...you can’t do anything about it either because in this country unfortunately everything is for sale and they [the criminals] will tell you that they will hurt you when you denounce them [they threaten you] and [...] when you are there to identify them, you take a risk. One is afraid, not me, but the family, the grandchildren are those who will ultimately pay.”³³

³¹ Interview 126, 16 May 2008

³² Also see Müller (2009a; 2009b) about the police-crime nexus in Iztapalapa.

³³ Interview 114, 10 April 2008

Secondly, people were afraid that the police would treat them as criminal rather than victims; that if they denounced a crime to the police, their children might become subjects of investigation instead. One lady mentioned:

“... in Ixtlahuacan there is a small gang...one lady was complaining like: ay, there they are again and we cannot even pass, I feel like calling the police but I'd rather not because my son ... what happens if they take him as well.”³⁴

On a different occasion, she also mentioned that her own son had been taken along to the police office when he was walking back from school. This fear of criminalisation touches upon an utterly complex issue, which resides in a combination including the real presence of organised crime in the area, the social status of the inhabitants and the politicisation of the security and justice apparatus. While it is unfeasible to explore such issues in detail here³⁵, it is worth noting that insecurity and protection in Iztapalapa are shaped through a complex web of relations between residents, criminals, the police and politicians.

The fact that organised crime resides in Iztapalapa not only puts a high pressure on the residents (when deciding whether to denounce a neighbour they know that they will have to continue living together), but also on the authorities. A local police commander in the area recounted how he frequently received threats to his police corps from organised criminal groups in the area.³⁶ The pressure on the police further rises due to politicians increasingly calling for combatting insecurity. Therefore, the police's distinguishing between residents and criminals occurs under high pressure, with politicians interfering in that process. A local police officer argued that political interference already started on the level of who he could arrest:

‘The area is filled with politics...if a citizen has any connection to a parliamentarian I can't do anything. If for example, it is an acquaintance of [a local parliamentarian in the area] he will call my boss and I will have to let the person go...’³⁷

Accordingly, rather than the judge, the local politician determines who is a criminal and who is not. This means that residents' access to security and justice largely depends on their relations with politicians, just like we have seen for urban services and access to public space.

³⁴ Interview 88, 1 March 2008

³⁵ For a more detailed account of these issues, see Müller (2009a; 2009b) and Davis (2010).

³⁶ Interview 51, 29 April 2008

³⁷ Interview 52, 19 May 2008

Making ends meet

“There are no employment opportunities, only people with a *palanca* [contacts] can enter somewhere to work and he who cannot, goes around selling encyclopaedias or books, or sometimes gets a taxi to drive, or he will work as a bus- or truck driver. My son [who has an academic degree, ID] started to work with one of his brothers who is a mechanic in refrigerators and now he is a mechanic as well, he knows how to repair refrigerators and that is how he earns his living. If only there were opportunities for the students, but they finish their degrees and then...during many years they are working like crazy (*‘quemandose las pestañas’*) in order to finish and then there is no work. And if there is no work for them, imagine how it is for those who haven’t been to school, so we stay like this, and then, the children from these youngsters, what will they do? They go out with friends and the first thing they do is they start to drink, to get addicted, they end their lives with their wives in a room *eating beans* [expression that indicates that they have nothing].”³⁸

The quote above highlights a lack of decent employment and income opportunities as another important concern indicated by respondents in the outer suburbs of Iztapalapa. Most people that I met were either working self-employed (taxi-drivers, street vendors selling ‘tacos’ or newspapers, or mechanics) or as day labourers (in construction, cleaning or manufacturing) in other parts of the city.

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Picture 2. Mechanics



Source: *fieldwork* 2008

³⁸ Interview 112, 18 March 2008

Several studies point out that formal economic opportunities in the borough are low compared to its population density. Arriaga Navarrete and Estrada López (2005) note that Iztapalapa is one of the five most economically dynamic boroughs of Mexico City, with this economic activity concentrating on commerce and manufacturing. Iztapalapa has the highest number of economic units in these sectors compared to the other boroughs (Arango Durán and Lara Medina 2005a: 23). However, when comparing the number of economic units in manufacturing to the borough's inhabitants, Iztapalapa scores relatively low (Arriaga Navarrete and Estrada López 2005: 200). Arango Durán and Lara Medina conclude that the borough by far does not generate sufficient (official) employment for its own population: even if the (registered) economic units in the area only employ people from the area, they could only absorb 30% of the population.³⁹ At the same time, they note that 72% of the economically active population of Iztapalapa is employed (only few of which as bosses) and that 22% is self-employed (Arango Durán and Lara Medina 2005a: 26-31). This means that a large share of the Iztapalan labour force is either employed outside of the borough or in unregistered economic units. Residents experienced this as a problem because – especially for those living in the outskirts of Iztapalapa – they had to spend two to three hours on a daily basis travelling between home and work, time they could not spend with their children. Respondents frequently used this as an explanation for why there were so many problems with the local youth – high school dropouts, teenage pregnancies, gang membership. The alternative – working in the informal sector within the borough – generally produced too little revenues.

Arango Durán and Lara Medina note that Iztapalapa has the highest number of 'family enterprises' in Mexico City (Arango Durán and Lara Medina 2005a: 24). This seems to correspond to the observation by Arriaga Navarrete and Estrada López (2005: 210) that a relatively high percentage of the overall turnover and employment in Iztapalapa is generated by micro- and small enterprises (between 1-100 employees).⁴⁰ This is relevant given that they point at a correlation between an enterprise's size and the salary for its employees, which are generally four times higher in large enterprises than micro-enterprises (Arriaga Navarrete and Estrada López 2005: 215). Arango Durán and Lara Medina highlight that the salaries in the eastern part of Iztapalapa are significantly lower than the rest of the borough. In Iztapalapa, the average income is around 2.800 USD a year (against 7.800 USD on average per year in the richest borough, which equals a teacher's salary⁴¹), equating to around 230 USD a month, with lower average incomes in the outer areas such as Miravalle. In 2003, 72% of the inhabitants in Miravalle earned only up to 2 minimum monthly salaries, namely 200 USD per month.⁴² Accordingly, this could be explained by the fact that many people work in family enterprises.

³⁹ It is not clear whether this number incorporates government institutions in the borough. In fact, I found that many residents volunteered with local politicians in the hope to acquire a paid job within the local government.

⁴⁰ Although it is not clear whether all the 'family enterprises' are actually registered and counted as micro- or small enterprises. There might be many family enterprises beyond the micro- and small enterprises identified by Arriaga Navarrete and Estrada López (2005).

⁴¹ Arango Durán and Lara Medina (2005: 26).

⁴² Coordinación de la Planeación del Desarrollo Territorial del Gobierno del DF (COPLADE 2003), downloaded at www.sideso.df.gob.mx/index.php?id=35 in May 2008.

Other data suggests that Iztapalapa has relatively few highly educated workers. Considering the residents' professions in Iztapalapa, Arango Durán and Lara Medina highlight that 20% of all men in Iztapalapa are craftsmen, 16% merchants, 10% transport operators, 7% workers in personal services (for example security), 6% office workers and 5% day labourers. Of all the women, 20% are merchants, 17% office workers, 9% workers in personal services, over 8% domestic workers and 7% engaged in handicraft. In total, these categories represent around 65% of the occupied population, with the remainder distributed across other professions that each count for less than 5% (Arango Durán and Lara Medina 2005: 29). In terms of education levels, Iztapalapa has fewer professionally educated inhabitants than the city average (12% as compared to 20%), with lower levels in the outskirts (Arango Durán and Lara Medina 2005: 20-21).

It can be inferred from the above that relatively many inhabitants of Iztapalapa work in the so-called informal economy. As highlighted by Cross (1998) and Alba Vega (2012), politics plays an important role in the informal economy of Mexico City. Owing to their unclear legal status, informal economic activities are actually heavily dependent on the tolerance and protection by politicians and local leaders. For example, this applies to street vending, yet also informal taxi services, activities that are known to be organised under the PRD.⁴³ In this respect, it is relevant to note that the city government executed a number of operations in informal markets in 2007 and 2008, in its struggle against organised crime in the city. One of the largest and oldest irregular markets in Iztapalapa, the El Salado market, became subject to a large government operation in May 2008, when all the merchants were forced to register and stick to designated areas. Although the main argument of the Department for Public Security for intervening in the market was the supposed traffic of illegal merchandise, another argument was just as important for the local government. The head of the borough, Horacio Martínez Mesa, revealed in a local newspaper what the operation was also about, in stating that the local government had "... decided to break with corporatism; so that the merchants, instead of paying the local leaders, comply with the law and make their contributions as stipulated in the Financial Code."⁴⁴ The question is however whether the main objective of the local government was to have the leaders comply with the official laws. The area in which El Salado lies is under informal control of a leader politically opposed to the borough.⁴⁵ Given the importance of political alliances for leaders in the informal sector (Cross 1996; Alba Vega 2012), this statement of the head of the borough might also reveal that the local leaders did not politically support the local government and that therefore he had an extra interest in having the merchants of El Salado complying with the law.

43 The 'panteras', an association of at least 4000 informal taxi drivers, is associated to the Frente Popular Francisco Villa, a social movement in Iztapalapa that has engaged in an alliance with the PRD.

44 La Jornada, "Hoy vence el plazo para que comerciantes aseguren un lugar en el tianguis El Salado", Wednesday 21 May 2008.

45 Alfredo Hernández, alias El Camarón, member of the Izquierda Unida in alliance to the Nueva Izquierda faction in the PRD.

Informality and stigmatisation

The unclear legal status of informal economic activities, the presence of organised crime in the area and the operations of the authorities that link both contribute to the existing stigma concerning the residents of Iztapalapa. When the merchants from the El Salado market protested at the central square in Mexico City, they carried banners stating “We are merchants, not criminals”. In fact, stigmatisation actually reflects an important component of the relation between the borough and the rest of the city.

Interactions between Iztapalapans and other inhabitants of the city are manifold: youngsters from Iztapalapa travel to Mexico City’s central square for pop concerts; while many people work in the city centre, as previously mentioned. Therefore, the relation between the inhabitants of Iztapalapa and those of other parts of Mexico City is physically close; however, this does not preclude stigmatisation. Notwithstanding the nationwide fame of the rich cultural traditions of Iztapalapa, the most persisting image of the borough within the rest of the city is that of insecurity. During my initial period of research, the prejudices concerning the area soon became clear. People repeatedly told me not to go to Iztapalapa alone and to be careful in public transport, ‘because hands are being cut off in the metro in order to steal jewellery’. In a way, this image of Iztapalapa is being internalised by the residents, and particularly the local youth: it has become a matter of identity, something to be proud of.⁴⁶ A social worker originally from Iztapalapa expressed that:

“Iztapalapa is like ‘Iztapalapa’ [makes symbol of respect]...when you go to the community and say that you’re from Iztapalapa, everybody watches his bag, when you go to Tepito and you say that you are from Iztapalapa, they will look at you like: wow! People from Iztapalapa and Tepito usually compare themselves, who is the strongest?....”⁴⁷

However, the effects of this stigmatisation for the exclusion of Iztapalapans within the general context of the city are mitigated by the fact that people from Iztapalapa at least are politically represented; they can participate in politics and occupy positions in the government. Their representatives can advocate for further investments in Iztapalapa and the provision of more resources to the borough.

In short, a closer consideration of the main concerns of Iztapalapa residents revealed that patterns of exclusion within the borough are closely related to political divisions.

⁴⁶ It is beyond the scope of this study to go deeper into the effects of stigmatisation, but studies on Western societies have indicated similar processes of the internalisation of stigmatisation. See for example J.D. de Jong (2007). *Kapot Moelijk*. Amsterdam: Akzan, on group behaviour of Moroccan immigrant youth in Amsterdam.

⁴⁷ Interview 117, 8 February 2008

The dense population of Iztapalapa exerts significant pressure on urban and public services, public space and employment opportunities, rendering access different for significant parts of the population. In the face of scarcity, public goods that are supposed to be equally provided for by the government become negotiable. This particularly applies to the distribution of urban services and access to public space. Moreover, access to justice and protection for informal economic activities is a further topic of negotiation between the residents and the authorities. For the residents of Iztapalapa, access to services, public space and protection largely depends on people's support for and relations with politicians. In chapters 5 and 6, I will further elaborate on how these relations take shape and negotiations take place. However, I will first describe the main features of urban exclusion in Mayo.

4.2 Being poor in Mayo

"We are tired, we don't have anything to eat, and we cannot go back to our villages. Our problems are too much: we need help..."

"No one can explain our problems. I can just cry. Only God knows, he is the one who makes us survive. I am a widow..."

"We don't have homes and we are really tired. We cannot do anything. We are just asking for help."⁴⁸

These are quotes from Nuba IDPs in Mayo, which is known within Khartoum as a squatter area that is home to many IDPs. Over the years, some areas in Mayo have been regulated by the government, housing the relatively better-off families, and the merchants in the main markets are actually quite wealthy. In the entirety of Mayo, increasingly more people have completed secondary education and attend university. However, at the same time, many residents of Mayo are still squatting. For many of them, life is marked by all kinds of insecurities and an absolute lack of income. During my interviews, residents typically stressed the need for land and services, income and employment, as well as the recognition of their identity and cultural belonging. The inhabitants were concerned about security, but of a different kind than in Iztapalapa, as I will show in the coming paragraphs.

Dreaming of a plot in the capital

Many of the inhabitants of Mayo are first generation migrations, often IDPs, from the rural areas. Some of them have remained in the capital for years, waiting to regularise their situation, which has sometimes driven people into despair. Some women were truly desperate about their living conditions in the city, with many of them having lost their husbands during the war and come to the city alone with their children, hoping for a better life. Most of them did not speak Arabic, but only Nuba languages. Their hopes had not yet materialised. After twenty years in the city, they still did not own land and consequently still lived in improvised shelters.

⁴⁸ Interview 75, focus group, April 2011.

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Every year, the area where they live transforms into a mud field during the rainy season, because there are no paved roads in their area:

“People are displaced and live in tents. The floods are bad...During the rainy season you cannot even come here...The places are demarcated but we don't have documents or building materials...we stay in the desert, we are redundant...the situation of the IDPs is not good. Things are a mess. There is no electricity, no water. Public services are poor...We are suffering like our parents.”⁴⁹

The account above emphasises that access to land is the first major issue of concern for the poor inhabitants of Khartoum. Regularisation of land (including the provision of land titles) is a first step of access to the city: it is a precondition for the construction of roads and provision of urban services. In areas where the land has not yet been regulated, there is no sewage system and houses often do not have latrines. There is no water or electricity network; people buy water from the donkey carts (or walk to the water pumps in 55 degrees Celsius) and electricity from somebody who owns a generator.

People are willing to endure all this with the hopes of eventually owning a plot in the capital. Medina, a 25 year old woman with five children, who is originally from Darfur, says:

“There is no health centre in the neighbourhood because it is a squatter settlement. For the hospital we go to Bashair or else to Khartoum. Parts of the neighbourhood are planned and others are not planned...there are schools in the area but the classes are too full. When the planning comes there will be health centres and more schools. We get our water from donkey carts and electricity from generators...There is a police station in the neighbourhood and a bigger one close to it...The situation is not good but we are waiting. There are private schools, but what can you do if you have to feed five children, so they go to public schools. We go to the locality [local government] to solve these problems, but the people there are also waiting for the planning to solve the service problems. We have already registered for the land: we have papers and tokens (a ‘Dibaya’).”⁵⁰

Other inhabitants who had been living in the area since the 1970s and still do not own their plots recount: “Even if we wanted to leave to another area, we couldn't because we would lose our entitlements to land anywhere in Khartoum. We have to stay and wait. Although the spaces are very limited we are happy with it.”⁵¹

49 Interview 75, focus group, April 2011

50 Interview 84, April 2011

51 Interview 83, April 2011

In fact, the land issue in Mayo remains far from being solved. According to the government, around sixty percent of the households in Mayo own their plot, around twenty percent are renting and the other twenty percent squatting (Abdalla 2008: 98). The quality of housing in Mayo varies: in the older plan areas, most of the houses are made of mud brick and built on a clearly demarcated 300 square meter plot.⁵² However, for many inhabitants acquiring a plot is already a major investment and many cannot afford to build on it, certainly not within such a short time period, which results in the bad quality of housing. In the unregulated areas, most of the houses are made of improvised materials such as plastic, cardboard and gunny bags. Owing to the heavy rainfalls that occur in July and August each year, most of these shacks have to be rebuilt on an annual basis.

Picture 3. Squatting in Mayo



Source: fieldwork 2011

Large relocation operations took place as recently as between November 2008 and July 2009 (Pantuliano et al 2010: 20). Around 10,000 families were affected by this relocation, with only one third of them being reassigned plots in Mayo. The remainder were mainly relocated to Al Fatih, which is an unserviced area around 30 kilometres north of the capital, and even further from Mayo, where people originally had their livelihoods.

The relocations are often heavily contested and have sometimes resulted in violent confrontations between the squatters and government. For example, this happened in a squatter area neighbouring Mayo on 8th May 2008, with newspaper reports mentioning that at least 17 people were killed and dozens wounded in clashes that erupted in Soba Aradi when Sudanese police tried to relocate refugees mainly from southern Sudan.⁵³ An inhabitant recalled how the violence erupted:

⁵² See Pantuliano et al (2011: 19). Based on the colonial system the land in Khartoum is classified into four categories, of which only categories 1-3 can be legalised. The distribution of land in this class imposes certain conditions on the owner, such as a limited time period for construction (UN-habitat 2009:14).

⁵³ Reuters, "Sudan says 17 dead as police clashes with refugees", 18 May 2005

“The government ... planned the relocation for the same day (8th May 2008). They brought the Khartoum state police that surrounded the entire area. I tried to get out of the area but they stopped me. I asked what was going on. They said: “we are moving the people here”. I asked: “just any kind of moving, I asked, without any committees?” [he referred to a preparatory process in which local organisations would be included, ID]. I was trying to find someone to talk to and I found one, who said that they were relocating the people who did not have the right to stay in Soba [who did not have residence certificates]. All the people gathered spontaneously around the George Kangor building. All the police cars that were supposed to take the people were there as well. After a while they started having some clashes between the people and the police. The Southerners were the first to start these clashes. After a while the whole area was chaos. Then after that we heard gunshots. Before the gunshots they [the police] used tear-gas. After that all the people were frightened. All families went into the streets, women tried to find their children, everyone was very much afraid. After that a military car entered the area with a military officer of an unknown position. People in the car were shouting “one people, one military!” This meant that the military was on the side of the citizens, there was only one car, they were talking to the people and they put people in their car, they were peaceful. Before the military car people were using rocks to defend themselves, the police was using guns. After the people defended themselves with rocks and the police started shooting and the people withdrew into the area. They [the people] said that “all these conflicts were because of the popular committee”. People then set the houses of the popular committee members on fire; they destroyed the office of the committee near the police centre of Soba. When they destroyed the offices, these were close to the police centre. The officers who died that day did not have a bad relation with the people; the people liked them because they organised the area. They were not killed intentionally. The reason for their death was that one officer when he saw the fire shot into the air to disperse the crowd. He accidentally shot a child. After that, all the area attacked the police centre. After that the area really was a mess, a chaos, nobody knew who was defending, who was fighting. Everyone took care of himself. After that many people died and they didn’t even know who, many people also died in prison through violence. There were many police officers in the centre but it was not clear how many. The police did not have enough guns because they were not there to fight. They ran out of guns and people killed them with knives and machetes. In the hospital it was proved. [Because of the resistance] no one could be

relocated from Soba...They named another popular committee after these events and they started negotiating. People live peacefully until now".⁵⁴

A UN-Habitat official recounted that around 8,000 people were relocated to Al Rasheed, another 30 kilometres south of Khartoum, after the clash. They were attracted to this area by the promise of owning a plot, despite it being very far from the city and employment opportunities. According to this official, people accepted these offers because the situation in the IDP-camps was even more difficult.⁵⁵ The story of Soba Aradi shows that people are desperate to own a plot in Khartoum. Interviews revealed that access to plots was determined by a variety of factors, most importantly including money and political representation.⁵⁶ In committees where both NCP and SPLM were present it was more difficult for the NCP to decide unilaterally over the evacuation of the IDPs. This seemed to result more in stalemates in the planning process than to result in residence permits for the SPLM constituencies however. Among NCP constituents only personal connections are likely to be more decisive.

Self-service(s)

Related to access to land and tenure security is the access to urban services, which are only available in the planned areas. Houses in the regularised parts of Mayo, such as Wahid-wa-talateen and parts of Al Nasr, are connected to the water and electricity networks, managed by state-owned companies: the Khartoum Water Corporation the National Electricity Company and the Khartoum Garbage Company. They raise fees for the usage of the networks and collection of the garbage. However, the quality of the services in these areas remains poor; for example, according to inhabitants, the water network in Al Nasr had been polluted for at least two years due to the nearby waste dump. Therefore, people did not drink from the water network and kept buying from the donkey carts.⁵⁷

However, most parts of Mayo are not connected to the water and electricity networks. The local government estimates that around fifty percent of the houses in Mayo are connected to a borehole network (Abdalla 2008: 98), whereas ten years ago around sixty percent of the entire state of Khartoum were estimated to have access to formal, household-based public provision of drinking water (Abusin 2003: 34). People in the unplanned areas fetch water directly with hand pumps, or buy it in barrels from donkey carts. Most of the pumps have been dug by the communities themselves and are managed under the supervision of the Khartoum Water Corporation on the government's behalf.

⁵⁴ Interview 79, April 2011.

⁵⁵ Interview 39, December 2010.

⁵⁶ Interview 34, popular committee coordinator Al Wehdat, March 2010.

⁵⁷ Interview 66, April 2011.

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The person who carries out this task is allowed to raise a fee: one barrel of water can be purchased at the pump for 1 SDG and is subsequently sold by donkey cart owners to private households for 2-6 SDG per barrel or 0,5 SDG per jerrycan.⁵⁸ Inhabitants of the unregulated areas often buy electricity from privately owned generators: the power for one light bulb costs 15 SDG per month, the same as the price for the power needed for a TV.⁵⁹ In the unplanned areas, garbage is usually burned on the streets by the inhabitants themselves. UNEP (2007) estimates that around twenty eight percent of the households in the entire city are connected to the drainage network. In Mayo, this is much less. Most houses have pit latrines, yet some residents have to rely on public toilets.

Picture 4. Provision of water by donkey carts



Source: fieldwork 2011

Social services in Mayo are offered by the government and private institutions (mostly NGOs and religious organisations). According to the Education Office of the State Ministry of Education, there were 58 schools in AlNasr and 672 teachers⁶⁰; the Administrative Unit reported 72 primary schools in the area and seven secondary schools in AlNasr: four for boys and three for girls.⁶¹ According to different surveys, overpopulated classrooms are a problem in the area: classes with 100 children are not an exception. Indeed, many of my respondents confirmed this.⁶² Moreover, school was too expensive for some inhabitants, with one Nuba woman recounting:

⁵⁸ UNEP estimates that a poor household uses 64 gallons or 1,5 barrel a day. As a barrel price is 2-6 SDG (depending on whether someone gets it at the water pump or buys it from a donkey cart), UNEP estimates that poor families spend up to 40% of their daily income to water. See UNEP 2007 and field notes August 2009.

⁵⁹ Interview 51, March 2011 and interview 84, April 2011.

⁶⁰ Interview 60, March 2011

⁶¹ Data provided to research assistants. These figures also included private schools like the Comboni college.

⁶² See Pantuliano et al 2011 and interviews 3 (February 2010); 6 (February 2010); 8 (February 2010); 9 (March 2010); 10 (March 2010); 12.(March 2010)

“There is no work; you can’t send your children to school. Many of us took our children out of school, they will be in the street”...

”You want to feed your children and take them to school, but you cannot even build your house”.⁶³

Access to public health care was also restricted. According to the health coordination unit of the State Ministry of Health, there is one hospital and 22 government-led health centres in AlNasr, 13 of which are led by NGOs in the IDP-camps and nine run by the government in the squatter areas.⁶⁴ Guidelines establish that there has to be a health centre for every 10,000 inhabitants, yet given that the population number (particularly in the non-planned areas) is not known, this has been adapted to the standard of one health centre per every two kilometres.

Table 3. Access to social services in Mayo, compared to city average

	Mayo	Khartoum
Education		
Schools/inhab	1/5.000	1/3.112
Teachers/stud	1/100	1/37-53 in better areas (planned ratio 1/10-15)
Enrollment	48% not enrolled in the camps in 2006	87% of all children between 6-13 enrolled in 2003
Health		
Clinics/inhab	2/500.000 , plus 1 primary health center every 2 km	
Doctors/inhab	1/26.000	1/8.400 in better areas

Source: Abdalla (2008), Pantuliano et al (2011), fieldwork 2011

According to the representatives of the state ministry of health, NGOs can ask for more health centres, thus deviating from the rule (essentially meaning: if an NGO wants to start a health centre, there can be more). Every year, the ministry’s representatives at the locality level make a plan based on the population size.⁶⁵ According to a Reliefweb report from 2005, people in eight IDP and peripheral settlements in Khartoum state – including Mayo camp - have good access to health facilities in terms of the infrastructure available, yet they did not make use of it owing to the relatively high costs involved.⁶⁶

63 Interview 53, focus group, Angola, March 2011

64 Interview 59, 29 March 2011, Dr. Bushra explains that there are 42 NGO lead health centres and 18 government lead health centres in the whole of Jebel Awlia, of which there are nine in Mayo.

65 Interview 59, March 2011

66 See “Sudan: rapid assessment of health and nutrition situation in IDP settlements and peripheral settlements in Khartoum State, May 2005”, Reliefweb report, <http://reliefweb.int/node/412246>, p.8.

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During my fieldwork, I also found that health care proved too expensive for many Mayo inhabitants because of the difficult income situation. One Darfuri woman explained:

“There is no health centre in the area, the nearest is about 9 miles away. The hospital is expensive, we have to get a 5 SDG ticket [1,6 USD], and then pay the doctor and the medication. Therefore many people use traditional medicine (hibiscus, tea, sesame oil, honey). Sometimes children get sicker from this medication.”⁶⁷

Even a man with a permanent relatively well paid job and his own house in a regularised area had trouble providing for the needs of his (extended) family in terms of health and education:

“...The biggest challenge is, of all these families [..], only one or two guys from them are working. So [...] for a family of ten, they are waiting for one guy to [save money] for their health, to [pay] for their schools, for their food, for this and that. And if you go to my house, you can see a lot of children who are out of school...they are ... polishing the shoes [in the town]...you can see that children of school age are on the roads during the morning time, because everybody has to work...Also the problem they have is, you see, the health. And of course, everywhere you hear that it is free medical care and this and that and that, but if you go to the hospitals you have to buy everything. If ... [you have a family of ten] and one is in the hospital than it means the income has to go to that guy. Then tomorrow you can see your own children who [can't] go to the school not because they don't want to go, but because ...I have no money for that.”⁶⁸

At the time of my fieldwork, the government was in the process of introducing a health insurance policy in Mayo that would guarantee all residents access to affordable health care. Notwithstanding, in order to apply for the insurance the head of the household has to submit an identity certificate issued by the popular committee in his area. Moreover, marriage and birth certificates are required for the family members, or an age estimate from the statistics office. Based on these documents and a monthly fee, health care is provided almost for free.⁶⁹ However, because the health insurance is thus dependent on a residence certificate (only available in the planned areas), health services remain inaccessible for large part of the population in Mayo.

⁶⁷ Interview 51, focus group Al Andaluz, March 2011

⁶⁸ Interview 34, March 2010

⁶⁹ Interview 65, April 2011

In sum, access to services is limited by the high entry costs, which applies in the case of urban services and services such as health care and education. Moreover, for land, housing and access to services, having the right documentation is quintessential (Jacobsen et al 2001: 96), although this is dependent on cooperation of the (tribal chiefs within the) popular committee, as well as having sufficient resources (Jacobsen et al 2001: 88; Pantuliano et al 2011: 21). This is a problem for many of the inhabitants of Mayo, particularly for the (Southern) IDPs. Let us take a closer look at the income situation of Mayo's inhabitants.

Scraping a living

The challenges for the urban poor in Khartoum do not end with land ownership and tenure security; another major concern for them is access to income. Estimates suggest that around 45% of the population of Khartoum work in the informal economy (Abdalla 2008: 39). Many inhabitants of Mayo are working as day labourers for construction companies, as rickshaw drivers or petty traders (Al Tayeb 2003: 6; Abdalla 2008: 98). Formal jobs are mostly provided by the government (Abdalla 2008: 38), yet are inaccessible for most of Mayo's inhabitants. A manager of the local health centres attributes this to the low levels of education amongst the population:

“If you compare Mayo to Kalakla or to Al Azhari, you will find that in the other areas people have stable jobs whereas in Mayo people are day labourers...most employees in the health centres are not from Mayo...Communities are often not welcoming. The solution would be to recruit from the areas but the education level is generally too low. There is therefore a lack of personnel in the health centres.”⁷⁰

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Some interviewees also believed that high level (government) jobs were not accessible when you did not have the right political affiliation. One primary school teacher said: “Although I graduated as an engineer, I could not have access to a [government] job because of my political background”. Based on interviews, among others in Mayo, Pantuliano et al (2011: 16) note that some people become a member of the ruling party because it enlarges their chances of getting a job. Most of the employed people in the area worked in low-skilled jobs; for example, as donkey cart or rickshaw drivers.⁷¹ Domestic work is also a resort for many urban poor, particularly women.

Others are self-employed within the area, with some working as shopkeepers. Most of the people who run shops actually do not own them, but rather rent them from others.⁷² Another means of self-employment for higher educate people within the area is founding a school. I came across a number of private schools in

⁷⁰ Interview 59, 29 March 2011

⁷¹ Interview 43, February 2011.

⁷² Interview 42, February 2011. Those who run shops are actually pretty well off because they have the formal permit to stay and their interests are protected by the market committee.

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Mayo that were founded by teachers, not least to secure a job for themselves. One teacher explained to me why he founded a school three years ago:

“...although I graduated as an engineer, because of my political background I could not have access to a job. So I created the school also to have a job. Everyone can start his own school in Sudan.”⁷³

A focus group discussion with Nuba women highlighted that many of them worked as street vendors, selling tea or peanuts:

“You do your best, some women and men work in houses or they put a chair in the street and sell something for the people...most of us sell tea, others work in the houses of Arabs”...“you can put a table in the street with *foule sudani* (peanuts) or herbs”.

Picture 5. A tea-seller at the main market



Source: fieldwork 2011

Under the shari'a law, income strategies of mainly female IDPs have become criminalised. Tea-selling has become associated with prostitution, with tea-sellers often harassed by the police. The IDP women in Mayo are known for their locally brewed alcohols, *merissa* and *araki* (Al Battahani 1998: 33⁷⁴; Pantuliano et al 2011: 15). Police raids are frequently carried out in the area to close illegal alcohol selling points and arrest the 'wine sellers'.⁷⁵

⁷³ Interview 63, April 2011

⁷⁴ Pages in the 1998 version of the paper are not numbered. Al Battahani et al call these 'survival practices' "moonlighting strategies" under paragraph 1.4.2.

⁷⁵ Interviews 23, March 2010; and interview 63, April 2011.

This is one of the reasons why most of the female inmates in Omdurman women's prison are from South Sudan or the Nuba Mountains (Al Zain 2008: 8). The position of single mothers and their income strategies under Shari'a law has increased the stigma concerning urban poor women, and not only Southern and Nuba women, but also Ethiopian and Eritrean (refugee) women.⁷⁶

Almost all of these women interviewed had to work because they had no husband to provide their family with an income.⁷⁷ However, a group of Darfuri women with husbands who worked (mostly day labourers; they had "free work at the market" or worked as engineers) also wanted to work themselves "because their income had to be increased."⁷⁸ In Mayo, a family can barely cover the minimum costs based on an average income. A donkey cart driver makes around 15 SDG per day (6.20 USD⁷⁹), part of which he has to give to the donkey cart owner. By comparison, a government employee in Sudan earns between 25 and 61 USD a month.⁸⁰ Even when the average income per family in these areas is 10-20 SDG per day⁸¹, people can barely pay for their daily expenses. The costs for rent and water already amount to 12.5 SDG per day; what remains for food depends among others on transport. The income-expenditure ratio also implies that other expenses such as health care and education represent too great a sacrifice for many families, let alone the capacity to afford to purchase and build on a plot (UN-Habitat 2009: 25). Maternal mortality is almost twice as high in squatter areas as the average for urban areas. Owing to the costs involved, the inaccessibility of health and antenatal care is expected to have a negative impact on the health of women in these areas (Abdalla 2008: 42).

⁷⁶ Even a (Christian) Southern Sudanese friend explained in my presence to a foreign newcomer that most Ethiopian women are prostitutes.

⁷⁷ Interview 53, March 2011

⁷⁸ Interview 51, March 2011

⁷⁹ During the research period the SDG fluctuated from 2.8 SDG per USD until 3.4 SDG per USD (until 5 SDG per EURO on the black market). Fluctuations varied with 60%, therefore the numbers have to be treated with caution (discuss in methodology). In February 2013 1 USD equals 8 SDG.

⁸⁰ Abdalla 2008:38.

⁸¹ The average income for families in Khartoum, see Pantuliano et al (2011: 15).

Table 4. Living expenses in Mayo

Living expenses (1 SDG = 0,40 USD)	
Housing	
Plot price	20.000-40.000 SDG
Land allocation process	Up to 5731 SDG: National certificate: 40 SDG Plus witness charges Marriage certificate: 30 SDG Birth certificate: 30-200 SDG Age assessment: 40 SDG Lottery entrance fee: 461 SDG Deed MPPPU: 1200-5000 SDG
Construction	Depending on workers and materials
Procurement ready-made building	23.000 SDG for a minimum size building
Funerals	PM
Weddings	PM
Yearly expenditures	
Social services	
Education	Public school: 50-90 SDG per child per year (plus transport) Private school: 200-1000 SDG per child per year (plus transport)
Health	3-5 SDG entrance fee 3 SDG per test Plus medication and transport
Monthly expenditures	
Housing (from 5 SDG per day)	
Rent	150 SDG per month for a room 400-1000 SDG per month for a house
Urban services (from 0,5 SDG per day)	
Electricity	15 SDG per a lamp per month, 15 SDG for a television per month
Sewage	- (pit latrines)
(Shop rent at the main market in Mayo)	
	100-400 SDG per month
Daily expenditures	
Food	Remaining
Clothes and household items	1 SDG per day
Water	7,5 SDG per day (up to 40% of the daily income)
Transport	3-6 SDG per day (20-40% of daily income)
Social contributions	Remaining
Security/permits to sell (especially for informal street vendors and tea sellers)	PM

Source: Abdalla (2008), Pantuliano et al (2011), UN-Habitat 2009, fieldwork 2011

The table above shows that the average daily family income of 10-20 SDG per day barely reaches for daily expenses, let alone monthly, yearly and incidental expenses that have to be covered. People have their own mechanisms to increase their income, including living in large households where everybody (including children) contributes to the shared income, combining different jobs as individual household members, as well as participating in *Sanadeeq* (rotating credit associations; see also Abdalla 2008: 163). For many families, remittances represent an important additional source of income. Zakat (Islamic donations for the poor) and other social programmes such as the Al Waqaaf fund (a fund based on legacies from the deceased) generally consist of low amounts and are cumbersome to access, which renders them an uninteresting source of income for most people (Pantuliano et al 2011: 17). People personally address politicians for financial aid.⁸² Politicians in the area have important social functions and 'have to help people with personal problems'⁸³, which essentially means that they have to contribute to wedding and funeral expenses in order to maintain their support.⁸⁴ I will return to these functions of politicians in chapters 5 and 6. However, the income situation for many inhabitants in Mayo is generally unstable and below the levels required for their daily survival. Urban exclusion in Mayo translates into absolute poverty for many, much more so than in Iztapalapa. The access to formal and informal income strategies partly depends on people's relations with the authorities. This is not only because the government or individual politicians can support people financially, but also given that people depend on the authorities for the permission to work. Accordingly, this brings us to the relation between the inhabitants and the police.

In search for protection

Many people in Mayo do not seek protection from, but actually against, the police. Public security in Mayo is of a different nature than in Iztapalapa. In comparison to Iztapalapa and other African popular neighbourhoods, the area can be generally considered relatively safe (just like the rest of Khartoum). Public policing has been slowly introduced in Mayo. Initially, when the outskirts of the city were not yet planned and new migrants kept joining their kinsmen, protection was mainly a matter of the inhabitants themselves. According to Berridge (2012), the police refrained from intervening in the peripheral areas of the city at least until 1989, yet the government has also invested more heavily in public security in those areas after recognising that most of the migrants were not about to return to the rural areas. As a result of the conflicts between the centre and periphery, this has also become a matter of national security in the eyes of the government. Gradually, and together with other urban services, police stations have been introduced in the area. This has not gone unnoticed, with residents stating that the general security situation has improved under the current regime. One Darfuri inhabitant of Mayo, who has been there over 30 years, recalls:

⁸² Interview 62, March 2011

⁸³ As noted by a politician, interview 85, July 2011

⁸⁴ Interview 85, July 2011

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“...after the area has been planned, they [the government] made security points inside the area. Like police stations. They call it ‘ijtihab al shaabi’, that is, a civilian security something like that... sometimes they are helpful...But we used to do [something ourselves] if something happened...the popular committees also have to choose two or three guys they have a [security task], like they’re managing, like a surveillance...now it [the area] looks more secure.”⁸⁵

There are around 136 police stations in the entire Jebel Awlia locality (including Al Nasr and three other administrative units, covering 938,000 inhabitants in total⁸⁶), which implies that there is approximately one police station for every 7,000 inhabitants in the locality. There are several ways in which residents can contact the police: during the patrols, by visiting them in the local police stations or headquarters, or by calling a special emergency number.⁸⁷

However, residents generally rely more on their tribal leadership than on the police for security. Residents indicated that the stations were far away, and when called the police often arrived late.⁸⁸ They said that whenever they had security problems, they went to their tribal leaders. Tribal and intertribal conflicts in Sudan are historically resolved by the tribal leadership.⁸⁹ A traditional court called the ‘*judia*’ exists within every tribe, composed of tribal leaders who can mediate in conflicts and also issue verdicts. This tradition was imported from the countryside to the city and exists throughout the different blocks of Mayo.

The kinds of insecurity threats that people face are relatively minor. One group of women pointed out:

“There is a lot of troubles...Because people are not working there is trouble. You are a woman: if they find you in the street at night they will kill you [laughter]... Young people when you look good they will take your bag and your cell phone”.⁹⁰

Another group of women said:

“There are many street children in the area. They have parents, but because of poverty they stay in the street...They make small crimes, they carry knives or glass to steal from people. They take things out of people’s houses. The community doesn’t do anything against this, they can’t catch it. There are street children from families in the neighbourhood, we know their parents.

⁸⁵ Interview 34, March 2010

⁸⁶ Interview 38, December 2010

⁸⁷ Interview 70, April 2011

⁸⁸ Interview 51, March 2011. Berridge (2012) contends that according to the police, the story is the other way around: the residents do not call them.

⁸⁹ Interview 52, February 2011

⁹⁰ Interview 53, March 2011

The problem is that those families can't pay for the school and the children are afraid to go home because they get beaten. The community can't do anything because everyone is poor."⁹¹

People, especially women, stated taking some precautions and did not go home after dark. However, when I was in Mayo in the evening, I always found plenty of people on the streets. In the official IDP-camps, problems have been reported with youth gangs, although the scope of this phenomenon remained unclear throughout my fieldwork. Pantuliano et al (2011) and Diphooorn (2011) described the presence of youth gangs that had been inspired by gang culture from neighbouring countries, such as Kenya and Egypt, based on interviews conducted by local research assistants. While one of my respondents, a teacher, confirmed the presence of youth gangs, I never encountered them during my visits to the area. Although I did not focus my research on the IDP camps, I would have heard more about them if they had been a major threat in the eyes of the inhabitants. As previously mentioned, the borders of the IDP camp and the squatter areas of Mayo were porous and only known to those living in the area. The 'status' of the so-called Nigger gangs in terms of autonomy was also unclear. For example, around the elections, rumours spread that gangs had been paid by either the government or opposition parties to force people to vote for a certain political party. Given the parties' record of making use of proxies in conflicts besides their official armed forces⁹², as well as the presence that we can also assume of those (former) proxies among IDPs in Khartoum, this would not be hard to imagine; however, I did not find proof of such allegations. Several respondents also indicated that the gangs had disappeared from the area closer to the referendum, probably owing to the mass returns of the Southerners.

A greater concern for the residents was the criminalisation of livelihood strategies and its follow-up by the community police, along with the fact that the extensive security system itself had a flip side for the common person in the area and particularly for those belonging to specific ethnic or political groups. The community police regularly raided so-called 'wine houses' and forced people to pay fines or put them in prison.

Besides the regular police forces, the security and intelligence service (NISS) has a strong presence in Mayo. The security service has been greatly empowered by the conflicts in different parts of the country (Ali 2010). This is also experienced by the migrants from areas such as Mayo, where many displaced live. The displaced are often considered as an extension of rebel movements in the periphery⁹³; therefore, security forces have increased their grip on the inhabitants. The perception of security for (particular sections of) the urban poor in Khartoum is largely determined by the activities of the National Security and Intelligence Service (NISS), which falls directly under the Presidential Guard.⁹⁴

⁹¹ Interview 51, March 2011

⁹² Both the government and rebel forces have used tribal militias in the various conflicts. See among others Salih (1995), Johnson (2003), De Waal (2005).

⁹³ Interview 34, March 2010

⁹⁴ The police are accountable to the Minister of Interior and the army to the Minister of Defence. Security officers fall under the presidential guard but can occupy (higher) posts within the police and the army. Interview 57, March 2011.

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The NISS has an office in Mayo that attempts to “maintain good relations with the population”, in the words of its director. For example, it distributes food or toys for children during Ramadan.

Sometimes it carries out tasks that officially belong to others, such as providing instructions for the reparation of the water network or the sewage system.⁹⁵ However, these activities did not alter the fact that large parts of the population of Mayo feared the security services, which were said to have infiltrated the popular committees in order to gather information, and as such played out different groups of inhabitants (belonging to different tribes) against each other. Although I did not directly encounter tribal militias as such in Khartoum, tribal affiliations were also used by the security services to divide and rule. The ethnic dimensions of the civil conflicts in Sudan rendered entire groups particularly vulnerable to suspicion and harassment by the security service.⁹⁶

The service exercises tight control in the IDP camps through its representatives in the Humanitarian Aid Commission. In the camps, it can overrule other government institutions. This became clear when we had been invited by state government representatives to visit one of the NGO health centres in Mayo but we were not allowed to by the NGO in charge because we did not carry an official permit from the Humanitarian Aid Commission (not having been warned that the NGO we were supposed to visit worked in the camps). When eleven Western NGOs were expelled from the country in 2009 several other ministries, such as the Ministries of Health and Justice, expressed the concern that they would not be able to meet their policy objectives without these NGOs.

Owing to the ethnic nature of the conflicts, access to protection by the security system was strongly conditioned by ethnic background and, in a related way, by political affiliation. In chapter 3 I have argued that political loyalties in Sudan are strongly based on regional and ethnic identities and that conflicts between the government and rebel forces are largely being defined – from both sides – in ethnic terms. In spite of the initial efforts of the government to overcome these ethnic dimension of politics (by promoting a project of Islamisation and Arabisation), currently ethnicity is the main determinant of socio-political cleavages in Sudan. This is closely related to the topic of the next subsection: identity, cultural belonging and stigmatisation.

⁹⁵ Interview 57, March 2011

⁹⁶ Among the IDPs from the conflict areas there are almost inevitably people who have fought in militias on one side or the other. On the government side there is a distinction between army personnel and members of the Popular Defence Forces, who are inserted into a formal structure. In addition, there are tribal militias who fight for the government but who cannot directly be linked to any formal structure. Nomads who migrate across the North-South border with arms are suspected by the South to be proxies of the government; whereas they claim to carry arms only to defend themselves against cattle raiding (see Johnson 2003; 2008). Among the rebel movements the distinction between a formal ‘army’ structure and armed civilians is obviously also blurred.

Ethnicity and stigmatisation

“Fortunately I don’t work in Mayo. Why? Because it is an area filled with rebels”.

This statement expresses the stigma that rests on Mayo. It was made by a young female doctor who I met at a picnic of a voluntary association, when I asked her where exactly in Khartoum she was working. It is telling of the image that Mayo has acquired over the years. Relations between Mayo and the rest of the city are polarised, just like in the case of Iztapalapa, although contacts are frequent. Mayo lies relatively close to the city centre: a bus ride to central Khartoum takes approximately 30 minutes and costs 1 SDG. The relation of Mayo to the city centre had already been physically changed when the current regime removed the so-called ‘green belt’: a natural boundary that demarcated the end of the city. Moreover, the relations with the city centre have also become closer in all kinds of non-physical aspects. Work has brought many inhabitants of Mayo to central Khartoum for construction activities, while many often work in the houses of Northern Sudanese families as housekeepers or babysitters. Furthermore, second generation inhabitants of Mayo attend universities in the city centre. This has changed the outlook of the area, as becomes clear from the following statements:

“It has been of great influence that among the second generation of inhabitants there are now also students, except for those who are really suffering...As they also have friends everywhere in Khartoum, they are the eyes of the community to the outside world. Even Mayo now has journalists, who can report for example on the flood situation that occurs each year in Mayo.”⁹⁷

“Most of the people in the areas are labourers, and good ones (skilled ones), such as mechanics, electricians. Because of their jobs they have good linkages with other areas. They also put their kids in school...The second generation is educated and the economic status of the area is now better. In the beginning nobody owned a car and now Mayo has over 7000. Even in political terms they have improved: they used to have representatives from outside the area (people from other areas came here through parties to nominate themselves) and now the people are managing their area themselves. They have representatives at the administrative unit, in the locality, at the state level. This is now possible because they are literate.”⁹⁸

Nonetheless, many inhabitants of Khartoum still associate the population of Mayo with rebels, owing to the large presence of IDPs in the area. In this respect, “Black Monday” has certainly contributed to the negative image of Mayo.

⁹⁷ Interview 63, April 2011

⁹⁸ Interview 85, July 2011

*Box 3. Black Monday*⁹⁹

Mayo's physical and mental proximity to the city centre became painfully clear on Monday 2nd August 2005, which is locally known as 'Black Monday'.¹⁰⁰ On that day, and in response to the sudden death of the formal Southern Sudanese rebel leader John Garang, hundreds of people, mainly yet not exclusively Southern Sudanese from the suburbs, including from Mayo, roamed the streets of Khartoum to take revenge for what they considered the assassination of their political leader. It left 24 dead on that day in the capital alone, while 74 more would follow in the subsequent days.¹⁰¹ These events did not leave the inhabitants of Mayo unaffected. As Reuters reported, a few days later...:

*"...millions of Sudanese living in slums and makeshift camps around the Sudanese capital were still suffering the effects of the violence. Some in the Mayo camp, populated mostly by southern Sudanese and those who fled fighting in the western region of Darfur, said they were too afraid to leave their homes and there were food shortages as movement between the capital and the camp had been cut off. Police had surrounded the camp area to prevent rioters from there moving elsewhere."*¹⁰²

This event had a significant psychological impact on the inhabitants of other parts of the capital. One friend from Northern Sudan told me that when Southerners were passing through his street he became so afraid that he decided to buy a gun. In a city that is generally considered extremely safe by its inhabitants, this statement is telling. My research assistant often received comments from her fellow students when she was undertaking her MA fieldwork in Mayo that she was very courageous to even go there during daytime. The image of Mayo amongst the rest of the city is predominantly negative.

The stigma resting on Nuba and Southerners in general is significant among the rest of the community. Many interviewees cited the prevalence of 'negative phenomena' or 'negative behaviour' in Mayo, referring to the selling of alcohol and prostitution. Meryam explained that this even reflected a reason for her decision to move out of her neighbourhood:

⁹⁹ See Medani (2005); Tilly and Tarrow (200). Tilly and Tarrow use 'Black Monday' an illustration for the 'open' political opportunity structure of Sudan under the CPA, but this mostly refers to the national situation where the power of the NCP is seriously contested by the SPLM. During the period of my fieldwork the SPLM ever more focused on Southern independence, leaving the opportunity structures for opposition in the capital rather closed.

¹⁰⁰ A reference to 'Black Sunday' on 6 December 1964, when race riots also broke out in the streets of the Sudanese capital because Southerners thought that their first representative with an important cabinet post, Clement Mboro, had been murdered (Collings 2008: 82).

¹⁰¹ "Riots follow death of Sudanese vice-president", James Sturcke and agencies, guardian.co.uk, 1 August 2005 and "Khartoum quiet after riots", Opheera McDoom (Reuters), Sudantribune, 5 August 2005.

¹⁰² "Khartoum quiet after riots", Opheera McDoom (Reuters), Sudantribune, 5 August 2005.

“This area is characterised by diversity in tribes, such as Arabs, Nuba, Fur and even Fellata (from Nigeria). This affects the area a lot. Every tribe has its own habits. For example the Nuba drink wine, the Arabs don’t, the Fellata are again different. For the children their attitude and their language should be Arabic but in the schools they are influenced by children from the other tribes and they “exchange the language”. Arabic is the formal language but you can find Arab children talking with a Fellata accent. This is the reason I wanted to move out of the area. I have young children that started to be affected. In Ed Husein there are no Nuba, Fur or Fellata. The norms and values are similar.”¹⁰³

Members of Nuba and Southern tribes appeared to be very conscious of this fact. The sense of marginalisation among the inhabitants includes a lack of physical protection among women and men alike. For example, in November 2010 I interviewed an inhabitant of a neighbouring squatting area concerning why he was planning to take his wife and five children from the capital city to his home region Abyei, which was one of the main hotspots in the conflict between North and South Sudan at that time.¹⁰⁴ He responded that with the Southern Sudanese referendum in sight, he feared riots whereby the inhabitants of the squatter areas would not receive any protection from the government. During ‘Black Monday’, the police had just stood by and watched how people were lynched in the streets. Consequently, he preferred to “die standing on his own soil than to be slaughtered like a goat in Khartoum.”¹⁰⁵ Whereas people had previously escaped from their areas of origin to Khartoum due to the situation in their home towns being worse, the situation for him had now reversed. Medani (2005) highlights that present day conflicts between the government and inhabitants of Mayo and its surrounding areas, such as those that occurred on “Black Monday”, are related to presumed relations between IDPs and rebel groups, yet are also fuelled by a feeling of marginalisation during their experiences within the city. Furthermore, these also have a strong economic component, and are related to relative deprivation in the field of services, including protection.

Overall, informality is characteristic of most of the aspects of the lives of Mayo’s inhabitants: their housing situation and access to services, their income strategies and reliance on protection. The formalisation of their presence in the city is one of the main purposes for the residents. Urban exclusion in Mayo refers to limited formalised access to land, services and (even informal) income opportunities. Furthermore, ethnic stigmatisation reinforces processes of exclusion in the city. Members of specific ethnic backgrounds are easily considered as rebels and their livelihood strategies are criminalised.

¹⁰³ Interview 58, March 2011

¹⁰⁴ Abyei is one of the contested areas on the border, where the inhabitants were allowed to cast their vote on 9 January 2011 in a referendum on pertaining to the North or the South together with the Southern Sudanese referendum.

¹⁰⁵ Fieldnotes Soba Aradi, 8 November 2010

As a result of ethnic and political polarisation at the national level, social relations in the city also become polarised.¹⁰⁶ This exclusion is further deepened by gender relations, because women particularly suffer the consequences of the criminalisation of livelihood strategies under shari'a law.

4.3 Conclusion: exclusion and citizenship in Iztapalapa and Mayo

As highlighted in the previous sections, the poverty situation in Mayo and Iztapalapa differs in many respects. Both areas find themselves in a different phase of urbanisation, consequently with differing experiences of poverty. In Mayo, poverty concentrates on access to land and services, with many inhabitants still dreaming of having access to a plot in the capital one day. Relocations are still occurring, entire neighbourhoods are being bulldozed, and people have to build new shelters every time they are relocated to another area of the city. Access to land is the basis for being acknowledged as a citizen of Khartoum, and as such it reflects the starting point for inhabitants' access to other issues of importance. However, once land titles have been secured, services are not guaranteed either. The government is only limitedly involved in this domain, which makes people rely on self-help activities, NGOs and religious organisations. Nonetheless, many of those services are inaccessible due to their high costs. Access to income is a challenge for almost all of Mayo's inhabitants, both in the unregulated and regulated areas alike. Government jobs are inaccessible for people without higher education or the right political affiliation. Most of them rely on informal income strategies and many fear prosecution by the government because their livelihood strategies are illegal under Shari'a law. Access to land, services, income and protection is more complicated for IDPs from specific ethnic groups (mostly Nuba and Southerners), and particularly for women. They require some form of protection to be able to work, yet they are unlikely to receive this from the government.

In Iztapalapa, people are mostly concerned about the quality of services, insecurity and a lack of public space. While such issues can be largely attributed to the overcrowdedness of the borough, they also have their roots in (the organisation of) urban management. Particularly in terms of the lack of public space and water scarcity, the city government at its different levels has difficulties in catering for the demands of the entire population. Moreover, the demand for the provision (and the maintenance) of services in Iztapalapa is so high that the government has to make a choice concerning whom to serve first. This sometimes even challenges existing regulations. I have argued that despite all the land in Iztapalapa having been formally regulated and assigned, these agreements have come under pressure again. The competition for public space is being exploited for economic and political gains throughout the borough.

¹⁰⁶ And vice versa: because people experience exclusion on an ethnic basis in the city, they are more likely to support opposition parties and even be sympathetic towards rebel movements. Also see Medani (2005).

Although arrangements have been made regarding land ownership, conceding parts of the territory to the general public (ecological parks, as well as small parks on streets corners of the neighbourhoods), these arrangements are constantly challenged by squatters or people who appropriate public spaces for private use, including youth gangs. The presence of youth gangs contributes to a generalised feeling of insecurity in Iztapalapa. Perceived insecurity involves two important elements: criminal activities within the neighbourhood and a lack of trust in the police.

A related problem is the lack of employment in Iztapalapa. Despite the borough having a significant share of the city's economic activities, this does not automatically translate into more employment opportunities for the residents. The residents have the choice between either working far away from home (spending three hours a day on transport is common) or working in the informal economy. Most residents of Iztapalapa indeed often work in small family enterprises that are considered as part of the informal economy. The salaries in these enterprises are relatively low, which translates among others into poor quality of housing. Moreover, other effects of the lack of employment include migration to the US and participation in the drug trade as a quick route to (economic) success. The general image of Iztapalapa is one of insecurity, with the inhabitants of Iztapalapa generally stigmatised by the other residents of Mexico City.

Exclusion in both areas thus qualifies citizenship in its social dimensions. The socio-economic aspects of citizenship (equal access to public services, but also values like justice and solidarity) is severely lacking for many residents of Mayo and Iztapalapa. Scarcity renders access conditional, or negotiable. The question is to what extent this also shapes the conditions for the political citizenship of the urban poor. In any case, the experiences of exclusion, relative deprivation and stigmatisation contrasts with people's own expectations of citizenship (Abdalla 2008: 52-59). In both Mayo and Iztapalapa, people embraced the notion of citizenship and explicitly regretted that they were not treated equally by their governments, compared to other groups of residents. In Iztapalapa and Mayo the understanding of citizenship entailed a strong notion of access and equal treatment. In both Iztapalapa and Mayo people expressed the feeling of being second class citizens. People indicated that they felt that they were not recognised as citizens because they did not have equal access to land, services or protection despite also belonging to the nation. This perceived interests might very well serve as a motivation for political agency. In Sudan in fact, this even was the key grievance behind the desire for separation for many Southerners.

Picture 6. First class citizens



Source: Tamar Azzam, 9 July 2011

140 Those inhabitants of Mayo who did not necessarily want the South to separate because they saw their future in Khartoum, even more forcefully wanted to have their citizenship rights met. Before turning to the citizenship strategies of the urban poor however, I will first explore the opportunity structures in which the residents of Mayo and Iztapalapa could exert their political agency and negotiate their citizenship with the local state.

5. Fields of negotiation: opportunities and resources in a grey zone

Because of scarcity, the urban poor in Iztapalapa and Mayo do not have guaranteed access to land and housing, services, security and income opportunities. They have to negotiate these goods on an almost daily basis. However, according to many the megacity provides particular opportunities for political participation and claim-making. How does this translate into the realities of the urban poor in Mayo and Iztapalapa? What are their opportunities for claim-making, or more specifically: who is involved in the negotiation of access? How is the interaction between the different players regulated and how is it structured in practice? These are the questions that guide the present chapter. In section 5.1 of this chapter, I will introduce the different players engaged in the negotiation of public goods such as urban services, security and the regulation of economic activity in both cities by considering both the providers- and claimants-side. It will become clear that the picture is much more complex than a simple state-versus-the-urban poor dichotomy. The fact that so many players are involved means that intermediation is key. In section 5.2, I will discuss the ways in which these players are connected to each other, highlighting the importance of brokerage, within which multiple parties, such as the state, alternative authority bearers, political parties and community leaders, are involved. In order to explore the real opportunities offered by the interplay between these different players, a closer look at the power relations between them is necessary. Therefore, in section 5.3, I will analyse brokerage in the context of a democratic transition (Iztapalapa) and one-party rule (Mayo). In section 5.4, I will conclude concerning the consequences of the urban poor, in terms of their opportunities for claim-making.

5.1 Introducing the players

States are commonly held responsible for the provision of public goods, including security, infrastructure and, to some extent, the regulation of the economy. However, in the context of neo-liberal development policies, many Latin American, African and Asian states have severely cut back their public spending in the social sectors since the 1980s (Rakodi 1997). Many developing countries have also implemented extended decentralisation programmes, whereby government tasks have been transferred to lower levels of government, albeit often without accompanying resources. Simultaneously, urbanisation has often occurred at such a pace that government regulation, resources and capacity have been able to keep up with the expanding population's needs. This has had a significant impact for the provision of public goods and services in urban areas. Various authors have noted that urban citizens often establish their own means of survival outside the scope of state regulation, responding to their own laws and authorities (Chatterjee 2004, Koonings and Kruijt 2009). All such trends have also affected Mexico City and Khartoum. In the forthcoming paragraphs, I will explore how this has transpired by presenting an overview of the players involved in the negotiation of public goods in

Mexico City and Khartoum. I will first focus on the providers of public goods such as urban services, security and work permits and licenses. These providers are likely to be state institutions, yet they are not necessarily limited to the state. Subsequently, I will elaborate on the claimants of urban public goods. It is often assumed that the nature of the urban poor's interests affects mobilisation and claim-making, and particularly whether this is collective or not. Therefore, I will explore the role of social organisations and the kinds of leadership that they generate.

The providers

The state in Mayo

In Mayo, the role of the state in service provision is largely limited to oversight, with most of the urban and social services left to communities themselves, (state owned) companies or NGOs. Many urban services, both in the regulated and unregulated areas, are paid for and set up by the local communities. Resources needed for the establishment come from communities themselves, mobilised by their popular committees. Once boreholes and electricity poles are established, the management is usually taken over by a state-owned company, such as the Khartoum Water Company (for the boreholes) and the National Electricity Company. Both companies charge user fees for consumption and maintenance (the Water Company cashes revenues at the water pumps where people come to fetch water and the Electricity Company sends people to the houses that are connected). Investment by the state in services remains minimal.

Social services are to a large extent provided by NGOs and religious organisations under the supervision of the local government. For example, the health system is officially managed by the State Ministry of Health, but the majority of the basic health centres that carry out primary health across the territory¹ of Mayo are run by NGOs with foreign money (the Da'awa Al Islamiya, Islamic Relief, Médecins Sans Frontières, among others). According to the State Ministry of Health, there are 22 health centres in AlNasr, with 13 of them led by NGOs in the IDP-camps and nine run by the government in the squatter areas.² The health coordinator of the State Ministry even acknowledged that the relation between the government and the communities was not particularly good, stating that "the people prefer to work with NGOs".³ Therefore, the government often approached the traditional leadership to communicate to the population.

1 The health coordinator argued that because in Mayo the number of inhabitants was unknown, they had decided to distribute the health centres based on the principle distance (one health centre every two kilometres).

2 Interview 59, March 2011. An MoH official explained that there are 42 NGO lead health centres and 18 government lead health centres in the whole of Jebel Awlia, of which there are nine in Mayo.

3 Interview 59, March 2011.

Education is also largely being taken care of by NGOs and religious organisations. While education in Mayo is the responsibility of the State Ministry of Education and its locality office, it largely depends on (religious) NGOs, such as the Da'awa Al Islamiya and the Islamic Relief Organisation (organisations linked to the international Muslim Brotherhood) for the establishing and operating of schools. The Ministry establishes the curriculum and pays the salaries of the teachers.⁴ Mosques, and particularly the *ghalwas* or Qur'an schools, play an important role in women's education. IDPs rely to a large extent on education activities provided for by the Church. In Mayo, there were branches of the Episcopal Church of Sudan belonging to the Anglican Church of England and the Southern Sudanese Church of Christ, which run primary and secondary schools in the area. Furthermore, private individuals can also start their own schools with permission from same education office.

The State Ministry of Social Welfare provides a very small number of social programmes and support through the social affairs departments of the administrative unit in Al Nasr. The resources for such programmes come from the ministry itself, as well as the 'Zakaat' and 'Al Awqaaf' institutions (Islamic charity institutions organised by the state), which are administered by the State Ministry of Finance.⁵ Most of the social services however are provided by (international) religious organisations, most prominently Islamic NGOs such as Islamic Relief and the Da'awa Al Islamiya. Like in other countries in the Middle-East, these organisations build schools, mosques and health clinics in all parts of Mayo, but they also provide people with support packages during Ramadan. They receive their funds from financiers in the Arab peninsula and act in close cooperation with the government.⁶ Some small local NGOs are also financed by private (Sudanese) philanthropists from the Gulf. Organisations such as the Da'awa also provide support to non-Muslim IDPs⁷, but proselitism (for example, building mosques) is an integral part of the activities of the Da'awa Al Islamiya and Islamic Relief; an activity for which they receive ample governmental support.⁸ Non-Muslim IDPs also rely heavily on the support of Western NGOs such as MSF France, the Irish GOAL and the Canadian Fellowship for African Relief (FAR).

Consequently, the presence of the Sudanese state through the provision of urban and social services is limited, and even more so in the IDP camp in Mayo. The reach of the state stops at a certain point. In terms of security however, the Sudanese state is very much present. This is particularly felt in an area like Mayo. First of all, the involvement of other actors in service provision is closely monitored, not only by the different Line Ministries but also by the National Security Service through the Humanitarian Aid Commission.

4 Interview 60, March 2011.

5 Interview 81, April 2011

6 Interview 44, February 2011

7 Interview 44, February 2011

8 Mosques are actually considered as a public service by the regime.

NGOs cannot function in Mayo without permission of the Humanitarian Aid Commission; they have to engage with representatives of the government in the neighbourhoods on an almost daily basis.⁹ Indeed, this particularly holds true for activities in the IDP camps. Second, there is ample presence of the state security services in Mayo, including representatives of the regular police, the ‘community police’¹⁰ and the intelligence and security service. According to the Police Commander in Mayo, the regular police are in charge of the general aspects of security, while the community police are responsible for ‘decent behaviour’, including the combatting of ‘negative phenomena’ such as the selling of alcohol and prostitution (important livelihood strategies of particularly IDP women, as seen in the previous chapter).¹¹ Groups of officers of both the community police and regular police patrol the neighbourhoods day and night, occupying the local police stations on a rotation basis.¹² The police and the security service also seek to build alliances with the local bodies of citizen representation and the native administration in the area.

For example, in order to intensify the cooperation with the tribal leaders’ councils, the police headquarters in Mayo opened an office for the ‘*judia*’, a mediation council of tribal leaders, within its compound in June 2011. Besides inviting the ‘*judia*’, the police has also created so-called ‘social committees’ in which the police directly relate to the community leaders. In the words of the police commander, the members of these social committees are appointed by the police headquarters based on their leadership qualities, which implies that many tribal leaders are involved. There is one social committee of twenty members for every area. The social committees only exist as a counterpart to the police and are renewed every year.¹³

The tribal leadership has also been assigned an important role in the court system. Next to the police headquarters in Mayo one can find the local court, which is subdivided into a regular court and a ‘city court’, which is an official tribal court based on customary law. Contrary to the ‘*judia*’, the city court is inscribed in the penal code; therefore, every court in Khartoum has a ‘city court’ (while not every police headquarter works with the ‘*judia*’). The court has the authority to award punishments (payments, beatings or incarceration) in relation to a specific set of cases determined by the penal code. The city court is composed by twelve traditional leaders who are appointed for life.

9 Interview 72, April 2011

10 After the reinforcement of the Shari’a Laws in 1990, the Popular Police Force Act of 1991 created a special police for example controlling the Islamic dress of women in public space. Muslim women in Khartoum are not allowed to wear trousers; they have to cover the entire body and head. Penalties often consist of flogging (Collins 2008: 192).

11 Interview 68, April 2011

12 Interview 68, April 2011. Based on a population of approximately 350.000 this is about one police officer per 1400 inhabitants. At the same time, the NISS is said to have about 20.000 fixed staff in Khartoum alone which signifies that there is approximately one intelligence officer per every 300 inhabitants.

13 Interview 70, May 2011

They are selected per neighbourhood and not per tribe.¹⁴ The city court cooperates with other traditional leaders in the area (who are sometimes part of the '*judia*'), as well as the popular committees.¹⁵ Members of the city court in Mayo indicated that residents preferred to settle their issues in front of the city court instead of making it a formal court case in many instances, owing to its greater focus on reconciliation. This means that people often have to pay less (cases are resolved with 'blood money', taking the capacity to pay into consideration), whilst also preserving better relations with their neighbours.

The role of the state in regulating economic activities at the neighbourhood level is significant in various respects: first of all, the state is the main provider of formal employment (Abdalla 2008); and second, it validates or prohibits activities within the informal economy that are often vital for the urban poor. The state authorises some activities in the informal economy by issuing licenses (for the operation of taxis, rickshaws, donkey carts, or for shopkeeping at the markets), whilst penalising others through the operations of its police service (such as the selling of alcohol and prostitution). These activities are single-handedly undertaken by state institutions: in the aforementioned cases, these are the traffic police (for licensing the rickshaw drivers and taxis), the locality (for licensing the donkey carts) and the community police, the administrative units and the popular committees (for 'combatting negative behaviours').

Overall, the state in Mayo relies heavily on the communities themselves for the establishment and maintenance of urban services, on NGOs and religious organisations in health, education and social affairs, and on the traditional leadership in the field of security. The state clearly sets the frameworks in place and closely monitors the activities of NGOs and religious organisations. Therefore, other organisations are submitted to the state's authority and can only exist in symbiosis with state power. At the same time, the state heavily invests in (national) security. This situation actually comes close to the notion of the politics of survival as introduced by Migdal (2001): the Sudanese government spends a lot of its resources on (a military approach to) the various conflicts in the country in order to remain in power, which leaves little for the accomplishment of specific policy objectives. Whereas in Khartoum (the national power centre) in general, it can be said that the state does invest in services to maintain its legitimacy, this is not the case in Mayo. In Mayo (an 'opposition area'), the state concentrates on its own survival through security measures and the weakening of opposition, whereas it engages as minimalistically as possible in measures that would increase its legitimacy. Most of these measures have actually been outsourced. As a result of this outsourcing, in combination with the maintenance of control by the state, it is hard to establish the extent to which the state and others formed distinctive providers for public goods. Thus, boundaries between what is supposed to be 'the public' and 'the private' are thoroughly blurred in Mayo.

¹⁴ This was the official reason given for the fact that there were no 'judges' from Nuba or Southern tribes in the city court in Mayo, which is actually surprising considering the large population groups from those tribes in Mayo.

¹⁵ Interview 45, April 2011


The state in Iztapalapa

In Iztapalapa, the role of the state is a very different one. The state is the main provider of urban services, health care and education. The city government and local government also offer a number of social programmes to the residents of Iztapalapa, such as the ‘programas de adultos mayores’, based on an initiative of the former Mexico City Mayor, Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador. These government-run social programmes are administered by civil servants at both levels of government in Iztapalapa (offices of the city government and the borough), in close cooperation with contracted who operate in the field. Many of these are actually former campaign workers of the politician who controls their level of government. Volunteers working for the borough or one of the ‘módulos’ or offices of the parliamentarians in the area are also key in delivering specific programmes. They sometimes encourage residents to organise, and in other cases cooperate with existing neighbourhood organisations and their leaders in the delivery of social programmes. For example, in the “Programa Comunitario de Mejoramiento Barrial” of the city government, residents can collectively apply for a government fund to refurbish a public area in their neighbourhood.

According to the “Ley Orgánica de Administración Pública del Distrito Federal”, the tasks of the city and local governments are subsidiary; indeed, there is daily cooperation in the security field.¹⁶ However, in the field of social programmes, the local government official in charge pointed out that there was no such coordination.¹⁷ The fact that the main coordination structures set up by the local government and the city government do not correspond, as shown in picture 1, is a case in point. Respondents often indicated their belief that different levels of government compete with each other in the provision of services and social programmes.¹⁸

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Figure 9. Administrative divisions in Iztapalapa



16 Although the local government can deploy its own (small) police force independently. Interview 57, coordinator for public security for the local government, 19 May 2008
 17 The Director of Social Development in the borough for example stated that there was no coordination with the city government in the field of social programmes, interview 54, June 2008,
 18 Interview 104, 25 February 2008 and Interview 39, 11 July 2008

Historically, alternative service providers have been active in Iztapalapa. In the outskirts of the city, there are still a number of community health centres set up by the residents in cooperation with NGOs, and private schools run by different branches of the Catholic Church in Iztapalapa. Notwithstanding, these initiatives are presently complementary to the government services offered, rather than a real substitute. In Mexico City, international NGOs represented an important opportunity network for the local social movements in the past. Based on the financial support of international NGOs, they were able to engage in self-help activities with the support of international NGOs and could build up a degree of autonomy towards the state. During my research period, they had almost entirely left the scene in Iztapalapa, yet they were still supporting some local community organisations.

Some respondents hinted that organised crime provide urban services to the residents of Iztapalapan neighbourhoods. One social worker in the Unidad Habitacional Vicente Guerrero said that: “The criminals give them street pavement, fiestas etcetera. The people are actually more satisfied with them than with the government.”¹⁹ A Mexican researcher involved in the ICESI study on public security in Iztapalapa (2005) highlighted that many people decide to live on a friendly basis with criminals, because they believe that “he won’t hurt me (he only robs visitors) and at best I gain something – when they are in the street they can watch my car, or they invest their money in the community.”²⁰ In the neighbourhoods where I executed my fieldwork, the state and politicians remained the ultimate object of claim-making.²¹ While it cannot be ruled out that these politicians derived (some of their) resources from criminals circuits, in 2008 at least this did not form part of the common perception among the residents of Iztapalapa.

Despite security being to some extent privatised in Mexico City, public security in Iztapalapa is largely a government affair. Müller (2009b) convincingly demonstrates that different levels of government are involved, often on their own account in spite of efforts to coordinate. On the one hand, the city government embraced the ‘mano dura’ approach advocated for by New York City Mayor Giuliani (Pansters and Castillo Berthier 2007; Müller 2009b; Davis 2010), which became clear in the multiple operations that were carried out with great firework displays in 2007 and 2008 (in La Ford, El Salado), while on the other hand it focused on social conditions and the relations between the police and residents. Just like in Mayo, the police in Iztapalapa actively sought interaction with the residents and their organisations. In 2008, the city government adopted various measures to improve relations between the residents and the police, including the creation of special (elite) police units, the *Unidades the Policía* (UPC), which were used for the programme ‘Policía de Barrio’. This programme was managed by the Department for Public Security in cooperation with the Department of Citizen Participation from the central city government, and consisted of assigning fixed police officers for each neighbourhood in order to be recognisable and gain the residents’ trust.

19 Interview 117, February/March 2008

20 Interview 16, 22 May 2008

21 This is supported by Müller based on his field research in Iztapalapa in 2006-2008.

Besides the 'Policía de Barrio' programme, the central city government also disposed of other means for citizen participation, such as the security committees. Members of these committees were invited by the mayor and could submit requests on behalf of their community; for example, a member of the security committee for San Miguel Teotongo successfully submitted a petition requesting the replacement of the police commander.

In sum, the government in Iztapalapa takes care of the provision of most of the area's 'public goods', and while NGOs, religious organisations and private companies also play a role, this is on a much lesser scale than in Mayo. Notwithstanding, the city government in Iztapalapa has to reckon with its own government counterpart – the borough – as an alternative service provider. Indeed, there is an evident lack of coordination, particularly in the provision of social programmes, between the city and local government. In fact, in the area of social programmes, both governments represented two distinct providers.

I have discussed above the different public goods providers in Iztapalapa and Mayo. In both cases there is a problem of scarcity: In Mayo this mainly involves land, employment and the resources of the government. In Iztapalapa it involves mainly water and public space. Because of this scarcity, access has been negotiated over with the local state. The negotiation of the access to such goods involves both the supply side and the 'demand-side', with the urban poor representing the ultimate claimants of public goods. For a better understanding of their opportunities for claim-making, it is thus necessary to analyse the resources at their disposal, which largely lie in their forms of organisation. Therefore, I will take a closer look at how the 'demand-side' is organised in both Mayo and Iztapalapa, focusing on the social basis for the organisation of the urban poor and the leadership structures subsequently generated.

The claimants

Community organisations in Iztapalapa

Iztapalapa has often served as an example for studies on urban social movements in Mexico (Cornelius 1975; Álvarez Velazquez 2005). In chapter 3 (p. 52), I described how the Sierra de Santa Catarina has become known as the birthplace for some of the popular movements in the Federal District with a national outreach (Moctezuma 1999). In the Sierra, rural and urban immigrants who had bought land from communal land owners organised themselves around common needs, namely basic services such as electricity, roads, and transport, sewage and water services. In the early 1980s, several members of the student movement moved to popular neighbourhoods in Iztapalapa to support the residents in their struggle for services, together founding organisations such as the 'Coordinadora Regional del Valle de México' of the CONAMUP (the national coordination of the Urban Popular Movement) and the UPREZ (the Unión Popular Revolucionario Emiliano Zapata) in 1987, which has maintained linkages with the

EZLN in Chiapas.²² The UPREZ still has between thirty and fifty member ‘colonias’ in Mexico City. Another organisation to have originated in the same period (1988-1989) and still has a strong basis in Iztapalapa is the Frente Popular Francisco Villa, or the FPFV, which still comprises ninety four cooperatives and around one hundred and fifty sub-leaders.²³ Furthermore, the Frente also became linked to the CONAMUP through the struggle for housing.²⁴ Much of the organisation capacity in the Sierra was originally based on the contribution of women, who were responsible for most of the self-help activities and the protest actions in face of the government.

Neighbourhood organisations were much stronger in the unplanned areas in Iztapalapa than in the government-planned social housing units. Cornelius (1975) indicated that community organisation in Mexico City in the early 1970s was already largely dependent on the formation of specific neighbourhoods and collective learning in that context. Indeed, I found that the socio-political dynamic was different in the social housing projects initiated by the government (where services were present from the start); indeed, neighbourhood organisations were still less significant in these areas in 2008. According to a researcher with ICESI, “loyalties [in these areas] go beyond family relations but in most cases not beyond the building, the street or the ‘manzana’”.²⁵

Also in the unplanned areas however, the strength of the neighbourhood organisations has weakened. In one respect, this relates to the changing necessities and interests of the residents, with respondents in all the neighbourhoods under study stressing that it has subsequently become more difficult to mobilise people.²⁶ The older people (first generation migrants) also complained that the youth are no longer interested in common issues. They have been raised “*con la mesa servida*” [because all the services were in place, ID] and no longer value the organisations.²⁷ It seemed more difficult for the neighbourhood organisations to engage in issues such as security and employment, although some organisations were also making attempts to work on the economic interests of their constituencies. However, on the other hand, and perhaps even more importantly, many neighbourhood organisations had become involved in party politics; for example, the leaders of the organisations had been incorporated in the PRD, which has been winning local elections and taken charge of the government in Mexico City since 1997.²⁸ By 2008, several leaders of the UPREZ, as well as other leaders in Iztapalapa, occupied government posts both at the city and local level.

22 Interview 81, 26 May 2008, interview 39, 11 June 2008 and interview 69, 16 April 2008

23 Interview 84, leader Cabeza de Juárez, 20 June 2008 and interview 37, Líder de los FPFV and Director de Asuntos Indígenas de la Secretaría de Desarrollo Rural, 21 June 2008

24 Interview 79, 13 June 2008

25 Interview 16, 22 May 2008

26 Among others interviews 89, 23 February 2008, interview 85, 12 March 2008, Interview 125, 08 May 2008. Notwithstanding, interest as jobs and security can also be perceived as collective, like is demonstrated by the efforts of the Frente Popular Francisco Villa to incorporate the informal taxi drivers.

27 Interview 113, 10 April 2008

28 also see chapter 3, p.52 for a history of the social movements in the Sierra; chapter 5, p.125 for the development of a particular leadership and p.129 for the legacy of Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas.

Although Iztapalapa is known as home to indigenous populations that imported communal traditions into the capital (Moctezuma 1999: 27, 34), I did not encounter ethnic organisations in the areas where I conducted my research. I only found some local leaders who were inspired by what they said were 'indigenous' ideologies of collectivity, while people in San Miguel Teotongo were proud to have received commanders of the Zapatistas during their march on Mexico City in 2001; however, otherwise people did not make explicit reference to ethnicity. Their relations were not exclusively nor predominantly based on ethnic ties. Some colonial traditions such the 'cargo' system and the 'Mayordomías' are still kept alive in the villages of Iztapalapa, yet this is not the case in the poorest areas, namely the social housing projects or the outskirts of the borough.²⁹ In Iztapalapa, the most outstanding form of community organisation for the urban poor remains the neighbourhood organisation, with neighbourhood leaders being important representatives of the urban poor in the negotiation for public goods and services.

Community organisations in Mayo

In Mayo, communities are primarily organised around ethnic ties. As previously mentioned, tribal relations have provided the main entry point for rural migrants into the city, with many settling with their kinsmen in specific areas. Before these areas were incorporated into the city through urban planning and the regularisation of land and services (including public security), tribal authority was the most important mode of governance. Each group administered its own affairs, while issues between groups were resolved between the tribal leaders. This is also how rural traditions such as the '*judia*' made their way into the city. One example of a very organised tribe in Khartoum is the Nuba tribe.

*Box 4. Nuba tribal organisation in Khartoum*³⁰


The Nuba tribal organisation in Khartoum is composed by Sheikhs and Omdas, and are accountable to the 99 Nazirs of the 99 Nuba Tribes in the Nuba Mountains and one Mek, who also has his seat in the Nuba Mountains in Central Sudan (approximately one thousand kilometres from Khartoum). It has a head office in Khartoum North, where every sub-tribe has its representative. The office organises meetings for the election of the local headmen within the urban area.³¹

²⁹ Interview 49, Coordinador Regional Oriente de la Subsecretaría de Participación Ciudadana, 21 May 2008. The 'cargo' system entails for example the appointment of a 'delegado': someone who knows the police and who represents the community vis-a-vis the authorities. The villages also appoint 'Mayordomos': people who are the protagonists of a Saint for an entire year and who have to celebrate his name day and other festivities in his honour. The Mayordomo generally has the approval of a parliamentarian, or a sectoral leader, or the borough. The appointment of a Mayordomo is usually done in interplay between local leaders, the political establishment and the church.

³⁰ For the organisation of other tribes in Khartoum, such as The Dinka, see for example Al Battahani 1998; Jacobsen 2001.

³¹ Information based on interview 52, February 2011

Nuba Tribal Organisation



Together with his 12 sheikhs, the Omda forms the ‘native administration of his area’. An Omda is chosen by consensus in public meetings, which are organised every four to five years. Sheikhs themselves argued that one must have a clean record and a good relationship with other tribes in order to become an Omda. Moreover, it is also important to be reliable, liked and trusted. An Omda can only be in place for two consecutive periods, yet can subsequently still form part of the native administration; for example, representing the Mek, or can become part of a council of elders of the tribe. If the Omda does not perform well, he can be rendered destitute by the people.

A main task of the Omda lies in conflict mitigation and mediation: within the (sub)tribe, between (sub)tribes, as well as between the (sub)tribe and government. Furthermore, the government also uses the Omdas to pass messages to the communities. The other task of the Omda relates to social development: if there are meetings for development, the Omda must participate for the benefit of his people. Some of the Omdas are part of the popular committees, although not all of them because the popular committees are chosen through elections. However, if the popular committee wants to do anything, they have to discuss with the Omdas to gain the people’s consent.³²

³² Interview 52, Nuba Omdas, February 2011.

As previously mentioned, ethnic associations have a strong political dimension in Sudan, with ethnic groups having organised themselves in armed rebel forces in the context of (various) civil war(s). Al Zain (2008) emphasises that ethnicity in the capital has become strongly politicised, owing to the IDPs who have moved to Khartoum. Medani (2005) points out that rebel movements have a certain degree of legitimacy among the urban poor,³³ although the extent to which this translates into practical assistance remains unclear;³⁴ Indeed, I did not encounter any non-state armed actors during my fieldwork.

The government promoted the mixture of tribes during replanning processes, and the former tribal areas in Mayo (Feriq Fur, Feriq Nuba, Feriq Fellata etc.) no longer exist in the regulated areas. Indeed, there is now some degree of cooperation that extends beyond ethnic ties in such areas.³⁵ Non-tribal forms of social organisation in the city are mostly based on rural traditions that have been adapted to the new urban environment. One such example is the phenomenon of '*Sanadeeq*', rotating community credit schemes, by which poor people collectively save money that is disbursed to beneficiaries in turns (Pantuliano et al 2011: 16). These forms of mutual cooperation are no longer purely tribally based.

However, the trust between neighbours, and particularly those of different tribes, is affected by security activities, which hampers the formation of strong neighbourhood organisations, as expressed by the following quote:

“Again also sometimes we have like the same tribal system problems as in Darfur. Here in Khartoum, like the government is going to use one of the tribes against the other. Like let's say...the government in Khartoum is going to use the Arabs who came from Darfur against the people who are here. Like,...in the popular committees, we are dealing with the Arabs. Ok? They, the Arabs don't like that tribe which is from the Fur tribe. They can just whisper to the ear of the government that they are supporting the rebels. And I can be taken somewhere. Why? Because...they are using it with the politics they can do everything. Ok?”³⁶

Overall, there are strong forms of social organisation among the urban poor in both cities: ethnic organisations in Mayo (particularly in the unregulated areas) and neighbourhood organisations in Iztapalapa. The traditional organisations in Mayo are engaged in the organisation concerning public services and particularly in mitigating conflict in the area.

33 Also see Medani (2005) on the socio-economic backgrounds of “Black Monday”. He points out that this not only has to do with their experiences in the countryside, but also with their experiences of marginalisation in the city.

34 The government suspected urban dwellers from specific tribes to have supported the JEM attack on Khartoum in May 2008; the reason for which raids have been executed among the Zhagawa in particular. Many have been convicted without proper trials however (Human Rights Watch 2008).

35 Debate exists around the question whether this has really generated a ‘melting pot’ of different cultural backgrounds or whether the internal divisions are still intact in the city; see Assal 2008 and Berridge 2012.

36 Interview 34, March 2010.

However, as a result of urban planning, many traditional organisations have been ‘broken open’ and new forms of neighbourhood organisation have arisen, albeit in a modest way. The neighbourhood organisations in Iztapalapa have a strong history and still have an important role to play, focusing on the maintenance of services and the preservation of public space in alliance with political parties. However, a third type of social organisation is becoming ever more relevant in both areas: the professional organisation.

Professional organisations

Unregulated activities in Iztapalapa are often highly organised, as in the case of the informal street vendors in the city centre (Cross 1998; Alba Vega 2012) or the informal taxi drivers.³⁷ In addition, many street vendors’ organisations are affiliated to the “Frente Nacional de Comercio Informal”. A large number of informal taxis throughout the city (around 5,000 in total) are united in an organisation called “*the panteras*”, which pertains to the *Frente Nacional Francisco Villa*. One of the leaders of the FNFV explained:

“They [the panteras] have a ‘civil association’; they are people who offer taxi services without having a license for driving a taxi. They are not illegal, they are not outside the law, they are unregulated, they are not illegal because they did not steal the vehicle, they are not committing an offense; they are outside the regulations but not outside the law. [...] The regulation says that someone who does not have a license cannot drive a taxi, but the law does not [...] What is the concept of the law? The right to work; the constitution says that every citizen has the right to a decent job that allows him to maintain his family.[...] The law is above the regulation.”³⁸

The informal taxis have ‘bases’ in the outskirts of the city where they gather, and that operate radio systems to coordinate their routes and customers. The ‘base’ of the taxis in San Miguel Teotongo held regular meetings in the office of the neighbourhood association.

³⁷ Various authors see the situation of informality within the larger politics of populist mobilisations and state power as something typical for Latin America, see Roy and Alsayyad 2004: 14.

³⁸ Interview 37, 17 and 21 June 2008

Picture 7. “Base de taxis piratas”, Iztapalapa



Source: fieldwork 2008

In Mayo, some activities that are considered as part of the informal economy are also organised; for example, there is a donkey cart association in Mayo with 250 members³⁹, which had successfully negotiated with the locality for the reduction of its members' licence fees. In fact, professional organisations seemed to be allowed more space than other types of organisations in Mayo. For instance, the director of a national NGO argued that they preferred registering their partner organisations as 'corporations' with the State Ministry of Labour, because this was much easier than registering them as humanitarian organisations with the Humanitarian Aid Commission. The informal economy in itself was perceived as a vital interest of the population that should not be too greatly hampered; for example, the police was not very strict in implementing the traffic rules for rickshaw drivers (despite there being plenty of traffic police dressed in white on the streets of Mayo). Those self-employed in the illegal sphere, such as tea-sellers or alcohol brewers, are not allowed to organise, given that their activities are considered illegal and are thus harshly repressed by the community police.

In both cities, the relative weight of professional organisations can be expected to increase as urbanisation continues. Like in Iztapalapa, some organisations in Mayo recognised that the centre of gravity for assembling political capital has moved from urban services to income and employment with the advancement of urbanisation.

³⁹ Interview 42, February 2011

I have already mentioned the example of the Frente Popular Francisco Villa, hosting the largest organisation of informal taxi drivers in Mexico City. Because the need for housing has been largely addressed, the Frente leaders recognise that the organisation has to change its course.⁴⁰ A representative of an opposition party in Mayo argued that:

“[We] wanted to be in the market committee, because that is the most important one. In the neighbourhoods the popular committees are about distributing services but now that the services are there their role is diminishing.”⁴¹

In this section, I have described the providers of public goods in both neighbourhoods, as well as the organisation of the claimants (the urban poor). I discussed how the state depends on NGOs and religious organisations with foreign resources for the delivery of services in Mayo. In terms of security the state is more directly engaged, yet strongly relies on the traditional leadership for its relations with the communities. In Iztapalapa, the state is more directly engaged in service delivery, although there are also some alternative providers present, with the state depending on community organisations and their leaders for the execution of its social and security programmes. Therefore, there is a degree of overlap between providers and claimants in both Mayo and Iztapalapa: some of the representatives of the urban poor are directly engaged in the provision of services (neighbourhood organisations and their leaders in Iztapalapa) or the provision of security (traditional leaders in Mayo). In terms of their activities, it is not always clear whether these players belong to the domain of the state or the urban poor. Furthermore, the allies of the state in service provision (NGOs, religious organisations, organised crime) also represent powers on their own. These organisations cannot simply be seen as placed between the urban poor and the state, given that they also potentially represent alternative opportunity networks for the urban poor. It is not always clear for whose benefit and under whose authority these providers intervene. Accordingly, I will further explore these interrelations in the next section.

5.2 Connecting the pieces

In an ideal situation where the promise of citizenship is fulfilled for the entire population, public goods will be equally distributed among all claimants. Indeed, both providers and claimants would favour such a situation, because the providers (particularly the state) seek legitimacy and the claimants (the residents) seek services and other public goods that they are entitled to. A crucial problem in both Mayo and Iztapalapa however is that there is scarcity. In chapter 4 we have seen that in both areas urban public goods such as water, land or government resources are scarce in the face of the pressing demand. In Iztapalapa, the population density places severe pressure on urban services and public space, as well as employment opportunities in a different way.

⁴⁰ Interview 37, leader FPFV, 17 and 21 June 2008

⁴¹ Interview 63, Umma party member, April 2011

In Mayo, there is insufficient land for the residents and businesses that wish to settle close to the city centre, while the regularisation of people's citizenship status is lagging behind with the denial of access to public goods as a consequence. Therefore, somewhere in between the needs of the providers and the needs of the claimants therefore, filters operate in order to determine who gets what. How does this work? I argue that intermediation is key. When we want to gain better understanding of the processes of intermediation that operate in Iztapalapa and Mayo, we have to consider both how intermediation is officially organised and at how it works in practice. Therefore, in the coming paragraphs, I will take a closer look at the role of political parties, and elected politicians in particular, as well as local leaders and the alternative providers introduced in the previous section.

Official intermediation

The governments in both Iztapalapa and Mayo have made significant efforts to institutionalise citizen participation. Overarching administrative arrangements for citizen participation exists in both cities, in order to channel citizens' demands, communicate government messages and implement (social and security) programmes within their territory. These are the organisations that are primarily established to regulate interaction between the government and residents in all sorts of areas, from urban service delivery to security.

Mayo

In Khartoum, the most important 'window' for citizen participation is 'popular committees', which are tied to the territorial divisions of the city.⁴² The (federal) local governance act stipulates the establishment of popular committees per 'block' of around 8,000-9,000 inhabitants. The members are volunteers elected among the inhabitants of a neighbourhood in a public meeting for a period of two years, and the popular committees usually have 15 (paid) members, of which three or four have to be women. Mayo (officially: the administrative unit of Al Nasr) is divided into 42 popular committees, spread over the regulated and unregulated areas.⁴³ The heads of all the 42 committees meet twice per month and have selected one general popular committee, headed by a president, from amongst their midst. The president of that committee is the popular committee coordinator of the Al Nasr administrative unit, serving for a period of four years. Furthermore, the general popular committee has appointed coordinators for the popular committees in the three geographic areas comprising the Al Nasr administrative unit (Al Nasr, AlWehdaat and Bashair Shahinaat⁴⁴). These coordinators act as liaisons between the popular committees in their area, the administrative unit and the locality.

⁴² The origins of the popular committees lie in the Popular Defence Act of 1989, but they have been revised in the Popular Committee Act 1994, the Local Governance Acts 1998 and 2003 (Abdalla 2008: 106).

⁴³ Interviews 62, March 2011 and 82, April 2011. Unfortunately, I was not able to purchase an official map with the territorial divisions. I was referred several times to the engineering department in the AU, but in the end, one engineer said he had indeed many maps but that he was not allowed to share them with me.

⁴⁴ As said in chapter 3, these three geographical units do not correspond with the areas that were covered by the Al Nasr Administrative Unit according to the acting manager of the locality. He referred to Mayo, Mansoura, Soba, and Mandela.

The president and popular committee coordinators interact with a coordinator appointed inside the locality by the commissioner.⁴⁵

The popular committee is literally the first government institution that people encounter, given that its members are present in the neighbourhoods. Moreover, they are also the primary state interlocutor for the residents of Mayo in terms of what they do. First of all, the popular committees are extremely important for the urban poor because they issue identity documents and resident certificates, certificates of good conduct and the confirmation of death (Pantuliano et al 2011: 11). The popular committees act as gatekeepers to various aspects of urban citizenship for the urban poor who lack identity documents, such as many IDPs, because identity documents are a *sine qua non* for access to land, health insurance or participation in elections, and even to remain in the city.⁴⁶

Second, the popular committees play an important role in the establishment, management and overseeing of urban services. In fact, it is an official task of the popular committees to mobilise the communities for development initiatives or the promotion of self-help ('juhud as shaabi'), as explained in chapter 3.⁴⁷ In the face of hyper-urbanisation and successive economic crisis, the Sudanese government has applied a policy of self-help in terms of urban service provision for the urban poor since the 1990s (Abdalla 2008: 20). The popular committees can encourage communities to construct boreholes and electricity poles, and can also request for the population to make contributions for government interventions, as the following statement of an employee of the state Malaria Unit illustrates:

"We have cooperation with the popular committees, for example when the unit wants to do a fieldwork to fight mosquitoes, we tell the local community about it, or in some cases the popular committee [meaning the local population, ID] can provide assistance in the form of petrol. Especially in the case they ask for the move".⁴⁸

Whenever a citizen has a complaint or request (from reporting a broken water pipe to requesting chairs for the local school), this should be addressed to the popular committee, which is subsequently supposed to send an authorised letter via the administrative unit and locality to the responsible office at the state level (a company in the case of water or electricity, or a state ministry in the case of health or education). Third, the popular committees also distribute a limited amount of money on behalf of the locality; for example, on mosques and kindergartens. Moreover, the popular committees can also help people with writing applications for Zakaath⁴⁹, as well as distributing them.⁵⁰

45 Interview 82, coordinator PCs Al Wehdaat, April 2011

46 The 'Identity Card Law' of 1981 established that all Sudanese above the age of 18 had a legal requirement to obtain identity cards. The inhabitants of Khartoum's peripheries without identity cards were sent back to the country sides during government 'sweeps' or 'kasha'. Berridge argues that this was mainly used to shield the cities – Khartoum first and foremost – from the influx of migrants from the country side (Berridge 2012: 10). On Kasha, also see Salih 1987.

47 See Local Governance Act 2003, p.8

48 Interview 7, February 2010

49 An Islamic contribution to the poor, see for example Abdalla (2008: 108).

50 Interview 42, February 2011

Although popular committees exist in the entire territory of Sudan, they are particularly important in the poorer neighbourhoods of Khartoum owing to their engagement in the areas of documentation, urban services and social welfare. In fact, I never came across the popular committee in the middle-upper class residential area where I lived. A Sudanese friend living in a lower-middle class area related that nobody ever attended the popular committee meetings in her neighbourhood. In these regularised areas, the popular committees are only relevant for people who want to buy a plot. It is particularly in areas where the inhabitants have needs for regulation (land, housing, services) where the popular committees are influential. Abdalla highlights that all people in the poor areas that she studied knew most of the members of their popular committee. Furthermore, she notes that "popular committees have full political, economic and cultural control over the neighbourhood, deciding on the eligibility of residents in their block to land, Zakat or social funding for the poor" (Abdalla 2008: 107).

Given the omnipresence of the popular committees, it is unsurprising that the expectations of the popular committees among the poor are high. As one Nuba woman recounted: "the government or the popular committee should solve problems, not us. Often the people do not know about the problems".⁵¹ People also approach the popular committee members with personal requests. The coordinator of the popular committees in Mayo recounts that since he is the coordinator, people expect him to do everything for them, even regarding personal matters: "I must reply in terms they understand, sometimes I also have to give people money to solve their problems".⁵²

However, respondents argued that many popular committees had become instruments in the hands of the ruling party. For example, claim-making does not always follow the official path, with complaints or requests around services also directly handed over to the higher ranks of the ruling party through its own popular committee members.⁵³ As such, the popular committee is both a 'citizens window' for the state administration and the ruling party.⁵⁴ Consequently, support of the popular committee is also dependent on the community's political support, which rendered the committees more representative for some. Owing to the politisation of the committees, there were subgroups of the population who felt particularly underrepresented. This applied to specific ethnic groups, with one Nuba woman recounting:

"We have nobody to help. The popular committee has eaten a lot from us, we get nothing from them. They eat the money in terms of our names, nothing happens. We are not regarded as Sudanese."⁵⁵

⁵¹ Interview 53, March 2011

⁵² Interview 62, March 2011

⁵³ Clerk at the Water Company, interview February 2010

⁵⁴ Both Hamid (2001) and Abdalla (2008) underscore the politisation of the popular committees.

⁵⁵ Interview 75, April 2011

Patriarchal traditions constituted an additional factor of exclusion, with some women arguing that they felt underrepresented by their popular committees. Abdalla noted during her fieldwork that the percentages in the popular committees in the areas that she investigated were lower than 10 percent (Abdalla 2008: 105). Members of a women development organisation recounted: “We know a few people in the government, but in the popular committee the men are in control. They don’t allow women to participate.”⁵⁶ Furthermore, personal agendas and capacities also determined the internal dynamics within the committees:

“The popular committee hasn’t done anything so far. Last week our chair went to the popular committee meeting. They were dividing the work to help the area, but the men were only fighting for positions, everybody wants to be in more than one committee. They didn’t resolve anything. Planning is the most important committee [this was in an unplanned area, ID] because they can get something for themselves. They don’t care about their committee”.⁵⁷

Corruption within the popular committees was also recognised as a problem by the government itself, partly explaining its decision to return the responsibility for handing out land titles back to the State Ministry of Urban Planning.⁵⁸

Iztapalapa

In Mexico City, the government has also established an overarching model for citizen participation, with the so-called ‘citizen committees’ introduced with the Law of Citizen Participation by the newly elected PRD government in 1997. In fact, this form of citizen representation dates back to the period of one-party rule in Mexico, as highlighted in chapter 3,⁵⁹ although the intention of the PRD was to set up new committees that were freed from the old political interference. The start-up of these new style ‘citizen committees’ faced some important challenges, and attempts to replace the old (PRI dominated) ‘*comités de manzana*’ with more pluriform organisations for citizen representation had not yet succeeded by 2008.

⁵⁶ Interview 51, March 2011

⁵⁷ Interview 51, March 2011

⁵⁸ Interview UN Habitat, December 2010.

⁵⁹ Since the function of the Mayor in Mexico City had been replaced in 1928 by a ‘delegado’ of the President, a ‘consejo consultivo’ had functioned integrating 13 appointed representatives of Mexico’s different social sectors. President Echeverría installed the ‘Junta(s) de Vecinos’ in 1977, in order to restore some of the democratic power for the residents of Mexico City (Davis 1994: 198; Ward 2004: 292). The ‘Juntas de Vecinos’ replaced the 13 representatives to the Consejo Consultivo. In 1978, a new reform to the administrative law of the Federal District created two new organs: the resident associations and the *comités de manzana* (Álvarez Enriquez 2004: 81). From 1978 until 1986 the system was based on the following pyramid (Álvarez Enriquez 1004: 82):

1. *Consejo Consultivo*, constituted by the presidents of the Juntas de Vecinos (instead of the delegates per sector that had constituted it beforehand)
2. *Juntas de Vecinos*, one per borough, constituted by the leadership of the resident associations in the respective borough (three elected posts)
3. *Resident Associations* were constituted by the ‘jefes de los comités de manzana’ in each colonia, pueblo, barrio or housing unit (a president, a secretary and three members)
4. *Comités de Manzanas*, per manzana in the Federal District

At the same time, the ruling party was organised along similar lines. The PRI had a president of Mexico City, who was assisted by 40 district presidents, each of them presiding between 140-160 sections, at their turn based on the organisation of 2,5 manzanas.

Therefore, the 'citizen committees' had been dismantled and not yet been re-elected.⁶⁰ In the meantime, the main overarching institution in the field of citizen participation for the city government in Iztapalapa was thus the '*módulo de participación ciudadana*'.

For the purpose of programme implementation, Iztapalapa is divided into 184 so-called territorial units,⁶¹ within each of which the government of the Federal District is present by means of a '*módulo*'.⁶² These *módulos* are occupied by so-called (mostly female) social workers who organise meetings with the inhabitants to gather their opinions and inform them about specific government programmes. Furthermore, the '*módulo*' is also responsible for organising elections for the citizen committees.⁶³ At the time of my fieldwork, the '*módulos*' were concentrating on citizen participation within two specific programmes in the field of public security: the 'programa de mejoramiento barrial' and the 'policía de barrio' programme. Both programmes were closely interlinked, and intended to improve citizen participation in the field of public security, which reflected one of the main concerns of the residents and the authorities at the time.

In turn, the borough of Iztapalapa also has various windows for citizen participation, with around 2,000 people working in the borough for the implementation of its social programmes (the 'programas de adultos mayores'⁶⁴; youth; health and sports).⁶⁵ In addition, the borough of Iztapalapa disposes of seven territorial coordination units,⁶⁶ each with a window for citizen demands. The 'windows' are the main point of contact between the residents and the borough, representing the places where citizens can deposit requests for the maintenance of services (broken street lights or water pipes) or request permission to close a street for festivities, for example. Citizens can also ask the borough for social assistance through the 'windows'; for instance, because they are disabled or have a low income and need social support. There is an office for citizen participation in the borough of Iztapalapa that channels the demands through the various territorial units to the right area department.⁶⁷ Moreover, the borough has also contracted volunteers to promote citizen participation and mobilisation around specific programmes in the borough.

Interviews with the residents and their political leaders suggested that the borough and central city government used social programmes conditionally for political purposes.

60 These have been established in October 2010 but for this study I will base my findings on the functioning of the *módulos*.

61 The entire Federal District is divided into 16 boroughs covering 1292 territorial units.

62 The responsibility for these *módulos* lies with the department for Citizen Participation within the directorate for Social Development, which has sub-offices throughout the different boroughs.

63 Ley de Participación Ciudadana del D.F.

64 Social programmes that specifically target the elderly, including activities and in kind support for living expenses.

65 Fieldnotes 7 May 2008

66 Aculco, Centro, Cabeza de Juárez, Ermita Zaragoza, Santa Catarina, Paraje San Juan and San Lorenzo Tezonco.

67 Interview 59, 7 May 2008

In 2008, both administrations were occupied by different political factions within the ruling party. According to many residents, this meant that when they had the support of one of the two, they automatically lost the support of the other. By choosing to support a political candidate, they also chose for the support of a specific level of government. The promoters of the 'módulos' for citizen participation actually played a key role in this, with many of the promoters in fact having campaign workers of the city government's political leaders and the leaders of the borough.

Therefore, the local governments in both Mexico City and Khartoum have advanced overarching structures for citizen participation. The 'popular committees' and 'citizen committees' both aim to organise the inhabitants, capture their demands and communicate government programmes. However, in Mexico City in 2008, the 'módulos de participación ciudadana' were in charge of regulating citizen participation given that the 'citizens committees' had not yet been established. In Mayo, the popular committees served as an important mobilisation and control instrument of the ruling party. In Iztapalapa, the módulos and promoters in the different levels of government worked for different factions of the ruling party that were in heavy competition with each other. In fact, there was little difference between the promoters who worked for the government and those who worked for elected politicians. Moreover, there was also little difference between the elected politicians in Mayo and Iztapalapa, who functioned as brokers between the governments and the urban poor. I will return to this issue of brokerage below.

The role of political parties

A constituency-based electoral system is in place in both Mexico City and Sudan, which ensures an important role for elected parliamentarians (both local and national) in the neighbourhoods, before and after they have been elected. These elected officials continue to represent the interests of their constituencies once they are in office, and these interests were mostly very concrete. In both cities, the support of the party offices and the elected officials takes on operational, often also personal, proportions that are hard to distinguish from the tasks of the state bureaucracy. For example, the majority of the elected officials in Iztapalapa belong to the PRD. Their elected (central and national) parliamentarians were mainly involved with '*gestiones*' (administrative operations), mediating between citizens and the executive around the distribution of public services, social programmes and the preservation of public space. Parliamentarians of the national and local parliaments have their own '*módulos*' of offices, for which they receive a budget. This should enable them to keep in touch with the inhabitants' general concerns in order to perform their legislative tasks. In practice, the offices mainly provide administrative assistance to the residents, and although this does not correspond to the official task descriptions of the parliamentarians, these '*gestiones*' offer important opportunities for the claim-making of the urban poor.

In Khartoum, elected parliamentarians were also active within their constituencies. Khartoum has both a state legislative assembly and local council, with the

members of the former elected through the ballot since 2009, while the latter are 'elected' in community meetings. The representatives of the state legislative assembly and council do not have formal offices like in Iztapalapa (I interviewed one of the representatives in the Education Office), but they are known and accessible to the area's inhabitants. The representative explains how he maintains relations with his constituencies:

"... [how I become aware of the needs of the population] depends on the needs...There are also many personal needs such as jobs or funds....The relationship with the community is not based on money or education, it is based on relationships and things you are offering: people are very sociable. People usually nominate you socially and politically."⁶⁸

Therefore, the ruling parties in both Mayo and Iztapalapa provide an important centre for the residents' claim-making, particularly through the functions and activities of their elected representatives. In both cases, the ruling parties actively engaged in day-to-day government affairs, through their control over the executive (and its resources) and their role in the legislative. By interfering in the interaction between the state bureaucracy and residents, the elected politicians actually adopted the role of brokers.

Patterns of brokerage

Both cities showed striking similarities in terms of how the leadership and broker functions of the local politicians were 'constructed'. In both Mayo and Iztapalapa, many politicians had started their 'careers' as community activists engaged in the negotiation of services, while most of the community leaders had become involved in politics. The party is not the main form of community organisation: the power base of the brokers comes from outside the party, namely local forms of community organisation.⁶⁹ For example, historically the sheikh embodies the traditional broker between the people and government in Sudan, pre-dating colonial times:

"And we have in the village, in the community, one guy who is you can say the director or he is the guy who is keeping the community in the village closed. This is the sheikh. And he is the connector to liaison to the government. The guy has been... chosen by the people in that village...and the government during the sixties and the seventies they used this sheikh [for] whatever they had".⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Interview 85, July 2011

⁶⁹ Auyero (2007) calls 'the zone of clientelism' those spheres of daily life where party politics and other forms of organisation overlap.

⁷⁰ Interview 34, March 2010

Many of these 'sheikhs' had moved into Khartoum with their communities. Since 1989, the popular committees have been the 'official' brokers between the communities and the government, and according to some respondents are now the most powerful bodies in the neighbourhood.^{71 72} But how do people become members of these powerful popular committees? The popular committees are usually elected by the people in their neighbourhood, as we have seen before, although the ruling party has a strong hand in these elections. People who were identified as powerful included the representative of Al Nasr east in the state parliament, the coordinator of all the popular committees and the NCP in Al Nasr, and the head of the Market Committee in area 31, who was also 'sheikh al hila' (a neighbourhood sheikh) and a NCP member. All of these people were at some point elected in popular committees based on community activism, as exemplified as follows:

"Political activism is social activism. I already started to be socially active in school in North-Kordofan. I used to be a part of the public efforts for the development of the area after I had moved to Mayo. When the Administrative Unit was still a political body I was the head of it [...] and now I am the head of the legislative council at the state level. I used to be a social and political activist because for any area to develop people must work. People who are aware should also help their community. After social activism people usually think about how to benefit their communities and that is why I became politically active. Then, when there are elections, people should nominate someone. There are many activists in Mayo. I started with the popular committee (in 1989), then went to the administrative unit, then to the locality legislative board and then to the state parliament. Every time I was nominated."⁷³

Membership of the popular committee was often a first step in a political career that could later entail membership of the local council and state parliament. Other stories were similar in the sense that people started as social activists became subsequently being nominated for representative functions within the neighbourhoods, starting with the popular committee. One sheikh who was a merchant at the main market was identified as a powerful person, because the popular committee in the area started the land office with money from loans on his house. Therefore, social activism, typically within the field of service delivery, was the most important basis for the development of community leadership.

⁷¹ Interview 68, April 2011

⁷² However, they have not fully replaced the role of the 'sheikhs'. As a UN-habitat official said: "the culture is such that a sheikh cannot be contradicted." Interview UN Habitat, 2 December 2010.

⁷³ Interview 85, July 2011

Box 5. Summary of a typical career of a broker in Khartoum:

- A merchant, teacher, religious leader or tribal leader; or works for an NGO (mentioned: Al Manaar, GOAL, ADRA) and as such gains community support;
- starts organising literacy classes (women) or manages a borehole;
- becomes a member of the popular committee, in some cases elected, in others appointed by the NCP (recruited based on social activism);
- in some cases becomes a member of the ruling party and continues as a representative of the area in the local council, state assembly, women's union or government administration.

In Iztapalapa, the most powerful local leaders also built their political capital on the struggle for urban services. At the time of research, people commonly identified five local leaders: Clara Brugada, Rene Arce, Cuauhtemoc Gutierrez, Alfredo Hernandez Raigosa and Alfonso Lopez Villanueva (together with other leaders of the Frente Popular Francisco Villa). With the exception of Cuauhtémoc Gutierrez, who inherited an imperium of his father based on the leadership of the union of 'pepenadores' (garbage collectors) and was active in the PRI from an early age, the others had become involved in the students movements in the 1970s, before starting to engage in the demand for services in the areas in which they lived. They had all become members of the PRD at some point.

When Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas founded the "Frente Democrático Nacional" and postulated himself as a presidential candidate against Salinas de Gortari in 1988, he solicited the support of the various social movements in Mexico City. Large sections of the CONAMUP, including the UPREZ, decided to participate in his campaign and support him. Salinas de Gortari won the presidential elections and Cardenas ran again in 1994 with the support of many of the urban social movements. While he lost the presidential elections, in 1997 he won the first local elections and became the first elected Mayor of Mexico City since 1929. His victory was mainly based on the support of the movements. Therefore, since 1997, leaders of the various social movements that were mainly based on neighbourhood associations (Uniones de Colonos) have occupied posts in the city administration. Since the establishment of the Asamblea de Representantes and its successor, the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District (established in 1994), the neighbourhoods leaders have also occupied posts in the legislative for the PRD.

Box 6. The story of Clara Brugada

Clara Brugada started working with the Union de Colonos as a student, and quickly learned that she had to engage in mobilising the masses in order to gain the trust of the people. Because she and her colleagues did not want to practice "political tourism" and were ambitious in their plans to transform society from below, they moved to the popular neighbourhoods. After Brugada graduated,

she started to work for the NGO Equipo Pueblo, from where she could mobilise significant resources for self-development activities, such as soup kitchens, health centres and schools, public issues that gave the union a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the government. With the Unión de Colonos and others, she also founded the regional coordinator of the Urban Popular Movement (CONAMUP) and the UPREZ in San Miguel Teotongo (also see chapter 3, p.52).

In 1988, the UPREZ decided to support the candidacy for the presidential elections of Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas, and thus engaged in an alliance with the PRD without formally becoming part of it. The UPREZ supported the campaign for all the candidates allied with Cárdenas, politically and practically. Although Cárdenas lost, the ruling party established more channels for citizen participation in the capital. In 1995, when the 'consejeros ciudadanos' were introduced, the Unión de Colonos in San Miguel Teotongo proposed Brugada as their candidate. She won the representation of San Miguel Teotongo based on a number of votes that superseded all other candidates in the rest of the city. According to Brugada, she began to grow as a political figure from that moment onward because people started seeing her as municipal president: "it was unbelievable, from six in the morning until I left, [and from the moment I returned] it continued into the evening...people came to me to resolve everything."

The number of votes that she won gave her significant leverage over the government. Based on these successes, the members of the Unión wanted her to become a deputy for the national assembly in 1997, when the first Mayor of Mexico City was elected. However, to hold this function she had to become a member of the PRD. Brugada argued that she was hesitant, yet the people did not want anybody else to represent them, because they knew and they trusted her. Therefore, she consequently affiliated herself, the people organised her support in the campaign and she won. From 2000 until 2003, she was a deputy to the ALDF, and from 2003 until 2006 she was deputy to the national parliament again, this time based on a relative majority of votes in one of the districts in Iztapalapa. She stated that during her period as deputy she never left the movement because she had to be present as a representative: "in every colonia they knew me, simply the gestiones that I did in one year were about 55,000, as a *diputada* many more than as a Procuradora Social". Finally in 2009, after a fierce internal battle within the PRD, she made it to 'Jefa Delegacional' of Iztapalapa.

The political careers of other PRD leaders followed a more-or-less similar path, and thus the career of a typical broker in Iztapalapa could be summarised as follows:

Box 7. Summary of a typical career of a broker in Iztapalapa:

- Member of a student movement or trade union; starts to provide legal assistance or engage people for the delivery of services in the popular areas (and in most cases also lives there);
- becomes a member of representative bodies such as the comité de manzana (in the 1990s), the asamblea ciudadana (still under the PRI);
- (simultaneously or before) becomes a member of a political party and continues as a representative of the area in the ALDF (after 1997) or the national parliament;
- Occupies a government post;
- (competes for the post of 'delegado' in Iztapalapa).

Therefore, brokerage had very similar characteristics in both cases: leaderships emerge based on the brokerage of a main need for the urban poor, and particularly urban services.⁷⁴ In both Mayo and Iztapalapa, those who were currently identified by people as being power holders, often politicians, almost without exception started their 'careers' as social activists in their neighbourhoods. In Iztapalapa, many well-known brokers had been students who developed as community leaders and subsequently joined a political party (mostly the PRD). In Mayo, the brokers were often teachers, religious leaders, tribal leaders or merchants who had engaged in the provision of services before subsequently becoming elected 'neighbourhood sheikhs' ('sheikh al hila') and were thus incorporated into a political party - mostly the ruling party. In both cases, the leaders further developed their leadership within the party system, and at a certain point also occupied functions within the government administration. In Iztapalapa, the typical broker was a community leader who – as a party member - occupied a post in either the city government or local government, or a post in parliament, while still acting as the leader of their community. In Mayo, the typical broker was a sheikh or Imam who joined was also a member of the ruling party and the popular committee, local council or national assembly. The question is whether these patterns of brokerage had similar effects in Mayo and Iztapalapa in terms of the opportunities for the urban poor. In order to answer this question, I will now turn to the power dynamics in Iztapalapa and Mayo.

⁷⁴ Increasingly, professional organisations seem to take over the 'role' of the neighbourhood organisations as they negotiate with the state on the conditions for work (the most important 'need' of the urban poor in contemporary Iztapalapa).

5.3 Brokerage and political power in Iztapalapa and Mayo

The aforementioned similarities described are all the more surprising given that the overall political situation in Iztapalapa and Mayo is quite different. Mexico has actually experienced a transition to multiparty politics in the last decade, whereas Sudan remains in the grip of one-party rule, with several armed conflicts between the government and peripheral areas in the country. Does this have any consequences for patterns of brokerage in the poor neighbourhoods of the capital cities? In this section I will explore how brokerage relates to the political context in both cases.

Brokerage in a context of multiparty politics: competitive clientelism

In 2000, Rene Arce was the first elected governor of Iztapalapa for the PRD. He remained so until 2003, when his brother, Victor Hugo Círigo, won the elections after an internal struggle with Clara Brugada for the candidacy. In 2006, Horacio Martinez, a former assistant to Arce, won the post, and in 2008, Arce's wife, Silvia Oliva, was put forward as the main internal competitor to Clara Brugada for the local elections in 2009.⁷⁵ Many followers of Clara Brugada were complaining about a 'caciquismo' that was installing itself around the family of Rene Arce in Iztapalapa. In fact, this 'tribu' was connected to an increasing internal ideological struggle within the PRD. While internal divisions had been part and parcel of the party's history since its foundation⁷⁶, the Mexican presidential elections in 2006 created a major split between two of its factions. One faction, the 'Nueva Izquierda', to which Arce and his clique belonged, chose to support and cooperate with the national government lead by Felipe Calderón, whereas the followers of the former Mexico City Mayor Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) did not recognise the federal government. These followers were united in the 'Izquierda Unida', which composed otherwise diverse groups such as the members of the UPREZ, the Frente Popular Francisco Villa and the Izquierda Democrática Nacional (IDN).

Ten years after the take-over of the PRD in Mexico City and eight years after the local governments had become elected posts, the different currents within the PRD were fiercely competing for power in Iztapalapa. I characterise this competition as 'competitive clientelism'; practices by which 'factions', 'tribus' or 'camarillas' attempts to obtain and maintain power through organisations at different political levels, connected to each other in a chain.

⁷⁵ The internal PRD elections that eventually took place in 2009 were heavily contested between those two currents, whereby the latter actually won with the support of the Mexico City Mayor. On the one hand, this can be explained as a victory of the popular sectors for it was the current that encapsulated the main social movement in the area that triumphed over the current that was characterised by dynastic treats. On the other hand, the way the game was played was again clientelistic.

⁷⁶ The main difference was between the confrontational course as advocated for by Cárdenas and for example Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador and Marcelo Ebrard, is based on a vision of the party as the main representative for the popular sectors of society. The more reconciliatory course towards the PRI and PAN governments is based on a desire to reform the party to be able to also appeal to the (lower) middle classes and to small entrepreneurs. Advocates of this 'Nueva Izquierda' current are the former party president Jesus Ortega and the current president Jesus Zambrano, Carlos Navarrete. See Borjas Benavente (2003).

More than ten years after the PRI was defeated at the city level, I identified at least five distinctive ‘power chains’ in Iztapalapa, four of which belong to different factions of the same ruling party (PRD), while the fifth was connected to the PRI and had a historical power base in Iztapalapa. Leading figures, most of who are based on Iztapalapa’s home grown social movements from the 1970s, had divided control over the whole Iztapalapan territory through these power chains, and linked their political parties and factions to all levels further below.

The power chains all had a similar structure, and were patronised by a key political figure representing a political party or faction, ‘tribu’ or ‘camarilla’ within a party. They generally provide the local leaders with a formal place in government (the executive or the legislative) and grant them a certain degree of liberty in their local territory, in exchange for the political support from the inhabitants.⁷⁷ Therefore, the local leaders occupy a formal position in the city or local government, with direct access to government resources, whilst also continuing to lead their territorial movements. They employ hundreds of people working full-time on the ground in order to organise the people; for example, as community workers. One promotora in the UHVG recounted:

“Here (in her neighbourhood) three factions are present: the faction of Clara Brugada that I manage in the UHVG, the *nueva izquierda* faction of Horacio Martinez, every supermanzana he has like 5 people, and Alfredo Hernandez, alias ‘el Camarón’. ... (Sonia, 29, promotora)⁷⁸

One of the local leaders, commonly referred to as “El Camarón”, revealed that: “at the first level, we are like 30 people, then on a second level we have like 300, a little bit lower in the organisation, and then on the lowest level we have like 20.000 members”.⁷⁹ Victor Hugo Círiga, the national parliamentarian linked to the *Nueva Izquierda* faction, said that he had about 80 working for him through his two offices in the UHVG and one other location in Iztapalapa, excluding government workers.⁸⁰ Many of these people working in the power-chains were paid by government resources or, in some cases, out of the personal salaries of the local leaders, as in the case of El Camarón.⁸¹

77 The key political figures are the current mayor of Mexico City and his political allies such as Alejandro Encinas and AMLO on the one hand, and Jesus Ortega on the other. The five local leaders were, as mentioned earlier, Clara Brugada (UPREZ, based in the Southern part of Iztapalapa/Procuradora Social), Rene Arce (Nueva Izquierda, based in the Centre-East of Iztapalapa/his assistant is Jefe Delegacional of Iztapalapa), Alfredo Hernandez (numerous social organisations, based in the North East of Iztapalapa/Director of Territorial Regulation in the City Government), Adolfo López Villanueva (FPFV in the Centre and South of Iztapalapa/Director of Indigenous Affairs in the City Government) and Cuauhtemoc Gutierrez (union of pepenadores, Centre and far South East of Iztapalapa/no formal function in 2008 because the PRI was out of government, but was supporting a local parliamentarian).


78 Interview 77, 22 May 2008

79 Interview 38, 30 June 2008

80 Interview 28, 22 May 2008

81 Interview 26, 12 June 2008

Figure 10. Current power chains in Iztapalapa



The power chains included many of the neighbourhood organisations in the outskirts of Iztapalapa. Indeed, the alliance between neighbourhood organisations and the PRD was expressed in various activities; for example, during my visits to the outskirts of Iztapalapa, the neighbourhood associations were busy campaigning for the internal elections in the PRD for the candidacy in the local elections in 2009. The office of the Unión de Colonos was filled with posters of Brugada and Varela, and people could volunteer for campaign work. The neighbourhood organisation also kept its own record of the vote count based on the polling stations that it had administered.

Picture 8. Vote count in the Unión de Colonos



Source: fieldwork 2008

The alliance also stood hold beyond the electoral period, when the neighbourhood organisations attempted to build structural support for the party and its main leader, AMLO. For example, neighbourhood organisations were organising the mobilisation of people from the outskirts to the Zócalo by busses, for mobilisations around the privatization of the national petroleum company, PEMEX, in March 2008. The mobilisation of support sometimes happened in clientelistic ways; for example, members of the Unión for organised groups of elderly people and attempted to sensitise them to the PRD's political project. One active member of a neighbourhood organisation recounted how she engaged the elderly, explaining that the organisation offered social programmes for them, as well as instructing them to vote:

“The elderly are with us. We carry a notebook and write down the age and everything...All of us we have to vote, including the elderly...we are not seeing for whom they are voting because it is a secret but we tell them...”⁸²

In Iztapalapa, neighbourhood organisations actively participated in the elections, encouraging people to vote for particular candidates. The members of the neighbourhood organisation did this based on the distribution of social programmes, although they did not make participation conditional on voting.

Therefore, the neighbourhood association helped the party with electoral strategies, while the party offered something in return. The alliance between the ruling party and social movements meant that the *‘escritos’* to the government were now made jointly with party representatives. In fact, the office of the Union de Colonos in San Miguel Teotongo was merged with the office of the local representative to the Federal Assembly.

Picture 9. Combined office of the Unión de Colonos and a PRD politician



Source: fieldwork 2008

⁸² Interview 114, 10 April 2008

The leaders of the neighbourhood associations who had joined the government could continue to function as brokers, simultaneously combining different functions: government official and community leader. In the eyes of the inhabitants, this was not illegitimate at all. On the contrary, many saw the advantages of such a 'double hatting principle': "They [the leaders] have not forgotten us once they came to power". Although she is critical of the politisation of the Unión de Colonos, Doña Lidia says: "We have Clarita as *Ombudsman*, she has never abandoned us, she remains at the head of our organisation, she is like our natural leader..."⁸³ By contrast, Don Ramiro and Don Marco commented on Rene Arce, who, "...did nothing for the neighbourhood in terms of services" once having become jefe delegacional of Iztapalapa with the support of San Miguel Teotongo.⁸⁴ In fact, the leaders are expected to use government resources for the benefit of their constituency. Many of the inhabitants conceived of the democratic transition in terms of 'pay-back time' or 'now it's our turn to eat'.⁸⁵

Box 8. Nepotism in Iztapalapa

Rene Arce is a senator and has been leading a social movement in Iztapalapa for the last 20 years. In 2000, he became the first democratically elected *Jefe Delegacional* for the PRD in Iztapalapa. From 2003-2006, his brother Victor Hugo Círigó followed, and subsequently from 2006-2009 his assistant (and according to unconfirmed rumours his brother-in-law), Horacio Martinez. For the local elections in 2009, his wife, Silvia Oliva, a parliamentarian, ran as an internal PRD candidate. This group of people was in charge of the local government for almost ten consecutive years belongs to the *Nueva Izquierda* faction within the PRD.

Círigó, who was a member of the Legislative Assembly of Mexico City in 2008, had around 80 people working for him in his offices in Iztapalapa. Oliva also has multiple offices or '*módulos*' in Iztapalapa. In addition, there were a couple of hundreds of community workers active for the local government, with some people passing from voluntary community workers to employees of the local borough.

Señor R. was a volunteer, who is authorised by the local government to decide on the use of a local public garden. His group of elders joined every Friday in this garden, and the rest of the time he can rent it out to other groups.

⁸³ Interview 115, 30 April 2008.

⁸⁴ Interviews 104 and 107, 25 February 2008

⁸⁵ This is the title of a book by Michaela Wrong on corruption in Kenya. She explains how corruption is being maintained, among others because for every corrupt official there is a corruptee. Wrong, M. (2009). *Now it's our turn to eat. The story of a Kenyan Whistle Blower.* New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

His group was member of the PRD. It was asked to give support to the different candidates or to go to meetings of the *delegado*. “Sometimes they do something, sometimes they do nothing, but one has to support them”, says Señor R.⁸⁶

Clientelistic practices are far from new in Mexico City, with Wolf already arguing in 1956 that the main upward mobility of the power holders after the Mexican revolution took place through the political channels, while the major means of consolidating and upholding power on the regional and national level in Mexico was political. Political advantages were necessary to obtain economic advantages, rather than the other way around. He argued that the main formal organisation through which the interests of political and economic power seekers are mediated was the PRI. Its major function was to establish channels of communication and mobility from the local community to the central power group at the helm of the government. The surprising element is rather that this remains the dominant way of doing politics, ten years after the end of the PRI domination and the introduction of multi-party politics, and that it has largely absorbed the social movements in Iztapalapa that used to be autonomous from the government.

Therefore, has nothing changed in the course of the democratic transition in Mexico City? Does multi-party politics not matter at all? Yes it does; in terms of how power is exercised, particularly for the position of the intermediaries, and as a result, for the position of the urban poor. With the introduction of democracy at the local levels and local government functions being put up for elections, old structures of clientelism have become more competitive because they are based on multiple sources of power. Different political parties and factions of political parties can gain direct access to government resources. Wolf argued that rearrangements in conflict and accommodation between groups produced a changed configuration in the relationship of community-oriented and nation-oriented groups, and that once wealthy in their own right, these nation-community ‘brokers’ could become independent of government favours and rewards (Wolf 1956). The resources of international NGOs and organised crime can also feed into or pose alternatives to the abovementioned power chains (Kruijt 2011; Alvarado 2012; Serrano 2012). The support of international NGOs to the neighbourhood associations associated with the Clara Brugada chain reflects a clear example, while alliances between criminal money and politicians were less visible.

Brokerage in the context of one party rule

How does brokerage then work out in Mayo, where the same ruling party has been in place for almost three decades? The ruling party holds tight control over political activities in Mayo. Although concessions have been given little by little, and often in the face of international pressure (Ahmed and Al Naggar 2003), governance in Mayo remains characterised by one-party rule.

⁸⁶ Interview 78, 20 June 2008

In chapter 3, I emphasised how the ruling party has increased its grip on the country during the past 25 years. Indeed, its centre of gravity remains in the capital, with the ruling party deeply engaged not only with all levels of the administration in Khartoum, but also with the other authority bearers. This is particularly felt in Mayo, as the well-known host to supporters of the SPLM.

In Mayo, the ruling party is dominant from the top to the lowest levels of political organisation. The head of the NCP in Mayo very clearly explained the relation between his party and the administrative unit in the area:

“The relation between the NCP and the administrative unit is one of coordination. The NCP office sets the policies and the administrative unit carries them out. The locality also puts policies together with the NCP: it contains both the executive and a legislative body (the local council). The administrative unit is only executive.”⁸⁷

In this sense, under the ruling party, the executive and legislative are one. One women activist also stated: “My party membership brought me to the centre of decision-making. Decisions were made at the level of the administrative unit, the locality and the state [by the ruling party, ID].”⁸⁸

As I have pointed out, a central function for state-society interaction in Mayo is reserved for the popular committees. Despite being supposed to represent the interests of the population, in practice the popular committees represent an important instrument in the hands of the ruling party. Although I encountered some DUP and Umma party members who were active in their popular committees, most members in Mayo were linked to the NCP. In Mayo, there are 42 popular committees that had chosen a representative board with a chair as the popular committee coordinator in Mayo. Not coincidentally, the popular committee coordinator in Mayo was also the NCP coordinator for Mayo. In his words, this was “not obligatory but logical because most of popular committee heads [who had to elect him] in the area are NCP”. Furthermore, he also explained that whenever the committee wants to do something, “[they] can raise it [...] with the NCP office and then they can arrange with the locality or the administrative unit to get it.”⁸⁹

Despite opposition members maintaining that the popular committees should be independent in order to represent the residents’ interests, most residents and government officials that I encountered in Mayo actually considered the popular committees as an integral part of the government. My field notes from an interview with the popular committee in Al Wehda (unplanned area) read as follows:

87 Interview 62, March 2011

88 Interview 58, March 2011

89 Interview 62, March 2011

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We meet a few members of the popular committee (sheikhs) in a courtyard of the popular committee building. They are spending their entire day in the courtyard. During our interview many people walk in and out. According to the sheikhs, the people come with problems to submit to the popular committee because the popular committee is “the government of the area”.⁹⁰

Although the popular committees were thus instrumental for the ruling party, it did not limit its interaction with the residents to the popular committees. Moreover, it also had its own organisation in the neighbourhoods, just like the PRD has them (and the PRI used to have them) in Iztapalapa. A representative for Mayo in the state parliament explained that:

“in the state parliament there is a committee of 50 members from the area (called ‘circles’, there is one for Al Nasr east). They meet every three months. The members of the ‘circle’ are usually selected through the representative of the area; they are political activists or ‘logical party members’.”⁹¹

The ruling party also built linkages with other organisations in the area that were important for the mobilisation of the urban poor. The most important allies of the ruling party in the neighbourhood were the religious organisations, particularly the mosques, as well as the (international) religious NGOs. Mosques are the most important platform of political mobilisation in Khartoum: like in the entire Middle-East, most of the rallies in Khartoum actually happen after people gather in the mosques on Fridays. Every mosque in Khartoum has a mosque committee that functions as its ‘board’. In Mayo, the members of the mosque committee often overlapped with the members of the popular committee. Therefore, the Imams and religious institutions fell under the indirect control of the ruling party through the popular committees in the area. A critical Imam in the area had been assigned a mosque in the area where he lived, because he had founded a Qur’an school in the area; however, the freedom he had in his mosque was limited:

“I cannot talk about the things I want in my mosque. I want to talk about the unjust treatment of the poor people, and about the unaccountability of the security services that treat people badly. But people do not want to talk about these kinds of things...This is because of the general lack of education and unawareness of the people in the neighbourhood.”⁹²

It was not only due to unawareness that he could not speak freely; moreover, it was also because of the oversight of the ruling party through the popular committee. When he requested that visitors of his mosque engage in an interview with me, a

⁹⁰ Field notes visit to Al Wehda block 2, interview 83, April 2011

⁹¹ Interview 85, July 2011

⁹² Field notes visit Jihad Mosque, May 2011

foreigner, he entered into conflict with members of the popular committee who accused him of wanting to bring a spy to the community. Through the popular committees, the government would generally pay close attention to what was being discussed in the mosques, particularly during the Friday Prayers, and would attempt to influence this for its own benefit. Many mosques propagated to vote for the ruling party during the elections. Indeed, minibuses were collecting people at the mosques in Mayo to take them to the polling stations during the general elections in 2010.⁹³

As a result of their support to the ruling party, international religious NGOs such as the Islamic Relief Organisation and the Da'awa Al Islamiya (Islamic Call) had almost total freedom to operate in Mayo, and were actually in charge of many of the schools and health facilities in the area (Ali 2000). They carried out tasks with international money that the government was not able to provide. However, the story was different for Western NGOs, which had to submit to strict security regulations in order to gain permission to carry out their operations.

The ruling party also tries to control the tribal leadership, although the relation between the ruling party and the tribal leadership is more of a two-way street. These leaders have a local power base on their own. As described earlier, tribal leaders have a broad social support base in Mayo. There are different kinds of tribal leaders in the area. From the 1980s onwards, different political forces started to recognise the political weight of the traditional leaders in the city - particularly the Nuba Sheikhs - and started to develop relations with them.⁹⁴ During this time, the war with the South had flared up again, which also increased government attention for the Southern tribal leaders. At times they have been co-opted, and the government has played an active role in influencing the native administration within the boundaries of Khartoum by appointing neighbourhood sheikhs.⁹⁵ De Geoffroy terms these appointed sheikhs as 'the third sheikhs' (De Geoffroy 2009).

Publicly, all Sheikhs and Omdas would pledge alliance to the ruling party. For example, when the '*judia*' office was inaugurated in the local police station, or during the elections of the popular committees, sheikhs were sitting in the front rows and pledging allegiance to the ruling party by shouting religious slogans.⁹⁶

⁹³ Field notes election observation 2010.

⁹⁴ In the third democratic elections in 1986 the Sudan National Party, created by one of the founding-fathers of the Nuba Mountains General Union, gained seven seats in the national parliament, one of them being based on its voters in the squatter areas of Omdurman (Salih 1995: 74).

⁹⁵ 'Appointing' can happen indirectly by supporting a specific Omda during the elections, the same way in which popular committee members can be 'appointed elected'. I will come back to this in chapter 6.

⁹⁶ Field notes security sector, inauguration of the Judia at the police headquarter, May 2011

*Box 9. The Sultan from the Dinka from Rumbek*⁹⁷

We found the Popular Committee Coordinator of Al Wehdaat (the unregulated squatter areas in Mayo) in his office on the market, behind a 'TV watchroom' where people can come and watch TV for a small contribution. The waiting hall of this office is filled with big leather sofas, as is the case in most offices of higher government officials in Khartoum but not in the administrative unit in Mayo that has significantly less resources. The coordinator, a tall man with a golden tooth, sits behind a large wooden desk with a wall-filling picture of the President behind him. A nameplate on his desk states that he is also 'Sultan from the Dinka from Rumbek'. Pointing at the leather sofas we are sitting on, he explains that he has furnished his office with his own means, proving to the people that the government is actually making an effort.

What kind of space was there for brokerage in Mayo? Behind public appearance local leaders did have some room to operate. Some Nuba Omdas said that "if the popular committees want something, they have to sit with the Omdas"⁹⁸, or that "whenever people have a problem, they first go and see the Omda."⁹⁹ Indeed, not all sheikhs in Mayo are NCP.¹⁰⁰ I also came across sheikhs in Mayo who were members of opposition parties such as Umma or DUP. The precise function and position of a sheikh depended on the popular support within his neighbourhood, as well as their links with his rural constituencies that give them legitimacy vis-a-vis their urban tribe members. In the case of the Nuba, the link with the rural constituencies is actively maintained by inviting the Nazirs from the Nuba Mountains for the Omda elections in Khartoum. A representative of UN-habitat explained the informal power position of the sheikhs:

"Formally the sheikhs and the popular committees are separate entities. The sheikhs are generally in the popular committee when they are in line with what the popular committees want to do. The popular committee has the upper hand; the internal power dynamics however are such that sheikhs cannot be contradicted."¹⁰¹

The sheikhs do have some influence at the local level, because the state also depends on them for its legitimacy. Traditional leaders still have a cultural power base, because people are loyal to them and, as the UN-Habitat official said, the culture is such that sheikhs cannot be counterdicted. This is even more the case when their linkage to rural constituencies remains strong, such as in the case of the Nuba leaders who act under the approval of the Mek in the Nuba Mountains.

⁹⁷ Field notes and interview 82, Popular Committee Coordinator Al Wehda, April 2011

⁹⁸ Interview 52, February 2011

⁹⁹ Interview 53, March 2011

¹⁰⁰ Similarly, not all Southern tribal leaders were SPLM. I also found Southern tribal leaders representing the NCP in government. Several Southern sheikhs or omdas had made a conscious choice to join the ruling party because they saw the future for them and their tribes in the North of Sudan, such as the coordinator of the popular committees of Al Wehda who was actually a Sultan from the Dinka from Rumbek.

¹⁰¹ Interview 39, 2 December 2010.

The state thus also depends on these leaders for a variety of things, for the mobilisation of community resources for development, for solving community conflicts and for mobilising voters in election times.

Notwithstanding, although challengers to the ruling party do exist in Mayo and they cannot easily be removed from their position, they are limited in their scope for action. As previously argued, it is difficult for the opposition parties to organise themselves and be present in Mayo, although space for political organisation was opened up in the early-2000s.¹⁰² The SPLM had a somewhat exceptional position during the CPA years because it was formally part of the Government of National Unity and consequently its presence had to be tolerated; indeed, it was the only party outside the NCP with an office in Mayo. SPLM members also formed part of the popular committees in some areas, and in some cases had been able to reach agreements with the NCP on specific local issues, such as the distribution of land.

Although a representative of one part of the Umma party, which remains in an informal cooperation agreement with the NCP, argued that it would be possible to operate out in the open if it had sufficient resources¹⁰³, a representative of another part (opposing the government) revealed that he has to hold meetings in secret and is not allowed to open an office.¹⁰⁴ The DUP also has difficulties operating in Mayo, with residents further indicating that it can be potentially dangerous to openly support opposition parties. Moreover, NGOs that were not supportive of the government faced severe restrictions, and basically had to get permission for every move, or alternatively face the threat of being closed down. In the IDP camps, they were submitted to the control of the security service through the humanitarian aid commission.

Competition to the state from other authority bearers was suppressed in so far as that was possible. Foreign organisations always feared the threat of expulsion and despite their resources being much needed; there was so much on offer that the threat was real. However, the local support base for the tribal leaders had to be somehow accommodated. Competition sometimes arose between the different instances of the state itself, such as between the (state) line ministries and (national) security services who sometimes manage opposing policy objectives (particularly concerning the contribution of foreign NGOs). Local levels of the administration essentially had little power,¹⁰⁵ and thus in the context of one-party rule, brokerage was mainly linked to the ruling party. Although the ruling party also has its internal divisions (International Crisis Group 2011), this was not as clearly present at the local level and was not so visible related to electoral politics as in Iztapalapa.

¹⁰² See Ahmed and El Nagar (2003).

¹⁰³ Interview 80, April 2011. In 2001 NCP and Umma have agreed on some political reforms with Mubarak AlFadil Al Mahdi of the Umma faction Reform and Renewal. After that there have been some conflicts and Mubarak withdrew. Some people stayed in the government however, under the leadership of Abdalla Masaar (Minister of Information since December 2011).

¹⁰⁴ Interview 63, April 2011

¹⁰⁵ The administrative units used to have the status of 'localities', meaning that they had the control over their own budget, before the Local Governance Act 2003. Interview 68, April 2011.

I have argued that the appearance of the Sudanese state in Mayo corresponds to the notion of the 'politics of survival' as defined by Migdal (2001): the state concentrates its limited resources on its own survival by controlling opposition forces instead of concentrating on its own policy objectives. The reach of the state is limited in the field of service delivery, but it is omnipresent in the field of security. This ambivalence comes into expression in the room for manoeuvre of the various brokers.

In this section, I have showed how the pathways of political power work out in Iztapalapa and Mayo. It has become clear that the ruling parties not only control the state apparatus in both cases, but also maintain extensive relations with other authority bearers in society, such as the neighbourhood organisations in Iztapalapa and religious and tribal organisations in Mayo, in order to enhance and to maintain their power position.

In both cases, the boundaries between the state and other organisations and between the representatives of the state and the urban poor were blurred. Therefore, fields of negotiation were hybrid in a double sense: both horizontally and vertically. The actors with double functions between the state and other authority bearers were generally also those who mediated between the state and the urban poor.

5.4 Conclusion: brokered citizenship

In this chapter I have demonstrated that there is a plethora of other 'authority bearers' present in the popular neighbourhoods of Mexico City and Khartoum that play a role in public service provision (including security). Both developments have contributed to the existence of governance arrangements in which the practices and tasks of state institutions and other institutions overlap through the double functions of brokers.

In Iztapalapa, the main social movements in the area (composed of neighbourhood organisations) have allied themselves with political parties. In fact, the dominant 'field of claim-making' in Iztapalapa presently consists of an alliance between a political party, particular level of government and neighbourhood organisation. The transition to multiparty politics in Iztapalapa has not fundamentally altered the corporatist arrangements that were so characteristic under the PRI; rather, it has merely included the social movements into such practices and further differentiated the options. I have described the main pathways of power as 'competitive clientelism' in which different political factions were engaged through brokerage systems operating from the political top to the grass roots in the neighbourhoods. The politicians compete for the voters in Iztapalapa. For the urban poor, the fact that there are several factions of political parties in the game, each with access to government resources, provides opportunities given that their potential vote counts amongst such competition.

In Mayo, the operations of the state can be characterized as 'the politics of survival', making only the necessary investments for keeping the ruling party in place. The focus thereby lies on the maintenance of security, not on the provision of services. The government has allowed social organisations to operate within the context of a 'self-help' strategy since the economic crisis in the 1980s. However, this does not mean that these organisations operate outside government control; rather, the government has gradually increased its grip on the area over the years. 'Social activities' and organisations engaged in economic or professional issues are usually tolerated, but 'political activities' are highly restricted. Although the government itself does not provide public services, it strongly controls who is providing them and to which part of the poor population. Religious organisations and NGOs cannot provide assistance to the urban poor without interference from the government through the 'popular committees' or extensive intelligence and security apparatus. Therefore, the typical 'field of claim-making' in Mayo consists of an alliance between the popular committee, the ruling party and NGOs or religious organisations. In the security field, the traditional leadership, together with the main security institutions of the state, constitutes another field of claim-making. Brokerage exists in the sense that different agents operate within different spheres of influence, such as the state, community organisations and alternative authority bearers such as mosques or the traditional administration. In terms of party politics, Sudan's political regime retains full control, with the ruling party in Mayo having been in power for over 25 years, maintaining virtually all political and economic resources in its hands. Although the SPLM was part of the government under the CPA, it had hardly access to state resources (in terms of access to financial resources and government posts). Consequently, the urban poor in Mayo hardly have a choice besides engaging with the ruling party, either directly or indirectly, if they want to make their voices heard. The only room for manoeuvre lies in the position of the tribal leaders on whom the state relies to a certain extent to implement its policies and to exercise control.

Somewhat surprisingly therefore, similar brokerage structures exist in Mayo and Iztapalapa. While the brokers' power base appears to be slowly changing from urban services to issues such as jobs and security, it can be generally said that the 'careers' of brokers in newly-urbanised areas have developed along surprisingly similar lines in Mayo and Iztapalapa. In a context of under-regulation and scarcity of resources, there is a 'political market' that matches the government's need for legitimacy and control with the urban poor's need for land and services, with brokers featuring as the matchmakers in this market. These brokers connect different institutions with the state – the ruling party, NGOs, religious organisations and community organisations - and derive their power position from both political party and community membership (through engagement in neighbourhood organisations, tribal organisations, religious organisations, et cetera).

Opportunities for claim-making resemble each other in this interplay between the state and other institutions and particularly in the operations of the brokers, with

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the character of these governance arrangements dependent on the distribution of political power between the state and other institutions and the brokers. In the next chapter, I will seek to explain the resulting dynamics between brokers, state institutions and the urban poor.

6. Navigating the grey zone

We have seen that a variety of actors are involved in the negotiation over public goods between the urban poor and the state. The fields of negotiation can be characterised as grey zones in which the boundaries between the state and other authority bearers and those between state representatives and the representatives of the urban poor are both blurred. An essential part of the grey zone is that actors perform double functions, with the fact that they belong to different domains simultaneously placing them in a broker position. Therefore, the final set of sub-questions that should contribute to an understanding of how citizenship and political agency is shaped in the context of the megacity is as follows: how does the interplay take shape between the urban poor, governments and brokers? The strategies employed by the urban poor, governments and brokers feed into each other. I have argued in chapter 2 that ‘feedback loops’ exist between the agency of these different actors: the strategy of governments and brokers contribute to the strategies of the urban poor, and vice versa. For the purpose of analytical clarity, I will explore each of them separately in the coming sections. I will first take a closer look at the way in which the urban poor shape their claim-making strategies. Subsequently, in section 6.2 I will explore the ways in which both governments in Iztapalapa and Mayo engage with the population. Finally, in section 6.3, I will focus on the practice of brokerage.

6.1 Claim-making by the urban poor

Claim-making strategies of the urban poor have collective elements rooted in their migration history. Rural-urban migration in Mexico was mainly based on kinship ties (Cornelius 1975: 22), with the struggle for urban services subsequently undertaken by organisations of people living in the same neighbourhoods. One inhabitant from the outskirts of Iztapalapa remembers:

“...the inhabitants started to organise themselves to not allow more selling of property...and from there the struggle of the neighbourhood organisation began, for the defence of the green areas, for the regularisation of the land ownership, for drinking water that we didn't have, for public transport, ‘la ruta 100’ [the public transport route, ID]...”¹

In the first instance, the struggle for services was based on self-help strategies. With support from foreign NGOs, the residents organised their own community health centres, schools and soup kitchens (Moctezuma 1985). Many of these activities were actually taken care of by women. A female member of a *Unión de Colonos* remembers how women were also active in the organisation of security, including how the Unión was divided into groups of ten who would survey the area day and night.²

¹ Interview 113, 10 April 2008

² Interview 112, 18 March 2008

This was very similar in Mayo, where rural migrants gathered around their kinsmen and started organising themselves in order to provide their basic collective needs: housing, water, transport and security. This mostly occurred within tribal structures:

“There was no government and there were no rules, people just spread out here. After that the traditional leaders started to distribute the land with ropes, they were trying to organise it and to let people not build on the streets. The leaders had a committee, this was not formal, it was just to organise...”³

“There [was] no... security system. That’s why the people [were] staying here in groups, to protect themselves...during the 1980s the 1970s when people were staying in groups, because every group has a tribal system...”⁴

People relied on each other’s help based on a community tradition in Sudan called ‘*Nafeer*’ (Hamid 2001: 152; Hamid 2002: 12-13). *Nafeer* is a name for community assistance in the broadest sense of the word; it can refer to assistance in building houses or working the land. Moreover, *Nafeer* also implies a strong system of social control: if somebody does not offer assistance, the whole village can come to their house “to drink tea as a punishment (because he has to pay for that tea!).”⁵

There are still forms of community organisation and collective self-help to be found in both cities at present. In Khartoum, these remain predominantly tribal, although in the regulated areas such organisations are also based on neighbourhoodship. Examples include the *sanadeeq* and *tandas*, which are surprisingly similar in both cases.

Box 10. Sanadeeq and Tandas

A resident of Mayo explains how a *sandouq* works: “We meet weekly in the house of one of us, collect money and give it to the owner of the house. A *sandouq* can contain 40 to 50 women. All participants are from the same area, but it is also open to people from other areas. It is important that we know each other. The person who is inviting should own the house (cannot be renting) and the others should know her before. Sometimes even if the person is renting but she seems serious she can join. A *sandouq* for one year however cannot be joined by renters. [...] A *sandouq* can be for a week, a month or a year. The money can be used for school fees, building, furniture, refrigerators.

³ Interview 83, April 2011

⁴ Interview 34, March 2010

⁵ Interview 34, March 2010

The order is determined through a luck game [a lottery]: *al gouraj*. But sometimes it can be adapted according to the needs, for example when someone is sick”.⁶ Household sanadeeq were uniquely run by women, but men had their sanadeeq on the market. Jacobsen (2001) reports that so-called ‘kasha-sanadeeq’ are used by communities to cope with the financial losses as a result of the police raids on the illegal selling of alcohol.

In Iztapalapa, the urban poor cooperated in community credit schemes called ‘tanda’. Mari bought the majority of her furniture through tandas, including her bed, mattress, two televisions and her computer. She explained that you can either set up a ‘tanda’ or participate in one that has been set up by someone else. They can be organised either for consumption goods or money. Tandas are always set up between people who know and trust each other, either directly or on the basis of recommendation. For example, you can say that you will organise a ‘tanda’ for 3500 pesos, whereby all the participants bring in 200 pesos per week. They all get a number, and when the 3500 pesos are reached, number 1 receives the money. They all continue to pay until everybody has received 3500 pesos. Accordingly when you are number 1, you will have your computer or whatever very soon, and will continue to pay for it for three months. When you have a high necessity, people are typically willing to give you a low number, whereas if you can wait a little longer than you will receive a higher one. However, in the end they all receive their money. There is usually one person who administers and collects the money. While this work is voluntary, it offers the advantage that you can be the number one.

The struggle for urban services has also generated new forms of organisation and leadership in the city, as discussed in the previous chapter. In Mayo, some tribal leaders came with their people from the countryside, and are termed by De Geofroy (2007) as ‘the first sheikhs’. In the new urban context, many of the old community structures have been disrupted and new sheikhs have been appointed by the communities, the so-called the ‘sheikhs al hila’ (or the ‘second sheikhs’). In Iztapalapa, new forms of leadership have emerged from the cooperation between the neighbourhood organisations and student movements, as pointed out in chapter 3. In interaction with the student leadership, the neighbourhood organisations have developed a discourse based on the premises of citizenship rights, and have connected self-organisation with claim-making towards the government.

⁶ Interview 76, April 2011

The neighbourhood organisations united in the UPREZ (San Miguel Teotongo, Miravalle and El Molino) all started working around three axes: '*autogestión*' or self-reliance; the '*gestión*' or negotiation of services from the government; and '*democratización*', focusing on greater influence of the inhabitants on public policies (Moctezuma 1985; Villaseñor 2006).⁷

These leaders were not only important for the organisation of the communities and self-help activities, but also for forwarding requests to the governments. For example, in Mayo, requests to the government were made to the government through the tribal leaders:

"The community started to request for a school through its traditional leaders. My brother in law, who was a teacher, had convinced the leaders to put a request to the local council in Khartoum. They built a school for us in the neighbourhood that was called the national unity school... We then started to ask for an intermediate school, again through our traditional leaders. The leaders were from different tribes represented in the area."⁸

Over the years, the role of the tribal leaders has been complemented by the popular committees, which have incorporated the tribal leadership to some extent; however, approaching the government through the local leaders remains an important, if not dominant, element of poor people's politics. This is also the case in Iztapalapa, where people still rely on their neighbourhood leaders for claim-making.

Trusting people, more than offices: the importance of local leaders

There is a local expression "if you do not have a strong back you will be slapped on your stomach". This means that you need a VIP to take care of you".⁹

Although this is a Sudanese expression, it could have come from either Iztapalapa or Mayo.¹⁰ This quote illustrates how the residents of both areas generally perceived their opportunities for claim-making. Indeed, the mirror image of this perception is reflected in quotes of the local leaders in both areas:

"...The people saw me as the municipal president, not as 'consejera ciudadana', it was tremendous, from 6 in the morning until I would leave for whatever [occasion], I came back and it went on in the night ... [What did people come to ask?] Everything, services, whatever issue that affected them, people resorted to me to resolve everything."
(neighbourhood leader)¹¹

7 Interviews 39, 75 and 79, resp. 11, 24 and 13 June 2008

8 Interview 58, March 2011

9 Interview 64, March 2011

10 Interview 107, March 2011

11 Interview 39, June 2008

“People now expect me to do everything for them, even personal things [...] It is a difficult task. I must reply in terms they understand, sometimes I also have to give people money to solve their problems. If it is a small amount I can pay it from my own pocket. But if it is a bigger problem, I can write to the Commissioner or goes to the Zakat institution.” (popular committee coordinator)¹²

These are quotes from current day community leaders in Iztapalapa and in Mayo. People approached the leaders for personal issues in both Mayo and Iztapalapa, but they also generally believed that personal contacts were a requisite for getting something done from the government. For example, in one part of Mayo, members of the popular committee claimed that they had a garbage car coming to their area because one of the residents was working in the locality.¹³ An ex-popular committee member argued that personal relations were more important than political relations in terms of getting things done, stating that: “even with the popular committee it works like this, you have to know them”.¹⁴ Therefore, the residents of Iztapalapa and Mayo always try to personally approach who they believed to be power holders in their area.

Jacobsen (2001) highlights that ‘citizenship strategies’ among the displaced in Mayo consist of maintaining good relations with the tribal chiefs for acquiring identity documents and consequently land; for proving one’s status as an unmarried women; to avoid ‘*kasha*’ (eviction to the country side); or to maintain relations with government-appointed committees that play a role in the distribution of relief goods (Jacobsen et al 2001: 96-97). In dealing with the police, people also relied on the intervention of members of their popular committees¹⁵ or their tribal leaders who mediate. A group interview with Nuba refugee women in Mayo revealed that they were hardly aware of the functioning of the administration and fully relied on their tribal leadership. They stated that whenever there was a problem, the people went to see the omda, who, if necessary, would subsequently go to the police. When I asked whether the omda also was a member of the popular committee, there was confusion among the group.¹⁶

To some extent, this was similar in Iztapalapa. While people were more aware of the official institutions for citizen participation – they knew that the local government had windows for citizen participation and they knew the módulos for the central government in their area –they generally also relied on their relations with local leaders when they wanted to get things done. This was even more the case in areas that did not have a tradition of community organisation, such as the social housing projects.

¹² Interview 62, March 2011

¹³ Interview 47, February 2011

¹⁴ Interview 58, March 2011

¹⁵ Interview 42, February 2011 and interview 63, April 2011

¹⁶ Interview 53, March 2011

Despite the efforts of the Department for Citizen Participation of the city government towards promoting autonomous community participation,¹⁷ people believed that this was the way it worked. As one resident said:

“Here first you have to go with Clara and she will refer you to someone else...it’s important because if the first one you visit doesn’t attend you it is difficult that the next one will attend you, that is a problem.”¹⁸

Community workers in the area attributed the people’s habit of approaching the government through the local leaders to a lack of awareness and the political culture of dependency in the area. According to Francisco, a teacher in a church-run high school, people still interpreted the provision of services as a favour rather than a right. He saw this as the heritage of a situation in which a small number of people (*caudillos*) always resolved the problems of the community. In his words, “even if people do not need to call in the help of a parliamentarian to get some *‘gestión’* done, they will still continue to do so.”¹⁹

In fact, the neighbourhood organisations employed a double strategy. Indeed, respondents explained that even when the neighbourhood organisations protested in the streets for services, they always ensured that they also presented a written request (an *‘escrito’*, or an *‘oficio’*) to the government. Furthermore, he also explained why: “Before doing a *marcha* we always present an *‘escrito’*...The *‘escritos’* are only to prove that we did officially request [*‘que lo gestionamos’*] although [we knew that] they would not give it to us”.²⁰ They did not rely on these official approaches. One young woman in charge of one of the neighbourhood offices in Izapalapa responded to my question concerning whether they arranged the services at the political or administrative level as follows:

“Not really political because if it was political everything [could be easily resolved] between leaders, done and finished, but no, it all has to be administrative, so for example ... if the federal government was to arrange anything the city government has to receive them and when the city government has federal problems in its territory the federal government has to receive them, so it is everything, politics, administration and the social. Let’s say that is a “*trabajo equilibrado*” [balanced effort].”

Pansters (2009: 16) argues that it is characteristic of Latin American politics for people, and particularly poor urban dwellers, to make use of citizenship discourses, as well as personalistic instruments, because they trust more in the relationship with people they know than in an impersonal bureaucracy.

17 Interview 49, civil servant in the Department of Citizen Participation, 21 May 2008

18 Interview 88, 1 March 2008

19 Interview 71, 1 March 2008

20 Interview 113, 10 April 2008

However, the fact that people relied on the brokers did not mean that they were fully dependent on them, with brokers at least feeling that they were accountable. Moreover, the urban poor also had a certain amount of leverage over the brokers. The NCP and popular committee coordinator in Mayo stressed that despite job sometimes being tough, he could not do otherwise because people had elected him: “My job is voluntary. It is difficult but I can’t say no because people elected me.”²¹ Although the ruling party was certainly influential in his appointment, this did not mean that he did not have any need for legitimacy among the people. The fact that he attended to residents around the clock, as well as investing his personal money and time, reflected that he somehow felt they had to deliver. In Iztapalapa, the residents steered the brokers to a certain extent; for example, Brugada claimed that she was pushed by the people of the Unión de Colonos to participate in politics:

“In 1997 all my friends from the Unión wanted me to be a deputy and I did not want to be a deputy because I would have to affiliate myself to a political party, I was happy as a ‘consejera ciudadana’ because I did not belong to a political party but to the people but the *compañeros* said: how can we allow that someone else comes to represent us when we have you here [...], so we talked to the PRD [and they replied]: well, you will have to affiliate yourself because there will be an internal election and you will have to compete with others [...] so this is when the Unión decided to join the party and I was with much hesitation because I did not think we were going to win and I did not really want to but the *compañeros* were all very excited.”²²

I have argued that the residents in Mayo and Iztapalapa have organised in groups since their arrival in the city, providing the basis for their claim-making practices. The community leaders started to function as brokers between the urban poor and the state, and they still do in both areas. In Iztapalapa, the residents still maintain the habit of approaching the brokers first or in parallel to addressing the government through official channels (such as the windows for citizen participation in Iztapalapa), despite official government efforts to encourage the latter. In Mayo, the residents are obliged to address the state through the popular committee, which also acts as the communities’ representative. Within the popular committees, people prefer to approach people that they know. Besides, people continue to address their own community leaders, whether or not they form part of the popular committees. This has resulted in the leaders having an important say on the terms on which people negotiated with their government in both areas.

²¹ Interview 62, March 2011

²² Interview 39, June 2008

Brokerage and negotiation tactics

“In order to organise the services we had to do ‘marchas’, meetings, sit-ins and everything, [...] in order to pressurise the government, we had to go walking with thousands of people [...] when they did not respond to our ‘marchas’ we did a ‘mitin’...the ‘mitin’ was to go to wherever, for example the Zocalo, the borough, we gathered there and denounced that they were not attending us [...] and when they still did not respond, we decided to do ‘plantones’, the ‘plantón’ was to stay there day and night until they received us...and if not, well we decided, when with all that we still didn’t succeed, we decided to ‘take’ [to occupy] the borough.”²³

Inhabitants of San Miguel Teotongo in the outskirts of Iztapalapa explained that the way in which they engaged with the government through their leaders to acquire access to their basic needs under PRI-rule was confrontational, consisting of marches, sit-ins and the occupation of government buildings. The neighbourhood organisations claimed services from the government, thereby employing increasingly forceful means, with the ultimate aim of coming to negotiations with the government. The interaction with the government under PRI-rule thus followed the logic of pressure-negotiation (*presión-negociación*): people created nuisance on the basis of which they hoped to receive concessions from the government. At the same time, they developed proposals and often started self-help activities without seeking permission, consequently forcing the government to react. The purpose of the combined strategies was to retain a degree of autonomy based on self-organisation, because in the end the marches were not a goal in itself, but rather a means to come to negotiations with the government.

The story of autonomous development and confrontations with the government lasted until the mid-1990s at least,²⁴ before starting to change. In 2008, the tactic of the neighbourhood associations had become ‘quieter’. As Mari said: “before that was the way to arrive and to demand, it was with ‘marchas’, now we are coming to more quiet forms, one is to first come and present a problem, to arrive at negotiations.”²⁵ This was not so much directly related to the democratisation process, but rather to the fact that the neighbourhood leaders had become incorporated into the city government, which directly translated to the residents’ claim-making strategies:

²³ Interview 113, 10 April 2008

²⁴ Interview 89, 23 February 2008, Interview 71, 1 March 2008

²⁵ Interview 98, 30 April 2008

“Clara and Victor have put a limit [to the forms of action] because they are from the same party, so let’s say, we still demand but because we are from the same party I cannot attack you [the party] publicly so that the media will hear, because for example in other times when the PRI was still in government we would close boroughs, streets and avenues, even with the PRD for example we have closed the territorial coordination of Santa Catarina, yes we have exercise pressure but not like when other parties were governing”.²⁶

The incorporation of the leaders in the ruling party and subsequent change in tactics produced paradoxical outcomes for the urban poor. On the one hand, it actually offered the residents some short-term concrete advantages:

“When the government was the PRI it would never attend us, it was only under pressure that they supported us, but now with Marcelo we just send a delegation, before it wasn’t like that, the entire neighbourhood would go, now we have representatives who go and they talk with his secretary, they make an appointment, they talk with him and things are solved...”²⁷

The alliance had also generated resources for the areas, including neighbourhood leaders occupying high ranks within the city government. A leader in El Molino said that: “since 2000 the resources started to arrive.”²⁸ Even when their leaders were not formally responsible for programmes that affected them, they could negotiate with the person who was from within the government. This became evident from the role played by Clara Brugada in the concession of the ‘Programa de Mejoramiento Barrial’ for San Miguel Teotongo. As the Procuradora Social she had nothing to do with the programme, but as neighbourhood leader she helped to design it. When the programme was inaugurated it was not the Director of Social Development, Marti Batres, who gave the first speech on behalf of the government, but rather Clara Brugada.²⁹ The neighbourhood organisations of the UPREZ were able to push for the “Law on Social Development” through the participation of one their leaders in parliament, while community members were invited to participate in security advisory committees. Importantly, the inhabitants of the neighbourhoods felt that they finally had access to their government. Some stressed that the Unión de Colonos was still independent. Social movement leaders within the party were in check by the association; in fact, both Clara Brugada and Victor Varela donated part of their salaries to the UPREZ. Residents believed that the association negotiated the terms of engagement with the party:

²⁶ Interview 101, 03 March 2008

²⁷ Interview 114, 10 April 2008

²⁸ Interview 74, 24 June 2008

²⁹ Fieldnotes inauguration of the Proyecto de Mejoramiento Barrial in San Miguel Teotongo, 20 April 2008

“...now it would not be opportune if Ebrard didn’t respond because if we go to the ‘*secretaría de gobernación*’ we would have to ask a favour of a Panista when we know that Ebrard is PRDista, therefore they are in two games...[because he is opposed to the borough] Ebrard came to San Miguel [and he helped out]...because at that time it was beneficial for him...Well, because he wanted to have us, he also wanted to have people, and we also have our needs. We also negotiate, haha!”³⁰

Notwithstanding, others stressed that the alliance with the ruling party also weakened the autonomy and the bargaining strength of the neighbourhood organisations. The dilemma was clearly felt by the leadership of the organisations, provoking many internal discussions.³¹ The loss of autonomy became clear from a few issues. First, by engaging in party politics, the neighbourhood organisations had distanced themselves from some of the inhabitants and their preoccupations. For example, some residents felt that the organisation was too involved in politics, rather than issues that directly concerned the neighbourhood.³² Second, the alliance limited the negotiating options for the organisations. As previously argued, it had become more difficult to engage in visible opposition given that that could damage the ruling party’s interest. Finally, there were indications that the organisations had become absorbed by machine politics by aligning itself with party politics, contrary to the democratic principles that they had been fighting for in the first place. This was illustrated by a discussion that emerged between two neighbourhoods concerning a proposal for participatory budgeting. One neighbourhood had proposed to engage in an exercise of participatory budgeting with the borough to the example of the experience in Porto Alegre in Brazil; however, the other neighbourhood organisation refused, because, according to a leader of the other neighbourhood:

“it would not allow them to continue to relate to and to obtain certain advantages of government programmes ... there was a very close relation and other informal channels; this relation would be put into question through a methodology of participatory budgeting.”³³

A participatory exercise might reveal that the neighbourhoods supporting particular political leaders benefitted relatively more from social programmes operated by the city government, such as the Programa de Mejoramiento Barrial, and some people within the neighbourhood association might have feared having to compete with others in areas where they now had an advantage.

³⁰ Interview 102, 11 March 2008

³¹ Interview 66, 13 June 2008, Interview 79, 13 June 2008, Interview 80, 24 June 2008

³² Interview 88, 1 March 2008

³³ Interview 75, 24 June 2008. This was the situation before Clara Brugada came to power in Iztapalapa in 2009. She introduced at least two programmes for participatory budgeting.

Overall, the paradox of the social movements in Iztapalapa is that whereas alliances initially helped them to gain strength and autonomy, alliances have presently brought them into the same cycle of clientelistic machine politics. While the alliance with the student movements increased their bargaining strength, the alliance with party politics has subsequently reduced it.

The residents in Mayo also tried to arrive at negotiations with the government, but did so in a much more asymmetrical way than was the case in Iztapalapa. This can be largely explained by the role of the popular committees. People recounted gaining services in their area through so-called '*juhud-as-shaabi*', or 'efforts of the people'. In fact, it is in the official mandate of the popular committees to promote '*juhud as shaabi*' among the communities for development initiatives as part of the government policy of self-help (Hamid 2001: 153). '*Juhud as shaabi*' essentially meant that respondents paid and organised the purchase of services themselves, before subsequently going to ask cooperation from the government to build water points, electricity or police stations.

Within the framework of the '*juhud as shaabi*', people recounted how they made demands to the government. In the early days, the demands of the residents were presented by the tribal leadership, although since 1989, when the current regime came to power, the representation of the communities vis-à-vis the government has been officially taken over by the popular committees. The engagement of the local communities with the government over services through the popular committees involved a lot of bargaining, as shown by the following example.

Box 11. Asking for services

One ex-popular committee member from Darfur in a planned area of Mayo recounted how his neighbourhood 'asked' for a permanent well through people in the government 'with good positions'. The government was initially reluctant to provide the well because a construction of more permanent infrastructure could encourage people to stay in the city. After the people through their popular committee had 'approached people with good positions in the government', the government eventually promised the well. However, this promise did not translate into material support but rather only permission, given that the community had to pay for the well itself or find other partners to construct it.

"In our case, the government promised us the well but it didn't keep its promise. It said we will do that for you but at the end of the term nothing had been done. Therefore, the popular committee had to use *their own relations or their own connections* with other organisations...The popular committee had to ask the organisations, the NGOs...We had a good experience with GOAL; they had an office in

Angola [name of a particular area within Mayo, ID]. And MSF Holland had an office in area 31. And at that time also ADRA was active in the area. We asked if they could dig wells because they had a water section for dealing with the camps. I was close to them because I had worked with a Dutch guy from MFS Holland before.”

When the inhabitants found an organisation willing to dig the well, they still had to gain official permission from the government. Therefore, the popular committee had to address a letter to the respective government office, in this case the water section, which had to be delivered to the locality. The locality first had to give permission for the NGO to intervene, before subsequent additional permission was required from the State Ministry of Mining for the digging of the well.

Furthermore, government cooperation was also needed for the maintenance of the well. The residents could choose from two arrangements: first, that the government would take responsibility for the maintenance and would consequently appropriate all revenues; or second, that the costs and benefits would be shared between the popular committee and the government.³⁴ The community opted for the first arrangement, fearing in the latter case that the costs would be incurred by the community while the benefits (consisting of the user fees) would remain with the popular committee.

Nowadays, many areas in Mayo remain unplanned and people are still ‘bargaining’ with the government over urban service delivery: based on their own contribution, people ask the government for permission and the maintenance of services. In the case that the government does not comply, the communities will not pressure with marches and sit-ins, like happened in Iztapalapa in the initial stages of urbanisation, but rather it will intend to persuade the government with the mobilisation of community funds or the voluntary abstinence from certain services in exchange for others. Respondents for example often referred to the sugar supply or sugar support programme.³⁵ With this programme, the government used to sell subsidised sugar to the communities based on household ration cards through the popular committees, in order to stimulate the sugar industry and prove people with one of their most basic daily necessities. The popular committees could sell the sugar below market prices and earn some revenues (Abdalla 2008: 107). However, many communities in Mayo abstained from the sugar donations – in order that it could be provided to other communities - in exchange for the purchase of electricity, for example. Reportedly another attempt for acquiring services consisted of pledging allegiance to the government by donating blood for the *jihad* in the South.

³⁴ Fieldnotes March 2010 and Interview 34, March 2010. Hamid writes that it is common that once services, like schools, have been established through *nafeer*, they are usually turned over to the concerned ministry for administration although the communities continue to pay for maintenance and operational costs (Hamid 2001: 151).

³⁵ Also see Abdalla (2008: 107, 120).

While I have not been able to find confirmation of this, reports on recruitments for the jihad have recently returned to newspaper headlines.³⁶ What becomes clear is that the popular committees were always central in each step of the bargaining process, controlling how the engagement would take place.

In Mayo, claim-making has rarely been confrontational. However, two well-known exceptions confirm the crucial role of brokers, and particularly the popular committees, in the claim-making strategies of the urban poor. Violent confrontations in Khartoum that have received much (international) newspaper coverage were the riots that broke out around the death of John Garang in August 2005 (“Black Monday”), as well as the violent confrontations around the forced relocation of people in Soba Aradi in 2008. As described in chapter 4, on Black Monday thousands of residents from the suburbs roamed the streets of Khartoum in revenge of the alleged killing of their leader. The demonstrators left a trace of destruction: many shops were burned and properties destroyed. In Mayo the building of the popular committee was set on fire, but its members were not personally attacked. In Soba Aradi, the police office was set on fire and eight police officers were eventually killed. The main object of people’s rage were the members of the popular committee (although I did not find out if they were also killed). According to respondents from both areas, the degree of violence – in particular towards the popular committee members – depended on the relation between the people in the neighbourhood and the popular committee prior to the incidents. In Soba Aradi, the popular committee was suspected of having cooperated in the planning of the forced relocation, and many of its members were not from the neighbourhood. As such, they represented the government who had urged the relocation in the eyes of the residents, who violently attacked them in person. In Al Wehda, the popular committee claimed that there had not been any physical attacks against its members because the members were from the area and knew all the people.

In sum, the brokers largely determined the negotiation tactics in both cities. In Izta-palapa, the community’s representatives are nowadays members of the government, explaining why the strategies of the urban poor vis-à-vis the government are less confrontational than previously. In Mayo, people initially approached the government via their tribal leaders but were now obliged to do this through their popular committees, in which their leaders were sometimes incorporated. The fact that many popular committees in Mayo were not independent from the ruling party naturally had implications for the bargaining position of the residents and their allies.³⁷ The residents of Mayo paid for most of the services themselves, either in financial terms or by conceding goods or support to the government. There were indications that when the interaction between the government and the urban poor turned violent, this also concerned the relation between people and their popular committees. The brokers were the constant factor within a plethora of negotiating tactics.

³⁶ BBC news, ‘South-Sudanese press ganged by rebels in Khartoum, 22 December 2011.

³⁷ There are also other differences between Izta-palapa and Mayo in the sense that the education level and politisation level is higher in Izta-palapa than it is in Mayo. Residents of Izta-palapa found important allies in the student movements in the 1980s and were much more conscious of their bargaining position based on their nuisance power. Nowadays they can make use of the competition between parties and their factions.

6.2 Government responses: in search for legitimacy and control

“Usually, *in areas where people are simple, people are easy to lead...*in more sophisticated areas this is much more difficult because people will argue with you. They will go over you”. (Hakim, 50, administrative unit Alnasr) ³⁸

This was the view of an official in the administrative unit in Mayo. In fact, government representatives in Iztapalapa argued exactly the same. Sergio (32), parliamentarian for the PRD *Nueva Izquierda* faction, explained the government’s political strategies in Iztapalapa in a nut shell by stating that the lower class has immediate necessities such as water, electricity and street pavements. According to him, it was much more difficult for the government to keep the middle classes satisfied, because they demanded more in terms of accountability, the development of laws and regulations, human rights, et cetera, and were much more conscious of their position. Therefore, keeping the popular classes satisfied related to the provision of services; however, this was not the only way in which both governments attempted to maintain their position. The remainder of this section deals with how the governments in Mexico City and Khartoum relate to the poorest sections of Iztapalapa and Mayo. I will explore the government strategies that set the cadres for the strategies of the urban poor, considering both so-called ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’. In particular, I will focus on three distinct issues: the way in which governments attempt to maintain legitimacy through vote-buying; the way in which they tried to control the community leaders or brokers; and the way in which outright repression determines the environment for the claim-making of the urban poor. Before commencing, it is useful to note that although they sometimes coincide, there is a distinction between the terms ‘government’ and ‘ruling party’. In Iztapalapa, different levels of government are occupied by different parties or factions. Although this section concerns government strategies, I am in fact discussing the strategies of the ruling parties that make use of being in charge of the government (and government resources).

Enhancing legitimacy: vote-buying

Vote-buying tactics in Mayo and in Iztapalapa were thus surprisingly similar. Every banner on the road drawing attention to a government programme in Iztapalapa features the following caption:

³⁸ Interview 54, March 2011

“This programme is of a public nature, it is not patronised nor promoted by any political party and its resources come from the taxes that are paid by all the contributors. It is prohibited to use this programme for political, electoral, material and any other purposes that are different from the ones originally established. Who make inappropriate use of the resources of this programme in the Federal District will be sanctioned in accordance with the applicable law and in front of the competent authority.”³⁹

These objectives reflect an expression of the PRD’s desire to curb the clientelist political practices in the Mexican capital city that have been the main mode of political integration for decades.⁴⁰ Following the change in government at the city level in 1998, expectations for democratisation were high. The department for Citizen Participation is actually working hard to foster democratic citizen participation, although this reality appears obstinate. Ten years after the PRD’s arrival in power, the way of doing politics still carries significant remnants from the past. The party leadership perceives itself as being faced with the choice of either participating in the game or risking losing it. Consequently, politicians, local leaders and inhabitants remain involved in a play in which government resources are being applied in return for political support. In fact, the democratisation at city level has rendered a reinforced competition between factions within the PRD, which was largely played out along the same lines as the old politics.

In March 2008, internal elections were scheduled to decide on the PRD’s candidate for the local elections in 2009. A few weeks before, all government programmes that distributed resources were put on hold owing to the fear they would be misused for political gains. Notwithstanding, allegiance had been assured far in advance. For example, a local neighbourhood leader at the bottom of the political hierarchy within one the *Izquierda Unida* described the most prevalent tactic currently employed by politicians and bureaucratic government representatives in Iztapalapa: organising groups of inhabitants and providing them with concrete benefits (household kits, excursions, activities, private access to public space) in exchange for participation in support demonstrations and votes when elections occur. She explained how the local government applied government resources conditionally:

³⁹ Article 38 of the law on Social Development of the Federal District. This statement is also to be seen on every banner that announces a project within the area of Iztapalapa.

⁴⁰ See for example, Cornelius 1975; Fox 1994; Davis 1996; Walton 1998.

“They will ask a copy of your voter ID, before doing anything... so that they can affiliate the people and then consider them as part of theirs, they add them to their register...[then, before elections] the borough comes [in the person of a contracted ‘*promotora*’], knocks your door and says: ‘you know what, you are part of the PRD and you have to vote on that day for that person’, so people will think: ‘ay, they came to search for me so that I vote that day for that person’ and they feel obliged, they wonder: ‘How do they know my name? How do they know where I live?’ ... they will go and vote because they feel that there has been an agreement because they have given their voter ID even if it was just because [the borough] was arranging they *lawn* ...”⁴¹

Whilst acknowledging that she would do the same for her own faction that controlled the city government, she argued that the difference was based upon the fact that she was educated not to exert pressure:

The borough forces people, they pass a list and whoever is not present does not receive his household kit or will be sacked from the group, in other words the borough threatens, this is the difference with us, those who have a concept of Clara Brugada and another type of person, for some reason I am with her ...”⁴²

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She explained that these tactics often targeted the elderly, who were perceived as an important political target because they still voted and had influence over the rest of his family. Therefore, the elderly were also often placed in brokerage positions by the government in order to deliver groups of voters. The following example illustrates how the elderly become politically involved.

⁴¹ Interview 77, 22 May 2008

⁴² Interview 77, 22 May 2008

Box 12. Controlling the elderly

Don Rafael is the leader of a group of elderly that was created by the borough and given access to benefits in exchange for political support, including direct response regarding the maintenance of services, household kits and excursions. He had also been given the key of a small public garden in the area where he lived. Although this garden on the corner of a street was officially a public space, Don Rafael was the only person authorised to open it for the public:

“...I have the papers signed by the territorial coordination unit and the borough of Iztapalapa...I am the one who is responsible for the opening and the closure...the one supporting us here is the borough. It gives household kits, excursions and everything one needs for the usage of the park [...] all the problems in the community are being dealt with by the territorial coordination unit [of the borough], they take care for example of broken (street) lamps, one tells them, they send a note and they send someone to change the lamp, these are the problems that exist in the community...they come to ask me for support in a meeting or something, they ask us to attend, but no other things [...] only in election times. Or for example when there is a gathering, when the *delegado* comes for example, they will tell us [...] we are practically affiliated to the PRD as a group, so they will constantly ask us for support for the candidate they propose.”⁴³

The government strategy of the exchange of services for votes does not only entail the conditional provision of services and social programmes, but also implies the denial of services to opposition areas. Several inhabitants of areas that were opposed to the faction holding the borough complained that they were purposely denied services by the territorial units of the government of Iztapalapa owing to political reasons. A local leader explained that governments were in fact reluctant to invest in opposition areas because this might increase the political support for the local leader.⁴⁴ As such, the factionalism within the PRD reflected a catch-22 situation for the government (satisfying the population by providing services could mean losing political support to a rival). This situation caused a certain fear and cautiousness among the inhabitants, as the following quote exemplifies:

“I was kind of afraid...for retaliations, not that much that they would do things to us but later on...well, this group of persons works more with the borough, so there are necessarily problems that they will take to the borough, [I am afraid of] that they are not going to make life very easy for you or in procedures...we are exposed to that there could be a delay or a denial of procedures because of the fact that you did not accept their ideas.”⁴⁵

⁴³ Interview 78, 20 June 2008

⁴⁴ Interview 39, 11 June 2008

⁴⁵ Interview 85, 12 March 2008

Negotiating Urban Citizenship

Therefore, the residents felt that the provision and denial of services was politically motivated, which in turn influenced their claim-making practices.

As far as Mayo is concerned, vote-buying also belongs to the repertoire of the government. The current government started to regulate the squatter settlement in the 1990s, with a local parliamentarian for the ruling party arguing that the government's increased interest in the area was to prevent the development of a criminal belt.⁴⁶ Another respondent argued that the main reason was that the government recognised that the increasing population could be mobilised politically.⁴⁷ The government started to regulate the area by assigning lots and clearing the roads. Indeed, the former governor of Khartoum state explained how he invested in areas such as Mayo:

“We spent 20 years urbanising Khartoum, everything is now planned. We did much for the IDPs. People may be poor but their locations are planned. The roads, water and electricity help them to open shops. There is security. We have 35000 teachers in Khartoum. We gave them plots for free and provided them with electricity. That is why they stay in Khartoum....The poor are sometimes 15 km from the city and people say it is desert, but the whole of Khartoum was once a desert and we transformed it into a city by creating roads, water and electricity”.⁴⁸

The construction of the necessary infrastructure for the provision of services was largely left to the communities, who built the boreholes, electricity poles and police stations themselves; nonetheless, they were dependent on the ruling party for permission. According to the residents, the provision of services was conditioned by support to the ruling party. In the words of an ex-popular committee member, “they [the ruling party, ID] will answer just like “you have to support our party and then – so I’m going to get services but of course [I have to do something in return]”.⁴⁹ People did actually pledge alliance to the regime: “In the first celebration of the *Al Ingaz* revolution⁵⁰, 35 busses full of people [from Mayo, ID] went to participate in the event.”⁵¹ However, it is difficult to assess whether these 35 busses are a true indicator for the popularity of the regime, given that many of the rallies are actually organised by the regime itself. As an NGO employee from a popular area expressed:

“In squatter areas people are being bribed for elections with carrots and sticks. The popular committees organise rallies...you will only find [rallies] in the ‘easy areas’ [where people can easily be ‘bought’].”⁵²

46 Interview 85, July 2011

47 Interview 28, March 2010

48 Interview 31, former Wali of Khartoum state, September 2009

49 Interview 34, March 2010

50 The first anniversary of when the current regime came to power, thus in 1990.

51 Interview 28, March 2010

52 Interview 64, March 2011

During the elections in 2010, there were NCP tents all over Mayo, handing out voter registration cards to people. Residents of the neighbourhood claimed that people – particularly women - were given rations of sugar for their families and others who they brought to register in the tents. My field notes read:

Underway to polling stations in Al Nasr we saw two NCP tents on the road where people were gathering. We met an acquaintance of ..., who jokingly commented that in these tents people were persuaded to vote for the tree (the symbol of the NCP), so that they could sit in its shadow.⁵³

Owing to more limited resources, the parties, including the ruling party, also had to resort to strategies other than vote-buying in order to win the elections, including controlling the voting process and preventing those who were not supportive of the ruling party from voting. In fact, the Rift Valley Institute identifies registration as one of the main weaknesses in the past few electoral processes in Sudan (Willis et al 2009). The registration process for the elections is controlled by the popular committees and native administrations, acting as witnesses in the distribution of voting cards for people who do not dispose of identity documents, which accounts for the majority of the rural population and many IDPs in the urban areas. In 2010, the popular committees were given a main task of identifying people during the registration, with an opposition member arguing that the popular committees play a role in election fraud in this way:

“The government put NCP people in the popular committees to control the people. They would cheat in elections, for example by having one person vote multiple times...democracy is difficult when people are hungry, you can just buy them with money”.⁵⁴

The ruling party also relied on the mosque committees and Ghalwas in Mayo for the mobilisation of people for elections. The Ghalwas are an ideal platform for mobilisation, as one Qur’an teacher in a Ghalwa indicated: “We had the idea to make an organisation but we did not do it yet because when anything happens in the neighbourhood they will send a messenger to the Ghalwa to ask for help”.⁵⁵ During the elections in 2010, many busses collected people in front of the mosques and transported them to the polling stations.⁵⁶

In terms of effects for the urban poor, one could say that the strategy of vote-buying has delivered results for the urban poor in both Mayo and Iztapalapa. The urban poor in Mayo have seen a number of their claims being responded to in the face of the search for legitimacy of the regime, with parts of Mayo now planned and people having land titles and access to services.

⁵³ Fieldnotes 15 April 2010

⁵⁴ Interview 63, March 2011

⁵⁵ Interview 84, May 2011

⁵⁶ Field notes election observations in Mayo, April 2010

The ex-popular committee member quoted earlier found that the people's strategies had actually been quite successful:

“So, we were trying to push the government...Yes it took a long time but we have got it. We now have a hospital, Al Bashaer Hospital in Mayo. It is not ... enough but it is better than nothing. When we asked for the water tank, at first it was difficult, but we tried, we tried going through the people who have the power, yes, you need a ... guy who can [push]...They will answer just like “you have to support our party and then – so I’m going to get services but of course [I have to do something in return]...Do you think we will always distribute this water with the donkeys? No, after the tank we will ask for a water network. That is the aim of the people. And the government also realizes: after years I am a Khartoum citizen. I won’t go back. They then say yes, you are allowed to drill a water tank but you are not allowed to do that ... We now also have the electricity...And certainly we have kept our aims...now everybody has the water in his house.”⁵⁷

Vote-buying and the threat of the withdrawal of services occurred in both Iztapalapa and in Mayo; although it was more clearly the dominant strategy of political control in the case of in Iztapalapa. This can be explained by the fact that power in Mexico presently centres more on electoral competition than in Sudan, as well as the fact that the government of Mexico City simply has greater resources to spend. For the practice of vote buying, both governments depend on brokers, relying upon them to organise people and deliver votes in exchange for services. The PRD factions in Iztapalapa worked through local leaders who were connected to neighbourhood organisations in some cases, as well as promoters and volunteers in others. In Mayo, the popular committees carried out the ‘political hand work’ for the ruling party by identifying people during voter registration (or removing them from the list of voters), organising transport to the polling stations and handing out concrete benefits such as sugar and tea. Therefore, control over these brokers was key for both ruling parties.

Controlling state society interaction: targeting the local leaders

In April 2011, four months after the start of the Arab Spring in Tunisia⁵⁸, the Sudanese government dissolved all the popular committees and announced re-elections in order to make the popular committees more inclusive of the opposition parties and particularly the youth. When I asked a representative of the ruling party and organiser of the popular committee elections in Mayo whether the re-elections had accomplished the objective mentioned by the vice-president, he responded: “Yes, we now have all the youth. This is *our* change; we are not like Syria, Libya and Egypt.”⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Interview 34, March 2010

⁵⁸ The Arab Spring is often said to have started with the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010 in Tunisia.

⁵⁹ Fieldnotes, popular committee elections in Mayo, May 2011

The re-elections of the popular committees in Mayo in May 2011 represent a clear example of the government's intent to control the local leadership.

In the coming paragraphs, I will focus on the efforts of both ruling parties to control the interaction between the different institutions of the state and the urban poor. This interaction is shaped by direct representatives of the government at the local level – who are not necessarily party members – and, as we have seen, also by intermediaries or brokers. I will first consider how both governments attempt to control the state bureaucracy at the local level and subsequently how they try to control the non-state intermediaries or brokers.

Controlling local government representatives

The first issue to explore is the way in which both ruling parties have attempted to control the bureaucratic institutions of the state. In 2008, the control of the PRD over the local state institutions in Iztapalapa was actually limited in several ways. On the one hand, this related to its internal divisions, whereby different party factions controlled different levels of government and were competing with each other; on the other hand, it concerned the remnants of the political past. In Mexico, around one-third of the government personnel rotate with incoming elected officials, to ensure the loyalty of the government workers to the incoming politicians. However, because the government of the borough is elected directly, the incoming staff that it brings along are not automatically loyal to the city government. In fact, in 2008 much of the staff of the borough had been campaign personnel for the *Nueva Izquierda* PRD faction, while most of the promotoras of the department for citizen participation had actually been campaign workers for Marcelo Ebrard and for AMLO. The different teams still acted in a mode of competition, although both levels of government were supposed to work in a complementary manner. The fact that different levels of government – national, city and local – were occupied by different parties or even different factions of parties complicated cooperation between these different levels.

Furthermore, most of the government workers of the central and local government are fixed staff that have served for years under the PRI and have vested interests in their dealings with outsiders,⁶⁰ thus rendering these state bureaucrats in a powerful position. Incoming officials faced many obstacles when entering a routinised patronage network, as illustrated by the following story of a former leader of Iztapalapa. Elio Villaseñor was the first PRD appointed 'delegado' in Iztapalapa in 1998 (elections were introduced at the borough level in 2000, after which the PRD has also held these positions in Iztapalapa), and was invited by Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas to carry out the agenda of the PRD. He recounted what he found when he arrived in Iztapalapa:

⁶⁰ Interview 40, 20 February 2008

“We can consider the budget of the borough of approximately 2000-3000 million pesos per year⁶¹ (that mostly comes from the central city budget; the borough has very little own income) as a cake of which the distribution of three quarters was already decided...they were supposed to be distributed according to [bundles of] organisations: PRI, PRD, Pancho Villa...when I arrived everything was already done, except for the fact that the PRDistas said that they were entitled to the largest part of the cake, because they had won the elections...”⁶²

He found that breaking this cycle of ‘clientelism and corporativism’ was extremely difficult owing to the resistance that he met from all sides. All layers within and outside the administration were engaged in informal arrangements concerning the distribution of the budget, from the workers union to the union of the water distributors. Deals were made concerning assignments and jobs, in turn for parts of the allowances or salaries. In Iztapalapa, clientelism and corporatism deeply penetrate into the local state itself. Therefore, Villaseñor and his successors tried to link the government as directly as possible to these citizens; for example, by inaugurating telephone numbers where people could deposit complaints. Notwithstanding, because of these standing practices of the administration, incoming governments saw themselves forced to play along in the game if they wanted to maintain power. The government actually had a limited grip on the state bureaucracy, which also made access for citizens in a new, non-clientelistic and complicated matter.

Considering the case of Mayo, by way of contrast, the ruling party has been in power for the last 25 years and is in firm control over the local administration. Its first action taken after coming to power was to install the popular committees as representatives of the people and as the lowest level of government in the territory. These popular committees were given central tasks: during the last two decades, the governance system in Mayo has been increasingly formalised in the sense of becoming ‘paperised’⁶³, with people required to put their demands in writing, through the popular committees with stamps from both the administrative units and localities. Consequently, they cannot work around the popular committees. The acting head of the local administrative unit put it as follows: “there is still personal contact [between the administrative unit and the population] but we have to ask people to put things in writing.”⁶⁴ The popular committees have replaced the traditional authorities as mediators between the communities and the government, while traditional authorities have been incorporated into government institutions, particularly in the security and justice sector.

⁶¹ The interviewee still talks in terms of the old Mexican peso. The new Mexican peso (MXN), introduced in 1993, is worth 1 thousand old Mexican pesos (MXP). The amount of 3 million new Mexican pesos is now worth around 240,000 USD.

⁶² Interview 56, 6 May 2008

⁶³ The judges of the city court made the argument that they would treat cases in the first instance ‘informally’; i.e. ‘without papers’. Interview 69, April 2011.

⁶⁴ Interview 68, April 2011

Second, local state institutions are being kept weak. Most importantly, decentralisation efforts have not been accompanied with the real transfer of responsibilities and the resources needed to carry them out. Other measures that have been taken again correspond with Migdal's description of 'the politics of survival' intended to ensure the survival of the ruling party.⁶⁵ Mandates of different institutions are unclear and overlapping, with confusion among different government institutions and their functionaries concerning their roles and mandates. Furthermore, many tasks have been outsourced to non-government institutions, further adding to the confusion about responsibilities. Finally, personnel in the local administration are seconded from higher levels, often directly appointed by the state government and rotating frequently. The commissioner is appointed by the Wali himself, and is mainly engaged in political mobilisation rather than day-to-day operational matters (Hamid 2001:147). In fact, the longest serving officer in the Administrative Unit in Mayo had been there for only nine years. Therefore, Abdalla notes that the state remains the main power broker at the local level (Abdalla 2008: 104).

The rotation of personnel, combined with the fact that they do not come from the area, also prevents the local administration from developing strong ties with the community, which are generally believed to help safeguard the community's interests. The fact that most government officials were not from the area and, more importantly, not from the same ethnic background as many of the inhabitants⁶⁶, also led to the persistence of prejudice and stigmatisation among government officials over inhabitants. For example, one of the health inspectors in the administrative unit held the opinion that the public health situation would improve after the separation of the South (and the departure of the Southerners), given that many of those people had bad hygienic habits. He said to my translator that that "these people do not use toilets".⁶⁷ He did not mention that people in the unplanned areas did not *have* sanitary services at their disposal, not in the streets, let alone in their (improvised) houses. Government employees also suggested on countless occasions that the poorest people did not want to let their children go to school because this was not in their culture⁶⁸, despite interviews with poor Nuba communities indicating that people did want to send their children to school yet simply could not afford it.⁶⁹

Therefore, the precise issues that prevented the ruling party from controlling the local state institutions in Iztapalapa – elected officials at different levels of government who could appoint their own staff loyal to them, and relations between local level bureaucrats and local interest groups – were not applicable in Mayo. In Iztapalapa, local state institutions had much more autonomy than was the case in Mayo.

65 Migdal (2001: 71-84). He specifically mentions the replacement of officials (the big shuffle), non-merit appointments and overlapping bureaucratic competencies.

66 The representation of Southerners and other ethnic groups, not only in politics but also in the administration, has in fact been a main issue in the different conflicts between center and periphery. The power sharing agreement of the CPA therefore includes stipulations about the incorporation of Southerners in the civil service.

67 Interview 55, March 2011. He asked my translator not to translate this to me, because I could perceive his remarks as racist. He was thus aware that his views could be perceived as such.

68 Interview 81, April 2011

69 Interview 53, March 2011 and interview 75, April 2011

While the control of the ruling party in Mayo was also limited, this was merely due to the limited availability of resources and its subsequent dependence on external institutions such as NGOs to provide basic services to the population. Therefore, both governments maintained an interest in controlling authority bearers outside the state institutions.

Controlling brokers

In his study on Mexico City, Ward (2004) identifies three dominant mechanisms of control applied by the PRI during the period of one-party rule: clientelism, divide and rule and the moulding of popular ideology (Ward 2004: 353). He argues that these strategies were insufficient to counter the rise of autonomous popular movements and halt the change towards political opposition (Ward 2004: 485). However, in Iztapalapa in 2008, the social movements themselves were incorporated into new forms of clientelism. While the space for social organisations was relatively large, the different parties and factions within parties recognised the strengths of the social movements and attempted to capitalise on the neighbourhood organisations in their electoral strife. An authority strategy of control that was frequently mentioned in interviews was the co-optation of (small) local leaders by party representatives holding government offices, particularly through employing them. This represented a successful strategy because many of the urban poor are in need of jobs. In different areas of Iztapalapa, the neighbourhood organisations mentioned that former friends had accepted jobs in the borough and were used to provide information about the neighbourhood strategies. Furthermore, the *promotoras* also supported the ‘delegado’ because they hoped to work for the borough one day:

“[the idea of those people is] that they will continue, that he will accommodate them, that they will be his bodyguards or anything of that kind, but they have in fact more years of working with him than I have [in this work] and for anything that he doesn’t like, he will just replace them”..⁷⁰

The co-optation of leaders and members actually caused splits and tensions within communities, consequently weakening community organisations. This was reinforced by parties’ attempts to ‘infiltrate’ and thereby control representative organisations of citizens, particularly in relation to specific projects and programmes. For all the programmes implemented by the department of citizen participation, administrative and oversight committees had to be formed. Respondents reported that a common current strategy of particularly the borough of Iztapalapa or the *Nueva Izquierda* (but most probably the same happened the other way around) was to send people who were not from the areas to participate in the meetings and vote for certain candidates who were known to be loyal to the borough.

⁷⁰ Interview 77, 22 May 2008

“So when the [department for citizen participation] organize[s] the gatherings, the political current brings additional people to the gathering [in addition to its affiliates within the community itself]. You more or less know who belongs to the community and you realise that those people are not from here and that they...auto-nominated themselves to pertain to this committee of [colindancia y queque]... Now this is generating a little bit of fear because there was much anger on their side, it was not only within the same party but there was another party as well, the PRI, so there are days when there is a bit of fear, that day for example that they protested and asked whether we were actually taking care that the resources would be spent on what they were intended for.”⁷¹

This also happened with the more general citizens committees (‘Committees Vecinales’), given that they had not been renewed in the past eleven years despite that they were supposed to be re-elected every two years. Therefore, increasing inter-party competition lead to increasing tensions and splits within communities in Iztapalapa, leading to the weakening of their bargaining position rather than more autonomous participation.

Just like in Iztapalapa, the Sudanese government and the ruling party in particular divided communities by co-opting leaders and infiltrating representative bodies of the population in Mayo. The first efforts targeted the native administration, with the government attempting to ensure interventions happen when needed through nominations of people among the traditional leadership (the ‘third sheikhs’), and that the claims of the inhabitants are mitigated. As described earlier, the broker role of the native administration during the urban planning process has been largely substituted by the popular committees, which are supposed to be elected by the residents of a particular area. However, as previously mentioned, the committees are not entirely independent. In various interviews, people claimed that representatives were nominated or installed by the ruling party. How did this happen in practice? I attended some of the elections of the popular committees in May 2011.

Box 13. Popular committee elections

In April 2011, the government announced that all popular committees were dismantled and new elections were to be held in order to include more opposition parties and particularly the youth. I was allowed to attend a few of the elections in Mayo and accompanied the government officials responsible for the organisation. The election rules were as follows: residents of a particular neighbourhood could either vote for individual candidates who nominated themselves (with one supporter) during the public gathering in which the committee is supposed to be elected, or they can vote for a list with candidates, also with one supporter.

⁷¹ Interview 85, 12 March 2008

There are 15 names on each list (including 3 women) and 5 'reserve' candidates (including 1 woman), in case people object to the presence of a particular person on the list. The lists are composed by people in the area, but this happens in a way that is fully non-transparent. According to the organisers of the elections, there was no prior public campaign for these elections.

During the election meeting that I attended, three lists were presented and no individual candidates nominated themselves. The traditional leaders were sitting up front and acted as supporters, but three young men presented the lists. One of them complained to the organising committee about the presence of outsiders during the meeting, as he wanted to ensure that the people who are going to be elected are from the neighbourhood. The chair argued with him and asked if he could identify the people who are not from the neighbourhood. He could not, and with that the discussion was over (in order to be a member of the popular committee, one has to have lived in the neighbourhood for 3 months according to the law).⁷² The list that was presented by a young man with a shawl of the ruling party around his neck won with an absolute majority.

Therefore, the nomination of candidates is fully non-transparent and although the communities have a say in the elections, the organising committee did not appear to be particularly neutral.

Socially active residents of Mayo were often invited to participate on behalf of the government (co-opted), as happened to Addawea, the leader of the Sudan Women Union, or Am Brema. A teacher in the area recounted about how the ruling party tried to get him on board after he had engaged in a political discussion at the university and mobilised some of his fellow students:

“We started like a mini-revolution, we went to the office of the students union, then to Al Nileen University, then to Khartoum University and then even to the Islam University. Security officers threatened me, they put six guns against my head, but I was lucky because the guns were not loaded. Three days later I went to the University and three security men took me with them in their car, they offered me good food, we watched TV together and we chatted. They promised me a house, a car and a wife if I would join them. I refused the offer(s) and said that I was not interested in politics but that I had gotten angry about what I had heard. I said that if the party wanted people to speak on its behalf in public it should educate them so that they wouldn't talk nonsense.”

⁷² Fieldnotes Popular Committee Elections 25 April 2011

The aforementioned respondent did not respond to the invitation and actually joined the Umma party. When ‘leaders’ did not want to join the ruling party, such as the teacher quoted above, yet had too large a support base to simply be ignored, they would be ‘allowed’ to participate in a local popular committee. However, given that the ruling party controlled the entire government bureaucracy (and to a large extent the state parliament), their further career options would be limited. This was the reason that the abovementioned respondent subsequently founded a private school.

The Sudanese government’s lack of resources places a serious strain on its ability to control. Much of its resources go to the armed struggle in the rest of the country, which actually also presents one of its limits in Khartoum. Therefore, it is relatively tolerant towards those – autonomous – initiatives that do not pose a threat to the regime. This is mainly the case in the economic field; for example, the donkey cart association successfully negotiated with the government to reduce the costs of the license fees, although this meant that the government would actually earn less income. According to the secretary of the donkey cart association in Mayo, the government is also reasonable:

“The association had written a request to the license office in Al Kalakla (Jebel Awlia) locality regarding the fee, and explained why it was too high. Then we went back to the administrative unit with a new fee. Every year it became less until it was 75 SDG. Logic convinced the authorities: rickshaws and the water net are posing competition to the cart owners, so they make less money. They used to collect 30-40 SDG per day, now it is only 15 SDG. We invited the government for field visits, so they could see with their own eyes. We started from the borehole locations and checked the water carts, the passenger carts and so we convinced the authorities.”⁷³

The rickshaw drivers and informal street vendors are also to some extent tolerated even if they operate outside the margins of the law, because the government knows that people’s bottom line is their daily income. The government clearly bears in mind that the Sudanese people had previously taken to the streets owing to economic hardship, which in both cases led to the fall of military regimes.⁷⁴

The government was usually also tolerant towards initiatives that fulfil a need that it could not satisfy itself. For example, anyone can start a private school in Mayo, which would subsequently be officially recognised by the government. Even churches that fell outside government criteria have been allowed to build schools admitting pupils. Indeed, I have already argued that one of the government strategies in the delivery of services in the 1990s was the promotion of self-help initiatives, owing to a lack of resources. The government also tries to distribute as much as it can through proxies; for example, Islamic NGOs are considered strategic allies.

⁷³ Interview 43, February 2011

⁷⁴ The Abud regime fell after the October Revolution in 1964 and the Nimeiry regime after street protests in October 1985 (Collins 2008).

Mosques are a public good in Mayo, and their construction is sometimes financed with public money. They represent an important object of government control given the ambitions of the regime to form an Islamic state. Several foreign Islamic NGOs are active in the building of schools and mosques in Mayo, forming an important support base for the government. Churches were also allowed to provide services such as schooling and health care to the IDPs, even prior to the signing of the CPA. However, the government remained in strong control in all such forms of organisation through the popular committees, which are supposed to monitor the Parent Teacher Associations in schools, religious organisations and those active in service provision. In practice, members of the popular committee are often also members of the PTAs, mosque committees and project committees for specific development initiatives. It is virtually impossible for anyone active in the area to work around the popular committees. The government was not tolerant towards political opposition and distrusted ethnic associations other than its own. It distinguished between loyals and non-loyals based upon ethnicity and as such 'combated the ethnic with the ethnic', in the words of Al Zain (2008).

The comparison of Iztapalapa and Mayo in relation to this second point (the control over institutions of citizen participation) highlights that both governments generally make use of the same tactics, albeit in different degrees: co-optation (and nomination) of leaderships and the infiltration of strategic organisations. From the analysis of strategies to control the local state and the organisations for citizen representation within society, it becomes clear that both governments place great effort in controlling the brokers between the state and, through them, organised groups in society. However, one important difference is that different levels of government in Iztapalapa are in competition with each other, and both have the resources to buy off the loyalties of brokers, whereas in Khartoum the ruling party that controls all government levels faces the challenge of limited resources,⁷⁵ and therefore has to rely more on external allies with resources, such as international (Islamic) NGOs. Its other option is to rely more on repression, which is the final government strategy that I will discuss.

Repression as an ultimate resort

In Mayo, (potential) political opposition is harshly repressed. Repression is targeted at the opposition parties, anti-government NGOs and rebel movements alike. Opposition parties are not allowed to have offices and anti-government NGOs are strictly controlled in their activities.

⁷⁵ Al Zain (2008: 6) notes that in the 1980s it already became clear to the Nimeiry regime that control could not be achieved by the promises of economic development or a pan-Arab ideology, particularly in the face of the presence of so many IDPs in the capital; the main reason for which it embraced Islamism and Sharia as an ideology.

Box 14. Limits to NGO operations Khartoum

According to the director of a national NGO in Khartoum, there is a significant basis for community organisation and mobilisation in the city; however, the difficult part is the formalisation of this potential: “Most difficult is not to organise communities but to register with the government. The government is afraid that [particularly] the IDPs will be organised and wants to keep them scattered”. He explains that one needs to be registered for all forms of activity: without registration, an organisation cannot open a bank account to receive funds, or install communication modalities such as a telephone line. While this is easy for organisations that work in line with the government, others have to account for every single one of their actions. For example, his organisation has to ask permission for every field visit it undertakes within the city, specifying the purpose of the visit. He concludes: “We don’t have free space. We have to fight in these kinds of countries, but we cannot confront directly because we will be closed down.”⁷⁶

One of the organisations that had easy relations with government institutions was the Al Huda development association, founded in the area by ex-government workers (mostly ex-military) in 1995. These people had been scattered all over the country during their careers but knew each other from their education in Khartoum and moved to Mayo because they had relatives there (area *wahid-wa-talateen* was first organised for government workers under Nimeiry). They felt the need for urban services for themselves and the other inhabitants of the area. The organisation survives on membership contributions and private donations, mostly from friends in Kuwait and Qatar.⁷⁷ In the case of this organisation, the director had significant power in the neighbourhood and operated in close cooperation with the government. In his own words: “The government makes it easy for us because they know where we live and what we are doing. I also depend on my personality and the rules of the department for collaboration.”⁷⁸ After our meeting, I had a separate discussion with two Nuba tribal leaders who were also part of the organisation’s board. The directors’ assistant wanted to be present during the meeting, when we exchanged telephone numbers with the Nuba leaders and I found out that both worked in construction in Khartoum. After the meeting had ended, he told my research assistant that if we wanted to meet the tribal leaders again “we had to come through the same way”, namely through the organisation rather than approaching the leaders directly.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Interview 72, April 2011

⁷⁷ Interview 50, February 2011

⁷⁸ Interview 50, February 2011

⁷⁹ Fieldnotes 19 February 2011

Direct interaction with (parts of) the citizenry also has a repressive character. For example, urban planning has often been characterised by the forced relocation of – mainly IDP – settlements,⁸⁰ some of these relocations are far away from the city centre. The standard argument of the government was that relocations were needed for urban planning and the delivery of services; moreover, the side effect of tribes becoming mixed as a result of forced relocations was considered as something ultimately positive by the government and opposition alike.⁸¹ However, several academics have stressed that the relocations were not conducted according to international standards, and that demolitions and relocations should be considered in relation to the economic interests of the ruling party, given that the prices of land in central Khartoum have risen dramatically over recently decades (Jacobsen 2001: 86; De Geoffroy 2007). The then Wali of Khartoum indeed stated that the land prices in one of the most expensive parts of the city had doubled in six months. Land prices in Khartoum varied between 1 and 1500 SDG per square meter in 2009 (between 0,30 and 500 USD at the time).⁸² Others mentioned the political dimension of the squatter settlements, hinting that the squatter settlements have always been sealed off during coups d'état, because the poor – and the IDPs in particular - are commonly seen as rebels. In terms of the effects, they argue that the IDPs have lost their community structures and leadership several times (Jacobsen 2001).

Another form of repression directly affecting community organisation is the omnipresence of the security service. This intransparent and publically unaccountable security service severely undermines the rule of law. In the wake of the civil war, their power increased to a maximum. Most NGOs also cannot enter the camps without asking for permission. If they did not comply their registration could be revoked and they could be forced to close down. The next passage from an interview with a Darfuri resident from Mayo recounts how the system is perceived by the local residents, from his experience:

“It is just like to organise people from A to Z. In the popular committees there are security members! They can write on forehand with the government and we have seen a lot of people from our popular committee who have been taken to jail! Just they can one day, you can get a [visit] to your house, and you can be taken with the security!... Because he on forehand knows, that guy is from communist party and that guy is from the other party. Yes, the parties were there before they came....Still their families are there...Sometimes, people are having a meeting, let's say, from M's house, negotiating about their party. And what we have to do for the elections, for the country, for the future. Then, the government says oh, they are trying to do things... They can beat him up. Especially the leaders from the other parties.”

80 Evictions of squatter settlements have also been common practice in Mexico between the 1950s and the 1970s (Cornelius 1975: 31).

81 Interview 63, April 2011.

82 Interview 31, 1 September 2009.

One reason for arresting people is that they engage in opposition activities, which also explains why there is such little open opposition in Khartoum. Furthermore, they are suspected from supporting the rebel movements in various parts of the country, as illustrated by the following quote:

“Especially like what is going on now in Darfur. If you have seen... like the people who were fighting in the South, they get finance from their own people who are in Khartoum. They are getting money and send it to them during the war time. The same things have been done whenever there is a war, whether it is in the West, or in the North, or you see...Darfurians, they have to support their people. Which means you support them, either you send them money, or you can get...collect hands. Ok? And if it had been discovered with the security, these people has to be taken to the jail and that’s why you can see a lot of Darfurians are now in the jails. This is one of the difficulties also we have because, we are coming from somewhere and we must have...[a loyalty] yes, and that is also the concern.”⁸³

This inhabitant argued that the government also makes use of brokers and proxies for its divide and rule policy for security purposes, like it does in other areas of the country⁸⁴:

“Again also sometimes we have like the same tribal system problems as in Darfur. Here in Khartoum. Like the government is going to use one of the tribes against the other. Like let’s say...the government in Khartoum is going to use the Arabs who came from Darfur against the people who are here. Like,...in the popular committees, we are dealing with the Arabs. Ok? They, the Arabs don’t like that tribe which is from the Fur tribe. They can just whisper to the ear of the government that they are supporting the rebels. And I can be taken somewhere. Why, because...they are using it with the politics they can do everything. Ok?”⁸⁵

Several residents and NGO activists argued that these security strategies, particularly those of infiltration and co-optation, severely affected the trust between and within communities, and even between families. The arbitrary arrests of suspected rebels, opposition party members and human rights activists that are regularly reported by organisations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW 2009: 8) and Amnesty International⁸⁶ add to a general feeling of insecurity that virtually paralyses people in the area from forming strong organisations.

⁸³ Interview 34, March 2010

⁸⁴ See for example Small Arms Survey – Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Allies and defectors: an update on armed groups integration and proxy force activity”, Sudan Issue Brief, No. 11, May 2008.

⁸⁵ Interview 34, March 2010

⁸⁶ These reports point at the fargoning power of the NISS to arrest and detain individuals without judicial oversight up to four and a half months, based on the National Security Act (1999, amended in 2009).

The threat of being “PNG-ed” (being declared a ‘persona non grata’, meaning being expelled from the country) also prevents foreigners from doing anything against the will of the government. Indeed, this reflects a very effective and relatively cost-efficient means of maintaining security.

Political opposition in Iztapalapa was not faced with such significant repression, but predominantly with the strategies previously mentioned: vote-buying and divide and rule through the co-optation and nomination of leaderships. This can be attributed to the fact that the main political opposition in Iztapalapa consisted of the ruling party’s own ranks. However, Iván recounted that police repression in Iztapalapa had also become less over the years: “distrust in the police is more caused by their incapacity and their corruption or inaction than by fear for repression.”⁸⁷ The main form of ‘*mano dura politics*’ that the residents faced during my time of research were the ‘*operativos*’ executed by the Mexico City government against local appearances of organised crime⁸⁸, which targeted informal street vendors indiscriminately such as during the operation in the El Salado market.⁸⁹ Like the distribution of urban services and social programmes, security was also used as a ‘chip’ in the electoral struggle, with representatives of different parties distributing and withholding security elements according to the residents’ political loyalties.

“Yes, we as an organisation asked it because it was the duty of the borough here, the borough had to put security but it never wanted to, in the entire colonia and the park, it had the responsibility to send the patrols inside, that the police would go in, but they never did, they only pass outside, in the streets, so we asked that they would come inside like now that they are here permanently and when they see anything they talk to their colleagues and they come, but that is not from the borough, it comes directly from the central government.

[Does the delegation send patrols to other areas?]

Yes because they do have patrols, that is why there are political conflicts between them and of course they have a lot of budget, they also have received [a budget] for security and it did not comply...they don’t do it, where those resources go, where they are, I don’t know where they apply them but you don’t see anything in terms of services.”⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Interview III, March 2008

⁸⁸ As Villaseñor, former head of the borough, indicated, most of the government actions were targeted at local expressions of organised crime such as the vending of illegal goods and local drug use, because for the big guys ‘major intelligence was needed, that the borough did not have’.

⁸⁹ Interview 22, Human Rights Commission of Mexico City (CDH-DF), 22 May 2008

⁹⁰ Interview 104, San Miguel Teotongo, 25 February 2008

In fact, the security department of the borough stated that the main basis for their decisions concerning the deployment of their own police forces (which are few in numbers) is the “needs of the residents”.⁹¹ However, these are naturally broadly interpretable. As a local police commander argued: “They [the politicians] have discovered that security is ‘*el major gancho*’, or a lucrative business”.⁹²

Overall, a whole array of mechanisms of political control have been employed by both governments, including providing carrots through vote-buying, controlling brokerage by nominating or co-opting leaders and infiltrating organisations and using sticks (mainly in the field of security). In Iztapalapa, vote-buying and the co-optation of leadership were dominant strategies of control, whereas in Mayo there was more direct nomination of leadership figures, with the government relying much more strongly on repression. Many strategies were mainly targeted at community leaders who (potentially) acted as brokers. Are these brokers mainly instruments between the residents and the governments? Alternatively, do they have some room for autonomous manoeuvring themselves? I will explore this issue in the final section accordingly.

6.3 “We are a governability factor”⁹³

In the previous sections, I have argued that the interaction between state and society in both cities largely went through brokers, or community leaders that held double functions, either as politicians or government representatives. Despite all of the differences encountered between Mayo and Iztapalapa, this presence and the functioning of brokers was strikingly similar. In both Mayo and Iztapalapa, I came across so-called informal power holders who simultaneously held different positions. For instance, they were community leaders or representatives, yet at the same time had a linkage to the party leadership. In chapter 5, I already introduced the brokers, pointing out that most came into their position based on social activism. Indeed, many of them started as organisers of public services and later developed further within the political system. In the following paragraphs, I will explore how they actually manoeuvre and exercise the practice of brokerage, describing how they maintain their power base and engage in mediation in both cities.

Acquiring and maintaining a power base

Residents of Iztapalapa indicated that their political loyalties were not fixed, stressing that they remained independent of the political parties and their currents despite their political alliances as members of a neighbourhood organisation. As one intermediate leader of the *Frente Popular Francisco Villa* stated:

⁹¹ Interview 57, 19 May 2008.

⁹² Interview 52, local police officer, 19 May 2008. Also see Müller (2009b).

⁹³ Expression of a local leader, interview 38, 30 June 2008

“Because we have certain conjunctures with sympathising parties but in the end we do not belong to them for obvious reasons, for example, if now the PRD is government we of course have to work [with them] and continue to do the petitions, when before it was the PRI we also had to work with them and when after this the PAN will be in power well, we will have to work with whomever is in power, it is not because they are from the PAN, PRI or the PRD that we will not go and ask, we have to reclaim with whomever is in the borough at that particular moment”.⁹⁴

Therefore, the power holders had to make use of a variety of strategies to maintain their power base. Like the government itself, they also have their own carrots and sticks. I detected several similarities in the ways in which brokers maintained their power base in Iztapalapa and Mayo, which mainly lie in the sphere of establishing personal loyalties, exerting violence and coercion and the monopolised distribution of resources, based on a mandate from within the government.

Establishing loyalties

As briefly touched upon in chapter 5, a politician has important social functions in both Mexico and Khartoum (Wolf 1966; Cornelius 1975; Pansters 2005). In Iztapalapa, they are commonly a godfather or mother of many children of their supporters.⁹⁵ The rural tradition of *compradazgo*, or co-ritual parenthood, remains omnipresent in Iztapalapa. These *compadrazgos* are usually organised around baptisms, but also around the *quinceaneros* (a celebration when a girl turns fifteen years old) that are common in the entire Sierra de Santa Catarina. A particular role is reserved for local neighbourhood and political leaders; they sometimes have over hundred ‘*ahijados*’ or godchildren among their constituencies, relations that closely tie them to the members of the community.⁹⁶

Furthermore, they also directly engage in the provision of services in their district. In Mayo, the leaders frequently have to pay for funerals and weddings within their constituencies, although this is less formalised. Some leaders testified of how they personally helped people, with the representative to the state parliament in Mayo explaining:

“There are also many personal needs such as jobs or a fund...The relationship [of the politician, ID] with the community is not based on money or education; it is based on relationships and things you are offering: people are very sociable. People usually nominate you socially and politically.”⁹⁷

94 Interview 37, 20-21 June 2008

95 During the 33rd anniversary of the Union de Colonos in San Miguel Teotongo I sat next to Iván, who tells me that Clara is the godmother of his daughter. I ask how many godchildren she has in the area. He replies that he thinks there must be about 150. Fieldnotes 22 June 2008.

96 For an elaborate description of ‘*compadrazgos*’ see Lomnitz (1971).

97 Interview 85, July 11

This personal engagement of the brokers also leads to emotional ties with the constituencies. A neighbour referred to one of the sheikhs as “a great man,”⁹⁸ while someone else said that he “[...] has ‘a gift of God to help people’, which is very special.”⁹⁹ These personal bonds between the brokers and their followers are similar in Iztapalapa, where people speak about their leaders as personal friends:

“Our friend Clara was deputy, we would have loved her to continue with us but she also has to grow, we love her so much, so much you can’t imagine, I love her a lot, she has like a precious angel, for me it is something special and I have one in my altar, in the time she was deputy, she was ‘consejera’ and she supported us so much, i say to her: my precious [hija].”¹⁰⁰

This is similar to the affective dimension of brokerage that Auyero (2001) describes. This personal engagement of brokers also generates certain expectations on the part of the population and a certain image of the government and leadership. For example, Don Pepe is disgruntled because he feels that he should have been rewarded by Clara for all his hard work over the years with a job in the Procuraduría:

“For example Clara in which department is she? An office in which she could have invited some when all politicians have their groups: let’s have a look compañeros so that we can accommodate you or find you [...] a place in other areas, well she doesn’t do that and that upsets me.” (Don Pepe, 60, worker)¹⁰¹

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The same happened in Cananea, where social movements were expected to offer ‘*chambas*’ (jobs). Where the brokers did not deliver according to these expectations, they potentially lost support. Useful resources to distribute change over the years: whereas process services were the most important ‘currency of political exchange’¹⁰² in the beginning of the urban planning in both Mexico and Khartoum, the needs of people have changed from housing to services, jobs and even ‘excursions’ for the elderly. Brokers in both cities have adapted to changing circumstances. For example, the Umma party in Mayo wanted to be in the market committee, because that is currently the most important one (“the neighbourhood committees have lost power because the services are there”); moreover, in Iztapalapa, the Pancho Villa have engaged in living space, and more recently also in the organisation of informal taxi drivers.

98 Interview 80, April 2011

99 Interview 42, February 2011

100 Interview 112, 18 March 2008

101 Interview 69, 16 April 2008

102 Term borrowed from Walton (1998)

When a broker rises in the political hierarchy and the support base becomes too large, they are no longer able to maintain personal contacts with all the constituents, with the brokers in Iztapalapa consequently disposing of entire organisations. Some of those were supported by their official functions: a parliamentarian in Mexico receives a budget to maintain offices in the district where they were elected, and a governor has a budget to pay ‘*promotoras*’. Silvia Oliva, Rene Arce’s wife, had 40 people working for her in her five *modulos*,¹⁰³ While Victor Hugo Círigo had 80 people working for him in Iztapalapa.¹⁰⁴ Clara Brugada contracted dozens of people from the UPREZ under the Procuraduria Social.¹⁰⁵ Cuauhtemoc Gutierrez had inherited a fortune from his father’s union of garbage collectors that he used to pay people from, and had family members working for him all over Iztapalapa.¹⁰⁶

Brokers not only need resources to pay people to work for them, but also to provide to their constituencies; whether jobs, access to services or government permission. While the latter can only be provided for by the government, direct cash flows can also come from other sources, such as organised crime. This is where we enter into the murky part of the grey zone.

Violence and coercion

Besides carrots, the local leaders also have sticks at their disposal. For example, all of the leaders in Iztapalapa were reported to dispose of so-called squat gangs. However, only in the case of Cuauhtemoc Gutierrez did I receive a direct testimony of someone who had been attacked by one of the squat gangs of his father, after having published an article about the ‘Tzar de la Basura’. Nonetheless, there were also many stories about the others (by the other side and independent residents). For example, Roberto recounts: “It is the politics of fear. Like to the lower levels ...For example, Clara Brugada, I don’t know her, but I know those who surround her. These are criminals.”¹⁰⁷ It is not clear to whom he precisely refers, but given the history of marches and violent demonstrations, this might have generated the image of a ‘rowdy’ constituency. Notwithstanding, a good friend of Clara confirmed:

“Cuauhtemoc Gutierrez has squat gangs, Alfredo Hernandez and the Pancho Villa have them too...Nueva Izquierda and the UPREZ also but less....Some groups still consider that violence gives them a better negotiation position towards the authorities.”¹⁰⁸

103 Interview 25, 29 May 2008

104 Interview 28, 22 May 2008

105 Interview 40, 20 February 2008

106 Interview 30, 14 May 2008

107 Interview 117, February/March 2008

108 Interview 56, May 2008

Sources from both the *Nueva Izquierda* and *Izquierda Unida* PRD-factions confirmed that the Pancho Villa often made use of violent tactics.¹⁰⁹ In particular, the Panteras (the informal taxi drivers) were considered as radical in their positions and aggressive in their methods (land invasions, for example). However, the leaders naturally deny direct responsibility. In the words of Victor Hugo Círigo, one of the leaders of the *Nueva Izquierda*:

“Of course in some instances there are things that go beyond our control because there are [*compañeros*] who most of all react when they are attacked, so they have engaged in fighting, so we say: let’s see [*compañeros*], let’s go to the authorities, let’s go file a complaint at the Public Prosecutor but we are not the ones who are going to engage in [*justicia por propia mano*], that’s bad, that’s how we always react, including to go and talk with the leaders of the other side, calm down, we should not hurt each other because in this struggle we have always educated or tried to educate our [*compañeros*]...”

Some leaders do that, they don’t do it themselves but they send people who would shout at you, so that you are attacked, we don’t do that, we know how to start it but we don’t know how it will end, it could end even in shout outs between [*compañeros*], we don’t share this approach, we are calm...we are too [*blandos*] because they are very aggressive, our opponents within the PRD...the groups who support Alejandro Encinas: the Pancho Villa, the ‘Bejaranos’, the ‘Panteras’, those of Dolores Padierna, the ‘Norona’, all those, they are a true criminal gallery, that is how they are described in the media, everybody knows that they are there to attack, you never know in what moment they will scratch your face because that’s the way they act, you can’t talk with them, they scream, they offend...”¹¹⁰

The different groups that he mentions are all supporting the main rival of the *Nueva Izquierda* within the PRD. The Pancho Villa belong to the *Izquierda Unida*; with the ‘Bejaranos’ Círigo refers to being followers of René Bejarano, a former assistant of AMLO who became involved in a corruption scandal in 2004. Dolores Padierna is his wife. With the ‘Norona’, he refers to the followers of José Fernández Noroña, who is known as pertaining to the radical wing of the PRD. The followers of the other factions accuse la *Nueva Izquierda* of the same.

However, it is difficult to assess the strategic aspects of the violence. First, a question that is hard to answer concerns the extent to which the leaders exert full control over their ‘workers’. For example, it became clear from the interview with Círigo that he was not fully aware of what was going on in the field, given that he did not even know about the replacement of his coordinator in Iztapalapa.

¹⁰⁹ Interview 28, 22 May 2008 and interview 38, 30 April 2008

¹¹⁰ Interview 28, 22 May 2008

Second, a distinction has to be made between aggressive and violent citizens and organised criminals. While there are many accounts concerning the presence of organised crime in Iztapalapa, from talking to the residents I did not get clear signals that the main power holders in the area actually derived their power and influence from illicit activities. Indeed, if these were public secrets, I was not made part of them. For many people in Iztapalapa, it was common to hold weapons. An employee of the Procuraduría Social, who had been threatened at gunpoint by the citizen committee in his area on the same day that I met him, said that this did not scare him because he was from Santa Cruz Meyehualco (one of the villages in Iztapalapa), where it was a tradition to walk around with guns. During festivities, people would traditionally use their guns to shoot in the air.

In Mayo, there were also rumours about the government paying the so-called Nega gangs during election time, in order force people to vote for the ruling party; however, I been unable to verify such claims during my research. It is not unlikely that (indirect) violence was used in the struggle for power by political parties. The Sudanese government and opposition parties are still engaged in an armed conflict, and they all have a long tradition in fighting wars by proxy.¹¹¹ It is also known that groups among the IDPs in Khartoum have switched allegiance over the course of the civil war.¹¹² In this sense, it is not unlikely that these tactics of conflict were also used in the city by both parties, to place pressure on the voters and the IDPs in particular. Notwithstanding, although the coercive aspects of broker relations should not be neglected, in general the position of the brokers was mainly reinforced in terms of their capacity to generate resources (services, licenses, money) for the communities they represented. In the next subsection, I will turn to how they actually did this.

The relative autonomy of the brokers

“If there weren’t so many of us, we are 100 or 200 leaders, Iztapalapa would be a powder keg without doubt, we are a governability factor, i.e. instead of people taking decisions in an anarchistic way they do so through the organisations...”¹¹³

This is a quote of one of the five most important leaders that people identified in Iztapalapa. As Wolf argues, brokerage is based on an agent connecting two sites without resolving their conflicts, because that would undermine his position (Wolf 1956). Vertical brokerage is based on the monopolisation of the relation between the government and people, with *El Camarón* (the schrimp) providing a clear example of these practices in Iztapalapa.

¹¹¹ Mostly tribal militias. See Johnson (2003), De Waal and Flint (2005), Collins (2008), Small Arms Survey 2008 and various International Crisis Group reports on Sudan.

¹¹² For example the Southern Sudanese Defense Forces or SSDF, who belonged to Khartoum after the Khartoum Peace Agreement in 1997, turned to the SPLM when Southern independence came in sight with the signing of the CPA and the demobilisation of the militias on both sides.

¹¹³ Interview 38, 30 June 2008

El Camarón is the leader of the eastern sector of Iztapalapa, the part that is known within Iztapalapa for its violent atmosphere. *El Camarón* was born in the area and acquired a leading role, like most of the others, through the provision of services. He has brokered many services for people in his area, although like the other leaders he also knows how to appropriate the successes of (different) government programmes. A ‘smaller’ leader in an area close to his recounts how this generally occurs:

“Often [the leaders] take advantage of government programmes, let’s say often the *Procuraduría Social* has a programme and they say that ‘thanks to that leader or [parliamentarian]...let’s say that if the *Procuraduría* starts building a kiosk, or to repair it, they [the *Procuraduría*] will invite all the people to a meeting but many people do not participate, [...] a good percentage goes, but no one will ask what happened during the meeting. So the people won’t know it is a government programme and that is when they [the leaders] take advantage, they put themselves in the committees requested by the *Procuraduría* [...] then they will go and do house visits and they will say ‘thanks to that person we constructed the kiosk’, or ‘we are going to paint it but we need your voter ID’, even when this programme belongs to the annual programme of the borough...so of these programmes they take advantage, there have been times when even Alfredo Hernandez has appropriated himself of programmes of the borough...”¹¹⁴

In fact, El Camarón was a political opponent to the faction in charge of the borough, given that he supported the *Izquierda Unida*. The fact that leaders such as El Camarón knew how to turn government efforts to their own advantage also explains why the different governments of currents within the government are so reluctant to intervene in areas of the opposition areas: not necessarily to punish the people, but rather because they are afraid that it will strengthen their political competitors. The brokers skim the political benefits of such programmes. As Clara Brugada said:

“The problem is that they [the *Nueva Izquierda* faction in the borough] think that everything they do for our *compañeros*, like for example, paving a street, putting a street light, etcetera, will give them [the *compañeros*] political strength and therefore they won’t do it, so we have had major fights with the borough, very, very ugly...”¹¹⁵

Some brokers such as El Camarón are skilled in playing the residents and particular government institutions off against each other in order to reinforce their own political (and financial) position, as exemplified as follows.

¹¹⁴ Interview 77, 22 May 2008

¹¹⁵ Interview 39, 11 June 2008

Box 15. Building monopolies

Edgardo from the Procuraduría Social tells me that he has once been threatened at gun point in the Ejército Constitucionalista. The issue was about 'tinacos', big tanks that people use to save water in. Given that this is not a public affair (the tanks are private, they are not shared between multiple houses), the *Procuraduría Social* does not have a role to play in the provision of the tanks. Notwithstanding, *El Camarón* had pulled a trick with the tanks, after having promised the neighbourhood to purchase the tanks. He had been given 800 tanks by the government, yet pretended to the residents that he had only received 400, telling them that the remainder were extremely difficult to purchase. He did later bring the other 400, but 'because it had been so cumbersome to get them, it would be good if the residents could buy them for a cheap price'. When the residents indicated that they did not have any money, he had said that they would have to wait until the next year, because then the *Procuraduría Social* would hand out the other 400. When Edgardo had to tell the residents that the *Procuraduría Social* never hands out tanks, he was threatened at gunpoint. He stated that these kinds of actions are undertaken by leaders to (re)generate political dependencies as well as private economic gains."¹¹⁶

220 To my surprise, I later discovered that this leader formed part of the Mexico City government. When I asked Edgardo whether these kinds of events complicate the inner-party and inner-governmental relations, he said that this leader enjoyed the protection of a high official in the city government. In fact, this confirms the existence of smaller tribus, even within the factions of the PRD, which are more important for explaining politics in Mexico City than institutional relations between departments. Furthermore, this also indicates the power of the local leaders or brokers in the face of the government. In fact, when I was waiting for an appointment in the Department for Citizen Participation one day, I learned that the employees were preparing for a meeting with *El Camarón*. They meet with him every week because it is the only way it can get access to the territory. Therefore, he seems to have acquired a reasonably comfortable position. Nonetheless, he argues his belief that the government does not sufficiently recognise the role of the local leaders:

"I believe there is no full recognition of the leaders, the leaders are not principal actors for the government, I mean all levels of government: municipal, local and state governments, there is still no acknowledgement of the image of the leader as this governability factor, instead he is seen as another intermediary, another demander of services and not as a basic interlocutor, therefore I told you that I characterise the local government (the borough) as a right wing government because it does

not incorporate the principle leaders who are governing Iztapalapa, if they were there their vision would be totally different because they know the origins of the trouble and you would have a discussion on the budget that would be more participatory, more adapted to the necessities and not only taking care of your heritage through political means”.

Despite several respondents stressing that Clara Brugada employed more democratic methods, in a way she was also confined to monopolising resources and relations between the government and residents if she wanted to continue participating in politics. She has initiated an entire “institution” within the area, monopolising relations between the inhabitants of San Miguel Teotongo and the government, with people having become dependent on her. One resident stated:

“Here first you have to go with Clara and she will refer you to someone else...it’s important because if the first one you visit doesn’t attend you it is difficult that the next one will attend you, that is a problem.”¹¹⁷

When the government programme of *Mejoramiento Barrial* was officially inaugurated in San Miguel Teotongo, Brugada sat on stage on behalf of the city government, together with the director of Social Development, who was officially responsible for the programme. She was the one who delivered a speech first, despite institutionally having nothing to do with the programme. However, several residents recount that she was actually the one developing the programme for the area, in her role as neighbourhood leader.

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Therefore, the city government does legitimise the position of certain brokers, either willingly or unwillingly. While the government experiences negative consequences of this factionalism in its daily work, it cannot necessarily change it. One argument is that political figures in the government benefit from the support of these local leaders. Furthermore, another argument is that the government *consists of* those same local leaders, which seems to have transpired in the case of the PRD governing Iztapalapa. Finally, there are some who argue that the government *has to work with* certain local leaders because it fears that the alternatives are worse.¹¹⁸ In any case, it becomes clear from the aforementioned examples that the brokers in Iztapalapa have a certain degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the city government. Although the *neighbourhood organisations* as a whole have lost autonomy by becoming incorporated into the ruling party, the *brokers* have strengthened their position by becoming part of the government. They have been able to reinforce their monopoly position between the communities and the government. Furthermore, owing to the competition between the different PRD factions that control different levels of government, brokers actually have a variety of political bosses between whom they can chose, which also enlarges their scope for action.

¹¹⁷ Interview 88, 1 March 2008

¹¹⁸ For example in order to keep organized crime out (personal information from Marianne Braig, 2012).

Indeed, this reflects a crucial difference between Iztapalapa and Mayo. Although the careers of brokers in Mayo also start with the provision of urban services to the population, they mainly operate under the control of the ruling party, which is actually the only one holding the resources that people seek. Tribal leaders in Mayo do have some degree of leverage because the state depends on them for the mobilisation of the communities for services and the delivery of votes; and the resolution of community conflicts. It is not easy for the ruling party to destitute a disloyal leader with a large community support base. Notwithstanding, the state controls the level of access of the leaders to the political system and its resources. Although people can approach the popular committees with any issue, the response received is largely dependent on the relation of its members with the ruling party. A representative of a faction of the Umma party that cooperates with the NCP stated: "It is not that we are not allowed to have an office, but we do not have the resources. We cannot afford it. The NCP has all the money."¹¹⁹ Furthermore, a female leader of the NCP suggested:

"All the problems in the area we raise it to the member of the area in the national board, we as responsible people in the NCP receive complaints from people, the SPLM has no role in the area they are problem causing".¹²⁰

222 The SPLM actually used to have the resources and permission to have an office in Mayo after the signing of the CPA, while the SPLM leaders in the IDP areas also gained access to significant support from the international community. However, at the time of my research, any leverage that they might have accrued based on these opportunities had since disappeared. An SPLM leader in Mayo expressed:

"We have chiefs, popular committees, church and Muslim leaders, intellectuals, CBOs. But all these people have the same problem: they have no money. Look at me: I am a chief. [There are] popular committees also, religious leaders. We need support."¹²¹

Part of the problem was that the SPLM did not invest in its constituencies in the North in the build-up to the referendum on Southern separation. The SPLM office in Mayo was actually closed a few months prior to the referendum, and the remnants of the SPLM were mostly busy with organising the return of their constituents to the South before the referendum took place. Those SPLM supporters that were to remain in Khartoum found themselves without any representation left, which implied that the residents of Mayo did not really have any alternatives other than the ruling party, and the same also counted for their local leaders.

119 Interview 80, May 2011

120 Interview 27, March 2010

121 Interview 75, May 2011

In chapter 5, I showed that the development of brokerage in an urbanising context is surprisingly similar in our both cases. In this section, I have showed that brokers also seek personal loyalties of their constituencies in a similar way in both cases, with carrots and sticks going hand-in-hand in the maintenance of power and control. However, one remarkable difference between the two cases was that the relative autonomy of the brokers was greater in Iztapalapa than Mayo. They could essentially choose whether to position themselves closer to the state or the residents (as was the case in the social movements). In some cases, powerful brokers were more representatives of the communities. By contrast, the most powerful brokers in Mayo were more an extension of the ruling party. I contend that this had important effects on the way in which citizenship of the urban poor was shaped.

6.4 It takes three to tango

When and under what circumstances do the poor use what kind of strategies? I have indicated that besides the obvious differences in the way that poor people claim their rights to the city in both Iztapalapa and Mayo, there are also surprising similarities. These particularly lie in the existence of a grey zone of overlapping functions and brokers within it playing a central role in the negotiation over public goods between the urban poor and the government.

First, it became clear that the way in which the poor perceive their best chances of acquiring access depends on their personal relations in both cases. The way in which they make claims always consists of a mixture of practices in which they use official and personalised methods interchangeably. In both Iztapalapa and Mayo, residents indicated that they presented written requests to the formally appropriate government channels whenever they wanted to achieve something. However, they would simultaneously also work on a 'plan B', which meant approaching 'influential people in the government', 'personal contacts' or politicians responsible for their area. In both cities, people were highly conscious of the importance of networks, as became clear from local expressions people used such as "unfortunately, we live in a country of *'palancas'*" (Mexico City¹²²), or "you need a strong back, otherwise you will be slapped on your stomach" (Khartoum¹²³). Accordingly, both formal and informal methods form part of a 'menu' of options for the poor, which are both used whenever deemed opportune and often simultaneously. In both Mayo and Iztapalapa, poor people's strategies were generally neither confirmational nor confrontational, with different strategies aimed at reaching negotiations with the government. Whether or not these strategies turned violent, or generally, whether they were successful, was largely influenced by the position of the brokers.

¹²² Interview 112, 18 March 2008

¹²³ Interview 52, February 2011 and interview 63, March 2011.

Second, both governments concentrated their efforts to maintain legitimacy and control over the popular neighbourhoods and squatter areas on their relations with the local leaders or brokers. Indeed, both governments were to some extent receptive to the claims of the urban poor. However, the government strategies in Iztapalapa consisted of providing carrots to a relatively greater extent, while in Mayo they consisted relatively more of using sticks. Both efforts usually targeted the brokers, who subsequently provided opportunities for the claim-making for the urban poor.

Third, considering the influence of the brokers themselves, it can be said that local leaders in Iztapalapa were relatively more autonomous owing to their choice between different political bosses. In Iztapalapa votes were 'delivered' to political factions through local leaders or brokers. The denial of services to groups of residents by political parties should be understood in this context: it was a reaction of the political parties to the existing practice of local leaders to appropriate the results of government programmes. Political parties were afraid that if they delivered services to constituencies of other parties or factions, then neighbourhood leaders aligned to that faction would successfully claim to be responsible. Given that all parties and even party currents are involved in electoral competition concerning state power, this threat affects them equally. This fits in the idea of competitive clientelism, in which the notion that brokers can carve out some space for themselves is essential. It is in this sense that even the leaders who genuinely aim to advance democratic citizen participation are faced with a prisoners dilemma,¹²⁴ because they cannot circumvent the brokers, who have thus altered the interaction between the state and the urban poor.

In Khartoum, brokers also performed double functions (community leader, NGO worker or religious leader and NCP member for example). Notwithstanding, they were more dependent on the ruling party for building up their position. Thus their room for 'political entrepreneurship' was much more limited. As discussed in chapter 3, the ruling party in Mayo is not all homogenous. It is not all-powerful either. Although it has gained control over most of the economic resources in the country, the ruling party needs to rely on self-help and community organisation. Particularly the traditional leadership is important in this respect. The lack of government capacity thus gives brokers in Mayo some room for autonomous action at the micro-level. Moreover, the confusion generated by the proper state structure with overlapping mandates and the existing competition between different instances of government, such as the line ministries and security service, also represented a resource for brokers. Bureaucratic in clarity and competition encouraged the residents to approach the government through people they knew, who could then build up a broker position. Notwithstanding, the political dynamics in Mayo left much less room for autonomous action of brokers than in the case of Iztapalapa.

¹²⁴ I call this a prisoner's dilemma because the 'democratically oriented' brokers (and politicians) fear to lose power if they play the game along democratic rules, as long as there are other brokers who do not respect these. These fears seem realistic moreover.

Divisions without the ruling party did not visibly translate into more autonomy for different local leaders in the neighbourhood. Although the SPLM gained official status through the CPA and even formed part of the government, it was unable to push brokers up the ranks of the political system to the same extent as the ruling party, and failed to deliver as many concrete benefits to its followers. In fact, the most powerful brokers in Mayo strengthened the grip of the ruling party over the area.

Therefore, I conclude that in both cases the brokers largely influenced how the claim-making strategies of the urban poor were shaped in the face of strategies for legitimacy and control by both governments. They did so in different ways however. Either they strengthened the government strategies (and reduced negotiation space for the urban poor) or they added a dimension to state-society interaction, thereby providing a (distorted) form of access for the urban poor to the government and its resources. In this case, the choreography of the interaction between the urban poor and the state was modified by a broker to such an extent that the broker made himself indispensable: it took three to tango.

The question then remains how these differences and similarities in the interaction between the state and the urban poor in Mayo and Iztapalapa can best be understood theoretically. How does the importance of brokerage within these two polities relate to the differences in regime types, and what does this imply for a theoretical understanding of the political mobilisation of the urban poor? This is what I will discuss in the final chapter.

7. Discussion: negotiating urban citizenship

This study is about the exercise of citizenship by poor inhabitants of megacities in a context of increasing urban informality. It focuses on the ways in which informality affects the interests, the resources and opportunities, and finally, the claim-making strategies of the urban poor in Mexico City and Khartoum, in interaction with the strategies of their respective governments. In this chapter, I will discuss the findings of the comparison of these elements in both cities. The chapter is divided into two parts, whereby I will first draw conclusions about the ways in which poor inhabitants of Mexico City and Khartoum claim access to public goods and services in their neighbourhoods, in the face of policies applied by their governments. My research pointed out that although brokerage was crucial in the interaction between the urban poor and the local state in both cases, it assumed different characteristics. Second, I will explore deeper into the theoretical implications of my findings and will reflect on what the differences and the similarities between Mexico City and Khartoum mean for our current understanding of the exercise of citizenship and political agency. Based on this study of contrasting cases I will argue that the model that distinguishes between authoritarian and democratic regimes for explaining different forms of political mobilization from below is too general because it does not account for similarities I identified between Mexico City and Khartoum. In order to understand the interaction between the state and the urban poor, we have to look beyond current theories that explain mobilisation strategies in terms of regime types. If we want to know how the exercise of citizenship by the urban poor unfolds, we have to take into account the hybrid character of the specific polity that includes the urban poor. That polity is characterised by the existence of a grey zone of overlapping spheres between the state, society and alternative authority bearers, which are connected to each other through brokerage. Current academic enquiry lacks an adequate appreciation for the power dynamics within that grey zone. I aim to contribute to filling that gap by introducing the notions of unipolar and multipolar brokerage.

7.1 Claim-making by the urban poor in Mexico City and Khartoum

Khartoum and Mexico City are contrasting cases in many respects. This was also reflected in my findings: I found two important differences in relation to the topic of this study. First, there are differences between Iztapalapa and Mayo in terms of the interests and subsequent political claims of both populations. As discussed in chapter 4, Iztapalapa is an 'advanced urban' area where most of the urban services are in place. Whereas the initial need for services in the neighbourhoods was so high that people organised for self-help activities and obtaining services from the government, the resident's concerns have changed over the years. In 2008, the residents of Iztapalapa were mostly worried about the quality of the services, particularly the availability and quality of water. Particularly in the outskirts of Iztapalapa, many people only received water twice per week through the general water network and it was of insufficient quality. Moreover, residents of Iztapalapa were also concerned about income and employment opportunities. Ordinary people

generally found that there were too few stable income opportunities in the surrounding area and that salaries did not suffice for living expenses in the area. This corresponds to data from the UAM-Iztapalapa, validated by the local government, suggesting that the borough of Iztapalapa fails to generate sufficient income for its own population. Consequently, many people have to work in other boroughs, meaning that they have to travel two to three hours a day between home and the workplace (with consequences for their family life) or otherwise work in the informal economy where the salaries are relatively low. Respondents also stressed that many migrated abroad. Finally, a major issue for many residents was the deteriorating security situation in the area. The perceived public insecurity essentially consisted of two elements: the fear of becoming a victim of criminal activities and the sense of not being protected by the state, *in casu* the police.

The situation in Mayo is different. For many residents of Mayo, access to land and housing is not yet secured, let alone their access to services and employment. Many residents in Mayo, particularly IDPs, do not have a formal status in the city, lacking identity documents, residence certificates or land titles. Their presence and livelihood opportunities largely depend on the tolerance of the government. Generally they are in the process of formalisation of land and tenure security, although for a significant portion of the population this process has already lasted for over twenty years without any success. The government does not provide services in the unregulated areas, which implies that many residents of Mayo depend on private arrangements for acquiring access to water and electricity. Moreover, once people have formalised access to land in Mayo, they still have difficulties in generating sufficient income. Most people in Mayo gain their living in the informal economy (as street vendors, cleaning personnel or construction workers), but generally these income strategies barely suffice to cover daily expenses. The common lack of income among Mayo's population also increases the access barriers to social services such as health care and education, which are generally provided for by charity organisations (NGOs and religious organisations), although they do raise user fees. Moreover, although the government is working on a generalised health security scheme, also in Mayo, many people do not have access to this scheme due to lacking the necessary income to organise the relevant identity documents needed for health insurance. In other words, poverty in Mayo is much more absolute than it is in Iztapalapa.

Public (in)security is also of a different nature in Mayo than it is in Iztapalapa. In terms of criminal activity (robberies and homicides), the area is relatively safe. The government predominantly defined security in terms of national security. Therefore, specific groups of people felt threatened by the authorities in the security field. IDP women engaged in illegal economic activities such as alcohol brewing or – supposed – prostitution were frequently arrested by the community police, which had to ensure the implementation of shari'a laws. Others feared the National Intelligence and Security Service, which checked on political opposition and presumed support to rebel groups in areas such as Mayo. Owing to their difficult relation with the police, people often relied on their tribal leadership for security matters.

Second, when considering the resources and opportunities for claim-making in both cities, one striking difference is the role of the state in service provision in the popular areas. In chapter 5, I argued that in Iztapalapa, the government is the most important provider of urban and social services, including security. There are private organisations active in the field of service provision, such as NGOs who often operate in combination with neighbourhood organisations (neighbourhood organisations regularly receive funds from national or international NGOs) or religious organisations in the fields of health and education. While private companies and individuals play a role in the field of security, the state remains the dominant actor in the field of service provision, including security.

In Mayo, the opposite is true. The reach of the state is limited, insofar as service delivery is concerned. Although the local government in the area retains the responsibility for all of the public goods and services that the residents claim, it lacks the capacity to deliver these services and cater for the needs of the population. This is why other organisations and individuals, particularly traditional leaders, religious organisations and development organisations, as well as small private entrepreneurs, play an important role in service delivery to the residents. In some cases, these other organisations are incorporated into government structures (such as the tribal leadership in the case of security), but they usually offer services within a regulatory framework set by the government. However, the state is very active in the field of security, with private actors not being allowed to operate in security provision. This means that the reach of the state stops at a certain point when it comes to service delivery, given that it lacks sufficient capacity to cater for the needs of the population itself. It concentrates on the function that is crucial for the survival of the state and particularly the ruling party. Therefore, I consider the operations of the Sudanese state in Mayo as what Migdal describes as 'survival strategies' (Migdal 2001).

The above suggests that both cases showed important differences in relation to two features generally considered as crucial for the explanation of political mobilisation, namely interests and opportunities. Therefore, one would expect that claim-making strategies of the urban poor differed accordingly. However, in terms of claim-making by the urban poor, I encountered surprising similarities between Mayo and Iztapalapa. Considering the practices of the urban poor, three important parallels can be drawn between both neighborhoods. In chapter 6, I discussed that first, the residents addressed their governments indirectly in both cases. The urban poor in both Mayo and Iztapalapa approached the government through people they knew personally, thereby contributing to the hybridisation of state society relations. Although residents of Mayo and Iztapalapa participate in elections and use the official channels for citizen participation, they will not do this without addressing the government simultaneously via their own representatives. In Mayo residents had to address the government through their popular committee, but first people would address their traditional leaders (who in some cases were members of the popular committees) or locally elected politicians. In Iza-

palapa, various possibilities have been created for citizens to address their government directly, through windows and módulos for citizen participation. Although residents do sometimes make use of these opportunities, they are likely to address the local leaders they know, either instead or simultaneously. By addressing those leaders, they are in fact often also addressing the government, because many of the leaders have joined the political party that took over the city government in 2000. They have either occupied posts in the executive or have become members of parliament, locally or nationally. Given that most of the leaders have retained their functions at the neighbourhood level as well (they are government executives and neighbourhood leaders, or parliamentarian and neighbourhood leaders), the boundaries between the government and the neighbourhood associations have become blurred. Based upon this double hatting of leaders, the relations between the authorities and the residents have a particularistic character. In both cities therefore, citizenship or the relation between the state and the urban poor was largely indirect and strongly mediated.

A second parallel in claim-making practices was that the urban poor in both Mayo and Iztapalapa made use of a variety of strategies or negotiating tactics, employing a mixture of practices to claim their rights to the city. Various claim-making strategies have been described within existing literature, ranging from clientelism and resistance to social movements, quiet encroachment and violence. I found indications of the existence of all such strategies in both Iztapalapa and in Mayo. For example, clientelism and particularistic politics were present in both areas. I did not find social movements in Mayo in the present circumstances, but in Iztapalapa they are not a given either. Social movements are much less a dominant mode of contestation today in Iztapalapa than they used to be. While the repressive character of the regime complicates open political opposition in Mayo, collective forms of claim-making for public goods and services do exist. Examples of 'quiet encroachment' can be found in both areas. Violent interaction proved rare in both cases, yet emerges when the interests of the residents come under direct attack. More importantly, I found that all strategies the urban poor employ are ultimately directed at reaching negotiations with the government. In Iztapalapa, negotiation used to be based on nuisance power, whereas nowadays they are based on political weight. In Mayo, negotiation took the shape of bargaining over the deliverables of the community and the state, whereby a community would deliver money, votes, blood or sugar in exchange for government services.

Figure 11. Differences and similarities in poor people’s practices

	Mexico	Khartoum
Differences	History of collective action. This used to be rather confrontational (but not any longer). Assertive language (to claim, citizenship rights). Presión-negociación. Open discussions about politics, presence of opposition parties (main strategy competitive clientelism)	The poor’s weight in negotiations (concession-negotiation), degree of repression, importance of traditional leadership and ethnicity, discourses (to ‘ask’ the government, no clear discourse of citizenship) (main strategy tit for tat)
Similarities	(Collective) self-help, negotiation, non-violence, fragmented state, personalistic relations, vote buying, brokerage	

A third, and in my view most important, parallel in the claim-making strategies of the urban poor was the sum of the two parallels mentioned earlier: brokers essentially decided which negotiation tactic was employed when. Put differently, the urban poor relied on the compass of their brokers when they navigated the grey zone. In Iztapalapa, the neighbourhood organisations had adapted their ways of confronting the government, given that their leaders now formed part of that same government for a specific political party and they could not give their party a bad image. The same government was to some extent sensitive to the needs of the residents in these particular neighbourhoods, but not necessarily more than the PRI had been before. The government had an explicit agenda of autonomous citizen participation, but in practice these programmes were run by (former) political campaign workers. In Mayo, the fact that popular committee members often formed part of the ruling party determined the way they channelled and responded to claims made by the urban poor. The lack of independence of the popular committees also determined the relatively weak bargaining position of the poor communities. Accordingly, the communities gave in significantly in their negotiations with the government.

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Figure 12. Differences and similarities in government practices

	Mexico	Khartoum
Differences	More resources (more carrots), less repression	Less resources, more repression (including forced relocation); stronger control of intermediary organizations such as mosques and NGOs
Similarities	vote buying, controlling the state, cooptation and infiltration in bodies of citizen representation, generating hope, brokerage	

According to my findings, government strategies reinforced the importance of brokerage in both cases. Both governments disposed of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ to maintain in power and both concentrated their efforts to retain legitimacy and

control over the role of brokers. Both governments demonstrated using the tactic of vote-buying during elections, although the Mexican government had more resources at its disposal than the Sudanese, while the Sudanese government made greater use of repression tactics. In both cases, vote-buying was largely conducted through the local leadership: the popular committees, imams and traditional leaders in Mayo and the neighbourhood leaders in Iztapalapa. Therefore, in between elections, both governments concentrated their efforts for retaining the support of the urban poor on the leaders. Both governments undertook several efforts to control the brokers, from co-optation and nomination of leaderships to the infiltration of community organisations.

How can these parallels – indirect claim-making, the plethora of strategies to choose from and the decisive influence of brokers regarding this choice - be explained in view of the differences that I mentioned earlier? How is it possible that claim-making strategies show similarities in cities characterised by such extreme cultural differences and such a different political context? I argue that besides the obvious differences, there were also important parallels between the interest, the resources and opportunities in both cities that warrant more of our attention and relate to the influence of poverty and urban informality.

First, although the concrete interests of the inhabitants differed in both cases, patterns of exclusion are similar: under the pressure of scarcity, access to public goods and services is not granted through public institutions; rather, it has to be negotiated by the residents on a daily basis. In both areas, the access of the urban poor to land and housing, good quality services, security and to a certain extent income opportunities (insofar as the permission of the government was required) is negotiable. The social status of both population groups is also comparable: the inhabitants of Mayo and Iztapalapa are both heavily stigmatised by inhabitants of the rest of the city and their governments. In Khartoum, inhabitants of Mayo are generally considered as rebels; in Mexico City, residents of Iztapalapa are generally considered as criminals. Both areas are important support bases for opposition parties: in Mayo, many IDPs support the SPLM, while Iztapalapa is a main political support base for the PRD (in charge of the city government but an opposition party at the national level). Although the causal relation between supporting an opposition party and lacking access to services did not clearly emerge through my fieldwork (are people excluded from services because they support opposition parties or do they support opposition parties because they are excluded from services? Both are probably true), what did become clear was that access to public goods and services was determined by processes of social in- and exclusion that had important informal components.

Second, I also observed important parallels in terms of the hybridity of political opportunity structures in both areas. In both Mayo and Iztapalapa, state institutions, political parties and various non-state actors (community organisations, NGOs, religious organisations, private entrepreneurs and even criminal organisa-

tions) are involved in the negotiation of access to public goods and services for the urban poor in interrelated ways. As explained, the government in Mayo relies on non-state actors for the execution of its tasks in the squatter areas and IDP camps. Urban services such as water, electricity and garbage collection are being provided by (state owned) companies, while NGOs and religious organisations assume public tasks by carrying out health and education programmes. In Mayo, the setting up of mosques is considered a public task. As a consequence, mosques are involved in public service delivery in multiple ways. Moreover, traditional organisations are involved with the provision of security. The state is very much present in setting the rules and regulations and overseeing the activities of these private institutions. In the case of security provision, it has even incorporated the traditional leadership into its own structures through the judia and the city court. This intermingling of public and private roles performed by formal and informal actors produces what I have called horizontal hybridity. Vertical hybridity was expressed through private organisations that executed public services also acting as intermediaries between the state and the urban poor. For example, many traditional leaders and imams took seat in the popular committees that were official intermediaries between the state and the urban poor, while at the same time they had a position in steering committees for projects of international NGOs. In Mayo, the typical hybrid field of claim-making thus consisted of an alliance between a popular committee, a third organisation (a company, an NGO or a religious organisation) and the ruling party.

In Iztapalapa, the state is the dominant actor in service provision, but rather than services and public programmes being distributed by bureaucratic institutions to the urban poor, they are negotiated between political parties, bureaucratic institutions and neighbourhood organisations (and social movements at large). Now that the neighbourhood organisations have become incorporated into a political party and government institutions, they contribute mainly to vertical hybridity. Other authority bearers are less involved in Iztapalapa at present than in Mayo. NGOs' presence is very meagre compared to one or two decades ago. Criminal organisations were not visible in these governance arrangements but did play a role in the negotiation of public security between the residents and the police. Therefore, a typical field of claim-making in Iztapalapa consists of an alliance between a territorial (often a neighbourhood) organisation, a bureaucratic institution and a faction of the ruling party.


In both cases, different organisations or institutions were interlinked through the practices of brokers who held multiple functions; they operated partly within the state and partly outside it. Brokers played a crucial role in connecting the poor, third organisations and the state. The structural features of brokerage of these typical urban issues were strikingly similar in both cases, with brokers having originally built their power and influence on the provision of public services to the poorer segments of the urban population. Therefore, I would add to Wolf's claim that the specific nature of the megacity (namely the disjuncture between the capa-

bilities of urban management and the needs of the population, in combination with the need of every government to maintain legitimacy) created a political market in which political entrepreneurs can flourish.

In Iztapalapa, neighbourhood leaders (often former students or teachers) who had been incorporated into a political party and consequently occupied positions in the government were the most important brokers. In Mayo too, brokerage existed between the state, alternative authority bearers and the urban poor. They had some room to manoeuvre at the local level, particularly the traditional leaders who have a culturally determined power base. For instance, the government depends on them for the mobilisation of communities for urban development, for conflict mitigation and the mobilisation of communities in elections. Community activists (often teachers, imams, merchants or tribal chiefs) however had often become incorporated in the ruling party, and as such occupied a position within a popular committee or higher in the government bureaucracy. Moreover, as a member of the popular committee, this person was often the lynch-pin for a religious organisation or an NGO providing services in a specific area, sitting on oversight committees of specific projects on behalf of the community and/or the state. In both Mayo and Iztapalapa, fields of claim-making or the configuration of actors through which the distribution of public goods and services to certain groups of people was decided can be labelled as hybrid.

The involvement of non-state actors and brokers originated from the fact that in both cases, the urban poor could not make direct claims regarding services et cetera to formal state institutions because of their informal living and employment status. Urban informality thus produced another parallel between both cases, besides exclusion from access to public goods and services: political opportunity structures comprised hybrid fields of claim-making, bound together through brokerage. The figure presented in chapter 2 visualises these hybrid fields for both Iztapalapa and Mayo.

Figure 13. Brokerage in the grey zone



The figure also situates the brokers in these overlapping areas, portraying neighbourhood leaders who occupy state functions or are involved in NGO activities and alternative authority bearers executing state tasks while also representing their communities (in popular committees, for example). These patterns occur in Mayo and Iztapalapa alike. Therefore, I argue that we have to look at the similarities in the patterns of exclusion and in the hybridity of fields of claim-making. Both polities of which the urban poor form part are characterised by the presence of a grey zone between the state, society and alternative authority bearers. In order to understand the parallels in claim-making practices by the urban poor in both contrasting cities, we have to consider the existence of that grey zone and the importance of brokers within it.

Let me take this argument one step further. I have asserted that citizenship of the urban poor in both Iztapalapa and Mayo was an outcome of negotiations between the representatives of the urban poor and the government, much more than a relation based on formal rights. Brokers in both cities exerted decisive influence on the type of strategy that was mostly used by the urban poor to reach negotiations with the government. In Iztapalapa, while residents used to negotiate based on their nuisance power, they now negotiated through their representatives within the government based on their political weight. In Mayo, negotiation took the shape of bargaining over the deliverables of the community and the deliverables of the state, with a community delivering money, votes, blood or sugar in exchange for government services. In Mayo, the urban poor gave in much more than in Iztapalapa in their negotiations over public goods and services. Based on these observations, I contend that it is the position of the brokers in relation to the state

and alternative authority bearers that matters most for the eventual choice of claim-making strategies and for the outcomes for the urban poor.

This is the level at which the different political situations in Mayo and Iztapalapa become important again for explaining political agency of the urban poor: the difference between both cases lies in the distribution of power and access to resources within the grey zone. Democratization in Mexico has not necessarily led to more direct interaction between the state and the poor residents of one of the capital city's boroughs, or to the prevalence of one single claim-making strategy over another (social movements rather than clientelism, for example, as is assumed by social movement theory). In the case study on Iztapalapa, we could observe that Mexico City has not only generated social movements since its democratic transition; on the contrary, there are many new clientelistic relations between the old social movements (based in the neighbourhood organisations) and the local government, via the local leaders who have accessed the ruling party. Some neighbourhood organisations even prefer to hold on to these positions, because they feel that, now that they have direct access to government, they work to their advantage. Notwithstanding, the political pluralism and the fact that different political parties and factions of parties can now all gain access to government resources leads to what I call 'competitive clientelism'. The ruling party in Mexico City is divided into different factions that are in competition with each other. This generates a plethora of instances whereby the urban poor can make their claims via their representatives. Moreover, local leaders' degree of choice between different political bosses also translates into a certain degree of leverage for the urban poor. The Iztapalapan leaders consciously build up and cultivate this autonomy, which ultimately also enlarges the opportunities for the residents.

In the context of one-party rule in Mayo, brokers are very much dependent on a single political party (the NCP) for the delivery of resources to their constituencies. For example, the SPLM provided formal political opposition during the CPA interim period, although its intermediaries could not offer much concrete to the urban poor because they lacked sufficient capacity and the resources. Therefore, the local leaders in Mayo have to operate under much more direct tutelage of the ruling party. This means that the local leaders in Mayo possessed much less autonomy vis-à-vis the government than in Iztapalapa, which also leads to a weaker bargaining position for the urban poor.

The difference between the democratic transition in Iztapalapa and one-party rule in Mayo did not translate into the unique prevalence of social movements in Iztapalapa and clientelism or quiet encroachment in Mayo. In both areas, all mobilisation strategies existed in one form or another, and all were targeted at reaching negotiations with the government. However, the democratic transition in Iztapalapa did produce more pluralism in the access to resources, which explained the relative autonomy of the brokers and consequently the stronger bargaining position of the urban poor. The outcomes of the negotiations between the state and the urban poor thus had

less to do with the formalisation of democratic state-society relations than the pluralisation of power and resources under the democratic transition in Mexico. I consider the main difference between the state and its relation with the urban poor to be that the brokers in the grey zone in Iztapalapa pertained to a variety of political parties and could manoeuvre with a certain room of autonomy, whereas in Mayo brokers in the grey zone mainly derived their influence from their connections to the ruling party and hardly had any independent space to manoeuvre.

7.2 Democracy versus authoritarianism in the grey zone: unipolar and multipolar brokerage

What does the above description of two urban polities teach us about the relation between regimes, brokerage and citizenship of the urban poor? Returning to theoretical explanations for the exercise of citizenship by the urban poor, I conclude that although regimes in a broader sense provide a useful entry point for explaining differences in the exercise of citizenship between Iztapalapa and Mayo, the political process approach (and political opportunity thinking in particular) tends to overlook specific features in the interaction between the state and the urban poor that can explain similarities in the exercise of citizenship in such different socio-political settings as Mexico City and Khartoum. The model of authoritarian versus democratic regimes and corresponding mobilisation types is too general, given that focusing on the general features of regimes does not account for why clientelism can flourish in a democracy such as is the case in Mexico City. Moreover, it does not account for similarities in claim-making strategies under democratic and authoritarian regimes. Based upon the present empirical study, additional elements have been identified to explain the mobilisation of the urban poor, which lie in the existence of a grey zone, the specific features of brokerage and differences in their access to resources (resource pluralism) under specific regime types. Indeed, the comparison between Mexico City and Khartoum shows that brokers - the personalised incarnations of clientelism - can benefit even more from democratic or pluralist systems where competition over state power is institutionalised than from an authoritarian system.

I argue that in order to appreciate the importance of brokerage for the political agency of the urban poor, one has to accept the existence of a grey zone between the state and society including alternative authority bearers. The grey zone is constituted by overlapping spheres between organisations of the urban poor and the state, as well as between the state and alternative authority bearers. Moreover, it is characterised by multiple functions of actors who switch between particularistic and universalistic logics (vertical hybridity), as well as between the representation of formal and informal forms of authority (horizontal hybridity). In order to understand how citizenship takes shape in marginalised areas of megacities, it is necessary to adopt a focus on the power dynamics between the state, the urban poor and third actors. Based on this comparative study between the polities of Mexico City and Khartoum, I argue that the lens of the 'grey zone' helps to take into account the hybrid fields in which these dynamics take shape.

The merit of the grey zone as a lens for the analysis of state-society interaction is twofold. First, it lies in the explicit acknowledgement of this role of 'third actors' who potentially modify the interaction between the state and segments of society. It recognises the input of distinguishable domains, namely the state, society and alternative authority bearers, into state society dynamics and their mutual interaction. Second, it is a rather 'neutral' concept in terms of the power relations between these domains. This distinguishes the grey zone from the notion of 'blurred boundaries' of the state, which is more state-centred, despite relativising the centrality of the state (Gupta 1996; Sharma and Gupta 2006). The blurred boundaries debate focuses on expressions of 'stateness' and daily encounters between the state and residents, thereby potentially ignoring the role of authority bearers that exist outside the state. I also consider the notion of the grey zone more fitting for understanding political hybridity than the notion of neo-patrimonialism, which attaches great importance to charismatic leadership. Neo-patrimonialism also incorporates a strong notion of 'traditional' forms of domination intermingled with 'modern' forms of domination (Erdmann and Engel 2006). In fact, I found that hybridity in both Mexico City and Khartoum was first and foremost related to the search for power and access to resources in a context of rapid urbanisation. In this sense, it was just as modern as it was traditional. In Iztapalapa just as in Mayo, charisma was an important asset for brokers, who also sought to maintain their constituencies through affective bonds; however, the charisma or personal characteristics of local leaders were ultimately very much dependent on the resources they could deliver for their constituents. Moreover, I did not find references to the charisma of leaders beyond the local political levels in the ways in which people engaged in claim-making. Finally, neo-patrimonialism as a concept also leaves less room for including the overlap between the state and other (non-traditional) authority bearers as actors with an independent input, given that it focusses on forms of domination other than the legal-rational bureaucratic one inside the state.

The fact that the lens of the grey zone draws attention to horizontal and vertical overlaps also opens up space for the analysis of multisided brokerage. In this study, I found that the distribution of power between the actors in the grey zone is crucial for understanding the outcomes of state-society interaction for the urban poor. Based on these results, I argue that there is a fundamental difference between multi-polar brokerage, exemplified by the Mexican political system, and unipolar brokerage, exemplified by Khartoum. In Mexico, brokers are able to carve out an autonomous position for themselves based upon their capacity to play out different political currents against each other. By contrast, the brokers in Khartoum are almost entirely dependent on their connections with the ruling party for maintaining their own position. Therefore, some of the brokers in Mexico City can be said to operate closer to the interests of the urban poor (such as the leaders of the neighbourhood organisations), exerting leverage on their behalf, whereas most brokers in Khartoum operate under the control of the ruling party and cannot exert much leverage on behalf of the urban excluded. Besides the repression

exerted on any form of opposition by the regime in Khartoum (and not so much in Mexico), the fact that the ruling party holds an almost absolute control over resources strongly restricts the leverage of the urban poor in the permanent bargaining with the authorities that takes place.

Whether brokerage is unipolar or multipolar depends on the distribution of political power, relating to access to the state apparatus and its resources. In Khartoum, brokers tend to be unipolar despite many of them connecting more than two sites (the state, a political party, one or two alternative authority bearers and the urban poor). In Mexico, where brokers usually connect three actors (the state, a political party and the urban poor through their neighbourhood organisations), brokerage is multipolar because it draws upon different power sources. I have called this competitive clientelism. This distinction between multipolar and unipolar brokerage is essential, given that the common understanding of brokerage within studies on clientelism is that it is based on a pyramid of relations that integrates subjects into a political system based on the dominance of one political actor. The multipolar model, according to which brokers have the choice between different political bosses and occupy an autonomous position, does not fit this image of a pyramid. Therefore, I recommend further research on the notion of competitive clientelism.

Finally, the arrangements described above can be assumed as typical for the poorer areas of megacities, because this is where brokers can mediate between the population's need for services and the government's need for political support in a context of scarcity. The prevalence of informality in the polity of which the urban poor are a part can differ from other areas in rapidly expanding cities. For example, the popular committees hardly play a role in the middle and upper class areas of Khartoum, areas where the government concentrates its capacities for services. Neighbourhood organisations assume very different characteristics in the upper and middle class areas of Mexico City, acting less as service-brokers than in the popular neighbourhoods. The question is whether 'the urban' in its entirety shows similar traits to those described in this study and consequently whether it should be treated as a distinctive analytical unit of analysis. This revives the old discussion between Lefebvre (1970) and Castells (1977), more recently taken up by Brenner (2000) and Nicholls (2008), concerning whether thinking about 'the urban' is a separate level of analysis. Is there such a thing as *urban* citizenship? Is mediated and negotiated citizenship typical for 'the urban' in a broader sense? Is there a particular type of 'urban citizenship' emerging? Moreover, is it confined to Southern megacities or can one speak of a global type of urban citizenship? These questions can only be answered by qualitative cross-continental comparisons. Cities around the world possibly share specific features that would remain neglected without explicit comparison. Furthermore, the economic structure that they are all increasingly becoming part of invites more rather than fewer comparisons. This study dealt with two Southern cities, but one could also argue for comparisons between postcolonial and (post)industrialist cities. While Roy and Alsayyad rightly

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argue that urban informality works out differently in different local contexts (Roy and Alsayyad 2003), this study has highlighted sufficient reasons to believe that, even in seemingly contrasting cases, the rise of urban informality generates important similarities in terms of state-society interaction.

Summary

This study is about citizenship and informality in megacities. The percentage of the world population living in cities is expected to further increase in the coming decades. Urbanisation is characterised by informality in large parts of the globe. Despite urban dwellers formally having the right to a roof above their heads, public services and work, these basic livelihood features remain inaccessible for many. They do not have land titles or rental contracts; they live in improvised houses, obtain their electricity from private generators and earn their income in the informal economy. Notwithstanding, the city also offers them specific opportunities for political mobilisation and participation: this is the so-called “citizenship paradox”. In order to explore this paradox in greater depth, this study concentrates on the ways in which citizenship is shaped for poor inhabitants of two contrasting megacities. Based on six months field work in Mexico City and six months in Khartoum, spread over a period of three years, I argue that there are surprising similarities in the ways in which poor residents negotiate their citizenship with the local government in these two cities. These similarities are expressed in the role of intermediaries or brokers in the ‘grey zone’ of (state) power. They mediate between the population, the local government and other ‘authorities’ such as religious organisations, neighbourhood organisations, (development) NGOs and sometimes even criminal organisations. What is striking in the light of existing theories is that this kind of intermediation (often described as clientelism) does not disappear with democratisation. In Mexico City, which is democratic yet also characterised by scarcity, brokers operate in roughly the same way between the state and citizens as in Khartoum, which is authoritarian. Moreover, they even benefit from the democratic transition in Mexico, while the difference between Mexico City and Khartoum lies in the relative power position of the brokers vis-a-vis the local government. In Mexico, the brokers can choose between multiple political bosses, which gives them space to manoeuvre in relation to the state and strengthen their own position. In Khartoum, brokers depend on a sole political boss – the ruling party, which means that they often operate as an extension of the state. Given that this has consequences for the negotiation position of the poor residents, I plea for making a distinction between multipolar and unipolar brokerage.

This book consists of 2 parts. In the first part – from the introduction until chapter 3 – I draw the frameworks for the more empirical parts of the study: this is where I describe the methodology, conceptual framework and background of both cases. In the second part – chapters 4 through 6 – I discuss my empirical findings. In chapter 7, I formulate a number of conclusions and discuss their implications for theory building on citizenship and state society relations. In this chapter, I introduce the notion of unipolar versus multipolar brokerage.

In **chapter 2**, I develop the conceptual framework for this study on citizenship in two contrasting mega cities. Based on recent empirical literature, I assume that urban informality heavily influences the ways in which poor residents can shape

their citizenship. First, I explore the role of informality in the daily lives of poor residents of mega cities. I argue that the informality, violence and inequality that characterise the lives of the urban poor stand in sharp contrast with the dominant notion of citizenship, involving the central principles that all citizens are equal before the law and are entitled equal access to the resources of the state. Informality has consequences for the different dimensions of citizenship, which are closely interconnected: exclusion of access to claims on land, shelter and employment also determines the conditions for the exercise of political participation.

It has been increasingly recognised within recent literature that formal and informal forms of governance are intrinsically linked. This claim mostly relates to hybridity in the relation between the state and its citizens, which is interchangeably based on a particularistic and universalistic logic. This is what I refer to with the term 'vertical hybridity'. I wish to add the notion of 'horizontal hybridity', which relates to the increasing role of private organisations in the public sphere and the resulting intermingling between the public and private. In the context of rapid urbanisation and a lack of regulation, the state depends on 'informal' forms of leadership for the execution of its authority (cooperation of traditional leaders, neighbourhood organisations, et cetera). When, in addition, the state outsources tasks as part of an active policy, as a result of which private organisations start to execute public tasks, this dependence increases. Horizontal and vertical hybridity are interconnected when 'informal' authorities in the city start to act as mediators between the state and its citizens: this whole constitutes a 'grey zone' of state power.

Subsequently, I analyse what the above means for the political agency of the urban poor. I return to social movement studies' ideas on the importance of motives, resources and opportunities for the political strategies of both power holders and subaltern. 'Political opportunity structure' is the dominant concept for the analysis of the interaction between state and society. This concept puts the most important explaining factor with the nature of the regime in place. Social movements are supposed to be the dominant form of mobilisation in democracies, whereas under authoritarian regimes we are more likely to observe silent opposition or armed resistance. I argue that the grey zone of vertical and horizontal informality represents the political opportunity structure within which the urban poor can make their claims towards the state under different kinds of regimes, and assume that brokers occupy central positions within this grey zone.

In **chapter three**, I introduce both cases in their national political and historical context. I briefly describe the urbanisation history of Mexico City and Khartoum and highlight how huge popular areas have been formed in both cities. In order to interpret political relations within these areas, I also provide an image of the most important national political developments in the past decades. Iztapalapa is a popular neighbourhood in the South-East of Mexico City, with approximately two million inhabitants. The area is almost entirely regulated: 70% of the residents owns

the land on which they live and 95% are connected to the water, drainage and electricity networks. Even though it can thus be disputed whether Iztapalapa can be termed as a 'slum', it is undoubtedly one of the poorest areas of Mexico's Federal District. Iztapalapa is often associated with criminality, because organised crime has a foot on the ground there. In order to understand political activities in Iztapalapa, we have to include the history of the neighbourhood as well as the national political context. Different parts of Iztapalapa have been populated in different ways: some parts have been planned by the government, whereas others have been populated through the illegal selling of communal land. In the latter areas above all, strong social movements have originated around the struggle for public services. These social movements gained strength after the major earthquake that devastated large parts of the city and played an important role in the democratisation process that eventually led to the end of the one party state at the national level in 2000. The democratisation process has also led to more autonomy and space for political participation on the level of the Federal District and its boroughs. Since 1988, the Federal District has been governed by the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), a party whose support base is located in Iztapalapa. Nowadays, many of the social movements have been incorporated into the PRD.

Mayo is a neighbourhood in the South of Khartoum, comprising a mixture of refugee camps, squatter settlements and regularised living areas. The area frequently makes the headlines due to its high number of internally displaced persons in the area, as well as the conflicts that this has entailed, particularly surrounding the relocations that are an essential part of urban planning policies. Political relations in Mayo cannot be understood without the national political context, including the conflicts between the national government in the centre and armed movements in the rest of the country. Until the 1980s, subsequent governments tried to limit the influx of rural migrants into the city, because they formed a political, economic and security threat from the perspective of the powerholders (and the urban population). The current government of Khartoum has accepted the pertinence of the migrants and has engaged in various urban planning efforts. The regime of which it forms part can be characterised as authoritarian. It acts tough on every form of political opposition, which is associated with the armed opposition elsewhere in the country. The regime came into power in 1989 and since strived to implement a social transformation based on an ideology of Islamisation and Arabisation. As a result of these policies, rebel movements from South, Central and Western Sudan, who were already fighting against marginalisation before the regime came to power, intensified their resistance. Indeed, many internally displaced from these areas actually live in Mayo. In 2005, the government and the largest rebel movement, the SPLA, reached a peace agreement and the SPLA transformed into a political party, the SPLM. This gave SPLM supporters in Mayo a political framework to claim their rights, although in practice this has had limited effects, also because the priority of the SPLM lay with the separation of Southern Sudan and the return of the displaced to the South.

In sum, both cities are marked by important differences. Whereas Mexico City can be seen as a consolidated urban area, Khartoum is fully in flux. Mexico has undergone a democratic transition, whilst Khartoum falls under authoritarian rule and is the capital of a country marked by various armed conflicts. In Khartoum, the security services play a dominant role between the state and residents. However, at the same time there are also similarities: urbanisation has been based on comparable 'drivers' and popular neighbourhoods have developed along similar lines (they are to a large extent unplanned). Moreover, both popular areas provide ample support to important opposition parties.

In **chapter 4**, I discuss poverty and exclusion in Iztapalapa and Mayo. There is scarcity in both neighbourhoods, albeit in different areas and in different measures. In Iztapalapa, exclusion is mainly a matter of lacking access to good quality public services, employment and security. Compared to the rest of the city, the quality of water provision can be considered poor, partly due to the geographical location of Iztapalapa. The government compensates for the limited water supply through the distribution of water through lorries, although this distribution system is vulnerable to manipulation and corruption. Public spaces and green areas are also scarce in Iztapalapa. While all land has formally been allocated, this allocation is being challenged on a daily basis. Public areas are being claimed by new settlers with the support of political actors, but also by groups of residents: the (retired) elderly and (unemployed) youth, who do not attend school. Youth gangs contribute to the perceived insecurity in the area. Furthermore, residents complain about a lack of employment opportunities. Despite Iztapalapa having a significant share of the economic activities in the Federal District, this does not translate into employment opportunities for the residents of Iztapalapa themselves. Most of the residents work in small family enterprises that are often considered part of the informal economy. The salaries in these enterprises are relatively low, which translates into a poor quality of housing. Migration to the U.S. and opportunities in the drug trade as a quick route to economic success are other consequences of a lack of employment. Accordingly, Iztapalapa is commonly associated with criminality and residents of Iztapalapa are generally stigmatised by other inhabitants of Mexico City.

In Mayo, exclusion is first and foremost a matter of lacking access to land, housing, public service delivery, employment and protection. Some residents have been waiting for land regularisation for twenty years, with relocations still being executed. In neighbourhoods where land ownership has not been regularised, there are no public services either: people buy their water from donkey carts and electricity from private generators. Inhabitants of Mayo mostly work in the informal economy, as day labourers in other parts of the city, as street vendors, rickshaw drivers or cleaners. Government jobs are not easily accessible for people with relatively little education. Revenues are generally insufficient for sustaining a livelihood. Security is a complex topic in Mayo: on the one hand, it is a safe area with little criminality; however, on the other hand, the police and security services

pose a security threat for parts of the population, including the women who develop economic activities that are prohibited under shari'a law (such as the selling of alcohol). Political activities are a security risk for the inhabitants and membership of a specific ethnic group alone can already lead to suspected support to rebel groups. Despite the inhabitants of Mayo formally enjoying the right to protection, public service delivery and political participation, in practice they can hardly exercise such rights. Exclusion determines the social dimensions of citizenship to an important extent.

In **chapter 5**, I explore the residents of Mayo and Iztapalapa's possibilities to claim equal access. First of all, I discuss the players involved: the providers of public goods and services and the claimants. In Mayo, the state hardly offers anything itself; rather, it almost entirely leaves service delivery to (state-owned) companies, NGOs and religious organisations. In theory, these 'alternative authorities' operate within the frameworks set by the government and intermediate for the poor vis-a-vis the government. In Iztapalapa, while the state is the most important provider of public services, their distribution is often conducted via neighbourhood organisations. In both areas, fields of claim-making are thoroughly hybrid, with both state institutions and political parties and other organisations playing a role in providing access to important goods and services for the poor. On the demand side, social organisations in Mayo are characterised by tribal bonds, whereas neighbourhood organizations are the dominant form of social organisation in Iztapalapa. This kind of organisations plays an important role in formulating the residents' demands vis-a-vis the government and other service providers, such as development NGOs and religious organisations. Professional organisations are gaining importance in both areas.

In a context of scarcity, intermediation between the aforementioned supply and (organised) demand becomes a necessity. This happens in different ways. In both Iztapalapa and Mayo, there are official institutions for citizen participation. In principle, the government of Mexico City supports interaction between the government and the local population on the basis of equality, although the model to represent the citizens towards the government had not yet been set up in 2008. Therefore, citizen participation took place upon the invitation of and under the conditions posed by the government. In Mayo, there is only one organisation for citizen participation, which belongs more to the state than the residents themselves. Therefore, the government puts its mark on the ways in which the residents can exert influence or make claims. Political parties fulfil an important task in both cities in mediating between supply and demand. They do not limit themselves to the struggle for political power and the control thereof via the parliament. In both cities, political representatives of districts have offices in the neighbourhoods and interfere directly with service delivery from the government to the residents. In both areas, 'social activism' is an important condition for political success, with politicians engaging in public service delivery and successful service deliverers becoming politicians.

The intermediaries or brokers who operate between the state and the residents are noticeably similar in both areas. Almost without exception, they started their political careers as social activists, claiming and/or organising land rights and public services for their support base (mostly newcomers to the city). In both Iztapalapa and Mayo, there is still space for these so-called political entrepreneurs who fulfil double functions between state institutions, political parties and other organisations involved in public service delivery. However, an important difference between the two cities lies in the local power relations. In Iztapalapa, the democratic transition (the fact that state power and resources are accessible for multiple parties at the same time), in combination with the factionalism inside the PRD, leads to what I call 'competitive clientelism'. Local leaders can make a choice between different political bosses who compete with each other, which gives them a certain power position. In Mayo, different organisations all have to succumb to the ruling party, which virtually controls all economic resources. In both areas, the 'political opportunity structure' thus consists of a grey zone that is characterised by double functions of intermediaries or brokers, although these relate differently to one another and the local government.

In **chapter 6**, I analyse the consequences of this political opportunity structure for the agency of the residents of both areas. I analyse the political strategies of the population in relation to the strategies of the government and the brokers themselves. In both areas, the poor try to defend their interests collectively, with local leaders playing a central role. One important similarity between the two areas is that the residents tend to approach the state through individuals who they know personally, which reinforces the role of the local leaders. A second similarity is that the way in which the poor try to defend their interests is always a certain variety of a negotiation game. The poor maintain a variety of strategies that are employed according to the context – sometimes simultaneously, sometimes invariably. Clientelism occurs in both areas, as well as the strategy characterised by Bayat as 'quiet encroachment'. (Violent) resistance takes place incidentally in both areas, when vital interests are at stake. While I did not encounter social movements in either case (anymore), I did encounter other forms of collective interest representation in both. Ultimately, the residents' strategies are always directed at reaching negotiations with the local state. The stakes in these negotiations is determined by the brokers to an important extent.

Subsequently, I study the strategies the both governments employ. Both governments dispose of different means to increase their legitimacy as well as maintaining control. Brokers also play a crucial role in these strategies. During elections, both governments were shown to make use of the tactic of vote buying via intermediaries, while in between elections they both tried to gain local leaders on their side by coopting them. Another possibility that both governments made use of – albeit more so in Mayo than Iztapalapa – was the infiltration of local organisations and the nomination of leaders by the government.

Finally, I analyse the interaction between the residents and the government from the perspective of the intermediaries themselves. I show how they build up and exploit a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the residents and the local government in Iztapalapa, by creating and occupying monopoly positions. Ultimately, the relation between the state and its citizens in Iztapalapa is not dyadic (as the definition of clientelism supposes), but rather a triangle in which the third figures take the shape of brokers. In Mayo, brokers also play an important role, although they act much more as a prolongation of the ruling party. Consequently, the options for the residents to negotiate with the government are much more limited.

Finally, in **chapter 7**, I first draw a couple of conclusions regarding the ways in which poor residents in Mexico City and Khartoum (can) claim access to public goods and services. Subsequently, I discuss the implications thereof for theory formation around citizenship and the hybridisation of state-society relations. There are important differences between the motives and opportunities for mobilisation of residents in Iztapalapa and Mayo: in Mayo, poverty is much more absolute and the state is much less directly involved in service delivery. Therefore, it is striking that I still found similarities in the political agency of the poor residents in the two areas: from my research, it appeared that that poor residents in both cities tended to address their government indirectly, through persons who they knew, and they disposed of a variety of strategies that they employed simultaneously or invariably. Moreover, intermediaries or brokers between the residents and the local governments played an important role in deciding which strategy was employed and when in both areas. How can these similarities be explained with the aforementioned differences in mind? A closer look at the motives and opportunity structures in the two areas also highlights some parallels. First, processes of exclusion are comparable between the two areas: in a context of scarcity, access to services is not guaranteed by public institutions but rather has to be negotiated on a daily basis. These practices do not respond to formal rules. Second, in both cases there is a hybrid or 'grey' opportunity structure in which the role of the state is mixed with other forms of authority, via the double functions of brokers.

The difference between the 'democratic' Iztapalapa and the 'authoritarian' Mayo are thus not so much expressed in the presence of one or another political strategy of the urban poor (social movements in Iztapalapa and clientelism of 'quiet encroachment' in Mayo). In fact, all strategies occur in both areas. The difference is between the positions of the intermediaries in relation to the local government. The democratic transition in Iztapalapa has generated more pluralism in the access to resources of the state, with brokers consequently able to gain certain autonomy. In Mayo, the brokers fully depend on the ruling party and have relatively less room to manoeuvre, which has consequences for the negotiation position and thus also for the outcomes for the urban poor.

Therefore, the more favourable negotiation position of the urban poor in Iztapalapa has less to do with the formalisation of democratic state-society relations

than with the pluralisation of power and resources. This nuances the value that the concept of 'political opportunity structure' attributes to national regimes and their character, whether democratic or authoritarian. My conclusion is that although regimes in a broader sense provide a useful entry point for explaining differences in the exercise of citizenship between Iztapalapa and Mayo, the political process approach (and political opportunity thinking in particular) tends to overlook specific features in the interaction between the state and the urban poor that can explain similarities in the exercise of citizenship in such different socio-political settings as Mexico City and Khartoum. I argue that in order to understand state-society interaction in cities like these, it is necessary to accept the existence of a grey zone based on the intermingling of formal and informal forms of authority and formal and informal forms of interaction between the state and residents. Brokers are the crucial linchpins within this grey zone of state power. In a mega city context, they know how to take benefit of administrative chaos and scarcity by creating monopoly positions. The comparison between Mexico City and Khartoum shows that brokers can even benefit more from a democratic system in which competition concerning (state) power is central than an authoritarian system in which they have limited space to manoeuvre. In fact, in Mexico City one can speak of 'multipolar brokerage', because the brokers have the choice between political bosses, whereas in Khartoum one can speak of 'unipolar brokerage', because the brokers depend on a single power source. It is possible that these findings count above all for poor neighbourhoods in large cities, because the tension between the needs of the residents and the search for legitimacy by the government is most notable in a context of scarcity. In order to verify this, further empirical comparisons between cities worldwide could offer interesting insights. Despite Roy and Alsayyad (2003) rightfully arguing that informality works out differently in different contexts, this study has proven that there are sufficient reasons to believe that – even in contrasting cases – informality generates comparable effects in terms of state-society relations.

Samenvatting

Deze studie gaat over burgerschap en informaliteit in megasteden. Het percentage van de wereldbevolking dat in steden woont zal de komende decennia snel toenemen. Verstedelijking wordt in grote delen van de wereld gekenmerkt door informaliteit. Hoewel inwoners in theorie recht hebben op een dak boven het hoofd, stedelijke voorzieningen en werk, is hiervan in de praktijk voor velen geen sprake. Zij hebben geen eigendomsrecht of huurovereenkomst, wonen in geïmproviseerde huizen, betrekken elektriciteit van private generatoren en halen hun inkomen uit de informele economie. Toch biedt de stad ook voor hen specifieke mogelijkheden voor politieke mobilisatie en participatie. Dit is de zogenaamde 'burgerschapsparadox'. Om die paradox nader te doorgronden concentreert deze studie zich op de manieren waarop burgerschap voor arme stadsbewoners gestalte krijgt in twee contrasterende megasteden. Op basis van zes maanden veldwerk in Mexico Stad en zes maanden veldwerk in Khartoum, verspreid over een periode van drie jaar, beargumenteer ik dat er in deze steden opvallende overeenkomsten zijn in de manieren waarop arme stadsbewoners burgerschap uitonderhandelen met hun lokale overheid. Deze overeenkomsten komen tot uitdrukking in de rol van tussenpersonen die opereren in de 'grijze zone' van de (staats)macht. Zij bemiddelen tussen de bevolking, de lokale overheid en andere 'autoriteiten' zoals religieuze organisaties, wijkorganisaties, (ontwikkelings) NGO's en soms ook criminele organisaties. Opvallend in het licht van bestaande theorieën is dat dit soort bemiddeling (vaak beschreven als 'cliëntelisme' niet verdwijnt met democratisering. In het democratische maar eveneens door schaarste gekenmerkte Mexico Stad opereren bemiddelaars tussen de staat en burgers op nagenoeg dezelfde manier als in het autoritaire Khartoum. Van de democratische transitie in Mexico hebben zij zelfs profijt: het verschil tussen Mexico Stad en Khartoum ligt in de relatieve machtspositie van de bemiddelaars ten opzichte van de lokale overheid. In Mexico kunnen de tussenpersonen kiezen tussen meerdere politieke broodheren, waardoor ze manoeuvreerruimte hebben ten opzichte van de staat en ze hun eigen positie kunnen versterken. In Khartoum zijn tussenpersonen afhankelijk van een enkele broodheer – de regerende partij. Hierdoor opereren ze vaak als een verlengstuk van de staat. Omdat dit consequenties heeft voor de onderhandelingspositie van de arme stadsbewoners pleit ik voor het maken van onderscheid tussen unipolaire en multipolaire bemiddeling.

Dit boek bestaat uit 2 delen. In het eerste deel – van de introductie tot en met hoofdstuk 3 - schets ik de kaders voor het meer empirische deel van de studie: hierin beschrijf ik de methodologie, het conceptuele kader en de achtergrond van de beide casussen. Het tweede deel – hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 6 - is het deel waarin ik mijn empirische bevindingen bespreek. In hoofdstuk 7 formuleer ik een aantal conclusies en bespreek ik implicaties hiervan voor theorievorming over burgerschap en staat-maatschappijrelaties. In dit hoofdstuk introduceer ik de notie van unipolaire versus multipolaire bemiddeling.

In **hoofdstuk 2** ontwikkel ik het conceptuele kader voor deze studie over burgerschap in twee contrasterende megasteden. Op basis van recente empirische literatuur is mijn assumptie dat stedelijke informaliteit bepalend is voor de manier waarop arme bewoners gestalte (kunnen) geven aan burgerschap. Eerst verken ik de rol van informaliteit in het dagelijks leven van arme inwoners van megasteden. Ik laat zien dat de informaliteit, het geweld en de ongelijkheid die het leven van stedelijke armen karakteriseren in scherp contrast staan met de heersende opvatting van burgerschap, waarin het principe dat alle burgers gelijk zijn voor de wet en het principe van gelijke toegang tot de middelen van de staat centraal staat. Informaliteit heeft consequenties voor de verschillende dimensies van burgerschap die met elkaar samenhangen: uitsluiting van toegang tot de aanspraak op land, onderdak en werk bepaalt ook de voorwaarden voor het uitoefenen van politieke participatie.

Om de mogelijkheden voor politieke participatie te begrijpen moeten we ook kijken naar de 'ontvangende kant' daarvan: de staat. Ik verken daarom ook hoe informaliteit stedelijk bestuur beïnvloedt. In recente literatuur wordt steeds meer erkend dat formele en informele vormen van bestuur intrinsiek met elkaar vermengd zijn. Meestal heeft deze claim betrekking op hybriditeit in de relatie tussen staat en burgers, die afwisselend is gebaseerd op een particularistische en een universele logica. Ik voeg hier de notie van horizontale hybriditeit aan toe: deze heeft te maken met de toenemende rol van private organisaties in de publieke sfeer en de vermenging tussen publiek en privaat die daaruit voortvloeit. In de context van snelle verstedelijking en een gebrek aan regulering is de staat vaak afhankelijk van 'informele' vormen van leiderschap voor de uitoefening van haar autoriteit (medewerking van traditionele leiders, wijkorganisaties). Als de staat bovendien diensten uitbesteedt waardoor private organisaties publieke taken gaan uitvoeren, neemt deze afhankelijkheid nog toe. Horizontale en verticale informaliteit raken met elkaar verbonden doordat 'informele' autoriteiten in de stad gaan bemiddelen tussen de staat en burgers. Dit geheel vormt een 'grijze zone' van staatsmacht. Vervolgens ga ik na wat het bovenstaande betekent voor de handelingsperspectieven van de stedelijke armen. Daarbij ga ik terug naar het centrale idee uit de studie van sociale bewegingen over het belang van motieven, middelen en mogelijkheden voor de politieke strategieën van machthebbers en ondergeschikten. Het begrip 'politieke mogelijkheden structuur' is het dominante model voor het analyseren van de interactie tussen staat en maatschappij. Dit begrip legt de belangrijkste verklarende factor bij de aard van een regime. Sociale bewegingen zouden het voornaamste middel voor mobilisatie zijn in democratieën, terwijl onder autoritaire regimes eerder heimelijke oppositie of openlijke gewelddadige strijd ontstaat. Ik veronderstel dat de 'grijze zone' de mogelijkheden structuur vormt waarbinnen de stedelijke armen hun claims kunnen maken vis-à-vis de staat in verschillende soorten regimes en ik neem daarbij aan dat tussenpersonen een cruciale rol vervullen.

In **hoofdstuk 3** introduceer ik de beide casussen in hun nationale historische en politieke context. Ik beschrijf kort de urbanisatiegeschiedenis van Mexico Stad en

Khartoum en schets hoe zich in beide steden enorme volkswijken hebben gevormd. Om politieke relaties binnen de volkswijken te kunnen duiden, schets ik ook een beeld van de belangrijkste nationale politieke ontwikkelingen in de afgelopen decennia. Iztapalapa is een volkswijk in het Zuid-Oosten van Mexico Stad, waar ongeveer twee miljoen mensen wonen. Vrijwel het totale gebied is geregulariseerd; 70% van de inwoners is eigenaar van het land waarop ze wonen en 95% is aangesloten op het electriciteits- water- en rioleringsnet. Ook al valt het te betwijfelen of je van een sloppenwijk kunt spreken, Iztapalapa is onmiskenbaar een van de armste deelgemeenten van Mexico Stad. Iztapalapa wordt sterk geassocieerd met criminaliteit, omdat de georganiseerde misdaad er een stevige voet aan de grond heeft. Om politieke activiteiten in Iztapalapa te kunnen begrijpen moeten we kijken naar de geschiedenis van de wijk en naar de nationale politieke context. Verschillende delen van Iztapalapa zijn op verschillende manieren ontstaan: sommige delen zijn door de overheid gepland en andere zijn door de illegale verkoop van gemeenschappelijk land bewoond geraakt. Met name in die laatste gebieden zijn sterke sociale bewegingen ontstaan rondom de strijd voor publieke dienstverlening. Deze sociale bewegingen werden versterkt door een aardbeving, die in 1985 de hoofdstad verwoestte, en speelden een belangrijke rol in het democratiseringsproces dat in 2000 uiteindelijk leidde tot het einde van de één partijstaat op nationaal niveau. Dat democratiseringsproces heeft ook geleid tot meer autonomie en ruimte voor politieke participatie op het niveau van Mexico Stad en haar deelgemeenten. Mexico Stad wordt sinds 1988 geleid door de Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), een partij die haar machtsbasis heeft in Iztapalapa. Inmiddels zijn veel van de sociale bewegingen uit Iztapalapa onderdeel geworden van de PRD.

Mayo is een wijk in het Zuiden van Khartoum die bestaat uit een mengeling van vluchtelingenkampen, 'squatter settlements' en geregulariseerde woongebieden. Het is een gebied dat regelmatig het nieuws haalt. Dit heeft te maken met het hoge aantal Zuiderlingen in de wijk en de conflicten waarmee dat gepaard gaat, met name rondom de relocations die een essentieel onderdeel vormen van het stedelijke planningsbeleid. Ook politieke relaties in Mayo kunnen niet begrepen worden zonder de nationale politieke context en de conflicten tussen de nationale regering in het centrum en de rebellenbewegingen in de rest van het land in ogenschouw te nemen. Tot ver in de jaren '80 van de vorige eeuw is gepoogd mensen uit de rurale gebieden uit de stad te weren, omdat zij vanuit het perspectief van de machthebbers (en de stedelijke bevolking) een bedreiging vormden op politiek, economisch en veiligheidsgebied. Het bestuur van Khartoum en ook dat van Mayo wordt inmiddels gekenmerkt door een autoritair regime dat hard optreedt tegen elke vorm van politieke oppositie, die wordt geassocieerd met de gewapende oppositie elders in het land. Het regime is aan de macht gekomen in 1989 en probeert sindsdien een maatschappelijke transformatie te bewerkstelligen op basis van een ideologie gericht op Islamisering en Arabisering. Rebellenbewegingen uit Zuid-, Centraal- en West-Sudan, die al langer vochten tegen marginalisatie, hebben hun verzet als gevolg hiervan geïntensiveerd. Veel vluchtelingen uit deze gebieden wonen in Mayo. In 2005 is tussen de regering en de grootste rebel-

lenbeweging, de SPLA, een akkoord tot stand gekomen. Dit gaf SPLA aanhangers in Mayo een formeel kader om hun rechten te claimen. In de praktijk heeft dit beperkt effect gehad, mede omdat de prioriteit van de SPLA lag bij de afscheiding van Zuid-Sudan en de terugkeer van ontheemden naar het Zuiden.

Samenvattend vertonen beide steden in meerdere opzichten belangrijke verschillen. Zo kan Mexico Stad gezien worden als een geconsolideerd urbaan gebied terwijl Khartoum nog volop in ontwikkeling is. Mexico heeft een democratische transitie doorgemaakt terwijl Khartoum onder een autoritair bewind valt en de hoofdstad is van een land dat in meerdere gewapende conflicten is verwickeld. In Khartoum spelen de veiligheidsdiensten een dominante rol in de relatie tussen de staat en burgers. Tegelijkertijd zijn er ook parallellen: urbanisatie is in beide landen op vergelijkbare 'drivers' gebaseerd en volkswijken zijn op vergelijkbare manieren tot stand gekomen. Beide volkswijken bieden bovendien steun aan belangrijke oppositiepartijen.

In **hoofdstuk 4** bespreek ik armoede en uitsluiting in Iztapalapa en Mayo. In beide wijken is sprake van schaarste, zij het op verschillende terreinen en in verschillende mate. In Iztapalapa is uitsluiting voornamelijk een kwestie van een gebrek aan toegang tot functionerende publieke voorzieningen, werk en veiligheid. In vergelijking met de rest van de stad is de kwaliteit van de watervoorziening ronduit slecht. Dit heeft deels met de ligging van Iztapalapa te maken. De overheid compenseert de gebrekkige watertoevoer door de distributie van water met vrachtwagens, maar deze distributie is kwetsbaar voor manipulatie en corruptie. Openbare ruimtes en groenvoorzieningen zijn eveneens schaars in Iztapalapa. Alle grond is formeel verdeeld maar in de praktijk wordt deze verdeling dagelijks opnieuw ter discussie gesteld. Openbare ruimtes worden met steun van politieke actoren opgeëist door onwetmatige bewoners (*squatters*), maar ook door specifieke bevolkingsgroepen, (gepensioneerde) ouderen en (werkloze, niet schoolgaande) jongeren in het bijzonder. Jeugdbendes dragen bij aan de grote (gepercipieerde) onveiligheid in Iztapalapa. Inwoners klagen bovendien over een gebrek aan werkgelegenheid. Ook al heeft Iztapalapa een significant aandeel in de economische activiteiten van de stad, dit vertaalt zich niet in werkgelegenheid voor de bevolking van Iztapalapa zelf. De meeste inwoners werken in kleine (familie)bedrijfsjes die vaak worden gezien als onderdeel van de informele economie. De salarissen zijn hier relatief laag, wat zich vertaalt in een slechte kwaliteit van woningen. Migratie naar de VS en mogelijkheden in de drugshandel als snelle route naar (economisch) succes zijn andere gevolgen van het gebrek aan werkgelegenheid. Iztapalapa wordt algemeen geassocieerd met criminaliteit en inwoners van Iztapalapa worden gestigmatiseerd door andere inwoners van Mexico Stad.

In Mayo is uitsluiting vooral een kwestie van een gebrek aan toegang tot land, huisvesting, publieke dienstverlening, werk en bescherming. Sommige inwoners wachten al twintig jaar op land regularisering. Relocaties worden nog steeds uitgevoerd. In wijken waar landeigendom niet geregulariseerd is, is er ook geen pub-

lieke dienstverlening. Mensen kopen hun water van ezelkarren en elektriciteit van private generatoren. Inwoners van Mayo werken veelal in de informele sector: als dagloners in andere delen van de stad, als straatverkopers, riksja-chauffeurs of schoonmakers. Overheidsbanen zijn moeilijk bereikbaar voor mensen met een relatief lage opleiding. Inkomsten zijn over het algemeen onvoldoende om van rond te komen. Veiligheid is een complex onderwerp in Mayo. Enerzijds is Mayo een veilig gebied met lage criminaliteit. Anderzijds vormen de politie en de veiligheidsdiensten voor delen van de bevolking zelf een bedreiging, bijvoorbeeld voor vrouwen die economische activiteiten ontplooiën die verboden zijn onder de sharia-wet (zoals het verkopen van alcohol). Politieke activiteiten vormen voor de inwoners een veiligheidsrisico en alleen al het behoren tot een specifieke etnische groep kan leiden tot een verdenking van steun aan rebellen. Ook al hebben inwoners van Mayo en Iztapalapa formeel recht op bescherming, publieke dienstverlening en politieke participatie, in de praktijk kunnen ze die rechten moeilijk uitoefenen. Uitsluiting bepaalt in belangrijke mate de sociale dimensies van burgerschap in beide wijken.

In **hoofdstuk 5** onderzoek ik de mogelijkheden die inwoners van Mayo en Iztapalapa hebben om gelijke toegang te eisen. Allereerst bespreek ik de spelers die hierbij betrokken zijn: de aanbieders van publieke goederen en diensten en de vragers. In Mayo biedt de staat nagenoeg niets zelf aan en laat ze alles over aan bedrijven en NGO's en religieuze organisaties. In theorie opereren deze 'alternatieve autoriteiten' wel binnen de kaders die door de overheid worden gesteld en bemiddelen zij in zekere zin voor de armen richting de overheid. In Iztapalapa is de staat wel de belangrijkste aanbieder van publieke diensten maar loopt de verdeling vaak via wijkorganisaties. In beide gevallen zijn de 'velden voor claim-making' dus hybride: zowel staatsinstanties als politieke partijen en andere organisaties spelen een rol bij de toegang tot zaken die voor de bewoners van belang zijn. Aan de vraagkant worden in Mayo sociale organisaties gekenmerkt door tribale verbanden terwijl in Iztapalapa de dominante vorm van sociale organisatie de wijkorganisatie is. Dit soort organisaties spelen een belangrijke rol bij het formuleren van de vraag van de bewoners vis-a-vis de overheid en andere aanbieders van diensten, zoals ontwikkelings NGO's en religieuze organisaties. Professionele organisaties zijn in beide gebieden in opkomst.

In een context van schaarste moet tussen bovengenoemd aanbod en (georganiseerde) vraag bemiddeld worden. Dit gebeurt op verschillende manieren. In Iztapalapa en in Mayo zijn er officiële instanties voor burgerparticipatie. In principe ondersteunt de regering van Mexico Stad interactie tussen de overheid en de lokale bevolking op basis van gelijkwaardigheid, maar het model dat de burgers moest vertegenwoordigen richting de overheid was in Iztapalapa in 2008 nog niet van de grond gekomen. Burgerparticipatie vond vooral plaats op uitnodiging van en op de voorwaarden van de overheid. In Mayo is er slechts één organisatie voor burgerparticipatie, die eerder toebehoort aan de overheid dan aan de burgers zelf. De overheid drukt daardoor een grote stempel op de manier waarop burgers

inspraak kunnen uitoefenen of claims kunnen leggen. Politieke partijen vervullen in beide steden een belangrijke taak bij bemiddeling tussen vraag en aanbod. Zij beperkingen zich lang niet alleen tot de strijd om de staatsmacht en het controleren daarvan via het parlement. In beide steden hebben vertegenwoordigers van een districtenstelsel zelf kantoren in de wijken en bemoeien ze zich direct met de dienstverlening van de overheid aan de burgers. Sociaal activisme is in beide wijken zelfs een belangrijke factor voor politiek succes: politici doen aan stedelijke dienstverlening en stedelijke dienstverleners worden politici.

De bemiddelaars, die actief zijn tussen de staat en de burgers in beide wijken, vertonen opvallend veel overeenkomsten. Zij zijn vrijwel allemaal hun politieke loopbaan begonnen als 'sociaal activisten', die landrechten en publieke diensten eisten en/of organiseerden voor hun achterban, meestal nieuwkomers in de stad. In zowel Iztapalapa als in Mayo is er nog steeds ruimte voor politieke ondernemers, die dubbelfuncties vervullen tussen overheidsinstanties, politieke partijen en andere organisaties betrokken bij publieke dienstverlening. Een belangrijk verschil tussen beide steden ligt in de lokale machtsverhoudingen. In Iztapalapa leidt de ingezette democratisering (het feit dat de staatsmacht voor verschillende partijen toegankelijk is) in combinatie met het factionalisme binnen de PRD tot 'competitief cliëntelisme'. Lokale leiders hebben de keuze uit verschillende politieke broodheren die met elkaar concurreren, wat hen een zekere machtspositie verschaft. In Mayo moeten verschillende organisaties zich uiteindelijk allemaal onderwerpen aan de regeringspartij, die vrijwel alle economische middelen in handen heeft. In beide wijken bestaat de 'politieke mogelijkheden structuur' dus uit een grijze zone die gekenmerkt wordt door de dubbelfuncties van tussenpersonen, maar deze verhouden zich anders tot elkaar en tot de lokale overheid.

In **hoofdstuk 6** onderzoek ik welke consequenties deze politieke mogelijkheden structuur heeft voor het handelingsperspectief van de inwoners van beide wijken. De politieke strategieën van de bevolking beschouw ik in samenhang met de strategieën van de overheid en van de tussenpersonen zelf. In beide wijken proberen de armen hun belangen collectief te behartigen, waarbij de lokale leiders een centrale rol spelen. Een belangrijke overeenkomst tussen beide wijken is, dat mensen de neiging hebben de staat te benaderen via persoonlijke contacten, hetgeen de rol van lokale leiders versterkt. Een tweede overeenkomst is dat de manier waarop armen proberen hun belangen te behartigen in beide steden steeds een bepaalde variant is op een onderhandelingspel. Zij hanteren een palet aan strategieën, die al naar gelang de context – soms tegelijkertijd, soms afwisselend - worden ingezet. In beide wijken komt cliëntelisme voor, evenals een strategie, die door Bayat beschreven is als 'quiet encroachment'. (Gewelddadig) verzet vindt incidenteel plaats in beide wijken, als vitale belangen worden aangetast. Sociale bewegingen heb ik in beide gevallen niet (meer) aangetroffen maar andere vormen van collectieve belangbehartiging weer wel. Uiteindelijk zijn de strategieën van de inwoners steeds gericht op het bereiken van onderhandelingen met de lokale overheid. De inzet bij onderhandelingen wordt voornamelijk bepaald door de tussenpersonen.

Vervolgens bekijk ik de strategieën die beide overheden hanteren. Beide overheden hebben verschillende middelen tot hun beschikking om zowel hun legitimiteit te vergroten als de controle te behouden. Tussenpersonen spelen ook daarbij een cruciale rol. Bij verkiezingen lieten beide overheden zien gebruik te maken van het opkopen van stemmen via tussenpersonen en tussen verkiezingen door proberen beide overheden potentiële leiders in hun kamp te winnen door ze te coöpteren. Een andere mogelijkheid die beide overheden benutten – al gebeurt dit meer in Mayo dan in Iztapalapa - is het infiltreren van lokale organisaties en het benoemen van leiders door de overheid.

Tot slot analyseer ik de interactie tussen inwoners en de overheid vanuit het perspectief van de tussenpersonen zelf. Ik laat zien hoe zij in Iztapalapa een zekere mate van autonomie ten opzichte van de inwoners en overheid opbouwen en uitbuiten, door monopolieposities in te nemen. Uiteindelijk is de relatie tussen de staat en haar burgers in Iztapalapa niet dyadisch, maar een driehoek, waarbij de derde figuren de vorm aannemen van brokers. In Mayo spelen tussenfiguren eveneens een belangrijke rol, maar ze zijn veel meer een verlengstuk van de regeringspartij. De opties van de inwoners om met de overheid te onderhandelen zijn hierdoor meer beperkt.

In **Hoofdstuk 7** tenslotte trek ik eerst een aantal conclusies ten aanzien van de manieren waarop arme inwoners van Mexico Stad en Khartoum toegang (kunnen) claimen tot publieke middelen en diensten. Vervolgens bespreek ik de implicaties hiervan voor theorievorming rondom burgerschap en staat-maatschappij interactie.

Er zijn grote verschillen in de motieven voor politieke mobilisatie voor de inwoners van Iztapalapa en Mayo en in de mogelijkheden die ze daartoe hebben: in Mayo is de armoede meer absoluut en is de staat veel minder direct betrokken bij dienstverlening. Opvallend is daarom dat ik toch overeenkomsten vond in het politiek handelen van de arme inwoners in beide wijken: uit mijn onderzoek is gebleken dat in beide steden arme inwoners de overheid vrijwel altijd indirect adresseerden en dat zij in beide gevallen een palet aan strategieën tot hun beschikking hadden en deze soms gelijktijdig - inzetten. In beide wijken spelen tussenfiguren tussen de inwoners en de lokale overheid een belangrijke rol in het bepalen wanneer welke strategie wordt ingezet. Hoe kunnen deze overeenkomsten verklaard worden, indachtig de hierboven genoemde verschillen? Een nadere blik op de motieven en de mogelijkhedenstructuren in beide wijken laat ook parallellen zien. Ten eerste zijn uitsluitingsprocessen in beide wijken vergelijkbaar: onder de druk van schaarste is toegang tot dienstverlening niet verzekerd door publieke instituties maar moet toegang dagelijks uitonderhandeld worden. Deze praktijken onttrekken zich aan algemene regels. Ten tweede is er in beide gevallen sprake van een hybride of 'grijze' mogelijkhedenstructuur waarin de rol van de staat vermengd is met andere vormen van autoriteit, via de dubbelfuncties van tussenpersonen.

Het verschil tussen het 'democratische' Iztapalapa en het 'autoritaire' Mayo uit zich niet zozeer in het voorkomen van de ene of de andere politieke strategie van de armen (sociale bewegingen in Iztapalapa en cliëntelisme (of 'quiet encroachment' in Mayo) maar in het verschil in de positie van de tussenpersonen ten opzichte van de lokale overheid. De democratische transitie in Iztapalapa heeft meer pluralisme in de toegang tot (staats)middelen gecreëerd, waardoor de tussenpersonen een zekere autonomie hebben weten te verwerven. In Mayo blijven de tussenpersonen afhankelijk van de regeringspartij en hebben zij relatief minder manoeuvreerruimte. Dit heeft consequenties voor de onderhandelingspositie van de armen en dus ook voor de uitkomst van onderhandelingen.

De gunstigere onderhandelingspositie van de armen in Iztapalapa heeft dus minder te maken met de formalisering van democratische staat-maatschappij relaties dan met de pluralisering van macht en middelen. Dit nuanceert de waarde die het begrip 'politieke mogelijkheden structuur' hecht aan nationale regimes en hun karakter: democratisch of autoritair. Mijn conclusie is dat, hoewel het regimedenken in theorieën over politieke participatie nuttige aanknopingspunten biedt, de politieke procesbenadering (en het concept 'politieke mogelijkheden structuren' in het bijzonder) voorbij gaat aan bepaalde kenmerken van de interactie tussen de staat en de stedelijke armen, die overeenkomsten in uiteenlopende casussen als Mexico Stad en Khartoum kunnen verklaren. Mijn stelling is, dat we het bestaan van een 'grijze zone' gebaseerd op vermenging van formele en informele vormen van autoriteit en formele en informele vormen van interactie tussen de staat en inwoners als uitgangspunt moeten nemen om staat-maatschappij interactie in dit soort steden te kunnen begrijpen. Tussenfiguren vormen de cruciale schakels binnen deze grijze zone van de staatsmacht. In een grootstedelijke context weten zij te profiteren van bestuurlijke chaos en schaarste door monopolieposities te creëren. De vergelijking tussen Mexico Stad en Khartoum laat zien dat tussenfiguren zelfs meer kunnen profiteren van een democratisch systeem waarbij competitie om de macht centraal staat dan van een autoritair systeem. In feite is er in Mexico Stad sprake van 'multipolaire bemiddeling' omdat de bemiddelaars de keuze hebben tussen politieke broodheren, terwijl er in Khartoum sprake is van 'unipolaire bemiddeling', omdat de bemiddelaars afhankelijk zijn van één en dezelfde machtsbron. Het is mogelijk dat deze bevindingen vooral gelden voor arme wijken in grote steden, omdat in een context van schaarste de spanning tussen behoeften van de bewoners en de zoektocht van de overheid naar legitimiteit het grootst is. Om dit te toetsen zou meer empirisch vergelijkend onderzoek tussen steden wereldwijd interessante aanknopingspunten kunnen bieden. Hoewel Roy en Alsayyad (2003) terecht stellen dat informaliteit overal verschillend uitwerkt, blijkt uit deze studie dat er genoeg redenen zijn om te veronderstellen dat- zelfs in contrasterende casussen - informaliteit vergelijkbare effecten sorteert als het gaat om staat-maatschappij interactie.

Resumen

Este estudio trata sobre ciudadanía e informalidad en mega ciudades. El porcentaje de la población mundial que vive en áreas urbanas seguirá creciendo en las próximas décadas. La urbanización en grandes partes del mundo está caracterizada por la informalidad. Aunque habitantes de las grandes ciudades en general tienen derecho a alojamiento, servicios públicos y empleo, muchos en realidad no tienen acceso a esto. No tienen títulos de propiedad o contratos de alquiler, viven en casas de materiales improvisados sin servicios y generan sus ingresos por medio de la economía informal. No obstante, la ciudad también les ofrece oportunidades específicas para la movilización y la participación política. Esto se puede caracterizar como la paradoja de la ciudadanía urbana. Para entender a más profundidad dicha paradoja, éste estudio se concentra sobre las maneras en que la ciudadanía está construida para los habitantes de barrios populares en dos mega ciudades contrastantes. Basado en seis meses de trabajo de campo en México D.F. y seis meses en Khartoum, entre el 2008 y 2011, argumento que en estas dos ciudades existen similitudes sorprendentes en cuanto a las maneras en que los habitantes de barrios populares negocian su ciudadanía con el gobierno local. Las similitudes se expresan en el papel de los intermediarios que operan en la 'zona gris' del poder del Estado. Ellos negocian entre la población, el gobierno local y otras 'autoridades', como organizaciones religiosas, organizaciones populares, ONGs para el desarrollo y a veces organizaciones criminales también. Sorprendente es que a la luz de teorías existentes es que esta forma de intermediación (a menudo descrito como 'clientelismo') no desaparece con la democratización. En México D.F. que vivió un proceso de democratización pero también está caracterizada por la escasez, intermediarios operan en la misma manera que en la ciudad de Khartoum que está gobernada de manera autoritaria. Ellos hasta se aprovechan de las oportunidades que les ha ofrecido la transición democrática: la diferencia entre México D.F. y Khartoum se encuentra en la posición relativa del poder comparado con el gobierno local. En México los intermediarios pueden escoger entre múltiples dueños políticos, lo cual les da un espacio para maniobrar vis-a-vis el estado y la posibilidad de fortalecer su posición. En Khartoum los intermediarios están dependiendo de un dueño único – el partido en el poder. Por lo tanto ellos operan más bien como una función prolongada del estado mismo. Porque esto tiene consecuencias para la posición de negociación para los habitantes yo argumento para una distinción entre la mediación unipolar y la mediación multipolar.

Este estudio consiste en dos partes. En la primera – de la introducción hasta el capítulo 3 – ofrezco al lector los marcos para la parte empírica del estudio: la metodología, el marco conceptual y el marco político-nacional de ambos estudios de caso. En la segunda parte – capítulos 4 hasta 6 – presento mis datos empíricos. En el capítulo 7, al final formulo mis conclusiones más importantes y discuto sus implicaciones para teorías sobre la ciudadanía y relaciones estado-sociedad. En este último capítulo introduzco la noción de intermediación unipolar y la intermediación multipolar.

En el capítulo 2 desarrollo el marco conceptual para este estudio sobre la ciudadanía en dos mega ciudades contrastantes. Basado en la literatura empírica asumo que la informalidad urbana influye sobre la manera en que habitantes de barrios populares construyen su ciudadanía. Primero exploro el papel de la informalidad en la vida cotidiana de los habitantes pobres de mega ciudades. Argumento que la informalidad, la violencia y la desigualdad que caracterizan la vida de los pobres están en contraste fuerte con la conceptualización dominante de la ciudadanía, en que todos los ciudadanos son iguales ante la ley y que el principio de igual acceso a los beneficios y los recursos del estado ocupa un lugar central. La informalidad tiene consecuencias para las diferentes dimensiones del concepto de la ciudadanía que están interrelacionados: la exclusión de acceso a la tierra, alojamiento y empleo también influye en las condiciones para la participación política.

Para poder entender las oportunidades para la participación política también se debe considerar el lado 'receptor' de éste: el Estado. Por esta razón analizo como la informalidad también afecta la administración municipal. La literatura reciente reconoce que modalidades formales e informales de gestión están profundamente mezcladas. En su mayoría esta aserción tiene que ver con la relación entre el estado y sus ciudadanos, que está basado invariadamente en una lógica particularista y una lógica universalista. Se refiere a esto con la 'hibridización vertical'. Quiero añadir la 'hibridización horizontal': éste tiene que ver con el papel creciente de organizaciones privadas en la administración pública y la mezcla entre lo público y lo privado que proviene de esto. En el contexto de la urbanización rápida y la falta de regularización, el Estado se encuentra dependiendo de liderazgos 'informales' para la ejecución de su autoridad (la cooperación de los líderes tradicionales o de organizaciones populares por ejemplo). Además cuando organizaciones privadas empiezan a ejecutar tareas públicas, estas dependencias aumentan. La informalidad horizontal y vertical, están interconectados porque autoridades informales empiezan a mediar entre el Estado y sus ciudadanos. Este total constituye una 'zona gris' del poder del Estado. Seguidamente, analizo lo que todo esto significa para las perspectivas de actuación de los pobres urbanos. En esto retorno a la idea central del estudio de movimientos sociales sobre la importancia de motivos, recursos y oportunidades para las estrategias políticas. El concepto de la 'estructura de oportunidades políticas' es el modelo dominante para el análisis de la interacción del Estado y la sociedad. Este modelo considera las características de un régimen como el factor más importante para la movilización. Por ejemplo, movimientos sociales serían la forma de movilización más importante en democracias. En regímenes autoritarios promoverían oposición clandestina o la lucha armada. En este sentido, propongo que la 'zona gris' constituye la estructura de oportunidades políticas en la cual los habitantes de los barrios populares pueden reclamar sus derechos frente al estado en regímenes de distintas características y asumo que las y los intermediarios juegan un papel crucial en esto.

En el capítulo tres introduzco ambos estudios de caso en su contexto nacional histórico y político. Describo brevemente la historia de la urbanización en México

D.F. y en Khartoum y esbozo como en ambas ciudades se han generado barrios populares inmensos. Para poder entender las relaciones políticas adentro de los barrios, describo los acontecimientos políticos nacionales más importantes de las décadas pasadas. Iztapalapa es una Delegación en el Sureste de México D.F. donde viven cerca de dos millones de habitantes. Casi todo el terreno está regularizado: 70% de la población es propietaria de la tierra sobre la que vive y 95% está conectado a las redes de electricidad, agua y drenaje. Sin embargo, Iztapalapa es una de las Delegaciones más pobres de la ciudad. Iztapalapa tiene una fuerte connotación de inseguridad porque se cree que es una de las bases del crimen organizado en México D.F.. Para poder entender las actividades políticas en Iztapalapa tenemos que considerar la historia de la Delegación en combinación con el contexto político nacional. Diferentes partes de Iztapalapa han sido pobladas de maneras distintas: algunas partes han sido planificadas por el gobierno, mientras que otras han sido pobladas por el fraccionamiento y la venta ilegal de tierras comunales. En estas últimas partes se han generado movimientos sociales alrededor de la lucha para la regularización de la tierra y la lucha para los servicios públicos. Estos movimientos sociales han ganado fuerza después del terremoto que destruyó grandes partes de la ciudad en el 1985. Jugaron un papel importante en el proceso nacional de democratización y sobre todo en la capital. Desde 1988 México D.F. está gobernada por el Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), un partido que tiene su base de apoyo por una gran parte en Iztapalapa. Actualmente muchos de los movimientos sociales en Iztapalapa han sido incorporados por el PRD a través de sus líderes.

Por otro lado, Mayo es un barrio en el sur de Khartoum que consiste en una mezcla de refugios para desplazados, asentamientos irregulares y zonas planificadas. El barrio regularmente está en las noticias, por el gran número de desplazados que vive ahí y los conflictos que tienen que ver en su mayoría con la planificación urbana. También en el caso de Mayo, las relaciones políticas no pueden ser entendidas sin considerar el contexto político nacional y particularmente los conflictos entre el gobierno central y los diferentes grupos armados en las zonas periféricas del país. Hasta los años '80 del siglo pasado se ha tratado de limitar el acceso de los migrantes rurales a la ciudad, porque desde la perspectiva de los poderosos (y la ciudadanía urbana) ellos formaron una amenaza política, económica y de inseguridad. Actualmente la administración de Khartoum y de Mayo también se puede caracterizar como un régimen autoritario muy poco tolerante hacia la oposición política, que está asociado con los movimientos armados en otras partes del país. El régimen ha llegado al poder en 1989 y desde entonces ha promovido una transformación social en la base de una ideología concentrada en la Islamización y la Arabización. Grupos armados en el sur, centro y el oeste de Sudan que ya estaban luchando contra la marginalización económica, han intensificado su resistencia en respuesta a esta política. Muchos de los desplazados de estas áreas viven actualmente en Mayo. En el 2005 se concluyó un acuerdo de paz entre el gobierno y el movimiento armado más grande, el cual se transformó en un movimiento político llamado el "Sudan People's Liberation Movement" (SPLM). Formalmente este

acuerdo ha proporcionado a los seguidores del SPLM en Mayo un marco político para reclamar sus derechos. En la práctica, sin embargo, sus efectos han sido limitados, entre otros porque la prioridad del SPLM estaba con el estatus del Sur Sudan después del referéndum en el 2011 y el retorno de los desplazados.

En resumen, existen importantes diferencias entre ambas ciudades. México D.F. puede ser considerada como un área urbana consolidada, mientras que Khartoum está en pleno desarrollo. México D.F. ha vivido una transición democrática mientras que Khartoum está administrada por un régimen autoritario y que es la capital de un país que conoce varios conflictos internos armados. Los servicios de seguridad juegan un papel importante en la relación entre el Estado y los habitantes en Khartoum. A la vez también se detectan similitudes: la urbanización está basada en [drivers] que son comparables en ambos países y los barrios populares se han desarrollado más o menos de la misma manera. Ambos barrios populares además constituyen bases de apoyo importantes para los más grandes partidos políticos de oposición.

En el capítulo 4 discuto la pobreza y la exclusión en Iztapalapa y en Mayo. En ambos barrios existe la escasez, aunque en diferentes áreas y en diferentes medidas. En Iztapalapa la exclusión se expresa sobre todo en la falta de acceso a servicios públicos de buena calidad, el empleo y la seguridad. En comparación con el resto de la ciudad la calidad del servicio del agua está muy mal. En parte esto tiene que ver con la ubicación de la delegación. Sin embargo, el gobierno compensa las faltas en el sistema de aporte de agua con la distribución en 'pipas', pero esta distribución es vulnerable para la explotación. Espacios públicos y áreas verdes también son escasos en Iztapalapa. Casi todo el terreno está regularizado pero ésta regularización está desafiado diariamente. Con el apoyo de actores políticos, asentados irregulares ('paracaidistas') reclaman estos espacios para vivir, mientras que grupos de habitantes particulares, como los adultos mayores y los jóvenes reclaman estos espacios para pasar tiempo. Bandas juveniles que también ocupan estos espacios contribuyen a un sentimiento general de inseguridad. Habitantes también se quejan de una falta de empleo.

Aunque Iztapalapa genera una proporción significativa de las actividades económicas en la ciudad, esto no se traduce en oportunidades de empleo para la población de Iztapalapa misma. La mayoría de los habitantes trabaja en pequeñas empresas de familia, que generalmente son considerados como parte de la economía informal. Los salarios en estas empresas son relativamente bajos, lo cual se traduce entre otros en una calidad mediana de las viviendas. La migración hacia los Estados Unidos y oportunidades en la venta de drogas como camino rápido hacia el éxito económico también son consecuencias de la falta de empleo en la delegación. En general Iztapalapa está asociado con la criminalidad y sus habitantes son estigmatizados por el resto de la ciudad.

En Mayo, la exclusión es una cuestión de la falta de acceso a la tierra, alojamiento, servicios públicos, empleo y protección. Algunos habitantes han estado esperando

por más de veinte años para la regularización de sus terrenos. Se sigue ejecutando desplazamientos de la población. En los barrios donde la tierra no ha sido regularizada no existen servicios públicos. Habitantes compran su agua de carros tirados por burros y su electricidad de individuos que poseen un generador en su casa. Regularmente trabajan en la economía informal: como obreros en otros partes de la ciudad, como vendedores ambulantes, choferes de taxi o de ‘riksha’ o como empleadas del hogar. Trabajos en el gobierno son muy poco accesibles para gente con una educación limitada, que son la mayoría de los habitantes en Mayo. En general los ingresos no alcanzan para una vivienda. La seguridad es un tema complicado en Mayo. Por un lado Mayo es un área segura con bajos índices de criminalidad. Pero, por otra parte la policía y los servicios de seguridad en sí mismos ponen un riesgo de seguridad para partes de la población, por ejemplo para las mujeres que viven de actividades consideradas como ilegales bajo la ley ‘shari’a’ (como vender bebidas alcohólicas). Actividades políticas son un riesgo de seguridad y solo el pertenecer a un cierto grupo étnico puede menar a la sospecha de apoyo a grupos armados. Aunque formalmente los habitantes de Mayo tienen derecho a la protección, servicios públicos y la participación política, en la práctica resulta difícil ejercer estos derechos. La exclusión determina en una medida significativa las dimensiones sociales de la ciudadanía en ambos barrios.

En el capítulo 5 exploro las posibilidades que los habitantes de Mayo y de Iztapalapa tienen para reclamar derechos iguales. Primeramente discuto los actores involucrados: los proveedores de bienes y servicios públicos y los demandantes. En Mayo el Estado casi no ofrece nada y deja todo a empresas privadas, ONGs y organizaciones religiosas. Estas ‘autoridades alternativas’ operan bajo el marco que está definido por el Estado y actúan como intermediarios para los pobres. En Iztapalapa el Estado es el proveedor más importante de servicios públicos, pero la distribución se hace a través de las organizaciones populares y partidos políticos. En ambos casos los ‘campos de reclamo’ son híbridos: tanto las instituciones del Estado como partidos políticos y otras organizaciones juegan un papel en proveer el acceso a asuntos de importancia para los habitantes. Al lado de la demanda las organizaciones sociales en Mayo están caracterizadas por sus dimensiones étnicas, mientras que en Iztapalapa la forma dominante de organización social son las organizaciones populares. Estas organizaciones juegan un papel importante en formular la demanda de los habitantes frente al Estado y otros proveedores de servicios, como ONGs de desarrollo y organizaciones religiosas. Las organizaciones profesionales están ganando importancia en ambos barrios.

En un contexto de escasez, se tiene que intermediar entre la oferta mencionada aquí arriba y la demanda organizada. Esto funciona en diferentes maneras. Tanto en Iztapalapa como en Mayo existen instancias para capturar la demanda ciudadana. En principio el gobierno de México D.F. apoya la interacción estado-sociedad en la base de autonomía de las organizaciones populares, pero el modelo ideal que tenía que representar los ciudadanos hacia el gobierno todavía no existía en el 2008 en Iztapalapa. La participación ciudadana se hizo a la invitación y bajo las

condiciones puestas por el gobierno. En Mayo hay una sola organización para la participación ciudadana, que más bien pertenece al Estado. El gobierno influye de manera importante como los habitantes pueden participar o reclamar sus derechos. Partidos políticos ocupan un lugar central en la intermediación entre la oferta y demanda (de servicios públicos) en ambas ciudades. Sin embargo, no se limitan a la lucha para el poder del Estado y el control de éste a través de la asamblea. En ambas ciudades los representantes de sistemas electorales basados en distritos tienen oficinas en los barrios e interfieren directamente con la prestación de servicios del Estado a los habitantes. El activismo social es un factor importante para el éxito político tanto en Iztapalapa como en Mayo: los políticos se meten en la prestación de servicios urbanos y prestadores de servicios se convierten en políticos.

Más sorprendente son las similitudes que existen entre los intermediarios que operan entre el Estado y los habitantes en ambos barrios. En su mayoría estos intermediarios han empezado su 'carera' como activista social, reclamando derechos a la tierra y servicios para sus seguidores (a menudo los recién llegados en la ciudad). En Iztapalapa tanto como en Mayo todavía hay mucho espacio para emprendedores políticos quienes ocupan funciones dobles entre instituciones del gobierno, partidos políticos y otras organizaciones involucradas en la provisión de servicios públicos. Una diferencia importante se encuentra en las relaciones de poder en ambas ciudades. En Iztapalapa la transición democrática (y particularmente el hecho de que el poder y los recursos del Estado están accesibles para diferentes partidos a la vez), en combinación con el faccionalismo dentro del PRD han llevado a lo que llamo el 'clientelismo competitivo'. Líderes locales pueden escoger entre diferentes dueños políticos quienes competen entre ellos, lo cual les da una cierta posición de poder. En Mayo las diferentes organizaciones tienen que someterse al partido gobernante, el cual controla casi todos los recursos económicos en el país. En ambos barrios entonces, la estructura de oportunidades políticas consiste de una zona gris, caracterizada por las funciones dobles de intermediarios. La diferencia entre México D.F. en Khartoum consiste en que estos intermediarios se relacionen de manera diferente entre ellos y con el Estado.

En el capítulo 6 investigo las consecuencias que la estructura de oportunidades políticas tiene para la perspectiva de actuación política de los habitantes de ambos barrios. Analizo las estrategias políticas de los habitantes en conjunto con las estrategias del gobierno y de los intermediarios mismos. En ambos barrios los habitantes tratan de defender sus intereses de manera colectiva, en el cual los líderes locales juegan un papel fundamental. Una similitud importante entre ambos barrios es que los habitantes tienden a acercar el Estado siempre a través de contactos personales, lo cual refuerza el papel y la posición de los líderes. Una segunda similitud es que la manera en que los pobres tratan de defender sus intereses en ambos barrios siempre es una variedad de un juego de negociación. Los habitantes manejan una variedad de estrategias que emplean según el con-

texto – a veces simultáneamente, a veces invariadamente. En ambos barrios el clientelismo ocurre, tanto como la estrategia descrito por Bayat como la ‘tránsito silenciosa.’ La resistencia (violenta) ocurre incidentalmente en ambos barrios, cuando intereses vitales de los habitantes están en juego. No encontré movimientos sociales, ni en Iztapalapa ni en Mayo, pero si encontré otras formas colectivas de defender intereses. Al final de cuenta las estrategias de los habitantes siempre están dirigidas hacia llegar a negociaciones con el gobierno local. La puesta de las negociaciones está determinada por los intermediarios.

Seguidamente, analizo las estrategias empleadas por ambos gobiernos. Ambos gobiernos tienen varios medios a su disposición para aumentar su legitimidad, tanto como para mantener el control. Intermediarios también juegan un papel central en esto. En tiempos de elecciones ambos gobiernos locales mostraron de comprar votos a través de intermediarios y entre elecciones ambos gobiernos intentaron de ganar líderes potenciales a su lado por la cooptación. Otra posibilidad que emplearon los gobiernos – aunque más el de Mayo que el de Iztapalapa – era la infiltración de organizaciones comunitarias y la nominación de líderes. Al final analizo la interacción entre los habitantes y el gobierno desde la perspectiva del intermediario mismo. Demuestro como en Iztapalapa los intermediarios construyen y explotan un cierto grado de autonomía hacia los habitantes y el gobierno, ocupando posiciones de monopolio. Al final la relación entre el Estado y sus ciudadanos en Iztapalapa no es ‘diádico’. Es más bien, un triángulo, en la cual los actores terceros se posicionan como intermediarios. En Mayo los intermediarios también juegan un papel importante, pero actúan más como una prolongación del partido gobernante. Esto limita las opciones de los habitantes para negociar con el gobierno.

En el capítulo 7 finalmente, primero ofrezco algunas conclusiones en cuanto a las maneras en las cuales los habitantes pobres de México D.F. y de Khartoum pueden reclamar acceso a bienes y servicios públicos. Posteriormente, discuto las implicaciones de estas conclusiones para la formulación de teorías alrededor de la ciudadanía y la interacción estado-sociedad.

Existen grandes diferencias entre los motivos y en las posibilidades de movilización para los habitantes de Mayo y de Iztapalapa: en Mayo la pobreza está mucho más absoluta y el Estado está mucho menos directamente involucrado en la prestación de servicios. Por lo tanto sorprende que encontré similitudes en las estrategias políticas de los habitantes de ambos barrios: de mi investigación apareció que los habitantes pobres casi siempre se dirigen hacia el gobierno de manera indirecta y que mantienen un conjunto de estrategias que emplean. En ambos barrios intermediarios juegan un papel fundamental en la determinación sobre cuando se emplea cual estrategia. ¿Cómo se pueden explicar estas similitudes, considerando las diferencias mencionadas aquí arriba? Argumento que con una mirada más detallada a los motivos y las oportunidades se puede encontrar similitudes en estas también. Primeramente existen paralelos entre los pro-

cesos de exclusión en ambos barrios: bajo la presión de la escasez, el acceso a la prestación de servicios no está garantizado por instituciones públicas. El acceso tiene que ser negociado a diario. Estas prácticas de negociación no corresponden a reglas formales. En segundo lugar, en ambos casos existe una estructura de oportunidades políticas híbrida o 'gris', en la cual el papel del Estado está mezclado con otras formas de autoridad, a través de las funciones dobles de los intermediarios.

Por lo tanto, la diferencia entre Iztapalapa 'democrática' y Mayo 'autoritario' no se expresa tanto en la ocurrencia de una estrategia u otra (movimientos sociales en Iztapalapa y clientelismo en Mayo) pero en la diferencia en la posición de los intermediarios hacia el gobierno local. La transición democrática en Iztapalapa ha generado más pluralismo en el acceso a los recursos del Estado, por lo cual los intermediarios han ganado una cierta autonomía. En Mayo los intermediarios son más dependientes del partido gobernante y tienen menos espacio de manobra. Esto tiene consecuencias para la posición de negociación de los habitantes y para los resultados de la negociación.

La posición de los pobres más favorable en Iztapalapa tiene menos que ver entonces con la formalización de relaciones estado-sociedad democráticas que con la pluralización del poder y con el acceso a los recursos. Esto modifica el valor que el concepto 'estructura de oportunidades políticas' atribuye a regímenes nacionales y su carácter: democrático o autoritario. Mi conclusión es que aunque el pensar en términos de regímenes en teorías de participación política ofrece indicaciones interesantes, el concepto 'estructura de oportunidades políticas' pasa por encima de ciertas características de la interacción entre el Estado y los pobres urbanos que pueden explicar similitudes en casos contrastantes como México D.F. y Khartoum.

Por lo tanto mi tesis es que debemos tratar la existencia de una 'zona gris', basado en la mezcla de formas formales e informales de autoridad y formas formales e informales de interacción entre el Estado y los habitantes, como punto de partida para poder entender la interacción estado-sociedad en ciudades como éstas. Los Intermediarios son el vínculo indispensable en esta zona gris del poder del Estado. En un contexto urbano ellos aprovechan el caos administrativo y la escasez para crear/ reforzar su posición. En algunos casos lo emplean para el beneficio de los pobres, pero en otros no. La comparación entre México D.F. y Khartoum muestra que los intermediarios pueden aprovecharse aún más de un sistema democrático (en el cual la competición para el poder esta fundamental) que de un sistema autoritario. Efectivamente en México D.F. existe 'la intermediación multipolar' porque los intermediarios pueden escoger entre dueños políticos, mientras que en Khartoum existe 'la intermediación unipolar' porque los intermediarios dependen de un solo fuente de poder. Es posible que estas conclusiones sobre todo se apliquen en barrios populares en grandes ciudades porque en un contexto de escasez la tensión entre las necesidades de los habitantes y la

búsqueda para la legitimidad del gobierno es tan significativa. Para comprobar esto, más comparaciones empíricas entre ciudades en el mundo podrían proveer indicios interesantes. Porque aunque autores como Roy y AlSayyad (2003) dicen, la informalidad se expresa diferentemente en todos partes del mundo, este estudio ha demostrado que existen suficientes razones para suponer que – aún en casos contrastantes – la informalidad genera efectos parecidos en términos de la interacción estado-sociedad.

ملخص

هذه الدراسة حول المواطنة والتعامل غير الرسمي في المدن الكبرى. سوف تزداد النسبة المئوية من سكان العالم الذين يعيشون في المدن بسرعة في العقود المقبلة. يتميز التحضر في كثير من أنحاء العالم بالتعامل غير الرسمي. على الرغم من أن الناس نظرياً لديهم الحق في وجود سقف فوق رؤوسهم، ومرافق حضرية وحق في العمل، ولكن في الواقع العملي فإن ذلك لكثير منهم غير متوفر. فليس لديهم ملكية أرض أو عقد إيجار لمساكنهم، ويعيشون في منازل مؤقتة تحصل على الكهرباء من مولدات كهرباء خاصة ويحصلون على دخولهم من الاقتصاد غير الرسمي. ومع ذلك، توفر المدينة لهم فرص محددة للتعبئة والمشاركة السياسية. وهذا ما يسمى "مفارقة المواطنة". لفهم المزيد عن هذه المفارقة تركز هذه الدراسة على الطرق التي تتشكل بها المواطنة لفقراء المناطق الحضرية في المدن الكبرى في حالتين متناقضتين. فإبني أزم وعلى أساس ستة أشهر من العمل الميداني في مدينة المكسيك وستة أشهر من العمل الميداني في الخرطوم، على مدى فترة ثلاث سنوات، أن في هاتين المدينتين أوجه تشابه لافت للنظر في السبل التي يمكن للفقراء في المناطق الحضرية التفاوض بها مع الحكومة المحلية حول المواطنة. يعبر هذا التشابه عن نفسه في دور الوسطاء العاملين في ما يسمى "المنطقة الرمادية" من سلطة (الدولة). إنهم يتوسطون بين الحكومة المحلية والسلطات العامة الأخرى، مثل المنظمات الدينية والمنظمات المجتمعية والمنظمات غير الحكومية (التنموية) والمنظمات الإجرامية في بعض الأحيان. اللات للنظر، في ضوء النظريات القائمة أن هذا النوع من الوساطة (كثيراً ما يوصف بأنه 'محسوبية') لا يفتحي مع الديمقراطية. حيث يعمل الوسطاء، في ظل الديمقراطية ولكن أيضاً المتميزة بالندرة، في مدينة المكسيك بين الدولة والمواطنين في الكثير الأحيان بنفس الطريقة كما هو الحال في الخرطوم الاستبدادية. فقد استفادوا من التحول الديمقراطي في المكسيك: الفرق بين مدينتي المكسيك والخرطوم هو في الهيمنة النسبية للوسطاء بالنسبة للحكومة المحلية. يمكن للمعلماء، في المكسيك، الاختيار بين عدة رعاية سياسيين، مما يعطيهم مجالاً للمناورة في ما يتعلق بالدولة، كما يمكنهم أن يعزوا من موقفهم الذاتي. أما في الخرطوم فيعتمد الوسطاء على راعي واحد - الحزب الحاكم. ونتيجة لذلك فإنهم غالباً ما يعملون كامتداد للدولة. لأن لهذا الوضع عواقب على الموقف التفاوضي للفقراء في المناطق الحضرية فإبني أزيد التمييز بين الوساطة ذات القطب الواحد والمتعددة الأقطاب.

يتكون هذا الكتاب من جزأين. في الجزء الأول - من المقدمة وحتى الفصل الثالث - أقدم الخطوط العريضة لإطار الجزء الأكثر تجريبية من الدراسة: حيث أصف هنا المنهجية، الإطار المفاهيمي وخلفية الحالتين. يضم الجزء الثاني - الفصول الرابع إلى السادس - حيث ناقش استنتاجاتي التجريبية. في الفصل السابع، أقوم بصياغة بعض الاستنتاجات ومناقشة الآثار المترتبة على نظريات المواطنة وعلاقات الدولة والمجتمع. في هذا الفصل، أقدم عرض لفكرة الوساطة ذات القطب الواحد مقابل الوساطة متعددة الأقطاب.

فقد طورت في الفصل الثاني الإطار المفاهيمي لدراسة المواطنة في المدن الكبرى في حالتين متناقضتين. استناداً إلى الأدبيات التجريبية الحديثة التي تفترض أن التعامل غير الرسمي في المناطق الحضرية يحدد كيفية تشكيل السكان الفقراء لمكانة المواطنة لديهم. أولاً استكشف دور التعامل الرسمي في الحياة اليومية لفقراء سكان المدن الكبرى. سوف أبين أن طابع التعامل الرسمي والعنف وعدم المساواة التي تصبغ توصيف حياة فقراء الحضر تتناقض بشكل حاد مع الرأي السائد حول المواطنة، القائمة على مبدأ أن جميع المواطنين متساوون أمام القانون ومبدأ المساواة في الحصول على موارد الدولة كأمراض أساسية. فقد كان التعامل غير الرسمي له عواقب على مختلف أبعاد المواطنة المرتبطة مع بعضها البعض: الحرمان من الحق في الحصول على الأراضي والمأوى والعمل، كما يحدد شروط ممارسة المشاركة السياسية.

لفهم فرص المشاركة السياسية، يجب علينا أيضاً أن ننظر إلى "الطرف المتلقي" منه: أي الدولة. ولذلك، فإبني أيضاً استكشف كيفية تأثير التعامل غير الرسمي على الإدارة الحضرية. يتزايد في الأدبيات الحديثة الاعتراف بأن أشكال الإدارة الرسمية وغير الرسمية في جوهرها مختلفة معاً. يتعلق عادة هذا الإدعاء بالتهجين في العلاقة بين الدولة والمواطنين، والتي تقوم بالتناوب على منطق التخصيصية والعالمية. أود أن أضيف هنا أن مفهوم التهجين الأفقي لذلك: هذا له علاقة مع تزايد دور المنظمات الخاصة في المجال العام والمزج بين العام والخاص الناجم عن ذلك. في سياق التحضر السريع وعدم وجود تنظيم، فإن الدولة غالباً ما تعتمد على أشكال "غير رسمية" من القيادة لممارسة سلطتها (إشراك الزعماء التقليديين، والمنظمات المجتمعية). يتزايد هذا الاعتماد بالطبع إذا قامت الدولة تمويل الخدمات من الباطن حيث تؤدي المنظمات الخاصة الواجبات العامة. ويصبح التعامل غير الرسمي الأفقي والرأسي مترابطين بسبب أن السلطات "غير الرسمية" تتوسط بين الدولة والمواطنين في المدينة. هذا كله يشكل "المنطقة الرمادية" من سلطة الدولة. بعد ذلك سأتناول المعنى المذكور أعلاه بالنسبة لمنظور الفقراء في المناطق الحضرية. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، أعود إلى الفكرة المركزية في دراسة الحركات الاجتماعية حول أهمية الدوافع والوسائل والفرص لاستراتيجيات السياسية للقيادة والمرؤسين. إن مفهوم "هيكل الفرص السياسية" هو النموذج المهيمن لتحليل التفاعل بين الدولة والمجتمع. يفسر هذا المفهوم العامل التفسيري الرئيسي في طبيعة النظام. حيث كانت الحركات الاجتماعية الوسيلة المهيمنة للتعبئة في الديمقراطيات، في حين في ظل أنظمة استبدادية ينشأ صراع عنيف لمعارضة سرية أو علنية. أعتقد أن "المنطقة الرمادية" تشكل هيكل الفرصة التي من خلاله

يمكن للفقراء في المناطق الحضرية من طرح مطالباتهم في مواجهة الدولة في أنواع مختلفة من الأنظمة وأغنى هنا أن الوسطاء يلعبون دوراً حاسماً.

لقد قدمت في **الفصل الثالث** حالتين في سياقهما التاريخي والسياسي الوطني. لقد وصفت بلباز تاريخ التحضر في مدينتي المكسيك والخرطوم والخطوط العريضة لكيفية تشكل أحياء شعبية ضخمة في كلتا المدينتين. ولتفسير العلاقات السياسية داخل الأحياء الشعبية رسمت صورة للتطورات السياسية الوطنية الرئيسية في العقود الأخيرة. يمثل ازابالابا حي شعبي في جنوب شرق مدينة المكسيك، حيث يقطن حوالي مليوني شخص. وتضع المنطقة بأكملها تقريباً للتنظيم الحضري؛ 70٪ من السكان يملكون الأرض التي يعيشون عليها و95% من المساكن مربوطة بشبكة الكهرباء والمياه والصرف الصحي. وعلى الرغم من أنه من المشكوك فيه ما إذا كان يمكن الحديث عن ازابالابا الفقيرة باعتباره واحد من أفقر المجالس البلدية في مدينة المكسيك. وحيث يرتبط ازابالابا بقوة بالجريمة، إذ توجد للجريمة المنظمة هنا موطئ قدم ثابت. يجب علينا لفهم الأنشطة السياسية في ازابالابا أن ننظر إلى تاريخ الحي والسياق السياسي الوطني. فقد تم إنشاء أجزاء مختلفة من ازابالابا بطرق مختلفة: فبعض أجزاء الحي خطط من قبل الحكومة والبيض الأخر أصبح مسكوناً بسبب البيع غير المشروع للأرض المشاع. وظهرت حركات اجتماعية قوية تناضل من أجل الخدمات العامة خاصة في المناطق الأخيرة. تعززت هذه الحركات الاجتماعية بسبب الزلزال الذي دمر العاصمة في عام 1985 ولعبت دوراً هاماً في عملية التحول الديمقراطي في عام 2000 مما أدى في نهاية المطاف إلى نهاية دولة الحزب الواحد على المستوى الوطني. وقد أدت هذه العملية الديمقراطية أيضاً إلى مزيد من الحكم الذاتي وفتح فضاء للمشاركة السياسية على مستوى مدينة المكسيك والمجالس البلدية التابعة (الأحياء) لها. يدير حزب الثورة الديمقراطي مدينة المكسيك منذ عام 1988، وهو الحزب الذي لديه قاعدة أساسها في ازابالابا. وفي الوقت نفسه، أصبحت العديد من الحركات الاجتماعية من ازابالابا جزءاً من حزب الثورة الديمقراطي.

أما حي مايو فهو حي يقع في جنوب الخرطوم ويتكون من خليط من مخيمات اللاجئين، "السكن العشوائي" ومناطق تم ضمها للسكن المنظم. وهو حي عادة يذكر بانتظام في الأخبار. ويرجع ذلك إلى ارتفاع عدد الجنبيين في الحي والصراعات التي رافقت ذلك، وخصوصاً حول عمليات الترحيل التي تشكل جزءاً أساسياً من سياسة التخطيط الحضري. لا يمكن فهم العلاقات السياسية في حي مايو دون أخذ السياق السياسي الوطني والصراعات بين الحكومة الوطنية في المركز وحركات التمرد في بقية مناطق البلاد بعين الاعتبار. فمنذ عقد الثمانينات من القرن الماضي تمت محاولة استبعاد المواطنين، القادمون من المناطق الريفية، من المدينة لأنهم يشكلون خطراً على المجالات السياسية والاقتصادية والأمنية من وجهة نظر من هم في السلطة (وسكان المناطق الحضرية). وتتميز حكومة الخرطوم وتلك التي في حي مايو الآن بكونها نظام استبدادي والذي يضيّق الخناق على أي شكل من أشكال المعارضة السياسية، وهو أمر يرتبط بالمعارضة المسلحة في أماكن أخرى من البلاد. فقد جاء النظام إلى السلطة في عام 1989 ويحاول منذ ذلك الحين تحقيق تحول اجتماعي على أساس إيديولوجي يهدف إلى الأسلمة والتعريب. لقد كثفت الحركات المتمردة من جنوب ووسط وغرب السودان، الذين يقاوتون ضد التهميش، من مقاومتها نتيجة لذلك. يعيش العديد من اللاجئين من تلك المناطق في حي مايو. وفي عام 2005 تم التوصل إلى اتفاق بين الحكومة وأكبر حركة متمردة، الجيش الشعبي لتحرير السودان. لقد منح هذا الاتفاق أنصار الحركة الشعبية في حي مايو إطاراً رسمياً للمطالبة بحقوقهم. لقد كان لذلك تأثير محدود في الممارسة العملية، ويرجع ذلك جزئياً كون أولوية الجيش الشعبي تتجه نحو فصل جنوب السودان وعودة النازحين إلى الجنوب.

وباختصار، تظهر كلا المدينتان فروق ذات دلالة هامة في العديد من النواحي. يمكن أن ينظر إلى مدينة المكسيك باعتبارها منطقة حضرية موحدة، في حين لا تزال الخرطوم في طور النمو. فقد عبرت مدينة المكسيك مرحلة التحول الديمقراطي، بينما ما زالت الخرطوم تترزح تحت ظل نظام استبدادي وعاصمة لبلاد واقعة في شراك العديد من النزاعات المسلحة. تلعب في الخرطوم الأجهزة الأمنية دوراً مهماً في العلاقة بين الدولة والمواطنين. في نفس الوقت، هناك أوجه تشابه: فالتحضر في كلا البلدين قائم على أساس دوافع متشابهة وأن الأحياء الشعبية قامت على أسس متشابهة. يدعم كلا الحين الشعبين أحزاب المعارضة الرئيسية أيضاً.

سوف نناقش في **الفصل 4** الفقر والاستبعاد في حي ازابالابا ومايو. في كلا الحين المذكورين يمكن الحديث عن الندرة، وإن كان ذلك في مجالات مختلفة ودرجات متفاوتة. في حي ازابالابا الاستبعاد هو أساساً مسألة انعدام القدرة على الوصول إلى الخدمات العامة والعمل والعمالة والأمن. بالمقارنة مع بقية المدينة فإن نوعية إمدادات المياه سيئة بوضوح. وهذا له علاقة جزئياً بموقع ازابالابا. حيث تعوض الحكومة عدم وجود إمدادات المياه من خلال توزيع المياه عن طريق الشاحنات، ولكن هذا التوزيع يكون عرضة للتلاعب والفساد. كما أن الأماكن العامة والمناظر الطبيعية الخضراء هي أيضاً نادرة في ازابالابا. لقد تم رسمياً تقسيم كل الأراضي ولكن في الواقع هذا التقسيم عرضة يومياً للنزاع والتحدى مرة أخرى. يطالب السكان غير القانونيين بالأماكن العامة مدعومين من قبل الجهات السياسية (السكن العشوائي)، ولكن أيضاً من قبل مجموعات سكانية معينة مثل كبار السن (المتقاعدين) والشباب (العاطلين عن العمل، والذين لا يرتادون المدارس) على وجه الخصوص. تسهم عصابات الشباب في انعدام كبير للأمن في ازابالابا. ويشكو السكان أيضاً من نقص في فرص العمل. على الرغم من أن حصة ازابالابا الكبيرة في الأنشطة الاقتصادية للمدينة، إلا أن هذا لا يترجم إلى فرص عمل للمواطنين في ازابالابا نفسها. يعمل معظم السكان في الشركات الصغيرة (المملوكة

للأسر) التي غالباً ما ينظر إليها على أنها جزء من الاقتصاد غير الرسمي. كما أن الرواتب منخفضة نسبياً هنا، وهو ما يترجم إلى رداءة في نوعية السكن. تمثل الهجرة إلى الولايات المتحدة والفرص المتاحة في تجارة المخدرات الطريق السريع إلى النجاح (الاقتصادي) وهي من العواقب المترتبة على انعدام فرص العمالة. ويرتبط عموماً حي ازتابالابا بالجريمة ويوصم المقيمون في الحي من قبل الآخرين من سكان مدينة مكسيكو.

أما في حي مايو فالاستبعاد هو أساساً مسألة نقص فرص الحصول على الأراضي والسكن والخدمات العامة والعمالة والحماية. ينتظر بعض السكان حوالي عشرين عاماً من أجل تنظيم الأراضي. كما لا زال يتم تنفيذ عمليات الترحيل. ففي المناطق التي ليس هناك تنظيم لملكية الأرض، لا توجد هناك خدمات عامة. حيث يشتري السكان المياه من عربات تجرها الحمير والكهرايم من المولدات الخاصة. غالباً ما يعمل سكان مايو في القطاع غير الرسمي: كعمال باليومية في أجزاء أخرى من المدينة، وكباعة جاتلين، وكسائقي عربات الركشة أو كعمال نظافة. كما يصعب الوصول إلى الوظائف الحكومية بالنسبة للأشخاص من ذوي المهارات المنخفضة نسبياً. كما أن الدخل/الأجور بشكل عام غير كافية لتسديد متطلبات الحياة. ويعد الأمن في مايو موضوعاً معقداً. فمن جانب، يعد حي مايو منطقة آمنة مع معدل جريمة منخفض. من ناحية أخرى، تشكل الشرطة والأجهزة الأمنية في حد ذاتها تهديداً لأجزاء من السكان، على سبيل المثال، النساء اللاتي شاركن في الأنشطة الاقتصادية المزدهرة ولكنها المحظورة بموجب الشريعة (مثل بيع الكحول). تشكل أشكال الأنشطة السياسية للمقيمين مخاطر أمنية ويمكن أن يؤدي الانتفاء إلى مجموعة إثنية محددة إلى الاشتباه في دعم المتمردين. بالرغم من أن لدى السكان من مايو وازتابالابا حق رسمي في الحماية والخدمات العامة والمشاركة السياسية، إلا أنهم في الممارسة العملية يصعب عليهم ممارسة ذلك. يحدد الاستبعاد إلى حد كبير الأبعاد الاجتماعية للمواطنة في كلا المنطقتين المذكورتين.

لقد بحثت في الفصل 5 الإمكانيات المتوفرة لسكان حي مايو وازتابالابا كي يطالبوا بحق الوصول المتساوي. أولاً، أناقش اللاعبين المشاركين هنا: مقدمي السلع والخدمات العامة والطلاب لهذا الخدمات. في حي مايو لا تتوفر الدولة شيئاً يذكر تقريباً، وتسمح للشركات والمنظمات غير الحكومية والمنظمات الدينية بتقديم كل شيء. من الناحية النظرية، تعمل هذه السلطات "البديلة" بشكل جيد ضمن الأطر التي وضعتها الحكومة وتتوسط للفقر بالتأكد عند الحكومة. في ازتابالابا الدولة هي المزود الرئيسي للخدمات العامة ولكن التوزيع في كثير من الأحيان من خلال منظمات المجتمع المحلي. في كلتا الحالتين، فإن إحقول صنع المطالب، وبالتالي الهجين: أجهزة الدولة والأحزاب السياسية وغيرها من المنظمات تلعب دوراً في الوصول إلى الأشياء المهمة للسكان. وعلى جانب الطلب في مايو تتميز المنظمات الاجتماعية بصيغة العلاقات القليلة بينما في ازتابالابا الشكل السائد من التنظيم الاجتماعي هو منظمة الحي. تلعب هذه المنظمات دوراً هاماً في صياغة مطالب السكان في مواجهة الحكومة وغيرها من مقدمي الخدمات، مثل المنظمات غير الحكومية الإنمائية والمنظمات الدينية. كما أن المنظمات المهنية أخذة في الظهور في كلا المنطقتين.

يجب، في سياق الندرة، أن يكون بين العرض والطلب (المنظم) نوع من الوساطة. ويتم ذلك بطرق مختلفة. في ازتابالابا ومايو هناك جهات رسمية لمشاركة المواطنين. من حيث المبدأ تدعم حكومة مدينة المكسيك التفاعل بين الحكومة والسكان المحليين على أساس من المساواة، ولكن النموذج الذي ينبغي أن يمثل المواطنين في مواجهة الحكومة لم ينشأ في ازتابالابا في عام 2008. حيث تتم مشاركة المواطن على أساس دعوة من الحكومة وبموجب شروطها. وفي مايو هناك منظمة واحدة فقط لمشاركة المواطنين، تنتمي للحكومة وليس للمواطنين أنفسهم. ولذلك تؤثر الحكومة بشكل كبير على الطريقة التي يمكن للمواطنين ممارسة المشاركة أو تقديم المطالبات العامة. تلعب الأحزاب السياسية في كلا المدن دوراً مهماً في الوساطة بين العرض والطلب. ومنذ فترة طويلة لا تنقيد الأحزاب فقط بالفضال من أجل سلطة الدولة والسيطرة عليها من خلال البرلمان. في كلتا المدينتين، لدى ممثلو نظام الحي نفسه مكاتب في الحيين ويتدخل هؤلاء بصورة مباشرة في تقديم الخدمات الحكومية للمواطنين. يشكل النشاط الاجتماعي في كلا المنطقتين عاملاً مهماً للنجاح السياسي: يقوم الساسة بتقديم الخدمات الحضرية ومقدمي الخدمات الحضرية يصبحون سياسيين.

التشابه الملحوظ في كلا المنطقتين هم الوسطاء النشطين بين الدولة والمواطنين. لقد بدأ هؤلاء مهنة السياسة باعتبارهم "ناشطين اجتماعيين"، حيث يطالبون بحقوق الأراضي والخدمات العامة أو ينظمون ذلك للأعضاء المساندين لهم، ومعظمهم من الوافدين الجدد إلى المدينة. لا يزال تقريباً في كل من ازتابالابا ومايو هناك مجال لأصحاب المشاريع السياسية الذين يقومون بمهام مزدوجة بين السلطات العامة والأحزاب السياسية والمنظمات الأخرى المشاركة في تقديم الخدمات العامة. الفارق الهام بين المدينتين هو في توازن القوى المحلية. يؤدي التحول الديمقراطي في ازتابالابا (حقيقة أن سلطة الدولة يمكن الوصول إليها من قبل الأحزاب المختلفة) في تركيبة الانقسامات داخل حزب الثورة الديموقراطية إلى "المحسوبية التنافسية". يملك القادة المحليين الإختيار من بين الرعاة السياسيين المختلفين الذين يتنافسون مع بعضهم البعض، مما يمنحهم هيمنة معينة. يجب في مايو أن تخضع المنظمات المختلفة كلها في نهاية المطاف للحزب الحاكم، الذي يملك تقريباً كل الموارد الاقتصادية. يتكون في كلا المنطقتين "هيكل الفرص السياسية" من المنطقة المرادية التي تتميز بوظائف مزدوجة للوسطاء، ولكن هذه تتصل بشكل مختلف مع بعضها البعض ومع الحكومة المحلية.

Negotiating Urban Citizenship

في الفصل السادس سأبحث عواقب هيكل الفرص السياسية هذا من منظور عملي لسكان الحيين. سأتناول الاستراتيجيات السياسية للمواطنين وبالترزامن مع استراتيجيات الحكومة والوسطاء أنفسهم. يحاول الفقراء، في كلا المنطقتين، الدفاع عن مصالحهم المشتركة، وفي هذا الشأن يلعب الزعماء المحليون دوراً محورياً. إن عنصر التشابه بين كلا الحيين أن السكان لديهم ميل إلى الاتصال بالدولة من خلال الاتصالات الشخصية، الأمر الذي يعزز من دور القادة المحليين. أما عنصر التشابه الثاني فهو أن الطريقة التي يحاول بها الفقراء الدفاع عن مصالحهم في كلا الحيين لها أسلوب معين من لعبة المساومة. أنهم يستخدمون مجموعة من الاستراتيجيات - في وقت واحد في بعض الأحيان، بالتناوب في أحيان أخرى - وذلك حسب السياق. تبرز المحسوبية للأمام في المنطقتين المذكورتين، فضلاً عن الاستراتيجية التي وصفها Bayat (بايت) باسم "الزحف الهادئ". تحدث المقاومة (العنيفة) أحياناً في المنطقتين المذكورتين، عندما تتأثر مصالحهما الحيوية. لقد وجدت الحركات الاجتماعية في كلتا الحالتين بإعتبارها شكل من أشكال أخرى لتمثيل والدفاع عن المصالح الجماعية. في نهاية المطاف، لا تزال استراتيجيات السكان تركز على تحقيق المفاوضات مع الحكومة المحلية. يتم تحديد الالتزام بالمفاوضات بشكل رئيسي من قبل الوسطاء.

سوف ألقى نظرة على الاستراتيجيات التي تتعامل بها الحكومتان. لدى الحكومتان مختلف الوسائل المتاحة لزيادة شرعيتها والحفاظ على السيطرة على حد سواء. يلعب الوسطاء دوراً حاسماً في هذا الشأن أيضاً. أظهرت الحكومتان، في الانتخابات، استخدامهما لشراء الأصوات من خلال الوسطاء واستخدام هذه الانتخابات من قبل الحكومتان في محاولة كسب القادة المحتملين إلى معسكرهما، وذلك من خلال استمالتهم. والاحتمال الآخر الذي تستثمره الحكومتان - يحدث هذا أكثر في مايو مقارنة بآزتابالا - أن يتم اختراق المنظمات المحلية وتعيين قادة من قبل الحكومة.

وأخيراً، أود تحليل التفاعل بين السكان والحكومة من وجهة نظر الوسطاء أنفسهم. سوف أبين كيف يمكن بناء درجة من الاستقلال عن السكان والحكومة في آرتابالا واستغلالها لاحتلال مواقع احتكارية. وأخيراً، فإن العلاقة بين الدولة ومواطنيها في آرتابالا ليست ديناميكية، ولكن مثلية، وحيث يمثل الصلح الثالث الوسطاء. يلعب الوسطاء في مايو أيضاً دوراً هاماً، بل أكثر أهمية، باعتبارهم امتداد للحزب الحاكم. وبالتالي فإن خيارات السكان للتفاوض مع الحكومة أكثر محدودة.

في الفصل السابع والأخير، أود أن أقدم بعض الاستنتاجات بشأن السبل التي يمكن للفقراء من مدينتي المكسيك والخرطوم للمطالبة بالوصول إلى الموارد والخدمات العامة. وبعد ذلك مناقشة الآثار المترتبة على النظريات حول المواطنة والتفاعل بين الدولة والمجتمع.

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إن هناك اختلافات كبيرة في الدوافع والإمكانات للتعينة لسكان آرتابالا ومايو: ففي حي مايو، فإن الفقر مطلق والدولة أقل مشاركة في تقديم الخدمات بشكل مباشر. ما يلفت النظر هو أنني ما زلت أجد أوجه تشابه في العمل السياسي للسكان الفقراء في كلا الحيين: فقد أظهر بحثي أنه في كلتا المدينتين يخاطب الفقراء الحكومة بطريقة غير المباشرة دائماً وأنه كان لديهم مجموعة من الاستراتيجيات في الحالتين تحت تصرفهم وهذه يستخدمونها - في وقت واحد في بعض الأحيان. يلعب الوسطاء في كلا الحيين دوراً هاماً بين السكان والحكومة المحلية في تحديد متى يتم استخدام الاستراتيجية المعنية. كيف يمكن تفسير هذه التشابه، ومتى نضع في الاعتبار الاختلافات المذكورة أعلاه؟ إذا ما معنا النظر في الدوافع والهياكل المحتملة في المنطقتين المذكورتين تظهر أيضاً أوجه التشابه أولاً عمليات الإقصاء في كلا المنطقتين قابلة للمقارنة: تحت ضغط الندرة، فإن الحصول على الخدمات العامة التي لا تعطيها أو تؤمنها المؤسسات العامة ولكن يجب أن يتم التفاوض يومياً للحصول عليها. هذه الممارسات تتفادى من القواعد العامة. ثانياً، في كلتا الحالتين هناك هيكل فرصة الهجين أو المنطقة "المرادية" حيث يختلط فيها دور الدولة مع غيرها من أشكال السلطة، من خلال وظائف مزدوجة للوسطاء.

يتم التعبير عن الفرق بين آرتابالا "الديمقراطي" ومايو "السلطوي" في وجود الاستراتيجيات السياسية المختلفة للفقراء (الحركات الاجتماعية في آرتابالا والمحسوبية أو "الزحف الهادئ" في مايو)، ولكن الفرق في وضع الوسطاء تجاه الحكومة المحلية. لقد خلق التحول الديمقراطي في آرتابالا تعددية أكثر في الوصول إلى موارد (الدولة) مما يمكن الوسطاء من تحقيق بعض الاستقلالية. يظل الوسطاء في مايو يعتمدون على الحزب الحاكم ولديهم مساحة أقل نسبياً للمناورة. وهذا له عواقب على الموقف التفاوضي وبالتالي النتائج لصالح الفقراء.

الموقف التفاوضي المواتي للفقراء في آرتابالا له ارتباط أقل بإضفاء الطابع الرسمي على العلاقات بين الدولة الديمقراطية والمجتمع مقارنة بالعلاقة بتعددية السلطة والموارد. هذا يوهل الربط الذي يوليه مفهوم "بنية الفرصة السياسية" للأنظمة الوطنية وطابعها: ديمقراطية أو استبدادية. إن استنتاجي هو أنه بالرغم من أن التفكير في نظام نظريات المشاركة السياسية توفر أدلة مفيدة، إلا أن نهج العملية السياسية (ومفهوم "هياكل الفرص السياسية على وجه الخصوص") يتجاهل بعض ملامح التفاعل بين الدولة وفقراء المدن الذي يفسر التشابه في مختلف الحالات بين مدينة المكسيك والخرطوم. من وجهة نظري أننا ينبغي أن نأخذ وجود "المنطقة المرادية" المبني على مزيج من السلطة الرسمية وغير الرسمية وأشكال التفاعل الرسمية وغير الرسمية بين الدولة

والمواطنين كنقطة انطلاق لفهم علاقة التفاعل بين الدولة والمجتمع في مثل هذه المدن. يشكل الوسطاء روابط حاسمة ضمن هذه المنطقة الرمادية من سلطة الدولة. فهؤلاء يعرفون، في سياق المدن الضخمة، الاستفادة من الفوضى الإدارية والندرة لخلق أوضاع احتكارية. وتدل المقارنة بين مدينة المكسيك والخرطوم على أن الوسطاء يمكنهم الاستفادة أكثر من نظام ديمقراطي فيه التنافس على السلطة يلعب دوراً مركزياً مقارنة بنظام سلطوي. يتم الحديث، في الواقع، في مدينة المكسيك عن "الوساطة متعددة الأقطاب" لأن لدى الوسطاء خيار الإختيار بين الرعاة السياسيين، في حين أن الحديث في الخرطوم عن "الوساطة ذات القطب الواحد" لأن الوسطاء يعتمدون على مصدر سلطة واحد فقط. ومن الممكن أن تنطبق هذه الاستنتاجات على الأحياء الفقيرة في المدن الكبيرة، لأنه في سياق الندرة فإن التوتر ضخم جداً بين احتياجات السكان وسعي الحكومة للشرعية. ويمكن لاختبار هذا الاستنتاج أن توفر المزيد من البحوث التجريبية المقارنة بين المدن في جميع أنحاء العالم أدلة مثيرة للاهتمام. وعلى الرغم من أن Roy en Alsayyad (روي و الصياد) (2003) يجادلان بحق أن التعامل غير الرسمي له نتائج مختلفة، إلا أن هذه الدراسة تبين أن هناك سبب وجيه لافتراض أن أنواع التعامل غير الرسمي له آثار مماثلة عندما يتعلق الأمر بالتفاعل بين الدولة والمجتمع - حتى في الحالات المتناقضة.

List of acronyms

AEC	Assessment and Evaluation Commission
ALDF	Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal
AMLO	Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador
CNC	Consejo Nacional de Campesinos
CNOP	Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares
CONAMUP	Coordinadora Nacional del Movimiento Urbano Popular
COP	Confederación de Organizaciones Populares
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CTM	Consejo de Trabajadores Mexicanos
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
EZLN	Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional
FAR	Fellowship for African Relief
FONAPHO	Fondo Nacional para la Habitación Popular
FOVISSSTE	Fondo de la Vivienda del Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado
FPFV	Frente Popular Francisco Villa (also referred to as 'El Frente', 'Los Pancho Villa' or 'Los Panchos')
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICESI	Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre la Seguridad A.C.
IDN	Izquierda Democrática Nacional (PRD-faction)
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INEGI	Instituto Nacional de Estadística y de Géó-Información
INFONAVIT	Insituto del Fondo Nacional de Vivienda de los Trabajadores
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
KPWG	Khartoum Protection Working Group
MSF	Médicins Sans Frontières
MUP	Movimiento Urbano Popular
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NCP	National Congress Party
NIF	National Islamic Front
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service
NMGU	Nuba Mountaints General Union
OIR	Organización de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Línea de Masas)
PAN	Partido Acción Nacional
PCP	Popular Congress Party
PDF	Popular Defense Forces
PEMEX	Petroleo Mexicano
PPS	Partido Popular Socialista
PRD	Partido de la Revolución Democrática
PRD-IU	PRD-Izquierda Unida (allied PRD-factions, consisting of at least UPREZ and IDN)
PRD-NI	PRD-Nueva Izquierda (PRD-faction)

PRI	Partido Revolucionario Institucional
SLA	Sudanese Liberation Army
SPLA	Southern People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Southern People's Liberation Movement
SSU	Sudan Socialist Union
UAM	Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana
UCISV	Unión de Colonos, Inquilinos y Sollicitantes de Vivienda Libertad, Cananea (Piraña Cananea)
UHPC	Unidad Habitacional Piraña Cananea (own abbreviation ¹)
UHVG	Unidad Habitacional Vicente Guerrero (own abbreviation)
UMMA	Umma Party (not an acronym, but generally written in capitals)
UNAM	Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Program
UPC	Unidad de Protección Ciudadana (special police unit)
UPREZ	Unión Popular Revolucionario Emiliano Zapata
ZMCM	Zona Metropolitana de la Ciudad de México
ZMVM	Zona Metropolitana del Valle de México

¹ The particular area where this housing unit is situated is often referred to as El Molino, in the territorial coordination of San Lorenzo Tezonco (see Álvarez Velasquez 2004; Moctezuma 1999). In El Molino four social organizations founded their own specific collective housing arrangement, of which Piraña Cananea is one.

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Annex I. Topic lists for interviews in Khartoum

Residents / key interlocutors for sectors Water distributors for water, nurses and doctors for health, teachers for education, police officers for security, officials for land registration and ownership	
	Can you describe the situation in your sector? (F.e. how is the health situation, how is access to water services, how is access to education, what is the situation of land rights/property, what is the security situation like?)
	What are the main challenges in your sector?
	How are challenges in your sector usually addressed? Can you give an example of something that happened in the past? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who was involved? • What happened? What did different people do exactly? • How did the situation evolve? • How did it end?
	If you want to address an issue in your sector, what do you do? Can you describe an example of something you undertook to address a specific challenge? Can you explain why?
	Which government department is responsible for your sector?
	Can you give an example of how the government addressed the abovementioned challenges in your sector? How is the government informed of these kind of issues? How does it respond?
	What other organisations are active in your sector (community organisations, political parties, popular committees, zakat committees, etc)? What role do they play in problem solving?
	Are there specific persons within the community that engage in problem solving in your sector?
	What is the background of these persons? Why are they involved?
	Can you tell something about the situation of the youth in the area?

Members of community organisations	
The neighbourhood	
	How long have you been living in your neighbourhood? Where did you come from?
	Do you know all your neighbours? How are social relations within your neighbourhood?
	Have you witnessed many changes in your neighbourhood over the years? In what sense?
	How did you get involved in your community organisation?
Problems in the community	
	<p>What do you consider as the main problems in your neighbourhood?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tell me something about public services in your neighbourhood? (water, transport etc.) • Tell me something about social services in your neighbourhood? (education, health etc.) • How about security in your neighbourhood? Do you feel safe? If there is a security problem, what does it consist of?
Problem-solving	
	<p>How do you generally address problems in your neighbourhood? Can you give an example?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who was involved? • What did you do? • Has anything changed in the strategies during the course of the process? • How did it end?
	<p>In case of a problem, who do you usually turn to?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The popular committee • The zakat committee • The locality • A political party • A particular person • Otherwise, namely...
Government presence	
	Which levels of government are present in your neighbourhood? What are their tasks?

	What does the government undertake in relation to abovementioned issues?
	How do you interact with the government?
Political relations	
	Which political parties are present in your neighbourhood?
	How do they contribute to problem-solving in your neighbourhood?
	Are you related to a political party?

Formal and informal power holders	
All relevant power holders, sampling guided by functions in organisations such as neighbourhood associations, religious organisations, NGO's or otherwise indicated by the other groups of interviewees	
Life history	
	How long have you been living here?
	How did you get involved in your organisation?
Organisation (if applicable)	
	What is the structure of your organisation?
	How is it financed?
	How did you become a leader?
Vision	
	What do you see as the main problems in the neighbourhood?
	How do you evaluate government performance in relation to these problems?
	What do you think should/could be done about it?
Strategies	
	What did you do to combat the main problems in the neighbourhood? What happened? What did your strategy consist of? (How) did you organise the inhabitants? (How) did you contact other organisations? How were relations with the government regarding these issues? Has your strategy changed during the process?

Negotiating Urban Citizenship

	What have been successful strategies, and what have been less successful strategies?
	What were the decisive factors that made your strategies successful?
	In the less successful strategies, what problems have you encountered?
	What have been the results of your strategies?
Alliances	
	Are you related to a political party?
	Are there any other organisations that support you?

Politicians	
Political career and political capital	
	Can you describe your political career?
	Where do you have your main support base?
	How do you maintain this support base? How do you try to expand it?
	How many people are working for you? Where and in what functions?
Agenda	
	What is the agenda you are pursuing at this moment? What are the needs of your support base?
	How are you executing/implementing this agenda?
	What are the main challenges/bottlenecks?
Relations/loyalties	
	How is your relation with the authorities in the implementation of your agenda?
	How is your relation with the other political parties or factions within your own party? Who are your allies and who are your main adversaries?
	What are other organisations you work with?

Annex II. Topic lists for interviews in Mexico City

Habitantes	
Habitantes de diferentes colonias en Iztapalapa, en base de su profesión o de su papel en la resolución de problemas	
La colonia / la unidad (historia y relaciones sociales)	
	¿Desde cuándo ha Ud. vivido en esta colonia/unidad? ¿De donde vino
	(si es relevante:) ¿Cómo y porque Ud. se involucro en la organización x?
	¿Ha visto muchos cambios en la colonia/unidad durante los años? Me puede dar ejemplos?
	¿Conoce Ud. Todos sus vecinos? ¿Cómo son las relaciones sociales en su colonia/unidad?
	¿Cómo son las relaciones con las colonias/unidades vecinas?
Problemas en la colonia/la unidad	
	¿Qué considera Ud. como la mayor problemática en su colonia/unidad? ¿Me podría contar algo sobre los servicios públicos en su colonia/unidad? ¿Cómo funcionan? (agua, transporte etc.) ¿Me podría contar algo sobre los servicios sociales en su colonia/unidad? ¿Cómo funcionan? (educación, salud etc.) ¿Me podría contar algo sobre la situación de seguridad en su colonia/unidad? ¿Ud. Se siente seguro/a? ¿Si hay un problema de seguridad, de que consiste?
Resolución de problemas	
	¿Cómo en general se resuelvan problemas (de carácter público) en su colonia/unidad? ¿Me puede dar un ejemplo? ¿Quién(es) estaba(n) involucrado(s)? ¿Qué hizo Ud.? Algo en sus estrategias cambio a lo largo del tiempo? ¿Cuál fue el resultado?

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	<p>¿Si Ud. o sus vecinos quieren resolver un problema, a quien más se dirige(n)?</p> <p>Al GDF (¿Qué instancia?)</p> <p>Al CNDH-DF</p> <p>A la Delegación de Iztapalapa (¿Qué instancia?)</p> <p>Al comité vecinal</p> <p>A la unión de colonos</p> <p>A los partidos políticos</p> <p>A la iglesia</p> <p>A una persona específica (si relevante: ¿Con qué frecuencia vea Ud. a esta persona? ¿En relación con qué tipo de asuntos?)</p> <p>Otro, a saber...</p>
Presencia/actuación del gobierno	
	¿(Cómo) nota la presencia del gobierno en su colonia/unidad?
	¿Considera Ud. la presencia o las acciones del gobierno efectiva/os en cuanto a estos problemas?
	<p>¿Han habido conflictos con el gobierno en su colonia/unidad? Me puede dar un ejemplo? ¿Qué pasó?</p> <p>¿Que hizo Ud.?</p> <p>¿Sus estrategias han cambiado durante el proceso?</p> <p>¿Cómo terminó?</p>
	<p>¿Considera que hay personas en el gobierno que le ayudan?</p> <p>¿Quién(es)? ¿Y quién(es) no?</p>
Partidos políticos	
	¿Qué partidos políticos están presentes en su colonia/unidad?
	¿Cómo y cuándo nota Ud. su presencia?
	¿Cómo operaron ellos en la resolución de problemas o durante conflictos con el gobierno?
	¿Esta Ud. Afiliado a un partido político?
Ambiciones personales	
	¿Cuáles son sus ambiciones personales? ¿Se quiere quedar en su colonia/unidad (en el caso de que no: ¿a dónde quisiera ir?)

Líderes de colonias/unidades	
Todos los líderes relevantes, muestra en base de cargos en organizaciones como asociaciones de colonos/vecinos, Iglesias, ONGs o indicados por otros entrevistados	
Historia de vida	
	¿Por cuánto tiempo ha Ud. estado viviendo aquí?
	¿Cómo Ud. se involucró en organización x?
Organización	
	¿Cómo es la estructura de su organización?
	¿De dónde provienen sus recursos?
	¿Como Ud. se hizo líder?
Visión	
	¿Me puede dar una breve descripción de las problemáticas principales en la colonia/unidad?
	¿Como Ud. evalúa las acciones de las autoridades con respecto a estos problemas?
	¿Qué piensa Ud. que se debería hacer?
Estrategias	
	¿Me podría dar ejemplos de iniciativas que tomó para combatir estos problemas? Que pasó? ¿Cuál fue su estrategia? ¿(Como) Ud. organizó los vecinos? ¿(Como) Ud. contactó otras organizaciones/buscó alianzas? ¿Cómo eran las relaciones con el gobierno durante el proceso? ¿Su estrategia ha cambiado a lo largo del proceso?
	¿Cuáles han sido las experiencias exitosas, y las menos exitosas? (¿Me puede dar ejemplos?)
	¿En las exitosas, cuáles han sido factores decisivas?
	¿En las menos exitosas, que tipo de problemas han encontrado?
	¿Cuáles han sido los resultados?
Alianzas	
	¿Esta Ud. afiliado a algun partido político?
	¿Para qué y quien(es) siente Ud. que está trabajando principalmente?

Ambiciones	
	¿Donde espera Ud. que esta la colonia/unidad en diez años?
	¿Donde espera estar Ud. en diez años?

Autoridades	
Descripción de la institución y del cargo específico	
	¿A qué se dedica la institución en la cual Ud. está trabajando?
	¿De dónde proviene su presupuesto?
	¿Cómo está organizada?
	¿Por cuánto tiempo ha usted estado trabajando en ella? ¿Cuál es su carrera profesional / su especialidad?
	¿Cuáles son sus funciones/responsabilidades?
	¿Para quién(es) considera que está trabajando principalmente?
Visión y programa de acción	
	¿Me puede dar una breve descripción de la zona en la cual trabaja la institución? En cuanto a la organización social y política En cuanto a las problemáticas principales
	¿Qué piensa Ud. que deberían/podrían hacer las autoridades para combatir estos problemas?
	¿Me podría dar ejemplos de iniciativas que tomó para combatir estos problemas?Cuál fue su estrategia? ¿Ha cambiado durante el tiempo?
	¿Cuáles han sido las experiencias exitosas, y las menos exitosas? (¿Me puede dar ejemplos específicos?)
	¿En las exitosas, cuáles han sido factores decisivas según Ud.?
	¿En las menos exitosas, que tipo de problemas han encontrado?
	¿Cómo reaccionaron los grupos involucrados? ¿Quienes le apoyaron en su trabajo y quienes no?
Relaciones con habitantes	
	¿Cuándo y cómo encuentra Ud. los habitantes de la zona? ¿Hay contacto directo con los habitantes, o pasa a través de intermediarios?

	¿Cuáles son los principales reclamos de los habitantes, que aportan a su oficina?
	¿Cómo trata su oficina estos reclamos?
	¿Ha habido conflictos con los habitantes? ¿Qué iniciativas ha tomado Ud.? ¿Los conflictos han sido resueltos?
Ambiciones	
	¿Cuáles son sus ambiciones personales? ¿Donde espera estar en diez años de aquí?

Políticos	
Carera y capital político	
	¿Me podría describir su carera política? ¿Cómo adquirió su capital político?
	¿Donde tiene su mayor base de apoyo en este momento?
	¿Cómo mantiene el contacto con este base de apoyo?
	¿Cuántas personas están trabajando para Ud.? ¿Donde trabajan y que hacen?
Agenda y estrategia	
	¿Cuáles son las necesidades principales de su base de apoyo?
	¿Cuál es la agenda política que Ud. está implementando?
	¿Cómo esta Ud. implementando este agenda?
	¿Cuáles son los mayores desafíos?
Relaciones	
	¿Cómo es su relación con otras autoridades en la implementación de su agenda?
	¿Cómo es su relación con otros partidos políticos o con otros corrientes dentro de su partido?
	¿Quienes considera Ud. como sus alianzas y quienes como sus adversarios?
Ambiciones	
	¿Cuál es su motivación para estar en política? ¿Donde espera estar en 10 años de ahora?

Annex III. Code list data-analysis Mexico City

Coderingschema data				
Characterization of respondents	gender	male		
		female		
	age	under 30		
		between 30-45		
		between 45-65		
		65+		
	place of origin	city		
		province		
	place of residence	SMT		
		Miravalle		
		UHVg		
		UHPC		
	category	government		
		politician		
leader				
resident				
secondary source				
Description of problems				
security	protection			
	crime			
urban services	water			
	transport			
	electricity			
	public space			
social services	education			
	health			
Communities				
politically relevant groups	social stratification			
	belonging			
political capital	political claims			
	power base			
	community organisation			
	resources			
	opportunity networks			

		internal conflict		
	formal strategies for citizen participation	committees		gender
		party membership		
		voting		
		oficios-escritos-gestiones		
	informal strategies	resistance	protesting, demonstrations etc	collective or individual, non-violent to violent, reactief of proactief
		avoidance	apathy	
		patron-client relations		
		collective action	setting up autonomous social services: health, education	
			evaluating government performance	
		quiet encroachment		
		violence		
		negotiation		
Informal power holders	organisation informal power holders			
	resources informal power holders		politics as business	
	selection of lidership			
	strategies informal power holders			
Authorities	authority structure	formal		
		informal	competition - cooperation between authorities	
	finance of authority	formal		
		informal		
	engagement	formal		
	absence			
	mechanisms of political control	informal		

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	party politics		political competition, political parties	
Interaction between community and authorities	initiative by the community			
	initiative by the authorities			
Opportunities for political participation	formal POS for participation	laws		
		responsibles		
		access		
	informal POS for participation	access		
Outcomes	effectiveness for the poor	succesfull		
		unsuccesfull		
	direction of political change	formal to informal		
		informal to formal		

Annex IV. Code list data-analysis Khartoum

Coderingsschema data				
Characterization of respondents	gender	male		
		female		
	age	under 30		
		between 30-45		
		between 45-65		
		65+		
	place of origin	city		
		province		
	role	government		
		community leader		
		inhabitant		
		member of political party		
		informal power holder		
Description of problems	security	protection		
		crime		
	urban services	water		
		public space		
	social services	education		
		health		
Communities	politically relevant groups	social stratification		
		political claims		
	political capital	power base		
		community organisation		
		resources		
		opportunity networks		
	formal strategies	committees		
		party membership		
		voting		
	informal strategies	resistance	protesting, demonstrations etc	collective or

Negotiating Urban Citizenship

		patron-client relations		individual, non-violent to violent, reactief of proactief
		collective action	setting up autonomous social services: health, education	
			evaluating government performance	
		quiet encroachment		
		violence		
		open		
	expectations of the government			
Informal power holders	organisation informal power holders			
	resources informal power holders			
	strategies informal power holders			
Authorities	authority structure	formal		
		informal		
	finance of authority	formal		
		informal		
	engagement			
	mechanisms of political control	formal		
		informal		
Interaction between community and authorities	initiative by the community			
	initiative by the authorities			
Opportunities fo political participation	formal POS for participation	laws		
		responsibles		
		access		
	informal POS for participation	access		

Outcomes	effectiveness for the poor	sucesfull		
		unsucesfull		
	direction of political change	formal to informal		
		informal to formal		
Security specific: description of problems security, community responses to insecurity, police behaviour				

Annex V. Interviews Mexico City²

#	Name/function	Organisation	Date
1	Hisham	Clerk Malaria Unit , Mayo	February 2010
2	Omer	Head Health center, Mayo	February 2010
3		Teachers Secondary School, Mayo	February 2010
4	Bashir	Clerk Water Department, Mayo	February 2010
5	Fahmi	Head Education Office in Mayo	February 2010
6	Teachers	Primary school, Mayo	February 2010
7	Soraya	Employee Malaria Unit, Dar El Salaam - North	February 2010
8	Ayat	Teacher Education Office, Dar El Salaam - North	February 2010
9	Husna	Teacher School , Dar El Salaam - North	March 2010
10	Abdulgader	Teacher School, Dar El Salaam - North	March 2010
11	Einas	Health worker Dar El Salaam	March 2010
12	Teachers	School, Dar El Salaam - South	March 2010
13	Malika	Nurse Health Center, Dar El Salaam	March 2010
14	Brema	Police officer Police Center, Dar El Salaam – South	March 2010
17	Redouan	Headmaster School, Dar El Salaam	March 2010
18	Ahmed	Intellectual Dar El Salaam - South	March 2010
19	Sadiq	Inhabitant Dar El Salaam - South	March 2010
20	Rami	Former area security officer Dar El Salaam - South	March 2010
21	Idriss	Inhabitant Dar El Salaam - South	March 2010
22	Hassan	Member Popular committee Dar El Salaam South	March 2010
23	Khalid	Head Popular committee Mayo (fellata sheikh)	March 2010
24	Tamer	Employee Garbage office Mayo	March 2010
25	Zahid	Secretary Popular committee, Mayo	March 2010
26	Ikram	Employee Adda'awa Al Islamiya	March 2010
27	Meryam	Employee Adda'awa Al Islamiya (former popular committee member and responsible for the women section in the Administrative Unit in Mayo)	March 2010
28	Zaki	Employee Adda'awa Al Islamiya	March 2010
29	Wahid	Manager Garbage office, Mayo	March 2010
30	Dr. Agnes de Geoffroy	CEDEJ	ongoing
31	Dr. Al Mutaafi	(former) Governor Khartoum State, NCP	September 2009
32	Dr. Munzoul Assal	Khartoum University	ongoing
33	Dr. Musa Abdel Jalil	Khartoum University	ongoing
34	Said	Inhabitant, Mayo Alnast East (former popular committee member)	March 2010
35	Dr. Sara Pantuliano	ODI	November 2010
36	Kuol	Abyei returnee Soba Aradi	November 2010
37	Amna Haroun	General Manager Um Baddha locality	November 2010
38	Tareq Abdelwahad	Plv. General Manager Jebel Awlia locality	December 2010
39	Fernando Murillo	UN-Habitat Sudan	December 2010

² More detailed overview available upon demand

42	Ali	Head Market committee	February 2011
43	Saif	Head Donkey cart Association	February 2011
44	Hassan	Director Ada'awa Al Islamiya	February 2011
45	Osman	Head security Bashair Teaching Hospital Mayo	February 2011
46	Musa	General manager Bashair Teaching Hospital Mayo	February 2011
47	Joshua	Teacher Church school, Mayo	February 2011
48	Haider	Imam Mosque, Mayo (Turdu sheikh)	February 2011
49	Peter and Steven	Headmaster and Priest Church school, Mayo	February 2011
50	Ibrahim	Director Local NGO, Mayo	February 2011
51	10 members	Local women NGO, Mayo	March 2011
52	Musa and Yassine	Nuba Lumun and Kawalib tribes Mayo	February 2011
53	Group of 40 women	Church (Nuba IDPs)	March 2011
54	Hakim	Deputy head Administrative Unit Alnasr	March 2011
55	Employees health unit	Administrative Unit Alnasr	March 2011
56	Teachers	Secondary School	March 2011
57	Alghali	Officer*Al Nasr police	March 2011
58	Meryam	Employee* Adda'awa Al Islamiya (former member NCP, popular committee Mayo)	March 2011
59	Brema	Coordinator Health Centers Mayo	March 2011
60	Tatima	Head**Education Office Mayo	March 2011
61	Two headmasters	Primary schools Mayo	March 2011
62	Ustaz Ali	Head NCP Mayo (coordinator of 42 popular committees)	March 2011
63	Yusuf	Head Umma Party Mayo (independent), popular committee member	April 2011
64	Farid	Officer International NGO	March 2011
65	Hiba	Doctor Health Center, Mayo	April 2011
66	Atta	Organizer Youth club (voluntary), Mayo	April 2011
67	Youth focus group	Mayo	April 2011
68	Ibrahim	Deputy head*Administrative Unit Alnasr	April 2011
69	Three judges	City Court	April 2011
70	Bashir	Commander Police Head Quarter	April 2011
71	Mustafa	Consultant MEFFIT	April 2011
72	Mohamed	Director National NGO	April 2011
73	Eisam	Head*Popular committee (fellata Sheikh)	April 2011
74	Hakim	Security member Popular committee	April 2011
75	Focus group	School Mayo (SPLM members)	April 2011
76	Women focus group	UN-Habitat project Mansoura	April 2011
77	Male focus group	UN-Habitat project Mansoura (Darfuri Sheikhs)	April 2011
78	Abderahman Mustafa	UN-Habitat	April 2011
79	Salahidin	Member Umma Party Soba Aradi	April 2011
80	Mubarak	Member Umma Party Mayo, area 31 (Mubarak Al FadlAl Mahdi section), member of the legislative council Jebel Awlia Locality	April 2011
81	Employees	Social affairs department, Administrative Unit	April 2011

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82	Deng	Coordinator Popular Committees Al Wehda, Sultan Dinka from Rumbek	April 2011
83	Members	Popular Committee Al Wehda (Darfuri sheikhs)	April 2011
84	Salma	Participants and teacher Qur'an School	April 2011
85	Musa	Representative Elnasr East State Legislative Assembly	July 2011

*=repeated interview with the same person

**=person in function changed

Annex VI. Interviews Khartoum³

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18	Ahmed	Intellectual Dar El Salaam - South	March 2010
19	Sadiq	Inhabitant Dar El Salaam - South	March 2010
20	Rami	Former area security officer Dar El Salaam - South	March 2010
21	Idriss	Inhabitant Dar El Salaam - South	March 2010
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39	Fernando Murillo	UN-Habitat Sudan	December 2010
42	Ali	Head Market committee	February 2011
43	Saif	Head Donkey cart Association	February 2011

³ More detailed overview available upon demand

Negotiating Urban Citizenship

44	Hassan	Director Ada'awa Al Islamiya	February 2011
45	Osman	Head security Bashair Teaching Hospital Mayo	February 2011
46	Musa	General manager Bashair Teaching Hospital Mayo	February 2011
47	Joshua	Teacher Church school, Mayo	February 2011
48	Haider	Imam Mosque, Mayo (Turdu sheikh)	February 2011
49	Peter and Steven	Headmaster and Priest Church school, Mayo	February 2011
50	Ibrahim	Director Local NGO, Mayo	February 2011
51	10 members	Local women NGO, Mayo	March 2011
52	Musa and Yassine	Nuba Lumun and Kawalib tribes Mayo	February 2011
53	Group of 40 women	Church (Nuba IDPs)	March 2011
54	Hakim	Deputy head Administrative Unit Alnasr	March 2011
55	Employees health unit	Administrative Unit Alnasr	March 2011
56	Teachers	Secondary School	March 2011
57	Alghali	Officer*Al Nasr police	March 2011
58	Meryam	Employee* Adda'awa Al Islamiya (former member NCP, popular committee Mayo)	March 2011
59	Brema	Coordinator Health Centers Mayo	March 2011
60	Tatima	Head**Education Office Mayo	March 2011
61	Two headmasters	Primary schools Mayo	March 2011
62	Ustaz Ali	Head NCP Mayo (coordinator of 42 popular committees)	March 2011
63	Yusuf	Head Umma Party Mayo (independent), popular committee member	April 2011
64	Farid	Officer International NGO	March 2011
65	Hiba	Doctor Health Center, Mayo	April 2011
66	Atta	Organizer Youth club (voluntary), Mayo	April 2011
67	Youth focus group	Mayo	April 2011
68	Ibrahim	Deputy head*Administrative Unit Alnasr	April 2011
69	Three judges	City Court	April 2011
70	Bashir	Commander Police Head Quarter	April 2011
71	Mustafa	Consultant MEFFIT	April 2011
72	Mohamed	Director National NGO	April 2011
73	Eisam	Head*Popular committee (fellata Sheikh)	April 2011
74	Hakim	Security member Popular committee	April 2011
75	Focus group	School Mayo (SPLM members)	April 2011
76	Women focus group	UN-Habitat project Mansoura	April 2011
77	Male focus group	UN-Habitat project Mansoura (Darfuri Sheikhs)	April 2011
78	Abderahman Mustafa	UN-Habitat	April 2011
79	Salahidin	Member Umma Party Soba Aradi	April 2011
80	Mubarak	Member Umma Party Mayo, area 31 (Mubarak Al Fadl Al Mahdi section), member of the legislative council Jebel Awlia Locality	April 2011
81	Employees	Social affairs department, Administrative Unit	April 2011
82	Deng	Coordinator Popular Committees Al Wehda, Sultan Dinka from Rumbek	April 2011

83	Members	Popular Committee Al Wehda (Darfuri sheikhs)	April 2011
84	Salma	Participants and teacher Qur'an School	April 2011
85	Musa	Representative Elnasr East State Legislative Assembly	July 2011

*=repeated interview with the same person

**=person in function changed

Author biography

Ingeborg Denissen obtained her Master degree in Political Science (International Relations) from the University of Amsterdam and did a Minor in Socio-Historical Anthropology at the same university. She joined the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2003, where she worked for the civil society department and the research department. She was responsible for establishing strategic partnerships with Dutch universities (the “IS-academie”) until 2008. Until 2011 she was 1st secretary at the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Khartoum, where she coordinated the Dutch peace-building efforts in the border areas between North and South Sudan. For this study she spent six months in Mexico City and conducted her fieldwork in Khartoum on top of her regular work at the embassy. The final work on this research project was done during a sabbatical in Berlin. In 2012 she moved back to the Ministry headquarters as a senior policy advisor in the Strategy Advisory Unit.