

Going it Alone

U.S. Perspectives on the NATO Alliance

prior to the Iraq War, 2002-2003



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Introduction

“The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources to make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.”¹

- Secretary of State Robert Gates, June 2011 -

These words of caution by Secretary of State Robert Gates in June 2011, characterize the state of the trans-Atlantic relationship at the time, especially regarding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Gates’ warned that the U.S. was losing interest in investing time and money in the organization that once symbolized the good relations between the U.S., Canada, and European nations. Gates’ June 2011 speech points at the remarkable tension between the U.S. and Europe over their cooperation within NATO over the last decade, in particular after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. of September 11, 2001. The particularly harsh words chosen by Gates raise the question of whether long-term ideological perspectives influenced this critical approach.

This thesis will analyze the ideologies that shaped U.S. foreign policy and examine whether these ideological considerations influenced concrete policy decisions regarding NATO. It is important to realize that this thesis will focus on ideology, defined as “an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms.”² This means that the strategic considerations behind U.S. policy decisions will, to a large extent, be discussed from that perspective.

Given the broadness of this subject, it is important to indicate more specifically on which period and actors this thesis will focus. The focus will be on the period 2002-2003. Within the development of transatlantic relations in the post-9/11 era, the years 2002-2003 form a particularly interesting historical moment. The dramatic effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. were still highly visible in these years. The years 2002-2003 also mark interesting changes in the American approach to foreign policy. In 2002 president George W. Bush presented his new *National Security Strategy*, which, according to some scholars, represented a fundamental realignment of US foreign policy in the post-9/11 world. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay state in their book *America Unbound* –

¹ Robert M. Gates, “The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO)” Remarks delivered in Brussels, Belgium. 10 June 2011.

² Michael H. Hunt, “Ideology.” In *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Hogan, Michael J. and Thomas G. Paterson. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 221.

The Bush Revolution in foreign policy that in these years Bush “unleashed the United States to use its overwhelming power without the constraints of multilateralism.”³ This unilateral approach inevitably had consequences for the trans-Atlantic relationship in general and for NATO in particular. The U.S. did not give NATO a central role in the war against terrorism that it started fighting in Afghanistan after 9/11, not even after NATO invoked Article V, by which the organization affirmed that the attack against the U.S. would be conceived as an attack against all.⁴ The fact that the U.S. showed such little interest in consulting with NATO during these years, makes the period particularly relevant for the topic of this thesis.

This thesis will not focus on the European criticism on the U.S. during these crucial years, but on the ideology that underlies America’s critical approach to NATO in 2002-2003. Moreover, this research will focus on domestic and internal factors that influenced the U.S. approach towards NATO, largely leaving geopolitical and strategic factors out of consideration. The aim is to expose the underlying images of Europe and NATO, the so-called mental maps, that played a role in the minds of those making U.S. foreign policy decisions in the years after 9/11.

This thesis will focus on the ideas, considerations and convictions of those responsible for American foreign policy. It will focus on the White House, because it can be argued, as for instance Daalder and Lindsay do, that the 9/11 attacks caused the “pendulum of power to shift from Capitol Hill to the White House.”⁵ Just as after previous attacks on the U.S. or situations of increased threat, the White House became the place where major decisions were made after 9/11. The members of the National Security Council (NSC) will play a major role, given that the White House calls the NSC its “principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters.”⁶ Principal members of the NSC during 2002-2003 were President George W. Bush, his Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant for National Security Affairs Condoleezza Rice and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers. The majority of these people were also part of a group of foreign policy advisors, popularly known as the Vulcans, assembled by Bush during his campaign for the presidency.⁷ The view of this group as a whole will be taken into account as well. In this research, the term “principal foreign policy officials” will be used to describe the above-mentioned group of administration officials.

³ Ivo Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy*. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 13.

⁴ Daalder and Lindsay, *America unbound*, 167.

⁵ Daalder and Lindsay, *America unbound*, 92.

⁶ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc>

⁷ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon&Schuster, 2002), xvii.

The relevance of this research lies in the fact that there is reason to believe that the ideology that shaped foreign policy after 9/11 has a continuing effect on U.S. foreign policy, which can still be seen in the policy of the current Obama administration.⁸ As becomes clear from the cited remarks by Secretary Gates, NATO criticism was still present in 2011 and the ideological foundation explored in this thesis may help us understand this critical position.

Research Question

Having demarcated the topic, the research question on which this thesis is based can be established. This thesis will explore which long-term ideological considerations can be considered to have shaped the critical U.S. position regarding NATO during the George W. Bush administration in 2002-2003.

In order to answer this question, this thesis will, in a broad sense, explore the fundamental view of George W. Bush and his principal foreign policy officials on America's role in the world and its relationship with Europe, in the crucial years leading up to the Iraq war. It will explore whether the mental maps that defined the way foreign policy officials in the U.S. perceived the relationship to Europe, had a strong influence on concrete U.S. policy decisions regarding NATO. Themes such as neoconservatism, anti-Europeanism and unilateralism in the post-9/11 years will be discussed, as they are structures into which the ideas of the Bush administration's principal foreign policy officials can be placed. The thesis aims to analyze whether the ideas underlying policy regarding NATO in 2002-2003 were a continuation of ideas that originated much earlier, or whether the decisions made in these years mark a clear breaking point with the way NATO was perceived before.

The first two chapters of this thesis will identify the ideological considerations shaping the U.S. perspective on its own position in the world and its relationship with Europe. The final chapter discusses the U.S. approach to NATO. This chapter can be considered a case study: to what extent does one see the ideology driving U.S. foreign policy officials in 2002-2003 reflected in a concrete example of foreign policy?

Academic discussion

The trans-Atlantic relationship is a much-debated subject. Numerous scholars have commented on the relationship post-9/11, often in the context of NATO. On several issues, scholarly opinions differ and no consensus has yet been found. This thesis adds to our understanding of the trans-Atlantic

⁸ Inderjeet Parmar, "Foreign Policy Fusion – Liberal Interventionists, Conservative Nationalists and Neoconservatives – The New Alliance," *International Politics* 46, no. 2/3 (2009): 204.

relationship post-9/11 in general and to the discussion about NATO's continuing relevance. The research will also provide insight in the broader question of whether the foreign policy of the Bush administration can be considered a breaking point with earlier U.S. foreign policy, or whether Bush's policies were largely shaped by ideas that predated the administration.

Many scholars have discussed the question of whether there are limitations to the trans-Atlantic relationship and whether the continuation of the strong bond between the U.S. and Europe is in danger. On one side of the spectrum there are those who argue that Europe and the U.S. are fundamentally different and no longer share common interests since the fall of the Soviet Union. This then means that there are inevitable limitations to the relationship. This line of thinking is perhaps most clearly represented by Robert Kagan who argues that "Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less."⁹ According to him, Europe and the U.S. share so little common ground that the continuation of a good trans-Atlantic relationship is in serious danger. He argues that to "stop pretending that we agree" is a necessary step on the road to recovery, but it is a step that no one has yet been willing to take.¹⁰ Geir Lundestad agrees with Kagan in emphasizing the serious problems in the relationship between the U.S. and Europe. He argues that "the golden years of Atlantic cooperation are gone forever." In other words, he is convinced that the trans-Atlantic relationship is has become less important and less strong in recent years. However, Lundestad is more nuanced than Kagan in adding that "some continuation of present arrangements seems likely," because, despite the cooled relationship, it is not possible to unite Europe in a policy of confrontation with the U.S.¹¹ Lundestad sees major problems, but does not predict an end to the relationship between the U.S. and Europe.

There is another group of scholars who argue that differences in opinion between both sides of the Atlantic are as old as the relationship itself, and are therefore no indicators of the decline or downfall of a strong trans-Atlantic relationship. Jussi M. Hanhimäki and others argue in *Transatlantic Relations since 1945* that, despite serious problems faced over the last decade, "the record of the past six decades suggests that the trans-Atlantic community is not in danger of imminent disintegration."¹² Sebastiaan Reyn concludes that, despite the fact that anti-Europeanism in the U.S. and anti-Americanism in Europe run deep, the Atlantic region has been "a medium of shared experiences and an area of unique political, cultural and social cross-fertilization. [...] Americans and

⁹ Robert Kagan, "The U.S.-Europe Divide," *The Washington Post*, 26 May, 2002.

¹⁰ Kagan, "The U.S.-Europe Divide", 2002.

¹¹ Geir Lundestad "Towards Trans-Atlantic Drift?" in *The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: US-European Relations after Iraq*, ed. David M. Andrews (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2005), 29.

¹² J.M. Hanhimäki, et al. *Transatlantic relations since 1945 – an introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 174-175.

Europeans still inhabit the same political universe.”¹³ Reyn is convinced that the trans-Atlantic relationship is not at a particularly critical point. The problems that are faced after 9/11, will eventually be solved.

It is clear that there is not yet a consensus among academics about the state of and the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship. This thesis does not aim at providing the decisive arguments to put this discussion to rest, but it does aim to provide new insights in this matter. It does this for example by focusing on the American perspective, whereas much literature that has been written on the trans-Atlantic relationship so far emphasized the reasons for European criticism on the U.S. and the policies that were formulated by the George W. Bush administration after 9/11.

The discussion described above, between those who believe that the U.S. and Europe are fundamentally different and those who consider them inevitable partners, has led scholars to discuss the continuing importance of NATO. Some scholars believe that NATO has become irrelevant and will inevitably disappear. Stephen Meyer, who has written an article with the telling title “Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO,” boldly argues that NATO has become an irrelevant institution. The fundamental differences between the U.S. and Europe will eventually cause the trans-Atlantic partnership within NATO to collapse.¹⁴ Elizabeth Pond also considered the crisis faced by NATO in the years after 9/11 as potentially leading to the extinction of NATO. She argues that at the time of the disagreement between the U.S. and European nations over the necessity of war in Iraq, the very “survival of the Alliance was at stake.”¹⁵

On the other side of the spectrum, there are scholars who are convinced of the lasting relevance and necessity of a trans-Atlantic partnership and an institution such as NATO. The differences in opinion between the US and NATO member states in Europe are considered to be solvable. Ryan C. Hendrickson places the differences between the U.S. and European NATO members in an historical context, and argues that NATO will overcome them, just as it overcame previous crises. He argues in “The Miscalculation of NATO’s Death” that the popular scenarios that predict NATO’s inevitable collapse are wrong. They “misrepresent the alliance’s previous achievements and ongoing security functions,” Hendrickson argues.¹⁶ Alexandra Gheciu also argues that NATO has, “contrary to the gloomy expectations of some policymakers and (realist) scholars,” continued to evolve in the decades after the end of the Cold War. She emphasizes NATO’s capability of transformation, and argues that NATO has turned into a more complex organization, still highly

¹³ Sebastiaan Reyn, *Allies or Aliens* (Den Haag: Atlantische Commissie, 2007), 178.

¹⁴ Stephen Meyer, “Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO,” *Parameters* (Winter 2003/2004): 83-97.

¹⁵ Elizabeth Pond, “The Dynamics of the Feud over Iraq,” in *The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: US-European Relations after Iraq*, ed. David M. Andrews (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2005), 46.

¹⁶ Ryan C. Hendrickson, “The miscalculation of NATO’s Death,” *Parameters* (Spring 2007): 98-114.

important in pursuing international security.¹⁷

Although this research in no way aims to provide an answer to the question of whether NATO will live on, it does provide more insight into this matter by focusing on the ideological factors that drive American policy regarding NATO. By examining the ideological foundations of the American criticism on NATO in 2002-2003, the research investigates whether these are long-term tendencies in American foreign policy, or ideas heavily influenced by the circumstances on one specific time and place. This then, can provide insight in whether the crisis faced by NATO in the years after 9/11 is comparable to or completely different from the crises that the organization faced throughout its history. Also, this research will focus on NATO's capability to transform its policies and will investigate whether these transformations were in line with what the U.S. expected of the organization.

This thesis also adds to the discussion about the extent to which George W. Bush's policy, in particular his policy towards Europe, was revolutionary. Some scholars, most notably Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, state that the early 2000's "Bush had set in motion a revolution in American foreign policy. It was not a revolution in America's goals abroad, but rather in how to achieve them."¹⁸ James Mann, who traced the beliefs and values of the most prominent foreign policy advisors of the Bush administration, agrees with Daalder and Lindsay that Bush's policy was revolutionary. According to him, the Bush administration put forth a "remarkable series of new doctrines and ideas, ones that represented a dramatic break with the foreign policies and strategies of the past" in the years after 9/11. They "represented an epochal change, the flowering of a new view of America's status and role in the world."¹⁹ These scholars have no doubt about the fact that the policies of the Bush administration were revolutionary and unprecedented. This would, of course, have considerable ramifications for the trans-Atlantic relationship as well. As Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay put it: "Bush, and the policies his administration pursues, represent the tipping point in US-European relations." According to Daalder, Bush's policies and his personal style aggravate the fissures in the trans-Atlantic relationship.²⁰

However, other scholars are less convinced of Bush's revolutionary character and its effect on the trans-Atlantic relationship. In the paragraph above, scholars who argue that the crisis in the trans-Atlantic relationship was no different from previous problems, have been mentioned. It is clear that they do not consider Bush's policies revolutionary or unprecedented. As Mark Webber argues,

¹⁷ Alexandra Gheciu, *The EU, NATO, and the OSCE in the Post-9/11 World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 115.

¹⁸ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*, 2.

¹⁹ James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans – The history of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Penguin books, 2004), xii.

²⁰ Ivo Daalder, "The end of Atlanticism," *Survival* 45, no. 2 (2003), 158.

“NATO’s experience under Bush was not unique”. Webber also states that Bush’s foreign policy ideas, in particular the policies regarding Europe and NATO, show clear similarities to the policy of previous President’s, both Republican and Democratic.²¹

This research will add to the academic discussion over the revolutionary character of the Bush administration, by focusing on the ideologies that shaped the policies of the Bush administration. It will provide insight in the question of whether these are ideologies that have shaped U.S. foreign policy for years, or whether they are relatively new ideas, influenced heavily by the circumstances of the specific time.

Theoretical Framework

Several theories can be used when discussing trans-Atlantic relations. To understand the theoretical framework in which this research fits, it is first of all useful to pay attention to a prominent discussion within the study of American foreign relations. From the start, scholars writing about American foreign policy from a nationalist perspective, concentrating on state-to-state relations, were challenged by progressives who searched for the intellectual assumptions held by foreign policy makers and emphasized the domestic, economic, political and regional forces that influenced foreign policy. This division was again visible in the 1960s and 1970s, when revisionists formed the most influential current within foreign policy research. Revisionists emphasized the importance of ideas and focused on non-state actors, until they were challenged in the 1970s and 1980s by post-revisionists who were concerned with strategic and geopolitical determinants, rather than internal or domestic forces. This contradiction illustrates the division that according to Michael Hogan and Thomas Paterson “has marked the study of American foreign relations from its very beginning”: between scholars focusing on internal forces and those focusing on geopolitical considerations.²² This research will focus on the internal forces that played a role in the decision making process of foreign policy experts regarding NATO in the years after 9/11 and it can clearly be placed on the “revisionist” side of this division.

One “revisionist” theory that will be used in this research is formulated by Michael M. Hunt. Hunt argues that “ideology is the proper concern of all diplomatic [foreign relations] historians.”²³ Hunt identifies ideology as “an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the

²¹ Mark Webber, “NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 11, (2009): 47.

²² Hogan, Michael J. and Thomas Paterson. *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 5-9

²³ Hunt, “Ideology,” 221.

complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms.” Scholars of foreign relations using the framework of ideology as described by Hunt, “search for ideas that give structure and meaning to the way policy makers see the world and their country’s place in it.”²⁴ Hunt argues that ideology forces the scholar to focus on the consciousness of policymakers and the cultural values that shape that consciousness. This strategy will be used in this thesis to try and explain the reasons behind the ideas of American foreign policy makers regarding NATO in 2002-2003.

Several strands can be identified within Hunt’s definition of ideology, of which “corporatism” is most directly connected to the history of foreign policy and thus particularly fitting to this research. The idea of corporatism is described by Michael J. Hogan as “an approach that analyzes the economic, social, cultural, and ideological influences at work on diplomacy.” This theory can be used to “trace the connection between foreign policy and ongoing changes in the political structure.” It is a framework that can accommodate both internal and external imperatives, depending on the point of departure.²⁵ In this research, Hunt’s framework will be used to examine internal imperatives that underlie the U.S. policy regarding NATO. Using this analytical device, one can, by looking at a particular moment in history, explain long-term trends and discover lines of continuity or breaking points.

Both Hunt and Hogan point out that it is important for historians to take elements of ideology and connect them to foreign policy. However, the concept of “ideology” they use is very broad. For the purpose of this research the concept of ideology needs to be closely defined. In this research we will look at ideology as the set of distinctive ideas, shared by the group of people responsible for America’s foreign policy, that shaped the way this group thought about the American role on the global stage, the amount of priority that should be given to Europe and the extent to which the U.S. should get involved in multilateral action.

Methods and limitations

Much of this research is based on secondary literature. Within the literature on the transatlantic relationship and NATO in particular, there is a distinction between “revisionist” scholars focusing on internal, ideological factors that influence foreign policy and “post-revisionists” who emphasize geopolitical and strategic factors. This research will mostly use secondary literature written by scholars with a revisionist approach.

²⁴ Hunt, “Ideology,” 222.

²⁵ Hogan, “Corporatism,” 138.

For primary source material this research consists largely of transcripts of speeches and press-conferences found in the Digital National Security Archive, the online archive of the U.S. State Department and the website of the American Presidency Project. Documents in which U.S. policy regarding NATO is laid out, are usually confidential and for a large part still unavailable to the public. Still, several documents in which traces of the ideological framework that underlies U.S. policy can be identified, have been found in the online databases.

When focusing on a topic as broad as the ideological foundation of U.S. foreign policy, it is important to expand on the inevitable limitations to the thesis. Ideology is a concept that can be defined in different ways and numerous ideas can be considered 'ideological ideas'. Therefore, it is impossible to give a complete overview of all ideological factors shaping U.S. foreign policy in the post-9/11 years in this thesis. A selection of concepts that are particularly relevant for the topic of this research will be discussed, but others are bound to be overlooked. Also, it is important to note that this research will often speak of the opinion or the view of the Bush administration as a whole. Needless to say, this administration is formed by numerous people with different views on several issues. Where necessary, these differences in opinion will be addressed, but in many cases these will have to be ignored for the sake of creating cohesive arguments.

Finally, it is important to realize that the strategic considerations behind the U.S. policy decisions regarding NATO will be overlooked to a large extent. Most likely, a combination of both the ideological foundation and the strategic reasons at any given time in history provides one with the best explanation of policy decisions. In focusing only on the ideological considerations, this thesis does not claim to provide a complete explanation of U.S. policy decisions regarding NATO in the post-9/11 years.

This thesis will consist of three chapters, the first of which will focus on the ideas held by U.S. foreign policy officials about America's role in the world. It will provide an overview of the ideological considerations that influenced the way in which foreign policy officials thought the U.S. should act on the global stage. Much attention will be given to the American stance on multilateralism and the influence of exceptionalism on American foreign policy. The chapter will also examine the way in which the U.S. views the importance of military force in the world.

The second chapter will zoom in on the U.S. relationship with its European allies and the ideological considerations that shaped this relationship in the years 2002-2003. The chapter will focus on domestic developments in the U.S. that had an effect on the trans-Atlantic relationship. One of the hypotheses underlying this chapter is that a shift in Washington, towards a less Europe-minded foreign policy elite, is one of the reasons for America's critical stance towards NATO.

Attention will also be given to the influence of the neoconservative branch within the George W. Bush administration on the relationship with Europe.

In the third and final chapter, this thesis will turn to NATO. The ways in which the U.S. interacted with NATO when facing the global challenges following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 will be discussed here. The aim is to examine the extent to which the U.S. was willing to work with NATO in these years and the ways in which it preferred to do so. This way, the extent to which U.S. policy regarding NATO was influenced by the ideological considerations that have been examined in the first two chapters of this thesis, will be made clear. This chapter will provide a short historical overview of NATO and the U.S. cooperation with the Alliance. It will then answer the question of whether the U.S. was actively and consciously trying to work around NATO in pursuing its foreign policy goals in the years 2002-2003.

1. A Nation on a Mission

America's view on its role in the world post-9/11

“America has friends and allies in this cause, but only we can lead it. Only we can rally the world in a task of this complexity, against an enemy so elusive and so resourceful. The United States and only the United States can see this effort through to victory.”¹

- Vice President Dick Cheney, February 2002 -

Vice President Dick Cheney made this statement on February 16, 2002, a few months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Cheney said this in regard to the American response to 9/11 and the steps that were to be taken in the War on Terror. His remarks provide interesting insights into the way the U.S. saw its role in the world after 9/11. For the United States, 9/11 marked a change in foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War up until September 2001, the U.S. was not faced with a “single immediate, global threat that any roomful of experts could agree upon,”² as Dick Cheney stated in the same set of remarks. The years after 9/11 marked an interesting period, as the U.S. was reinventing its own role on the global stage. It is interesting to take a close look at the way the Bush administration viewed world and the role the U.S. played in it, because, as Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay explain, “not its goals but its logic about how America should act in the world” was what made Bush’s foreign policy different.³

This chapter will examine the ideas held by U.S. foreign policy officials in the years 2002-2003 about the optimal way for America to act in the world. It will provide an overview of the elements that influenced the way in which U.S. foreign policy officials viewed the world and the American role in it in the years 2002-2003. What ideological factors were shaping the way the U.S. viewed itself and its role on the global stage in these years? An answer to this question will help us understand the American relationship to its European allies, which we will explore in the next chapter, and, finally, the American response to NATO in the post 9/11 years, on which we will focus in the final chapter.

For this chapter, some themes that tell us something about the way the U.S. viewed itself and its position in the world have been selected. It is important to note that this chapter does not aim to unveil all aspects of the American worldview in the post-9/11 years. Only the themes that are relevant with regard to the rest of this research will be examined. These are themes that shed light

¹ Dick Cheney, “Remarks by Vice President Dick Cheney before the Council of Foreign Relations,” *New York Times*, 16 February 2002, <http://bev.berkeley.edu/fp/readings/DickCheney.txt>.

² Dick Cheney, “Remarks by Vice President Dick Cheney before the Council of Foreign Relations,”

³ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 40.

on the way the U.S. views its role in the world, in relation to other countries, including Europe. In the first section of this chapter, the American stance on multilateralism will be examined. In the second section, the influence of exceptionalism on the way America sees its role in the world is the central theme. A third section will be focused on the way the U.S. views the importance of (military) force and in a final section we will examine how all these themes fit into the general notion of hegemonism.

Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism

Soon after George W. Bush took office, in many foreign countries, the perception that Bush's administration was unilateralist in its approach, took hold. By the time George W. Bush made his first trip to Europe, in June 2001, his counterparts in Europe were already expressing their worries about the unilateralist direction in which Bush was taking his foreign policy. Bush attempted to set this straight: "I hope the notion of a unilateralist approach died in some people's minds here today. Unilateralists don't ask opinions of world leaders."⁴ It remains to be seen whether his attempts had an changing effect on the international opinion.

Throughout history, American foreign policy makers have been divided over the benefits and risks inherent to participation in global organizations, or in other words, of multilateral policies.⁵ The extent to which an administration is willing to engage in multilateral efforts, explains much about the way they view the role of the U.S. in the world. Given the fact that the Bush administration was often portrayed as being unilateralist, it is worth examining the views on multilateralism as held by prominent foreign policy officials within the Bush administration. In this section the extent to which American foreign policy makers in 2002-2003 preferred a unilateral approach over a multilateral one will be examined.

It is first of all important to establish the exact definition of unilateralism. According to James Mann the definition of unilateralism as we see it in American foreign policy is the tendency by the U.S. to act on its own, rather than in concert with other countries or with international organizations.⁶ It is important to realize that there is a difference between isolationism and unilateralism. Unilateralism does not mean that the U.S. refrains from any interference with the outside world. Some scholars however, such as David Haglund, define isolationism as "acting abroad without the encumbrance of

⁴ Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 286-287.

⁵ Edward C. Luck, "American Exceptionalism and International Organization: Lessons from the 1990's," in *US Hegemony and International Organizations – The United States and Multilateral Institutions*, eds. Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane and Michael Mastanduno (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 29.

⁶ Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 286-287.

potent allies.”⁷ Using this definition, there is no clear distinction between isolationism and unilateralism. Haglund affirms this; he argues that “unilateral internationalism” is a more accurate term to describe the tendency of the U.S. to act alone abroad than isolationism.⁸ In this research, the term unilateralism is used in the sense that it describes the policy of acting abroad alone, without sharing responsibilities with other nations or with unilateral institutions.

It is important to realize that, as several scholars acknowledge, unilateralism was the common foreign policy concept in the U.S. for much of the country’s history. George Washington already warned his nation to “steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the world.”⁹ It seems that American leaders took this advice to heart for a long time. As Rajan Menon, author of *The End of Alliances* states: “For 169 years, from the Declaration of Independence to the end of World War II, the U.S. avoided long-term alliances.”¹⁰ David Haglund concurs that only after World War II, the U.S. made its first move towards multilateralism by making security commitments to European nations.¹¹ This all suggests that for the largest part of American history, unilateralism was considered to be the normal state of being, while multilateralism only started playing a role in America’s foreign policy after World War II.

There are several events however, that appear to indicate a move towards a more unilateralist approach after George W. Bush took office in 2001. In the first months in office, the Bush administration took several steps to undercut treaties or agreements.¹² In 2001 the Bush administration rejected a U.N. accord to enforce the Biological Weapons Convention, despite 7 years of negotiation. It also decided to abandon the multilateral Kyoto protocol, a climate control treaty and the Administration refused to ask the Senate to ratify a treaty to establish the International Criminal Court.¹³ The fact that all these steps were taken within the first months of George W. Bush’s presidency seems to suggest a strong tendency towards unilateralism. What did unilateralism under the Bush administration entail exactly?

Sebastian Reyn argues that under Bush, the preferred American approach to cooperating with other nations was based on bilateral agreements, instead of multilateral ones. The U.S. was not prepared to commit to an alliance, but more interested in choosing certain nations they thought

⁷ David G. Haglund, “Trouble in Pax Atlantica?” in *US Hegemony and International Organizations – The United States and Multilateral Institutions*, eds. Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane and Michael Mastanduno (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 218.

⁸ Haglund, “Trouble in Pax Atlantica?” 219.

⁹ George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796. Accessed via the Yale Avalon project: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp.

¹⁰ Rajan Menon, *The end of Alliances* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 23.

¹¹ Haglund, “Trouble in Pax Atlantica,” 215.

¹² James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 287.

¹³ Melissa August et al., “Unilateralism is U.S.,” *Time* 158, no. 5 (2001).

would be good partners in specific cases. This strategy of “cherry picking” was used for example to form the coalition of the willing at the time of the war against Iraq in 2003.¹⁴ The expression that Vice President Rumsfeld often used, “The mission determines the coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission”, fits this description of a “cherry picking” policy.¹⁵ This strategy is also mentioned in the preface of the National Security Strategy of 2002. According to this document “Coalitions of the willing can augment permanent institutions,” such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States and NATO.¹⁶ While the document does not argue that permanent institutions can be replaced altogether, the view that handpicked coalitions had an added value over long-standing alliances such as NATO can be detected. The National Security Strategy of 2002 also contained the following statement: “While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary [...]”.¹⁷ This shows that the Bush administration is not only prepared to handpick coalition partners, it is also prepared to face challenges on its own if necessary.

U.S. foreign policy makers have provided several reasons for their tendency to approach to global affairs. A rather pragmatic reasoning was expressed by Douglas Feith, Under-Secretary for Defense for Policy, in March 2003: “In the future, it is unlikely that NATO will face threats over which all [...] 26 members would have to go to war all together.”¹⁸ The simple fact that it was unrealistic to imagine all members of the trans-Atlantic alliance to have the exact same interests at the same time was used as an argument against relying too much on the alliance. More generally speaking, this reasoning meant that some issues in which U.S. interests were at stake, had to be dealt with alone or in a smaller coalition of like-minded nations. An additional argument for the U.S. to opt for unilateralism was that the Kosovo War in 1999 was considered proof for the fact that, in Paul Wolfowitz’s words, “you should not fight wars by committee.”¹⁹ The violent clash between Serbians and Albanians in Kosovo caused NATO to intervene in March 1999. While this seems to illustrate that an alliance like NATO still had an important role to play²⁰, at the same time it made the U.S. realize that there were major differences between the European and American approaches and that excessive consolation between the NATO member-states had a negative effect on effectively and

¹⁴ Reyn, *Allies or Aliens*, 167-168.

¹⁵ “Rumsfeld’s Pentagon News Conference,” *The Washington Post*, 18 October 2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/rumsfeld_text101801.html.

¹⁶ National Security Strategy 2002, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>, preface.

¹⁷ National Security Strategy 2002, 6.

¹⁸ Arnout Molenaar, *(Dis)Organizing European Security – The Iraq Controversy and Patterns in US-European Relations* (Den Haag: Atlantische Commissie, 2007), 118.

¹⁹ Molenaar, *(Dis)Organizing European Security*, 118.

²⁰ Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism – American Foreign Policy since 1938* (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), 171.

quickly settling the conflict.²¹ This led foreign policy officials in the Bush administration, as Reyn argues in his work *Allies or Aliens*, to openly disavow alliance-based cooperation, because it was considered “restraining the flexibility of American foreign policy.”²²

In an article written in 2000 for *Foreign Affairs* Condoleezza Rice makes the case for unilateralism. She wrote this before the 2001 presidential elections and the article can be considered a policy advice addressed to the next president. Rice reasons in the article that many within the U.S. are uncomfortable with the amount of power the U.S. has got. Therefore, instead of using this power, they appeal to international law and institutions to provide them with the necessary legitimacy. Rice strongly rejects this way of thinking. She acknowledges that it is good to do something that benefits all humanity, but reminds her audience at the same time that the “national interest” is not the same as the “humanitarian interests”, or the interests of the “international community.” In short, her argument is that multilateral agreements should not be ends in themselves because national interests should always come first and are never completely in sync with international interests.

It is interesting to note that multilateralism was not refused all-together by George W. Bush and his principal foreign policy advisors in these years. According to Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay the Bush administration did not underestimate the importance of multilateral alliances. However one important condition was formulated: were the U.S. to be involved in a coalition, the U.S. should be leading within that coalition. This explains the Bush administration’s criticism of Clinton, which “reflected a belief that he [Clinton] had been too willing to follow his European counterparts and not bold enough to lead them”.²³ This attitude is also reflected by Dick Cheney in his “Remarks to the Council of Foreign Relations” in February 2002. “On the one hand there is the need to work with allies and to make sure they understand we value their advice [...], and on the other hand, to provide the leadership that’s necessary to defend the United States of America.”²⁴ This statement reflects the idea that multilateral alliances are important and sometimes necessary, but the U.S. should be the one pointing out in what direction the alliance should go. This all suggests that the Bush administration in the years 2002-2003 was most comfortable in a situation where they could be in charge. They wanted to keep control and were very hesitant to share responsibilities. This explains why they, in many instances, preferred unilateralism over multilateralism and why they wanted to be leading within the coalitions they did enter.

²¹ Molenaar, *(Dis)Organizing European Security*, 111.

²² Reyn, *Allies or Aliens*, 139,

²³ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 38-39.

²⁴ Dick Cheney, “Remarks by Vice President Dick Cheney before the Council of Foreign Relations,” *New York Times*, 16 February 2002, <http://bev.berkeley.edu/fp/readings/DickChaney.txt>.

An increased tendency to act unilaterally can be observed during the first years of the Bush administration. Recent experiences in Kosovo, and an strong belief that national interests should come first, made multilateral agreements into a secondary goal for the U.S. during the first years of the Bush administration. In some instances, a multilateral approach was inevitable or even desirable, but only if the U.S. was bold enough to lead within the coalition that was formed. The U.S. did not want to see its flexibility in confronting the conflicts faced in the years 2002-2003 compromised by having to negotiate each step with allies or institutions.

The increasingly unilateral approach chosen by the Bush administration in the years after 9/11 was influenced by events that occurred during or leading up to these crucial years. The fact that Bush's policy stirred up much discussion within the U.S. and on the global stage, leads one to believe that it was not simply a continuation of the policy of Bush's predecessor. Therefore, it is interesting to examine what events influenced the U.S. apparent shift to a more unilateral approach.

Given the impact of the event, it makes sense to examine whether the terrorist attacks of September 11 can be considered a turning point regarding the U.S. approach to multilateralism. James Mann, who wrote *Rise of the Vulcans*, states that the attacks of 9/11 had an major impact on the Bush administration and its approach to global affairs. "Over the following years [after 9/11] the administration put forth a remarkable series of new doctrines and ideas, ones that represented a dramatic break with the foreign policies and strategies of the past."²⁵ Arnout Molenaar agrees with Mann's suggestion that 9/11 had a large impact. According to him, multilateralism was seen by the Bush administration as a "function in achieving national security objectives" and not as an aim in itself. 9/11 was constituted as proof of the fact that national security was not protected well enough. It proved to many within the administration that "institutions and treaties could not defend the US and prevent terrorist attacks".²⁶ The 9/11 attacks caused priorities to shift: more than ever, national interests were the number one priority and since multilateralism did not help in protecting these interests, there was less patience to negotiate with international institutions.

While James Mann claims that a dramatic break with the foreign policies of the past occurred after 9/11, he also points out that the development towards a more unilateral approach, had started years before 9/11. Documents written in the early 1990's, just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, contain the foundation of the more unilateralist approach that could be observed under George W. Bush. The Pentagon's Defense Planning Guide, written by Scooter Libby, then deputy under-secretary for strategy at the Pentagon, working under Paul Wolfowitz, contains interesting statements about

²⁵ Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, xii.

²⁶ Molenaar, *(Dis)Organizing European Security*, 72.

unilateralism. “We will not ignore the need to be prepared to protect our critical interests and honor our commitments with only limited additional help, or even alone, if necessary,” it read.²⁷ This leads Mann to conclude that the Bush administration’s unilateral vision was designed at the end of the Cold War. Other scholars adhere to the vision that a change was already occurring before 9/11. Edward C. Luck argues that history “did not start over after 9/11”²⁸. According to Luck, the U.S. critical approach to multilateralism was a result of events in the 1990’s. After the end of the cold war, the U.S. invested much in United Nations peacekeeping missions around the world. These missions did not always end well (in Somalia for example, American rangers were killed and dragged through the streets) and the U.N. was blamed for these failures. Already in the 1990’s, president Clinton was therefore seeking to distance himself from these multilateral undertakings. When Republicans regained power after the election of George W. Bush, this administration merely continued the course that Clinton had already charted.²⁹ The real turning point then, lay years before 9/11, according to Luck. This all suggests that, although the attacks of 9/11 accelerated and intensified the process, the foundation for a more unilateral approach to the world was laid by U.S. policy makers in the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Within the Bush administration, in the years following 9/11, there was no consensus over the extent to which unilateralism was to be the preferred course of action. Sebastiaan Reyn differentiates between several strands of conservatism within the Bush administration. Although this approach may be somewhat simplified, as all those responsible for the Bush administration’s foreign policy of course had their own unique set of convictions, it provides us with an overview of the different opinions regarding unilateralism vs. multilateralism. According to Reyn, the group of “traditional conservatives,” which included Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, was not principally against working through multilateral institutions. They were, of all conservatives within Bush’s administration, perhaps the most internationalist.³⁰ The second group, consisting of “conservative nationalists” such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, is “impatient with multilateral diplomacy, believing that the mission should define the coalition and not the other way around.” The final group, consisting of neoconservatives, including Paul Wolfowitz, was highly convinced of America’s own power. They deemed multilateral action unnecessary in the first place; the U.S. is capable to do it alone.³¹

²⁷ Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 210-213.

²⁸ Luck, “American Exceptionalism and International Organizations: Lessons from the 1990’s,” 25.

²⁹ Luck, “American exceptionalism and International Organizations,” 31-32.

³⁰ Reyn, *Allies or Aliens*, 142.

³¹ Reyn, *Allies or Aliens*, 142-144.

In statements and documents by prominent foreign policy advisors such as Powell and Rumsfeld, we see this difference in opinion reflected. There are several reports of disagreements between Powell and other members of the National Security Council, including President Bush. In late September 2001, at a National Security Council meeting, Powell reportedly brought up the importance of an international coalition in the fight against terrorism. He argued that “The coalition doesn’t constrain our operations.” In doing so, he responded to the often-heard argument of Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, that a coalition would hold the U.S. back. Although George W. Bush had argued before that a coalition was not necessary, since the U.S. could do it alone, he now agreed with Powell: “It [the war against terrorism] requires a coalition, it can’t be done without one.”³² Still, disagreements about the necessity of a coalition did not vanish and in August 2002, as the U.S. was preparing to invade Iraq, Powell made an emotional plea for an international coalition or a resolution backed by United Nations. He told the president: “It’s nice to say we can do it unilaterally, except you can’t.”³³ This again suggests that Powell strongly believed in the advantage of multilateralism over unilateralism. In this specific instance, he was able to convince the president, who agreed to a speech about Iraq at the U.N. General Assembly in September 2002.

It is clear that others, for example Donald Rumsfeld, were less internationalist in their approach to the 9/11 aftermath. In March 2001 Rumsfeld wrote a set of guidelines for the use of force. In this document, he also comments on the discussion about unilateralism: “While the United States should expect to fight most often in the company of a coalition, it should avoid operating with collective command structures where a committee makes decisions or accepting restrictions on U.S. military options.”³⁴ This statement suggests that Rumsfeld’s idea about the necessity of multilateralism was quite pragmatic: it is usually the only option, but the U.S. should never let a coalition limit its freedom to make decisions.

Paul Wolfowitz’s stance on multilateralism reflects the idea presented by Sebastiaan Reyn: that neoconservatives in the Bush administration deemed cooperation with other nations unnecessary, because of their strong faith in America’s own capabilities. In Wolfowitz’s biography, written by Lewis D. Solomon, it is emphasized that Wolfowitz saw the United States as the world’s sole superpower since the end of the Cold War. Following this belief, came the conviction that the United States no longer needed to accommodate other world powers.³⁵ The examples mentioned

³² Woodward, *Bush at War*, 113.

³³ Woodward, *Bush at War*, 333.

³⁴ Bradley Graham, *By his own rules – The Ambitions, Successes and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009), 299.

³⁵ Lewis D. Solomon, *Paul D. Wolfowitz: Visionary Intellectual, Policymaker and Strategist* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007), 42.

here illustrate that there were in fact differing opinions within the Bush administration and the differences can be structured along the lines of Sebastiaan Reyn's division.

The arguments above suggest that, even though there were clear differences of opinion within the Bush administration, there was an overall tendency within the Bush administration to a unilateral approach in the years after 9/11. This is reflected in statements by President Bush and his prominent foreign policy advisors and can be explained by the fact that the U.S. foreign policy makers liked to keep full control over their endeavors. The unilateral approach was not invented by Bush, but had already resurfaced after the end of the Cold War. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, U.S. unilateral tendencies were intensified.

Exceptionalism

There appears to be a link between unilateralism and the U.S. sense of exceptionalism. Edward C. Luck states that "[The U.S.'s] reluctance to defer to multilateral processes and its insistence on maintaining maximum flexibility reflect its innate sense of exceptionalism."³⁶ This citation illustrates the idea that one of the ideological reasons behind the US's tendency to unilateral action is the fact that foreign policy makers consider the U.S. to be exceptional. In this part of the chapter we will explore this concept and examine the extent to which exceptionalism had an effect on the way the U.S. viewed its role in the world in the years 2002-2003.

First of all, it is important to define the concept of exceptionalism. A clear definition of the concept is given by Robert G. Patman: "The idea of U.S. Exceptionalism refers to an informal ideology that endows Americans with a pervasive faith in the uniqueness, immutability and superiority of the country's founding liberal principles." Patman adds that exceptionalism does not only have an effect the identity of Americans, but on U.S. foreign affairs and on the way the U.S. sees its own place in the world as well. Exceptionalism also refers to the conviction that the U.S. has a special destiny among nations.³⁷

In the book "Exceptionalism, a Double-Edged Sword," political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset traces the meaning and history of exceptionalism in the U.S. According to him, exceptionalism is inextricably linked to the U.S., because "its national identity is not rooted in history but defined by ideology."³⁸ In other words, the U.S. was different from the start. Lipset considers exceptionalism to

³⁶ Luck "American Exceptionalism and International Organization: Lessons from the 1990's," 47.

³⁷ Robert G. Patman, "Globalisation, the New US Exceptionalism and the War on Terror," *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 6 (2006): 964.

³⁸ Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism – A Double-Edged Sword* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996), 31.

be a concept that explains this innate difference. It does not necessarily mean that the U.S. considers itself to be better than other nations.³⁹ According to Lipset, exceptionalism should be seen in connection with “protestant-inspired moralism”; the conviction that what U.S. does is morally just. In a conflict, the U.S. therefore tends to define its role as being “on God’s side against Satan.”⁴⁰ For this research, exceptionalism will be defined as the idea that the U.S. is fundamentally different from other countries and always convinced to represent the moral ‘right’ side in global affairs and conflicts.

While exceptionalism has been part of the U.S. identity perhaps since the nation’s founding, exceptionalism played a particularly active role in the period after 9/11. After the terrorist attacks made it painfully clear to the U.S. that the country was not invulnerable, the Bush administration worked hard to familiarize the nation and the rest of the world again with America’s uniqueness.⁴¹ It is interesting to explore why it was at this difficult time that exceptionalism once again became such an important concept to U.S. foreign policy makers.

According to Daalder the awareness of America’s uniqueness in U.S. foreign policy makers already started growing as the Cold War ended. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a reordering of the international system and to a situation in which the U.S. was the ‘global hegemon’ and the leading factor shaping global affairs.⁴² The Bush administration adhered to the idea of the U.S. as the biggest and most powerful force on the global stage. The opening statement of the *National Security Strategy*, published by the administration in 2002, reads: “The United States possesses unprecedented - unequalled - strength and influence in the world, [which] should be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.”⁴³

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 had an influence on the way in which the concept of exceptionalism was used in the U.S. After 9/11 the link between Christian values and American exceptionalism was strengthened. According to Robert Patman, who speaks of “New American Exceptionalism” after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration initially responded to the events of September 11 by using strong, Christian rhetoric. The conflict was immediately characterized as a conflict between ‘good and evil’. The administration linked this world-view to the long-standing idea that the U.S. was a nation with an exceptional nature, destined to fight evil as the force of ‘good’ in

³⁹ Lipset, *American Exceptionalism*, 31.

⁴⁰ Lipset, *American Exceptionalism*, 20.

⁴¹ Patman, “Globalisation, the New US Exceptionalism and the War on Terror,” 971.

⁴² Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 151.

⁴³ National Security Strategy 2002, preface.

the world. As Patman argues: "It was almost as if Bush was saying that to spread American values in a troubled world was to be on the side of God and to resist them was to oppose God."⁴⁴

President George W. Bush's own convictions should be mentioned when discussing exceptionalism in the U.S. in the years after 9/11, because several sources comment on Bush's personally held beliefs when it comes to the role of his country. Was Bush himself influenced by a belief in exceptionalism in making foreign policy decisions? Sebastiaan Reyn argues that he most certainly was. According to him, Bush held the deep conviction that the United States was essentially 'good' and that American values set a universal standard. The U.S. was to show purposeful leadership, not out of empathy with the rest of the world, but because it was its duty as the force for good in the world. Reyn argues that according to Bush, "Legitimacy is not bestowed upon the United States by others, but by its own unique goodness."⁴⁵ There was a Christian component to Bush's personal belief in exceptionalism as well. In his article "Globalisation, the New US Exceptionalism and the War on Terror" Robert Patman mentions Bruce Bartlett, a former treasury official in the George H. Bush administration. According to Bartlett, who knew George W. Bush personally, Bush "truly believes he is on a mission from God and tends to rely on his "instincts for major decisions such as invading Iraq."⁴⁶ According to Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, one of Bush's close friends once said: "I think, in his frame, this is what God has asked him [Bush] to do."⁴⁷ In a 2005 BBC TV series, Nabil Shaath, a Palestinian negotiator, stated that president Bush told people at a 2003 conference that he was "driven with a mission from God" and that God had told him to invade Afghanistan and Iraq. These statements were immediately denied by the White House and called "absurd".⁴⁸ Although we can never know with certainty whether Bush believed he was on a divine mission, this all strongly suggests that Bush at least felt that he was leading his country on a path that was approved by God. Bush appears to have a strong faith in the U.S.'s exceptional position and capabilities.

This conviction was reflected in many of his public or private statements. In a war cabinet meeting on September 15, 2001, in which Bush discussed the American response to 9/11 with Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Colin Powell and CIA director George Tenet, the subject of international cooperation came up, a topic that, as we have seen in the previous section of this chapter, always spurred discussion. Powell expressed the fear that certain countries would drop out of the coalition. Bush's response here provides us with much information about his view of America's role in the world: "At some point, we may be the only ones left. That's okay with me. We are

⁴⁴ Patman, "Globalisation, the New US Exceptionalism and the War on Terror," 972-973.

⁴⁵ Reyn, *Allies or Aliens*, 141-142.

⁴⁶ Patman, "Globalisation, the New US Exceptionalism and the War on Terror," 977.

⁴⁷ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 88

⁴⁸ James Sturcke, "White House denies Bush God claim," *The Guardian*, 7 October 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/oct/07/usa.jamessturcke>.

America!”⁴⁹ He clearly believed that America, under all circumstances, had to fight for what was right, even if it had to be done alone. In public speeches, such as an address at the National Religious Broadcasters’ Convention in early 2003, we also see Bush’s belief that the U.S. had a duty, or even a mission to fight evil in the world reflected. “We’re called to extend the promise of this country into the lives of every citizen who lives here. We’re called to defend our nation and to lead the world to peace, and we will meet both challenges [...]”⁵⁰ From this we learn that Bush considered the world to be dependent on the U.S. to lead the way to freedom and that he felt that the Americans had a, perhaps divine, mission to meet the challenges they were confronted with.

Not only Bush himself, but his principal foreign policy advisors have made statements that reflect a strong belief in exceptionalism. James Mann traces the development of the views of the members of Bush’s foreign policy team in his book *Rise of the Vulcans*. He focuses on the group of experts known as the Vulcans, formed by Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage and Dick Cheney, who were assembled by Bush during his campaign to advise on foreign policy matters. According to Mann, this group put forward new ideas during the years after 9/11, which represented “an epochal change” and a “flowering of a new view of America’s status and role in the world.”⁵¹ Central to these new ideas was the conviction that “America was not in decline, that it was and should be the world’s most powerful nation and should advance its values and ideals overseas.”⁵² This suggests that, according to Mann, the Vulcans as a group strongly believed in America’s exceptional position in the world. Daalder and Lindsey share Mann’s view that most of Bush’s foreign policy advisors believed that the U.S. played an exceptional role in the world. However, they mention Colin Powell as the exception to this rule. Powell was aware of U.S. limits and worried about the costs of alienating other nations.⁵³ This may explain why Powell was also one of the only ones within the administration who saw more virtue in multilateral efforts.

One of the ‘Vulcans’, Dick Cheney, comments on America’s exceptional position in his remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations, on February 16, 2002. As we have seen in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter, Cheney believes the United States is the only power that can see the world through the challenges it faces after 9/11. In the same address, he states the following: “This responsibility did not come to us by chance. We are in a unique position because of our unique assets, because of the character of our people [and] the strength of our ideals.”⁵⁴ Cheney

⁴⁹ Woodward, *Bush at War*, 75.

⁵⁰ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 88-89.

⁵¹ Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, xii.

⁵² Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, xv.

⁵³ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 45.

⁵⁴ Dick Cheney, “Remarks by Vice President Dick Cheney before the Council of Foreign Relations,” *New York Times*, 16 February 2002, <http://bev.berkeley.edu/fp/readings/DickCheney.txt>

believes that the U.S. is not only the single most capable nation in the world to fight evil, it is also a nation destined to play this role. Paul Wolfowitz, finally, shared the conviction that America was the only superpower with the strength and willingness to be leading in global affairs. In a testimony before the House National Security Committee in 1996 he argued: "American dominance gives us a unique opportunity to lead the world in building a peaceful relationship among the emerging great powers of the next century".⁵⁵ From the examples above, one may conclude that in fact most of the men and women serving as foreign policy advisors under Bush in 2002-2003, held a world view that was influenced by the perception that the U.S. was more exceptional than any other country in the world was at the time.

The above strongly suggests that exceptionalism played a considerable role in the minds of George W. Bush and his principal foreign policy advisors. Exceptionalism has always been part of America's identity, but it was referred to increasingly often after 9/11. References to the U.S.'s exceptional position in the world can be found in several documents and speeches. The way the U.S. foreign policy officials considered the role their country played on the global stage in the years 2002-2003 was influenced by the perception that the U.S. was on the 'right' side, destined to fight evil.

Exceptionalism is therefore an important ideology underlying the foreign policy adopted by the U.S. in the years after 9/11.

Use of force

The belief in the importance of military power, should be discussed in this examination of the ideas that shaped the U.S. world view in the years after 9/11. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. is usually considered to be the single most powerful nation on earth, in terms of actual military force. Charles Krauthammer argues in his article "The Unipolar Moment" that "the center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States."⁵⁶ There seems to be little doubt that the U.S. possesses power, but how military power is valued may vary in different administrations. In 2002-2003, during the George W. Bush administration, the group of people responsible for foreign policy was particularly convinced of the importance of power and the necessity of being willing to use power. According to James Mann all of the principal foreign policy advisors believed in the importance of American power, even the least 'hawkish' members such as Colin Powell.⁵⁷ In this

⁵⁵ Solomon, *Paul D. Wolfowitz: Visionary Intellectual, Policymaker and Strategist*, 42.

⁵⁶ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, No. 1 (1991): 23.

⁵⁷ Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, xvi.

section we will examine what ideas underlie this belief in force and in what ways we see this belief reflected in the statements by foreign policy officials.

One of the root causes of the belief in the importance of force can be found in the fact that most foreign policy officials considered the world surrounding them an extremely dangerous place. In his candidacy announcement speech in 1999, President George W. Bush stated that: "This is still a world of terror and missiles and madmen."⁵⁸ This clearly illustrates that Bush viewed the world as a dangerous place. According to his biographer, Bruce Montgomery, so did his Vice President Dick Cheney. According to Montgomery, "Driving Cheney's actions after 9/11 seemed to be a Hobbesian view of human nature. He long believed the world was a brutish place."⁵⁹ Montgomery argues that 9/11 intensified these ideas even further. For Cheney, and many others with him, the 9/11 attacks illustrated what he had already thought to be true: that the world is a dangerous place. To him, the attacks therefore once more underlined the importance of a strong national security state.⁶⁰

To create this strong national security state, the U.S. has to depend on its power. There seems to be a connection between the idea of a dangerous world and the tendency to rely on military force, especially after the 9/11 attacks showed that the U.S. was not invulnerable and that international agreements and law could not prevent a catastrophe like this from happening. As Robert Kagan puts it in his 2002 article *The EU-US Divide*: "The United States [is] exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international rules are unreliable and where security and the promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might".⁶¹ In other words: having and using military force is necessary, because it is the only way to maintain or create some structure in an essentially chaotic and dangerous world.

This view is reflected by the statements and policies of the George W. Bush administration. Bush himself already made his position on the importance of power known during his campaign. In an address held at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in California in November 1999, he stated: "There are limits to the smiles and scowls of diplomacy. Armies and missiles are not stopped by stiff notes of condemnation. They are held in check by strength and purpose and the promise of swift punishment."⁶² President Bush emphasized the importance of power over that of words once more

⁵⁸ George W. Bush, Candidacy Announcement speech, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 12 June 1999, <http://www.4president.org/speeches/2000/georgewbush2000announcement.htm>.

⁵⁹ Bruce P. Montgomery, *Richard B. Cheney and the Rise of the Imperial Vice Presidency* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2009), 153.

⁶⁰ Montgomery, *Richard B. Cheney and the Rise of the Imperial Vice Presidency*, 153.

⁶¹ Kagan, "The U.S.-Europe Divide," 1.

⁶² George W. Bush. "Address at Ronald Reagan Presidential Library," California, 19 November 1999, <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm>.

in an interview with Bob Woodward at his ranch in Texas, in August 2002. “Well, you can’t talk your way to a solution to a problem. And the United States is in a unique position right now. We are the leader. And a leader must combine the ability to listen to others, along with action.”⁶³

Others within the administration put emphasis on the use of power as well. Condoleezza Rice for example, stated in an article written in *Foreign Affairs* that “Power matters, both the exercise of power by the United States and the ability of others to exercise it.” It is clear to Rice that (military) power plays an essential role in global affairs and she regrets the fact that in the United States, many have grown “uncomfortable with the notion of power politics.”⁶⁴ Later in the article, she refers to the Kosovo war in 1999 as having been conducted “incompetently”. One reason for this incompetence was, according to Rice, the fact that the Clinton administration at the time was unwilling to commit to a decisive use of military force.⁶⁵ At the time Rice writes this article, Bush is not yet elected, so she expresses the hope that in a new administration these types of situations will be handled differently. It is important to note that these comments were written before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, an event that may have changed Rice’s opinion on matters of power. However, it is most likely that when 9/11 illustrated the U.S.’s vulnerability, Rice became more convinced of the fact that only decisive use of force can protect the national security of the U.S.

According to James Mann Bush’s principal foreign policy advisors did not only emphasize the importance of power in global affairs, but they believed in the necessity for the U.S. to have such great power that no other country could ever hope to compete with it. “The vision was that of an unchallengeable America, a United States whose military power was so awesome that it no longer needed to make compromises or accommodations with any other nation or groups of countries.”⁶⁶ After the Cold War, the Pentagon, led by Paul Wolfowitz, had drafted a strategy that was to lead the U.S. through the post-Cold War years: “America would build up its military power to such an extent that it would be fruitless and financially crippling for any other country to hope to compete with it.”⁶⁷ Wolfowitz still adhered to this ideal in the years after 9/11, when he served as Secretary of Defense under George W. Bush. In the National Security Strategy drafted by the Bush Administration in 2002, this very idea can again be recognized. Even though this document’s final version was written by Condoleezza Rice, Wolfowitz’s idea of the importance of overwhelming power can clearly be identified: “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a

⁶³ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 341.

⁶⁴ Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” *Foreign Affairs* 79 (January/February 2000), 47.

⁶⁵ Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” 52.

⁶⁶ Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 363.

⁶⁷ Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 363.

military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.”⁶⁸ The fact that this strong statement can be found in the National Security Strategy, a document supported by the Bush administration as a whole, indicates that the idea that the U.S. does not only believe in the importance of military force, but in the importance of being the strongest military force in the world, was carried broadly within the administration.

The above clearly illustrates that U.S. foreign policy officials in 2002-2003 were guided by a strong belief in the importance of having and exercising military power. This belief was strengthened by the vision of the world around them as a dangerous and chaotic place, which could only be structured by applying force. The September 11 attacks illustrated the vulnerability of the U.S., and made the U.S. dependency on power even more relevant. The above also suggests that the U.S. believed in the necessity to be the biggest military power in the world, in order to guarantee as much national security as possible.

Bush as a Hegemonist?

In their book *America Unbound* Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay present an interesting theory about the foreign policy of the Bush administration, which incorporates almost everything that has been discussed in this chapter so far. According to Daalder and Lindsay, the ideas underlying Bush’s foreign policy have roots in a strain of realist political thinking called hegemonism.⁶⁹ Daalder and Lindsay identify five pillars of hegemonist thinking in the policies of the Bush administration, four of which are similar to the themes already discussed in this chapter. Daalder and Lindsay mention the fact that the Bush administration considered today’s world to be a dangerous place, the belief that military power is of great importance in global affairs, the belief that “multilateral agreements and institutions are neither essential nor necessarily conducive to American interests” and the belief that “the United States is a unique great power and others see it as such”.⁷⁰

These first four pillars have already been discussed in this chapter. The only additional feature that Daalder and Lindsay attribute to hegemonism is the belief that “self-interested nation states are the key actors in world politics”. They acknowledge that this pillar sounds least plausible, given the fact that the Bush administration was very preoccupied with fighting Al Qaeda or terrorism in general, instead of nation states. However, according to the authors, the Bush administration did always link terrorism to rogue regimes, thereby again focusing on nation states as key actors.

⁶⁸ National Security Strategy, quoted in: Lewis D. Solomon, *Paul D. Wolfowitz: Visionary Intellectual, Policymaker and Strategist* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007), 95.

⁶⁹ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 40.

⁷⁰ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 42-44.

Statements made in speeches by George W. Bush support this argument. On the day of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Bush held an emotional speech in which he stated that: “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”⁷¹ This indicates that, as Daalder and Lindsay have suggested, the link to the states that provide shelter to terrorist organizations was immediately made. The same sentiment can be identified in the following statement made by Bush: “See, free nations are peaceful nations. Free nations don’t attack each other. Free nations don’t develop weapons of mass destruction.”⁷² In other words: the key to creating a safe society is to focus on creating or maintaining free nations.

The fact that, as we have seen throughout this chapter, all the pillars of hegemonism mentioned by Daalder and Lindsay, are reflected in the policies and statements of the principal foreign policy advisors of the Bush administration in the years 2002 and 2003, suggests that the ideology of the administration can indeed be summarized by using the term “hegemonism”. This gives us much information about the way in which the administration viewed the world and the role their country played in it during the crucial post-9/11 years. Daalder and Lindsay give the following broad definition of hegemonism: “At its most basic, the hegemonist argument contends that America’s immense power and the willingness to wield it, even over the objections of others, is the key to securing America’s interests in the world.”⁷³ This suggests then, that the U.S. saw itself to a large extent as the dominant power in the world, able to act without the restrictions of other nations or organizations.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the ideological factors shaping the way the U.S. viewed itself and its role on the global stage in the years 2002-2003. It has discussed unilateralism, exceptionalism, the use of military force and, finally, it has illustrated how all of these themes fit into the notion of hegemonism.

The section on unilateralism strongly suggested that, despite differences of opinion within the Bush administration, a unilateral approach was preferred by the Bush administration in the post-9/11 years. The wish to act unilaterally on the global stage can be identified in several statements made by Bush and his foreign policy advisors, suggesting that the Bush administration was very keen on keeping full control in all their global endeavors.

⁷¹ George W. Bush, “9/11 address,” 11 September 2001, http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-11/us/bush.speech.text_1_attacks-deadly-terrorist-acts-despicable-acts?_s=PM:US.

⁷² George W. Bush, “Address in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,” 3 October 2003.

⁷³ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 40.

The administration had a profound trust in its own capabilities and in the exceptional standing of the U.S. in the world, which provided them with faith in the fact that they could act by themselves. The second section of this chapter illustrated that foreign policy officials believed that the US was given a special mission because of its exceptional identity. The notion of exceptionalism thoroughly influenced the way the U.S. saw itself and its role in the world.

In order to perform the above-mentioned 'mission', the U.S. was willing to use military force, as the third section of this chapter illustrated. U.S. foreign policy officials in 2002-2003 were guided by a strong belief in the importance of having and exercising military power. The use of force was one of the most important factors guiding global affairs. Not only did they believe in the importance of power, they believed that the U.S. should be the biggest military power in the world.

As the final section of this chapter showed, all the ideas above fit into the notion of hegemonism. This chapter illustrated that the Bush administration can be considered to have had a hegemonist ideology. This means, in a broad sense, that U.S. foreign policy officials considered their own country to be dominant in the world and were willing to pursue their interests, even if this meant they would not conform to other nations or international institutions or laws. As the title of this chapter reads: the U.S. had a mission, and it was not easily persuaded to abandon that mission.

2. Trans-Atlantic Troubles

The reasons behind Washington's negative view on Europe in 2002-2003.

Several moments of tension between the U.S. and Europe occurred in the years 2002-2003. For example, when Gerhard Schröder won a narrow reelection in Germany, President George W. Bush refused to place a congratulatory phone call because Schröder was opposed the war in Iraq. When France failed to support the war in Iraq as well, Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld canceled American military participation in the annual Paris Air Show and sought to exclude the chief of the French air force from a conference of air force commanders organized in the U.S.¹ These small, seemingly rather unimportant actions, are signs of a deteriorating relationship between the U.S. and Europe, or even a 'trans-Atlantic crisis' in the years after 9/11.

When George W. Bush was still in the race to become president of the U.S., he actually appeared keen on improving the relations with America's European allies. This soon changed. While campaigning he promised to go "back to basics" in the field of foreign relations if he were to become President. In promising this he meant that he would strengthen the relations with America's traditional allies, including European nations, as opposed to the Democrats of the 1990's who had strayed too far from traditional foreign policy concerns.²

However, during his presidency it became clear that the differences in outlook between the U.S. and Europe, which had developed during the 1990's, would mark the relationship during the first years of the Bush administration. While Europeans increasingly tended to rely upon negotiations, diplomacy and international law, the U.S. continued to stress the importance of a strong military. These differences did not change after 9/11; perhaps they were even intensified. Despite an outpour of sympathy with American citizens, it soon became clear that European nations were not willing to provide unconditional support to the U.S. As German chancellor Gerhard Schröder stated: "We are prepared for risks and also military risks, but not for any adventures."³

Besides this apparent caution on the European side, it is also clear that the U.S. was not very committed to strengthening the relationship with Europe, despite Bush's campaign promises. When European nations such as Spain, Italy, France and Germany, offered to send troops under NATO command to Afghanistan in order to help the American cause, Bush stated that NATO would only

¹ Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 115.

² James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans – The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 256.

³ Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 304.

contribute to the effort if “we [the U.S.] deem it necessary.”⁴ This shows that Bush was keen on keeping the control of this war effort in American hands. The fact that, after much hesitation, only very small contingents of European troops eventually fought alongside the Americans in Afghanistan, illustrates that major European support was not deemed necessary. At this time, Bush was more interested in gaining support from strategically more important countries, such as Pakistan and Russia.⁵ This all strongly suggests that despite promising campaign statements in the years leading up to George W. Bush’s presidency, the relationship between Europe and the U.S. was deteriorating in the years after 9/11.

Disagreements and disputes across the Atlantic are not a new phenomenon. They usually are concerned with differing views on foreign policy or on trade issues. In the years 2002-2003 the same was the case. However, “[these differing views] touch on something more fundamental and enduring”.⁶ This chapter aims to expose these fundamental, underlying ideological considerations that shaped the American view on Europe in the years 2002-2003. It is important to examine this in order to place the attitude towards NATO in these years in the right context. This chapter analyzes the mental map Americans had of Europe. What fundamental ideas and considerations influenced the negative approach of American foreign policy officials towards Europe in 2002-2003?

In the first part of this chapter the domestic developments that had had an effect on the U.S.’s foreign policy and on the trans-Atlantic relationship will be examined. Attention will be given to the background of foreign policy officials that were most influential in the years 2002-2003. A special focus will be on President George W. Bush in this respect. The next part of this chapter will analyze the influence of neo-conservative ideas on the view that American foreign policy officials had of Europe. First the anti-European ideas of the neoconservative branch within the George W. Bush administration will be examined. Secondly, the question whether traces of these neoconservative ideas found their way into the mainstream thinking within the Bush administration, will be answered.. Finally, the last section will examine the influence of political convictions on the attitude towards Europe, and discuss the effect of fundamental differences between the American and the European worldview.

⁴ Jussi M. Hanhimáki, Benedict Schoenborn and Barbara Zanchetta, *Transatlantic Relations since 1945 – An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 157.

⁵ Hanhimáki et al., *Transatlantic Relations since 1945*, 157.

⁶ Peter Baldwin, *The Narcissism of Minor Differences – How America and Europe are Alike* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 6.

The politics of domestic change

In the years after 9/11, ongoing demographic changes within the United States can be detected. Consequently, these changes led to a shift in domestic politics. In this section the effect of these developments on the way Americans think about the trans-Atlantic will be examined. To what extent did demographic changes within the United States in the years after 9/11 have an effect on the way European nations were viewed by U.S. foreign policy officials?

The extent to which Americans feel connected to their European heritage, may influence their view on Europe. It may have an effect on whether they consider the European continent to be a priority in U.S. foreign relations. Historically, there has been a strong connection between the United States and Western Europe on a personal level, because a large portion of the U.S. population originally immigrated from Western European countries. However, over the last few decades this is changing according to according to Samuel Huntington. While for years non-Hispanic whites would describe themselves as for example Irish-American, British-American or German-American, now more often than not they simply use the term 'American' to describe themselves. This "un-hyphenating process" can clearly be seen in the difference between the 1990 and the 2000 census. Compared to the census taken in 1990, in 2000 the number of people who for example reported English ancestry dropped by 26 percent and those reporting German ancestry by 27 percent. The number of people describing themselves as 'American' rose by no less than 55 over this 10-year period.⁷ Americans are starting to feel less connected to their European heritage. Huntington points out the consequences of this development for the American identity, but he does not go as far as to suggest these changes have any political consequences, or an influence on America's foreign policy.

There are scholars, such as Geir Lundestad, who argue that demographic changes not only influence the American identity, but in fact have an effect on America's foreign policy as well. In his book *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*, Lundestad, argues that there are visible signs of drift between the U.S. and Western Europe in the 21st century. He mentions demographic changes within the United States as one of the main reasons for concern about the continuation of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Like Huntington, he states that the non-Hispanic white American population is losing the close connection to its European heritage. Besides this development, he also sees the population growth in the South and West as an important factor influencing American politics. In line with these demographic changes, the U.S. political center shifts to the West and South. The traditionally large political influence of Eastern and Mid-Western states is decreasing. Lundestad points out that almost all elected presidents until John F. Kennedy came from the

⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *Who are we? – The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 301-302.

Northeast and Midwest. After Kennedy they have all come from the South or West. Given the fact that you “have to be quite conservative to win in the South and in the West,” this has severe consequences for American politics.⁸

There are more scholars who acknowledge the idea that a politician’s region of origin has an effect on his political ideas. One of these scholars is Joseph Fry, who makes the case for domestic regionalism and its influence on American foreign policy in his article “Place Matters”. He points to several other authors who formulated theories concerning regionalism and its effect on foreign policy. He mentions Edward W. Chester, who concluded in his book *Sectionalism, Politics, and American Diplomacy* “that regionalism had not only been a persistent and important influence on U.S. foreign relations, but also “any assessment” of post- World War II policies abroad that fails to consider it would be doomed to incompleteness if not to inaccuracy.”⁹

Following this strain of thought, it becomes relevant to examine the influence of the shift of the U.S. political center to the West & South on American foreign relations, and on the relationship with Europe in particular. It is important to note that, while the Northeast and the Midwest have directed their attention primarily towards Europe, in the South the focus is on the Western hemisphere and in the West on the Pacific.¹⁰ This argument is underlined by Martin List, who argues in his article “EU-U.S. International Relations – A Political Science perspective” that “already under President Reagan, a former governor of California, the direction of view of the U.S. elite started to turn eastward, across the Pacific.”¹¹ This development causes the level of interest in and knowledge about Europe, as displayed by American government officials, to decrease.¹² Martin List adds another element to this argument by stating that the trans-Atlantic ruling class, “a dense elite network of actors from business, politics and academia sharing the view that good trans-Atlantic relations are in their own interest”, is changing into a *global* ruling class. Because new players such as India and China have emerged on the international stage, personal networking across the Pacific will increase in density and importance. Although this new, global elite is not Anti-European and shares the values of democracy and liberalism with Europeans, “the extent to which there is a transatlantic, Europe-focused elite is certainly on the decline.”¹³

⁸ Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 291.

⁹ Joseph A. Fry, “Place Matters: Domestic Regionalism and the Formation of American Foreign Policy,” *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 3 (2012), 453.

¹⁰ Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*, 17.

¹¹ Martin List, “EU-US International Relations: A Political Science Perspective,” in *Innovation, Employment and Growth Policy Issues in the EU and the US*, eds. Paul J.J. Welfens and John T. Addison (Heidelberg: Springer, 2009), 338.

¹² Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*, 17.

¹³ List, “EU-US International Relations: A Political Science Perspective,” 338.

It is interesting to examine the relationship between George W. Bush, his Texan background and his view on Europe. In his article "Place Matters", Joseph Fry mentions Michael Lind, who argues in his book *Made in Texas* that since the 1960's, there has been a "Texanization" of the American right. By this he means that the "isolationist and protectionist conservatism of the Midwest has been replaced by a recognizably Texan (and broadly Southern) conservatism that unites a belief in minimal government at home and a bellicose foreign policy abroad with religious fundamentalism." President George W. Bush is an example of this development. Under his presidency "Texanization featured hostility toward diplomacy and international organizations and a preference for unilateral militarism" according to Lind.¹⁴ Sebastiaan Reyn argues in his book *Allies or Aliens* that George W. Bush's Texan origin actually influenced his negative attitude towards Europe. First of all, because Bush had never traveled to Europe before reaching the presidency he had no experience and little sympathy with Europe.¹⁵ During his campaign he even emphasized that as a President he would "look south". He was committed to placing Mexico at the center of America's foreign policy and to focus on Latin America more than his predecessors did.¹⁶ It is no surprise that this created the impression that Europe would be put on a back burner. To make matters worse, he showed little interest in remedying his lack of experience with Europe. The first trips abroad he made as a president were to Mexico and Canada. He seemed to value these neighboring countries more than Europe, which he did not visit until June 2001. In June 2001 he visited Britain and France but, by rejecting the Kyoto Protocol and adhering to a unilateral approach to other multinational programs, Bush was sending signals that "were bound to antagonize the allies."¹⁷

The fact that Bush was off to a rocky start in his relationship with Europe was not only caused by his actions, but it was almost inevitable, given his background. Sebastiaan Reyn argues that, of all American states Texas is "arguably the epitome of what makes America different from Europe." This has been argued for centuries, for example by Frederick Turner who, already in 1893 wrote that: "it is [in Texas], if anywhere, that American democracy will make a stand against a tendency to adjust to a European type."¹⁸ The fact that Bush's mindset was formed largely in un-European Texas has influenced his interest in and his policies towards Europe during his presidency. A clear contrast between Bush and his predecessor Clinton can be seen. Clinton had been a Rhodes scholar at Oxford University and he had political ties across the Atlantic. This was true for leading officials within the Clinton administration as well. Madeleine Albright, Strobe Talbott, Richard

¹⁴ Fry, "Place Matters: Domestic Regionalism and the Formation of American Foreign Policy," 482.

¹⁵ Sebastian Reyn, *Allies or Aliens – George W. Bush and the Transatlantic Crisis in Historical Perspective* (Den Haag: Atlantische Commissie, 2004), 173.

¹⁶ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 191.

¹⁷ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO divided, NATO united: the evolution of an alliance* (Westport: Praeger, 2004), 134.

¹⁸ Reyn, *Allies or Aliens*, 173.

Holbrooke: all had strong connections with their European counterparts.¹⁹

The fact that Bush's focus was elsewhere became painfully obvious during an interview in Boston for WHDH-TV by reporter Andy Hiller. Hiller had planned a pop-quiz, testing the president on his knowledge of foreign rulers. When Bush struggled to name the president of Chechnya, the general of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India, he quickly changed the subject, asking Hiller to name him the foreign minister of Mexico.²⁰ This illustrates that, when it comes to foreign affairs, Bush's priority lay with the South, with the country he dealt with most as a governor of Texas, and less with other regions of the world, including Europe. This suggests then, that in Bush's case, there is a definite connection between his background and his ideas about foreign affairs and the relationship with Europe in particular.

It is important to examine the backgrounds of other decision makers within the Bush administration as well. Upon doing so, one discovers that, despite the apparent political shift from Northeast to South and West described above, many of the prominent foreign policy officials in George W. Bush's administration were actually from the Northeast or Midwest of the U.S. To illustrate this: Vice President Dick Cheney was born in Nebraska, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz are from New York and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is from Chicago. Being born and raised in Alabama, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice appears to be the exception, not the rule.²¹

However, the fact that the majority of the prominent foreign policy officials under the Bush administration were from the traditionally Europe-oriented North-Eastern and Mid-Western regions of the U.S., does not necessarily mean they all felt a strong connection to the European continent. In this respect it is interesting to look at the personal background of Donald Rumsfeld and his decisions regarding Europe during his political career. Rumsfeld was appointed ambassador to NATO in 1973 under President Nixon. His then colleague Francois de Rose, French ambassador to NATO, recalled that "when Don first arrived, he had very little knowledge of international relations". Rose stated: "He had never lived abroad and didn't speak any of the European languages. He was really a green horn and very young for the job."²² Yet, according to Rumsfeld's biographer Bradley Graham, he quickly learned his way around and he developed warm interpersonal relationships with several veteran European diplomats. Still, these close relationships with his European counterparts in no way meant that Rumsfeld was extra preoccupied with maintaining the trans-Atlantic relationship during

¹⁹ Reyn, *Allies or Aliens*, 175.

²⁰ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 18.

²¹ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 22-30.

²² Bradley Graham, *By his own rules: The ambitions, successes and ultimate failures of Donald Rumsfeld*, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009), 103.

the rest of his political career. On the contrary: in 2003 Rumsfeld lobbied intensively to reposition U.S. forces away from the European continent and towards Asia, despite the fact that many within the U.S. State Department argued that maintaining troops in Europe was important to show America's political will to their European allies.²³ The fact that there seems to be no clear connection between Rumsfeld's personal background, his early career and his later foreign policy decisions, shows that there are limits to the theory described above. In Rumsfeld's case, his origin or his personal background does not appear to have shaped the way he viewed Europe. It did not influence the decisions he made regarding the trans-Atlantic relationship.

The arguments above suggest that demographic changes within the U.S. have an effect on the way Europe was viewed by American foreign policy makers. We have seen that Americans have a decreasing sense of connection to their European heritage and this affects the amount of priority they give to the relationship with Europe. Also, the fact that the population of Southern and Western states is increasing, causes the U.S. political center of gravity to shift from the traditionally Europe-oriented Northeast to the South and West. The fact that in the South, the focus is on Latin America, and in the West, the focus is on the Pacific, makes that Europe is less of a priority for U.S. foreign policy officials in the years 2002-2003. Texas-born President Bush is exemplary for this process. European nations were not front and center on his map of the world during his presidency.

It is important to keep in mind however, that, apart from Bush himself, most prominent foreign policy officials in his administration were from traditionally Europe-oriented regions of the country. Donald Rumsfeld's background shows us that this does not necessarily mean a different, more positive, outlook on European affairs. To gain insight in what factors did shape the view prominent foreign policy officials had of Europe, other underlying ideological considerations should be examined as well.

Neoconservative views on Europe

In January 2003 Richard Perle, chairman of the defense policy board under president Bush, used the expression "Axis of Weasels" to describe European nations.²⁴ This is clearly an expression of American frustration with the countries on the other side of the Atlantic. It is important to note that Richard Perle can be considered a neoconservative. It is interesting to find out whether his negative view on Europe was influenced by his neoconservative ideology, particularly given the fact that some of the regular members of George W. Bush's National Security Council had neoconservative ideas as

²³ Graham, *By his own rules*, 508-509.

²⁴ Marc Chavannes, "Weifeland Nederland is Axis of Weasles," *NRC*, 28 January 2003, <http://vorige.nrc.nl>

well. This part of the chapter will examine the neoconservative ideas about European nations and the extent to which this view influenced the way others in the Bush administration viewed Europe. How important were neoconservative ideas in shaping the fundamental view on Europe in 2002-2003?

Neoconservatism is a concept hard to define, since there is “no absolute dividing line between who is and who is not a neoconservative”, as Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke explain in their book *America Alone*.²⁵ In naming the common denominators of neo-conservatism, one is bound to oversimplify, but it is necessary to define the concept. Neoconservatism started out in the 1960’s as a “philosophical movement of political significance to American society”. It was a movement mostly dealing with domestic issues, such as the balance between social control and individual freedom. Neoconservatives distinguished themselves from conservatives by focusing on ideology and on the central place religion held in society.²⁶ As the movement grew older, foreign policy started taking a central place. In foreign policy, neoconservatives are in a broad sense led by the religious conviction that the U.S., being a force for good, should always be willing to fight against evil and the idea that military power defines the relationship between states.²⁷ According to Halper and Clarke, the neoconservative story’s climax came after 9/11, when many neoconservatives found themselves in positions of high influence and “took charge of America’s war machine.”²⁸

Before turning to the neoconservative view on Europe in the post-9/11 years, it is important to examine the amount of influence neoconservative ideas had on the George W. Bush administration in general during these years. This amount of influence is assessed differently by different scholars. Some, like Michael Lind, argue that “a neoconservative coup” took place in Washington during the Bush administration. He states that “the core group now [2003] in charge consists of neoconservative defense intellectuals. [...] Paul Wolfowitz is the defense mastermind of the Bush administration; Donald Rumsfeld is an elderly figurehead who holds the position of defense secretary only because Wolfowitz himself is too controversial.”²⁹ Other scholars, for instance Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, argue that those speaking of a neoconservative coup “fundamentally misunderstood the intellectual currents within the Bush administration.” According to them, neoconservatives were more prominent outside the administration, than they were inside it.³⁰ Arnout Molenaar argues however, that the neoconservatives within the Bush administration, although admittedly a small group, had extra influence on Bush’s policy, since they had aligned

²⁵ Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone – The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 10.

²⁶ Halper and Clarke, *America Alone*, 40-42.

²⁷ Halper and Clarke, *America Alone*, 11-12

²⁸ Halper and Clarke, *America Alone*, 9

²⁹ Michael Lind, “The weird men behind George W. Bush’s war,” *New Statesman*. (2003): 10

³⁰ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 15.

themselves with powerful nationalist conservatives such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, who held influential positions under Bush.³¹ This alignment was already established in the 1980's, under President Ronald Reagan.

From all this, we conclude that although certainly not all of George W. Bush's principal foreign policy advisors held neoconservative ideas, there was a definite neoconservative influence on the policy put forward by the Bush administration in the years 2002-2003, since many people on influential positions had neoconservative ideas or had close affiliations with people who had them.

It is interesting to examine the neoconservative view on Europe, especially because it is rather outspoken in its anti-Europeanism.³² Sebastiaan Reyn states in his book *Allies or Aliens* that neoconservatives are essentially anti-European, for they dismiss the entire European worldview and are critical of the European society model in a broad sense. The dismissal of the European worldview stems from the fact that neoconservatives have a "strong desire to define America as being different from Europe and even as an escape from it", argues Reyn. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke confirm this desire in their book *America Alone* and they add that neo-conservatives were successful in achieving their ideal: "early neo-conservatives helped to establish a genuinely American brand of conservatism that broke free of European roots".³³ Neoconservatives do not define Europe as the cradle of enlightenment but as the "breeding ground of detestable creeds like communism, fascism and anti-Semitism."³⁴ From a neoconservative perspective, it is un-American and therefore detestable to act 'European', or to engage intensively with Europeans.

Sebastiaan Reyn argues that neoconservatives consider Europeans to suffer from "an ingrained weakness for defeatism, nihilism and appeasement."³⁵ European nations are considered unwilling to use power, because of their naïve view when it comes to the use of force in the world. They are considered to be unaware of the dangerous world outside of their own protected European sphere.³⁶ A dangerous world Americans are very aware of, as we have seen in the previous chapter. These ideas are also reflected by Robert Kagan, a scholar who Andrew Bacevich once described as the "neoconservative movement's chief foreign policy theorist."³⁷ In *Of Paradise and Power* Kagan argues that there are "profound differences in the way the U.S. and Europe conduct foreign policy." The U.S. resorts to force rather quickly and Americans want problems solved and threats eliminated,

³¹ Arnout Molenaar, *(Dis)Organizing European Security – The Iraq Controversy and Patterns in US-European Relations* (Den Haag: Atlantische Commissie, 2007), 37.

³² Reyn, *Allies or Aliens*, 170.

³³ Halper and Clarke, *America Alone*, 10.

³⁴ Reyn, *Allies or Aliens*, 170.

³⁵ Reyn, *Allies or Aliens*, 170.

³⁶ Reyn, *Allies or Aliens*, 170.

³⁷ Andrew Bacevich, "Present at the Re-Creation," review of *The return of history and the end of dreams*, by Robert Kagan, *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 2 (2008)

even if the only way to do that is by acting unilaterally. Europeans, on the other hand, approach problems with greater nuance and favor peaceful responses. They emphasize process over result and are quicker to appeal to international institutions.³⁸ These differences led to tensions in the relationship after the end of the Cold War. The U.S. expected Europe to act in a way similar to the way they would have acted themselves, by taking the opportunity to expand Europe's strategic purview. However, "many Europeans took the end of the Cold War as a holiday from strategy."³⁹ In Kagan's view, ever since the end of the Cold War, American officials have become increasingly impatient with Europe because it is not taking a responsible role on the global stage.

In addition to this, Kagan argues that the safety in which Europeans find themselves, was only established thanks to American efforts and by using the very force that Europeans today oppose. "Europe's evolution into its present state occurred under the mantle of the U.S. security guarantee and could not have occurred without it. [...] And now, in the final irony, the fact that U.S. military power has solved the European problem, allows Europeans today to believe that American military power is outmoded and dangerous".⁴⁰ In short, the neoconservative view of Europe is rather negative. European nations are seen as ungrateful, free-riding on the safety provided by the U.S. It is very well possible that this view is partially responsible for the tensions in the trans-Atlantic relationship.

Many of the neoconservative sentiments, such as those put forward by Robert Kagan, were reflected in the statements and documents by George W. Bush and his prominent foreign policy officials in the post-9/11 years. One way in which these sentiments found their way into the more mainstream policies of the George W. Bush administration, was through the think tank 'Project for a new American Century'. This think tank, founded by Robert Kagan and William Kristol in 1997, is frequently considered the "quintessential neoconservative vehicle".⁴¹ Interestingly enough, there are close links between the Project for a New American Century and the Bush administration. Many of those affiliated with the project from the start, were given important (cabinet) functions after George W. Bush won the election for presidency. The fact that the Statement of Principles, as formulated by the think tank at its establishment, is signed by, amongst others, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, illustrates this.⁴²

³⁸ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power – America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 5.

³⁹ Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, 25.

⁴⁰ Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, 72-73

⁴¹ Inderjeet Parmar, 'Foreign policy fusion: Liberal interventionists, conservative nationalists and neoconservatives – the new alliance dominating the US foreign policy establishment' *International Politics* 46 (2009), 177.

⁴² Statement of Principles, Project for a New American Century. Accessed on November 12, 2012. www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm

The founders of the Project for a New American Century wanted the U.S. to accept its role as the “world’s preeminent power” and face the challenges this role brings with it. Regarding the relationship with Europe, the Statement of Principles is rather neutral, stating that “America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia and the Middle East” and that “[the U.S.] needs to strengthen the ties to democratic allies.”⁴³

A testimony held before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2003 by William Kristol, speaking on behalf of the Project for a New American Century, offers some interesting statements about the way the Project members viewed the trans-Atlantic relationship. First of all, Kristol stated in his testimony that “ it is too late to paper over [questions about the health of the alliance] and pretend all is well. We need [...] to be honest about the difference in world view between some in Europe – especially in France and Germany- and many in the United States.” Later on in this address Kristol wonders how to bridge the gap between the U.S. and Europe, and answers his own question by stating: “We won’t entirely. Washington and the capitals of Europe cannot help but have some differences of perspective on interests and threats for the simple reason that the U.S.’s role in the world is far different from theirs. [...] That said, we cannot abandon our basic convictions because they make some Europeans uneasy. We cannot fail to confront the threats we face [...] because some Europeans balk.”⁴⁴ From this statement it becomes clear that the Project for a New American Century recognizes fundamental differences between the U.S. and Europe. Even though a strong trans-Atlantic relationship is considered important, the U.S. should never change its behavior only because Europe disagrees. Like Robert Kagan, William Kristol portrays Europe as a group of nations rather naïve about issues of global power. Through the Project for a New American Century, these neoconservative ideas found their way into the more mainstream policy of the Bush administration. Some statements made by foreign policy officials in the Bush administration, including statements by George W. Bush himself, reflect neoconservative ideas, similar to those put forward by Robert Kagan. A speech given by President George W. Bush in London in November 2003 seems to reflect Kagan’s theory, albeit in a less straightforward manner.

Europe’s peaceful unity is one of the great achievements of the last half-century. And because European countries now resolve differences through negotiation and consensus, there is sometimes an assumption that the entire world functions in the same way. But let us

⁴³ Statement of Principles, Project for a New American Century. Accessed on November 12, 2012. www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm

⁴⁴ William Kristol, The Future of NATO as proclaimed before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 8, 2003. www.newamericancentury.org/nato-20030408

not forget how Europe's unity was achieved – by allied armies of liberation and NATO armies of defense.⁴⁵

Although Bush spoke positively about Europe and about his faith in international organizations such as the NATO in this speech, the quotation above shows the frustration with Europe's reserved position when it comes to the use of power. The fact that Bush points out that Europe's unity was only achieved through the use of allied force, makes that the speech reminds of Kagan's theory.

James Baker, who had been Secretary of State under George H.W. Bush and was a special presidential envoy for George W. Bush on the issue of Iraqi debt, also expressed an interesting opinion about European nations and the trans-Atlantic relationship.⁴⁶ Although Baker is not one the most prominent foreign policy officials of the George W. Bush administration, he has "played a significant role in helping shape the path of modern European-American relations"⁴⁷ and his statements on Europe are an interesting example of the attitude towards European nations. It is interesting that Baker's ideas remind one of the neoconservative views put forward by Kagan. When interviewed by Sarwar Kashmeri for his book *America and Europe after 9/11 and Iraq*, Baker expresses his astonishment over the fact that German chancellor Schröder came to power on an anti-American platform only ten years after the U.S. put much energy into helping Germany reunify. "Germany would never have been unified if the United States had not stood up," Baker stated. It was incomprehensible to him that despite all this American effort, "the leader of one of [the United States'] closest European partners, campaigned for power on an anti-American platform and succeeded."⁴⁸

One may perceive from these statements a sense of disappointment in Europe similar to that expressed by Robert Kagan in *Of Paradise and Power*: "The fact that U.S. military power has solved the European problem, especially the 'German problem', allows Europeans today, and Germans in particular, to believe that American military power [...] is outmoded and dangerous".⁴⁹ Both Baker and Kagan are disappointed in Europe and annoyed by the fact that Europeans are unaware of the fact that they owe the safe world they live in to a large extent to the U.S.

The above-mentioned arguments show, first of all, that the neoconservative view of Europe was a negative one. Neoconservatives like Robert Kagan convey an image of European nations being naïve,

⁴⁵ George W. Bush, "Address at Whitehall Palace," delivered at Whitehall Palace, London, November 19, 2003.

⁴⁶ Biography James A. Baker, as published on the official website for the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. Accessed on November 14, 2012. http://www.bakerinstitute.org/personnel/honorary-chair/jbaker/chair_view

⁴⁷ Sarwar A. Kashmeri, *America and Europe after 9/11 and Iraq: The great divide*, (Westport CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 18.

⁴⁸ Kashmeri, *America and Europe after 9/11 and Iraq*, 19.

⁴⁹ Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, 73.

ungrateful and too obsessed with negotiation and consensus. Besides that, this section also illustrated that neoconservatives were quite influential within the George W. Bush administration. Many high-ranking positions were held by officials with neoconservative convictions or by people closely affiliated with neoconservatives. There was a strong connection between the think tank Project for a New American Century and the Bush administration, which allowed neoconservative ideas about Europe to find their way into the more mainstream policy of the administration. This section suggests that neoconservatism is one of the underlying ideologies that shaped American foreign policy officials' mental map of the world. Neoconservatism therefore had a definite influence on the ideas about Europe in the years 2002-2003.

A more general view

Apart from neoconservatism, there were other ideologies that influenced the negative approach that U.S. foreign policy officials had of Europe in the post-9/11 years. In this last section of the chapter we will therefore look at some final concepts shaping foreign policy officials' view of Europe, including the influence of political convictions and the effect of fundamental differences between the U.S. and Europe. This is necessary to form a complete picture of the fundamental, ideological considerations shaping the American view on Europe in the years 2002-2003.

According to Sebastiaan Reyn, there were different levels of anti-Europeanism within the Bush administration. Neoconservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz within the Bush administration were obviously anti-European in their policies, as became clear from the section above. Reyn suggests that the more traditional conservatives such as Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice and conservative nationalists such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld did not share this anti-European view, but they did have an "un-European" one. They were less extreme in their judgment but they nonetheless had "little patience for multilateral diplomacy and were not prepared to put much effort in taking into account the preferences of the allies in Europe".⁵⁰

One theory that may explain this attitude is that an un-European view is simply inherent to a Republican administration. Peter Baldwin argues in his book *The Narcissism of minor differences* that within the United States, anti-Europeanism is part of the battle between right and left. Officials on both the left and right emphasize the major differences in worldview between Europe and the U.S., but for opposite reasons. Liberals in the U.S. tend to idealize Europe and emphasize that the continent is different from America in a positive way: "Americans carry guns, execute prisoners, go bankrupt, drive large cars and live in even larger houses. The [...] Europeans, by contrast, enjoy

⁵⁰ Reyn, *Allies or Aliens*, 172.

socialist hospitals, schools, and welfare systems. They pay high taxes, live longer, and take the train.” Conservatives, on the other hand, tend to be negative about Europe, regardless of their exact position within the conservative party. According to Baldwin, when conservatives attack Europe they do so to provoke the American liberal elite.⁵¹

This idea, of criticizing Europe, or at least showing little interest in the continent, as part of a strategy to undermine the left, can be observed during the Bush administration as well. The fact that the majority of those in power in 2002-2003 held strong republican convictions, affected the amount of preoccupation foreign policy officials had with Europe at this time. This is reflected in the political convictions of Colin Powell. A traditional conservative, Powell was one of the Bush administration’s most experienced foreign policy officials. Within the administration he was, according to James Mann, most prone to multilateralism and diplomacy and least hawkish.⁵² Still, even Powell seemed less pre-occupied with sustaining diplomatic relationship with Europe in the post-9/11 years. In 2002 he only travelled to Europe once, while, in the 1990’s, the US Secretary of State travelled to Europe on average almost once a month.⁵³ The fact that Powell, in February 2003, warned that the trans-Atlantic alliance was “breaking up”⁵⁴, also illustrates that even one of the most moderate of Bush’s foreign policy advisors showed little interest and little faith in a lasting trans-Atlantic relationship. Perhaps the simple reason for this was that Powell was part of a Republican government, which was less preoccupied with Europe from the beginning.

Finally, it is important to examine the fundamental differences in worldview between Europe and the U.S. in the years 2002-2003 as a factor that influenced the negative American view on Europe. These differences may have always been there, but they resurfaced after the attacks of 9/11. According to Ivo Daalder, the post-9/11 international environment is characterized by two unprecedented phenomena: the predominance of the United States and globalisation. Where Europeans consider the latter to be most defining in international relations, Americans, and the Bush administration and its supporters in particular, believe American primacy to be the defining feature.⁵⁵ Bush’s personal conviction, that after 9/11 his country was given a divine mission to fight against evil, highlighted these differences with the European approach even further. Europeans did not understand this U.S. approach, as Daalder illustrates by quoting Javier Solana, Secretary General of the Council of the European Union: “For us Europeans, it is difficult to deal with because we are secular. We do not see

⁵¹ Baldwin, *The Narcissism of Minor Differences*, 5 and 11

⁵² Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 366.

⁵³ Ivo H. Daalder, “The End of Atlanticism,” *Survival* 45 (2003), 153-154.

⁵⁴ Daalder, “The End of Atlanticism,” 147.

⁵⁵ Daalder, “The End of Atlanticism,” 151.

the world in such black and white terms.”⁵⁶

On the American side, foreign policy officials became increasingly impatient with this nuanced European approach to foreign affairs, especially at the time of the Iraq war. The conviction that the U.S. was fulfilling its duty, or even its destiny, in fighting against evil, caused foreign policy officials to believe that no country could ever be a true ally, unless it was fully supportive of this American cause. The fact that many European countries, most notably France and Germany, were not fully supportive and not prepared to fight the ‘War against Terror’ with the same conviction as the U.S., prompted Vice-President Dick Cheney to ask the French ambassador in 2003 whether France was an ally or a foe. When the ambassador stated France remained an ally, Cheney replied: “We have many reasons to conclude that you are not really a friend or an ally.”⁵⁷

Because the American approach was inspired by the conviction that the U.S. was given a mission to fight evil after 9/11, there was little room for nuance. This led Donald Rumsfeld to divide the European continent in an old and a new Europe, based on the amount of support European nations gave to the U.S. cause. New Europe consisted of the nations of Eastern Europe who were “not with France or Germany on [the Iraq issue]; they’re with the U.S.”⁵⁸

So, besides domestic changes and the influence of neoconservatism, good-old party politics and fundamental differences in worldview between Europe and the U.S., made that the U.S. did not have a very positive view of Europe in the years after 9/11. The above suggests that Republican administration are usually prone to anti-European policies and that the ‘black and white’ approach chosen by the Americans in their response to terrorism clashed with a more nuanced European view.

Conclusion

In this chapter the underlying, ideological considerations that shaped the American view on Europe in the years 2002-2003 have been examined. An examination of the U.S. position towards Europe, provides us with a background against which the relationship to NATO, an organization consisting of mostly European nations, can be seen. The chapter started out by illustrating the poor state of the trans-Atlantic relationship at this time and proceeded to find out what factors influenced the negative view that prominent foreign policy officials had of European nations in these years.

This chapter suggested that demographic changes within the United States had an effect on the amount of priority given to Europe during the George W. Bush administration. While in the past

⁵⁶ Daalder, ‘The End of Atlanticism,’ 160.

⁵⁷ Bruce Montgomery, *Richard B. Cheney and the Rise of the Imperial Vice Presidency*, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2009), 189.

⁵⁸ Graham, *By his own rules*, 413.

the North-Eastern and Mid-Western regions of the U.S. were best represented within in the government, today, due to increased population, the less-European minded Western and Southern regions are most influential. President Bush, being from Texas himself, appears to epitomize this theory. However, the fact that for other principal foreign policy officials, such as Donald Rumsfeld, no connection can be discovered between origin and a negative view on Europe, suggests that there must be other factors influencing this view.

Another one of these factors influencing the negative American view on Europe is the influence of neoconservative ideas within the Bush administration. This chapter suggested that the Neoconservative wish to differentiate America from other nations, in particular from Europe, causes anti-European foreign policy ideas. Neoconservative policy makers consider Europeans to be overly dependent on compromise and negotiation and unaware of the fact that it was American military power that created the safe environment they are enjoying today. These neoconservative ideas found their way into more main-stream thinking about foreign policy in the Bush administration, for example through the influential neo-conservative think tank 'Project for a New American Century'. This all suggests that neoconservative ideas were important in shaping the view on Europe in 2002-2003.

Apart from neoconservatism, some final broad ideological concepts that influenced the way the foreign policy officials' view on Europe were discussed in this chapter. Political convictions have an effect on the way Europe is judged. Criticizing Europe is part of the political battle between conservatives and liberals within the United States. A certain degree of un-Europeanism is therefore inherent to a Republican administration. Finally, the fundamentally different ways in which the U.S. and Europe approach foreign affairs, led to frustrations on both sides of the Atlantic, especially after 9/11. U.S. foreign policy officials began losing their patience with European countries, because they seemed unable to understand the importance of the mission that the U.S. was carrying out.

It is clear then, that there are several fundamental, underlying ideological considerations that shaped the American view on Europe in the years 2002-2003. Some of these were relatively new domestic developments and others were long-standing differences in outlook between the U.S. and Europe, some of them intensified by the events of 9/11. All of these factors help explain why Europe no longer held a central position on the global map as seen by the principal foreign policy advisors in the post-9/11 years. In the next chapter we will see the effect this had on the way America perceived the relevance of NATO in these years.

3. 'Natural Allies' or 'Never Again'?

U.S. cooperation with NATO in the years 2002-2003.

“Far from becoming less valuable, one would have to note that NATO, in the post-Cold War period, is taking on increasing importance as Western democracies face deadly new threats in the 21st century”.¹

- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, December 2001 -

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated the above in December 2001, after meeting with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defense ministers in Brussels. The statement appears to be reflecting U.S. faith in the continuing, post-Cold War importance of NATO as an organization to provide security in the Atlantic region. However, despite these seemingly bright hopes for NATO's future, several signs indicate that the U.S. was not that willing to work with NATO on the new challenges of the 21st century. As discussed in the previous chapters, NATO invoked Article V for the first time in its history after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. of September 11, 2001. In doing so, NATO declared that the attack on the U.S. was considered an attack against all NATO members. This was seemingly a moment of great allied unity. However, the fact that the U.S. decided to not fully incorporate NATO into the military campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, despite NATO's invocation, soon led to tensions.²

The U.S. was positive about the continuing importance of NATO while, at the same time, U.S. foreign policy officials did not deem it necessary to cooperate with NATO in the battle against terrorism. This contradiction leads one to wonder how to assess the relationship between the U.S. and NATO in the crucial post-9/11 years. The relationship between the U.S. and NATO is interesting to examine, in particular because, as Mark Webber argues: “NATO's fortunes have always been closely tied to the preferences and priorities of American foreign policy”. This has, on the one hand, served the alliance well, but on the other hand has left the Alliance vulnerable to changes in U.S. foreign policy preferences.³

¹ Donald Rumsfeld, “Secretary Rumsfeld News Briefing in Brussels after meeting with NATO defense ministers,” December 18, 2001. National Security Archive. <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.

² Richard E. Rupp, *NATO after 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 96-97.

³ Mark Webber, “NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan,” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 11, (2009): 46.

This chapter aims to find out to what extent and in what ways the U.S. interacted with NATO in facing the challenges that followed the attacks of 9/11. How much willingness to commit to NATO did principal U.S. foreign policy officials show in the years 2002-2003? This analysis will allow us to determine whether the policy regarding NATO reflected the broader ideology behind U.S. foreign policy, as was described in the previous chapters of this research.

This chapter will first provide a brief historical background of NATO and the challenges the Alliance faced as a result of disagreements between the U.S. and other NATO members. It will then zoom in on the period 2002-2003 and examine the challenges faced by the Alliance in these years. It aims to find out what events caused friction between the U.S. and other NATO members at this time. After having provided this overview, the chapter will continue to investigate whether the U.S. was consciously trying to work around NATO in pursuing its foreign policy goals in the years after 9/11. The chapter will end with an examination of NATO policies that were initiated or supported by the U.S., and the extent to which these policies reflect the broader American foreign policy goals.

Historical Background

Several scholars argue that in over 60 years of NATO history, the organization's development was characterized by periods of crisis and division between the members. As Mark Webber states in his article "NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan": "NATO has been held to be in decline almost since its inception."⁴ While the focus of this chapter will be on the American attitude towards NATO during the Bush administration, it is important to realize that NATO's experience under Bush was not unique. To illustrate this, attention should be turned to NATO's history of crises. In his function of U.S. secretary of State, Colin Powell commented on this history before the Senate Foreign Relations committee in 2003: "None of us follow blindly. We debate. We disagree. On those occasions when we disagree, we roll up our sleeves, put our heads together and find a way to work things. At the end of the day, that is our great strength."⁵ This section will provide a brief overview of the major moments of tension. First the effect of the end of the Cold War on NATO will be examined. Then, crises that occurred well before the Soviet Union fell apart will be discussed. The section will end by examining the way the U.S. has viewed its position within NATO throughout the institution's history.

NATO was founded in 1949 as a military alliance, in which the members agreed to mutual defense if one of them was to be attacked by an external party. NATO's first secretary general, the British Lord

⁴ Webber, "NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan," 47.

⁵ Arnout Molenaar, *(Dis)Organizing European Security – The Iraq Controversy and Patterns in US-European Relations* (Den Haag: Atlantische Commissie, 2007), 120.

Ismay, argued that NATO's goal was to "keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down."⁶ It is clear that NATO's roots lay in the Cold War period, during which the Soviet Union was considered the mutual enemy. It is not surprising then, that after the fall of the Soviet Union, many analysts posed the question of what NATO's purpose was after the enemy that had provided the organization with its initial purpose, had disappeared of the global stage.⁷ NATO had always focused on European security, and with the reunification of Europe in 1989, its mission seemed to be accomplished.⁸ However, despite the discussions over continuing relevance, NATO never ceased to exist. According to Arnout Molenaar there are three reasons that explain why NATO was still relevant after the Cold War. First of all, stability within Europe remained in the interest of all NATO members and an organization that provided this stability was therefore still very much needed. Second of all, the end of the Cold War was no guarantee that Russia would never again re-emerge as a possible threat to the Western stability. A "hedge" against Russia was therefore still necessary. Finally, NATO found a new purpose in assisting the nations that were newly independent from the Soviet Union. NATO helped to manage the negative consequences of Soviet disintegration in several Balkan states, for example Kosovo and Bosnia.⁹

Like Daalder, Ryan C. Hendrickson disagrees with NATO skeptics who are convinced that NATO became outdated after the end of the Cold War. He points out that NATO, since its inception, but particularly after the end of the Cold War, was able to redefine its mission(s) in trans-Atlantic security. After the Cold War, in 1991, NATO agreed to address conflict prevention and crisis management issues and it decided to extend its cooperative military partnerships to much of recently independent Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁰ The new focus on peacekeeping in Europe enabled NATO to remain relevant.

This all strongly suggests that NATO continued to be relevant, albeit a in a different kind of mission, after the end of the Cold War. Later on in this chapter we will examine whether NATO, in a similar way, reinvented its mission after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

NATO's ability to overcome crises had already been tested before the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is important to note that NATO faced several crises in its history, some considered to have been even more severe than the crisis in the early 1990's or the situation faced after 9/11. NATO was faced with its first major crisis in 1956, over the handling of the Suez Canal crisis. When Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, France and the United Kingdom cooperated with Israel to launch an attack on Egypt.

⁶ Joseph S. Nye Jr., "The US and Europe: Continental Drift" *International Affairs* 76, no. 1 (2002): 51.

⁷ Molenaar, *(Dis)Organizing European Security*, 110.

⁸ Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 5 (2006)

⁹ Arnout Molenaar, *(Dis)Organizing European Security*, 110.

¹⁰ Ryan C. Hendrickson, "The Miscalculation of NATO's Death," *Parameters* 37, no.1 (2007), 104.

There was no consultation with NATO at all, which led U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower to state that he felt personally betrayed by the British. The ensuing U.S. decision to side with the Soviet Union in opposing the British-French-Israeli actions, almost led to the “destruction of the Alliance”, according to Lawrence Kaplan.¹¹

A second NATO crisis followed in 1966, when French President Charles de Gaulle demanded the removal of NATO headquarters from his country. NATO was forced to relocate to Belgium. American Ambassador to NATO at the time, Harlan Cleveland, considered the French action a “cheap, anti-American gesture”. NATO successfully relocated to Belgium and set up a Defense Planning Committee without France, given that this country no longer wanted to work within NATO’s structures.¹²

A final crisis worth mentioning occurred in 1986, when U.S. President Ronald Reagan conducted air strikes against Libya, as a response to the Libyan involvement in a terrorist attack on a German nightclub that killed several Americans. The NATO ambassadors and the North Atlantic Council were only informed of the air strikes after they had already happened. This left European NATO partners frustrated, especially given the fact that the American general who conducted the Libya bombings, Bernard Rogers, was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), one of the two highest-ranking strategic commanders for NATO.¹³

It is clear then, that NATO faced many crises throughout its history, many of which involved the United States to a certain extent. This illustrates the shortcomings of the idea that the U.S. and Europe had a completely shared vision during the Cold War. Even though all NATO members were united in opposing the Soviet Union, they were internally divided on several issues. It is a testimony to NATO’s relevance that despite all of these moments of tension, member states, including the U.S., usually kept faith in the institution.

Finally, it is important to focus on the way the U.S. saw its role in NATO throughout the institution’s history. In fact, since NATO’s inception, the U.S. has been divided on the question of how much power should be directed to the institution. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, argue that throughout the Cold war there was a difference in opinion between American intellectuals of the school of Woodrow Wilson and those of the Henry Cabot Lodge School. Those in the Wilsonian school “take pride in the fact that Washington had championed the creation of international organizations such as NATO” and were convinced that, in doing so, the U.S. was laying the groundwork for the expansion of the rule of law in international affairs. Those in the Lodge school, however, were proud of the fact that America was able to *dominate* international organizations such as NATO. “In NATO [...] the U.S.

¹¹ Hendrickson, “The Miscalculation of NATO’s Death,” 101.

¹² Hendrickson, “The Miscalculation of NATO’s Death,” 102.

¹³ Hendrickson, “The Miscalculation of NATO’s Death,” 103.

was the superpower that provided the alliance's ultimate security guarantee, and as a result it had a disproportionate say over alliance policy."¹⁴ In other words; the disagreement lay in the fact that some American intellectuals were happy to relinquish some power to international institutions such as NATO, while others were only happy to be the dominant power within international institutions.

According to Mark Webber, the U.S. does in fact dominate NATO, and has done so since the organization's founding. Webber states that the U.S. first set the terms of NATO's formation, then took the leading role in its institutional development and finally continued to be the foremost initiator of NATO policies. He goes as far as to argue that "almost every major change has been the consequence of American action and no change has been possible without American support." American foreign policy was never subordinate to NATO and the U.S. could afford an attitude of aloofness with regard to NATO, because it had such a dominant position in it.¹⁵

This suggests that, when it comes to America's attitude towards NATO throughout its history, the U.S. was happy to work within the NATO framework, but felt comforted by the fact that it was the dominant force within the institution. The fact that the U.S. was never inclined to subordinate its foreign policy to NATO, characterizes the relationship between NATO and the U.S., also in the post-9/11 years.

This discussion illustrates that NATO, an organization shaped by the Cold War, has a history characterized by periods of great difficulty, but also by the organization's capability to overcome these problems. The U.S. has disagreed with its European NATO partners on several occasions. It also became clear from this chapter that the U.S. has always had an interesting role within NATO. Several sources indicate that the U.S. considered itself to be dominant within NATO. Its dominant position made it unnecessary for the U.S. to ever change its own foreign policy goals in regarding NATO's goals.

2002-2003: a period of tension

Having discussed the challenges and dilemmas faced by NATO during and after the Cold War in the previous section, the following section will focus on the situation after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. of September 11, 2001. In the years after 9/11, NATO was severely tested once more. The Alliance underwent several severe crises in a very short period of time. The United States and most NATO partners have been at odds on many of the central questions that the 9/11 attacks and the

¹⁴ Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 11.

¹⁵ Webber, "NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan," 49-50.

following War on Terror imposed.¹⁶ This section will examine three key moments of tension that NATO faced in the years after 9/11. The focus is on the years 2002-2003, but the American response to NATO's invocation of Article V in 2001 will be discussed as well, since this event, most likely, still had an influence on the NATO partners' relationship in 2002-2003. This section will then turn to President Bush's 2002 State of the Union speech, which underlined many of the differences in opinion between the United States and European NATO members. Finally, it will focus on the controversy around the run up to the war on Iraq and the disagreement between NATO members on this mission. By discussing these events, this section will illustrate the difficult relationship between the U.S. and the other NATO partners and the pressure that this put on the Alliance in the post-9/11 years.

A day after the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York, on September 12, 2001, NATO unanimously voted to invoke Article V. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states that an attack on one of NATO's members constitutes as an attack on them all. The United States was appreciative of this gesture, but turned down any concrete, military aid. This shows from Paul Wolfowitz's comments to the press after meeting with NATO defense ministers in Brussels in September 2001. When he was asked by a reporter whether he was going to ask for collective NATO action, Wolfowitz answers: "We think we had a collective affirmation of support with what [our NATO partners] said with Article V, and if we need collective action we'll ask for it. We don't anticipate that at the moment".¹⁷ In other words, Wolfowitz describes that the U.S. is happy to know that it can count on its NATO partners in the war against terrorism, but does not expect this to be necessary in the foreseeable future. Stephen Meyer argues that this was quite a blow to the European NATO partners. "Washington signaled that it did not need NATO and that the European allies counted for little in the greatest threat to US vital interests since perhaps the attack on Pearl Harbor".¹⁸

Several scholars point out the necessity of viewing this American decision in the right context. Richard Rupp argues that, even though NATO partners had unanimously accepted the invocation of Article V, there were many public and private reservations that some NATO governments expressed before and after the vote in Brussels. There were considerable reservations by the representatives from Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium and Norway. These countries were uneasy adopting a measure that would constitute unbounded support to any U.S. policies in response to the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. was aware of this hesitation and therefore it viewed Europe as

¹⁶ Rupp, *NATO after 9/11*, 92.

¹⁷ Paul Wolfowitz, "Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Press Conference Brussels," September 26, 2001. National Security Archive. <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.

¹⁸ Stephen Meyer, "Carcass of dead Policies," *Parameters* 33 (2003) 94-95.

“a reluctant geopolitical partner,” and was less inclined to take up its offer.¹⁹ In his book *The End of Alliances*, Rajan Menon adds to this that while “[the invocation of Article V] was a display of solidarity, the reality was that this amounted to symbolism. NATO had little to offer by way of firepower in support of the American war against the Taliban regime.”²⁰ Sebastiaan Reyn also argues that the U.S. had considerable, strategic reasons not to give NATO a central role in the Afghan campaign. The U.S. needed to act quickly in a region in which NATO had never expressed any deep interest. The U.S. therefore chose to consider the invocation of Article V as gesture of political solidarity and not of real military aid.²¹

This suggests that the U.S. decision not to take up NATO’s offer of support through the invocation of Article V, was based on strategic considerations. The U.S. was not fully convinced that its NATO partners were actually willing to put their personal doubts aside and fully support the U.S. in its mission to fight terrorism. Also, NATO simply had little to offer and little experience in fighting in remote locations, and was therefore not considered a very valuable partner. This provides an explanation for the U.S. response to the invocation of Article V, but, still, it is clear that this event severely tested the relationship between NATO partners.

On January 29, 2002 President Bush held his second State of the Union Address. This address would later become known as the “Axis of Evil Speech.” In this speech, Bush mentions North Korea, Iran and Iraq and declares that these nations “constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.” Later on in the speech he states: “Our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun.”²² Especially this last statement caused frustration with many NATO allies in Europe and North America. It indicated that the war on terror was to be a broader mission than expected and that other countries would soon be involved. This had been feared for a while, but the speech was the first confirmation of these fears.²³ Besides this fact, which gave European NATO partners much to worry about, the speech also upset the partners for another reason. James Mann states that the allies resented the fact that the President never thanked, or even mentioned, NATO in his State of the Union speech, even though NATO had already shown unprecedented support of the U.S. in the months after 9/11.²⁴

¹⁹ Rupp, *NATO after 9/11*, 97.

²⁰ Rajan Menon, *The end of Alliances* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 98.

²¹ Sebastiaan Reyn, *Allies or Aliens – George W. Bush and the Transatlantic Crisis in Historical Perspective* (Den Haag: Atlantische Commissie, 2007), 167.

²² George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm>

²³ Rupp, *NATO after 9/11*, 94.

²⁴ James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans – The History of Bush’s War Cabinet* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 321.

The relationship between the U.S. and NATO was set off further by this speech for these two reasons. It was the first clear indication that Bush's war on terror would not only be fought in Afghanistan and it did not comment on NATO's efforts at all, making the partners once again feel like they were not needed.

A final moment of tension worth mentioning, occurred during the first months of 2003, when NATO was deadlocked over the Iraq conflict. On January 17, 2003, the U.S. actually requested NATO support on the U.S. proposals for military operations against Iraq. Most members were willing to consider this request and even to respond positively and lend their support. However, some countries, most notably France and Germany, opposed the idea of a war in Iraq. As French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin declared: "We believe that nothing today justifies envisaging military action."²⁵ The situation got heated further when Turkey asked for NATO assistance because it feared an attack on its soil by Iraq. The U.S. encouraged NATO to act and come to the aid of Turkey, a fellow NATO partner. Opponents of any NATO commitment to a war in Iraq argued that the Bush administration was merely using Turkey to trigger a NATO response. They feared that if NATO acted in Turkey, the option of a diplomatic solution to the problems in Iraq would be ruled out once and for all. It turned out that the opponents' suspicions were most likely to have been true. In 2004 a legislative staffer in Washington stated that "We [the U.S.] really were not worried about Saddam Hussein attacking the Turks. We wanted to pressure the Alliance to lend greater support to our overall Iraq policy."²⁶

It is clear that these disagreements concerning Iraq constituted another crisis for NATO. Journalist and scholar Elizabeth Pond is often quoted in calling the crisis over Iraq "NATO's near-death experience." She argues that NATO "faced potential obsolescence at this juncture as some in Washington were so angry at the French, that they were ready to punish Europe by themselves helping to demolish NATO."²⁷ Secretary of State Colin Powell also expressed his concerns about the differences over Iraq, which were differences that touched upon core issues regarding NATO's purpose. Powell warned that these differences could cause the alliance to break up.²⁸ Although it never came to a break up, this again illustrates the serious trouble faced by NATO in these years.

The three moments of serious tension discussed in the section above, illustrate that there were fundamental disagreements between the U.S. and other members of NATO in the post-9/11 years. In the first two examples, the U.S. alienated its European NATO allies by making them feel obsolete in

²⁵ Daalder and Goldgeier, "Global NATO."

²⁶ Rupp, *NATO after 9/11*, 130-134.

²⁷ Webber, "NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan" 52.

²⁸ Rupp, *NATO after 9/11*, 138.

the battle against terrorism. It is remarkable that, in a very short period of time, NATO was first faced with a situation in which the U.S. refused to take up NATO's offer of military assistance, and, shortly after this, it was faced with the situation in which the U.S. requested military assistance, but was not easily granted any. It is difficult to see a pattern in this series of crises, but it is clear that the internal disagreements, particularly between the U.S. and other NATO members, wore on the institution as a whole in the post-9/11 years.

Leaving NATO out?

It is interesting to examine the extent to which the United States was consciously trying to leave NATO out of the war it fought against terrorism after 9/11. From the previous section, it became clear that NATO faced several moments of severe tension in the years after 9/11. The United States played a major role in these events and its vision on what was best for global security often differed from that of its European NATO partners. On the other hand, NATO appears to be high on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, regardless of any disagreements. This shows for example from the fact that, as Bob Woodward describes, Secretary of State Colin Powell already thought about NATO when he was on a plane back to the U.S., only hours after hearing about the 9/11 terrorist attacks. According to Woodward, Powell was scribbling notes to himself, one of them being: "How is the world, the U.S., going to respond to this? What about the United Nations? What about NATO?"²⁹ In this section the question to what extent the U.S. was consciously trying to work outside of the NATO framework in the years 2002-2003 will be answered. Reasons that indicate ongoing faith in NATO will be discussed, as well as reasons indicating the opposite.

At first glance, it may appear to be obvious that the U.S. was consciously not working within the NATO framework when responding to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. As we have seen, NATO was not considered to be the right vehicle to use in fighting the war against terrorism. U.S. foreign policy officials were arguing this already before plans for the War on Terror were even made. The remarks made at a hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations shortly after the war in Kosovo in 1999 are telling. At this occasion professor Eliot Cohen stated: "We are not going to march into the future thinking that NATO is the cohesive military instrument which we can bring to solve all kinds of military issues."³⁰ Several senators also expressed their doubts as to whether NATO should truly be a joint-American-European partnership playing a role in future American military endeavors. Senator

²⁹ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 11.

³⁰ Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2004), 98.

Gordon Smith stated: “It would be a mistake to think of it [NATO] as a really effective war-fighting machine.”³¹

Mark Webber argues that under the Bush Administration, especially during its first term, NATO was regarded in a particularly negative way.³² Sebastiaan Reyn, who typifies the attitude of the Bush administration towards NATO as “essentially aloof,” shares this idea. According to Reyn “[Bush’s] administration has tended to regard the Alliance as an instrument of control over European security affairs rather than as a forum for political consultation or collective military action.”³³ This attitude was reflected in the fact that the U.S., according to Richard Rupp, never seriously considered seeking tangible support from NATO or the individual NATO states in the planning of hostilities in Afghanistan or Iraq. The employment of NATO in these wars was a way to obtain political legitimacy, not a way to get help in the actual war fighting.³⁴ In Afghanistan, NATO eventually did play a large role, especially after the formal command of the operation was shifted to NATO in 2003. However, it is important to note that by the time NATO assumed leadership of the operations, Afghanistan was no longer the central priority for the Bush administration. In 2003 operations had already started in Iraq and Afghanistan was no longer center-stage.³⁵

U.S. foreign policy officials have, on occasion, expressed reasons for their lack of interest in working with NATO. Paul Wolfowitz, for example, argued that there simply was not that much in which European NATO allies could support the U.S. In a roundtable with European journalists in November 2001 he stated: “If anything what we, I think, experience is a little bit of frustration from some of our allies that they’re ready and willing to do things and there aren’t a long list of tasks for which we need a lot of help.”³⁶

This all suggests that the U.S. did not seem to need any NATO assistance in the post-9/11 years, partly because it wasn’t convinced of NATO’s added value. Scholars typify the U.S. approach to NATO as aloof or plain negative. However, as we will see in the following paragraphs, there is another side to this story.

There are many scholars who point towards a continuing U.S. interest in NATO, as opposed to what is suggested above. Mark Webber, for example, though acknowledging that NATO was regarded negatively under the Bush administration, states that the administration was “not entirely indifferent

³¹ Halper and Clarke, *America Alone*, 98.

³² Webber, “NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan,” 47.

³³ Reyn, *Allies or Aliens*, 165.

³⁴ Rupp, *NATO after 9/11*, 125.

³⁵ Jussi M. Hanhimäki, et al. *Transatlantic Relations since 1945: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 157.

³⁶ Paul Wolfowitz, “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Roundtable with European Journalists,” 27 November, 2001. National Security Archive: <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.

to NATO's fortunes".³⁷ James Mann even goes as far as to point out the fact that when Bush was campaigning for the presidency, he mentioned "a strong NATO" as a priority in one of his speeches.³⁸ According to Mann, Bush definitely did not flatly rule out working through international institutions such as NATO from the start.

The fact that the Alliance did get involved in several aspects of the war against terrorism after 9/11, indicates that NATO was not completely out of the picture for the U.S. As Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay pointed out, the war in Afghanistan did eventually enjoy broad international support, after the U.S. initially rejected offers of help.³⁹ Richard Rupp, though acknowledging that the U.S. decided to keep NATO's overall involvement in the operations in Afghanistan limited, also points out that the U.S. actually requested numerous smaller NATO contributions at this time. The U.S. did work with the Alliance in requesting the deployment of surveillance aircrafts to the U.S. between October 2001 and April 2002 and in requesting NATO controlled ships to be dispatched to the Eastern Mediterranean sea.⁴⁰ NATO granted both of these requests and was thus involved in the U.S. mission against terrorism, albeit not in ground operations in Afghanistan.

Steven Meyer, himself convinced that NATO no longer serves a clear purpose in the post-Cold War World, takes the idea that the U.S. still works with NATO a step further. According to him "the current Bush Administration [...] has remained staunchly committed to NATO and its expansion". Meyer bases this on, amongst other things, the fact that at the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002, all of the Alliance's serious problems were "ignored, downplayed, or glossed over."⁴¹ According to Meyer, NATO is the "the security institution that best exemplifies the static world the U.S. prefers," and therefore the U.S. will cling to the Alliance and "continue to manufacture complicated, ineffective, even deleterious mechanisms to 'prove' NATO's importance."⁴² Meyer would probably consider the ways in which the U.S. involved NATO in its efforts against terrorism in 2002-2003 as attempts to prove NATO's ongoing relevance. In any case, he argues that during these years the Bush administration was definitely not attempting to work its way around NATO.

This then suggests that one identify more than just an American rejection of NATO efforts in the years 2002-2003. While it is clear that the U.S. preferred to keep the control of the war against terrorism in its own hands, requests for support were made to NATO on several occasions. NATO was not flatly ruled out as a partner; according to Meyer, it was even deliberately included in anti-terrorism missions in order to stress its continuing relevance.

³⁷ Webber, "NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan" 47.

³⁸ Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 258.

³⁹ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 116-117.

⁴⁰ Rupp, *NATO after 9/11*, 102.

⁴¹ Meyer, "Carcass of dead Policies," 85.

⁴² Meyer, "Carcass of dead Policies," 95.

The U.S. attitude towards NATO in the years 2002-2003 cannot be considered a purely positive or negative one. It is therefore interesting to pay attention here to the several nuanced views on this subject that scholars have expressed. Two general ideas will be discussed here. The first is the idea that the U.S. was willing to work with NATO, but only if it was able to create different coalitions with NATO member states, for different missions. The second is the idea that the U.S. was convinced that NATO needed a transformation, before it felt confident to execute missions in cooperation with NATO.

The Bush administration displayed, as we have seen in the previous chapters of his research, a tendency towards unilateralism. According to Joseph Nye, the “new unilateralists” of the 21st century “tend to prefer alliance a la carte and to treat international institutions as toolboxes into which U.S. policymakers can reach when convenient.”⁴³ In the years 2002-2003 one sees that the U.S. is reluctant to engage NATO as a whole in its missions, but willing to ask specific NATO members that have expressed support for the American cause to work with them on certain missions. The U.S. engages in creating so-called coalitions of the willing. When the progress of the war in Afghanistan and the question of getting other nations involved were discussed at a National Security Council meeting at the end of 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that: “we’d like three or four countries to go in, not the U.N., not NATO, but a unified command. [...] It might be some sort of a coalition of the willing.”⁴⁴

It seems that U.S. foreign policy makers saw the support that NATO granted them through the invocation of Article V in this light. At a press conference in September 2001, Paul Wolfowitz made the following statement: “We got something very important when NATO invoked article 5, and this gives us a very powerful basis for a variety of individual requests we’re making of individual countries.”⁴⁵ This strongly suggests that the U.S. was not interested in involving NATO as an institution in its post-9/11 missions, but it did see opportunities in making requests to individual countries. In remarks made en route from Brussels on September 27, 2001, Wolfowitz comments on his attempts to explain this strategy to his European counterparts. “I thought there was a lot of understanding for the idea that this is a different kind – that we are not talking about one grand coalition, that we’re talking about flexible coalitions. I think very much it was understood and appreciated.”⁴⁶ Condoleezza Rice describes this U.S. strategy as well, when stating the following in a briefing to the press in May 2002: “when you look at it, member states of NATO, not as NATO qua-

⁴³ Joseph Nye, “U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs* 82, no.4 (2003): 67-68.

⁴⁴ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 306.

⁴⁵ Paul Wolfowitz, “Press Conference Brussels,” September 26, 2001. National Security Archive: <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.

⁴⁶ Paul Wolfowitz, “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz En Route from Brussels after attending NATO meetings,” September 27, 2001. <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.proxy.library.uu.nl/nsa/documents/TE/01312/all.pdf>

NATO, but member states of NATO, now play an increasingly important role in the coalition's efforts [in fighting terrorism]."⁴⁷ These statements clearly illustrate the American approach to NATO: viewing it not as one coalition, but as a collection of nations to choose from in making coalitions for specific missions.

In the years 2002-2003 U.S. foreign policy officials emphasized that they were interested in involving NATO in its operations, on the condition that NATO would transform itself in the light of a new, anti-terrorism agenda. As Mark Webber argues: "After 9/11, administration officials – the Afghan adventure notwithstanding – continued to regard NATO as a central plank of US strategy; now, however, with the important caveat that the alliance should be transformed in light of this emerging agenda."⁴⁸ The U.S. saw a role for itself in making sure that NATO would transform into the right direction. Foreign policy officials of the Bush administration criticized former President Clinton because he had been too willing to follow his European counterparts and not bold enough to lead them. Daalder and Lindsay quote George W. Bush, stating in January 2000 that "[f]or NATO to be strong, cohesive and active, the President must give it consistent direction: on the alliance's purpose; on Europe's need to invest more in defense capabilities; and, when necessary in military conflict."⁴⁹ It was Bush's conviction that the U.S. needed to play the leading role within NATO, in order to make the organization fitting to U.S. foreign policy objectives.

This idea, that the U.S. considered it necessary for NATO to transform in order to truly become suitable in combating the challenges of the 21st century, can also be identified in statements made by U.S. foreign policy officials. Condoleezza Rice stated the following in a May 2002 press briefing, commenting on Afghanistan: "It took some adaptation, even on the part of the American Armed Forces, to figure out how to fight a war in this terrorist haven, marrying up horses with 21st century air power. [...] And you would like, with the next time that we have to deal with a terrorist safe haven, for NATO to have the same kind of conversation. And I think the President will press that agenda."⁵⁰ What she argues is that the U.S. will encourage NATO to transform so that the organization would, in a next event similar to the war in Afghanistan, be a valuable military partner. Donald Rumsfeld stated in a press conference that many ways of strengthening NATO for the challenges ahead had been discussed at a meeting with NATO defense ministers in December 2001. The measures discussed included: "improving the capabilities that members bring to the alliance, bringing in new members, and addressing older missions, so that we can take on new ones in the war

⁴⁷ Condoleezza Rice, "Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice on the Presidents' Trip to Europe and Russia," May 20, 2002. The American Presidency Project.

⁴⁸ Webber, "NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan," 52.

⁴⁹ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 38.

⁵⁰ Condoleezza Rice, "Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice on the Presidents' Trip to Europe and Russia."

on terrorism.”⁵¹ In 2001 Paul Wolfowitz commented on his efforts to convince his European counterparts to invest more in defense and international security. After attending NATO meetings in Brussels in September he stated that he “made the pitch that this was a wakeup call for us about the importance of investing adequately and providing for security.” Later he argued that “one senses the consensus that NATO, and the countries particularly, need to increase their efforts in the counter-terrorism area, which is something we’ve been lobbying for some time.”⁵²

From these quotations it becomes clear that Rice, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz considered it a U.S. task to convince European NATO-partners of the importance of the war against terrorism, even though the fighting of this war was, in the first place, an American mission. Foreign policy officials do see a place for NATO in this mission, but they do not hide the fact that NATO-transformation is necessary in order to upgrade the alliance’s capabilities to the desired level.

The section above has demonstrated that the U.S. consciously attempted not to work with NATO in its post-9/11 undertakings, but on the other hand, it has also suggested that U.S. foreign policy officials saw a continuing need for cooperation with NATO. The section ended by presenting more nuanced views on the American stance towards NATO in the post-9/11 years. These nuanced ideas are most likely closest to the truth. The section suggests that the U.S. was keen on keeping the final control of its efforts against terrorism in its own hands. The idea of sharing responsibilities for the war in Afghanistan as a whole was rejected, but requests were made for NATO assistance on certain aspects of the war. Also, the U.S. was unwilling to engage NATO as an institution, but they were more comfortable viewing NATO as a “toolbox” from which they could pick and choose their coalition partners for different missions. One may conclude, then, that the U.S. was not consciously trying to work around NATO, but it made a conscious effort to work with NATO on terms defined by the U.S., which limited the cooperation to a certain extent.

Changes within NATO

In this final section the focus will be on the policy changes that occurred within NATO in the years 2002-2003. From the section above it became clear that U.S. foreign policy officials pushed for NATO transformation in the years after 9/11. It would be interesting to find out to what extent the U.S. was able to push NATO in the direction it preferred. This section will therefore examine the ways in which NATO changed in the years 2002-2003, and the extent to which the U.S. had lobbied for these changes. In doing so, it not only aims to examine the changes that NATO has gone through post-9/11,

⁵¹ Secretary Rumsfeld, “News Briefing in Brussels after meeting with NATO defense ministers,” December 18, 2001. National Security Archive: <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.

⁵² Wolfowitz, “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz En Route from Brussels after attending NATO meetings.”

but it will also provide insight in the extent to which U.S. preferences influenced the changes in NATO's policy.

According to Mark Webber, NATO underwent quite a transformation between 2001 and 2008. He argues that the transformation was shaped, "in large measure by the preference of American foreign policy."⁵³ Webber mentions an increase in NATO membership and an 'upgrade' of NATO's military capabilities through the creation of a Rapid Action Force as two major changes in NATO policies that were in line with U.S. foreign policy preferences. Both of these transformations will be discussed in this section. Furthermore, the idea of splitting the different tasks of global security over different NATO member states will be discussed. Besides focusing on new policies that were enacted by NATO, attention will also be given to changes that did *not* occur, despite U.S. lobbying.

At NATO's summit in Prague, in November 2002, a number of transformative changes were enacted, one of them involving NATO expansion. Seven new members were accepted into the Alliance at this summit. According to the official Prague Summit Declaration, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks to join the Alliance. The declaration also stated that "NATO's door will remain open to European democracies willing able to assume the responsibilities of membership."⁵⁴

The Bush administration had been lobbying for NATO expansion since it took office in 2001. In his remarks following discussions with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson in April 2002, President Bush stated that "[NATO] must take on new members, securing freedom from the Baltic to the Black Sea."⁵⁵ Bush was pushing for a globalized NATO. The reasoning behind this was that in a globalized world, with global problems, a truly global alliance was necessary to guarantee international security.⁵⁶ In an address to the Atlantic Student Summit in Prague, a few days before the 2002 NATO summit, Bush comments on the U.S. stance on expansion once more. He stated that: "Because America supports a more united Europe, we strongly support the enlargement of NATO, now and in the future. Every European democracy that seeks NATO membership and is ready to share in NATO's responsibilities should be welcome in our Alliance."⁵⁷ Bush argues that NATO enlargement is good for the current members as well as for those who join. It is good to encourage

⁵³ Webber, "NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan" 53.

⁵⁴ "Prague Summit Declaration," Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting on November 21, 2002. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>

⁵⁵ George W. Bush, "Remarks following Discussion with secretary General Lord Roberston of NATO," April 9, 2002.

⁵⁶ Daalder and Goldgeier, "Global NATO."

⁵⁷ George W. Bush, "Remarks to the Prague Atlantic Student Summit," November 20, 2002. The American Presidency Project: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu>.

nations to work hard in order to meet the standards for membership and “every new member contributes military capabilities that add to our common security,” according to Bush.⁵⁸

However, the U.S. objective of enlargement was initially met with much resistance by the European NATO members. They worried that the Bush administration was pushing for another round of NATO enlargement only so that Washington would be increasingly able to pick and choose its allies in a crisis or mission under the pretext of working with NATO. European NATO states were, as Sherle Schwenninger argues, afraid that the U.S. was looking for “a way to put a multilateral face on American unilateralism.”⁵⁹

The eventual acceptance of new members by NATO in 2002 cannot solely be attributed to the Bush administration’s lobbying, because the discussion about NATO enlargement predates the Bush administration and the U.S. was pushing for enlargement already in the 1990’s, under President Bill Clinton.⁶⁰ However, in a report to Congress by Paul E. Gallis, working for the Congressional Research Service, it is argued that the terrorist attacks of September 11 had an effect on the enlargement debate. After 9/11, “a likely part of the enlargement debate will be on how prospective members might contribute to the conflict against terrorism.”⁶¹ It seems that the timing of the Bush administration’s push for enlargement had an effect on the eventual acceptance of new NATO members in 2002. In any case, the above suggests that the decision to include seven more members in the Alliance very much pleased the Bush administration, because it fitted the vision of a strengthened NATO, more capable of providing international security.

At the same NATO summit in Prague in 2002, another fundamental change was enacted: the agreement to create a ‘rapid action force’ named the NATO Response Force (NRF). The participants of the NATO summit state in their joint declaration that the NRF will consist of a “technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed”. The NRF would be fully operational by October 2006.⁶² The NRF was part of a comprehensive package of measures that NATO approved “recalling the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and our subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.” It is clear then, that the NRF was designed as a tool to combat post-9/11 challenges, including global terrorism.

⁵⁸ George W. Bush, “Remarks to the Prague Atlantic Student Summit.”

⁵⁹ Sherle R. Schwenninger, “Bush’s Globalized NATO,” *The Nation* 237, no.21 (2001), 26.

⁶⁰ James M. Goldgeier, *Not Whether But When: The U.S. decision to enlarge NATO*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 45.

⁶¹ Paul E. Gallis, “CRS Report for Congress on NATO Enlargement,” May 5, 2003, 2.

⁶² “Prague Summit Declaration,” Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting on November 21, 2002. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>

The U.S., and the Bush administration in particular, had encouraged NATO for some time to develop more effective ways to combat terrorism. Though many NATO governments had been victims of political terrorism, the Alliance members showed a degree of reluctance to use NATO for counter-terrorism purposes.⁶³ After 9/11, it seems that this reluctance diminished to a certain extent. In the Summit Declaration published after the Prague summit one reads the following: "Terrorism, which we categorically reject and condemn in all its forms and manifestations, poses a grave and growing threat to Alliance populations, forces and territory, as well as to international security. We are determined to combat this scourge for as long as necessary."⁶⁴ This illustrates that combating terrorism has become an important NATO goal.

As part of a counter-terrorism strategy, the U.S. had been encouraging NATO to create a rapid action force in the months leading up to Prague summit in 2002. In the U.S. 2002 National Security Strategy a reform agenda designed to improve NATO's capabilities in out-of-area operations and anti-terror missions was formulated.⁶⁵ Furthermore, when Donald Rumsfeld met with NATO defense ministers in November 2002, he stated that, "if NATO does not have a force that is quick and agile, which can deploy in days or weeks instead of months or years, then it will not have much to offer the world of the 21st century."⁶⁶ The fact that the plans for the NRF were presented one month later, suggests that Rumsfeld had been able to convince his European counterparts. The creation of the NATO Response Force was, in any case, another NATO transformation welcomed by U.S. foreign policy officials, who believed it was necessary to 'update' NATO's military capabilities.

A final concept playing a role in discussions about NATO in the years 2002-2003 is the idea of splitting up the several tasks within the field of international security that need to be addressed over different NATO partners. In other words, the idea is to let countries invest in what they are best at. No formal decisions have been made about this issue at the 2002 NATO summit in Prague or elsewhere as of yet. It seems clear though, that the Bush administration saw many advantages to this concept. According to Sherle Schwenninger, "if the Bush administration has its way, [...] NATO would entail a clearer division of labor between Europe and the United States: a NATO in which the Europeans assume more responsibility for post-cold war peacekeeping and nation-building in the Balkans, while the U.S. is given a mandate to act outside the region against supposedly common enemies [...]"⁶⁷

The period 2002-2003 illustrates that the U.S. not only saw a role for its European NATO partners in post-conflict operations and nation-building in the Balkans, but in other parts of the

⁶³ Rupp, *NATO after 9/11*, 95.

⁶⁴ "Prague Summit Declaration," November 21, 2002.

⁶⁵ Rupp, *NATO after 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline*, 112-113.

⁶⁶ Rupp, *NATO after 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline*, 118.

⁶⁷ Schwenninger, "Bush's Globalized NATO," 27.

world as well. While, as Richard Rupp states, the U.S. was “particularly adamant about not allowing NATO any say in the military campaign [in Afghanistan], fearing a repeat of the war-by-committee it found itself fighting against the former Yugoslavia [1999]”, this situation changed once the military campaign came to an end.⁶⁸ As Mark Webber argues, after the Taliban had been removed from power in Afghanistan, “the U.S. did see the virtues of a NATO role in the more protracted business of stabilizing the country”.⁶⁹ It seems that this became reality in August 2003, when NATO took over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan.

After the initial fight in Iraq was over, a comparable situation occurred. U.S. foreign policy officials saw a role for NATO in post-Saddam Iraq, in stabilizing the country and in post-conflict nation building. The European NATO-states however, rather saw the U.N. dealing with these issues. Secretary of State Colin Powell traveled to Brussels in April 2003 to discuss the matter. He raised the prospect of dispatching NATO peacekeeping units to Iraq in the future.⁷⁰ The U.S. was faced with considerable resistance to this idea. In a 2004 report on “Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations” the Congressional Research Service states that “although the Bush Administration has hoped that NATO would take over, news reports indicate that the earliest this might occur would be after elections that may occur at the end of 2004 or early 2005.” It is clear that U.S. officials were disappointed with the fact that in Iraq, peacekeeping could not be delegated to NATO.

This all suggests that U.S. foreign policy officials under the Bush administration were lobbying for a division of labor within NATO. Their lobby appears to have been partly successful in the years 2002-2003, given that NATO did assume responsibility for peace-keeping and nation building in Afghanistan after the Taliban was removed from power, but did not step up in post-Saddam Iraq.

It is important to note, finally, that the U.S. was not always successful in lobbying for policies or concepts to be implemented in NATO in the years 2002-2003. Under President Bush, the U.S. indicated on several occasions that the European NATO members should increase their budgets for defense spending in order to maintain, or improve, NATO’s strength as an institution. The statements by Paul Wolfowitz in Brussels in September 2001, shortly after the attacks of 9/11, can be considered an example of this. At this occasion, Wolfowitz stated that “if it is a matter of spending money to forestall the horrible surprises that we saw two weeks ago, [...] we should think about the thousands of people who died.” Later he added that “It doesn’t mean that you can solve these problems by throwing money at them, but we shouldn’t say that we can’t afford what we need to do.”⁷¹ In other words, Wolfowitz argued that the money needed to guarantee international security, should be

⁶⁸ Rupp, *NATO after 9/11*, 27.

⁶⁹ Webber, “NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan” 55.

⁷⁰ Rupp, *NATO after 9/11*, 139.

⁷¹ Wolfowitz, “Press Conference Brussels.”

mobilized for this cause. One may interpret these statements as a subtle way to urge European NATO partners to set their reservations overboard and increase their investments in (inter)national security.

These pleas appear to have had some effect, because at the Prague summit in 2002, all the allies pledged to improve their existing military capabilities and made an informal promise to meet the two percent gross national product spending level for national defense that the U.S. had requested.⁷² However, as of recently this goal has not been met. In 2011, out of 26 NATO members, only 4 spend 2% or more on their national defense.⁷³ This issue therefore continues to be a “sore point in the United States-European relations” within NATO.⁷⁴

The section above discussed how NATO underwent several major changes in the years 2002-2003. The U.S. welcomed and often initiated many of these changes. To a certain extent U.S. foreign policy preferences seem to have influenced the changes within NATO in these years. For example, the U.S. pushed for a rapid action force, which was promptly initiated at the 2002 NATO summit in Prague. Here, we clearly see that U.S. encouragement had an immediate effect on the implementation of a change in NATO policy. Still, though not all changes happened only because the U.S. lobbied for them and some U.S.-preferred policies never came through at all, it is clear that there are examples of new NATO policies in 2002-2003 that fit the American vision of a transformed NATO.

Conclusion

This chapter centered on the contradiction that the U.S. on the one hand expressed continuing faith in NATO in the years after 9/11, while, on the other hand, it was reluctant in involving NATO in the actual missions that were executed in these years. The aim of this chapter was to find out in what way the U.S. interacted with NATO and to what extent there was willingness to commit to the Alliance. Also, the chapter aimed to find out whether long-term U.S. policy preferences influenced NATO's development in the post-9/11 years.

In order to answer these questions the chapter started out with an overview of NATO's history, which illustrated that this history is characterized by conflicts between its members and by NATO's capability to overcome these conflicts. This section also suggested that the U.S. has always considered its own role within NATO to be a dominant one, which led the U.S. unwilling to reconsider

⁷² Hendrickson, “The Miscalculation of NATO's Death,” 105.

⁷³ Jonathan Dowdall, “As Europe Wakes to Defense Spending Shortfall, NATO Risks Losing US Investment”, *Defense Dateline Group*, March 14, 2011, <http://www.defenceiq.com/defence-technology/articles/as-nato-wakes-to-defence-spending-shortfall-intern/>

⁷⁴ Hendrickson, “The Miscalculation of NATO's Death,” 105.

its own objectives in the light of NATO's goals. The chapter continued to suggest that the years 2002-2003 formed another period in which the relationship between the U.S. and NATO got severely tested. The disagreements between the U.S. and other NATO-partners touched upon core issues about NATO's purpose, and therefore seriously affected the organization in a negative way during the post-9/11 years.

Whether the U.S. was consciously trying to work around NATO in the post-9/11 years cannot be fully confirmed or denied, as we have seen in this chapter. The truth seems to be more nuanced. In the years 2002-2003, the U.S. did not turn away from NATO, but regarded the institution as a 'toolbox' from which it could pick and choose nations to form coalitions with. The U.S. was not interested in working with NATO as a whole, but turned to NATO-partners to form "coalitions of the willing." Also, the U.S. considered it necessary for NATO to transform in fundamental ways before it could be a viable partner in combating the post-9/11 challenges. The final section of this chapter illustrated that NATO underwent many changes in 2002-2003, many of which were encouraged by the U.S. It seems that the U.S. was able to steer NATO into becoming more like the transformed organization that the U.S. envisioned.

In short, this chapter suggests that the relationship between the U.S. and NATO faced many challenges in the years 2002-2003. However, it also illustrates that cooperation between the U.S. and NATO never came to a full stop. While reluctant to involve NATO in the grand-strategy of the war against terrorism in the post-9/11 years, the U.S. did make numerous requests to NATO and is working with NATO partners on several issues. The U.S. is not consciously working around NATO, but willing to work with NATO on its own terms. Finally, the U.S. made an effort to influence the path of NATO's development in order to shape NATO into an organization more suited to achieve the U.S. foreign policy goals in 2002-2003.

Conclusion

This thesis aimed to analyze which ideological considerations have shaped the U.S. position towards NATO in the years 2002-2003. The first two chapters have explored the ideology that shaped the view of the Bush administration's foreign policy officials on the U.S. role in the world and on the relationship with Europe. The third chapter examined the U.S. policy regarding NATO, enabling the reader to see whether the ideological framework outlined in the first two chapters had an effect on these policy decisions.

The first chapter of this thesis concludes that a unilateral approach to global affairs was preferred by the Bush administration in 2002-2003. The Bush administration was keen on maintaining full control over its global endeavors and therefore not easily inclined to opt for a multilateral approach, in which other nations or institutions would have a say in its plans as well. This thesis suggests that an explanation for this unilateral behavior can be found in the U.S.'s sense of exceptionalism. The foreign policy officials of the Bush administration had a strong belief in America's unique standing in the world and a profound trust in U.S. capabilities. The U.S. was on a special mission after 9/11, one that only the U.S. itself was capable of accomplishing. Finally, the chapter suggested that the strong belief in the importance of military power, held by most notable foreign policy advisors in the Bush administration, had an influence on the way the U.S. saw the world and its own role in it. All these factors taken together, lead to the conclusion that the Bush administration adhered to an hegemonist ideology, which contends that America's exceptional power and the willingness to wield it, even if other nations object, is key to America's foreign policy. The chapter suggested that ideological considerations related to hegemonism influenced the way in which policy officials thought the U.S. should act on the global stage.

The second chapter focused on the way the U.S. saw Europe in 2002-2003. First of all the hypothesis, that a shift in Washington towards a less European-minded foreign policy elite was one of the reasons for a critical U.S. stance towards Europe, was tested. The chapter suggested that the less-European minded Western and Southern regions did in fact gain influence in U.S. domestic politics, which had negative implications for the interest in working with European nations. However, a connection between place of origin and policy towards Europe could not be identified for all foreign policy officials. The chapter also suggested that the influence of anti-European ideas held by the neoconservative branch within the Bush administration, was considerable. Neoconservative thinking, inspired by the profound wish to differentiate from Europe, fostered anti-European ideas, which, through several channels, managed to influence the more mainstream policy regarding the U.S. relationship to Europe. The effect of neoconservative thinking on the relationship with Europe in

2002-2003 was therefore considerable. Finally, the chapter suggested that the policy towards Europe is part of the battle between Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Every Republican administration, including that of George W. Bush, is inclined to condemn European values to a certain extent, to oppose the 'European' ideas of Democrats.

It became clear from the first two chapters that several fundamental ideological considerations shaped the American view on Europe in the years 2002-2003. It is interesting to assess whether the ideological foundation shaping U.S. foreign policy in 2002-2003 consists of long-term tendencies, that have been present in U.S. policy-making for decades or even centuries, or whether they are relatively new ideas, influenced by current events. The ideological concepts discussed in the first two chapters, suggest that the foreign policy at this time was shaped by ideological concepts that long predate the Bush administration. The fear to get entangled in international organizations, the idea that the U.S. is exceptional, the Republican tendency to discredit European nations; they are all examples of ideological concepts deeply rooted in the American mind. What is interesting though, is that the period 2002-2003 illustrates the intensifying effect of a devastating event such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 9/11 intensified the ideas that already existed. It, for instance, led president Bush to connect Christian values to the idea of exceptionalism, causing the war against terrorism to become a battle of good against evil. Other nations either had to be completely on the American side, or they were joining the 'evil' side. A complex organization such as NATO, representing different nations with different ideas, therefore was not the right vehicle to fight this battle, according to the U.S.

9/11 also served as proof to U.S. policy makers that the system of international law and international organizations was no guarantee for a safer world. The U.S. regained belief in the idea that the world was a dangerous place, and that the U.S. itself was best equipped to deal with that. 9/11 caused the shift towards a more unilateral approach, which had been in the making for some time, to speed up considerably. Again, an international organization such as NATO was at this point not considered the best partner to combat the challenges faced.

It is interesting to turn to the academic discussion mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, about whether or not George W. Bush's policies were revolutionary. This thesis has indicated that the effects of 9/11 heavily influenced the U.S. policy in the period 2002-2003. Ideologies that had been leading American politics for years were intensified. This leads to the conclusion that Bush was not a particularly revolutionary president, he was simply in charge during an exceptional period.

Regarding the relationship to Europe, this thesis suggested that there are some indications that Bush's personal background and personal values influenced a more negative view on Europe. At the same time, while campaigning he promised to give more attention to the long-standing trans-Atlantic relationship. It would therefore be wrong to argue that Bush himself had revolutionary

foreign policy ideas, in particular regarding the relationship with Europe. This thesis suggests that if any of his policies, for instance his unilateral approach to foreign affairs, seem 'revolutionary' in hindsight, this was caused by the exceptional post-9/11 situation the U.S. was in under his presidency.

In short then, this thesis suggests that U.S. foreign policy in 2002-2003, including the policy regarding Europe and NATO, was shaped by several ideological concepts that have influenced American policy for a very long time, but were intensified by the challenges the U.S. faced at the time, following 9/11.

The final chapter of this thesis turned to the U.S. policy regarding NATO. The aim of this chapter was to examine the way in which the U.S. interacted, or, indeed, refused to interact, with NATO in facing the global challenges after 9/11. The chapter offered a historical overview of NATO and the American relationship with the Alliance, which illustrated that NATO's history is characterized by conflicts between its members and by the capability to overcome these conflicts. The years 2002-2003 formed no exception to this. The chapter concludes that it is not possible to confirm or deny the idea that the U.S. consciously tried to work around NATO. The chapter made clear that the U.S. did not completely turn away from the organization, but was reluctant to involve the Alliance as a whole in its missions. It rather worked with separate NATO members who were supportive of a certain mission. The U.S. also considered it necessary for NATO to transform in fundamental ways, before the organization would be considered a viable partner in protecting international security. The chapter finally suggested that the U.S., by influencing the policy transformations that NATO went through in the years following 9/11, tried to shape the organization into one that was more suited to the U.S. foreign policy goals. So, in short, the chapter suggested that the U.S. was not working around NATO in 2002-2003, but the willingness to work with NATO depended on NATO's ability to reform itself according to U.S. standards.

It is possible to see the connections between the ideological background of U.S. foreign policy, as outlined in the first two chapters, and the concrete policy regarding NATO in 2002-2003. This thesis for instance suggested that the U.S. was inclined to act unilaterally in these years, partly because it was convinced of its own exceptional place in the world. The U.S. simply did not think it was necessary to ask others for help, let alone a complex organization such as NATO, because it would mean that they would lose control to a certain extent. This can be seen as a reason for the American hesitation in involving NATO in the fight against terrorism post-9/11. This thesis also illustrated that domestic changes within the U.S. and a considerable neoconservative influence in its politics, caused anti-European ideas and policies to become more mainstream in the post-9/11 years. This can be considered an explanation for the fact that the U.S. did not immediately turn to its European NATO-

allies after the terrorist attacks of 2001. Europe was simply not front and center on the American map. Since European nations were not expected to provide unconditional support to the American cause, and because the U.S. had little faith in Europe's military capabilities, they refused to fully involve NATO, even after NATO offered its help.

In the first chapter we have seen that the U.S. foreign policy officials in power in 2002-2003, shared a belief in the importance of having and using military force. This seems to have influenced the fact that, as illustrated in chapter 3, the U.S. strongly encouraged individual NATO-members to invest in defense expenditures, and encouraged NATO as a whole to create a rapid action force that would improve NATO's short-term military capabilities. The U.S. projected its own belief in military force onto NATO. The fact that this U.S. conviction was not fully shared by its NATO partners was a source of tension in the relationship.

It is clear then, that the ideological foundation underlying U.S. foreign policy and the relationship with Europe, has immediate effects on the concrete policy regarding NATO in 2002-2003. It illustrates that the American view on NATO at this time, can be traced back to ideological considerations that predate the Bush administration.

The introduction of this thesis expanded on the academic discussion over whether there are fundamental limitations to relationship between the U.S. and Europe, causing the continents to drift apart, or whether there is no indication of a diminishing trans-Atlantic relationship. This thesis suggests that, in fact, the U.S. and European nations have held fundamentally different views on the best way to conduct foreign policy throughout history, especially since the end of the Cold War. While Europeans are more prone to discussion, compromises, and international law, the U.S. is more focused on eliminating threats completely, and willing to accomplish that by themselves if necessary. In the post-9/11 years, domestic developments in the U.S., such as the increasing power of neoconservatives and the growing influence of Southern states, have added to the friction in the trans-Atlantic relationship. Furthermore, the conviction that the world, led by the U.S., had a mission to fight terrorism after 9/11, was not fully shared by Europe, causing the U.S. to become increasingly impatient with its European allies. This thesis does not suggest that there are fundamental, insurmountable differences between the U.S. and Europe, but it does indicate that the two continents do not necessarily share a vision. Furthermore, this thesis indicated that in the years 2002-2003 the friction between the two continents was intensified, as a result of 9/11.

In the introduction, the academic discussion over the future of NATO was mentioned as well. Given the number of European NATO members, this discussion is of course closely linked to the one over the Trans-Atlantic relationship. This thesis has provided different scholarly views on the way the U.S. considered NATO after 9/11. Whereas some sources indicated that the U.S. pulled away from

NATO in these crucial years, this thesis concludes that the more nuanced theories give a more accurate description of the situation at this time. The U.S. did not refuse to work with NATO, but it only wanted to work within the Alliance framework on its own terms. Also, NATO itself adopted new policies that were lobbied for, or at least welcomed by, the U.S. in the years 2002-2003. This indicates that the U.S. still plays a rather dominant role within the organization, and that NATO has the capability to transform itself in order to remain relevant. Returning to the discussion over NATO's continuing relevance, this thesis then suggests that as long as the U.S. is able to steer NATO in the direction it prefers, NATO will continue to be an interesting partner to them. The final chapter of this thesis illustrated that NATO's history is full of conflicts, which were all eventually settled. The years 2002-2003 were no exception to this. Despite sometimes fundamental differences in opinion, NATO never broke up and the U.S. never completely drifted away from the organization. It is important to add though, that the U.S. vision of NATO in the years 2002-2003, differed from the vision some other NATO members had of the organization. The U.S. considers NATO as a collection of states from which it can choose partners in specific missions, showing little interest in engaging NATO as a whole, since that would cause the U.S. to lose too much control over its missions.

In sum, this thesis suggests that several ideological considerations, held by the U.S. foreign policy officials in the period post-9/11, shaped the critical position that the Bush administration held regarding NATO. Unilateralism, exceptionalism, neoconservatism, a belief in military might and changes in domestic policies were identified as ideological concepts that shaped the U.S. policy towards NATO. On the mental map of the world, as held by U.S. foreign policy officials, Europe occupied relatively little space, whereas the U.S. itself took up much, given the important mission it was carrying out on the global stage after 9/11. This led the U.S. to deny NATO a large role in this mission. However, it should be emphasized that NATO certainly did not disappear from America's map altogether. Cooperation still occurred, but the U.S. was continuously careful not to lose control during the years 2002-2003. One might say that as the U.S. was 'going it alone' during these years, it, at the same time, felt comforted by the idea that NATO was there to lend support if absolutely necessary.

This thesis touched upon many ideas and concepts that form interesting subjects for further research. Whereas this thesis concentrated on a short period of time, 2002-2003, it would be interesting to know whether the ideological framework that has been described here, had a continuing effect on the policies in later years, for instance under the Democratic administration of Barack Obama. As we have seen in the introduction, criticism on NATO was still expressed in 2011, by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. It would be interesting to know whether the considerations and ideas shaping the critical stance in 2002-2003, had a continuing effect on the U.S. policy regarding

NATO. Future research focusing on continuations in the policies of the Bush and Obama administrations, would provide us with further insight into the question of whether the ideological considerations were long-term ideas, or whether they arose under the specific circumstances of these years, and disappeared again after this period.

It would also be very interesting to combine the ideological considerations that were outlined in this thesis, with the more realist, strategic motives the U.S. had for working with, or around, NATO in the years 2002-2003. It is unrealistic to think that ideological considerations alone are responsible for creating certain policies. However, the other way around is true as well. As Robert Kaplan argued during a lecture in Amsterdam in November 2012, "Realism without ideology, is simply unrealistic".¹ A combination of both strategic and ideological motives, would therefore lead to the most complete overview of the factors shaping the U.S. policy towards NATO. Future research could also be done into the question of which set of motives was most influential. Were long-term ideological considerations or short-term strategic ones decisive?

Finally, there are possibilities for further research in which the tension between the U.S. and its NATO allies as described in this thesis, is placed in a larger historical perspective. To an extent, this thesis did that by pointing out the history of NATO crises and by giving an overview of the way the U.S. saw its relationship to NATO over the years. It would be interesting to find out whether the crises of 2002-2003 are comparable to the previous NATO crises, in the sense that NATO is capable to overcome the problems and continue on the same path it was on before. One might find that the post-9/11 crisis between NATO and the U.S. has been 'solved', similar to the way in which previous crises were 'solved'. The post-9/11 crisis would then simply be part of a long string of NATO-crisis that occurred since the organization's founding. It is also possible that future research finds that this crisis was different, because the reasons behind it were more fundamental and the frustrations on both sides ran so deep that a 'solution' was not achievable. If the latter would be the case, it would mean that the tensions between NATO and the U.S. in 2002-2003 indicated a real, perhaps long-term change in the relationship. Future research, in which the post-9/11 crisis between NATO and the U.S. is put in historical perspective, can provide insight into the exceptionalism of the situation post-9/11.

¹ Robert Kaplan, "The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate", book presentation given in Amsterdam, November 15, 2012.

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