

**Earning Your Place:  
The Relation between Immigrants' Economic and  
Psychological Integration in the Netherlands**

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**Earning Your Place:  
The Relation between Immigrants' Economic and  
Psychological Integration in the Netherlands**

Je Plek Verdienen:  
De Relatie tussen Economische en Psychologische Integratie  
onder Immigranten in Nederland  
(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

**Proefschrift**

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# Contents

<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>9</b>
1.1 Research problem	10
1.2 The relation between economic and psychological integration: Theory and previous research	11
1.3 Research questions per chapter	18
1.4 Research population and data	22
1.5 Overview of the book	24
1.6 Notes	26
<b>2. Settlement Intentions of Recently Arrived Immigrants and Refugees in the Netherlands</b>	<b>27</b>
2.1 Introduction	28
2.2 Theory and Hypotheses	29
2.3 Data and Methods	32
2.4 Results	35
2.5 Discussion	40
<b>3. The Origins of Generalized and Political Trust among Immigrants in the Netherlands</b>	<b>43</b>
3.1 Introduction	44
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses	45
3.3 Data and Methods	48
3.4 Results	52
3.5 Discussion	57
3.6 Notes	60
<b>4. Economic Integration and National Identification of Immigrants in the Netherlands</b>	<b>61</b>
4.1 Introduction	62
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses	63
4.3 Data and Methods	67
4.4 Results	70
4.5 Discussion	74
4.6 Notes	78

<b>5. Economic Integration and National Self-Identification of Refugees in the Netherlands</b>	<b>79</b>
5.1 Introduction	80
5.2 Theory and Hypotheses	81
5.3 Data and Methods	83
5.4 Results	87
5.5 Discussion	91
5.6 Notes	95
<b>6. The Integration Paradox: Level of Education and Immigrants' Attitudes towards Natives and the Host Society</b>	<b>97</b>
6.1 Introduction	98
6.2 Theory and Hypotheses	99
6.3 Data and Methods	101
6.4 Results	105
6.5 Discussion	107
6.6 Notes	111
<b>7. Life Satisfaction among Immigrants in the Netherlands: Do Economic, Social, and Psychological Integration Matter?</b>	<b>113</b>
7.1 Introduction	114
7.2 Theory and Hypotheses	116
7.3 Data and Methods	120
7.4 Results	123
7.5 Discussion	129
7.6 Notes	132
<b>8. Conclusion</b>	<b>133</b>
8.1 Introduction	134
8.2 Research questions per chapter	135
8.3 General conclusions and contributions to the literature	138
8.4 Limitations and directions for future research	144
8.5 Final conclusions	146

<b>Appendix</b>	<b>149</b>
<b>Samenvatting</b> (Summary in Dutch)	<b>169</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>173</b>
<b>Dankwoord</b> (Acknowledgements)	<b>189</b>
<b>Curriculum Vitae</b>	<b>191</b>
<b>ICS dissertation series</b>	<b>193</b>



# 1

## Introduction

## 1.1 Research Problem

The integration of immigrants and their children in society has become a major cause for public concern and political debate, in the Netherlands as well as in many other countries. On the one hand, the concern is that the relatively disadvantaged socio-economic position of first and second generation immigrants points to discrimination in the Dutch society and labour market. On the other hand, some politicians argue that the ‘lack’ of integration of immigrants is costly, reveals a lack of loyalty towards the host country and undermines cohesion in society. Despite the opposing definitions of the problem, however, there seems to be a basic consensus that integration is beneficial for immigrants and for society as a whole. Moreover, a prevalent assumption among politicians and policy makers is that economic integration, meaning participation and achievement in the education system and labour market, is the key factor that drives the integration of immigrants in society in all other domains. In this dissertation, I critically examine the assumption that immigrants’ economic integration is positively related to integration in other domains. Specifically, I focus on the relation between immigrants’ economic integration and their psychological integration, which is their sense of belonging and identification with the host country.

How immigrants’ economic integration is related to their psychological integration in the host society is a relevant question from a theoretical perspective. In the early literature on migration and integration, psychological integration was seen as an integral aspect of integration, the most ‘difficult’ aspect, for which economic and also cultural and social integration would be necessary requirements (Alba & Nee, 1997; Gordon, 1964). In other words, psychological integration was considered the ‘final stage’ or ‘pinnacle’ of integration. This ‘assimilation perspective’ lost much of its popularity after the 1960’s, but in more recent years social scientists have argued that it is necessary to seriously rethink and rehabilitate assimilation theory (e.g., Alba & Nee, 1997; Brubaker, 2001; Gans, 2007) These scholars argue that it is theoretically useful to think about immigrant integration as a set of interrelated processes in different domains, and that economic integration plays a key role in stimulating integration in other domains (Esser, 2003).

Despite the claim in (classic) assimilation theory that immigrants’ integration in the economic domain should have a positive effect on their psychological integration in society, relatively few studies have systematically examined this relation. Instead, immigrants’ economic integration, on the one hand, has been the focus of many *sociological* inquiries into the determinants of the generally disadvantaged socio-economic position of immigrants (Chiswick, 1978; Friedberg, 2000; Van Tubergen, Maas & Flap, 2004). *Psychological* research, on the other hand, has investigated immigrants’ psychological integration from the perspectives of social identity theory, acculturation theory, and intergroup contact theory, and has been focused mainly on individual (cognitive) and intergroup processes and attitudes (Berry, 1997; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Verkuyten, 2005a).

While the advances made in the sociological and psychological literature on immigrant integration are considerable, and while many complexities to the processes of economic and psychological integration have been demonstrated, an interdisciplinary empirical analysis of a modern version of assimilation theory is needed. Such a ‘theory of social integration’, as it is

called by Esser (2001), argues that economic, social and cultural integration are interrelated processes that together stimulate psychological integration in the host society. Psychological integration can be beneficial for immigrants, because positive group memberships help fulfil universal needs for belonging and esteem. Moreover, high levels of identification, trust and social cohesion are thought to be important from a societal point of view, because they can stimulate cooperation and economic development. Indeed, also proponents of multiculturalism argue that a well-functioning society needs a sense of commitment and common belonging, making it important to foster a spirit of shared national identity (Modood, 2007; Parekh, 2000). The key issue in this dissertation is to what extent immigrants' psychological integration in the host society is related to their economic integration. In addition, I focus on the role of socio-cultural integration and perceived relative deprivation as possible intermediate factors.

The immigrants in this study come from nine different origin countries. First, I use data on the four largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands, including first and second generation immigrants from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam, and the Dutch Caribbean (former Netherlands Antilles). According to the official definition of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics, first generation immigrants are defined as those people who were born in another country, and of whom one or both parents were born in another country, while second generation immigrants are those people of whom one or both parents were born in another country, but who were themselves born in the Netherlands (Keij, 2000). Second, in two of the chapters, I use data on (first generation) immigrants from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Based on the dangerous political conditions in these origin countries at the time of migration and the associated motives for migration, I refer to these immigrants as refugees.<sup>1</sup> For the sake of convenience, I will also use the term 'immigrants' to refer to first generation immigrants, second generation immigrants, and refugees simultaneously.

## **1.2 The Relation Between Economic and Psychological Integration: Theory and Previous Research**

In this section I outline the theoretical background to the study, and the empirical evidence from previous research. I first discuss the different domains of integration, and then the aspects of psychological integration that are studied in the dissertation. Furthermore, I discuss the presumed positive consequences of economic integration, and the roles of social integration and perceived relative deprivation. In the subsequent sections (1.3-1.5), I give an overview of the organization of the dissertation, in terms of the main research questions, groups under study, and data sources used in each chapter.

### **Domains of integration**

According to the German sociologist Hartmut Esser (2001), immigrants' adaptation to the host society consists of integration in four interrelated domains: the structural, cultural, social, and psychological domain. The first, structural integration, is what Esser has described as positioning and what I refer to as *economic integration*. Economic integration involves the advancement in the economic and educational institutions and structures of the host society.

Second, the process of *cultural integration* concerns the learning of cultural codes, customs and language that enable meaningful interaction with others in society. Third, *social integration* refers to the establishment of social contacts and relationships across ethnic boundaries, and with majority members in particular. Finally, the aspect of integration that Esser refers to as identification is what I term *psychological integration*. Psychological integration is defined as the development of an emotional relationship with the host society, including feelings of identification, loyalty and trust.

Most researchers agree that these domains do not necessarily represent stages that follow each other in a fixed order (Alba & Nee, 1997; Brubaker, 2001; Esser, 2001). For example, having a job can contribute to learning the host language but learning the language can also contribute to finding a job. And having a job can lead to developing social contacts with majority members, while these contacts also contribute to immigrants' economic success (Kanas & Van Tubergen, 2009). Yet, most agree that economic integration is an important first step in the integration process. This comes from the idea that improving economic conditions is a central motive for migrating to a new country in the first place. Indeed, a main explanation of immigrants' settlement intentions revolves around economic incentives, based on the difference between economic opportunities in the origin country and the host society (Constant & Massey, 2003; Dustmann & Weiss, 2007). Following human capital theory, it is argued that migrants try to maximize the returns to their individual skills by moving from one country to another, taking migration costs into account (Constant & Massey, 2003; Jensen & Pedersen, 2007). The material benefits of economic integration subsequently provide the motivation to stay in the host country and to invest in cultural, social and psychological integration. Furthermore, education and employment in the host country facilitate immigrant's contact opportunities and the development of inter-ethnic relationships. In turn, these relationships can lead to a stronger sense of belonging to the national category.

### **Aspects of psychological integration**

In this dissertation, I study different aspects of immigrants' psychological integration. First, psychological integration in the host society is most often interpreted in terms of national (host country) identification (Esser, 2001). National identification can mean self-categorization as a member of the national population (i.e. self-labelling), but also refer to the strength of the emotional commitment one feels with the host country (i.e. level of identification 'with', the extent to which an individual considers the national identity as an important part of his or her sense of self) (Verkuyten, 2005a). In terms of well-being, feelings of belonging and esteem form the key significance of social identifications (Verkuyten, 2005a). For immigrants, both the ethnic group and the host society can offer a sense of belonging and feelings of esteem (Berry, 1997). Indeed, proponents of 'acculturation theory' suggest that it may be psychologically most beneficial for immigrants to combine relatively high levels of commitment both to the minority group and to the host society (e.g., Berry, 1997; Sam, 2000), and studies show that immigrants themselves tend to prefer such 'dual identification' over assimilation into or separation from the mainstream (Van de Vijver, Helms-Lorenz & Feltzer, 1999; Van Oudenhoven, Prins & Buunk, 1998).

Second, it can be argued that the concept of psychological integration encompasses more than the extent to which immigrants, or citizens in general, feel that the national identity is an important aspect of their sense of self (Esser, 2001). Psychological integration in society can also be interpreted more generally, as emotional orientation toward the host society that includes feelings of loyalty and solidarity with the host society and national community, and acceptance of the cultural and institutional conditions as the framework for shaping a pleasant life (Esser, 2001; Heath & Roberts, 2006). In other words, a sense of belonging in the host country consists of acceptance of others in society, and a belief that institutions and other members of society generally have your best interest at heart. Many social psychological studies argue and show that ingroup identification is closely associated with more positive and trusting attitudes toward the ingroup (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman & Rust, 1993; Voci, 2006). For immigrants, this means that stronger national identification is also closely associated with more positive attitudes towards members of the native majority (Gaertner et al., 1993; Brown & Hewstone, 2005). It can be argued that psychological integration, as a feeling of belonging, also requires that one accepts, trusts and has positive regard for fellow citizens and institutions that one has to ‘work’ with in society, in order to have a rewarding and successful life. Psychological integration can therefore also be conceptualized as a positive and trusting attitude towards society and fellow citizens, in addition to the aspect of national identification.

In the empirical chapters of this dissertation, I investigate four different aspects of immigrants’ psychological integration in society. In two of the chapters, I investigate immigrants’ *identification with the host country*. Furthermore, I look at attachment to society in a broader sense, in terms of immigrants’ *intentions to settle permanently in the Netherlands*, their *generalized trust and trust in political institutions*, and their *favourable attitude towards natives and the host society*.

The intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands, rather than return to the origin country, is an important emotional commitment to the host society. It is a sign of whether immigrants feel and expect that they belong enough to the host society to have a satisfying life in this country. It has been estimated that, in European countries like the Netherlands, as much as 20 to 50 per cent of immigrants at some point return to the origin country (Bijwaard, 2010). Especially in the first years after arrival, therefore, it is interesting to investigate how immigrants’ experiences with economic participation and social interaction are associated with the emotional commitment to settling permanently in the host country.

The question whether immigrants adapt to the trust levels of the host society is also a relevant aspect of their psychological integration. To feel you belong, you need to have the idea that your interests are protected as well as those of any other man or woman in society. This comes down to having trust in others in general and in the political institutions of the host country. In this sense, it has been argued that trust basically amounts to a general assessment of the society or the political system one resides in (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Newton, 1997).

I consider immigrants’ attitudes towards natives and the host society as another aspect of their psychological integration. To develop a sense of belonging to society, immigrants should not only have the feeling that their interests are generally safe, but there should also be

some ‘liking’ or positive regard for the host society and general population. If the host society and general population are not seen in terms of positive qualities, then immigrants are not likely to develop feelings of belonging, pride and esteem based on the host country.

In addition, the last empirical chapter of the dissertation is focused on immigrants’ satisfaction with life. As a follow-up question, I investigate to what extent integration in each of the different domains – economic, social and psychological – can possibly make a positive contribution to immigrants’ subjective well-being. Thus, crucially, this chapter includes a test of the assumption that psychological integration in society can be beneficial in terms of immigrants’ own sense of well-being.

### **Expected consequences of economic integration**

So why would immigrants’ psychological integration in society depend on their economic integration? An influential assumption in the classic assimilation approach is that participation in structures and institutions of the host society that directly (i.e. labour market) or indirectly (i.e. language, education system) relate to one’s economic position, play a key role in stimulating other forms of immigrant integration, such as identification with the host society (Gordon, 1964). Surprisingly few studies, however, have actually investigated the relation between immigrants’ economic and psychological integration empirically. Furthermore, the findings of these studies are not consistent, with some finding no association (Walters, Phytian & Anisef, 2007; Zimmermann, Zimmermann & Constant, 2007) and others showing that structural integration contributes to psychological integration (Heath & Roberts, 2006; Nesdale, 2002). This mixed evidence is partly due to the different operationalizations of national identification. Therefore, it is useful to investigate further how economic integration can contribute to different aspects of immigrants’ psychological integration in society.

Economic explanations are most prominent in the literature on immigrants’ settlement intentions. Indeed, the dominant approach to explanations of these intentions revolves around economic incentives, based on the economic opportunities in the origin and host countries (Constant & Massey, 2003; Dustmann & Weiss, 2007; Jensen & Pedersen, 2007). Theoretically, the arguments on immigrants’ economic incentives build on human capital theory (Constant & Massey, 2003; Jensen & Pedersen, 2007). According to human capital theory, migrants try to maximize the returns to their individual skills by moving from one country to another, taking migration costs into account (Constant & Massey, 2003; Jensen & Pedersen, 2007). Following neoclassical economic theories and assimilationist theories, economic integration is subsequently an important individual level motivation to stay in the host country, rather than return to the origin country, because this will ensure the highest return to the human capital skills (De Haas & Fokkema, 2011; Constant & Massey, 2002). What matters in terms of economic integration, is the extent to which individuals manage to benefit from the host countries’ economic opportunities, and it follows that the more economically successful they are, the more they are expected to intend to settle permanently in the host country (Jensen & Pedersen, 2007).

Also regarding the other aspects of psychological integration, theory suggests that economic participation and success may be important determinants. There is a research tradition that relates unemployment and poverty to reduced social integration and mental

well-being (Bohnke, 2008; Strandh, 2000). Being economically unsuccessful makes people feel 'left out', and leads to disengagement from society (Heath & Roberts, 2006). In contrast, people who participate economically and are more successful in the labour market will have a feeling that they contribute to society, and will sooner feel that they belong and 'fit in'. Similarly, trust has also been described as a characteristic for the 'winners in society' (Newton, 1997). People who have been able to attain good socio-economic positions are more likely to have the sense that they are generally treated fairly by others (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). Conversely, if an individual has been treated unfavourably in past interactions, feels thwarted in his or her attempts to secure a good socio-economic position through education and climbing the occupational ladder, he or she will have less generalized social trust and less trust in political institutions (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002).

Researchers have noted that higher unemployment levels and lower labour market positions set immigrants apart from mainstream society and undermine their motivation to adapt (Hagendoorn, Veenman & Vollebergh, 2003). Especially among immigrants, therefore, economic participation in society confirms that they are valued members who make a useful contribution (Hagendoorn et al., 2003). Immigrants' economic participation in the host country is thus associated with feelings of achievement, self-esteem and belonging, which can translate into a positive attitude towards the host society (Hagendoorn et al., 2003).

To assess whether economic integration is indeed positively related to psychological integration in society, I use several different measures of economic integration. First of all, I look at the aspect of participation in the labour force. Secondly, I look at the aspect of prestige, in terms of occupational level. Thirdly, I look at the aspect of economic marginalization, by analysing the role of subjectively experienced financial problems. Fourthly, I look at education. The analysis of education underlines that the relation between economic or structural integration on the one hand and psychological integration on the other may not always be straightforward and positive, because of the complicated relations between immigrants' education levels, occupational positions, expectations, and experiences of acceptance and exclusion.

### **The role of social integration**

Immigrants' social integration is a crucial aspect of their integration in society, and can be a mechanism that explains the relation between economic integration and psychological integration. Social contacts, and more specifically increased interethnic contacts, play a central role in the classical assimilation theory as advanced by Park and Gordon in the 1950's and 1960's (Walters et al., 2007). According to Walters and colleagues (2007), Park has described interactions and relations between members of different groups as the main catalyst in processes of assimilation. Also modern proponents of assimilation theory argue that social integration in the host country is a crucial aspect of immigrant integration and a key condition for their psychological integration in society (Alba & Nee, 1997; Esser, 2001).

An important approach in the research on the relation between social integration and psychological integration in society draws upon the contact hypothesis. The contact hypothesis holds that close and sustained contact with members of different ethnic groups will promote positive and tolerant attitudes towards those groups (Allport, 1954; Dixon, 2006;

Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Powers & Ellison, 1995). The contacts are thought to yield direct (positive) information on the values and practices of other groups, and individuals can use these favourable experiences as a basis for generalizations in future cross-ethnic interactions (Powers & Ellison, 1995; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). The common ingroup identity model emphasizes that ethnic group boundaries do not only become less salient through cross-ethnic contacts, but that cross-ethnic social interaction also stimulates a sense of belonging to a larger superordinate category, of a common (national) identity (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell & Dovidio, 1989). This means that cross-ethnic contact can stimulate a more positive attitude towards native majority group members among immigrants, because members of the native majority are increasingly seen as members of a common national group (Brown & Hewstone, 2005).

Previous research on different aspects of psychological integration provides further reasons to expect that social integration can indeed play an important role. Regarding settlement intentions, for instance, researchers have argued that migration decisions do not revolve as much around economic considerations as classical theory would suggest, because social networks play a very prominent role in the decision-making (Alberts & Hazen, 2005; Constant & Massey, 2003; De Haas & Fokkema, 2011; Güngör & Tansel, 2008; Harvey, 2009; Haug, 2008). The driving force behind the relation between social ties and immigrants' settlement intentions is the spatial proximity to relatives and friends, which determines the social incentives involved in migration decisions, or in other words their location-specific social capital (Constant & Massey, 2003; Haug, 2008). At the time of migration, immigrants – and especially with regard to return migration also refugees – take into account the social costs of leaving behind family and friends, and the social rewards of reuniting with family and other contacts overseas. Both social ties with co-ethnics in the host country and social ties with natives therefore represent host country social capital and add to the social costs of leaving the host country.

Regarding trust, social integration in society is also seen as one of the key explanatory factors. The basic idea is that trust is formed through civic participation and through social interaction more generally. The most well-known example is the presumed importance of membership of voluntary organizations (Putnam, 2000). The underlying assumption is that learning to trust others in one's own social circle will create a spill over effect of trusting others more generally in different contexts (Nannestad, 2008). While much research has explicitly focused on voluntary organizations, the argument that trusting in general is learned through practice with trusting known others may as well apply to other social contexts. Furthermore, it has been shown that social networks, perceived social support and feelings of loneliness have a strong impact on life satisfaction (Diener & Seligman, 2004; Hooghe & Vanhoutte, 2011; Kapıkıran, 2012; Ram, 2010; Wong, Chou & Chow, 2012).

In this dissertation, I argue that social integration is one of the key mechanisms that can explain how economic integration is related to psychological integration in society. In other words, social integration can be seen as a consequence of economic participation, leading up to psychological integration. While initial language difficulties and lower socio-economic positions may reduce the pool of eligible people to form social relations with in the host society (Martinovic, Van Tubergen & Maas, 2009), employment and occupational status



(and also education and language proficiency), will increase the opportunities to form and sustain social contacts with members of other groups in society (Fong & Isajiw, 2000; Fong & Ooka, 2002).

From the perspective of assimilation theory and contact theory, the focus has been largely on immigrants' social ties with natives. As we learn from the literature on settlement intentions, however, social ties with co-ethnics in the host country can also be seen as a form of location-specific social capital, with possibly a positive effect on feelings of belonging in the host country, because co-ethnic contacts can also provide opportunities in the host society. This is confirmed in the literatures on trust and subjective well-being, which emphasize social and civic participation and feelings of social integration and loneliness rather than the ethnic composition of social networks. I therefore look at these different aspects of social integration in society.

### **Discrimination and relative deprivation**

Though assimilation and integration theories strongly focus on factors that at least partially depend on immigrants' own efforts to integrate in society, namely their economic, social and cultural integration, attitudes and behaviours among the majority population also play an important role (Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault & Senécal, 1997). In other words, immigrant integration can be seen as a two-sided process, requiring adaptation of immigrants to the host society as well as adaptation (accommodation) on the part of the host society and majority population. In this regard, Esser (2001) argues that immigrant integration actually concerns two separate but related processes, on the one hand the 'social integration' of immigrants, and on the other hand the 'integration of the system' (host society) as a whole. Basically, integration in the latter sense can be seen as the absence of segregation in the economic, socio-cultural and psychological domains. Because I focus on the perspective of immigrants in this dissertation, I investigate to what extent they perceive such segregation; whether they think key socio-economic positions in society are equally open to them, and whether they feel accepted and respected by the majority population. Thus, I look at immigrants' perceived relative deprivation, defined as immigrants' perception of a lack of acceptance and of discrimination by the majority population, and the possible consequences for their psychological integration in society.

The underlying mechanism of the relations between perceived relative deprivation (specifically discrimination), on the one hand, and attitudes towards the majority and national (dis)identification, on the other, is well described in the social psychological literature. According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and the related rejection-identification model (Branscombe, Schmitt & Harvey, 1999), discrimination is a negative experience that can strengthen ethnic identification of minorities. It presents a threat to group identity, making people increasingly turn toward the safety and acceptance of their minority group and away from the discriminating majority group. Moreover, these processes can also involve increasingly negative attitudes towards the native majority. Recently, the rejection-identification model has been extended to the rejection-disidentification model, which suggests that perceived discrimination not only leads to increased identification with one's minority group, but also prevents minorities from developing national identification with the

host country (Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind & Solheim, 2009; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Also regarding social trust and regarding attitudes towards natives and the host society, previous research has shown that perceived discrimination by the majority population is an important negative factor (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Safi, 2010; Utsey, Ponterotto, Reynolds & Cancelli, 2000). In several chapters, therefore, I take the role of perceived discrimination among immigrants into account, in addition to economic and social integration in society.

An interesting question, to which I pay special attention in this dissertation, is how economic integration in society is related to perceived acceptance and discrimination by the majority population. Economic integration in society is generally thought to have positive consequences, but insights from relative deprivation theory suggest a more nuanced relation between economic and psychological integration (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). The reason is that immigrants who are more integrated economically or structurally may perceive higher levels of relative deprivation, indirectly leading to less positive attitudes towards the host society and native population. Thus, I argue that perceived relative deprivation can also be a mechanism in the relation between economic and psychological integration. This is most clear when we look at economic integration in terms of education, and at the ‘integration paradox’. This paradox describes the phenomenon of the highly educated immigrants psychologically turning away from the host society, instead of becoming more oriented towards it (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006; Entzinger & Dourleijn, 2008). Relative deprivation theory suggests that the higher educated (more advantaged) members of disadvantaged groups are more likely to engage in group comparisons (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). Higher education might thereby increase one’s awareness and concern about the vulnerable and relatively marginal position of immigrants in society. Moreover, education enables immigrants to become more sophisticated social critics of patterns of discrimination and lack of opportunities for immigrants (Kane & Kyyro, 2001; Wodtke, 2012). Consequently, there can be an indirect negative relation between structural (economic) integration and psychological integration in society, through increased levels of perceived discrimination and lack of opportunities in the host society. In chapter six, I explicitly focus on this negative indirect relation between economic and psychological integration.

### **1.3 Research Questions per Chapter**

The main question of this dissertation is:

*How is immigrants’ psychological integration related to their economic integration in the host society?*

Firstly, this involves the questions to what extent economic integration is positively related to immigrants’ settlement intentions, trust in fellow citizens and in host society institutions, identification with the host society, and attitudes towards natives and the host society. Furthermore, I investigate whether social integration and perceived relative deprivation can be seen as intermediate factors that can partially explain the relation between economic and psychological integration. Lastly, as a follow-up question, I investigate whether immigrants’ psychological integration (and integration in other domains) is positively related to their

general satisfaction with life. As I describe below, one or more of these questions are addressed in each of the empirical chapters of this dissertation.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Settlement Intentions of Recently Arrived Immigrants and Refugees in the Netherlands**

This chapter investigates settlement intentions of recently arrived immigrants and refugees. The main research questions of this chapter is: *To what extent is economic integration in the host country positively related to the settlement intentions of recently arrived immigrants and refugees?* The economic approach to immigrants' settlement intentions has already been quite dominant in previous research (Bijwaard, 2010; Constant & Massey, 2002; Dustmann & Weiss, 2007; Harvey, 2009; Jensen & Pedersen, 2007), but the data available in this study offer a unique opportunity to test the relations between economic integration and the intention to settle in the host country, among recently arrived immigrants and refugees.

Moreover, researchers have recently argued that social networks and cultural integration are of crucial importance for migrants' settlement decisions (Alberts & Hazen, 2005; De Haas & Fokkema, 2011; GÜngör & Tansel, 2008; Harvey, 2009; Haug, 2008). This chapter also contributes to the literature by investigating whether socio-cultural integration might promote permanent settlement intentions, in addition to economic integration. Because the current research has mainly focused on family ties in the host country and origin country, or on sub-populations of foreign students and highly skilled migrants, more research is needed investigating how social interaction with natives and cultural integration affect immigrants' settlement intentions.

## **Chapter 3**

### **The Origins of Generalized and Political Trust among Immigrants in the Netherlands**

In chapter 3, I investigate generalized social trust, i.e. the feeling that most people can be trusted, and trust in political institutions, among first and second generation immigrants. The chapter answers the following main question: *To what extent is immigrants' economic integration positively related to their generalized trust and trust in political institutions?* This chapter thus contributes to the literature by analysing two distinct forms of trust. While generalized trust is generally considered to be quite a stable attitude, trust in political institutions is considered to be more dependent upon the context (Nannestad, 2008; Zmerli & Hooghe, 2011). This implies that factors such as economic integration should be more strongly associated with trust in political institutions than with generalized social trust. The NELLS 2009 data used in this chapter are very much suited to test these assumptions.

Furthermore, this chapter contributes to the literature by making a comparison between immigrants and natives, and by examining what the most important correlates of trust are among immigrant groups. Previous studies have shown that trust levels of first and to a lesser extent second generation immigrants are lower than trust levels of the general population (Dinesen & Hooghe, 2010). Little is known, however, on how we can explain these differences in trust between immigrants and natives. In this chapter, I investigate to what extent these differences can be explained by differences in economic and social integration.

#### **Chapter 4**

##### **Economic Integration and National Identification of Immigrants in the Netherlands**

In chapter 4, I investigate identification with the host country, among first and second generation Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands. The chapter answers the following main question: *To what extent is immigrants' economic integration positively related to their identification with the Netherlands?* While economic success is widely assumed to be associated with stronger emotional attachment to society, this assumption has not been tested often (Heath & Roberts, 2006; Nesdale, 2002; Walters et al., 2007; Zimmermann et al., 2007).

The chapter further makes a contribution to the literature on immigrants' national identification in several ways. First, we determine whether immigrants have lower host national identification than Dutch natives, and we examine whether the level of national identification differs between immigrants from different origin countries. Cross-national research shows that in most countries immigrants generally have lower host national identification than the majority group and a relatively weak sense of national belonging to the new country, but differences between countries and between minority groups suggest that further investigation is important in this regard (Elkins & Sides, 2007; Heath & Roberts, 2006; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin & Pratto, 1997; Staerklé, Sidanius, Green & Molina, 2010). Second, we investigate whether economic success is equally important for natives' national identification as it is for immigrants' host national identification. Third, we examine specific determinants of national identification among immigrants, allowing to assess the importance of economic integration, relative to other factors such as interethnic contacts, discrimination, and migrant generation.

#### **Chapter 5**

##### **Economic Integration and National Self-Identification of Refugees in the Netherlands**

This chapter examines whether refugees from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia self-identify as a member of the host society. Because of refugees' distinct motives for migration and their generally disadvantaged socio-economic position in host societies, it is interesting to find out whether refugees' self-identification as a member of the host society follows the same pattern found among other immigrants, and whether their socio-economic position in the host society affects their national self-identification. Like the previous chapter, this chapter contributes to the literature, first of all, because only relatively few previous studies have investigated economic explanations of host country identification though they are widely assumed to be important (Heath & Roberts, 2006; Nesdale, 2002; Walters et al., 2007; Zimmermann et al., 2007). Furthermore, the chapter contributes to the literature by investigating whether the relation between economic integration and host country identification is mediated by increased social interaction with natives. This chapter thus answers two main questions. *First, is economic integration positively related to national self-identification among refugees? Second, to what extent is the relation between economic integration and national self-identification mediated by social integration?*

## Chapter 6

### The Integration Paradox:

#### Level of Education and Immigrants' Attitudes towards Natives and the Host Society

The so-called integration paradox refers to the phenomenon of the economically more integrated and highly educated immigrants psychologically turning away from the host society, instead of becoming more oriented towards it (Buis, Demant & Hamdy, 2006; Entzinger & Dourleijn, 2008). The focus is on the processes behind the potentially negative relationship between level of education and attitudes towards the host society and the native population. Following relative deprivation theory, this relationship is expected to be mediated by a lack of perceived opportunities and perceived discrimination. In other words, higher educated immigrants may be more negative about natives and the host society, because they perceive a greater lack of opportunities and more discrimination against immigrants in society. Whereas initial studies on the integration paradox have focused on the role of perceived discrimination, this chapter suggests that relative deprivation also includes a perceived lack of opportunities in the host country. Furthermore, this chapter examines whether the same mechanisms affect immigrants' attitude towards the host society and towards natives, while previous studies only focused on attitudes towards natives. The chapter answers the following main research question: *To what extent is there a negative indirect relation between economic integration (education) on the one hand and immigrants' attitudes towards natives and towards the host society on the other, through perceived relative deprivation?*

## Chapter 7

### Life Satisfaction among Immigrants in the Netherlands:

#### Do Economic, Social, and Psychological Integration Matter?

The main research question of the last empirical chapter is: *Do economic, social and psychological integration affect life satisfaction among immigrants?* This analysis sheds further light on the extent to which integration in the economic, social and psychological domains is desirable, because it is possibly in immigrants' own best interest from the perspective of their subjective well-being. This is a central issue in the debate on the present-day merits of a 'modern assimilation theory' (Alba & Nee, 1997; Brubaker, 2001; Esser, 2001).

Furthermore, this chapter contributes to the literature by making a comparison between immigrants and natives. Previous research has demonstrated that immigrants' level of life satisfaction is lower than that of natives (Bălăţescu, 2007; Bartram, 2011; Safi, 2010; Verkuyten, 2008). We do not know, however, to what extent this difference can be explained by the fact that on average the former group is faced with less prosperous living conditions. This chapter therefore compares life satisfaction of native Dutch respondents and first and second generation Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, and investigates whether the differences in life satisfaction between immigrants and natives can be explained by differences in economic integration, social integration, and psychological integration in society.

## **1.4 Research Population and Data**

The studies in this dissertation were conducted in the Netherlands, in which there is a large and historically dominant native majority. During the second half of the twentieth century, however, the Netherlands has become increasingly multicultural. Non-Western immigrants, including first and second generation immigrants from former colonies and from source countries of ‘guest workers’ and refugees, now form a minority in the Netherlands that amounts to more than 1.8 million people, which is about 11 per cent of the Dutch population (Nicolaas, Wobma & Ooijevaar, 2010). Because the experiences of first and second generation immigrants and refugees may be different in several respects, the analyses in this dissertation are based on several large scale population surveys that include large samples of at least one of these three groups. These survey data have been collected on initiative of the Netherlands Institute for Social Research and Statistics Netherlands (SPVA 1998-2003, SIM 2006, SING 2009 surveys) and the universities of Tilburg and Nijmegen (the NELLS 2009 survey).

### **Immigrants and refugees in the Netherlands**

The largest groups of non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands are originally from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam and the Dutch Antilles (Nicolaas et al., 2010). In the 1960s, the Netherlands was one of the European countries that recruited labour migrants from Morocco and Turkey. From the 1970s onwards, family reunification and formation led to a further increase in the Turkish and Moroccan immigrant population in the Netherlands (Hagendoorn et al., 2003; Nicolaas et al., 2010). Currently there live around 730,000 people of Turkish or Moroccan origin in the Netherlands, which is around 4.4 per cent of the population. The early immigration from the former colony of Surinam to the Netherlands mainly consisted of students. Following the independence of Surinam in 1975, immigrants from diverse socio-economic backgrounds came to the Netherlands. Like the Surinamese, the immigration of the Antilleans to the Netherlands, which rapidly increased in the 1990s, concerned people with diverse socio-economic backgrounds, including students but also many underprivileged youth (labour migrants) (Hagendoorn et al., 2003; Nicolaas et al., 2010). Around 480,000 people with a Surinamese or Antillean background live in the Netherlands, which is around 2.9 per cent of the population. Interestingly, about half of the Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands and even more of the Surinamese and Antillean groups now belong to the second generation (Nicolaas et al., 2010). Therefore, potential differences in the experiences of first and second generation immigrants are considered in most of the chapters of this dissertation.

In addition to the four largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands, two of the empirical chapters also focus on refugees. The refugees in our study come from Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and the former Yugoslavia. In each of these countries, intense political problems have resulted in large-scale forced migration (UNHCR, 2007). The political problems that forced most people of the current refugee groups out of their origin countries started in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s (Nafziger, Stewart & Vayrynen, 2000). In 1977, for instance, the Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia started, after which the military

dictatorship in Somalia became increasingly repressive and many Somali's fled their country (Nafziger et al., 2000). A second surge in the number of Somali refugees followed the civil war in the 1990's. Regarding the former Yugoslavia, the first migrants to the Netherlands were labour migrants. After Tito's death in 1980 ethnic tensions grew and already started to become a motive for fleeing the country up until the eruption of the Yugoslavian wars in the 1990s (Nafziger et al., 2000). Regarding Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, there have been relatively large refugee flows since 1979-1980, when there was the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the start of the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Afghanistan by Russia (Nafziger et al., 2000). Because of civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and political suppression in Iran, refugees from these countries continued to grow into important minority populations in countries like the Netherlands in the 1990s and early 2000s (Nicolaas et al., 2010; UNHCR, 2007).

### **Datasets used**

The analyses in the second chapter are based on the SPVA (Social Position and use of Provisions by Ethnic Minorities) survey data collected in 2003 among refugees and in 1998 and 2002 among other immigrants, the SING data (Survey Integration New Groups) collected in 2009 among refugees, and the SIM data (Survey Integration Minorities) collected in 2006 among other immigrants (Hilhorst, 2007/2010; Martens, 1999; Schothorst, 2004; The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP), 2005). The respondents are refugees from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, and immigrants from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam, and the Dutch Antilles, which are the largest minority and refugee groups in the Netherlands. The respondents were selected from thirteen larger cities in the Netherlands. These cities were chosen because of the concentration of these groups in larger cities in the Netherlands. The respondents were randomly selected from the municipal records of the thirteen cities. The respondents were interviewed face-to-face in the Dutch, Turkish (for Turks) or Arabic (for Moroccans) language. Response rates of the groups were between 30 per cent (Antilleans) and 55 per cent (Afghans). The sources of non-response showed a similar pattern across the national origin groups, the most important being that about 25 per cent of the people refused cooperation, about 15 per cent was repeatedly not at home at the time of data collection, and for about 15 per cent of the people the address was incorrect. Other sources of non-response include language difficulties, and people who were in very bad health or had passed away (Hilhorst, 2007/2010; Martens, 1999; Schothorst, 2004; The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP), 2005). From the respondents in these datasets, I have selected 'heads of household' who are first generation immigrants and who have been residing in the Netherlands for less than ten years (total N=4,344) for the second chapter. For the fifth chapter, I have also used the SPVA 2003 dataset, which is collected under more than 2500 Somali, Iraqi, Afghani, Iranian and ex-Yugoslavian refugees in the Netherlands. For the sixth chapter, I have also used the SIM 2006 dataset. This dataset includes about 4,000 respondents from the four largest migrant groups, originating from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam, and the Dutch Antilles.

In three of the empirical chapters (chapters 3, 4 and 7), I use the first wave of the Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study (NELLS), which focuses on questions of social

cohesion, inequality, and norms and values (De Graaf, Kalmijn, Kraaykamp & Monden, 2010a). The NELLS survey is a rich data source because it contains data of more than 1700 Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and more than 2200 natives in the Netherlands. In collecting the data, a random sample of municipalities was selected, based on region and degree of urbanization. The four largest cities in the Netherlands were added to these municipalities, because of the large proportions of ethnic minorities in the largest cities. Second, respondents were randomly selected from the population registry based on the respondents' age (14-49), their country of birth and their parents' country of birth. First and second generation immigrants, mainly Moroccan and Turkish, were oversampled. According to the official definition of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics, first generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants are those individuals who were born in Morocco or Turkey, and of whom one or both parents were born in Morocco or Turkey (Keij, 2000). About one third of the immigrant respondents belong to the second generation (i.e. born in the Netherlands). The survey was administered in the Dutch language, and both face-to-face interviews and a self-completion questionnaire were used. The overall response rate was 52%, which is about average for this type of surveys in the Netherlands (De Graaf, Kalmijn, Kraaykamp & Monden, 2010b). It should be noted however that response was somewhat lower for Moroccan immigrants (46%) and Turkish immigrants (50%) than for the native Dutch (56%). The reason is that immigrants were more difficult to reach and less willing to participate than natives, but immigrants could also more often not participate because of language problems (De Graaf et al., 2010b).

### **1.5 Overview of the Book**

The empirical chapters of this dissertation have originally been written as independent research articles, and can also be read as such. In this book, however, I have collected them in such an order that the general research question of the dissertation is answered step-by-step. In chapter 2, we first look at immigrants' and refugees' settlement intentions, because settlement intentions can be seen as a first basic psychological commitment to the host country in an early stage after arrival. In chapter 3, I look at generalized social trust and trust in political institutions among immigrants in the Netherlands. Then, in chapters 4 and 5, I look at national identification among immigrants and refugees, which is generally seen as the central aspect of psychological integration in society. In these first four empirical chapters, I investigate the expected positive relationships between economic and psychological integration in society, focusing on the mediating role of social integration in chapter 5. In the following chapter, chapter 6, I contrastingly look at the relation between structural integration (education) and relative deprivation, and the associated negative consequences with regard to immigrants' attitudes towards the native majority and host society. In the final empirical chapter, chapter 7, I examine the relations between immigrants' economic, social and psychological integration and their satisfaction with life. Finally, the eighth chapter provides a general conclusion and discussion of the results in this dissertation. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the research questions answered in each of the empirical chapters, and the dependent variables, population groups under study, and data sources used in each chapter.



Table 1.1. Overview of empirical chapters

Chapter	Main research questions	Outcomes	Groups under study	Data sources
2	To what extent is the economic integration of recently arrived immigrants and refugees positively related to their settlement intentions in the host country?	Settlement intentions	Refugees First generation immigrants	SPVA 1998/2002/2003 SIM 2006 SING 2009
3	To what extent is immigrants' economic integration positively related to their generalized social trust and trust in political institutions?	Generalized trust Political trust	First and second generation immigrants Dutch natives	NELLS 2009
4	To what extent is immigrants' economic integration positively related to their national identification?	National identification	First and second generation immigrants Dutch natives	NELLS 2009
5	To what extent is refugees' economic integration positively related to their national self-identification? Is the relation between economic integration and national self-identification mediated by social integration?	National self-identification	Refugees	SPVA 2003
6	To what extent is there a negative indirect relation between economic integration (education) on the one hand and immigrants' attitudes towards natives and towards the host society on the other, through perceived relative deprivation?	Attitude towards Dutch natives Attitude towards the Netherlands	First and second generation immigrants	SIM 2006
7	To what extent are immigrants' economic, social and psychological integration positively associated with their satisfaction with life?	Life satisfaction	First and second generation immigrants Dutch natives	NELLS 2009

### **1.6 Notes**

<sup>1</sup> This means that I do not focus on the small minorities among the Turkish, Surinamese, Moroccan and Antillean first generation who have had political reasons to migrate (i.e. could be considered refugees), nor on the small minority of people from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia who did not migrate because of political reasons (i.e. who are not refugees).

# 2

## Settlement Intentions of Recently Arrived Immigrants and Refugees in the Netherlands

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## **Settlement Intentions of Recently Arrived Immigrants and Refugees in the Netherlands**

### **2.1 Introduction**

Large-scale migration towards Western countries has sparked a considerable interest in the settlement patterns of immigrants in the scientific literature. The bulk of the literature focuses on one direction in the settlement patterns of migrants, namely the initial migration to Western host countries. In European countries like the Netherlands or Denmark, however, it turns out that as much as 20 to 50 per cent of immigrants at some point return to the origin country (Bijwaard, 2010; Jensen & Pedersen, 2007).

Much research on immigrants' settlement and remigration has focused on whether immigrants actually decide to return to the origin country or stay permanently in the host country. Because the longitudinal survey data needed for such analyses is difficult to obtain, information on the stayers and return migrants is often limited to basic demographic characteristics (Alberts & Hazen, 2005). Analyses of settlement intentions provide a valuable addition to research on actual settlement behavior, because it opens up the possibility to investigate the characteristics and motivations of potential stayers and returnees in more detail (Alberts & Hazen, 2005).

The most prominent explanations of immigrants' settlement intentions and behavior are based on economic incentives in the host and origin country, building on neoclassical economic theories of migration (Bijwaard, 2010; Dustmann & Weiss, 2007; Jensen & Pedersen, 2007). The empirical evidence is mixed, however, suggesting that economic integration in the host society is not always negatively related to return intentions and return migration.

This study contributes to the current literature in two ways. First, next to economic incentives we consider socio-cultural conditions that might promote or hinder settlement intentions. Recently, researchers have argued that social networks and cultural integration are of crucial importance to migrants' settlement decisions (Alberts & Hazen, 2005; De Haas & Fokkema, 2011; Güngör & Tansel, 2013; Harvey, 2009). Because prior research mainly focused on family ties in the host country and origin country, or on sub-populations of foreign students and highly skilled migrants, more research is needed on how social-cultural integration affects immigrants' settlement intentions.

Second, we elaborate on prior research by studying refugees. Despite the growing research literature on immigrants' settlement intentions and return migration, little is known about the settlement intentions of refugees. Refugees have become a large and distinct group of immigrants in many Western countries, however, and because of their different conditions in the origin country and migration motives their settlement intentions might differ from those of immigrants.

In this respect, the Netherlands is an interesting case to study, because it hosts both refugees and immigrants. In our study, we compare the settlement intentions of both groups. The refugees in our study come from Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and the former Yugoslavia. In each of these countries, intense political problems have resulted in large-scale

forced migration in the 1990s and early 2000s (UNHCR, 2007). Because of civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and political suppression in Iran, refugees from these countries now form important minority populations in the Netherlands and other European countries (Nicolaas et al., 2010; UNHCR, 2007).

The immigrants in our study come from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam and the Dutch Antilles, the four largest groups in the Netherlands (Hagendoorn et al., 2003; Nicolaas et al., 2010). These immigrant groups differ substantially in their historical attachments to the Netherlands, and the ‘cultural closeness’ to mainstream Dutch culture. Surinam and the Dutch Antilles were former Dutch colonies, and immigrants from these countries that arrive in Holland mostly speak the language well and have some familiarity with the Dutch culture. On the other hand, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants enter the Netherlands with no knowledge of the Dutch language, and over 95% are Muslim, much different than the secular-Christian Dutch society. (Hagendoorn et al., 2003; Nicolaas et al., 2010).

We have two main questions in this study. First, how do immigrants and refugees differ in their settlement intentions? Second, to what extent are settlement intentions affected by economic conditions and socio-cultural conditions? To answer these questions, we use survey data on various immigrant and refugee groups in the Netherlands, collected between 1998 and 2009. Because we combine several large scale surveys, we can focus on the settlement intentions of immigrants and refugees who recently arrived in the host country. It is important to focus on the population that recently arrived, because older populations are a selective group of immigrants and refugees that stayed in the host country.

## 2.2 Theory and Hypotheses

### **Economic and Political Conditions**

The dominant approach to explanations of immigrants’ settlement intentions revolves around *economic incentives*, based on the economic opportunities in the origin country and the economic opportunities in the host country (Constant & Massey, 2003; Dustmann & Weiss, 2007; Jensen & Pedersen, 2007). Theoretically, the arguments on immigrants’ economic incentives build on human capital theory (Constant & Massey, 2003; Jensen & Pedersen, 2007). According to human capital theory, migrants try to maximize the returns to their individual skills by moving from one country to another, taking migration costs into account (Constant & Massey, 2003; Jensen & Pedersen, 2007).

Economic migration theory suggests that the differences in wages and unemployment levels between origin and destination countries are among the main contextual level forces behind migrants’ settlement decisions (Constant & Massey, 2003). From the perspective of refugees, however, unstable political circumstances in the origin country clearly form a discouragement for returning to the origin country, and can be expected to be at least as important a consideration as the economic conditions in the host and origin country (Leerkes, Galloway & Kromhout, 2011).

Following neoclassical economic theories, economic integration of immigrants and refugees in the host country can also be an important individual-level motivation to stay in the

host country (De Haas & Fokkema, 2011). What matters is the extent, to which individuals benefit from the host countries' economic opportunities. The more economically successful they are, the more they are expected to settle permanently in the host country (Jensen & Pedersen, 2007).

### **Socio-Cultural Conditions**

In contrast to economic migration theories, researchers have argued that social networks play a role in the migration decisions (Alberts & Hazen, 2005; Boyd, 1989; Constant & Massey, 2003; De Haas & Fokkema, 2011; GÜngör & Tansel, 2013; Harvey, 2009; Haug, 2008; MacDonald & MacDonald, 1964). Immigrants' settlement intentions are influenced by the spatial proximity to relatives and friends, which determines the *social incentives* involved in migration decisions (Boyd, 1989; Constant & Massey, 2003; Haug, 2008). Immigrants take into account the social costs of leaving behind family and friends, and the social rewards of reuniting with family and other contacts overseas.

At least three types of social contact should thus be considered, namely contact with natives, contact with co-ethnics in the host country, and contact with people in the country of origin. Following the logic of 'location-specific social capital', social ties with people in the origin country are incentives for return migration, because they facilitate re-integration in the origin country (Haug, 2008). On the other hand, both social ties with co-ethnics in the host country and social ties with natives represent social capital at the place of residence, and should therefore be positively associated with the intention to stay in the host country (Haug, 2008). However, it can also be argued that interaction with co-ethnics in the host country can stimulate return migration, because co-ethnic contacts can be a link in transnational social networks that facilitate return migration (GÜngör & Tansel, 2008). In other words, while contact with natives clearly raises the benefits of settlement in the host country, contact with co-ethnics in the host country can have contrasting effects. Therefore, immigrants who have relatively more contact with natives will more likely have the intention to stay in the host country, compared to immigrants who have relatively more contact with co-ethnics.

In addition to economic and social integration in the host society, cultural integration can affect immigrants' return migration decisions. Cultural dissimilarity between the origin and host country is generally considered to be a motivation for leaving the host country (Alberts & Hazen, 2005; Harvey, 2009). The Netherlands is a country where 'modern' cultural values, such as gender equality and individual autonomy, are widespread and form a dominant cultural norm, as in other European countries. On top of the group-level characteristic of cultural similarity between origin countries and the host country, the extent to which individuals do or do not agree with the dominant cultural values in the host society can make them feel either more out of place in the host society or more reluctant to leave the host society and go back to the origin country (Alberts & Hazen, 2005; Harvey, 2009).

### **Group-level Differences**

Based on both theories, we formulate hypotheses on group differences. It is well-known that economic development, political rights and civil liberties are generally much more limited in the origin countries of refugees than in the origin countries of immigrants (Freedomhouse,

2009; UNDP, 2009). Because the economic situation and political circumstances are generally less favorable in the origin countries of refugees, they will have most to gain by permanent settlement in the host country. Therefore, we hypothesize that *refugees are more likely to intend to settle permanently in the Netherlands than immigrants* (H1).

We also expect to see differences across immigrant groups. Specifically, an important distinction might be drawn between ‘Caribbean’ immigrants (i.e., Surinamese and Antillean) and ‘Mediterranean’ immigrants (from Turkey or Morocco). Being former colonies, the Dutch language has been one of the common languages in Surinam and the Dutch Antilles, and the education system and labor market are ‘modeled’ to some extent on the Dutch education system and labor market (Hagendoorn et al., 2003). Qualifications and work experience obtained by immigrants in the host country can, in turn, be relatively more valuable when returning to an origin country with a labor market that is more similar to the host country (e.g. Surinam) than when returning to an origin country with a labor market that is less similar to the host country (e.g. Turkey) (Kanas & Van Tubergen, 2009). Thus, reasoning from the perspective of economic incentives, immigrants from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles would be more likely to leave the host country, because institutional similarity leads to higher economic incentives to return to the origin country. We therefore hypothesize that *Caribbean immigrants are less likely to intend to stay permanently in the Netherlands than Mediterranean immigrants* (H2a)

On the other hand, however, immigrants from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles could also be more likely to *stay* in the host country, because cultural *dissimilarity* with the Dutch native population can also be a motivation to leave the host country (Alberts & Hazen, 2005; Harvey, 2009). And as the cultural dissimilarity between Dutch natives and Mediterranean immigrants is generally perceived to be greater, cultural dissimilarity should be a stronger motivation to return to the origin country for Mediterranean immigrants than for Caribbean immigrants (Hagendoorn et al., 2003). Based on the cultural dissimilarity argument, one could thus formulate a hypothesis alternative to hypothesis H2a, namely that *Caribbean immigrants are more likely to intend to stay permanently in the Netherlands than Mediterranean immigrants* (H2b).

### **Individual-level Differences**

In addition to characteristics of the origin groups, immigrants’ settlement intentions may be related to individual characteristics. Secondly, therefore, we formulate hypotheses at the individual level. Following the neoclassical economic approach, we investigate the presumed positive relation between economic success and the intention to stay in the host country. As indicators of economic success in the host country, we look at employment, occupational status, and perceived financial security. We hypothesize that *employment, occupational status and financial security in the Netherlands are positively related to the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands* (H3).

Furthermore, we investigate the effects of social ties in the origin country, and social integration in the host country. We use two indicators of social integration in the host country, namely the frequency of contact with natives (relative to frequency of contact with co-ethnics) and membership of organizations (i.e. none, co-ethnic or native). We hypothesize that

immigrants and refugees who have relatively more social contact with natives are more likely to intend to settle permanently in the Netherlands (H4). As an indicator of social ties in the origin country, we look at whether refugees and immigrants send remittances. Remittances can be considered an appropriate measure of social ties in the origin country, because much of the remittances are sent to family and close ties in the origin country, and because recent research in the field of ‘brain circulation’ suggests there are important links between contacts and investment in - and return to - the country of origin (Harvey, 2012; Taylor, 1999). We hypothesize that *immigrants and refugees who send remittances are less likely to intend to settle permanently in the Netherlands* (H5).

Finally, we use measures of support for norms on gender equality and on the level of individual autonomy for children to assess the extent to which immigrants and refugees support the ‘modern’ cultural values that are dominant in the Dutch host society. Our last hypothesis is that *immigrants and refugees who have more ‘modern’ cultural values are more likely to intend to settle permanently in the Netherlands* (H6).

## 2.3 Data and Methods

### Data

Our analyses are based on the SPVA (Social Position and use of Provisions by Ethnic Minorities) survey data collected in 2003 among refugees and in 1998 and 2002 among immigrants, the SING data (Survey Integration New Groups) collected in 2009 among refugees, and the SIM data (Survey Integration Minorities) collected in 2006 among immigrants (Hilhorst, 2007/2010; Martens, 1999; Schothorst, 2004; The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP), 2005). The respondents are refugees from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, and immigrants from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam, and the Dutch Antilles, which are the largest minority and refugee groups in the Netherlands. The respondents were selected from thirteen larger cities in the Netherlands. These cities were chosen because of the concentration of these groups in larger cities in the Netherlands. The respondents were randomly selected from the municipal records of the thirteen cities. About 15 per cent (N=913) of the immigrant respondents in the 1998 survey were re-interviewed in 2002. We have excluded these respondents from the ‘2002 part of the sample’, so that every respondent is included only once in our analyses.

The respondents were interviewed face-to-face in the Dutch, Turkish (for Turks) or Arabic (for Moroccans) language. Response rates of the groups were between 30 per cent (Antilleans) and 55 per cent (Afghans). The sources of non-response showed a similar pattern across the national origin groups, the most important being that about 25 per cent of the people refused cooperation, about 15 per cent was repeatedly not at home at the time of data collection, and for about 15 per cent of the people the address was incorrect. Other sources of non-response include language difficulties, and people who were in very bad health or had passed away (Hilhorst, 2007/2010; Martens, 1999; Schothorst, 2004; The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP), 2005).



From the respondents in these datasets, we have selected ‘heads of household’ who are first generation immigrants and who have been residing in the Netherlands for less than ten years (total N=4,344). We have excluded respondents from the ‘refugee countries’ from our sample (N=174) who explicitly stated having economic and family motives rather than political motives for migration, because we want to focus on the refugees. For the respondents with missing values on one or more of the independent variables (9,6%), we have used multiple imputation with the program ‘ICE’ in Stata 11 to impute the missing values (Royston, 2004). This method of imputation involves the creation of several datasets with imputed values (we use five) on which the final analyses are based (Royston, 2004). We have deleted respondents with missing values on the dependent variable (0.5%) from the dataset. All in all, 4,151 respondents are included in our main analyses.

Although the data we use are rather unique (i.e. a large-scale survey, including detailed information on key aspects of immigrant integration), a disadvantage is the cross-sectional design. Thus, our data do not rule out endogeneity problems, meaning that it is not entirely possible to test the causality of the relations between independent and dependent variables. Immigrant integration is a dynamic process in which settlement intentions can also promote immigrants’ (investments in) human capital skills and social interaction with natives. Moreover, we cannot account for the selectivity in the sample that is due to selective outmigration between entry in the Netherlands and the moment of the survey.

To address this problem with the data currently available for this study, we limit our analysis to respondents who settled in the Netherlands in the last ten years prior to the survey. Furthermore, we conduct different analyses, each of these having its strengths and weaknesses. First, we run the analyses on surveys that contain all the relevant variables and with all respondents who settled in the last ten years. These surveys are SPVA 1998, 2002 and 2003, because SIM 2006 and SING 2009 surveys lack some independent variables. This first analysis is rich in detail and controls and is based on a large sample, but selective remigration within the ten year time frame is still an issue. Second, as a robustness check, we re-do the analysis among respondents who settled in the last five years. This analysis has the same level of detail and reduces the problem of sample selectivity, but does not have a big sample. Third, we re-do the analysis among respondents who settled in the last five years on all surveys, but then leaving out variables that are not included in SIM 2006 and SING 2009. This gives more cases for our robustness check, but at the potential cost of model misspecification.

### **Dependent Variable**

Settlement intentions were measured with the question, ‘Do you intend to ever return to your country of origin?’, to which respondents could answer ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’. For our dependent variable, we contrast the respondents who do not want to return to the country of origin (but stay in the Netherlands) and those who don’t know (1) with the respondents who do want to return to the origin country (0).

### **Origin Groups**

In our main analysis, we have divided respondents in three *origin groups* based on country of origin. We distinguish refugees (from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, the former Yugoslavia, and

Somalia) from Caribbean immigrants (Surinam and the Dutch Antilles) and Mediterranean immigrants (from Turkey and Morocco). In additional analyses, we used dummy variables for each of the *origin countries*; Turkey (1), Morocco (2), Surinam (3) the Dutch Antilles (4), Afghanistan (5), Iraq (6), Iran (7), the former Yugoslavia (8), and Somalia (9).

### **Economic Integration**

We operationalise economic integration in the host country, first by looking at *employment* and *occupational status*. Respondents were asked if they were currently employed. We contrast respondents who are not employed (0) with respondent who are employed (1). All respondents who were employed have described their occupation. Through standardized tools, we have recoded respondents' occupation into the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI), which is an internationally comparable measure of occupational status (Ganzeboom, De Graaf & Treiman, 1992). ISEI scores represent a continuous approach to occupational stratification and reflect a weighted sum of the average education and average income of occupational groups (Ganzeboom et al., 1992). To illustrate, office cleaners have a score around 20, nursing personnel a score around 40, and medical doctors have a score around 85. We use the ISEI scores, ranging from 16 to 88, as a measure of occupational status. Unemployed respondents were given a score based on their previous occupation, and if no previous occupation was listed they were given the mean score of their respective national group. In this manner we have tried to minimize the influence of the unemployed in the effect of occupational status, while retaining as much variation in the data as possible.

In addition to employment and occupational status, we use a variable that indicates *perceived financial security*. Respondents were asked how often they have, over the last three months, worried about their finances. The four-point scale ranges from constantly worrying about finances to never worrying about finances.

### **Socio-Cultural Integration**

We include the composition of contacts with the Dutch majority and with members of the 'own' minority group as a measure of the *relative intensity of social contact with natives*. Respondents were asked to indicate if they had more native social contacts than co-ethnic, more co-ethnic contacts than natives, or an equal amount of contacts from both groups. Respondents who indicate having more native than co-ethnic social contacts (3) and those who indicate that they have an equal amount of native and co-ethnic contacts (2) are contrasted with those who indicate having more co-ethnic than native contacts (1).

We also include *organizational membership* as a measure of social contact with natives and co-ethnics. Respondents were asked if they were members of an organization and if the other members of the organization were mainly natives or co-ethnics. We include dummy variables representing respondents who are not members of an organization (1), respondents who are members of an organization with mostly co-ethnics (2) and respondents who are members of an organization with mostly natives (3). Regarding social contacts in the origin country, we use a variable for sending *remittances*. Respondents who do not send remittances (0) are contrasted with respondents who do send remittances (1).

Cultural integration was measured with three items on ‘*modern*’ *cultural values*, two regarding gender roles in the household; ‘the household should be women’s main responsibility’ and ‘women should stop working once they have children’, and one regarding the autonomy of adult children; ‘children should stay in the parental home until they are married’, to which respondents could answer on a five-point scale. We use the average of the three items, with a scale reliability of .59 (Cronbach’s alpha), with higher values representing more ‘modern’ values (support for more emancipated gender roles and more autonomy for children).

### **Demographic Controls**

We control for four compositional features of the origin groups. We include variables indicating respondents’ *gender*, *age* (15-25 years, 25-45 years, and 45 or older), and *years of residence in the Netherlands*. Furthermore, we use a variable indicating the level of *pre-migration education* with five categories, ranging from no education at all to tertiary education.

### **Analyses**

A preliminary ordered logistic regression analysis including the ‘Brant test’, in STATA, indicated that the ordered model violates the assumption of parallel regression equations (overall  $\chi^2=50.76$ ,  $DF=19$ ,  $p<.001$ ). This means that an ordered logistic model is not appropriate for our analyses, and that binary and multinomial logistic models should be preferred. In our main analyses, therefore, we have used binary logistic regression. Moreover, we have performed additional analyses to check the robustness of our results. First, we have alternatively coded the dependent variable, including the respondents who answer ‘don’t know’ with the respondents who want to return to the origin country (0), instead of with the respondents who want to stay in the Netherlands (1). Second, we have performed multinomial regression analyses with three separate categories on the dependent variable. As noted above, we have also performed a third robustness check that analyzes the nine origin countries separately, instead of the three broader origin groups. The results of these robustness checks confirm the main results, and are not presented in the tables but available upon request (but see Tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix).

## **2.4 Results**

### **Descriptive Findings**

The descriptive statistics for the independent variables are presented in Table 1. Interestingly, Table 1 shows a number of stark differences between the two immigrant groups on the one hand and refugees on the other. Compared to immigrants, refugees tend to be higher educated prior to migration. Furthermore, refugees are more often unemployed, and perceive less financial security. Regarding social networks, refugees have more contact with natives and less contact with co-ethnics.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics for independent variables

	Range	Caribbean N=1,123		Mediterranean N=1,139		Refugees N=1,889	
		M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
<i>Economic Integration</i>							
Employed	0/1	.63		.61		.35	
Occupational level	16-88	40.44	9.66	36.08	8.07	38.91	7.25
Financial security	0-3	1.58	1.05	1.56	1.04	1.30	1.07
<i>Socio-Cultural Integration</i>							
Social contacts							
More co-ethnics	0/1	.56		.73		.42	
Both equally	0/1	.29		.20		.35	
More natives	0/1	.15		.07		.23	
Member organization							
None	0/1	.80		.86		.84	
Co-ethnic org.	0/1	.07		.09		.02	
Native org.	0/1	.13		.05		.14	
Sends remittances	0/1	.29		.50		.29	
Modern values	0-4	2.16	.80	1.58	.81	1.80	.85
<i>Control variables</i>							
Male	0/1	.39		.77		.73	
Age							
15-25 years	0/1	.15		.11		.14	
25-45 years	0/1	.70		.86		.69	
45 and up	0/1	.15		.03		.17	
Years in the Netherlands	0-64	5.63	3.05	6.23	2.92	7.70	1.85
Education in origin							
None	0/1	.08		.23		.12	
Primary	0/1	.31		.33		.28	
Lower secondary	0/1	.29		.14		.12	
Higher secondary	0/1	.26		.21		.26	
Tertiary	0/1	.06		.09		.22	

Source: Own calculations (SPVA 1998-2003, SIM 2006, SING 2009).

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variable. The intention to stay in the host country, with three categories, is shown separately for each origin country and for the three broader national origin groups. About 49 per cent of the refugees in our sample intend to stay in the Netherlands, while 33 per cent intend to return to the origin country and 18 per cent is undecided. Within the group of refugee countries, those who come from Somalia stand out with less than a third of respondents indicating that they intend to stay in the Netherlands. Together with the refugees from Somalia, the intention to stay in the Netherlands is lowest among Caribbean immigrants (about a third intend to stay). Among Mediterranean immigrants, the intention to stay in the Netherlands is somewhat lower than among refugees (45 per cent), but it should also be noted that the intention to stay in the Netherlands is lower among Turkish immigrants (39 per cent) than among Moroccan immigrants (52 per cent). This means that among Moroccan immigrants, the intention to stay appears as high as among refugees. Among Turkish immigrants, the intention to stay appears not as high as among refugees, but higher than among Caribbean immigrants.

Table 2: Distributions dependent variable

	Back to origin	Don't know	Stay in NL	N
<i>National origin group</i>				
Caribbean	.49	.18	.33	1,123
Antillean	.48	.18	.34	709
Surinamese	.52	.17	.31	414
Mediterranean	.33	.22	.45	1,139
Turkish	.41	.20	.39	598
Moroccan	.24	.25	.52	541
Refugees	.33	.18	.49	1,889
Afghan	.26	.18	.57	596
Iraqi	.35	.19	.46	510
Iranian	.38	.13	.48	263
Yugoslavian	.18	.26	.56	212
Somali	.51	.17	.32	308
<i>Total</i>				4,151

Source: Own calculations (SPVA 1998-2003, SIM 2006, SING 2009).

### Logistic Regression Results

In Table 3, the results of our main analyses are presented in terms of Average Marginal Effects (AME). AME should be interpreted as the change of  $P(Y=1)$  that is associated with a change in the predictor, from 0 to 1 in case of categorical predictors and a change of one unit in case of continuous predictors, while keeping the other predictors in the model constant. Compared to Odds Ratios (OR), considerable advantages of AME are their straightforward substantive interpretation and the possibility to compare AME across models, because they do not reflect unobserved heterogeneity as OR do (Mood, 2010).

The first model in Table 3 includes the national group dummies and control variables. The indicators of economic integration are added in the second model, and the indicators of socio-cultural integration are added in the third 'complete' model. Table 3 also shows two robustness checks, in Model 4 and Model 5. The fourth model in Table 3 shows results with a more restricted sample (i.e. having arrived in the last five years prior to the survey) ( $N=1,132$ ). The fifth model in Table 3 shows results with additional respondents with a length of stay under five years from the 2006 and 2009 surveys ( $N=1,691$ ), in which unfortunately not all measures were included. Below, we focus on the 'main results' that are presented in the third model of Table 3, unless mentioned otherwise.

### Group-level Differences

We hypothesized that refugees would be more likely to intend to settle permanently in the Netherlands than immigrants. Table 1 already shows that the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands is on average higher among refugees than among Caribbean immigrants, while there is not much difference between refugees and Mediterranean immigrants. The results in Table 3 support this pattern. The probability of having the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands is about 18 percentage points higher among refugees, compared to Caribbean immigrants (Table 3, Model 3). The intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands is not higher among refugees than among Mediterranean immigrants.

Chapter 2 | Settlement Intentions

Regarding the differences between Caribbean immigrants and Mediterranean immigrants, we find that the probability of having the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands is about 23 percentage points higher among Mediterranean immigrants, compared to Caribbean immigrants (Table 3, Model 3). Hypothesis 2a is thus confirmed, rather than the alternative hypothesis 2b.

In an additional analysis, we studied group differences with each origin country group separately, instead of the three broader origin groups presented in Table 3. These confirm, as Table 2 suggests, that refugees from Somalia form an exception to the general pattern which shows that refugees more strongly intend to settle in the Netherlands (appendix, Table A.1).

Table 3: Binary logistic regression of intention to stay in the Netherlands

	Model 1: groups + controls		Model 2: economic integration		Model 3: full model		Model 4: <5 years in host country		Model 5: additional surveys	
	dy/ dx	se	dy/ dx	se	dy/ dx	se	dy/ dx	se	dy/ dx	se
<i>National origin group</i>										
Caribbean (ref.)										
Mediterranean	.181	.022***	.185	.023***	.231	.022***	.283	.036***	.233	.030***
Refugees	.193	.021***	.192	.022***	.177	.022***	.204	.047***	.251	.029***
<i>Economic integration</i>										
Employed			-.026	.017	-.032	.018	-.036	.033	-.030	.026
Occupational level			.001	.001	.000	.001	-.001	.002		
Financial security			.013	.007	.009	.007	-.002	.014		
<i>Socio-Cult. integration</i>										
<i>Social contacts</i>										
More co-ethnic (ref.)										
Both equally					.110	.017***	.113	.034**	.090	.028**
More natives					.176	.020***	.182	.040***	.168	.031***
<i>Member organization</i>										
None (ref.)										
More co-ethnics					-.130	.036**	-.197	.056***	-.154	.045**
More natives					-.004	.024	-.054	.047	-.069	.034*
Sends remittances					-.034	.016*	-.059	.032	-.043	.027
Modern values					.039	.010***	.050	.019*	.043	.015**
<i>Control variables</i>										
<i>Age</i>										
15-25 (ref.)										
25-45	.047	.024	.051	.024*	.071	.024**	.049	.036	.051	.027
45 and up	.128	.029***	.128	.030***	.163	.030***	.173	.049***	.137	.039***
Years in Netherlands	-.012	.003***	-.012	.003***	-.013	.003***	-.004	.009		
Male	-.012	.017	-.006	.017	-.000	.017	-.001	.032	.005	.024
<i>Education in origin</i>										
None (ref.)										
Primary	.022	.024	.022	.024	.012	.023	.047	.046		
Lower secondary	-.034	.028	-.031	.028	-.050	.027	-.013	.052		
Higher secondary	-.057	.026*	-.057	.026*	-.079	.025**	-.112	.050*		
Tertiary	-.058	.030	-.062	.031*	-.091	.030**	-.089	.060		
<i>N</i>	4,151		4,151		4,151		1,132		1,691	
<i>LR chi</i> <sup>2</sup>	142.9		147.6		281.3		131.2		160.8	
<i>DF</i>	10		13		19		19		12	
<i>Pseudo R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.026		.027		.051		.087		.073	

Source: Own calculations (SPVA 1998-2003, SIM 2006, SING 2009). \*\*\* p<.001, \*\* p<.01, \* p<.05. Presented are *average marginal effects*; *standard errors* in second column.

### Individual-level Differences

The results in Table 3 show that employment, occupational status and perceived financial security are largely unrelated to immigrants' settlement intentions. We thus conclude that hypothesis 3 is not supported by the results. Regarding social integration, results show that the probability of having the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands is indeed higher when immigrants and refugees have more native contacts (about 18 percentage points), or an equal amount of native and co-ethnic contacts (about 11 percentage points), than when they have more co-ethnic than native contacts. The results in both Model 4 and Model 5 confirm the positive association, indicating that social interaction with Dutch majority members is an important pull factor for immigrants and refugees early after arriving in the Netherlands. However, membership of an organization with mainly natives is not positively associated with the intention to stay in the Netherlands, when contrasted with people who are not members of an organization, and the final model even shows a significant negative association. Membership of an organization with mainly co-ethnics is negatively rather than positively associated with the intention to stay in the Netherlands.

We also hypothesized that immigrants and refugees who send remittances are less likely to intend to settle permanently in the Netherlands. This hypothesis is supported by the results. Table 3 (Model 3) shows that sending remittances is associated with an about 3 percentage points lower probability of having the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands. However, when we look at samples of respondents who have spent only five years or less in the Netherlands, in Model 4 and Model 5, the negative relation between sending remittances and intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands is not confirmed.

Our final hypothesis stated that immigrants and refugees who have more 'modern' cultural values (i.e. support gender equality and individual autonomy) are more likely to intend to settle permanently in the Netherlands. This hypothesis is also supported by the results presented in Table 3. Table 3 shows that expressing more support for 'modern' cultural values is associated with an about 4 percentage points higher probability of having the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands.

Surprisingly, the results show that among recent immigrants and refugees, a greater length of stay in the host country is negatively associated with intentions to stay in the host country. However, when we analyze a subsample of respondents who have spent only five years or less in the Netherlands in Model 4, we do not find a negative association between length of stay and intentions to stay in the host country. Furthermore, immigrants and refugees who are older are more likely to have the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands, and higher education in the origin country is negatively associated with the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands.

Lastly, Table 3 shows that the differences in settlement intentions between the origin groups cannot be attributed to explanatory factors at the individual level. Comparing the effects of the origin dummies between Models 1, 2 and 3, we see a considerable stability of the gaps in settlement intentions between Caribbean immigrants on the one hand and Mediterranean immigrants and refugees on the other. There are little differences between refugees and Mediterranean immigrants, and this also remains stable when we add the economic and socio-cultural integration variables in Table 3. All in all, therefore, we conclude

that the group differences in settlement intentions cannot be explained by compositional differences between the groups, and that group (or origin country) characteristics therefore remain important.

## 2.5 Discussion

In this study, we have investigated the settlement intentions of more than 4,000 immigrants and refugees in the Netherlands. We had two main questions in this study. The first question concerned how refugees and migrants of different origin countries differ in their settlement intentions. Secondly, we asked to what extent the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands can be explained by economic and socio-cultural integration in the host country.

A drawback of studies on immigrants' and refugees' settlement intentions is that part of the immigrants and refugees who once held the intention to leave the host country may have left already, causing selectivity in the sample. We have addressed this drawback by analyzing a sample of recently arrived immigrants and refugees (<10 years), with additional robustness checks among respondents with a maximum length of stay of five years, indicating that our results are quite robust against selection bias.

We find that refugees are generally more likely to intend to stay in the Netherlands than other migrants. This was in line with our expectations, based on the less attractive economic and political conditions in refugees' countries of origin. Refugees from Somalia form an exception to the general pattern, however. Statistics and reports on economic development and civil liberties do not suggest that conditions in Somalia are relatively favorable, but rather the contrary (Freedomhouse, 2009; UNDP, 2009). Because little research has been done on the settlement intentions of refugees, it remains to be investigated whether refugees from Somalia are an exceptional case only in the Netherlands, and why.

Our study shows that immigrants from former Dutch colonies (i.e. Surinam and the Dutch Antilles) are less likely to have the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands. This supports the argument that immigrants from countries that have structures and institutions that are more similar to those of the host country (e.g. former colonies) may be more attracted to return to the origin country, because the skills and experience obtained in the host country are more likely to also yield economic rewards in the origin country.

We find that economic integration in the host country is not positively related to the intention to settle permanently in the host country. This is quite surprising because economic incentives and human capital skills are important explanations of migrant settlement decisions in the literature, and a positive relation is expected from neoclassical economic theories (Constant & Massey, 2003; Dustmann & Weiss, 2007; Jensen & Pedersen, 2007). Our results support arguments that the relation between economic integration and settlement intentions is more complicated. One explanation of our results is that immigrants and refugees may be disappointed about their economic opportunities in the host country. Previous studies have shown that immigrants and refugees get relatively limited returns to the educational qualifications obtained in the origin country, which leads to feelings of underemployment (Kanas & Van Tubergen, 2009). When the quality of employment in the host country is below migrants' educational standards and their level of pre-migration employment, this may result



in feelings of relative deprivation rather than integration in the host country. Future studies should therefore investigate the effects of employment in more relative terms, compared to the level of training and quality of employment in the country of origin.

Our study shows that social ties with natives and cultural integration are indeed positively related to the intention to stay in the host country. Also in line with our expectations, we find that social ties to the origin country are negatively related to the intention to stay in the host country. Our study thus to some extent confirms the argument in the recent migration literature on the role of location-specific social capital, which emphasizes the social costs of leaving the host country and the social rewards of returning to the origin country (Güngör & Tansel, 2013; Harvey, 2009; Haug, 2008).

Contrary to the location-specific social capital argument, however, we find that social ties with co-ethnics are negatively associated with the intention to settle permanently in the host country. Apparently, co-ethnic social contacts in immigrants' social environment can also stimulate immigrants' intentions to return to the origin country. This contradicts the findings of other studies which find that contacts with both co-ethnics and natives form an incentive to stay in the host country (e.g. Haug, 2008), but is in line with research on the return intentions of Turkish students studying abroad (Güngör & Tansel, 2008). Possible explanations for our findings are that immigrants who have the intention to return to the origin country stimulate other immigrants to return to the origin country, through transnational social ties and by promoting the sense that one is most comfortable around co-ethnics. Moreover, immigrants who plan to stay indefinitely in the Netherlands may consciously interact relatively more frequently with natives. Indeed, recent research even suggests that some migrants, aware of the benefits of interaction with natives for their integration in the host society, even avoid co-ethnic social networks (Harvey, 2008). It should therefore be interesting to investigate in future studies to what extent immigrants' settlement intentions are influenced by the settlement intentions of co-ethnic social ties.

In sum, we find that immigrants from former Dutch colonies (i.e. Surinam and the Dutch Antilles) are less likely to have the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands. This suggests that institutional and linguistic similarities are important group-level factors associated with return migration decisions. At the individual level, we find that social and cultural integration in the host society are positively associated with the intention to stay in the host country, among recently arrived immigrants and refugees. Our study suggests that economic motives are less important for migration decisions than is suggested in neoclassical theories of migration, but instead provides evidence for the importance of social and cultural factors.



# 3

## The Origins of Generalized and Political Trust among Immigrants in the Netherlands

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## **The Origins of Generalized and Political Trust among Immigrants in the Netherlands**

### **3.1 Introduction**

Research has shown in a convincing manner that trusting societies perform better and are able to establish higher levels of quality of life for their inhabitants (Putnam, 1993/2000). Trust reduces transaction costs and enables collective action. This is not just the case with generalized trust: societies with higher levels of political trust levels are characterised by more effective and legitimate political systems (Easton, 1965; Marien & Hooghe, 2011). In recent decades, however, diversity has transformed traditional (political) communities and it is assumed that this also has an effect on levels of generalized and political trust. As a result, the relationship between increasing ethnic diversity and feelings of trust has come under intense scrutiny in recent years (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Hooghe, 2007; Laurence, 2011; Putnam, 2007). In his well-cited article “E pluribus Unum”, Putnam (2007) argues that in the short run ethnic diversity is likely to erode trust levels in society. Diversity is also argued to affect political trust levels as the heterogeneity of the political community increases and shared identities and values come under pressure (McLaren, 2012). While initially this research line mainly focused on the question what effect ethnic diversity could have on the trust levels of the original population of a country, more recently, research attention has shifted to the question what determines the levels of trust among minority communities themselves (Wilkes, 2011).

Generalized trust and trust in political institutions can be seen as aspects of immigrants’ psychological integration, which is defined as feelings of identification, belonging and commitment in the host society (Esser, 2003). Previous research has shown substantial differences in the trust levels of the immigrant population and the majority population. Theories on ‘domains’ of immigrant integration suggest that immigrants’ psychological integration in society crucially depends on their economic and social integration (Esser, 2003). As a result, this model predicts that trust levels of immigrant minority populations should adjust to those of the host society, to the extent that these groups advance in terms of economic and social integration.

The question whether immigrants acculturate to the trust level of host societies is thus very relevant from the perspective of societal and political debates on immigrant integration. In recent years, quite some politicians and other social actors have wondered whether the integration of immigrants in Western Europe can be regarded as successful. To some extent trust measurements offer us an indirect answer to that question, as it can be assumed that trust amounts to a general assessment of the society or the political system one resides in, related to feelings of belonging and commitment, which is a crucial prerequisite for cohesion and economic development in society (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Newton, 1997). If we would find that immigrants have persistent lower levels of trust than the original population, this could imply, either that these groups have not really integrated into their new society, or that they indeed have good reasons to be distrustful, as suggested in some of the research on different trust levels of black and white US citizens (Michelson, 2003; Smith, 2010).

In this study, we investigate the origins of trust, by comparing two distinct forms of trust. In particular, we compare natives and immigrants with regard to generalized trust, i.e. the feeling that most people can be trusted, and with regard to trust in political institutions. In order to investigate the determinants of both forms of trust, we rely on an analysis of the first wave of the Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study (NELLS), which was conducted in 2009 and included an oversampling of members of the Turkish and Moroccan communities in the Netherlands (De Graaf et al., 2010a). In this article we briefly review the literature on determinants of trust. Subsequently we present the data and methods before going into the results of this study. In the discussion we ascertain what these findings tell us about the determinants of generalized trust and trust in political institutions.

### 3.2 Theory and Hypotheses

#### **The relation between integration and trust**

The basic distribution of high and low trust societies has not changed all that much during the past decades (Nannestad, 2008; Marien, 2011). In most of the research it is therefore assumed that the reason for this stability lies in the fact that feelings of trust are internalized early on in life, and remain relatively stable thereafter. The persistence theory, which is most clearly formulated in the work of Uslaner, departs from a specific conceptualization of trust which is cultural or moralistic rather than strategic or rational (Nannestad, 2008; Uslaner, 2002). This trust concept implies that trust is a general outlook on human nature, which is not based on actual experience of others' trustworthy behaviour, but on early socialization experiences (Uslaner, 2002). The persistence theory would therefore predict that immigrants are and will remain distinct from the majority population with regard to their level of generalized trust (Uslaner, 2008).

Uslaner (2008), e.g., has shown that US citizens from Scandinavian descent are still characterized by the generalized trust levels of their country of origin, even if their ancestors already migrated to the United States some generations ago. Dinesen and Hooghe (2010) have also shown that trust levels of first and to a lesser extent second generation immigrants are lower than trust levels of the general population. This analysis relies on the results of the European Social Survey, but the authors acknowledge that sampling of immigrants is not necessarily uniform or equally successful across European societies.

Other authors claim more strongly that trust is a reflection of actual experiences and thus is open to lifelong learning and adjustment (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Nannestad, 2008). Especially regarding trust in political institutions, it has been demonstrated that trust reacts strongly to stimuli provided by the environment (Zmerli & Hooghe, 2011). Political trust has for instance been shown to be strongly influenced by the perceived performance of political institutions and actors (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2010; Rothstein & Stolle, 2003). Also regarding generalized trust, however, it has been argued that trust depends on learning experiences and perceived trustworthiness in past interactions (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Nannestad, 2008).

It can be assumed therefore that when the social and political environment are the same for natives and immigrants, we can expect that immigrants adapt to the trust levels that

are prevalent within the host society (Aleksynska, 2011; Dinesen & Hooghe, 2010). The notion of integration and learning prompts the question what kind of learning experiences and social integration matter. In this regard, trust has also been described as a characteristic for the ‘winners in society’ (Newton, 1997). People who have been able to attain good socio-economic positions are more likely to have the sense that they are generally treated fairly by others (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). Conversely, if an individual has been hurt in past interactions, feels thwarted in his or her attempts to secure a good socio-economic position through education and climbing the occupational ladder, he or she will trust less (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). Because immigrants, both first and second generation, generally hold less favourable socio-economic positions, this may be associated with a lower level of trust among these groups.

In other words, minorities’ feelings of trust and belonging in the host society depend on their economic and social integration in society, as has also been suggested in sociological theories on immigrant integration (Esser, 2003). Indeed, the crucial question in this study is to what extent factors associated with immigrants’ socio-economic integration in society are related to trust levels, and whether these socio-economic disadvantages can help explain the differences in trust levels between natives and minorities.

The distinction between generalized trust and trust in political institutions is important, because the research on trust in political institutions generally departs from a rational or ‘experiential’ conceptualization of trust, while claims in the literature suggest that generalized trust may also follow a logic of cultural persistence (Dinesen, 2013; Uslaner, 2002). Thus while generalized trust is often thought to be affected by (cultural or normative) origin effects, political trust is thought to be dependent on conditions in the host society (destination effects). Comparing both attitudes should allow us to arrive at a better understanding of the extent to which immigrants’ socio-economic integration in society is related to their levels of generalized trust and trust in political institutions. Therefore we expect that political trust will be more strongly associated with immigrants’ socio-economic integration in society. This leads to the following two hypotheses:

H1. The level of generalized trust among immigrants will be distinct from the trust level of native Dutch.

H2. Taking socio-economic disadvantages into account, the level of trust in political institutions among immigrants will not be significantly different from the level among native Dutch.

We can expect that the first generation immigrants will be less integrated than the second generation. Therefore, we expect the first generation to have lower trust levels than natives, while second generation immigrants are expected to occupy an intermediate position.

### **Civic participation and trust**

The notion that trust is acquired through social interaction has also given rise to the idea that trust is formed through civic participation, and social integration more generally. The most

well-known example is the presumed importance of membership of voluntary organizations (Putnam, 2000). The underlying assumption is that learning to trust others in one's own social circle will create a spillover effect of trusting others more generally in different contexts (Nannestad, 2008). While much research has explicitly focused on voluntary organizations, the argument that trusting in general is learned through practice with trusting known others may as well apply to other social contexts. A difference in trust between natives and immigrants may therefore be partially explained by lower civic participation and less extensive social networks of immigrants.

H3. The differences in trust between natives and immigrants can be partially explained by civic participation and social integration.

#### **Neighbourhood characteristics and trust**

An important debate in the recent literature is whether neighbourhood characteristics, most notably ethnic diversity, will affect trust (Gijsberts, Van der Meer & Dagevos, 2012; Lancee & Dronkers, 2011; Putnam, 2007; Savelkoul, Gesthuizen & Scheepers, 2011). The argument put forth by Putnam as the 'constrict theory' can be seen as an adaptation of homogeneity theory, meaning that it should be more difficult to trust others who are more 'unlike' yourself (Gijsberts et al., 2012). People who live in a more ethnically diverse neighbourhood will have lower levels of trust, as a result of being surrounded by others to which they feel a relatively large social distance. Another possibly important neighbourhood characteristic is neighbourhood disadvantage. The idea that people in disadvantaged neighbourhoods will be less trusting follows the logic of the success and well-being argument, which can be applied at the group level as well as the individual level (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). Because immigrants more often reside in ethnically diverse and economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods, this may partially explain lower trust levels among immigrants.

H4. The differences in trust between natives and immigrants can be partially explained by neighbourhood disadvantage and neighbourhood ethnic diversity.

#### **Political orientation and trust in political institutions**

The notions of success and well-being, civic and social participation, and neighbourhood diversity and disadvantage are relevant for both generalized trust and trust in political institutions. Researchers have shown that especially civic participation and social capital positively affect the political trust of immigrants (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Fennema & Tillie, 2001). It can also be expected, however, that trust in political institutions is affected by distinct political factors. Trust in political institutions is closely related to political participation and being interested in politics, as evidenced for instance by a local study among ethnic minorities in Amsterdam (Fennema & Tillie, 1999). Moreover, it is likely that an individual's political trust rises when parties and politicians that appear to share his or her ideals come into power. Differences in political trust between natives and immigrants may therefore be related to differences in political attitudes.

H5. The differences in trust between natives and immigrants can be partially explained by different political attitudes.

#### **Minority-specific determinants of trust**

Lastly, we investigate determinants of trust that are specific to the experience of immigrants. In line with the success and well-being perspective, researchers have noted that members of groups who have a (perceived) history of being treated unfairly will trust less, as in the case of discrimination against minority groups (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Smith, 2010). Also, at the individual level, it can be expected that perceived discrimination will negatively affect the trust of minorities.

H6. Perceived discrimination will be negatively related to immigrants' trust levels.

Furthermore, the homogeneity theory suggests that it is easier to trust others who are perceived to more closely resemble oneself (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Gijsberts et al., 2012). In the case of immigrants, this leads to the expectation that trust will be higher among those who perceive less social distance towards natives, and who self-identify more with the host country. We also explore the effects of language proficiency, years since migration and nationality in this regard.

### **3.3 Data and Methods**

#### **Data**

For collecting the NELLS data, a random sample of 35 municipalities was selected, stratified by region and degree of urbanization. The four largest cities in the Netherlands were included because of the large proportions of ethnic minorities in these cities. Second, respondents were randomly selected from the population registry based on their age (14 to 45 years), country of birth and parents' country of birth (De Graaf et al., 2010b).

Minority status was defined according to the official definition of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics. First generation Moroccan and Turkish minorities are those individuals who were born in Morocco or Turkey. Second generation Moroccan and Turkish minorities are defined as those individuals of whom one or both parents are born in Morocco or Turkey, but who are themselves born in the Netherlands (De Graaf et al., 2010b).

The survey was administered in Dutch, and both face-to-face interviews and a self-administered drop-off questionnaire were used. The overall response rate was 52 per cent, which is average for this type of survey in the Netherlands (De Graaf et al., 2010b). It should be noted however that response rates were somewhat lower for Moroccan minorities (46%) and Turkish minorities (50%) than for the native Dutch (56%). The reason is that minority respondents were more difficult to reach and less willing to participate than natives, but minorities could also more often not participate because of language problems (De Graaf et al., 2010b). It has to be acknowledged that this effectively limits the sample to those ethnic minorities that have a sufficient knowledge of Dutch to participate in the survey. The



consequence is that our study is not fully representative for the minority population in the Netherlands. Nevertheless it has to be noted that we do not know about any other population survey in Western Europe with such a broad sample of immigrant group respondents.

We excluded the small portion of respondents in the sample (about 7.5 %) that did not fill out the self-administered part of the survey, because this part contains key items for the analysis. Because only few respondents had missing values on the variables of interest (i.e. about 4 %), they were also deleted from the sample. All in all, this study includes 4,222 respondents, of which 2,381 are native Dutch, 929 are Moroccan minorities, and 912 are Turkish minorities.

#### **Dependent variables**

Generalized trust was measured with the following statements, to which respondents could answer on a five-point scale: ‘You can’t be too careful in dealing with people’, ‘If you trust too easily, people will take advantage of you’, and ‘You will often be cheated when you help others’. Analysis showed that the items form a coherent scale (Cronbach’s Alpha =.71). The items are very similar to other multiple-item measures of generalized trust used in previous research (Dinesen, 2011; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008). Trust in political institutions was measured with the question: ‘Could you indicate how much trust you have in the following institutions: a. politics, b. the government, c. the European Union, and d. the police and justice department?’, to which respondents could answer on a four-point scale. Analysis showed that these items also form a coherent scale (Cronbach’s Alpha =.83).

#### **Independent variables**

We distinguish five groups of respondents; the native majority, first and second generation Moroccan immigrants, and first and second generation Turkish immigrants. The measure of minority status is based on respondents’ self-reported country of birth and parents’ country of birth. About one third of the minority respondents in the sample belong to the second generation, corresponding to the population in the age range of 14 to 45.

To measure socio-economic status, we focus on education, employment status and financial difficulties. Education is measured on a six-point scale, ranging from no education to higher tertiary education. Because a substantial portion of first generation minorities have pursued education in their country of origin, we also include a measure indicating whether one is educated abroad.

Our measure of respondents’ main activity (labour market status) consists of four categories; employed, unemployed, non-active (including, for instance, stay-at-home parents and permanently disabled), and students. For occupational status, we use the ‘international socioeconomic index of occupational status (ISEI)’ (Ganzeboom et al., 1992). Unemployed, non-active and student respondents were given the mean score of the employed respondents.<sup>1</sup> We further include a measure indicating whether employed respondents have a supervising position. To assess financial difficulties, respondents were asked ‘Have you, in the past three months, had to deal with the following: a. not being able to replace broken equipment, b. having to borrow money for essential expenses, c. falling behind on regular expenses, d. being visited by a bailiff, e. having difficulty making ends meet’. The ‘financial problems’-scale

was obtained by summing the five items, which form a coherent scale (Cronbach's Alpha =.73).

Furthermore, we use several variables to measure civic participation and social integration. We account for associational activity by distinguishing members and volunteers from those respondents who have no associational memberships. Six questions were asked on respondents' perceived social support. This scale was balanced, with three positive items, such as 'there are enough people I can rely on in difficult times', and three 'negative' items, such as 'I often feel abandoned'. Factor analysis indicates that these items constitute two distinct factors. We thus constructed two variables for perceived social support; perceived integration – based on the positive social support items (Cronbach's alpha= .81), and perceived isolation – based on the negative social support items (Cronbach's alpha= .80). We also include a variable indicating whether one has 'outgroup' friends. The variable perceived collective efficacy in the neighbourhood is based on five items that form a reliable scale (Cronbach's Alpha =.83). These items strongly resemble those suggested by Sampson and colleagues, (1997), who define collective efficacy as 'social cohesion among neighbours and their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good' (p. 918). An example of the items is 'people in this neighbourhood would take action if youths cause disturbance'.

We use three political orientation variables. Left-right orientation is measured by asking respondents to place themselves on a scale ranging from '0' (left) to '10' (right). The variable for interest in politics ranges from '0' (not at all interested), through '1' (reasonably interested), to '2' (very interested). We also include a variable indicating whether the respondent had a preference for one of the parties who were in government in 2009 (a coalition of CDA (centre right), PvdA (centre left) and Christenunie (centre left)).

We include several variables that are specifically relevant for minorities. We use a measure of ethnic discrimination; based on questions asking whether respondents ever felt discriminated against in six different situations, such as with job applications or in nightlife. We take the average of the six items, resulting in a reliable scale (Cronbach's Alpha =.81).<sup>2</sup> We also include host country identification, based on three items such as: 'I strongly identify with the Netherlands'. We take the average of these items, resulting in a reliable scale (Cronbach's Alpha =.86). We further include measures of Dutch language proficiency (based on four items asking whether respondents have difficulty in understanding, speaking, reading and writing in Dutch, which form a highly reliable scale (Cronbach's Alpha =.96)), how many years respondents are living in the Netherlands, and of whether respondents have the Dutch nationality.<sup>3</sup>

The data also allow us to include neighbourhood characteristics. Respondents are nested within neighbourhoods, based on their six digit postcode (De Graaf et al., 2010b). We include a measure of the proportion of non-Western minorities in the neighbourhood, and the average income (in 100 Euros/person/month) in the neighbourhood. Lastly, we include the demographic control variables age, gender, and family status, because they may affect trust levels (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for natives as well as the minority groups. A table of the bivariate correlations is included in the appendix (Table A.1).

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables

	Range	Natives		1 <sup>st</sup> gen. Moroccan		2 <sup>nd</sup> gen. Moroccan		1 <sup>st</sup> gen. Turkish		2 <sup>nd</sup> gen. Turkish	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<b>Dependent variables</b>											
Generalized trust	0-4	2.10	.70	1.71	.69	1.80	.69	1.70	.68	1.69	.65
Political trust	0-3	1.37	.55	1.22	.66	1.27	.58	1.18	.63	1.29	.67
<b>Individual characteristics (level 1)</b>											
Female	0/1	.54		.54		.58		.48		.54	
Age	14-49	31.66	9.07	34.41	6.88	22.85	6.53	35.58	7.56	24.47	7.39
Has a partner	0/1	.60		.69		.22		.70		.36	
Education level	0-5	3.14	1.03	2.16	1.35	2.71	1.02	2.30	1.32	2.69	1.01
Education in other country <sup>a</sup>	0/1	<.01		.28		.01		.42		.02	
<b>Prof. Activity</b>											
Currently employed	0/1	.73		.57		.35		.62		.43	
Currently unemployed	0/1	.03		.08		.04		.10		.08	
Non-labour-force	0/1	.05		.28		.08		.22		.08	
Currently student	0/1	.19		.07		.53		.07		.41	
Occupational status	22-88	48.43	12.86	43.63	8.65	47.32	7.97	44.06	10.52	46.38	9.25
Supervisor at work	0/1	.24		.13		.09		.19		.12	
Financial problems	0-5	.42	.88	1.12	1.42	.63	1.09	1.16	1.44	.90	1.30
<b>Associations</b>											
Association - none	0/1	.24		.45		.31		.44		.38	
Association - only member	0/1	.40		.35		.49		.31		.46	
Association - volunteer	0/1	.36		.20		.20		.24		.16	
Social support - integrated	0-3	2.20	.53	2.06	.61	2.11	.62	1.95	.60	2.03	.61
Social support - isolated	0-3	.76	.60	1.06	.66	.83	.60	1.12	.59	.95	.65
Outgroup friends	0/1	.40		.79		.93		.78		.92	
Perceived collective efficacy	0-3	2.42	.56	2.28	.60	2.33	.56	2.20	.59	2.27	.56
Left-right scale <sup>b</sup>	0-10	5.17	2.04	3.84	2.07	3.61	2.20	4.21	2.12	4.27	2.04
Interested in politics <sup>b</sup>	0-2	.69	.61	.71	.68	.85	.60	.57	.65	.58	.62
Preference for ruling party <sup>b</sup>	0/1	.34		.47		.45		.44		.41	
Perceived discrimination <sup>c</sup>	0-2			.31	.40	.41	.43	.33	.40	.30	.37
National identification <sup>c</sup>	0-4			2.74	.82	2.75	.81	2.51	.79	2.67	.74
Dutch language proficiency <sup>c</sup>	0-4			3.03	1.00	3.84	.38	2.82	1.03	3.64	.62
Years spent in the Netherlands <sup>c</sup>	0-45			19.72	9.29	22.85	6.53	20.76	10.24	24.47	7.39
Dutch nationality <sup>c</sup>	0/1			.71		1.00		.68		1.00	
<b>Neighbourhood characteristics (level 2)</b>											
Proportion Non-Western res.	0-.85	.09	.09	.29	.19	.26	.18	.27	.19	.25	.15
Average income level	8.2-24.4	12.92	1.32	12.33	1.58	12.54	1.54	12.34	1.65	12.38	1.42
N		2,381		585		344		578		334	

Source: NELS 2009, own calculations.

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Less than one per cent of the natives in our sample followed education abroad. <sup>b</sup> Only included in the analyses of trust in political institutions. <sup>c</sup> Minority-specific variable.

## Analyses

We first test the measurement invariance of the dependent variables before we assess differences in trust levels between natives and immigrants. Because the respondents are nested within neighbourhoods and we include neighbourhood level predictors, we use multilevel modelling with the 'MIXED' module in SPSS version 19.0 for the main analyses.

We use random intercept multilevel models (with restricted maximum likelihood estimation), meaning that we take the hierarchical structure of the data into account but do not treat any of the individual level predictors as random effects (Hox, 2002). As shown in Table 2 and Table 3, we estimate stepwise models, subsequently including minority status and the control variables, then the socio-economic position variables, then the civic and social participation variables, and in the fourth model the neighbourhood characteristics. Regarding political trust, the fourth model also includes the political orientation variables. Table 4 shows the results of additional analyses, in which we added the variables that are specifically relevant for minorities. To obtain an indication of the amount of variance explained in the analyses, we have first estimated empty models (not presented). The thus obtained estimates of the 'initial' variance components at the individual and neighbourhood levels are used to calculate the percentage of explained variance at both levels for each model.

### 3.4 Results

#### Measurement invariance

We tested the measurement invariance of the dependent variables between natives and minorities with Confirmatory Factor Analysis in MPLUS. Regarding generalized trust, the weak invariance model (constraining the factor loadings to be equal among natives and minorities) fitted the data reasonably well (RMSEA=.074, CFI=.990). The Chi<sup>2</sup> difference test did indicate, however, that the model with invariant loadings fitted the data significantly more poorly than the unconstrained model (Chi<sup>2</sup> difference=23.548, df=2, p<.001). Inspection of the factors loadings indicates that especially the loading for the item 'You can't be too careful in dealing with people' is lower among immigrants.

Regarding trust in political institutions, the model with invariant loadings fitted the data very well (RMSEA=.026, CFI=.999). The Chi<sup>2</sup> difference test again indicated, however, that the model with invariant loadings fitted the data significantly more poorly than the unconstrained model (Chi<sup>2</sup> difference=11.221, df=3, p=.011). Further analyses show that a partial weak invariance model in which the loading of the 'politics' item is left unconstrained does not fit the data more poorly than the unconstrained model. Moreover, a partial strong invariance model in which the loading and intercept of both the 'politics' and the 'European Union' items are left unconstrained also does not fit the data more poorly than the unconstrained model. Inspection of the factors loadings and intercepts indicates that the loading for the 'politics' item is lower among immigrants, and that the (low) intercepts for the 'politics' and the 'European Union' items among minorities correspond differently to the mean of the latent construct than among natives. The poorer performance of these two items is potentially related to the strong anti-immigrant rhetoric by some politicians in the Netherlands and on the European level, which should be reflected less in immigrants' assessments of the government and of the police and justice department (i.e. the other items).

In the literature on measurement invariance, the idea is broadly supported that strong measurement invariance warrants meaningful comparison of factor means across groups, and that partial invariance at this level (at least two items per factor exhibit strong invariance) can

be considered a sufficient condition (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). Our results thus indicate that we can validly compare trust in political institutions. On the other hand, even though the indicators form reliable measures of generalized trust, we do have to take into account that weak (or strong) invariance could not be established, and consequently that the items measuring generalized trust do not mean exactly the same to natives as they do to minorities. This is in line with criticisms of this type of trust questions, which argue that respondents may take different ‘imagined communities’ in mind when asked about ‘most people’, ranging from all people in the world to most people they know personally (Delhey, Newton & Welzel, 2011; Sturgis & Smith, 2010). It may be the case that this systematically differs between immigrants and natives, because ‘most people’ will more strongly connote ‘outgroups’ in society to immigrants than it does to natives.

#### **Multilevel regression models of generalized trust**

Regarding generalized trust, the results do provide support for our first hypothesis. We find that the relations between the immigrant group variables and generalized trust remain significant in each model of Table 2. While the effects become smaller by adding new variables, they do remain significant also in the full Model 4.

Regarding socio-economic position, Table 2 shows that education level and occupational status are positively related to generalized trust, while having financial problems relates negatively to generalized trust. Regarding civic participation and social integration, the results show that generalized trust is higher among those who are active in voluntary organizations, among those who perceive more social support (i.e. feel more integrated and less isolated), and among those who perceive more neighbourhood collective efficacy. Furthermore, the results of Model 4 in Table 2 indicate that trust is higher among residents of higher-income neighbourhoods, but including the neighbourhood level variables does not have much influence on the relations between the minority group variables and generalized trust. A test of interaction effects between minority status and the other independent variables shows that the main correlates of generalized trust do not differ much between natives and minorities, though the positive effects of education and occupational status are stronger among natives than among minorities (appendix, Table A.2).<sup>4</sup>

#### **Multilevel regression models of trust in political institutions**

A different picture arises when we look at trust in political institutions (Table 3). For this kind of trust, the results provide support for hypothesis 2 as the initial differences largely become non-significant in Model 4. We find that the relations between the minority group variables and trust in political institutions only remain significant for second generation Moroccan minorities, and to a lesser extent first generation Turkish minorities (Models 1-4, Table 3). Moreover, trust in political institutions is clearly related to socio-economic position, to civic participation and social integration, and to respondents’ political orientation.

Regarding socio-economic position, Model 2 in Table 3 shows that education level and occupational status are positively related to trust in political institutions, while having financial problems relates negatively to trust in political institutions. Moreover, trust in

political institutions is higher among students. The relations between the minority group variables and trust in political institutions are substantially reduced by including the socio-economic variables in the second model of Table 3, lending support to our third hypothesis.

Table 2: Multilevel models of generalized trust, N= 4,222

	MODEL 1 Ethnic group + demographics			MODEL 2 Economic position			MODEL 3 Social capital			MODEL 4 Neighbourhood characteristics		
	Est.	SE	p	Est.	SE	p	Est.	SE	p	Est.	SE	p
<b>Individual characteristics (level 1)</b>												
Ethnic group (ref= native)												
Moroccan – 1 <sup>st</sup> generation	-.392	.034	***	-.211	.036	***	-.173	.037	***	-.164	.039	***
Moroccan – 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	-.239	.042	***	-.199	.041	***	-.180	.042	***	-.172	.043	***
Turkish – 1 <sup>st</sup> generation	-.411	.034	***	-.240	.037	***	-.184	.038	***	-.173	.040	***
Turkish – 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	-.357	.043	***	-.272	.041	***	-.227	.042	***	-.217	.043	***
Female	.036	.021		.032	.021		.028	.021		.026	.021	
Age	.004	.001	**	.007	.002	***	.007	.002	***	.007	.002	***
Has a partner	.048	.026		.015	.026		-.018	.026		-.017	.026	
Education level				.083	.010	***	.071	.010	***	.071	.010	***
Education in other country				-.013	.041		.017	.040		.017	.040	
Prof. Activity (ref= employed)												
Currently unemployed				-.120	.051	*	-.084	.050		-.084	.050	
Non-labour-force				-.032	.038		-.004	.038		-.000	.038	
Currently student				.081	.037	*	.064	.036		.061	.036	
Occupational status				.007	.001	***	.007	.001	***	.007	.001	***
Supervisor at work				-.033	.029		-.036	.028		-.037	.028	
Financial problems				-.076	.009	***	-.057	.009	***	-.057	.009	***
Associations (ref= none)												
Association - only member							.054	.025	*	.054	.025	*
Association - volunteer							.071	.027	**	.073	.027	**
Social support - integrated							.097	.019	***	.096	.019	***
Social support - isolated							-.134	.018	***	-.132	.018	***
Outgroup friends							-.015	.023		-.018	.023	
Collective efficacy							.054	.018	**	.052	.018	**
<b>Neighbourhood characteristics (level 2)</b>												
% non-western neighbours										-.013	.093	
Average income level										.020	.009	*
(Constant)	2.057	.025	***	2.015	.028	***	1.893	.057	***	1.630	.133	***
Variance components												
Individual level	.462			.436			.422			.422		
Neighbourhood level	.012			.004			.005			.004		
Percent of var. explained												
Individual level	3.5			9.0			11.9			11.9		
Neighbourhood level	64.7			88.2			85.3			88.2		

Source: NELLS 2009, own calculations. Significant at: \*\*\*,  $p < .001$ ; \*\*,  $p < .01$ ; \*,  $p < .05$ .

Table 3: Multilevel models of political trust, N= 4,222

	MODEL 1 Ethnic group + demographics			MODEL 2 Economic position			MODEL 3 Social capital			MODEL 4 Political orientation		
	Est.	SE	p	Est.	SE	p	Est.	SE	p	Est.	SE	p
<b>Individual characteristics (level 1)</b>												
Ethnic group (ref= native)												
Moroccan – 1 <sup>st</sup> generation	-.143	.029	***	-.016	.031		.004	.032		-.056	.033	
Moroccan – 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	-.160	.036	***	-.133	.035	***	-.116	.035	**	-.181	.037	***
Turkish – 1 <sup>st</sup> generation	-.173	.029	***	-.073	.032	*	-.040	.033		-.078	.034	*
Turkish – 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	-.122	.036	**	-.052	.035		-.021	.037		-.049	.037	
Female	.089	.018	***	.086	.018	***	.074	.018	***	.088	.018	***
Age	-.007	.001	***	-.001	.001		-.001	.001		-.002	.001	
Has a partner	.013	.022		.008	.022		-.005	.022		-.006	.022	
Education level				.061	.009	***	.054	.009	***	.046	.009	***
Education in other country				.093	.034	**	.106	.034	**	.131	.034	***
Prof. Activity (ref= employed)												
Currently unemployed				-.090	.043	*	-.069	.043		-.072	.042	
Non-labour-force				-.015	.032		-.003	.032		-.009	.032	
Currently student				.213	.031	***	.203	.031	***	.193	.031	***
Occupational status				.004	.001	***	.004	.001	***	.004	.001	***
Supervisor at work				-.028	.024		-.026	.024		-.036	.024	
Financial problems				-.071	.008	***	-.062	.008	***	-.062	.008	***
Associations (ref= none)												
Association - only member							.048	.021	*	.040	.021	
Association - volunteer							.061	.023	**	.045	.023	
Social support - integrated							.102	.016	***	.095	.016	***
Social support - isolated							-.014	.015		-.010	.015	
Outgroup friends							-.019	.020		-.022	.020	
Collective efficacy							.051	.016	**	.054	.016	**
Left-right scale										-.008	.004	
Interested in politics										.096	.015	***
Preference for ruling party										.145	.018	***
<b>Neighbourhood characteristics (level 2)</b>												
% non-western neighbours										.082	.087	
Average income level										.009	.008	
(Constant)	1.322	.022	***	1.244	.024	***	1.220	.030	***	1.033	.118	***
Variance components												
Individual level	.331			.311			.305			.298		
Neighbourhood level	.012			.008			.008			.007		
Percent of var. explained												
Individual level	2.9			8.8			10.6			12.6		
Neighbourhood level	<0.1			27.3			27.3			36.4		

Source: NELLS 2009, own calculations. Significant at: \*\*\*, p < .001; \*\*, p < .01; \*, p < .05.

Table 4: Multilevel models of trust among immigrants, N= 1,841

	MODEL 1			MODEL 2		
	Generalized trust			Political trust		
	Est.	SE	p	Est.	SE	p
<b>Individual characteristics (level 1)</b>						
Ethnic group						
Moroccan – 1 <sup>st</sup> generation	.078	.060		-.065	.054	
Moroccan – 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	.066	.052		-.082	.048	
Turkish – 1 <sup>st</sup> generation	.053	.059		-.069	.053	
Turkish – 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation (= ref.)						
Female	-.003	.034		.063	.031	*
Age	.003	.004		-.000	.003	
Has a partner	-.057	.039		-.011	.036	
Education level	.043	.015	**	.025	.014	
Education in other country	-.005	.052		-.011	.047	
Prof. Activity (ref= employed)						
Currently unemployed	-.112	.064		-.003	.057	
Non-labour-force	-.004	.051		.014	.046	
Currently student	-.102	.058		.151	.053	**
Occupational status	.007	.002	***	.003	.002	
Supervisor at work	-.040	.050		-.054	.045	
Financial problems	-.064	.012	***	-.056	.011	***
Associations (ref= none)						
Association - only member	.017	.036		.038	.032	
Association - volunteer	.051	.043		.055	.039	
Social support - integrated	.057	.027	*	.049	.025	*
Social support - isolated	-.094	.026	***	.035	.024	
Outgroup friends	-.013	.045		.027	.041	
Collective efficacy	.047	.028		.070	.025	**
Left-right scale				.004	.007	
Interested in politics				.116	.023	***
Preference for ruling party				.108	.029	***
<i>Perceived discrimination</i>	-.097	.042	*	-.279	.038	***
<i>National identification</i>	-.027	.021		.103	.019	***
<i>Dutch language proficiency</i>	-.009	.025		-.070	.023	**
<i>Years spent in the Netherlands</i>	.001	.003		-.004	.003	
<i>Dutch nationality</i>	.082	.047		.028	.043	
<b>Neighbourhood characteristics (level 2)</b>						
% non-western neighbours	-.215	.123		-.161	.135	
Average income level	-.000	.014		-.010	.014	
(Constant)	1.762	.221	***	1.116	.228	***
<b>Variance components</b>						
Individual level	.428			.341		
Neighbourhood level	.003			.014		
<b>Per cent of var. explained</b>						
Individual level	6.3			14.1		
Neighbourhood level	70.0			<.01		

Source: NELLS 2009, own calculations. Significant at: \*\*\*, p < .001; \*\*, p < .01; \*, p < .05.



Regarding civic participation and social integration, the results show that trust in political institutions is higher among those who are active in voluntary organizations, among those who perceive more social support (i.e. feel more integrated), and among those who perceive more neighbourhood collective efficacy. The relations between the minority group variables and trust in political institutions are further reduced by including the variables for civic participation and social integration in Model 3 of Table 3.

Regarding hypothesis 4, the results in Table 3 (Model 4) indicate that trust in political institutions is largely unrelated to the neighbourhood level variables. The results in the fourth model of Table 3 also indicate, however, that trust in political institutions is positively related to being interested in politics and having a preference for one of the parties currently in government. Interestingly, including the political variables does not further reduce the relations between the immigrant group variables and trust in political institutions, in contrast to our fifth hypothesis. Conversely, the relations between the immigrant group variables and trust in political institution become larger, because immigrant group members more have a preference for one of the ruling parties, and also because interest in politics is relatively high among second generation Moroccans (see Table 1).

When comparing the correlates of trust in political institutions between natives and minorities using interaction effects, we see both parallel and contrasting effects (appendix, Table A.2). For both natives and minorities, trust in political institutions is negatively related to having financial problems, and positively related to perceived social support (i.e. feeling integrated), interest in politics, and having a preference for one of the ruling parties. On the other hand, unemployment, occupational status, and education significantly affect trust in political institutions among natives but not among minorities.

#### **Minority-specific determinants of trust**

To investigate the main correlates of generalized trust and trust in political institutions among minorities more in depth, we turn to the results presented in Table 4. From the first model in Table 4, it becomes clear that of the variables that are specifically relevant for minorities, only perceived discrimination is significantly related to generalized trust. Regarding trust in political institutions, the variables that apply specifically to minorities have more impact. Discrimination and identification with the host country are among the most important correlates of minorities' trust in political institutions, as can be seen in the second model of Table 4.

### **3.5 Discussion**

In this study we set out to investigate whether immigrants' levels of generalized trust and trust in political institutions are lower than those of natives, and to what extent the differences in trust between natives and minorities remain significant when controlling for important correlates of trust. In accordance with our hypotheses, immigrants display significantly lower levels of generalized trust. For trust in political institutions, on the other hand, most of the initially observed difference is rendered non-significant in the full multivariate and multilevel model.

In light of the remaining difference in generalized trust levels between natives and minorities, therefore, our study suggests that both cultural explanations (such as religiosity) and learning experiences (such as perceived group discrimination and traumatic experiences) should be investigated further in future studies. The main conclusion of this study is therefore that socio-economic position and civic and social participation are indeed related to levels of trust. Because we find that factors such as education and perceived neighbourhood collective efficacy do also affect generalized trust, our results suggest that policies aiming to improve immigrants' economic and social integration will generally be conducive to immigrants' psychological attachment to society.

It has to be noted that metric (or higher) measurement equivalence between natives and minorities could not be established for the generalized trust variable. This implies that caution is required in comparing the generalized trust levels between groups. We do use straightforward indicators of generalized trust, however, similar to national and cross-national studies that did find generalized trust to be equivalent across groups (Dinesen, 2011; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008). On the other hand, other researchers have raised doubts regarding this type of trust questions, because it has been shown that respondents may take different 'imagined communities' in mind when asked about 'most people', ranging from all people in the world to most people they know personally. Our results suggest that forms of trust that refer to specific actors, institutions or domains can be more confidently compared between minorities and the majority group.

The analysis demonstrates that immigrants do not have significantly lower levels of trust in political institutions than native Dutch, once economic position, civic and social participation, and political orientation are taken into account. Only the second generation Moroccan minorities deviate in this regard. Our study furthermore shows that minorities' trust in political institutions, and to a lesser extent generalized trust, is heavily influenced by feelings of personal discrimination. Unfortunately, we cannot compare natives and minorities in this regard, since the discrimination question was not asked to the native respondents. Inspection of the data does reveal that perceived discrimination is especially high among second generation Moroccans. In line with the argument already made by Rothstein and Stolle (2003), it is tempting therefore to investigate the relation between perceived discrimination in the hands of authorities and levels of political trust among this group. Our findings are compatible with earlier findings showing that trust is lower among discriminated groups (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Michelson, 2003; Smith, 2010).

It has to be remembered that in this case too, data collection was only conducted in one language. This implies that ethnic minority members that do not have a sufficient level of Dutch to participate in the survey were not included in the sample. It remains to be investigated, therefore, whether the current findings could be generalized toward the entire community of immigrants, including those who do not have much knowledge of the language of their host society. How exactly one could conduct in a valid manner such a survey in multiple languages, however, does remain a cause for concern and further investigation. Further, given the cross-sectional nature of the dataset, we do not have information on the trust levels of ethnic minorities before they immigrated. This means that we cannot account for the possible selectivity in trust of those who have migrated to the Netherlands.

Furthermore, future studies that can benefit from a double comparative research design, with multiple origin and destination countries, will be more suited to distinguish origin and destination effects and will also provide yet a better test of the persistence and life-long learning hypotheses. It has to be noted that this study was limited to one country, and future research should determine whether similar patterns can be found in other countries in Western Europe.

### 3.6 Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Analyses were also conducted with a different operationalization, where the unemployed were entered as a distinct category. Results of the analysis, however, were identical.
- <sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, the discrimination questions were not asked to the native Dutch, so we cannot include discrimination in the analyses for the full sample.
- <sup>3</sup> It should be noted that most second generation immigrants have sufficient proficiency in the Dutch language, all second generation minorities hold the Dutch nationality, and years in the Netherlands is equal to age for second generation minorities.
- <sup>4</sup> Additionally, we have results for interaction effects with all four minority group dummies available upon request (alternative to Tables A.2). These results lead to the same substantive conclusions, because the relations differ little between the minority groups.

# 4

## **Economic Integration and National Identification of Immigrants in the Netherlands**

**A slightly different version of this chapter is under review as  
De Vroome, T., Verkuyten, M. & Martinovic, B.,  
Host National Identification of Immigrants in the Netherlands.**

## **Economic Integration and National Identification of Immigrants in the Netherlands**

### **4.1 Introduction**

Immigration and cultural diversity put a strain on the social cohesion of societies. Diversity might lead to a lack of feelings of belonging together which is considered a prerequisite for national solidarity, a unified society and effective democracy (Barry, 2001; Putnam, 2007). Politicians and the media often claim that many immigrants have divided loyalties and a lack of attachment to the host society and therefore undermine a cohesive national identity. In West European countries, there is a renewed societal emphasis on traditional national values and immigrants are being scrutinized for their assimilation to a set of 'core values' and their loyalty to the host nation (see Entzinger & Fermin, 2006; Kundnani, 2007; Vasta, 2007). Proponents of multiculturalism also argue that a well-functioning society needs a sense of commitment and common belonging making it important to foster a spirit of shared national identity (Modood, 2007; Parekh, 2000).

Cross-national research shows that in most countries immigrants generally have lower host national identification than the majority group and a relatively weak sense of national belonging to the new country (e.g., Elkins & Sides, 2007; Staerklé et al., 2010). There is also some research evidence for a re-emphasis of ethnic distinctiveness (re-ethnicisation) and rejection of the host society (national dis-identification) among immigrants (e.g., Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). On the other hand, there are many immigrants who do develop a sense of belonging and commitment to the host society and want to make a contribution. This raises the question about the conditions that stimulate or hamper immigrants' national identification. Furthermore, there can be important differences between immigrant groups. Studies on national identity in Britain and the United States indicate that the strength of national identification may not be equal for immigrants from different origin countries and therefore that different immigrant groups should be examined separately (Heath & Roberts, 2006; Sidanius et al., 1997).

### **Integration and identification**

Based on the work of T.H. Marshall, Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul (2008) argue that four dimensions of citizenship can be distinguished: legal status, equal rights, participation and a sense of belonging. Most immigrants in Western countries have legal status and equal citizen rights but participation and particularly a sense of belonging tend to more problematic. Host national identification is considered to be one of the aspects of immigrant integration, alongside structural participation and socio-cultural integration (Fokkema & De Haas, 2011). These aspects of integration tend to be related; access to employment and education (structural participation) enables immigrants to interact more with natives (social integration) and learn the host country's language and customs (cultural integration) (Martinovic et al., 2009; Van Tubergen & Kalmijn, 2009). According to the influential assimilation theory of Gordon (1964), and later Alba and Nee (1997) and Esser (2003), gaining access to employment and education is the first and most important step in the integration process.

Immigrants' national identification is considered the 'final step' in the integration process, which only takes place after immigrants find that they can reach or have reached satisfactory socio-economic positions in the host society (Esser, 2003; Gordon, 1964). Research suggests that also natives who are socio-economically marginalized have a relatively low sense of national belonging (Heath & Roberts, 2006). The notion that socio-economic marginalization reduces national identification among natives raises an interesting question, namely whether national identification of natives and immigrants is similarly affected by economic participation.

Next to the structural determinants of national identification, previous research suggests that there are several determinants of national identification that are specific to immigrants. These include indicators of social and cultural integration as well as ethnic minority identification, discrimination, and migrant generation (Heath & Roberts, 2006; Maxwell, 2009; Nesdale, 2002). The influence of these characteristics on immigrants' host national identification has mostly been studied separately. However, these factors tend to be related and therefore should be considered simultaneously in order to determine their independent relationships with immigrants' host national identification.

Our study makes a contribution to the literature on immigrants' host national identification in several ways. First, we determine whether immigrants have lower host national identification than Dutch natives. Second, we examine whether the level of national identification differs between immigrants from different origin countries. Third, we investigate whether economic success is equally important for natives' national identification as it is for immigrants' host national identification. Fourth, we examine specific determinants of national identification among immigrants.

We use representative samples (18-49 years of age) of more than 2200 Dutch natives and 1700 Moroccan and Turkish first and second generation immigrants. Moroccan and Turkish immigrants are studied because they are the two largest non-western minority groups in the Netherlands (De Graaf et al., 2010b). Moreover, they are interesting groups to study, because research has shown that their economic integration lags behind natives and other immigrants, and because they are relatively often discriminated against (Dagevos & Bierings, 2005; Hagendoorn & Pepels, 2003).

## 4.2 Theory and Hypotheses

### **Level of national identification among immigrants and natives**

When immigrants arrive in a country, their sense of identity is typically centred on membership in their ethnic community. There is a large body of acculturation research that focuses on the way immigrants re-evaluate their ethnic identity, and the extent to which they come to identify with the host country (Berry, 1997; Phinney, 1990; Zimmermann et al., 2007). According to the acculturation framework, some immigrants will maintain an exclusive ethnic identity (separation), while others prioritize the new national identity (assimilation), or take on a dual identity that encompasses attachments to both the ethnic

minority group and the host country (integration) (Berry, 1997; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012; Zimmermann et al., 2007).

It is typically assumed that national identification is lower among immigrants than among natives. Because many nation states in Europe have historically developed around an indigenous group, the state institutions and national symbols (such as courts, schools, and the national anthem) reflect the majority group language and culture (Staerklé et al., 2010). These institutions and symbols will thus appeal more to ethnic majority than to immigrant groups. As a result, majority groups typically feel closer to the nation than minority groups (Staerklé et al., 2010). Because large-scale immigration to the Netherlands did not start until the recruitment of labour migrants in the 1960's (Bevelander & Veenman, 2006), the Dutch state institutions and national symbols reflect the language and culture of the native majority group. It follows that minority groups will likely feel less close to the Netherlands than natives. Therefore, our first hypothesis states that (*host*) *national identification will be lower among immigrants than among natives* (H1).

### **Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands**

In examining differences between immigrant groups, we propose two alternative hypotheses. First, the migration history of Moroccans and Turks in the Netherlands is quite similar. Many people from Turkey and Morocco, mostly low-educated men, were recruited as labour migrants in the 1960s and early 1970s (Bevelander & Veenman, 2006). After the period of labour recruitment, family reunification and family formation resulted in a further increase of immigration from Morocco and Turkey to the Netherlands in the 1980s and 1990s (Bevelander & Veenman, 2006). Compared to natives, the education level, labour market participation and level of income of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants are much lower (Hagendoorn et al., 2003). Furthermore, both Turkish and Moroccan immigrants are at the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy, facing the highest levels of rejection and exclusion (Hagendoorn & Pepels, 2003; Schalk-Soekar & Van de Vijver, 2008).

However, despite the similarities mentioned, researchers have noted that the Moroccan and Turkish communities differ in several respects. While Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands are often considered to be equally low-status groups, Turkish immigrants do have somewhat higher employment rates and income levels than Moroccans (Gokdemir & Dumludag, 2012). Moreover, because general levels of education and literacy are higher in Turkey than in Morocco, and because Turkey is a secular state like the Netherlands and unlike Morocco, the cultural distance between natives and Moroccan immigrants might be larger than between natives and Turkish immigrants (Stevens, Pels, Bengi-Arslan, Verhulst, Vollebergh & Crijnen, 2003). Therefore, it might be more difficult for Moroccan immigrants to adjust to Dutch society than for Turkish immigrants. This leads to the hypothesis that *host national identification will be lower among Moroccan than among Turkish immigrants* (H2a).

However, it can also be argued that national identification will be lower among Turkish than among Moroccan immigrants. It has been found that Turkish immigrants' life satisfaction in the Netherlands tends to be lower than among other immigrant groups (Gokdemir & Dumludag, 2012). Also, Turkish immigrants have a relatively stronger orientation on their ethnic community, compared to other minority groups in the Netherlands



(Fennema & Tillie, 1999). Of all immigrants in the Netherlands, Turks have the most extensive and highly interconnected network of ethnic associations (Fennema & Tillie, 1999). Because it is more difficult to identify with a society that one is not very satisfied with, and because the ethnic communities and organizations of Turkish immigrants provide an important source of identification and social control, it can be hypothesized that *host national identification will be lower among Turkish than among Moroccan immigrants* (H2b).

### **Economic participation**

For natives as well as immigrants, economic participation and success are important determinants of feeling included in society. There is a long research tradition that relates unemployment and poverty to reduced social integration and mental well-being (Bohnke, 2008; Strandh, 2000). Being economically unsuccessful makes people feel 'left out', and leads to disengagement from society (Heath & Roberts, 2006). In contrast, people who participate economically and are more successful on the labour market will have a feeling that they contribute to society, and will sooner feel that they belong and 'fit in'. In the literature on immigrant integration, it is suggested that economic participation plays a key role in stimulating other aspects of immigrants' integration, such as identification with the host country (Gordon, 1964). Similar to natives, economic participation can nurture a positive attitude toward society among immigrants because it confirms that they are valued members who make a useful contribution (Hagendoorn et al., 2003). We therefore hypothesize, for immigrants as well as for natives, that *economic participation (being employed, and having a higher occupational level) will be positively related to national identification* (H3a).

Researchers have noted that unemployment levels and labour market positions set immigrants apart from mainstream society and undermine their motivation to adapt (Hagendoorn et al., 2003). Because immigrants are more likely than natives to doubt whether they are seen as valued members of society, the effects of being economically successful on national identification can be expected to be stronger for immigrants than for natives. We therefore hypothesize that *the positive relation between economic participation and national identification will be stronger for immigrants than for natives* (H3b).

### **Immigrant-specific determinants of national identification**

In addition to economic participation, the literature suggests that ethnic identification, language proficiency (cultural integration), social interaction with natives and co-ethnics (social integration), perceived discrimination, and migrant generation are key determinants of immigrants' host national identification. We investigate these factors simultaneously in order to determine their independent associations with immigrants' host national identification.

First, host national identification has long been considered to be the opposite of ethnic identification (Phinney, 1990). This notion has been heavily contested in the literature, where the consensus now is that immigrant identification should be understood as two-dimensional rather than one-dimensional (Berry, 1997; Verkuyten, 2005a; Zimmermann et al. 2007). An important factor determining whether immigrants' ethnic identification is compatible with their sense of national belonging is whether the country of settlement has a civic, more pluralistic conception of nationhood, or rather has an ethnic conception (Phinney, Berry,

Vedder & Liebkind, 2006; Sidanius et al., 1997). While some studies find positive correlations between ethnic identification and national identification, this is typically in pluralist societies where active participation in and commitment to one's ethnic community can function as a means of furthering integration in and commitment to the wider society (Sidanius et al., 1997).

In nation states with a more ethnic conception of nationhood, immigrants are often considered a low-status out-group, and they find it more difficult to combine ethnic and host national identifications (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007; Yağmur & Van de Vijver, 2011). According to social identity theory, the identity threats encountered by low-status minority groups cause the members of these groups to identify stronger with their ethnic minority group and to distance themselves from the host society (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Negative correlations between ethnic and national identification are thus typically found in states with a more ethnic conception of nationhood (Phinney et al., 2006; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Traditionally, the Netherlands has an intermediate position between pluralist nations (such as Australia) and more ethnic nations (such as Germany), combining multiculturalist and assimilationist integration policies (Yağmur & Van de Vijver, 2011). In recent years, however, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants are often faced with anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments in public and political debates, with concomitant ethnic conceptions of Dutch nationhood (Vasta, 2007; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007; Yağmur & Van de Vijver, 2011). Consequently, it might be difficult for immigrants in the Netherlands to combine ethnic and host national identifications. We therefore hypothesize that *ethnic identification will be negatively related to host national identification* (H4).

Second, researchers have suggested that national identification is closely related to proficiency in and use of the host country language (Remennick, 2004; Vervoort, 2011). Studies on immigrants' language proficiency and usage and their national identification have demonstrated that language can function as an important marker of identity (Vervoort, 2011). Proficiency in the host country language is also an important pathway to further integration in the host country (Espenshade & Fu, 1997; Remennick, 2004). By learning the language, immigrants become more familiar with the majority culture which makes it easier to identify with the host society (Esser, 2003). We therefore hypothesize that *Dutch language proficiency will be positively related to immigrants' host national identification* (H5).

Third, researchers have argued that social integration, more specifically interaction with natives, forms an important explanation for immigrants' host national identification (Lubbers et al., 2007; Nesdale, 2002). Because individuals tend to adapt their norms, beliefs and commitments to those of their social network, the networks in which immigrants are involved will affect their national identification (Lubbers et al., 2007). Having many natives in one's personal network will make immigrants feel more accepted in the host society and will increase their orientation towards the host society (Nesdale, 2002). Therefore, we hypothesize that *more social contacts with natives will be positively related to immigrants' host national identification* (H6). In contrast, having personal networks that largely consist of co-ethnics can reduce the orientation towards the host society and foster more exclusive forms of ethnic identification (Lubbers et al., 2007). Therefore, we also hypothesize that *more social*

*contacts with co-ethnics will be negatively related to immigrants' host national identification (H7).*

Fourth, an important factor relating to the national identification of immigrants' is perceived discrimination by the majority population (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009; Maxwell, 2009; Ono, 2002; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Discrimination implies unfair treatment and such treatment tells people that they are not equal members of society and that society itself is less just. Therefore, and following the Rejection-Disidentification Model (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007) it can be expected that discrimination strengthens ethnic identification and a distancing from the host society. We expect that *perceived discrimination will be negatively related to immigrants' national identification (H8).*

Finally, it can be expected that that immigrants adapt more to the host society over the course of years spent in the host country, and from one migrant generation to the next (Maliepaard, Lubbers & Gijsberts, 2010; Van Ours & Veenman, 2003). Therefore, we hypothesize that *time spent in the Netherlands will be positively related to host national identification (H9a)*, and that *host national identification will be higher among second generation immigrants than among first generation immigrants (H9b).*

### 4.3 Data and Methods

#### Data

We use the first wave of the NETHERlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study (NELLS), which focuses on questions of social cohesion, inequality, and norms and values (De Graaf et al., 2010a). The NELLS survey is a rich data source because it contains large groups of natives and Moroccan and Turkish immigrants. In collecting the data, a random sample of municipalities was selected, based on region and degree of urbanization. The four largest cities in the Netherlands were added to these municipalities, because of the large proportions of ethnic minorities in the largest cities. Second, respondents were randomly selected from the population registry based on the respondents' age (14-49), their country of birth and their parents' country of birth.

First and second generation immigrants, mainly Moroccan and Turkish, were oversampled. According to the official definition of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics, first generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants are those individuals who were born in Morocco or Turkey, and of whom one or both parents were born in Morocco or Turkey (Keij, 2000). Second generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants are defined as those individuals who are themselves born in the Netherlands, and of whom one or both parents are born in Morocco or Turkey (Keij, 2000).

The survey was administered in the Dutch language, and both face-to-face interviews and a self-completion questionnaire were used. The overall response rate was 52%, which is about average for this type of surveys in the Netherlands (De Graaf et al., 2010b). It should be noted however that response was somewhat lower for Moroccan immigrants (46%) and Turkish immigrants (50%) than for the native Dutch (56%). The reason is that immigrants

were more difficult to reach and less willing to participate than natives, but immigrants could also more often not participate because of language problems (De Graaf et al., 2010b).

About one third of the immigrant respondents belong to the second generation (i.e. born in the Netherlands). We excluded the small minority of respondents in our sample (about 7.5 per cent) that did not fill out the self-completion part of the survey, because this part contains key items for our analysis. Furthermore, because we are interested in the role of economic participation, we focus on the respondents who are 18 or older (adults, of working age). Thus we exclude the respondents between 14 and 17 years of age (about eight per cent). Lastly, because only a few respondents had missing values on our variables of interest (i.e. less than three per cent), they were also deleted from the sample in most cases. For two variables where the missing values were limited to only one item of a set of four or more scale items (i.e. language proficiency and perceived discrimination), we have used the remaining scale items to impute that value. All in all, our study includes 4009 respondents, of which 2286 are native Dutch, 866 are Moroccan immigrants, and 857 are Turkish immigrants.

#### **Dependent variable**

National identification was measured with the following three statements, to which respondents could answer on five-point scales: 'I identify strongly with the Netherlands', 'I really feel connected to the Netherlands', and 'My Dutch identity is important to me'. Analysis showed that the items form a reliable scale (Cronbach's Alpha =.87). We tested the measurement invariance of the scale across the three groups (i.e. natives, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants) with Confirmatory Factor Analysis in AMOS. First, based on the RMSEA and CFI fit measures, the model with invariant loadings (when we constrain the factor loadings to be equal across the three groups) fitted the data very well (RMSEA=.031, CFI=.998). The Chi<sup>2</sup> difference test did indicate however that the model with invariant loadings fitted the data significantly more poorly than the unconstrained model (Chi<sup>2</sup> difference=19.665, df=4, p=.001). A model with invariant loadings for Moroccan and Turkish immigrants (when we only constrain the factor loadings to be equal between the Moroccan and Turkish groups) fitted the data equally well as the unconstrained model (Chi<sup>2</sup> difference=.020, df=2, p=.990). This means that, even though our three indicators form a reliable measure of national identification, we do have to take into account that the items measuring national identification may not mean exactly the same to natives as they do to the immigrant groups.

In addition, we have tested whether a model with invariant loadings for first and second generation immigrants fitted the data significantly more poorly than the unconstrained model. This was not the case (Chi<sup>2</sup> difference=4.416, df=2, p=.110), which means that the measure of national identification is comparable across the two generations of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants.

#### **Independent variables**

For economic participation, we use a variable that indicates respondents' *employment status*. We distinguished between those who are employed, those who are unemployed (but would want to work), those who do not actively participate in the labour market (and do not plan to

do so), and those who are currently students. For the measure of *occupational level*, respondents were asked to indicate what level of education is required for their current job position. Consequently, our variable for occupational level consists of the levels (1) no education or primary education required, (2) lower secondary education, (3) higher secondary education, (4) lower vocational training, (5) higher vocational training, (6) higher vocational training or university degree, and (7) university degree required. Respondents who are not employed are given the mean score of their respective origin group.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of National Identification and Independent Variables

	Range	Natives N=2,286		Moroccans N=866		Turks N=857	
		M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
<i>Dependent variable</i>							
National Identification	1-5	3.72	.74	3.75	.81	3.56	.78
<i>Economic participation</i>							
Employment status							
Employed	0/1	.78		.54		.61	
Unemployed	0/1	.03		.07		.10	
Inactive	0/1	.05		.23		.18	
Student	0/1	.14		.16		.11	
Occupational level	1-7	3.90	1.41	3.01	1.23	3.01	1.36
<i>Immigrant-specific factors</i>							
Ethnic Identification	1-5			4.05	.83	4.03	.89
Language proficiency	0-4			3.28	.94	3.06	1.00
Native contacts	0-6			4.59	1.74	4.62	1.68
Co-ethnic contacts	0-6			4.53	1.95	4.55	1.87
Discrimination	1-3			1.35	.41	1.33	.41
Second generation	0/1			.31		.31	
Years in the Netherlands	0-44			21.41	8.72	23.00	9.55
<i>Control variables</i>							
Female	0/1	.54		.55		.51	
Age	18-49	32.90	8.28	31.64	7.79	33.33	7.95

Source: NELLS 2009, own calculations.

Regarding immigrant-specific factors, the measure of *ethnic identification* consists of the same items as our dependent variable, but with a reference to the origin group rather than the Netherlands. These three items also form a reliable scale (Cronbach's Alpha =.92). We use a measure of *language proficiency* that consists of four items. Immigrant respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point scale how often they had difficulties in understanding, speaking, reading and writing Dutch. The scores on the four items were summed and divided by four. Analysis showed that the items form a reliable scale (Cronbach's Alpha =.96). For measuring *native contacts*, respondents were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale ranging from 'never' to 'daily', how often they had contact with natives in their neighbourhood.<sup>1</sup> The measure of *co-ethnic contacts* is the same as the measure of native contacts; respondents were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale ranging from 'never' to 'daily' how often they had contact with co-ethnics in their neighbourhood. *Perceived discrimination* was measured by asking respondents to indicate, on three-point scales, how often they had been discriminated

against in job applications, at work, at school, on the street, in clubs (like sports), and while going out (nightlife). We took the average of these items which form a reliable scale (Cronbach's Alpha =.81). *Years since migration* is based on respondents' answer to the question 'In what year did you come to live in the Netherlands?'. For second generation immigrants, years since migration is set equal to age. Finally, we use two control variables in our analysis: *gender* (female=1, male=0), and *age*. The descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables are presented in Table 1.

#### 4.4 Results

##### Descriptive results

The descriptive results in Table 1 indicate that, compared to natives (M=3.72, SD=.74), Turkish immigrants have lower national identification (M=3.56, SD=.78) but Moroccan immigrants do not (M=3.75, SD=.81). Table 1 also shows that natives are more often employed than Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, who are more often unemployed (and looking for work) or inactive. Regarding the immigrant-specific factors, language proficiency is lower among Turkish immigrants than among Moroccans, while the other factors (i.e. ethnic identification, native and co-ethnic social contacts and discrimination) are similar for Moroccan and Turkish immigrants.

Table 2 presents the associations between the different variables for the immigrant respondents in our sample. All independent variables except co-ethnic contacts are significantly correlated with host national identification in the predicted directions. There is a positive correlation between host national identification on the one hand and employment, occupational level, language proficiency, and native contacts on the other. Perceived discrimination and ethnic identification are negatively correlated with host national identification. To examine the relationships more closely, we next turn to the results of the multivariate analyses.

Table 2: Correlations between Independent Variables and National Identification, N=1,723

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Currently employed	.000	.114**	.028	-.133**	.029	.176**	-.037	.088**
2. Occupational level		.280**	.045	-.081**	.045	.200**	-.090**	.054*
3. Language proficiency			.179**	-.076**	.149**	.447**	-.111**	.211**
4. Native contacts				.440**	.008	.040	-.050*	.126**
5. Co-ethnic contacts					.026	-.159**	.132**	-.013
6. Discrimination						.133**	.013	-.077**
7. Years in the Netherlands							-.097**	.197**
8. Ethnic Identification								-.056*
9. National Identification								

Source: NELS 2009, own calculations. The correlation is statistically significant at \* (p<.05), \*\* (p<.001).

##### National identification among natives and Turkish and Moroccan immigrants

Our first hypothesis stating that national identification is lower among immigrants than among natives is partially confirmed. Regression analysis shows that, compared to natives,

Turkish but not Moroccan immigrants have significantly lower national identification (Table 3, Model 1). In addition, the results in Table 1 and Table 3 confirm hypothesis 2b, which stated that national identification is lower among Turks than among Moroccans.

Table 3: Regression Analyses of National Identification among Natives and Immigrants

	M1		M2		M3		M4	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
<i>Origin group</i>								
(Natives = ref.)	-		-		-		-	
Moroccan immigrants	.035	.030	.078 *	.032	-		-	
Turkish immigrants	-.155 **	.031	-.120 **	.032	-		-	
Immigrants (M + T)	-		-		-.022	.027	-.008	.031
<i>Economic participation</i>								
<i>Employment status</i>								
(Employed = ref.)			-		-		-	
Unemployed			-.098 *	.056	-.108 *	.056	-.269 *	.100
Inactive			-.195 **	.040	-.184 **	.040	-.098	.072
Student			-.094 *	.042	-.091 *	.043	-.075	.052
Occupational level			.004	.009	.004	.009	-.013	.011
<i>Interactions</i>								
Unemployed x Immigr.							.226 *	.121
Inactive x Immigr.							-.117	.086
Student x Immigr.							-.038	.073
Occup. level x Immigr.							.045 *	.018
<i>Control variables</i>								
Female	.014	.024	.035	.025	.037	.025	.035	.025
Age	.002	.001	.001	.002	.000	.002	.000	.002
(Constant)	3.646 **	.053	3.687 **	.074	3.718 **	.066	3.722 **	.067
N	4,009		4,009		4,009		4,009	
R <sup>2</sup>	.009		.015		.008		.011	

Source: NELLS 2009, own calculations.

The relation is statistically significant at \* ( $p < .05$ ), \*\* ( $p < .001$ ).

Note: one-tailed test for hypothesized effects.

### Economic participation

Next, we hypothesized that economic participation (being employed and having a higher educational level) is positively related to national identification (H3a). The results partially confirm this hypothesis. We find that, compared to employed respondents, those who are unemployed ( $b = -.098$ ,  $se = .056$ ) and those who are inactive on the labour market ( $b = -.195$ ,  $se = .040$ ) have lower national identification (Table 3, Model 2). Employment is, in other words, positively related to national identification. The results in Model 2 of Table 3 also indicate, however, that occupational level is not significantly related to national identification ( $b = .004$ ,  $se = .009$ ).

We further hypothesized that the positive relation between economic participation and national identification would be stronger for immigrants than for natives (H3b). In Model 4 of Table 3, we compared the relation between economic participation and national identification for natives with Turkish and Moroccan immigrants (combined). For the sake of clarity, we include Model 3 in Table 3 to show that the main effects of economic participation on national identification are practically the same whether or not we combine the Turkish and Moroccan immigrant groups in our analysis (thus, compared to Model 2 in Table 3).

The results in Table 3 (Model 4) confirm our hypothesis (H3b) regarding occupational level, but not regarding employment status. As expected, the significant interaction effect indicates that the relationship between occupational level and national identification is more positive among immigrants than among natives ( $b=.045$ ,  $se=.018$ ). We calculate simple slopes as suggested by Aiken & West (1991). The simple slopes indicate that occupational level is positively related to national identification among immigrants ( $b=.032$ ,  $se=.014$ ), but not among natives ( $b=-.013$ ,  $se=.011$ ).

With regard to employment status, we find a significant interaction effect between being unemployed and immigrant origin (Table 3, Model 4). However, contrary to our expectations, this significant interaction ( $b=.226$ ,  $se=.121$ ) indicates that the relation between being unemployed (vs. being employed) and national identification is more positive (less negative) for immigrants than for natives. From calculation of simple slopes, it appears that the negative effect of unemployment only holds for natives ( $b=-.269$ ,  $se=.100$ ) and not for immigrants ( $b=-.043$ ,  $se=.068$ ). To examine this further, we can turn to Table 4 (Model 1) which shows that it is not the unemployed but rather the inactive immigrants who have significantly lower national identification than employed immigrants. The results in Table 3 and 4 combined thus suggest that being employed is positively associated with national identification among both natives and immigrants, but mainly in contrast to the inactive for immigrants.<sup>2</sup>

#### **Immigrant-specific determinants of national identification**

The results in Table 4 indicate that ethnic identification is not significantly related to immigrants' national identification (Table 4, Model 2), while we expected a negative relationship (H4).

We also hypothesized that Dutch language proficiency would be positively related to immigrants' national identification (H5). Model 2 in Table 4 shows that better Dutch language proficiency is indeed significantly associated with a higher host national identification ( $b=.103$ ,  $se=.023$ ).

We further hypothesized that social contact with natives would be positively related to immigrants' host national identification (H6), and that social contact with co-ethnics would be negatively related to immigrants' host national identification (H7). Having more social contact with natives is indeed significantly associated with higher host national identification ( $b=.050$ ,  $se=.012$ ; H6), but having social contacts with co-ethnics is not associated with host national identification (H7).

The hypothesis that perceived discrimination will be negatively related to immigrants' host national identification (H8), is confirmed by the results ( $b=-.231$ ,  $se=.047$ ). Finally, in



line with our ninth hypothesis, we find that the number of years spent in the Netherlands is positively related to national identification ( $b=.014$ ,  $se=.003$ ). However, national identification is not significantly related to migrant generation (H9b).

Table 4: Regression Analyses of National Identification among Immigrants

	M1		M2	
	B	SE	B	SE
<i>Origin group</i>				
(Moroccan immigrants = ref.)	-		-	
Turkish immigrants	-.205	** .038	-.205	** .038
<i>Economic participation</i>				
<i>Employment status</i>				
(Employed = ref.)	-		-	
Unemployed	-.032	.071	.052	.069
Inactive	-.235	** .051	-.094	* .052
Student	-.115	* .069	-.152	* .067
Occupational level	.033	* .015	-.007	.015
<i>Immigrant-specific factors</i>				
Ethnic identification			-.017	.022
Language proficiency			.103	** .027
Native contacts			.050	** .012
Co-ethnic contacts			-.005	.011
Discrimination			-.254	** .047
Second generation			-.034	.058
Years in the Netherlands			.014	** .003
<i>Control variables</i>				
Female	.037	.040	-.032	.040
Age <sup>1</sup>	.002	.003	-.002	.004
(Constant)	3.742	** .107	3.463	** .205
N	1,723		1,723	
R <sup>2</sup>	.030		.102	

Source: NELLS 2009, own calculations.

The relation is statistically significant at \* ( $p < .05$ ), \*\* ( $p < .001$ ).

<sup>1</sup> When years in the Netherlands is included in the (second) model, age can effectively be interpreted as age at migration.

Note: one-tailed test for hypothesized effects.

The results in Table 4 further suggest that the effects of economic participation on immigrants' national identification are outweighed by the role of the immigrant-specific factors. Employed immigrants have higher levels of national identification, mainly in contrast to immigrants who are inactive. Further, immigrants who hold higher status occupations have higher levels of national identification (Table 4, Model 1). However, when we take the immigrant-specific factors into account in Model 2 (i.e. language proficiency, contact with natives and co-ethnics, discrimination, ethnic identification years in the Netherlands and migrant generation), the effect of being inactive versus being employed becomes much smaller, and the effect of occupational level is no longer significant. This suggests that employment and occupational level are not directly related to national identification but rather through factors such as language proficiency and native contacts.

### **Interactions with origin group and generation**

In order to examine whether the established relations hold for both groups of immigrants, and for the first and second generation, we estimated two sets of additional models.<sup>3</sup> First, we estimated models as presented in as presented in Table 4 (Model 2), but additionally including interactions between the all the predictors and ethnic group. Only the interaction between being a student (as opposed to employed) and being from Turkish origin turned out to be significant. This means that the relations between occupational status and national identification and between the immigrant-specific factors and national identification do not differ between Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. Simple slopes indicate that being a student is associated with lower national identification among Moroccan immigrants ( $b=-.263$ ,  $se=.083$ ) but not among Turkish immigrants ( $b=.002$ ,  $se=.094$ ).

Second, we estimated a model with interactions between all predictors and migrant generation. The interactions involving three predictors, language proficiency, contacts with natives and contacts with co-ethnics, proved to be significant. We found a positive interaction between language proficiency and belonging to the second generation ( $b=.138$ ,  $se=.070$ ). However, inspection of the simple slopes indicates that language proficiency is positively related to national identification both among second generation immigrants ( $b=.220$ ,  $se=.065$ ) and among first generation immigrants ( $b=.082$ ,  $se=.029$ ).

The interaction between contact with natives and belonging to the second generation proved to be negative and significant ( $b=-.062$ ,  $se=.024$ ). Inspection of the simple slopes for first and second generation immigrants shows that the positive relationship between native contacts and national identification only applies to the first generation ( $b=.067$ ,  $se=.014$ ) and not to the second generation ( $b=.006$ ,  $se=.022$ ). For interpreting this finding it is important to note that most second generation immigrants have relatively high levels of contact with natives on our measure. Therefore, it remains difficult to conclude whether a lack of contact with natives would reduce second generation immigrants' host national identification as it does among the first generation.

Regarding co-ethnic contacts it should be remembered that, overall, co-ethnic contacts and host national identification are not significantly related (Table 4, Model 2). The interaction between contact with co-ethnics and belonging to the second generation proved to be negative and significant ( $b=-.062$ ,  $se=.021$ ), however. Inspection of the simple slopes for first and second generation immigrants shows that contact with co-ethnics is negatively related to national identification among the second generation ( $b=-.047$ ,  $se=.018$ ), but not among the first generation ( $b=.015$ ,  $se=.013$ ). It should be noted that there is a small minority of second generation immigrants (about ten per cent) who has no co-ethnic contacts and scores relatively high on national identification. This yields a more negative relation between co-ethnic contacts and national identification among second generation immigrants, compared to first generation immigrants.

## **4.5 Discussion**

We set out to answer four main questions in this study. First, do immigrants have lower national identification than natives? Second, does the level of national identification differ

between immigrant groups? Third, does economic participation similarly affect national identification among natives and immigrants? And fourth, what are important determinants of national identification among immigrants?

Cross-national studies have found that national identification is lower among immigrants than natives (Elkins & Sides, 2007; Phinney et al., 2006; Staerklé et al., 2010). These studies, however, have neglected differences between minority groups (but see Sidanius et al., 1997; Heath & Roberts, 2006). Our findings indicate that it is important to consider differences in national identification between immigrants from different origin countries. We found that Turkish but not Moroccan immigrants had lower national identification than natives. For the Moroccan immigrants this result is surprising, because the expectation typically is that immigrants' national identification lags behind the national identification of natives. Interestingly, other studies have also shown that some groups (e.g. African Americans, and Black Caribbeans in the UK) have lower national identification than the native majority, while other minority groups (e.g. Mexican Americans, and ethnic Indians in the UK) do not (Heath & Roberts, 2006; Sidanius et al., 1997). Thus, the often made assumption that immigrants have a lower sense of national belonging compared to natives does not apply to all groups.

It is difficult to explain why Turkish immigrants identify less with the host country than Moroccans. Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands have a rather strong orientation towards their ethnic community (compared to other minority groups in the Netherlands), which could explain this result. It has for instance been noted that of all immigrants in the Netherlands, Turks have the most extensive and highly interconnected network of ethnic associations (Fennema & Tillie, 1999). Yet, after controlling for the effects of ethnic identification and co-ethnic social contacts, among other factors, the difference in national identification between Turkish and Moroccan immigrants remained. Future research should investigate alternative explanations, such as the relatively high residential segregation and community pressure among Turkish immigrants, the relatively high levels of nationalism in Turkey, and the extensive transnational networks of Turkish immigrants (Koopmans & Statham, 2001; Van der Laan Bouma-Doff, 2007; Van Heelsum, 2002).

The group differences in national identification can also indicate that national identification does not mean exactly the same to the groups studied, as is suggested by the results for the measurement equivalence of the items used. This puts studies that compare natives' and immigrants' national identification into perspective (e.g. Elkins & Sides, 2007; Staerklé et al., 2010). Researchers have noted that there can be qualitative differences in national identification between ethnic groups, which should be considered in empirical research (Verkuyten, 2005a). Our findings confirm that notion and suggest that caution is required when studying national identification across majority and minority groups. Furthermore, it is important for future studies to examine different aspects and dimensions of national identification. We focused on the sense of belonging but national identification can also relate to, for example, the process of self-categorization, feelings of esteem and pride, and sharing beliefs and values (Ashmore et al., 2004; Verkuyten, 2005a).

Regarding the role of economic participation, we found that being employed is positively associated with national identification, both among natives and immigrants.

However, among natives the group that had significantly lower national identification than employed people were the unemployed, while among immigrants the inactive had significantly lower national identification. From a policy perspective, this indicates that there are two specific groups at risk of feeling excluded from society. Among natives, the economically marginalized (i.e. those who are unemployed and cannot find work, despite wanting to work) feel most 'left out', in line with the study by Heath and Roberts (2006). Among immigrants, the sizeable group of people who do not actively participate on the labour market (about 20% of our sample, compared to about 5% among natives) identified less with the host country than the employed. Furthermore, our study reveals that moving up on the occupational ladder matters for immigrants but not for natives. The results thus indicate that economic participation – in terms of being active on the labour market and attaining a higher status position – generally increases the national identification of immigrants, while among natives the unemployed form a specific group of concern.

Our study further indicates that ethnic identification is not significantly related to immigrants' national identification. This is in contrast with previous research in the Netherlands that did find a negative relationship (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). However, we did find a negative bivariate correlation between ethnic and national identification, and unlike many other studies we controlled in our multivariate analyses for factors that can explain this negative association, such as perceived discrimination and social contacts. This suggests that the nature of the relationship between ethnic and national identification is indirect, mediated by specific conditions.

Regarding the other factors that are specific to immigrants, our findings indicate that perceived discrimination and Dutch language proficiency are among the most important determinants of host national identification. This confirms the notion from previous research that national identification is closely related to proficiency in and use of the host country language, and that the perceived acceptance or rejection by the majority heavily influences immigrants' sense of national belonging (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009; Remennick, 2004; Vervoort, 2011). Furthermore, our findings suggest that social contacts with natives are important for the national identification of first generation but not for second generation immigrants. It is thus likely that policies trying to stimulate interaction with natives will positively affect the host national identification of first generation immigrants. For second generation immigrants, social contacts with natives are already quite extensive and therefore having more contacts has less influence on the development of a sense of national belonging. It should be noted though that our measure of social contacts with natives reflects the quantity rather than the quality of contacts. Our study therefore does not rule out that close interethnic friendships can positively affect the national identification of second generation immigrants.

We want to mention some limitations of our study. While it is surprising that the unemployed immigrants did not have lower national identification than the employed, this may partly be due to a large portion of immigrants working in 'ethnic niches' of the labour market. It could be that employment in mainstream jobs is more positively associated with national identification among immigrants. This means that future studies should take into account the differences between employment in ethnic niches and employment in the economic mainstream. Another limitation is that the explained variance in our models is

rather low, meaning that much of the variance in national identification is not accounted for by the determinants examined.

Furthermore, we cannot make causal inferences because we used cross-sectional data. We argued that national identification can be the result of factors such as economic participation, but national identification, in turn, can also stimulate economic and social integration. However, this reversed causation is possible but less likely (Nekby & Rödin, 2007) and our predictions were theoretically derived and there is longitudinal, causal evidence for some of the proposed relationships, such as between discrimination and host national identification (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009).

Despite these limitations, our study has several strengths. We have used large representative samples (18-49 years) of two immigrant groups from different origin countries. We were able to make a comparison with natives, and we used a large set of reliable measures and adequate control variables to test our hypotheses, which were largely confirmed. Therefore, we think that this study presents a useful contribution to the literature and a good vantage point for future studies.

In conclusion, immigrants' host national identification does not appear to be much lower than the national identification of natives. This means that we found little evidence for the claim that immigrants have divided loyalties and a lack of attachment to the host society and therefore undermine a cohesive national identity. Our findings indicate that it is important to examine the conditions that stimulate or hamper immigrant's national identification. For example, the findings indicate that the economic integration of immigrants is not only an important goal in itself but can also contribute to a sense of national belonging. In addition, policies aiming to further stimulate immigrants' host national identification should focus on factors that are closely connected to the development of a sense of belonging, such as host language proficiency, discrimination and interethnic contacts.

#### 4.6 Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The questions on social contact in this survey asked how often respondents had contact with natives (or co-ethnics), in their neighbourhood, at work and at social clubs. Because many respondents were not employed (about 40 per cent) and were not a member of any social club (about 60 per cent), we focus on the neighbourhood contacts.
- <sup>2</sup> Additional analyses (not shown here) indicate that when natives are analysed separately, unemployed but not inactive respondents have significantly lower national identification than employed respondents. These results are available upon request from the authors.
- <sup>3</sup> These additional models are not included in the tables, but are available upon request from the authors.

# 5

## Economic Integration and National Self- Identification of Refugees in the Netherlands

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## **Economic Integration and National Self-Identification of Refugees in the Netherlands**

### **5.1 Introduction**

Even though refugees are a large and distinct group of immigrants in Western countries, less is known about their integration than of other immigrants (De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2010; Lamba, 2003; Waxman, 2001). Moreover, the research on refugees has mainly focused on their economic integration (Colic-Peisker, 2009; Connor, 2010; De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2010). Because of refugees' distinct motives for migration and their generally disadvantaged socio-economic position in host societies, it is interesting to find out whether refugees' self-identification as a member of the host society follows the same pattern found among other immigrants, and whether their socio-economic position in the host society affects their national self-identification.

We examine refugees' self-identification in terms of the act of defining oneself as a member of a particular social grouping (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Verkuyten, 2005a). According to Ashmore and colleagues (2004), self-identification is the precondition for other dimensions of national identity, including feelings of belonging, commitment and attachment. National self-identification concerns identification *of* oneself as a member of the host society, which is a first and necessary step for identification *with* the host society (Verkuyten, 2005a).

Immigrants' identification with the host society is a critical issue in public and scientific debates on immigrant integration (Phinney, 1990; Zimmermann et al., 2007). Some have claimed that immigrants' self-identification as a minority group member is coupled with a lack of identification with the host society which undermines the common bonds in society, while others have argued that identification with the ethnic minority group does not necessarily imply a lack of commitment to the host society. Research has shown that ethnic identification and national identification of immigrants are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Berry, 1997; Verkuyten, 2005a; Zimmermann et al., 2007). Although our study is related to this research, we do not look at the strength of ethnic and national identification as two separate dimensions but focus on whether refugees self-identify as a member of the host society, as opposed to identification as a member of their ethnic origin group. In this manner, we focus on the factors that can stimulate identification with the host country among refugees.

Immigrants' economic participation in the host country is generally considered to be a critical determinant of host country identification (Alba & Nee, 1997; Walters et al., 2007). Considering refugees' disadvantaged socio-economic position in host societies, the main aim of our study is to investigate how refugees' economic participation in the host country is related to their national self-identification.

In addition to economic participation, researchers have argued that immigrants' social integration and the perceived discrimination by the majority population play an important role in determining immigrants' national identification (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009; Lubbers, Molina & McCarty, 2007; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Therefore, we investigate to what



extent refugees' social ties and perceived discrimination by the majority population affect their national self-identification.

Furthermore, we examine the intermediate role of refugees' social ties for the relation between economic participation and national self-identification. We suggest that the relation between participation in the host country and national self-identification is partially mediated by refugees' social ties with natives. This means that social ties with natives can function as a mechanism that explains the relation between economic participation and national self-identification. We argue that this mediating mechanism may be a valuable addition to studies on host country identification among immigrants in general.

Sociological studies on determinants of immigrants' host country identification are quite scarce (Walters et al., 2007; Zimmermann et al., 2007), and studies among refugees are even scarcer. Using a unique data set, we are able to examine the national self-identification of more than 2500 refugees from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia in the Netherlands. These are the largest groups of refugees who have been granted asylum in the Netherlands between the late 1970's and 2002. Large numbers of refugees from these countries have settled in many other destination countries as well (Hovy & Chabake, 2005).

The political problems that forced most people of the current refugee groups out of their origin countries started in the late 1970's and early 1980's (Nafziger et al., 2000). In 1977, for instance, the Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia started, after which the military dictatorship in Somalia became increasingly repressive and many Somali's fled their country (Nafziger et al., 2000). A second surge in the number of Somali refugees followed the civil war in the 1990's. Regarding the former Yugoslavia, the first migrants to the Netherlands were labour migrants. After Tito's death in 1980 ethnic tensions grew and already started to become a motive for fleeing the country up until the eruption of the Yugoslavian wars in the 1990s (Nafziger et al., 2000). Regarding Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, there have been relatively large refugee flows since 1979-1980, when there was the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the start of the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Afghanistan by Russia (Nafziger et al., 2000).

## **5.2 Theory and Hypotheses**

Previous research suggests that economic participation, discrimination by the majority population and social ties are important determinants of immigrants' national self-identification (Nesdale, 2002; Walters et al., 2007; Zimmermann et al., 2007). We argue that these factors can also be relevant to the experience of refugees, and we propose that the economic position and social ties in the origin country should be considered in addition to economic participation and social ties in the host country.

### **Economic position**

An influential assumption in the literature on immigrant integration is that participation in structures and institutions of the host society that directly (i.e. labour market) or indirectly (i.e. language, education system) relate to one's economic position, play a key role in stimulating other forms of integration, such as identification with the host community

(Gordon, 1964). Economic participation in the host country is thought to nurture a sense of achievement, self-esteem and belonging, which can translate into a positive attitude towards the host society (Hagendoorn et al., 2003). Following this argument, it can be expected that economic participation in the host country stimulates refugees' national self-identification. We therefore hypothesize that *higher economic participation in the host country (i.e. education, employment and occupational status in the host country and proficiency in the host country language) increase refugees' self-identification as Dutch (H1).*

Pre-immigration economic factors, such as education in the country of origin, can also affect the national self-identification of immigrants (Zimmermann et al., 2007). The skills and knowledge that 'secured' a certain socio-economic position in the origin country may not be easily transferable to the host country, especially for refugees (De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2010; Friedberg, 2000; Kanas & Van Tubergen, 2009). Moreover, education in the country of origin represents a period of socialization in childhood and/or adolescence which can have a lasting effect on refugees' sense of ethnic belonging. It can thus be expected that the education in the origin country stimulates ethnic rather than national self-identification. We therefore hypothesize that *a higher level of education in the origin country will be negatively related to refugees' self-identification as Dutch (H2).*

### **Social Ties**

Researchers have argued that the social integration of immigrants forms an important explanation of immigrants' host country identification (Lubbers et al., 2007). The main argument is that interaction with others in social networks contributes to a sense of belonging. Social ties can function as a basis for self-identification and group membership because immigrants will tend to consider themselves as members of the same group as their (close) social ties. It can be argued that, consequently, social ties with co-ethnics will foster self-identification as a member of the ethnic minority group (Lubbers et al., 2007). In contrast, social ties with natives (i.e. social integration) will foster host country identification (Nesdale, 2002). Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that *social ties with natives (i.e. having Dutch friends, being a member of a Dutch organization, having more contact with natives than with co-ethnics) is positively related to refugees' self-identification as Dutch (H3).*

In addition to the social ties with natives and co-ethnics in the host country, we consider the partner, children, and other social ties that refugees may have left behind in the origin country, or who have moved to another country than the Netherlands. Similar to social ties with co-ethnics in the host country, social ties in the country of origin are expected to stimulate self-identification in terms of the ethnic group, rather than self-identification as a member of the host society. We thus hypothesize that *social ties in the origin country (i.e. having a partner or children in the origin country and sending remittances) is negatively related to refugees' self-identification as Dutch (H4).*

Finally, we suggest that social ties can function as a mechanism that partially explains why refugees' economic participation in the host country can affect their national self-identification. We propose this mechanism because the literature is rather unclear about why exactly there would be a relationship between economic participation and national self-identification. As noted earlier, one explanation in the literature is that economic participation

in the host country nurtures a sense of achievement in the host society and acceptance by the majority population, which can translate into a positive attitude towards the host society (Hagendoorn et al., 2003). We argue that education and employment in the host country and proficiency in the host country language can also facilitate refugees' contact opportunities and interactions with natives. In turn, these social ties can lead to a stronger sense of belonging to the national category. This means that by increasing social ties with natives, refugees' economic participation in the host country might indirectly increase the likelihood of refugees' national self-identification. We thus hypothesize that *refugees' economic participation in the host country increases refugees' social ties with native Dutch, and these increase refugees' self-identification as Dutch* (H5).

### **Perceived Discrimination**

In addition to economic participation, the perceived acceptance by the majority population might play an important role in immigrants' national self-identification (Hwang & Murdock, 1991; Nesdale, 2002; Ono, 2002). Research in sociology and social psychology suggests that perceived discrimination, or perceived rejection by members of the majority population, is an important explanation of national (dis)identification (Ono, 2002; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). The underlying mechanism of the relation between perceived discrimination and national (dis)identification is well described in the social psychological literature. According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and the related rejection-identification model (Branscombe et al., 1999), discrimination is a negative experience that strengthens ethnic identification of minorities. It presents a threat to group identity, making people increasingly turn toward the safety and acceptance of their minority group and away from the discriminating majority group.

Recently, the rejection-identification model has been extended to the rejection-disidentification model, which suggests that perceived discrimination not only leads to increased identification with one's minority group, but also prevents minorities from developing national identification with the host country (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Because the refugees from the origin countries in our study are often distinct from native Dutch in their physical appearance and cultural expressions, and because native Dutch will tend to perceive a 'cultural distance' between these groups and the majority group, refugees are also likely to encounter and perceive discrimination in Dutch society. The perception of being discriminated against can be expected to decrease the likelihood of national self-identification among refugees. We hypothesize that *perceived discrimination is negatively related to refugees' self-identification as Dutch* (H6).

## **5.3 Data and Methods**

### **Data**

According to the 2003 UNHCR statistical yearbook, the refugee groups included in our study were the largest groups of refugees in the Netherlands in 2003, with about 8000 Iranian, 14000 Somali, 26000 Afghan, and 29000 Iraqi refugees and about 20000 refugees from the

former Yugoslavia (Hovy & Chabake, 2005). We base our analysis on the SPVA (Social Position and Use of Provisions by Ethnic Minorities) survey data, collected in 2003 by Veldkamp research and commissioned by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP). The purpose of the survey was to gain more insight into the socio-economic position of refugee groups in the Netherlands. The survey data includes a cross-section of more than 3500 people who are born in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, or the former Yugoslavia (Schothorst, 2004).

The respondents were randomly selected from municipal records in twelve larger cities in the Netherlands. The fieldwork was done using Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) in the Dutch, English, or French language. Response rates of the groups were between 43% (former Yugoslavians) and 55% (Afghans). The reasons for non-response showed a similar pattern across the refugee groups, the most important being that about 25% of the people refused cooperation, about 15% could not be contacted at the time of data collection, and about 5% could not participate because of language difficulties. Other reasons of non-response include respondents for whom the address was incorrect and those who were in very bad health or had passed away. Analysis of the data shows that the distribution of the sample across age and gender strongly resembles that of the respective refugee populations. Moreover, the distribution across cities of residence is similar between the sample and the population (Schothorst, 2004).

Because of the sampling method used - respondents were selected on the basis of their country of birth - a minority of the respondents has migrated to the Netherlands for other reasons than seeking refuge. When asked to indicate their primary motive for migration, 86 per cent of the respondents mentioned reasons such as 'political suppression' and 'war/violence', and 14 per cent of the respondents mentioned reasons that relate to finding work and family formation and reunification. Because we want to focus our study on refugees, we excluded the latter group of respondents from the sample. It should be noted that most of the work and family migrants that are excluded in our analyses were born in the former Yugoslavia and came to the Netherlands before the 1980s. Furthermore, we have selected respondents between the ages of 18 and 65, and we have excluded a small number of respondents who were born in the Netherlands or who were younger than age six at the time of migration. We thus focus on the foreign born adult respondents. The people with missing information on one or more of the independent variables (3%) are also excluded from the analyses. The total number of respondents for our analyses is 2516.

### **Dependent Variable**

National self-identification was measured with a two-step procedure. Respondents were asked the question 'Do you see yourself as an <ethnic origin group>?' (e.g. Afghan). When respondents responded negatively, they were asked to which group they felt they did belong. Part of the respondents replied with stating 'Dutch', while other respondents indicated that their primary identification was centred on an ethnic subgroup (e.g. Pashtun). A small minority of respondents answered 'don't know' (7%) or 'other, namely ...' (3.9%) followed with a variety of self-identifications. With these two questions, we have created a measure indicating whether or not refugees (primarily) categorize themselves as Dutch. For our main

analyses, we excluded the people who answered ‘don’t know’ or ‘other, namely..’ from the sample. In our analyses, we contrast the respondents who categorize themselves as Dutch (1) with the respondents who categorize themselves as a member of an ethnic origin group (0). Our analyses are based on a sample of 2516 respondents. We have conducted additional analyses (not discussed in this paper), in which we contrasted the respondents who categorize themselves as Dutch (1) with the respondents who categorize themselves as a member of an ethnic group (2) and the respondents who answered ‘don’t know’ (3) or ‘other, namely..’ (4). The results of these additional analyses yielded the same substantive conclusions.<sup>1</sup>

### Independent Variables

We operationalize economic position in the host country by looking at refugees’ post-migration education, proficiency in the host country language, employment, and occupational status. With respect to *education in the host country*, respondents were asked if they had acquired education in the Netherlands. We use a binary variable, contrasting respondents who had acquired education in the Netherlands (1) to those who did not (0). The measure for *Dutch language proficiency* is based on the assessment of the interviewer, who rated the respondent’s language proficiency on a three point scale ranging from good to bad. In the analyses, we have contrasted the respondents with good Dutch language proficiency (1) with respondents with reasonable and bad language proficiency (0). Regarding *employment*, respondents were asked if they were currently employed. Those who were currently employed (1) are contrasted with unemployed people, including those who are and those who are not ‘seeking’ employment (0). All respondents who were employed have described their occupation. We have recoded the respondents’ occupation into the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI), which is an internationally comparable measure of *occupational status* (Ganzeboom et al., 1992). ISEI scores represent a continuous approach to occupational stratification and reflect a weighted sum of the average education and average income of occupational groups (Ganzeboom et al., 1992). To illustrate, office cleaners and farm workers have a score around 20, nursing personnel a score around 40, and lawyers and medical doctors have a score around 85. We use the ISEI scores, ranging from 16 to 88, as a measure of occupational status. Because we also include a dummy variable for employment, unemployed respondents were given the mean score. In this way the unemployed do not influence the effect of occupational status. Regarding refugees’ economic position in the origin country, we include a variable for refugees’ *education in the origin country*. We use a measure indicating the highest type of education in which the respondent has been enrolled in the country of origin. The measure includes five categories ranging from no education at all, through primary education and lower and higher secondary education, to tertiary education.

To measure social ties with natives, we use three measures of the extent to which refugees’ social networks include members of the majority population. First, respondents were asked to indicate if they have any *Dutch friends*. We have contrasted respondents who do not have any Dutch friends (0) with those who do have Dutch friends (1). The second measure is *organizational membership*. Respondents have indicated whether or not they were a member of an organization. The organizations may include any kind of association, such as sports, community, and political organizations. Only about 1% of the reported organizational

memberships were with an ethnic organization, and these are not included as an organizational membership. We have contrasted respondents who are member of one or more organizations (1) with respondents who have no organizational memberships (0). Third, we have included a dummy variable for the *composition of contacts* with the Dutch majority and with members of the ethnic minority group. Respondents were asked to indicate if they had more Dutch social contacts than co-ethnic, more co-ethnic contacts than Dutch, or an equal amount of contacts from both groups. Respondents who indicated having more co-ethnic than Dutch contacts (0) are contrasted with those who indicate that they have an equal amount of Dutch and co-ethnic contacts and those who indicate having more Dutch than co-ethnic social contacts (1).

Regarding social ties in the origin country, we look at whether the respondents have a partner or child(ren) in the country of origin and whether the respondents send remittances. For having *children*, we include dummy variables contrasting respondents who have no children (1), respondents who only have children in the Netherlands (2), respondents who only have children in the origin country (3), and respondents who have children in both the origin country and the Netherlands (4). Regarding having a *partner*, we include dummy variables contrasting respondents who do not have a partner (1), respondents who have a co-ethnic partner in the Netherlands (2), respondents who have a partner in the origin country or another country that is not the Netherlands (3), respondents who have a Dutch partner (4), and respondents who have a partner in the Netherlands with another (third) ethnicity (5). For *remittances*, we include a dummy variable contrasting respondents who do send remittances (1) to respondents who do not send remittances (0).

Regarding *perceived discrimination*, we look at refugees' perceived personal discrimination and group discrimination. First, respondents have indicated their perception of personal discrimination, rated on a five-point scale ranging from 'never discriminated against' to 'very often discriminated against'. Second, respondents have indicated whether they have the impression that their ethnic group (e.g. Somalis) is being discriminated against, also on a five-point scale ranging from 'never' to 'very often'. There is a significant correlation between the answers to the two questions of group and personal discrimination ( $r=.68$ ,  $p<.01$ ). Therefore, we created one variable for perceived discrimination, with a five-point scale ranging from 'never discriminated against' to 'very often discriminated against', based on the average of the two questions.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, we include several background variables that have been found to affect national identification in previous research on immigrants, or that might be relevant for the specific situation of refugees (Walters et al., 2007; Zimmermann et al., 2007). About 74% of the refugees in our sample have the Dutch nationality, and the other 26% of the respondents have residence documents that guarantee their legal residence in the Netherlands for at least five years (after which it is sometimes necessary to apply for an extension). We therefore control for legal citizenship in our analyses by including dummy variables that contrast refugees who only have the Dutch nationality (1) to refugees who have the Dutch and another nationality (2) and refugees who only have a foreign nationality (3). We also include dummy variables representing the country of origin (i.e. Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and the former Yugoslavia). We further control for the effects of gender, age at migration and

duration of stay in the Netherlands. The descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables, N = 2516

	Range	Mean	SD
<b>Dependent variable</b>			
Self-identification as Dutch	0/1	0.198	
<b>Independent Variables</b>			
<u>Economic Opportunities</u>			
Employed	0/1	0.428	
Occupational status	16-88	39.506	9.908
High Dutch language proficiency	0/1	0.638	
Education in the Netherlands	0/1	0.266	
Education in the origin country	0-4	2.205	1.321
<u>Social Ties</u>			
Native friends	0/1	0.727	
Member of an organization	0/1	0.144	
Composition contacts (half/mainly natives)	0/1	0.591	
Children			
Only children in the Netherlands	0/1	0.504	
Only children in origin country	0/1	0.054	
Children in origin country and in the Netherlands	0/1	0.049	
No children	0/1	0.393	
Partner			
Co-ethnic partner in the Netherlands	0/1	0.460	
Partner in origin country or third country	0/1	0.076	
Dutch partner	0/1	0.019	
Partner with other ethnicity in the Netherlands	0/1	0.026	
No partner	0/1	0.420	
Sends remittances	0/1	0.311	
<u>Perceived Discrimination</u>			
Perceived personal and group discrimination	0-4	0.815	.868
<u>Control Variables</u>			
Nationality			
Dutch nationality only	0/1	0.668	
Dutch and foreign nationality	0/1	0.076	
Foreign nationality only	0/1	0.256	
Country of origin			
Afghanistan	0/1	0.231	
Iraq	0/1	0.222	
Iran	0/1	0.187	
Former Yugoslavia	0/1	0.141	
Somalia	0/1	0.216	
Male	0/1	0.706	
Age at migration	6-57	26.977	9.561
Years of residence in the Netherlands	1-28	9.530	3.219

Source: Own calculations (SPVA, 2003).

## 5.4 Results

First we describe some demographic group differences between the groups of refugees (see Table 2). Most of the refugees in our sample are male, but more than half of the refugees from Somalia are female. Considering the age at migration, refugees from Somalia stand out with a mean age at migration of around 22, which is substantially lower than the average age at

migration in the other groups (around 28). Table 2 also shows that, on average, the refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq have lived in the Netherlands for less than ten years, while the average length of residence in the Netherlands for the refugees from Iran, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia is ten years or more.

Table 2: Demographic details by refugees' country of origin

Country of origin	Male	Age at Migration		Years of residence in the Netherlands	
	Mean	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Afghanistan	.843	28.378	10.116	7.550	2.892
Iraq	.826	28.731	9.016	8.840	2.640
Iran	.730	28.234	8.602	11.580	3.493
Former Yugoslavia	.603	27.603	9.897	10.080	2.667
Somalia	.484	22.215	8.501	10.220	2.702

Source: Own calculations (SPVA, 2003).

To analyse the relationship between refugees' economic position and national self-identification, and the role of refugees' social ties and perceived discrimination, we have used a stepwise approach with two models. Model 1 includes the variables that are related to refugees' economic participation in the host country and economic position in the origin country (i.e., post-migration education, Dutch language proficiency, employment and occupational status in the host country, and education in the country of origin), and perceived discrimination. Model 2 includes the variables for social ties (i.e. Dutch friends and organizational membership, relative frequency of contact with natives, location of the partner and children, sending remittances). We use this approach because it facilitates the testing of the hypotheses on direct relations and on the role of social ties with natives as a mediator of the relationship between refugees' economic position in the host country and national self-identification. We use binary logistic regression to estimate our models. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 3. In addition, we use Sobel tests of mediation to determine whether the mediating (i.e. indirect) relationships are statistically significant.

### Economic Position

We hypothesized that higher economic participation in the host country (i.e., Dutch education, proficiency in the Dutch language, employment and economic status in the Netherlands) is positively associated with refugees' self-identification as Dutch (H1). Results show that employment is indeed significantly and positively related to national self-identification. Refugees who are employed have about 1.3 ( $e^{.279}$ ) times higher odds of identifying themselves as Dutch (Table 3, Model 1). In addition, occupational level is also significantly and positively related to national self-identification. One standard deviation increase in occupational status is associated with 1.1 ( $e^{.009*9.908}$ ) times higher odds of self-identification as Dutch (Table 3, Model 1). Furthermore, Dutch language proficiency is significantly and positively related to national self-identification. Refugees who have high proficiency in the Dutch language have about 1.6 times higher odds of self-identifying as Dutch, other things



being equal (Table 3, Model 1). However, it turns out that education in the Netherlands is not significantly related to national self-identification (Table 3).

Our second hypothesis stated that a higher level of education in the origin country is negatively related to refugees' self-identification as Dutch (H2). In line with this hypothesis, results show that one standard deviation increase in educational level in the origin country is associated with 1.3 times lower odds of self-identification as Dutch (Table 3, Model 1).

Table 3: Logistic Regression Analyses of Refugees' National Self-Identification

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	se	B	se
<u>Economic Opportunities</u>				
Employed	0.279*	.117	0.187	.124
Occupational status	0.009*	.005	0.007	.005
High Dutch language proficiency	0.448*	.129	0.310*	.135
Education in the Netherlands	0.170	.123	0.161	.126
Education in the origin country	-0.218**	.046	-0.239**	.048
<u>Social Ties</u>				
Dutch friends			0.255*	.153
Member of an organization			0.189	.143
Composition contacts (half/mainly natives)			1.063**	.134
Children				
Only children in the Netherlands (ref.)			0	
Only children in origin country			-0.113	.288
Children in origin country and in the Netherlands			-1.025*	.354
No children			0.011	.135
Partner				
Co-ethnic partner in the Netherlands (ref.)			0	
Partner in origin or third country			-0.193	.266
Dutch partner			0.788*	.327
Partner with other ethnicity in the Netherlands			0.115	.319
No partner			0.097	.132
Sends remittances			-0.246*	.127
<u>Perceived Discrimination</u>				
Perceived personal and group discrimination	-0.056	.061	-0.043	.063
<u>Control Variables</u>				
Nationality				
Dutch nationality only (ref.)			0	
Dutch and foreign nationality	-0.702*	.217	-0.599*	.222
Foreign nationality only	-0.348*	.147	-0.434*	.152
Country of origin				
Afghanistan (ref.)			0	
Iraq	-0.103	.159	-0.068	.165
Iran	0.388*	.168	0.206	.175
Former Yugoslavia	-0.014	.179	-0.109	.186
Somalia	-0.644**	.184	-0.432*	.190
Male	-0.073	.123	-0.043	.131
Age at migration	0.017*	.006	0.029**	.007
Years of residence in the Netherlands	0.025	.020	0.018	.020
Constant	-2.161**	.353	-3.059**	.405
chi <sup>2</sup> model		114		238
Df		15		26
p (chi <sup>2</sup> )		0.001		0.001
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>		0.070		0.143
N		2516		2516

Source: Own calculations (SPVA, 2003).

Notes: \*\*p<.001; \*p<.05 (one-tailed test for hypothesized effects, two-tailed test otherwise). The Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> is a pseudo R<sup>2</sup> measure for logistic regression models, and it is calculated by dividing the Cox & Snell pseudo R<sup>2</sup> by the maximum value of the Cox and Snell pseudo R<sup>2</sup> (Nagelkerke, 1991).

### **Social Ties and Perceived Discrimination**

We hypothesized that refugees who have more social ties with natives will be more likely to self-identify as Dutch (H3). In line with this hypothesis, the results show that having Dutch friends is positively related to national self-identification. In contrast with refugees who do not have Dutch friends, those who do have Dutch friends are about 1.3 times more likely to self-identify as Dutch. Results also show that a relatively high number of contacts with native Dutch is positively and significantly related to national self-identification. In contrast with refugees who have only or mainly social ties with co-ethnics, refugees whose social ties are equally divided between native Dutch and co-ethnics or who have more contact with native Dutch than with co-ethnics have about 2.9 times higher odds of self-identification as Dutch, other things being equal (Table 3, Model 2). From the results in Table 3, it appears that organizational membership is unrelated to national self-identification.

We also hypothesized that refugees who have more social ties in the origin country are less likely to self-identify as Dutch (H4). The evidence for this hypothesis is mixed. Having a partner abroad does not significantly affect refugees' national self-identification, when contrasted with refugees who have a co-ethnic partner in the Netherlands. Our fourth hypothesis is to some extent confirmed, namely for the effect of having children. Results show that when contrasted with having only children in the Netherlands, having children in the origin country as well as in the Netherlands, but not having children in the origin country only, is significantly and negatively related to refugees' odds of self-identifying as Dutch. Having children in the origin country as well as in the Netherlands is associated with about 2.9 times lower odds of self-identification as Dutch. Our fourth hypothesis is supported by the results for sending remittances. As expected, refugees who send remittances are about 1.3 times less likely to self-identify as Dutch (Table 3, Model 2).

Furthermore, we hypothesized that the effects of economic participation in the host country on national self-identification would be (partially) mediated by refugees' social ties with natives (H5). The critical test for mediation is that the influence of the predictor (economic participation) on the dependent variable (national self-identification) is substantially reduced when the mediator (social ties) is added as a predictor (see Baron & Kenny, 1986). The results provide some evidence for this mediating hypothesis. Employment and occupational status in the Netherlands do no longer significantly affect national self-identification when the measures for social ties are introduced in the second model, and the relation between Dutch language proficiency and national self-identification is also reduced (Table 3, Model 2). Sobel tests of mediation show that there are two significant mediation effects, both in which refugees' composition of contacts (i.e. whether half or more of refugees' contacts are natives) is the mediating variable. The indirect effect of employment, through refugees' social contacts, on national self-identification is positive and significant ( $Z=2.668$ ,  $p=.004$ ). The indirect effect of language proficiency, through refugees' composition of contacts, on national self-identification is also significant ( $Z=2.591$ ,  $p=.005$ ). The relationships between employment and national self-identification and between language proficiency and national self-identification are thus partially explained by the composition of refugees' social contacts. This supports the proposition that refugees' economic participation in the Netherlands is related to national self-identification because it increases refugees' social

ties with natives. Sobel tests of mediation show that there are no significant mediation effects for the relationships between refugees' occupational status and national self-identification, and between refugees' education in the Netherlands and national self-identification.

We further hypothesized that refugees who perceive more discrimination would be less likely to self-identify as Dutch (H6). Our results show, however, that perceived discrimination does not significantly affect refugees' self-identification as Dutch (Table 3, Model 1 and 2).

Finally, some of the results for the control variables warrant discussion. First, the differences between ethnic groups are rather large in our first model. Especially Somali respondents have lower odds of identifying themselves as Dutch, in contrast to the other refugee groups. In our second model, the contrasts between the refugee groups are smaller. This indicates that the differences in national self-identification between refugee groups can be partially explained by taking the social ties in the origin country, host country and third countries into account. Furthermore, having Dutch legal citizenship is associated with higher odds of self-identification as Dutch, in contrast with refugees who do not have Dutch citizenship. Having double citizenship is also associated with lower odds to self-identify as Dutch, in contrast with refugees who only have Dutch citizenship. There are no gender differences in national self-identification. Finally, while also taking into account the duration of residence in the Netherlands, age at migration is positively and significantly related to identification as Dutch: refugees who were older when they came to the Netherlands are more likely to self-identify as Dutch. While this is somewhat counterintuitive, it should be noted that factors that explain (away) the negative effects of age at migration on national self-identification (e.g., education, language, and contacts) are simultaneously included in the model.<sup>3</sup>

## 5.5 Discussion

In many countries the question of immigrants' commitment to the nation is raised, and worries are expressed about fragmentation or a decline in national unity and social cohesion, due to immigrants maintaining their loyalty towards the origin country. We have examined the national self-identification of more than 2500 foreign born Somali, Iraqi, Afghani, Iranian and ex-Yugoslavian refugees in the Netherlands. The aim of this study was to investigate the role of economic participation in the host country in fostering refugees' national self-identification. In addition, we argued that refugees' social ties with natives and with people in the country of origin, as well as the perceived discrimination by natives, might be important determinants of refugees' self-identification as a member of the host society.

This article presents one of the first studies on the national self-identification of refugees and extends insights from research on ethnic and national self-identification of immigrants in general (e.g., Berry, 1997; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007; Zimmermann et al., 2007). Because of refugees' specific migration motives and disadvantaged socio-economic position in the host society, it is interesting to find out whether refugees' self-identification as a member of the host society follows the same pattern and is affected by the same factors as among other immigrants.

The results show that among refugees in the Netherlands, economic participation in the host country does foster national self-identification. We find that language proficiency, employment and occupational status are positively related to national self-identification. Our results thus support the assumption that refugees' economic integration fosters identification with the host country. These results differ from previous studies on identification among immigrants that find no significant effects of post-migration education and economic success in the host country on national identification (Walters et al., 2007; Zimmermann et al., 2007). In line with our study, however, research by Nesdale (2002) in Australia has shown that immigrants' occupational status is positively related to host country identification. These contrasting findings suggest that the relationship should be investigated in more detail. In this study, we did so by analysing the role of social ties with natives as an intermediate factor.

Next to economic integration in the host country, we also studied the economic position in the origin country. In contrast to previous research on immigrant identification (Zimmerman et al., 2007) we find that education in the origin country is important in explaining refugees' national self-identification. Among refugees in the Netherlands, the economic position in the origin country appears to promote self-identification in terms of the ethnic origin group, rather than national self-identification. The negative relation between educational level in the origin country and national self-identification lends support to the argument that refugees' pre-migration human capital skills (e.g. educational qualifications) yield little reward in the Netherlands, which is a problem that can negatively affect refugees' national self-identification (Kanas & Van Tubergen, 2009).

Regarding social ties, we find that having relatively more Dutch social ties is positively correlated with national self-identification. These results support previous research on national identification, which also shows that having social contacts with natives contributes to identification with the host society (Walters et al., 2007). Our results also partially support the notion that having more ties in the country of origin is negatively related to refugees' self-identification as Dutch. This indicates that it is important to take transnational social ties into account in understanding refugees' national self-identification. It is likely that these ties are also important for immigrants in general (Lubbers et al., 2007; Nesdale, 2002).

Furthermore, we showed that the relationship between refugees' economic participation in the host country and national self-identification is partially mediated by refugees' social ties with natives. This suggests that these ties are a mechanism that explicates how economic integration in the host country promotes national self-identification, namely by increasing refugees' social contacts with natives. The notion that economic integration in the host country may indirectly foster host country identification, through more social ties with natives, may also be useful in research on ethnic and national identification of immigrants in general. The mechanism of social ties comes in addition to other mechanisms that can explain the relation between immigrants' economic integration and host country identification that have been described in the literature. For example, there is the notion that economic integration nurtures a sense of achievement and of acceptance by the majority which in turn leads to a positive attitude towards the host society and increased host country identification (Hagendoorn et al., 2003). Our study indicates that employment stimulates national self-

identification when the occupation provides opportunities for contact with natives. Unfortunately, the weak economic position of refugees in the Netherlands - with high unemployment and low occupational status among the employed (De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2010) – implies that refugees' contact opportunities with natives are hampered by unemployment and work in low-paying sectors of the Dutch labour market in which immigrants are predominantly employed.

Unexpectedly, the findings show that perceived discrimination is not independently related to refugees' national self-identification. This result contradicts the findings in previous research on the identification of immigrants (e.g., Nesdale, 2002; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007) and does not support the rejection-disidentification model (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). One likely explanation is that the reported levels of discrimination are quite low (averaging below 1 on a scale between 0 and 4) which indicates that most respondents did not perceive any or much discrimination. Other studies in the Netherlands have shown that levels of perceived discrimination are much lower among refugees compared to other immigrant groups (Gijsberts, 2005). One explanation is the difference in migration motive. Refugees, who often have left their origin country because of violence and political suppression, may perceive the social context in the destination country as less negative than labour migrants. Moreover, in a study among refugees in Australia there were higher levels of perceived discrimination but these perceptions were not related to dissatisfaction with Australian society (Fozdar & Torezani, 2008). This suggests that even when levels of perceived discrimination among refugees are higher, the extent to which they reduce their orientation towards the host society may be limited. A likely reason is that refugees evaluate their current situation more positively than the situation in their origin country.

Our measurement of national self-identification has some limitations. First, it should be noted that the sequence of the two identification questions creates a bias towards self-identification as a member of an ethnic origin group because the participants were first asked whether they see themselves as a member of their ethnic group. It is likely that national self-identification would have been higher on an open-ended question. A second and related limitation of our measure of national self-identification is that it does not reflect the widely accepted notion that immigrants' identity is better understood as two-dimensional (i.e. dual or hyphenated identities that combine identification with the national community and with the ethnic group) than as one-dimensional (i.e. identification with either the host society or the ethnic origin group) (Berry, 1997; Verkuyten, 2005a; Zimmermann et al., 2007). Thus, the measure used limits the conclusions that we can draw. However, about 20% of the refugees in this study did self-identify as Dutch. Moreover, empirical research among Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands has shown that self-labelling in terms of a dual identity (e.g. Turkish-Dutch or Dutch-Afghan) is quite uncommon in the Netherlands, and that ethnic identification is negatively related to national identification (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Thus, although we were unable to assess hyphenated identities, it is likely that our conclusions for the determinants of national self-identification will also hold for a two-dimensional measure of self-identification.

Third, because national self-identification is measured at the same time as the other variables (i.e. we have cross-sectional data), we can only test for significant associations.

Panel data are needed to test for causation because it is also possible that, for example, social contacts with native Dutch improve economic integration rather than the other way around. Despite the limitations of the data, we believe that this study provides novel and important insights into the national self-identification of refugees.

Although not the main focus of our study, the findings for some of the control variables should be noted. First, we found that citizenship is related to refugees' self-identification. While nationality is especially relevant to the experience of refugees, nationality and citizenship status can be an issue in the immigration experience of other immigrants as well. Our study suggests that this is important to take into account in research on ethnic and national identification. Second, we show that there are differences in the odds of national self-identification between refugees from different origin countries, and that these differences are to some extent explained by refugees' social ties. Interestingly however, not all differences in national identification between the refugee groups are accounted for. There are various possible explanations of why refugees from Somalia are less inclined to self-identify as Dutch compared to refugees from Afghanistan and Iran, such as differences in the size of the groups, residential segregation, migration patterns and transnational networks. Another possible explanation is the group difference in visibility (Colic-Peisker, 2009). The relatively high visibility of the predominantly black Somali group means that they stand out more in the predominantly white Dutch society. Though these explanations are beyond the scope of this study, it will be interesting to investigate them in future research.

In conclusion, our study provides support for the assumption that economic participation in the host country is positively related to refugees' national self-identification. In addition, we found that social ties with natives and social ties in the origin country are correlated with national self-identification, and that the relationship between economic participation in the host country and national self-identification is partially mediated by refugees' social ties with natives. These findings have implications for the on-going immigration and integration debates in many societies. They suggest that, among refugees, economic and social integration stimulate a sense of belonging to the host society. More specifically, economic integration seems to increase the opportunities to have contacts with members of the native population and these contacts, in turn, stimulate the identification of oneself as a member of the host society. Thus, concerns about immigrants' loyalty to the nation and the fragmentation of society due to immigrants' lack of host country identification might be addressed by improving their economic participation and social integration. In addition, a higher level of education in the country of origin was associated with lower national self-identification. This suggests that for developing a sense of belonging it is important that immigrants' skills and knowledge obtained in the country of origin are recognized in the host society. This study focused on explaining differences in national self-identification between refugees within the Netherlands. Researchers have noted that the tone in Dutch political debate on immigration has become harsher since the 1990s, and that Dutch policy moved away from the model of multiculturalism (Koopmans, 2003). Cross-national studies or panel data are needed to assess how contextual factors like political climate and integration policies affect host country identification among refugees, which would be an interesting question for future research.

## 5.6 Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The results of the additional analyses are available upon request from the authors.
- <sup>2</sup> Analyses with two separate variables for perceived personal discrimination and perceived group discrimination lead to the same substantive conclusions. Results of these analyses are available upon request from the authors.
- <sup>3</sup> In a model including only country of origin and age at migration, the effect of age at migration is negative (results available from the authors upon request). When factors that explain (away) the negative effects of age at migration on national self-identification (e.g., education, length of stay, language, contacts) are included in the model, the ‘remaining effect’ of age at migration on national self-identification becomes positive and significant.





# 6

## The Integration Paradox: Level of Education and Immigrants' Attitudes towards Natives and the Host Society

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## **The Integration Paradox: Level of Education and Immigrants' Attitudes Towards Natives and the Host Society**

### **6.1 Introduction**

Despite their disadvantaged socio-economic background, children of immigrants sometimes outperform native peers on a variety of outcomes, such as academic progress and better health (Fuligni, 1998; Sam, Vedder, Liebkind, Neto & Virta, 2008). Furthermore, as immigrants acculturate to the host society, their developmental outcomes sometimes deteriorate (Garcia Coll, Patton, Marks, Dimitrova, Yang, Suarez & Patricio, 2012). This so-called 'immigrant paradox' has received considerable attention in the recent literature on immigrant integration in the United States (e.g., Fuligni, 1998; Palacios, Guttmanova & Chase-Lansdale, 2008) and also in Europe (e.g., Sam et al., 2008; Van Geel & Vedder, 2011).

The current study focuses on a related paradox for which some tentative evidence has been found in Europe, namely the 'integration paradox'. This paradox describes the phenomenon of the economically more integrated and highly educated immigrants turning away from the host society, instead of becoming more oriented towards it (Buijs et al., 2006; Entzinger & Dourleijn, 2008). Reports in West European media have suggested that policy makers should be concerned that highly educated immigrants become disengaged from the host society and increasingly decide to leave the country (Tagesspiegel, 2011; Volkskrant, 2011). Even if the out-migration of highly skilled immigrants remains limited in numbers, the integration paradox suggests that higher education and structural integration do not always lead to a stronger orientation on the host country.

Theoretically, the paradoxical nature of highly educated immigrants' dissatisfaction with the host society is important. Classical immigration theories suggest that structural integration (improving one's education and economic position) will lead to other forms of integration, such as a more positive attitude towards the host society (Alba & Nee, 1997; Esser, 2001; Gordon, 1964). Yet, the integration paradox suggests that education might form an obstacle for developing positive attitudes towards natives and the host society. A key reason for this would be that higher educated immigrants perceive more discrimination by the majority population, which in turn would lead to more negative out-group attitudes (Tolsma, Lubbers & Gijsberts, 2012; Van Doorn, Scheepers & Dagevos, 2012).

In this paper, we use relative deprivation theory (RDT) to empirically investigate this reasoning. Relative deprivation concerns the perception that oneself or one's group is at an unfair disadvantage in comparison to other individuals or relevant out-group (Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner, Meertens, Van Dick & Zick, 2008; Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin & Bialosiewicz, 2012). Whereas initial studies on the integration paradox have focused on the role of perceived discrimination, we suggest that relative deprivation also includes a perceived lack of opportunities in the host country. A lack of opportunities is not limited to discrimination because it can for instance refer to the perceived lack of diversity policies aimed at strengthening the cultural and economic position of immigrants.

Furthermore, previous studies have only focused on immigrants' attitudes towards natives (i.e. intergroup attitudes). RDT suggests, however, that relative deprivation should not

only lead to more negative out-group attitudes but also to attitudes towards the country as a whole. Relative deprivation can lead to support for initiatives and actions that seek to redress unfair situations in society (Smith et al., 2012). This raises the question whether the integration paradox is reflected more in dissatisfaction with the host society than in unfavourable attitudes towards the native population.

Another key aspect of our study is that we test whether education in the host country is differently related to perceived relative deprivation compared to education in the origin country. This is important because from the perspective of RDT, the central issue is that immigrants might perceive that they themselves or members of their ethnic group get lower returns for exactly the same educational investments in the host society (Baumgartner, 1998). For these immigrants the native population is a relevant comparison group, whereas this is probably less so for those who are educated in their country of origin.

Our main research question is whether higher education is related to less favourable attitudes towards natives and the host society, and whether this association is due to perceptions of relative deprivation. Our study adds to the existing literature that has focused on discrimination and attitudes towards natives in several ways. First, we investigate whether the relation between education and the attitude towards natives is mediated by the perceived lack of opportunities, in addition to perceived discrimination. Second, we examine whether the same mechanisms affect immigrants' attitude towards the host society and towards natives. Third, we examine whether the relationships between education and attitudes differ for host country and origin country education. In addition, we investigate whether the proposed relationships hold for two generations of immigrants and for four different migrant groups. We use data from the Survey Integration Minorities (SIM 2006), which contains a sample of more than 3900 first and second generation immigrants of the four largest groups in the Netherlands: of Surinamese, Antillean, Turkish and Moroccan background.

The main argument of the integration paradox is that the higher educated are more negative towards the host society and native population, because they perceive fewer opportunities and more discrimination than the lower educated (Buis et al., 2006; Entzinger & Dourleijn, 2008). First, we discuss the theoretical reasoning behind the expected relation between relative deprivation and attitudes towards natives and the host society. Then, we explain why perceived relative deprivation may be higher among higher educated immigrants.

## **6.2 Theory and Hypotheses**

### **Relative Deprivation and Attitudes**

RDT provides a framework for understanding the proposed negative relation between education and attitudes towards natives and the host society. According to Smith and colleagues (2012), the definition of relative deprivation contains three aspects. First, there must be comparisons made, at the individual or group level. Second, the comparison must lead to the perception that one is at a relative disadvantage with respect to other individuals or relevant out-groups. Third, the perceived disadvantage should be seen as being unfair.

Perceptions of discrimination and opportunities in the host country present a good test-case for RDT because these perceptions nicely combine the elements that define relative deprivation. When immigrants have the sense of being discriminated against, they will feel that they have an unfair disadvantage relative to members of the majority group, either personally or as a group. And when immigrants have the sense that their group lacks opportunities to succeed economically and to freely enjoy their social and cultural life, they compare their position to the opportunities that are open to other groups in society, most prominently the dominant majority.

Individuals who perceive more group relative deprivation have been shown to have more prejudiced attitudes towards out-groups (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Pettigrew et al., 2008), and less positive attitudes toward the social system, such as reduced just-world beliefs, reduced confidence in political institutions, and higher support for political protest (Corning, 2000; Klandermans, Roefs & Olivier, 2001; Pettigrew et al., 2008). Perceived lack of opportunities and perceived discrimination indicate that immigrants are put at an unfair disadvantage compared to other members of society. Both perceptions of relative deprivation can be expected to be associated with negative attitudes towards the native majority and the host society.

### **Education and Relative Deprivation**

The integration paradox suggests that perceived relative deprivation is higher among immigrants who are structurally more integrated, such as the higher educated. This positive relation between education and perceptions of relative deprivation contrasts with research on relative deprivation among majority members. Majority members who report relative deprivation are traditionally those of lower socioeconomic status (Pettigrew et al., 2008). Education level is by definition a hierarchical position and European research has shown that the less educated report higher group relative deprivation (Pettigrew et al., 2008).

Yet, the literature on ethnic discrimination provides insight into the expected positive relation between education and perceived relative deprivation. Previous research has found a positive relation between level of education and perceived discrimination among immigrants in countries such as the United States and the Netherlands (Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2007; Sizemore & Milner, 2004; Van Doorn et al., 2012; Wodtke, 2012). There are a number of possible reasons for this. First, higher education implies more cognitive sophistication which can mean that the higher educated immigrants are more aware of, and have a better understanding of, processes of discrimination and the lack of opportunities in society (Kane & Kyyro, 2001; Wodtke, 2012). Education enables immigrants to become more sophisticated social critics who can seek to combat discrimination and advocate policies that redress group disadvantages.

Second, the theory of rising expectations suggests that higher educated immigrants tend to be more sensitive to acceptance and rejection by the majority population. Whereas the lower educated can attribute their relatively weak social position to a lack of opportunities and thereby deny personal responsibility ('blaming the system'), this self-justification argument does not apply to the higher educated. The higher educated can more confidently claim that a lack of opportunities and discrimination prevents themselves and members of their group

from gaining economic parity with natives. Immigrants who pursue higher education and thereby try to participate and make a contribution to society, also develop higher expectations. They therefore are more strongly disappointed about perceived unequal treatment: their higher expectations are not met with equal rewards (Buis et al., 2006; Entzinger & Dourleijn, 2008). Within the framework of RDT, it has been argued that the more advantaged members of disadvantaged groups are most likely to engage in group comparisons (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). Higher educated immigrants may thus feel more deprived because the relevant comparison to similarly educated native turns out unfavourably. It is expected that this is particularly true for those who have been educated in the host society because for them the native majority is an especially relevant and meaningful comparison group.

Putting together the expected positive relation between education and perceived relative deprivation and the negative relation between relative deprivation and attitudes towards natives and the host society, we come to our main hypothesis: *there will be negative indirect relations between education on the one hand and favourable attitudes towards natives and the host society on the other, via lower perceived opportunities and higher perceived discrimination.*

### **The Context**

Our study was conducted in the Netherlands in which there is a large and historically dominant native majority. Some 50 years ago groups of immigrants started to come to this country and most of them are originally from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam or the Dutch Antilles (Nicolaas et al., 2010). In the 1960s, the Netherlands was one of the European countries that recruited labour migrants from Morocco and Turkey. From the 1970s onwards, family reunification and formation led to a further increase in the Turkish and Moroccan immigrant population in the Netherlands (Hagendoorn et al., 2003; Nicolaas et al., 2010). Currently there live around 750,000 people of Turkish or Moroccan origin in the Netherlands, which is around 4.5 per cent of the population.

The early immigration from the former colony of Surinam to the Netherlands mainly consisted of students who came for educational reasons. Following the independence of Surinam in 1975, immigrants from diverse socio-economic backgrounds came to the Netherlands. Like the Surinamese, the immigration of the Antilleans to the Netherlands, which rapidly increased in the 1990s, concerned people with diverse socio-economic backgrounds, including students but also many underprivileged youth (labour migrants) (Hagendoorn et al., 2003; Nicolaas et al., 2010). Around 490,000 people with a Surinamese or Antillean background live in the Netherlands which is around 2.9 per cent of the population.

## **6.3 Data and Methods**

### **Data**

We use data from the Survey Integration of Minorities (SIM 2006), which was set up by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research and Statistics Netherlands (Hilhorst, 2007). The dataset contains information on the four largest minority groups in the Netherlands. In order

to approximate optimal national representativeness, the samples were randomly drawn from the population registry. Interviews were held by bilingual interviewers when language problems were expected to occur. Response rates ranged between 46% for the Surinamese respondents to 60% for the Turkish respondents, which is usual for the Netherlands (Stoop, 2005). The sample originally includes 4,217 respondents from the four migrant groups. Because we have deleted cases with missing values on one of the dependent variables, the present study includes 3,981 respondents.

### **Dependent Variables**

Our first dependent variable, ‘attitude towards natives’, was measured with the well-known ‘feeling thermometer’. The thermometer has been used as a global measure of out-group attitude in many studies, including research in the Netherlands (e.g., Riordan, 1987; Verkuyten, 2005b; Wolsko, Park & Judd, 2006). After the interviewer’s statement ‘I would like to know how you feel about the different ethnic groups in Dutch society’, the respondents were asked the following question: ‘What is your opinion on Dutch natives? Imagine a thermometer ranging from very negative feelings about this group (0) to very positive feelings (100)’. Respondents thus evaluated the native Dutch on a scale from zero to one hundred, which we recoded for our analyses to range from zero to ten.

Our second dependent variable, ‘attitude towards the host society’, was measured in a similar manner. First, the question was introduced by the interviewer with the statement ‘I would like to know how you feel about Dutch society’. Then, respondents were asked the following question: ‘What is your opinion on the Dutch society? You can grade Dutch society on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 if you are very dissatisfied to 10 if you are very satisfied with Dutch society’. Respondents thus evaluated the host society on a ten-point scale, which we recoded for our analyses to range from zero to nine.

### **Independent Variables**

The main independent variables in our analyses are educational level, perceived opportunities in the host country, and perceived discrimination. First, *level of education* was measured by asking respondents about their highest level of education completed. Following the relevant educational system, there were eight categories, ranging from no education, through primary education, lower vocational education (*lbo*), lower general education (*mavo*), medium vocational education (*mbo*), medium or higher general education (*havo or vwo*), higher vocational education (*hbo*), to university education. We entered education in the analysis as a continuous variable (see De Graaf, De Graaf & Kraaykamp, 2000).<sup>1</sup> Respondents still in school were treated as having achieved the level of education they are currently enrolled in. About a third of the respondents was educated in the country of origin only ( $N = 1013$ ), and another third of the respondents was educated both in the country of origin and in the Netherlands ( $N = 1366$ ), or only educated in the Netherlands ( $N = 1314$ ). In separate analyses, we have investigated whether the expected relationships differ according to where immigrant immigrants received their education.

Second, our measure of *perceived opportunities* in the host country contains four statements (five-point scales) on the acceptance and rejection of ethnic minorities in the

Netherlands. The statements are: ‘In the Netherlands, minorities have all possible opportunities’, ‘In the Netherlands, minorities’ rights are respected’, ‘The Netherlands is a hospitable country for immigrants’, and ‘The Dutch society is open to foreign cultures’. We have used these four items in our analysis to measure the latent construct ‘perceived opportunities’. The four items form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .80).

Third, we have used the two items available in the data set for assessing *perceived discrimination* (five-point scales). The items are ‘Minorities are often discriminated against in the Netherlands’, and ‘Are you ever discriminated against by natives?’. We have used these two items in our analysis to measure the latent construct ‘perceived discrimination’. Analysis showed that the items form an acceptable scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .67). The bivariate correlation between perceived opportunities and perceived discrimination is  $-.39$  ( $p < .001$ ).

In the analyses we have taken several control variables into account. The literature suggests that these variables are likely to be related to education as well as to perceived opportunities, discrimination, and attitudes towards the host society and the native majority (Ten Teije, Coenders & Verkuyten, 2012; Tolsma et al., 2012; Van Doorn et al., 2012). We included *country of origin*, *minority generation*, *age*, *years since migration* (for the first generation), *gender*, and *occupational status* in the analysis. Furthermore, we have taken frequency of *contacts with majority members* into account which was measured by the question “How often do you have personal contact with native friends and acquaintances?” (five-point scale; 1 = ‘never’ and 5 = ‘daily’). Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	Range	Mean / Proportion	sd
<b>Dependent variables</b>			
Satisfaction with the Dutch society	0-9	5.539	1.575
Positive attitude toward natives	0-10	6.726	1.869
<b>Independent</b>			
Education	0-7	3.425	1.922
<b>Mediators</b>			
Perceived opportunities			
Opportunities immigrants	0-4	2.062	1.185
Respects rights immigrants	0-4	2.407	1.031
Hospitable immigrants	0-4	2.466	1.057
Open to foreign cultures	0-4	2.538	.988
Perceived discrimination			
Personal discrimination	0-4	1.061	1.072
Group discrimination	0-4	1.933	.994
<b>Control variables</b>			
Turks	0/1	.268	
Moroccans	0/1	.236	
Surinamese	0/1	.253	
Antilleans	0/1	.239	
Second generation	0/1	.248	
Age	15-87	37.272	14.775
Years since migration	1-60	21.644	10.556
Female	0/1	.535	
Employed	0/1	.494	
Contact	0-4	2.491	1.406

Source: SIM 2006, own calculations. N=3981.

### Analysis

MPLUS 6 was used to analyse the data. All models were fitted by maximum likelihood estimation. Because missing values did amount to about 11 per cent across all variables, we have used multiple imputation with five replications. Because of statistical reasons we did not impute values for the dependent variables and therefore deleted cases with missing values on these variables. As suggested by Kline (2010), we have used a two-step approach for our structural equation models: we first tested the measurement models before testing the structural model with the hypothesized relations.

Exploratory factor analysis clearly suggested that the six items measuring perceived host country opportunities and perceived discrimination form two distinct factors. Confirmatory factor analysis was then used to further determine whether perceived opportunities in the host country and perceived discrimination are indeed two separate latent constructs. The fit of a one-factor model was unsatisfactory ( $\chi^2 = 645.3$ ,  $df = 8$ ,  $p < .001$ ; CFI = .900; RMSEA = .141). A two-factor measurement model did have a satisfactory fit ( $\chi^2 = 5.1$ ,  $df = 7$ ,  $p = .647$ ; CFI = 1.000; RMSEA = .000), and fitted the data significantly better than a one-factor measurement model ( $\Delta\chi^2 = 640.2$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < .001$ ).<sup>2</sup>

Additional tests of cross-group measurement equivalence showed that the two latent constructs are also sufficiently comparable across generations and across immigrant groups (detailed results available on request). For generations as well as for immigrant groups, the statistical tests indicated that the measurement of the latent factors is equivalent at the level of 'metric invariance', although partially for the immigrant groups (because of two of the items measuring perceived opportunities). This means that the relationships of the latent factors 'perceived opportunities' and 'perceived discrimination' with other variables (e.g., education) can be validly compared across the two generations and across the four immigrant groups. Because a higher level of measurement equivalence could not be established, caution is needed when comparing the mean levels of perceived opportunities and discrimination across these groups. However, our focus is on the relationships and not on group differences in means.

In our structural model of the hypothesized relations, the dependent variables are predicted by education, perceived opportunities, perceived discrimination, and the control variables. The mediators, perceived opportunities and perceived discrimination, are predicted by education and the control variables. We have also added the covariances between perceived opportunities and perceived discrimination, and between the two dependent variables.

In separate multiple group analyses, we have investigated whether the relations between education, relative deprivation and attitudes towards natives and the host society differ for subgroups of immigrants who are educated in the origin country, in the Netherlands, or both in the origin country and the Netherlands. Additionally, to investigate the robustness of the model, we have used multiple group comparison to assess the extent to which the proposed model holds across the two immigrant generations and the four different immigrant groups.




## 6.4 Results

### Structural Model

Figure 1 presents the findings for the hypothesized relations.<sup>3</sup> The proposed model had a good fit,  $\chi^2/df = 7.339$ ,  $p < .001$ , CFI = .954, TLI = .911, RMSEA = .040 (low = .036, high = .044). Regarding the indirect relations between education and attitudes towards the host society and towards natives, the results support our hypothesis. As can be seen in Figure 1, education is negatively related to perceived host country opportunities which, in turn, is positively related to attitudes towards the host society and towards natives. The relations through the discrimination mechanism are less strong, but also in the expected direction. Education is positively related to perceived discrimination and perceived discrimination, in turn, is negatively related to attitudes towards the host society and towards natives.

Figure 1: Path diagram of standardized direct and indirect effects of education on immigrants' positive attitudes towards natives and satisfaction with the host society



Note: Rectangles are observed variables, ovals are latent factors.

Not presented in the figure are the factor indicators, the error terms and the control variables.

The standardized relations in Figure 1 indicate that attitudes towards the host society appear to be more strongly related to perceived host country opportunities and perceived discrimination, than attitudes towards natives. This suggests that the integration paradox applies at least as much to immigrants' attitudes towards the host society as to their attitudes

towards natives. Furthermore, Figure 1 indicates that education is directly and positively related to the attitude towards natives, whereas there is no significant direct relationship between education and attitude towards the host society.

Table 2 shows the total, direct and indirect relations between education and the two attitude measures. In line with the ‘paradoxical results’ of earlier empirical studies, we do not find positive total relations between education, on the one hand, and favourable attitudes towards natives and the host society, on the other. In fact, the total relation between education and attitudes towards the host society is negative rather than positive, although not significant. Furthermore, the results in Table 2 confirm the importance of the proposed indirect relationships. The total indirect relations between education and attitude towards the host society and between education and attitude towards natives are negative and significant. The findings show that the indirect relations through perceived opportunities are significant. The indirect relation through perceived discrimination is also significant for the attitude towards the host society and marginally significant for the attitude towards natives.

Table 2: Specific relations between education and attitudes towards natives and the host society

Path			b	se	p	
<b>Satisfaction society</b>						
Satisfaction society	←	Education	(Total)	-.024	.015	.113
Satisfaction society	←	Education	(Direct)	.014	.015	.329
Satisfaction society	←	Education	(Indirect)	-.039	.006	***
Satisfaction society	←	Opportunities	← Education	-.029	.005	***
Satisfaction society	←	Discrimination	← Education	-.010	.003	.002
<b>Attitudes towards Natives</b>						
Attitudes towards Natives	←	Education	(Total)	.020	.018	.268
Attitudes towards Natives	←	Education	(Direct)	.049	.018	.006
Attitudes towards Natives	←	Education	(Indirect)	-.029	.005	***
Attitudes towards Natives	←	Opportunities	← Education	-.025	.005	***
Attitudes towards Natives	←	Discrimination	← Education	-.004	.002	.069

Source: SIM 2006, own calculations. N=3981. \*\*\*:  $p < .001$ .

Entries are the result of a SEM analysis in MPLUS.

Reported are the unstandardized coefficients (b), standard errors (se) and p-values.

### Location of Education

We used multiple group analyses to determine whether the hypothesized relations differ between those respondents who were educated in the Netherlands only, those who were educated in the origin country, and those who followed education both in the origin country and in the Netherlands.<sup>4</sup> These analyses indicate that the relations in the model are quite stable for the location of education. Whereas a model in which all the structural relations are constrained to be equal across the education groups does fit the data more poorly than the unconstrained model ( $\Delta\chi^2 = 34.03$ ,  $df = 8$ ,  $p = .005$ ), releasing one constraint (on the relation between education and perceived opportunities) results in a model that fits the data equally well as the unconstrained model ( $\Delta\chi^2 = 22.85$ ,  $df = 7$ ,  $p = .063$ ). Most of the hypothesized relations (i.e. the direct relations between education and the dependent variables, between perceived opportunities and the dependent variables, and between perceived discrimination and dependent variables) do not differ for the location of education.

Interestingly, however, education is negatively related to perceived opportunities among those respondents who were fully or at least partially educated in the Netherlands, but not among those who were educated in the origin country. Thus, as expected the level of host country education rather than origin country education is associated with a perceived lack of opportunities. On the other hand, origin country education appears to be related to higher perceived discrimination. However, perceived discrimination is, in turn, less strongly associated with attitudes towards natives and the host society than perceived lack of opportunities. Thus, the integration paradox seems more applicable to immigrants who have invested in host country education than for those who only followed education in the origin country.

### **Robustness Checks**

We used multiple group analyses to determine whether the hypothesized relations apply equally to first and second generation immigrants. This analysis did not indicate much difference between the two generations.<sup>5</sup> A model in which the structural relations are constrained to be equal across the two generations does not fit the data more poorly than the unconstrained model ( $\Delta\chi^2 = 14.45$ ,  $df = 8$ ,  $p = .071$ ). This indicates that proposed relationships are similar for the two generations.

We used multiple group analyses to determine whether the hypothesized relations differ between immigrants from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam and the Dutch Caribbean (Antilles).<sup>6</sup> A model in which all the structural relations are constrained to be equal across the four groups fit the data more poorly than the unconstrained model ( $\Delta\chi^2 = 76.88$ ,  $df = 24$ ,  $p < .001$ ). However, separate  $\chi^2$ -difference tests indicate that three of the hypothesized relations (i.e. between education and satisfaction with Dutch society, between education and perceived discrimination, and between perceived discrimination and attitudes towards natives) do not differ significantly across the immigrant groups. Moreover, the other hypothesized relations (i.e. the relation between education and perceived opportunities, between perceived opportunities and the dependent variables, and between perceived discrimination and satisfaction with the host society) differ significantly in strength between the groups, but are in the same direction. This means that the proposed mediation model finds support among all four groups. The most striking difference between the four groups concerns the direct relationship between education and attitudes towards natives. This relationship is positive and significant for immigrants from Surinam and the Antilles, while it is not significant for immigrants from Turkey and Morocco.

## **6.5 Discussion**

Whereas the ‘immigrant paradox’ indicates that immigrants and their children sometimes outperform native peers on a variety of outcomes, such as educational achievement, the ‘integration paradox’ raises concerns about what happens when immigrants and their children advance their educational and socio-economic position. The integration paradox suggests that the more highly educated immigrants will show relatively high levels of dissatisfaction with the host society and more negative attitudes towards the native majority.

Our study confirms the notion of an integration paradox among first and second generation immigrants of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origin in the Netherlands. The pattern of associations was quite similar for the two generations and the four immigrant groups. Looking at the total relations between education and favourable attitudes towards the host society and the native population, we do not find the positive relation that would be expected on the basis of classical assimilation theory (e.g., Gordon, 1964). More importantly, we found that there is a negative indirect relationship between education and these attitudes. Higher education is associated with higher levels of perceived relative deprivation (perceived opportunities and discrimination), which in turn is associated with less favourable attitudes towards the host society and the native population.

Previous research among immigrants in the Netherlands suggests that higher education is associated with higher perceived discrimination (Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2007; Ten Teije et al., 2012; Van Doorn et al., 2012) which has also been found in the North American context (Sizemore & Milner, 2004; Wodtke, 2012). We add to this research by showing that education is negatively related to immigrants' perception of having equal opportunities to succeed and to live freely according to their own cultural values. The negative indirect relations through the perceived lack of opportunities were stronger than the indirect relations through perceived discrimination, but this could be due to a less reliable measurement of the latter construct.

We also go beyond existing research by showing that perceptions of relative deprivation are related to a more negative evaluation of the host society in addition to negative out-group attitudes (Ten Teije et al., 2012). Importantly, our study shows that the attitude towards the host society is independently and at least as strongly related to a perceived lack of opportunities and perceived discrimination, as is the attitude towards natives. This is important because a critical evaluation of the host society as being unfair and in need of change, is a more likely precursor of immigrant's endorsement of and participation in initiatives and actions that aim to improve the rights, power and influence of their group, than negative attitudes and stereotypes towards the native out-group (Van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008). Our findings suggest that education enables immigrants to become more sophisticated social critics of patterns of discrimination and lack of opportunities for immigrants. The higher educated might more strongly support actions and policies that try to redress the disadvantaged group positions (Kane & Kyyro, 2001; Wodtke, 2012). Higher education might increase one's awareness and concern about the vulnerable and relatively marginal position of immigrants in society. Relative deprivation theory suggests that the higher educated (more advantaged) members of disadvantaged groups are more likely to engage in group comparisons (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). Our results support this argument by showing that higher educated immigrants are more negative about group opportunities and perceive more discrimination.

To examine the relative deprivation explanation of the integration paradox more fully, future studies should examine relative deprivation more directly by including measures that tap justice-related affective judgments such as anger, resentment and frustration (Smith et al., 2012). Future studies could also examine the degree to which the higher educated engage in group comparisons and the extent to which they identify with their minority group and immigrants more generally. In doing so, these studies could also consider further the role of

the location of education. Our findings show that higher education is associated with a greater perceived lack of opportunities among immigrants who were educated in the host country but not among those educated in the country of origin. This suggests that the notion of an integration paradox is most meaningful for the experiences of the former group of immigrants. Their sense of relative deprivation probably stems from perceiving less opportunities despite the fact of having the same level of educational as natives. Education of natives is perhaps a less relevant standard of comparison for immigrants who are educated in the country of origin.

While our study provides important and novel findings that are largely similar across generations and for four immigrant groups, it also has some limitations. First, we rely on cross-sectional data, from a single country in Western Europe. This means that we could not test the causality of the proposed relationships and that the generalizability of our findings needs to be investigated further. Also, our data do not allow us to assess to what extent higher educated immigrants are actually more discriminated against. In contrast to the arguments of cognitive sophistication and rising expectations, an alternative explanation of the higher perceived discrimination among higher educated immigrants is that they are actually more discriminated against. However, this probably cannot explain the association between education and perceived opportunities. Furthermore, immigrants' dissatisfaction with the host society can lead to diverse and possibly contradictory behavioural outcomes. This means that while our findings indicate that relative deprivation is associated with a more negative and critical attitude towards the host society, it needs to be investigated whether, for example, dissatisfaction with the host society is related to trust in political institutions and to what extent perceptions and feelings of relative deprivation lead to political engagement and protest or rather political disengagement and withdrawal.

Second, although the response rate of around 50% is similar to other surveys in the Netherlands it means that some form of selectivity is likely. Furthermore, there often is a trade-off between the advantage of using data from large scale immigrant samples and the measurement of constructs. These data are typically collected for different purposes by a multidisciplinary team of researchers which has implications for the number of questions that can be asked for the different constructs. For example, perceived discrimination was measured with only two questions and more extensive measures of discrimination might result in stronger relationships.

Despite these limitations, our study on the integration paradox has several implications. While there is much research on the relationship between education and out-group attitudes among the native majority population (see Hagendoorn & Nekuee, 1999; Vogt, 1997), few studies have investigated this relation from the perspective of minority groups (Wodtke, 2012). And while research among the majority population by and large shows a clear positive relation between education and out-group acceptance, the integration paradox suggests that such findings cannot be readily transposed to the experiences of immigrant groups. Higher education can be associated with more negative attitudes to natives as well as to the host society, especially for immigrants who are educated in the host country. Thus, more successful immigrants might become more negative towards the host society and

native population because they are more concerned about the existing discrimination and unequal opportunities.

These findings improve our understanding of the ways in which immigrants try to adapt to the host society. Furthermore, there are reasons to expect that the integration paradox is not limited to attitudes towards this society or the native population but also involves behaviour. A study showed that Moroccan-Dutch youngsters who are on custody awaiting trial are much better integrated in Dutch society than their Moroccan-Dutch non-criminal peers (Stevens, Veen & Vollebergh, 2009). Relative to the latter, the former group more often speaks the Dutch language fluently, have more contacts with Dutch people and self-identify more often as Dutch. Their relatively strong orientation on Dutch society makes them extra sensitive to inequalities and negative treatment. This increases the likelihood of feelings of relative deprivation with the associated negative emotions of anger, resentment and frustration that can lead to crime (Agnew, 2001; Smith et al., 2012). Similarly, several studies in the United States have found relative high levels of delinquency among ethnic minority youth who have a strong orientation on American society (Samaniego & Gonzales, 1999; Vega, Gil, Warheit, Zimmerman & Apospori, 1993).

Future studies in other national contexts and by focusing on other attitudes and other forms of behaviour should contribute to a further understanding of the paradox of integration among immigrants. In addition, future studies should more fully investigate perceptions and feelings of relative deprivation to further test the social psychological processes underlying the integration paradox. Furthermore, research should examine individual, family and community level factors that can play a role in the integration paradox (Garcia Coll et al., 2012).

## 6.6 Notes

- <sup>1</sup> We have checked the robustness of our results with a recoded education variable indicating years of education, instead of levels. The results of analyses with such a variable lead to exactly the same conclusions.
- <sup>2</sup> Based on preliminary analyses, we have included the correlation between the error terms of two of the ‘perceived opportunities’ items in our measurement models, to improve model fit.
- <sup>3</sup> An overview of all estimated relations can be found in Table A.1 in the appendix.
- <sup>4</sup> An overview of all hypothesized relations can be found in Table A.2 in the appendix.
- <sup>5</sup> Results are available upon request (but see Table A.3).
- <sup>6</sup> Results are available upon request (but see Table A.4).





# 7

## **Life Satisfaction among Immigrants in the Netherlands: Do Economic, Social, and Psychological Integration Matter?**

A slightly different version of this chapter is under review as  
De Vroome, T. & Hooghe, M.,  
**Life Satisfaction among Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands:  
Immigration Experience or Adverse Living Conditions?**

## **Life Satisfaction among Immigrants in the Netherlands: Do Economic, Social, and Psychological Integration Matter?**

### **7.1 Introduction**

Life satisfaction is the cognitive component of subjective well-being, and can be defined as people's evaluations and judgments about their quality of life as a whole (Angner, 2010). The other components of subjective well-being are positive and negative affect, feelings of happiness and the absence of distress (Angner, 2010; Diener, 2000; Neto, 1995). Researchers have argued that measures of subjective well-being can be an important alternative instrument to measure group inequalities and policy outcomes, because they better reflect what people themselves want out of life than traditional economic indicators of well-being and equality such as income (Diener, 2000; Veenhoven, 2004). In this study, we focus on differences in life satisfaction between immigrants and the native population, while because of data restriction we do not investigate other elements of subjective well-being.

Previous research has shown quite convincingly that levels of life satisfaction among immigrant groups in Western Europe tend to be significantly lower, compared to the native majority population (Safi, 2010). The gap in life satisfaction has been demonstrated across various countries in Western societies, and across various population groups (Bălăţescu, 2007; Bartram, 2011; Safi, 2010; Verkuyten, 2008). In the analysis of Safi (2010), the gap remained equally strong for first as for second generation immigrants, which would imply that we do not have any indication that immigrant populations eventually would catch up with the native population with regard to levels of life satisfaction.

Three main approaches can be taken to the study of life satisfaction among immigrant populations. First, the observed lower level of life satisfaction can be directly related to the experience of immigration as such. Because immigrants are uprooted from their primary social networks and have to adapt to a new host society with different social and cultural norms, they often experience stress and adaptation problems (Berry, 1997; Smart & Smart, 1995; Vohra & Adair, 2000). Within this perspective, the gap in life satisfaction is perceived as an almost inevitable price one has to pay for the experience of migrating from one society to another.

Second, however, an interesting puzzle arises when we look at the theory of life satisfaction homeostasis. This theory focuses on the relative stability and positive tendency in measures of subjective well-being, even across countries with different cultures and different objective living conditions (Cummins & Nistico, 2002; Kennedy & Cummins, 2007). The theory proposes that people tend to have a relatively positive outlook on life, because maintaining a positive level of life satisfaction is a basic adaptive human attribute (Cummins & Nistico, 2002). Following the theory of life satisfaction homeostasis, differences between natives on the one hand and immigrants on the other would actually not be expected. Even given different experiences and living conditions, homeostasis theory assumes the occurrence of equal levels of life satisfaction.

Third, need-gratification theory relates the level of life satisfaction to fulfilment of human needs, based on Maslow's need-gratification theory (Maslow, 1970; Oishi, Diener,

Lucas & Suh, 1999; Veenhoven, 1991). It has been well documented in the migration literature that the economic and social integration of immigrants and their children in Western societies is limited (Van Tubergen, 2006; Hagendoorn et al., 2003). Moreover, it has been suggested that immigrants' psychological integration in society, meaning their identification with society and trust in fellow citizens and political institutions, is lower than among natives, which could be associated with lower feelings of belonging and esteem (Dinesen, 2013; Esser, 2003; Staerklé et al., 2010). Because immigrants on average occupy disadvantaged positions in society, they have fewer resources to attain need-gratification. Therefore, need-gratification theory suggests that lower levels of life satisfaction among immigrants can be explained by immigrants' adverse living conditions.

The distinction between the three mechanisms is important, both from a policy as well as from a theoretical perspective. From a policy perspective, the first approach leaves policy makers with limited options, as lower levels of life satisfaction are almost inherently linked to migration experiences. The homeostasis approach is in general optimistic about life satisfaction levels among immigrant populations, but the need-gratification approach predicts that policy efforts to reduce social and economic disadvantages among immigrant populations should also have an impact on life satisfaction among immigrants.

From a theoretical perspective, the research question is relevant too. If we consistently observe lower levels of life satisfaction among immigrants, this would suggest that life satisfaction can be durably affected by disruptive life events. If, on the other hand, we observe little group differences in life satisfaction, this would imply that satisfaction is quite a resilient characteristic throughout the life cycle, robust to shocking and uprooting events as homeostasis theory would predict. Moreover, if the initially observed group differences can be mainly explained by immigrants' incomplete economic, social and psychological integration in society, this would suggest that life satisfaction does respond to specific contextual variables that are open to change, because it is driven by basic human needs. Research on life satisfaction among immigrant populations can therefore also further our theoretical understanding on the sources of life satisfaction in general and contribute to the debate about the empirical merits of homeostasis and need-gratification approaches to life satisfaction.

In this study, we investigate to what extent economic position, perceived social support and psychological integration in society can explain majority-minority differences in life satisfaction, and whether these explanations of life satisfaction apply equally well to both natives and first and second generation immigrants. We thus provide further evidence on the validity of these explanations of life satisfaction. To investigate the difference in levels and determinants of life satisfaction of natives and immigrants, we rely on an analysis of the first wave of the Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study (NELLS), which was conducted in 2009 and included a strong overrepresentation of members of the Turkish and Moroccan communities in the Netherlands (De Graaf et al., 2010a).

## 7.2 Theory and Hypotheses

### **Immigration shock and life satisfaction homeostasis**

Although research on immigrants' life satisfaction is relatively new, it has been shown on several occasions that immigrants' levels of life satisfaction in Western countries tend to be significantly lower than those of natives (Bălătescu, 2007; Bartram, 2011; Safi, 2010; Verkuyten, 2008). Based on the extensive research on immigration and mental health outcomes, a first strand in the literature has focused on the negative consequences of the 'shock' of migration and acculturative stress for immigrants' subjective well-being (Bălătescu, 2007; Sam, 1998; Vohra & Adair, 2000). Though improvement of quality of life may indeed be the underlying motive for migration decisions, international migration usually means that immigrants are uprooted from their primary social networks, and experience losses of culture, property, social support and identity. Immigrants also have to adapt to a new host society with different social and cultural norms, which can create stress and adaptation problems (Berry, 1997; Sam, 1998; Smart & Smart, 1995; Vohra & Adair, 2000). From this perspective, lower levels of life satisfaction among immigrants are perceived to follow quite directly from the experience of immigration and stresses of acculturation, especially for the first generation.

Our first straightforward starting hypothesis therefore is:

H1: Life satisfaction will be lower among first and second generation immigrants than among natives.

In contrast to the immigration shock perspective, however, differences in life satisfaction between natives and immigrants would not be readily expected from the perspective of well-being homeostasis theory. The theory of well-being homeostasis is built around the observation that measures of life satisfaction are relatively stable and tend to be positive rather than negative (Cummins & Nistico, 2002; Kennedy & Cummins, 2007). The theory argues that maintaining a positive level of life satisfaction is a basic adaptive human attribute, because life satisfaction stimulates productivity while dissatisfaction will have a debilitating effect (Cummins & Nistico, 2002). A positive level of life satisfaction is buffered primarily by cognitive mechanisms such as self-esteem, control and optimism, which act to minimize the influence of negative external events (Cummins & Nistico, 2002; Kennedy & Cummins, 2007). The resilience of life satisfaction is evidenced by empirical studies which have observed that people who experience major disruptive life events over time tend to return to the positive equilibrium level of before the crisis (Headey & Wearing, 1992; Cummins & Nistico, 2002). Following the theory of life satisfaction homeostasis, therefore, differences between natives on the one hand and immigrants on the other would in principle not be expected.

In contrast to the first hypothesis, our second hypothesis therefore is:

H2. Life satisfaction will not be lower among first and second generation immigrants than among natives.

### **Domains of integration and need-gratification**

The ‘migration shock’ and ‘life satisfaction homeostasis’ models offer an interesting theoretical puzzle. A third approach however, need-gratification theory, might also elucidate the origins of differences in life satisfaction that have been found between immigrants and natives. This approach assumes that life satisfaction is driven by the fulfilment of human needs, including basic physiological needs and the needs for safety, love and belonging, esteem, and personal growth (Maslow, 1970; Oishi et al., 1999; Veenhoven, 1991). The sociological immigration literature suggests that immigrants’ integration in the host society consists of integration in four interrelated domains: cultural integration, structural or economic integration, social integration, and psychological integration (Esser, 2003; Fokkema & De Haas, 2011). Cultural integration concerns in the basic knowledge of cultural codes and customs that enable meaningful interaction with others in society, most importantly language proficiency. Structural integration refers to participation and advancement of immigrants in the education system and the labour market of the host society. Social integration, thirdly, refers to the establishment of social relations across ethnic boundaries. Finally, psychological integration refers to identification with the host society, and a sense of belonging and civic commonality that is also expressed in feelings of trust (Esser, 2003).

On average, research shows that immigrants and their children occupy disadvantaged socio-economic positions in Western societies (Van Tubergen, 2006; Hagendoorn et al., 2003). Moreover, immigrants’ social support networks may be more limited and their identification with the host society and levels of trust in other citizens and political institutions may be lower (Dinesen, 2013; Elkins & Sides, 2007; Martinovic, 2013; Staerklé et al., 2010). Consequently, because economic deprivation and feelings of isolation and distrust frustrate the gratification of physiological needs and needs for safety, belonging, esteem, and personal growth, a lack of integration in these different domains may explain the lower levels of life satisfaction among immigrants. We focus on three types of integration with regard to which immigrants are routinely found to be at a disadvantage in the immigration literature; economic integration, social integration and psychological integration.

### **Economic integration**

One of the most prominent explanations of life satisfaction is based on access to economic resources, which can be operationalized in terms of labour market participation, occupational level and income. This test is of crucial importance for this analysis, because it has been documented that immigrant groups of the population in the Netherlands have lower income levels than the native group, partly because of lower education levels but also as a result of discriminatory practices on the labour market (Gijsberts, Huijnk & Dagevos, 2012; Hagendoorn et al., 2003). Especially for those who hold relatively low socio-economic positions, it has been demonstrated that access to material resources can have a huge impact on life satisfaction, as these resources provide them with more opportunities in their daily lives. This effect is weaker among the higher income groups, where additional resources have

only a limited marginal effect on the opportunity to develop one's human capabilities (Cheung & Leung, 2004).

The statistical correlation between income and life satisfaction tends to be significant, but rather weak (Headey, Muffels & Wooden, 2004; Moghaddam, 2008), but largely this is a result of this ceiling off effect among the highest income groups. Furthermore, there is also a problem of measurement validity. In survey research it is notoriously difficult to obtain reliable figures about family income: a substantial proportion of respondents refuse to reveal their family income, while for those who do, there are doubts about the reliability of the figures. When measures are used that more directly tap people's perceived sense of economic well-being and financial security, a stronger relation between economic position and life satisfaction emerges (Headey et al., 2004; Moghaddam, 2008). Especially for research among ethnic minorities, it is important to consider income position as a determinant of life satisfaction as these groups are concentrated in lower income segments of the population (Amit, 2010; Gokdemir & Dumludag, 2012).

### **Social integration**

Social networks, social support and the perceived quality of one's primary social relations have a strong impact on life satisfaction (Diener & Seligman, 2004; Hooghe & Vanhoutte, 2011; Kapıkıran, 2012; Ram, 2010; Wong et al., 2012). Social support networks are of crucial importance in upholding life satisfaction, and this effect is particularly strong in adverse economic conditions (Park, Roh & Yeo, 2012). Perceived loneliness, on the other hand, is detrimental for one's level of life satisfaction (Kapıkıran, 2012).

As with economic integration, the social integration of immigrants in society may be limited in comparison to natives. Immigrants have often had to leave behind friends and family in the country of origin, while their social ties with the native population might be hindered by cultural barriers or tendencies toward homophily in social relations. Furthermore initial language difficulties and lower socio-economic positions may also reduce the pool of eligible people to form social relations with in the host society (Martinovic et al., 2009). Consequently, it can be expected that immigrants run a higher risk of lacking social support and experiencing loneliness. Therefore, social contacts and the perceived level of social support can form an additional explanation of the difference in life satisfaction between immigrants and natives.

### **Psychological integration**

In the literature on domains of integration, psychological integration is most often defined in terms of national identification (Gordon, 1964; Esser, 2003). From the perspective of immigrants, this means the strength of the emotional commitment one feels with the host country (i.e. the extent to which an individual considers the national identity as an important part of his or her personal identity) (Verkuyten, 2005a). It can be argued, however, that psychological integration encompasses more than the national identification of immigrants, and citizens in general (Esser, 2003). Psychological integration, defined more generally, is an emotional orientation toward the host society that includes feelings of loyalty and solidarity with the host society and national community, and acceptance of the cultural and institutional

conditions as an acceptable framework for shaping a pleasant life (Esser, 2001; Heath & Roberts, 2006). In other words, a sense of belonging in the host country consists of acceptance of others in society, and a belief that institutions and other members of society can generally be trusted. Psychological integration can therefore also be conceptualized as a positive and trusting attitude towards society and one's fellow citizens.

Psychological integration in society can contribute to life satisfaction, because positive group memberships help fulfil universal needs for belonging and esteem (Verkuyten, 2005a). It is argued that psychological integration is actually the most 'difficult' aspect of immigrant integration and is not likely to occur before considerable advances have been made in terms economic, cultural and social integration in society (Alba & Nee, 1997; Esser, 2003). We can therefore expect that levels of national identification and trust in others are lower among immigrants than among natives, and are thereby a potential explanation of the difference in life satisfaction between immigrants and natives. Indeed, cross-national research shows that in most countries immigrants generally have a relatively weak sense of national belonging to the new country and lower levels of trust (e.g., Dinesen, 2013; Elkins & Sides, 2007; Staerklé et al., 2010).

Following need-gratification theory, we expect that economic integration, social integration and psychological integration will each partially mediate the relation between minority group membership and life satisfaction. Our third hypothesis is thus the following:

H3. The observed differences in levels of life satisfaction between immigrants and natives can be explained by differences in economic integration, social integration and differing levels of psychological integration in society.

#### **Different groups, different explanations?**

It has to be noted that for all these elements, two possible relations are theoretically possible. The first one is a mediation effect. Given the fact that ethnic minorities have lower income levels, this might reduce their satisfaction with life. This would imply that income has the same effect for all respondents, but that immigrants simply have lower average income levels. The second possibility is an interaction effect, and this implies that the effect of income levels is different for minority and majority respondents. Therefore, it is important to include both main and interaction effects in our analysis.

Previous research has established that correlates of life satisfaction may differ cross-culturally, between countries, and between social groups in society, e.g., with regard to class position (Cheung & Leung, 2004; Diener & Diener, 1995; Oishi et al., 1999). Following recent studies focusing on income effects, which suggest that suggests that the impact of economic position on life satisfaction may be greater for immigrants than for natives (Bartram, 2011, Olgiati, Calvo & Berkman, 2012), our present study takes this line of research a step further by examining whether the relevance of economic, social and psychological correlates of life satisfaction differs between natives and first and second generation immigrants.

In addition, we also examine two correlates of life satisfaction that are unique to the position of immigrants in society. First, both the ethnic group and the host society can offer a

sense of belonging and feelings of esteem for immigrants. Indeed, a large body of ‘acculturation research’ indicates that it is most beneficial for immigrants to combine relatively high levels of commitment both to the minority group and to the host society (e.g., Berry, 1997; Sam, 2000). Therefore, ethnic identification can have psychological benefits for immigrants, just like national identification can among immigrants and natives alike. Second, much research has indicated the detrimental effects perceived discrimination can have on life satisfaction among minority groups (e.g., Barnes & Lightsey, 2005; Broman, 1997; Safi, 2010; Utsey et al., 2000). Because ethnic identification and discrimination are considered crucial factors in much of the literature on immigrants’ life satisfaction, it is interesting to assess the importance of these factors relative to the resources that are associated with economic, social and psychological integration.

### 7.3 Data and Methods

#### Data

Moroccan and Turkish minorities are included in the NELLS survey because they are two of the largest non-Western minority groups in the Netherlands (De Graaf et al., 2010b). Moroccan and Turkish minorities are theoretically relevant groups to investigate because research has shown that their economic integration lags behind natives and other minorities such as Surinamese, and because they experience discrimination more often than other groups do (Dagevos & Bierings, 2005; Hagendoorn & Pepels, 2003). Furthermore, both ethnic groups are also present in other Western European countries, opening up the possibility for future comparative research.

In collecting the data, a random sample of 35 municipalities was selected, stratified by region and degree of urbanization. The four largest cities in the Netherlands were included because of the large proportions of ethnic minorities in these cities. Second, respondents were randomly selected from the population registry based on the respondents’ age (14 to 45 years), their country of birth and their parents’ country of birth.

Minority status was defined according to the official definition of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics. First generation Moroccan and Turkish minorities are those individuals who themselves were born in Morocco or Turkey, and of whom one or both parents were born in Morocco or Turkey. Second generation Moroccan and Turkish minorities are defined as those individuals who are themselves born in the Netherlands, and of whom at least one parent is born in Morocco or Turkey (Keij, 2000).

The survey was administered in Dutch, and both face-to-face interviews and a self-administered drop-off questionnaire were used. The overall response rate was 52 per cent, which is average for this type of survey in the Netherlands (De Graaf et al., 2010b). It should be noted however that response rates were somewhat lower for Moroccan minorities (46%) and Turkish minorities (50%) than for the native Dutch (56%). The reason is that minority respondents were more difficult to reach and less willing to participate than natives, but minorities could also more often not participate because of language problems (De Graaf et al., 2010b). The response rates are calculated by dividing the number of (complete plus



partial) interviews by a relevant base sample that excludes ineligible cases and cases for which the name and address provided by the municipality were incorrect (about 9% of the initial sample), in other words Response Rate 6 as defined by the AAPOR (AAPOR, 2011).

Because the survey was administered in Dutch, some concern may be in order as to the representativeness of the sample. More specifically, a small though selective group of intended minority respondents could not participate because of insufficient Dutch language skills. Therefore, we have compared the pattern in unemployment rates between our sample and nationally representative figures. Unemployment is defined as the proportion of people who do not have work in the labour population. In the Netherlands, in 2010 unemployment was much higher among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants (about 12.9 per cent) than among natives (about 4.5 per cent) (Gijsberts, Huijnk & Dagevos, 2012). In our sample, unemployment is also much higher among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants (about 12.8 per cent) than among natives (about 3.2 per cent). The fact that we find roughly the same unemployment rates (and the differences between groups) suggests that the sample is rather representative, despite potential language barriers. As such we can be confident that the oversampling technique did not endanger the representativeness of this specific subsample.

We excluded the small portion of respondents in the sample (about 7.5 %) that did not fill out the self-administered part of the survey, because this part contains key items for the analysis. Furthermore, we focus on the respondents who are 18 or older (adults, of working age), thus we exclude the respondents between 14 and 17 years of age (about 8 %). Lastly, because only few respondents had missing values on the variables of interest (i.e. about 5 %), they were also deleted from the sample. All in all, this study includes 3,910 respondents, of which 2,220 are native Dutch, 1,159 are first generation minorities, and 531 are second generation minorities.

### **Dependent variable**

Life satisfaction was measured by four items taken from the Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin, 1985). Using five-point scales, the items were, ‘The conditions in my life are excellent’, ‘I am satisfied with my life’, ‘The most important things I expected out of life, I have obtained’, and ‘In most ways my life is close to my ideal’. The scale is routinely used in research, and offers an evaluation of one’s life experiences by the respondent. Previous research has indicated that the scale can be considered as valid, and can be used in various cultural and social contexts (Diener, Oishi & Lucas, 2009). Factor analysis shows that all four items load on a single factor. The items also prove to form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .86$ ).

### **Independent variables**

The NELLS data allow us to distinguish three groups of respondents; the native majority, first generation minorities and second generation minorities. The measure of minority status is based on respondents’ self-reported country of birth and parents’ country of birth.

The data also allow us to operationalize the independent variables that we would like to include in the model. With regard to *economic integration*, we use a measure for respondents’ main activity (labour market status) consisting of four categories; those who are

currently employed (1) and those who are currently unemployed (2), those currently non-active (including, for instance, stay-at-home parents and permanently disabled) (3), and students (4). For occupational status, we use the ‘standard international socioeconomic index of occupational status (ISEI)’, ranging from 22 to 88 (Ganzeboom et al., 1992). Unemployed respondents were given the mean score of the employed respondents, so that this variable cannot play a role for them. To assess whether respondents perceive financial difficulties, they were asked ‘Have you, over the course of the last three months, had to deal with the following: a. not being able to replace broken equipment, b. having to borrow money for essential expenses, c. falling behind on regular expenses, d. being visited by a bailiff, e. having difficulty making ends meet’. The ‘perceived financial problems’-scale was obtained by summing the five items, which form a coherent scale (Cronbach’s Alpha = .73).

With regard to *social integration*, we first include measures of the frequency of face-to-face social contact with family members and with friends. These two seven-point scales range from never to daily. Six questions were also asked on respondents’ perceived social support. This scale was balanced, with three positive items, asking ‘there are many people I can trust completely; there are enough people to whom I feel closely connected; there are enough people I can rely on in difficult times’. The scale also included three ‘negative’ items ‘I feel an emptiness surrounding me; I miss having people around me; I often feel abandoned’. We thus constructed two variables for perceived social support; perceived integration – based on the positive social support items (Cronbach’s alpha = .81), and perceived isolation – based on the negative social support items (Cronbach’s alpha = .80).

With regard to *psychological integration*, national identification was measured with the following three statements, to which respondents could answer on five-point scales: ‘I identify strongly with the Netherlands’, ‘I really feel connected to the Netherlands’, and ‘My Dutch identity is important to me’. Analysis showed that the items form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s Alpha = .87). Generalized trust was measured with the following statements, to which respondents could answer on a five-point scale: ‘You can’t be too careful in dealing with people’, ‘If you trust too easily, people will take advantage of you’, and ‘You will often be cheated when you help others’. Analysis showed that the items form a coherent scale (Cronbach’s Alpha = .71). The items are very similar to other multiple-item measures of generalized trust used in previous research (Dinesen, 2013; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008). Trust in political institutions was measured with the question: ‘Could you indicate how much trust you have in the following institutions: a. politics, b. the government, c. the European Union, and d. the police and justice department?’, to which respondents could answer on a four-point scale. Analysis showed that these items also form a coherent scale (Cronbach’s Alpha = .83).

Regarding *immigrant-specific factors*, the measure of ethnic identification consists of the same items as the measure of national identification, but with a reference to the origin group rather than the Netherlands. These three items also form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s Alpha = .92). Perceived discrimination was measured by asking respondents to indicate, on three-point scales, how often they had been discriminated against in job applications, at work, at school, on the street, in clubs (like sports), and while going out (nightlife). We took the average of these items which form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s Alpha = .81).

Finally, we include the control variables which have been found to be important correlates of life satisfaction in previous empirical research; age, gender, having a partner, having children, and education level (Amit, 2010; Headey et al., 2004).

### **Analyses**

First, it could be argued that the more subjective measures that we use of economic and social integration (financial problems and the measures of perceived social integration and isolation) are conceptually and may be empirically quite closely related to life satisfaction. Therefore, we have first explored the extent of endogeneity of these factors with life satisfaction, with an exploratory factor analysis (EFA). The analysis shows that items for life satisfaction, financial problems, perceived integration and perceived isolation indeed clearly measure these four distinct factors, and can thus be empirically distinguished (see appendix Table A.1). The bivariate correlations between life satisfaction on the one hand and financial problems, perceived integration and perceived isolation on the other are about .4 (see appendix Tables A.3-A.6). While some element of endogeneity is almost inevitable, it does not invalidate the current research design.

Second, to assess whether our measure of life satisfaction is as valid for immigrants as it is for natives, we use confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). We tested the measurement invariance between natives and first and second generation minorities (three groups) with multigroup CFA models in MPLUS 6. In accordance with common practice, we have tested for increasingly strict levels of measurement invariance in subsequent models (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). First, we have assessed the fit of configural invariance models (in which the general factor structure is constrained to be equal across groups), and have used these as a baseline to test for ‘weak invariance’ (i.e. metric invariance, when item loadings are constrained to be equal across groups) and ‘strong invariance’ (i.e. scalar invariance, when item intercepts or thresholds are constrained to be equal across groups). The results of the measurement invariance tests are included in the appendix (Table A.2).

Subsequently, we have generated descriptive statistics of the variables used. For our main analyses, we have used OLS regression models tested in SPSS 19. We centred all individual-level variables (but not the dummy variables) by the overall mean across all groups. We used stepwise models to be able to evaluate our expectations on partial mediation. Lastly, we have tested interactions to evaluate whether the associations of the selected predictors with life satisfaction differ between immigrants and natives.

## **7.4 Results**

### **Measurement invariance**

Previous research has indicated that tests of the cross-cultural measurement invariance of the satisfaction with life scale are desirable in comparative research (Tucker, Ozer, Lyubomirsky & Boehm, 2006). The Chi<sup>2</sup> difference tests (Table A.2) indicated that the weak invariance model for life satisfaction (in which item loadings are constrained to be equal across groups) did not fit the data significantly worse than the configural invariance (unconstrained) model

( $\Delta\chi^2=8.283$ ,  $df=6$ ,  $p=.218$ ). The initial strong invariance model (in which item intercepts are constrained to be equal across groups), did fit the data significantly more poorly than the configural invariance model. However, a partially invariant model could be constructed by allowing the loading and intercept of one item to be estimated freely across groups. This model did not fit the data significantly more poorly than the configural invariance model ( $\Delta\chi^2=12.775$ ,  $df=8$ ,  $p=.120$ ), meaning that partial strong measurement invariance was established for the measure of life satisfaction.

In the literature on measurement invariance, the idea is broadly supported that strong measurement invariance warrants meaningful comparison of factor means across groups, and that partial invariance at this level (at least two items per factor exhibit strong invariance) can also be considered a sufficient condition (Byrne et al., 1989; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). These results thus indicate that we can validly compare life satisfaction among natives and ethnic minority groups.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of life satisfaction and independent variables, N = 3,910

	Range	Natives		First generation		Second generation	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<u>Dependent variable</u>							
Life satisfaction	0-4	2.854	.634	2.571	.780	2.692	.679
<u>Economic integration</u>							
Labour activity							
Employed	0/1	.778		.601		.503	
Unemployed	0/1	.026		.092		.072	
Inactive	0/1	.053		.261		.100	
Student	0/1	.144		.048		.326	
Occupational status	19-88	48.598	13.295	43.665	9.611	46.926	9.780
Financial problems	0-5	.430	.887	1.142	1.429	.866	1.288
<u>Social integration</u>							
Contact - family	0-6	4.471	1.176	4.043	1.747	5.138	1.157
Contact - friends	0-6	4.337	1.160	4.337	1.486	4.819	1.111
Social support - integrated	0-3	2.204	.531	1.994	.607	2.086	.597
Social support - isolated	0-3	.759	.598	1.097	.629	.922	.630
<u>Psychological integration</u>							
National identification	0-4	2.720	.736	2.624	.804	2.740	.770
Generalized social trust	0-4	2.106	.698	1.709	.682	1.754	.673
Trust in political institutions	0-3	1.358	.545	1.192	.640	1.237	.601
<u>Minority position</u>							
Ethnic identification	0-4	-		3.087	.821	2.931	.923
Perceived discrimination	0-2	-		.324	.400	.380	.422
<u>Control variables</u>							
Age	18-49	32.826	8.305	35.383	6.768	25.938	6.518
Female	0/1	.537		.513		.554	
Partner	0/1	.637		.706		.373	
Children	0/1	.490		.744		.313	
Education	0-5	3.191	1.019	2.202	1.339	2.827	1.035
N			2,220		1,159		531

Source: NELS 2009, own calculations.

### Descriptive statistics

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all respondents simultaneously, and for the different groups separately. Bivariate correlations for the full sample are included in the

appendix (Table A.3). As can be observed in Table 1, immigrants (first and second generation) indeed have lower levels of life satisfaction. A one-way ANOVA with post estimation tests (Tukey's HSD) indicates that all the differences in life satisfaction between the three groups are statistically significant. The fact that the second generation occupies a position half way between the level of the first generation and that of the native group suggests an acculturation process whereby the children of immigrants gradually acquire the life satisfaction level of the native majority group. This lends some support to our first hypothesis about the observed differences between majority and minority groups. It should also be noted, however, that the group differences are quite small substantively, less than three tenths on a five point scale. Moreover, all groups on average have levels of life satisfaction comfortably above the neutral midpoint of the scale, which is 2. Therefore, the descriptive group differences also go a long way in providing support for our second hypothesis based on life satisfaction homeostasis theory. It is therefore interesting to look at a more critical test of the observed group differences, when we take the mechanisms of our third hypothesis into account.

### **Regression analyses**

Table 2 presents the parameter estimates for the subsequent regression models. The first model in Table 2 simply confirms that levels of life satisfaction are lower among first and second generation immigrants than among natives. It can be noted that the effect is weaker for second generation immigrants compared to the first generation. For the demographic background variables, we observe the relations that we could expect given earlier research: respondents with a partner and a higher education level feel more satisfied, while age has a negative effect on satisfaction with life.

The effects of migration status, however, are already strongly weakened if we include information about economic integration in Model 2. The unemployed and those experiencing financial problems have much lower levels of life satisfaction, and including these variables apparently takes away some of the relation that initially was attributed to migration status. The effect of education too, diminishes when including the economic integration variables in Model 2, suggesting that the education effect is partly mediated by economic integration.

Including the measures of social integration in Model 3 goes a step further: both the feeling of integration and the feeling of isolation have a very strong effect on satisfaction with life, and including these variables renders migration status totally non-significant. Having more frequent contact with friends is also significantly positively related to life satisfaction. However, contact with friends does not help explain the differences in life satisfaction between majority and minority respondents. Additional analyses indicate that while minority status is indeed negatively related to economic integration and feelings of social integration and isolation, minority status is positively related to the frequency of social contact with friends.<sup>1</sup> Contact with family members is not significantly related to life satisfaction, but it should be noted that we control separately for marital status and having children.

Finally, in Model 4, we add the measures of immigrants' and natives psychological integration in society. We find that national identification is indeed positively related to life satisfaction, as is trust in political institutions. These factors further contribute little to the

explanation of the difference in life satisfaction between immigrants and natives, however, as can also be concluded from the fourth model in Table 2. The reason is that levels of national identification actually differ very little between immigrants and natives, as evidenced by the descriptive statistics in Table 1 and additional analyses with national identification as a dependent variable.<sup>2</sup> Regarding generalized trust and trust in political institutions, it is the case that trust is lower among immigrants than among natives. However, we do not find that generalized trust is associated with life satisfaction. Moreover, additional analyses show that the difference in trust in political institutions between immigrants and natives is explained away by the economic and social factors that are already included in the model, meaning that initial differences in trust in political institutions do in fact not constitute an additional lack of resources in our model, beyond immigrants' disadvantaged socio-economic positions in society.<sup>3</sup> All in all, the results from the regression reported in Table 2 show quite clearly that no significant differences are left between natives and first and second generation immigrants if we take differences in economic and social integration into account.<sup>4</sup> This means that our third hypothesis is supported by the results.

Table 2: Stepwise OLS regression models of life satisfaction, N = 3,910

	Model 1 Minority status + controls			Model 2 Economic integration			Model 3 Social integration			Model 4 Psychological integration		
	B	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
<u>Minority status</u>												
Native = ref.												
1st generation	-.208	.026	***	-.066	.026	.012	.005	.025	.834	.009	.025	.706
2nd generation	-.148	.034	***	-.075	.032	.019	-.038	.030	.216	-.028	.030	.356
<u>Economic integration</u>												
Employed = ref.												
Unemployed				-.282	.048	***	-.219	.045	***	-.208	.044	***
Inactive				-.160	.035	***	-.102	.033	.002	-.098	.033	.003
Student				.090	.037	.015	.067	.034	.053	.045	.034	.190
Occupational status				.005	.001	***	.004	.001	***	.004	.001	***
Financial problems				-.171	.009	***	-.138	.009	***	-.129	.009	***
<u>Social integration</u>												
Contact – family							.001	.007	.920	.004	.007	.620
Contact – friends							.026	.008	.002	.024	.008	.003
Social support - integrated							.217	.018	***	.196	.018	***
Social support - isolated							-.256	.017	***	-.248	.017	***
<u>Psychological integration</u>												
National identification										.042	.013	.001
Generalized social trust										.009	.015	.521
Trust in political institutions										.136	.017	***
<u>Control variables</u>												
Age	-.014	.002	***	-.012	.002	***	-.010	.002	***	-.010	.002	***
Female	.034	.022	.113	.043	.021	.041	.030	.020	.123	.019	.020	.336
Partner	.262	.028	***	.203	.027	***	.169	.026	***	.173	.025	***
Children	.080	.030	.005	.117	.028	***	.108	.026	***	.101	.026	***
Education	.079	.010	***	.025	.010	.012	.010	.009	.306	.001	.009	.894
(Constant)	2.603	.024	***	2.587	.025	***	2.586	.023	***	2.593	.023	***
<u>Model fit</u>												
R <sup>2</sup>	.092			.192			.299			.314		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.091			.189			.296			.310		

Source: NELS 2009, own calculations. \*\*\*: significant at p<.001.

Table 3: Final model (Model 4, Table 2) + interactions, N = 3,910

	First generation			Second generation			All immigrants		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
<u>Economic integration</u>									
x Unemployed	-.022	.099	.821	.042	.127	.742	-.006	.094	.946
x Inactive	.205	.069	.003	.250	.104	.016	.220	.067	.001
x Student	.064	.089	.469	.135	.067	.044	.088	.056	.118
x Occupational status	-.002	.002	.264	-.004	.003	.103	-.003	.002	.069
x Financial problems	.012	.018	.529	.003	.024	.912	.010	.017	.568
<u>Social integration</u>									
x Contact – family	-.007	.015	.622	.009	.024	.710	-.007	.014	.612
x Contact – friends	.007	.016	.648	.071	.025	.005	.018	.015	.227
x Social support – integrated	-.004	.037	.903	-.071	.048	.143	-.026	.033	.424
x Social support - isolated	.015	.034	.658	.042	.045	.357	.026	.031	.401
<u>Psychological integration</u>									
x National identification	-.035	.027	.200	.014	.037	.698	-.021	.024	.385
x Generalized social trust	-.089	.031	.004	-.078	.041	.061	-.086	.027	.002
x Trust in political institutions	.001	.036	.985	-.026	.048	.590	-.009	.032	.779
<u>Control variables</u>									
x Age	-.002	.003	.497	-.002	.004	.629	-.001	.002	.814
x Female	.065	.043	.131	-.024	.056	.670	.035	.038	.360
x Partner	-.034	.046	.460	-.114	.058	.052	-.048	.039	.219
x Children	-.016	.047	.737	-.031	.060	.607	-.006	.039	.876
x Education	-.049	.018	.008	-.039	.027	.152	-.048	.017	.005

Source: NELLS 2009, own calculations. \*\*\*: significant at  $p < .001$ .

Note: Interaction effects were tested separately in models that further include all the variables of the final model (Model 4 of Table 2). Separate models were also tested for first and second generation immigrants on the one hand and all immigrants simultaneously on the other, in both cases with native Dutch as the reference group.

### Are the effects different?

In Table 2, we thus far only investigated the main effects. It is possible, however, that immigrant groups respond differently to, e.g., financial problems than the native majority of the population. In Table 3, therefore, we systematically include interaction effects with the independent variables. All interaction effects in Table 3 were tested separately while controlling for all variables included in the full model (Model 4) of Table 2, once for first and second generation immigrants compared to natives (first two columns) and once for all immigrants compared to natives (third column). If these interaction effects would be significant, this would indicate that the independent variables have a different effect on life satisfaction among minorities than among the general population.

Few effects significantly differ between immigrants and natives. The interactions show that only the effects of education, not being active on the labour market, the frequency of contact with friends and generalized trust are significantly different for immigrants, compared to natives. This means that for immigrants, generalized trust is not related to life satisfaction, while there is a weak positive relation between trust and life satisfaction among natives. One explanation for this difference could be that the measure of generalized social trust is not equally valid for immigrants, as suggested in chapter 5. Furthermore, the interaction effects suggest that education has a less powerful effect on life satisfaction for first generation immigrants than for the general population. For first generation immigrants, this might be due to the fact that they have gained their education degree in a different country than the host society. For second generation immigrants, the interaction effects do not

suggest a different effect of education on life satisfaction than among natives. A third element that significantly differs between immigrants and natives is not being active on the labour market. To express it differently: the negative effect of being inactive is stronger for the majority than for the minority. This suggests that, for immigrants, economic integration matters less in terms of the needs for self-esteem and self-actualization that are satisfied by participation, and that the critical dimension is the financial security that corresponds to more basic needs. Lastly, the frequency of contact with friends appears to be somewhat more important for second generation immigrants' life satisfaction. This may be related to the fact that this group is on average younger than the first generation immigrants and natives in this study, even though we control for age in our models.

Table 4: Stepwise OLS regression models of life satisfaction among immigrants, N = 1,690

	<u>Model 1</u>			<u>Model 2</u>			<u>Model 3</u>			<u>Model 4</u>		
	Minority status + controls			Economic integration			Social integration			Psychological integration		
	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p	b	se	p
<u>Minority status</u>												
1st generation = ref.												
2nd generation	.026	.047	.577	-.022	.047	.636	-.046	.043	.289	-.034	.043	.429
<u>Economic integration</u>												
Employed = ref.												
Unemployed				-.328	.067	***	-.158	.061	.010	-.149	.060	.014
Inactive				-.161	.052	.002	-.057	.047	.230	-.066	.047	.161
Student				.074	.067	.264	.109	.060	.071	.083	.060	.168
Occupational status				.004	.002	.026	.002	.002	.270	.003	.002	.161
Financial problems				-.167	.012	***	-.138	.012	***	-.126	.012	***
<u>Social integration</u>												
Contact - family							.002	.011	.815	.004	.010	.725
Contact - friends							.030	.012	.015	.027	.012	.023
Social support - integrated							.209	.028	***	.183	.028	***
Social support - isolated							-.236	.027	***	-.235	.027	***
<u>Psychological integration</u>												
National identification										.035	.021	.088
Generalized social trust										-.035	.024	.153
Trust in political institutions										.127	.026	***
<u>Minority position</u>												
Ethnic identification										.069	.019	***
Perceived discrimination										-.127	.042	.002
<u>Control variables</u>												
Age	-.017	.003	***	-.012	.003	***	-.010	.003	***	-.010	.003	.001
Female	.062	.037	.097	.091	.038	.018	.043	.035	.215	.008	.035	.831
Partner	.180	.048	***	.192	.048	***	.129	.044	.003	.133	.043	.002
Children	.103	.054	.058	.129	.054	.017	.138	.049	.005	.110	.048	.023
Education	.040	.015	.005	.015	.016	.338	-.009	.014	.515	-.004	.014	.805
(Constant)	2.410	.043	***	2.434	.047	***	2.552	.043	***	2.587	.043	***
<u>Model fit</u>												
R <sup>2</sup>		.044			.138			.247			.273	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		.040			.133			.240			.264	

Source: NELLS 2009, own calculations. \*\*\*: significant at  $p < .001$ .

For all the other elements, however, there are no significant interaction effects. This means that having financial problems and feelings of isolation have exactly the same effect on



natives as on first and second generation immigrants. The main problem for the immigrants is therefore not that they perceive financial problems or loneliness differently, or that these factors have a different impact on life satisfaction among immigrants, but it is rather that they experience having more financial problems, and that they are more prone to feeling isolated.

Lastly, we turn to the results in Table 4 to see what are the main correlates of life satisfaction among immigrants specifically. The first three models confirm that these are generally the same factors as among the general population. Financial problems and perceived social support have a strong impact on life satisfaction among immigrants. The fourth model further confirms that trust in political institutions also matters. Interestingly, the results in Model 4 of Table 4 suggest that not only national identification, but also ethnic identification is positively associated with life satisfaction among immigrants, and more strongly so too. This confirms insights from the acculturation literature suggesting that ethnic identification can be an import resource for immigrants. As expected, perceived discrimination by members of the majority population is negatively associated with life satisfaction among immigrants.

## 7.5 Discussion

We know that ethnic minorities and immigrants tend to have lower levels of life satisfaction than the majority group, and in this respect this study from the Netherlands confirms previous findings. It has to be noted, however, that the group differences in life satisfaction can be fully explained by taking differences in economic and social integration into account. This suggests that, despite all the negative effects associated with migration, levels of satisfaction with life are not inevitably lower among immigrants than among natives.

What we could show in the current article, however, is that the main determinants of satisfaction with life are largely the same for minority and majority groups. Financial problems and social isolation have a strong negative effect on satisfaction with life, among the entire sample. Our most important finding is maybe that there are very few interaction effects with migration status. Financial problems and social isolation seem to have exactly the same effect on majority and minority respondents and we do not find any evidence for cultural differences in this regard.

These results imply a number of policy and theoretically oriented conclusions. From a policy perspective, it can be assumed that the inequality with regard to levels of satisfaction with life amounts to a social problem, as it indicates that the integration into society of ethnic minorities apparently has not been fully successful. Furthermore, low levels of life satisfaction in turn can be associated with socially disruptive behaviour, like criminality, hostility or forms of political or religious radicalism. What we can note, however, is that these low levels of life satisfaction are not some inevitable price one has to pay for the immigration experience. Immigrants do not attain the level of Dutch people, but this can be explained by real life indicators of economic and social integration. Apparently immigration does not have an automatic negative effect on satisfaction with life. Of course the effect might still be indirect. If one migrates from one society to another, one's educational credentials might not always be equivalent, and this might be associated with lower levels of life satisfaction. If one leaves one's family behind in the home country, almost inevitably this leads to a higher risk of

social isolation in the host country. The policy implication is that low levels of life satisfaction among ethnic minorities should not be considered as a price one has to pay for the original sin of moving from one society to another. Although this is a rather naïve reading of multivariate analysis, a provoking way to state our findings would be that poor immigrants who feel isolated report exactly the same life satisfaction as poor Dutch natives who feel isolated.

The theoretical relevance of our findings is that they allow us to test competing theories on the determinants of life satisfaction. In principle, life satisfaction homeostasis theory does not predict group differences in life satisfaction. Our empirical results indicate, however, in line with need-gratification theory, that adverse living conditions are strongly related to life satisfaction, indeed leading to differences between immigrants and natives. From the perspective of life satisfaction homeostasis, it has been argued that in addition to cognitive buffers such as self-esteem and optimism, economic and social resources form an additional set of external buffers that are important to maintain levels of life satisfaction (Kennedy & Cummins, 2007). In this sense, a needs-based approach can complement life satisfaction homeostasis theory; the lack of resources to fulfil economic, social and esteem needs can be seen as leading to weaknesses in the homeostatic control system. This study also provides evidence for the homeostatic model in that group differences are relatively small and can be fully explained by relevant correlates, resulting in levels of life satisfaction that are on average distinctly positive among all of the groups studied.

Our study also confirms important insights from the literature on immigrant integration. Generally, the integration of immigrants in different domains, economic, social and psychological, indeed appears to be in immigrants' own best interest. As has been suggested in discussions of 'modern' assimilation theory, this study confirms that economic and social integration are positively related to immigrants' subjective well-being (Alba & Nee, 1997; Brubaker, 2001). Moreover, this study adds that some aspects of immigrants' psychological integration, trust in political institutions and host national identification, are also positively related to life satisfaction.

From the perspective of immigrants' subjective well-being, socio-economic disadvantages in comparison to natives should thus be resolved. Regarding psychological integration, the discourse of 'disadvantage' is not appropriate (Brubaker, 2001). Moreover, the differences between natives and immigrants in national identification and trust are modest. Nonetheless, our study also shows that both host national identification and identification with the ethnic minority group are positively associated with life satisfaction. This is in line with the notion that group identities, both ethnic and host national identities, can provide a sense of esteem and belonging, which would be positively associated with life satisfaction (Berry, 1997; Parekh, 2000; Verkuyten, 2005a). Moreover, the importance of trust in political institutions is confirmed, providing further evidence that psychological integration in society can indeed be positively associated with immigrants' life satisfaction. On the other hand, we do not find evidence that generalized social trust is related to life satisfaction.

We also want to mention some limitations to our present study. First, because we rely on cross-sectional data, we cannot provide a strong test of the causality of the proposed relations. Second, because we use a single cross-sectional survey, common method bias may

to some extent be reflected in the levels of life satisfaction found, and we cannot assess the generalizability of our results to other cultural settings. These issues suggest that our results should be confirmed in longitudinal and comparative studies. Third, it has to be acknowledged that some of the variables that we introduce to explain levels of life satisfaction might be rather endogenous. Empirical analysis, however, suggests that this risk is not that strong, and it does not seem to invalidate our main findings in this study. Fourth, we focus on factors that are relevant for the experience of both the majority and the minority groups. Therefore, we give less attention to factors that may be particularly relevant for the experience of minorities, such as perceived discrimination and ethnic identification (Amit, 2010; Verkuyten, 2008; Vohra & Adair, 2000). In terms of the needs for belonging and self-esteem, however, factors such as ethnic and national identification and perceived discrimination may indeed be quite important (Kennedy & Cummins, 2007; Safi, 2010). Fifth, many of our measurements have been subjective assessments. It is still possible that ethnic minorities report more financial problems, even given the same objective income level as the majority population. Although we cannot exclude this possibility, all the real life indicators that are available about immigrant groups suggest that their income position is indeed more negative, that their unemployment levels are much higher. As such, there is enough reason to assume that their lower scores on these indicators in the current survey indeed reflect a less privileged social position.

## 7.6 Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The results of these additional analyses are available upon request.
- <sup>2</sup> The results of these additional analyses are available upon request.
- <sup>3</sup> The results of these additional analyses are available upon request.
- <sup>4</sup> In order to make sure that these non-significant findings are not being caused by dividing the ethnic minority group into first and second generation immigrants, we also ran the models of Table 2 again with all ethnic minorities (1st and 2nd generation combined) together, and with four ethnic minority groups separately (1st and 2nd generation Moroccans plus 1st and 2nd generation Turks separately). The results of these alternative operationalizations indicate that the non-significant relation between minority status and life satisfaction is not caused by making the distinction between first and second generation immigrants. Also when the two groups are combined, or when we separate four groups, we do not find a significant relation between minority status and life satisfaction in the final model (once controlling for economic and social integration). The results of these additional analyses are available upon request.

# 8

## Conclusion

## 8.1 Introduction

There has been growing popular concern that diversity can put a strain on the social cohesion of societies (Barry, 2001; Putnam, 2007). Politicians and the media often claim that many immigrants have divided loyalties and a lack of attachment to the host society and therefore undermine a cohesive national identity. In West European countries, there is a renewed societal emphasis on traditional national values and immigrants are being scrutinized for their assimilation to a set of ‘core values’ and their loyalty to the host nation (see Entzinger & Fermin, 2006; Kundnani, 2007; Vasta, 2007). And though this harsher attitude towards immigrants has also raised much criticism, even proponents of multiculturalism argue that a well-functioning society needs a sense of commitment and common belonging making it important to foster a spirit of shared national identity (Modood, 2007; Parekh, 2000).

Cross-national research shows that in most countries immigrants generally have lower host national identification than the majority group and a relatively weak sense of national belonging to the new country, as well as lower levels of generalized trust in others in society (e.g., Dinesen & Hooghe, 2010; Elkins & Sides, 2007; Staerklé et al., 2010). There is also some research evidence for a re-emphasis of ethnic distinctiveness (re-ethnicisation) and rejection of the host society (national dis-identification) among immigrants (e.g., Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). On the other hand, there are many immigrants who do develop a sense of belonging and commitment to the host society and want to make a contribution. This raises the question about the conditions that stimulate or hamper immigrants’ psychological integration in society, which is their sense of belonging and identification with the host country.

I have argued that ‘modern assimilation theory’ can provide a good framework for investigating immigrants’ psychological integration. Although this line of research has received relatively little attention in recent years, the basic idea that a sense of belonging to the host society can be stimulated by economic integration is important to investigate (Alba & Nee, 1997; Esser, 2001). Firstly, because it is important to identify conditions that stimulate or hamper psychological integration in society and, despite the clear theoretical expectations, surprisingly few studies have examined these relations empirically. Secondly, it is worthwhile to critically examine the assumption that economic integration is the key factor that drives the integration of immigrants in society in all other respects, which is a highly prevalent assumption among politicians and policy makers. In this dissertation, I therefore focus on the relation between immigrants’ economic integration and their psychological integration.

In this final chapter, I first summarize the main results in section 8.2, corresponding to the research questions of each empirical chapter. Then, in section 8.3, I discuss the general conclusions of this dissertation, in light of the main research question and the contributions to the literature. In section 8.4, I discuss some of the limitations to this study and possible directions for future research. Lastly, section 8.5 provides a summary of the final conclusions and policy implications.

## 8.2 Research Questions per Chapter

### Chapter 2

#### **Settlement Intentions of Recently Arrived Immigrants and Refugees in the Netherlands**

Chapter 2 investigates the settlement intentions of recently arrived immigrants and refugees. The main research question of this chapter is: *To what extent is economic integration in the host country positively related to the settlement intentions of recently arrived immigrants and refugees?* Contrary to the expectations, the study shows that economic integration in the host country is not positively related to the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands.

In addition to the main research question, the study provides evidence that social and cultural integration are related to the settlement intentions of recently arrived immigrants and refugees. Having more social ties with natives, and support for cultural values such as gender equality, is positively associated with the intention to settle in the Netherlands. Contrary to what was expected, the results also show that those who have more social ties with co-ethnics (e.g. other Surinamese) in the Netherlands are less likely to have the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands.

Furthermore, an interesting aspect of this chapter are the differences in settlement intentions among the nine origin groups in the study. The results show that immigrants from Surinam and the Dutch Caribbean are least likely to have intentions of permanent settlement in the Netherlands. The Moroccan and Turkish groups, and the ‘refugee’ groups on the other hand (those from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia), are more likely to have the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands. Unlike the other refugee groups, however, immigrants from Somalia are among the least likely to have the intention to settle permanently in the Netherlands (i.e. not different from Surinamese and Antilleans).

### Chapter 3

#### **The Origins of Generalized and Political Trust among Immigrants in the Netherlands**

In chapter 3, I investigate generalized social trust and trust in political institutions, among first and second generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants. The chapter answers the following main question: *To what extent is immigrants’ economic integration positively related to their generalized trust and trust in political institutions?* The results confirm that economic integration is positively associated with both generalized social trust and trust in political institutions. Immigrants with a higher level of education and with a higher occupational level have higher levels of generalized and political trust. Moreover, there is a negative relation between subjectively experienced financial problems and both forms of social trust.

Furthermore, the additional aims of chapter 3 are to examine what the most important correlates of trust are among immigrant groups, and to investigate to what extent group differences in generalized trust and political trust between immigrants and natives can be explained by differences in socio-economic integration between the groups. The results show that differences in political trust between immigrants and natives are substantially smaller when socio-economic differences are taken into account. Regarding generalized trust, on the other hand, all differences between natives and immigrants remain significant, when taking

economic and social integration into account. In addition to the indicators of economic and social integration, the analysis also shows that immigrants' generalized trust and political trust are negatively related to perceived discrimination.

#### **Chapter 4**

##### **Economic Integration and National Identification of Immigrants in the Netherlands**

In chapter 4, I investigate identification with the host country among first and second generation Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands. The chapter answers the following main question: *To what extent is immigrants' economic integration positively related to their identification with the Netherlands?* The results confirm that economic integration, in terms of being employed and having a higher occupational level, is positively associated with immigrants host national identification.

Furthermore, the results unexpectedly show that immigrants do not have much lower host national identification than Dutch natives. Compared to natives, national identification is somewhat lower among Turkish but not among Moroccan immigrants. Moreover, an analysis of interaction effects shows that occupational status is positively related to national identification among immigrants, but not among natives. The results also show that immigrants' host national identification is not significantly associated with their ethnic identification, but that language proficiency, contact with natives and years since migration are positively related to identification with the Netherlands, while there is a negative association with perceived discrimination by natives.

#### **Chapter 5**

##### **Economic Integration and National Self-Identification of Refugees in the Netherlands**

Chapter 5 examines whether refugees from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia self-identify as a member of the host society. The chapter answers two main questions: First, *is economic integration positively related to national self-identification among refugees?*, and second, *to what extent is the relation between economic integration and national self-identification mediated by social integration?* As indicators of economic integration, I use employment, occupational level and level of education, as well as Dutch language proficiency (which is perhaps rather cultural integration, but can also be seen as a form of human capital). The results show that, initially, employment, occupational level and Dutch language proficiency are indeed positively related to national self-identification.

Importantly, however, this chapter indicates that the relation between economic integration and host country identification is partially mediated by increased social interaction with natives. This means that economic integration can be *indirectly* positively related to national self-identification among refugees, because economic integration is positively related to social interaction with natives, which is in turn positively related to national self-identification. In addition to the main research questions, the results unexpectedly show that perceived discrimination does not affect the national self-identification of refugees.



## Chapter 6

### The Integration Paradox:

#### Level of Education and Immigrants' Attitudes towards Natives and the Host Society

In chapter 6, I investigate attitudes towards natives and attitudes towards the host country among first and second generation immigrants from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam and the Dutch Caribbean. The chapter focuses on the so-called integration paradox, which basically concerns the *indirect* negative relationships between level of education, on the one hand, and attitudes towards the host society and the native population, on the other. This relationship is expected to be mediated by perceived relative deprivation (i.e. a lack of perceived opportunities and perceived discrimination). The chapter answers the following main research question: *To what extent is there a negative indirect relation between economic integration (education) on the one hand and immigrants' attitudes towards natives and towards the host society on the other, through perceived relative deprivation?*

The results confirm that higher education is associated with lower perceived opportunities and higher perceived discrimination. In turn, perceived opportunities are positively associated with favourable attitudes towards natives and the host society, while perceived discrimination is negatively associated with those attitudes. This means that higher educated immigrants may be more negative about natives and the host society, because they perceive a greater lack of opportunities and more discrimination against immigrants in society. In addition, taking into account the indirect negative relations, there is a direct positive relation between education and immigrants' favourable attitudes towards natives.

## Chapter 7

### Life Satisfaction among Immigrants in the Netherlands:

#### Do Economic, Social, and Psychological Integration Matter?

The main research question of the last empirical chapter is: *Do economic, social and psychological integration affect life satisfaction among immigrants?* The results support the notion that economic, social, and psychological integration are positively associated with immigrants' general life satisfaction. Regarding economic integration, employment, occupational level and financial security are positively associated with life satisfaction. Regarding social integration, contact with friends and social support are associated with higher life satisfaction, and with respect to psychological integration, national identification and trust in political institutions are associated with higher life satisfaction.

In addition to the main research question, this chapter makes a comparison between immigrants and natives in the Netherlands. The results show that life satisfaction is generally lower among immigrants than among natives. When individual differences in economic integration and social integration are taken into account, however, the difference between natives and immigrants is no longer significant. Moreover, the results of this chapter also show that among immigrants, ethnic identification is positively related to life satisfaction, and perceived discrimination is negatively related to life satisfaction.

### 8.3 General Conclusions and Contributions to the Literature

#### **The role of economic integration in society**

The main question of this dissertation is: *how is immigrants' economic integration related to their psychological integration in the host society?* It is surprising that relatively few studies have examined the relations between immigrants' economic integration and their feelings of identification, commitment and belonging in the host society, despite theoretical claims that economic integration should have a positive effect. All in all, the results in this dissertation do provide support for the assumption that economic integration in society is positively related to immigrants' psychological integration.

Regarding national identification, this study confirms that among refugees and immigrants in the Netherlands, economic participation in the host country can foster national identification. These results differ from previous studies on identification among immigrants that find no significant relations between post-migration education or economic success in the host country and host national identification (Walters et al., 2007; Zimmermann et al., 2007). In line with our study, however, research by Nesdale (2002) in Australia has shown that immigrants' occupational status is positively related to host national identification. These contrasting findings suggest that the relationship should be investigated in more detail. In this dissertation, I did so by analysing different aspects of immigrants' psychological integration in relation to their economic integration, and by examining the role of social ties with natives and perceived relative deprivation as intermediate factors.

The importance of economic integration in society is confirmed regarding levels of social trust. Education level, occupational status and financial security are positively associated with generalized social trust and trust in political institutions. Contrastingly, the study shows that economic integration in the host country is not positively related to the intention to settle permanently in the host country. This is quite surprising because economic incentives are important explanations of migrant settlement decisions in the literature, and a positive relation is expected from neoclassical economic theories (Constant & Massey, 2003; Dustmann & Weiss, 2007; Jensen & Pedersen, 2007). One explanation of this unexpected result is that immigrants and refugees can be disappointed about their economic opportunities in the host country. Previous studies have shown that immigrants and refugees get relatively limited returns to the educational qualifications obtained in the origin country, which leads to feelings of underemployment (Kanas & Van Tubergen, 2009). When the quality of employment in the host country is below migrants' educational standards and their level of pre-migration employment, this may result in feelings of relative deprivation rather than integration in the host country.

This dissertation moves beyond existing research by investigating whether measures of economic integration are similarly related to psychological integration among different ethnic groups. Interestingly, there are indeed differences between natives on the one hand and immigrants and refugees on the other. Regarding national identification, being employed is associated with higher national identification among immigrants and refugees as well as natives, but only among immigrants and refugees is higher occupational status associated with

higher national identification. The results regarding national identification thus indicate that economic integration – in terms of being active on the labour market and attaining a higher status position – is generally associated with higher national identification among immigrants and refugees, while among natives the unemployed form a specific group of concern. This latter observation is in line with research that suggests that the economically marginalized feel ‘left out’ in society, also among the majority population (Heath & Roberts, 2006). The results regarding national identification also support the notion that especially among immigrants, economic advancement and occupational prestige can be associated with feelings of achievement, self-esteem and recognition in the host society, which can translate into increased feelings of national attachment (Hagendoorn et al., 2003).

### **The role of social integration in society**

A central argument in this dissertation is that social integration may partially explain the relation between economic integration and psychological integration, because economic integration opens up opportunities for interaction with natives, which in turn can have a positive effect on immigrants’ psychological integration. This idea is most explicitly tested in the analysis on refugees’ national identification. The results show that the relationship between refugees’ economic participation and national self-identification is indeed partially explained by having more social ties with natives. The study thus indicates that economic integration can stimulate immigrants’ psychological integration when the occupation provides opportunities for contact with natives. Unfortunately, this implies that refugees’ and immigrants’ contact opportunities with natives are hampered by their relatively weak economic position in the Netherlands, considering the relatively high levels of unemployment and overrepresentation in low-paying sectors of the Dutch labour market.

As noted in chapter 5, the idea that economic integration in the host country may indirectly foster host country identification, through more social ties with natives, is likely as relevant for the psychological integration of immigrants in general as for refugee groups specifically. In line with this argument, the theoretical literature and the empirical results in this dissertation provide a strong case that immigrants’ social integration in society may be a critical factor associated with their psychological integration. Social contacts, and more specifically increased interethnic contacts, play a central role in the classical assimilation theory as advanced by Park and Gordon in the 1950’s and 1960’s (Alba & Nee, 1997). Especially Park (1950) has described interactions with members of the majority as the main catalyst in processes of immigrants’ adaptation to society. Much more recently also, the idea that social integration in society is one of the most important factors associated with immigrants’ attachment to society has also been advanced in the literatures on settlement intentions, identification, and social trust (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Constant & Massey, 2003; Haug, 2008; Lubbers et al., 2007).

The analyses in chapter 2 and chapter 4, on settlement intentions and national identification, clearly confirm that social interaction with natives is positively related to immigrants’ psychological integration. Moreover, the analyses among first and second generation immigrants from Turkey and Morocco in chapter 4 are also consistent with the idea that the relation between economic integration and psychological integration may be

partially mediated by social interaction with natives. The relations between employment and occupational level, on the one hand, and host national identification, on the other, become substantially smaller when social contact with natives and other covariates are introduced in the model.

Furthermore, however, the analyses in chapter 4 suggest that social contacts with natives are important for the national identification of first generation but not for second generation immigrants. It is thus likely that policies trying to stimulate interaction with natives will positively affect the host national identification of first generation immigrants. For second generation immigrants, social contacts with natives are already quite extensive and therefore having more contacts has less influence on the development of a sense of national belonging. It should be noted, though, that our measures of social contact with natives reflect the quantity rather than the quality of contacts. These results therefore do not rule out that interethnic friendships can have a positive influence on the psychological integration of second generation immigrants.

In this regard, it is interesting to note that the analyses on trust and life satisfaction among immigrants and natives (chapter 3 and chapter 7) focus on the importance of feelings of loneliness and social support, rather than the quantity of contact with natives. It can be observed in chapter 7 that immigrants report higher levels of feelings of loneliness and less social integration than natives do, despite having as much or even more contact with friends and family members. This confirms, indirectly, that social resources outside the smaller circle of close friends and family are important. Contact with natives is thus important for immigrants' psychological integration in society, not only because it builds acquaintance with mainstream group norms, or because it yields more positive information and builds more positive attitudes toward outgroups, as suggested by the literature on identification and contact theory (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Lubbers et al. 2007). In a country with a large majority population like the Netherlands, social integration and contact with majority members is also important because mainstream society offers a much wider range of (economic and) social opportunities than the ethnic community. The results in chapter 3 further suggest that the key aspect of social integration is increasing one's social capital or resources in the host country, rather than interacting with natives per se. Controlling for feelings of loneliness and social support, there is no independent relation between having native friends and immigrants' generalized and political trust. This suggests that future studies on immigrants' psychological integration should take into account feelings of social integration and loneliness, in addition to the traditional focus on the intensity of cross-ethnic and co-ethnic contacts. Also regarding the relation between immigrants' economic and psychological integration, it will be interesting to take up this broader definition of social integration, and test to what extent feelings of loneliness and social support can partially explain the relation between economic and psychological integration.

#### **The role of perceived relative deprivation**

This dissertation makes a significant contribution to the literature by investigating the relation between economic integration and perceived relative deprivation, focusing on economic integration in terms of education. This also puts the presumed positive relation between

economic and psychological integration into a different perspective, as perceived relative deprivation is in turn negatively associated with immigrants' psychological integration. Previous research among immigrants in the Netherlands suggests that perceived discrimination is higher among higher educated immigrants (Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2007; Ten Teije et al., 2012; Van Doorn et al., 2012) which has also been found among minority groups in the North American context (Sizemore & Milner, 2004; Wodtke, 2012). This dissertation adds to this research by showing that education is negatively related to immigrants' perceptions of having equal opportunities to succeed and to live freely according to their own cultural values, in other words to relative deprivation more generally. I also go beyond existing research by showing that perceptions of relative deprivation are related to a more negative evaluation of the host society in addition to negative out-group attitudes (Ten Teije et al., 2012). Importantly, the analyses show that the attitude towards the host society is independently and at least as strongly related to a perceived lack of opportunities and perceived discrimination, as is the attitude towards natives. This is important because a critical evaluation of the host society as being unfair and in need of change, is a more likely precursor of immigrant's endorsement of and participation in initiatives and actions that aim to improve the rights, power and influence of their group, than negative attitudes and stereotypes towards the native out-group (Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

Our findings suggest that education enables immigrants to become more sophisticated social critics of patterns of discrimination and lack of opportunities for immigrants. The higher educated might more strongly support actions and policies that try to redress the disadvantaged group positions (Kane & Kyyro, 2001; Wodtke, 2012). Higher education might increase one's awareness and concern about the vulnerable and relatively marginal position of immigrants in society. Relative deprivation theory suggests that the higher educated (more advantaged) members of disadvantaged groups are more likely to engage in group comparisons (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). Our results support this argument by showing that higher educated immigrants are more negative about group opportunities and perceive more discrimination.

In addition, this dissertation provides further evidence on the negative relation between discrimination and immigrants' psychological integration. In accordance with findings in previous research on the identification of immigrants (e.g., Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009; Nesdale, 2002; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007) and the rejection-disidentification model (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009) it turns out that perceived discrimination is an important determinant of national identification among immigrants. Generalized trust and trust in political institutions are also strongly influenced by feelings of personal discrimination, in line with previous studies showing that trust is lower among discriminated groups (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Michelson, 2003; Smith, 2010). Unexpectedly, however, the findings show that perceived discrimination is not independently related to national identification among refugees. This result contradicts the findings among immigrants, also from previous research on national identification (e.g., Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009; Nesdale, 2002; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). One likely explanation is that the reported levels of discrimination are quite low (averaging below 1 on a scale between 0 and 4) which indicates that most respondents did not perceive any or much discrimination. Other studies in the Netherlands have shown that

levels of perceived discrimination are much lower among refugees compared to other immigrant groups (Gijsberts, 2005). This may be due to the difference in migration motive. Refugees, who often have left their origin country because of violence and political suppression, may perceive the social context in the destination country as less negative than labour migrants. Moreover, in a study among refugees in Australia there were higher levels of perceived discrimination but these perceptions were not related to dissatisfaction with Australian society (Fozdar & Torezani, 2008). This suggests that even when levels of perceived discrimination among refugees would be higher, the extent to which they reduce their orientation towards the host society may be limited. A likely reason is that refugees evaluate their current situation more positively than the situation in their origin country.

### **Group differences in psychological attachment to society**

While the focus of this dissertation is on the relation between economic and psychological integration, some conclusions follow from the observed group differences in levels of psychological integration in society. One surprising conclusion is that immigrants' levels of national identification, trust and also life satisfaction are not much lower compared to natives.

Cross-national studies have found that national identification is lower among immigrants than natives (Elkins & Sides, 2007; Phinney et al., 2006; Staerklé et al., 2010). These studies, however, have neglected differences between minority groups (but see Sidanius et al., 1997; Heath & Roberts, 2006). Our findings indicate that it is important to consider differences in national identification between immigrants from different origin countries. We found that Turkish but not Moroccan immigrants had lower national identification than natives. For the Moroccan immigrants this result is surprising, because the expectation typically is that immigrants' host national identification lags behind the national identification of natives. Interestingly, other studies have also shown that some groups (e.g. African Americans, and Black Caribbeans in the UK) have lower national identification than the native majority, while other minority groups (e.g. Mexican Americans, and ethnic Indians in the UK) do not (Heath & Roberts, 2006; Sidanius et al., 1997). Thus, the often made assumption that immigrants have a lower sense of national belonging compared to natives does not apply to all groups.

Similarly, the analyses demonstrate that immigrants do not have significantly lower levels of trust in political institutions than native Dutch, once economic position, civic and social participation, and political orientation are taken into account. Only the second generation Moroccan minorities deviate in this regard. Also regarding levels of life satisfaction, the group differences between immigrants and natives can be almost fully explained by more financial problems and stronger feelings of social isolation among immigrants. The optimistic conclusion that follows, despite the negative effects associated with migration in terms of disadvantaged socio-economic positions, is that feelings of belonging to society and satisfaction with life are not inevitably lower among immigrants than among natives. The second conclusion that follows, relatedly, is that immigrants' psychological integration in society may not be very well understood in terms of a 'disadvantage' compared to natives. The findings in this dissertation provide little support for

concerns about immigrants' lack of national attachment or the negative effects of ethnic diversity on social cohesion in society

### **Theories on domains of immigrant integration**

I have argued that a 'modern' version of assimilation theory provides a good framework to analyse the relation between immigrants' economic and psychological integration in society. This actually goes a step further than what is suggested by some of the, what I have called, proponents of 'modern assimilation' theory. Brubaker (2001), for instance, strongly focuses on the notion that assimilation (or integration) is domain-specific, and that integration is mainly taking place in the economic domain. Moreover, it has been suggested that immigrants' economic mobility may be only very loosely related to integration in other domains, or only over the course of generations instead of at the individual level (Brubaker, 2001). In this view, modern assimilation theory is mainly concerned with socio-economic inequalities, rather than national attachment. At the individual level, the relation between economic and psychological integration is largely discarded, because it seems reminiscent of the heavily criticized idea in classic assimilation theory that psychological integration is an end-state to the assimilation process, characterized by exclusive identification with the mainstream 'core culture' instead of the 'ethnic culture' (Alba & Nee, 1997; Brubaker, 2001).

In contrast, Esser (2001) has suggested that it remains useful to analyse the interrelations between integration in different domains, which is the line I have taken up in this dissertation. It is important to note that this is not in contradiction with the notion that integration is a two-way process and that psychological integration is ill-conceived as complete identificational assimilation of immigrants towards the native 'core culture'. Instead of defining psychological integration in such a normative 'assimilationist' sense, psychological integration can also be conceptualized more neutrally as a sense of national belonging. This leaves open the issue that national identity and 'mainstream culture' itself can be transformed by immigration and diversity. Assuming, however, that a sense of national belonging is important for cohesion in society, it is relevant to ask what factors are associated with psychological integration.

Previous research has shown that immigrant' integration in the economic, cultural and social domains tends to be related. Access to employment and education (economic integration) enables immigrants to interact more with natives (social integration) and learn the host country's language and customs (cultural integration) (Fokkema & De Haas, 2011; Martinovic et al., 2009; Van Tubergen & Kalmijn, 2009). This study adds to these previous findings by empirically relating integration in the economic (and social/cultural) domain to psychological integration in society. To this end, I have considered several aspects of immigrants' psychological integration. The results of this dissertation to a large extent confirm that there is a positive relation between immigrants' economic and psychological integration at the individual level. Moreover, I have developed this perspective further by investigating the mechanisms that can explain this relation, specifically to what extent social integration plays a role as intermediate factor, and by showing that there can also be an indirect negative relation between economic and psychological integration through feelings of relative deprivation.

#### **8.4 Limitations and Directions for Future Research**

In addition to the empirical findings and contributions of this dissertation, there are several limitations that should be discussed in order to provide possible directions for future research. The main limitations of this dissertation are related to the cross-sectional nature of the data and possible selection effects, conceptualization and measurement, and the theoretical notion that integration is not unidirectional but a two-sided process.

A first limitation is the inability to make causal inferences, because the chapters are based on cross-sectional data. Regarding settlement intentions for instance, it can be argued that immigrant integration is a dynamic process in which settlement intentions can also promote immigrants' (investments in) human capital skills and social interaction with natives. Moreover, a drawback of studies on immigrants' and refugees' settlement intentions is that part of the immigrants and refugees who once held the intention to leave the host country may have left already, causing selectivity in the sample. In the chapter on settlement intentions, I have addressed this issue by analysing a sample of recently arrived immigrants and refugees (<10 years), with additional robustness checks among respondents with a maximum length of stay of five years, indicating that our results are quite robust against selection bias.

Another example of the causality issue concerns the relation between economic and social integration. Because economic integration is perhaps the most studied aspect of immigrant integration, researchers have more often paid attention to the effect of social contacts on the economic success of immigrants than vice versa (Kanas & Van Tubergen, 2009). These studies generally indicate that social contacts with members of the ethnic majority community can also significantly contribute to immigrants' economic success (Kanas & Van Tubergen, 2009). Furthermore, I have argued that national identification can be the result of factors such as economic participation, but national identification, in turn, can also stimulate economic and social integration. However, this reversed causation is less likely (Nekby & Rödin, 2007) and our predictions were theoretically derived and there is longitudinal, causal evidence for some of the proposed relationships, such as between discrimination and host national identification (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). All in all however, it should be noted that I have only been able to test for significant associations. Panel data are needed to test for relations over time, and this should be regarded an important task of future studies.

Regarding conceptualization and measurement, it should be noted that the measure of national identification that is used in the analysis on refugees has some limitations. This measure of national self-identification, does not reflect the widely accepted notion that immigrants' identity is better understood as two-dimensional (i.e. dual or hyphenated identities that combine identification with the national community and with the ethnic group) than as one-dimensional (i.e. identification with either the host society or the ethnic origin group) (Berry, 1997; Verkuyten, 2005a; Zimmermann et al., 2007). Thus, the measure used limits the conclusions that can be drawn.

In the analysis on national identification among immigrants and natives, I use a better measure of national identification. Yet the group differences in national identification can also indicate that national identification does not mean exactly the same to the groups studied, as is suggested by the results for the measurement equivalence test of the items used. This puts



studies that compare natives' and immigrants' national identification into perspective (e.g. Elkins & Sides, 2007; Staerklé et al., 2010). Researchers have noted that there can be qualitative differences in national identification between ethnic groups, which should be considered in empirical research (Verkuyten, 2005a). The findings in this dissertation confirm that notion and suggest that caution is required when studying national identification across majority and minority groups. Furthermore, it is important for future studies to examine different aspects and dimensions of national identification. We focused on the sense of belonging but national identification can also relate to, for example, the process of self-categorization, feelings of esteem and pride, and sharing beliefs and values (Ashmore et al., 2004; Verkuyten, 2005a).

Also regarding social trust, it has to be noted that metric (or higher) measurement equivalence between natives and minorities could not be established for the generalized trust variable. This implies that caution is required in comparing the generalized trust levels between groups. I have used straightforward indicators of generalized trust, however, similar to national and cross-national studies that did find generalized trust to be equivalent across groups (Dinesen, 2011; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008). On the other hand, other researchers have raised doubts regarding this type of trust questions, because it has been shown that respondents may take different 'imagined communities' in mind when asked about 'most people', ranging from all people in the world to most people they know personally (Sturgis & Smith, 2010). This problem is as relevant for natives as it is for minorities, but the results do suggest that forms of trust that refer to specific actors, institutions or domains can be more confidently compared between immigrants and natives.

Moreover, the measures of relative deprivation and social integration could be improved, to provide yet a better understanding of the indirect relations suggested in this dissertation. To examine the relation between economic integration and relative deprivation among immigrants more extensively, future studies should also include measures that tap justice-related affective judgments such as anger, resentment and frustration and examine the degree to which immigrants explicitly make comparisons with natives on the group level, as these are integral aspects of relative deprivation (Smith et al., 2012). This study also suggests that, when it comes to immigrants' social integration, we should look beyond the frequency or intensity of contact with natives and focus more on the quality of contacts in terms of the social support provided.

Lastly, the theoretical notion that integration is an inherently two-sided process can be integrated further in future research on the relation between immigrants' economic and psychological integration. This means taking into account the fact that the attitudes and behaviours of not only immigrants and minority groups but also natives are relevant when it comes to integration, and that the host society and 'mainstream culture' can also be influenced by immigration and cultural diversity. An important step in that direction is taken in this dissertation by analysing the role of perceived relative deprivation, in other words perceived attitudes and behaviours of the majority population. Moreover, a second step is taken by defining psychological integration, not in terms of 'identificational assimilation to the core culture', but as a sense of national belonging. This allows to focus extensively on the factors that are associated with national belonging among immigrants. However, this also raises the

issue to what extent national belonging as it is conceptualized in this dissertation is 'desirable', as some level of scepticism towards politicians may be seen as quite healthy, and extreme levels of national identification may not be. In this regard, this study does indicate that these aspects of psychological integration are positively related to subjectively experienced well-being. Still, by identifying different aspects of psychological integration, the idea that integration is not a one-way process is not yet developed to its full extent. Immigration and diversity will likely have the effect that national belonging itself is being redefined, also from the perspective of native majority members (Alba & Nee, 1997; Verkuyten, 2010). Moreover, the same applies to the economic, social and cultural domains. While this dissertation provides important insights on the integration of immigrants in society, in other words the extent to which they participate in the 'mainstream', future research can develop further the notion that, as a consequence of immigration and ethnic diversity, the 'mainstream' labour market, and social and cultural life itself are transformed for all members of society (Brubaker, 2001; Esser, 2001).

### **8.5 Final Conclusions**

This dissertation argues that it is important to examine the conditions that stimulate or hamper immigrant's psychological integration in society. The results show that economic integration of immigrants is not only an important goal in itself but can also contribute to a sense of national belonging. Both economic integration and social integration are positively associated with feelings of identification, belonging and commitment in society, among immigrants as well as among natives. Moreover, differences in economic and social integration can almost fully explain the gap in life satisfaction between natives and immigrants. These findings have implications for the on-going immigration and integration debates in many societies. They suggest that policies aiming to redress socio-economic inequalities can be expected to increase commitment and loyalty to society and will improve levels of subjective well-being.

A second main conclusion, however, is that immigrants' levels of national identification, trust and also life satisfaction are actually not much lower than among natives. In fact, Moroccan immigrants' national identification was not found to be lower than among natives, and group differences in trust in political institutions and in life satisfaction could almost fully be attributed to differences between natives and immigrants regarding their economic and social resources. The optimistic conclusion is that feelings of belonging to society and satisfaction with life are not inevitably lower among immigrants than among natives. This also means that we found little evidence for the claim that immigrants have divided loyalties and a lack of attachment to the host society and therefore undermine a cohesive national identity. Thus, concerns about immigrants' loyalty to the nation and the fragmentation of society due to immigrants' lack of host country identification might be addressed by improving their economic and social integration, as they are positively related to psychological integration, but conversely the results in this dissertation do not really suggest that there is a problematic lack of orientation on the host society among immigrants to begin with.

Furthermore, though the conclusions are generally optimistic in the sense that differences in identification, social trust and life satisfaction between immigrants and natives are relatively small and can almost entirely be explained by different socio-economic positions, the findings on perceived relative deprivation do raise some pressing policy issues. Relative deprivation, in terms of perceived discrimination by the majority and a perceived lack of opportunities, is associated with more negative attitudes towards natives and the host society. The negative effect of discrimination is also demonstrated regarding other aspects of psychological integration, including national identification, generalized social trust and trust in political institutions. The results presented here suggest that especially immigrants who are higher educated perceive relatively high levels of discrimination and denial of equal opportunities for immigrants in Dutch society. In part this will be due to the fact that higher educated people are more sophisticated social critics, but it also suggests that a 'glass-ceiling effect' is perceived especially by those who make a considerable effort to integrate. This underlines the fact that immigrants' national attachment and well-being do not only depend on their own efforts to integrate in society, but are also associated with the attitudes towards them among the general population and the levels of segregation that characterize the labour market and other domains of the receiving society.





**Appendix**  
**(Supplemental tables for chapters 2, 3, 6 and 7)**

**Chapter 2**

Table A.1: Additional analysis,  
with origin countries separately

	Model 3 <sup>1</sup>	
	dy/ dx	se
<i>National origin group</i>		
Caribbean		
Antillean (ref.)	-	-
Surinamese	.016	.031
Mediterranean		
Turkish	.172	.030***
Moroccan	.313	.028***
Refugees		
Afghan	.253	.029***
Iraqi	.190	.031***
Iranian	.126	.038**
Yugoslavian	.330	.035***
Somali	.016	.037
<i>N</i>	4,151	

\*\*\* p<.001.

Presented are *average marginal effects; standard errors* in second column.

<sup>1</sup> The effects presented in Table A.1 are the result of a model that includes all variables that are also included in the third model presented in Table 3.

Table A.2a: Multinomial logistic regression of intention to stay in the Netherlands;  
*AME on probability of (Y=1 'return to origin country').*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	dy/ dx	se	dy/ dx	se	dy/ dx	se
<i>National origin group</i>						
Caribbean (ref.)						
Mediterranean	-.181	.022***	-.184	.023***	-.231	.022***
Refugees	-.193	.021***	-.192	.022***	-.177	.022***
<i>Economic integration</i>						
Employed			.026	.017	.032	.018
Occupational level			-.001	.001	.000	.001
Financial security			-.013	.007	-.009	.007
<i>Socio-Cult. integration</i>						
Social contacts						
More co-ethnic (ref.)						
Both equally					-.110	.017***
More natives					-.176	.020***
Member organization						
None (ref.)						
More co-ethnics					.135	.036**
More natives					.003	.024
Sends remittances					.035	.016*
Modern values					-.039	.010***
<i>Control variables</i>						
Age						
15-25 (ref.)						
25-45	-.048	.024	-.051	.024*	-.071	.024**
45 and up	-.129	.029***	-.129	.030***	-.164	.030***
Years in Netherlands	.012	.003***	.012	.003***	.013	.003***
Male	.012	.017	.006	.017	-.001	.017
Education in origin						
None (ref.)						
Primary	-.022	.024	-.022	.024	-.012	.023
Lower secondary	.034	.028	.031	.028	.050	.027
Higher secondary	.057	.026*	.057	.026*	.079	.025**
Tertiary	.057	.030	.060	.031	.090	.030**
<i>N</i>	4,151		4,151		4,151	
<i>LR chi</i> <sup>2</sup>	206.9		215.6		386.4	
<i>DF</i>	20		26		38	
<i>Pseudo R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.024		.025		.045	

\*\*\* p<.001, \*\* p<.01, \* p<.05.

Presented are *average marginal effects*; *standard errors* in second column.

| Appendix

Table A.2b: Multinomial logistic regression of intention to stay in the Netherlands;  
*AME on probability of (Y=2 'don't know').*

	<u>Model 1</u>	<u>Model 2</u>	<u>Model 3</u>
	dy/ dx se	dy/ dx se	dy/ dx se
<i>National origin group</i>			
Caribbean (ref.)			
Mediterranean	.047 .018*	.050 .018**	.056 .019**
Refugees	.000 .016	.008 .017	.018 .017
<i>Economic integration</i>			
Employed		.017 .014	.012 .015
Occupational level		.001 .001	.000 .001
Financial security		.002 .006	.002 .006
<i>Socio-Cult. integration</i>			
Social contacts			
More co-ethnic (ref.)			
Both equally			.019 .015
More natives			-.034 .017*
Member organization			
None (ref.)			
More co-ethnics			-.022 .026
More natives			-.015 .019
Sends remittances			.013 .014
Modern values			.023 .008**
<i>Control variables</i>			
Age			
15-25 (ref.)			
25-45	.003 .019	.003 .019	.005 .019
45 and up	.017 .026	.022 .026	.029 .026
Years in Netherlands	-.003 .002	-.004 .002	-.004 .002
Male	.023 .014	.018 .014	.018 .015
Education in origin			
None (ref.)			
Primary	-.004 .018	-.004 .019	-.008 .019
Lower secondary	.036 .022	.035 .023	.029 .023
Higher secondary	.056 .021**	.052 .021*	.044 .021**
Tertiary	.054 .024*	.048 .025	.038 .025
<i>N</i>	4,151	4,151	4,151
<i>LR chi</i> <sup>2</sup>	206.9	215.6	386.4
<i>DF</i>	20	26	38
<i>Pseudo R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.024	.025	.045

\*\*\* p<.001, \*\* p<.01, \* p<.05.

Presented are *average marginal effects*; *standard errors* in second column.



Table A.2c: Multinomial logistic regression of intention to stay in the Netherlands;  
*AME on probability of (Y=3 'stay in the Netherlands').*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	dy/ dx	se	dy/ dx	se	dy/ dx	se
<i>National origin group</i>						
Caribbean (ref.)						
Mediterranean	.134	.022***	.135	.022***	.178	.023***
Refugees	.193	.020***	.184	.021***	.159	.021***
<i>Economic integration</i>						
Employed			-.043	.017*	-.044	.018*
Occupational level			.000	.001	-.000	.001
Financial security			.011	.007	.007	.007
<i>Socio-Cult. integration</i>						
Social contacts						
More co-ethnic (ref.)						
Both equally					.090	.018***
More natives					.211	.022***
Member organization						
None (ref.)						
More co-ethnics					-.113	.034**
More natives					.012	.025
Sends remittances					-.047	.017**
Modern values					.016	.010
<i>Control variables</i>						
Age						
15-25 (ref.)						
25-45	.045	.023	.048	.023*	.066	.023**
45 and up	.112	.030***	.107	.030***	.135	.030***
Years in Netherlands	-.009	.003**	-.008	.003*	-.009	.003**
Male	-.035	.017*	-.024	.018	-.017	.018
Education in origin						
None (ref.)						
Primary	.026	.025	.026	.025	.021	.025
Lower secondary	-.070	.029*	-.066	.028*	-.079	.028**
Higher secondary	-.112	.026***	-.110	.026***	-.124	.026***
Tertiary	-.111	.029***	-.108	.030***	-.128	.030***
<i>N</i>	4,151		4,151		4,151	
<i>LR chi</i> <sup>2</sup>	206.9		215.6		386.4	
<i>DF</i>	20		26		38	
<i>Pseudo R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.024		.025		.045	

\*\*\* p<.001, \*\* p<.01, \* p<.05.

Presented are *average marginal effects*; *standard errors* in second column.

Table A.3: Binary logistic regression of intention to stay in the Netherlands;  
category 'don't know' coded as '0 – back to origin country'

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	dy/ dx	se	dy/ dx	se	dy/ dx	se
<i>National origin group</i>						
Caribbean (ref.)						
Mediterranean	.134	.022***	.134	.022***	.175	.022***
Refugees	.192	.020***	.183	.021***	.156	.021***
<i>Economic integration</i>						
Employed			-.042	.017*	-.042	.018*
Occupational level			.000	.001	-.000	.001
Financial security			.011	.007	.007	.007
<i>Socio-Cult. integration</i>						
Social contacts						
More co-ethnic (ref.)						
Both equally					.092	.018***
More natives					.212	.022***
Member organization						
None (ref.)						
More co-ethnics					-.108	.037**
More natives					.013	.025
Sends remittances					-.048	.017**
Modern values					.011	.010
<i>Control variables</i>						
Age						
15-25 (ref.)						
25-45	.043	.023	.046	.023*	.063	.023**
45 and up	.114	.030***	.108	.030***	.135	.030***
Years in Netherlands	-.009	.003**	-.008	.003*	-.009	.003**
Male	-.035	.017*	-.024	.018	-.018	.018
Education in origin						
None (ref.)						
Primary	.026	.025	.026	.025	.022	.024
Lower secondary	-.071	.028*	-.067	.028*	-.078	.028**
Higher secondary	-.113	.026***	-.110	.026***	-.122	.026***
Tertiary	-.110	.029***	-.107	.030***	-.124	.030***
<i>N</i>	4,151		4,151		4,151	
<i>LR chi</i> <sup>2</sup>	158.3		164.9		293.5	
<i>DF</i>	10		13		19	
<i>Pseudo R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.028		.029		.052	

\*\*\* p&lt;.001, \*\* p&lt;.01, \* p&lt;.05.

Presented are *average marginal effects*; *standard errors* in second column.

## Chapter 3

Table A.1: Correlations - All respondents &gt;&gt;&gt; part 1

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14		
1. Generalized trust	1	.273**	.028	.058**	.059**	.266**	-.119**	.104**	-.094**	-.095**	.000	.212**	.059**	-.210**		
2. Political trust		1	.074**	-.094**	-.040**	.200**	-.043**	-.047**	-.086**	-.060**	.150**	.146**	-.024	-.188**		
3. Female			1	-.022	.050**	-.001	-.021	-.113**	-.007	.185**	-.005	.019	-.177**	-.025		
4. Age				1	.538**	-.024	.179**	.459**	.021	.127**	-.660**	.021	.236**	.064**		
5. Partner					1	.048**	.160**	.425**	-.061**	.058**	-.521**	.039*	.191**	-.049**		
6. Education						1	-.170**	.207**	-.111**	-.294**	.042**	.372**	.123	-.194**		
7. Education in OC							1	-.038*	.042**	.241**	-.165**	-.155**	-.039*	.143		
8. Employed								1	a	a	a	.000	.370**	-.122**		
9. Unemployed									1	a	a	.000	-.111**	.171**		
10. Non-labour-force										1	a	.000	-.174**	.138**		
11. Student											1	.000	-.248**	-.052**		
12. Occupational status												1	.131**	-.115**		
13. Supervisor													1	-.086**		
14. Financial problems														1		
15. No member															1	
16. Member																1
17. Volunteer																1
18. Integrated																1
19. Isolated																1
20. Outgroup friends																1
21. Collective efficacy																1
22. Left-right scale																1
23. Interested in politics																1
24. Preference ruling party																1

a : Exclusive categories

Table A.1b: Correlations - All respondents >> part 2

	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
15. No member	1									
16. Member		1	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>	<sup>a</sup>
17. Volunteer			1	.075**	-.070**	-.089**	.104**	.055**	.066**	.041**
18. Integrated				1	-.347**	-.007	.132**	.016	.085**	.009
19. Isolated					1	.061**	-.129**	-.048**	-.078**	-.005
20. Outgroup friends						1	-.070**	-.177**	.056**	.021
21. Collective efficacy							1	.074**	-.029	.025
22. Left-right scale								1	.012	-.051**
23. Interested in politics									1	.012
24. Preference ruling party										1

<sup>a</sup> : Exclusive categories.

Table A.2: Interaction effects between minority status and independent variables

	Generalized trust		Political trust	
	Est.	SE	Est.	SE
<b>Individual characteristics (level 1)</b>				
Minority status:				
Natives=0, Minorities=1				
x Female	-0.015	0.041	0.041	0.035
x Age	0.001	0.002	0.004	0.002 *
x Having a partner	-0.010	0.043	0.028	0.036
x Education level	-0.083	0.018 ***	-0.115	0.016 ***
x Education other country than NL	0.039	0.221	-0.128	0.187
Prof. Activity (ref= Employed)				
x Currently unemployed	-0.012	0.104	0.208	0.087 *
x Non-labour-force	0.148	0.075 *	0.215	0.063 **
x Currently student	-0.128	0.053 *	-0.051	0.045
x Occupational status	-0.003	0.002	-0.005	0.002 **
x Supervisor at work	-0.030	0.055	-0.055	0.046
x Financial problems	-0.001	0.019	0.016	0.016
Associations (ref=none)				
x Association - only member	-0.116	0.049 *	-0.071	0.041
x Association - volunteer	-0.079	0.054	-0.074	0.046
x Feels integrated	-0.117	0.036 **	-0.085	0.030 **
x Feels isolated	0.083	0.033 *	0.094	0.028 **
x Outgroup friends	-0.063	0.051	-0.015	0.043
x Perceived collective efficacy	-0.031	0.036	0.082	0.031 **
x Left-right scale			0.040	0.008 ***
x Interested in politics			-0.048	0.028
x Preference for ruling party			-0.040	0.036
<b>Neighbourhood characteristics (level 2)</b>				
x % non-western residents	-0.155	0.180	-0.282	0.165
x Average income level	-0.026	0.016	-0.011	0.015

Source: NELLS 2009, own calculations.

\*\*\*Significant at  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*significant at  $p < 0.01$ ; \*significant at  $p < .05$ .

Note: interaction effects were tested separately in models including a dummy variable for minority status and all independent variables.

Chapter 6

Table A.1: Direct and indirect effects of education on satisfaction with the Netherlands and attitudes towards natives

	DV: Satisf. Society		DV: Attitude Natives		DV: Opportunities		DV: Discrimination					
	b	se	β	se	b	se	b	se				
<b>Structural part</b>												
Education	.014	.015	.018	.049**	.018	.051	-.061***	.009	-.140	.029**	.008	.079
<i>Mediators</i>												
Opportunities	.475***	.044	.251	.411***	.053	.183	-.000	.002	-.001	.003	.002	.050
Discrimination	-.347***	.055	-.155	-.147*	.068	-.055	-.082*	.030	-.049	-.018	.028	-.013
<i>Controls</i>												
Age	.008**	.003	.079	-.001	.003	-.005	.001	.002	.025	-.008***	.002	-.161
Years since migration	-.007*	.003	-.050	.007	.004	.039	-.000	.002	-.001	.003	.002	.050
Female	.203***	.048	.064	.033	.059	.009	-.082*	.030	-.049	-.018	.028	-.013
Employed	.064	.050	.020	.046	.062	.012	-.015	.030	-.009	.067*	.028	.047
Contact	.109***	.018	.098	.075**	.023	.056	.035**	.011	.058	-.005	.010	-.009
Turks = ref.												
Moroccans	.100	.066	.027	-.131	.081	-.030	.159***	.041	.081	-.071	.038	-.043
Surinamese	.052	.070	.014	.122	.086	.028	.391***	.043	.204	-.294***	.039	-.182
Antilleans	.154*	.070	.042	-.062	.085	-.014	.156**	.043	.080	-.026	.040	-.016
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	-.050	.076	-.014	.312**	.093	.072	.033	.047	.017	-.170***	.044	-.105
<b>Measurement part</b>							<b>Factor: Opportunities</b>			<b>Factor: Discrimination</b>		
Opportunities for immigrants							1.000	.000	.702	1.000	.000	.655
Immigrants' rights respected							.840***	.023	.678	1.075***	.050	.759
Hospitable for immigrants							.939***	.026	.739			
Open to foreign cultures							.834***	.024	.703			
<b>Model Fit</b>												
Chi <sup>2</sup> /DF	7.339											
CFI	.954											
RMSEA	.040											
R <sup>2</sup> Satisfaction NL	.148											
R <sup>2</sup> Attitude natives	.073											
N	3981											

\*\*\*=p<.001; \*\*=p<.01; \*=p<.05.

Note: Model includes covariances between the latent factor opportunities and discrimination (b=-.295; se=.017; p<.001), and between the dependent variables satisfaction with the Dutch society and attitude towards natives (b=.399; se=.043; p<.001).

Table A.2: Hypothesized relations for three education groups

	M1: Education in NL			M2: Education NL + origin			M3: Education origin only		
	b	se	$\beta$	b	se	$\beta$	b	se	$\beta$
<b>Effects on Satisfaction society</b>									
Education	.050	.027	.054	.034	.027	.035	-.014	.035	-.013
<i>Mediating Variables</i>									
Opportunities	.438***	.072	.241	.532***	.073	.279	.594***	.100	.291
Discrimination	-.297**	.103	-.130	-.430***	.097	-.183	-.181	.110	-.083
<b>Effects on Attitude natives</b>									
Education	.109**	.034	.096	.094**	.032	.083	-.011	.041	-.008
<i>Mediating Variables</i>									
Opportunities	.532***	.090	.238	.416**	.087	.188	.424***	.119	.181
Discrimination	.014	.131	.005	-.281*	.115	-.103	-.059	.132	-.023
<b>Effects on Opportunities</b>									
Education	-.082***	.017	-.161	-.085***	.017	-.166	-.025	.020	-.047
<b>Effects on Discrimination</b>									
Education	-.011	.015	-.027	.021	.014	.050	.043*	.019	.086
R-square Satisfaction NL	.115			.181			.167		
R-square Attitude Dutch	.072			.091			.080		
N	1314			1366			1013		

\*\*\*=p<.001; \*\*=p<.01; \*=p<.05

Factor loadings not shown in table.

Covariances not shown in table.

Control variables not shown in table.

Table A.3: Hypothesized relations for the two generations

	M1: 1 <sup>st</sup> generation		M2: 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	
	b	se	b	se
<b>Effects on Satisfaction society</b>				
Education	.004	.017	.047	.031
<i>Mediating Variables</i>				
Opportunities	.479***	.052	.402***	.079
Discrimination	-.371***	.065	-.300**	.114
<b>Effects on Attitude natives</b>				
Education	.045*	.021	.106*	.037
<i>Mediating Variables</i>				
Opportunities	.399***	.063	.478***	.095
Discrimination	-.156*	.079	-.128	.141
<b>Effects on Opportunities</b>				
Education	-.057***	.011	-.067**	.019
<b>Effects on Discrimination</b>				
Education	.036***	.010	-.012	.018
R-square Satisfaction NL	.163		.097	
R-square Attitude Dutch	.062		.080	
N	2992		989	

Note: Unstandardized effects reported.

\*\*\*=p<.001; \*\*=p<.01; \*=p<.05

Factor loadings not shown in table.

Covariances not shown in table.

Control variables not shown in table.



Table A.4: Hypothesized relations for the four origin groups

	<b>M1: Turks</b>		<b>M2: Moroccans</b>		<b>M3: Surinamese</b>		<b>M4: Antilleans</b>	
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
<b>Effects on Satisfaction society</b>								
Education	-.015	.032	.009	.030	.006	.028	.021	.031
<i>Mediating Variables</i>								
Opportunities	.791***	.117	.494***	.085	.424***	.074	.225**	.083
Discrimination	-.064	.134	-.466***	.123	-.202*	.097	-.589***	.110
<b>Effects on Attitude natives</b>								
Education	-.021	.039	.013	.037	.118**	.034	.075*	.037
<i>Mediating Variables</i>								
Opportunities	.519***	.137	.263*	.104	.620***	.094	.339**	.099
Discrimination	.086	.155	.068	.150	-.207	.120	-.311*	.127
<b>Effects on Opportunities</b>								
Education	-.047*	.018	-.019	.019	-.076***	.018	-.104***	.019
<b>Effects on Discrimination</b>								
Education	.031	.017	.031	.016	.040*	.016	.002	.018
R-square Satisfaction NL	.176		.195		.123		.135	
R-square Attitude Dutch	.082		.041		.118		.081	
N	1081		941		1009		950	

Note: Unstandardized effects reported.

\*\*\*=p<.001; \*\*=p<.01; \*=p<.05

Factor loadings not shown in table.

Covariances not shown in table.

Control variables not shown in table.

**Chapter 7**

**Table A.1: Exploratory factor analysis, N = 3,910**

	Pattern Matrix				Structure Matrix			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Life satisfaction 1	,856	,052	-,014	-,022	,830	-,293	-,327	,358
Life satisfaction 2	,778	-,075	-,018	-,022	,805	-,389	-,326	,359
Life satisfaction 3	,804	,032	-,010	,038	,813	-,309	-,334	,399
Life satisfaction 4	,673	-,040	,018	,031	,697	-,320	-,265	,340
Financial problems 1	-,037	,537	,009	-,021	-,269	,559	,141	-,192
Financial problems 2	,051	,663	-,011	,000	-,215	,640	,103	-,157
Financial problems 3	,064	,673	,018	-,011	-,223	,653	,134	-,178
Financial problems 4	-,019	,453	-,005	,020	-,193	,454	,086	-,114
Financial problems 5	-,104	,630	-,001	-,010	-,365	,675	,171	-,234
Social support - isolated 1	,017	,001	-,652	,027	,284	-,146	-,671	,314
Social support - isolated 2	,021	,016	-,839	-,004	,339	-,161	-,842	,360
Social support - isolated 3	-,036	-,017	-,854	-,020	,294	-,169	-,834	,334
Social support - integrated 1	,047	,006	-,013	,714	,374	-,216	-,336	,739
Social support - integrated 2	-,040	,013	,032	,792	,302	-,187	-,289	,757
Social support - integrated 3	,011	-,029	-,038	,765	,385	-,256	-,376	,794

Source: NELLS 2009, own calculations.

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

Table A.2: Multigroup CFA tests of measurement invariance of the life satisfaction scale

	Model fit indices						Model comparison		
	$\chi^2$	df	p	$\chi^2/df$	CFI	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	$\Delta df$	p
<u>Life satisfaction</u>									
M1: configural invariance	8.142	3	.043	2.714	.999	.036			
M2: weak invariance	15.425	9	.080	1.714	.999	.023	7.283	6	.295
M3: strong invariance	86.242	15	***	5.749	.990	.060	78.100	12	***
M4: strong invariance, partial	20.274	11	.042	1.843	.999	.025	12.132	8	.145

Source: NELLS 2009, own calculations. \*\*\*: significant at  $p < .001$ .  $N = 3,910$ .

Note: Goodness of fit statistics were obtained by estimating CFA models in MPLUS 6 (Muthén & Muthén, 2010).

Table A.3: Correlations – all respondents, N = 3,910

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Life satisfaction	1	,174**	-,165**	-,032*	,126**	-,163**	-,127**	,055**	,137**	-,358**
2. Native	,174**	1			,222**	-,132**	-,239**	,013	,161**	-,264**
3. 1st generation	-,165**		1		-,122**	,117**	,279**	-,173**	-,175**	,244**
4. 2nd generation	-,032*			1	-,158**	,036*	-,025	,212**	,001	,056**
5. Employed	,126**	,222**	-,122**	-,158**	1				,001	-,169**
6. Unemployed	-,163**	-,132**	,117**	,036*		1			,000	,175**
7. Inactive	-,127**	-,239**	,279**	-,025			1		-,001	,135**
8. Student	,055**	,013	-,173**	,212**				1	-,001	-,013
9. Occupational status	,137**	,161**	-,175**	,001	,001	,000	-,001	-,001	1	-,118**
10. Financial problems	-,358**	-,264**	,244**	,056**	-,169**	,175**	,135**	-,013	-,118**	1
11. Contact – family	,084**	,030	-,181**	,198**	-,031*	-,009	-,117**	,157**	-,060**	-,080**
12. Contact – friends	,086**	-,059**	-,033*	,130**	-,161**	-,009	-,042**	,261**	-,074**	,004
13. Support - integrated	,339**	,157**	-,150**	-,027	,074**	-,087**	-,098**	,049**	,080**	-,170**
14. Support - isolated	-,392**	-,223**	,223**	,026	-,135**	,105**	,153**	-,030	-,102**	,237**
15. Nat. identification	,126**	,039*	-,060**	,024	,085**	-,029	-,070**	-,029	,001	-,051**
16. General. social trust	,199**	,265**	-,210**	-,103**	,108**	-,094**	-,099**	,009	,224**	-,212**
17. Trust in pol. inst.	,241**	,128**	-,111**	-,037*	-,019	-,082**	-,056**	,130**	,152**	-,187**
	11	12	13	14	15	16	17			
1. Life satisfaction	,084**	,086**	,339**	-,392**	,126**	,199**	,241**			
2. Native	,030	-,059**	,157**	-,223**	,039*	,265**	,128**			
3. 1st generation	-,181**	-,033*	-,150**	,223**	-,060**	-,210**	-,111**			
4. 2nd generation	,198**	,130**	-,027	,026	,024	-,103**	-,037*			
5. Employed	-,031*	-,161**	,074**	-,135**	,085**	,108**	-,019			
6. Unemployed	-,009	-,009	-,087**	,105**	-,029	-,094**	-,082**			
7. Inactive	-,117**	-,042**	-,098**	,153**	-,070**	-,099**	-,056**			
8. Student	,157**	,261**	,049**	-,030	-,029	,009	,130**			
9. Occupational status	-,060**	-,074**	,080**	-,102**	,001	,224**	,152**			
10. Financial problems	-,080**	,004	-,170**	,237**	-,051**	-,212**	-,187**			
11. Contact – family	1	,221**	,132**	-,106**	,095**	-,037*	-,029			
12. Contact – friends	,221**	1	,184**	-,088**	,040*	-,003	,042**			
13. Support - integrated	,132**	,184**	1	-,357**	,141**	,202**	,166**			
14. Support - isolated	-,106**	-,088**	-,357**	1	-,116**	-,239**	-,118**			
15. Nat. identification	,095**	,040*	,141**	-,116**	1	-,010	,113**			
16. General. social trust	-,037*	-,003	,202**	-,239**	-,010	1	,285**			
17. Trust in pol. inst.	-,029	,042**	,166**	-,118**	,113**	,285**	1			

Source: NELLS 2009, own calculations. Significant at: \*\* p<.01, \* p<.05.

Table A.4: Correlations – Natives, N = 2,220

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Life satisfaction	1				,111**	-,126**	-,149**	,021	,155**	-,308**
2. Native		1								
3. 1st generation			1							
4. 2nd generation				1						
5. Employed	,111**				1				,069**	-,128**
6. Unemployed	-,126**					1			-,021	,150**
7. Inactive	-,149**						1		-,030	,063**
8. Student	,021							1	-,053*	,043*
9. Occupational status	,155**				,069**	-,021	-,030	-,053*	1	-,100**
10. Financial problems	-,308**				-,128**	,150**	,063**	,043*	-,100**	1
11. Contact – family	,054*				-,102**	,050*	-,005	,101**	-,160**	-,059**
12. Contact – friends	,071**				-,228**	,025	-,058**	,296**	-,103**	,029
13. Support - integrated	,354**				,013	-,072**	-,058**	,054*	,052*	-,123**
14. Support - isolated	-,405**				-,086**	,074**	,086**	,013	-,073**	,194**
15. Nat. identification	,135**				,064**	-,057**	-,024	-,034	-,016	-,056**
16. General. social trust	,220**				,049*	-,064**	-,065**	,012	,223**	-,136**
17. Trust in pol. inst.	,255**				-,051*	-,110**	-,093**	,170**	,190**	-,157**
	11	12	13	14	15	16	17			
1. Life satisfaction	,054*	,071**	,354**	-,405**	,135**	,220**	,255**			
2. Native		1								
3. 1st generation			1							
4. 2nd generation				1						
5. Employed	-,102**	-,228**	,013	-,086**	,064**	,049*	-,051*			
6. Unemployed	,050*	,025	-,072**	,074**	-,057**	-,064**	-,110**			
7. Inactive	-,005	-,058**	-,058**	,086**	-,024	-,065**	-,093**			
8. Student	,101**	,296**	,054*	,013	-,034	,012	,170**			
9. Occupational status	-,160**	-,103**	,052*	-,073**	-,016	,223**	,190**			
10. Financial problems	-,059**	,029	-,123**	,194**	-,056**	-,136**	-,157**			
11. Contact – family	1	,273**	,094**	-,041	,064**	-,116**	-,054*			
12. Contact – friends	,273**	1	,242**	-,083**	,044*	,000	,059**			
13. Support - integrated	,094**	,242**	1	-,384**	,131**	,199**	,198**			
14. Support - isolated	-,041	-,083**	-,384**	1	-,112**	-,215**	-,135**			
15. Nat. identification	,064**	,044*	,131**	-,112**	1	-,038	,081**			
16. General. social trust	-,116**	,000	,199**	-,215**	-,038	1	,333**			
17. Trust in pol. inst.	-,054*	,059**	,198**	-,135**	,081**	,333**	1			

Source: NELLS 2009, own calculations. Significant at: \*\* p&lt;.01, \* p&lt;.05.

| Appendix

Table A.5: Correlations – First generation, N = 1,159

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Life satisfaction	1				,108**	-,150**	-,047	,051	,046	-,332**
3. 1st generation										
5. Employed	,108**				1				-,274**	-,136**
6. Unemployed	-,150**					1			,107**	,136**
7. Inactive	-,047						1		,199**	,070*
8. Student	,051							1	,075*	-,017
9. Occupational status	,046				-,274**	,107**	,199**	,075*	1	-,056
10. Financial problems	-,332**				-,136**	,136**	,070*	-,017	-,056	1
11. Contact – family	,088**				,098**	-,008	-,159**	,113**	,017	-,075*
12. Contact – friends	,108**				-,008	-,032	-,033	,130**	-,031	-,039
13. Support - integrated	,299**				,068*	-,063*	-,073*	,078**	,057	-,138**
14. Support - isolated	-,319**				-,151**	,062*	,136**	-,017	-,050	,164**
15. Nat. identification	,100**				,104**	,015	-,112**	-,028	,012	-,042
16. General. social trust	,077**				,070*	-,062*	-,038	,000	,120**	-,167**
17. Trust in pol. inst.	,193**				-,018	-,040	,028	,039	,032	-,165**
18. Ethnic identification	,094**				-,058	-,008	,075*	-,011	-,058	-,051
19. Discrimination	-,186**				,054	,108**	-,140**	,019	-,015	,159**
	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	
1. Life satisfaction	,088**	,108**	,299**	-,319**	,100**	,077**	,193**	,094**	-,186**	
3. 1st generation										
5. Employed	,098**	-,008	,068*	-,151**	,104**	,070*	-,018	-,058	,054	
6. Unemployed	-,008	-,032	-,063*	,062*	,015	-,062*	-,040	-,008	,108**	
7. Inactive	-,159**	-,033	-,073*	,136**	-,112**	-,038	,028	,075*	-,140**	
8. Student	,113**	,130**	,078**	-,017	-,028	,000	,039	-,011	,019	
9. Occupational status	,017	-,031	,057	-,050	,012	,120**	,032	-,058	-,015	
10. Financial problems	-,075*	-,039	-,138**	,164**	-,042	-,167**	-,165**	-,051	,159**	
11. Contact – family	1	,106**	,168**	-,154**	,123**	,027	-,047	,060*	,070*	
12. Contact – friends	,106**	1	,173**	-,126**	,071*	,058*	,059*	,041	-,029	
13. Support - integrated	,168**	,173**	1	-,283**	,135**	,110**	,112**	,090**	-,118**	
14. Support - isolated	-,154**	-,126**	-,283**	1	-,143**	-,135**	-,029	,005	,084**	
15. Nat. identification	,123**	,071*	,135**	-,143**	1	-,004	,133**	-,078**	-,054	
16. General. social trust	,027	,058*	,110**	-,135**	-,004	1	,157**	-,095**	-,039	
17. Trust in pol. inst.	-,047	,059*	,112**	-,029	,133**	,157**	1	-,006	-,186**	
18. Ethnic identification	,060*	,041	,090**	,005	-,078**	-,095**	-,006	1	-,012	
19. Discrimination	,070*	-,029	-,118**	,084**	-,054	-,039	-,186**	-,012	1	

Source: NELLS 2009, own calculations. Significant at: \*\* p<.01, \* p<.05.

Table A.6: Correlations – Second generation, N = 531

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Life satisfaction	1				,012	-,173**	-,034	,104*	,041	-,375**
4. 2nd generation										
5. Employed	,012				1				,003	-,086*
6. Unemployed	-,173**					1			-,001	,159**
7. Inactive	-,034						1		-,001	,059
8. Student	,104*							1	-,002	-,034
9. Occupational status	,041				,003	-,001	-,001	-,002	1	-,050
10. Financial problems	-,375**				-,086*	,159**	,059	-,034	-,050	1
11. Contact – family	,067				-,146**	-,090*	,064	,164**	-,067	-,005
12. Contact – friends	,127**				-,247**	-,067	-,025	,316**	-,064	,011
13. Support - integrated	,250**				,087*	-,073	-,013	-,044	,053	-,152**
14. Support - isolated	-,339**				-,015	,127**	,001	-,054	-,037	,225**
15. Nat. identification	,109*				,093*	-,036	,020	-,092*	-,018	,014
16. General. social trust	,138**				,032	-,069	,053	-,030	,160**	-,191**
17. Trust in pol. inst.	,192**				-,100*	-,036	-,003	,129**	,094*	-,158**
18. Ethnic identification	,148**				-,034	-,062	,076	,022	-,105*	,032
19. Discrimination	-,134**				-,005	,096*	,035	-,069	-,012	,171**
	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	
1. Life satisfaction	,067	,127**	,250**	-,339**	,109*	,138**	,192**	,148**	-,134**	
4. 2nd generation										
5. Employed	-,146**	-,247**	,087*	-,015	,093*	,032	-,100*	-,034	-,005	
6. Unemployed	-,090*	-,067	-,073	,127**	-,036	-,069	-,036	-,062	,096*	
7. Inactive	,064	-,025	-,013	,001	,020	,053	-,003	,076	,035	
8. Student	,164**	,316**	-,044	-,054	-,092*	-,030	,129**	,022	-,069	
9. Occupational status	-,067	-,064	,053	-,037	-,018	,160**	,094*	-,105*	-,012	
10. Financial problems	-,005	,011	-,152**	,225**	,014	-,191**	-,158**	,032	,171**	
11. Contact – family	1	,319**	,073	-,041	,051	-,049	,041	,110*	,011	
12. Contact – friends	,319**	1	,061	-,061	-,089*	-,080	-,031	,027	,054	
13. Support - integrated	,073	,061	1	-,256**	,150**	,179**	,065	,144**	-,027	
14. Support - isolated	-,041	-,061	-,256**	1	-,001	-,214**	-,078	-,029	,052	
15. Nat. identification	,051	-,089*	,150**	-,001	1	-,003	,147**	,020	-,140**	
16. General. social trust	-,049	-,080	,179**	-,214**	-,003	1	,238**	-,126**	-,131**	
17. Trust in pol. inst.	,041	-,031	,065	-,078	,147**	,238**	1	-,035	-,290**	
18. Ethnic identification	,110*	,027	,144**	-,029	,020	-,126**	-,035	1	,080	
19. Discrimination	,011	,054	-,027	,052	-,140**	-,131**	-,290**	,080	1	

Source: NELLS 2009, own calculations. Significant at: \*\* p&lt;.01, \* p&lt;.05.







**Samenvatting  
(Summary in Dutch)**

### **Inleiding**

De psychologische integratie van immigranten is, in andere woorden, het gevoel erbij te horen in de ontvangende samenleving. In dit proefschrift worden verschillende aspecten van de psychologische integratie van immigranten in Nederland onderzocht: de intentie om in Nederland te blijven, identificatie met Nederland, sociaal en politiek vertrouwen, en positieve houdingen ten opzichte van autochtonen en ten opzichte van de Nederlandse samenleving. De belangrijkste vraag in dit proefschrift is hoe economische integratie, dat wil zeggen participatie in het onderwijs en op de arbeidsmarkt, samenhangt met deze verschillende aspecten van psychologische integratie.

Het onderzoek is gebaseerd op gegevens uit grootschalige vragenlijstsonderzoeken onder immigranten uit Turkije, Marokko, Suriname, de voormalige Nederlandse Antillen, Iran, Irak, Afghanistan, Somalië, en het voormalig Joegoslavië. De empirische hoofdstukken zijn samen met co-auteurs geschreven als onafhankelijke onderzoeksartikelen. Zoals in de inleiding (hoofdstuk 1) wordt beschreven, belichten de eerste empirische hoofdstukken (hoofdstuk 2-6) steeds op een andere manier de vraag hoe de psychologische integratie van immigranten samenhangt met hun economische integratie, door naar verschillende aspecten van psychologische integratie te kijken, door tussenliggende verklaringen te onderzoeken (zoals sociaal-culturele integratie en ervaren discriminatie), en door vergelijkingen te maken met autochtonen. In het laatste empirische hoofdstuk (hoofdstuk 7) wordt onderzocht hoe economische, sociale, en psychologische integratie samenhangen met het subjectief welbevinden van immigranten.

### **Onderzoeksvragen en resultaten**

De centrale onderzoeksvraag in *hoofdstuk 2* is in welke mate arbeidsintegratie bij draagt aan de intentie om permanent in Nederland te blijven, onder migranten die relatief kort geleden naar Nederland gekomen zijn. Daar waar in de literatuur economische motieven gezien worden als één van de belangrijkste redenen voor migratie, vinden we in dit hoofdstuk geen verband tussen economische integratie in Nederland en de intentie om zich permanent in Nederland te vestigen. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat sociale en culturele integratie wel gerelateerd zijn aan de intentie om in Nederland te blijven. Immigrantengroepen die meer contact hebben met autochtonen en meer de norm van gelijkheid tussen mannen en vrouwen onderschrijven zijn minder geneigd om terug te willen keren naar het land van herkomst. Daarnaast laat het onderzoek interessante groepsverschillen zien. Immigrantengroepen uit Suriname, de voormalige Nederlandse Antillen, en Somalië zijn minder geneigd om permanent in Nederland te blijven dan immigrantengroepen uit andere herkomstlanden.

In *hoofdstuk 3* gaat het om de vraag of arbeidsintegratie positief gerelateerd is aan algemeen sociaal vertrouwen (het idee dat de meeste mensen over het algemeen te vertrouwen zijn) en politiek vertrouwen. Wat betreft sociaal en politiek vertrouwen vinden we wel een positieve relatie met economische integratie. Mensen met een hoger opleidingsniveau, een hoger beroepsniveau, en meer financiële zekerheid hebben een hoger sociaal en politiek vertrouwen. Een interessant aspect aan dit hoofdstuk over sociaal en politiek vertrouwen is ook de vergelijking die we maken tussen autochtone Nederlanders enerzijds en eerste en tweede generatie immigranten van Turkse en Marokkaanse afkomst anderzijds. Sociaal en

politiek vertrouwen zijn lager onder de migrantengroepen dan onder autochtonen, maar wat betreft politiek vertrouwen laat dit verschil zich vrijwel volledig verklaren door verschillen in economische en sociale integratie. Dus, wanneer we rekening houden met de relatief ongunstige sociaal-economische positie van immigranten zien we eigenlijk geen verschil met autochtonen wat betreft het vertrouwen in politieke instituties.

*Hoofdstuk 4* gaat over identificatie met Nederland. De belangrijkste vraag is of er een positieve relatie is tussen economische integratie en identificatie met Nederland. Dit wordt inderdaad bevestigd. Onder immigranten is zowel het hebben van werk als een hoger beroepsniveau positief gerelateerd aan identificatie met Nederland. Ook in dit hoofdstuk maken we een vergelijking tussen autochtonen en immigranten van Turkse en Marokkaanse afkomst. Hieruit blijkt, verrassend genoeg, dat identificatie met Nederland onder immigranten van Marokkaanse afkomst niet lager is dan onder autochtonen. Daarnaast laat het onderzoek zien dat beroepsniveau alleen onder immigranten samenhangt met nationale identificatie, niet onder autochtonen. Onder immigranten zijn Nederlandse taalvaardigheid, gevoelens van discriminatie, en sociaal contact met autochtonen de belangrijkste factoren die gerelateerd zijn aan nationale identificatie.

Ook *hoofdstuk 5* gaat over identificatie met Nederland, maar dan onder immigranten (vluchtelingen) uit Iran, Irak, Afghanistan, Somalië, en het voormalig Joegoslavië. In dit hoofdstuk beantwoorden we twee onderzoeksvragen. In de eerste plaats de vraag of er een positief verband is tussen economische integratie en nationale identificatie, en in de tweede plaats de vraag in welke mate deze relatie verklaard kan worden door sociale integratie. Het onderzoek bevestigt dat er een positieve relatie is tussen economische integratie en nationale identificatie. Het hebben van werk, een hoger beroepsniveau, en ook Nederlandse taalvaardigheid hangen positief samen met de neiging zichzelf als Nederlander te beschouwen. We vinden ook aanwijzingen dat dit verband voor een deel indirect is, en via sociale integratie verloopt. Dit betekent dat economische integratie sociaal contact met autochtonen stimuleert, wat vervolgens weer de kans vergroot dat men zichzelf als Nederlander beschouwt.

Het onderwerp van *hoofdstuk 6* is de zogenaamde ‘integratieparadox’. De paradox is dat hoger opgeleide immigranten soms een negatievere houding hebben ten opzichte van het gastland en de autochtone bevolking dan lager opgeleiden. Dit is in tegenstelling tot de verwachting dat opleiding (en economische integratie in algemenere zin) positief zal samenhangen met integratie in andere domeinen, zoals sociale en psychologische integratie. In dit hoofdstuk laten we zien dat er inderdaad ook een indirect negatief verband kan zijn tussen opleidingsniveau en houdingen ten opzichte van Nederland en de autochtone bevolking. De verklaring is dat hoger opgeleide immigranten meer discriminatie en minder acceptatie ervaren dan lager opgeleiden. Een hoger gevoel van discriminatie, en de ervaring van een gebrek aan respect voor immigranten in Nederland, kan vervolgens leiden tot een negatiever oordeel over de Nederlandse samenleving en een negatievere houding ten opzichte van de autochtone bevolking. Rekening houdend met de negatieve indirecte relaties is er een positieve directe relatie tussen opleidingsniveau en de houding ten opzichte van autochtonen.

In het laatste empirische hoofdstuk, *hoofdstuk 7*, onderzoeken we levenstevredenheid (subjectief welbevinden). In tegenstelling tot de voorgaande hoofdstukken is dit geen aspect

van psychologische integratie maar een mogelijke uitkomst ervan. De vraag die voorop staat in dit hoofdstuk is of economische, sociale, en psychologische integratie bijdragen aan levenstevredenheid. De resultaten in dit hoofdstuk bevestigen dat integratie in deze domeinen inderdaad positief gerelateerd is aan levenstevredenheid. Onder meer het hebben van werk, een hoger beroepsniveau, sociale steun, nationale identificatie, en politiek vertrouwen zijn positief geassocieerd met levenstevredenheid. Bovendien hebben we, net als in hoofdstuk 3 en hoofdstuk 4, een vergelijking gemaakt tussen autochtonen en eerste en tweede generatie immigranten van Turkse en Marokkaanse afkomst. Hieruit blijkt dat levenstevredenheid lager is onder immigranten, maar dat dit verschil te verklaren is door verschillen tussen immigranten en autochtonen wat betreft sociaal-economische positie.

### **Conclusies**

Over het algemeen blijkt uit dit onderzoek dat economische integratie inderdaad positief samenhangt met psychologische integratie. Ook al is er geen verband tussen economische integratie en de intentie om in Nederland te blijven, we zien wel positieve relaties met economische integratie als het gaat om de andere aspecten van psychologische integratie, namelijk nationale identificatie, sociaal en politiek vertrouwen, en houdingen ten opzichte van autochtonen. Dit betekent dat wanneer de economische integratie van immigranten toe neemt, het aannemelijk is dat dit een positieve uitwerking zal hebben op het gevoel ‘erbij te horen’. Daarbij zijn bepaalde condities wel van belang. Er is vooral een positief effect te verwachten van economische integratie wanneer dit sociale integratie stimuleert, en wanneer dit gepaard gaat met het gevoel dat minderheden gerespecteerd worden en gelijke kansen krijgen om in hogere functies aan het werk te komen en door te stromen.

Een opvallende uitkomst van dit onderzoek is dat de psychologische integratie van immigranten eigenlijk niet ver achter blijft bij die van autochtonen. Er is weinig verschil in nationale identificatie tussen de groepen en, rekening houdend met sociaal-economische positie, weinig verschil in politiek vertrouwen. Dit roept de vraag op in welke mate de psychologische integratie van immigranten als een probleem op zich gezien moet worden. Het blijkt moeilijk vast te stellen dat er een ‘achterstand’ is op dit gebied. Gezien de relatief ongunstige sociaal-economische posities van immigranten in Nederland, in ieder geval binnen de herkomstgroepen die in dit onderzoek vertegenwoordigd zijn, lijkt het voor de hand te liggen het beleid vooral op economische en sociale integratie te richten. Dit zal uiteindelijk ook de sociale samenhang in Nederland ten goede komen en een positieve uitwerking hebben op de levenstevredenheid van immigranten.



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## Curriculum Vitae

## | Curriculum Vitae

Thomas de Vroome was born on the 9th of May in Den Haag (the Netherlands). He obtained a Bachelor's degree in Interdisciplinary Social Science (2006) and Cultural Anthropology (2007) at Utrecht University. In 2009, he completed the research master program in Migration, Ethnic Relations and Multiculturalism at Utrecht University. Subsequently, he pursued his PhD research within the Interuniversity Centre for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS) and as a member of the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER). His PhD research was part of a larger project on cultural diversity and economic integration, titled 'Arbeidsintegratie in een Kleurrijke Samenleving', which was a collaboration between the Institute for Integration and Social Efficacy (ISW, University of Groningen) and ERCOMER (Utrecht University). In 2012, he spent two months as a visiting scholar at the Centre for Citizenship and Democracy of the University of Leuven, where he is currently employed as a postdoctoral researcher.





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