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THE DYNAMICS OF
SECURITY PROVISION
IN THE AFTERMATH
OF WAR

Rens C. Willems

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The Dynamics of Security Provision in the Aftermath of War

How international efforts to contribute to security in post-settlement countries relate to national and local perceptions and practices of security

De Dynamiek van Veiligheidsvoorziening in de Nasleep van Oorlog

Hoe internationale inspanningen om bij te dragen aan veiligheid in gebieden waar een vredesakkoord is gesloten zich verhouden tot nationale en lokale percepties en praktijken van veiligheid
(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

Proefschrift

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List of Abbreviations

ACIAR	<i>Appui à la Communication Interculturelle et à l'Autopromotion Rurale</i>
ACD-Ikibiri	<i>Alliance Démocratique pour le Changement-Ikibiri</i>
AFDL	<i>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo</i>
AGR	<i>Activités Génératrices de Revenus</i>
ALPN	<i>Action de Lutte Contre la Pauvreté et Protection de la Nature</i>
APPM	Armed Political Parties and Movement
AU	African Union
AVR	Armed Violence
BINUB	<i>Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi</i>
BNUB	<i>Bureau des Nations Unies au Burundi</i>
CAR	Central African Republic
CCDC	<i>Comité Communal de Développement Communautaire</i>
CCS	Centre for Conflict Studies
CDCPA	<i>Commission de Désarmement Civil et de lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes légères</i>
CDJP	<i>Commission Diocésaine Justice et Paix</i>
CEDAC	<i>Centre d'Encadrement et de Développement Des Anciens Combattants</i>
CENI	<i>Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante</i>
CES	Central Equatoria State
CIC	<i>Centre d'Initiative et de Créativité pour la Promotion Rurale</i>
CICAM	Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management
CNDD-FDD	<i>Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Défense de la Démocratie</i>
CNDP	<i>Congrès National pour la Défense de la Peuple</i>
CNDRR	<i>Commission National de Démobilisation, Réinsertion et Réintégration</i>
CONADER	<i>Commission Nationale du Désarmement, de la Démobilisation et de la Réinsertion</i>
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CRC	<i>Centre Résolution Conflit</i>
CRU	Conflict Research Unit (of the Clingendael Institute)
CSAC	Community Security and Arms Control
DCR	Disarmament and Community Reinsertion
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development

DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECC	<i>Eglise du Christ au Congo</i>
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EES	Easter Equatoria State
EU	European Union
FAB	<i>Forces Armées du Burundi</i>
FAC	<i>Forces Armées Congolaises</i>
FAR	<i>Forces Armées Rwandaise</i>
FARDC	<i>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</i>
FAZ	<i>Forces Armées Zairoises</i>
FDLR	<i>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</i>
FDNB	<i>Forces des Défenses Nationales de Burundi</i>
FNL	<i>Forces Nationales de Libération</i> (previously: Palipehutu-FNL)
FOMI	<i>Forum des Mamans de l'Ituri</i>
FRODEBU	<i>Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi</i>
GFN-SSR	Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HCSS	The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IL	<i>Initiatives Locales</i>
ILP	<i>Initiatives Locales de Paix</i>
ILSC	<i>Initiatives Locales de Sécurité Communautaire</i>
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITS	<i>Indemnité Transitoire de Subsistance</i>
JJC	Joint Cease-fire Commission
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MLC	<i>Mouvement de Libération du Congo</i>
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDRP	Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
MSD	<i>Mouvement pour la Solidarité et la Démocratie</i>
NDC	Nduma Defence for Congo
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

OAG	<i>Observatoire de l'Action Gouvernementale</i>
OCSE	Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONUB	<i>Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi</i>
PADI	<i>Programme d'Action pour le Développement Intégré</i>
PNB	<i>Police Nationale du Burundi</i>
PNDDR	<i>Programme National de Désarmement, de la Démobilisation et de la Réinsertion (in DRC)</i>
PSDN	Peace Security and Development Network
RCD	<i>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</i>
RCD-K-ML	<i>RCD-Kisangani-Mouvement de Libération</i>
RCD-N	<i>RCD-National</i>
RHA	<i>Réseaux Haki na Amani</i>
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SALW	Small Arms and Light
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SNG	Special Needs Group
SPLA/M	Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement
SSANSA	South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Forces
SSPS	Southern Sudan Police Service
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TDRP	Transitional Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
UE-PNDDR	<i>Unité d'Exécution du Programme National de Désarmement, de la Démobilisation et de la Réinsertion</i>
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN IAWG	United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UPDF	Ugandan People's Defence Force
UPRONA	<i>Union pour le Progrès National</i>
WAAFG	Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups
WES	Western Equatoria State

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Introduction: A Chivalric Quest

“I am sensible and certain of my being enchanted; and that is sufficient for the quiet of my conscience, which would give me great uneasiness, if I had the least doubt about my fate, and allowed myself to be in this cage, like an idle coward, deceitfully withholding my succour from a great number of the needy and oppressed, who, at this very hour, must be in the absolute and extreme necessity, from the want of my aid and protection.”

– Don Quixote, Part I, Chapter XLIX –

Miguel de Cervantes’ famous character Don Quixote de la Mancha saw the world differently than others. After his head was bemused by reading chivalric tales about quests of honour, he sets out with his companion Sancho Panza and his trusty steed Rocinante and starts an adventure in which he fights bandits and giants. Perhaps not quite as enchanted as Don Quixote, the international community sets out to undertake peacebuilding and statebuilding missions with a similar hopeful attitude and belief in chivalry. And there is another similarity between the quests of Don Quixote and those of the international community. Where the belief in the old moral system of the chivalric code does no longer fit into the world in which Don Quixote lived, so does the Western concept of the state – on which peacebuilding and statebuilding missions are based – not quite fit the realities found on the ground in much of the developing world, especially in the aftermath of war.

This book focuses on how international security interventions – i.e. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Armed Violence Reduction (AVR), including Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) control – play out in the context in which they are being implemented. Research has been conducted in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi and South Sudan.¹ The aim is to better understand the interactions – and results thereof – between international actors that organise and support interventions, and local and national actors involved in security. Since the end of the Cold War interventions in conflict have increased, and wars have declined. At the same time,

¹ See appendices 1, 2 and 3 for maps of these countries.

these interventions have broadened in scope, going from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and statebuilding (Human Security Centre, 2005). However, while wars have been on the decline, low intensity warfare or violence in the shape of crime continues to plague development and human security (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008; 2011). Moreover, introduced systems of governance to control violence and ensure security do not seem to strike root, or rather, take on different shapes and forms. As will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter, western interventions are based on particular assumptions and logics, derived from western notions of how security should be organised. A dominant perspective is that violence is best organised by bringing it under state monopoly, and that the state's legitimate use of violence is best achieved through a democratic system of governance. As such, the point of departure of statebuilding interventions is this 'ideal model' of statehood, based on western concepts and normative notions of what a state should look like. What is not found to be functioning according to this liberal democratic model in a country of intervention is to be built, and what is functioning poorly is to be strengthened or controlled through intervention. In this way, it is hoped, 'fragile states' can be developed and improved. However, this logic has proven to be problematic in practice. Aiming to build institutions based on an ideal model, interventions often lack sound connection with the realities on the ground.

This problem is acknowledged, and several authors have proposed alternative ways of looking at the functioning of state and society in non-western societies, referring to 'hybrid political orders' (Boege et al, 2008; 2009a; 2009b), 'mediated state' (Menkhaus, 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2008) or 'negotiated statehood' (Hagmann and Péclard, 2010) involving 'twilight institutions' (Lund, 2007). Others have described the different logics of functioning of 'natural states' vis-à-vis 'open access orders' (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). State and society interact in different ways than assumed in western state models, violence is dispersed rather than monopolised, and actors and institutions both within and outside 'the state' intertwine, cooperate and compete. It is then often argued that interventions should build on this hybrid reality and start with what is actually there on the ground and what is working. For instance, the OECD (2010: 54) is now stressing that donors should,

(a) pay much more attention to state legitimacy, especially in fragile situations, and to aspects of legitimacy that derive from people's beliefs and perceptions, not just from a Western state model; (b) focus on relations between state and society in a given context, and the scope for making these more constructive; and (c) recognise the diversity of

interests, perceptions, shared beliefs and political orders in play in any given context.

But the ideal model remains guiding interventions and the realisation of hybrid political context in which interventions take place have led to a search for those elements in the context that could serve as entry points. Context analyses are made to look how and where the programmes of interventions can 'connect' with local institutions and practices in society. Yet, this still risks clouding the analysis with the goals the intervention aims to reach. Certain contextual factors may be left out because they do not fit the proposed strategies and goals. Moreover, the end-goal remains unquestioned, even when it in practice might not match local realities. Programmes of interventions are generally assessed along their pre-set programmatic targets – e.g. the number of weapons collected, the number of ex-combatants that passed through demobilisation, the number of police trained, etc. – but much less on the extent to which such programmes indeed contribute to the larger process of security promotion. This book intends to take analysis a step further. As mentioned, and as will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, there is a difference in the assumed logic of the ideal state model that underlies security interventions and the logic and functioning of the society in which they are implemented. In the latter, there is a hybrid political context with a multiplicity of actors involved in security (and insecurity), and there is a dispersed control over violent means. These actors can cooperate but also conflict, and as a result security provisioning is not static but a dynamic process: what actors are involved, what means they have access to and the ways in which they relate to one another is marked by change. Interventions consist of programmes, such as disarmament programmes, reintegration programmes, vocational training for ex-combatants, training programmes for police and military, reform programmes to enable democratic oversight (of processes), etc. And when these short-term programmes are completed, the processes still continue. It can therefore not be expected that programmes dictate processes, or attain goals set out for these processes. The influence of programmes on the processes on the ground is to a certain extent limited, and in the best case they positively contribute to it. This book aims to look at these processes on the ground, here referred to as the dynamics of security provisioning, and how and to what extent the programmes of security interventions affect such processes. The main research question is therefore:

How do international efforts to build or contribute to security in the hybrid political context of post-settlement countries in sub-Saharan Africa relate to national and local perceptions and practices of security?


This question leads to seven sub-questions, divided into three blocks. The first block of questions focuses on international efforts to build or contribute to security. First, if there are international efforts that aim to build or contribute to security, the question arises what the intentions and ideas are of those who organise and support these efforts? This will be the main subject of the first chapter, which will identify and discuss the ideal model of the state as presupposed by international actors. Yet, such assumptions cannot be – and are not – taken for granted. This leads to the follow-up question of whether or not these assumptions are correct, which will be addressed in chapters 2 and 3. The first block then consists of the following sub-questions:

- I. *What are the underlying assumptions of international actors who organise and support security interventions?*
- II. *What are the most prominent critiques on the dominant intervention model?*

The second block of questions is directed at understanding how international, national and local perceptions and practices of security relate to one another. This first raises the question of how security and security provision can be defined, which is discussed in chapter 4. Two other questions are concerned with the ways in which the agenda and programmes work out in the societies in which they are implemented, and how this relates to local and national actors involved in security. The second block then consists of the following sub-questions:

- III. *What is 'security' and 'security provision'?*
- IV. *How are the programmes of interventions experienced, perceived and used at national and local levels?*
- V. *How do local and national perceptions and practices of security relate to each other?*

To make sense of the complex interplay between the various agendas, programmes, perceptions and practices regarding security of the different actors that are involved in security, an analytical model is developed that looks at the relations and interactions between local, national and international actors. In other words, the analysis looks at three arenas of interaction: 1) between intervening international actors and state actors, 2) between intervening international actors and actors at the local level, and 3) between state and non-state actors in security provision at the local level. Figure 1 (next page) illustrates this, with each arrow representing one of the layers of analysis. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 each look at one of these arenas of interaction, and are guided sub-questions IV and V.



Clearly, such a model warrants much caution as it simplifies categories and creates boundaries that are very much blurred in reality. State and non-state actors are intertwined, state actors may act for private interests, or non-state institutions may become (partly) 'state' or 'state-like'. Also, the international community may on the ground be represented by locals, who are working for international organisations such as the UN and international NGOs. Furthermore, just like the categories 'local actors' and 'state actors', the 'international community' is no unitary actor but composed of a variety of international actors, each having its own agenda. This should not only be kept in mind, but will also become clear when discussing the model in practice and focussing on the different arenas of interaction in more detail in the chapters to come. And while a full analysis of the interactions and politics between international actors is beyond the scope of this research, where relevant, some attention is given to the ways in which international actors relate to each other.

The different arenas should therefore not be considered as rigid categories, but fluid and primarily chosen to enable examination of separate parts of the bigger whole, and better grasp the changing dynamics of security provisioning. Doing so will show how security interventions interact and become part of these changing dynamics of security provisioning, which they can only influence to a limited extent.

² This model will be explained in more detail in chapter 4, see page 116

The conclusions will then come back to the main research question, as well as look into the questions whether or not the state and its security functions should be so high on the agenda of international actors, and whether security interventions are still relevant. The conclusions also look into the final sub-question:

VI. *What implications do the findings have for policy?*

As will be discussed below, the research undertaken for this book has also been the basis for a number of policy reports that looked at the programmes of security interventions in the three countries in question. The primary purpose of this book is therefore not to evaluate policies and programmes or to develop new policy instruments, but to gain a better understanding of how the policies and programmes of security interventions relate to local perceptions and practices of security. Nonetheless, the question of what academic findings mean for practitioners is not evaded, and the conclusions will give some considerations on what the implications of the findings are for policy.

Concepts and Focus

One of the key concepts used in this research is *security*, and will therefore be discussed in much more detail in chapter 4. A few introductory comments on the concept will be made here to place the research in the debate. A variety of meanings have been ascribed to *security*, and the study of security has evolved. Traditionally, security has been considered mainly a characteristic that the state could have. Security meant national security and it was closely related to the 'security dilemma' of nation states (Herz, 1950). It was only after the Cold War that the referent object of security became subject for discussion (Krause and Williams, 1997). This led to the development of the concept of 'human security', which not only shifted focus of what it is that needed to be secured from the state to individuals and groups of human beings, but also broadened and diversified the possible threats to security (UNDP, 1994). This research mainly focuses on threats to physical security. However, it also approaches security with a constructivist perspective, meaning that answers to the questions "what needs to be secured?" and "from what threats?" depend also on where the question is asked and to whom. As will become clear when analysing security provisioning from the different perspectives mentioned above, there is a variety of norms, values, needs and priorities regarding security among different actors.

It is the interactions between these different perspectives on security that create processes of *security provision*. Security provision is here not considered only to be security provision by formal security providers, such as state security actors like the police or the army. It includes also communities and private citizens acting in favour of their own personal security. Thus, rather than the implementation or imposing of security by state actors, security provision here refers to the actions taken by various actors in pursuit of their own security or the security of others. A variety of different actors working on behalf of different norms, values, needs and priorities regarding security creates a process of a constant struggling and negotiating of different security definitions and strategies by multiple individuals and institutions. This process is referred to as the *security dynamics*.

This book focuses on *security interventions*, which is used as a generic term for interventions such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Armed Violence Reduction (AVR), including Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) control. These interventions are part of the larger peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions, and with security provision generally considered to be the primary service a state is supposed to provide, these programmes can be considered the cornerstones of the larger peace- and statebuilding project. Here, these security interventions are in first instance considered to be international efforts to promote security and stability. Nonetheless, as will be discussed later in more detail, also national governments play an important role in design and implementation. Chapter 1 will elaborate on the development of these interventions and their relations to one another.

The focus on the *aftermath of war* is chosen because the term 'post-conflict' signifies a new beginning after crisis, and implies that the conflict is over and that there is an end to hostilities. However, after armed conflict there is often a rise in violent crimes and armed criminal gangs (cf. Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008: 67-88). "Ironically in places such as El Salvador and South Africa, civilians faced greater risk of violent death or serious injury after the end of the conflict than during it" (Call & Stanley, 2001: 151). Indeed, as argued by Chabal and Daloz (1999: 136), elites and politicians in Africa often gain from a continuous climate of insecurity. And according to Englebort and Tull (2008: 121) they "more often see it as ongoing competition for power and resources, facilitated by power sharing agreements, increases in foreign aid, and lax international oversight." For populations in post-conflict situations conditions often do not change, and "though the violence of war may cease, violence may simply transmute itself from the political to the criminal" (Baker, 2008: 32). Violence often also shifts from the public domain to the domestic domain, affecting women disproportionately (UN Economic & Social Council, 2001:

18). Although a peace agreement may be signed, the post-conflict situation is thus merely a small step in a long process. For this reason, the title of this book refers to *the aftermath of war*. Where the term post-conflict is used, this is done with the understanding that conflict and violence are often far from being in the past, thus preference is given for the use of the term *post-settlement*.

A further important concept is that of *hybrid political orders*, referring to the hybrid political context in which security interventions are being implemented. This concept coined by Boege and his colleagues (2008; 2009a; 2009b), as well as related concepts such as the 'mediated state' (Menkhaus, 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2008), 'negotiated statehood' (Hagmann and Péclard, 2010) and 'twilight institutions' (Lund, 2007), will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2. Yet, what they all describe, and what is the political context in which security interventions are being implemented on the ground, is that the authority to define and enforce collectively binding decisions is dispersed, and that different authority structures overlap, cooperate and compete.

The geographical focus on sub-Saharan Africa, with case studies in Eastern DRC, Burundi and South Sudan, is made for a number of reasons. From a theoretical perspective, the context of hybrid political orders can be readily observed in many countries in Africa – although certainly not exclusively in Africa. Another important motivation is the prevalence of security interventions in Africa. Choosing for a focus on one continent over different countries worldwide also allowed deeper study and discussion of specific literature. This is not to say that African cases can be generalised, and the countries discussed here are perhaps among the more difficult ones. For example, the lack of control Kinshasa exerts over the eastern part of the DRC is not exemplary for the whole of Africa. And South Sudan only recently gained independence, making it an exceptional case by definition. However, with the particularities in mind in all three countries governance was affected by European colonialism, can be characterised by hybridity in governance and security provisioning, have been (or are) affected by violent conflict, and are subject to outside security interventions. A final reason for choosing these particular three countries was more pragmatic. As will be further discussed below, the research was also part of a project that was partially subsidised by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While the choice for countries was left open, a preference was given for choosing among the 'focus countries' of the Ministry in order to maximise the policy influence of the project.

Initially, the starting point of the research project was that the three countries could serve as comparative case studies. As field research alternated with desk research

and the project developed, the complexity of interventions and the contexts in which they are implemented became more apparent. This made me think about the ways in which to look at this complexity. I became aware of the various processes of interaction between different actors involved in security, and started to deconstruct interventions and the interactions of intervening actors within these processes. Instead of looking at 'the' intervention in different cases, I looked at different deconstructed 'arenas' of interaction between local, state and international actors involved in security provision. The data collected in the three countries in which I did field research was then not used as comparative country cases, but to cover a broad and large empirical diversity, and analyse patterns in the different arenas.

Relevance

The scientific relevance of this research is that it contributes to a better understanding of the effects of security interventions and of processes of security provisioning with which these interventions inevitably interact. Research on security interventions tends to focus on the extent to which its programmatic targets are reached, or in other words: the outputs of the programmes. The linkages between the outputs and the desired outcomes – the broader societal impact – often remain poorly defined (Pugel, 2009: 70). Regarding DDR, for instance, relatively recently calls were made that “analysis of what and why it does or does not work [... is] urgently needed” (Muggah, 2009: 4). At the same time the scope and shape of security interventions is changing with the development of 'second generation DDR' and AVR programmes.³ As such, the range of programmes and their impacts that require analysis and understanding is growing. And while monitoring and evaluation of projects and programmes is done, it is understandable that policy makers and practitioners focus on delivery. It is therefore also an academic responsibility to gain better understanding about the workings of these interventions and the impacts they have on society. This book will furthermore contribute to the discussion on hybridity and complexity of state-society relations. While more and more is written on this subject, few direct connections are still being made with interventions. This research will fill this gap by also focusing explicitly on the interplay of security interventions with the dynamic processes on the ground.

A better understanding of the effects of security interventions on local processes of security provisioning is also socially relevant. Most obviously, and most

³ The particularities of these programmes and the developments will be discussed in further detail in chapter 1.

importantly, such an understanding may contribute to the improvement of the security of people living in countries that have been or are still undergoing violent conflict. Furthermore, besides improving security provisioning, security interventions aim to enable a post-settlement country to move to a situation of durable peace. A thorough understanding of what these interventions do in practice is therefore vital. Moreover, these security interventions are very costly, and involve large amounts of public money as well. When spending funds to improve the security of people living in countries that are recovering from violent conflict, it is important to know whether it is spent in the right way or where it can be spent more effectively to support this cause.

Development of the Research Project

In 2008, while completing my Master's degree in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at the Centre for Conflict Studies (CCS) of Utrecht University, I took on an internship at IKV Pax Christi, a Dutch Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) (or political peace movement).⁴ My supervisor, Georg Frerks, had contacted Miriam Struyk, and I could write my thesis at a desk of IKV Pax Christi on DDR and local level security. IKV Pax Christi also supported my field research in South Sudan as part of my thesis, during which I visited Juba and Jonglei State. The literature research of this thesis was furthermore done in anticipation of an initiative of the Peace Security and Development Network (PSDN), a knowledge platform that brought together a variety of Dutch actors - knowledge institutes, NGOs, the business sector and several Ministries of the Dutch government - to gather knowledge on fragile states. Within this network, the CCS and IKV Pax Christi were partners in a proposed working group on 'community security and community-based DDR'. By the time I graduated, the funding for this project was approved and the CCS and IKV Pax Christi became co-chairs of the working group. Georg Frerks offered me a position as researcher for this working group with the CCS, which I could at the same time use to write a PhD dissertation. After working as a researcher with IKV Pax Christi for a period of six months, I moved full time to the CCS in April 2009.

The working group was, as mentioned, a part of the PSDN. On 30 June 2007 the Dutch cabinet, civil society organisations, the corporate sector and other agencies signed the Schokland Agreement (Akkoord van Schokland), which later was renamed the Millennium Accords. The partners concurred to undertake concrete and active efforts to effectively reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) -

⁴ Pax Christi and IKV (the Inter-Church Council) merged in 2007 into IKV Pax Christi.

concrete targets to halve world poverty – in 2015. The PSDN was established as part of the Millennium Accords, and motivated by the realisation that MDG performance was comparatively lower in fragile contexts and post-settlement situations. Hence, the PSDN set out to contextualise the realisation of the MDGs in these contexts and arrive at relevant considerations and recommendations. The network was initiated by the CCS of Utrecht University, the Conflict Research Unit (CRU) of the Clingendael Institute, Cordaid and The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), but soon was to include several other partners that were interested to contribute to this effort. The partners of the working group on community security and community-based DDR included: the CCS, the Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management (CICAM) of the Radboud University Nijmegen, CRU, the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), IKV Pax Christi, PSO and the Dutch Council for Refugees. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs covered the direct costs and 40 per cent of the indirect costs, and the individual partners contributed 60 per cent of their indirect costs.

My work for the working group in the PSDN mainly included doing research, as well as the support of the coordination of the working group's activities. The first product was a desk study into the theoretical linkages between community security and DDR (Willems et al, 2009), on basis of which four case studies were conducted. These were in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Rouw and Willems, 2009), Burundi (Willems, Kleingeld and Van Leeuwen, 2010), Colombia, (Derks, Rouw and Briscoe, 2011) and South Sudan (Willems and Rouw, 2011a). Each field research was conducted in a partnership of two organisations from the working group. Of the cases I did, the research in Eastern DRC and South Sudan was undertaken together with Hans Rouw from IKV Pax Christi, and the research in Burundi was conducted with Jesper Kleingeld and Mathijs van Leeuwen from the CICAM of the University of Nijmegen. Aside from these reports, a number of policy briefs have been published (Willems, Rouw and Oudes, 2009; Willems and Rouw, 2011b; Willems, Rouw and Duke, 2011; Rouw, 2011), and the findings were published in a synthesis report (Frerks, 2011) and presented and discussed at an expert meeting and the working group's final conference in The Hague on 1 and 2 December 2011, as well as during the final conference of the PSDN in Utrecht on 5 April 2012. Furthermore, several discussion meetings were organised in New York between 4 and 9 December 2011 to discuss the findings with international NGOs and several departments of the UN.

Experiences: Between Research and Policy

This dissertation has been very different from the more common PhD positions where, apart from possible teaching obligations, time can be entirely devoted to scientific research independently from others. This has had both advantages and disadvantages. A disadvantage was that instead of the usual four years, the money available for this project allowed only a contract of three and a half years. As a result, I had less time to write my dissertation during which I also had obligations to the working group, but through strict planning I was nonetheless able to finish within the allotted time. The most important advantage is clearly that the PSDN has enabled this research, and that the direct costs of the field research were provided by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, the CCS was not employed by the Ministry as a consultant, but was an independent partner contributing 60 per cent of the personnel costs. Hence, while there was cooperation with others, this did not hamper academic independence. Furthermore, as the CCS provided one of the co-chairs of the working group the academic approach of the research could be safeguarded throughout the project. And while the subject of interest of the working group – community security and community-based DDR – was predetermined, the project itself included a desk study to find the knowledge gaps and orientate the field research. I was involved in this desk study, as well as three out of the four case studies. And where a focus for DDR was chosen initially, as the original focus on DDR *and* SSR was considered too broad, elements of SSR, AVR and SALW control were incorporated in the field researches where relevant. For instance, in every case I did research, issues of SSR and SALW control were mentioned by interviewees. And in South Sudan there was little DDR going on in two of the three states visited during the time of research due to delays in the programme, but SALW control proved all the more pressing.

The country choices for the cases were in first instance based on relevance to the research. The choices have been influenced by the Ministry's focus countries. While the Ministry had stressed that the working group was free to choose countries that were of most relevance, this choice was made to maximise the policy influence. Furthermore, within the – at the time – 33 focus countries there were sufficient relevant cases to choose from.⁵ Another motivating factor included the preferences of the researchers, including my own, and the presence of local partners of the working group's members, which could provide useful contacts for the field

⁵ In 2011 the decision was made to reduce to 15 'focus countries' or 'partner countries'. Of the cases studied in this project South Sudan and Burundi remained on the list, while the partnership with Colombia is to move from development cooperation to economic cooperation. The DRC has fallen off (though the Great Lakes region remains an area of interest).

research. The cases that were eventually chosen were Burundi, Colombia, Eastern DRC and South Sudan. It was agreed that I would undertake the African cases, because, as discussed above, I had made a deliberate choice of focus on Africa for my dissertation.

It could be considered a disadvantage that there was little time to develop an extensive theoretical framework and a clearly defined research question before the first field research was to be undertaken. Where in a common PhD position field research is undertaken after extensive preparations, and perhaps a short exploratory trip, the time schedule of the working group obliged me to commence my first field research seven months after I started full time at the CCS, in effect pushing me towards a grounded research methodology.

At the same time, the participation within the PSDN with practitioners, policy makers and researchers with different backgrounds has enabled me to take a look behind the scenes in the policy world. As such, the argument has not only developed through the field research in the different cases, but also as a result of my cooperation and interaction with the other actors in the PSDN, something that could arguably be considered to have been additional ethnographic and participatory research. At the same time the different partners of the working group provided a sounding board that could be used to discuss my research and ideas.

A Note on Methodology and Research Design

The epistemological background of this research is what Michael Young termed 'social realism', which views knowledge both as socially and historically constructed as well as real in itself:

[This social realist approach...] is social because it recognizes, with Marx, Durkheim and Vygotsky, the role of human agency in the production of knowledge. Knowledge can never be taken as given in any more than a temporary sense; it is always a part of history and always fallible. Equally, the approach to knowledge and the curriculum that I am arguing for is realist because it recognizes the context-independent characteristics of knowledge, and that the powerful discontinuities between knowledge and common sense are not some transient separation to be overcome in the future, but the real conditions that enable us to gain new knowledge about the world. (Young, 2008: 62-63)

Thus, while recognizing the socially and historically constructedness of knowledge, it argues that knowledge cannot be subsumed into the processes of historical and social construction, science is “an empirically based, rational and objective enterprise, the purpose of which is to provide explanatory and predictive knowledge” (Keat and Urry, 1975: 3). Here, for instance, the multiple constructed interpretations of different actors in society of what security means is acknowledged. However, rather than only observations and descriptions of discourses, I also analyse policies and their consequences, and thus acknowledge rational objectivity in knowledge. Qualitative research methods have been adopted, in order to look at the various meanings, concepts, characteristics and descriptions that shape peoples’ realities. The precise methods used will be elaborated on below.

Following the divisions of qualitative research described by Richy (2003: 26-31), the orientation of this research is predominantly generative in nature, as it aims to produce new ideas as a contribution to both the development of social theory – here the understanding of the dynamics of security provisioning in interaction with security interventions – as well as the refinement of policy solutions. Doing so, it also is in part descriptive and explanatory as it aims to describe and explain the interaction between intervening actors who organise and support security interventions and the dynamics of security on the ground.

Organising Field Research

Only in South Sudan I had previous research experience. Therefore, each field trip was preceded by several weeks of preparation. Not only did this include reading up on the situation and context, but also logistical arrangements of which establishing local contacts was most important. To ease access on the ground and facilitate the researches, contacts were made with local organisations and individuals who could support in the logistics on the ground and facilitate the research agenda. This included contacting people to be interviewed, making appointments and providing directions to offices, people and hotels. It also entailed providing relevant background information on the security issues in the region and translating interviews (from local languages to English or French) when necessary.

The first local contacts were made through known contacts of working group partners. This ensured that – through the previous experiences of partners – it could to a certain extent be known what to expect from these contacts. It also allowed for discussion of the research purposes and expectations on both sides over phone and email prior to arrival in the field. Upon arrival in the field, a meeting was set to further elaborate with local partners on the research purposes and make final

agreements. In return for their support, a stipend was agreed upon, which also covered food and hotel costs during longer field visits, as well as costs of communication and transportation that local partners had to make when arranging meetings and interviews.

The research in the DRC focused on the East, and in particular on the Ituri region, North Kivu and South Kivu, and was undertaken for a period of eleven weeks from 26 September until 11 December 2009. The research started in Ituri, crossing the border from Uganda. Here, research was mainly facilitated by the *Réseaux Haki na Amani* (RHA), and Mahagi and Bunia were used as basis from which field visits were undertaken. In North Kivu, research was facilitated in Beni by the *Centre Résolution Conflit* (CRC), in Butembo by Maliyasasa Syalembereka, and in Goma by Merci Corps, *Programme d'Action pour le Développement Intégré* (PADI) and *Action de Lutte Contre la Pauvreté et Protection de la Nature* (ALPN). In Bukavu in South Kivu, Méschac Bilubi facilitated logistics. Again, these cities were used as a basis from which field trips were organised (returning the same day or spending several nights away), as well as to meet representatives from the government, national and international NGOs, UN organisations and donors based there. A similar approach was adopted in the other two cases. In Burundi, research was conducted during ten weeks between 12 April and 19 June 2010, visiting eleven out of the country's seventeen provinces. In Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura Rurale and Muramvya, the research was facilitated by the *Centre d'Encadrement et de Développement Des Anciens Combattants* (CEDAC). MIPAREC from Gitega provided assistance in Gitega, Ruyigi, Muyinga, Mwaro, and Ngozi provinces. Finally CED-Caritas facilitated the research in the provinces of Bururi, Bubanza and Cibitoke. The research in South Sudan lasted an initial eight weeks between 11 March and 29 April 2011, and focussed on Jonglei State, Western Equatoria State (WES) and Eastern Equatoria State (EES), as well as discussions in the capital of Juba in Central Equatoria State (CES). Here, the research was facilitated by the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA), a network of South Sudanese civil society organisations involved in SALW control. In each state, a local SSANSA representative from that state facilitated the research agenda set by the researchers. Due to additional funds made available and a special policy interest in South Sudan as a new independent country since 9 July 2011, an additional two-week visit was made between 29 September and 14 October 2011. Meetings were organised in Juba, Yambio in Western Equatoria State and Torit in Eastern Equatoria State. Unfortunately time constraints and poor weather conditions after the rainy season prevented a second visit to Jonglei. During this trip the report that had been written based on the research of March and April was presented and discussed. Through these

discussions earlier findings could be further verified and new data could be gathered.

Collecting Data

The research project started with a desk study examining the state of affairs with regard to community security and DDR policies and programmes (Willems et al, 2009). For this dissertation further literature study was undertaken on statebuilding, interventions and security. As such the available academic literature and policy documents have been extensively analysed prior to the field research.

Field research provided another large set of data. A variety of qualitative research techniques were used, such as focus group discussions, interviews and participatory observation. A semi-structured approach was taken in interviews and group discussions. This enabled getting the perspectives of those who are interviewed, as people could respond to questions as they pleased and raise issues when they deemed this to be relevant (Bryman, 2004). As a result, it was possible to have a general set of questions throughout the research in all three countries, while still being able to adapt to local circumstances and variations. The choice for particular villages and communities depended on a number of issues, such as aiming for a regional spread, different ethnic backgrounds and conflict experiences, as well as practical matters, including the availability of local contacts, accessibility and security.

Group discussions and interviews were chosen as they enable to extract attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences and reactions of groups, and are more likely to be revealed through the interaction in a group than individual interviews (Gibbs, 1997). It also enabled access to the stories and perceptions of large numbers of people, as well as provided a platform where factual errors presented by people could be quickly corrected by other members of the group. Organising different groups and individual interviews in the same location provided another way to triangulate data.

Group discussions were mainly held with community members, women, youth, and ex-combatants from a variety of armed groups and forces, as well as traditional chiefs, the army and the Arrow Boys in South Sudan. Typically such discussions lasted between one and two hours, with peaks of three to four hours, depending on the amount of information put forward by the interviewees. In general, the focus of these discussions was about perspectives on security, security provision and particular interventions (e.g. DDR). Questions related to what security means, how

people define security, what priorities they set, how security is arranged, by whom security is arranged, how these actors are perceived, how programmes of interventions are perceived, etc. A more elaborated topic list can be found in appendix 4. In several instances individual interviews were held with community members and ex-combatants to triangulate the data found in group discussions, following a similar semi-structured approach and topic list.

Selection of respondents was for logistical reasons in many cases facilitated by the local contacts, who arranged focus groups in advance. In other cases, focus groups were organised a day in advance when arriving at a location. During earlier discussions with local contacts the purposes of the research were discussed and explanations were given about the type of groups that were to be selected. This included separate discussions with amongst others ex-combatants, youth, and women. It was also stressed that the makeup of discussion groups included different groups from the community so they could be considered as a reflection of the makeup of the community. For instance, during discussions groups with communities the aim was to have a gender balance, and when talking with ex-combatants the aim was to include a proportionate number from the different armed groups in a particular region. In certain cases, a small compensation was given to participants for their presence, usually in the form of a soft drink and a snack or – when a drinks and snacks could not easily be arranged on short notice – cash of a similar value. Discussions were held in a private setting, sometimes outside under a tree, but in most cases in a closed building. In any case, whether outside or inside, it was strived to prevent the possibility of random passersby listening in or joining the conversation, to ensure the privacy of participants and maintain a stable group dynamic. At the beginning of each discussion and interview, a substantial amount of time was spent to explain the purpose of the research and what would happen with the information that was given. It was always made clear that the interview or discussion and the research it served would not be followed by development projects or other kinds of support. After an introduction was given, people were given the opportunity to ask questions for clarification, after which the discussion or interview would start. Afterwards, again, interviewees were asked whether they felt that all relevant subjects had been discussed, if they had things to add, or whether they still had questions for the researchers. During discussions people were always given the opportunity to speak in their own language, which was then translated to French (in the DRC and Burundi) or English (in South Sudan) by our local contact or a translator. Especially during the group discussions with communities and ex-combatants people expressed themselves in local languages. The perspectives at the village level were

supplemented with individual interviews with actors at the village level, such as church leaders, local chiefs, teachers etc.

Interviews were also held with actors operating at national and international levels. Amongst others, this included civil servants, political leaders, church leaders, traditional leaders, policy makers, individual experts and personnel of international organisations and embassies. In these interviews, similar topics were discussed as with community members in order to gain insights on the various perceptions of different actors. Interviews also focused on the particular function of the interviewees in relation to the main research question and topic lists (appendix 4). In each research location, efforts were made to talk to a particular set of officials and organisations, such as the local administration, traditional chiefs, government DDR offices, UN DDR offices, etc. At the same time a 'snowball' technique was used, implying that local contacts and interviewees were continuously asked for the contacts of other people in the area that were relevant to talk to. As will be elaborated on below, discussion meetings were also held with personnel of national and international NGOs, UN organisations and embassy staff. To gain further understanding of the perspectives of international actors, additional discussions were held with international NGOs, UN organisations and donors in The Hague and New York.

The choice was made not to record interviews and discussions, as this may hamper open and free answering to questions (Bryman, 2004). Security is considered by many in the post-settlement contexts where research was undertaken to be a sensitive subject, and knowing their voices would be recorded could very well have constrained respondents in their answers. Therefore, during the interviews notes were taken, which were typed out the same day, or as soon as possible, for instance when there was no electricity and light after 9 p.m. Because most discussions and interviews were undertaken with a colleague, turns were taken between typing out the interview and checking it for accuracy and completeness. Corrections were made in track changes and discussed when different interpretations arose. If not agreed on a particular part of transcription after having discussed it, this was left out of the analysis. Furthermore, undertaking the research in teams allowed for a broader reach, as it was possible to split up and have simultaneous interviews. In total 70 formal interviews and 50 group discussions were held in Eastern DRC, 44 interviews and 50 group discussions in Burundi, and 60 interviews and 15 group discussions during the first trip to South Sudan. The group discussions consisted of between 5 and 10 people on average. Also, various informal talks and discussions were held throughout the research with experts, colleagues, facilitators, drivers and people on the street.

Furthermore, after the case study in the DRC the idea was developed to verify the data and bring back information to respondents. In the last two weeks in Burundi return visits were therefore organised in four communities in Burundi – Mutimbuzi, Kabezi, Itaba and Kibimba – where group discussions were held with the same groups who had been interviewed before. Preliminary findings were presented and discussed for verification. In addition, two discussion meetings were organised with Burundian NGOs – one in Gitega and one in Bujumbura. Another discussion meeting was organised in Bujumbura with international NGOs operating in Burundi, and a final discussion was held with donors and international organisations. In South Sudan a similar discussion meeting was organised in Juba where representatives of civil society organisations, government officials, UN agencies and international NGOs were present to discuss the preliminary findings and brainstorm about relevant policy implications. As mentioned, in September 2011 a return visit to South Sudan was organised, during which various discussion meetings and interviews were organised in Yambio and Torit with youth, women, local organisations and representatives of the government, international NGOs and United Nations (UN) agencies.

Throughout the report, I have included quotations to provide the reader with a sense of how people expressed themselves on the topics that were discussed, and to enliven and illustrate the analysis. Unless stated otherwise, the quotations recurred in other wordings in more than one interview, and represent a general trend rather than the perspective of particular individuals only.

Problems and limitations

As in any research, especially in a context where conflict has only recently ended or is still ongoing, there have been a number of problems and limitations affecting the research. As already discussed above, the schedule of the working group involved some time restrictions, although this has not resulted in significant problems. Moreover, all research is inevitably restricted by limitations in time (and budget).

More important, however, is the positionality of the researcher, specifically regarding the ways in which local respondents perceived or may have perceived my presence. Clearly, as a white male from the Netherlands, my appearance contrasts with that of the inhabitants of the African countries where I undertook my research. There was little doubt about my ‘foreignness’ with respondents. Especially during conversations with people in small villages and ex-combatants, it is not unlikely that the presence of western foreigners may have created certain expectations, as western foreigners visiting these areas are often working with an

NGO or for a particular donor organisation. Expectations of funds or benefits may not only cause frustrations when these expectations fail to materialise, but may also influence the answers of respondents. For instance, respondents may have given answers that they believed were more likely to draw external support, rather than describing the situation as they really perceived it. To limit this, the purpose of the research was always thoroughly explained, and it was always emphasized that the research team did not have access to funds or goods, and that the discussions would not be followed by projects or donations. However, it cannot be ruled out that respondents' answering has been influenced by the researchers' western background. At the national level this may have been less of an issue, as interactions with non-Africans are much more common. Nonetheless, the research's affiliation with the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and the perceived impact of the research on current or future relations has probably affected the answers of particular NGO representatives or government officials.

Language was also an issue. Especially the group discussions were often conducted in the local language and translated on the spot into French or English. This inherently increases chances of misinterpretation. By carefully instructing the translators about the research intentions and their role as translators, stressing they were to translate as literally as possible, I sought to mitigate this to the greatest extent. The choice to use existing local organisations to find access to respondents may have led to a bias to visiting locations where these particular organisations were active. To limit these effects, a deliberate choice was made to work with different organisations from different backgrounds. Moreover, careful instructions were given to local contacts about which respondents to select and locations were determined in consultation. Various interviews and group discussions were also organised in the field without support of local contacts.

The DDR programmes in the different cases were in various stages of implementation during the time research was conducted. Where in the DRC various types of training programmes were ongoing, while other ex-combatants had already completed the DDR programme, in Burundi the programme was coming to an end, and in South Sudan the programme was still in its initial stage of implementation. The advantage was that this provided a variety of perspectives on the DDR programmes at different stages. But on the other hand it also makes direct comparison of the final outcomes of these programmes impossible. The lack of progress of the DDR programme in South Sudan also led to relatively more focus on civilian disarmament in South Sudan in comparison to the other cases.

Issues of accessibility and travelling possibilities posed a constraint, which prevented a complete random sample of visited communities and hampered a greater geographical reach. The budget did not allow for a lot of air travel and local public transportation was not always safe and often reliable for its unreliability. UN flights were an option, but the chances of being ‘bumped’ right before departure by passengers with a higher priority for the UN are relatively high for an independent researcher not affiliated with the UN. Therefore, a choice was made to travel by road in cars of local contacts, or vehicles that were rented. This provided much flexibility and allowed for the observation of the travelling schedule set by the research team. Nonetheless, poor road conditions made travelling very time consuming. While the 100 kilometre tarmac road from Bujumbura to Gitega in Burundi takes roughly an hour and a half, in Ituri we once took 20 minutes to get across 20 meters of a muddy mountain road. Because of the poor road conditions after the rainy season on the road from Juba to Bor, which had more than doubled the distance in time, Jonglei was not visited during the visit in September 2011.

Security issues added to problems of accessibility, as it was not always considered safe to travel after dark, or even to stay in certain places overnight. Several of the roads travelled in the DRC were restricted for UN personnel without armed escort, and the road from Torit to Kapoeta was only considered safe by locals a since few days after the army started patrols. Trucks with bullet holes on the side of the road remained as evidence of the armed robberies that often took place there. Yet, because the research was facilitated by local contacts with great knowledge about the present security situation – and who shared similar desire to arrive safely – and by contacting people along the road before departure, we were able to make well informed decisions. As a result, it was decided not to travel further south in the direction of Uvira in South Kivu, as the region was at the time the scene for clashes between the Congolese army and rebel groups. In Jonglei in South Sudan, travelling further north was prevented by fighting between the South Sudanese army and the defected General George Athor. Apart from a minor incident when driving on a road in North Kivu, where suddenly a group of angry youth was scared off by firing Congolese soldiers, no security incidents were encountered directly. Travelling with an armed UN escort, which has been offered to the team in a few places, would have perhaps given a larger geographical reach in certain places. But it was considered to be too gravely affecting the research when people were to be interviewed about security and disarmament by researchers backed by armed soldiers.

In Burundi, the research was carried out during the electoral period, which in total would last for about six months and was therefore difficult to circumvent. On 24

May 2010 *commune* elections were held and one week after our departure on 20 June presidential elections were held on 28 June. There were some instances of violence related to the elections, such as intimidation campaigns by political parties' youth wings. Yet, a week after the *commune* elections the situation became increasingly tensed. A number of politically motivated killings occurred, as well as some grenade attacks on political buildings, bars and hotels where politicians resided. During the research, when people were asked about what they regarded as security and insecurity, people responded in far wider terms than relating their (in)security experience solely to insecurity events related to the elections. References were also made to security issues relating to the elections and the elections indeed impacted security in Burundi. I nevertheless feel that the data has not been biased to an extent it negatively impacts on the internal and external validity. During the field research I continuously aimed to identify what issues were specific to this election period. On the other hand, while tensions may have been raised by the elections, many security issues – including political ones – are characteristic for the post-settlement context.

Chapter outline

Having discussed the purpose and methods of this research, the rest of this book is outlined as follows. The first part presents the theoretical background and framework. Chapter 1 investigates the underlying assumptions of international actors who organise and support security interventions. It first discusses the development of international interventions in conflicts, and then looks at the theories of state formation and state conceptualisation underlying them. A dominant view is that the state is the best way to organise violence, that the ideal state has to function as an organisation with the legitimate monopoly on the use of violence, and that the primary task of the state is the provision of security. Security provisioning – by maintaining a monopoly on violence – is thus considered an important task of the state, and security interventions aim to support, build and reform state institutions to enable this. DDR, SSR, and AVR including SALW control are the main intervention tools to do so, and the last part of the chapter discusses the development of these interventions.

Chapter 2 shifts focus to the literature criticising the assumptions underlying security interventions and discusses what is termed the 'context critique'. According to the context critique, there is incomplete understanding of how violence is organised, and thus how and by whom what security is provided. Rather than the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in the hands of the state, the situation is one where violence is dispersed. The chapter looks at the development of the state

and its relationship with society in Africa, the implications of colonialism and the functioning of post-colonial governance. Instead of a clear state-society division, the context is characterised by hybridity in which various authority structures are overlapping, cooperating and competing. As a result there is a myriad of actors – both state and non-state – involved in security provisioning. For the context critique there is insufficient understanding of the functioning of the state in a hybrid political context, and the relationship between state and society. As a result of this there are unrealistic expectations of how the above two points can be changed by external actors.

Chapter 3 discusses a second string of criticism, which is termed the ‘intervention critique’ and builds on the critiques discussed in chapter 2. It starts by questioning how realistic the ideal model is and whether this presumed ideal does not distract from – or perhaps even neglects – the empirical reality and the functioning of state-society relations in the contexts in which interventions take place. It furthermore looks at the contradictions and complications that arise in the process from formulation to implementation of policies. For the intervention critique, policies and programmes of interventions are not simply implemented, and a form of local ownership is created in the process. And as interventions are implemented by a multiplicity of actors with diverging agendas, they can be considered hybrid themselves. This hybridity of interventions further enables local actors to use the policies and programmes of interventions to further their own agendas.

Chapter 4 connects the literature presented in the first part of the book with the empirical chapters in the second part. It starts by discussing the critiques, which bring a number of valid and useful points, but do not provide any answers as to what the consequences are for security interventions. Finding that there is still little known about the actual dynamics created by the interactions between international actors organising and supporting security interventions and the local security dynamics created by the interactions between both state and non-state actors involved in security, the chapter develops an analytical framework to fill this gap in knowledge. To do so, the chapter investigates the concepts of security and security provision, and proposes a focus on the security dynamics, which is described as a dynamics of a constant struggling and negotiating of different security definitions and strategies by multiple individuals and institutions. The analytical model then looks at multiple realities of security interventions, focusing on three different arenas of interaction and looking at how international, national and local perceptions and practices of security relate to one another.

The second part of the book presents the empirical analysis. Chapter 5 investigates the first arena of interaction between intervening international actors and actors at state level, and looks at how the programmes of interventions are experienced, perceived and used at the state level. To do so, a brief outline of the context of the three countries is given, focusing on a number of characteristics that are considered to be crucial in influencing the post-settlement security situation: the type of conflict, the type of settlement, the type of current security challenges, and the type of government and governance. The final section then discusses this arena of interaction in closer detail, making a number of observations and conclusions about how intervening international actors relate to state level elites. It finds that interventions take place in a dynamic process where political struggles over authority between different power holders continue after a settlement. Interventions aim to mitigate and influence these struggles, but at the same time become part of it themselves, as the programmes and benefits provided by interventions become stakes for state actors and other power holders.

Chapter 6 looks at the arena of interaction between security interventions and the local level, and looks at how the programmes of interventions are experienced, perceived and used at the local level. The focus here is specifically on programmes supporting the reintegration of ex-combatants, since they aim to directly affect individuals and communities at the local level. The chapter first discusses the implementation of reintegration programmes in the three countries. After this, it shifts attention to the concept of reintegration and distinguishes it from the local reintegration processes. Where DDR is a security intervention, the ultimate objective of DDR programmes is essentially the outcome of a process, involving economic and social factors, many of which cannot be directly influenced by the programmes. Trying to manage the complex processes and steer them to the desired outcome, the programmes of interventions aimed at supporting reintegration have over the years expanded and become more complex, making these programmes more difficult to manage.

Chapter 7 discusses the arena of interaction between state and non-state actors involved in security provisioning at the local level. It starts with a discussion of how security is perceived at the community level, followed by a discussion of the variety of actors involved in security provisioning. The variety of security perceptions and interests, and these differences in values, norms and interests also determine the relationships between the different actors. Despite the absence of its practices of the state, or state security actors being considered as a source of insecurity, the idea of the state is that of an organisation that should provide security to its civilian population and have the capacity to do so. Yet, in a hybrid political context where

there is no state monopoly on violence, when the actions of the state are considered to inadequately address the security needs according particular norms, interests or priorities, non-state security initiatives (re-)emerge. The chapter then focuses on three cases of non-state initiatives involved in security provisioning, and discusses their development and relationship with the state. These examples show that non-state security initiatives may not always be easily categorised in terms of replacing, supporting or confronting the state as they may take on different roles, and are not readily incorporable into state structures. The interactions between different security actors (both state and non-state) create struggles in society about whose norms, interests and priorities regarding security are promoted, what actions to provide security are considered legitimate, and about who is considered legitimate security actor. This could be considered processes of state formation.

Chapter 8 provides the conclusions and discusses the implications of the findings for policy.

Chapter 1. Books of Chivalry: Assumptions and Approaches to Interventions

This chapter investigates the practices and rationales of interventions. Focusing on the first sub-question, it looks at the underlying assumptions of international actors organising and supporting security interventions. The first is that the state is the best way to organise violence and enable stability and peace. Second, the ideal state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. And third, the primary task of the state is the provision of security.

The chapter starts by examining the development of interventions from peacekeeping to statebuilding, showing how interventions have developed in scope as well as in size. More importantly interventions have expanded in their ambitions and aim to build entire states. An underlying assumption is that peace is best achieved through the establishment of a functioning state. The second part zooms in on this assumption. When states are being (re-)built, what is it supposed to look like, how is this state conceptualised? It starts with a description of how state formation in Europe is believed to have gone from a form of organised crime to an organisation that holds the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. In Western Europe this monopoly is held by liberal democratic states, and this liberal democratic model is seen by many as the ultimate way to ensure the legitimacy of this monopoly on violence. As such, this model of the 'modern state' is assumed to be the proper way in which security is organised, and has become the ideal that guides statebuilding interventions. Moreover, everything that does not fit this ideal is deemed a potential security threat – both to the civilian population and the international state system as a whole. As such, normative assumptions of what states should be are guiding interventions, and at the same time legitimise interventions. The assumption that the ideal state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence thus relates to the assumption that the primary task of the state is the provision of security. The final section of this chapter focuses on security interventions and their role within the statebuilding project. As security is seen as the core service a functioning state is expected to provide to its civilian population, interventions that aim to enhance state security provision are considered to be one of the cornerstones as well as the primary phase of statebuilding interventions. The state monopoly on the legitimate use of force is central in this. Then, a description is given of the programmes of security interventions that have been developed based on (and in pursuit of) the assumptions of statebuilding interventions, i.e. DDR, SSR,

and SALW control. Finally, the emergence of AVR is discussed as being a programmatic answer to failing aspects of traditional DDR and a lacking connection between SSR and SALW control, as well as being part of the discourse on fragility and the legitimisation of the increasing scope of security interventions.

From Peacekeeping to Statebuilding

As will be described in this section, interventions in conflict have changed and evolved over the last decades. Aiming to improve the effectiveness of interventions and sustainability of peace, there has been an ever-expanding agenda. The underlying assumption that gradually developed is that the state system is the best way to organise violence and enable stability and peace. The ambitions have greatly expanded and interventions aim to do and control increasingly more, aiming to build entire states, and have as a consequence developed into a large-scale billion dollar industry.

During the Cold War the UN mainly concerned itself with peacekeeping, which meant the monitoring of cease-fire agreements or peace agreements with a small lightly armed military force. Not capable of actual military deterrence, such a neutral force posed a symbolic buffer between warring parties, and the idea that the world was watching over their shoulders. The UN was not making peace, but was there to keep the peace made by the warring parties who consented to the presence of peacekeepers. After the end of the Cold War, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was willing to maintain the high levels of military and economic assistance to their respective allies. Particularly in Africa, the end of the Cold War meant such support was strategically inconsequential. This allowed international organisations, including the UN, to become more directly involved in conflicts and efforts at ending wars (Paris, 2004: 16). From merely keeping an existing peace, there was an increase in efforts aimed at making peace through mediation, negotiation or military intervention. The critique was that peacekeeping did not change the dynamics that caused or perpetuated the conflict. Consequently, there has been a growing demand for the development of peacebuilding strategies and operational capacities. The *Brahimi Report* (UN, 2000a) calls amongst other things for stronger presence on the ground to protect the mission and deter potential aggressors, for fact-finding missions to acquire more information for both quick response as well as protection of the mission on the ground, and for strengthening

of the permanent capacity of the UN to develop strategies and to implement programs in support of those strategies.⁶

Apart from an expanding ambition and agenda, there has also been a growth in the number and size of interventions. The call for development of strategies and capacities of interventions has coincided with a stark increase of interventions in conflict and post-conflict areas since the end of the Cold War. Before 1990 the UN initiated 12 missions, whereas it has launched 57 after 1990 of which 16 are still in operation at the time of writing. Other actors such as the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) also organised peace missions. In May 2003 the UN had 34,941 military and civilian police serving in 89 countries, as well as 3,215 international civilian personnel and 6,665 local civilian personnel. The approved budgets for operations between 1 July 2002 and 30 June 2003 amounted to 2.63 billion US\$ and the estimated costs since the first operations in 1948 until 30 June 2003 were 28.73 billion US\$ (Fasulo, 2004: 63). The approved budget for 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 has risen to 7.06 billion US\$, and as of 31 July 2011 almost 122,000 personnel were serving in one of the UN missions, which represents a nine fold increase since 1999. More than 85,000 of those serving were troops and military observers, there were 14,000 police, 5,700 international civilian personal, 14,000 local civilian staff and 2,200 UN volunteers (UN DPKO, 2011: 1-2).

Clearly, peacebuilding (as well as related international development support) has evolved into a large-scale billion dollar industry, which some authors have described with scepticism as a business whose largest beneficiaries are the organisations that participate in it (cf. Maren, 1997; Polman, 2008). Others have questioned the motives donors have to participate in interventions (cf. Chomsky, 2001; Orford, 2003; Chang, 2008). But aside from such criticism, war clearly has tremendous costs in terms of loss of lives and development. Paul Collier (2007: 27) describes war as 'development in reverse', and estimates that civil wars reduce growth by around 2.3 percent a year, which means that "the typical seven-year war leaves a country around 15 percent poorer than it would have been." And not only are the costs of war high - both in humanitarian and financial terms - peacebuilding is considered important as a country that recently has been through conflict has a high chance of returning to conflict. The World Bank (2004: 8) found that post-conflict countries face a 44 percent chance of reverting to conflict within the first five

⁶ It should be noted, however, that a lot of the recommendations made by the Brahimi report have failed to materialise.


years, and Collier and his colleagues (2003: 7) argue that half of the countries fall back in conflict within the decade.⁷

And despite the criticism interventions face, it is also argued that interventions do help stop war and prevent the chances of it reoccurring. The UN High-Level Panel (2004: 33-34) stated that the rapid growth of UN activity in civil wars coincides with a sharp decline in the numbers of civil wars:

Since 1992, civil wars have declined steadily, and by 2003 had dropped by roughly 40 per cent to less than 30 wars. In the last 15 years, more civil wars were ended through negotiation than in the previous two centuries in large part because the United Nations provided leadership, opportunities for negotiation, strategic coordination, and the resources needed for implementation. Hundreds of thousands of lives were saved, and regional and international stability were enhanced.

This idea has been confirmed in statistical studies that suggest the positive effect of UN interventions on the likelihood of peace (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2004; 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008; Newman, 2009). The 2005 Human Security Report also finds that there has been a steady decline of interstate and colonial conflicts since the Second World War, and since 1992 there has also been a decline of intrastate conflict (Human Security Centre, 2005: 22-23). The report attributes the sharp decline in wars since 1992 to – apart from a growing number of democracies, increase in economic interdependence, and decline of economic utility of war – increased involvement by governments in international institutions helps to reduce the incidence of conflict, as these institutions encourage peaceful settlement and help promote democratisation and interdependence (ibid, 148-49). As aforementioned, to prevent the reoccurrence of war, peacebuilding strategies have been developed to add to peacekeeping efforts. As stated in the *Brahimi Report*, “while the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers’ support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders’ work” (UN, 2000a: 5). Similarly, the UN High-Level Panel (2004: ix) “identifies post-conflict peacebuilding as an area of vital concern.” Peacebuilding therefore not only aimed to address direct violence, but also underlying issues that could cause conflict to reoccur. Essentially, peacebuilding aims to ensure not only what Johan Galtung

⁷ However, it should be noted that Suhrke and Samset (2007: 201) find that “estimates of recurrence are fragile and easily affected by changes in definitions, data, time periods studied and method of analysis.” They also note that Collier and his colleagues claimed a likeliness of return to conflict within five years of 50 per cent, 44 per cent, 23 per cent and 20.6 per cent in different documents, but that the highest number continues to be cited in policy documents.



(1969; 1996) refers to a 'negative peace' but also aims to build a 'positive peace'. Galtung's model suggests that conflict can be viewed as a triangle with contradiction, attitude, and behaviour on the three corners (see figure 2). The contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation (real or perceived incompatibility of goals between actors), the attitude refers to the parties' perceptions and misperceptions of each other and themselves, whereas the behaviour refers to the parties' actions. These three elements of conflict can be equated with three forms of violence; structural, cultural, and direct violence. Whereas in a negative peace the direct violence may be absent, structural and cultural violence may continue which will lead to the recurrence of direct violence. The high chances post-settlement countries have to return to conflict are thus to be limited by addressing the cultural and structural issues that may breed new conflict. In Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* (1992: 15), the then UN Secretary-General stated that comprehensive efforts are needed to consolidate peace:

(...) these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

Moving beyond traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding, interventions came to include "constructing or reconstructing of institutions of governance capable of

providing citizens with physical and economic security” (Chesterman, 2004: 5). Peacebuilding thus came to include the elements of statebuilding, driven by self-analysis of interventions and the growing acceptance of the democratic peace theory (Human Security Centre, 2005: 148-49). According to the UN High-Level Panel (2004: 23), “(...) helping States prevent or reverse the erosion of State capacity, (...) is crucial for meeting almost every class of threat.” Security, it is argued, is provided by ensuring a proper and capable state. Yet, most of such statebuilding efforts resort to technical programmes and fail to explicitly formulate the nature of the state that is to be built (Samuels and von Einsiedel, 2003: 3).

From ‘Tillian’ to ‘Weberian’: The Rise of the Modern State

The promotion of sustainable peace has thus developed into efforts to build states. The question is then how and what is to be built, and what does this state look like? The following section will look into how, in the context of statebuilding and security interventions, ‘the state’ is defined. The dominant definition, based on European experiences, is that the means of violence are to be controlled by the government, which in turn is to act on behalf of the civilian population. In other words, the ideal state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.

The emergence of ‘states’ in the west has been a long and violent process. Charles Tilly (1985: 169) defines this war making and state making as organised crime. He equates the state with a protection racket, exercised by “coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs.” It was out of the rise of these protection rackets that they gained legitimacy, succeeded in protecting those within its territories from threats from outside, and were able to extract taxes and enforce a level of order that the modern state emerged. Similarly, Max Weber also analyses the state in his essay *Politik als Beruf* from 1919 “in terms of a *Means (Mittel)* which is peculiar to the state, as it is to all other political associations, namely physical violence (*Gewaltsamkeit*). ‘Every state is founded on force (*Gewalt*)’, as Trotsky once said at Brest-Litovsk. That is indeed correct” (1994: 310). Violence⁸ is not the only means used by the state, but, in Weber’s definition, it is the means *specific* to the state. A state is then, “that human community which (successfully) lays claim to the *monopoly of legitimate physical violence* within a certain territory, this ‘territory’ being another of the defining characters of the state” (ibid. 310-11, original emphasis). Through a ‘Tillian’ phase, operating as a security shield and establishing a bond between itself and its citizens,

⁸ The German term ‘Gewalt’, used by Weber, does not differentiate between ‘force’ and ‘violence’ and the terms are here used interchangeably.

the state has evolved into the 'Weberian' state with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence:

[T]he modern state is an institutional association of rule (Herrschaftsverband) which has successfully established the monopoly of physical violence as a means of rule within a territory, for which purpose it unites in the hands of its leaders the material means of operation, having expropriated all those functionaries of 'estates' who previously had command over these things in their own right, and has put itself, in the person of its highest embodiment, in their place. (ibid. 316)

Weber does not, however, hold the state's citizens to be its oppressed victims and his quintessential element of the state only befalls when the people are acquiescent to it. "For the state to remain in existence, those who are ruled must *submit* to the authority claimed by whoever rules at any given time" (ibid. 311). And while Weber observes three grounds from which legitimacy can be derived – which are tradition or custom, charisma, and legal statute – legitimate violence is "violence that is *held* to be legitimate" (ibid. emphasis added).

The legitimacy of the state authority thus requires some form of consent from those who are governed. An important discussion concerning the legitimacy of the state authority and the equal rights of individuals is found around the theoretical conceptualisation of 'the social contract', a term that remains strongly present in policy vocabulary. For instance, in its policy guidance publication on statebuilding in situations of conflict and fragility, the OECD talks about "critical elements of statebuilding that underpin the social contract" (2011a: 29). It furthermore reifies the social contract as if it could be a real paper signed by agreeing legal entities, when it states that "the normative terms of the ideal social contract were set forward in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (and successive international human rights covenants)" (ibid, 24). Shortly after the UNDP published its report *Governance for Peace. Securing the Social Contract* (UNDP, 2012), UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented his 2012 Agenda for Action arguing "we need a new social contract" (UNSG, 2012). And shortly before the presentation of the World Bank's *World Development Report 2011*, which also mentions "the social contract between state and citizen" (World Bank, 2011a: 125), the World Bank's director gave a speech entitled: *The Middle East and North Africa: A New Social Contract for Development* (World Bank, 2011b).

Among the early thinkers on social contract theory, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau are the most prominent. In 1651 Hobbes describes in

Leviathan how people established a social contract and gave up some of their rights to the state authority in exchange for their protection. Hobbes depicts the state of nature, life before government, as a war of all against all. If each person is entirely free and has rights to everything, there would be no peace and everyone would continuously fight for their personal rights. Therefore, he argues, there needs to be an absolute authority to ward off this state of nature. The people need to establish a social contract with the governing authority, and give up some of their rights to this authority in exchange for protection (Hobbes, 2010: 102-5). Contrary to Hobbes, in 1689 Locke describes the natural state in his *Two treatises of government* as one in which people enforce themselves. Without a governing authority, he argues, there is not a war of all against all but a law of nature. But with the development of societies and economies, conflicts arise because people are not impartial in their own disputes. The state therefore arises out of society as people search for a way to restrain conflict between individuals. At the same time, Locke argues, state sovereignty is to be restricted to protect the individual freedoms derived by natural law. This is where Locke goes further than Hobbes, who in chapter 18 on the rights of the sovereign authority denied the need to restrict the sovereign authority and argues that the rights and powers of this authority cannot be shared or separated (Hobbes, 2010: 110). Criticizing Hobbes, Rousseau argues in *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* in 1755 that in the natural state people do not act as immorally as Hobbes claims, but also rejects Locke's notion of a natural law. Rather, peoples' natural aversion of suffering has created instinctual reactions to behave morally. As societies developed, he argues, instinct was substituted by reasoning and justice. Property rights and solving of conflicts needed the adoption of institutions to ensure rule of law. In his 1762 book *Du contrat social* he states that this is how civil society developed, as people agreed to a social contract in which they submitted to the general will of the people in order not to be submitted to the will of others. Similarly to Hobbes, Rousseau denies the divisibility of the sovereign, as it constitutes the general will and the general will cannot be divided. However, he distinguishes this general will or sovereign authority from the government, which is "an intermediate body set up between subjects and the Sovereign, to secure their mutual correspondence, charged with the execution of the laws and the maintenance of liberty, both civil and political" (Rousseau, 1923: 49).

All three authors allow for a monarchy or oligarchy to be serving as authority, and Hobbes even finds a monarchy as best capable of serving the general will. Nevertheless the social contract theory heavily influenced the notion of a democratically elected government that is itself also subject to the rule of law. Writing in the 20th century, Weber found the ideal type of legitimacy not to be derived from tradition, custom or charisma, but from the legal statute. The modern

state is then a rational-legal authority, in which the authority of the state is tied to impersonal rule of law through a rational bureaucratic system.

The modern state thus evolved through a process of internal pacification and external warfare by which it acquired the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Internal problems such as coups, uprisings, urbanisation and its corollary breakdown of local supervision led to the development of policing forces from the late eighteenth century onwards (Baker, 2008: 12). Subjects submitted to this central authority in exchange for protection. External threats and the levying of taxes created standing armies, which evolved from opportunistic armies composed of a few male members of society at times of war in Greek city states or among tribes without rulers, through feudal societies, chiefdoms and empires using conscription and mercenaries, to standing armies which developed from the mid-fifteenth century onwards (Van Creveld, 2007). Security, both internal and external, had become a public good provided by the state. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, it was regarded as self-evident that preventing and responding to crime, and maintaining and restoring order and security was the duty of the state, which hence needed the monopoly on violence to fulfil its role. "Thus, what had only been the experience for 150 years in the west, was regarded as 'natural' and 'right', whilst the longer historical pattern of diversity and plurality by non-state authorisers and providers was unimaginable" (Baker, 2008: 18).

Whether acting as enforcers of the law or as defenders of the nation, the means of violence are supposed to be controlled by the government, which in turn is supposed to be representing or acting on behalf of the population. This is – in essence – the modern state model, which is so deeply engrained in the social sciences that it often remains implicit, unspoken, and thus unquestioned. (Stepputat et al, 2007: 7)

Stepputat and his colleagues describe how this administrative capacity and ability to uphold the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence of the state is linked to its ability to raise revenues from society, which in turn is linked to the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the population, which again is linked to its capacity to provide services for which it needs administrative capacity and a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. "This is the basic circular triangulation that modern states are supposed to square. And it is against this benchmark that postcolonial states are currently being measured to determine how fragile they are" (ibid. 8).

Legitimizing Interventions: Fragility and Security

As will be discussed in this section, the belief in the state as an ideal organisation to prevent conflict and promote development is then also a basis for the legitimisation of interventions. The assumption is that the primary task of the state is the provision of security. When a state is unable to square the triangulation mentioned at the end of the previous section, it is deemed to be 'fragile'. This fragility is not only considered a security threat for the people living in this particular state or region, but also considered a threat for the state system as a whole. Based on this argument, intervention is not only legitimate but also necessary.

When trying to understand what 'state fragility' means, one quickly finds that there is no agreed definition of 'the fragile state' and international organisations and countries all produce their own lists (Cammack, et al. 2006: 16). Most definitions converge around the definition proposed by the OECD, which defines a state to be "fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations" (OECD, 2007a: 2). Nevertheless, international organisations and donors all use their own definitions, often based on their particular mandates and interests. For instance, where the IMF (2008: 7) emphasises a state's characteristics that "impair their economic and social performance" and finds that they are "least likely to achieve the MDGs," USAID (2005a: 1) refers to states that are "unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security." This lack of clarity over the definition then allows it to be used to legitimise interventions in what a state or organisation classifies as 'fragile states' (much like the term 'terrorist' does). Moreover, Lars Engberg-Pedersen and his colleagues (2008: 21) note that it assumes fragility is best solved by strengthening the state and thus is neglecting the importance of private actors, social movements, civil society organisations, and the like. A case in point they present is that one of the DAC guidelines for international engagement sets a "focus on state-building as the central objective" (OECD, 2007a: 2).⁹ International influences are also seen as less influential on state fragility than civil war and national institutions. Fragility in this sense is seen as a national issue, rather than linked to global and grassroots phenomena. Moreover, political will is hard to assess and labelling a state 'unable' or 'unwilling' can cause diplomatic harm. Engberg-Pedersen and his colleagues therefore prefer to define *fragility* as "institutional instability undermining the predictability, transparency and

⁹ It should be noted that in later documents on statebuilding and related interventions the OECD has stressed a focus on state-society relations, which apart from the strengthening of state institutions includes a focus on civil society (cf. OECD, 2008a).

accountability of public decision-making processes and the provision of security and social services to the population” (Engberg-Pedersen, et al. 2008: 21-4).

The concept of fragility is relatively new. Colonisation imported borders and a state apparatus, which after the Second World War were handed over during decolonisation. Throughout the Cold War, the economic and technical support the post-colonial states received was for a large part based on geo-politics from the superpowers and their respective allies. While these post-colonial states suffered from the divisive politics, also an economic crisis swept through much of the developing world in the seventies and eighties. This caused lending to developing countries to be more and more linked to aid conditionalities, which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank advanced into their Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). However, its policies aimed at privatisation and deregulation further weakened existing political institutions and contributed to fragility (Cammack et al, 2006: 21; Debiel & Lambach, 2009: 22). When after the Cold War many suppressive regimes lost the support from their former patrons, the ‘fragility’ of many countries became even more apparent. Weak political and administrative capacity was seen to be gravely hindering poverty reduction and development, as well as causing conflict and insecurity.

The apparent ‘fragility’ of states has brought about a debate on the sovereignty of states and the obligations a state has towards its citizens. Sovereignty, it is argued by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and its proponents, is no longer a legal given but is something a state has to earn and implies a responsibility for the protection of its people. States have the “Responsibility to Protect”, commonly shortened by “R2P”. When a state is deemed ‘fragile’ and fails to provide security to its civilian population, intervention is legitimate (and even urged for):

Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. (ICISS, 2001: XI)

Moreover, state fragility was not only believed to be threatening the human security and causing violent conflict in the fragile states, but also to threaten the security worldwide. The modern state first has to organise and guarantee public order domestically in its own territory, and secondly together with other states with which it constitutes the international system. Fragile states are then not only incapable of providing services to their citizens, but also to their responsibilities to

the international system (Schneckener, 2006: 23). Therefore they are also found to be a direct threat for the security in the developed west, by the facilitation of international terrorist networks,¹⁰ allowing room for 'shadow' economies to operate freely, and affecting the "social cohesion" in Western countries through the large flow of refugees they create (Duffield, 2007: 162). After the events of 9/11 the (real or perceived) relation between underdevelopment in the world and international security – the so-called development-security nexus – has been fortified even more. The World Bank stated that the attacks of 11 September 2001 have increased the number of people living in poverty by 10 million and has cost the world economy over 80 billion dollars (quoted in UN High-Level Panel, 2004: 14). Not only is it, so the argument goes, because of the human and financial costs of war and the humanitarian responsibility that necessitates interventions in fragile states, it is also in the security interest of the west to intervene. The threat, it is argued, no longer comes from strong adversary states, but from weak states from where crime, violence, poverty and diseases can spill over. "Today, more than ever before, threats are interrelated and a threat to one is a threat to all. The mutual vulnerability of weak and strong has never been clearer" (UN High-Level Panel, 2004: 19). And Francis Fukuyama (2004: ix) argued that, "state-building is one of the world's most important issues for the world community because weak or failed states are the source of any of the world's greatest problems, from poverty to AIDS to drugs to terrorism."

Through the introduction of the concepts of 'negative peace' in which there is only an absence of direct violence (Galtung, 1969) and 'Human Security' (UNDP, 1994) the meaning of security has been widened. Security is not just seen as a prerequisite for development, but development is necessary for security. This is not only the security of those living in underdeveloped areas, but also the security of the developed world. Furthermore, development even entails security promotion itself in terms of human security. This has led to what some refer to as the "securitisation of development" (Duffield, 2001). Such criticism is in line with the argument of Arturo Escobar (1995), who found that the hegemonic 'development discourse' was constructed by the west as a neo-colonial mechanism to maintain its dominance. And Stephen Browne (2006) has argued that most development aid is driven by self-interest rather than altruism. With the emerging human security discourse, development agencies have gone out of their way to declare how development aid can alleviate the root causes of conflict and terrorism. "[T]heir organisational self-interest lies in underlining and redefining their role as problem solvers within the

¹⁰ However, the link between fragile states and terrorist networks is challenged by many scholars (Menkhaus, 2004; Stewart, 2006; Hehir, 2007)

discourses that are presented to the Western public by deploying the appropriate language and concepts” (Debiel & Lambach, 2009: 27). Of course this framing is not necessarily bad altogether, and is arguably necessary for actors involved in development and interventions to give meaning to their work. And although difficult to measure precisely, development aid doubtlessly has contributed to the improvement of living conditions of at least a portion of those living in so-called fragile states. Development is at times radically explained as if the intention is not the development of others but the governance of the other for the benefit of our security (Duffield, 2007). Yet, at the same time it can be argued that politics sometimes requires the formulation of that overriding goal of poverty alleviation into a prevailing political discourse. What is of importance here is that the theoretical ideal of the ‘modern state’ has evolved the perception that the world is organised in a system of states, and that states that are not ensuring the human security of their populations are seen as a threat to the state system, the other states in this system and their populations; an argument that is then used to legitimise interventions. As such, interventions aim to develop other states along this ideal model of the state, both to ensure human security as well as to protect state interests.

Security Interventions: Implementing Security?

This last section describes the history of security interventions and discusses their position in interventions as a whole. How do they fit in the strategies and rationales of the statebuilding project, and how do they relate to the underlying assumptions? Their goal is to promote peace and stability, which is assumed best to be achieved by a system of states, in which the state is an organisation that holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence with the primary task to provide security. The belief in the state as an ideal organisation to provide security not only forms a basis for the legitimisation of interventions, but it also provides interventions with direction. Implicitly or explicitly referring to Weberian and Rousseauian state concepts, security interventions all work towards a common goal. That is to (re)install a monopoly over the use of violence in the hands of state institutions – by disarming former combatants, armed groups and civilians – and improving security provision by state security forces in order to improve state-society relations (i.e. a social contract). As such, it can be argued that security interventions are one of the cornerstones of statebuilding interventions. Salomons (2005: 19) describes security as the one absolute prerequisite to any effective recovery process and “(...) the successful disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants after violent conflict represents the touchstone, the moment of truth, for

any peacebuilding process.” And while the costs of demobilisation and reintegration may be high, according to Kees Kingma (2000: 19),

(...) long-term costs for society – or even the region – could be larger if the ex-combatants were unable to find new livelihoods. It could lead to increasing unemployment and social deprivation, which could again lead to rising crime rates and political instability.

Based on similar arguments, the *Brahimi Report* recommended bringing DDR programmes into the assessed budgets of peace operations. It also recommended,

(...) a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments. (UN, 2000a: 8)

And the World Bank (2011: 148) argued that “consolidating and coordinating security services is a fundamental first step in institutional reforms to prevent violence.” As observed by Knight (2009: 36), “we have come to expect DDR and SSR processes to tackle the security-development nexus in efforts to address broad national recovery efforts and human security needs.” These interventions are both perceived to be vital for the success of post-conflict reconstruction and the prevention of a relapse into conflict (Muggah, 2009).

As such, these security interventions are here in first instance considered to be international efforts to promote security and stability. The design of policies and programmes is dominated by international actors, programmes are largely financed by international donors, and several elements of these interventions are also implemented by international actors. And international actors often push for the inclusion of provisions on DDR and SSR in peace agreements between conflicting parties. But these interventions are not just international efforts, and the role of national governments in the design, implementation and sometimes also financing has to be recognized. Furthermore, security interventions are not only about security, but also include development objectives. Below, the development of the different elements of security interventions will be discussed.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

An important part of security interventions are DDR programmes, which despite much criticism on both results and implementation remain an important tool. DDR

operations have become a well-established feature of post-cold war peace operations. For development to be achieved, it is argued, there needs to be security and former fighters must not only believe, but also take part in the peace process. Briefly put, DDR aims to do this by taking away their arms and uniform, and dismantle factions and help ex-combatants to get back to or begin their civilian lives. Linked to DDR is SSR, which aims to adjust and restructure the security sector to the peace situation. These programmes and the goals that they are to attain have changed over the years. Before the 1980s DDR was mainly informed by the Cold War and focused on disarming and demobilizing military establishments and right-sizing armed forces. In the late 1980s, with the end of the Cold war and the victory of the democratic ideology, the UN and its donors started to include a wider set of activities, specifically in Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, there was an increased interest in promoting democratic oversight of military institutions; a first step to SSR policies. From the 1990s onward, a more development-oriented approach to DDR was adopted and objectives became more comprehensive. They now also included the livelihoods of ex-combatants and their communities, and started to make distinctions between child soldiers, women associated with armed groups and other vulnerable groups. Linkages with other aspects of post-conflict interventions, such as economic development and SSR, became more and more evident. Recognizing this, the *Brahimi Report* (UN, 2000a) underscored the importance of missions with stronger mandates to support the peace process and underpinned the adoption of integrated DDR strategies. Different UN agencies are often involved in the DDR programme, including the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Another important player is the World Bank, which initiated the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP)¹¹ after the Congolese wars. To respond to the fragmented approach to DDR, a number of UN agencies, departments, funds and programmes came together in 2004 to draft a series of standards, known as the *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards* (IDDRS). Then in 2005 the UN Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) on DDR was formally established and mandated to improve the UN performance in DDR. This produced the first edition of the IDDRS in 2006, which provides a set of policies, guidelines and procedures for DDR and has become the standard reference for DDR programme design. The social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants became DDR's main objective (UN IAWG, 2006: 4.30, 1), thus setting far higher ambitions for these programmes compared to the 1980s.

¹¹ The MDRP will be discussed in further detail in chapter 5.

This reintegration component of the DDR programmes will be the focus of chapter 6.

While on the one hand DDR programmes have grown in size as well as scope, on the other hand there has been much criticism. Willems, Kleingeld and Van Leeuwen (2010: 30) argue that these programmes,

Are expected to have significant consequences for local security. At the same time, improved security at the local level is a key prerequisite for successful DDR. Yet, many programmes focus on national rather than local security and tend to be organised in a very top-down way. Consequently, they not only fail to ensure the security of ex-combatants and local population, but also miss opportunities at community level that might effectively contribute to peace and security at the local level, thereby decreasing chances for success of DDR and SSR programmes.

The need for the involvement of local communities and organisations in DDR has been generally acknowledged and is stressed in the current guideline to DDR programming, the UN IDDRS. Indeed, the IDDRS refer 698 times to terms as 'community-based' and the 'community' (UN IAWG, 2006). Although the need for increasing local participation and ownership in DDR (as well as SSR) is often sounded by practitioners and academics alike, in practice this has proven to be difficult. This can be ascribed to a number of reasons. First, the sheer size of DDR programmes and the large number of organisations and donors involved have led to the creation of a number of standards, most notably the UN's IDDRS (UN IAWG, 2006). While these standards doubtlessly enhance possibilities for collaboration and coordination that hitherto were found lacking, this has also reinforced a 'blueprint approach'. Indeed, there is a need for clear guidelines in order to better connect the security related elements of the intervention to development, because "no matter how well the demobilisation and disarmament of ex-combatants is done by security-focused agencies, it will be a failure unless the rehabilitation and reintegration part is also done well by development agencies" (Olson & Gregorian, 2007: 81). However, as contexts differ greatly from case to case (and even from community to community within a given country), Kingma (2000: 240) previously warned "not to search for standard lessons of how a demobilisation and the subsequent reintegration support should be organised." Second, the multi-donor trust funds, although necessary for the implementation of the large and costly programmes, impede downward accountability since they create a bidding chain of organisations involved, from the fund to INGOs to local NGOs. Local NGOs are then not representing local communities, but rather aim to please their contractors

(Douma and Van Laar, 2008; Klem and Douma, 2008: 28; Specker, 2008: 19; Willems et al, 2009: 61; Rouw and Willems, 2010: 20). Programme design is then largely based on policies and theories invented in the headquarters in Europe and the United States rather than including ideas of local communities. Third, programmes impose their own logic, along with bureaucratic restrictions, simplifications, budgets, timelines and procedures. Thus even where policymakers have fairly enlightened ideas about community involvement in DDR and SSR, these ideas of flexibility and context sensitivity are often 'lost in translation' due to this programme logic and the desire for fast implementation (Willems et al, 2009; Rouw and Willems, 2010: 20).

And besides problems affecting the implementation, in recent years more fundamental questions have been raised about the proposed effects of these programmes. There have been few studies undertaken on the long-term effects of these programmes, and in their review of the available literature, Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010: 4) find that many best practices are not based on solid empirical assessments and that there is "a large conceptual gap in understanding the relationship between DDR effectiveness at the individual level and the broader impact of these programs on the risk of war recurrence." Indeed, programmes tend to be assessed on outputs, such as the numbers of weapons collected and reintegration kits distributed, and the outcomes regarding improved security are often assumed. The main motivation for conducting DDR is that crime and violence are reduced, yet according to Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis this is never proven in impact evaluations of DDR programmes.

Similar accounts of crime and violence in post-conflict settings without DDR programs are also often used to suggest that, if a DDR program had been in place, this could have led to reductions in crime levels. However, since we observe surges in crime in virtually all post-conflict settings, analysts must at least leave open the possibility that DDR programs may not be sufficient to reduce crime and violence after civil war and that some increases, locally or nationally, may be the inevitable by-product of the transition. (ibid, 11)

Logically, as a result of this criticism on both results and implementation, donors seem less interested in investing in DDR programmes, as exemplified by the difficulties to acquire external funding for the second phase of the DDR programme in South Sudan (Small Arms Survey, 2011a: 5). After limited success with its MDRP, the World Bank's interest in DDR programmes has diminished, and argues in its flagship *World Development Report* that "the need to build trust between erstwhile

enemies may call for the integration of the belligerent forces rather than their immediate disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration” (World Bank, 2011: 149). Further a lack of alternative livelihood opportunities necessitates “a cautious approach to DDR” (ibid. 151). Rather, one of the key elements in fostering security and development is the prevention of “repeated cycles of violence by investing in citizen security, justice, and jobs” (ibid. 270). The focus shifts from DDR to more SSR related activities as well as job creation. Investing in jobs is undertaken to prevent young people from turning or returning to rebel groups or gangs.

Surveys found that the main motivations young people cited for becoming rebels or gang members are very similar – unemployment, idleness, respect, and self-protection, all well ahead of revenge, injustice, or belief in the cause. (ibid. 80)

The scope of the World Bank has changed from merely ex-combatants to young people at risk of joining rebels or gangs in general. And despite giving less prominence to DDR in future operations, the MDRP programme is still shown in a box as an example of regional programming, noting that it is sometimes necessary to implement such high risk programmes (ibid. 219).

And apart from the World Bank, also the UN is reinventing DDR in response to past criticisms. It has developed what is referred to as ‘Second Generation DDR’, which involves measures that can be implemented instead or alongside traditional DDR programming.¹² These include *post-conflict stabilisation measures* such as emergency employment programmes, reinsertion programmes for ex-combatants, and sub-national or community approaches to security and violence reduction; *the targeting of specific groups* such as the disarmament and dismantlement of militias, commanders and senior officers incentive programmes, at-risk youth and gang programmes, pension schemes, and psychosocial recovery strategies; and *alternative approaches to addressing disarmament and unregulated weapons* such as flexibility in sequencing of traditional DDR, weapons management, and weapons for development and weapon lotteries (UN DPKO, 2010). Interesting to note is that such initiatives follow the same lines as AVR programming that will be discussed below. Where ‘Second Generation DDR’ is promoted by the UN as follow-up or addition to traditional DDR, AVR is a policy spearheaded by the OECD as a supplement to SSR (also an OECD spear point) (cf. OECD, 2008b).

¹² It should be noted, however, that this ‘new DDR’ is mostly driven by DPKO’s desire to label particular programmatic tasks in such a way that it falls within its mandate and could access funds from the assessed UN funding.

Security Sector Reform

Also SSR has developed itself over the years. Williams (2005: 3) traces the term “back to the 1960s when various attempts were made by the international community to ensure that the establishment of security forces in developing countries were consistent with the developmental and democratic requirements of these countries.” The role security forces could play to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state was seen as vital. However, at the inception of the Cold War security assistance became politicised and even more so in the following decades. Governments were supported based on their ideological alliance rather than actual intentions to ensure democratic oversight of security institutions. Support was also very technical and intended to ensure military strength of the USA and USSR spheres, instead of dealing with the way security institutions and the civilians interact (ibid, 3-5). The goal of support was to ensure the security of the state - and by that its allies - rather than the security of individuals within these states. After the Cold War, first steps to include the security sector into broader development support were taken.

In 1999 the British Department for International Development (DFID) firmly placed SSR on the agenda, noting that “unprofessional or poorly regulated security forces tend to compound, rather than mitigate, security problems” (quoted in Knight, 2009: 34).¹³ Although military assistance remains a part of SSR today, the primary aim of SSR now became to restructure security institutions with the aim to make their governance and oversight more democratic and transparent. Human rights and the security of individuals became the standard, bloated armies were to be downsized and police forces trained to deal with post-conflict violence. Reforms in the judiciary and penal systems are to ensure capacity and independency of those dispensing justice. SSR is promoted by the World Bank and the UN, but its strongest advocate is the OECD which defines SSR as follows:

‘Security system reform’ is another term used to describe the transformation of the ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework. (OECD, 2005: 20)

¹³ Through DFID support Great Britain also set up the ‘Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform’ (GFN-SSR) with the University of Birmingham “to promote a better understanding of security and justice sector reform” (GFN-SSR, 2008).

The OECD states that SSR aims to improve the ability of the security system to provide for the security needs of the people in a society. As such, their concept of SSR aims to emphasise a people-centred approach (OECD, 2011b, 15). That said, SSR interventions itself are highly institution-centred and aim at institutional reforms (for improved capabilities, governance and oversight) and material support and training of security and justice actors to improve their capacities. And the World Bank (2011, 17) considers SSR to be an important feature of one its “core tools” of *institutional transformation*. Whereas DDR aims to support the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force, the main goal of SSR is to enhance the social contract through improving the provision of security services by the state. SSR interventions encompass a wide and diverse group of programmes which arguably makes it difficult to measure the effectiveness of SSR and its contribution to changes in security provision, more so even than DDR. On the other hand, SSR has received much less criticism than DDR and is considered an important part of post-conflict peace- and statebuilding by donors. Chapter 5 will further elaborate on the results of SSR programmes.

Small Arms and Light Weapons Control

In its attempt to create or recreate a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, DDR programmes are faced with the problem that far from all firearms are held by armed forces. Instead of clearly uniformed opposing armed forces, current conflicts are also often fought by civil defence forces, militias¹⁴, paramilitaries, criminal groups, armed gangs, child soldiers, private military and security companies, and inadequately demobilised and reintegrated combatants from previous cessations of war and hostilities (Buchanan & Widmer, 2006: 6). It is also not uncommon for weakened governments to supply small arms to selected groups of their own citizens. Rivalries between communal groups are fuelled in order to defend the state, or simply to foster chaos and keep opponents of the government divided. And when a peace agreement is signed, the reasons for people to hold arms often have not disappeared:

Such groups also use their state-supplied weapons for their own purposes, to pursue traditional practices such as cattle raiding or to manage relations with rival communal groups over access to land and resources – and, of course, the supply to one group generates new demand (and a market) in others. (Regehr, 2004: 5)

¹⁴ Throughout this book, unless indicated otherwise, a militia refers to a non-government armed force, and not a paramilitary force allied to the state army.

Excess armed combatants are thus only a small part of the problem after conflict, as an estimated 650 million firearms, seventy-five per cent of the global stockpiles, is in civilian hands (Small Arms Survey, 2007a). In the top four countries with the highest number of civilian firearms per 100 residents are the United States of America, Switzerland and Finland (Small Arms Survey, 2011b: 2). Without a stable and functioning security and justice system, however, civilian-kept small arms are considered a large source of insecurity and potential instability. Weapons can be used by 'spoilers' who are dissatisfied with the terms of a peace agreement, for instance if they were profiting from the war economy or feel that 'victor's justice' is being imposed (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008: 49). Furthermore, small arguments on the street or within households can quickly escalate when weapons are easily accessible, or weapons may be used for crime. In other words, the proliferation of SALW hinders the success of DDR programmes (since ex-combatants can easily acquire new firearms) as well as the success of SSR (since the state security forces face armed competition). SALW Control programmes aim to address the potential dangers posed by a proliferation of SALW among civilians.

SALW control activities are undertaken at national as well as regional and international levels. Although not the focus of this research, regional and global treaties on non-proliferation are also part of wider efforts for SALW control. Moreover, at national levels policies are written to delegitimize weapons possession as a whole, or restrict the use of weapons to particular types of firearms and call for registration. To enable the collection of weapons there is often a period of amnesty during which firearms can be handed in without legal consequences.

One way to motivate people to hand in their weapons is through 'gun buy-back programmes', in which money is given in return for a weapon. This is either based on the black market price, a percentage of it, or on average sales prices from dealers catalogues (Meek, 1998). Such guns for cash programmes have largely fallen out of favour, amongst other reasons because it can create a new demand and contribute to the cross-border proliferation of weapons. As a result donors tend to favour programmes where weapons are exchanged for goods. This can be individually granted goods, such as farming equipment, pots and pans, building materials, clothing, radios, etc. The type and amount of goods given then generally depends on the type and condition of the weapon that is handed in. Weapon lotteries are also used, in which handing in a weapon gives a chance to win particular goods (e.g. motorcycle) in a lottery. In weapons for development programmes support is given to a particular geographic community when a certain number of weapons is

collected from this community. Support then can be the construction of a school, health centre or road, and can be decided upon in consultation with the community.

As the proliferation of arms is a big obstacle to security, disarmament is a logical measure. However, complete disarmament is often not feasible (at least initially) and registration of firearms, establishing clear criteria, and regulating use (e.g. not carrying guns in the open) can be a first step (Buchanan & Widmer, 2006: 14). Yet, post-settlement countries are far from the most desired environment to enforce laws, assuming SALW proliferation can indeed be managed by controlling supply. In the case of landmines campaigners successfully claimed that they had no military or police utility, creating a ban not only *de jure* but also *de facto*. In the case of SALW, however, there is a military and police utility and there is a demand by civilians (Regehr, 2004: 4). Efforts to control availability are thus frustrated by demand.

Armed Violence Reduction

Linking SSR and SALW control efforts is Armed Violence Reduction (AVR), a policy approach spearheaded by the OECD which “aims to reduce the risks and effects of armed violence” (OECD, 2009: 22). While the OECD provides a forum for governments and its reports are not necessarily translated into policy – countries have to do this themselves – its reports do strongly influence thinking and policy on the subject. AVR is developed as a result of the criticism about the implementation problems, lacking effects and state centeredness of DDR and SSR programmes. It is not a new form of programming, but rather combines and builds on existing practices, frameworks and approaches in the areas of conflict prevention, peacebuilding, crime prevention and public health. AVR programmes are both aimed at creating better responsiveness of state security institutions to citizens’ security needs, as well as contributing to civilian disarmament and dealing with armed (rebel or criminal) elements in society. AVR was developed by the OECD because of their observation, amongst other things, “high incidents of armed violence in non-conflict countries”, “higher than expected rates of armed violence in societies emerging from conflict”, an “emergence and expansion of under-governed spaces” which “tend to be controlled not by public authorities, civic entities and their security forces, but by non-state actors who are often well armed”, and “the collusion of state actors with non-state criminal groups” (ibid. 36).

The 2011 report of the Geneva Declaration emphasised what had already been stated in its report of 2008: most violent deaths do not occur as a direct result of conflict. In fact, the 2011 report claims, nine out of ten violent deaths occur outside

of conflict. Trends to which the OECD attributes armed violence to are amongst other things the weakening of national and local institutional capacities and the empowerment of non-state actors and networks (OECD, 2009: 37). AVR therefore “offers a set of approaches that can help achieve the broader goals of statebuilding, peacebuilding and development (including aid effectiveness). This is because chronic and armed violence signals a *fragile situation*” (ibid. 22, original emphasis). Instead of ‘fragile states’, the OECD tactically refers to ‘fragile situations’ as “the state may not be fragile overall, but it is fragile with respect to those citizens, communities, cities or sub-state areas that are under threat of armed violence” (ibid.). Not only is this politically less sensitive than calling an entire state – in which intervention is to take place and with whose government is to be cooperated – a fragile state, it also allows for intervention outside what previously were considered fragile and post-conflict situations. Wherever high levels of violence can be identified, intervention is legitimised. As such, programming is expanded and linked to particular regions in for instance Brazil and the United States. It is a fact that violence is not only problematic during or after conflict and is in various cases even more lethal than in situations labelled as ‘war’. It is therefore only logical that this observation is followed by a response from policy makers. However, it is interesting to note that there are strong institutional ties between those who report the problem and who provide the policy answer.¹⁵ In effect, they are together contributing to the legitimisation of external interventions in increasingly broader types of situations

Just as with Second Generation DDR for traditional DDR, AVR is seen as complementing wider SSR efforts. Both have the objective of contributing to stability, safety and security, which in the end is to be achieved through ensuring a legitimate monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and bringing together the citizens as recipients and the state as provider of security. “AVR programming targets risk and protective factors that appear to increase or reduce the likelihood of armed violence” (OECD, 2011b: 16). It does this through direct programming, such as targeting the proliferation of SALW through disarmament initiatives, as well as indirect programming, such as by improving street lighting or other development projects that contribute to increased security. For the OECD, SSR and AVR are highly complementary, and SSR can serve as an entry point for AVR and vice versa.

¹⁵ The Small Arms Survey has been mandated to coordinate the efforts of the Geneva Declaration and hosts the Geneva Declaration’s secretariat, and the Geneva Declaration Secretariat collaborates closely with the OECD-DAC. The Geneva Declaration has signalled the consequences and sources of armed violence in its flag-ship report, edited by the Small Arms Survey. The policy answer is provided by the OECD’s AVR document, which was co-authored the then director of the Small Arms Survey.

In some cases, the OECD argues, a government may be only willing to discuss more general institutional reform of security institutions before talks about AVR programmes involving communities can be initiated. Likewise, implementing AVR programmes in areas where the state is not delivering security can be a starting point of acquiring state security provision in these areas. As such, there is a clear intention to use both interventions to adjust the ways security is organised towards the ideal model described above.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter looked at the underlying assumptions of international actors organising and supporting security interventions. In the last decades interventions in conflict situations have both increased in number and expanded in scope. Instead of merely standing between two previously opposing parties (peacekeeping), programmes have been launched to build state institutions, collect weapons and change entire societies from cultures of war to cultures of peace. This rebuilding of society is a daunting task and hence requires some form of guidance. How to ensure security and development in countries that after the signing of a peace agreement are struggling to recover? How is security best organised, if security has been absent for so long? The answer is often sought in the way security is organised in those places we know best, and where security is relatively well organised. In Weberian terms, it is argued, a state must have a monopoly on the legitimate use violence, which has to be balanced by some sort of social contract. For the monopoly on violence in the hands of the state to be legitimate, the state must therefore provide services to its citizens, of which security is a prominent one. As such, an ideal model of how the state should function is created that gives meaning and guidance to interventions. Moreover, this model also provides legitimisation for interventions. There is severe human suffering through violent conflicts, and a solution to this can be provided by the intervention. Furthermore, a debate has evolved in which governments are held responsible to provide security – that is after all seen as a state’s core task – and when they fail to do so external intervention is legitimised. In addition, fragile states or contexts are seen as a threat to western states.

With security provision being the most important of services that states are expected to provide, the first phase of statebuilding interventions after war are those elements specifically aimed at enabling state security provision. These security interventions aim to establish the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence by disarming rebel factions through DDR, neutralizing their man-power through the reintegration of ex-combatants, and by disarming the civilian population or at least attaining some control over the types of weapons in civilian

hands. The provision of security and justice services by the state is then to be enhanced through SSR. AVR programming offers on the one hand an answer to the criticism that current security interventions are too technical, state-centric and not matching the reality on the ground. The AVR framework shifts to a people-centred focus and emphasises the reality of a dispersed control of violence on the ground as opposed to the theoretical ambition of a state monopoly. Furthermore, it emphasises longer-term interventions with a broader developmental focus. On the other hand, the AVR framework also contributes to the further legitimisation of interventions and broadening the scope of situations in which interventions are considered legitimate. After all, armed violence is not only a problem faced by conflict and post conflict countries, and it requires intervention in every situation. This not to say that efforts to reduce armed violence outside conflict zones would otherwise be illegitimate. More interestingly, through a discourse of idealised notions of what the state should look like and how it should provide security to its citizens, both the deepening and the widening of external interventions in state functioning is being legitimised externally. As such, through the assumption that security should be organised by the state (and in a specific manner), there arises more and more a system of world governance in which interventions interfere in regions where state security provision is considered inadequate to global standards. The ever-expanding agenda of interventions is also caused by self-analysis and realisation that the conflicts cannot be prevented by a number of blue helmets keeping the peace, or with the strengthening of a few state institutions. On the road to the peace and stability it has set for itself, the intervention picks up more and more tasks as it goes. The contexts in which interventions are implemented, it seems, are too complex to just bring in the ideal state model and get peace. This has led to fierce criticism on the dominant intervention model discussed in this chapter. The first, which can be termed as 'context critique', is that the context is much different and much more complex than presumed by intervening actors. Second, what can be termed as 'intervention critique', is that the policies and programmes of international actors are rarely implemented as originally planned for on the drawing board. As a result of these issues, critics argue, interventions fail to sufficiently address the problems they are designed for. The following two chapters will look into these two dominant critiques.

Chapter 2. A Disenchanted Reality: Chaos and Order

Having discussed the practices, rationales and assumptions of statebuilding, and security interventions in particular, in the previous chapter, this chapter looks at what can be termed the 'context critique' on the dominant ideal model that underlies interventions. While there is certainly some variation between authors, in essence this critique argues that the states where interventions take place are not 'fragile' or 'sick', but simply function differently. The context critique on the dominant intervention model presented in the previous chapter finds that there is incomplete understanding of how violence is organised, and thus the ways in which security provided and by whom. Furthermore, there is insufficient understanding of the functioning of the state in a hybrid political context, and the relationship between state and society. As a result of this lacking understanding, there are unrealistic expectations of how the above two points can be changed by external actors.

As will be discussed in this chapter, compared to the intervention model, the context in which security interventions take place is rather disenchanted. One assumption behind interventions is that security is best provided by the state, and that the state as an organisation therefore requires a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. However, such a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence is far from a given. Rather, there is competition between different actors in control of violent means, as well as new emerging actors, creating a constant struggle over what institutions are able to define and enforce collectively binding decisions, and what norms, interests and priorities are promoted. In other words, with a dispersed control over violent means, there is also a dispersed control of governance and security provisioning.

The first section of this chapter discusses the framework provided by North, Wallis and Weinstein (2009) who start with a dispersed control of violence. From there, they describe how certain states evolved into something that approximates the ideal model discussed in the previous chapter. The second section then looks at the development of the state in Africa, and the implications of colonialism on the state and the functioning of governance in particular. Attention is also given to state-society relations, and what notions such as 'citizenship' and 'civil society' - often taken as self-evident - mean in an African context. As these observations clearly do

not match the theories that underlie most security interventions, alternative theories and perspectives to this reality are discussed. What emerges is what is described as 'hybrid political orders', 'mediated' or 'negotiated' statehood, and 'twilight institutions', in which various authority structures overlap, cooperate and compete. The final section then investigates what this 'hybridity' means for security provision on the ground. If the state has no monopoly, there is a multitude of overlapping institutions, both state and non-state, involved in governance and security provision. This means a myriad of security providers, but possibly also a multitude of sources of insecurity.

Dispersed Violence and Social Order

The previous chapter discussed how the state is conceptualised in terms of an organisation with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. For Douglass North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast (2009), looking at the state as if it is a single actor with a monopoly on legitimate violence assumes away the fundamental problem of how the state achieves such a monopoly. In other words, it neglects to problematize and investigate the ways in which violence is organised, and thus the ways in which security provided and by whom. How do societies deal with violence if this monopoly does not (yet) exist? In their book *Violence and Social Orders* they aim to explain how societies evolve in the way they organise violence, and thereby how they organise the provision of security. According to the authors, there are different kinds of social orders, each with their own particular logics of how they function. Although their evolutionary argument (which is less important here), the generalisability of the transition from one type of organisation to the other for all societies, and their focus on elites can be questioned, they bring a useful characterisation of the different ways in which different societies function. Moreover, their argument has been lauded by academic reviewers (cf. Bates, 2010; Holden, 2010; Kiewit, 2010; Shanske, 2010; Stefancic, 2011), as well as in the policy world. For instance, a reference to the book is made in the 2010 report of the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy on development aid (WRR, 2010: 64-65), and an IMF report investigated the framework and finds it valid (Gowllwitz Franke and Quintyn, 2012: 34). Below, first the framework presented by North and his colleagues is presented, following a discussion of what elements in it are problematic and what is useful for the argument presented in this chapter.

The framework of North and his colleagues focuses on two of these social orders present in today's world: the "limited access order" or "natural state" and the "open access order." They argue that social orders are "characterised by the way societies craft institutions that support the existence of specific forms of human organisation,

the way societies limit open access to those organisations, and through the incentives created by the pattern of organisation" (ibid. 1). Fundamental is also how social orders limit and control violence. The natural state is characterised by personal relations and limited access to organisations. In such natural states, powerful elites are directly connected to the organisations they head and strong elites together form a dominant coalition:

The natural state reduces the problem of endemic violence through the formation of a dominant coalition whose members possess special privileges. The logic of the natural state follows from how it solves the problem of violence. Elites – members of the dominant coalition – agree to respect each other's privileges, including property rights and access to resources and activities. By limiting access to these privileges to members of the dominant coalition, elites create credible incentives to cooperate rather than fight among themselves. Because elites know that violence will reduce their own rents, they have incentives not to fight. Furthermore, each elite understands that other elites face similar incentives. In this way, the political system of a natural state manipulates the economic system to produce rents that then secure political order. (ibid. 18)

However, this dominant coalition is highly unstable. Indeed, it is perhaps best viewed as a dynamic process in which the dispersed power over violent means is constantly shifting between existing powerful actors, as well new emerging actors. With every change in circumstances the structure of the dominant coalition has to be re-negotiated, as North and his colleagues put it, through talks perhaps but certainly also through violent means. Furthermore, as the privilege of using an organisation lies with its leader, rather than with the organisation itself, organisations are not perpetually lived. Simply put, when the king decides on certain rules of land possession for the elite, these rules are not necessarily taken as given by a successor. This changes as elites attempt to secure their positions and "societies gradually begin to develop ways of privileging organisations as legal persons (entities), irrespective of the personal identity of the leaders" (ibid. 35). They then become more capable of sustaining more complicated organisational structures, even outside the state organisation itself. This development characterises the development from "fragile natural states" to "basic natural states and then "mature natural states". This process, however, is by no means necessarily teleological and societies may move up and down this scale. When a society does move towards a mature natural state, it gradually reaches what the authors call the three "doorstep conditions" in which impersonal relations within the elite are possible. The first doorstep condition is rule of law for elites, which "extends the

range of contracts and relationships among elites and allows mutual dependency to exist that could not survive without some form of legal protection" (ibid. 26). The second is the existence of "perpetually lived forms of public and private elite organisations, including the state itself" (ibid). And the third doorstep condition is the consolidated control of the military. This "removes the need for elites to maintain alliances among elite groups tied to military factions, which are activated in situations where violence breaks out" (ibid). When these doorstep conditions are met, a society can make the "transition proper" towards an open access order, although this is by no means guaranteed.

The transition proper begins when elites find a common interest in transforming elite privileges into impersonal elite rights shared by all members of the elite. [...] The transition proper is the process by which elites open access within the dominant coalition, secure that open access through institutional changes, and then begin to expand access to citizenship rights to a wider share of the population. (ibid. 190)

The open access order functions in a distinctly different fashion than the natural state. "Political management of violence is based on impersonal rules and organisations, not, as in the natural state, on the manipulations of economic privileges" (ibid. 122). Therefore open access orders are able to adjust to economic and social changes without necessarily making changes in the political arrangements that deal with violence. In open access orders,

[...] personal relations still matter, but impersonal categories of individuals, often called citizens, interact over wide areas of social behaviour with no need to be cognisant of the individual identity of their partners. Identity, which in natural states is inherently personal, becomes defined as a set of impersonal characteristics in open access orders. The ability to form organisations that the larger society supports is open to everyone who meets a set of minimal and impersonal criteria. Both social orders have public and private organisations, but natural states limit access to those organisations whereas open access societies do not. (ibid. 2)

Yet, there are a number of problems with the argument of North and his colleagues. Especially their explanation for the transition from the natural state to an open access order is problematic. Their framework is based on the experience of what they call the "first movers," namely Great Britain, the United States and France. Yet, in these three cases the way doorsteps were reached, where the emphasis in this process was, and what actually caused the "transition proper" all differed.

Although this is acknowledged by the authors, they find that “even if the specific historical paths the first movers followed to open access were unique, every subsequent transition accomplished the same results with respect to institutions, organisations, and the transformation of elite rights into citizen rights” (ibid. 194). However, while giving a lot of attention to the transition in their framework, they fail to give a satisfying explanation of why some societies move towards open access while others have not. And according to Bates, the authors resemble the work of classical development theorists, such as Almond and Coleman (1960), Smelser (1959) and Parsons (1951; Parsons and Shils, 1951), and by highlighting the distinctive features and dominant characteristics of the societies they study, they create typologies, classifying societies as traditional or modern and generating ideal types (quoted in: Bates, 2010: 755). Furthermore, their emphasis lies strongly with the elites in societies. The balance in natural states is determined by the constant negotiating between elites, and it is elites that aim to transform their privileges into rights, and then start expanding access to these rights. The framework thus leaves little or no space to the agency of non-elite members of society.

Despite these problems, the framework provided by North and his colleagues allows for two important observations. First, the authors argue that “natural states are not sick” (ibid. 269), and show there is a distinct difference in the logics by which different societies function. While open access societies strictly limit access to violence, they ensure open access to political and economic activities based on impersonal relations. And where open access orders use competition and open access to provide order and stability, limited access orders use rent-creation and limited access. “Both social orders are dynamic, but the internal logic of their dynamism differs” (ibid. 255). Thus, not only is there a difference in which violence and security provision is organised – either through a state with a monopoly or through dispersed violence in control of multiple competing actors – but also is there a different logic in the way relationships are organised – that is personal versus impersonal relationships. As such, the authors are far from optimistic about development, aid conditionalities and the promotion of democracy. According to the authors, most development attempts to induce the transition from natural state to open access order. What such interventions attempt is to set conditions that aim to develop and export the institutions and logic from open access orders to natural states. “The relevant dynamics of social change for developing countries, however, lie in the logic of the natural state, not the logic of the open access orders” (ibid. 265). Therefore, they explain, many interventions have different outcomes than intended.

The transplanting of institutions from open access orders to natural states cannot, in and of itself, produce political and economic development. Indeed, to the extent that these institutions are forced onto societies by international or domestic pressure but do not conform to existing beliefs about economic, political, social, and cultural systems, the new institutions are likely to work less well than the ones they replace. Worse, if these institutions undermine the political arrangements maintaining political stability, these new institutions may unleash disorder, making the society worse off. (ibid. 265)

While there may be elections in natural states, with limited access there is often a weak range of (civil society) organisations to represent and mobilise the interests of their members. Because most benefits from the states are not provided impersonally, “natural states cannot sustain public goods and social insurance programmes that share widely the benefits of the market economy in ways complementary to markets” (ibid. 137). The differentiation between the different logics of natural states and open access orders shows how interventions and institutions based on a liberal democratic model can have different and unintended outcomes in the practice. What is interpreted as not functioning in so-called ‘fragile states,’ it can therefore also be argued, is simply functioning along a different logic than stipulated in an OECD-ideal.

The second issue that North and his colleagues point out is the constant struggle and negotiation about how dispersed violence is organised. Rather than starting with the assumption that the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence – or that such a monopoly can be installed through interventions and disarmament programmes – they start with the assumption of dispersed violence. A legitimate monopoly on violence is only acquired, according to the authors, at the end of the process of completing the doorstep conditions before moving to an open access order. And because “the default outcome is natural state, not open access” (ibid. 13), assuming a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence is inconsistent with the reality on the ground in most states where interventions take place. Such an assumption does not enable an understanding of the state as a process and the way states may or may not acquire such a monopoly on legitimate violence.

The observations of differences in the logic according to which different societies function and the constant struggles and negotiation over the control of violence – and by that the organisations through which security is organised – are very relevant when looking at security provision in Africa. Before further discussing these dynamics, the following section first takes a closer look at the development of the states in the African context.

The Development of States in an African Context

The argument made by North and his colleagues is based on the development of a number of western states, but does not consider Africa and the impact on institutions of the colonial past. Therefore, this section discusses the characteristics of state institutions and their relationship with society in Africa in a historical perspective. This is certainly not to say that there is no variation between the experiences of African countries and that the development of the state can be generalised for the African context. But while African political systems have developed in different ways, what they have in common – and what the cases discussed by North and his colleagues have not – is colonisation (Allen, 1995). To a more or lesser extent, the political organisation of societies in Africa has certainly been greatly affected by the colonial period, as well as by the ways in which post-colonial regimes appropriated the institutions after independence. What can be observed are changes in the functioning of patrimonial relations and an increased hybridity of state institutions.

According to Lemke (2004: 14), while Africans were on their own track to make states in a fashion familiar to students of European history, they were curtailed by interference by political entities that had a head start in their own state making, and African state-making efforts continue to be hindered by these colonial legacies. In his well-known book *Citizen and Subject*, Mahmood Mamdani (1996: 61) describes how colonialism has created what he calls a ‘bifurcated’ world,

[...] inhabited by subjects on the one side and citizens on the other; their life is regulated by customary law on one side and modern law on the other; their beliefs are dismissed as pagan on this side but bear the status of religion on the other; the stylised moments in their day-to-day lives are considered ritual on this side and culture on the other; their creativity is considered crafts on this side and glorified as arts on the other; (...) in sum, the world of the ‘savages’ barricaded, in deed as in word, from the world of the ‘civilised.’

According to Mamdani, colonial rule led to the institutionalisation of two systems of power under a single authority. On the one hand, there was a centrally located modern state based on civil power and rights, which excluded the colonised based on race. And on the other hand a locally organised ‘Native Authority’, “whose claim was to enforce custom through customary law” within the territory of the tribe (ibid. 183). This Native Authority was a tribal authority that dispensed customary law to those living within the territory of a particular tribe. As such, the customary became synonymous with the tribal and cultural groups were divided,

each to be ruled under its own Native Authorities, and all fell under the authority of the central state. It did not intend to guarantee rights but enforce custom, and everything that was to be legitimised as custom. This customary justice was dispensed by chiefs that were either traditional chiefs incorporated into the system or colonial chiefs appointed by the colonizing power. As such, the chief became accountable to its colonial paymasters, people lost their right to remove an errant chief, and village councils lost power. Indirect rule in Africa therefore “signified a mediated – decentralised – despotism” (ibid. 17). The native populations were governed by the Native Authority, which was backed by the central state. As such, this system excluded natives from civil freedoms guaranteed to citizens in civil society. Towards independence, this space opened up, but native civil society remained restricted to a small urban elite.

According to Mamdani, the challenges confronting African countries in the struggles for independence and after were to deracialise civil society, democratise the state and particularly customary power, and restructure unequal external relations of dependency. When the nationalist movements – referred to Mamdani as ‘mainstream nationalism’ – inherited the system of decentralised despotism after independence, they failed to ‘detrribalise’ and democratise this Native Authority system. As a consequence, where multiparty elections were organised, the stakes were very high.

The winner would not only represent citizens in civil society, but also dominate over subjects through the appointment of chiefs in the Native Authority. The winner in such an election is simultaneously the representative power in civil society and the despotic power over Native Authorities. (ibid. 289)

In this context, urban politicians started forging and strengthening patron-client relations with rural constituencies. As such, clientelism was exacerbated and extended to the countryside and the communal and tribal ties were mobilised by political leaders to gain control of the Native Authority structures.

Apart from the so-called mainstream nationalism, there were “radical regimes that sought to detrribalise Native Authority” (ibid. 290). This created a ‘centralised despotism’ led by a single party. As argued by Chabal (2009: 104), the one-party state forced politicians to spread their clientelistic net more widely. While perhaps more patrimonial, Chabal reasons, it was at least less brutally ethnic. His argument can be questioned to the extent how much wider politicians of one-party states really were forced to spread their clientelistic net. For example, during one-party

rule of the Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA) in Burundi, most of its leaders were Tutsis from the Bururi province. Yet, the point is that irrespective whether the post-colonial state underwent democratisation or singly-party rule, the connections between the political elite and their constituencies were characterised by clientelistic ties. “Whereas the one-party system favoured a more ‘traditional’ patrimonial organisation, multiparty elections have introduced greater competition between different types of networking – all of which turn on the negotiation of political support for economic advantage” (ibid. 141). A similar argument has been made by Chris Allen (1995), who argued that in response to early post-independence crises contrasting forms of politics were produced, referring to these as ‘centralised-bureaucratic politics’ and ‘spoils politics’.

From colonial times onwards, further changes occurred in the functioning of patrimonialism. As discussed, Mamdani describes how the colonial state created a division between the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional.’ Important in this regard that the new modern structure paid little attention to accountability, and the new traditional was removed from its previous accountability mechanisms. Furthermore, the modern state was only accessible to a small emerging political elite. Whether this political elite chose a path of multi-party elections or preferred single-party rule, the state structure they inherited lacked significant accountability mechanisms. In terms of the previous chapter, what is lacking is a social contract between the population and the elites in control of the state security apparatus.

Having entrusted their future to nationalist liberators, ordinary men and women came to realise that they had effectively mortgaged that future to ‘modern’ elites whom they could scarcely reach, let alone control. Or rather, the only way they could connect with them was by means of clientelism.
(Chabal, 2009: 91)

Politics became more and more characterised by a form of patrimonialism, “commonly understood (with reference to Weber) to denote systems in which political relationships are mediated through, and maintained by, personal connections between leaders and subjects, or patrons and clients” (Pitcher et al, 2009: 129). However, due to colonialism the way this patrimonialism functioned had changed drastically. Characterizing of patrimonial relations are the ties of reciprocity that bind leaders and followers. But the bifurcated state had made chiefs – i.e. traditional chiefs that were incorporated in the state, or appointed colonial chiefs – accountable to the central state and stripped them of their authority.

They were merely the disbursers of clientelistic favours, no longer the keepers of socio-political order. The result was a thinning of the patrimonial relation and the gradual emergence of a non-accountable form of clientelism – that is, a clientelism narrowed to the strictly instrumental, increasingly divorced from the moral and ethical dimensions of pre-colonial rulership. (Chabal, 2009: 95)

According to Chabal (ibid. 122), pre-colonial chiefs did not exploit their position to become rich, but they became rich because of their position. This position “imposed on them a duty to exhibit as much substance as they could in order both to uphold their rank and to offer generosity as socially required.” However, during the colonial period, the accountability mechanisms through which social requirements could be enforced were to a large extent broken down. Chiefs were forced to work for, and account to the imperial authorities, and over time “the office became to be seen instrumentally as a device for accumulating resources” (ibid. 123). Of course, no generalisations can be made and the extent to which accountability mechanisms were broken down varied greatly. Also today politicians still have to account to their constituency, even if their position is not determined by elections. Nevertheless, what can be identified is a dissolution of downward accountability, which ensured that “power conferred possibilities of rent-making that were not sanctioned by collective responsibility and local accountability” (ibid. 124). State power has thus become an instrument through which resources can be accumulated.

Although the state is considered to be a strong instrument for the accumulation of resources, Chabal and Daloz (1999: 16) argued nevertheless that in most African countries the state has little authority.

[...] the state is no more than a décor, a pseudo-Western façade masking the realities of deeply personalised political relations. There may well appear to be a relative institutionalisation of the main state structures but such bodies are largely devoid of authority.

One of their central arguments is that the state is both vacuous and ineffectual. Vacuous because after decolonisation whatever state was rapidly disintegrated and fell prey to factional struggles, resulting in the failure to acquire the legitimacy or competence. It is ineffectual as it never was in the interest of post-colonial African elites to work for proper institutionalisation of the state apparatus. Because of this, state institutions have largely neglected to provide security to the populations. Similar to Chabal and Daloz, Bruce Baker (2008: 74) finds that the historical norm in

African communities is that they provide their own security instead of it being provided by state institutions, which sometimes have been introduced “alongside”.

But whether the state in Africa is indeed a mere façade can be questioned. Trefon (2009: 10) argues that despite a lacking effectiveness in the provision of services to its population, states in Africa still have a *raison d’être* throughout society, for elites and ordinary citizens alike. Clapham (2001) underscores this by arguing that the map of Africa only had a few minor changes since 1900, while an elderly central European in the twentieth century could have been governed by five different states without moving house. Even after independence the borders of African countries underwent only a limited number of changes. According to Clapham this is exactly because of the arbitrarily imposed borders, making “their maintenance the primary concern of subsequent African ruling élite. Once there is an attempt to change the colonial boundaries of Zambia or Côte d’Ivoire, for example, there is no alternative basis on which a Zambian or Ivoirian state could be constructed.” Some degree of feelings of a common national identity has emerged in African countries, even in countries as artificial as the DRC. And for populations too, borders mean trade and business, and thus a way to make a living. Moreover, with state institutions being vacuous and ineffectual the state has not become meaningless. State power is referred to in order to claim political control and legitimacy, and it is still substantial because state control is the ultimate price for all political elites. And while the exploitation of the state is weakening the state further, at the same time the political elites controlling the state depend on it.

And it is not merely the political elites that use the state to profit. Where Weber (1994: 315) observed that in the modern state “there is no longer even a single official left who personally owns the money he expends or the buildings, supplies, tools, or machines of war over which he has control,” this can be hardly argued to be the case in most African states. State administrations continue to be real because also the staff depends on it. State officials have privatised what officially are public services and turned their position into one that is advantageous. Police and army extract money on the side of the road or at the entrance of markets, and administrative clerks ask ‘fees’ for their services. For instance, when driving on a road in the DRC it is not unusual to pass checkpoints where soldiers of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) demand a ‘tax’, which is often negotiable if you are not in a hurry and when you have sufficient leverage. But also the survival of these ‘civil servants’ depends on the continuation of the administrative structures of the state. As argued by Trefon (2009: 12), “agents consequently need to justify the importance of their work – and themselves – by rendering services which are often insignificant, such as issuing authorisations,

certificates, testimonials and by wielding the stamps and seals of their power.” For instance, when travelling through eastern DRC, it is not unlikely that someone claiming to be a state official will make contact and demand a tax or insist their service should be hired. At the moment that their position as actual state officials can be questioned, however, their negotiating position quickly drops. The tables can also be turned with a written permission of a higher ranking official, or his business card in hand showing intention to call him. The real or perceived backing of a state structure is thus an important requirement for the ‘legitimation’ of extortion, also for lower ranking clerks.

Therefore, Raeymaekers and his colleagues (2008: 9) argue that on the one hand the state has indeed eroded and opened up space “for the negotiation of sites of political and economic interaction” for a multitude of actors. However,

[...] on the other hand, the state in Africa continues to play a preponderant role both as an objective of contemporary interventions in the domain of (transnational) conflict resolution, and in the brokerage of local decision-making processes through street-level bureaucracies and everyday political interaction.

The state is thus not merely a façade. Rather, it functions differently than according to the logic of impersonal bureaucracy assumed by the western ideal state model discussed in the previous chapter. Politics inside the constitutional arrangements of the state are intersecting with politics outside such legal arrangements, and formal economies intersect with informal and illegal economies. There is an entanglement of the formal and informal orders. The informal is in this regard not equivalent with the ‘traditional’ and the ‘ancient’, but a continuing transformation and modernisation of the traditional (Panters, 2009: 6). Where in the literature the state is often seen as the embodiment of the formal, and with that the reverse image of the informal, the formal and informal are interwoven, also within the state. The clear theoretical distinction between formal or informal sectors and actors can therefore not be observed in practice. Rather, actors are navigating between the formal and informal depending on their intentions. Debiel and Lambach (2009: 31) describe these as,

[...] hybrid situations, in which local actors and power-holders engage with state institutions to advance their own goals. These can be multifarious, from resource access, power, and legitimacy, to the desire to make a positive impact on national politics.

Seemingly contradictory, even formal citizenship rights can then be obtained through informal channels (ibid. 16; Mirafteb, 2004). And being frustrated about the corruption of the government at one moment and using this corruption at the same time, is not by definition experienced as contradicting. Working through informal sectors is not necessarily a last resort of those excluded from the formal sector, but it is a matter of initiative and innovation. Important is also that it is not just the 'traditional' or 'illegal' actors that participate in informal politics and economies, but all layers of society, both inside and outside the state (Chabal, 2009: 131).

The state still has authority and to a certain extent also informal clientelistic ties form a way (albeit limited) to ensure accountability. Naturally, these 'hybrid situations' in which formal and informal are interwoven have consequences for the functioning of the state and the way security is organised. On the one hand it has indeed enabled large numbers of clients, both within and outside the official state, to find new or additional sources of revenue. On the other hand, the efficacy of the state has been undermined because resources are extracted from the state for patrimonial purposes and because activities are diverted from what the state should formally devote its energy to (ibid. 131). This severely impedes the capacity of state institutions to implement public policy, and limits the number of channels through which public demands can be transmitted. This has caused the state to steadily lose legitimacy and it puts a premium on other ways to pressure politicians. Where formal channels are limited, informal networking remains the most successful way to do so. And when public policy is hardly implemented, politicians can too benefit from patronage to increase their legitimacy. "As a result, both rulers and ruled have a vested interest in keeping alive, and if possible making thrive, those networks that can serve them best" (ibid. 140-41). The relationship between citizens and the state in Africa works therefore according to a different logic than in the ideal state model described in the previous chapter. And for the context critique there intervening actors insufficiently understand the functioning of the state in a hybrid political context, and the relationship between state and society. The following section will elaborate further on this relationship.

Civil Society, Citizenship and the African State

To come back to the notion of the Weberian state, trust is essential for people to be willing to submit to the monopoly on violence of the state. As discussed in the previous chapter, to achieve the condition of Weberian stateness European states went through a phase in which they functioned as protection rackets. It was the dependency of these protection rackets on the resources produced by the people they protected that caused a true concern of these protection rackets in the well-

being of those people, or at least their capacity to produce as efficiently as possible. This is what gave the people a bargaining chip and out of this long process of negotiations states emerged that were bounded to protect interests as formulated by the people, creating what is termed the 'social contract'. This process, however, was not the route for colonised countries, which were "arbitrarily carved up into zones of foreign power influence and jurisdiction, separating and uniting diverse and incompatible social groupings under the rubric of 'state.' In this way, the very nature of the African state is contested and fragile" (Small, 2006: 13). Instead of creating a security apparatus internally they inherited one from outside. The state was never negotiated but imposed and resources colonisers were interested in were simply extracted. After independence new elites not only had resources to extract and sell off to multi-nationals, but they could also count on external assistance. Where in Tillian Europe people were able to hold the state – which needed taxes to sustain wars with other countries – accountable and drove the state institutions and its security apparatus into working on their behalf, the people in the colonies had no such bargaining chip. African people do not provide a tax-base to which African states feel inclined to account for their actions. Instead of protecting the people who provided the resources to sustain the state, the security apparatus' chief function was (and is) to protect the elites and resources, such as mines and oil; not the people.

Furthermore, an important aspect of African identity is kinship. This strongly contrasts with individual notions of citizenship in western states. "People do not perceive themselves as citizens or nationals (at least not in the first place). They define themselves instead as members of particular sub- or trans-national social entities" (Boege et al, 2009: 9). These kinship lines form an important basis for patrimonial relations (Pitcher et al. 2009: 138). The relevance of kinship becomes particularly important in regions where the state is not providing services and where it is communities that provide such issues as security, order and basic social services. What Chabal (2009: 46) identifies as most significant about kinship, is that it contributes to a sense of socially meaningful belonging. Identity is then strongly linked to a communal identity and maintaining one's belonging to this communal identity entails fulfilling obligations to the kinship group. "To have no obligations is not to belong" (ibid. 48). Obligations to the kinship group can then be viewed a form of solidarity or redistribution of resources within the group, enforced by the importance of belonging. If someone does not fulfil his or her obligations to the kinship group, accusations of witchcraft can seriously damage this person's position in society (cf. Geschiere, 1997; Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Bayart, 2009). The other side of this enforced solidarity is that it limits opportunities for accumulation of wealth for investment. The 'belonging' to kinship therefore entails the obligation to

redistribute resources one has access to – personal or state resources – under the threat of exclusion from this belonging, something David van Reybroeck referred to as “the rationality of corruption and the cruelty of solidarity.”¹⁶ This exemplifies again that politics, economy and societal relations cannot simply be seen as distinct from each other, or analysed in a distinct fashion. By only looking at the formal realm of politics, based on its distinct separation from society in the West, the analysis of what actually takes place in the realm of politics is being confined. Chabal and Daloz (1999:134) speak of the “the political instrumentalisation of disorder,” which shows “how the political, social and economic ‘logics’ of contemporary Africa come together in a process of modernisation which does not fit with the Western experience of development.” In Africa – instead of the theoretical distinction between state and society – the state and society have become more and more intertwined, blurring the distinction between formal and informal, state and non-state, legal and illegal.¹⁷ This calls for recognition of the co-existence of a variety of public authorities in the same geographical area of the state, which are overlapping, cooperating and contradicting at the same time.

While often a clear distinction between the state and civil society is taken for granted, such a dichotomy does not reflect the realities on the ground in Africa (Mamdani, 1996; Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Lund, 2007). As such, “there is very little scope for conceptualizing politics in Africa as a contest between a functionally strong state and a homogeneously coherent civil society” (Chabal & Daloz, 1999: 21). Politicians are obliged to kin, clients, communities, regions, clan or religion, and not responsible for the greater good of society as a whole. This does not simply imply “that the state and civil society are conflated, but rather that the Western conceptual understanding of the terms – and therefore the development programmes based upon those understandings – may not apply particularly well to postcolonial circumstances” (Scheye & Anderson, 2007: 227). And despite this argument being well articulated, “reified understandings that view the state as a differentiated institutional realm separate from civil society are notably persistent in academic and political debate” (Painter, 2006: 752). Clearly, state-society relations have developed in a different manner than described in the theories of the modern western state that were discussed in the previous chapter. In sight of this, how should the relationships between state and non-state actors involved in security provision then be viewed? The following section discusses a number of theories and frameworks as described in the literature on this subject.

¹⁶ Presentation at PSDN meeting, *Who should do what? Peace Security and Development in DRC*. 1 November 2010. Utrecht.

¹⁷ Although such a clear distinction is arguably also more theoretical than empirical in the ‘western world’.

Mediated States and Hybrid Political Orders¹⁸

Multiple institutions and actors, both state and non-state, are involved in security provision and governance. Below, some of the literature describing this is discussed. While the concepts used vary, they all describe the processes in which institutions struggle over the ability to enforce collectively binding decisions (Lund, 2011). These struggles may have been more openly violent during armed conflict, but after it they continue nonetheless. The hybrid political context, in which interventions are being implemented on the ground, can therefore be described as a context in which the authority to define and enforce collectively binding decisions is dispersed, and that different authority structures overlap, cooperate and compete.

The phenomenon of overlapping, contradicting, and cooperating state and non-state actors, or at least the increasing observations of it by scholars and practitioners, is now being described as ‘new forms of governance’. Lund (2007: 1) describes them as ‘twilight institutions’, defined as in-between institutions or organisations that engage in state-like performances. “[T]hey are not the state but they exercise public authority.” This makes it difficult to make clear distinctions between what is ‘state’ and what is not. These institutions also challenge the state but they do so in the same language of authority and legitimacy, and at the same time they use the state’s procedural and symbolic forms of legitimacy to obtain legitimacy themselves. Lund also notes that with multiple institutions exercising public authority, both state and non-state, “parties in dispute may go ‘forum shopping’, taking their claim [...] to the institution which they deem most likely to produce satisfactory outcome” (ibid. 4). Thus, “while government institutions are important, the state qualities of governance – that is, being able to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on members of society – are not exclusively nested in these institutions” (Lund, 2007: 13). Especially at the local level, it is argued by Logan (2009: 107), non-state authorities “may compete with local government officials for real power – over land, tax revenues or other resources, responsibility for dispensing justice, and influence over community activities and decisions, and even votes.”

Similarly Boege and his colleagues (2008; 2009a; 2009b) find in their research in the Pacific Islands that state institutions are not the only institutions that fulfil functions that, in the model Western state, are clearly state obligations. This phenomenon cannot, however, be simply described as a division of labour between state and non-state actors over which there are at times disagreements. They observe that in regions that are deemed ‘fragile’ a diversity of power and logics to order co-exist,

¹⁸ Several sections in this section draw partially from the author’s contribution to Van Overbeek et al (2009).

overlap and intertwine, “namely the logic of the ‘formal’ state, of traditional ‘informal’ societal order, and of globalisation and associated social fragmentation” (Boege et al, 2008: 10). Hence, a clear dichotomy between state and non-state does not exist. On the one hand traditional structures and customs often still have huge influences in daily life and also ‘infiltrated’ and transformed state institutions. As opposed to the ideal-type Weberian state, “[state] institutions are captured by social forces that make use of them in the interest of traditional, mostly kinship-based, entities” (Boege et al, 2009b: 15). On the other hand, local non-state orders are also affected by the intrusion of the state. Indeed, everything, including customary uses, has been affected by colonialism, evangelism, imperialism, globalisation, etc. Communities in Africa “have had long experience in adapting customary sources of law, security and conflict management in turbulent political settings created by some combination of a weak or predatory state.” (Menkhaus, 2007b: 71). Non-state security and justice arrangements can be regulated or criminalised, networked or excluded, collaborated with, incorporated in, or trained by the state. As mentioned in the previous section, customary ways and institutions are thus not simply to be equated with the ways of the past. According to Boege and his colleagues, this complex nature of governance is further complicated by the emergence and/or growing importance of institutions, movements and formations as a consequence of poor state performance, and their activities can contribute to the further weakening of state structures (2009b: 16). They define their observations as ‘hybrid political orders’:

In hybrid political orders, diverse and competing authority structures, sets of rules, logics of order, and claims to power co-exist, overlap, interact, and intertwine, combining elements of introduced Western models of governance and elements stemming from local indigenous traditions of governance and politics, with further influences exerted by the forces of globalisation and associated societal fragmentation (in various forms: ethnic, tribal, religious). In this environment, the ‘state’ has no privileged monopolistic position as the only agency providing security, welfare, and representation; it has to share authority, legitimacy, and capacity with other institutions. (ibid. 17)

These hybrid political orders¹⁹ differ considerably from the Western (Weberian) model of the state. Moreover, they define hybridity not to be an ambition that is to be achieved. It is not a normative concept, like that of the OECD state model or the fragile state, which ranks states and sets the agenda towards a particular type of

¹⁹ Hybrid political orders are here distinct from what is sometimes referred to as hybrid regimes or states, in which democratic and authoritarian characteristics are combined.

statehood. Rather, the hybrid political order is an analytical concept through which the political reality outside the West is to be better understood. By doing so, it is argued that one can formulate an innovative policy with a much more positive outlook on states that are classified as weak or fragile, and which builds upon the institutions and networks of governance that are embedded in the societal structures on the ground, rather than introducing governance structures from the outside (Boege et al, 2009b: 20).

According to Trotha (2009: 42) this concept of 'hybrid political orders' described by Boege and his colleagues is too static and does not sufficiently highlight the dynamism of the hybridity on the ground, and "it downplays the dynamics, interests, conflicts and power struggles of those customary non-state institutions and actors." Rather, and much like the constantly redefining of the dominant coalition in the theory of North and his colleagues, the arrangements through which governance and security provision is organised are very complex and fluid:

[They] are hybrid systems, involving complex and constantly renegotiated alliances between a combination of traditional clan elders, local political elites, business leaders, civic (NGO) leaders, religious figures, municipalities, and others. Likewise, the codes, laws, precedents and procedures on which local security systems are based are also often a combination of customary, modern, and sharia laws. (Menkhaus, 2007b: 78)

The question is then how these complexities of local arrangements of governance and security provision interact with each other, as well as with the state. Menkhaus (2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2008) makes the observation that where the state is unable to provide basic services they in some cases can find alternatives for the provision of (relative) stability in the hinterlands based on non-state authority structures. Rested on the most widely used concept of a fragile state – a state that is unable and/or unwilling – Menkhaus identifies four possible states. The first is unwilling and unable and thus basically absent; the second is willing and able and with that basically the ideal type sovereign state; the third is able but unwilling and could be characterised as a predatory state; and the final option is that a state is willing but unable. This last option can then – in case of a renewed interest to extend the rule of law to its peripheries, such as for instance threats to the position of the government, discovery of natural resources, public or international pressure, etc. – lead to a 'mediated state'. In this case, a state authority lacking other options "has no choice but to work through local intermediaries (...) [and t]he state's relationship with local governance structures is negotiated, not purchased or coerced" (Menkhaus,

2006: 7). According to Menkhaus, the mediated state approach “is one which combines what is already working locally with what is essential nationally” (ibid. 12). He distinguishes a mediated state from the outsourcing of governance functions (such as the hiring of security companies by the American and British armies) which he considers to be a choice of a state authority, whereas a mediated state is a strategy of a state authority which lacks options.

As an example of the mediated state Menkhaus (2008) gives Wajir – a region in northern Kenya – where a collection of non-state actors led by women formed an umbrella movement and established peace and security in the region. Here, the institutions in which the government exerted control to govern did not reach the whole territory of the country. The government nevertheless had an interest to gain control over the Wajir region, as the insecurity in the region posed a security threat to the state. The situation was characterised by anarchic violence and largely determined by other actors than the government. In response to the levels of violence and lack of governance, informal committees for peace and development were developed by women, who included several other local actors and leaders. Without the government as an available actor, but with other actors available and ties in informal networks to mobilise, new forms of governance could be developed. The government, however, viewed this first as a threat to its own possibilities to govern the region. Stronger institutions of governance controlled by other actors would limit the opportunities of the government to enforce its control over the Wajir region. The informal systems of governance were then brought together in an umbrella movement and were given support by international donors, in effect legitimizing the actions of this non-state movement. This again inhibited the possible actions the government could undertake to bring the region under its control, and thereby diminish the security threat the region posed. The option the government then chose, limited by the opportunities available, was to negotiate and forge a formal relationship with the movement in Wajir, bringing the region under a hybrid form of governance. Based on this experience, Menkhaus defines a mediated state to be more than an ad hoc peacebuilding strategy, more than a post-colonial version of indirect rule, and more than a division of labour that just happened to be convenient. He finds it more similar to the process of state formation in medieval Europe, but nevertheless something new and distinct, and perhaps “at the forefront of an emerging, largely unrecognised, hybrid form of state-building in weak states” (ibid. 29).

The ‘twilight institutions’ observed by Lund can thus at times cooperate with state institutions, creating what Menkhaus describes as a ‘mediated state’. On the other hand, however, such ‘twilight institutions’ can also be incorporated into the state, or

become the state by themselves. Menkhaus (2007b: 88) not only observes the formation of a mediated state between state and non-state actors in northern Kenya, but also distinguishes the formation of a hybrid state in Somaliland “in which traditional authorities have been formally grafted into the state structure itself.” In Eastern Ethiopia he finds that the relations of Somali communities with the state are a mix of the two, “with the state both grafting elders into its administrative arm (...) and having to periodically negotiate access to the Somali polity via the elders.”

A similar observation about how states function as a constant process of negotiating governance is made by Hagmann and Péclard (2010) in their introduction to a special edition of *Development and Change*. Just like North and his colleagues, they reject the reification of “states as a-historical ‘things’, as given and fixed sets of institutions rather than as political processes” (Hagmann & Péclard, 2010: 241). They propose a framework of “negotiated statehood,” in which they explore “by whom and how state domination is fashioned (‘actors, resources, repertoires’), where these processes take place (‘negotiation arenas and tables’) and what the main outcomes and issues at stake are (‘objects of negotiation’)” (ibid. 544). Rather than providing a model to explain state failure and state formation, it aims to provide a framework to look at past and ongoing dynamics of state domination. Their framework thus assumes that,

[...] processes of state (de-)construction are dynamic and partly undetermined, that the analysis of state institutions must be embedded in a broader understanding of state–society relations, that state building and formation is inherently conflictive and contested and that empirical rather than judicial statehood constitutes the analytical point of departure. (ibid. 557)

As Lund argues, when looking at a society where there is competition over authority, one witnesses not necessarily the collapse of something that was in place before – i.e. not necessarily a state failing or collapsing – “but rather contingent efforts unfolding to make disparate fragments cohere” (Lund, 2011: 888). He describes how, “no single institution is the state as such; ‘state’ is, rather, the quality of an institution being able to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on members of society” (ibid. 887). For Lund, this quality is sovereignty. Generally sovereignty is understood as a question of either/or, that is a state has sovereignty over a territory and population, and is legally claimed by a government in the name of the state. However, by applying the concept of sovereignty “[...] to internal issues of state formation, and focus on *de facto* power to determine the issues of political subjectivity and property, sovereignty becomes a question of degree”

(ibid.). As such, the power to act as a sovereign – i.e. to govern and have ‘state quality’ – is a dispersed quality determined by which institutional actor is able to define citizenship and property rights. Property is then distinguished from possession by virtue of being recognised. And also citizenship – the right to have rights – designates a mutual reciprocal recognition between subject and authority. Recognition in this sense does not necessarily imply normative approval, but the acknowledgment that the authority of an institutional actor needs to be reckoned with. Control over property – of which access to land is the most primary in many African contexts – “and political subjects does not *represent* or *reflect* pre-existing sovereignty. It *produces* it” (ibid. 889, original emphasis).

Summarizing, the different theoretical ideas discussed above all describe a complexity of different institutions, both state and non-state, with different actors moving through this complex hybridity. These different institutions overlap, cooperate, but certainly also conflict with one another, and there is a constant struggle and (re)negotiation between the various institutions and the actors that work with, against, within, outside or alongside these institutions. The struggles and negotiations are in the end about the control of violent means and governance, about which institutional actor can enforce rights and determine who is entitled to these rights. With that, it is also inherently about the protection of citizenship and property rights, i.e. security provision.

Myriad Sources of Security

What, then, does this hybrid political context entail for security provision? When access to violent means is dispersed and there is a constant struggle over authority between different institutions and the actors that work with, against, within, outside or alongside these institutions, this means there are different actors involved in the provision of security (as well as insecurity), many of which are non-state actors and institutions. Moreover, the distinctions between such actors can be blurred. For instance, is a particular group best described as a community watch group, a vigilante militia, or is it actually a rebel group? The following section looks at what this multiplicity of non-state security actors involved implies for the provisioning of security.

As has become clear in the previous sections of this chapter, the presence of a state security apparatus with a legitimate monopoly on the use of violence is far removed from African reality. There is a multitude of institutions that hold certain levels of control over violent means. As such there is what some authors refer to as “oligopolies of violence that (by definition) comprise a fluctuating number of partly

competing, partly cooperating actors of violence of different quality” (Mehler, 2009: 60). These actors may be state actors or non-state actors, which may be private actors or more informal community-based actors.²⁰ In fact, informal security arrangements (i.e. security arrangements not initiated by the state) are often the main if not sole source of security and protection for communities and households. In Africa, customary courts are the dominant form of regulation and dispute resolution, covering up to 80 or 90% of the population. Similar estimates can be made for countries in other regions, such as in Afghanistan, Yemen, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste and Nepal (Baker & Scheye, 2007: 512; OECD, 2007b: 67). As mentioned, these non-state security arrangements thrive due the absence of the state in the peripheries, as well as due to their roots in the norms and cultures of society. According to Baker (2008) people in Africa then have a multi-choice of sources for security provision and dispute resolution. Although perhaps a misleading term, as also acknowledged by Baker, as it is the experience of security provision and dispute resolution that is multiple. This does not necessarily imply a free choice among multiple options. Nevertheless the reality is that people find security “based on ‘what is available’, ‘what works best’ and ‘what is affordable’, more than issues of who controls the policing body and to whom they are accountable” (Ibid. 29). This brings about a wide variety of non-state actors involved with security provision and dispute resolution:

[T]he manifestations of policing in Africa today are societal responses to the flouting of norms, criminal activity, armed conflict and weak state security provision. Yet specific patterns of policing vary according to the social context. In other words, the ingredients may be similar, but not how they are cooked. (Baker, 2008: 155)

According to Baker, the specific forms of security initiatives²¹ are products of structure and agency. As far as agency, people may have altruistic motives as concerned citizens, they may be seeking political power, economic gains, or they may be reacting directly to being victimised by crime. “Together, then, authorisers and providers of policing offer a large range of the unique and unpredictable” (Ibid. 156). However, these actors are also influenced by structures, such as the state, internal conflict, development programmes, and commercial opportunities. The impact of the state depends on the degree of its penetration (how much can it do itself), centralisation (how much does it decide its policy on a central or local level),

²⁰ It should be noted here that those able to deliver security are also capable of being a source of insecurity.

²¹ Baker uses the term ‘policing’, which he defines in a similar way as the term security initiatives that is used here.

militarisation, supervision (what is the level of corruption, misuse of power, excessive force, etc.) and facilitation (to what extent does the state obstruct informal and formal alternatives to the state). The internal conflict determines the positions of elites and how they engage with each other, as well as the extent to which rule of law is destroyed (both formal and informal structures). Donors and development organisations have financial muscle and experts, which strongly influences the direction of policy, potentially overriding local ideas. Commercial opportunities may also limit certain initiatives with much social but less economic relevance.

There is thus a large variety of non-state actors that can be involved with security provision, which as a group cannot be readily demonised or romanticised. These actors may range from warlords and gang leaders to civil defence groups and neighbourhood watches to chiefs, religious leaders and NGOs. But what does this variety of actors entail for the provision of security on the ground? Several studies have shown that when neither state nor informal security systems are functioning, human rights abuses and serious conflict are more likely to occur (Chirayath, et al. 2005: 6). Yet, such non-state security initiatives are not without complications.

A first issue confronted when working with informal arrangements for security provision is that they can be illiberal and may lack compliance with international human rights standards. And indeed, the illiberal nature is a serious dilemma for the international community in cooperating with, or even supporting them, as customary laws do not always adhere to human rights standards and rarely to gender equality. The question is whether they can indeed be viable building blocks for a more stable and effective system of governance and security provision. Problems also arise when customary, sharia and national legal codes and jurisdictions overlap. Also, where (in theory) security provision as monopoly of the state is based on the principle of universal protection, inequality becomes an issue with non-universal providers of security. Indeed, there are concerns about practices of investigation and discrimination against women, minorities or particular age groups. Outsiders may be subject to different penalties or even directly targeted through informal systems. With minimum constraints and supervision, excessive use of violence also becomes an issue. There is often collective rather than individual responsibility, which clashes with the recognition of private property, and which in turn impedes development.

On the other hand, state institutions are often not compliant with human rights standards. "Sometimes critics of non-state security and justice seem to be implying that these agencies should be ahead of their state institutions and societies in terms of human rights and democratic governance" (Baker & Scheye, 2007: 517). Indeed, it

is merely a presumption that accountability and protection of human rights are best achieved through state systems. As non-state systems are closest to their clients and more in line with local values and norms, potentially they could be better able to act more people-centred and locally owned. For instance, where the *bashingantahe*²² in Burundi aim to find an amicable solution to a dispute, the formalised justice system is viewed as too much focused on rendering a winner and a loser which perceived to be more conducive to *injustice* (Thorne, 2005: 3). The norms adhered to by informal systems are often grounded in everyday life, and where human rights standards conflict with these norms they may not be simply changed overnight:

The legal and norm-based frameworks in any given society serve to mediate social life and social disputes; without these the level of cooperation necessary for everyday life – let alone a market economy – would be difficult to sustain. Norms and customs are embedded in the rule systems and institutions that govern everyday life, which in turn serve to maintain and reinforce these systems of meaning. Much like languages, rules systems are deeply constituent elements of cultural norms and social structures; power relations and structures of inequality are thus underpinned by everyday norms, and often entrenched by the rule-based systems that perpetuate them. At the same time, these systems are continually shifting and changing, and are constantly being reinvented; while this happens within the confines of the social structures they serve to reproduce, they remain potential vehicles for social change. (Chirayath, et al. 2005: 2)

Indeed human rights and equality is important and one should by no means refrain from aiming to achieve this. However, one should also remain realistic about what can be achieved in the short term. In post-conflict situations the intervention community is asking for institutions – in what is referred to as fragile states, qualified by means of definitions that find fragile states to be *incapable* of sustaining a monopoly on violence, governing, and providing basic services – to implement and govern standards that have only been introduced in other countries relatively recently.

Another complication is that of jurisdiction. With a multitude of security providers, it becomes problematic to determine who is mandated to do what and who has jurisdiction in what regions. This will require constant negotiating and forums where this can be discussed need to be supported. A related issue is that of accountability, as those who cannot be held accountable can easily become sources

²² The institution of the *Bashingantahe* will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7.

of insecurity, or become involved in crime. Are there standards to which these local security arrangements adhere to, and if so, is this being checked and recorded? According to Baker and Scheye (2007: 518-19) "accountability is, primarily, about holding values concerning how the relationship is to be conducted" between security providers and those affected. "Only in a secondary sense does accountability mean the institution of structures and processes to facilitate this." In this sense, accountability can be demanded by both state and non-state organisations, but also directly by the public pressure of market mechanisms that ensure agencies act according to the desires of their clients. When the state is not or no longer capable of providing security to its population, various local initiatives for security provision pop up from the ground. The problem with these local initiatives, as we have seen, is their accountability. Some have suggested that in fragile situations the division of tasks between civil society and the state is then inverted. SSR should then be aiming at the improvement of state structures in such a way that they can at least monitor and regulate these local initiatives and hold them accountable (Ibid. 519-20; Scheye & Anderson, 2007: 228).

Another reason why informal security arrangements cannot be regarded as a panacea is their lack of capacity. Menkhaus (2006: 14) found that customary law has often a limited reach and can be overwhelmed by the scale of violent conflicts in the region. Moreover, the arrangements are uneven in capacity, lack a sustained flow of resources, and are plagued by high turnover. The capacity problem of informal arrangements to provide security is also due to changes in society. Conflict, urbanisation and globalisation, the involvement of state institutions, and other influences challenge traditional and customary arrangements for security provision and conflict resolution (Mulugeta & Hagmann, 2008). Traditional mechanisms are badly equipped to deal with modern and urban problems, and where elders in the village may know everyone and all the circumstances, this is often not the case in the city. And "it is especially the younger members of society who are likely to be unwilling to resort to the traditional mechanism, or who choose to disregard it. Returning expatriates or refugees are also less likely to resubmit to the authority of their clan elders." (Thorne, 2005: 5-6)

Linked to the earlier discussed issue of an illiberal nature and lack of accountability, local systems are also liable to be hijacked by local strongmen (although it must be noted that this has been quite often the case with state institutions in Africa too). Those presiding over the security arrangements may be politically compromised and aimed at personal gain at the cost of certain vulnerable minorities. The question when working with local security arrangements is then whether or not a particular arrangement is likely to remain protective. In relation to this, Reno (2007) describes

that it is not so much availability of resources itself that give rise to predatory militias, but rather he finds them to be “products of extensive patronage politics.” According to him it is when heavily patronage-based regimes fragment, that this leads to the appearance of predatory militia. For instance, as Sierra Leone’s president Saika Stevens placed local chiefs in the boards of directors of joint ventures with international investors in order to ensure their support for him, the bulk of the wealth of chiefs in Sierra Leone was derived from their privileged positions in diamond mining enterprises. “Their capacity to mobilise youth militias became closely connected to their favour in the capital and the resources that came with it, and relied less on their customary status and positions in local community institutions” (Ibid, 111). Another example that Reno gives is that of the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria, who enjoy (political and material) support from governors in three states, ostensibly to supplement anticrime efforts of the police, but in fact serve as political muscle for a number of local governors. Reno’s point here is that neither the patron nor the militia has to rely on the support of the local population to gain access to resources. Those who opposed the Abacha regime in Nigeria, on the other hand, were forced to turn to local cultural figures to preserve authority, which caused the formation of protective militias such as the O’odua People’s Congress.²³ Local community authorities who would have been excluded were now integrated in this network. “In sum, the behaviour of protector militias is contingent upon the presence of social space that is insulated from interference from capital-based patronage networks” (Ibid, 118).

To conclude, with a dispersed control of violent means, there is also a variety of non-state security arrangements. Local security arrangements quite often pose similar limitations regarding human rights and equality as the state security apparatus, and may also by themselves pose a security threat to some. Yet, local non-state security provision may be very legitimate in the eyes of the local population, and cannot just be neglected. Perhaps not necessarily a panacea, security interventions certainly do not start with a tabula rasa.

Concluding Remarks

The context critique on the dominant intervention model is that the context is much more complex and functions according to different logics than presumed. In post-settlement contexts, there is very often a dispersed control over violent means, and thus a dispersed control of governance and security provision. A peace agreement

²³ Although it should be noted here that the O’odua People’s Congress does not quite always adhere to international human rights standards (Human Rights Watch, 2003).

may have been signed, but this does not imply that there is an agreement in society over what institutions control what. Indeed, fierce competition between actors continues, creating a complex context for interventions. Rather than taking a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence with the state for granted, the framework discussed at the beginning of this chapter problematised it. As such, North and his colleagues provided an interesting alternative for looking at how violence, and through that governance and security provision, is organised in places where such a monopoly does not exist. The authors describe the logic of 'natural states' and the logic of 'open access orders', which function in their own distinct ways.

While providing an interesting perspective, the framework suggested by North and his colleagues should not be placed on the African context without further discussion. Their framework is based on the development of a few western countries, and although the authors claim a certain level of universality, African countries had a very different history with regard to development of the state. Colonisation has had a profound impact on the way state institutions in Africa function. Traditional authority structures were incorporated into the colonial state and changed the way they operate. 'Modern' state institutions were imported from the west but were adjusted and used in ways that had more local meaning. As such, state-society relations have developed in different ways than in the way such relations are assumed to be functioning in a liberal democratic model.

The complex picture of merged and overlapping, cooperating and competing authority structures of both state and non-state actors that can be observed is what some authors call 'hybrid political orders', in which various authority structures overlap, cooperate and compete (Boege et al, 2008; 2009a; 2009b). Lund (2007) describes 'twilight institutions' that are not state but fulfil state functions, and perhaps can become state. Menkhaus (2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2008) observes a 'mediated state' in which such non-state institutions are adopted by – and as such become part of – the state, and Hagmann and Péclard (2010) describe what they refer to as 'negotiated statehood'. While critiquing and aiming to provide an alternative for the conceptualisation of the state in Weberian terms described in the previous chapter, these theories and frameworks are nonetheless still framed in terms of the state. The hybrid reality is to be used when active in statebuilding, and non-state institutions should be seen as part of a statebuilding process and they may themselves even become part of the state. Nonetheless, a number of interesting observations come forward and there is much overlap with the theory described by North and his colleagues, specifically in regard to what they term 'natural states'. The most important conclusion is to be drawn on the fact that what all authors

describe is not a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, but a dispersed control of it. With that, there is thus also a dispersed control of governance and security provision. And without a monopoly there is a constant competition between the different actors in control of violent means, as well as new emerging actors. The hybrid political context, in which interventions are being implemented on the ground, can therefore be described as a context in which the authority to define and enforce collectively binding decisions is dispersed, and that different authority structures overlap, cooperate and compete.

This clearly has its implications for interventions trying to address how the provisioning of security is organised. The state is far from the only security provider, and for many people in Africa non-state actors are much more relevant for security provision in their daily lives. Indeed, there may be lacking equality (i.e. between ethnic groups or gender) and adherence to human rights, and competing security providers may lead to insecurity. Furthermore, where there is a lack of oversight and control non-state security providers may quickly become a security threat as well. That said, the same argument goes for the state security apparatus, which may not act in favour of the general population. As discussed in this chapter, the bureaucratic control over security forces assumed in the ideal model of the previous chapter does not exist. Rather, personal relations and interests may be guiding the behaviour of these state security providers. The complex diversity of security providers is often seen as problematic due to their often illiberal nature, the personal and unequal provision of security, and the risk of insecurity caused by different competing security actors. Yet, on the ground, what can be observed is that also state security actors do not act on an impersonal and equal basis, and may even compete with one another. Compared to the ideas underlying intervention that were discussed in the previous chapter, the reality is disenchanting. Moreover, because according to the context critique this reality is insufficiently understood, there are unrealistic expectations about how the ways in which external actors can change the hybrid political context and the ways in which violence is organised. This links also the 'intervention critique' that will be discussed in the following chapter, which also questions the extent to which external actors can achieve the results that their interventions are designed for.

Chapter 3. Policy Implementation, Politics and Ownership

Having discussed the context critique in the previous chapter, this chapter discusses a second, corollary criticism of interventions, which can be termed the 'intervention critique'. The context critique underscores the differences between the theoretical underpinnings of the ideal model discussed in chapter 1 and the organisation of violence and state-society relations in practice. As this critique finds that there is insufficient understanding of this practice, it asserts that there are unrealistic expectations about how this can be changed by intervening actors. Building on this observation, the intervention critique discusses the policy implications of this mismatch between theoretical underpinnings of interventions and the empirical reality in which they take place. The intervention critique overlaps with the context critique, and can be broken down into two streams. The first is that states do not necessarily develop towards an ideal model but very differently depending on social, historical, political and economic circumstances. Implementing a particular model is therefore considered to be futile. The second stream finds that even if the ideal model is presumed to be relevant, policies and programmes of interventions are not simply implemented, and 'local ownership' is inevitably created in the process.

The previous two chapters have shown a difference in the theoretical underpinnings of interventions and analytical descriptions of how societies function. The first section below starts by discussing the mismatch, questioning how realistic the ideal model is and whether this presumed ideal does not distract from – or perhaps even neglects – the empirical reality and the functioning of state-society relations in the contexts in which interventions take place. Presuming this ideal model is possible and desirable, the question is whether this ideal can indeed be built or implemented by intervening actors. The second section therefore discusses this, and finds that external actors inevitably find themselves engaged in a political process with local actors. Therefore, in the third section a closer look is taken at what the 'implementation of policy' exactly entails. The notion of policy is discussed and how the process from formulation to implementation is likely to bring a different outcome than prescribed at first, as policies and programmes are appropriated and effectively creating a certain form of local ownership. While interventions come with their particular ideas and policies, local actors have their own interests and goals. As such, the outcome of a policy described at the highest

level of, for example, the UN may through this process of implementation and interaction with local counterparts become something different than what was originally planned. Different outcomes of programmes and interventions than originally planned for are therefore not only caused by a mismatch between policy ideals and empirical realities, but also by the political processes of policy implementation through which different actors at different levels reject, adopt or adapt it. The hybridity of interventions, in that they are implemented by a multiplicity of actors with diverging agendas, further enhances the ability of local actors to pursue their own goals – and at times even use the programmes of intervening actors to do so.

Criticising on the Ideal

Building on the context critique, a first question raised by the intervention critique is whether the ideal model is in fact something to which states will develop, and whether this ideal state really exists in practice. Do OECD states indeed have the state monopoly on the legitimate violence presumed in the ideal model? Building on the context critique discussed in the previous chapter, it finds a mismatch between the ideal and the empirical reality in places where interventions take place. While some scholars may argue that there is no longer a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in the west, hardly anyone would argue that there is such a monopoly in places of intervention. Indeed, this absence is the reason why security interventions are implemented there. But is the goal – the ideal state model – realistic? And does this ideal not distract from how state-society functions in practice?

As the previous chapter described, the context in which interventions take place is quite complex. One does not start building a brand new state from scratch, but there is a variety of both state and non-state institutions present, and an even greater variety of actors moving within and outside these institutions. Furthermore, while a peace agreement may have been signed, violence and conflict often continue and the chances of a return to a full-blown war are ever present. And within this complex context interventions are expected to get results with limited resources, with minimal casualties, and within a short time-frame.

Not only are peacebuilders expected to perform near miracles without requisite resources, but they are expected to do so with amazing speed because the international community suffers from attention deficit disorder and will quickly lose interest and patience. (Barnett and Zürcher, 2009: 31)

Intervening is a daunting task, and hence requires clear guidance. Luckily, so it seems, this guidance is provided by the theories described in chapter one, leading to an ideal-type of state. However, there arise a number of problems from this model. First of all, it is very normative in that it measures countries against a (what is deemed to be) perfect model of the state and wherever a state is not corresponding to this model it has to be helped to do so. It also “reveals a dogmatic assumption and wishful thinking that all states will – in the long run – converge towards a model of Western liberal democracy” (Hagmann & Hoehne, 2007: 20). And whereas western states developed without any presupposed plan or ideal image, today it is presumed “that modern states should have rule of law, democratic institutions, and market-driven development” (Barnett and Zürcher, 2009: 28). All roads, it seems, must eventually lead to Rome.

Right up to the present day, political science, its sub-discipline peace studies and practical politics have found it difficult to reconcile themselves to what is empirically obvious. Their state-centrism has seemed insurmountable. In the course of the not particularly civilised “civilising process”, the state has become ‘second nature’ for the western – and not only the western – world, even though this form of political rule is anything but the historical norm. Many legacies converge in this state-centrism, not least colonialism, which tried to realise the utopia of modern state rule in the colonies and thereby globalised that utopia. As such a globalised utopia, one-dimensional thinking within the categories of statehood has even outlived decolonisation. The juridical features of statehood have remained the touchstone for participation in international relationships. (Trotha, 2009: 38)

It is implicitly assumed that we need states and that the world should be ordered by a system of states, without which there will be chaos and terror. However, some authors question whether the idea of a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in the hands of the state that defines the state *de facto* still exists. According to Wulf, at a local level, non-state structures of security provision and governance have become more apparent and at the global level transnational organisations and notions like ‘the responsibility to protect’ have broken down the sovereignty of the state:

It is surprising that the debate on the role of the state does not recognise the stark contrast between the pivotal role that the international community places on building strong state-centric structures at a time of globalisation

when typical state functions are de-nationalised and the role of the nation-state diminishes. (Wulf, 2007: 6)

Herbert Wulf observes three trends that challenge the Weberian notion of the state, namely the privatisation of force, the internationalisation of military functions and globalisation. Although debatable, a trend is indeed witnessed where inter-state wars are declining in favour of warlords, militias, gangs, and intra-state war (Kaldor, 2001; Human Security Centre, 2005: 15), which Wulf calls “bottom-up privatisation of force” (Wulf, 2007: 11). Another trend is top-down privatisation by the outsourcing of military and police tasks. According to Max Weber (1994: 311), outsourcing of the means of violence does not pose a threat for his concept of the state with a monopoly on the use of violence as it is still the state who determines who and when other actors may be granted with these means. However, almost a century after he delivered his famous lecture, the power of private companies has grown and it can be argued that the military-industrial complex has eroded the state’s monopoly. Indeed, there are now more private security ‘officers’ in the United States than there are soldiers or police (Van Creveld, 2007: 62; see also Shearing & Stenning, 1983). Wulf’s second argument is that the international community has progressively tried to respond to outbreaks of violence and war, is more and more willing to intervene, and if necessary by military means. His final point is that globalisation has led to de-nationalisation, and while wars are fought at the local level, the political economy of conflict has effects on whole regions and are affected by (and affect) financial streams on a global level. “National boundaries have become increasingly contested and porous due to the processes of globalisation. Many actors are able to operate outside the boundaries dictated by the logic of territoriality. Conceptually and in reality, the state is being emptied of some of its functions” (Wulf, 2007: 17). Thus, state characteristics as observed by Weber in western Europe in the beginning of the 20th century have changed.

Furthermore, it is presupposed that the state is a source of security. As argued by Migdal, state-society interaction creates meaning for people in society and thereby can naturalise the state. “Naturalisation means that people consider the state to be as natural as the landscape around them; they cannot imagine their lives without it” (Migdal, 2001: 137). However, for those in many countries in Africa, the state has more often than not been a source of insecurity rather than security; something that is frequently overlooked by external statebuilding interventions. With governments such as that of the Apartheid regime in South Africa (1948-1994), Mobutu Sese-Seko in the DRC (1965-97), Siad Barre in Somalia (1969-90), Idi Amin in Uganda (1971-79), Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia (1973-70), Hissène Habré in Chad (1982-90), Ibrahim Babangida (1985-93) and Sani Abacha (1993-98) in Nigeria, Samuel Doe

(1986-90) and Charles Taylor (1997-2003) in Liberia, and Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe (1988-present), it may be comprehensible that many Africans have a bit more cautious set of assumptions of the state. The human security approach revitalised the debate about the state as a potential source of insecurity rather than security (cf. Frerks & Klein Goldewijk, 2007). However, in the practice of interventions often the faith in the state as the best capable institution to organise and control violence by intervening states, as well as interests of stability and influence in governance, seem to prevail. Also, the capacities of post-conflict states cannot bear the weight or meet the demand placed on them when intervening actors expect them to implement DDR and SSR programmes. Neither can it be expected that the state's institutions and its resources can be made sufficiently capable in the intermediate term to deliver the reforms proposed by the international community. The assumptions of state control, penetration, resources and sustainability simply do not correspond to the conditions on the ground (Baker & Scheye, 2007: 507).

Moreover, there seems to be a mismatch between the ideal state model and the functioning of society it assumes on the one hand, and the reality on the ground and how state-society relations interact on the other hand. As has been discussed in chapter one peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions are vested on Weber's conceptualisation of the state as an organisation with a monopoly on the use of violence. As the end of the Cold War signalled in the triumph of the liberal democracy, statebuilding also became focused on building liberal democratic institutions. Whereas Weber identified a variety of ways through which the state could legitimise its monopoly on the use of violence – i.e. tradition or custom, charisma, and legal statute – the legal statute provided by liberal democratic institutions became the norm for interventions. The state has therefore become something that is constantly being reified into a thing consisting of institutions. This focus on institutions causes the political sphere of fragile states to be considered problematic for statebuilding, but not central to it. As such, interventions expect to create rule of law by building institutions, without taking into account the local dynamics in which the rule of law may perhaps not necessarily be equated with the introduced institutions. “One of the persistent obstacles to more effective peacebuilding outcomes is the chronic inability of international actors to adapt their assistance to the political dynamics of the war-torn societies they seek to support” (Tschirgi, 2004: i). The main weakness in privileging organisation features of the state is that one tends to ignore the processual aspects of the formation of public authority, and in particular how it takes place in day-to-day socio-economic encounters (Lund, 2007). Menkhaus gives the example of the Somali impasse, in which he finds that the genuine desire of Somali communities for improved

security, rule of law, and basic services is too easily conflated with a desire for a revived central government. “It is possible to actively pursue the former and actively hinder the latter” (Menkhaus, 2007b: 80). The Weberian concept of the state as starting point has led to the failure to distinguish between governance and government, hence the assumption that any solution to governance problems must come from the government. “[T]he Western governance debate limits the breadth of the definition of governance by explicitly and implicitly focusing on the state as the central actor of governing” (Draude, 2007: 4). Focusing on government agencies often directs attention away from the full range of governmental authorisers and providers that exist outside the central government. And not only is there a multitude of actors involved in security provision outside the state, also are state-society relations different than assumed in the ideal model. “The problem of taking a model of Western systems as a baseline is that we are in danger of de-emphasizing fundamental differences between forms of human social life” (Gledhill, 1994: 14). As argued by Anne Pitcher and her colleagues, it is simply presumed that there should and can be a distinction between the informal and the formal.

[The question] why there is no “fire wall” between the personal and the political in African nations – was derived from a normative conviction that there should be a fire wall, and from a sweeping empirical assumption that such boundaries are commonly found, intact and legitimate, in many or most other states. (Pitcher et al, 2009: 138)

As a result of this, African societies have been judged by standards that have not been realised anywhere. According to Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 2) patronage-based, party-voter linkage exists in many countries, including advanced industrial democracies. And despite views that “clientelism was a holdover from pre-industrial patterns that would gradually disappear in the modernizing West, clientelistic structures seem to have remained resilient in party systems in advanced industrial democracies such as Italy, Japan, Austria and Belgium” (ibid. 3).

Implementing an Ideal Model?

As the previous section made clear, there are questions about how real the ideal model is in practice, and whether this ideal is not distracting the attention of intervening actors from the empirical reality. But presuming that the ideal model is possible and desirable, it is then questioned whether this ideal state model can be implemented in practice. This section discusses the critiques that raise this question.

This stream of the intervention critique questions the assumption that an outside intervention can be designed to move from situation A to a predetermined situation B. As discussed above, state-society relations are often not organised – at least not completely – along formal relations as presumed in the ideal state model. Interventions focused on the strengthening of formal institutions therefore do not necessarily lead to less informal actions and hybridity. Logan (2009: 108) emphasises that structures of traditional authority and informal norms and values will not simply go away when formal alternatives are offered. Changes in the formal rules or institutions of society are not necessarily matched by changes in informal norms and values. Traditional norms and values may be persistent because of “the existence of informal sanctions and rewards that persuaded individuals to continue to behave in culturally approved ways” (Geddes quoted in Logan, 2009: 108). On the contrary, pressing for a formal state structure in a society where informal ties are the norm can have the opposite effect. There is a possibility that the established order experiences forced changes towards a liberal democracy with the formal bureaucracy of the Weberian state as threatening to its positions, and turn to informal actions to secure its position. As mentioned, the state and its laws have sometimes also been experienced as a source of violence, suppression and inequality. When the experiences with security provision, healthcare and representation through informal networks and actions have been more positive, also civilians are not necessarily interested in the strengthening of the formal state and its institutions. The introduction of elections – which are seen as the means by which accountability is enforced in formal institutions – might make informal networking only the more relevant. Logan argues that, “granting the public the right to vote will not automatically generate a popular commitment to elections as the ‘only game in town’” (Logan, 2009: 122). As mentioned by North and his colleagues and discussed in the previous chapter, introducing institutions from so-called open access orders to natural states does not in and of itself produce political development. “The apparent autonomy of the political and the separation of public and private are central to Western ideas, but are products of history, and not universals” (Gledhill, 1994: 17-18).

There are a number of reasons of course, why informal structures of governance and security provision have been largely neglected by external aid agencies. As mentioned, this has partially to do with the excessive focus on the state and the thereby sometimes unconsciously or consciously (e.g. arguing their illiberal nature) sidelining local arrangements. Indeed, of the 78 assessments of legal and justice systems the World Bank has taken since 1994 in support of SSR, many mention the prevalence of traditional justice systems, but none explores them in detail or looks at linkages between these informal systems and the state system (Chirayath, et al.

2005: 3). As shown by Willems and his colleagues (2009) however, this also has to do with the top-down and technocratic logic of security interventions that often fails to adequately appreciate the local and cultural specificity. "Reforms have often lacked any clear theory about the roles and functions of justice systems, and have failed to consider how successful legal systems in developed countries were actually constructed—including how they gained authority and legitimacy" (Chirayath, et al. 2005: 1). By undercutting existing security systems, "external state-building initiatives have at times undermined rather than promoted public security and order, by undercutting existing informal security systems" (Menkhaus, 2007b: 70). According to Scheye and Anderson (2007: 232) international assistance that primarily targets support to state providers may in fact "contravene good development practice" (Scheye and Anderson, 2007: 232). The tendency to dismiss the contributions of informal arrangements for security provision "alienates citizens from the rebuilding of their states and undermines democratic accountability" (Englebert & Tull, 2008: 128). If it is then insisted upon to use Weber during statebuilding interventions, his definition of rationality – i.e. in terms of what individuals and political actors believe for themselves to be rational and not in terms of what outsiders deem to be rational – is perhaps a more useful concept. From this point of view, rational security arrangements are those systems based on what the actors affected by it deem to be a good system; not outside perceptions of what a security apparatus should look like. This does not mean that non-state actors are necessarily better than state institutions, but one must "acknowledge that they *are there* in many of the so-called fragile states, that they have to be reckoned with, and that external actors should look for constructive and informed ways to engage with them" (Boege, et al. 2009a: 90, original emphasis).

Very often, however, local (pre-war) institutions and customs are considered as obstacles to achieving the end-goal of the ideal state model (cf. Woodward, 2009: 52). It is commonly assumed that the informal is characteristic of the traditional and that the 'backwardness' of the informal can be addressed by development and 'modernisation'. The assumption seems that through development the old and informal can be modernised which inevitably leads to a form of state close to that envisioned in the ideal model. Statebuilding interventions thus tend to be underpinned by an implicit universalism, preferring technical solutions, and assuming that international standards are always applicable, and also "inexplicably underestimate the fiscal pressures on post-war states that make it hard to sustain expenditure on critical institutions at the same level as international donors." (Call & Cousens, 2007: 14) A similar argument is made by Englebert and Tull (2008) who find that it is too easily assumed that institutions can be transferred from the modern west to Africa, and that politics can be engineered from outside. "There is a

tendency to see state-building as a technical or administrative process, one which does not require building a popular consensus for policy-making" (Chandler, 2005: 308). And according to Debiel and Lambach (2008: 1) statebuilding is driven by "top-down concepts of social engineering, mainly focused on the national level." Similarly, Raeymaekers and his colleagues argue that in many cases in Africa statebuilding activities have taken "the form of massive social engineering exercises, in which African political realities are jammed into a procrustean bed of pre-set rule of law templates" (Raeymaekers et al, 2008: 10). Statebuilding activities are based on a combination of blueprints thought up behind desks in western capitals and 'lessons learned' from implemented programmes and projects in a wide variety of contexts. Combined, new policy frameworks, tools and checklists are used to build states in an Ikea-like fashion. Yet, the processes through which states are formed are highly complex and dependent on historical and contextual factors, and the 'step-by-step' approach "sees peacebuilding as a linear process and ignores the unpredictable character of post-war transitions and of modernisation as such, which proceeds differently in each country" (Van der Borgh, 2009: 307).

The idea that one could 'learn' state-building and then, so to speak, after passing one's exams would be ready to put what one has learned into effective practice signals an extensive loss of political and administrative elites' grasp on reality, as well as that of their aides in the universities and think-tanks – a loss that is proportionate to the spread and arrogant expansionism of the managerial, administrative sense of feasibility and control. (Trotha, 2009: 40)

When local institutions and practices are not seen as an obstacle, they tend to be regarded as building blocks that are to be used in pursuit of the end goal. The mismatch between policy ideals and empirical reality is then considered to be something that can be solved by learning about the context, taking from this context what is considered useful for the end-goal, improving and adjusting programmes to better 'connect' to this context, and enhancing manageability. In other words, the problem is considered 'technical' and can be solved as such. Yet, what happens when international actors come in with policies and programmes in pursuit of their ideal, in a hybrid context with a variety of state and non-state actors struggling over who is able to enforce collectively binding decisions? As argued by Debiel and Lambach, "external actors in the pursuit of statebuilding find themselves negotiating these hybrid political orders" (Debiel and Lambach, 2009: 26). When continuing in the pursuit of the ideal of a liberal democratic model, in reality such "ideal-type models of state-building are never implemented. Instead, we find a great variety of socio-political orders and very different development paths in the

emergence or non-emergence of statehood” (ibid. 22). The necessity to acknowledge this and actively engage with the reality of non-state actors in statebuilding interventions is now more and more acknowledged in policy documents. And indeed the OECD-DAC (2007a: 11) has proposed a multi-layered approach to SSR in its handbook, which recognises the role of non-state justice and security providers. A question often posed in response to the demand their policies should better connect to local realities, is how then to engage with non-state actors and informal institutions. Mehler cautions that working with such non-state and informal actors may not lead to a “functional mix of ‘modern’ and ‘customary’ institutions of the Somaliland type, but rather ‘more of the same’, i.e. a neo-patrimonial regime” (Mehler, 2009: 63). Working with ‘the local’ is therefore not something clear-cut and does not necessarily provide the desired solutions. The answer is not to be found in simply balancing the ‘top-down’ and the ‘bottom-up’ approaches, as there is an inherent mismatch between the logic of the ideal state that top-down interventions take as point of departure, and the reality of how state-society relations function on the ground. This mismatch between theories of change of intervening actors on the one hand and empirical realities on the other hand are one cause of a lack of clear and effective policies in statebuilding activities. Moreover, as will be discussed below, the outcomes of the policies and programmes are determined by the interactions between the different actors involved.

Implementing a Policy?

As became clear in the previous section, there are questions raised about the extent to which the ideal model can be implemented by external actors. To look closer at this criticism, this section looks into the concept of policy. The process from policy-making to the implementation in an evolving context with a variety of actors with different motives and goals further changes the outcome of interventions from what was originally drawn up as a blue-print. Different outcomes than intended are then not only caused by a mismatch between ideals and reality, but also by the political processes in which actors engage with each other.

It is often taken for granted that there is something like the ‘international community’ that undertakes statebuilding activities, and that in order to do so it designs, implements and supports the policies it deems are necessary. However, there is no ‘international community’ nor is what happens on the ground the same as what is prescribed behind the desks of policy-makers. Van der Borgh (2009: 309) describes how after every conflict there is a large variety of actors, including both civil and military actors who have a formal role in the implementation of the peace agreement, as well as bilateral donors and international organisations that work in

support of the peace process. These individual bilateral donors may have altruistic intentions, but are often also motivated by self-interest. Where one donor may be driven by a desire to access a particular economic market or access raw materials, another may be interested to expand or maintain political influence in a region. But also within the UN family, the different siblings at times show various (and sometimes conflicting) ideas on how to move forward, often with the DPKO and the UNDP at two opposite poles with other UN agencies somewhere in between. As such, “every post-war society has a unique network of intervening actors, who change over time and who often have great difficulty in coordinating their activities” (ibid.).

A second issue relates to policy implementation. What is ‘policy’ and what does it mean in practice? Colebatch (2009: 1) argues that policy is an idea that is used both in the analysis and the practice of governance. A general understanding of policy assumes hierarchy:

Politicians identify problems and what should be done about them, and claim credit (or evade blame) for the outcomes. So the work of government is seen as identifying and solving (or at least managing) problems by means of explicit courses of action – its policies. (ibid. 10)

The people at the top are making decisions that are then executed on the ground, what Colebatch refers to as ‘policy-making as deciding’. As such, the term ‘policy’ not only describes an action, but also frames “the process of governing in a particular way, stressing order, intention and outcome, and this makes the practice valid” (ibid. 19). However, authority is not concentrated in one point. For instance the UN, being the embodiment of international governance, consists of multiple agencies specialised in their own particular fields. And also within single governments, work is divided among several specialist agencies. Colebatch finds that officials of such agencies are often reluctant to go to cabinet to settle particular issues and prefer to negotiate their own agreement with other officials. Officials usually try to create order through negotiation with other participants in the process.

This happens on the ground as well as at headquarters. For people lower down in the organisation, the policy-making of the people at the top may not be sufficient to make their jobs stable and predictable, and they may have to construct some order themselves. (ibid. 27)

As such, people at different levels are involved in the policy-making process, and policy can be seen as a process of negotiation that is concerned with making organised activity stable and predictable. At the same time Colebatch finds policy-making to be a process of collective puzzling, as it involves not only what policies are implemented, but also the question why particular issues need to be addressed by policy. "Viewing policy formulation this way the question becomes 'how are problems and responses identified, and in what way is this challenged and changed?'" (ibid. 30). Policy-making is thus not only concerned with finding solutions to problems, but also the framing of particular problems as priorities and particular solutions as adequate responses. As discussed in chapter one, particular issues can become 'securitized' and interventions (i.e. policy actions) are framed in particular ways to legitimise them.

In the perspectives described above policy is goal-oriented. "The policy embodies a theory of cause and effect: if we do *a*, then *b* will result. When the policy-makers' intentions have been carried out, the desired objective should have been achieved: this is 'implementation'" (ibid. 50, original emphasis). However, the implementation of policies as intended – i.e. doing *a* to get result *b* – is far from self-evident. First, from formation to implementation, policies often pass through various offices and actors with their own perspectives on the issues concerned, and hence with different levels of commitment to the policy objective as originally formulated. "The more the policy depended on such 'clearances', the more likely it was that the original objectives would not be accomplished" (ibid. 51). Furthermore, decisions are at times ambiguous – of which most resolutions of the UN Security Council are an excellent example – and leave much room for interpretation by the other actors involved. Also, those involved with implementation may not prioritise a particular policy, may not have the necessary resources, or may not have the political clout on the ground to effectively implement. At the same time, the outcomes may be different than intended, or circumstances may have changed. Colebatch therefore concludes that "the literature is a little depressing because it seems to be largely about 'implementation failure'" (ibid.). He also finds that many participants in the process of policy-making to implementation are not necessarily trying to implement the programme or policy in question, but to do their jobs, and are interested in the programme or policy to the extent that it can contribute to their own agendas. But more than that, participants may be consciously sabotaging a process to further their own private goals.

Based on the above description Colebatch gives, it could be argued that the interventions of international actors themselves are hybrid. Participants in the process from policy formulation to implementation have their own agendas, which

may or may not overlap with the initial formulation, and may try to use, alter or obstruct the process in pursuit of their agendas. For example, at a global level it may be decided that there is a need for community-based reintegration rather than individual support for ex-combatants, and longer-term development may gain interest at the cost of quick-impact projects. An NGO involved in the drilling of bore holes wants to maintain its operations and frames its activities in areas where ex-combatants return as community-based development projects in support of the reintegration of ex-combatants in the community. Such renewed framing of its activities allows this implementing organisation to continue its activities and obtain the necessary funding, even where at the global level policy objectives have changed. With the 'international community' being constituted of a large variety of actors with different motivations, rarely are single and clear policy objectives being formulated. Rather, there is a variety of different, and at times conflicting, policies. And even if policy objectives are clear, the path towards implementation is full of hordes that alter policies and the way they are implemented. The following section will look closer at the practice of implementation of peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions.

External Policies, Local Ownership and Local Appropriation

A common term with regard to the implementation of policy is 'local ownership'. International actors aim to implement and support their particular programmes and interventions, but at the same time want the results to continue when they leave. To increase sustainability, it is therefore argued, programmes need to be owned by the actors subject to the interventions. However, this can be rather problematic both in practical and theoretical terms, and this notion of ownership is therefore discussed here. This section first looks at what ownership entails and its contradictory relationship with external interventions. It then turns to ownership in practice, showing how programmes and policies are appropriated during implementation processes, which may lead to some form of local ownership – albeit a different form of ownership than the ownership implied in policy terms.

The different actors involved in the chain from policy formulation to implementation may have different ideas and motivations regarding a particular policy. However, the implementation of peacebuilding and statebuilding activities is complicated even further. Not only does it involve a government trying to implement its policies through a variety of specialist agencies (e.g. particular ministries within the government, NGOs that are used for the implementation, etc.), it also involves governments and international agencies trying to get the states and other local actors in which interventions take place to adopt certain desired policies.

To ensure legitimacy in the local context, it is argued, there has to be a certain level of local ownership. However, in practice the interpretation of both 'local' and 'ownership' are debatable. The principle of local ownership, argues Egnell (2010: 476) is that "these predefined processes should be 'owned' by the very actors that the processes seek to transform." As noted by the OECD-DAC (2007a: 33), "reform processes will not succeed in the absence of commitment and ownership on the part of those undertaking reforms." Problematic in this regard is that for the largest part the characteristics of these reforms are decided by others than these local actors. Debiel and Lambach (2009: 25) suggest for instance that policy documents only stress the importance of local ownership, because "donors have realised that top-down approaches to state-building that had been developed in their think tanks might not survive once exposed to the harsh reality 'on the ground'."

The question is therefore what this 'local ownership' really entails in practice. Pretty (1994: 41) identifies different levels of participation, of which local ownership would imply self-mobilisation. This would mean that "people participate by taking initiatives independent of external institutions to change systems. Such self-initiated and collective action may or may not challenge existing inequitable distributions of wealth and power" (ibid.). Instead of an intervention being supported by local actors, it is then the process initiated by local actors themselves that an intervention should support. In practice, however, this is hardly ever the case and participation involves passive participation - "people participate by being told what is going to happen or has already happened" (ibid.) - participation in information giving, participation in consultation, or participation in exchange for material incentives.

As observed by Chesterman (2007: 7), the problem with statebuilding is that it is "undertaken precisely because of the malevolence or incapacity of existing governance structures" and ownership is therefore only an end or a goal of these interventions. Post-conflict governments are often severely weakened institutionally and lack the means to provide basic services, and also local actors' capacities are often considered to be low. Another practical problem is the desire for rapid implementation of interventions, which causes donors to push the process forward, fearing that consultation would slow it down too much (Ball & Hendrickson, 2005). Furthermore, the intervention community generally has a relatively fixed agenda of liberal democracy and market economy for which the proper institutions need to be installed or restored. According to Andersen, international donors tend to assume that they deal with a government that represents its entire population and territory, while this is rarely ever the case after peace agreements that can hardly be called inclusive to all parties involved (despite the trend to name them "Comprehensive Peace Agreement"). "[U]nder such conditions, a façade of national ownership may

be upheld while the international community in reality formulates the peacebuilding strategies – more or less coordinated with input from ‘local voices’” (Andersen, 2007: 30).

To make sense of such inconsistencies and contradictions in international statebuilding, Robert Egnell (2010) uses Nils Brunssons’ concept of ‘organised hypocrisy’. “Organised hypocrisy allows states and organisations to meet inherently contradictory normative demands simultaneously” (Egnell, 2010: 467). Intervening states and organisations do so not only to adhere to certain norms (e.g. human rights, local ownership, and self-determination) but also to fulfil political and economic interests and demands. “Norms and other pressures are inherently difficult to adhere to as they create inconsistent and contradictory demands on states and other actors within international politics – not least within the context of international state-building” (Egnell, 2010: 468). Such inconsistencies can be dealt with by using words, decisions and actions that are systematically in conflict with one another. While one demand can be dealt with through speech, another demand can be dealt with through action even if this speech and action contradict. Governments can praise the liberal market economy while at the same time have trade barriers to protect their national industries. The supposed positive effect of organised hypocrisy is that it acts as a safety valve which helps to preserve credibility of a state or organisation striving for certain norms, and at the same time preserve order within the international system as it mitigates the problems of conflicting demands.

However, according to Egnell it is also this organised hypocrisy that has negative implications for the operational effectiveness of statebuilding. It creates false expectations, as the required means of statebuilding interventions (actions) do not match the goals that interventions claim to strive for (speech). When benchmarks are set higher than the available means will allow reaching, not only is failure to reach these benchmarks inevitable but is the credibility of the intervention – and more specifically the intervening actors – at stake. Moreover, by nature a statebuilding effort intervenes, occupies and is largely externally driven and goes straight against principles of self-determination and national sovereignty. And at the same time statebuilding projects “deny any responsibility or accountability for this exercise” (Egnell, 2010: 473). And as argued by Wulf (2006: 87-88), even decisions to intervene that are taken according to law and internationally accepted norms, “are taken by a highly politicised UN Security Council in which democratic rule, namely the will of the sovereign, is not represented.” Indeed, Egnell (2010:482) notes that statebuilding in what is deemed a failed state “is an intervention in an existing system of political power-sharing” and revolutionary in the context within

which it takes place. Legitimacy is something based on interpretations and popular perceptions and “measurements and benchmarks of legitimacy are often based on what ‘should’ create legitimacy rather than local perceptions of ‘actual’ legitimacy” (Ibid, 481). For instance, in the DRC much criticism was raised about the lists of weapons collected and ex-combatants that passed through a programme as a measure for DDR’s success by donors, as these “do not say anything about security.”²⁴

There is thus an inherent contradiction in external interventions with local ownership, and ownership can perhaps be considered only a policy discourse. However, as will be discussed below, local ownership is nonetheless created. Indeed, the outcome of interventions is not necessarily, and in most cases is not, an exact implementation of the desired policies proposed by outside donors. The result is part of the interactions of the different actors involved, and it is through this political process that local ownership is created, even where interventions do not intend to do so.

Barnett and Zürcher (2009) describe how the key actors involved in the peacebuilding process – peacebuilders, state elites and sub-national elites – are fundamentally different. Using game theory, they describe these actors to be positioned in a game in which all actors have their own interest but need the cooperation of the other to further their objectives.

Peacebuilders need the cooperation of state and sub-national elites if they are to maintain stability and implement their liberalizing programs. State elites are suspicious of peacebuilding reforms because they might usurp their power, yet they covet the resources offered by peacebuilders because they can be useful for maintaining their power; and they need local sub-national elites and power brokers, who frequently gained considerable autonomy during the civil war, to acknowledge their rule. Sub-national elites seek the resources provided by international actors to maintain their standing and autonomy, yet fear peacebuilding programs that might undermine their power at the local level and increase the state’s control over the periphery. (Barnett and Zürcher, 2009: 24)

Furthermore, apart from resources, peacebuilders can also confer legitimacy to both state and sub-national elites. And where national elites may need sub-national elites to control particular regions, national elites can give legitimacy and authority

²⁴ Community member, Luvangire, Ituri, DRC, 19 October 2009

needed by sub-national elites. The game created by Barnett and Zürcher in which the actors strategise and adjust their policies depending on what others do (or they think others will do) has four possible outcomes: cooperative peacebuilding, compromised peacebuilding, captured peacebuilding and conflictive peacebuilding (ibid. 24-25). In cooperative peacebuilding, the national elites accept and fully cooperate with the peacebuilding programme. Given the fact that elites generally have an interest to stay in power and that the liberalisation often proposed by international donors threatens their power position, Barnett and Zürcher consider this outcome to be highly unlikely. In conflictive peacebuilding the 'international community' uses force or the threat of force to ensure domestic actors commit to the proposed policies and programmes. Such an outcome is similarly unlikely since it is doubtful donors will come up with the required resources to sustain such an operation. In captured peacebuilding the state and sub-national elites are able to fully redirect the distribution of assistance in line with their own interests and goals, although Barnett and Zürcher believe donors will not sustain their funding and political support under such circumstances. With compromised peacebuilding a programme is negotiated that reflects both the peacebuilders' desires (for stability, legitimacy, liberalisation, etc.) and the desires of elites to maintain their power base. They find this "the most likely outcome because of the nature of their preferences and constraints and because once both parties arrive at this result they have little incentive to defect" (ibid. 25). Similarly, Anten and her colleagues find that,

Institutional reforms that do not in some way align with the prevailing interests and incentives of powerholders, or do not redirect these incentives so as to support the new formal arrangements, are liable to be subordinated to and incorporated within the pre-existing logic of informal power. (Anten, et al. 2012: 52)

An oversimplification, however, is that Barnett and Zürcher seem to assume there is a negotiation over a grand scheme about the future of the state in which is intervened. In fact, there is not one policy on which a middle ground can be reached, but there is a multitude of policies and actors involved. As such, the result may not necessarily be one but a combination of the outcomes they propose, with particular policies adopted, others compromised and again others captured. Furthermore, Boer and Van der Borgh rightly observe that Barnett and Zürcher oversimplify by assuming "that groups are unchanging and have fixed objectives" (Boer and Van der Borgh, 2011: 70). Rather, when international donors are involved in local political processes, the actions and agendas of the counterparts in this process influence one another. International actors become more aware of the possible policies and strategies in a particular context, and are influenced by local

partners. Boer and Van der Borgh take the interaction between the international and the local described in Barnett and Zürcher's game a step further, describing what they term 'the politics of ownership'.

Local political actors, through their encounters with international administrators, will not only be influenced by the ideas of the international administrators, but also influence the international 'project'. It can even be argued that they become 'co-owners' of the project. The outcome is a process that nobody has originally planned for, and is the result of trial and error, piecemeal engineering, and ongoing negotiations and struggles between external and local stakeholders. (ibid.)

These limitations aside, Barnett and Zürcher's game shows how local actors do not simply give up power and political control when international actors come in. They call the equilibrium outcome of the game the 'peacebuilder's contract', and it actually reinforces the status quo as the reforms that take place will unfold in a way that protects the interests of the elites. In fact, peacebuilding may be symbolic or ceremonial,

[...] in that the symbols of reform have been transferred and thus there is the surface appearance that there has been a transformation of the kind of state, that is, toward a liberal-democracy, even though the existing power relations have largely emerged unscathed. (Barnett and Zürcher, 2009: 34)

For instance, after 1992, the economic policy changes proposed by IMF and the World Bank in Uganda were fully embraced by the Ugandan government, "giving international donors control of policy and the budget-making process" (Mwenda, 2010: 49). Yet while donors gained control over economic policies, Ugandan President "Museveni found that he had bought himself independence and discretion to pursue his preferred military and political agendas" (ibid. 50). Against donor wishes, the Ugandan government increased military spending and the importance of the security forces in Ugandan politics. Uganda has often been praised as an example of successful post-conflict reconstruction (cf. World Bank, 1998). Yet, Museveni's patronage networks were nurtured through the security forces and political access and freedom have hardly improved. This is not to say that outside interventions have no influence at all. In many cases policies have been adjusted through outside interventions, and even when only symbolic reforms are undertaken by state elites, "these public commitments can be used by liberalizing elements at home and abroad to try and force them to keep their word" (Barnett and Zürcher, 2009: 34).

Concluding Remarks

The intervention critique argues that states do not necessarily develop towards the ideal model that underlies security interventions. As discussed, in the context where interventions are implemented, control of violent means is dispersed and various authority structures overlap, cooperate and compete. This creates a constant struggle over what institutions and actors are able to define and enforce collectively binding decisions, and what norms, interests and priorities are promoted. There is therefore a mismatch between this empirical reality and the theoretical ideal model. And even when assuming that this ideal is a realistic and desirable end-goal, the question remains whether this ideal can be transferred into the hybrid political contexts that characterises the contexts where interventions are implemented. When designing and supporting the policies and programmes of interventions, external actors inevitably find themselves engaged in a political process with local actors. As described in this chapter, the implementation of policies is a process that further changes the outcomes of programmes on the ground in comparison with what may have been foreseen and drafted behind the desks of policy-makers. Even when starting off with clear set guidelines, such as the IDDRS and, for instance, implementing similar training courses for ex-combatants in each country, the intervention itself is changed by the interaction of international actors, state actors and local actors. And in what Boer and Van der Borgh have termed 'the politics of ownership', international actors change their policies and goals in their interaction with local actors in the local context just as the local context is influenced by the intervention. Arguably, interventions are hybrid themselves, as they consist of a large variety of policies and programmes that are implemented by a multiplicity of actors with diverging agendas. This gives local actors considerable leeway to pursue their own agendas, at times even using the external programmes to their own benefit.²⁵

Whereas the first chapter presented the dominant intervention model, this chapter and the previous chapter discussed the dominant critiques on this model, here summarized as the 'context critique' and the 'intervention critique'. The following chapter starts with a reflection on the critiques, analyses the gaps in knowledge and sets the agenda for the remainder of this book.

²⁵ This will become more evident when discussing the relations between state actors and intervening actors in chapter 5.

Chapter 4. The Dynamics of Security Interventions in Local Contexts

The previous two chapters discussed the critiques at the dominant intervention model presented in chapter 1, summarized as the context critique and the intervention critique. This chapter starts with discussion of these critiques. It finds that they provide a number of important comments to the dominant intervention model and add to our knowledge about how state-society relations and how societies deal with violence and organise security. Yet, other than simplistic recommendations that the 'complex context should be acknowledged' and that 'local actors and practices should be taken more seriously', they often fail to provide answers as to what consequences this has for interventions. The fact that the context is complex, and that there is a mismatch between the empirical reality and the ideal state model that underlies interventions does not necessarily make the ideal wrong.

The mismatch between the assumptions and ideals behind interventions and the reality on the ground in which interventions take place has been acknowledged. Also the differences between intervention policies at the highest levels and their implementation and outcomes in practice are recognised. However, there is still little research done on the actual dynamics created by the interactions between international actors designing and supporting security interventions and the local security dynamics created by the interactions between both state and non-state actors involved in security. Understanding the consequences of the issues identified by the critiques for security interventions, requires analysing and understanding these dynamics.

Starting with a discussion of what security and security provision means in the second section of this chapter, the third section develops an analytical model that focuses on these dynamics. As will become clear, there is a variety of norms, values, needs and priorities regarding security among different actors. The security dynamics are then defined as the interactions between different actors dealing with security provision, which create a dynamics of a constant struggling and negotiating of different security definitions and strategies by multiple individuals and institutions. This model aims to provide a lens with which to look at and analyse the interplay between the agenda and programmes of international actors and the perceptions and practices of security at the national and local level. The analysis will therefore focus specifically at how international, national, and local

actors involved in security relate to one another, looking at three arenas of interaction. The analysis will be further guided by the questions of how the programmes of interventions are experienced, perceived and used at national and local levels, and how local and national perceptions and practices of security relate to each other.

Discussing the Critiques

Chapter 1 presented the assumptions underlying security interventions, which hold that the state is the best way to organise violence and enable stability, that this state needs to hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and that the primary task of the state is the provision of security. Having such an ideal state model as an end goal is very useful, as it provides guidance, meaning and legitimisation. It provides guidance as it describes a clear goal to which programmes can be designed and implemented. It provides legitimisation in that what is not functioning according to this model is considered a threat, and hence requires intervention. It thereby also provides interventions with meaning, as it presumes that by building towards the ideal state model the security of citizens worldwide is improved. On the other hand, assuming an ideal end goal, and assuming that a path can be designed towards this goal, risks hindering a proper analysis of the situation prior or during interventions. When the fixed end-goal is kept in mind, there is the chance the analysis merely aims to look for the strategies to reach this goal. The analysis may become clouded by the goals that the intervention aims to reach. Instead of a 'blank' analysis, there is 'cherry-picking' from the context what is fitting in the strategy. This has two important consequences. First, looking for issues in the context that fit a particular strategy means that certain important contextual factors might be missing in the analysis because they do not fit the proposed strategies and goals. Secondly, the truth of the strategy or end-goal is unquestioned while in practice it might not match local realities. The context critique and intervention critique provide some important answers to these two problems.

The context critique acknowledges that the context is much more complex than interventions assume, and brings attention to and analyses the institutions, customs and norms that are present but which tended to be neglected, as they were at first sight considered less relevant or problematic by intervening actors. The context critique thereby also provides an important criticism to the concept of the 'fragile state'. As discussed in chapter 1, what is not considered to be functioning according to the ideal state model is regarded as dysfunctional and 'sick'. And more importantly, such fragile states are not only considered a severe threat to their own civilian populations, but also to the world as a whole. To refer back to a quote used

in the first chapter, “weak or failed states are the source of any of the world’s greatest problems, from poverty to AIDS to drugs to terrorism” (Fukuyama (2004: ix). The answer that the context critique provides for this highly normative concept of the fragile state, is a spectrum of analytical concepts that can be used to look at what and how institutions and societies do function in places that are considered to be dysfunctional. Looking through such a lens, the argument is that things are not broken, but they simply function in different ways than that is assumed correct by the ideal state model. When intervening based on a presumed ideal, the context critique finds that interventions have insufficient understanding of how violence is organised, how and by whom security is provided, and how state-society relations function.

This critique is fair, in so far that it provides an important insight into the things that *are* functioning in so-called fragile states, as well as how these things are functioning. As such, it not only fills in gaps in knowledge, but also emphasises the importance of the non-state institutions, customs and norms in society for security interventions and statebuilding. But at the same time, little answers are provided as to what exactly this entails for interventions, other than the continuing call that “the context is very complex.” If such answers are provided, it is generally stressed that local contexts need to be better taken into account. The hybrid context is then to be used to further the goal of the interventions and non-state institutions should be seen as part of the statebuilding process, which possibly become part of the state themselves in the end. This leads to an ongoing discussion on the appropriate levels of local input and contextual sensitivity on the one hand and the appropriate levels of external ideas required for development on the other hand. An underlying assumption seems to be that they can meet somewhere in between, and the trick is locating where exactly. Yet, this discussion between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ is nothing new. And other than stressing the importance of non-state institutions and local customs and emphasising that the context is complex, little answers are provided on how exactly interventions should relate to this complex context. Moreover, the fact that the context in which interventions take place is highly complex and functions differently than presumed in the ideal state model, does not mean that having this ideal as an end goal is wrong per se.

Building on the context critique and taking it a step further, the intervention critique discusses the policy implications of this mismatch between theoretical underpinnings of interventions and the empirical reality in which they take place. It finds that states do not necessarily develop toward an ideal model, and, referring to the second problem mentioned at the beginning of this section, it questions both the strategy as well as the end-goal of interventions. After all, if there is no evolutionary

path towards the ideal state, should this ideal still be held as an end goal? Furthermore, when looking at the implementation of policies and programmes of security interventions, the institutions that are considered desirably in the ideal model are not readily transferred and built in the hybrid political contexts where these interventions take place. Rather, through interactions with actors at different levels, the policies and programmes are adopted, as well as rejected and adapted, effectively creating a form of local ownership. And the hybridity of interventions, in that they are implemented by a multiplicity of actors with diverging agendas, further enhances the ability of local actors to pursue their own goals.

This emphasis on the actual practices of policy formulation and implementation placed by the intervention critique is not only very valid, but also provides a necessary insight in how the policies and programmes designed to work towards the ideal model may have very different outcomes than intended. Yet, the fact that policies and programmes of external actors are altered when they are implemented does not imply that the assumptions underlying these policies and programmes are irrelevant. And the fact that there is a mismatch between the assumptions and ideals behind interventions and the empirical reality in which these interventions are implemented also does not imply that these assumptions and ideals are necessarily wrong. Indeed, this mismatch will have consequences for the implementation process and the ways in which the programmes and policies are locally adopted, adapted or rejected. But the fact that there is a mismatch is also precisely one of the reasons why international actors intervene. And if there is no evolutionary path towards one particular type of state, or a particular way in which societies deal with violence, does this also imply that the ideal itself is wrong? Does it imply that the assumptions that underlie interventions are erroneous? In other words, in light of the critiques discussed in the previous two chapters, the question arises what the consequences are for security interventions. If, in the contexts where interventions are implemented, violence is organised differently, and with that the ways in which security provided and by whom, what does this mean for security interventions? Should the state and its security functions still be so high on the agenda of international actors? And are security interventions themselves still relevant? Though providing important criticism to both interventions and the assumed ideal model, as well as providing important additions to our knowledge of both the implementation of interventions and the contexts in which they are implemented, the critiques do not adequately answer this question.

Answering the question whether security interventions are still relevant requires a much more thorough understanding of the ways in which the agenda and programmes work out in the societies in which they are implemented. Apart from

research in line of the critiques discussed above, research of interventions is predominantly policy-oriented. It tends to focus on assessing whether programmes that are part of a particular intervention attain their preset goals – e.g. the number of weapons collected, the number of ex-combatants that passed through demobilisation, the number of police trained, etc. – but much less on the extent to which such programmes indeed contribute to the larger process of security promotion. When a particular number of combatants is demobilised and disarmed, and when a certain number of policemen are trained, does security indeed improve? Is there indeed a decreased chance of renewed conflict? Of course, there are a multitude of factors influencing the larger processes and the exact impact of a programme on this larger process is difficult to measure. Furthermore, the institutional reality for many donors is that there is a need to show results within a relatively short period of time, and programmes are then quickly assessed in terms of the clear-cut goals that were set. When policemen are trained, the number that passed the training is a result that can be shown, and the improved security this creates must for the short-term reporting be taken for granted. As a result, there is a significant gap in the understanding of the ways in which the agenda and programmes of intervening actors work out in the societies in which they are implemented, and how this relates to local and national actors involved in security. The remainder of this book will contribute to filling this gap in knowledge.

Conceptualizing Security: Hakuna Matata?

To look at the ways in which international, national and local perceptions and practices of security relate to one another, it is first necessary to look at what perceptions and practices of security are. Or in other words, what is ‘security’ and ‘security provision’? This section therefore discusses the different aspects attributed to security, followed by a reflection of the development of security studies. The conceptualisations of security and security provision proposed at the end of this section are then used to develop an analytical model of how to look at what will be termed the dynamics of security.

The origin of the word ‘security’ in the English and Roman languages is derived from the Latin word *securus*, ‘se’ meaning without and ‘cura’ meaning worry (Wæver, 2008: 101). In its original sense it is thus similar to the French phrase *sans souci*, or the Kiswahili phrase *hakuna matata* (literally ‘without problems’). Today, different meanings are ascribed to the term security and the concept as well as studies thereon has evolved, specifically since the end of the Cold War. For Buzan (1984: 110) “the concept of security has traditionally been treated as a side effect, arising from the possession of either power or peace.” According to Buzan, the only

attempt to develop security as a core concept was undertaken by John Herz during the first decade of the Cold War. Herz (1950: 157) developed the widely used notion of the 'security dilemma' in which groups, "are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst." For Buzan, problematic about this conceptualisation was that it again treats security as an outcome of a competition over power, rather than as a direct motive for behaviour. Opposing the concepts of peace and power, Buzan (1984: 111) argues for the use of security, which "if freed from the confines of 'national security' which tie it closely to the power view, security offers a comprehensive perspective on international relations." Here, Buzan makes an important first step in the re-conceptualisation of security, yet neglects to provide a clear explanation of what security exactly entails. Following Walter Gallie, Buzan (ibid. 125) finds that security is an 'essentially contested concept', similar to concepts such as 'art' or 'democracy'. "There are concepts which are essentially contested, concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users" (Gallie, 1956: 169). Preferring one conception of security over the other would then be unfounded. David Baldwin (1997) questions this view, arguing that the concept of security does not meet the requirements Gallie sets for a concept to be 'essentially contested. For Baldwin (ibid, 12), therefore, the contention of the concept does not seem to stem from 'essential contestability,' and "security is more appropriately described as a confused or inadequately explicated concept."

Its contentedness perhaps contested, the way security as a concept can be specified still needs clarification. Whereas security used to mean 'without worries' in Roman times, Wæver (2008: 101) notes that today security is seen to be 'something' and its absence is 'insecurity' (a double negative in Latin terms). Fierke (2007: 5) notes that traditional approaches to security studies assume security to be "a property of objects in the world: that is, a priori subjects or objects, such as the state, are or are not secure, have or do not have security. The provision of security is a response, or an action to manage or eliminate insecurity." It is also argued that security is a procedural or relational concept, linking things of value with things that threaten them (Powell, 2006). Furthermore, security encompasses both objective and subjective elements. Wolfers (1952: 485) argues the chance of future attack never can be measured objectively, and is always a matter of subjective evaluation and speculation. Ramsden (2008: 9) goes further and "notices the importance given to the psychological state of a person: feeling is as important as the actual physical means of ensuring absence of interference."

Traditional security studies have had a strong focus on the state: security referred to security of the state. For a long time this went almost unquestioned, and was further fuelled by the politics of the Cold War. Yet, this focus of security studies on the state and its corollary focus on military force privileges the position of the state. "Thinking of security as the threat, use and control of military force reduces security to *military security*, and renders other forms of security as something else" (Mutimer, 2007: 55). Security seemed to be equated with 'national security', and traditional security studies became "criticised for being ethnocentric, reflecting primarily American concerns within the Cold War" (Fierke, 2007: 6). In 1997 Krause and Williams published *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* in which they questioned: 'what is it that needs to be secured?' The state as referent object of security had long remained unquestioned, although Wæver (2008: 102, original emphasis) noted that even "to Hobbes and other key early modern thinkers, including notably the early liberals, the state is at the centre all right, but security – also to the state – is ultimately *individual security*."

While the debate on security was opened in academia, also more policy oriented discussions on security changed its focus. In the 1990s the concept 'human security' was developed, to move from the exclusive focus on the military security of the state to a more people-centred conceptualisation of security.²⁶ This does not mean that human security is necessarily contrary to state security; rather, it should be seen as complementing it by adding a focus on the individual and the community (CHS, 2003). The first major manifestation of the human security concept was the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994). The report defined the concept with seven main aspects: *economic security* (an assured basic income), *food security* (ready access to food), *health security* (prevention of disease and access to health care), *environmental security* (safety from environmental threats), *political security* (upholding human rights), *personal security*, and *community security*. Personal security entails being protected from physical violence carried out by governments, wars, crime, or domestic violence. Critics of this concept argue that it immensely broadens the possible threats to security, "[which] may be useful for advocacy, but it has limited value for policy analysis" (Human Security Centre, 2005: viii). In order to make the concept more workable, some have argued for a more narrow conceptualisation, proposing to limit the definition of human security to violent threats to the individual (Ibid. 19), excluding health-, food-, and environmental issues, which are seen to be more usefully part of human development. The *Human Security Report* of the Centre for Human Security at the University of British Columbia uses such a narrow definition (Mack, 2005). However, a benefit of a broad

²⁶ This section draws from Willems et al (2009)

definition is that it does justice to the multidimensional nature of threats to security, allowing for an integrated approach (Frerks & Klein Goldewijk, 2007). Looking through the lens of human security helps to take into account the interrelatedness of issues such as war, hunger, disease, crime, political oppression, and domestic violence. To overcome the problem for policy formulation of the all-encompassment of the human security concept, criteria have been proposed for challenges to be considered a human security risk. These include that they have to affect significant groups of people and that they should threaten the stability of society at large (ibid, 35-38).

But within academia the broadening of the referent object and potential threats was not the only development initiated in Critical Security Studies. Another focus was on the inquiry into how threats are defined and constructed. Threats are not only objectively identifiable, but are also subjective and can be partially constructed through discourse. "For critical scholars, discourses of threat are in large measure *constitutive* of the object to be secured" (Krause, 1998: 312, original emphasis). The Copenhagen School developed the theory of 'securitisation' in which they claim that talking about security is not only talking about it, but it is also doing something (Wæver, 1995, 1997; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998; Wæver, Buzan and de Wilde, 2008).

(...) the meaning of 'security' is what it does: someone (a securitizing actor) points to a development or potentiality claiming that something or somebody (the referent object) with an inherent right to survive is existentially threatened, and therefore extraordinary measures (most likely to be wielded by the securitizing actor himself) are justified, measures such as secrecy, violence and conscription, appropriate for 'matters of security' only. (Wæver, 2008: 102)

From the perspective of the Copenhagen School, security is a 'speech act': an action that is performed by being spoken. Other examples of speech acts are naming a child and making a promise. Through the performance of a speech act - i.e. by calling something a security issues - something becomes a security issue, "not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat" (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998: 24). The Copenhagen School acknowledges that there must be an audience that concurs with the securitisation of a particular issue as a security threat, but attributes much power to 'security' and the securitizing actor. Without departing from the constructivist approaches to security, Balzacq (2005) places some nuance, and argues that discursive acts through which issues are constructed as security issues occur in a context of actual threats,

some of which “can actually wreck entire political communities regardless of the use of language” (ibid, 181). To refer to an earlier made point, security encompasses both subjective and objective elements. Within this context, not anything can be simply securitised by claiming something is a security issue. “To persuade the audience (e.g. the public) (...) the speaker has to tune his/her language to the audience’s experience” (ibid, 184). Also Stritzel stresses that securitising speech acts and securitising actors are embedded in social and linguistic structures (Stritzel, 2007; 2011).

Security is thus conceptualised as a property of an object, the state, a group or an individual, as a condition, and as a discursive act. The interest in security for this book is in the institutions through which security is organised. This leads to the question of whom these institutions are providing security for, and what they are protecting exactly. Interesting in this regard is Baldwin’s (1997: 13) adaptation of “Wolfer’s characterisation of security as ‘the absence of threats to acquired values’.” Baldwin argues that the risk that particular threats cause damage may be lowered, but there can never be complete protection.²⁷ Through building codes the threat of an earthquake causing damage may be limited, but it cannot be ruled out. For Baldwin security is characterised as “a low probability of damage to acquired values (...) [and] in its most general sense can be defined in terms of two specifications: Security for whom? And security for which values?” (ibid.). Instead of an absence or presence of threats, he thus focuses on the preservation of security. This preservation of security is exactly what the institutions under research here aim to do.

The specification of ‘whom’ and ‘what values’ for Baldwin depends on the specific research question at hand. The first question can refer to an individual (some, most, or all), a state (some, most, or all), an international system (some, most, or all), etc. As will become clear, the answer to this question differs between the different actors relevant for this research, which clearly has implications for dynamics between the different security actors. Depending on who one asks, security organised through

²⁷ It should be noted that one page earlier Wolfer (1952: 484, emphasis added) characterises security “*some degree of protection of values previously acquired*” and the full sentence of Baldwin’s citation says security “*measures the absence of threats to acquired values*” (ibid, 485, emphasis added). Later, Wolfer (ibid, 494) argues that “every increment of security must be paid by additional sacrifices of other values,” and following the economic law of diminishing returns at some point the gain in security no longer compensates the added costs of attaining it. He therefore does not state that there is an ultimate protection possible, but talks about measuring a particular degree of security. Baldwin’s criticism on Wolfer’s characterisation is thus not quite accurate, but his adaptation to emphasise the ambiguity of a possible ‘absence of threats’ is useful nonetheless.

particular institutions prioritise security of certain individuals or groups, the security of the state, or security of the international system. The second question is about what values are to be secured, which can include issues such as physical safety, economic welfare, psychological well-being, etc. For Baldwin, these two specifications define the concept of security, although he proposes a few additional specifications to make security policies comparable with each other and with other policies. These specifications are: how much security, security from what threats, by what means, at what cost, in what time period.

When security is the low probability of damage to acquired values, security provision can be defined as actions taken by actors to react to or minimise threats to these values. The specifications defined by Baldwin mean that there are multiple interpretations possible of what is considered a threat, what values are considered important, and what issues are prioritised. Following this interpretation of security, different actors pursue different norms, values, needs and priorities regarding security. Security provision is here then not only used to refer to the implementation or imposing of security by state actors, but also to the actions taken by various non-state actors in pursuit of their own security or the security of others. With such a multi-interpretable definition of security, it also becomes clear that actors involved in security provision may at times have diverging, and at times even conflicting interpretations. The multiplicity of different actors working on behalf of different norms, values, needs and priorities regarding security creates a process of a constant struggling and negotiating of different security interpretations and strategies by multiple individuals and institutions, which will be referred to as the security dynamics. The following section elaborates on this concept, and presents an analytical model that will be used to look at the ways in which international, national and local perceptions and practices of security relate to one another.

Interventions and the Dynamics of Security

Where policy-oriented analysis focuses on the assessment of interventions, and more critical research looks at the context in which interventions take place and at processes of policy implementation, here it is proposed to analyse the interaction between international security interventions and the local dynamics of security in which they are implemented. In other words, how do the policies and programmes intervening actors relate to national and local perceptions and practices of security in the contexts where they are implemented? To answer this question, below an analytical model is proposed, which will be used in the following chapters of this book. The model builds on several elements of the literature discussed in the

previous chapters. First, the context in which interventions take place is dynamic and security provision is constantly being contested and negotiated. Furthermore, 'the' intervention does not exist, as multiple programmes and policies are designed and supported by different international actors, who interact with various local and national actors. To look at these interactions and the ways in which different perceptions and practices of security relate to one another, the analytical model focuses on different arenas of interaction: 1) between intervening international actors and state actors, 2) between intervening international actors and actors at the local level, and 3) between state and non-state actors in security provision at the local level. Keeping in mind that in practice these arenas of interaction are not completely distinct but overlap, this allows looking at the different levels of interaction between local, national and international actors involved. The development of this analytical model is discussed below.

Having reviewed the literature discussed earlier in this book at the beginning of this chapter, a number of elements can be adopted here. First, I depart from the starting point of North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) that access to violent means are dispersed rather than monopolised. As a result of this lacking state monopoly, there is a multitude of overlapping institutions, both state and non-state, involved in governance and security provision. Following Boege and his colleagues (2008; 2009a; 2009b), state and non-state actors and practices – or formal and informal – are intertwined and overlap, and have affected each other in such a way that the distinction formal-informal cannot really be made. However, as will be argued below drawing on Migdal (2001) and Ferguson and Gupta (2002), other than its at times perhaps blurred practices, the symbolic aspect of the state (i.e. the image of the state) as an actor above society with particular responsibilities to govern remains very much relevant, also in a hybrid political context. Yet, state practices are not necessarily undertaken by state actors or state institutions. Drawing on Lund (2011), there are different institutions having 'state' features and making authority claims, i.e. trying to define and enforce collectively binding decisions. Similar also to the argument of Hagmann and Péclard (2010), these different institutions (state and non-state) are set in a dynamic process of negotiating or competing for authority. Drawing on Migdal's state-in-society approach, the focus is then "on the ongoing struggles among shifting coalitions over the rules for daily behaviour" (Migdal, 2001: 11). His central argument is that such struggles for domination are not simply about whom controls the top leadership positions in the state, and such struggles are not just fought out by large-scale social forces, such as state institutions, social classes or civil society organisations. State and society constantly influence each other as in a 'Giddens' duality of structure (Giddens, 1986). The model must therefore take into consideration the struggles over the rules

of daily behaviour – in this case specifically regarding security – that also take place between individuals at a local level, as well as the interaction between larger institutions and structures set out by global politics and economics. In a hybrid political order, contrasting views on security are then competing in society's multiple arenas of interaction.

The 'struggles over the rules of daily behaviour' here means looking at 'the struggles over daily security'. Just as a competition over authority, there is competition over security provision. As will be elaborated upon in chapter 7, when discussing security people have very different ideas of what security means, and what security issues are to be prioritised. Depending on their particular context, experiences, and potential threats, as well as the possible definitions prevailing discourses in society provide for them and the influence of images presented by elites, people define for themselves what security constitutes to them. What security means and what priorities people set will be different from place to place, between rural areas and cities, or between men and women. And based on the available opportunities people have, they choose their strategies in pursuit of their security. This is certainly not always a conscious process, nor does it mean that people change their ideas about security and what is important to them from second to second. But circumstances and someone's particular position in society do have an effect on what security means, and specifically on what security aspects are prioritised. Moreover, changes in the contexts of peoples' lives provide or obstruct the different ways people can pursue their security interests. For example, in a village the local police officer can contribute to security by actively supporting the community by preventing and solving crimes. Yet, if this police officer is perceived to be an oppressor who acts in interest other than security as defined by the people in this village, people may find alternative ways to provide in their security, for instance by organizing neighbourhood patrols. At the same time policemen at the local level are part of the security dynamics. They too define their own security needs and strategies to pursue these needs. When their salaries are not paid, for example, they might use opportunities available to them to fulfil in their security needs and harass the population for money. Drawing on Hagman and Péclard (2010: 546-50), actors thus have different resources and repertoires. The resources are the material bases of collective action and include particular assets, capacities and finances. Repertoires are symbolic discourses that help to legitimise actions.

Definitions of security and strategies for the pursuit of security can conflict, as what is security for one can mean insecurity to another. Furthermore, there is no unified authority or centralised process where contrasting views on security meet. Drawing on securitisation theory discussed in the previous section, the struggles between

security actors in hybrid political contexts are then not just about which security issues are set on the agenda, but also about which actions are allowed, according to whose norms, and who is allowed to take action.²⁸ An ex-combatant reintegrating after the war may, after having been in the bush for years, find it difficult to economically and socially fit in the community. The armed group he was part of offered him a social structure, status and a steady income. This social and economic security fell away, and in the reintegration process he is expected to find different strategies to fulfil these security needs. But if this fails, he might opt to return to an armed group or criminal gang. What for this particular ex-combatant may be a way to fulfil in his security needs is likely to threaten the security of another. What defines as security is open for interpretation and what the 'right' definition and strategy is, is in the eye of the beholder. And the way security is pursued in a given community may be conflicting with the interests of interventions. The struggles over security in the security dynamics are undertaken by a variety of individuals, but as became clear from the above examples also include institutions. Institutions are then defined as significant practices, relationships or organisational structures in society, and can be for instance families, traditional structures, religious structures, rebel groups, criminal gangs, but also state institutions, such as the police or local government. In short, the interaction between different actors dealing with security provision can be described as a dynamics of a constant struggling and negotiating of different security definitions and strategies by multiple individuals and institutions: the security dynamics.

How then do interventions relate to these security dynamics? A starting point is the literature on interventions and policy implementation discussed in chapter 3. Colebatch (2009) brings in the politics of policy implementation, and Barnett and Zürcher (2009) set the implementation of policies and programmes of international actors in a political process with local stakeholders. Yet, the political process they describe is too oversimplified, not only assuming as if there is one big scheme over which actors negotiate and that the actors and their positions are fixed, but also assuming that actors at all levels continuously interact with one another in negotiating this political process. Rather, instead of one outcome of one intervention creating one particular process, pressures occur in what Migdal calls "society's multiple arenas of domination and opposition" (Migdal, 2001: 99). In other words, different actors and different political processes of negotiation or conflict between actors do not necessarily always interact. Similarly, Hagmann and Péclard (2010: 550-52) identify different negotiation arenas and tables in their framework. They argue that negotiation arenas have spatial, social and temporal dimensions, and

²⁸ This argument is further elaborated in Willems and Van der Borgh (forthcoming).

transcend the traditional units of analysis such as state-society dichotomy or local, national and international levels. The negotiation tables are then the formal settings of negotiation. Here, I do not make the distinction between negotiation arenas and tables, and consider arenas to be where both formal and informal interactions, negotiations and struggles of security dynamics take place.

To understand how local, national and international perceptions and practices of security relate to one another, the focus is on the arenas in which local, national and international actors involved in security provision interact. Useful for understanding the relations between local, national and international actors is the framework proposed by Ferguson and Gupta (2002). They describe how the hierarchies of a civil society serving as a zone of contact between the 'up there' state, 'on the ground' people, and institutions of global governance being seen as 'above' national states, are *imagined* spatial and scalar hierarchies. They also find that this image is challenged by the "profoundly transnational character of both the 'state' and the 'local,' and drawing attention to crucial mechanisms of governmentality that take place outside of, and alongside, the nation-state" (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002: 995). In their view, states are not the only ones exercising authority over localities. Transnational organisations exercise authority through their dominance over states' policies (e.g. IMF, World Bank, EU), and outside the state there are international NGOs through which authority is exercised. This is not to say that the state is irrelevant. While foreign national organisations and transnational organisations attempt to exercise authority over localities, at the same time the state continues to claim "vertical encompassment" of and authority over these same localities. Thus on the one hand there is an imagined hierarchy, which though imagined has very real consequences, and at the same time actors that are imagined to work on different levels in reality may be in the same community. For example, in a small rural village, a local farmer, a state security official, an international NGO and a representative of a UN organisation may work on the same issue.

Explanatory in this regard is also the definition of the state proposed by Migdal. He defines the state as "a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) *the image of a coherent, controlling organisation in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory*, and (2) *the actual practices of its multiple parts*" (Migdal, 2001: 15-16 – original emphasis). The repertoires and resources available for the multiple institutions to pursue particular security strategies are – in part – influenced by the image and practices of the state. The image of the state, in the line of Ferguson and Gupta, as an organisation 'above' society creates perceptions that particular security concerns are to be addressed by the state's institutions. The way in which security at the local level is defined, and

the choice of which security strategies to pursue, is then influenced by the projected image of the state and the related tasks that the state is to perform. For example, even in places where the state police have never provided security, during interviews in the DRC and Burundi people claimed that the police *should* be responsible for security provision. Security can thus be defined at the local level in terms of a responsibility of the state. Yet at the same time the state can be viewed as an oppressive power, and people might prefer to pursue security strategies outside the realm of the state. The practices of the state also determine the local security dynamics. The state can directly contest and influence local definitions of security, as for instance when national security interests and terrorist threats are linked with local dynamics. State practices in security provision may make particular security strategies available, for example by providing a functioning police that acts in favour of local security strategies. The state may also limit such strategies, such as when the police work against local interests or when the state prohibits traditional structures of security provision. Furthermore, local state actors, such as representatives and agencies, may use the image of the state on behalf of a national policy interest, or for private interests. As discussed earlier, for example, state representatives can use their uniform or title to extract 'taxes' for their own benefit. In this case, a local actor claims the state, and uses the image of the state as backing in the pursuit of his own security interest. The local security dynamics thus do not stand alone and operate in a vacuum, but are in constant interaction with the state, both as an image and as a practice.


The regional, international or global levels affect the security dynamics in three different ways. The most direct way the local dynamics are affected is through direct implementation of programmes and projects on the ground. Disarmament and demobilisation activities and reintegration support, for instance, aim to have a direct impact on the actions ex-combatants take in pursuit of their economic, social and physical security. It aims to take weapons away as an option for people to use to provide in their own security, and give those who pursued their security through their affiliation with armed groups other options. Yet, while disarmament may have an effect on the security strategies available, it does not necessarily take gun possession as an available strategy away. Direct then refers to the relation with the process, not to the relation with the desired effect.

More indirectly, interventions influence security dynamics through interventions in structures and practices of the state. For instance, SSR related interventions are directed at the state security and justice apparatus, and aim to adjust the relation of this apparatus with the people living in this state. However, the effect of such interventions greatly depends on the extent to which such adjustments are adopted

by the different actors within the state of intervention. As has become clear in the previous sections of this chapter, implementation of policies as intended is far from self-evident. Security interests of state actors may conflict with the interests of the intervention and the interests on local levels, which further complicates the security dynamics and changes the effects of the intervention in the ground.

A final level of influence on the security dynamics is that of global policies and economics. The global demand for coltan and other minerals affects the local dynamics in eastern DRC, by making the control of mines interesting for the state, as well as individual commanders and rebel groups. While not a deliberate policy of outside interventions, the global market is clearly a vital deterrent of the security dynamics. Also global changes in the political climate may greatly affect the security dynamics. When the US coined its 'War on Terror', several other states adopted the label to redefine particular struggles within their own territories, and when political opponents were placed on national and international lists of terrorists, the security dynamics changed considerably.

To make sense of the complex interplay between the various agendas, programmes, perceptions and practices regarding security of the different actors that are involved in security, the analytical model presented here looks at the relations and interactions between local, national and international actors involved in security provision. The figure below shows the three types of actors (local, state and



international) present in the context (the dotted circle) in which interventions take place. The arrows indicate the three arenas of interaction between these three types of actors involved in security: 1) between intervening international actors and state actors, 2) between intervening international actors and actors at the local level, and 3) between state and non-state actors in security provision at the local level. Apart from the different arenas, also changes and events of global economics and politics can affect the positions and motivations of actors on all levels. Clearly, the distinctions between arenas are blurred in reality as they overlap and actors interact on different levels. State and non-state actors are intertwined, state actors may act for private interests, or non-state institutions may become (partly) 'state' or 'state-like'. Furthermore, the 'international community' is no unitary actor, and may on the ground be represented by locals. And while a full analysis of the interactions between international actors in the global arena is beyond the scope of this research, where relevant some attention is nonetheless given to the ways in which international actors relate to each other. The choice for three arenas is made here to look at the interactions between actors at international, state and local levels. This does not mean that no other arenas could be distinguished, and the 'international community' could for instance be considered an arena of interaction on its own, or at least a sub-arena. Likewise, local actors and state actors are no uniform groups and will have diverging interpretations of security and the preferred actions to pursue security amongst themselves. The different arenas should therefore not be considered as rigid categories, but fluid and primarily chosen to enable looking at separate parts of the bigger whole, and better grasp the changing dynamics of security provisioning. Doing so will show how security interventions interact and become part of these changing dynamics of security provisioning, which they can only influence to a limited extent. The first two arenas then look at how the programmes of intervening actors are experienced, perceived and used by state and local level actors respectively. The third arena looks specifically at the interactions between local and state actors, in which international actors may, but do not necessarily, play a direct role. This arena is nonetheless very important when looking at how international efforts to build or contribute to security relate to national and local perceptions and practices of security, as these interactions greatly affect the ways in which security is experienced by people living in the contexts where security interventions are implemented.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter started with a reflection on the critiques discussed in the previous two chapters. They provide important insights, adding to our knowledge of how violence is organised, how state-society relations function, and how processes of

policy implementation function. Yet, a mismatch between policy ideals and empirical reality is a given, and does not make the policy ideal wrong per se. The question thus remains whether the state and its security functions should remain so high on the agenda of international actors, and whether security interventions are still relevant. Answering this question requires a much more thorough understanding of the ways in which the agenda and programmes of international actors work out in the societies in which they are implemented.

There is a lack of knowledge on this, which I will address in the remainder of this book. It requires looking at how outside interventions and programmes are experienced, rejected, adapted or appropriated. As interventions do not enter a static context, it also requires looking at the ways in which local and national perceptions and practices of security relate to each other. To address these questions, this chapter developed an analytical model focusing on the interactions between different actors. The model starts with the assumption that there is a variety of notions and definitions of what constitutes security, and different people prioritise different aspects of their preferred notion of security. Consciously or not, people make choices in pursuit of their security needs. As discussed, control of violent means is dispersed and various authority structures overlap, cooperate and compete. This creates a constant struggle over what institutions and actors are able to define and enforce collectively binding decisions, and what norms, interests and priorities are promoted. Drawing on securitisation, the struggles between security actors are therefore not only about which security issues are set on the agenda, but also about who is allowed to take action, and which actions are allowed (whose norms prevail). In other words: security dynamics in which both non-state and state actors are involved. At the same time, the image of the state as being on a level above 'the local' and as the first contact point for many international donors creates nonetheless very real opportunities for those actors in control over the state's institutions. Interventions directly undertake projects on the ground, or aim to adjust the way the state interacts within the local security dynamics by reforms of state structures and policies. Finally, security dynamics, the state and the interventions are all influenced by global politics and economics.

Drawing on field research undertaken in Eastern DRC, Burundi and South Sudan between 2009 and 2011, the following chapters will use this model to take critical analysis a step further, and gain better understanding of the interaction between security interventions and the security dynamics in which they are implemented. The analysis will be guided by sub-questions V and VI, focusing on how the programmes of interventions are experienced, perceived and used at national and local levels, and how local and national perceptions and practices of security relate

to each other. Using these I explore the model presented here and look for commonalities and differences in these arenas of interaction, drawing on the different countries where research has been undertaken. Of the three following chapters, each focuses on one particular arena of interaction of the analytical model, specifically looking at the ways in which the different actors relate to one another. Chapter 5 starts with the arena of interaction between intervening international actors and actors at the national level. A primary focus will be on SSR interventions, which predominantly concerns this arena of interaction. Chapter 6 then looks at the interaction between intervening international actors and actors at the local level. A particular focus is on the programmes for reintegration of ex-combatants in the communities. However, security interventions enter into a dynamic process in which different actors involved in security are overlapping, cooperating and competing. After having discussed the dynamics that result from the interactions between intervening international actors and the different actors at national and local levels, chapter 7 therefore turns to the interactions between state and non-state actors in security provision at the local level.

Chapter 5. Security Interventions and the State²⁹

To better understand security interventions and their implications, the following chapters look at three arenas of interaction between international actors who design and support these security interventions and other actors involved in security provisioning. This chapter will be guided by sub-question IV, and analyses how the programmes of interventions are experienced, perceived and used at national and local levels? As shown in the discussion of the assumptions underlying security interventions in chapter 1, which hold the state central to security provisioning, these interventions often first focus on state actors. This chapter therefore focuses on the arena of interaction between intervening international actors and actors at the state level, drawing on research in on these interventions in Eastern DRC, Burundi and South Sudan.

At the same time, this chapter serves to provide relevant background information on the three cases. The following section on ‘conflict backgrounds and the unfolding of interventions’ therefore discusses for each case how the conflict and the settlement developed, as well as the type of governance, security challenges and security interventions that followed. Not only does this provide relevant contextual information, but also does this provide practical illustrations to the politics of ownership and policy implementation discussed in the chapter 3.

The goal of the first part of this chapter is thus twofold: providing background information on the countries, which at the same time focuses and illustrates the interaction between international actors and actors at state level. The final section then discusses this arena of interaction in closer detail, making a number of observations and conclusions about how intervening international actors relate to state level elites. It also looks at the institutional frameworks through which security interventions are organised. What becomes clear throughout this chapter is that the struggles for authority between different actors of the conflict also continue after the settlement, which may or may not include violence, and may also include newly emerging actors. Security interventions that aim to contribute to statebuilding are

²⁹ The discussions of the conflict, the settlement and security interventions of each case draw partially on the country backgrounds and sections on DDR, SSR and SALW control written for Rouw and Willems (2009), Willems, Kleingeld and van Leeuwen (2010) and Willems and Rouw (2011a).

thus implemented in a dynamic process where different power holders struggle for authority. While security interventions aim to mitigate these struggles, they at the same time become part of it. Furthermore, interventions are influenced by the global politics and economics, and, as discussed in chapter 3, are essentially hybrid themselves. As a result, to a certain extent local power holders are able to use the programmes of international actors to their own benefits, and the outcomes and effects of security interventions can be different than what was originally planned for. Intervening actors thus relate to actors at the state level who are involved in struggles over authority, and where able will use the programmes and policies presented by interventions to further their own goals.

Conflict Backgrounds and the Unfolding of Interventions

Writing on three different countries in a single book, it is inevitable to elaborate on the background of the countries and conflicts. However, to make the background discussions more readable and meaningful, they are focused towards investigating the arena of interaction between intervening international actors and state actors. Each of the following three sections on the country cases will therefore be organised in four sub-sections. The first part discusses the background of the conflict, including the main causes and consequences, and is followed by a description of the settlements reached. Not only is the conflict the reason for interventions to take place, but also do the dynamics created during the conflict affect the post-settlement security situation and the type of governance – and with that the form and behaviour of the new state security forces. The settlement reached between the parties is the point of departure for security interventions, which often determines the makeup of the new state security forces. However, in all cases, the settlements did not end the violence between the conflicting parties, and struggles for authority continued between various power holders. In this context, the following sub-section looks at the type of government, governance and security challenges. The main security challenges consist of those issues that were considered critical by respondents during interviews. If struggles for authority continue, who is involved, how do these dynamics evolve, and what does this mean for state security provision? Where the backgrounds of the conflicts and following settlements form the setting of security interventions, the type of governance and security challenges are what they aim to address. The government refers to those who *de jure* control the institutions of the state. The type of government, or the regime, is defined by Tilly and Tarrow in terms of its capacity to enforce actions and the degree to which a regime is democratic (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007: 54-55). Democracy is the extent to which the subjects under the authority have broad, equal political rights (including property rights), exert significant direct influence over government personnel and

policy, and receive protection from arbitrary action by government agents. Following the argument made by Lund (2011) as discussed in chapter 3, the capacity relates to the *de facto* ability to enforce collectively binding decisions, or governance. It therefore also depends on the presence of other institutional actors competing with the government over governance. A particular focus is on the capacity of state security forces to adequately deal with the security challenges at hand, the most pressing of which are shortly discussed. While some of the root causes of the conflict may persist (e.g. land issues), security challenges have also developed from the conflict. And not only are the new security forces often not capable of dealing with the security problems, they are themselves also part of it. In the final sub-section the attention then shifts to the security interventions itself, and shortly discusses what interventions have taken place since a settlement was reached, how they developed, and what the outcomes were with regard to the new state security forces. The effect of the interventions is severely hampered by the dynamics created by the conflict and diverging interests of local power holders. The section thereafter then discusses the arena of interaction between intervening actors and actors at state level in more detail.

Eastern DRC

Congo was colonised by the Belgians, and ruled from 1885 to 1908 by King Leopold II who regarded the Congo Free State as his personal fiefdom. His violent rule set a precedent for the atrocities to come. In 1960 the renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) gained independence with Patrice Lumumba as prime minister. Later that year Lumumba was overthrown with support of the West who feared his move towards the Soviet Union, and was killed by elements of the army loyal to Joseph Mobutu. Mobutu took full power in 1965, renamed the country Zaire in 1971, and embarked on a politics of 'Zairianisation' in 1973, nationalizing all foreign businesses. This ensured Mobutu of a large amount of resources to distribute among his patrimonial network of clients, and he gave everyone a free hand to '*debrouillez-vous*' - fend for yourselves - reinforcing the corruption that would become characteristic of the Congo.

In general, the origins of the Congolese wars are located in North and South Kivu. In the 1990s conflicts over land issues started escalating as a result of discrepancies between traditional and state law, most notably the Bakajika Land Law (1966) and the General Property Law (1973). Ancestral land was being bought up by state functionaries and wealthy entrepreneurs. This also increased ethnic tensions, as some groups were better able to take advantage of the land laws. The final straw

was an influx of refugees and *Interahamwe*³⁰ after the 1994 genocide and the taking of power by a Tutsi government in Rwanda, after which Hutu militias allied with *Forces Armées Zairoises* (FAZ) and started attacking Tutsis in Eastern Zaire. The weakening of Mobutu's regime since the end of the Cold War had encouraged the interest of Zaire's eastern neighbours, who eagerly started supporting the rebellion of Laurent Kabila's *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Congo* (AFDL) in an attempt to access Zaire's mineral wealth. Kabila's AFDL, joined by Tutsi militias, started marching towards Kinshasa, ousted President Mobutu from power in May 1997 and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Once in power, Kabila attempted to curb the influence of his former allies and demanded that Rwanda's and Uganda's troops leave the country. In reaction Uganda and Rwanda supported the formation of a new rebel movement – the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD) – and occupied Eastern DRC, igniting Congo's Second War in August 1998.

In the Ituri district, local conflicts over land escalated as many Lendu were dispossessed by Hema entrepreneurs, who were often backed by the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) occupying the region since November 1998. "Ituri increasingly became the target of local strongmen who tried to re-establish themselves in the military power game" (Vlassenroot and Raeymakers, 2004: 395). In the Kivus, tensions over land also resulted in easy polarisation along ethnic lines. Being seen as ethnic strangers the Banyarwanda³¹ and Banyamulenge³² increasingly felt alienated from and threatened by the rest of the population. The arrival of Hutu refugees since 1994 further emphasised these ethnic differences. The Rwandan government hence easily found a constituency among those groups looking for protection. In the Kivus, the ethnic card was played as the Rwandan Tutsi government looked for support among the Tutsi Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge, and Kabila started calling for a fight against the foreign invasion, including their Tutsi supporters. Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia supported Kabila, while Rwanda and Uganda supported various rebel groups. On the ground, self-defence

³⁰ The Hutu *Interahamwe* that fled into the DRC would later be the basis of the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR).

³¹ 'Banyarwanda' means those who are from Rwanda and refers to both Hutus and Tutsis of Rwandese origin.

³² Banyamulenge' refers to Tutsi Congolese in South Kivu, who in the 1960s had renamed themselves to the hill where they first settled to distinguish their Congolese identity. For more on the Banyamulenge's conflicting fight for Congolese citizenship rights and their need for Rwandan support, cf. Vlassenroot (2002)

militias collectively referred to as *Mai Mai* were organised to fight against the foreign invasion.³³

Type of Settlement

The use of proxy forces by Uganda and Rwanda to fight the DRC army and later each other, ethnic polarisation and political games of local strongmen created a myriad of armed groups in Eastern DRC. The fact that many armed groups and army battalions from all sides were benefiting economically from the lands they occupied made it difficult to reach a settlement between all these actors. Negotiations had started almost immediately after the start of the second war and in July 1999 the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed by the governments of Angola, Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. However, Ugandan and Rwandan troops remained present in Eastern DRC. In January 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated and succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila, which created new room for negotiations. Several agreements had been reached in 2002, but only became effective when the 'Final Act' was reached in Sun City in April 2003 in which all previous agreements were brought together.³⁴

The Final Act of Sun City led to the integration of the government and the armed groups into the Transitional National Government with Joseph Kabila as president and four vice-presidents from the government, the unarmed opposition, the RCD-Goma and *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* (MLC). The fighting in the Kivus nevertheless continued, most notably by the *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* (FDLR)³⁵ and various *Mai Mai* groups. The FDLR, fearing repercussions

³³ They are highly feared for the magic powers they derive from water and oil, but the capacity and structures differ greatly between the various groups. While most *Mai Mai* groups originated as self-defence groups, many of them have started to trade ideological goals for economic ones, such as pillaging, occupying mines and forests to trade the resources, and the extortion of taxes from the population.

³⁴ In July 2002, a peace agreement was signed in Pretoria stipulating the withdrawal of the Rwandan Army and the dismantling of ex-FAR (*Forces Armées Rwandaise*) and Interahamwe. On 6 September, a similar agreement was signed in Luanda with Uganda. In December 2002, the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition of the DRC was signed by the parties of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, including the government, the RCD, *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* (MLC), the RCD-Kisangani-*Mouvement de Libération* (RCD-ML), RCD-National (RCD-N), various *Mai Mai* groups and the opposition.

³⁵ The FDLR originated from members of the *Interahamwe* that committed the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, although many among its current ranks have been mobilised in a later stage and are not necessarily implicated in the genocide. Kabila's government has in the past supported the FDLR in order to limit Rwandan influence in Eastern DRC.

upon returning to Rwanda, continued to pillage communities and kept control over mineral rich areas.

The general elections held in July 2006 brought the demise of the RCD-Goma. Triggered by this loss of Rwandan influence, Laurent Nkunda stepped up and formed the *Congrès National pour la Défense de la Peuple* (CNDP), claiming to protect the Congolese Tutsi and fight the FDLR. Before that, Nkunda had already been fighting the FARDC, even capturing Bukavu for a short period in 2004. After being unable to defeat the CNDP militarily, a new alliance was formed between former foes, Congo and Rwanda, allowing Rwanda to chase the remaining FDLR in Eastern Congo in return for Nkunda's arrest. To neutralise the CNDP, they were integrated into the FARDC, although for some it has rather been the FARDC that integrated into the CNDP (Berwouts, quoted in *Mondiaal Nieuws*, 2011). After Nkunda's arrest the command of the CNDP had been taken over by Bosco Ntaganda, who was made General in the Congolese army and controls most of the troops in the East, despite an International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for his arrest.³⁶

Government, Governance, and Security Challenges

Joseph Kabila was chief-of-staff of the land forces when his father was assassinated in 2001, and he took over power. He subsequently won the general elections of 2006 from his main opponent Jean-Pierre Bemba, then vice-president and commander of the MLC.³⁷ Yet, the degree of democracy of Kabila's regime is low, and a Human Rights Watch report stated that "the newly elected government is brutally restricting democratic space" (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 2). Kabila has used violence and intimidation to eliminate its political opponents, including killings and summary executions by government agents. Also the 2011 elections, again won by Kabila, were accompanied by intimidations, disappearances and killings (cf. Human Rights Watch, 2011a; 2011b; Hubert, 2011; *Mondiaal Nieuws*, 2011) and there have been widespread reports of irregularities in the voting process (Carter Center, 2011). There is therefore little direct popular influence over government personnel, nor

³⁶ Both Kabila and Kagame need Ntaganda and his CNDP. Kagame needed a stable and controlled CNDP to prevent certain elements of the Tutsi elite to gather support in opposition of him, and the CNDP further provides him with troops that control large parts of his neighboring country loyal to him. Kabila needed the CNDP to stabilise the region - as the FARDC was unable to defeat the CNDP militarily - and required CNDP support during the 2011 elections.

³⁷ Bemba did protest the results and alleged fraud. The Supreme Court rejected the fraud charges, and although Bemba disagreed with the decision, he accepted it "in the greater national interest and to preserve peace" (IRIN, 2006). In 2008 Jean-Pierre Bemba was arrested and handed over to the ICC in The Hague, who had charged him for crimes committed in the CAR.

protection from abusive government agents. Similarly, political rights are not equally enjoyed, nor are they always clear. A professor from Goma's University mentioned in this regard that a law determining Congolese nationality, which had changed four times since 1999, each time exempting certain ethnic groups from political rights.³⁸ This is problematic, since the Congolese conflict identity politics played a significant role, which were both fuelled by economic inequalities and exploited by powerful actors for the predatory behaviour that has characterised the conflict. A multitude of armed groups fought over a share of the pie, having little interest in the larger statebuilding ideals proposed by the West. Also after the signing of peace agreements, the fighting has continued as different power holders struggle for their positions.

Also land issues, which were another important contributing factor (if not root cause) of the conflicts in Eastern DRC, remained an important source of conflict and violence after the peace agreements. It was estimated that 85 percent of the issues the *tribuneaux de paix*³⁹ dealt with concerned land issues.⁴⁰ Ownership of land is difficult as official ownership titles (since 1973's General Property Law discussed above) now compete with customary rules creating much confusion and heightened tensions. Land conflicts have also taken on ethnic dimensions, as some groups are better able to obtain land – by buying up titles, through the (corrupted) court system, force, etc. – or pastoralist groups and agriculturalist groups using or claiming the same land.^{41, 42} Particularly pressing is the ethnic polarisation between those considering themselves autochthonous, and Congolese Banyarwanda Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), immigrants and ex-CNDP elements in the FARDC. Not only does the redistribution of land and property between those who stayed (and may have occupied the land of IDPs) and those who return cause conflict, but the return of IDPs may also lead to a rebalancing of the ethnic make-up of a particular region.

The activities of the CNDP have aggravated the issues over land and ethnicity in the region. The CNDP had heavily armed herders graze the cattle of high-ranking officers, and used these herders as auxiliary forces (UNSC, 2010: 42). Furthermore,

³⁸ Interview, Professor Goma University, Goma, North Kivu, 18 November 2009

³⁹ The lowest level of court

⁴⁰ Interview, Local NGO, Butembo, North Kivu, DRC, 22 October 2009

⁴¹ Ethnicity by no means determines the form of livelihood, and people may both have cattle and crops. However, in general the Hema in Ituri and Tutsis in the Kivus herd cattle, whereas the Lendu and Hutu tend to be agriculturalists.

⁴² For an elaborate report on various land conflicts in Ituri, cf. Mongo, E., D. Nkoy and J. van Puijenbroek (2009)

land in the Congolese part of the Virunga National Park has been bought up by Rwandan civilians and CNDP officers, and the existing population was chased away (UNSC, 2011: 88). Military operations of ex-CNDP FARDC units have been interpreted by the local population as attempts to clear land for refugees and Rwandans. There have been reports of the repatriation of refugees from Rwanda, as well as the movement of people from Rwanda to the Kivus who had not previously lived in the DRC. A group of students in Masisi, North Kivu, claimed that: "Illegal refugees carrying arms are coming from Rwanda. This creates insecurity. About 12.000 people have entered through the parks. They come without control. They herd their cows and set up tents. They aren't real refugees."⁴³ Such claims have been confirmed by the UN Group of Experts on the DRC (UNSC, 2011: 86-87). While integrated into the FARDC, Ntaganda remained in control of his troops, deployed them in strategic and economic areas of interest, and secured weapons caches. In and around Masisi, a parallel police force had been set up that ultimately reported to Ntaganda and the CNDP had taken over taxation and developed parallel structures of administration (UNSC, 2009: 46; 2010: 43; 2011: 82-85). In effect, the CNDP had been forming a state within a state and the Congolese state government had little control over its Eastern territories.

Also with regard to other battalions, the FARDC as state security provider is often itself part of the security problems as well. Army and police have a tendency not to pay their bills (e.g. in restaurants and hotels) and extort 'taxes' and 'fees': harassments that are so common that they are simply referred to as '*tracasseries*'⁴⁴. The impunity of state security personnel causes people to feel abandoned by the Congolese state, and contributes to the perception that crime and violence pays. The combination of impunity and weak capacity of state security forces contributes to the continuing presence of non-state armed groups. Several groups continue to control strategic areas, such as mines and forests for exploitation, and extort taxes from the local population. These include both foreign armed groups, such as the FDLR from Rwanda and the *Forces Nationales de Libération* (FNL) from Burundi, as well as Congolese armed groups, such as Mai Mai Yakutumba, Mai Mai Simba and the Nduma Defence for Congo (NDC). For instance, the NDC has cancelled all state taxes and introduced new taxes in Bisie in Walikale, North Kivu, and controls several goldmines in the region. The NDC maintains control by ensuring the payment of customary taxes to traditional leaders who support it, and exchanging tax exemptions to FDLR traders for military support (UNSC, 2011: 59-60). At the

⁴³ Group interview, Students, Masisi, North Kivu, DRC, 25 November 2009

⁴⁴ *Tracasseries* is often and widely used as a general term, for example for illegal taxations, fees for entering markets, roadblocks, theft and rape. More generally it relates to harassments and annoyance.

end of March 2012, Ntaganda defected from the FARDC, followed by a defection of Colonel Sultani Makenga in May, with the result that a large part of the former CNDP in the FARDC was again in the bush fighting the FARDC (Human Rights Watch, 2012a). All these attempts to control and tax particular geographic locations, alliances, defections and conflicts illustrate the ongoing struggles over authority between power holders in Eastern DRC.

Security Interventions and New Security Forces

Reacting to the nature of the “Great African War”, the Lusaka agreement instituted the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) programme, aimed at repatriating the foreign combatants on DRC soil.⁴⁵ MONUC disarmed combatants and transferred them to their countries of origin where the MDRP⁴⁶ assisted them in national reintegration programmes. The MDRP also contributed US\$ 200 million (50% from the World Bank and 50% from the donor community) to the *Commission Nationale du Désarmement, de la Démobilisation et de la Réinsertion* (CONADER) for the civilian components⁴⁷ of DDR (Kasongo and Sebahara, 2006).

In an attempt to monopolise violence, a law was passed on 12 November 2004 regulating and unifying the new national army, the FARDC. Included in this law was article 45, which recognised the incorporation of a number of armed groups into the FARDC, including the former government army *Forces Armées Congolaises* (FAC), the ex-FAZ, the RCD-Goma, RCD-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML), RCD-National (RCD-N), MLC, the *Mai-Mai*, as well as other military and paramilitary groups (as determined by the government). All these combatants were to enter the *tronc commun* before either being reintegrated into the FARDC or demobilised and reintegrated into civilian life. In this process, they were first assembled at *centres de regroupement* (operated by the military) and then transferred to *centres d’orientation* (operated by CONADER) where adult soldiers were asked to choose between demobilisation and entry into the FARDC. Those opting for enlistment moved on to *centres de brassage et recyclage* (operated by the military) where they received a short basic training, after which they were integrated into the FARDC. Children, combatants that were judged incapable of serving for medical reasons, and those suspected with “war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity” were not

⁴⁵ The Agreement would only go into effect in 2002 after bilateral agreements between the DRC and Rwanda and the DRC and Uganda, signed in Pretoria and Luanda respectively.

⁴⁶ The MDRP will be discussed in further detail at the end of this chapter.

⁴⁷ The civilian components according to the MDRP include demobilisation and reintegration.

allowed to choose for integration in the FARDC (Gouvernement de la RDC, 2006: 25). However, both Amnesty International (2007: 38) and a UN official in Bunia⁴⁸ were unaware of any cases where soldiers were prohibited to join the FARDC on “moral” reasons. Those opting for demobilisation then received “assistance with the socio-economic reinsertion in the communities” (Gouvernement de la RDC, 2006: 26). The army reform programme suffered delays, leading to an emergency plan, “which diluted the principles of identification and the simultaneous nature inherent in the two processes of DDR and army reform” (Amnesty International, 2007: 39).

Due to various reasons, most particularly CONADER’s inefficiency and corruption, the national demobilisation programme also suffered delays. In reaction to these delays, the government and the other international partners set up two pilot projects, one of which was the *Désarmement et Réinsertion Communautaire* (Disarmament and Community Reinsertion, DCR) in Ituri. The programme was designed specifically for the region where the armed groups had not signed the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement in Sun City and it was the first programme of CONADER, with a leading implementing role of UNDP (Puijenbroek et al, 2008: 9-10). The programme targeted 15,000 members of the armed groups in Ituri that signed the *Acte d’engagement de Kinshasa*. The main objectives of this programme were to disarm the combatants, decrease the proliferation of weapons and ensure pacification of the region. While the DCR ended in June 2005 after demobilizing 15,811 combatants, only an estimated twenty percent of the firearms had been collected, insecurity remained a pressing issue, and the reintegration process proved to be rather weak causing many to return to the bush (ibid, 14). After the DCR, the *Programme National de Désarmement, de la Démobilisation et de la Réinsertion* (PNDDR) commenced in Ituri in June 2005,⁴⁹ while in other provinces the PNDDR had already started. In 2007, yet another phase of DDR under the PNDDR had commenced in Ituri to respond to the remaining active militias in the region.

CONADER, which was originally responsible for overseeing implementation of the PNDDR, was in 2008 replaced by a new implementation unit, the *Unité d’Exécution du Programme National de Désarmement, de la Démobilisation et de la Réinsertion* (UE-PNDDR). With new financing the UE-PNDDR was tasked, amongst other things, with providing socio-economic reintegration support to 40,000 previously demobilised ex-combatants who were demobilised in 2006-2007, the demobilisation

⁴⁸ Interview, Bunia, North Kivu, DRC, 12 October 2009.

⁴⁹ This first phase of the NPDDR is referred to as the second phase of DDR in Ituri, as the DRC programme was considered Ituri’s first phase.

and reintegration of an estimated 23,000 combatants from the FARDC, and some limited support to 19,000 militia members in the East (MDRP, 2008). In the Kivus the Amani programme started in January 2008 after the signing of the Goma Agreement between 22 militias and the government. The Amani programme was part of the national programme, but designed specifically to deal with the militia operating in the Kivu provinces. However, the combination of the DCR programme in Ituri, the Amani programme in the Kivus, and the PNDDR that implemented programmes in both regions has failed to resolve the presence of active militia in Eastern DRC. Overall, with the lack of positive results of DDR programmes the DDR process in Eastern DRC can therefore be regarded as a failure.⁵⁰

Burundi

Since its independence in 1962 Burundi has been plagued by ethnic tensions between the dominant Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority.⁵¹ Like Rwanda, which was also colonised by the Germans and came under Belgian tutelage in 1916, there were tensions between these groups preceding colonisation. However, during the colonial period more dynamic relations between these two groups became frozen and antagonism was fuelled. The Belgian colonisers relied on the Tutsi minority to rule the Hutu majority. They coated this arrangement in dubious myths of 'racial superiority' and a 'traditional domination' of the Tutsi over the Hutu, transforming the organisation of society to reflect these myths (Prunier, 1995: 1-4; Malkki, 1995; Reyntjens, 1994). Yet, the situation in Burundi was rather different from that in Rwanda, where the 1959 'Social Revolution' brought power to the Hutu majority. In Burundi, power was in hands of princely lineages, the so-called Baganwa, who had managed to transcend ethnic difference to a certain extent. Decolonisation in Burundi was less abrupt than in Rwanda and initially did not affect the monarchy. But after the death of prime minister and prince Louis Rwagasore, ethnic polarisation sharpened due to the demonstration effect from the Rwandan revolution and led to increasingly ethnicised power struggles within the single ruling party *Union pour le Progrès National* (UPRONA), and a Tutsi-led coup within the army. Since then, Tutsi minority rule continued almost uninterrupted. Three military regimes have been in power successively (Michel Micombero, 1966-1976; Jean Baptiste Bagaza, 1976-1987; Pierre Buyoya, 1987-1993), and the army became a bastion of Tutsi power. Emerging rebellion met with harsh retaliations from the

⁵⁰ For more details, cf. Rouw and Willems (2009), as well as chapter 6 of this book.

⁵¹ Apart from these two groups, there is the minority ethnic group of the Twa, comprising about 1% of the population. Their role in the history and present politics is not included here.

army, leading to major bloodshed and large outflows of Hutu refugees in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1991.

When the Third Wave of Democratisation rolled over Africa, a new constitution providing for multiparty democracy was adopted by Pierre Buyoya, and military rule came to an end. The first democratic multi-party elections in 1993 were won by Melchior Ndadaye's *Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi* (FRODEBU), a pro-Hutu party. However, Ndadaye was assassinated three months later by Tutsi soldiers, leading to revenge killings by FRODEBU members and a spiral of Tutsi massacres and army reprisals began. The civil war that ensued has probably cost some 300,000 lives. In the central parts of the country the population got ethnically segregated, with Tutsi fleeing to displacement camps around the communal offices, while whole neighbourhoods of the capital Bujumbura became mono-ethnic. Part of the political leaders from FRODEBU fled to the exterior and formed the *Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (CNDD), with the *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (FDD) as its armed wing, which started attacks on Burundian soil. Another major rebel movement was the *Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de Libération* (Palipehutu-FNL), which was formed in the Tanzanian refugee camps. While Palipehutu-FNL had its support mainly in the central region of Muramvya and along Lake Tanganyika, CNDD was mainly supported in the southern regions of Bururi and Ruyigi. Both movements experienced factional infighting and schism.

Type of Settlement

In 1996 former military ruler Buyoya staged a coup, thereby suspending the constitution and effectively ending democracy. The coup led to an international boycott that further crippled Burundi's economy. Since 1998 a careful transition towards peace was initiated by Buyoya, who installed a government with more representatives from the Hutu. In 2001, Nelson Mandela managed to negotiate the establishment of a transitional government, but the main Hutu rebel groups CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL refused to sign the ceasefire and fighting continued. Only towards the end of 2003 an agreement was reached between the government and the CNDD-FDD, and FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza and other FDD members got some ministerial posts. In 2004, the *Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi* (ONUB)⁵² peacekeeping force took over from African Union troops and a new national army was to be formed, incorporating former government soldiers as well as former fighters of the CNDD-FDD. In the first democratic elections since the civil

⁵² ONUB was succeeded in 2007 by the *Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi* (BINUB), which was again succeeded by the *Bureau des Nations Unies au Burundi* (BNUB) in 2011.

war in 2005 the CNDD-FDD won the majority in parliament and Nkurunziza was elected president. Most minister posts came in hands of CNDD-FDD, though FRODEBU and UPRONA also became part of the government. The installation of Nkurunziza implied an end to the transitional period. He also took on a reconciliatory stance towards the FNL, and in the end of 2006, a ceasefire was signed with the government. The truce had to overcome several hurdles, including clashes between rival FNL factions in Bujumbura and raids in the north-west of the country, until end 2008, when a peace agreement was signed. The FNL leadership returned from exile in Tanzania and the movement was transformed into a political party. In January 2009, civil war was officially declared to be ended.

Government, Governance, and Security Challenges

In 2010 five successive elections were held over a period of almost five months, the second democratic elections since the end of the civil war, which included elections for the *communes*, the president, the national assembly, the senate and the *collines*.⁵³ The first round was the communal election, and in May the *Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante* (CENI) announced that the ruling party, the CNDD-FDD had received 64 per cent of the votes, and winning 120 out of the country's 129 communes (IRIN, 2010a; ICG, 2011). The opposition parties, who had been confident of victory, denounced the results and claimed fraud. They formed a coalition movement, the *Alliance Démocratique pour le Changement-Ikibiri* (ADC-Ikibiri), and said they would pull out if CENI would not dismiss and cancel the election outcomes.⁵⁴ Their demands were rejected, they boycotted the elections, and the Presidential elections were won by President Nkurunziza with 91 per cent. The national assembly and the senate were won by the CNDD-FDD with respectively 81 per cent and 94 per cent of the votes (ICG, 2011a: 5-6). Clearly, the course of the 2010

⁵³ Burundi is divided in 17 provinces, which are subdivided into *communes*, headed by an *administrateur*. Each commune is divided in *zones*, headed by *chef de zones* or *conseillers*. The *zones* are divided into *collines*, which consist of roughly three to five hilltops, headed by a *chef de colline*. Those again are divided in *sub-collines* or *cellules*, and *Nyumba Kumi*.

⁵⁴ International observers recognised the elections as free and fair, although these observers generally visited several polling stations and only stayed for short periods of time, making it hard to rule out fraud. There have been irregularities, but as was mentioned by some observers, instead of bringing evidence the opposition parties pulled themselves out of the elections, leaving observers with no other option than recognise the election results. More evidence of fraud has come out since, but the popularity of the ruling party among the large rural population has also been underestimated by both the opposition parties and the international community. During the CNDD-FDD's first five years in power, relative peace had returned to the country (the last armed group laying down its weapons in 2009) and there had been signs of development, such as the reconstruction of roads, schools and health clinics.

elections has not been positive for the democracy in Burundi. The CNDD-FDD regime in Burundi has become more and more authoritarian. During the research in 2010 offices of the ruling party were being constructed throughout the country, all clearly painted with the party logo – the characteristic eagle holding a cassava twig and a machete in its claws – and flying party flags, leaving no doubt about who is in power.

While the ethnic dimensions of the conflict have largely submerged, political tensions remain high and current violence has strong political dimensions, especially since the 2010 elections. Both the governing party CNDD-FDD and the opposition parties have been mobilizing youth and there have been several grenade attacks, shootings and burnings of CNDD-FDD offices, which resulted in counter-attacks and the extrajudicial executions. Several organisations have cautioned for the narrowing of democratic space in Burundi (Human Rights Watch, 2010a; ICG, 2011a), as opposition leaders have been arrested (or fled the country) and opposition members have been killed. Aiming to subdue any appearance of opposition or political unrest, the government ascribed much of the violence to common criminals. Yet, other attacks are attributed to opposition parties, which then serve as legitimisation for the government to crack down on the accused opposition parties. For example, the attack on 18 September on a bar in Gatumba, just outside Bujumbura, that resulted in the death of 39 people⁵⁵ was blamed on the ADC-Ikibiri and Agathon Rwaswa, the president of the FNL⁵⁶. While the ADC-Ikibiri and Rwaswa have denied responsibility, there were reports of the arrest, detention and killing of people affiliated with the opposition by state security officials (UNSG, 2011: 2). The watchdog organisation *Observatoire de l'Action Gouvernementale* (OAG), reported in November 2011 that at least 300 members of opposition parties (mainly FNL) have been killed by security forces or the youth wing of the CNDD-FDD in the second half of that year (IRIN, 2011b). According to observers “the leadership of the *Police Nationale du Burundi* (PNB) is often seen as related to the ruling political party” (Oxfam Novib and ICCO, 2010: 1), and that, “impunity has been particularly striking in cases where the perpetrators are believed to be linked to the security forces or the ruling party” (Human Rights Watch, 2012b). This violence can be characterised as ongoing struggles over authority. There is some pressure exercised by international actors to cease the violence, yet at the same time many international

⁵⁵ Another sources reported that 41 people had been killed (IRIN, 2011a).

⁵⁶ While Agathon Rwaswa is the President of the FNL, the overall commander is “General” Antoine “Shuti” Baranyaka, and Alexis Sinduhije, president of the opposition party *Mouvement pour la Solidarité et la Démocratie* (MSD) is considered to be one of the key political leaders (UNSC, 2011: 46-47).

actors want to keep the political dialogue with the parties to the conflict open and fear to risk the progress of programmes they are implementing.

Also general criminality is high and (armed) robbery and burglary were reported as most common security problems by people on the *collines*. The police was in many cases considered to be incapable of adequately addressing these security problems, due to its limited capacity or its own engagement in criminal behaviour. Another security issue is the proliferation of SALW, which feeds criminality, causes continued fear and distrust – particularly in those communities where violence had strong ethnic dimensions – and the escalation of small fights quickly escalate. It was often joked that a grenade – which seems to be one of Burundi’s favourite weapons – was about the same price as a large bottle of beer.⁵⁷ One striking example of the escalations caused by this availability of weapons was when a grenade had exploded in the market in Bujumbura. First thoughts were that it was related to politics, but it turned out to be an angry young man that wanted to settle a fight with his ex-girlfriend and threw the grenade in her shop. Finally, as in the DRC, land conflicts in Burundi are a tremendous problem. Burundi is one of the most populous countries of Africa⁵⁸ and land is increasingly becoming scarce.⁵⁹ With a large part of the population living in rural areas and predominantly dependent on agriculture for making a living, land conflicts have multiplied exponentially. Also like in the DRC, the reclamation of land by IDPs and refugees which in the meantime has been occupied by others is a problem, but as most serious land disputes are within families, land conflicts are unlikely to be a temporary problem (Van Leeuwen, 2010; CARE et al., 2004: 30-1).

Security Interventions and New Security Forces

In August 2000 the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreements were signed, which required among other conditions: the formation of the new *Forces des Défenses Nationales de Burundi* (FDNB), a police force, and the disarmament and demobilisation of those who were not eligible⁶⁰ to join these new forces. Preparations for the DDR programme started immediately with support of the

⁵⁷ Further research showed that a grenade costs around US\$ 4, the equivalent of four large bottles of beer.

⁵⁸ Burundi has a population density of 297 inhabitants/km² on average (PNUD, 2005)

⁵⁹ Over 80% of rural households have less than 1.5 ha of land (Leisz, 1998: 149; Huggins, 2004: 3; Kamungi et al., 2004: 1), while 15% of the population is landless (Nkurunziza, 2002, in: Jackson, 2003: 8).

⁶⁰ Eligibility was based on vetting standards, such as health condition, age, and in case of *Forces Armées du Burundi* (FAB) soldiers the number of faults made during their career.

World Bank, and came under the umbrella of the MDRP in 2003. The new security forces were to be established according to the principle of 50/50 ethnic representation, which meant the demobilisation of a large part of the FAB to make room for members of the Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs). The Arusha requirements also included the formation of the PNB, which now for 89 per cent consists of former military and paramilitary forces, of which about half are former rebel combatants (CIGI, 2009: 5). The target was to create an army and police force of 25,000 and 15,000 respectively.

In January 2003 the transitional government started with the design of a national DDR plan with support of the World Bank, and in August 2003 the *Commission Nationale de Démobilisation, Réinsertion et Réintégration* (CNDRR) was established. This national commission was responsible for the overall programme coordination and implementation, and would be monitored by the Joint Cease-fire Commission (JCC)⁶¹ and supported by the *Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi* (BINUB), the World Bank and the AU. The first DDR process was undertaken from 2004 to 2008 and was to demobilise a total of about 78,000 ex-combatants. This number consisted of 41,000 effectives from the Burundian Armed Forces and 15,500 combatants from different APPMs (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2008: 4). The FNL (although included in the abovementioned numbers) remained the only party in conflict with the government and did not participate in this programme. When the programme closed in December 2008, 23,022 adults were demobilised, all of which received reinsertion support and 21,966 received reintegration support. A group of 18,709 *Gardiens de la Paix*⁶² and little under 10,000 *combatants militants*⁶³ received reinsertion support called "*allocations de reconnaissance de service.*"⁶⁴

A second DDR programme started in 2009 and focused on the combatants of the FNL. This programme also included a small number of ex-combatants from the previous programme, and was to be completed in 2011. From the FNL 2,100 combatants were to be reintegrated into the army, 1,400 into the police, and 5,000 were to enter the national DRR programme under the same definitions of who was

⁶¹ The JCC included members of the transitional government, the AU and the UN, and operational activities were undertaken by the AU mission in Burundi.

⁶² The *Gardien de la Paix* were civilians who were armed by the government and organised as paramilitary groups to support the FAB.

⁶³ The *combatants militants* were similar to the *Gardien de la Paix*, but then supported the CNDD-FDD.

⁶⁴ During the reintegration programme, ex-combatants received some training during demobilisation and a reinsertion package when they left the demobilisation site. Within the community ex-combatants could opt for one of five different forms of reintegration support, including education, vocational training and entrepreneurial support. Reintegration in Burundi will be discussed in further detail in chapter 6.

considered a combatant as in the previous programme. Yet, a special category of *Adultes Associés* was created to deal with the large number of people associated with the FNL who had not been combatants. Compared to other armed groups in Burundi the FNL used more guerrilla tactics and support of civilians. These civilians often did not partake in direct combat, but supported with transport, food, housing, etc. The creation of this special group created some confusion and the idea among some FNL ex-combatants that they have received less support than others.⁶⁵

The first civilian disarmament efforts were undertaken by the transitional government and ONUB in 2005, which led to the formation of the *Commission de Désarmement Civil et de lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes légères* (CDCPA). The disarmament campaign organised by the CDCPA provided incentives for weapons to be handed in, such as pieces of cloth and bags of cement. The programme was undertaken during a 2 month amnesty period, as the possession of SALW by civilians is officially restricted by law. Government officials have made statements that about 80% of small weapons have been collected, quoting a report of the Small Arms Survey that estimated that there were about 100,000 SALW in civilian hands in Burundi.⁶⁶ Yet, various civil society organisations refute these claims. They point out, for instance, that it is very unclear how the government has arrived at its figure of 80,000 collected weapons. Some claim the number included discovered caches, unregistered weapons of the police, collected worn out arms of the police and army, and military uniforms and equipment. One source stated that most weapons were collected in the capital itself rather than in the interior.⁶⁷ Others point out that the number of 100,000 SALW was unrealistic in the first place, and that a more realistic estimate is 200-300,000 arms in civilian hands.⁶⁸ Community members in all provinces confirm the continued presence of arms in their communities. Examples abound of gunshots and grenade explosions been heard, armed robberies that have taken place, and many people believe the different political factions have arms stockpiles hidden.

South Sudan

In 1954 an agreement was signed that provided for self-determination and self-governance for Sudan on 1 January 1956 after more than fifty-five years of

⁶⁵ Interview, UN Official, SSR/SA Unit, Bujumbura, Burundi, 31 May 2010

⁶⁶ It should be noted, however, that the report suggests “that nearly 100,000 households have at least one weapon” (Pézard and Florquin, 2007: 16). No statement of a *total number* of 100,000 SALW in the hands of civilians is made in the report.

⁶⁷ Interview, Representative Burundian research institute, Bujumbura, Burundi, 20 April 2010

⁶⁸ Interview, Embassy official, Bujumbura, Burundi, 13 April 2010

colonisation by the British. The British had ruled Sudan divided in an Arab North and African South until 1946, when it decided to reverse this policy and unite the country. Nevertheless deep disparities remained, and the marginalisation in the economic development process and exclusion from power structures are the roots of the clashes between the Arab-run state and the peripheries of Sudan (Jok, 2007: 115). When the government in Khartoum renounced promises to establish a federal system in 1955, a number of Southern army officers mutinied in Torit in Eastern Equatoria. Several groups emerged and gradually developed in the *Anya Nya* movement that spread from the Equatorias to Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal. The war lasted seventeen years until the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which provided some autonomy for the South in exchange for the rebels laying down their arms.

Dissatisfaction in the south persisted and increased autonomy of the South was again limited. In response to the abolition of the federal structure a rebel movement was formed in 1978 known as *Anya Nya II*, and started attacks from Ethiopia from 1980 onwards. Then in 1983 Colonel Gafaar Nimeiry, who had taken power in Khartoum through a coup d'état in 1969, instituted the sharia Islamic law in the whole country, including the South. This proved to be the final drop for the predominantly Christian South, which felt more and more oppressed by the predominantly Islamic North. After mutiny of a group of Southern soldiers in Bor and Pibor, John Garang was sent to deal with the problem, but he joined the *Anya Nya II* movement and formed the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), marking the beginning of the second Sudanese civil war.

In Khartoum a coup d'état in 1985 and various changes of government followed until in 1989 Omar Hassan al-Bashir took power. Exploiting the tensions between Southern groups, Al-Bashir used various proxy forces to fight within and against the South. Further complicating the conflict was the discovery of large oil reserves in the South in the late 1970s. Production was predominantly controlled by the north and formed an extra motivation for continuation of the conflict on both sides. Oil production was used to finance the conflict, oil fields became strategic targets, oil related development such as roads eased military movements, and foreign interests in oil not necessarily aligned with the promotion of peace (cf. Switzer, 2002: ECOS, 2010).

The SPLA claimed to fight for John Garang's vision of a federal Sudan with equal rights for all citizens. This, however, was criticised by some as an attempt to bring

the south under SPLA – that is, Dinka⁶⁹ – control. SPLA-commanders Riek Machar (Nuer⁷⁰), Lam Akol (Shilluk) and Gordon Kong (Nuer) attempted a coup against Garang in 1991. Whereas Garang advocated for a united secular and democratic ‘New Sudan’, Machar advocated a politically independent South Sudan. Machar broke away with the SPLA-Nasir faction after the failed coup, and his Nuer militia attacked the Bor Dinka in Garang’s home territory in 1991. More than 100,000 people (almost all civilians) were estimated to be killed in this attack and the victorious Nuer looted and took cattle with them back North. This is one of the most raw and still persistent wounds in the South (and in Jonglei in particular) and still affects the relations between Dinka and Nuer today (Young, 2007a: 3).⁷¹

Machar signed the ‘April 1997 Peace Agreement’ with Al-Bashir, through which seven armed groups⁷² used by Khartoum as proxy were symbolically combined into the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF). The alliance between Khartoum and the SSDF was maintained by providing resources, cash payouts to senior commanders, playing the ‘ethnic card’ and drawing upon popular prejudices against John Garang and the Dinka ethnic group as the SSDF was primarily Nuer (Small Arms Survey, 2006: 3). Within the SSDF Machar, unable to push for a referendum on southern self-determination in exchange for his cooperation against the SPLA, became frustrated and ended his alliance with Khartoum in 2000 and re-joined the SPLA shortly thereafter, while Paulino Matieb took control over the SSDF. Garang never entered full negotiations with the SSDF and always tried to lure individual commanders to defect, only to marginalise these defectors afterwards (Young, 2005, p. 88).

⁶⁹ The Dinka are the largest group in South Sudan, inhabiting Bahr el Ghazal and the Greater Upper Nile region (i.e. Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity). They are mainly agro-pastoralist with cattle having significant cultural value, and are divided in tribes. For more on the Dinka, cf. Deng (1972).

⁷⁰ The Nuer are the second largest ethnic group in South Sudan, primarily pastoralist, and consist of a number of tribes. Apart from South Sudan, they also reside in western Ethiopia. For more on the Nuer, cf. Evans-Pritchard (1940; 1951; 1956) and Hutchinson (1996).

⁷¹ In August 2011 Riek Machar apologised and said that he “was responsible for both the good things and the bad things that came as a result of the Nasir Declaration” (Machar, quoted in Sudan Tribune 2011c). The reactions of both Nuer and Dinka communities to his apology have been split.

⁷² The signatories of the Khartoum Peace Agreement were the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (Riek Machar); the SPLM/A faction led by Kerubino Kwanyn Bol; the South Sudan Independents Group (Kawac Makwei); the Equatoria Defence Forces (Thiopholus Ochang Loti); the Union of Sudanese African Parties (Samuel Aru Bol); and the Bor Group (Arok Thon Arok) (Mc Evoy & LeBrun, 2010: 39).

Type of Settlement

As in Burundi, the conflict in Sudan was rooted in economic and political marginalisation. However, while political grievances were a main instigating factor economic motivations contributed to the continuation of the conflict. The conflict also led to polarisation between various groups within the South, as 'traditional' conflicts between the various pastoralist groups were played out by the North, using Southern proxies to fight against and divide the SPLA. As will become clear below, this not only hampered settlement of the conflict, but also had major consequences for the current security providers and security issues in South Sudan.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in Nairobi on 9 January 2005 with much international pressure, formally ending war between the North and the South. The CPA started a six year interim period which contained the possibility for an independent South through a referendum in 2011. During the 6 year period the South gained a large degree of autonomy and the country was ruled by a Government of National Unity consisting of the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS). The referendum started on 9 January 2011, and the official results released on 8 February showed that 98.83 per cent voted for independence (SSRC & SSRB, 2011) and on 9 June 2011 South Sudan became the world's 194th independent country. However, the South remains deeply divided, and also tensions with the North remain high.

Government, Governance, and Security Challenges

South Sudan has only recently become an independent country, and some progress has been made with regard to the building of state institutions and the provision of services to its citizens. However, less positive developments have occurred as well, including the restricting of the media, the centralisation of power in the office of the president, and the use of violence to oppress conflict and opposition. Human Rights Watch documented several cases where security forces intimidated, arbitrarily arrested, detained, physically assaulted, and tortured political party members opposed to the SPLM during the nomination, campaign, and election period from January to April 2010. (Human Rights Watch, 2010b: 16). "The SPLM shows understandable pride in celebrating the victory of independence," yet this has also resulted in a tendency to exclude other voices and opinions from the political debate (Aegis Trust, et al. 2011: 15). The International Crisis Group (ICG) found the SPLM to be reluctant to agree to power-sharing formulas, "and most of its senior officials - harbouring a 'winner-takes-all' mentality - indicate no intention of giving up high-profile ministries" (ICG, 2011b: 8). The SPLM dominates the institutions of

government to the extent that it becomes almost impossible to distinguish between the GoSS and the SPLM. In this context, any opposition against the SPLM is then also quickly considered to be opposing the GoSS. And with “far more [experience] in military administration than civilian government, the SPLM/A sometimes falls back on what it knows best, particularly in times of crisis” (ibid. 5). Although talking specifically about bordering South Kordofan in Sudan, the argument made by Rottenburg and his colleagues about the nature of politics in Sudan holds for South Sudan as well. They describe how violence and destruction became an established part of politics because – with almost continuous conflict for five decades – all dominant political players operated mainly military. The perpetuation of constant polarisation – or war logic – prevented the development of plural voices, and “the hard lines of identity drawn by violence and war were forcibly maintained” (Rottenburg, et al. 2011: 31).

This perpetuation of ‘war politics’ is also caused by the fact that tensions between the North and the South remained high with regular occurrences of violence between the SPLA and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) along the border region. Also within the newly independent South Sudan groups regularly clash amongst each other. As mentioned, the SPLA had split during the conflict, with some factions from Eastern Equatoria State and the Greater Upper Nile region⁷³ being gathered under the SSDF, to later again be moulded back into the SPLA in bits and pieces. After the referendum for independence, different SPLA commanders have defected and taken up arms against the SPLA, challenging GoSS capacity to manage conflict and prompting a military response. Although often motivated to negotiate a favourable position in the SPLM/A, these splits also display “a web of deep-rooted ethnic tensions and competing political objectives that exacerbate hostilities and draw in local communities” (ICG, 2011b: 4). These ethnic tensions have become painfully clear during conflicts in Jonglei (cf. Hsiao et al. 2012), but are also apparent in other states such as Eastern Equatoria and Upper Nile (IRIN, 2011c). These clashes also illustrate the continuing struggles over authority between different power holders and ethnic groups in South Sudan.

Another important factor contributing to these ethnic tensions are cattle raids between the various pastoralist communities. Cattle are very significant for the pastoralist communities in South Sudan. With many regions where agriculture is difficult, cattle keeping has become an important form of livelihood. And as many pastoralists depend on their cattle for survival, their cattle represent much more than merely their economic value. “Cows play a central role in the culture of people

⁷³ The Greater Upper Nile region consists of the present states of Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity.

here. Peoples' settlements and marriages are all done in cows and cows have become equated with life. The life of a cow has even become more important than the lives of people."⁷⁴ Pastoralists name themselves after their biggest bull, sing songs about him, and their cattle are part of his family. To marry a young man must pay dowry to his bride's family, which can be anywhere between 25 and 200 heads of cattle.⁷⁵ For many young Sudanese man cattle raiding is therefore the only option to acquire sufficient cattle to get married. As one young man explained: "if I succeed I will marry and eat the rest and if I fail I die."⁷⁶ During such raids people are often killed, because then, "they don't follow them after they raided the cattle."⁷⁷ The importance of cattle (and *your own* cattle in particular) and the killing that accompanies raids cause revenge attacks back and forth. Participating in raids is for young man also a way to prove their manhood. These cultural components of cattle raiding – besides the lack of economical alternatives and at times thrill seeking behaviour of adolescents – are firmly ingrained in Southern Sudanese society.⁷⁸

The tit-for-tat clashes between ethnic groups raiding each other's cattle are an old practice, but have taken on new dimensions during the past decades of civil war and the use of tribal groups as proxies in the conflict. Political and military strongmen also used the conflict to raid cattle from opposing groups, and pastoralists have learned military tactics, acquired satellite telephones for coordination and traded their spears for heavy automatic weapons. Both NGOs and the GoSS at times aim to use traditional non-state structures to bring peace between warring communities, but many of these agreements do not hold (cf. Schomerus and Allen, 2010: 78). With much of the traditional structures of social control deteriorated during the war and by the influx of weapons, large groups of youth no longer answer to their parents or the local chief. The involvement of politicians and security personnel makes the conflict also more intractable and more difficult to address (Kimani, 2010), and there have been reports of international trade networks of stolen cattle (cf. Mkutu, 2003: 15-16; Walraet, 2008; Leff, 2009: 193). One of the most violent of such clashes took place in Jonglei State between Nuer and Murle pastoralists. During several attacks and revenge attacks from early 2011 to early 2012, over 1,000 people were killed, hundreds of children were abducted, several thousands of heads of cattle were raided, and an estimated 120,000 people were

⁷⁴ Interview, GoSS Jonglei State Representative, Bor, Jonglei, South Sudan, 23 March 2011

⁷⁵ Feedback discussion Juba, South Sudan, 27 April 2011

⁷⁶ Group discussion, Youth, Torit, EES, South Sudan, 16 April 2011

⁷⁷ Interview, GoSS Jonglei State Representative, Bor, Jonglei, South Sudan, 21 March 2011

⁷⁸ For more on pastoralism, cf. Salih, Dietz and Ahmed (2001), Mkutu (2003; 2004; 2008), Homewood (2008), and McPeak, Little and Doss (2011).

displaced. One of the attacks was reported to be committed by 8,000 men from the White Army⁷⁹ militia (Sudan Tribune, 2012; UNMISS, 2012).

Security Interventions and New Security Forces

The CPA laid the basis for DDR in Sudan, explicitly calling for the “proportional downsizing of forces on both sides” (GoS & SPLA/M, 2005: VI, 1c). From the onset of the DDR programme in South Sudan, the focus has been the so-called Special Needs Groups (SNGs)⁸⁰. This has been the primary focus for the first phase of the programme for a number of reasons. Child soldiers were quickly disbanded and handed over to UNICEF, as the SPLA was eager to become a professional army and preserve its good standing with western donors. Also the Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (WAAFGs) entered the first phase of the programme. Lessons learned from other DDR programmes on the continent had shown the need for specific support for women, including those who did not fight but who had been cooks, nurses, transporting equipment, and/or involved as ‘bush-wives.’ As noted by the Small Arms Survey (2011: 7), the SPLA has rejected the term WAAFG as a donor term with the offensive implication they treated their female colleagues as bush wives or sex slaves. They nonetheless eagerly made use of donors’ desires to support WAAFGs and there are numerous doubts concerning the combatant status or eligibility of many WAAFG in the DDR programme.⁸¹ The disarmament and selection of DDR candidates in South Sudan is the responsibility of the SPLA as the CPA explicitly states that the national institutions are primarily responsible for the DDR programme, and that the UN and international actors are to fulfil a supporting role. As such, the UN’s involvement in verification was limited to checking an ex-combatant’s ID with the names on the list provided by the SPLA. Examining closer, some observers found that many ex-combatants currently involved in the DDR programme, had in fact not been combatants. It was mentioned that many in the programme were not physically fit to run 200 meters and had never held a

⁷⁹ The white army is not a single army, but rather a collection of armed groups of youth which were formed for the protection of cattle, and occasionally raided cattle themselves. Initially the power over the armed groups was in the hands of the traditional authorities in the community, but over time it passed from the chiefs to the white army youth. Later on some white army factions became part of the SSDF. A more complete historical account of the development of the white army can be found in Young (2007b).

⁸⁰ The SNGs consisted of child soldiers; elderly personnel; the war wounded and disabled; and women associated with armed forces and groups.

⁸¹ Interview, UNDP, Bor, Jonglei, South Sudan, 24 March 2011; Interview, DDR expert, Juba, South Sudan, 17 March 2011

weapon,⁸² that a great number had joined only after the peace agreement was signed in 2005, and that strangely enough a lot of ex-combatants had received the exact same discharge certificates by the SPLA stating they had handed in an AK-47 with exactly 30 rounds.⁸³

On the other hand, a large number of combatants did indeed join the SPLA after the Juba Declaration of 2006. It is no secret that many rebel groups boosted their numbers with civilians to increase their position in the negotiations. It is therefore understandable that the SPLA, aiming to professionalise the army, has been demobilizing these elements from its ranks first. This would explain at least part of the ex-combatants that joined after 2005 and the alleged 'civilians' in the DDR programme. Yet, it is clear that a part of those participating in the DDR programme are not eligible according to the programme criteria. One UN official involved in the programme claimed that, "cousins, aunts and even second and third wives were invited into the programme."⁸⁴

In 2006 the SPLA has started paying its soldiers a salary, making a job in the SPLA a desirable position in a post-conflict country with high unemployment rates. Soldiers are therefore hesitant to leave the SPLA and opt for demobilisation through a DDR programme. Arguably, the "SPLA does not regard the current DDR programme as worthy of its real fighters and heroes" (Small Arms Survey, 2011c: 4). Furthermore, until the referendum for independence in 2011 the SPLA had little interest to demobilise its troops. It is also likely that the SPLA leadership does not demobilise particular elements from its ranks out of fear that dissatisfied troops will defect and pose a threat. At the same time, DDR in South Sudan increasingly has become seen to be a sort of pension scheme or welfare plan, but one that is perceived to be insufficient to motivate the stronger elements of the SPLA to demobilise. After fighting for up to 20 years in the bush, in many cases by conscription, without having received any salaries, many combatants feel they are entitled to a salary or reward. DDR is often perceived to be a reward, and is sometimes mistakenly assumed to be a benefit on top of regular salaries. Furthermore, rumours are circulating that the SPLA will start paying out pensions, something that was even fed by the SPLA commanders in order to persuade their rank and file to demobilise.⁸⁵ Although this practice has stopped, it was motivated by the SPLA's

⁸² Interview, UNDP, Bor, Jonglei, South Sudan, 24 March 2011

⁸³ Interview, DDR expert, Juba, South Sudan, 17 March 2011

⁸⁴ Interview, UNDP, Bor, Jonglei, South Sudan, 24 March 2011

⁸⁵ Interview, Representative WES SSDDRC office, Yambio, WES, South Sudan, 7 April 2011; Interview, Representative SSDDRC, Juba, South Sudan, 12 April 2011; Group Discussion, Representatives EES SSDDRC office, Torit, EES, South Sudan, 14 April 2011

desire to professionalise the army, improve its operational effectiveness, and at the same time limit expenditures.^{86,87}

Civilian disarmament, however, was much more of interest of the GoSS, and the first civilian disarmament campaign after the signing of the CPA took place in Jonglei between December 2005 and May 2006. After Lou and Gawaar Nuer pastoralists asked for permission to let their cattle graze in Duk County, the (predominantly Dinka) State authorities requested the Nuer to surrender their weapons (Small Arms Survey, 2007b: 3; Young, 2007a: 3-4). The Nuer were hesitant to give up their arms, fearing to be left defenceless, and during clashes with the SPLA the Nuer White Army suffered great losses and retreated towards the north, looting from civilians. The pursuing SPLA, employed in the disarmament campaign, did not receive regular food supplies and took cattle and supplies from the local population. During the campaign an estimated 3,300 weapons were collected, and an estimated 1,200 White Army soldiers, 400 SPLA soldiers, and 213 civilians were killed (Young, 2007a: 2-6; Small Arms Survey, 2007b: 4). In response to this violent campaign, a small UN contingent worked with local government and SPLA administrations to develop a voluntarily disarmament campaign in Akobo and Pibor in 2006 and 2007, during which more than 2,500 weapons were collected without casualties. In an attempt to deal with the problem of SALW in civilian hands in a more constructive manner, the UNDP initiated its Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) programme, and a GoSS CSAC Bureau was established in 2006. The CSAC bureau is tasked to oversee community security issues and arms control in South Sudan, and to interact with international counterparts on the implementation of the Nairobi protocol, the UN Plan of Action on SALW, etc.⁸⁸ However, when the SPLA considered it to be necessary, violence or the threat of violence was still used. Again, this example of the predominantly Dinka state authorities disarming a group of predominantly Nuer can be seen as part of a struggle for power between these two groups. International actors have aimed to mitigate the government's disarmament campaigns by the development of the CSAC programme, but cannot deter the SPLA from using force to achieve its goals when it wants to.

The SPLA is the dominant state security actor, but is far from a unitary actor and a number of generals have already defected to fight the SPLA, taking a number of soldiers with them, often to later return after having negotiated a higher position.

⁸⁶ In 2010 ninety per cent of the SPLA budget was spent on salaries (Nichols, 2010: 14)

⁸⁷ Interestingly, while in the process of demobilisation, in April 2011 the governor of Unity State gave the order to recruit 6.000 men for the SPLA (Sudan Tribune, 2011a).

⁸⁸ Interview, Representative CSAC Bureau, Juba, South Sudan, 17 March 2011

As a result, the SPLA is reported to have over 200 generals.⁸⁹ Illiteracy rates are extremely high, with ninety per cent of the ranks and seventy per cent of the officers not able to read or write (Rands, 2010: 25). The state judiciary is barely functioning and the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) is undertrained and under-deployed. The majority of the police officers are recruits from the SPLA, vetting remains very limited, and again an estimated ninety per cent of the police force is illiterate (Lokuji, Abatneh, and Wani, 2009). And while young recruits are being trained, their functioning and motivation is hindered by the lack of interest in security provision of many of their commanding officers.⁹⁰ Another important issue is that the current division of labour between the different state actors – such as for example governors, minister of internal affairs, police and SPLA – on security issues is unclear, although steps are currently undertaken to address this.⁹¹

Discussion: From Drawing Board to Practice

Having looked at the backgrounds of the cases, the focus now shifts to a discussion of the arena of interaction between the intervening international actors and the actors at the state level. In particular, it is investigated how the development of the conflicts and the settlements affected the political opportunities and limitations for both international actors and actors at the national and sub-national level. The security interventions depart from the settlements between the conflicting parties, and are heavily invested upon with the aim to promote peace and stability. However, instead of technical programmes in neutral zones, these programmes become stakes in the ongoing struggles between power holders that continue to strive to maintain or improve their position. While the programmes of interventions aim to mitigate these struggles, at the same time they can provide power holders with opportunities.

The three countries described above all have their own particular characteristics, and it is therefore unsurprising that the security interventions in these cases have been affected by these differences in context. In Eastern DRC, the conflict was characterised by predatory behaviour, and also in the post-settlement context the control over land and resources continues to be a major factor in the political-economic context. Control of the East by the state government – i.e. Kabila's government in Kinshasa – is weak. The DRC is sometimes described as an 'archipelago state' in which the government attempts only to control key locations

⁸⁹ Interview, UNDP, Bor, Jonglei, South Sudan, 24 March 2011

⁹⁰ Group discussion, Women, Torit, EES, South Sudan, 16 April 2011

⁹¹ Interview, UNMIS, Juba, South Sudan, 29 March 2011

(Callaghy, 2001: 109). Unable to control the East, Kabila made a deal with the CNDP which in return for electoral support and ceasing its previous ambitions to conquer the whole country is allowed to maintain control in the Kivus. With several armed groups still present and high levels of insecurity and few economic opportunities, the environment is highly unfavourable for the reintegration of ex-combatants. With the relatively little reintegration support given to ex-combatants – especially outside larger cities that INGOs can easily access – it is therefore unsurprising that there were high levels of ‘revolving-door’ ex-combatants who went back into the bush after a DDR programme was finished.⁹²

In Burundi, the conflict was much more political of nature. When the peace agreement was signed, the armed groups were integrated into the new armed forces and the government, giving them a share of political control. Many combatants joined because they believed in the political ideals, wanted to fight marginalisation, or simply because the war had reached their village and they had to choose to either fight or flee. The peace agreement therefore signalled for many that their goals had been reached, and the majority of the ex-combatants demobilised voluntarily. From the peace agreements of 2000 onwards there have been continuous efforts to disarm non-state actors and to support former combatants in the reintegration in civilian life. With the FNL initially still in the bush, the CNDD-FDD was able to gain strong control over the government in the first elections since the war. This created new political divisions within the country, and increased fear and distrust among the opposition groups. The police consist largely of former militia members, and are highly incapable of adequate security provision. As a result, many people remained with their weapons. And with many ex-combatants having problems getting a stable income, they were easy targets for political entrepreneurs looking to fill their ranks.

In South Sudan, the conflict ignited due to political inequalities, yet economic motives became a strong instigating factor as the conflict proceeded. Not only was control of oil-rich regions desired by both the North and the South. But also cattle raiding was an important factor for young men to join a militia – simply to acquire a firearm, or as battalions could raid cattle along the way. During the 6 year interim period after the CPA the future status of South Sudan’s independence remained unclear. And with ongoing conflicts within its borders, and high levels of distrust towards the north, the SPLA had little interest in demobilizing its stronger ranks. DDR is in theory a tool to deal with the potential threat of young armed combatants

⁹² The following chapter will discuss the DDR programmes in closer detail, including the issue of ‘revolving-door’ ex-combatants.

after a conflict, and policy-makers stress the importance of DDR based on this argument. However, in South Sudan the programme has been morphed by the GoSS and SPLA into a one that helps to remove the weaker elements and modernise the army, and perhaps support some of its families. As one analyst explained, “a large part of those sent into DDR are those who are seen as dead wood within the SPLA.”⁹³

The settlements reached in all three cases – all with pressure and support of the ‘international community’ – required a form of power-sharing. During the conflict there were multiple opposing power holders controlling means of violence. In the line of the ideal state as an organisation that holds the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, the different power holders were to be brought within the institutions of the state in order to both neutralise their opposition against the state and bring the means of violence under control of the state. To settle the conflict, therefore, all groups were offered a piece of the cake, and were to be integrated in the new security forces. With an already bloated army and police force, in South Sudan former rebels are being placed in the wildlife protection and the fire department. As a result, the firemen walk around with automatic rifles and have more capacity to create fire rather than to put it out. Various benefits are used as carrots in the negotiation of settlements in exchange for rebel leaders to lay down their arms, such as the promise of high ranking positions within the government or army with a matching salary or an implicit license to extort taxes, and reintegration benefits for rank and file. These incentives, however, also have led to splits in armed groups, defecting commanders from state armed forces and the formation of new armed groups trying to negotiate their own settlement. At the individual level, a large number of ex-combatants are believed to have recycled through various DDR programmes, rejoining militias after the benefits in a DDR programme dried up.

A further consequence of bringing different parties to the conflict into the new security forces is that these become highly divided, as is clearly the case with the FARDC in the DRC and the SPLA in South Sudan. Indeed, the cleavages within these security forces have been a result of the conflict and the settlements have been attempts to dissolve these splits. Yet, the effect has been the opposite, in that the conflict has now been brought *within* the new security forces that are considered responsible for the provision of security and the prevention of conflict. In the DRC, a process of *brassage et recyclage* (‘mixing and recycling’) was envisaged in order to break the chains of command of the different groups that were to be integrated and to build the new Congolese security forces. Former rebel groups were to be

⁹³ Interview, DDR expert, Juba, South Sudan, 17 March 2011

dissolved, with the individual members mixed to form new battalions within the national army. As this process was considered vital for the promotion of stability in the region, SSR “increasingly became the centrepiece of the reconstruction efforts of the international community” (Hoebeke, et al. 2008: 4). However, the immense reforms that are required are difficult to push through in practice. From the outset SSR support confronted major coordination and coherence issues. And despite the agreement on the urgency of SSR in the DRC, and on the fact that such reforms would require long-term and active involvement, donor engagement has remained limited. At the same time the proposed reforms were considered over-ambitious with regard to the institutional capacity of, in this case, the DRC (Derks and Price, 2011: 7). As a result, the process failed and FARDC remained highly divided, with the major actors within the integrated armed groups maintained direct or indirect control over their factions.⁹⁴ The influence of informal networks in the security sector remains very strong, and they tend to favour the President as well as other powerful actors, rather than the security of the general public (Nlandu, 2012: 33-34). There also seems to be a presupposition with SSR interventions that the proposed reforms are indeed desired by those in power (Sedra, 2010: 17). And as SSR often implies a rebalancing of power this is arguably often not the case. As a result, the ‘state security forces’ are rather a façade for a collective of armed groups with their own private interests. The same could be said for the armed forces of South Sudan, and the SPLA command estimated it only controls about thirty per cent of its troops (Mc Evoy & LeBrun, 2010: 30-31). Consequently, there is sometimes a reluctance to send in state security forces to tackle a conflict within South Sudan out of fears that different elements within the army take different sides in the conflict, leading to further cleavages and potentially conflict within the security forces. In Burundi, a small country that is relatively easily accessible and with a history of a strong army, there have been fewer problems to control the armed forces, yet control has been taken over by the winning party that uses it to deal with its opposition. The settlements thus brought the cleavages of the conflict within the new security forces to ‘get peace’, which severely hinders the capacity these new security actors to provide both human security as well as state security. The security sector in a post-settlement context is therefore the result of a deal, but this new situation is not considered a final one by the different local power holders involved. Struggles over authority and the control of violent means continue. Looking at this arena of

⁹⁴ For instance, in 2011 the UN Group of Experts on the DRC found that 36 per cent of the command positions in North Kivu are ex-CNDP, and of the 48 per cent of government officers that were appointed to command positions, at least 60 per cent is ex-RCD. This means that the majority of the command positions in North Kivu are now held by former CNDP and RCD (both supported by Rwanda), which has prompted an outrage amongst the former PARECO (predominantly Hutu) within the FARDC (UNSC, 2011: 82).

interaction shows how international actors relate to state level actors involved in such struggles.

Donors do realise they are intervening in an arena where political struggles continue. But donors do not always control the ways in which their programmes and policies become stakes in these political struggles. Of course, there is no free and unlimited choice of actors that the international community can work with towards more sustainable peace and security. There are simply powerful actors whose position needs to a certain extent be acknowledged. Yet, there is often both a reluctance and incapability on the side of donors and agencies that design, implement and support security interventions to pressure powerful actors and push for the state ideals that underlie interventions. One of the limitations is the difficult balance between the desire to push for reforms and ownership of the post-settlement process by the national government discussed in chapter 3. This ownership is strived for because of the recognition that cooperation of the national government is required – and it therefore needs to perceive the reform as *their* reform – but also to prevent perceptions of neo-colonialism and as an exit-strategy. In South Sudan, the SPLM dominance has therefore often been accepted as a necessary condition for keeping the peace. Yet, as warned by an opposition leader, this is not without risks: “The international community has been nourishing a greedy boy; once that boy becomes strong, he will be difficult to change” (quoted in: ICG, 2010b: 2). Moreover, in the case of South Sudan the DDR programme was a CPA requirement, which made donors more hesitant to pull out when the programme showed serious shortcomings, fearing they would jeopardise the one practical implementation of the CPA and get in discredit with other donors.⁹⁵ In fact, a donor like the Netherlands was not only supporting the DDR programme but was also a signatory to the CPA itself and thus obligated to the CPA requirements. Also in the DRC the power holders at state level were able to resist and adapt donor programmes in pursuit of their own goals. The *brassage et recyclage* process envisaged by the DDR and SSR interventions has been a failure due to the lack of political will and power on the side of the Congolese army. One result was that former command structures and control of regions under former rebel commanders could stay intact. Whereas the goals of the security interventions were to support the creation of a state security force with the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, the CNDP has created a strong parallel structure of governance within the DRC. The result, therefore, is not an ideal-type state, but the rather hybrid forms of governance as described in chapter 2 that these interventions aim to counter. An embarrassing fact is also that the former commander of the CNDP, Bosco Ntaganda,

⁹⁵ Interview, DDR expert, Juba, South Sudan, 17 March 2011

became general in the FARDC, despite being wanted by the ICC. Furthermore, when MONUSCO was supporting the FARDC with operation 'Amani Leo' against a number of remaining rebel groups, Ntaganda told Reuters he was coordinating this operation - i.e. claiming the UN was supporting an operation under the command of a UN indictee (Manson, 2010). Although this was denied by the UN and official comments by the Congolese government, Human Rights Watch found confirmation from "internal army meeting notes, signed military orders, and confirmation from other army officers that Ntaganda gives them orders" (Human Rights Watch, 2010). This has subsequently been acknowledged by the UN group of experts on the DRC (UNSC, 2011: 82).

A further constraint for the effectiveness of security interventions is the fact that the international community is not a unitary actor. It consists of numerous donors and organisations, each with their own motivations to get involved and their own interpretations of how to be involved in the most effective way. Many may have altruistic intentions for participating in security interventions. Other motivations include the promotion of stability in politically, economically, and/or military strategic regions, or even control thereof. As one Burundian scholar commented in a jest on post-colonial involvement of western countries, "when the white men left, they left through the door and came back through the window."⁹⁶ For instance, the decision of U.S. President Obama to support the operations against the LRA in central Africa will in part be motivated by the outrage among Americans about Lord's Resistance Army's (LRA) atrocities (BBC News, 2011; LaFranchi, 2011). However, it will also be motivated by U.S. interests in the region and to foster relations with Uganda as a key ally. And it is exactly these interests donors have that allow the governments of 'fragile states' to play out donors against each other. Donors want to keep a foot on the ground and therefore settle for the reforms that governments can agree with. The more diverging interests different donors have the more this hampers the pursuit of a common intervention agenda, and the more this enables power holders and elites to pursue agendas of their own.

While at times being opposed and limited by local power holders, international actors are at the same time also limited to achieve the desired reforms by their own time constraints. This again empowers state level elites vis-à-vis international actors in this arena of interaction. While this is certainly not generalisable for all international actors, many donors are pressured to bring quick results, which may lead to setting low and easily attainable benchmarks of programmes that aim to affect large and complex processes. "[... D]onor states tend to lack the necessary

⁹⁶ Interview, local expert, Bujumbura, Burundi, 21 May 2009

political wherewithal, institutional frameworks, and long-term outlook to undertake the type of transformative agenda entailed [... by security interventions]" (Sedra, 2010: 17). As described in chapter 1, security interventions are part of the post-conflict development industry. It showed also how the discourse on what constitutes a legitimate intervention changed. First an intervention was merely keeping the peace by standing between two parties that came to an agreement. This evolved to the legitimisation of pro-active AVR programming that can also be undertaken in countries without any (recent) war, but where the intervening actors consider the threat to citizens to be significant. This is not to deny that this threat cannot be significant, nor to deny that external intervention can help promote human security. But it illustrates how this legitimisation evolved, widening the scope of what *external* interventions are considered to be legitimate. In other words, the market in which the international development industry is operating has broadened. But businesses need to show output as well. Results are necessary to show constituencies within the donor country that the money is well spent. As western donors are democracies, this means that parliament must approve of government spending and results shown within the time a government is in power are favoured. And as most members of parliament have are not specialised in international interventions and the context in which these interventions operate, results are preferably quantified in easily comparable numbers, pie-charts and bar-charts. The progress of MDRP programme was measured by the number of ex-combatants that passed through the different phases of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, in comparison to a set target (MDRP, 2009a).⁹⁷ The progress of SSR is often measured by the number of barracks that have been built, the number police, soldiers and judges that have been trained, and the amount of equipment donated. All this, however, does not measure the extent to which these programmes contribute to the human security of the population in the countries of intervention, as several people on the ground complained about in interviews.⁹⁸ This approach to SSR is what Sedra refers to as the 'train-and-equip' approach, and may have been more prominent in my cases because of their complexity:

This approach most often comes to the fore in the most difficult reform cases, where insecurity and political instability is acute. Under such pressure donors tend to do two things: instrumentalise SSR to address immediate

⁹⁷ In South Sudan the target for January 2011 was simply reduced from 45.000 to 35.000 when in May 2010 only 4.700 ex-combatants had been demobilised (Rands, 2010: 42; PwC, 2010).

⁹⁸ Group discussion, Community member, Luvangire, Ituri, DRC, 19 October 2009; Interview, representative Burundian research institute, Bujumbura, Burundi, 20 May 2010; Interview, Security expert, Juba, 30 March 2011.

instability and insecurity, and revert to what is most simple and familiar, training and equipping the security forces. (Sedra, 2010: 111)

It would be unfair to say that international actors do not aim to promote the democratic control over state security forces and their accountability to civilians. However, in complex situations and when dealing with governments that have little interest in the democratisation of the security forces, donors do revert to training and equipping. This may be to at least get some results, but also to maintain the dialogue with power holders and use training and equipment as carrots when pushing for institutional reforms. Moreover, the training and material support are often a real necessity as well. However, there is a risk that this support only increases the capacity to use violence of the power holders in control of the particular forces that are trained and equipped, rather than the human security of civilians. For instance, during a visit of Juba in 2011 the police were given training on VIP protection and crowd control; clearly something more in the interest of the ruling power holders than in the interest of the South Sudanese civilian population. The perspective of an arena of interaction shows how international actors relate to state level elites involved in political struggles, and how technical and material support given by donors can therefore also become highly political.

Also the institutional and organisational frameworks through which interventions are organised and implemented are not always helpful in achieving the ambitions set for them. As discussed in chapter 1, the chain of contractors from UN agencies down to INGOs and NGOs that is used to implement DDR programmes (and reintegration specifically) hampers downward accountability, the upward flow of contextual knowledge to the developers up the chain, and results in a high total amount of overhead costs from all organisations involved. Furthermore, while there is an urge for more integrated approaches – which for instance includes attention for women, children, communities, IDPs, etc. – this is prevented by the fact that support for different groups is channelled through different UN organisations (in this case, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF and UNIFEM.⁹⁹ The cooperation between different UN agencies is further complicated by the fact that they all have their own mission, and separate visions on what would be the best approaches. And as will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, for instance, the DPKO favours a more short-term security approach to DDR while the UNDP advocates a long-term development approach. Turf battles are not uncommon, and cooperation between the DPKO and the UNDP is reported to be difficult. The UN IAWG was set up to promote and facilitate an

⁹⁹ Discussion meeting, UN IAWG coordinator, New York, U.S.A., 6 December 2011

integrated approach to DDR, and the Sudanese DDR programme was to serve as an example of this new integrated approach. However, in practice the cooperation between the different UN agencies proved to be problematic, specifically between the management of the UNDP and the DPKO.¹⁰⁰ Nichols attributed these problems “institutional uncertainties, combined with clashing personalities” (Nichols, 2010: 20). Topics of disagreements were on how to support the national DDR Commissions, what type of reintegration support to offer, and whether to implement previously agreed CSAC components. Problems were exacerbated by DPKO and UNDP regulations restricting direct line management by staff from another agency. Other remarkable restrictions included the fact that in Juba, “UNDP computers are not permitted to connect to UNMIS [i.e. DPKO] networks and telephone connections do not link UNDDR Unit offices based on different UNMIS and UNDP premises” (Saferworld, 2008: 22-23). In effect, the donor level could be considered a sub-arena.

It should be noted, however, that there have also been serious efforts to harmonise and coordinate the support of different donors and agencies. A good example of this is the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP),¹⁰¹ which was initiated between 2002 and 2009 in response to the crisis in Africa’s Great Lakes Region after the Congolese Wars. The MDRP supported national programmes for the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo and Rwanda. It furthermore undertook several special projects in these countries, as well as in the Central African Republic and Uganda. With over USD 450 million the programme was the largest in its kind, and funded through a multi-donor trust fund.¹⁰² The MDRP was comprised by a partnership of 42 entities, including the 7 countries in which the programme was active, the 14 donors, and 21 international agencies such as the AU, different UN organisations, and others (MDRP 2010: 62). The regional approach ensured coherence and coordination of DDR in the region, and the partners noted already in the early stages of the programme that the benefits “in terms of unity of voice, reducing duplication, and increasing efficiency in programme implementation outweigh the potential gains of unilateral action” (MDRP, 2003:1). More than a funding mechanism, the MDRP brought partners together, organising joint partner meetings twice every year, where clients, donors and various UN agencies discussed progress and shared their knowledge. Furthermore, from the start national ownership of programme development and

¹⁰⁰ Interview, UNDP, Bor, Jonglei, 24 March 2011

¹⁰¹ The MDRP has been succeeded by the TDRP in 2009.

¹⁰² Donors were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the World Bank itself.

implementation was emphasised as one of the MDRP's core principles (MDRP, 2002: 2; MDRP, 2007: 6). "Even before the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda signified the mainstream push toward harmonization, the MDRP was already championing ownership, donor harmonization, and partnership" (MDRP, 2010: 2). That this was not easy was confirmed by the programme's midterm review, which criticised it defining national ownership too narrowly, and confusing it with state or government ownership (DAI, 2005: 7). This was considered a missed opportunity to promote greater civil society participation in DDR efforts. Secondly, giving the government a key role in implementation, the legitimacy or strength of the political system and the government's capacity were pivotal. The World Bank found that ownership was inherently stronger in countries with victory settlements or elected governments, such as Angola, Rwanda, Uganda and the Republic of Congo, and much weaker in transitional regimes that came to power under negotiated deals or coup d'états, as was the case in Burundi, the DRC and the CAR (MDRP, 2010: 45). Donors are making efforts to improve the coordination of their efforts and include the participation of national actors. And the MDRP did provide a very useful experience with regard to the harmonisation of donor support and policies, and the combining of national ownership with external interventions. However, local ownership remains difficult a difficult issue when local partners are lacking capacity or have different priorities.

Concluding Remarks

The signing of a peace agreement often signals the inception of security interventions and the labelling of the situation as 'post-conflict'. Yet, the conflict does not stop after a settlement has been reached. During the conflict dynamics between existing and emerging power holders developed, and where interventions aim to move the status quo of the settlement towards their proposed model of the state, these power holders simply strive to maintain or improve their position. Both violently and silently behind closed doors, the struggles and negotiations between different power holders continue. Some of these actors may have taken control of the state's institutions, while others have set up parallel structures that are in competition with those of the state. The struggles for power therefore take place within and outside state institutions, as well as between state and non-state actors, over what institutions and actors are able to define and enforce collectively binding decisions, and what norms, interests and priorities are promoted. The dynamics between power holders that have developed through the conflict therefore greatly affect the security situation and the type of governance. The power holders in control of the government are constantly opposed by other actors that are rivalling for governance. In the cases of Burundi and South Sudan, the CNDD-FDD and the

SPLM respectively are reacting to this competition by limiting access to government. Not able to restrict access to government, in the DRC Kabila has sought to include the CNDP to enhance his grip on Eastern DRC.

The dynamics between power holders that developed as a result of the conflicts and the settlements reached therefore affect post-settlement security situation and the types of governance and security provisioning. Whereas the conflict provides the motivation of interventions, and the settlement marks the point of departure, goal of interventions is to mitigate the struggles between different power holders and work towards a presumed ideal organisation of security provisioning. A first step is the formation of new state security forces, often consisting of the parties to the conflict that signed the settlement. However, as exemplified by the cases of the FARDC in the DRC and the SPLA in South Sudan, this risks creating highly divided security forces as it brings the cleavages of the conflict into the state security forces that are responsible for security provisioning and the prevention of conflicts. Rather than technical programmes in neutral zones, interventions clearly take place in a dynamic process of ongoing political struggles. The interventions aim to moderate the power struggles and contribute to stability, yet at the same time they also create a web of opportunities that power holders can use in their struggles. Power holders are able to pick and choose relatively freely – although certainly within limits – from the programmes offered by security interventions. As a result, the SPLA was allowed to determine who is eligible for DDR and gets benefits, the commanders of the different armed groups in the *mixage et recyclage* process in the DRC were able to resist this and maintain control of their troops and interests, and the CNDD-FDD could position its stronger and loyal elements in the national army. Security interventions aiming to improve the security of people living in post-settlement countries can therefore at times have the opposite effect. For instance, without improved oversight and mechanisms that ensure accountability, training and equipping of security forces may make them better capable of dealing with security issues, but at the same time increases their capacity to oppress the civilian population. Moreover, the benefits offered in settlements, as well as through DDR programmes, have caused several groups to return to the bush and fight for better positions in the DRC and South Sudan.

This chapter investigated the interaction between international actors designing and supporting security interventions and actors at the state level in countries where interventions take place. What emerges is not a picture of these interventions coming into a context in which their pre-existing policies and programmes that contribute to building the ideal state they proscribe are implemented. Rather, these interventions themselves become part of, and even contribute to, the dynamics

between different power holders that they seek to mitigate and control. Understanding the outcomes of these dynamics requires an in-depth understanding of this arena and the interactions that take place in it. International intervening actors relate to actors at the state level who are involved in struggles over authority, and where able will use the programmes and policies presented by international actors to further their own goals. The following chapter will look at the interaction between interventions and the local context.

Chapter 6. Security Interventions on the Ground: Reintegration¹⁰³

This chapter shifts the analysis to the arena of interaction between intervening international actors and actors at the local level. To investigate the interaction between security interventions and the local context, this chapter focuses on the final phase of DDR programmes; the reintegration of ex-combatants. The reintegration of ex-combatants is about readjusting ex-combatants from a military life in the bush to a civilian life in the community. These reintegration programmes thus aim to directly affect the lives of individual ex-combatants and the communities in which they reintegrate. The intentions of these programmes are very 'local', in that they aim to affect individuals and communities. It is acknowledged that national actors play an important role in the implementation of DDR programmes. The previous chapter has shown the emphasis the MDRP placed on national ownership in the DRC and Burundi, and also in South Sudan a national DDR commission has been set up. Yet, the provision of a DDR programme was in all countries stipulated in the peace agreements under pressure of the international community. International actors and guidelines also played an important role in the design of the programmes and in both the DRC and Burundi donors withheld financing – temporarily but under the threat of withdrawal – when national DDR commissions did not function satisfactory. Furthermore, various international organisations and NGOs were contracted for the implementation of the reintegration support on the ground. DDR is therefore viewed here as part of the efforts of international actors to promote security and stability.

As the previous chapter, this chapter will be guided by sub-question IV, and analyses how the programmes of interventions are experienced, perceived and used at national and local levels? Here, the specific focus is on the interaction between international actors and actors at the local level. The first section looks at the reintegration programmes, discussing their implementation in the three different cases and the organisational and political limitations that restrict the extent they can contribute to the reintegration of ex-combatants. The second section then looks at the concept of 'reintegration' investigating what it is in theory, in practice, and how it is interpreted by policy makers and international organisations involved in DDR

¹⁰³ This chapter draws from the reintegration sections written for Rouw and Willems (2009), Willems, Kleingeld and van Leeuwen (2010) and Willems and Rouw (2011a), and the argument developed for Willems and Van Leeuwen (forthcoming)

programmes. Here, a distinction is made between reintegration programmes and reintegration processes, and it shows how reintegration programmes have expanded over the years as international actors attempt to influence reintegration processes. Analysing the reintegration process with an arena perspective brings to the factors that influence the reintegration process of individual ex-combatants outside the reintegration programme's support to the fore. These factors are discussed in the third section and classified into three categories: the influences of armed groups and political leaders, the influences of individual experiences of ex-combatants, and the influences of the communities to which ex-combatants return. The final section then looks at the reintegration process in relation to the programmes of intervening actors. This makes even clearer that while DDR programmes are essentially security interventions aimed at mitigating a potential threat, the reintegration processes on the ground are also very much economic and social in nature. Arguably, they even relate to other complex processes of reconciliation and transitional justice. What becomes clear throughout this chapter is that international actors relate to local actors who are not just beneficiaries of the programmes and policies of interventions, but involved in complex multi-faceted processes. International actors can at best positively influence these processes, but the support given can at times also have the opposite effect than it intends to have.

Implementing Reintegration on the Ground

To give an overview of what reintegration programmes look like in practice, this section focuses on the implementation of reintegration programmes in the DRC, Burundi and South Sudan. These cases show that the implementation of these large scale programmes in complex contexts is far from easy. In all cases programmes suffered from delays and limitations, caused by managerial problems, corruption, as well as problems between national governments and donors. Amongst other reasons, which are discussed later in this chapter, this causes these programmes to have difficulties to address the needs and expectations of ex-combatants.

Reintegration in the DRC

As discussed in the previous chapter, there have been several DDR programmes in DRC. When the national DDR programme suffered delays, the DCR programme was initiated in Ituri in 2004. In the second quarter of 2005 CONADER had launched its activities, and from 2008 the programme continued under the UE-PNDDR. The reintegration component was supported by the MDRP, and of the MDRP countries the DRC was considered "the country with the largest, most

complex, and devastating set of conflicts” (Scanteam, 2010: 27). The MDRP also initiated two special projects, the ‘Community Recovery and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Eastern DRC and the ‘Rapid Reaction Mechanism to Support the DDR of Ex-Combatants in the DRC’, both implemented by the UNDP. The PNDDR ended in September 2011, and at the time of writing an independent review is yet to be published. Yet, as several militia still roam in Eastern DRC, at the end of 2011 MONUSCO requested the World Bank’s TDRP to support for a new project on DDRRR (TDRP, 2011: 4).

The research undertaken late 2009 gives good insight in the execution of the reintegration phase, as well as local perceptions thereon. Those combatants choosing to reintegrate into civilian life received up to six months of training (sometimes less, depending on the implementing organisation), a reintegration kit, and a *filet de sécurité*.¹⁰⁴ However, those that did not have a firearm were not eligible for the PNDDR. They can then try to apply for one of the programmes of the UNDP, which consists of two or three months paid manual labour (e.g. road construction), after which most ex-combatants have to reintegrate on their own due to the lack of follow-up programmes.¹⁰⁵ Especially among the Mai Mai, most combatants were armed with *armes blanches*¹⁰⁶ rather than firearms, sometimes sharing a firearm with thirty others.¹⁰⁷ There are even reports that Mai Mai, frustrated by their limited options to receive support, are stealing the ID cards from demobilised to acquire benefits.¹⁰⁸ Among ex-combatants, there are also large groups of auto-demobilised.¹⁰⁹ In Bunyakiri, a local NGO working on reintegration of ex-combatants estimated that in the region there were about 550 registered ex-combatants, but also about 1200 who had not registered.¹¹⁰ This implies that a large part of the intended target group was not reached.

An often aired complaint with the programme was that the reintegration training and benefits were predominantly given in places easily accessible for NGOs. As a result many ex-combatants had to travel long distances to obtain their reintegration support. There are many frustrations in communities and among ex-combatants about the many broken promises of the government and international

¹⁰⁴ Ex-combatants in the government programme are entitled to a monthly financial allowance for a period of 12 months, referred to as *filet de sécurité*.

¹⁰⁵ Interview, UNDP official, Bukavu, South Kivu, DRC, 8 December 2009

¹⁰⁶ *Armes blanches* is a collective term used for machetes and knives

¹⁰⁷ Group discussion, Ex-combatant, Mudaka, South Kivu, DRC, 4 December 2009

¹⁰⁸ Group discussion, Ex-combatant, Muhongoza, South Kivu, DRC, 3 December 2009

¹⁰⁹ Sometimes also referred to as deserters.

¹¹⁰ Interview, Local NGO, Bunyakiri, South Kivu, DRC, 1 December 2009

organisations. Many had been told there were reintegration projects available and that they would receive a reintegration kit, but they in fact did not. As a UN official explained, CONADER has been poorly managed, and many of the benefits never got into the hands of ex-combatants.¹¹¹ According to the MDRP evaluation, this was due to political and management problems at the national level, as well as the fact that the government was more concerned with the integration of combatants into the new armed forces than with the reintegration of ex-combatants (Scanteam, 2010: 28-29, 67). Furthermore, because the lack of a functioning banking system, there had been considerable delays in payments made to ex-combatants (ibid. 30). The delays led to many frustrations among ex-combatants, and a UN official involved in DDR said that the UN had to do a lot of “crisis-management, as ex-combatants would go on a rampage.”¹¹² A further complaint was a lack of follow-up support, as most ex-combatants had difficulties using their reintegration support to acquire sustainable means of income. The reintegration assistance was considered too individually focussed, and was not tied into other community development projects to enhance social reintegration. Furthermore, many ex-combatants felt they were forced into programmes that did not match their needs or desires, for instance having to choose to become a tailor and receiving a sewing machine. In part, this motivated many ex-combatants to sell their reintegration kits. Altogether, for many the reintegration support contributed little to their reintegration. The high expectations raised by the programme were not met. A PNDDR official in Bunia waved this off, saying that support was given and that the rest is up to the communities, neglecting that these communities have many difficulties themselves.¹¹³ In another case, what was called ‘a community-based reintegration project’ was described by those designing and implementing it as “a pay off,”¹¹⁴ rather than durable reintegration.

Reintegration in Burundi

The reintegration programme in Burundi was supported by the World Bank’s MDRP, and officially launched in December 2004. Once people volunteered or were selected for demobilisation, they were disarmed in their barracks and transported to the demobilisation centre where their status was formally changed to civilian. During their stay in the demobilisation camp ex-combatants received a training, and when discharged from the camp they received a reinsertion package (*Indemnité Transitoire de Subsistance* – ITS), which equalled 18 months of salary and consisted of

¹¹¹ Interview, UN official, Bunia, Ituri, DRC, 9 October 2009

¹¹² Interview, UN official, Bunia, Ituri, DRC, 12 October 2009

¹¹³ Interview, PNDDR, Bunia, DRC, 14 October 2009.

¹¹⁴ Interview, International aid organisation, Goma, North Kivu, DRC, 27 November 2009

a minimum total amount of 566,000¹¹⁵ fbu, depending on military rank. This reinsertion package was paid in instalments. The first instalment was paid in cash at the demobilisation centre, while the remainders of three instalments were paid through the banking system in their community of choice over a 10-month period (Boshoff and Vrey, 2006: 22). After this, demobilised combatants had five options with regard to their reintegration support: 1) return to their former employment situation (re-employment); 2) go back to formal education at school; 3) engage in vocational training; 4) receive entrepreneurial support; or 5) receive Income-Generating Activities support (*Activités Génératrices de Revenus – AGR*). The second DDR programme for the FNL was similar, except for the separate programme for the *Adultes Associés* run by the UNDP. This group received 50,000 fbu, a small reinsertion kit consisting of some clothing and house supplies, and transport back to the community of origin. After a few months they received another 50,000 fbu and could register for a UNDP development project.

The large majority of the ex-combatants opted for the AGR support, which included goods of their choice (e.g. food items for trade, animals, equipment, etc.) with a value of 600,000 fbu and some information on how to set up a project with this whilst at the demobilisation site (Douma and Gasana, 2008: 6). This choice was preferred because expectations among ex-combatants that this would provide fast revenue, and because vocational training was considered too expensive.¹¹⁶ Despite the system of focal points – ex-combatants who represented the ex-combatants in a commune at provincial and national levels – and the free choice the programme intended to give ex-combatants on their reintegration kit, many felt that they were not being sufficiently involved in the execution of the programme and the way decisions on the programme were made. As a result, ex-combatants felt that the programme did not adequately match their situation and needs.

Like in the DRC, the programme suffered many delays caused by capacity problems and corruption on the side of the Burundian government, and the bureaucracy of international assistance. As a consequence of the international community's concern for national ownership, all assistance was channelled through the government. Yet, the CNDRR was not capable of timely allocation of benefits, and in 2008 the *Sécretaire Exécutif* had to be replaced due to a corruption scandal. Apart from corruption, payments have been delayed to the government by the World Bank when the programme proposals for DDR handed in by the CNDDR were not yet

¹¹⁵ Which at the time was roughly equal to US\$ 515

¹¹⁶ Many ex-combatants could not afford transport to Bujumbura – where most vocational training programmes were given – and housing and living expenses during their training.

considered to be in order. This led to irritation on both sides, but the real frustrations were felt by the ex-combatants as their benefits were further delayed. This resulted in several manifestations by protesting ex-combatants in front of the CNDRR office in Bujumbura. There was a feeling amongst ex-combatants that DDR “was only there to excommunicate [*sic.*] us from the armed groups.”¹¹⁷ And even while in Burundi the economic benefits of DDR were relatively less important than national political reforms to convince ex-combatants to demobilise, DDR proved to be unable to address the economic problems ex-combatants faced during reintegration.

Reintegration in South Sudan

The CPA signed in 2005 called for a DDR programme to downsize the SPLA, but as discussed in the previous chapter, DDR focused predominantly on the SNGs. During the research period in 2011, after the referendum was held, the DDR programme was to be revised, and reintegration activities were limited to a few states. In Jonglei there had been no activities due to delays in registration, the absence of structures on the ground, the rainy season and inaccessibility of the state.¹¹⁸ In WES only 68 of the merely 100 expected ex-combatants showed up for registration, and only 43 showed up for reintegration support. The staff of the SSDDRC attributed this very limited number to the fact that there was no DDR centre in the state – forcing ex-combatants to travel long distances in order to receive assistance – and there were an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 ex-combatants in the state who had not gone through the programme.¹¹⁹ In Eastern Equatoria State (EES) the programme was ongoing, with 1,077 ex-combatants demobilised in Torit, of which 501 were already being trained by the German organisation for International cooperation GIZ. Other states with significant numbers of registered ex-combatants were Central Equatoria, Lakes, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Northern Bahr el Ghazal.

Due to the limited number of registered ex-combatants in Western Equatoria State (WES), larger international NGOs could not justify investing in operations for a limited number of beneficiaries. As a result, a small international NGO with fewer capacities was contracted for the implementation of reintegration support, and ex-combatants could only opt for training in small business. With many ex-combatants

¹¹⁷ Interview, Ex-combatant Ex-FAB, Muyinga, Burundi, 11 May 2010

¹¹⁸ Interview, UN DDR, Bor, Jonglei, South Sudan, 21 March 2011; Interview, UNDP, Bor, Jonglei, South Sudan, 24 March 2011

¹¹⁹ Interview, Representative WES SSDDRC office, WES, South Sudan, 1 April 2011

being illiterate and the training only lasting ten days, the majority of the ex-combatants have great difficulties to achieve sustainable income through their businesses.¹²⁰ In EES, like in the other states with a DDR centre, several reintegration options could be chosen, such as agricultural activities, small business, tailoring, vocational training, etc. Business and agriculture were most popular among ex-combatants. The courses take three months and are preceded by one month of literacy and numeracy training, and attendance is a requirement for attaining the reintegration kit. With regard to all courses there were complaints that the training programmes were too short to be truly beneficial,¹²¹ and one of the trainers predicted that many students would sell their kit after the training because the amount of income generation opportunities with the kit is limited.¹²²

A second phase of DDR is to commence in 2012, in which an estimated 150,000 ex-combatants are to be demobilised. The reintegration training for these ex-combatants will be extended to nine instead of the current three months. Possibly, soldiers will also remain within the SPLA and receive salaries during the reintegration period. The reintegration assistance will for the largest part remain individually based, but will be supplemented by a number of community projects for reintegration support to WAAFGs. However, whereas the UNDP expressed high value to such additional community approaches to DDR, the SSDDRC seemed more critical about such projects.¹²³

What is Reintegration?

This section looks closer at to what reintegration exactly is, and hence what the above described reintegration programmes effectively aim to achieve. The term 'reintegration' implies that an ex-combatant has been away in the bush, and now returns to the community to pick up his or her previous role. However, this is often not the case. Communities change over time, especially during conflict, and ex-combatants may choose to live in another village or city than where they originally came from. Moreover, after having spent years in the bush, ex-combatants themselves have changed as well. The term 'reintegration' is therefore misleading, yet will be used here as it is the most commonly used term. However, this is done with the recognition that it refers more to a process of 'integration' than one of 'reintegration'. It is also important to make a distinction between *process* and

¹²⁰ Interview, Representative WES SSDDRC office, WES, South Sudan, 7 April 2011

¹²¹ Group discussion, Ex-combatants, Torit, EES, South Sudan, 15 April 2011

¹²² Group discussion, Women, Torit, EES, South Sudan, 16 April 2011

¹²³ Interview, Representative SSDDRC, Juba, South Sudan, 12 April 2011

programme. The programmes have a fixed end and are being implemented to influence the ongoing processes. This raises the question to which extent programmes can be expected to influence the process, and to which extent it is necessary to take long-term processes into consideration when designing short-term programmes.

Those from the armed forces and groups not eligible to join the new state security forces after a settlement has been reached, are to be disarmed and demobilised. This is to mitigate the potential threat to the precarious post-settlement situation posed by a large number of armed and organised combatants. But these combatants cannot just be sent off. Even when assuming each combatant has indeed been successfully disarmed, weapons are often plentiful available in post-settlement contexts. Furthermore, demobilisation phase of the DDR programme is largely a symbolic exercise and former command structures are not broken down by a ceremonial discharge. Ex-combatants are thus easily remobilised by political entrepreneurs and are potential spoilers to the peace process. Therefore, the final phase of the DDR programme aims to provide reintegration assistance in order to provide ex-combatants with an alternative. Because within an armed force or group, ex-combatants were given a salary or a free hand to take what they needed from the civilian population, a strong assumption behind DDR is that an economic alternative is very important. However, disarmament and demobilisation does not only mean losing a source of income. A weapon also meant power and a position in an armed group provided a social structure, a certain status and a sense of belonging. Reintegration is then also about re-adjusting to the new social structures and acceptable norms of behaviour in the communities of return. This was illustrated by ex-combatants in Burundi:

In my opinion, if you were in the armed groups there were no laws. We could do anything, like stealing and killing for food or if you needed medicines you would rob a hospital. So reintegration for me is to learn to live according to the laws of the community again. We need support for that, whether this is financial or psychological support.

[...]

*Reintegration means to start living like humans again, without violence and weapons, but with each other. For me DDR means to support me with that.*¹²⁴

But what does reintegration entail according to those designing and supporting it? The meaning of reintegration in the policy debate has shifted over the years. In

¹²⁴ Group discussion, ex-combatants, Kibimba, Gitega, Burundi, 12 May 2010

1999, the UN DPKO Guidelines for DDR defined reintegration as the “assistance measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for them and their families’, economic and social integration into civil society”¹²⁵ (UN DPKO 1999: 15). A year later, the Secretary-General of the UN widened the concept further and stated reintegration is,

[...] the process which allows ex-combatants and their families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life. It generally entails the provision of a package of cash or in-kind compensation, training, and job- and income-generating projects. These measures frequently depend for their effectiveness upon other, broader undertakings, such as assistance to returning refugees and internally displaced persons; economic development at the community and national level; infrastructure rehabilitation; truth and reconciliation efforts; and institutional reform. Enhancement of local capacity is often crucial for the long-term success of reintegration. (UN, 2000b: 2)

Reintegration was defined as a process, including the provision of a package, training and income-generating projects, but which also depends on broader efforts for economic development, rehabilitation of infrastructure, and reconciliation. To enable the realisation of such an integrated approach, the UN Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) on DDR was established to facilitate the coordination of the efforts of the different agencies in the UN family. In 2006, the working group produced the first public edition of the IDDRS, which now made a stark distinction between ‘reinsertion’ as transitional assistance – such as allowances, food, clothes, shelter, and short-term education – that aims to meet immediate needs, and ‘reintegration’, which is,

[...] the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance. (UN IAWG, 2006: 1.10, 2)

Reintegration of ex-combatants in post-conflict settings is thus no longer viewed as providing short term benefits and training, but is increasingly seen as an integrative process, including both economic and social components. Moreover, reintegration is increasingly defined as a process involving communities, rather than just individual ex-combatants. It actually entails a change in identity of ex-combatants, and a

¹²⁵ The UN uses the notion ‘civil society’ here as a synonym for civilian life. This research uses civil society as a reference to the social midfield in society; i.e. NGOs, faith-based organisations, etc.

change in the relation between the individual ex-combatant and society, and a change in society's perception of the demobilised as a collective group.

This expansion of the notion of reintegration has not led to a consensus on the different processes involved, the sequences of different steps, or on how to define the success of the process as a whole (cf. Muggah, 2009; Torjesen and MacFarlane, 2009). Muggah argues that the concept of reintegration is poorly understood by the different actors involved in orchestrating and executing DDR (Muggah, 2009: 19). This has resulted in ambiguous use of the terms 'reinsertion' and 'reintegration'. For instance the Multi-country Demobilisation and *Reintegration* Programme supported the National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilisation and *Reinsertion* in the DRC, and at the same time the parallel National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilisation, *Reinsertion and Reintegration* in Burundi. Yet for both programmes the MDRP website shows roughly the same progress tables, indicating the amount of ex-combatants that was demobilised, that received their "safety transition allowance" (DRC) or "reinsertion support" (Burundi), and that received "reintegration support" (MDRP, 2009a).

The different interpretations of what a reintegration programme constitutes are also caused by the fact that there is no agreement within policy circles on what DDR should do (cf. Muggah, Maughan and Bugnoin, 2003: 18; Muggah, 2006: 198; 2009: 3-4; Jennings, 2008: 6-7; MDRP, 2009b: 10; Stankovic and Torjesen, 2010: 13). And while many theorists and practitioners may be more pluralist in their approach, two extreme positions stand out. On the one hand, there are those who advocate a 'maximalist' approach to DDR. From this perspective, it is necessary to keep longer-term development in mind from the start of the programme. Reintegration is seen as something that includes communities of return, facilitates ex-combatants in becoming productive members in civilian life, and gives attention to reconciliation and reconstruction. DDR programmes are then not just disarming, but should also address the wider development challenges of a post-conflict context. Such a maximalist approach is often advocated by agencies such as the UNDP and the World Bank (Kingma and Muggah, 2009: 9). On the other hand, a 'minimalist' approach to DDR argues that DDR should focus on short-term security goals, and provide incentives in order to deter ex-combatants from becoming spoilers to the ongoing peace process. It maintains that "the DDR process chiefly provides incentives to leave weapons *untouched* for a while" (De Vries and Van Veen, 2010: 2 - original emphasis). In this view, it is up to other programmes to deal with longer-term issues regarding reintegration, and effectively advocating that DDR programmes should only give reinsertion support. The argument is that by widening the goals of DDR, it becomes more and more difficult to attain these goals.

A more short-term security oriented focus is generally advocated by the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and government security forces (Kingma and Muggah, 2009: 9). This minimalist-maximalist debate is closely related to the debate in peacebuilding between those advocating peacebuilding should only aim to prevent the recurrence of conflict and those who argue it should address the fundamental inequalities and root causes of past and possible future conflict (Call and Cousens, 2007). This is again related to the debate between conflict management and conflict transformation (Miall, 2001). However, it also reflects internal funding politics within the UN and a tension about which institution is allowed to do what. When DDR is considered to be a short-term stability measure, it can be supported by the DPKO with funds from the assessed UN funding. When it is considered to be part of longer term development efforts, it falls within the territories of the UNDP, which is dependent on voluntary donor contributions, and the World Bank.

In general, the maximalist perspective appears to have the upper hand in the policy debate. The UN has set the norm when it developed the IDDRS and stated that “the sustainable social and economic reintegration of former combatants should be the ultimate objective of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration” (UN IAWG, 2006: 4.30, 1). Or, as Knight concludes:

So DDR programmes are generally put in place to dissipate threats to the security of a post-conflict society, and a particular region, by helping ex-combatants disarm, demobilise, and reintegrate into communities of their choice. These programmes should ultimately provide ex-combatants with the kind of skills necessary for them to become productive members in a peaceful society. (Knight, 2009: 32)

Yet, this maximalist approach is being strongly criticised by those favouring a more minimalist approach for setting unrealistic goals for DDR programmes, and for resulting in that DDR becomes seen as a panacea for all problems in post-conflict contexts. Moreover, it appears that in the practice of actual DDR programmes, a more minimalist approach predominates. As Jennings points out, most DDR programmes in fact start from a security perspective and thus in practice follow a minimalist agenda (Jennings, 2008: 13). Thus, on the one hand, as the standards for DDR prescribe a maximalist approach to DDR, expectations of what should be achieved through DDR programmes have grown. On the other hand, in practice, the political realities, financial limitations, and other practical issues often lead to the implementation of a more minimalist approach. DDR programmes therefore often do not live up to the expectations raised by standards such as the IDDRS. Regarding reintegration as a long-term social process, to which reintegration

programmes contribute, also means that the success of reintegration – and the contribution of reintegration assistance thereto – is extremely difficult to measure, as the number of weapons collected or the number of ex-combatants that received a reinsertion kit do not say much about the improvement of security or the prevention of a relapse into conflict. Pugel proposes to shift from measuring outputs to measuring outcomes (Pugel, 2009: 76). Yet, the multidimensional character of DDR programmes and the whole peace process in which they are embedded makes it very difficult to assess the individual contribution of specific programmes.

Local Processes of Reintegration: Diversity and Complexity

Having discussed the programmes in the first section, the previous section noted how reintegration programmes are distinct from the much more complex reintegration processes. This section turns to the local reintegration process and elaborates on the diversity and complexity of ex-combatants' experiences. Taking the UN's working definition of reintegration from the IDDRS mentioned above, reintegration is both a social and an economic process. The armed groups offered ex-combatants a social structure, status and a steady income. Where the disarmament and demobilisation process aims to take ex-combatants out of this structure, the reintegration process then aims to integrate ex-combatants in a civilian social structure, and support them in acquiring an income in civilian life. The economic process involves finding a sustainable (and legitimate) way to provide in his or her livelihood. The social component involves acquiring civilian status and a certain level of acceptance within the civilian community. During discussions with ex-combatants and individuals living in communities where ex-combatants were reintegrating, respondents mentioned numerous factors that are of influence on the reintegration processes of individual ex-combatants other than the reintegration programmes. The arena perspective on reintegration helps analyse the reintegration process in relation to these factors, many of which are outside the direct influence of reintegration programmes. These factors can be classified into three categories, which are discussed in the following sub-sections: the influence of armed groups and political leaders, the influence of the individual experiences of ex-combatants, and the influence of the communities to which ex-combatants return. These factors are thus made up of actors and the results of the interactions between individual ex-combatants and these actors.

Pressures from the Past

An important factor influencing the reintegration process is the presence of both formerly existing and newly emerging armed groups and political leaders that can potentially pressure ex-combatants to join their ranks. DDR programmes are designed to prevent ex-combatants from returning to violence, and where armed groups continue to exist they form direct competition.

The focus of DDR programmes is on the provision of economic support. And as will be discussed later in this chapter, the needs of many ex-combatants are indeed very high. This support is specifically intended to lure them away from armed groups, criminal behaviour, and manipulation by politicians. Those favouring a more maximalist approach want to do more than just that and want to change ex-combatants from potential spoilers to active participants in peace and development of the country. But foremost, DDR programmes aim to prevent ex-combatants from becoming spoilers. Therefore, existing armed groups, criminal gangs and political entrepreneurs that are looking for manpower can be seen as direct competitors for the DDR programme. As discussed in chapter 1, the demobilisation phase symbolically breaks down command structures, but the true breaking down of old structures and social linkages and the building up of new social linkages in civilian life is done through reintegration. Yet, during the reintegration programme the 'old' social linkages still exist. A representative of an international development organisation involved in DDR complained that, "command structures were kept in place, or at least not completely broken down, and ex-combatants still take orders from their former commanders."¹²⁶ And in one interview in the DRC it was even mentioned by an ex-combatant that he had still regular contact with his brothers in the bush.¹²⁷ But it is problematic when these social structures continue to function in a way that potentially spoils the fragile peace. Completely breaking down command structures through a symbolic ceremony is rather difficult if not impossible. In the DRC the phenomenon of 'revolving-door' combatants, going through different DDR programmes and returning to the bush when reintegration benefits dried up, was widely acknowledged.¹²⁸ The risk of remobilisation was exemplified by a female ex-combatant in North Kivu, who showed her demobilisation card while showing she was also still wearing her combat pants

¹²⁶ Interview, Representative international development organisation, Bujumbura, Burundi, 21 April 2010

¹²⁷ Group discussion, Ex-combatants, Kavumu, South Kivu, DRC, 4 December 2009

¹²⁸ It should be noted that apart from 'revolving-door' ex-combatants there were also ex-combatants who were 'double dipping', and applied for support from different programmes. This was possible because different programmes were financed by different donor organizations (MDRP, UNDP and MONUC) and there was no central list of which ex-combatants got support.

under her traditional skirt. She said she was demobilised, but could go back any time if she decided to.¹²⁹ In Burundi, ex-combatants themselves also claimed to be under the influence of politicians, who use their social and economic vulnerability to their benefit. “When the politicians are misbehaving the demobilised are misbehaving as well.”¹³⁰ The research was undertaken during the election period, and this problem may therefore have surfaced as more significant. However, elections are also typically pushed for by interventions and held shortly after peace agreements have been signed. In most post-settlement situations where DDR is implemented, the competition between political groups is intensified, as is the risk that ex-combatants are pressured by politicians – sometimes their former commanders. And apart from the influence of commanders and politicians, there were reports of former brothers in arms working together in small criminal gangs. While little studies on the long-term effects of DDR have been undertaken, a study in Colombia finds that paramilitary DDR did appear to have reduced homicidal violence, but these results also seemed to disappear over time (Restrepo & Muggah, 2009: 40).

Individual Experiences

Also the individual experiences of ex-combatants affect the ease and success of the reintegration process. These include experiences before, during and after their participation in the armed groups, and the factors that motivated or limited their choices. The issues that contributed to the mobilisation may have been addressed or may have changed, or an ex-combatant can have changed his or her priorities and motivations. The actual reasons (conscious or not) for joining an armed group or force may therefore be difficult to substantiate based on conversations with ex-combatants after their demobilisation. Nonetheless, the influence of the conflict dynamics on the choices of ex-combatants as they perceive and explain it gives an insight in how these ex-combatants look at their reintegration. Apart from the conflict dynamics, also the motivation to demobilise and the personal circumstances in which individual ex-combatants find themselves in the post-settlement situation affect the reintegration process.

Reintegration support tends to focus on providing an economic alternative to life in the armed groups. Indeed, economic motivations were often an important, if not primary, motivating factor for combatants to join an armed group. In the DRC for instance, many have joined for economic reasons, which also increasingly became

¹²⁹ Group discussion, Ex-combatant, Mangage Nogera, North Kivu, DRC, 28 October 2009

¹³⁰ Group discussion, Community member, Rugombo, Cibitoke, Burundi, 3 June 2010

the most important reason for many individual combatants to continue fighting. For the pastoralist groups in South Sudan, joining the military or an armed group provided access to firearms and opportunities to raid cattle. A group of ex-combatants in Torit mentioned that there were soldiers who were able to amass a lot of cattle and wealth during the war, something that was very much welcomed by their communities.¹³¹ Political grievances are often propagated by armed groups even when their leadership may be predominantly motivated by other reasons, and certain authors have stressed the importance of economic motivations (cf. Collier, et al. 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; 2004). Yet, combatants may nonetheless perceive themselves to be fighting for particular political ideals. In Burundi, for instance, the primary motivations ex-combatants gave for joining the army, a rebel group or militia, were political grievances, such as wanting to fight for an ethnically balanced government and army, freedom for Hutus, or fighting for peace and stability in the country. As an ex-combatant explained: "We wanted democracy but then Ndadaye was killed and the crisis began. People wanted change but that was resisted. I joined the CNDD-FDD to protect myself and help to achieve more democracy."¹³² A similar observation was made by Samii, who argued that for the case of Burundi, "the fixation on 'material opportunity' rather than grievances would be misguided" (Samii, 2007: 3). As many people in the community had supported these ideals, this caused less detachment between the communities and their ex-combatants.

Apart from economic gain or political grievances, important motivations include also self-defence. Many joined to protect themselves and their community from armed groups or the army. As one ex-combatant in the DRC explained, "we had to fight for our country. To fight against the foreigners who came here and attacked."¹³³ Besides physical protection, in many cases in the DRC and Burundi this also related to protection of their land, as land issues were a great source of conflicts. In South Sudan people similarly joined to acquire weapons to protect their cattle or raid the cattle of others. As discussed in the previous chapter, cattle raiding is an established practice among pastoralist communities, and these groups may have little desire to disarm. Indeed, cattle raiding practices in South Sudan have become highly militarised. The possibility to take revenge was mentioned in all three cases, against those who took land or cattle, or to revenge murdered family members. Many people also joined simply because the conflict reached their village, forcing them to either flee or join a militia, or seeing the militia as the only way to

¹³¹ Group discussion ex-combatants, Torit, EES, South Sudan, 15 April 2011

¹³² Interview, Ex-combatant CNDD-FDD, Rutegama, Muramvya, Burundi, 28 April 2010

¹³³ Group discussion, Ex-combatant, Mwenga, South Kivu, DRC, 5 December 2009

move back home after having fled. Finally, there have also been many cases of forced conscription or abduction.

Problematically, DDR programmes themselves have at times also been a motivating factor for joining armed groups. As already discussed, during negotiations various armed groups have tried to inflate their numbers to strengthen their position at the negotiating table. This resulted in the recruitment of combatants with the promise of benefits through the DDR programme after an agreement was signed. But also without such promises being made, the benefits ex-combatants received motivated people to join a militia. As one community member in the DRC complained, "DDR is the main reason there are still active militia out there."¹³⁴ And one DDR specialist mentioned that in one region in Eastern DRC all training centres had been occupied by NGOs implementing reintegration programmes, resulting in children being sent to armed groups by their family, as DDR was the only way to access training.¹³⁵ Reintegration programmes can therefore also have effects contrary to its goals, with people joining armed groups precisely because of the benefits DDR programmes provide.

Another important factor that affects reintegration are the motivations of ex-combatants to demobilise. This also relates to the extent to which particular issues and grievances that ex-combatants perceived themselves to be fighting for have been addressed. An underlying assumption of DDR programme is to provide an economic alternative, implying that economic motivations to stay with the armed forces or groups are of primary importance. Indeed, many ex-combatants said they demobilised, "because of the benefits they promised us."¹³⁶ Typically, the commanders of militias generally take the largest share of the spoils of war, leaving little benefits for the rank and file (cf. Bouta, 2005: 28). For many ex-combatants, the benefits provided by DDR therefore outweigh the benefits of the bush. Furthermore, "DDR gives a reason to quit the armed forces without being seen as a traitor. Then 'everybody' does it and you can participate without being seen as a traitor."¹³⁷

Especially in Burundi, ex-combatants felt that the political ideals they had fought for were achieved. Many ex-combatants also decided to demobilise voluntarily because they considered their job done when the peace agreements were signed. As one ex-combatant explained, "when the CNDD-FDD had come to power in Bujumbura I found it no longer necessary to be in the CNDD-FDD, so I quit to

¹³⁴ Community members, Luvangiri, Ituri, 19 October 2009

¹³⁵ Expert meeting on DDR, DDR specialist, The Hague, the Netherlands, 1 December 2011

¹³⁶ Group discussion, Ex-combatant CNDD-FDD, Kibimba, Gitega, Burundi, 12 May 2010

¹³⁷ Group discussion, Ex-combatant, Mangange Nogera, North Kivu, DRC, 28 October 2009

demobilise. After we had reached our goals I thought it was time for me to rest.”¹³⁸ Interestingly, ex-FAB soldiers who had been fighting the CNDD-FDD gave similar reasons for demobilizing: “I saw there were many killings and Burundi was in crisis. That’s when I joined the army to bring peace and security to the country. Thanks to God that goal has been reached so I demobilised voluntarily.”¹³⁹ These motivations may have been influenced by the discourses promoted by political leaders, but many ex-combatants genuinely considered their goals to be achieved. Others stopped simply because they were tired of the war, or because they were forced to demobilise as they were not allowed in the new state security forces – for instance because of age, a handicap, a bad record or insubordination.

After having been demobilised, there are different situations in which ex-combatants end up. The circumstances are much more difficult for those ex-combatants who for whatever reason could not return to their own communities, for those that upon return to their communities find their land lost, their houses destroyed and their family killed, and for those whose family members have been displaced. And reintegration is easier for those ex-combatants who return to their own houses and have families who have been taking care of their land. Also the demobilised combatants’ level of education was often related with the ease of reintegration, as more education enhances adaptation to the facets of community life and widens possibilities for the future. On the other hand, those who joined an armed group at a younger age and did not go to school – not having learned to read and write – often had great difficulties to use the reintegration support to move on with their lives. Reintegration was also much more difficult if ex-combatants had spent a relatively long period of time in the bush and when they experienced a lot of violence. When combatants who returned to their communities having fought somewhere else and therefore were not directly linked to the violence experienced by that community, reintegration was often relatively easier. When ex-combatants committed atrocities themselves, this not only caused them to be perceived negatively by those aware of their past, but also contributed to psychosocial problems and a self-image of being an outsider.

A Return to What Community?

As the reintegration process is about the integration of ex-combatants in a civilian social structure, the communities in which ex-combatants integrate into are vital. In an ideal situation, communities and families of ex-combatants actively support the

¹³⁸ Group discussion, Ex-combatant CNDD-FDD, Itaba, Burundi, Gitega, 6 May 2010

¹³⁹ Group discussion, Ex-combatant ex-FAB, Ruhoro, Ngozi, Burundi, 10 May 2010

reintegration of ex-combatants. As one community member explained, “the role of communities is to defend and assist the reintegration process. They can give advice and counselling and help ex-combatants to re-orientate and help them to stay in civilian life.”¹⁴⁰ It is the community that has to provide the civilian alternative to an armed life and provide an alternative value system, as well as direct social control. Communities may also support ex-combatants in finding an income. In Burundi, ex-combatants were stimulated to form organisations with civilians to work on the land.¹⁴¹ This also has been done in the DRC, where there were also plans to encourage ‘traineeship’ positions for ex-combatants with local organisations.¹⁴² In South Sudan business men were encouraged to mentor ex-combatants that were starting a business.¹⁴³

In order to support the reintegration process communities must – at least to a certain extent – have accepted and pardoned ex-combatants. The willingness and capacity to accept ex-combatants is influenced by various factors. The presence of local organisations, such as churches, political leaders, NGOs, that support the reintegration process is therefore of great importance. It was found in the DRC and Burundi that relations between communities and ex-combatants were much less problematic when local actors, such as local NGOs, political and religious leaders, were promoting cohabitation and dialogue. The perceptions communities have of ex-combatants also depend on how the armed groups have been perceived during and after the conflict. Ex-combatants can be seen as defenders of the community, or as the perpetrators of the past violence. In the DRC and in Burundi, some communities have sent out the combatants to protect the community and rewarded them upon return with some land and resources. Yet, other communities considered the integrating ex-combatants to be a threat to community life. In South Sudan the SPLA is generally regarded as victor, resulting in a relatively easy acceptance of ex-combatants in communities, while particular communities have opposed the SPLA during the war and are less favourable to ex-combatants. The fact that many Southerners who fought for the SAF of the North were forced by conscription is acknowledged by communities, which eases acceptance. In Burundi, many civilians supported the political ideals of the rebel movements, again something easing the integration of ex-combatants. The perceptions of communities about the armed group or force to which ex-combatants belong may thus affect the willingness of communities to accept them. Similarly, the ethnic makeup of a community and the level of ethnic tensions influence reintegration. For instance, in Burundi it was noted

¹⁴⁰ Interview, Community member, Goma, North Kivu, 17 November 2009

¹⁴¹ Interview, Representative Local NGO, Bujumbura, Burundi, 14 April 2011

¹⁴² Interview, Representative INGO, Goma, North Kivu, DRC, 27 November 2009

¹⁴³ Interview, Representative WES SSDDRC office, WES, South Sudan, 7 April 2011

by ex-combatants that because communities had become mono-ethnic due to the conflict, it was easier for them to reintegrate. "My community was entirely Hutu so it was easy for me to reintegrate. The Tutsis in the area did not trust me because I had been in the rebel group for so long."¹⁴⁴ Another factor affecting reintegration is the level of violence that communities have experienced. Where there were high levels of violence, reintegration was much more complicated due to the destruction of the local economy and infrastructure, and the traumatising of the population. Where the economic situation of the community is poor – as often is the case in post-settlement contexts – it makes it more difficult to absorb ex-combatants into the local economy and provide them support and work. As explained by a community member in Burundi, "our own situation is deplorable as well. We even can't give them much food to get out of their misery. In fact, the community is in the same situation as the ex-combatants."¹⁴⁵ Therefore also the amount of ex-combatants relative to the size of the community is pivotal, with reintegration being much easier with a relatively small number of ex-combatants. Not only is it more difficult to give a large number the necessary support and attention, but also can the balance of power easily be distorted by large influxes of ex-combatants which can create tensions within the community. The community members' responses throughout the research indicate that the smaller the number of demobilised, the fewer chances there were of conflict and other complications for the reintegration process. Finally, an important difference influencing reintegration is the distinction between urban and rural regions. In urban areas there are more employment opportunities, as the economy in rural areas is often limited to agriculture. Yet, the costs of living tend to be much lower in rural areas.

To conclude this section, there is a great variety of motivations for participating in armed groups and forces or deciding to demobilise. Furthermore, there are different personal experiences that influence the opportunities an ex-combatant has when he or she integrates into a particular community. These opportunities are further influenced by the characteristics of this community and the experiences of the people living there. DDR programmes also aim to influence the motivations for ex-combatants to demobilise and the opportunities they have to reintegrate, in order to prevent them from becoming spoilers to the peace process. Armed groups, criminal gangs and political entrepreneurs are then the direct competitors of DDR programmes. And under particular circumstances – such as the continuing presence of armed groups as is the case in the DRC, or heated political dispute fuelled by elections like in Burundi – this competition may become stronger. In other words,

¹⁴⁴ Interview, Ex-combatant CNDD-FDD, Gihanga, Bubanza, Burundi, 2 June 2010

¹⁴⁵ Group discussion, Community member, Kabezi, Bujumbura Rural, Burundi, 15 June 2010

the reintegration process is influenced by a great variety of factors, of which the DDR programme is one of many. The question is then how programmes are dealing with the complex context in which they operate, and how the reintegration processes are being influenced by the programmes. The section below therefore discusses the interplay of the programme within the local reintegration processes.

Reintegration Programmes: Connecting to the Local Process?

As already became apparent in the first section on the implementation of the reintegration phase of DDR in my three cases, organisational and political limitations restrict the programmes' contributions to the reintegration processes of ex-combatants. This section will look at the gaps between programmes and processes more closely, focusing on the thematic issues rather than the separate cases. Earlier in this chapter reintegration was defined to encompass both an economic and social processes. While DDR is a security intervention aimed at mitigating a potential threat, the sub-sections below illustrate how the reintegration processes on the ground are more economic, social, and arguably include even reconciliation. The first part will therefore investigate the effects of reintegration support on the economic reintegration processes, the second part will look at the social reintegration processes. The third part discusses an even broader interpretation of social reintegration, which may even come to include issues of reconciliation and transitional justice. In other words, this section looks at the ways in which the programmes of interventions are experienced, perceived and used at national and local levels, and the ways in which international actors who design and support these programmes relate to ex-combatants and the communities in which these ex-combatants reintegrate.

Economic Reintegration: Between Needs and Expectations

This first part looks at the economic reintegration support, which intends to give ex-combatants an immediate and longer-term alternative for the livelihoods provided by armed groups or criminal gangs. Programmes are faced with high expectations, which may be partially raised and unrealistic, but at the same time are grounded in very real needs. Programmes, faced by organisational and political limitations, have difficulties addressing these expectations and needs. And while economic reintegration support doubtlessly benefits ex-combatants, as well as their families, the little available research suggests that the longer-term effects of reintegration support are limited.

Although the amount of economic reintegration support that was given differed in the three cases, they all included some goods and/or financial benefits, as well as training programmes of various lengths. But despite the articulated desire to adjust programmes to their specific context, the implementing organisations offer a similar set of training programmes focused on economic reintegration in the three case studies, as well as in other countries where DDR programmes are being implemented. These include training to work on a farm (often organised in ‘associations’ of a group of ex-combatants, sometimes also including other community members), set up a small business, start as motor-taxi driver, become a mechanic, carpenter, or tailor, and in some cities also computer training.

This support has to balance the high needs many ex-combatants have in the post-settlement context after being demobilised. They often reintegrate into communities where there is hardly any health care or education, and high levels of poverty. In some cases ex-combatants returned to find their houses destroyed and their family killed. And while DDR does not aim to rebuild houses and create jobs, the needs of ex-combatants returning after many years in the bush are nonetheless very real. Moreover, due to the delays of the payments in several of the DDR programmes, many ex-combatants had acquired debts. “We have a lot of debts now because in the transit site they told us to borrow money rather than to steal. There was no alternative so the interest rate was very high.”¹⁴⁶ But apart from high needs, there are also very high expectations among ex-combatants, partially raised by the DDR programme itself. As already mentioned, in South Sudan people were motivated to demobilise with stories about DDR being a pension or well-fare scheme. And also in Burundi armed groups spread the word that DDR would reward their combatants, in order to inflate the number of their ranks and to assure they would be taken serious in the peace negotiations (Nindorera, 2008: 12), something that also occurred in the DRC. But also those implementing DDR programmes themselves contributed to high expectations. While according to a UN official commenting on the programme for *Adultes Associés*, it was tried “not to make any hard promises,”¹⁴⁷ the flyer handed out to ex-combatants reads that in the end of the programme there will be “*opportunités de réintégration socio-économique durable a base communautaire.*”¹⁴⁸ Yet, at that time *Adultes Associés* programme did not have the funds for this and only

¹⁴⁶ Group discussion, Ex-combatant, CNDD-FDD, Rutegama, Muramvya, Burundi, 28 April 2010

¹⁴⁷ Interview, UN Official, SSR/SA Unit, Bujumbura, Burundi, 31 May 2010

¹⁴⁸ “Durable socio-economic reintegration opportunities at the community level”

included the possibility to participate in high intensity labour for a period of three months.¹⁴⁹

The '*radio trottoir*' – the rumours on the street – further raised expectations. For instance, in Burundi people claimed that in the DRC people had gotten a tenfold of the support they had gotten, and that ex-combatants in Rwanda were rewarded with houses with running water and electricity.¹⁵⁰ And when the president talked on the radio about benefits that had already been paid, this created the perception that these benefits would again be paid out.¹⁵¹ Raised expectations over what the DDR programme would bring in benefits are thus for a large part caused by the context of mouth-to-mouth communication in which rumours easily spread. Some ex-combatants also pointed out that they expected a reward for their efforts during the war, or that communities expected them to return with something in their pockets. These expectations are further raised by the presence of DDR programmes themselves, as both ex-combatants and other community members are aware that support is being given. DDR programmes aim to deal with raised expectations through sensitisation and informing about what support is given and why. Yet, at the same time, when information is misunderstood or not properly communicated, this can actually feed misperceptions and raise expectations.

Reintegration support is thus faced with high demands due to high expectations as well as very real needs among ex-combatants. It is therefore not surprising that ex-combatants generally consider the economic reintegration support to be insufficient. A common complaint, which already became evident above in the discussion of the reintegration programme in South Sudan, was that the time spent for reintegration programmes was far too short. In the DRC, the UNDP community reintegration programme in Ituri involved "*a three-day course in preparation for civilian life* and provides each former fighter with a \$50 allowance and each family with one month's supply of food" (*emphasis added*, Marriage, 2007: 292). Indeed, an FNI-spokesman asks whether such "marginal" assistance is really believed to change their war-mentality (quoted in: Bouta, 2005: 28). And in Burundi, some ex-combatants said they had received a total of two weeks of training, others had only received three or four days. "When we were in the bush we were like wild animals. Three days is not enough to prepare yourself psychologically for a return to civilian

¹⁴⁹ The allocation of new funds later allowed the implementation of a reintegration project at the community level. Yet at the time that the promises were being made the availability of the required funds was still highly uncertain. Interview, UNDP Official, Bujumbura, Burundi, 20 May 2010

¹⁵⁰ Group discussion, Ex-combatant CNDD-FDD, Mutaho, Gitega, Burundi, 10 May 2010

¹⁵¹ Local NGO meeting, Bujumbura, 16 June 2010

life. Also, you can't really use your kit after so little training."¹⁵² Therefore, while the total sum of benefits given in Burundi was rather large – with a total value of about US \$600 – many ex-combatants found it difficult to effectively use it because they did not have the capacity to handle money. The reintegration support often failed to take account of the limited educational background of the ex-combatants. Many had been recruited at a very young age, had not finished school or had not attended school at all, and had sometimes resided in the bush for more than a decade. A government representative explained with regard to ex-FAB combatants that they had always been fed and clothed by the military.

*They have no idea where their food comes from; they have never been to the market. And in the army all they ever had to use their money for was buying beer, so that is all they buy from their money now. It is a bad habit, but it is a sad reality.*¹⁵³

A related complaint concerned the limited follow-up support given after the distribution of a reintegration kit and the end of the training. According to a UN official involved in DDR, the lack of follow-up is “a big flaw in this programme, and in all DDR programmes. There needs to be follow-up, but donors are in too much of a rush.”¹⁵⁴ Moreover, in the DRC training to follow-up on UNDP programmes in which ex-combatants could work in road construction for three months, only took place in a small number of easily accessible cities¹⁵⁵ and most ex-combatants do not find their way into these programmes. And also where more extensive vocational training is given with an accompanying reintegration kit, hardly any follow-up is done. Yet, ex-combatants may fail to use their reintegration support to successfully reintegrate. A chief in North Kivu adequately illustrated this, saying that, “If you give a goat to someone poor, he will be hungry again after a few days.”¹⁵⁶

A lack of follow-up does not only mean that any gains from previously given support may be lost, but also that there is no real assessment of what happens after support has been distributed – i.e. an assessment of the results of the programme. And indeed few longer-term assessments measuring the success of the reintegration of ex-combatants have been undertaken. Those that have, support the findings of the research done in the three cases, suggesting little sustainable effect of economic reintegration support. A survey undertaken in the DRC in 2007 found that 68 per

¹⁵² Group discussion, Ex-combatant CNDD-FDD, Shombo, Karuzi, 13 May 2010

¹⁵³ Government official, Bujumbura, 16 June 2010

¹⁵⁴ Interview, UN official, Bunia, Ituri, DRC, 12 October 2009

¹⁵⁵ E.g. in South Kivu in Bukavu, Uvira and Kalehe.

¹⁵⁶ Interview, Chef de groupement, Malio, North Kivu, DRC, 23 October 2009

cent of the ex-combatants had achieved basic self-subsistence, however, severe limitations of the survey suggest that the number is far lower (MDRP/CONADER, 2007).¹⁵⁷ And while Gilligan and his colleagues suggest that the programme in Burundi “provided a significant income boost” (Gilligan et al, 2010: 1), their sample choice is rather problematic. They compared between a group who had “received their socio-economic reintegration packages no more than 9 months prior to our fieldwork” and who were still receiving cash instalments (equivalent to 18 months of salary) at the time of their fieldwork, and a group that had not yet received this assistance (ibid, 39). That the former group has significant more income than those who are not currently receiving a year-and-a-half’s worth of salary is unsurprising, and provides little evidence of a sustained effect of the DDR programme’s economic reintegration support. A World Bank report on selected components of the DDR programme in Burundi finds the success of economic reintegration uneven, and establishes that only two per cent of the ex-combatants were able to satisfy six basic needs¹⁵⁸ (World Bank, 2009). And quantitative studies assessing reintegration in Sierra Leone (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007) and Liberia (Lively, quoted in Gilligan et al, 2010) point out that the economic impact of DDR reintegration support is limited or non-existing. This supports the qualitative data collected in my three cases, which suggest that ex-combatants had great difficulties acquiring a stable income, despite the assistance they received through the DDR programme. This was consistently reported by ex-combatants themselves, community members, and key informants.

As mentioned, DDR should not be seen as a panacea for all economic problems in the post-settlement context, and DDR cannot create jobs. But this lack of evidence of the effects of economic reintegration support is problematic nonetheless, because it is to provide an alternative to the income from armed forces or groups, or criminal gangs. If this fails ex-combatants may want to take up their arms again for economic reasons. Several ex-combatants expressed that while life was hard in the bush, it was often much easier to get food and other items in the militias than in civilian life without a job. An ex-combatant in the DRC explained, “many of the young ones

¹⁵⁷ The survey did not reach ex-combatants in combat zones or in remote areas, the sample consisted of the first demobilised group who have received better reintegration kits than those demobilised later on, and because less than half of the selected sample responded there is likely to be a high self-selection bias.

¹⁵⁸ These six basic needs included access to potable water, decent housing, adequate clothing, eating at least twice a day, children’s education, and healthcare. 55 per cent could satisfy one of these needs, 22 per cent could cover two, and 14 per cent could cover four. Only two per cent could cover all (World Bank 2009: 19).

turn back as they do not have much future perspective and, thus, it is more difficult to convince them to stay.”¹⁵⁹

Social Reintegration: From ‘Demobilised’ to ‘Civilian’?

Programmes generally give some training, but social reintegration generally receives much less attention than economic reintegration support. Partly, this is because economic reintegration is more easily defined – i.e. having a sustainable livelihood – and more easily translated into material support. But there is also the assumption that economic independence of ex-combatants can support their reintegration process. On the one hand, this assumption holds, although the special support for ex-combatants can on the other hand also contribute to them being considered as ‘others’. Moreover, where economic reintegration is lacking this stimulates the stigmatisation of ex-combatants.

In all DDR programmes in the three countries, much less attention was given to the social component of reintegration. During the time spent in the demobilisation site, often some time was reserved for training aimed at social reintegration. This generally included information on how to be ‘a good civilian’, how to peacefully resolve conflicts within the community, and some also included information on HIV/AIDS and human rights. Such training programmes lasted between a few hours and a number of days, up to a maximum of two weeks during which also other information (on how to use the kit for economic reintegration) was given. This caused some communities to feel that “demobilised are just dumped in the communities while they still have a military mindset.”¹⁶⁰ Also ex-combatants themselves felt that this support was insufficient.

Reintegration efforts have also largely focused on ex-combatants, leaving the receiving end of the community aside. The training given during demobilisation primarily focused on the resolution of small-scale conflict and the prevention of stigmatisation and hardly any attention has been given to psychosocial rehabilitation and reconciliation. Communities were hardly prepared for the arrival of ex-combatants and not supported in receiving them. In some communities, local NGOs filled this gap and helped sensitise and prepare communities, yet these organisations often had very limited resources and this was not a widespread phenomenon. Furthermore, the special support given to ex-combatants itself also contributed to the creation of differences. As one community member in Burundi

¹⁵⁹ Group discussion, Ex-combatant, Bunyakiri, South Kivu, DRC, 2 December 2009

¹⁶⁰ Group discussion, Community member, Bunyakiri, South Kivu, DRC, 2 December 2009

explained that, “everybody was affected by the war and we are all detached in some way. One person does not need more help than the other. When one group of people then receives more than another that is difficult to accept.”¹⁶¹ Moreover, as ex-combatants had received support through DDR, in some communities they were excluded from community development projects and related employment opportunities. Regarding this aspect, as argued by Geenen (2008: 137), “ironically, a programme that has been designed to facilitate cohabitation between demobilised and the rest of the population seems to have the opposite effect.”¹⁶²

The special support given to ex-combatants can also create expectations within communities that ex-combatants can provide for themselves or even that they can and will provide something for the community as a whole. A representative of a local NGO in Burundi explained that, “the village vibrates when they hear what ex-combatants get.”¹⁶³ And in some communities ex-combatants are even expected to bring something back from the war. In South Sudan certain ex-combatants could raid cattle when they were in the armed groups. “But now they can’t do that anymore they are seen as useless.”¹⁶⁴ And an ex-combatant in Burundi explained that, “the fact that we fought during the war and came back without any support for the community is looked down upon. They expect us to come back from the war with something for the community.”¹⁶⁵ When coming back without any benefits for the community and lacking capacities to find work and contribute economically, ex-combatants were considered futile or even a burden. The idleness and economic problems of many combatants also hampered their social reintegration, as those contributed to stigmatisation and the perception that ex-combatants were criminals:

*In Burundi it is normal for people to think bad things of people who do not work or go to school. Ex-combatants often do not have any work and when there are problems they are indeed often suspect. When they returned they fell into a situation where they have nothing to do. So when there is crime, people think it was them because they have nothing on their hands.*¹⁶⁶

The amount of social problems and tensions between reintegrating ex-combatants and communities of return differs significantly. This largely depends on factors

¹⁶¹ Group discussion, Community member, Kabezi, Bujumbura Rurale, Burundi, 15 June 2010

¹⁶² Translated from French: “Ironiquement, un programme qui a été conçu pour faciliter la cohabitation entre les démobilisés et le reste de la population semble avoir des effets opposés.”

¹⁶³ Discussion meeting, Representative local NGO, Gitega, Gitega, Burundi, 10 June 2010

¹⁶⁴ Group discussion, Ex-combatants, Torit, EES, South Sudan, 15 April 2011

¹⁶⁵ Group discussion, Ex-combatant FNL, Kabezi, Bujumbura Rurale, Burundi 21 April 2010

¹⁶⁶ Group discussion, Community member, Kibimba, Gitega, Burundi, 9 June 2010

discussed earlier, such as the amount of ex-combatants relative to the population, whether ex-combatants are perceived as victors or perpetrators, etc. But stigmatisation and being considered 'the usual suspects' when a crime occurs is considered by ex-combatants to be a great hindrance for their reintegration. As an ex-combatant in the DRC explained, "it is hard to live with the word 'demobilised' attached to you. We have to do something to change this name."¹⁶⁷ And in Burundi ex-combatants mentioned they tried to evade stigmatisation by moving to larger cities where people would not necessarily recognise you as an ex-combatant. Many of the community members expressed discomfort with the presence of many ex-combatants, feeling they posed a threat to their security. In South Sudan, Ashkenazi and his colleagues found that "ex-combatants are the most feared group of returnees" (Ashkenazi et al, 2008: 18). And a survey undertaken by Oxfam Novib showed that 80% of the people interviewed perceived ex-combatants a threat to security.¹⁶⁸ The stigmatisation of ex-combatants hinders social reintegration, not only as it obstructs acceptance in civilian society, but also because it continuously reinforces a deviant status, and thereby deviant behaviour.¹⁶⁹

Of course this does not mean that complaints of community members about the behaviour of ex-combatants are never justified. The discussions with community members brought up various instances of how ex-combatants remained violent in their home situations and were involved in rape and crime. There are also ex-combatants who expressed a feeling of superiority, or the idea that their efforts during the war should be rewarded. In South Sudan a local working with an international NGO complained about a particular group of ex-combatants that, "when they have nothing, they want to grab things by force. They can put a road block and demand things by force. They say 'I fought for this, I lost my leg for you, so I can take this.' That is their spirit."¹⁷⁰ Ex-combatants are also troubled by psychological problems and trauma, and many of them complained about sleeping badly and having nightmares. As one ex-combatant in Burundi aptly described, "there are still bullets and grenade fragments in our bodies and a spirit of war in our heads."¹⁷¹ Overall, hardly any psychological support is given and a government

¹⁶⁷ Group discussion, Ex-combatant, Bunyakiri, South Kivu, DRC, 2 December 2009

¹⁶⁸ Discussion meeting, Representative International NGO, Bujumbura, Burundi, 17 June 2010

¹⁶⁹ 'Labelling theory' argues that stigmatised individuals can begin to assume the deviant identity ascribed to them (cf. Lemert, 1951; Becker, 1963). Critics of this theory rightly argue that behaviour is not *necessarily* affected by stigmatisation, and a causal effect is not self-evident (cf. Fernald and Gettys, 1980; Bench and Allen, 2003), but studies have found that stigmatisation *can* evoke the behaviour that the stigma prescribes (cf. Jussim, et al. 2000: 395-96).

¹⁷⁰ Interview, Representative International NGO, Juba, South Sudan, 30 March 2011

¹⁷¹ Group discussion, Ex-combatant FNL, Kabezi, Bujumbura Rurale, Burundi, 21 April 2010

representative in Burundi argued that, “it is nature that has to solve things.”¹⁷² This is problematic, as psychosocial problems and trauma can lead to violent behaviour and substance abuse.

Towards Reconciliation?

Discussing the social reintegration process with ex-combatants and communities alike, also questions of reconciliation and transitional justice come to the surface. The question, however, is to what extent reintegration programmes can be expected to contribute to this. While these issues may be part of the social reintegration process, it proves to be difficult to address these issues programmatically, both within the DDR programme itself and within wider efforts of peacebuilding and statebuilding.

Apart from psychosocial problems and difficulties with adjusting to a new social status and a different socially accepted behaviour in civilian life, past violence also factor hinders reintegration. Especially those ex-combatants who were involved in violence within their own region have more difficulties finding acceptance. An ex-combatant in Torit explained that, “some may have killed by accident in the community. So when they come back there is still that feeling. In that situation the welcoming is not good and you always feel isolated.”¹⁷³ Communities often experienced a lot of violence, sometimes by the hands of the same groups – or even the same individual combatants – who are now living in these communities. Community members were forced to help armed groups with transport and supplies, villages were pillaged and women were raped: “Different things happened in the war. I myself was violated in front of my children. Now we continue to live together without talking.”¹⁷⁴ And even when at first sight people are living together without direct violence, under the surface the problems of the past often persist. In Burundi, many communities and ex-combatants said that cohabitation has improved; something that has also been reported by Uvin (2007: 21). In addition, Mvukiyehe, Taylor and Samii (2006: 29) found that “only 12% of ex-combatants reported problems with family and 22% reported problems with neighbours or community.” However, these positive numbers were opposed by Burundians working with these communities and ex-combatants on a daily basis:

¹⁷² Interview, Government official, Bujumbura, Burundi, 19 May 2010

¹⁷³ Group discussion, Ex-combatants, Torit, EES, South Sudan, 15 April 2011

¹⁷⁴ Interview, Community member, Mutimbuzi, Bujumbura Rurale, Burundi, 15 June 2010

You may say that there is reconciliation because people are living together. But this does not mean that they are forgiven. People live together without loving each other, without having forgiven each other.

[...]

You have to keep in mind the conflicts in Burundi, the things that happened in '72 and that came back in '93, that are still there. We Burundians do forget little. The good things people in Burundi do not remember, but unfortunately the bad things are never forgotten. Somebody who lost his son 30 years ago, he will take revenge. We Burundians do not forget.¹⁷⁵

Linked to the minimalist-maximalist debate mentioned earlier in this chapter, this raises the question to what extent issues of reconciliation and transitional justice should be included in reintegration programmes. Especially where the perpetrators of past violence are integrating into communities that have been victims, reconciliation is arguably a requirement for reintegration. But reconciliation, like reintegration, is a concept difficult to define. While reconciliation is sometimes seen as basically a method of creating encounters between parties in conflict to restore relationships (cf. Assefa, 2005), more often it is defined as a process, including elements like truth, healing, forgiveness, but also reparation and justice (Lederach, 1997; Huyse, 2003), while sometimes it is defined as an end-goal (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004). Discussions on reconciliation often concern the extent to which reconciliation mechanisms are based on western Christian principles or concepts of justice rather than local practices (cf. Shaw, 2005), or are about the relative importance and necessary order of those elements. To achieve reconciliation, it is for instance discussed in how far acknowledgement of past injustices need be accompanied by measures to redress those, or to prevent them from re-occurring. Or it is pointed out that to be effective, reconciliation might need economic development and changes in living conditions. Consequently, reconciliation has become as slippery a concept to define as reintegration (cf. Bloomfield, 2006). Nonetheless, reconciliation is considered vital for social reintegration, as has been pointed out in various post-conflict situations in Africa. For instance, the return of former child soldiers in Sierra Leone and Northern Uganda required a comprehensive process of reconciliation to prevent rejection in their home communities (cf. Veale and Stavrou, 2007; Stovel, 2008). The UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR also considers reconciliation a critical element of social reintegration of ex-combatants (UN IAWG, 2006).¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ Discussion meeting, representatives local NGOs, Gitega, Gitega, Burundi, 10 June 2010

¹⁷⁶ For other cases on the linkages between reconciliation and reintegration, cf. Giniifer (2003: 46) on Sierra Leone, Matsumoto (2008) and Fair (2010: 13-15) on Afghanistan. Similar arguments have also been made with regard to the reintegration of refugees, c.f. Rodicio (2001: 133) on Cambodia.

However, Sriram and Herman (2009: 466) note that so far there is no serious discussion as to what reconciliation means in the context of DDR or about how to measure success. Some consider reconciliation as a crucial aspect of DDR. For instance, in the context of the International Conference on Afghanistan in London, there was discussion on to what extent reconciliation is in fact a precondition for the reintegration of ex-combatants. More in general, it is argued that if DDR is to contribute to a reduction of arms and long-term security at community level, this requires confidence building and diminishing tensions between ex-combatants and communities of return, especially if ex-combatants or the armed group in which they participated have committed atrocities in those very communities (cf. Ginifer, 2003; Alusala, 2005). Indeed, some have called to directly address reconciliation in DDR programmes, for instance through the organisation of community dialogues, public healing ceremonies and traditional cleansing rituals, or through the creation of transitional justice instruments (CICS, 2006). To contribute to reconciliation, some authors suggest that DDR might be strategically linked to community development activities, or that ex-combatants should be specifically included in development activities, like construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure and schools, or sensitisation campaigns for civilian disarmament (cf. Leff, 2008; Thusi, 2004; USAID, 2005b).

During my research, the issue of reconciliation and transitional justice came most clearly to the fore as being part of the reintegration process in Burundi. But discussing the connection between DDR and reconciliation in Burundi, the opinions of community members, ex-combatants, and representatives of local and international NGOs differed greatly. On the one hand there are those who feel the need to discuss the past before there can be true reintegration and peaceful development. On the other hand, there is a lot of fear that addressing past violence will create more problems. Not only are people afraid of raising tensions by addressing the past, but also do they fear repercussions by those who will be incriminated, either directly or after they have served their sentence. For such reasons, people pragmatically argued that past crimes should just be forgotten. "They have stolen and killed during the crisis, but if you ask them to compensate that, you risk that they want to go back to the bush or go into crime."¹⁷⁷ And for those that argue that the past needs to be addressed, the question remains when and how this should be done. With regard to timing, some people felt that more stability is needed to reduce the risk of renewed violence when dealing with the sensitive issues of the past. There was also no agreement about the level on which

¹⁷⁷ Group discussion, Community member, Ruyigi, Ruyigi, Burundi, 7 May 2010

reconciliation and transitional justice should be addressed. Many people favoured an approach that focused on the community level, as they believed the issues are most urgent there. Others feared that when undertaken at a national level, transitional justice mechanisms would be used by the politicians in power to take revenge and bury their own crimes:

Transitional justice is going to be very difficult because people will all lie. Innocent people will be jailed and the big fish will walk. For the local level this will have little impact on impunity as people will not believe in the process. It will be more a façade the government puts up for the international community.¹⁷⁸

On the other hand, it was argued that not addressing the issue at a national level will leave the higher politicians out of the loop, who arguably need to be punished if the process wants to bring about any change. Also, some people believed that at the local level there is no professional capacity to deal with issues such as rape and killings.

This brings us back to the discussion between minimalist and maximalist approaches to DDR described in the earlier in this chapter. It became clear during the research that past violence can severely hinder reintegration of ex-combatants in communities of return. Yet, opinions differ greatly on whether it is possible to address these issues, and if so, how and when to do this. Clearly, reintegration processes are far too complex to be managed and controlled with reintegration programmes, or other additional support programmes. DDR is essentially a security intervention aimed at mitigating a potential threat. Yet, the reintegration processes on the ground are also economic and social in nature, and even relate to other complex processes of reconciliation and transitional justice.

Concluding remarks

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the IDDRS – the most prominent policy guidelines on DDR, which are guiding for the UN and is also used by other organisations and donors – finds the ultimate objective of DDR to be the sustainable social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants (UN IAWG, 2006: 4.30, 1). The ambitions set for reintegration programmes are thus very high; basically aiming to dismantle armed groups and support a process where the civilian communities that

¹⁷⁸ Discussion meeting, Representative international development organisation, Bujumbura, Burundi, 21 July 2010

suffered the brunt of the conflict are expected to adopt the individual ex-combatants. Problematic here is that the ultimate objective set for the DDR programme is the outcome of a very broad and complex process, involving both economic and social factors. This process involves the individual ex-combatants, the communities in which they reintegrate, as well as the wider social, political and economical context, and is thus influenced by a great number of contextual factors that cannot simply be adjusted by the DDR programme.

Where the DDR process is considered to be important in the promotion of peace and stability in the post-settlement context, looking at the reintegration processes on the ground, the contributions of DDR programmes to this process has shown to be limited. With regard to economic reintegration, success factors are often easily defined: economic reintegration is achieved when an ex-combatant acquires sustainable employment and income. With regard to this, the effects of reintegration support have overall been limited and uneven, and many ex-combatants continue to struggle for an income. Indeed, the context in which reintegration programmes operate is difficult, and DDR cannot be expected to rebuild the economy in the post-settlement context. The success of economic reintegration of ex-combatants is strongly affected by wider recovery and development, for instance the economic growth and resilience of livelihoods of the communities in which they resettle. But the lack of evidence of the effects of economic reintegration support is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, DDR is in direct competition with rebel groups, criminal gangs and political entrepreneurs, and if it fails ex-combatants may want to take up their arms again for economic reasons. Secondly, the failure of economic reintegration not only hinders their economic independence, but also has a direct impact on social reintegration, contributing to their stigmatisation. Compared to economic reintegration, the success of social reintegration is much more problematic to define. When investigating the issue of social reintegration in practice, the requirements for proper social reintegration seem to quickly slide from 'cohabitation' to 'reconciliation'. DDR cannot be expected to reconcile the victims and perpetrators of the conflict. Reconciliation processes are as complicated as reintegration, and there is no general agreement on how reconciliation can best be facilitated. That said, when events of the past remain to cause friction, the reintegration of ex-combatants is severely hampered. Because DDR programmes cannot do it all, it is often simply expected of communities that they accept ex-combatants and support their reintegration process.

Reintegration programmes cannot manage or steer the complex and multi-faceted reintegration processes it aims to influence, and can positively impact them at best. Furthermore, reintegration support has also had effects contrary to its goals, with

the support provided by programmes being used for other purposes or people joining armed movements precisely because of the benefits DDR programmes provide. In many cases, reintegration programmes are reviewed with much criticism as they often fail to successfully reintegrate a desired percentage of the target group. However, this chapter does not aim to attack these programmes or refute them altogether, as they in many cases offer an important contribution to the reintegration of individual ex-combatants. Rather, it shows how these programmes are one of a variety of factors influencing reintegration processes, and that many of these other factors are outside of the programmes' control. Investigating the interaction between international actors designing and supporting security interventions and actors at the local level, it also becomes clear that these international actors do not simply relate to local actors as beneficiaries. Instead, ex-combatants are involved in reintegration processes which include their own personal experiences and take place in a wider social context. Programmes of intervening actors try to manage the complex reintegration processes, just as at the national level discussed in the previous chapter, interventions become part of local processes and lose control over what they desire to influence.

Trying to manage the complex processes and steer them to the desired outcome, the programmes of interventions aimed at supporting reintegration have over the years expanded and become more complex. DDR programmes have over the past decades, like the evolving of interventions from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and development, broadened in size and scope. Acknowledging that reintegration is in essence a long-term process, reintegration support has been distinguished from reinsertion support and became more elaborated. Where previously only a limited support package was given, now a variety of vocational training programmes are offered and there are debates among policy makers and practitioners about what other aspects – e.g. reconciliation and transitional justice, but also gender issues – need to be included or linked to DDR programmes. Yet, at the same time this complexity hinders the manageability of interventions. The minimalist-maximalist debate discussed here illustrates how international actors are struggling with this dilemma. Moreover, the involvement of new actors in the ever-expanding programmes not only complicates manageability, but also stimulates the hybridity of interventions discussed in the previous chapter.

The following chapter shifts the analysis to the arena of interaction between local non-state actors and state actors involved in security provision. Reintegration programmes aim to move ex-combatants from armed groups into civilian life, and prevent them from taking part in armed violence and crime. Through the DDR programme, violent means are to be brought under control of the state, which is to

be democratised and reformed through the SSR interventions discussed in chapter 5. The next chapter brings in local perspectives on security provision, and the security dynamics at the local level.

Chapter 7. Dynamics of Security on the Ground

Whereas the previous two chapters discussed security interventions in relation to the national and the local levels respectively, this chapter looks at the arena of interaction between state and non-state actors in security provision at the local level. In other words, what is happening on the ground in the context in which security interventions take place? The chapter is guided by sub-question V, looking at how local and national perceptions and practices of security relate to each other. While international actors may not necessarily interact with these local non-state actors, this arena of interaction does greatly affect the ways in which security is experienced by people living in the contexts where security interventions are implemented. Indeed, the dynamics between the different perceptions and practices of state and non-state actors are key to understanding security provision. The results of these interactions could furthermore be considered to be instable processes of state formation, which are ongoing in contexts where statebuilding interventions are implemented. While local non-state initiatives and institutions involved in security provision are often relatively disconnected from the larger statebuilding efforts, they are deeply connected to these processes of state formation. And where the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence is considered a crucial aspect for statebuilding interventions, it is important to look at how violent means are dispersed and negotiated over in the arena of interaction between state and local level actors, and how new and unstable deals are created over security provision.

The first section therefore takes a closer look at how security is defined and perceived at the community level, followed by a discussion of the actors involved in security provision. Security is interpreted broadly, leaving room for differences between what aspects of security are prioritised by different actors. The differences in norms and interests and priorities also determine the relationships between the various actors involved in the provisioning of security. The respondents in this research described an image of the state as being responsible for the provision of their security, and the idea of the state promoted by security interventions seems to be relatively present. But due to its absence or failing to provide the security required by people they also put their claims in front of other security actors. And the different non-state actors emerge not only if the state is absent or failing, but

also where state security provision is not considered to be in line with local norms and priorities.

The second part of the chapter focuses on three particular cases that were encountered during my field research, to look closer at the interactions between these non-state initiatives or institutions involved in security provisioning and the state. In Eastern DRC, the *Réseaux Haki na Amani* was organised with support of an international NGO, reinventing traditional conflict resolution mechanisms at the local level after a period of conflict in a context with a relatively weak state.¹⁷⁹ In Burundi, the *Bashingantahe* are a long-standing traditional institution whose position has been affected by relatively strong states, yet it continues to play an important role. In South Sudan the Arrow Boys have been organised to counter the LRA in absence of adequate state security provision, which in their turn have met resistance from the state. In these three cases a particular focus is on the relationship between state and non-state actors in security provision. These examples are not only chosen to provide contextual examples of the interactions between state and non-state actors, but they also illustrate three points. First, non-state actors are not easily categorised into cooperating, confronting or competing with the state, and may in fact do all at the same time. Second, non-state institutions are not readily incorporable into the state or easily sidelined, especially when this undermines security provision according to local norms and priorities. And third, non-state security actors flourish where the state is considered not to provide adequate security according to local norms and priorities.

Local Perspectives on Security

In chapter 4 the concept of security has been discussed from a theoretical perspective. Here, this discussion is linked to the interpretations and perceptions of security as it was described by people in Eastern DRC, Burundi and South Sudan. Talking to people in the places where security interventions take place, what does security mean to them?

The first things people mentioned almost always related to physical security: the absence of war and crime, freedom to walk around, walk, no arbitrary arrests and living without fear. As has been discussed in more detail in chapter 5, security problems included the persistence of armed groups and political violence, but also shifted to criminality and armed assaults and robberies. Furthermore, land conflicts

¹⁷⁹ Although it is not clear how 'traditional' the mechanism really is, and some indicate that it was a colonial construct.

remained a cause of insecurity in the DRC and Burundi, whereas pastoralist clashes continued in South Sudan. Sexual violence was also often mentioned, relating both to sexual violence by (state and non-state) armed actors and violence within the household. In all cases, the state security forces responsible for the provision of security were also considered a security threat. In the DRC, one out of five people identified the FARDC as one of the main elements generating insecurity (Berghezan and Zeebroek, 2011: 115), and in South Sudan almost a quarter found the SPLA to be a source of insecurity (Lokuji, Abatneh and Wani, 2009: 11). In many cases, this related to extortion of 'taxes'. For instance, in one community in the DRC it was mentioned that the market was open less days than before, because the police asked large amounts of money of vendors who want to sell their goods.¹⁸⁰

But security was also assessed in a broader sense. Living without hunger and poverty, freedom of expression, access to safe water, healthcare, schooling, and good roads were often mentioned as components of security. In other words: "security covers everything."¹⁸¹ This image of a broad interpretation of security also emerged out of several quantitative surveys conducted in Eastern DRC, Burundi and South Sudan. In Eastern DRC, a survey undertaken late 2007 of over 2,600 people in the Kivus and Ituri found that peace (51 per cent) and security (34 per cent) were most frequently reported as priorities for the improvement of living conditions. This was followed by livelihood concerns, such as education (26 per cent) and food and water (26 per cent) (Vinck et al, 2008: 23). A survey of the Small Arms Survey covering 1,567 households in six of Burundi's seventeen provinces found that, "Burundians are mainly concerned with development problems—in the broadest sense of the term, covering questions of poverty and lack of infrastructure" (Pézard and De Tessières, 2009: 41). A survey by a Burundian research institute with 2,260 respondents in all seventeen provinces found that while 71.6 per cent mentioned criminality as a principal factor contributing to insecurity, 41.6 per cent of the respondents mentioned poverty and unemployment (Habimana, 2009: 19). The International Republican Institute's survey among 2,225 respondents in the whole of South Sudan found that food shortages were considered the most pressing concern, followed by health and unemployment (IRI, 2011). And a Small Arms Survey research conducted in Eastern Equatoria found lacking health facilities was a primary concern, followed by food, and then physical security threats (Mc Evoy and Murray, 2008: 40). People thus consider security to be something that is much broader than just physical security and the absence of violence.

¹⁸⁰ Discussion group, Community members, Rona, Mahagi, Ituri, DRC, 2 October 2009

¹⁸¹ Group discussion, Youth, Bor, Jonglei, South Sudan, 22 March 2011

Security is seen in terms of what is referred to as human security in policy and academia. Security and development were also seen as influential on each other. On the one hand, people mentioned that they required physical security to graze their cattle, work on their land or go to the market. “Without security you cannot do anything and not go anywhere [...] it’s like your hands are tied behind your back.”¹⁸² On the other hand, the lack of development was considered a cause of physical insecurity, as for instance poor road conditions prevented security providers to respond in time. Poverty was also seen as a direct cause of criminality. As a community member in Burundi remarked: “Poverty is the beginning of insecurity. When people are not satisfied the insecurity starts.”¹⁸³ As such, the way security was defined at the local level relates both to negative peace and positive peace as described by Galtung; both the absence of direct threats to physical security as issues relating to broader human security.

The main concern of security interventions – and of this research – relates to direct violence that poses a threat to physical security. However, this broader interpretation of security is important to mention. Not only is it how people view security in the places where security interventions are implemented – and thus important to acknowledge if these interventions are to serve their security interests in the end – but also does it explain a large variety of security interests on the ground. In other words, because security is not narrowly defined, different actors set different priorities. Before turning to these different priorities, the following section first looks closer at the different actors involved in security provision in the cases studied.

Who is Involved in Security Provision?

As has been discussed in chapter 2, control over violent means is dispersed and various authority structures overlap, cooperate and compete. As a result, there is a variety of actors involved in the provision of security, rather than state actors exclusively as is assumed in the ideal state model. When talking to respondents in local communities in the three countries where research has been undertaken, a large variety of actors are mentioned as being involved in the provision of security. Apart from state actors, such as the army and the police, there are traditional chiefs, NGOs and communities, ranging from ad hoc responses to an incident to organised

¹⁸² Group discussion, Women, Bor, Jonglei, South Sudan, 21 March 2011

¹⁸³ Discussion group, Community member, Bubanza, Bubanza, Burundi, 1 June 2010

vigilante¹⁸⁴ groups. This section shortly discusses these different actors in Eastern DRC, Burundi and South Sudan.

The largest state security provider is the army, although as has been discussed in chapter 5 this is far from a unitary actor. The FARDC, FDNB and SPLA are the results of agreements and consist of a variety of groups wearing the uniform of the new national army. Internal differences can therefore hinder the provision of security. In the case of South Sudan, the top leadership even openly discussed how dysfunctional the SPLA was in the presence of outsiders and with the doors open and personnel walking in and out.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, these armies are not necessarily working in the interest of communities, something that will be discussed in more detail shortly. There are also problems with regard to training and equipment, as well as delays in payment of salaries, all of which security interventions are struggling to deal with. A sad anecdote from the DRC exemplifies, where days after the completion of a EUSEC programme aimed at streamlining the payments for the FARDC in Ituri, the accountant fled with the monthly payments of all FARDC soldiers in the Ituri region.¹⁸⁶ The irregular pay of salaries contributes further to the harassment and taxation of the population.¹⁸⁷ Although problems were certainly reported, the FDNB was considered more disciplined compared to the FARDC and the SPLA. This is because the former army was a well-respected and organised institution and because the better organised elements close to the CNDD-FDD leadership were favoured for positions in the army. Furthermore, the military was not regularly involved in daily security provision, and civilians did not regularly interact with them.

As discussed, also with the police problems such as a lack of training, poor equipment, delayed payments of salaries, and abuse of force are endemic. The new police forces consist to a greater or lesser extent of combatants from the former armed forces and rebel groups. Because they generally favour positions in the army – which is where the power is, and which is often considered more respectable –

¹⁸⁴ Vigilantism has six defining characteristics: 1) it involves planning and premeditation by those engaging in it, 2) its participants are private citizens whose engagement is voluntary, 3) it constitutes a rudimentary populist movement mobilised around a rationality of activism, 4) it uses force or the threat of force, 5) it arises when an established order is under threat from the transgression, the potential transgression or the imputed transgression of institutionalised norms, and 6) it aims to control crimes or other social infractions by providing assurances of security to both participants and others (Johnson, 1996; 2001).

¹⁸⁵ Interview, South Sudan expert, Juba, South Sudan, 30 March 2011

¹⁸⁶ Interview, UN official, Bunia, Ituri, DRC, 09 October 2009

¹⁸⁷ It should be noted, however, that the payment of salaries does not necessarily prevent harassment and extralegal economic activities by army battalions (cf. Baaz and Stern, 2010: 34).

those ending up in the police are not always the best recruits. There were many complaints that the police were too far away to be effective, as they arrived long after a crime had been committed. Furthermore, they were considered too small in number to effectively confront the security problems at hand.¹⁸⁸ The police in Kapoeta in South Sudan admitted openly to be outgunned and outmanned by the pastoralist population.¹⁸⁹ Yet, because the government budgets of most post-settlement countries do not allow maintaining a large security force, there is often pressure by donors to downsize. This does not mean a larger police force would lead to improved security provision. Complaints over bribery and having to pay for processing are widespread. In the words of two community members in the DRC: “they do not intervene where troubles are, but where the money is,”¹⁹⁰ and “We are concerned with justice and the police wants money. We have no money and the police are not interested in justice.”¹⁹¹ People complained that instead of protecting the people they aim their weapons at the population, and there are rumours that policemen liaise with criminals by offering them their uniforms and weapons in return for some money (cf. for Burundi: CENAP, 2008: 86). As explained during one interview: “Policing is not a job. It is based on power and politics, and people just take up the uniform and the weapon of their father and they are police just like that.”¹⁹² In other words: being a policeman entails not (only) a government function with a duty to protect the civilian population, but also a position that implies power and the possibility to extract resources for personal gain. In those places where the police was perceived to work in favour of the security of the civilian population, this often was due to regular meetings and open discussions between the community, the local administration and the police, which strengthened internal relations and created a form of accountability.

Apart from the police, there were in all cases numerous reports of corruption within the state judicial system. A study of the justice system in Sudan found that rather than using statutory law as a guideline and basis for decision-making, the law was used as a power tool that reinforced officialness of a decision that had already been made (Leonardi et al, 2010: 34). When criminals were released by the system, this

¹⁸⁸ For instance, in Burundi the CIA World Factbook estimates the population to be 10,557,259 in July 2012 (CIA, 2012), and the target number for the police was set at 15,000. This is 142 police per 100,000 people, compared to 205 in China, 226 in the UK, 292 in the US, 296 in the Netherlands, 370 in Brazil, 434 in Belgium and 493 in Spain (Small Arms Survey, 2011d: 104).

¹⁸⁹ Interview, Acting chief of police, Kapoeta, EES, South Sudan, 18 April 2011

¹⁹⁰ Discussion group, Community member, Luvangiri, Djugu, Ituri, DRC, 19 October 2009

¹⁹¹ Discussion group, community member, Uguru, Mahagi, Ituri, DRC, 1 October 2009

¹⁹² Interview, Local research institute, Bujumbura, Burundi, 20 May 2010

also reflected negatively on the police who made the arrest. Furthermore, when the judicial system is vulnerable to bribery, it disadvantages the poor.

In Africa, a system of chiefs is a widespread phenomenon and many problems within the community are brought to the chief. Issues may range from personal and family conflicts to smaller land conflicts, but can also include heavier cases including violence, murder and rape. In such cases, the chiefs often refer a case to other authorities, such as the police or the local government. In certain areas the position of the chief was well-respected and held much influence in communal life. This phenomenon has led many donors to see the system of chiefs as a possible interlocutor and talk about “getting the strength of the chiefs and the traditional structures back.”¹⁹³ And while this differs greatly per community, the position of the chief has been subject to erosion. One reason for this is the widespread proliferation of arms, and the consequential loss of the chief’s capacity to deal with the security issues at hand. Furthermore, the system of chiefs is not present everywhere, and has in certain regions been installed by the colonial government (cf. Schomerus and Allen, 2010: 37). As discussed in chapter 2, also existing chiefs were incorporated in the colonial system, although the levels in which this was achieved differed greatly. After decolonisation, similar actions were undertaken by some of the ruling elites in an attempt to gain control over their territories. For instance, during conflict in South Sudan the SPLA tended to install chiefs in their areas of control that were loyal to the SPLA, bypassing ‘proper’ procedures and community consultation. These chiefs were then more accountable to the ruling elite than the community, which further deteriorated their standing within the community. The legitimacy chiefs have, and therewith the capacity to handle security problems in the community, is then very much dependent on the particular histories and political context, and differs greatly per community.

Apart from state institutions, communities also organise their own security provision. This is not only because people often have their reservations about the state security forces – due to their poor functioning and an often repressive nature of the state during in the colonial era and thereafter – but also because people have long histories of organizing their own security. Moreover, in a form of mediated statehood, state actors have also encouraged non-state actors to be involved in the provision of security. In South Sudan for instance, several state officials expressed

¹⁹³ Interview, Representative international NGO, Juba, South Sudan, 29 March 2011

the desire to use a system of community members patrolling when and where the police was unavailable.¹⁹⁴

There is a great variety of ways in which communities organise themselves in response to security problems. Often people make noise to alert the rest of the community and call for help. “We have an alarm system that works with drums to warn people when danger is coming.”¹⁹⁵ People also organise themselves, in most cases on an ad hoc basis, to patrol an area where theft has become common and chase – and sometimes catch – the suspect in case of a new attempt. In Gitega province in Burundi, people explained they organised a system of several groups of ten people, each taking shifts during night patrols around the village. “With this system the whole community is unified and works together like we are one. Security is not something individual, but it means working together.”¹⁹⁶ Another example of such ‘home guard’ systems is that of the Arrow Boys in South Sudan in response to the LRA, which will be discussed later in this chapter. An obvious risk with these neighbourhood patrols is that it can easily result in mob justice, where individuals are beaten or killed for suspected theft. The following comments made during a discussion with community members in Burundi illustrate this: “We don’t do an investigation when we catch criminals on the spot. [...] Waiting for an investigation is useless because they don’t come anyway. [...] we intervene and we kill the criminals because otherwise they will be released.”¹⁹⁷ Furthermore, the distinction between well organised home guard systems and militias is rather vague. This is exemplified by the Mai Mai in the DRC, which initially started off as community defence forces.

Other forms in which communities organise themselves are in traditional structures – or ‘reinvented’ traditional structures – in which security problems are addressed through dialogue. Two examples are the *Bashingantahe* in Burundi and *Haki na Amani* in Eastern DRC, both of which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Another example is that of the *Kyaghandanda*¹⁹⁸ of the Nande people in Northern Kivu province, which is most influential in the Beni-Lubero axis. It has now developed into a more modern structure, with a regional headquarters in Beni and international support from the Nande diasporas in Europe, the US and Canada.

¹⁹⁴ Interview, GoSS Jonglei State Representative, Bor, Jonglei, South Sudan, 23 March 2011; Interview, GoSS EES State Representative, Torit, EES, South Sudan, 15 April 2011

¹⁹⁵ Conversation with village chiefs, Paryak, Bor County, Jonglei, South Sudan, 24 March 2011

¹⁹⁶ Discussion group, Community member, Gitega Ruhoba, Gitega, Burundi, 4 May 2010

¹⁹⁷ Discussion group, Community members, Rumonge, Bururi, Burundi, 26 May 2010

¹⁹⁸ In its origin of the word *kyaghandanda* refers the traditional veranda of the houses of the Nande, which is a place for meetings, discussions and customary rituals (Mwana wa vene, 2005).

Within this system, people “talk about development related issues (health, food, schooling), security and [it] has a large role within the community.”¹⁹⁹ Apart from such structural platforms for discussions, communities also organise peace meetings or conferences to resolve conflicts and problems between communities. Especially in the pastoralist regions of South Sudan this was a practice that was often mentioned. Problematic, however, was the lack of permanent success of many of these conferences. This is oftentimes attributed to lacking participation of the entire community rather than only chiefs and spokespersons for sections of the community, as well as to the lack of follow-up mechanisms.

Interestingly, NGOs and church affiliated organisations were mentioned by communities as security providers as well. Especially with smaller matters communities often ask local NGOs for advice or even to assist in resolution. The reasons why these organisations are approached for security issues was because they resolved conflicts through listening and dialogue, and thereby followed an approach many communities are traditionally accustomed to. Another important factor is their perceived neutrality.

Securing What and for Whom?

The reality is thus one of a multitude of actors, both state and non-state, involved in the provision of security (and insecurity). In other words, control over violent means is dispersed among different actors. And as discussed in the first section of this chapter, there is also a variety of interpretations of security, and people set different priorities over what norms are to be secured. As will be discussed here, the different non-state actors emerge not only if the state is absent or failing to provide the security people require, but also where state security provision is not considered to be in line with local norms and priorities. Struggles over security are thus also very much about which security issues are set on the agenda, which actions are allowed, according to whose norms, and who is allowed to take action.

As became clear in the previous section, there is no state monopoly on the use of violence, and state actors are not always considered to be legitimate. However, despite that many people – in all three countries – expressed during interviews that they did think the government *should* be responsible for the provision of adequate security. And not only was this mentioned by people during interviews and discussions, but also did people report crimes to the police knowing that this would probably not result in an investigation or arrest. Using the distinction made by

¹⁹⁹ Interview, Local NGO, Butembo, North Kivu, DRC, 23 October 2009

Migdal (2001) between the practices and the image of the state, while the state's practices may be absent or a source of insecurity, the image of the state is that of an organisation that should provide security to its civilian population and have the capacity to do so. That said, where the state is considered to inadequately address their security needs, people at the same time put their claims in front of other security actors. In Burundi, one community member explained that, in the community there are two parallel structures," referring to both the state institutions and local initiatives and NGOs.²⁰⁰ People submit their problems to both systems, or choose for either one of them. And this choice is not only based on an estimation of who will provide security most adequately, but depends on who does it according to local norms and values. According to Baker the state security system has always been an agent of an authority that for many is following alien values, and thus even if effective in their role of providing security, alternative orders will continue to exist. At the same time he also witnesses a clear trend away from the state police, and "[n]on-state policing is engrained in every community in Africa with the specific form of non-state policing to be determined by local historical, social, economic, and political circumstances" (Baker, 2008: 100). People thus resort to non-state security providers either because of the state may be absent and incapable or unwilling to provide security, or because non-state security systems correspond better to local norms and values (Scheye & Anderson, 2007: 231). Indeed, Baker (2008: 29) argues that with bribes and corruption as common issues 'public' security provision cannot be deemed to be free, and as it also fails to deliver services to all, there is no (nor has there been) true public security provision. Lars Buur (2008) takes this argument a step further by arguing that vigilantism can even be seen as an implicit critique of the moral and ethical foundations of state law. Vigilante violence is commonly seen as a consequence of the inconsistency or incoherence of the state to apply the law, and by that the state not honouring its social contract on which its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence is vested. Buur argues that vigilantism is furthermore a reaction to legal entitlements based on international human rights that have led to behaviour that did not fit the moral standards of society.

[Proponents of vigilante non-state policing] argued that children, youngsters and women 'used rights' to legitimise behaviour that, in the township, was considered socially reprehensible and unlawful, such as disrespect for the authorities, drinking, engaging in sex and drugs, the disrespectful display of sexual bodies and disregard for social obligations. When such behaviour could no longer be punished physically, it was felt, it

²⁰⁰ Discussion group, Community member, Ruyigi, Ruyigi, Burundi, 7 May 2010

would spin out of control. In this view, rights had simply become the concrete embodiment of everything that had gone wrong. (ibid, 578)

Indeed, in South Sudan, for instance, a group of traditional chiefs complained about the human rights discourse brought by NGOs and the UN: “Thieves come to kill us and human rights say we cannot kill these thieves. Thieves and murderers are friends of human rights. But we just want to kill them because they kill us. Isn’t that our right as well?”²⁰¹ International norms are here perceived to be contradicting local norms and existing practices of security provision. An interesting example in which local practices conflict with international standards was also found by Leonardi and his colleagues in South Sudan (Leonardi et al, 2010: 57). They came across a case where two boys had died and a women was accused of witchcraft and poisoning them, both common accusations in African societies.²⁰² To appear more ‘modern’ and following western desires, the GoSS has tried to eradicate these practices and the government courts reject poison cases. To deal with this and attempt to find a modern solution to the problem, the community organised two elections to see who the most popular suspects were. One was held among the school pupils, and one among the wider community, both by written ballot. Unsurprisingly, the outcome was clear as to who was the primary suspect. The modern western form of elections was here thus used to provide evidence for witchcraft and poisoning, and to legitimise mob justice. Similar cases were found in Uganda (Allen, 2010: 256). International norms of democratic decision-making are here adapted to fit local norms of security provisioning. Another interesting case was found in Burundi. During a group interview, it was mentioned that as a victim you have to pay the meals of the thief while he was in jail, and that he or she is released when you do not pay. Surprised to hear this, the case was investigated further. It appeared that according to the law, people were not allowed to stay more than three days in the communal prison. After that, they have to be transferred to the central prison of the province. However, when it is only a small crime the suspect often is released, as not to be bothered with the transport and administration involved. Victims, who wanted the suspect to stay in prison longer than three days, were told to pay for the meals after three days.²⁰³ Whereas state officials aimed to meet the security needs of locals, this created the perception among locals that the national system of justice and security provision was corrupt and unjust.

²⁰¹ Conversation with village chiefs, Paryak, Bor County, Jonglei, South Sudan, 24 March 2011

²⁰² Witchcraft in African societies often goes much further than merely being a remnant of the past, but also still serves functions of control and belonging (cf. Geschiere, 1997).

²⁰³ Discussion group, Community members, Ruhoro, Ngozi, Burundi, 10 May 2010

Another important difference is about whose norms are to be protected, or in other words: what the referent object of security is. For instance, an ex-combatant in Burundi complained that the police “should be protecting civilians. But for the police in Burundi it is the contrary: they protect political leaders. A while ago the police was ordered by the state governor to arrest an opposition leader. Now he is dead.”²⁰⁴ And a local government official in South Sudan mentioned that, “the SPLA does not belong to us but to Juba,”²⁰⁵ implying that the state security forces worked for Juba’s interests only.

As discussed in chapter 4, the securitisation theory is here set in a different perspective. The question is not only whether or not a particular issue should be placed on the agenda (and thus become ‘securitised’), but it is also about what actors are considered appropriate to take action on a security issue, and according to which norms and values. Struggles about these questions continuously take place between different actors in hybrid political contexts.

Non-State Security Initiatives in Context

Having discussed how different security actors struggle over whose norms, interests and priorities are promoted, this second part of the chapter looks closer at these dynamics in practice. This warrants closer observations as it concerns the competition in society about what institutions are able to define and enforce collectively binding decisions. It are these interactions that result in processes of state formation and transformation (cf. Hagmann and Péclard, 2010; Lund, 2007; 2011),²⁰⁶ and it is in these local dynamics that security interventions – which are part of the larger state building interventions – are implemented. Therefore the following three sections take a closer look at the dynamics between local non-state security initiatives and the state. Three examples will be highlighted: *Haki na Amani* in Eastern DRC, the *Bashingantahe* in Burundi, and the Arrow Boys in South Sudan. The focus is specifically on the interaction between these initiatives and the state, as well as their interaction with the people whose interest they aim to serve. Each section will discuss shortly the context in which they are organised, how they are organised and what they do, how and to whom they are accountable, their capacity in terms of security promotion, and their position vis-à-vis the state.

²⁰⁴ Interview, Ex-combatant, Bujumbura Mairie, Burundi, 14 April 2010

²⁰⁵ Interview, Jonglei State government official, Bor, Jonglei, South Sudan, 21 March 2011

²⁰⁶ See also section “Mediated States and Hybrid Political Orders’ in chapter 2.

Eastern DRC: Haki na Amani

Haki na Amani was initiated in Ituri in Eastern DRC, which is one of the four districts of the Province Orientale and consists of five administrative *territoires* (Aru, Mahagi, Djugu, Irumu, and Mambasa). The area is a patchwork of numerous tribes – e.g. Alur, Biru, Labaru, Mabendi, Mambisa, Ndo, Mbo-Okebo and Walese – but the Ituri conflict originated between the pastoralist Hema and the agricultural Lendu who mainly reside in Djugu and Irumu. The Djugu territory is mainly associated with the ethnic Hema, also referred to as Gegere Hema or North Hema, and with the ethnic Lendu. In Irumu the South Hema live, as well as the Lendu-Bindi, also referred to as Ngiti. The Lendu lived in dispersed clan settlements, whereas the Hema had a clear authority structure (Vlassenroot & Raeymakers, 2004: 388). This contrast in social organisation caused Lendu in Djugu to develop relations of subservience to Hema, but Lendu did impose on Hema their language and certain practices and values and the Ngiti in Iruma maintained a high level of autonomy (Pottier, 2008: 432). The Hema also began to dispossess Lendu from land, which according to Lobho was accepted by the Lendu due to their culture of hospitality and abundance of land (quoted in Pottier, 2006: 154). When the Belgian colonists arrived they deprived the Hema king of its powers over Hema and their Lendu subjects, imposed strict administrative boundaries, and gave the Lendu their own chiefs (something they never had). While the Belgians limited the political power of the Hema, they also saw the richer Hema as superior and gave them priority access to education, administration and commerce (Pottier, 2008: 433). However, aside a number of hostile flashpoints in 1975 and 1991 the groups lived together peacefully, and conflicts during the Mobutu regime were often stopped “through the mechanisms of local administration, security and intelligence, as well as successful mediation and traditional agreements” (IRIN, 2000). Their coexistence had again become more pronounced after independence, as the level of intermarriage had increased (Pottier, 2008: 429).

The land conflicts that led to the Ituri conflict, and the ethnic politics it brought along, have sharpened the relations between the groups. In a series of land disputes in which Lendu opposed the loss of ancestral land to powerful Hema entrepreneurs, the latter took advantage of the Bakajika Land Law (1966) and the General Property Law (1973). These laws allowed ancestral land to be appropriated by state functionaries for private sale (Pottier, 2006: 155). Where this law states that the occupiers should be given two years notice before being asked to leave, this was being ignored once the UPDF had occupied the region in 1998. Several of the Ugandan soldiers had cultural and linguistic similarities with the Hema, and opportunistic army commanders increasingly sided with Hema elite, supporting the land evictions (although UPDF officers would back Hema and Lendu militias alike

as the conflict progressed in order to secure their private trade in resources). Lendu in turn organised themselves in village defence groups that turned into militias (ibid. 157). In June 1999 the first mass attacks were launched by Lendu from Pitsi against Hema villages in Blukwa, which also coincided with the appointment of district governor Adèle Lotsove, a Hema, who was fiercely criticised for her attempts to increase the political and economic standing of her own people (IRIN, 2000). The conflict in Blukwa had already begun in April 1999, when a Hema land owner expelled Lendu from his land with the help of the UPDF (Vlassenroot & Raeymakers, 2004: 391). Written warnings were sent out in May from chiefs from the Pitsi locality that the Hema had to vacate the land by 18 June, after which houses were burned and attacks moved into Blukwa on the 22nd (IRIN, 2000). What followed was a long war, which was also highly influenced by external actors – both regional and global, state and non-state – lured in by Ituri’s wealth in natural resources. Numerous armed groups and militias emerged followed by various splits and alliances. Whereas the Congolese war would officially end in 2003, the conflict continued in Ituri. Only from 2005 onwards were the rebel groups losing ground, with its commanders arrested, killed or incorporated into the FARDC. However, during the research in 2009 splinter elements of various militias were still roaming around in Ituri.

The conflict has intensified ethnic tensions in Ituri, and the underlying land conflicts remain an issue of concern. For instance, when in Djugu a question was asked about the reintegration of ex-combatants, the response was: “we are much more worried about border conflicts with the Hema than about reintegration of militia. These conflicts form the basis of the ethnic conflicts.”²⁰⁷ When in 2002 the Dutch NGO Pax Christi organised a conference in Arua on the issue of SALW these concerns were expressed. This was picked up and with support of Pax Christi a network was formed in the beginning of 2004, which would later be called *Réseaux Haki na Amani (RHA)*.²⁰⁸ The network consists of a variety of local associations and churches with different religious and ethnic backgrounds,²⁰⁹ and organised their work on four axes: Aru, Mahagi, Djugu-Irumu and Mambasa. Along these axes, RHA federates and supports a number of local initiatives called *Initiatives Locales de Paix (ILP)* in

²⁰⁷ Group discussion, Community member, Banjali Kilo, Djugu, Ituri, DRC, 17 October 2009

²⁰⁸ Haki na Amani is KiSwahili for Justice and Peace.

²⁰⁹ These are: *Appui à la Communication Interculturelle et à l'Autopromotion Rurale (ACIAR)*; *Centre d'Initiative et de Créativité pour la Promotion Rurale (CIC)*; *Commission Diocésaine Justice et Paix de Bunia (CDJP Bunia)*; *Commission Diocésaine Justice et Paix du diocèse de Mahagi-Nioka (CDJP Mahagi)*; *Commission Paroissiale Justice et Paix de Mambasa (CPJP Mambasa)*; *Eglise du Christ au Congo, Synode de Bunia (ECC)*; *Forum des Mamans de l'Ituri (Fomi)* and *Justice Plus (Réseaux Haki Na Amani, 2012)*

Djugu and Irumu and *Initiatives Locales de Sécurité Communautaire* (ILSC) in Mahagi and Aru,²¹⁰ the latter being locally referred to as *Nyumba Kumi*.²¹¹

Reviving traditional forms of conflict prevention and management, these *Initiatives Locales* (IL)²¹² are autonomous institutions with a bottom-up, local, open and inclusive nature and consist of community members themselves. They work both within their community – e.g. on personal and family conflicts, small theft – as well as with other ILs in the network to deal with problems between communities. Their work focuses on reconciliation of parties and accompanying victims. It starts by identifying the parties in the conflict and finding out what has happened. “By trying to find facts and looking at the possibilities with the communities, we try to find a solution that everyone can live with.”²¹³ Problems that arise within the community the community tries to solve themselves, and when a solution is found a report is generally given to the chef and the RHA. But apart from problems between community members, the ILs also try to address problems between communities and state institutions, such as the police or the FARDC, by maintaining regular dialogue.

The ILs form a source of information for the larger RHA to identify security problems, conflicts as well as possible peaceful resolution, and can provide continuous analysis of the situation. In turn, the RHA – through the respective local associations and churches – supports the ILs with assistance and training. There are a number of *animateurs* employed by the RHA which conduct information sessions on issues of land rights, good governance and on ways the communities can have a say in the use of natural resources in the district (Nsengimana et al, 2010: 12). The ILs can also call upon their assistance when needed. When the support of the RHA

²¹⁰ The network also includes a number of *Noyaux Pacifistes des Mamans* (women groups for peace, or “the pacifist core of mothers”) and *Comités Locales d’Eveil* (Local committees of awakening or alertness, operating in a similar manner as ILPs and ILSCs) in Mambasa. These will not be discussed here as they are smaller in number than the ILPs and ILSCs and were not encountered during the research in Ituri.

²¹¹ *Nyumba Kumi* is KiSwahili for ‘ten houses’ and is comprised of a number of elected representatives of a group of households (though not necessarily ten exactly). The term comes from the lowest unit of administration in Tanzania, and was later also adopted in Burundi and Rwanda the *Nyumba Kumi*, although their levels of organisation differ greatly in Burundi and the system was in 2006 replaced again in Rwanda. Also in Kenya there is mentioning of *Nyumba Kumi* systems. While there tasks and linkages with the government may be different, *Nyumba Kumi* always refers to a form of representation at the community level.

²¹² For the sake of clarity from here onward IL is used to refer to both ILPs and ILSCs.

²¹³ Group discussion, ILSC members, War Palare, Mahagi, Ituri, DRC, 1 October 2009

and the *animateurs*²¹⁴ is called, the same system is followed as with smaller problems within a community, starting with a thorough analysis of the problem. Both communities (and their ILs) are consulted separately to determine the core issues on both sides and to identify areas where negotiation or common understanding is possible. “The Réseaux [RHA] is considered as providing a service to the parties in conflict and to the [ILs]” (ibid. 13). The final step, when possible, is the organisation of a large community meeting called *barza communautaire* during which the different positions can be expressed and a solution can be agreed upon. Not only are inter-communal problems discussed during these *barzas*, but they are also used to address problems between communities and state actors – such as the police or the army – or companies involved in the extraction of resources.²¹⁵

Although the members of the ILs are elected, accountability is ensured by the way the system functions. As it is based on finding solutions through dialogue and mediation, reciprocal trust is needed for it to be effective. This was also expressed by members of the ILs: “We need confidence in the system or it will not work.”²¹⁶ Furthermore, people have a choice whether they contact the IL, or refer their case directly to the chef or the police. People also expressed they often preferred their cases to be handled by the ILs, because “cases brought to the police took too much time and too much money. The community cannot afford this.”²¹⁷ And the ILs “do not charge money”²¹⁸ and people said to have “more faith in an honest outcome.”²¹⁹ Other reasons why the IL system is often preferred are because it follows traditional ways of conflict resolution and includes the community in the process. As explained by an *animateur*, “the systems [of ILs] work because they are located in the daily life of the people involved.”²²⁰ The system of ILs and the continuing contacts of the *animateurs* with communities also provide the RHA with an in-depth understanding of the local dynamics. When the RHA becomes involved in a conflict between two communities, they do not necessarily intervene but rather provide support to the two communities in the mediation process. As a result, the outcome of the process is not one that is imposed from the outside but one that is very much owned by the communities themselves. The approach was considered to be very productive in

²¹⁴ These *Animateurs* are essentially counsellors who provide information and aim to facilitate conflict resolution.

²¹⁵ For more on the RHA cf. Frerks and Douma (2007). The approaches and experiences of RHA have also led to a manual for local peacebuilders (Tobie, 2010).

²¹⁶ Group discussion, ILSC members, Alur Djuganda, Mahagi, Ituri, DRC, 6 October 2009

²¹⁷ Group discussion, Community members, Alur Djuganda, Mahagi, Ituri, DRC, 5 October 2009

²¹⁸ Group discussion, Community member, Djokot, Mahagi, Ituri, DRC, 3 October 2009

²¹⁹ Group discussion, Community member, Baboa, Djugu, Ituri, 19 October 2009

²²⁰ Interview, RHA animateur, Mahagi, Mahagi, Ituri, DRC, 14 October 2009

many communities, and it was even mentioned in one interview that, “without *Haki na Amani* there would be no Ituri today.”²²¹ A more practical example of the capacities of the system was given in another community:

[Security] should be the task of the government but they left us during the war. We now try to contact the authorities, but the government cannot do much with tribal problems. We then started to talk together to bring back peace. In November 2003 we made a pact with the Lendu. We then made a protocol and formed commissions with the help of RHA.

[...]

We need peaceful solutions. We now have more intermarriage. After in 2003 the leaders of Hema and Lendu met and discussed problems, the communities continued to assemble.”²²²

In the same community it was also acknowledged that the system has its limitations and not all problems can be resolved. One person mentioned that while there was no war, “there was often conflict.”²²³ And another said that “things are better and we are together again, but it is not perfect.”²²⁴ In another community it was mentioned that the land conflicts in the region are sometimes too difficult to resolve: “we try in the traditional way but these are serious problems. They are the basis for the ethnic wars and disputes here.”²²⁵ The RHA itself also acknowledges many of the problems are outside of its capacity and that external problems can break down in a day what has been carefully built in years. Furthermore, it found that communities can get discouraged when there can be no solutions found for the problems that are identified during *barzas* (Réseaux Haki Na Amani, 2012).

The relationship of the ILs with state actors is different from community to community. For some, the network is replacing state actors, and does “the work the government is supposed to do. The government should handle things like we do.”²²⁶ Because the system of ILs does not charge money and outcomes are considered more honest, state systems are sidelined, creating a parallel structure. However, the system can never completely go around state actors and institutions.

²²¹ Group discussion, ILSC member, Bedu Ezekere, Djugu, Ituri, DRC, 16 October, 2009

²²² Group discussion, Community and ILP members, Bahema Nord, Djugu, Ituri, DRC, 19 October 2009

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Group discussion, Community and ILP members, Walendu, Djugu, Ituri, DRC, 17 October 2009

²²⁶ Group discussion, Community and ILP members, Bedu Ezekere, Djugu, Ituri, DRC 16 October 2009

Especially issues such as land conflicts, political inequalities and the dysfunctional state security apparatus in the end need to be addressed from a higher level, and need to be addressed with the cooperation of the state actors involved. A *chef de chefferies* in Ituri explained he cooperated with the RHA as he saw its benefits, but stressed that “not all issues are their responsibility, and some issues have to be addressed on a different level.”²²⁷ For Nsengimana and his colleagues, there is a risk when local mediation continues while the causes remain unaddressed at other levels.

[T]o a very real extent, local mediation efforts mitigate the symptoms of very deep conflicts, which are linked to the role and capacity of the state, imbalances and inequalities between communities, clashes of traditional and modern laws, etc. Local mediation can appear to make the visible manifestations of these deeper problems acceptable and manageable. This risks diverting attention away from the need to address the causes and drivers of the conflict and the long-term efforts that are needed to handle them. (Nsengimana et al, 2010: 16-17)

Rather than replacing the state, the ILs and the RHA therefore also play a mediating role between communities and state actors. As discussed in chapter 5, *tracasseries* by state security forces are a common problem in eastern DRC, and in some communities the ILs have started to address these issues. In several instances it was explained that the ILs were indeed able to mediate and limit the harassments. “We used to have many problems with *tracasseries* but it is much better now, because we set up a dialogue.”²²⁸ And the RHA also organised large *barzas communautaires* where communities confronted police and military with their actions and called for improved behaviour. Of course for such mediation attempts the cooperation of the police and army is required. When ILs come to speak to them they might refuse to talk, and when the RHA organises a *barza* they may not show up. Pivotal is therefore the political and social cloud that the RHA *animateurs* have. With some of them being well respected members of churches, and the church being a powerful institution in Eastern DRC, they can socially enforce cooperation to a certain extent. And also local political leaders wanting the support of the population have started to realise they need to work with the RHA on the resolution of conflicts (Anten, 2010: 24). Moreover, in several of the ILs an administrator from the lower echelons of the political-administrative state structure functions as an advisor (Frerks and Douma, 2007: 22).

²²⁷ Interview, Chef de chefferies, Djokot, Mahagi, Ituri, DRC, 3 October 2009

²²⁸ Group discussion, ILSC members, Djokot, Mahagi, Ituri, DRC, 2 October 2009

Summarizing, while initiated with the support of an international NGO, the system of RHA builds on traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution and mediation. The case shows that non-state initiatives active in security promotion can also often not easily be boxed and categorised in terms of replacing, supporting or confronting the state. While a non-state institution can replace particular state functions, it can at the same time cooperate or compete with the state, or even support to build the capacity of state institutions.

Burundi: Bashingantahe

The institution of the *Bashingantahe* is believed to have started at the end of the seventeenth century under King Ntare Rushati and functioned as informal advisors to the king and sub-chiefs and thereby provide of checks and balances to their political, legislative and judicial powers (Dexter and Ntahombaye, 2005: 11). In pre-colonial times the term *Bashingantahe* then referred to a body of men renowned for their sense of truth, justice and responsibility for the greater good. The role of this institution was to settle disputes through conciliation but also judgement, representing the local population to the authorities and advice politicians, oversee the maintenance of justice and the greater good (Nindorera, 1998; Ntabona, 2002; Ntsimbiyabandi and Ntakarutimana, 2004). In a similar fashion as the RHA, they are still consulted today by communities to help the settlement of communal conflicts. However, as will be discussed below, the institution has lost authority over the past decades.

An interesting characteristic of the system is that it represents both Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups which constitute 99 per cent of the population of Burundi.²²⁹ The term *Bashingantahe* is the plural of *Mushingantahe* and is a combination of the words *gushinga* ('to plant') and *intahe* ('ficus stick', also 'stick of wisdom') which means 'the one who plants the stick in the ground' (Dexter and Ntahombaye, 2005: 10; Ntamahungiro, 2007). This refers to the stick the *Bashingantahe* strike on the ground to underscore their words when they arbitrate conflicts. But the *Bashingantahe* refers to more than an institution, and according to Ingelaere and Kohlhagen, "[t]he real foundation of the institution resides in a set of social representations" (Ingelaere and Kohlhagen, 2012: 57). A larger set of moral and social values in Burundian society called *Ubushingantahe* underlies the *Bashingantahe* institution, which include "a sense of equity and justice, a concern for truth, a righteous self-esteem a hard-working character – all of which could perhaps be summed up in the word

²²⁹ Apart from these two groups there is the minority ethnic group of the Twa, comprising an estimated one per cent of the population.

‘integrity’” (Nindorera, 2003: 1). Someone with these qualities could be considered to become a *Mushingantahe*. While candidates needed not be very wealthy, to prevent corruptibility, poor or indebted persons were excluded. A young man could be singled out or asked to be considered for investment himself, and for a period of years he would be observed by his community to test his character. When someone had proven his merit by his general behaviour and attitude, his deeds and public statements, he would undergo a period of training with the help of a sponsor, first only as observer slowly becoming more and more involved in the process (Nindorera, 1998; Dexter and Ntahombaye, 2005: 11-12). A community member in Kiganda explained it as follows:

Whether someone can become a Bashingantahe depends on many factors. You have to be serious and not a racist. You have to be able to collect people and evidence and analyse it. And then at first you are allowed to sit in during meetings but you are still in reserve, ‘umutamana’. Then you are almost there.²³⁰

Only after his investment would a *Mushingantahe* be allowed to participate in the actual judgement. For the investment ceremony the candidate would have to provide beer for the community, where he would take an oath and receive his *intahe*.

According to the traditional process, which is followed to this day, the *Bashingantahe* attempt mediation and reconciliation through an informal process before making any judgements on the matter. Both parties are first heard and the *Bashingantahe* repeat the facts to verify they understand the situation, to show they are listening, as well as to inspire the parties to listen to each other. Then the witnesses of both parties are heard separately, after which the *Bashingantahe* go into deliberation. This deliberation is done in secret, and when a verdict is reached the one who presided over the deliberations would render the verdict publicly, while taping his *intahe* to the ground. In gratitude of the *Bashingantahe* the party that brought the case to be heard offered banana or sorghum beer, which would be shared by the two parties and the *Bashingantahe* and thereby symbolising the restored relationship (Dexter and Ntahombaye, 2005: 12-13; Ingelaere and Kohlhagen, 2012: 47).

The institution of the *Bashingantahe* was weakened during the colonial period, when the Belgian colonisers introduced customary courts. The *Bashingantahe* essentially were made into civil servants answerable to the colonial regime rather than to the

²³⁰ Interview, community member, Kiganda, Muramvya, Burundi, 27 April 2010

population. At the same time colonial authorities modified their verdicts and withdrew their rights to dispense justice and impose sanctions, which undermined the position of the *Bashingantahe* as well as their ability to ensure the continuity of customary law. At the same time missionaries competed over their role as advisors to the community, particularly regarding family matters (Nindorera, 1998; Dexter and Ntahombaye, 2005: 11; Ingelaere and Kohlhagen, 2012: 43). After independence the incorporation of the institution continued by UPRONA, which interfered with the appointment and investiture of the *Bashingantahe* (Nindorera, 1998; Reyntjens and Vandeginste, 2001; Deslaurier, 2003: 88).

Political criteria rather than virtue as advocated by the bashingantahe institution became dominant and the government would confer the title and function of mushingantahe on its own territorial administrators and local party bosses who were invested en masse. (Dexter and Ntahombaye, 2005: 11)

However, at the end of President Bagaza's regime, an attempt was made to restore the institution and in February 1987 reforms to the judicial code were adopted that stipulated that disputes in the *collines* would be arbitrated by a council of respected persons, which referred to the *Bahsingantahe*. The law also mentioned that the procedures of this council should reflect local norms (Nindorera, 1998). In 1987 Pierre Buyoya had come into power, who after large-scale ethnic killings in the north of the country in 1988 established a commission to investigate questions of national unity and reconciliation. Several government reports referred to the institution of the *Bashingantahe* and its underlying values as a factor of unity and called for rehabilitation of the system (Ingelaere and Kohlhagen, 2012: 44; Dexter and Ntahombaye, 2005: 11). The crisis of 1993 prevented any actions on this, and it was only when Buyoya came to power again in 1996 that the issue came back on the table and in 1997 Buyoya's government established a National Council of Bashingantahe. The commission was composed of 40 members of men and women from different backgrounds appointed by the president and made several recommendations in the context of ongoing negotiations between the warring parties (Nindorera, 1998; Ingelaere and Kohlhagen, 2012: 44). Also international actors showed interest in the institution, and in an attempt to rehabilitate it as a traditional mechanism of conflict resolution the UNDP financed a campaign to identify the 'real' *Bashingantahe*, which led to the creation of a new National Council of the *Bashingantahe* in 2002 (Ingelaere and Kohlhagen, 2012: 44-45).

The main factor that has weakened the system is its politicisation over the years and the consequential loss of accountability of the *Bashingantahe* to their communities.

During the traditional ceremony of investment each member of the community – even a child – could object. Furthermore, a *Mushingantahe* could be removed for corruption, violation of secrets or other misconduct (Dexter and Ntahombaye, 2005: 12). A community member in a *colline* of Gitega *commune* mentioned that for them, “the system of investment is now the opposite of what it used to be. It is no longer something from the people.”²³¹ In various communities complaints were made that the *Bashingantahe* were corrupted or politically affiliated:

*In the past your behaviour would be scrutinised for one year after you gave beer to become a Bashingantahe, but now there is no such test period anymore and giving enough beer automatically makes you a Bashingantahe and the people cannot say anything about it anymore.*²³²

*There is a big difference between the Bashingantahe of today and the Bashingantahe of yesterday. Yesterday they cooperated well without speculations of political alliances and they were real. Now they are confronted by political parties and corruption.*²³³

The system has also been portrayed by the CNDD-FDD as an elitist and Tutsi institution.²³⁴ As soon as the CNDD-FDD came into power in 2005, a new law was passed which formally ended the role of the *Bashingantahe* as an auxiliary to the state courts and installed *Comité Communal de Développement Communautaire* (CCDC) on every *colline*, consisting of five elected community members often referred to as *elus locaux*. In several communities the institution therefore has lost much of its authority. This is not only because people sometimes consider the *Bashingantahe* to be part of the past, but also because the government has undermined their capacity. For instance, in one community it was explained that while the tribunals in the past had to take a verdict of the *Bashingantahe* into consideration this now no longer is the case, making their verdict essentially powerless.²³⁵

Yet, while the institution has lost some of its power and standing, the underlying values are still considered to be an important element in Burundian society.²³⁶ Ingelaere and Kohlhaagen even found that when there is a dispute in a workplace,

²³¹ Group discussion, Community member, Ruhoba, Gitega, Burundi, 4 May 2010

²³² Group discussion, Community member, Bururi, Bururi, Burundi, 27 May 2010

²³³ Interview, Community member, Matana, Bururi, Burundi, 28 May 2010

²³⁴ Interview, Burundi expert, Bujumbura, Burundi, 19 May 2010

²³⁵ Group discussion, Community Member, Gitega, Gitega, Burundi, 13 May 2010

²³⁶ Interview, Burundian journalist, Bujumbura, Burundi, 16 April 2010; Interview, Burundi expert, Bujumbura, Burundi, 19 May 2010

public place or between neighbours, “everywhere in Burundi, councils of notables take shape and are reinvented, and this often happens without the explicit mention of the term *mushingantahe*” (Ingelaere and Kohlhagen, 2012: 47). The extent to which the *Bashingantahe* have lost authority differs from community to community, and in various places in Burundi they are still considered to be an important – if not the first – source for conflict resolution, specifically regarding problems within families or between members of the community:

*The Bashingantahe have a large role when there is a conflict in the community. They solve land conflicts and conflicts between neighbours. If there is an intervention needed in a conflict they are the first to be contacted. The role of the Bashingantahe is very important here. [...] Justice means starting at the basis and that means first having your case heard by the Bashingantahe.*²³⁷

Today, the *Ubushingantahe* values are still held high, on the national level the National Council of *Bashingantahe* still exists and functions as an advisory body, and also at the local level the *Bashingantahe* are still called upon. But altogether, there is much confusion about the current status of the *Bashingantahe* as an institute in Burundian society.

*There is a lot of respect for the traditional role they had in the past. But some think the institute has no longer any value. There is unclarity about their exact role, about where to place them. It is difficult for the community what to choose. Some people still respect them because of the past, and others are no longer interested in them. There is a lot of confusion.*²³⁸

Since the introduction of the CCDC's in 2005, some communities have both a committee of *elus locaux* and *Bashingantahe* existing in parallel, which resulted in fierce competition between the two. In other communities there are *Bashingantahe* who have been elected among the *elus locaux* within the CCDC, resulting sometimes in a discordant relationship within the CCDC between *Bashingantahe* and the other *elus locaux*. Interestingly, in one community the introduction of the CCDC was not seen as a replacement of the *Bashingantahe* – as it was intended by the national government – but considered to be a further institutionalisation of the *Bashingantahe* into the state system. The *Bashingantahe* now had to be elected, it was criticised, in what was now called the CCDC:

²³⁷ Group discussion, Community member, Matana, Bururi, Burundi, 28 May 2009

²³⁸ Group discussion, Community member, Kibimba, Gitega, Burundi, 9 June 2010

*And now they are chosen based on political issues. So there is no distinction anymore between politicians and Bashingantahe. They have become enmeshed in politics. This system has been introduced in 2005. Now the Bashingantahe are always related to elections and politics.*²³⁹

In reaction to the loss of legitimacy caused by the institutionalisation and consequential politicisation of the *Bashingantahe* in certain communities people have organised a parallel group of *Bashingantahe* following the traditional rules.²⁴⁰

Summarizing, the *Bashingantahe* are an institution with a long history in Burundian society. While both colonial and post-colonial regimes have undermined the institution's authority and capacity, the underlying values continue to play an important role. Non-state initiatives are thus not readily incorporable into state structures or easily sidelined. Doing so may result in the loss of authority and capacity of non-state institutions but also lead to the reinvention of these institutions outside direct control of the state. When state security actors – or incorporated non-state actors – do not work in the security interest of communities, these communities will organise other forms of security provision.

South Sudan: The Arrow Boys

The Arrow Boys in South Sudan have been organised in defence of the LRA.²⁴¹ The first incursions of the LRA into South Sudan were in the early 1990s, mainly in Eastern Equatoria State. After the split in the SPLA between Garang and Machar, Machar's faction signed a cooperative agreement with the GoS, and later also allied with the LRA. From 1994 onwards, LRA commander Joseph Kony and his second-in-command Vincent Otti regularly visited Khartoum and set up base in Juba in Central Equatoria State, which at the time was under control of the GoS. A partnership was established that benefited both: Khartoum used the LRA as a proxy to fight the SPLA and the UPDF, and the LRA received supplies and assistance in their fight against Museveni (Schomerus, 2007: 18). With the signing of the CPA between the GoS and the SPLA in 2005, GoS support for the LRA became problematic and the partnership ended.²⁴² In July 2006, under the auspices of the

²³⁹ Group discussion, Community member, Gihanga, Bubanza, Burundi, 2 June 2010

²⁴⁰ Group discussion, Community members, Nyabihanga, Mwaro, Burundi, 12 May 2010; Interview, Representative Burundian research institute, Bujumbura, 20 May 2010

²⁴¹ For a more detailed account of the LRA, cf. Allen and Vlassenroot (2010)

²⁴² It should be noted that the relation between Khartoum and the LRA had already come under pressure since 2002, and in that same year Khartoum allowed the UPDF to launch operation *Iron*

Government of South Sudan, negotiations started between the LRA and the government of Uganda. A cessation of hostilities was signed in August 2006, and it was agreed that LRA troops would be gathered and encamped in Eastern Equatoria (Magwi county - Owiny-Ki-Bul) and Western Equatoria (Ri-Kwangba) for the duration of the peace talks (Van Puijenbroek and Plooijer, 2009: 6). The latter was very close to the Congolese border, and many of the LRA troops had relocated to Garamba national park in the DRC. The process of the Juba Peace Talks was difficult, and when an agreement was finally reached by the delegations early 2008, Joseph Kony failed to show up. Several meetings were scheduled during which Kony remained absent, and at the end of 2008 the process had failed and violence had resumed. Shortly thereafter the UPDF launched operation 'Lightning Thunder' against the LRA, which was supported by the US in planning, intelligence and the provision of satellite phones and fuel. The FARDC supported the UPDF, and while the SPLA did not join the operation it closed its border to prevent the LRA from entering. However, the Sudanese government only learned shortly beforehand and the Congolese parliament, as well as MONUC and UNMIS, were not informed beforehand (ibid. 12).²⁴³ The operation not only resulted in a ferocious retribution by the LRA against civilians in the DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR), but the LRA also scattered into several small bands, making the LRA much harder to trace and counter.

The presence of the LRA has, since the end of the Sudanese war, been the largest security threat to the population in Western Equatoria. While in 2010 and 2011 the LRA has been more active in the DRC and the CAR, the consequences for real and perceived security have been high, and since 2008 there have been an estimated 70,000 LRA-induced IDPs in South Sudan (OCHA, 2012). As people feared to work on their land, this has also led to food shortages. Throughout the vast rainforests in the border region of South Sudan, the DRC and the CAR, the LRA has continued to terrorise, kill and abduct civilians. A government representative explained how the LRA "uses guerrilla warfare with 5 to 7 people move in from the LRA [...] they attack the civilians with small groups and attack small groups and abduct women and children."²⁴⁴ The SPLA is the main security force responsible for the protection

Fist on (South) Sudanese territory. On the other hand, there are also rumours that the LRA and Khartoum have maintained contact also after 2005.

²⁴³ Also Ugandan parliament complained about not being informed about military actions in a foreign country, and Vice President and chief negotiator Riek Machar claimed he and the UN Special Envoy for LRA-affected areas were only informed shortly before the announcement of the operation in Kampala (Van Puijenbroek and Plooijer, 2009: 12). The operation has nonetheless failed to surprise the LRA, and coordination problems further added to its failure.

²⁴⁴ Interview, GoSS WES State Representative, Yambio, WES, 1 April 2011

against the LRA, yet was heavily criticised by many civilians who felt they did not do enough. Complaints included the SPLA staying within their camps, responding to an LRA attack long after it had taken place, and that if they did go after the LRA in the bush they often only chased them very briefly. When a group of women in Yambio was asked what the SPLA did against the LRA, they began to laugh:

The SPLA has been here for a long time. The first time the LRA came [here in Western Equatoria] was in 2006; today it is 2011. The SPLA is here and I don't deny they try. But if they follow the LRA they follow at a distance and then they don't follow anymore. They sometimes say it's our own people. This is for them to hide [the fact they are not able to deal with the LRA]. But the LRA don't even speak our language [implying the distinction between LRA and locals is not difficult to make].²⁴⁵

As a result, the Zande communities of South Sudan organised a home guard system also referred to as 'the Arrow Boys', a name that is taken from the Ugandan civil defence militias organised in Teso against the LRA with support from the government in Uganda. Many people said such a system, or any other form of self defence groups, was entirely new to the Zande. However, a paramount chief claimed it was rooted in the system of what was translated as 'local police', which consisted of a few unarmed young men that supported the chiefs with small problems in the community.²⁴⁶ The Arrow Boys consist of young men who volunteered to counter the LRA, and their initiative is lauded by the rest of the community. During a discussion with youth in Yambio, people expressed that they "are proud of them and maybe should join them. [...] You cannot stay when your father and mother are killed."²⁴⁷ Being young men from the communities, the Arrow Boys are present in the places where the LRA attacks, and respond immediately when an attack occurs, often chasing the LRA in the bush in an attempt to catch them and release possible abductees. The Arrow Boys were also reported to patrol the region, looking for tracks that could signal the presence of LRA rebels. The organisational structure of the Arrow Boys is informal and the levels of organisation may differ per community. But generally there is an Arrow Boy Commander leading the Arrow Boys from a particular community, who reports back to the chief.

This structure creates a certain level of accountability, which is further strengthened by the fact that all Arrow Boys are members of the local communities in which they operate. They are dependent on the community for food and the care-taking of their

²⁴⁵ Discussion Group, Youth, Yambio, WES, South Sudan, 2 April 2011

²⁴⁶ Interview, Paramount Chief WES, Yambio, WES, 4 April 2011

²⁴⁷ Discussion group, Women, Yambio, WES, South Sudan, 2 April 2011

families when they are in the bush chasing the LRA and are unable to work on the land. The fact that the Arrow Boys are dependent on the communities, who often have little to spare themselves, creates a limitation for their capacity. Despite the support of their communities, the Arrow Boys have very limited equipment. An Arrow Boy commander explained that they “lack food, boots, rain coats, tents,” and much more, chasing the LRA for over 10 days and living off bush yams to survive.²⁴⁸ A group of Arrow Boys elsewhere mentioned the same problems, and said they needed satellite telephones to communicate with each other to ease the search.²⁴⁹ Another often heard complaint was that they lack guns and bullets, as many of them are armed with machetes, spears, and bows and arrows. They also use self-made rifles called ‘*fabrications*’, and make their own ammunition and gun-powder.

*You go into the bush and you just take a stone and take on people with guns. And they make their own guns. We call it a ‘fabrication’. But it shoots only once and then you need to put another bullet in. And they face people with training and weapons. They only use the experience they have from the war to face the LRA.*²⁵⁰

Due to their limited means, the Arrow Boys have previously demanded to be armed in their struggle against the LRA, which was supported by governor Bakosoro (IRIN, 2010b). This raised further concerns among both the SPLA and international organisations who feared this could undermine state control of violent means, but the national parliament later approved an amount of 5 million Sudanese Pounds (2 million US\$) to support the Arrow Boys. However, this was probably only promised to gain support from WES for the January 2011 referendum for South Sudanese independence and the money never reached WES in practice.

Apart from possible past war experiences, many of the Arrow Boys have a lot of experience hunting for bush meat and know the region very well. They have been rather effective in countering the LRA, despite their lack of equipment. Several instances were mentioned in which the Arrow Boys had killed the LRA after an attack and were able to release abductees. This is often attributed to their high motivation to go after the LRA, which is considered to be lacking with the state security forces. As a community member in Western Equatoria explained,

The Arrow Boys are trusted more, because when LRA attacks, they are the first to reach and go. If anything happens, within minutes they will be there.

²⁴⁸ Interview, Arrow Boys Commander of Operation, Yambio, WES, South Sudan, 7 April 2011

²⁴⁹ Interview with Arrow Boys and SPLA, Sangua Payam, Nzara, WES, 7 April 2011

²⁵⁰ Interview, Community member, Yambio, WES, South Sudan, 4 April 2011

*But the SPLA will reach only the next day. [...] Then there is already some other person buried. [...] The Arrow Boys are the ones in the community. The ones being killed are their relatives. For others, if we are killed it's just cold blood.*²⁵¹

This comment also touches upon a deeper problem between the SPLA and the Zande communities of WES. People often lamented the lack of initiative and motivation on the side of the SPLA to effectively deal with the LRA. This lack of initiative resonated with the answer received from an SPLA officer after asking whether they had asked for more means of transport – something that he earlier said was the reason they could not always respond to LRA attacks: “the problem of transport, we are not the ones to say bring us transport. It’s the government to think that transport is needed.”²⁵² The UPDF commander of the troops attributed the lack of initiative to an inadequate understanding on the side of the SPLA of how to deal with the LRA.²⁵³ For the Zande, however, the problem has also an ethnic dimension. The majority of the SPLA troops in WES come from other regions in South Sudan, many of them being Dinka. To enhance control of the new country and prevent armed uprisings of particular regions, the SPLA has stationed soldiers outside of their regions of origin. However, people from WES therefore felt that the SPLA ‘outsiders’ were not interested in their suffering. “Here most SPLA are from somewhere else and Western Equatorians in the SPLA are elsewhere. If they [SPLA soldiers] were from here at least they would do something.”²⁵⁴ The mistrust has also roots in inter-ethnic clashes between the Zande and the Dinka at the end of 2005 and beginning of 2006. Some Zande see the limited efforts of the SPLA as retribution: “During the war Dinkas were being killed by Zande and they want to take revenge.”²⁵⁵ And even before this conflict, there have been tensions between the Equatorian groups and the Dinka, the former viewing the SPLA as a vehicle for Dinka domination (Branch and Mampilly, 2005: 4).²⁵⁶ There are also rumours abound that Vice-president Machar has deliberately send the LRA to WES. There is no evidence to prove this, and they are likely based on the relations Machar’s faction had with the LRA and Khartoum during the civil war, his role as chief

²⁵¹ Discussion group, Women, Yambio, WES, South Sudan, 2 April 2011

²⁵² Interview, SPLA Officer, Nzara, WES, South Sudan, 6 April 2011

²⁵³ Interview, Commander UPDF forces, Southern Sudan, DRC and CAR, Nzara, WES, South Sudan, 4 April 2011

²⁵⁴ Interview, local NGO, Yambio, WES, South Sudan, 4 April 2011

²⁵⁵ Interview, Community member, Yambio, WES, South Sudan, 4 April 2011

²⁵⁶ As the largest ethnic group in the country, the Dinka are well-represented in the SPLA, and complaints about Dinka dominance are widespread among the other groups in South Sudan (cf. Walraet, 2010: 195).

mediator during the Juba peace talks, and that these talks included the encampment of LRA troops in WES. The fact that the area between South Sudan, the DRC and the CAR where the LRA is roaming around is precisely the home of the Zande further contributes to suspicions among some Zande that there is a deliberate intention behind the presence of the LRA and the poor security provision by the SPLA. While these are all rumours that cannot be substantiated, they exemplify the troubled relationship between the state security forces and the people of WES. And those who are less suspicious argue that the lacking initiative of the SPLA is simply the product of war fatigue. Many SPLA soldiers have been fighting a long war against the North and are now finally getting a salary – something they receive whether they chase the LRA or not. “Some of the security forces might not be interested in the war to end. The UPDF and the SPLA proper get a lot of employment when LRA threat remains here and therefore they do not really want it to stop. That’s what people think now.”²⁵⁷

The tensions between the SPLA and the civilian population in WES underlie a precarious relationship between the SPLA and the Arrow Boys. When the Arrow Boys were initially organised, it was met with fierce resistance from the national government and the SPLA. This resistance has somewhat reduced since the election of Joseph Bakosoro as new State Governor in 2010, the only independent candidate to win in South Sudan, who advocated in favour of the Arrow Boys at the national level. The official government line became that the Arrow Boys and the SPLA now cooperate: the Arrow Boys provide information about the LRA to the SPLA and accompany them on patrols to show directions in the dense forest. This is also the cooperation described by the Arrow Boys and the SPLA when they are together and when an SPLA camp was visited with the Arrow Boys they were allowed to carry their *frabrications* and a soldier offered his chair to the Arrow Boy commander.²⁵⁸ In another interview an Arrow Boy commander further explained that they have signals they use to communicate to the SPLA that they are Arrow Boys when they encounter them in the bush to prevent mistakes and accidents, and that they report to the SPLA when they go on a patrol.²⁵⁹ But talking to the Arrow Boys and the SPLA separately, it is clear that the relationship remains very precarious. Arrow Boys complained that the SPLA does not always respond to the information they give to them, or do so only after a long time, which made the Arrow Boys believe the SPLA does not want to encounter the LRA. Furthermore, the weapons they capture from the LRA are taken away by the SPLA, making it more difficult for

²⁵⁷ Interview, Community member, Yambio, WES, South Sudan, 4 April 2011

²⁵⁸ Interview with Arrow Boys and SPLA at SPLA camp, Sangua Payam, Nzara, WES, South Sudan, 7 April 2011

²⁵⁹ Simon Khamis Pee, Arrow Boys Commander of Operation, Yambio, WES, 7 April 2011

them to confront LRA fighters, and the SPLA was said to take credit for LRA fighters they killed and abductees they rescued.²⁶⁰ The SPLA was also badmouthing the Arrow Boys when the Arrow Boys were not around, claiming the Arrow Boys were not killing LRA but each other. One SPLA officer claimed the Arrow Boys had also killed a priest in Yambio,²⁶¹ but neither the governor nor the Diocese of Yambio knew of any instance where a priest had been killed.

Some explain this by a resentment of the SPLA that the Arrow Boys are more effective with very limited resources. "When the Arrow Boys catch LRA and bring them back to town the SPLA is jealous that they are capable to do so."²⁶² But the Arrow Boys are also considered to be a potential threat to the SPLA's monopoly on the use of force. For instance, an SPLA officer said that, "security is something for the security forces. These Arrow Boys are illegal. They didn't get their guns from the government."²⁶³ There are fears within the national government that the Arrow Boys could start off as a self defence force, but develop into a militia with the potential to turn against the SPLA. There are many examples of other defence groups that turned into rebel groups, such as for instance the Mai Mai in the DRC, and there are concerns about mob justice or the abuse of their power. And where the Arrow Boys are considered a potential problem, the LRA are not considered a threat to the security of the state. The SPLA faced numerous security problems, including attacks from the North and by several rebel groups and renegade commanders. As the commander of the UPDF explained, "the SPLA has big challenges, and they are not interested in a few LRA."²⁶⁴ This was also illustrated in a conversation with SPLA officers in Nzara county, who argued that there had not been any LRA attacks in a long time. When confronted with a report of recent attacks, they explained: "what you see there is not an attack. They just abduct people."²⁶⁵ An attack for them implied an attack on a military or government target. This exemplifies the different interpretations of human security and state security. A similar case was observed by Joost van Puijenbroek and Nico Plooijer (2009: 14-15) in north-eastern DRC, which is also home to the Zande community and where people also organised themselves in defence of the LRA when they considered state security provision to be inadequate. They found that state officials at a district

²⁶⁰ Interview, Arrow Boys Commander of Operation, Yambio, WES, South Sudan 7 April 2011; Interview with Arrow Boys, Sangua Payam, Nzara, WES, South Sudan, 7 April 2011

²⁶¹ Interview, SPLA Officer, Nzara, WES, South Sudan, 6 April 2011

²⁶² Interview, Commissioner Yambio County, Yambio, WES, South Sudan, 4 April 2011

²⁶³ Interview, SPLA Officer, Nzara, WES, South Sudan, 6 April 2011

²⁶⁴ Interview, Commander UPDF forces, Southern Sudan, DRC and CAR, Nzara, WES, South Sudan, 4 April 2011

²⁶⁵ Interview, SPLA Officer, Nzara, WES, South Sudan, 6 April 2011

level²⁶⁶ in eastern DRC hardly ever visited the territories that fall under their jurisdiction. Even when LRA attacked villages in Dungu territory in the northeast of the country, all the district commissioner did was wait for the outcome of international peace negotiations. Hardly any action was taken to secure the population and from 2006 to mid-2008 they were essentially left to their own fate. Yet, when civil defence groups were organised by communities in response to the LRA threat, they were obstructed by the commissioner. For him, the LRA was not a direct threat while the local responses to deal with the LRA were seen as potentially hazardous for the security of the state.²⁶⁷

Summarizing, the Arrow Boys are a loosely organised self-defence force. While it has some roots in earlier existing structures, it is mainly a reaction to the perceived failure of the state to provide adequate security according to local norms and priorities. While the Arrow Boys were met with many reservations and even hostility, this did not lead to a *Hobbesian* chaos. Rather, it was the rebalancing of relations between on the one hand a newly emerging organised and armed civil defence group with support from local politicians, religious leaders and the civilian population, and on the other hand a (also newly merging) national government and army who saw this as a potential threat to their position but came to realise they could not directly oppose it.

Concluding remarks

The chapter started looking into how security is perceived by people in their daily lives. What emerged is a broad interpretation of security, ranging from protection from direct physical threats to broader development-related issues. Furthermore, there is a variety of actors involved in the provision of security serving different security interests. As discussed in this chapter, the image of the state as an organisation that should provide security to its civilian population and have the capacity to do so is very much present, even in hybrid political contexts. That said, where the state is considered to inadequately address their security needs, people at the same time put their claims in front of other security actors. And with a variety of actors involved in security, this creates struggles in society about whose norms, interests and priorities regarding security are promoted, what actions to provide

²⁶⁶ The administration in Congo is organised from country, to province to district to territories to collectivities to groupings to villages and localities. However, the former districts of the old Kivu province Maniema, North Kivu and South Kivu are now provinces and do not have districts.

²⁶⁷ Joost van Puijenbroek, presentation at PSDN meeting, *Who should do what? Peace Security and Development in DRC*. 1 November 2010. Utrecht.

security are considered legitimate, and about who is considered legitimate security actor.

Looking at this arena of interaction, the cases show how relatively disconnected from security interventions and the influence of international actors local and state actors are in conflict and negotiation over security provision and access to violent means. The three cases show how initiatives for security provision at the local level are continuously balancing their position within this complex web. On the one hand they are confronted with the state and its interests in state security, and on the other hand with the local level communities with an interest in protection against the threats faced in their daily lives in ways that are most effective to them. The *Réseaux Haki na Amani* was initially mainly concerned with communal and inter-communal issues, such as problems within or between families, land conflicts and ethnic tensions. After a period of intense conflict in a region where the state was never strongly present to begin with, the RHA can be considered to have taken up some of the state's functions. Indeed, the network is strongly affiliated with church-based organisations, and the church has always been one of the stronger and more stable institutions in Ituri. But the state is not absent in Ituri and apart from taking up 'state-like' functions, the RHA also cooperates with state actors. Furthermore, dialogue is being created between state actors and communities, and state actors are confronted when their actions contradict the security interests of these communities. The institution of the *Bashingantahe* is much more a traditional system, and while it always was positioned as mediator and advisor between the state and the communities, its position and capacity have evolved. Initially the system primarily served the security interests of people in the communities and advised the state on behalf of these communities and the greater good. Compared to eastern DRC, the state in Burundi is much stronger and different regimes have tried to incorporate the institution, while at the same time limiting the power they held both vis-à-vis the state and independently of the state in communities. Yet, despite these attempts, and the real loss of authority this has caused, the underlying values continue to play an important role in Burundian society. As a result, the institution is not completely sidelined, and in some communities even revived. The initiative of the Arrow Boys is much less vested in traditional structures and is much more a reaction to a new security problem. Considered a potential threat to the security of the newly emerging state of South Sudan, the national government – as well as the international community – has treated it with reservation and even rejection. Yet, the government in Juba needed the support of the people in Western Equatoria during the 2011 referendum for independence and therefore the Arrow Boys could not be completely rejected. As a result there is a very precarious relationship between the Arrow Boys and the state security actors, most notably the SPLA.

The three cases discussed above exemplify a number of things. First, non-state initiatives in security promotion cannot easily be categorised in terms of replacing, supporting or confronting the state. As such, they can at the same time both work against and in support of state security actors, as well as the goals of security interventions. Secondly, non-state initiatives are not readily incorporable into state structures. Doing so may result in the loss of authority and capacity of non-state institutions and the reinvention of these institutions outside the direct control of the state. And third, when state security actors – or incorporated non-state actors – do not work in the security interest of communities, these communities will organise other forms of security provision. And it are the differences in norms, interests and priorities that affect the relationships between the different security actors. Moreover, the interactions between the different (state and non-state) actors involved in security provision about what norms, interests and priorities regarding security are provide by whom and how are essentially struggles over authority, and could therefore be considered to be processes of state formation (and reformation). Such processes of state formation are ongoing in contexts where international actors design, support and implement the policies and programmes of security interventions which are part of their larger statebuilding efforts. Local non-state initiatives and institutions involved in security provision are often relatively disconnected from the larger statebuilding efforts, but are all the more connected to these processes of state formation. Indeed, only in the case of RHA there was direct interaction with an international actor. Relatively disconnected from international actors there are local arenas where local and state actors interact, struggle, negotiate and create new relationships and realities. Nonetheless, it is within these security dynamics on the ground, in this complex web of state and non-state security providers with diverging security interests, that security interventions take place.

Chapter 8. Conclusions

This book looked at how international efforts to build or contribute to security in the hybrid political context of post-settlement countries in sub-Saharan Africa relate to national and local perceptions and practices of security. It focused on security interventions – meaning DDR, SSR and AVR, including SALW control – and drew from research conducted in the eastern DRC, Burundi and South Sudan. The first part of this book – consisting of chapters 1, 2 and 3 – focused on the underlying assumptions of international actors who design, implement and support security interventions, identified the dominant intervention model, and discussed the most prominent critiques thereon. Chapter 4 connected the first part of the book with the next. It identified a gap in the understanding of how international, national and local perceptions and practices of security relate to one another, and developed an analytical model to look at these interactions. The second part of the book – consisting of chapters 5, 6, and 7 – was concerned with the ways in which the agenda and programmes work out in the societies in which they are implemented, and how this relates to local and national actors involved in security. This concluding chapter discusses and elaborates on the findings that have been presented in this book, and looks into the implications of these findings for policy.

Security Interventions: Assumptions and Critiques

The first chapter looked into the underlying assumptions of international actors designing and supporting security interventions. The first is that the state is the best way to organise violence and enable stability and peace. Second, the ideal state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. And third, the primary task of the state is the provision of security. With security provision being the most important of services that states are expected to provide to their civilian population, those elements within interventions specifically aimed at enabling state security provision can be considered as the corner stones of statebuilding interventions. These interventions aim to support the establishment of a state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and promote the legitimisation of this monopoly. During the settlement after an armed conflict, the makeup of the state security forces is determined and those not eligible are to enter the DDR programme. Through the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life, these programmes aim to neutralise them as potential spoilers and make them constructive participants in the peace process. SSR intends to develop the security sector in a post-settlement country to

enable adequate and equal security provision by the state to its citizens, as well as promoting civilian and democratic oversight to ensure accountability and legitimacy. SSR then includes the promotion of reforms within state institutions, as well as training and equipping actors in the state security and justice apparatus. The collection and control of SALW aims to support the monopolisation of violence in the hands of the state. Based on the understanding that most violent deaths are not the direct result of conflict, as well as responding to critiques that security interventions were too state-centric, a broad spectrum of AVR programmes has been developed to complement SSR efforts and support the achievement of broader goals of statebuilding. Such programmes aim to promote security provision in areas where the state has limited or no control – in order to eventually bring in state control – as well as include a people-centred approach to state security provision where the state is in control.

Security interventions are usually part of larger efforts to promote peacebuilding and statebuilding following the signing of a peace agreement after a period of conflict. In the last decades, pushed by an enabling international environment after the end of the Cold War, rising ambitions to promote peace and an expanded industry that has come to surround interventions, international interventions have both increased in number and expanded in scope. Whereas international peacekeeping at first merely aimed to literally stand between conflicting parties as an impartial referee to monitor the agreement they had signed, today's interventions attempt to promote cultures of peace and aim to change entire societies and the institutions through which they are organised. Trying to address the practical problems faced during implementation and based on 'lessons learned', interventions have also been growing as they tried to manage processes and situations as good and holistic as possible. This task is a rather daunting one, and hence requires some form of guidance. How to ensure security and development in countries which, after the signing of a peace agreement, are struggling to recover? How is security best organised in places where security has been long absent? The answer is sought in the way security is organised in those places we know best, and where security is relatively well organised. Rather than being a referee following the rules agreed upon by conflicting parties, today's interventions bring in their own sets of rules, practices, rationales and assumptions. These include a certain understanding of how a state is supposed to function. In Weberian terms, it is argued, a state must have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, which has to be balanced by some sort of social contract. For the monopoly on violence in the hands of the state to be legitimate, the state must be accountable to its citizens and provide services, of which security is the most prominent one. From a western

perspective, a liberal democratic system is the best political system to enable the legitimacy of a state monopoly on the use of violence.

As such, this model of an ideal state is assumed to be the proper way in which security is organised, and has become the ideal that guides statebuilding interventions. In other words, the point of departure of interventions is the envisioned end goal, which gives meaning and guidance to interventions. Moreover, every state – or a particular area within a state – that does not fit this ideal is deemed fragile and interventions aim to build up institutions in these fragile states according to the ideal model. Thus, apart from guiding interventions and providing a particular goal to work towards, the ideal also provides legitimisation for interventions. The argument being that there is severe human suffering through violent conflicts, and a solution to this can be provided by the intervention. And more than that, a debate has evolved in which governments are held responsible to provide security – that is after all seen as a state's core task. Such fragile states are not only considered a severe threat to their own civilian populations, but also to the world as a whole. Therefore, when a state fails to uphold its task to provide security external intervention is legitimised. At first sight, it then seems that the assumption that security should be organised by the state – and in a specific manner – is more and more resulting in a system of world governance in which interventions interfere in regions where state security provision is considered inadequate to global standards.

The first set of criticisms on the dominant intervention model has been termed as the 'context critique'. Summarised, this critique finds that there is an incomplete understanding of how violence is organised in hybrid political orders, and thus how and by whom what security is provided. Furthermore, there is insufficient understanding of the functioning of the state in a hybrid political context, and the relationship between state and society. As a result of this lacking understanding, there are unrealistic expectations of how the above two points can be changed by external actors. While providing a normative goal, programmatic guidance and legitimisation for interventions, the ideal model also assumes a certain logic in which societies can be organised. When a state is not functioning according to this logic, it is considered 'fragile'. For the context critique these states are not 'fragile' or 'sick', but simply function in different ways and according to different logics. They have been described as 'hybrid political orders' (Boege et al, 2008; 2009a; 2009b), 'mediated states' (Menkhaus, 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2008) or 'negotiated statehood' (Hagmann and Péclard, 2010) involving 'twilight institutions' (Lund, 2007). North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) note there is a difference in the logics of functioning of what they refer to as 'natural states' and 'open access orders'. In other words, the

logic according to which societies function where interventions take place is different from the logic assumed in the ideal model that is the point of departure of interventions. Rather than open access to the political and economic system required for the liberal democratic model, there is a predominance of social relationships organised along personal lines. And instead of a state monopoly on the use of violence, control of violent means is dispersed and various authority structures overlap, cooperate and compete. The context critique provides a spectrum of analytical concepts that can be used to look at what and how institutions and societies function in contexts where interventions take place. With regard to interventions, this set of literature stresses the importance of non-state institutions and local customs and emphasises that the context is highly complex. But little answers are provided on how interventions should relate to this complex context. The argument that local input and contextual sensitivity is required is nothing new, and neither are the attempts to find a balance between local input and external ideas. Furthermore, this assumes that there is a correct balance between 'top-down' and bottom-up' that can be identified, which can be questioned.

A second set of criticisms has been termed the 'intervention critique'. The intervention critique builds on the context critique, and argues that states do not necessarily develop towards the type presented by the dominant intervention model. Secondly, the policies and programmes of interventions are not simply implemented, creating 'local ownership'. And third, interventions themselves are 'hybrid', as they are implemented by a multiplicity of actors with diverging agendas. By questioning the evolutionary path of state development, the ideal state is no longer an inevitable outcome. On the contrary, the development of institutions depends on social, historic, and economic circumstances and different types of states are much more likely. At the same time, the process from policy designing towards programme implementation is complicated and influenced by the diverging agendas of the different actors that are involved, who steer policies and implement programmes to favour their own goals. Barnett and Zürcher (2009) helped to set this implementation process into a political process with local stakeholders. Yet, their model is too oversimplified, assuming there is one big scheme over which actors negotiate, that the actors and their positions are fixed, and that actors at all levels continuously interact with one another in negotiating this political process. But it is helpful in understanding how the outcome of a policy described at the highest level of, for example, the UN may through this process of implementation and interaction with local counterparts become something different than what was originally planned for. The interactions between international and local actors lead to new and unplanned arrangements that influence the strategies and positions of both local and international actors, something that can be called the

politics of ownership (Boer and Van der Borgh, 2011). Through the interactions of actors at different levels, the policies and programmes are adopted, as well as rejected and adapted, creating local ownership in the process. And the 'international community' that designs, implements and supports interventions is not a unitary actor, but consists of a variety of different actors with different motivations. Interventions could therefore be considered to be hybrid, consisting of multiple, at times even conflicting, parts. This hybridity of interventions also enhances the ability of local actors to pursue their own goals.

Chapter 4 bridged the literature presented in the first part of the book with the empirical chapters in the second part. First it discussed the critiques, finding that they bring valid points, but fail to provide answers as to what the consequences are for interventions. Second, it finds that the interpretations of what security is in society are contested. Based on these two points it then develops an analytical model aimed at understanding how international, national and local perceptions and practices of security relate to one another. Several important elements are taken from the literature discussed in the first part of the book to look at the ways in which international efforts to build and contribute to security in hybrid political contexts relate to national and local perceptions of security. A first point of departure is that access to violent means in hybrid political contexts is dispersed rather than monopolised. As a result there is a multitude of overlapping institutions, both state and non-state, involved in governance and security provision, that are trying to define and enforce collectively binding decisions. A second stream of literature brings in the politics of policy implementation and sets this in a political process with local actors. A third stream of literature discusses the concept of security. Security is then defined as the low probability of damage to acquired values, and security provision is seen as actions taken by actors to react to or minimise threats to these values. In the hybrid political contexts where interventions take place, there are multiple actors involved in security provisioning, whose actions are based on different norms, interests and priorities, and as such on different definitions of security. These actors also have different resources and repertoires. The struggles between security actors are therefore not just about which security issues are set on the agenda as described by securitisation theory. Rather, in the hybrid political context with multiple security actors these struggles are also about which actions are allowed, according to whose norms, and who is allowed to take action. The interaction between different actors dealing with security provision, referred to as the security dynamics, has therefore been described as a dynamics of a constant struggling and negotiating of different security definitions and strategies by multiple individuals and institutions.

Acknowledging a gap in knowledge on the ways in which security interventions relate to these local security dynamics, an analytical model has been developed to gain a better understanding of how international, national and local perceptions and practices of security relate to one another. Following Migdal's definition of "society's multiple arenas of domination and opposition" (2001: 99), this model looked at different arenas of interaction, arguing that different actors and different political processes of negotiation or conflict between actors do not necessarily always interact. In other words, the implementation of security interventions cannot be considered as one big political process, in which one big plan is negotiated and competed over between actors at different levels who continuously interact with one another. While there is certainly no boundary between (the analytically imposed) local, national and international levels, and while the different arenas of interaction may overlap and intersect, there are nonetheless different realities of security interventions. It has therefore been proposed to focus on three different arenas of interaction between international, national and local actors: 1) between intervening international actors and state actors, 2) between intervening international actors and actors at the local level, and 3) between state and non-state actors in security provision at the local level. The analysis was further guided by the questions how the programmes of interventions are experienced, perceived and used at national and local levels, and how local and national perceptions and practices of security relate to each other. The goal was to take critical analysis of interventions a step further by looking at the interactions between international, state and local actors involved in security provision in the hybrid political contexts in which these interventions take place.

Struggles for Authority

The first arena of interaction that has been discussed looked at how intervening international actors relate to actors at the state level, or the elites in hybrid political contexts. It was found that struggles over authority between different power holders continue after a settlement. Interventions therefore take place in a dynamic process, and intervening actors relate to elites who are involved in political struggles. Interventions aim to mitigate and influence these struggles, but at the same time become part of it themselves, as the programmes and benefits provided by interventions become stakes for state actors and other power holders.

Chapter 5 analysed the different characteristics of the conflict, the settlement, the security situation and the state that influence the security intervention in the three researched cases. This showed how during the conflict different actors and institutions struggled over the control of violent means and ability to enforce

collectively binding decisions, how the dynamics between existing and emerging power holders developed, and how these dynamics continued after a settlement. The signing of a peace agreement often signals the inception of security interventions and the labelling of the situation as 'post-conflict', and interventions aim to move the status quo of the settlement towards their ideal state model. At the level of the state, security interventions aim to influence the organisational structure and functioning of its institutions, for example through SSR programming. Yet, this organisational structure and functioning is not static but is set in a dynamic process and different power holders continue to strive to maintain or improve their position. This occurs within the state's institutions, outside the state, as well as between state and non-state institutions and actors, and both silently behind closed doors and with the use of violence. Where on paper fighting parties are brought together to form new state security forces, in reality this also brings the cleavages of the conflict *into* these new state security forces. And where during the conflict some actors may have gained control of some of the state's institutions, others have set up parallel structures in competition with the state. The dynamics between power holders that have developed through the conflict therefore greatly affect the security situation and the type of governance. Security interventions aim to mitigate the power struggles and contribute to stability, and may limit the options particular power holders have to improve their control over violent means and the capacity to enforce collectively binding decisions.

Yet, at the same time security interventions also create a web of opportunities that power holders can use in their struggles. The 'international community' that organises, finances and supports security interventions is not a unitary actor. Different donors themselves also have a variety of norms, interests and priorities, and are furthermore influenced by global politics and economics. Altruistic motives and ideals of human rights and democracy compete with interests in short-term stability, economic gains and political influence. Especially when power holders control economically or militarily strategic locations, they have much leeway to negotiate about the terms and conditions of outside support. Moreover, if a particular donor attaches strong conditionalities to support, there is usually a choice to find other donors. Actors in control of government institutions are therefore enabled to pick and choose relatively freely – although certainly within limits – from the programmes offered by security interventions. A Sudan expert complained that donors are more interested in stability and trade, and "the first thing they trade off is democracy. [... Interventions are] brought down to technical issues and security issues. [...] Training and equipping soldiers is done, but what does it bring?

Shoot people better, kill better, torture better.”²⁶⁸ This perspective may exaggerate things, as in all three countries programmes were undertaken, during the time of research as well as during the time of writing, that aimed to improve civilian and democratic control over the state security forces. But the extent to which these are having an effect is limited, and at the same time building, equipping and training are often favoured over longer-term political processes in support of the democratisation of the security sector. The former are simply more likely to show measureable results in the short timeframes donors tend to have. While this is certainly not generalisable for all international actors, many donors are pressured to bring quick results, which may lead to setting low and easily attainable benchmarks of programmes that aim to affect large and complex processes. At the same time, donors also give support for projects in order to maintain a dialogue with a government. All these characteristics of the ‘international community’ bring considerable opportunities for the national elites. Therefore, even what are considered to be ‘fragile states’ are relatively strong in pursuing their own policies with regard to state – or regime – security.

International Programmes and Local processes

The second arena of interaction discussed how intervening international actors relate to actors at the local level. Here, the focus was on DDR programmes, and reintegration programmes in particular, supporting the reintegration processes of ex-combatants. It was found that while DDR is a security intervention, the ultimate objective of DDR programmes is essentially the outcome of a process that primarily involves economic and social factors. International actors relate to ex-combatants not just as beneficiaries, but to local actors involved in a complex process in which the programmes and benefits of the intervention are just one of the influencing factors. Trying to manage the complex processes and steer them to the desired outcome, the programmes of interventions aimed at supporting reintegration have over the years expanded and become more complex, making these programmes more difficult to manage.

Reintegration programmes aim to directly influence the process of reintegration at the local level, and affect both individuals and communities. These ex-combatants were prior to their demobilisation part of either a state security force or a non-state armed group. As such, they actively participated in the struggles between different institutions over the control over violent means and authority prior to the signing of a peace agreement. When this agreement is signed, dealing with the often

²⁶⁸ Interview, Security expert, Juba, 30 March 2011

mushroomed number of combatants that took part in these struggles is one of the priorities of security interventions. New state security forces are being organised, but these can generally not take in all ex-combatants as the costs of salary would simply be too high. Yet, ex-combatants looking for a new role in the new post-settlement situation may become a security threat when they resort to crime or remobilise into an armed group. The assumption behind DDR is that by reintegrating ex-combatants socially and economically in their communities of return, they cease to form potential spoilers to the peace process. Moreover, if reintegration is successful, ex-combatants can become active and constructive participants in the peace process. For many practitioners involved in the programme the goal of DDR has shifted from the appeasement of potential spoilers to 'reintegration'. Indeed, the leading policy document on DDR, the IDDRS, finds the ultimate objective of DDR to be the sustainable social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants (UN IAWG, 2006: 4.30, 1).

However, reaching this ultimate objective is easier said than done. The economic and social reintegration constitutes a complex process that involves the individual ex-combatants, the communities in which they reintegrate, as well as the wider social, political and economical context. Aiming to specify what this entails programmatically, authors distinguish, amongst others, economic, social, political and military dimensions both to operationalise reintegration and to monitor its progress (cf. Humphreys and Weinstein 2007: 50; Pugel, 2009: 85; UNDP, forthcoming). My research focused on what are considered to be the two main elements of reintegration in the IDDRS standards: economic and social reintegration. With regard to economic reintegration, which is about supporting ex-combatants in finding a sustainable and legitimate income, the effects of the programmes are uneven, but limited overall. The reintegration support has certainly benefited ex-combatants, but large groups have nonetheless difficulties finding a sustainable income and satisfy basic needs. This also directly impacts social reintegration as it makes ex-combatants economically dependent on others and contributes to stigmatisation. With regard to social reintegration, success is more difficult to define. Talking to ex-combatants and communities, the requirements for proper social reintegration and mutual acceptance seem to quickly slide from 'cohabitation' to 'reconciliation' and it can be questioned to what extent DDR programmes can be expected to achieve this. Moreover, there are instances where the reintegration benefits that have been provided have actually been counter-productive. Distinct support for ex-combatants has increased stigmatisation rather than supporting their reintegration, or reintegration support has motivated mobilisation into armed groups. Failing reintegration also has led ex-combatants to return to armed groups or get involved in criminal activities. In the DRC, in a

situation of on-going conflict, there were 'revolving door' combatants who recycled through DDR programmes into new armed groups. In South Sudan ex-combatants were easily recruited by defecting generals from the SPLA. And in Burundi ex-combatants admitted to be pressured by politicians during the heated election period.

But the successes and failures of reintegration cannot be completely attributed to DDR programmes. All in all, reintegration is a complicated long-term and multi-faceted process and many of the other factors affecting the reintegration processes of ex-combatants are outside of the programmes' control. At best, programmes can be expected to contribute to reintegration processes. Reintegration programming is then about supporting ex-combatants to find an alternative to the income and social structure that were previously provided by an armed group or force. The opportunities ex-combatants get and the choices they make are nonetheless also influenced by a variety of other factors and the context in which reintegration programmes operate is by definition difficult and evolving. In this context, the goals set for DDR programmes – i.e. sustainable social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants – are very ambitious. And looking closer at what reintegration processes entail in practice, perhaps even too ambitious. Trying to manage the complex processes and steer them to the desired outcome, the programmes of interventions aimed at supporting reintegration have over the years expanded and become more complex. Acknowledging that reintegration is in essence a long-term process, reintegration support has been distinguished from reinsertion support and became more elaborated. Where previously only a limited support package was given, now a variety of vocational training programmes are offered and there are debates among policy makers and practitioners about what other aspects – e.g. reconciliation and transitional justice, but also gender issues – need to be included or linked to DDR programmes. Yet, at the same time this complexity hinders the manageability of interventions. The minimalist-maximalist debate illustrates how international actors are struggling with this dilemma. From a minimalist or pragmatic perspective, with DDR just aiming to leave weapons untouched for a while, buying time is all a programme can, and therefore should, do. The long-term processes are then supported with time. This implicitly assumes that when time is bought the risk of a return to violence will decrease. But the competition of rebel groups, criminals and political entrepreneurs continues, and buying a few months time may not be enough. Furthermore, favouring short-term pragmatism risks neglecting the possible long-term effects these programmes may have. Therefore, from a maximalist perspective programmes should therefore be comprehensive and both give attention to the multiple facets of reintegration processes and take the longer term into consideration. But the problem there is that the end of the

reintegration process becomes the goal of inevitably limited programmes. However, the discussion between a maximalist and a minimalist approach will never provide a solution as the problems faced by comprehensiveness call for pragmatism, and the problems faced by pragmatism call for more comprehensiveness.

State actors, Non-State Actors and State Formation

The third arena of interaction discussed how state actors relate to actors at the local level. It was found that even when state actors fail to provide security, local actors nonetheless see the state as an organisation that *should* provide security to its civilian population and have the capacity to do so. But when state actors are considered not to adequately provide security, non-state security initiatives (re-)emerge. Such initiatives may not always be easily categorised in terms of replacing, supporting or confronting the state as they may take on different roles, and are not readily incorporable into state structures. The resulting interactions between different security actors (both state and non-state) create struggles in society about whose norms, interests and priorities regarding security are promoted, what actions to provide security are considered legitimate, and about who is considered a legitimate security actor. This could be considered processes of state formation.

Talking with people in local communities about security, they interpret it very broadly. This leaves room for a large variety of norms, interests and priorities regarding security amongst different actors. Consciously or not, actors make choices in pursuit of their security based on their priorities, which are determined by their needs, norms and interests, and are also determined by the available resources and repertoires. Apart from state actors in security provision, there are various forms of non-state security provision. Various communities encountered had set up a warning system, ranging from the use of drums, whistles to mobile phones. Others had organised neighbourhood patrols of young men walking around the village at night to ward off criminals. With that, there is thus also a dispersed control of governance and security provision. And where initiatives are better organised and when people armed themselves, this contradicts the desires a state may have to acquire a monopoly on the use of violence. And without a monopoly there is competition between the different actors in control of violent means, as well as new emerging actors. Therefore, there is a constant struggle over what institution is able to define and enforce collectively binding decisions (Lund, 2011), and among those participating in these dynamics are state institutions. However, despite that, many people – in all three countries – expressed during interviews that they did think the government *should* be responsible for the provision of adequate security. Useful to explain this is the definition of the state provided by Migdal (2001: 15-16), who

argues that the state can be seen as the *image* of a coherent, controlling organisation in territory where it represents the people bounded by that territory, as well as the *actual practices* of its multiple parts. For those in control of the state's institutions, the image of the state gives power and legitimisation of its actions. At the same time, this image creates expectations. Even in small rural African villages people felt that the state was responsible for the provision of security. And not only was this mentioned by people during interviews and discussions, but also did people report crimes to the police knowing that this would probably not result in an investigation or arrest. The problem for most of these people, however, is that the state does not always provide security according to their norms, interest and priorities. When there is impersonal, civilian and democratic oversight over a state's security forces, the accountability this ensures enables the steering of these forces to work in the interest of the general public. Public debate and democratic decision-making allows, as good as it goes, finding overlap between different security interests. However, in the contexts studied, the bureaucratic and impersonal control over security forces assumed in the ideal model discussed in chapter 1 does not exist. Rather, personal relations and interests may be guiding the behaviour of these state security providers.²⁶⁹ The implication of this is that security provision by the state is not impartial and not equally accessible.

Therefore, where the state is considered to inadequately address their security needs, people also put their claims in front of other security actors, or organise new forms of security provision. A good example of this was the case of the Arrow Boys in South Sudan. Such non-state initiatives should certainly not be romanticised as the solution to a lacking accountability of state security actors. Just as with state security actors, security provision by these non-state actors can be illiberal, personal and unequal, and the competition between various actors in itself can create insecurity. And where local mechanisms can start off with the primary goal of protecting the security in a community, they can turn into aggressors themselves as well. The Mai Mai in the DRC and the pastoralist youth protecting their cattle in South Sudan exemplify this. But it is nonetheless important not only to realise the multitude of actors involved in security provision, but also to acknowledge that especially in a context where there is no state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, the variety of norms, interests and priorities actually *stimulates* a multiplicity of actors in security.

²⁶⁹ Private interests are certainly not absent in states where impersonal democratic oversight exists. Yet, if all goes well, state security actors are held accountable when they use their position and power for personal gain, such as the extortion of money or to benefit the interests of a political party or leader.

The different norms, interests and priorities are important factors that determine the relations between the various actors in security provision. These relations are furthermore affected by the resources and repertoires available to security actors. And where the control over violent means and the possibility to use it to enforce decisions is certainly a powerful tool for an institution to have, soft power also provides certain institutions sufficient leverage to – to a certain extent – enforce decisions. The *Bashingantahe*, for instance, have no access to violent means and have even been stripped from the legal power they previously held, yet they continue – albeit certainly to a lesser extent – to play a role in Burundian society. The capacity that soft power provides should not be romanticised, and is definitely limited. Moreover, the spread of SALW, which further dispersed violent means, has resulted in the loss of the soft powers of certain actors and institutions. Several chiefs in South Sudan hold little sway over the heavily armed cattle raiding youth in their communities. But nonetheless the RHA in Eastern DRC has without violent means been able to confront misbehaviour of state security actors during public meetings, opened up dialogue with them, and in certain cases improved relations and thereby the behaviour of these state security actors.

Non-state initiatives active in security promotion cannot easily be boxed and categorised in terms of replacing, supporting or confronting the state, which has been illustrated by the case of the RHA. While a non-state institution can replace particular state functions, it can at the same time cooperate or compete with the state, or even support to build the capacity of state institutions. As such, they can at the same time both work against and in support of state security actors, as well as the goals of security interventions.

Non-state initiatives are also not readily incorporable into state structures. Doing so may result in the loss of authority and capacity of non-state institutions and the reinvention of these institutions outside the direct control of the state. This can in part be explained by the complex and ambivalent relations non-state institutions can have with regard to the state. While non-state actors and institutions may cooperate and can even have similar goals as the state, at the same time they can serve to balance the state's control over violent means and its ability to define and enforce collectively binding decisions. Where civilian and democratic oversight over the state's security forces is lacking, other security actors can provide an alternative to security provision by the state when the latter is considered to be inadequate or even threatening security. In a way, this rebalancing of control over violent means and the ability to enforce collectively binding decision outside of the state functions as an accountability mechanism where such mechanisms are lacking within the state's institutions. When a non-state actor is being incorporated into the state, it

becomes part of the state's institutions and loses its capacity to be an alternative. A good example is the case of the *Bashingantahe* in Burundi, which initially primarily served the security interests of people in the communities and advised the state on behalf of these communities and the greater good. As several regimes tried to incorporate it, and at the same time deliberately limiting its power, the institution lost position vis-à-vis the state. It not only lost authority because the state limited its legal powers to settle disputes within communities, but also because it lost autonomy from the state. However, not only do the values of *Ubushingantahe* continue to be an important element in Burundian society, but also do communities look for alternatives when security provision by state actors is considered to be inadequate. This explains why in some communities in Burundi the system is being revived.

The arena of interaction between state and non-state actors in hybrid political contexts can be considered to constitute processes of state formation (and reformation). The interactions between the different state and non-state actors involved in security provision are essentially about which security issues are placed on the agenda, what actors are allowed to take action, and what actions are considered appropriate. These struggles are thus about authority: about what institutions are able to define and enforce collectively binding decisions. Such processes of state formation are ongoing in contexts where international actors implement and support the policies and programmes of security interventions which are part of their larger statebuilding efforts. While local non-state initiatives and institutions involved in security provision are often relatively disconnected from the larger statebuilding efforts, they are connected to these processes of state formation.

Implications and Closing Remarks

The conclusion, and answer to the main research question, can be summarised as follows. After violent conflict, struggles at national and local levels continue between different groups, such as political elites, army battalions, rebel factions, ethnic communities, self-defence groups. These struggles are essentially about authority, about who has control over violent means, and thus about who takes on state functions. These struggles are also about what issues are considered a security issue and about which actions are allowed, according to whose norms, and who is allowed to take action. Intervening international actors therefore do not relate to local and state actors as beneficiaries of the programmes and policies they propose, but to actors who are involved in processes which have been termed the dynamics of security. Programmes and policies are but one of a multitude of factors

influencing local and state level processes. And at the same time programmes and policies can become stakes for local and national actors, as benefits and international recognition can alter their positions vis-à-vis others. Therefore, intervening actors are not simply intervening into these processes from outside, but they are themselves part of it. The implications of this are discussed below.

To understand how international actors designing and supporting interventions relate to local and national level perceptions and practices of security, interventions have been deconstructed and the analysis focused on different arenas of interaction. Taking this perspective shows that the linear notion of interventions in which a particular input logically results in a planned output should be abandoned. There are different arenas where various types of actors interact, negotiate and conflict over security provision. To understand the impact of interventions, it is therefore vital to gain a better understanding of the interactions in these arenas. Intervening actors do not simply implement pre-existing policies and programmes in a context, which then naturally and smoothly contribute to building the state they proscribe. Rather, looking at different arenas of interaction shows how both at the local and national level they become entangled with other actors in complex dynamic processes. Through negotiations and the forced incorporation of non-state institutions such as rebel groups into the state, the state becomes more rather than less hybrid. Both in the DRC and in South Sudan the cleavages of the conflict were internalised into the newly established national security forces. Furthermore, as long as there is little or no civilian democratic oversight over the state security forces, the strengthening of the state monopoly risks creating more hybridity. When state security forces are unaccountable and the security they provide is unequal, inaccessible and costly, other actors and institutions emerge and gain popular support.

Aiming to manage the complex processes they aim to steer, learning from past experiences and contextual analyses, international actors have continued to find new elements that need attention or improvement, resulting in an ever-expanding agenda. Interventions have grown in size and scope, programmes have become more and more complex and a larger number and variety of actors have become involved, inevitably with a variety of diverging agendas of their own. This also has severe consequences for the manageability of interventions, which have become criticized for becoming unrealistic in their goals. Moreover, it has given local and national actors also more opportunities to use the programmes and policies presented by international actors to further their own agendas – goals that do not necessarily overlap with the goals of intervening actors. The disconnect between the assumptions underlying interventions and the empirical realities with and in which

these interventions are interacting are then not just a 'technical' problem caused by misunderstandings between and a lack of cooperation between international, national and local actors. This disconnect is also very political, with different actors on different levels prioritizing different security needs and adjusting their actions to the context in their own ways. It is a result of the complex processes of negotiating and conflicting over security, of which donors become part. As such, improving manageability and comprehensiveness of interventions will never 'solve' the disconnect between policy ideals and local realities. As already noted, where the problems faced by this ever-expanding agenda perhaps call for more pragmatism, the problems faced by pragmatism call for more comprehensiveness.

But what then are the implications of the findings for policy? What concrete steps can be made to rethink and restructure security interventions in post-settlement situations? Below, a number of suggestions and recommendations are discussed. They are related to three main points. First, there is a need to look at the mechanisms and arrangements through which security interventions are organised, in order to deal with the complexity of the context more adequately, and to be better able to adjust to the changing dynamics intervening actors engage with. Second, more effective engagement in the security dynamics of hybrid political contexts where security interventions take place, requires a much more thorough understanding of these security dynamics. Corollary to these two points is the need to reconsider what goals can be expected to be achieved, how progress is measured, what actors are involved and how they relate to one another. A related and third point is then the need for a better and different participation of local stakeholders at different levels. Effectively, it entails even reconsidering the terms 'intervention' and 'ownership', and rethinking the ways in which international actors relate to local and national actors. These points are not entirely new, and underscore some of the recent developments in thinking on security interventions and international cooperation and development in general. But they also call for more radical thinking about how security interventions are organised and what roles actors at different levels play. This doubtlessly also raises many new questions. The points therefore do not provide a new framework for policy, but rather aim to stimulate debate and thinking.

The first set of considerations and recommendations is related to the mechanisms and arrangements through which security interventions are organised. Important steps have been made in recent years with regard to the harmonization of the multiple parts of interventions, and the development of comprehensive and coherent approaches. Donor convergence towards widely accepted standards, and new funding- and operational mechanisms have opened possibilities for mutual

collaboration and coordination that hitherto were lacking, and enable more rapid implementation. However, harmonization and coordination should not – and does not have to – go at the cost of the flexibility that is required to adjust to changing situations and local variations. Efforts should be made to allow the programmes of security interventions to consist of a multitude of smaller elements and programmes that are more decentralized and highly flexible. At the same time, platforms must be initiated and supported to continue with sufficient levels of cooperation, coordination and the exchange of information. Rather than overloading particular programmes with tasks, realistic goals should be set. Alternatives and complementary programmes can then add to the wider goals of security promotion and development.

This relates also to an increase in the development of standards, guidelines, frameworks and checklists. They are providing policy makers with specialist knowledge and tools for coordination and cooperation. Such guidelines and checklists will remain highly important, especially when programmes are to be more decentralised while at the same time add to a coherent and comprehensive effort. Yet, they also risk leading to ‘blueprint approaches’, inhibiting flexibility and openness to local input. This means that there is a need to balance the important objective of coordinated and swift actions with the objective of increased adaptability to local variations and changes in context. Checklists and guidelines should therefore not merely focus on listing what things to do and how, extracting a standardised approach from experiences and lessons learned from a variety of different contexts. They should provide tools to enhance flexibility, for instance, by listing the questions that should be asked and the information that should be gathered to allow programmes and policies to match local needs.

Blueprints and checklists can furthermore create the false impression that post-settlement contexts are makeable and fixable by following the proper guidelines and implementing the correct programmes. But as has become clear throughout this book, intervening actors, programmes and policies operate in complex environments. Therefore, there should be more recognition of the fact that improving post-settlement security situations is highly political. There are multiple actors involved in security provision, each having their own set of norms, interests and priorities. This creates a dynamic process in which there is constant struggling and negotiating of different security definitions and strategies by multiple individuals and institutions. This also means that security does not necessarily ‘trickle down’ when state security structures are strengthened and supported. State actors are indeed of vital importance for the provision of security, and the strengthening of state capacities to provide security to its population should remain

a priority, especially in post-settlement contexts. But the broader range of interpretations and priorities regarding security should not be neglected. This means that intervening actors are required to have a thorough understanding of the security dynamics. An accurate analysis of the differences and similarities in the perceptions and preferred practices of security of local, national and international actors is necessary. Searching for security issues on which there is mutual agreement between different actors can serve as a starting point to build a mutual ground and open up discussion on conflicting perceptions and interests of security. Practitioners and scholars furthermore have to think about the ways in which the progress and success of programmes are being measured. Programmes in post-settlement contexts should account for their contributions to (human) security and stability, and relevant indicators need to be developed that allow the monitoring of security progress in a broad sense.

A second set of considerations and recommendations is therefore related to the need for local knowledge. Taking the broad range of peoples' interpretations and priorities of security into account means that non-state security initiatives and institutions cannot be neglected. Most of such initiatives simply arise from communities themselves, when they feel that their norms, interests and priorities regarding security are not sufficiently addressed by other security providers. Very often, such initiatives also escape the scrutiny of interventions. They are either not observed at all, or quickly left aside when they are considered to be illiberal, to be unequally accessible, to suffer from a lack of accountability, or to be limited in their capacity and geographical reach. Nonetheless, the role of non-state security providers and their potential to contribute to security needs to be investigated, and possibly even promoted there where the formal alternative of state security provision is lacking or inadequate. Systems of oversight should be supported and enhanced in order to promote the transparency of non-state security provision, and to clarify their role vis-à-vis formal security providers. As became clear in the last chapter of this book, local security initiatives may not be readily incorporable into the structures of the formal state. It may also not be easy – or even impossible – to use such initiatives to the benefit of interventions and the security goals of international or national actors, when such security goals contrast the norms and needs that led to these local initiatives in the first place. But even then it is important not to neglect local non-state security initiatives, and to promote and facilitate dialogues between such local initiatives and state security actors.

Taking the broad range of peoples' interpretations and priorities of security into account also requires local knowledge. The notion that macro-level policies in and for post-settlement situations should constructively interact with micro-level

realities is widely accepted, but doing so remains a challenge for international actors in the field. Knowledge of international and national actors about the local security dynamics is often limited, and the role of local perceptions and practices in security remains little understood. The identification of informal systems of security provision and of the different perceptions on security needs to be strengthened. Most external actors focus on the easily visible formal state structures. Local and informal systems are less visible and therefore harder for outsiders to identify. In addition, many post-settlement contexts exhibit multi-layered systems of governance, which further complicates acquiring an accurate picture of who provides security to whom, in which cases and where. Even though the context in which security interventions take place is largely beyond the control of intervening actors, this context is at the same time of paramount importance for the success of these security interventions. The processes and mechanisms for security interventions should therefore be more inclusive of local knowledge, and international actors must invest in their capacities to acquire and use local knowledge. Hence, more research and community involvement in the early stages of security interventions is required to map local perceptions and practices of security, and to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of local non-state security initiatives. This should be more than quick consultation workshops in the planning stages of particular programmes. Local knowledge should be kept updated and used to adapt programmes when necessary. Donors therefore have to invest in ongoing dialogue with actors at different levels, including the community level.

The third set of considerations and recommendations is related to the need for a better and different participation of local stakeholders. Improving the inclusion of local knowledge demands constructive engagement with local organisations. Intervening actors should carry out capacity assessments to identify which local organisations are available to provide the required local input and seek active engagement of actors at the community level. Especially in post-settlement settings, engaging local actors can be difficult. Often mentioned reasons for limiting local involvement are capacity problems on the side of local actors, which are an issue of concern. But capacity issues should not be harnessed as a reason for less local involvement. This leads to the creation of parallel structures of international organizations, with less connection to local realities and less sustainability. Through the inclusion of local actors in programmes, cooperation and support these issues can be addressed and local capacity can be built. And on the other hand, local actors have local knowledge, are more able to adapt and find creative solutions fitting to the issues at hand, and are present on the ground. In theory, therefore, local actors have a presence and a capacity – i.e. local knowledge and understanding of the context – that international actors are often lacking– i.e. financial and organizational

knowledge – and vice versa. Constructive partnerships with local actors can therefore be mutually beneficial.

Creating better linkages with perceptions and practices of security at both national and local levels also requires changes in the institutional arrangements through which security interventions are organised. The importance of bottom-up involvement and national and local ownership of programmes is continuously stressed in policy reports and academic literature. The national programmes and commissions set up for the implementation of projects and policies, such as the CSAC Bureau in South Sudan and national DDR commissions, are a good start. Such initiatives provide opportunities to create national ownership and include local inputs and ideas. They also provide lessons and experiences of cooperation between national and international actors. Yet, international actors continue to dominate the thinking on security interventions and the design of policies and frameworks. And as discussed throughout this book, policies and programmes are at the same time being appropriated by national and local actors who pursue their own particular agendas. While this is perhaps a different form of ‘local ownership’, the results are often less beneficial to the goals of security interventions. Increased participation of national and local actors is therefore necessary. This requires a discussion on how participation should be shaped and what choices have to be made in this regard. It also means donors should investigate through what new forms of cooperation the participation by national and local actors can be increased.

Increasing local and national participation means that more decision-making and implementation initiatives should come in the hands of local actors. There are a number of hurdles that need to be addressed. It may be more difficult to find funding for programmes that have less international involvement, especially when there are concerns about capacity. The funding process may also become very lengthy in cases where donors are not satisfied with the proposals of national and local actors, and when such proposals have to be rewritten and reapplied. Studies are therefore required that look at what forms of collaboration and division of tasks between different actors at different levels are most appropriate and feasible. But a change in direction is needed. Capacity problems can be dealt with by providing technical support. This can for instance include facilitating the employment of a technical advisor to national commissions or government departments. Such a technical advisor can be an international expert if national capacity is lacking. But he or she should not be a representative of a donor that is assigned to keep an eye on things, and must work for and to the benefit of the commission or department in question. Smaller local organisations can be supported with training and the development of their strategic plans. Very often, smaller local organisations serve

primarily as sub-contractors for the programmes and projects of security interventions. Serving as an implementation partner for security interventions makes it difficult for local organisations to work on behalf of their own vision and approach that is based in their experiences on the ground. And relying completely on such projects for their income also limits their ability to provide critical reflections on external ideas. It is therefore necessary that actors who work with local organisations as implementing partners realise that a genuine partnership works both ways, and that they look for ways to also support the mission of their local partners. But local actors should also take up a stronger and more pro-active role vis-à-vis national and international actors. One way to achieve this is through a networked cooperative, of which SSANSA in South Sudan is an example. By creating networks of different local organisations working towards a common goal, these organisations can share experiences and lessons. A national committee or secretariat can facilitate this, and also function as a broker between these local organisations and national and international actors. It can enter into dialogue with the national government, international organisations and donors, facilitate the upward flow of local knowledge, and lobby for local needs and interests.

To conclude, people continue to search for stability and security. And although this book has placed much criticism on security interventions, it cannot be denied that these security interventions have also made important contributions to stability and security in the DRC, Burundi and South Sudan. And in the contexts where security interventions take place, people also still feel that the state should in the end be responsible for the provision of security to its civilian population. Therefore, while the ways in which security interventions are organised and implemented should be reconsidered, the ideals that drive these interventions may therefore still be valid.

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
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Appendix 1: Map of the DRC



Appendix 2: Map of Burundi




Map No. 3753 Rev. 6 UNITED NATIONS
September 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

Source: UN, 2012

Appendix 3: Map of South Sudan



Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

Source: UN, 2012

Map No. 4450 Rev.1 UNITED NATIONS
October 2011

Appendix 4: Topic Listⁱ

Communities

Security / security provision

- What do you do in daily life (work, etc.)?
- What does security mean? What is it? Difference man / woman?
- Are there any problems with security in the community? What kind of problems? What is the cause(s)?
- If there is a security problem (e.g. one mentioned), what actions are taken? Difference man/woman?
 - Is the problem solved? If yes, how? If no, how could it possibly be solved/what is needed?
- With what kind of problems do you go to the police / chief / local / administration / army / UN / other...?
 - How is the relationship with this actor?
 - Are they capable of solving the problems?
- Are there (apart from police, army, etc.) any other structures or ways to deal with security problems?
 - What kind of problems are being tackled?
 - How long does this system exist?
 - How is it organised?
 - What is the relationship with the police / government / community, etc.?

DDR / disarmament

- Has there been a lot of combat in this region during the war?
- Was there anyone who protected you?
 - Who (army, militias, etc.)?
- How were the relations between combatants during the conflict? Did they stay in the community or did they fight elsewhere?
- Where are these fighters now?

ⁱ This list provides an indication of the types of subjects that were discussed. Depending on responses of interviewees, different topics may have been discussed.

- What are they doing now?
- Is there a good relationship?
- What DDR programmes have there been here (if any)?
 - What is reintegration?
 - What is necessary for good reintegration?
 - What was good about the DDR programme? Why?
 - What was not good about the DDR programme? Why?
- According to you, are there many weapons in circulation? Do you hear shooting (day/night), are there armed robberies, etc.?
- Do you consider weapons as a problem?
- Why do people have weapons?
- Do you think disarmament is necessary? Why / why not?
 - Will disarmament improve security?
- Have there been disarmament programmes? If so, what kind, how did it take place, who initiated, etc.?
 - What do you think is / was good about disarmament? Why?
 - What do you think is / was not good about disarmament?
- In what ways did these programmes affect security? Has security changed because of these programmes, or not? How? Why?
 - Is there an alternative for these programmes?

Demobilisedⁱⁱ

DDR / disarmament

- What armed group did you fight with?
- What type of role did you have?
- Why did you join this group?
- Why did you demobilise?
- What do you do now (work?)?
- Was it easy to start this work?
- What is reintegration?

ⁱⁱ Security, security provision and disarmament questions as with community, where time permitted.

- What is needed for good reintegration?
- How is the relationship with the rest of the community?
 - Do you feel at home?
 - Did you get any support when you came back from relatives/other community members?
- Did you receive any DDR support?
 - What programme did you get support from?
 - What was good about the DDR programme? Why?
 - What was not good about the DDR programme? Why?
- What do you expect to do in the future?

Local administration, chiefs, etc.

Security / security provision

- Are there any problems with security in the community? What kind of problems? What is the cause(s)?
 - Are you able to solve these problems? How? Examples?
 - Are there any issues you cannot solve yourself?
 - What happens with those? Contact others? Who / how?
 - How are the relations with the police / chief / local / administration / army / UN / other...?
 - Are they capable of solving the problems?
- Are there (apart from police, army, etc.) any other structures or ways to deal with security problems?
 - What kind of problems are being tackled?
 - How long does this system exist?
 - How is it organised?
 - What is the relationship with the police / government / community, etc.?

DDR / disarmament

- Has there been a lot of combat in this region during the war?
- Was there anyone who protected you?
 - Who (army, militias, etc.)?

- How were the relations between combatants during the conflict? Did they stay in the community or did they fight elsewhere?
- Where are these fighters now?
 - What are they doing now?
 - Is there a good relationship?
- What DDR programmes have there been here (if any)?
 - What is reintegration?
 - What is necessary for good reintegration?
 - What was good about the DDR programme? Why?
 - What was not good about the DDR programme? Why?
- According to you, are there many weapons in circulation? Do you hear shooting (day/night), are there armed robberies, etc.?
- Do you consider weapons as a problem?
- Why do people have weapons?
- Do you think disarmament is necessary? Why / why not?
 - Will disarmament improve security?
- Have there been disarmament programmes? If so, what kind, how did it take place, who initiated, etc.?
 - What do you think is / was good about disarmament? Why?
 - What do you think is / was not good about disarmament?
- In what ways did these programmes affect security? Has security changed because of these programmes, or not? How? Why?
 - Is there an alternative for these programmes?

International organisationsⁱⁱⁱ

- What does your organisation do?
- How does it relate to the work of other organisations?
- What are the problems you come across?
- What are your limitations?
 - Does the mandate limit effectiveness?

ⁱⁱⁱ Topics of international organisations varied depending the particular organisation. In several instances topic lists were prepared specifically for an interview, with a more indepth focus related to the work of this organisation. This list provides a more general topic list.

- What is needed for a more effective approach?
- Do you work with counterparts at national and / or local levels?
 - How are the relations with these counterparts?

- What is the security situation in the region?
 - What type of security problems?
 - Where?
 - What causes these problems?
- What security actors are present?
 - What is their capacity regarding the provision of security?
 - How are their relations with other actors?
 - How are their relations with international actors?

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Summary

This book is based on field research in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi and South Sudan and looks at the dynamics of security provisioning in post-settlement contexts. A particular focus is on international security interventions, which are constituted by Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Armed Violence Reduction (AVR), including Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) control. The main question the book investigates is:

How do international efforts to build or contribute to security in the hybrid political context of post-settlement countries in sub-Saharan Africa relate to national and local perceptions and practices of security?

Chapter 1 discusses how since the end of the Cold War interventions in conflict have increased in size, numbers and scope, and investigates the underlying assumptions of international actors implementing security interventions. A dominant view is that the state is the best way to organise violence, that the ideal state has to function as an organisation with the legitimate monopoly on the use of violence, and that the primary task of the state is the provision of security. Security interventions are therefore aimed at supporting, building and reforming state institutions to enable this. DDR, SSR, and AVR including SALW control are the main intervention tools to do so. The ideal state model provides intervening actors with a goal and meaning, and legitimises their actions.

The first set of criticism on the dominant intervention model has been termed as the 'context critique', and is discussed in chapter 2. According to the context critique, there is incomplete understanding of how violence is organised, how state-society relations are organised, and thus how and by whom what security is provided. As a result of this there are unrealistic expectations of how the above two points can be changed by external actors. This context has been described as 'hybrid political orders' (Boege et al, 2008; 2009a; 2009b), 'mediated state' (Menkhaus, 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2008) or 'negotiated statehood' (Hagmann and Péclard, 2010) involving 'twilight institutions' (Lund, 2007). Others have described different logics of functioning of 'natural states' vis-à-vis 'open access orders' (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). Instead of a clear state-society division, the context is characterised by hybridity in which various authority structures are overlapping, cooperating and

competing. Rather than the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in the hands of the state, the situation is rather one where access to violent means is dispersed. With regard to interventions, this set of literature stresses the importance of non-state institutions and local customs and emphasises that the context is highly complex. But little answers are provided on how interventions should relate to this complex context. The argument that local input and contextual sensitivity is required is nothing new, and neither are the attempts to find a balance between local input and external ideas. Furthermore, this assumes that there is a correct balance between 'top-down' and bottom-up' that can be identified, which can be questioned.

Chapter 3 discusses a second string of criticism, which is termed the 'intervention critique' and builds on the critiques discussed in chapter 2. It starts by questioning how realistic the ideal model is and whether this presumed ideal does not distract from – or perhaps even neglects – the empirical reality and the functioning of state-society relations in the contexts in which interventions take place. It furthermore looks at the contradictions and complications that arise in the process from formulation to implementation of policies. For the intervention critique, policies and programmes of interventions are not simply implemented, and a form of local ownership is created in the process. And as interventions are implemented by a multiplicity of actors with diverging agendas, they can be considered hybrid themselves. This hybridity of interventions further enables local actors to use the policies and programmes of interventions to further their own agendas.

Chapter 4 connects the literature presented in the first part of the book with the empirical chapters in the second part. It starts by discussing the context and intervention critiques. While they bring a number of valid and useful points, they do not provide any answers as to what the consequences are for security interventions. Finding that there is still little known about the actual dynamics created by the interactions between international actors implementing security interventions on the one hand and the local security dynamics created by the interactions between both state and non-state actors involved in security on the other hand, the chapter develops an analytical framework to fill this gap in knowledge. Several important elements are taken from the literature discussed in the first part of the book to look at the ways in which international efforts to build and contribute to security in hybrid political contexts relate to national and local perceptions of security. A first point of departure is that access to violent means in hybrid political contexts is dispersed rather than monopolised. As a result there is a multitude of overlapping institutions, both state and non-state, involved in governance and security provision, and thus are trying to define and enforce

collectively binding decisions. A second stream of literature helps to include in the analysis of interventions, and brings in the politics of policy implementation and sets this in a political process with local actors. A third stream of literature discusses the concept of security. Security is then defined as the low probability of damage to acquired values, and security provision is seen as actions taken by actors to react to or minimise threats to these values. In the hybrid political contexts where interventions take place, there are multiple actors involved in security provisioning, whose actions are based on different norms, interests and priorities, and as such on different definitions of security. These actors also have different resources and repertoires. The struggles between security actors are therefore not just about which security issues are set on the agenda as described by securitisation theory. Rather, in the hybrid political context with multiple security actors these struggles are also about which actions are allowed, according to whose norms, and who is allowed to take action. The interaction between different actors dealing with security provision, referred to as the security dynamics, has therefore been described as a dynamics of a constant struggling and negotiating of different security definitions and strategies by multiple individuals and institutions. Following Migdal's definition of "society's multiple arenas of domination and opposition" (2001: 99), the analytical model looks at three different arenas of interaction: 1) between intervening international actors and state actors, 2) between intervening international actors and actors at the local level, and 3) between state and non-state actors in security provision at the local level. The analysis was further guided by the questions how the programmes of interventions are experienced, perceived and used at national and local levels, and how local and national perceptions and practices of security relate to each other.

The second part of the book presents the empirical analysis. Chapter 5 investigates the arena of interaction between intervening international actors and actors at state level, and looks at how the programmes of interventions are experienced, perceived and used at the state level. To do so, a brief outline of the context of the three countries is given, focusing on a number of characteristics that are considered to be crucial in influencing the post-settlement security situation: the type of conflict, the type of settlement, the type of current security challenges, and the type of government and governance. The final section then discusses this arena of interaction in closer detail, making a number of observations and conclusions about how intervening international actors relate to state level elites. It finds that interventions take place in a dynamic process where political struggles over authority between different power holders continue after a settlement. Interventions aim to mitigate and influence these struggles, but at the same time become part of it

themselves, as the programmes and benefits provided by interventions become stakes for state actors and other power holders.

Chapter 6 looks at the arena of interaction between intervening international actors and local actors, and looks at how the programmes of interventions are experienced, perceived and used at the local level. The focus here is specifically on programmes supporting the reintegration of ex-combatants, as it aims to directly affect individuals and communities at the local level. After discussing the implementation of reintegration programmes in the three countries, the chapter looks at the concept of reintegration and distinguishes it from the local reintegration processes. Where DDR is a security intervention, the ultimate objective of DDR programmes is essentially the outcome of a process, involving economic and social factors. International actors then relate to ex-combatants not just as beneficiaries, but to local actors involved in a complex process in which the programmes and benefits of the intervention are just one of the influencing factors. Trying to manage the complex processes and steer them to the desired outcome, the programmes of interventions aimed at supporting reintegration have over the years expanded and become more complex, making these programmes more difficult to manage.

Chapter 7 discusses the arena of interaction between state and non-state actors involved in security provisioning at the local level. It starts with a discussion of how security is perceived at the community level, followed by a discussion of the variety of actors involved in security provisioning. The variety of security perceptions and the differences in values, norms and interests also determine the relationships between the different actors. It finds that even when state actors fail to provide security, local actors nonetheless see the state as an organisation that *should* provide security to its civilian population and have the capacity to do so. Yet, In a hybrid political context where there is no state monopoly on violence, when the actions of the state are considered to inadequately address the security needs according particular norms, interests or priorities, non-state security initiatives (re-)emerge. The chapter looks closer at three cases – the *Réseaux Haki na Amani* in eastern DRC, the *Bashingantaha* in Burundi, and the *Arrow Boys* in South Sudan – and discusses their development and relationship with the state. These examples show that non-state security initiatives may not always be easily categorised in terms of replacing, supporting or confronting the state as they may take on different roles, and are not readily incorporable into state structures. The interactions between different security actors (both state and non-state) create struggles in society about whose norms, interests and priorities regarding security are promoted, what actions to provide security are considered legitimate, and about who is considered legitimate security actor. This could be considered processes of state formation.

Too conclude, both at the local and national level international actors implementing interventions become entangled with other actors in complex dynamic processes. Policies and programmes are therefore at times unsuccessful or even counter-effective, stimulating the political hybridity they aim to address. Aiming to manage the complex processes they aim to steer, learning from past experiences and contextual analyses, international actors have continued to find new elements that need attention or improvement, resulting in an ever-expanding agenda. Interventions have grown in size and scope, programmes have become more and more complex and a larger number and variety of actors has become involved, inevitably with a variety of diverging agendas of their own. This has severe consequences for the manageability of interventions and also has given local and national actors more opportunities to use the programmes and policies presented by international actors to further their own particular agendas. Yet, while the problems faced by the attempts to make interventions more comprehensive call for more pragmatism, the problems faced by pragmatism call for more comprehensiveness. The ways in which interventions are organised, including by whom with whom and for what purposes, are therefore in need of serious rethinking. A number of recommendations are suggested, which are related to three main points. First, the need to look at the mechanisms and arrangements through which security interventions are organised, and how they can better deal with changes and local variations. Second, the need for more and better local knowledge. Third, the need for a better and different participation of local stakeholders at different levels. At the same time, in the contexts in which these interventions take place people still feel that the state should be responsible for the provision of security to its civilian population. People do search for stability and security. Therefore, where the ways in which interventions take place should be reconsidered, the ideals that drive these interventions may still be valid.

Samenvatting

Dit boek is gebaseerd op veldonderzoek in het oosten van de Democratische Republiek Congo (DRC), Burundi en Zuid Soedan en kijkt naar de dynamiek van veiligheidsvoorziening in gebieden waar net een vredesakkoord is gesloten. De nadruk ligt in het bijzonder op internationale veiligheidsinterventies, welke bestaan uit *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration* (DDR) programma's, *Security Sector Reform* (SSR) en *Armed Violence Reduction* (AVR), met inbegrip van de beheersing van kleine en lichte wapens. De hoofdvraag van het boek onderzoekt luidt als volgt:

Hoe verhouden internationale inspanningen voor het opbouwen van of bijdragen aan de veiligheid in de hybride politieke context van landen na vredesakkoorden in sub-Sahara Afrika zich tot nationale en lokale percepties en praktijken van veiligheid?

Hoofdstuk 1 bespreekt hoe interventies in conflicten sinds het einde van de Koude Oorlog zijn toegenomen in omvang, aantal en verscheidenheid, en onderzoekt de onderliggende veronderstellingen van de internationale actoren die deze veiligheidsinterventies uitvoeren. Een dominante visie is dat de staat de beste manier is om geweld te organiseren, dat de ideale staat dient te functioneren als een organisatie met het monopolie op het legitiem gebruik van geweld, en dat veiligheidsvoorziening de primaire taak van de staat is. Veiligheidsinterventies zijn daarom gericht op het ondersteunen, bouwen en hervormen van de instituties van de staat om dit mogelijk te maken. DDR, SSR en AVR, met inbegrip van beheersing van kleine en lichte wapens, zijn de belangrijkste instrumenten van interventies om dit te doen. Het ideale model van de staat biedt interveniërende actoren een doel en betekenis, en het legitimeert hun acties.

Een eerste set van kritiek op het dominante interventie model is aangeduid als de 'contextkritiek', en wordt besproken in hoofdstuk 2. Volgens de contextkritiek is er een onvolledig begrip van de manier waarop geweld wordt georganiseerd, hoe de relaties tussen staat en maatschappij zijn georganiseerd, en daarmee hoe en door wie welke soorten van veiligheidsvoorziening worden verstrekt. Als gevolg hiervan zijn er onrealistische verwachtingen met betrekking tot de manier waarop de twee bovengenoemde punten kunnen worden veranderd door externe actoren. Deze contexten zijn omschreven als 'hybride politieke orde' (Boege et al, 2008; 2009a, 2009b), 'gemedieerde staat' (Menkhaus, 2006; 2007a, 2007b, 2008) of 'onderhandelde staat' (Hagmann en Péclard, 2010) met betrekking tot 'schemerinstitutionen' (Lund,

2007). Anderen beschreven de verschillende logica's achter de werking van 'natuurlijke staten' vis-à-vis 'open toegang orders' (North, Wallis en Weingast, 2009). In plaats van een duidelijke scheiding tussen staat en maatschappij wordt de context gekenmerkt door hybriditeit waarin verschillende gezagsstructuren overlappen, samenwerken en concurreren. In tegenstelling tot het monopolie op legitiem gebruik van geweld in de handen van de staat is toegang tot geweldsmiddelen verdeeld. Met betrekking tot interventies benadrukt de literatuur van de contextkritiek het belang van niet-statelijke instituties, lokale gewoonten en de complexiteit van de context. Weinig antwoorden worden er echter gegeven op de vraag hoe interventies zich tot deze complexe context dienen te verhouden. Het argument dat lokale input en contextuele gevoeligheid nodig zijn is niet nieuw, noch zijn de pogingen een evenwicht te vinden tussen lokale input en externe ideeën. Bovendien veronderstelt dit dat er een juiste balans tussen 'top-down' en 'bottom-up' kan worden geïdentificeerd, wat nog maar zeer de vraag is.

Hoofdstuk 3 bespreekt een tweede reeks van kritiek, die wordt aangeduid als de 'interventiekritiek' en voortbouwt op de kritiek die besproken is in hoofdstuk 2. Het begint met de vraag hoe realistisch het ideale model is, en of dit veronderstelde ideaal niet afleidt van de empirische werkelijkheid en de werking van relaties tussen de staat en de maatschappij in de contexten waarin interventies plaatsvinden - of dat het veronderstelde ideaal deze empirie misschien zelfs verwaarloost. Verder kijkt het naar de contradicties and complicaties die voortkomen uit processen van formulering en uitvoering van beleid. Voor de interventiekritiek worden beleid en programma's van interventies niet simpelweg uitgevoerd, en kan dit in de praktijk leiden tot zekere vorm van lokaal bezit van beleid en programma's. En aangezien interventies worden uitgevoerd door een verscheidenheid aan actoren met uiteenlopende agenda's, kunnen deze zelf ook als hybride worden beschouwd. Deze hybriditeit van interventies stelt lokale actoren nog meer in staat het beleid en de programma's van interventies te gebruiken voor de bevordering van hun eigen agenda's.

Hoofdstuk 4 verbindt de literatuur die in het eerste deel van het boek is gepresenteerd met de empirische hoofdstukken in het tweede deel. Het begint met een bespreking van de context- en interventiekritieken. Deze brengen een aantal nuttige en geldige punten, maar ze bieden geen antwoorden op de vraag wat de gevolgen zijn voor veiligheidsinterventies. Observerende dat er nog weinig bekend is over de werkelijke dynamiek die wordt gecreëerd door de interacties tussen internationale actoren die betrokken zijn bij de uitvoering van veiligheidsinterventies enerzijds en de lokale veiligheidsdynamiek die wordt gecreëerd door de interacties tussen zowel statelijke en niet-statelijke actoren die

betrokken zijn bij veiligheid anderzijds, ontwikkelt het hoofdstuk een analytisch kader om dit hiaat in kennis op te vullen. Om te kijken naar de manieren waarop internationale inspanningen om te bouwen en bij te dragen aan veiligheid in hybride politieke contexten relateren aan nationale en lokale percepties van veiligheid, worden een aantal belangrijke elementen afkomstig uit de literatuur die is besproken in het eerste deel van het boek meegenomen. Een eerste uitgangspunt is dat de toegang tot gewelddadige middelen in hybride politieke contexten verdeeld is in plaats van gemonopoliseerd. Als gevolg hiervan is er een veelheid van overlappende instituties, zowel statelijk als niet-staatelijk, die betrokken zijn bij bestuur en veiligheid, en daarmee proberen collectief bindende beslissingen te definiëren en te handhaven. Een tweede stroom van literatuur helpt de analyse van interventies toe te voegen, en brengt politiek van de beleidsuitvoering erin en zet deze in een politiek proces met lokale actoren. Een derde stroom van literatuur bespreekt het concept veiligheid. Veiligheid wordt dan gedefinieerd als de lage waarschijnlijkheid van schade aan verworven waarden, en veiligheidsvoorziening wordt gezien als acties van actoren om te reageren op bedreigingen van deze waarden of deze te minimaliseren. In de hybride politieke contexten waar interventies plaatsvinden, zijn er meerdere actoren betrokken bij veiligheidsvoorziening, wiens acties zijn gebaseerd op verschillende normen, belangen en prioriteiten, en daarmee op verschillende definities van veiligheid. Deze actoren hebben ook verschillende middelen en repertoires. De strijd tussen veiligheidsactoren gaat dan ook niet alleen over welke veiligheidsproblemen er op de agenda worden gezet, zoals beschreven door 'securitisation' theorie. In de hybride politieke contexten met meerdere veiligheidsactoren gaat deze strijd ook over welke acties zijn toegestaan, volgens wiens normen, en om wie er actie mag ondernemen. De interactie tussen de verschillende actoren die betrokken zijn bij veiligheid, aangeduid als de veiligheidsdynamiek, is daarom beschreven als een dynamiek van een constante strijd en onderhandeling tussen verschillende definities van veiligheid en strategieën om in veiligheid te voorzien door een verscheidenheid aan personen en instituties. In navolging van de definitie Migdal van "verscheidene arena's in de maatschappij van overheersing en oppositie" (2001: 99), kijkt het analytische model naar drie verschillende arena's van interactie: 1) tussen interveniërende internationale actoren en actoren op het niveau van de staat, 2) tussen interveniërende internationale actoren en actoren op lokaal niveau, en 3) tussen statelijke en niet-statelijke actoren in die betrokken zijn bij veiligheid op lokaal niveau. De analyse wordt verder geleid door de vragen hoe de programma's van interventies worden ervaren, opgevat en gebruikt op nationaal en lokaal niveau, en de manier waarop lokale en nationale percepties en praktijken van veiligheid zich tot elkaar verhouden.

Het tweede deel van het boek presenteert de empirische analyse. Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de arena van interactie tussen interveniërende internationale actoren en actoren op nationaal niveau, en kijkt naar de manier waarop de programma's van interventies worden ervaren, opgevat en gebruikt op het niveau van de staat. Hiervoor wordt er een korte introductie gegeven van de context van de drie landen, waarbij er wordt ingegaan op een aantal kenmerken die als cruciaal worden beschouwd in het beïnvloeden van de veiligheidssituatie na een vredesakkoord: het type conflict, de aard van het akkoord, de aard van de huidige veiligheidsproblemen, en het type van overheid en bestuur. De laatste paragraaf bespreekt deze arena van interactie vervolgens meer in detail, en maakt daarbij een aantal opmerkingen en conclusies met betrekking tot de wijze waarop interveniërende internationale actoren zich verhouden tot elites op statelijk niveau. Het concludeert dat interventies plaatsvinden binnen een dynamisch proces waar de strijd om gezag tussen verschillende machthebbers zich ook voortzet na een vredesakkoord. Terwijl veiligheidsinterventies als doel hebben deze strijd te beperken, worden ze er tegelijkertijd ook onderdeel van, en worden de steun en voordelen van programma's een belang in deze strijd voor statelijke actoren en andere machthebbers.

Hoofdstuk 6 gaat in op de arena van de interactie tussen interveniërende internationale actoren en lokale actoren, en kijkt naar de manier waarop de programma's van interventies worden ervaren, opgevat en gebruikt op lokaal niveau. De focus ligt hierbij specifiek op programma's ter ondersteuning van de re-integratie van oud-strijders, omdat deze programma's de intentie hebben om direct van invloed te zijn op individuen en gemeenschappen op lokaal niveau. Na het bespreken van de uitvoering van de re-integratie programma's in de drie landen, gaat het hoofdstuk in op het concept van re-integratie welke wordt onderscheiden van de lokale re-integratie processen. Hoewel DDR een veiligheidsinterventie is, is het uiteindelijke doel van DDR programma's in wezen het resultaat van een proces, waar economische en sociale factoren bij gemoeid zijn. Internationale actoren relateren dan niet alleen tot oud-strijders als begunstigden, maar tot lokale actoren die betrokken zijn in een complex proces, waarbij de programma's en de steun van de interventie slechts één van de beïnvloedende factoren zijn. In pogingen om de complexe processen te beheren en naar het gewenste resultaat te sturen, zijn de programma's van interventies die gericht zijn op het ondersteunen van re-integratie in de loop der jaren steeds meer uitgebreid en complexer geworden. Dit heeft tevens tot gevolg dat deze programma's steeds lastiger controleerbaar zijn.

Hoofdstuk 7 bespreekt de arena van interactie tussen statelijke en niet-statale actoren die betrokken zijn bij veiligheidsvoorziening op lokaal niveau. Het begint

met een bespreking van de manier waarop veiligheid wordt ervaren op het niveau van gemeenschappen, gevolgd door een discussie van de verschillende actoren die betrokken zijn bij veiligheidsvoorziening. De verscheidenheid van percepties van veiligheid, en de verschillen in waarden, normen en belangen bepalen ook de relaties tussen de verschillende actoren. Er wordt vastgesteld dat zelfs wanneer statelijke actoren falen in veiligheidsvoorziening, lokale actoren de staat desalniettemin zien als een organisatie die veiligheid *zou moeten* bieden aan haar burgerbevolking en de capaciteit nodig heeft om dit te kunnen doen. Echter, in een hybride politieke context waar het staatsmonopolie op legitiem geweld ontbreekt, en waar de staat onvoldoende in staat wordt geacht om te voorzien in de veiligheidsbehoeften volgens bepaalde normen, belangen of prioriteiten, ontstaan er niet-statale veiligheidsinitiatieven (of leven oude instituties op). Het hoofdstuk gaat vervolgens dieper in op drie casussen – het *Reseaux Haki na Amani* in oost DRC, de *Bashingantahe* in Burundi, en de *Arrow Boys* in Zuid Soedan – en bespreekt hun ontwikkelingen en relaties met de staat. Deze voorbeelden tonen aan dat niet-statale veiligheidsinitiatieven niet altijd gemakkelijk kunnen worden gecategoriseerd in termen van ofwel samenwerken met, bedwingen van, of concurrerend met de staat, aangezien ze tegelijkertijd verschillende rollen kunnen opnemen. Verder kunnen ze niet zomaar worden geïntegreerd in de staat of buitenspel worden gezet. In de interacties tussen verschillende veiligheidsactoren (zowel statelijk als niet-statale) wordt een strijd gecreëerd in de samenleving over wiens normen, belangen en prioriteiten met betrekking tot de veiligheid worden bevorderd, welke acties om in veiligheid te voorzien als legitiem worden beschouwd, en over welke veiligheidsactor er legitiem wordt bevonden. Dit kan worden gezien als processen van staatsvorming.

Concluderend, zowel op lokaal en nationaal niveau raken internationale actoren die interventies implementeren verstrikt in complexe dynamische processen met andere actoren. Beleid en programma's zijn daarom soms niet succesvol of zelfs contraproductief, en stimuleren ze juist de politieke hybriditeit zij beogen aan te pakken. Met als doel de complexe processen die ze willen sturen te beheren, en lerende van ervaringen uit het verleden en contextuele analyses, hebben internationale actoren steeds nieuwe elementen gevonden die aandacht of verbetering behoeven, met groeiende agenda's tot gevolg. Interventies zijn gegroeid in grootte en breedte, programma's zijn meer en meer complex geworden en een groter aantal van en verscheidenheid in actoren zijn betrokken geraakt, welke onvermijdelijk een verscheidenheid van uiteenlopende eigen agenda's hebben. Dit heeft ernstige gevolgen voor de beheersbaarheid van interventies en heeft tevens de lokale en nationale actoren meer mogelijkheden gegeven om het beleid en de programma's die worden gepresenteerd door internationale actoren te gebruiken

om hun eigen specifieke agenda's te bevorderen. Echter, terwijl de problemen als gevolg van de pogingen om interventies steeds beter te beheersen vragen om meer pragmatisme, vragen de problemen die worden veroorzaakt door een meer pragmatisme aanpak juist om een ruimere en bredere aanpak. De wijze waarop interventies worden georganiseerd, met inbegrip van door wie, met wie en voor welke doeleinden, dienen daarom grondig te worden herzien. Een aantal aanbevelingen worden voorgesteld, welke gerelateerd zijn aan drie hoofdpunten. Ten eerste, de noodzaak om te kijken naar de mechanismen en structuren waarmee veiligheidsinterventies worden georganiseerd, en hoe deze beter om kunnen gaan met veranderingen en lokale variaties. Ten tweede, de behoefte aan meer en betere lokale kennis. Ten derde, de noodzaak van betere en andere participatie van lokale belanghebbenden op verschillende niveaus. Tegelijkertijd hebben mensen in de contexten waarin deze interventies plaatsvinden nog steeds het gevoel dat de staat verantwoordelijk zou moeten zijn voor het verstrekken van veiligheid aan haar burgerbevolking. Mensen blijven zoekende naar stabiliteit en veiligheid. Terwijl de manieren waarop interventies plaats vinden moeten worden herzien, zijn de idealen die ten grondslag liggen aan deze interventies nog steeds geldig.

