

Islamic Charities and Social Activism

Welfare, Dakwah and Politics in Indonesia

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Welfare, *Dakwah* and Politics in Indonesia

Islamitische liefdadigheidsinstellingen en sociaal activisme: welzijn, dakwah
en politiek
(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

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Dedicated to the memories of
Moeslim Abdurrahman
(1948-2012)

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A Note on the Transliteration System

Throughout the text I have used the system of translation adopted in the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, but diacritics have been reduced for simplification. The names of people and organisations, as well as the titles of books, journals and articles, have been rendered as locally spelled and transliterated. For the plural forms of Arabic words, I simply add an 's', but for the plural forms of Arabic words which have been adopted in Bahasa Indonesia, I do not add an 's'. The words '*ulama*, *madrasah*, and *da'i*' can be singular or plural. There are also some Arabic and Indonesian terms that may be used interchangeably, such as *da'wa* and *dakwah*, *sadaqa* and *sedekah*, *Shari'a* and *Syari'ah*, and so forth. For the translation of the Qur'anic verses, I employed Abdullah Yusuf Ali's *The Meaning of the Holy Qur'an* (New Edition with Revised Translation and Commentary, 1991).

Map

Indonesia

Source: blank map¹ modified by the author



Nias Islands

Source: blank map² modified by the author



¹ <http://geography.about.com/library/blank/blxindonesia.htm>

² <http://www.bing.com/maps/>

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Introduction

Background

Charity is about giving, receiving, helping, granting, and the redistribution of wealth. People tend to associate the word ‘charity’ with the practice of assisting the poor, the way the wealthy share their fortunes, and other such good deeds. In many religious traditions, whether we are concerned with Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity or Islam, charitable action is considered as religiously meritorious and remains central to religiously-inspired social activism.¹ In fact, the culture of giving’s long history has resulted in charitable foundations, established decades and even centuries ago, such as houses for the poor, orphanages, places of worship, hospitals, public kitchens, and religious schools. The practice of giving has also been preserved in the community, either as a form of religious expression or integrated as a daily customary norm. In short, the concept of ‘generosity’ and the doing of compassionate deeds are culturally contextual.² The motives, reasons, legitimacy, and idioms utilised in the practice of giving can differ from one culture and another.

In recent times, while charitable activism has remained popular in Muslim societies, including Indonesia, the extent to which charity has been able to alleviate poverty has been heavily constrained by the complexity of the

modern social, economic and political system of nation states, and in turn, the provision of means to benefit communities and the creation of the public good at large has also become increasingly complex. Due to this, several terms have been utilised at a discursive level, and various methods have been formulated and put into practice by different actors (such as intellectuals, social activists, and politicians) in order to attain social goals: that is, the welfare of the community. Alongside individual efforts to express piety in the social, economic and even political spheres in Indonesian Islam, there has been a significant institutional transformation of present-day charitable practices, as marked by the tremendous development of Islamic charities with their distinct roles.

One of the main issues that this study attempts to address is how Islamic charities function in modern nation states, and how Islamic forms of giving and notions of benevolent acts have been conceived by Indonesian Muslims in the post-colonial era. Investigating the relationship between Islam and welfare issues, this present study explores, contrasts, and compares the experiences of Islamic charitable organisations in Indonesia's pluralistic society. In addressing this issue, actors undertaking charitable work, their religious affiliations, their beneficiaries at the grassroots level, approaches to problems and clients, sociological and political grounds for action, and interreligious, local, regional and transnational networks, will come under close scrutiny.

Researching charitable activism in Indonesia is interesting, partly because charitable services can be provided by different types of institutions, ranging from 'secular' to 'religious' associations, from community-based organisations to private companies or state-sponsored agencies, from *dakwah* institutions to politically-oriented associations, as well as from local or domestic charitable foundations to international aid organisations. All of these types of organisations have operated in Indonesia and play multiple roles in strengthening civil society at large. In a nutshell, as a result of the actions of Islamic charities, institutionalised forms of Islamic faith have become increasingly visible in public life.

Charitable Practice and Institutionalised Forms of Indonesian Islam

In Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country, institutionalised forms of Islamic faith have been known for centuries. The social history of modern Indonesia tells us that a tremendous development in Islamic institutions took place as early as the twentieth century. This was in part marked by the rise of a number of Islamic organisations, such as the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). These two associations, with their respective social welfare activities, represent the vibrant enthusiasm of the autonomous collective Muslim associations that have shaped the distinctive, publicly visible nature of Indonesian Islam for nearly a century. In 1912, the Muhammadiyah was founded by modernists, and is to this day renowned as a reformist movement that engages widely in social welfare enterprises. Like its Christian counterparts,³ the Muhammadiyah's social concerns have been articulated in a wide range of social welfare activities, including the relief of the poor. The movement has operated and governed thousands of modern schools and hundreds of hospitals, orphanages and cooperatives throughout Indonesia.⁴ In addition to the increasing visibility of the modernist movement, the traditionalist NU emerged in 1926 and shaped another type of Islamic movement whose discourse and activism have enriched Islamic social activism in Indonesia as a whole. NU, in particular, has played a considerable role in disseminating and preserving Islamic 'traditionalism', especially in rural areas, and has been instrumental in operating thousands of *pesantren* (traditional Islamic schools).

The increasing visibility of Indonesian Islam in the social, economic and political realm can also be viewed through the lens of the development of the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector. In Indonesia's New Order, the NGO sector as a whole grew rapidly, and social activism supported by Muslim intellectuals and social activists proliferated in particular. Since the 1970s and 1980s, a number of leading Muslim personalities have attempted to formulate Islamic faith as means of expressing their dissatisfaction with the New Order's political and economic policies, which have caused

wide disparities between the rich and the poor; as a means of overcoming the hardships faced by the society's grassroots; and as a means of answering the question, to what extent Islam can contribute to the social development process in an era in which the interplay between the state, the market, society and religion is becoming increasingly complex.⁵ This has led to the production of knowledge among Muslim intellectuals pertaining to the relationships between Islam and social change, and the role of Islam in fostering public welfare and in promoting Islamic economic system.

The NGO sector in Indonesia has developed remarkably in terms of linking up welfare issues to the state's responsibility for providing welfare, as well as in that of formulating strategies to empower society from below through community development. As early as the 1970s, local initiatives and NGOs that were involved in serving the collective good of the community mushroomed and added nuance to the discourses on welfare, self-reliance, poverty alleviation, and social justice in Indonesian society.⁶ Muslim intellectuals from both modernist and traditionalist circles, such as Muhammad Dawam Rahardjo (b. 1942-), Adi Sasono (b. 1943-), Ahmad Muflih Saifuddin (b. 1940), Ahmad Sadali (d. 1987), Muhammad Amin Aziz (b. 1936-), Muhammad Amien Rais (b. 1944-), Mansour Fakih (d. 2004), and Masdar F. Mas'udi (b.1954-), provided grounds for the development of the NGO sector in general, and for the dynamics of welfare-oriented activism through Islamic philanthropic and economic activities in particular. They rigorously tried to find a new form of Islamic welfare system and to formulate a distinct Islamic society by utilising Islam as a discursive axis. They also came to believe that it is the state's responsibility to ensure an adequate legal framework and to provide an appropriate economic and political system. For this reason, building social awareness by organising series of workshops and various forms of training to strengthen communities has become a major part of the agenda pursued by Muslim intellectuals.

Apart from this, there was a vibrant discourse among the Muslim middle class on the promotion of an Islamic welfare system through the operation of Islamic economic institutions, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. With ideas on promoting justice and reducing inequality of access to economic

resources, as well as realising the principles of 'Islamic economy', Islamic economic institutions such as Islamic cooperative loans (BMT) and Islamic banks have been founded and now operate in many regions.

After the collapse of the New Order regime, which coincided with the outbreak of an economic crisis in the late 1990s, Indonesia witnessed an unprecedented development on the part of Muslim NGOs, which was partly characterised by the spawning of relief and charitable organisations that operate in poor urban and rural areas, as well as in disaster-affected spots. The presence of Islamic charitable associations, with their widespread engagement in Indonesia's social and political landscape, seems to have been underpinned by strong enthusiasm among Indonesian Muslims for revitalising Islamic forms of giving, notably *zakat* (almsgiving) and *sedekah* or *sadaqa* (voluntary giving or benevolent acts). Thanks to considerable support from the public, and due to the prevalent process of Islamisation in Indonesia over the past two decades, Islamic charities have grown rapidly and are mostly present in major cities. Islamic charitable associations, in this respect, also act specifically as *zakat* collectors, whose main activities are to collect *zakat* and *sedekah* funds and to redistribute them to legitimate beneficiaries.

It is widely acknowledged that the culture of giving has become embedded in Muslim communities. Occasionally, Muslims in Indonesia (and perhaps in other parts of the world) pay *zakat* and *sedekah* sporadically. Some prefer to channel social funds directly to the poor and the needy without necessarily engaging official *zakat* agencies.⁷ For the majority of Indonesian Muslims, the payment of *zakat* is simply regarded as a form of 'financial worship',⁸ and less as a source of economic development for the community as at large. The absence of adequate, well-organised and professional *zakat* collectors, at least until the mid-1990s, indicates that in the past, Islamic forms of giving were managed in an unprofessional way. In the collection of social funds, small and informal *zakat* committees predominated. Consequently, the role of *zakat* agencies in creating long-term development projects was very limited, and their social enterprises were restricted to certain villages where *zakat* agencies existed. As a result, the impact of social funds on the social development process was far from satisfactory.

In response to this situation, efforts have been made by Muslim activists, government officials, and civil society organisations to reframe Muslim perceptions of *zakat* and how other Islamic forms of giving can make a greater contribution to poverty eradication and the welfare of societies. Recently, Islamic charities have undergone a tremendous institutional transformation, a shift in orientation, and an expansion of Muslim social enterprises in terms of both the geographical area covered and the operational strategy pursued. What has been remarkable about Islamic charities over the past two decades is their institutional transformation from being what were simply local initiatives in small communities into being organisations that operate in the national, and even international, arena. Islamic charitable associations in Indonesia can deal with humanitarian issues both nationally and internationally, and operate in disaster and conflict areas. Emergency aid, the creation of field hospitals, temporary shelters, and post-disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation projects are all areas with which Islamic charitable associations have become increasingly familiar. Some factors, such as ‘bureaucratisation’ and ‘professionalisation’, seem to have stimulated this shift to new forms of charity.

The ‘bureaucratisation’ of traditional forms of charity in Indonesia can be traced to certain trends. In Indonesia, there has been a clear shift in *zakat* practice in line with the process of Islamisation, at the state and societal level, where almsgiving has been seen as a socio-economic/political system rather than as the fulfilment of an individual’s religious duties.⁹ The pervasive involvement of the government apparatus in organising Islamic social funds is the most noticeable example of how ‘bureaucratisation’ happens. The enactment of the Zakat Law in 1999 and 2011, and the issuance of regulations on *zakat* administrations in certain provinces through the implementation of ‘*shari`a* by-laws’, whose objective is to forge compulsory—instead of voluntary—*zakat* payments (i.e. *zakat* on people’s salaries), illustrates how the issue of *zakat* has enjoyed political support from the government and how it has been bureaucratised in Indonesia’s current social and political setting.¹⁰ The government apparatus has been involved in charitable services, whether at a discursive or practical level. Government-sponsored *zakat*

agencies at the national and regional levels, such as BAZNAS (the National *Zakat* Board) and BAZDA (the Regional *Zakat* Board),¹¹ are instrumental in the process of the bureaucratisation of *zakat* on the government side.

There has also been a transformation of religious charitable enterprises. These have adopted a more corporate culture, which has considerably improved transparency in the collecting and redistributing of social funds, and efficiency in carrying out sustained programmes. This means that the governance of *zakat* in Indonesia has increasingly been characterised by ‘professionalisation’, as indicated by the spawning of well-organised Islamic charitable associations and community-based *zakat* agencies with the support of professional workers. The transformation of Islamic charities has, in turn, provided an opportunity for the middle class and educated people to act as professional workers and social activists. As a matter of course, Islamic charitable associations have strengthened their institutional capacity by recruiting dedicated and skilled workers, including well-trained accountants, researchers, social analysts, surveyors, managers, teachers, trainers, nurses and physicians.

Moreover, the processes of bureaucratisation and professionalisation have had a substantial impact on the way in which Islamic charitable associations formulate their strategies and on the types of social welfare activities that are carried out in the field. In the past, as mentioned previously, Islamic charitable associations dealt only with the relief of the poor without rigorous efforts to carry out development-oriented projects that addressed the ‘roots’ rather than the ‘symptoms’ of problems. Now, however, the attitudes of Islamic charitable organisations towards ‘social change’ and poverty issues have shifted and even moved into ‘empowerment’, marked in part by endeavours to encourage development providing scholarships, free or cheap healthcare services, micro-finance and income-generating projects, and skills training.

A range of Islamic charitable associations, mainly founded in the New Order era, will be discussed in this dissertation. A major breakthrough in the governance of Islamic social funds (*zakat* and *sedekah*) began when Dompet Dhuafa (DD), a leading community-based *zakat* agency, was established in 1993 by Muslim journalists working for a national newspaper, *Republika*. A

government-sponsored association, namely *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* (ICMI-Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association), was instrumental in the inception of *Republika*. Since 1993, this newspaper has increasingly caught the attention of Muslim readers in the countryside, and was the first to challenge the monopoly of *Kompas* and *Suara Pembaharuan*, which were seen as representing ‘secular’ and Christian groups, as a ‘quality newspaper’. Led by the senior journalist Ery Sudewo (b. 1957-), DD, as an Islamic charitable association that in turn functions as a *zakat* collector, had a modern management system. Equipped with a knowledgeable staff, dutiful volunteers and professionals, and strengthened by an effective media campaign, DD began to catch the public eye, developed rapidly and drew the attention of benefactors.

Other charitable associations originate from religious gathering groups and *dakwah* (religious proselytising) organisations. One example of such a religious gathering group is the Daarut Tauhid Foundation (DT), led by a young popular preacher, Abdullah Gymnastiar (b. 1962-), who is popularly known as ‘Aa Gym’. Founded in 1990 in Bandung, DT has functioned as a venue for the study of Islam. Aa Gym himself, as a founder of DT, is very popular with urban people and has been able to advertise DT as an Islamic *dakwah* association that offers various educational activities and training in leadership and entrepreneurship. Aa Gym has used marketing strategy ‘as a technique of religious proselytisation (*dakwah*) that fuses the corporate and the religious’.¹² In 1999, he set up a new *zakat* agency, known as Dompot Peduli Umat–Daarut Tauhid (DPU-DT-Wallet for the Care of Community–Daarut Tauhid). Aa Gym’s popularity, and his calm and charming personality, inspired people to donate and resulted in DPU-DT achieving considerable support from Islamic communities.

Also in Bandung, another community-based *zakat* agency, *Dompot Sosial Ummul Qura*’ (DSUQ–the Ummul Qura’ Social Wallet) was established in 1998. DSUQ originated from a religious gathering group, the Ummul Qura’ Foundation, led by Dedi Trisnandi (b. 1968-), who is known as ‘Abu Syauqi’. While the Ummul Qura’ Foundation continues to organise the study of Islam, the founder has engaged in a flurry of activity through social outreach

programmes. These, among other things, support disadvantaged segments of society, such as orphans and the needy. In 2003, DSUQ changed its organisational brand and became the more eye-catching *Rumah Zakat Indonesia* (RZI-Indonesia's *Zakat* House). RZI undertakes relief and development projects, such as providing goods and healthcare for the poor, as well as economic empowerment activities. In recent times, RZI has set up branch offices in several regions of Indonesia.

A similar type of organisation is Al-Azhar Peduli (AAP), an autonomous institution within the complex of the Al-Azhar Mosque in Jakarta. AAP was established in 2004 by the board members of the Al-Azhar Islamic Educational Foundation. This foundation represents a *dakwah* movement of ex-political activists who were involved in the Masyumi, the largest Islamic party in the 1950s. Al-Azhar was the centre of the reformist Muslim middle class and was associated with the leadership of a leading Muslim magazine in the 1980s, namely '*Panjimas*' (*Panji Masyarakat*-'the Banner of Society'). As a *zakat* agency, AAP has been targeting the urban Muslim middle and upper classes, notably those families whose students are studying at Al-Azhar educational institutions, from kindergarten to university. The agency has also focused on the participants of regular religious gatherings in the al-Azhar mosque, the alumni of Al-Azhar schools, and on fellow Muslims in general.

Within a few years, the Islamic charitable associations mentioned above, such as DD, DPU-DT, RZI, and AAP, were able to draw the admiration of the public, notably benefactors, and in turn, undertook a remarkable transformation into leading *zakat* agencies that pursue development-oriented programmes as their core activities, such as supporting micro-finance and conducting income-generating projects in addition to charitable services and *dakwah*.

In tandem with this development, Islamic solidarity groups that promote certain political ideologies and focus on national political affairs (e.g. the communal conflicts in Ambon-Moluccas, Poso-Celebes, and Sampit-Borneo) and international political affairs (e.g. the conflicts and wars in Palestine, Iraq, Bosnia and Afghanistan) have been involved in charitable activities, sending funds and volunteers to war zones, and providing means and medi-

cal assistance in conflict areas. This suggests that the increasing interplay between religion and politics, between nationalism and globalisation, between domestic political dynamics and the international geo-political context, as well as between locally-grounded social organisations and transnational movements, seems to have shaped the features of Islamic charities in Indonesia in many ways. Mohammad Natsir (d. 1993), the most prominent figure in the Islamic *dakwah* movement in Indonesia and the founder of *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* (DDII-the Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication), has been instrumental in building awareness among Indonesian Muslims of political issues in the Muslim world. Natsir's legacy and international exposure, including his commitment to supporting Palestinian independence from Israel, have been adopted, preserved and repeated by Islamic *dakwah* movements and Islamic solidarity groups in recent times.

Although concern among Indonesian Muslims about the political crisis in Palestine began as early as the 1930s, a major breakthrough in concrete humanitarian action for Palestine—with very limited capacity—occurred for the first time in 1973. Recently, the response of Indonesian Muslims to the issue has become increasingly enthusiastic, and perhaps more multifaceted at the same time, due to social and political complexities in the domestic and international arenas. New associations have emerged in public life and various social and relief missions have been carried out for those in need, both domestically and internationally. Some associations originating from Islamic solidarity groups have a firm political discourse. In their political rhetoric, they have preserved and utilised the notions of the unity of Islam and solidarity, such as fighting the 'others', seen as oppressors, and helping Muslim brothers, seen as the oppressed. In this respect, relief action is not simply for the sake of humanitarianism, but a religiously and politically motivated action. These associations are created as a means of promoting humanitarian and political campaigns in order to gain more popular support from Indonesian Muslims. The roles of Islamic solidarity groups, such as *Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam* (KISDI-Indonesian Committee for Muslim World's Solidarity), *Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Palestina* (KISPA-Indonesian Committee for Palestine Solidarity), *Komite Nasional untuk Rakyat*

Palestina (KNRP-National Committee for Palestinian People) and the like in reproducing the political discourse of humanitarianism and political struggle in contemporary Indonesia are worth exploring.

It should be emphasised that the pattern of social services organised by Islamic charitable associations is no longer restricted to the relief of the poor in densely populated urban neighbourhoods, but that such services are also focused on disaster-affected areas. Notably at the end of the 1990s, Islamic charitable associations first made their presence publicly felt in relief projects in response to deadly natural crises (floods, tsunami, earthquakes, and food shortages) and manmade crises (horizontal and communal conflicts). In this respect, one should be aware that the ‘*tarbiyah* movement’ in Indonesia, which established the *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS-Prosperous Justice Party) after the fall of Soeharto regime, and represents the Indonesian ‘branch’ of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, has been of the most important players in running relief organisations that operate specifically in disaster-affected areas, both nationally and internationally. *Pos Keadilan Peduli Ummat* (PKPU-Centre for Justice and the Care of Society), *Bulan Sabit Merah Indonesia* (BSMI-Indonesian Red Crescent Societies) and the Medical Rescue Committee (Mer-C) are among those institutions with a very visible public profile. These Islamic relief organisations have significant international exposure, as they have operated medical relief projects in such Muslim countries as Iraq, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. For this reason, they have close relations with other international relief organisations, notably from the Muslim world.

Finally, in its role as home to over 200 million Muslims, Indonesia has certainly attracted the attention of other transnational Islamic movements from all over the world. International Islamic charitable organisations, based in the West and the Middle East, have also been interested in operating in Indonesia for various reasons. Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid of the United Kingdom, the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO) of Saudi Arabia, and AMCF (Asian Muslim Charity Fund) of the United Arab Emirates are among the most prominent international Islamic charitable organisations that have set up branch offices in Indonesia. They are frequently involved in social services, either by creating their own programmes or by

establishing partnerships with domestic Islamic charities and other Islamic civil society organisations. For example, the AMCF, which specifically works on *dakwah*, welfare and education,¹³ has cooperated with certain Islamic associations in Indonesia, notably modernist Muslim groups such as the Muhammadiyah and PERSIS (*Persatuan Islam*-the Islamic Union).¹⁴

While Islamic charitable associations undoubtedly share some characteristics, there are also substantive distinctions between them which need to be recognised. By examining the Islamic charitable associations listed above, this study shows that almost all of the religious associations studied have carried out similar outreach programmes, using the issue of social welfare to achieve their goals. However, their activities also conceal particular religious, social, ideological, and political views that differ from one another. More importantly, cooperation and contestation, both discursively and practically, between state agencies and civil society organisations, between domestic voluntary organisations and international aid agencies, as well among Islamic charitable organisations themselves, have characterised recent social activism in Indonesia. While this present study will focus on Islamic charities, other religious associations working on social services, such as Christian and ‘secular’ NGOs, will not be excluded from the discussion, and comparisons between them will be drawn in this dissertation.

The Notion of Benevolent Deeds and the Category of Beneficiaries

Many factors have stimulated the proliferation of NGOs and these have been thoroughly detailed in the literature on the subject. Of interest to me are the key concepts that have philosophically underpinned Muslims’ social and political activism. Linking up the notion of ‘benevolent acts’ and Islamic forms of giving with social activism in Indonesia, this research will analyse three aspects of Muslim activism, namely welfare, *dakwah* and politics. As we shall see in the following, the ideas of ‘giving’ and the general concept of ‘benevolent activities’ have far-reaching meanings, and more importantly, welfare, *dakwah* and political issues are embedded in Islamic social activism.

It is therefore worthwhile discussing a number of arguments in the Islamic literature that justify religiously-inspired social activism among Muslims, and contemporary Muslims' interpretations of those Islamic arguments. The first and foremost issue is related to the concept of *sedekah*, which covers both voluntary and mandatory giving. The term *sedekah* has various meanings. *Sedekah*, which literally means 'alms', 'gift' or 'charity', seems to be a direct loan translation of the Arabic *sadaqa*.¹⁵ Scholars have also translated the term *sedekah* as 'charitable act' or as a general concept of 'Islamic giving.' The Islamic concept of *sedekah* can be understood in both a material and a moral sense. Every good action and sympathetic attitude, such as removing wire fencing from the street for the sake of safety, smiling benevolently at others, and feeding animals can be considered *sedekah*. Muslims utilise the term *sedekah* to signify the practice of aiding the poor. In Indonesia, the term *sedekah* as popularly used by Javanese Muslims and other Indonesians has a specific meaning, which is direct material giving from the wealthy to the needy.

The Qur'an often employs the term *sadaqa* to signify almsgiving (*zakat*). In Islam, *zakat* has eight specified types of beneficiaries (*asnaf*): the needy (*fuqara*), the poor (*al-masakin*), those whose hearts are inclined to Islam (*muallaf qulubuhum*), the bond person/slaves (*riqab*), people in debt (*gharimin*), the wayfarer (*ibn sabil*), the *zakat* administrators ('*amil*), and those who follow in the way of God (*fi sabilillah*). Of these beneficiaries, some receive more than others. For example, the needy and the poor are among the types of beneficiaries that have often received a lot of support from *zakat* agencies. By contrast, other categories, such as 'those whose hearts are inclined to Islam', 'the bond person', people in debt and wayfarers have in practice received small portions of *zakat* funds. In recent times, flexibility in interpreting the types of *zakat* beneficiaries as a target group seems to have allowed Islamic charitable associations to extend their activities by not simply distributing social funds to the poor and the needy in a neighbourhood, but also by reaching other groups that do not necessarily require redistribution. This in part is justified by the concept *fi sabilillah*.

The concept '*fi sabilillah*' as another category of *zakat* beneficiary has tra-

ditionally been interpreted in a flexible way, and often coupled with the concept of '*jihad*' to mean 'to struggle' or 'to optimise all possible capabilities'.¹⁶ The famous phrase '*jihad fi sabilillah*' signifies rigorous attempts to fight 'in the way of God', despite the fact that it is commonly translated as a 'holy war' (*qital* or *harb*), according to which fighting against a threat to the Islamic religion during a war is acceptable. Therefore, in the discussion of relief actions, helping Muslims who are 'victimised' by 'the others' in a conflict area becomes part of *jihad* and a benevolent act at the same time. In reality, it is unsurprising that during the mobilisation of domestic sources in Muslim societies for emergency relief, Islamic notions of *sedekah* (benevolence), *ta'awun* (mutual help/solidarity), and *jihad* (to struggle, strong efforts) are blurred. This also shows that Muslim relief NGOs understand relief assistance as a new pattern of '*jihad*'; *jihad bi al-mal* (with their wealth) and *al-anfus* (with physical efforts) in a moderate sense.¹⁷

Relief or humanitarian aid can also be regarded as an extended form of giving, but it has been, by definition, seen as separate from the general concept of *sedekah*. For example, in response to crises, the mobilisation of 'humanitarian aid' (*dana kemanusiaan*) by Islamic charitable associations is separated from the general meaning of other Islamic forms of giving, namely *zakat*, *sedekah* and *waqf*. This is because humanitarian aid constitutes more specific purposes: being mobilised, collected and redistributed 'for the sake' of humanitarianism, such as relieving people in disaster-affected areas by providing goods and emergency shelters for refugees. By contrast, to overcome the common phenomenon of poverty in the country, through such means as providing healthcare for destitute families in rural areas and feeding those in need in urban slums, Islamic charities usually employ *zakat* and *sedekah* funds, not 'relief funds' in a specific sense. Therefore, it is worth emphasising that connecting humanitarian aid and solidarity is imperative to analysing the extended meaning of 'giving'. In the case of Islamic societies, helping Muslim communities (*umma*) who are wounded in conflicts may also represent, with some justification, 'Islamic benevolent activities'.

While this kind of meaning remains accepted by Muslims, the attaching of broader connotations leads to a new reading of this term within Muslim

communities. *Jihad fi sabilillah* can be interpreted as an endeavour to support wide-ranging activities that are in line with 'God's orders', such as the promotion of social welfare, the provision of aid for the poor, offering scholarships for low-income households, supporting the establishment of adequate places of worship (mosques), and financing missionary activities (*dakwah*).¹⁸ From this view, we can say that Muslim societies are also well acquainted with more peaceful meanings of *jihad fi sabilillah*. It is therefore unsurprising that the widespread welfare-oriented activities undertaken by Islamic associations have also been legitimised by the notion of *jihad fi sabilillah*. In addition to this, the concept of the poor or the needy is often understood not only as a shortage in terms of material matters, but also in a spiritual sense. Muslim communities whose religiosity and religious knowledge are weak due to a shortage of Islamic education and absence of mosques, for example, can be regarded as being 'poor' spiritually and therefore legitimate targets of assistance. As far as Muslim interpretations are concerned, students who study Islam for the sake of God, those who earn money to feed their family members, those who carry weapons in the battlefield against the 'enemy of Islam', as well as all those who attempt to create a better Islamic society (*ummah*), can all be recognised as 'those who fight in the way of God'. Having said this, it can be argued that welfare, *dakwah* and political struggle are three issues that Islamic charitable associations have often dealt with in order to create 'Islamic welfare societies'.¹⁹

Research Focus and Methodology

This study aims to provide an alternative understanding of charitable and welfare activism in contemporary Indonesia: by examining the religious, social and political reasons for the charitable practices and welfare activism carried out by Islamic associations, and by going beyond recent studies conducted by (notably Indonesian) scholars who, for the most part, are concerned with the relation between Islamic associations and development issues, but who fail to further explain the variety of motives and other social and political justifications of charity practice and welfare activism. Specifically, this study will focus on three objectives: first, to retrace the *motives*, *objectives* and *ideo-*

logical grounds behind charitable practice; second, to discover multifarious *networks* and *alliances* by which ‘meaning’ and organisational trajectories of Islamic charities are constructed, reconstructed and contested; and third, to explain *how* Islamic charitable associations are involved in outreach programmes and *what* sort of social and political expediencies have conveyed their relief missions into urban and rural areas. Examining the transformation of Islamic charities from local social activities to global social religious and political movements, and scrutinising the influence of international interest on local dynamics, this dissertation analyses the following sets of questions:

1. How do Muslims conceive religious charity in the context of the interplay between the state, society and the market; and what sorts of social, religious, and political justifications lie behind their social, religious and political activism?
2. How do Islamic charitable associations approach the perceived problems (welfare, religious, and political issues) among Indonesian societies; and to what extent are they able (or not able) to provide viable ‘social security’ to the poor as a means of realising the public good in a pluralistic society?
3. To what extent have Islamic charities enriched social activism in Indonesia; and how do Islamic charitable associations reach segments of society at the grassroots level to which the government and ‘secular’ development associations have less or no access?
4. What are considerations influenced the creation or dismantling of both local and international relief projects and networks, and to what extent does the international geo-political context influence the social and political dynamics of Islamic charities in Indonesia?

In order to engage with the above research questions, the existing literature was studied and fieldwork was carried out in Java, Aceh and Nias in three consecutive visits. The bibliographical study was carried out in relevant libraries both in the Netherlands and Indonesia by surveying a wide range of sources: books, survey reports, magazines, and newspapers. The data were also obtained from the documents owned by Islamic charitable organisations. A comparative approach was used to analyse the theoretical and conceptual

aspects of faith-based charities in the Muslim world in general, and in Indonesia in particular, by discussing various concepts found in Islamic literature, both modern and classical, and those that have been adopted by Islamic charitable associations.

An empirical investigation through a series of fieldwork visits was conducted at various times between mid-2008 and early 2011 (September 2008-February 2009; November 2009-February 2010; and May 2010-February 2011). A number of places where faith-based charitable institutions operate were visited. My fieldwork in rural and urban areas was done in order to explain the complexity of charity activism within Islamic charitable associations, and to map out the typical beneficiaries in the given areas. I visited certain regions, such as Jakarta and Bandung (West Java), where Islamic charities have operated and provide goods for low-income household in urban areas. Jakarta and Bandung are where the largest and most important Islamic charitable organisations, such as DD, RZI, DPU-DT, and AAP, are based. Various types of institutions, such as charitable clinics, educational institutions, and training centres, also operate in these cities.

Moreover, in order to trace the way in which Islamic charitable organisations operate in and directly interact with the grassroots, and to examine their types of activities and beneficiaries, I conducted fieldwork in Yogyakarta, Nangro Aceh Darussalam (Banda Aceh), and Nias Island. Based on my fieldwork in natural disaster areas, this study shows the increasing trend among Islamic charitable organisations towards extending projects by engaging relief and development projects. This ranges from sending aid and volunteers to disaster-affected areas to dispatching *da'i* (preachers) to assist communities.

In order to obtain reliable data, I visited a number of institutions, including the branch offices of Islamic NGOs, domestic *zakat* agencies, international aid associations, solidarity groups, Islamic hospitals, rehabilitation centres, charitable clinics, mosques, orphanages, schools, and economic institutions (i.e. cooperatives) whose financial sources originate from various forms of giving (*zakat*, *sedekah*, and *waqf*). Observations were made during my visits to the above-named institutions in several regions, in both urban and rural

areas. Sometimes, I could undertake participatory research by becoming involved in the activities that Islamic charitable organisations were conducting, such as the redistribution of aid in disaster-affected areas, training on disaster relief, attending sermons and following the activities of *da'i* volunteers (preachers) who are supported by *zakat* agencies. However, it should also be acknowledged that for a variety of reasons, some Islamic charitable associations were only observed for short periods of time, and therefore these institutions were visited a number of times (between two and four times). For that reason and to complement my observations, I interviewed dozens of people, including theologians, preachers, intellectuals, political leaders, directors and administrative staff of *zakat* agencies, physicians, nurses, patients/beneficiaries, NGO activists (both Muslim and Christian), and former volunteers who had worked in disaster-affected areas in Indonesia and abroad. Not all of their views, however, are presented in this study.

Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is composed of eight chapters. *Chapter 1* is the introduction, consisting of a preliminary discussion of Islamic charities in Indonesia, the background to this study, some methodological notes, and an outline of the research structure.

Chapter 2 concerns the conceptual and theoretical framework of Islamic charities in the Muslim world and looks at how the involvement of faith-based charitable associations, solidarity groups and humanitarian NGOs has fully or partially been inspired by religious, humanitarian and political motives. This chapter also explores the extent to which Islamic charities are defined by scholars and practitioners, 'insiders' and 'outsiders' of Muslim communities, as well as elaborating some key concepts used by scholars and Muslim social activists when describing Muslim social activism.

Chapter 3 gives a brief outline of the historical and sociological development of Islamic social institutions and civil society movements within Indonesia's social, economic and political landscape. In particular, it focuses on Muslim social concerns and religious discourse, as well as on how welfare issues, poverty and charity relate to economic growth, the rise of the new

middle class, and the political policies of the government.

Chapter 4 shows how community-based initiatives and *zakat* agencies have given destitute families in poor urban and rural areas wider access to viable health services. Low-priced, accessible and free medical assistance for poorer families and small economic enterprises provided by *zakat* agencies reflect the endeavours of the Indonesian Muslim middle class to translate Islamic discourse on social welfare in the field of healthcare. While healthcare provision for low-income households is becoming increasingly popular among Islamic charitable associations, they are also seeking a more comprehensive remedy for healthcare problems in the grassroots.

Chapter 5 analyses the way in which Islamic charitable associations formulate development-oriented programmes for disadvantaged women or female beneficiaries. These female beneficiaries include groups such as female teenagers from low-income households and Indonesian women who are migrant workers overseas. The chapter discussed how Islamic associations shape gender-sensitive social work, how development-oriented projects are offered to vulnerable and deprived women, and how these activities are—or are not—addressing the interests of the middle class.

Chapter 6 discusses the roles of Islamic charitable organisations in running *dakwah* activities on Nias Island, and shows how Islamic charities have attempted to create welfare programmes under the *dakwah* scheme. It suggests that charity provided by *zakat* agencies aims to strengthen the social life of the Muslim minority who are regarded as needing assistance from other fellow Muslims. This chapter also looks at whether inclusive attitudes towards beneficiaries with different religious backgrounds have characterised Islamic social activism in ‘non-Islamic’ regions.

Chapter 7 is concerned with the internationalisation of domestic aid, from Indonesia to Palestine. It sets out the growing discourse on the concept of Islamic solidarity that in turn is stimulating Indonesian Muslims to deliver aid to Palestinians. This chapter suggests that the process of the internationalisation of domestic aid to support Palestinians by Islamic solidarity groups and charitable associations represents a new form of Islamic charity in Indonesia, one that is shaped by the international geopolitical context.

In *chapter 8*, I summarise and discuss my research findings and make suggestions for further research.

Endnotes

- ¹ In Hinduism and Buddhism, the concept of *danadharma* (charity, giving, and generosity) is a religious obligation, just like in Islam, as can be seen in the concept of *zakat* (mandatory almsgiving) and *sadaqa* (voluntary giving). In Christianity, see the concept of the tithe, under which the wealthy are urged to redistribute, share, and give some portions of their wealth for the sake of religious duties and for the relief of the poor.
- ² See for example Barnett F. Baron, *Philanthropy and the Dynamics of Change in East and Southeast Asia* (New York: Columbia University, 1991); Soma Hewa and Philo Hove, *Philanthropy and Cultural Context: Western Philosophy in South East, and Southeast Asia in the 20th Century* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997).
- ³ Both Protestant and Catholic congregations have acted in similar ways to their Muslim counterparts, using economic and social activities as vehicles to expand their religious missions. See Karel Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia: A Documented History* (Leiden: KITLV, 2007), 25; “The Power of Money: Development Aid for and through Christians Churches in Modern Indonesia 1965-1980,” in Susanne Schroter, *Christianity in Indonesia: Perspective of Power* (Berlin: Lit., 2010). Alwi Shihab, “The Muhammadiyah Movement and Its Controversy with Christian Mission in Indonesia”, *PhD Dissertation*, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1995, 242-252; Mida Purba, *Spirituality in Context: Vincentian Spirituality Actualized by the Batak Sisters of Charity in North Sumatra* (Discovery Books, 2008).
- ⁴ See for example Hilman Latief, *Melayani Umat: Filantropi Islam dan Ideologi Kesejahteraan Kaum Modernis* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2010); Amelia Fauzia, “Faith and the State: the History of Islamic Philanthropy in Indonesia”, *PhD Dissertation*, the University of Melbourne, Melbourne-Australia, 2009, 127-155.
- ⁵ For an overview of the NGO sector in Muslim societies in Indonesia, see Martin van Bruinessen, “Post-Soeharto Muslim Engagement with Civil Society and Democratization,” in Hanneman Samuel & Henk Schulte Nordholt (ed.) *Rethinking ‘Civil Society’, ‘Region’, and ‘Crisis’* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004), 37-66; also Martin van Bruinessen and and Farid Wajidi, “*Syū’un ijtimā’iyah* and the *kiai rakyat*: Traditionalist Islam, Civil Society and Social Concern,” in Henk Schulte Nordholt (ed.), *Indonesian Transitions* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2006), 205-248.
- ⁶ Some NGOs have devoted their energies to development-oriented projects, assisting society by participating in sustainable community development programmes and civil society building. These NGOs, which some observers have referred to as ‘development NGOs’, can work with both the people and government agencies, and address particular issues in society, including the environment, preventive healthcare, poverty alleviation, income-generating projects, and many other social concerns. Another type of NGO is the ‘empowerment NGO’, whose overarching objective is to change government policy by disseminating political awareness through advocacy as a means of fortifying social mobilisation and popular resistance among the grassroots. For the advocates of empowerment NGOs, the essence of

welfare in a modern nation state is mainly determined by state agencies, as the state is responsible for the well-being of the community. Therefore, their strategies lie predominantly in empowering communities so that people are able to voice their own interests and aspirations in order to, for example, eradicate unjust state policies that have caused social and economic insecurity. Bob S. Hadiwinata, *The Politics of NGOs in Indonesia: Developing Democracy and Managing a Movement* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 1 & 102-4; Philip J. Eldridge, *Non-government organisations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), 36-8; Meuthia Ganie-Rochman, *An Uphill Struggle: Advocacy NGOs under Soeharto's New Order* (Jakarta: LabSosio Universitas Indonesia, 2002), 5.

- ⁷ The 2008 survey conducted by PIRAC (Public Interest Research and Advocacy Center), a Jakarta-based NGO, in eleven cities in Indonesia found that the culture of giving among Indonesians living in urban areas has increased compared with the 2000 and 2004 survey. The report shows 43.7% of respondents as having allocated a special budget for donation, and 99.6% of them also admitted that they had donated a certain portion of their wealth in the past year (*The Jakarta Post*, 04/03/2008). While it is said that charitable practice can be prompted by various factors, religious motivation remains a dominant factor. Another PIRAC report pertaining to religious charity among Indonesian Muslims in ten cities suggests that 55% of Muslim respondents admitted that they had become active *zakat* payers (*muzakki*). This means that the number of *zakat* payers increased in comparison with the 2004 survey (49.8%) (*Republika*, 04/06.2008). In line with this, for the past three years, the amount of money collected by Islamic charitable associations, according to a report by the Association of Zakat Collectors (FOZ-Forum Zakat), has constantly increased, from Rp.144 billion rupiah and Rp.235 billion in 2004 and 2005 respectively to Rp.267 billion in 2006. See also PIRAC, *Muslim Philanthropy: Potential ad Reality of Zakat in Indonesia* (Depok: PIRamedia, 2005), 61-64.
- ⁸ Jonathan Benthall, "Financial Worship: the Quranic Injunction to Almsgiving, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 5:1 (March, 1999), 27-42.
- ⁹ In his study, Arskal Salim depicts a clear shift in *zakat* practice among Indonesian Muslims, from merely 'a [form of] financial worship' representing religious piety to becoming part of the Indonesian socio-political-economic system. The efforts of *zakat* agencies to incorporate the state's role in the optimising of *zakat* collection by, for example, issuing *zakat* laws and urging Muslims to channel their *zakat* funds to officially recognised *zakat* agencies, have characterised this structural shift. Arskal Salim, *The Shift in Zakat Practice in Indonesia: From Piety to an Islamic Socio-Political-Economic System* (Chiang Mai: Asian Muslim Action Network and Silkworm Books, 2008). 1-5.
- ¹⁰ Asep Saepuddin Jahar, "The Clash between Muslim and the State: Waqf and *Zakat* in Post Independent of Indonesia," *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 13, No. 3, (2006), 353-396; Arskal Salim, "Zakat Administration in Politics of Indonesia," in Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra, *Shari`a and Politics in Modern Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003); Michael Buehler, "Shari`a by-Laws in Indonesian Districts: An Indication for Changing Patterns of Power Accumulation and Political Corruption," *Southeast Asia Research*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2008), 165-195; and Sirojudin Abbas, "The Struggle for Recognition: Embracing the Islamic Welfare Effort in

- the Indonesian Welfare System,” *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2005), 33-72.
- ¹¹ BAZNAS is a government-sponsored national *zakat* agency. It has acted as a sort of national coordinator of regional government-sponsored *zakat* agencies (BAZDA) operating in many provinces and districts.
- ¹² James B. Housterey, “Marketing Morality: the Rise, Fall and Rebranding of AA Gym,” in Greg Fealy and Shally White (eds.), *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia* (Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 2008), 96.
- ¹³ In the field of education, AMCF has strongly sponsored the establishment of *Ma’had ‘Ali* (Islamic Higher Education Institution). *Ma’had ‘Ali* of the AMCF have operated in, among other things, Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta and Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta. A new *Ma’had ‘Ali* is going to be set up in Muhammadiyah University of Sumatra Barat, West Sumatra. Meanwhile, in Bandung, West Java, the AMCF has cooperated with the PERSIS. There is no evidence that the AMCF has founded a partnership with NU. This is probably because the AMCF believes that Muhammadiyah and PERSIS have a similar ideology, that is, puritan ideology. Moreover, the AMCF has recently run various projects, including building 850 mosques and 15 Arabic and Islamic Higher education institutions throughout Indonesia. For an overview of the development of *Ma’had ‘Ali*, see Marzuki Wahid, “*Ma’had ‘Ali*: Nestapa Tradisionalisme dan Tradisi Akademik yang Hilang”, *Jurnal Istiqra*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2005), 89-112.
- ¹⁴ PERSIS is a modernist association founded in 1923 by Haji Zamzam and Haji Muhammad Yunus. It is concerned with ‘purifying’ Islamic practice in Indonesia. Ideologically speaking, PERSIS shares similarities with Muhammadiyah in terms of religious practices, as both can be regarded as puritan Muslim associations. However, Muhammadiyah tends to pay greater attention to welfare issues by establishing schools, clinics, orphanages and universities throughout Indonesia, compared to PERSIS, which mainly focuses on education by establishing *pesantren* in West Java. For an account of the profile of PERSIS, see Howard M. Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1970), Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973). Achmad Minhaji, “Ahmad Hasan and Islamic Legal Reform in Indonesia (1887-1958)”, *Ph.D. Dissertation*, McGill University, Montreal, May 1997.
- ¹⁵ The Arabic term *sadaqa*, which corresponds to the Hebrew term *sedaka*, can generally mean ‘right’, ‘privilege’, ‘grant’, and ‘gift’. According Amy Singer, in Hebrew this term means a ‘moral sense’, such as ‘justice’ and ‘righteousness.’ Ami Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 4.
- ¹⁶ Prophetic narrations (*%adith*) suggest that there are at least two kinds of *jihad*: ‘greater *jihad*’ (*al-akbar*) and ‘lesser *jihad*’ (*al-asghar*). The greater *jihad*, which is to control the evil in one’s heart, is more difficult than the lesser *jihad*, which is physical *jihad* on the battlefield. The Prophet Muhammad urges Muslims back to greater *jihad*.
- ¹⁷ Quranic injunction and Muslim scholars have also suggested that Muslims should perform *jihad* through their wealth (*jihad bi al-mal*) and their life, including physical efforts (*jihad bi al-anfus*). The Qur’an also says, ‘*Those who believed, and adopted exile, and fought for the Faith, with*

their property and their persons, in the cause of Allah, as well as those who gave (them) asylum and aid - these are (all) friends and protectors, one of another. As to those who believed but came not into exile, ye owe no duty of protection to them until they come into exile; but if they seek your aid in religion, it is your duty to help them, except against a people with whom ye have a treaty of mutual alliance. And (remember) Allah seeth all that ye do' (QS. Al-Anfal [8]: 72). The translation is based on Abdullah Yusuf Ali's *The Holy Qur'an*.

- ¹⁸ Conceptually, the ties between *da'wa* and Islamic forms of giving are rather intriguing, and in the national context, the relations between *dakwah* activities and *zakat* agencies are quite dynamic. BAZNAS together with DDII, for instance, has launched a programme called '*Indonesia Dakwah*', under which this *zakat* agency will provide scholarships for Islamic preachers to pursue undergraduate or graduate programmes on Islamic studies at certain universities, such as Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta-Central Java and the University of Ibnu Khaldun, Bogor-West Java. This programme aims at strengthening *da'wa* activists' intellectual capacities, language skills in Arabic and English, and their talent in public communication. This long-term and prestigious programme is expected to produce 1000 *ulama* with specific expertise: 400 Muslim preachers with a Bachelor's degree, 400 with a Master's degree and 200 with a doctoral degree in the fields of Islamic exegesis (*tafsir*), Islamic law (*shari'a*), Islamic tradition (*hadith*), Islamic education (*tarbiya*), and Islamic history (*sira*). Interestingly, one of the main reasons for launching this programme was the notion of combating Islamic liberalism and secularism. <http://www.eramuslim.com/berita/nasional/baznas-pppa-darul-quran-sinergikan-program-kaderisasi-1000-ulama.htm> (Accessed 4 February 2011).
- ¹⁹ For further discussion on the relationships between Islamic forms of giving, the notion of *jihad fi sabilillah* and *dakwah* activities, see chapter 2.

Islamic Charities: Development, Movements and Networking

Introduction

The practice of charity has a deep and long historical roots in human civilisations. In Muslim societies, as in many others, practices of charity and giving have been, and to a certain degree still are, central to the increase in the creation of public goods and the growth, in terms of both number and quality, of the welfare of communities. This is partly due to public donations, beyond regular taxation and the state's 'conventional' fiscal system, for the financing of a variety of projects, such as the establishment of educational institutions, hospitals, charitable clinics, religious buildings, public kitchens, and shelters that notably benefit those from deprived economic backgrounds. In many countries, the use of religious idiom in fostering charitable giving is also widespread, and has been deeply characteristic of types of giving in recent times.

Robert Wutthnow's book on faith-based service and the roles of religious congregations and communities in America demonstrates how religion is increasingly playing a pivotal role in public life, especially in the organisation of social services. There has been a sort of 'de-privatising' of religion in public life, partly as a result of the dynamic encounters between religious and social, economic and political institutions.¹ As regards to why religion re-

mains essential to societal life, observers, using a Durkhemian viewpoint, note that in spite of ideas about belief and meaning, religion in public life functions as ‘the organic force of social solidarity and cohesion’,² partly because it has much to do with ‘the relationships among people and within communities and between individuals and associations’.³ These relationships, in turn, lead religious communities to translate and realise religio-moral socially embedded values such as helping, serving, supporting people and volunteering. As giving, supporting the poor and volunteering are embedded in—and can be adapted to—religious values, as well as representing what is increasingly referred to as ‘charity’, the involvement of religious communities in carrying out social services is therefore a very common phenomenon. In this respect, charitable practice can simply be understood as the way in which community members, including religious groups, attempt to strengthen their relationships among those within and beyond the community.

In modern Western vocabulary, which is culturally very much influenced by the Christian tradition, the term ‘charity’ is widely known as a part of the spiritual devotions and asceticism of pious personalities who dedicate themselves to loving God by keeping their distance from material matters.⁴ In the Christian tradition, the notion and practice of charity are closely related to faith. One example is that of monasteries, through which charitable giving was in some way channelled and in which a monk’s devotional life was dedicated to ‘loving God’ and helping—or even being part of—the poor. This devotional practice on the part of Christian monks also resembles that of certain Muslim *Sufis* and Buddhist monks. Thus, it can be said that charity can be conceived as a notion related to the poor, to spirituality, to religious ideals, to social concerns, to social relations, to human beings’ dedication to god, and, most importantly, to ‘giving’. As a matter of fact, recent studies on charitable practice have been characterised predominantly by the analysis of two ‘contrasting realities’: the prosperous and the poor, the benefactors and the beneficiaries, stronger groups and weaker entities. Therefore, charity and poverty, or giving and receiving, two conflicting but inseparable terms, are often coupled together.⁵

Notwithstanding the prevalence of religious framing in defining chari-

table works,⁶ a secular way of thinking played a considerable role in conceiving the meaning of beneficent acts for public ends by exploring moral concepts such as altruism, beneficence, benevolence, or munificence, as well as by promoting economically-driven development projects to which terms such as aid, development, relief, support and welfare are connected.⁷ In short, the practice of giving is a universal phenomenon, and yet the motives, reasons, or justifications behind this practice are as varied as the plurality of perceptions of religious and cultural values held by society, as well as outlooks on social, economic and political reality. Studies on religious charities have underlined that a person may envisage his benevolent work as his ‘compassionate good work’,⁸ as his ‘love of mankind’,⁹ as his expression of ‘hospitality’,¹⁰ and as his means of ‘demonstrating caring and commitment’.¹¹

However, there has been a new and significant development in the study of giving, charity, philanthropy and the like, as the interplay between religion, society, market and the state has become increasingly salient. This new development suggests that charitable work may represent a kind of altruistic behaviour, or religiously-embedded public awareness of the need to provide the best remedy for hardship within society. Charitable work has also become of interest to voluntary associations, private sector organisations and even government agencies. Despite the fact that state welfare programmes for the poor in the modern context of the nation state can no longer be regarded as ‘charity’ in its normative sense, in non-Islamic countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and in Europe as a whole, the state has been engaged in regulating charities for decades. The state is able to support, and at the same time, regulate and supervise community-based voluntary associations, religious congregations, and various social institutions that can benefit the public so that they are able to function effectively.¹²

Likewise, in Muslim countries, such as Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the engagement of the state in what can be called religiously-motivated ‘charities’ is to some extent no longer restricted to regulation. More than that, the state has even attempted to control and operate ‘Islamic charities’, so to speak. This reveals that the state, with its respective authority, has endeavoured to ‘take over’ the domain of the voluntary sector. In

other words, the state has acted as a rival of, instead of partner to, the community-based voluntary sector and civil society organisations in collecting and distributing public support.¹³ Due to the unclear distinction between public and voluntary sector domains in social work, it is therefore unsurprising that there may be clashing interests in terms of gaining domestic support. The relations between the two have been characterised by rivalry in the shaping of both religious and political authority, as well as competition in dispensing social funds between community-based welfare institutions and state-sponsored charitable agencies. In many cases, the state's imposition of and involvement in the collection of social funds beyond the tax taken from the public tends to generate various forms of resistance from society.¹⁴

In the same way, private organisations, whose aims are essentially to earn and increase the revenues of the companies for the sake of productivity, efficiency, and 'professionalism', have begun expanding their area of operation by entering the domain of the voluntary sector.¹⁵ The establishment of corporation-sponsored foundations that extensively promote public goods and sustainable development projects, referred to as 'corporate social responsibility' (CSR), reveals that practices of giving and social work are increasingly becoming multifaceted thanks to the changing nature of the meaning of 'giving', as well the shifting characteristics of the relationships between public, private and voluntary organisations. As suggested by one observer, 'The fusion of business, government, and societal values became the basis for ethical relationships and community giving, not only between individuals and society, and between citizens and government, but also between buyers and merchants.'¹⁶

It can be suggested, therefore, that as the roles and motives concealed behind charitable practice are very much dependent upon—and as varied as—the religious, social, and political orientation of the voluntary associations, rivalry may also occur among community-based charitable associations. In short, charity is apparently becoming more dynamic in the great variety of social, economic, and political contexts where charitable associations operate.

Giving in Islam and Approaches to the Study of Charity

Before further describing charitable practice in Muslim societies, I shall explain the meaning, scope, and characteristics of Islamic charities and their relation to the notions of social welfare and acts of benevolence. In contemporary Muslim societies, both *zakat* (mandatory almsgiving) and *sedekah* (voluntary almsgiving) are fundamental concepts that are central to the growth in the work of both voluntary organisations and state- and corporation-supported welfare agencies. The involvement of various parties (public, private, and voluntary) in managing aid and social funds gained from public sources such as *zakat* suggests that giving practice has evolved and shifted from being simply a government affair to becoming an overtly voluntary affair, or *vice versa*, thanks to the shift in the culture of giving in the era of the modern nation state. Therefore, in order to understand giving practice in Muslim societies, this chapter will focus on two theologically normative accounts as reflected in the Islamic normative sources: the Qur'an, representing the 'word' of God, and the *hadith*, the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad as the messenger of God. Yet, as giving practice has evolved since the seventeenth century into a 'living tradition' in a changing world, one may not neglect other historical, judicial, sociological and even anthropological accounts on Islamic forms of giving in Muslim societies.

Islamic Forms of Giving as Religious and Social Practices

Islamic practices have mainly relied upon two fundamental sources of Islamic teachings: the Qur'an and the *hadith*. Both sources are essential to the formation of Islamic ethics, the Islamic jurisprudential system, as well as social structures in Muslim societies, either in 'Islamic states' or in non-Muslim countries. The Qur'an consists of normative ethical principles presenting spiritual, social and political ideas on how to be a dedicated believer. It also contains orders on how to perform 'the right things' (*al-amr bi al-ma'ruf*) and to prevent 'wrongful doings' (*al-nahy 'an al-munkar*) in order to achieve the believer's ultimate goals both in the world, becoming 'the best community' (*khair umma*), and in the hereafter, enjoying the magnificence of heaven. In addition to referring to the Qur'an, Muslims also use the *hadith*, another

source of Islamic teaching, which to some extent provides more detailed information on—and explanation of—religious practices. To Muslims, the Prophet Muhammad is an ideal person whose deeds are protected and guided by God. Therefore, following, imitating and perhaps interpreting the Prophet Muhammad's sayings and acts is part of the way in which Islamic communities endeavour to attain their spiritual goals. The process of imitating and rearticulating the Prophet's deeds has led to the birth of what is to be called 'prophetic tradition' (*sunna*).¹⁷ It is of equal importance that the formation of Islamic legal thought and jurisprudential principles can also be derived from the sayings of the Prophet's companions and the religious/legal opinions (*ijtihad*) of Islamic scholars who have formulated Islamic jurisprudence. In many cases, Islamic scholars' legal reasoning (*ijtihad*) on contemporary issues, upon which the Qur'an and *hadith* give unclear judgement, can be partly based on principles formulated in the Islamic jurisprudential system, such as 'analogy' (*qiyas*), 'juristic preference' (*istihsan*), 'textually unregulated benefit' (*masalih mursala*), and 'principle of presumption of continuity' (*istishab*).¹⁸

In particular, giving practice is included in Muslim religious worship, representing spiritual piety. It is the third of five pillars of Islam (*arkan al-Islam*): 1) profession of faith, declaring the oneness of God (*shahada*), that there is no God but Allah; 2) prayer (*salat*); 3) giving of alms to the needy (*zakat*); 4) fasting, especially during the month of Ramadan (*saum*); and 5) pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*). There is no doubt that giving practice in Muslim societies represents devotion towards God, as there are also many Quranic verses and prophetic narrations commanding all believers (*mu'min*) to pay alms for the needy. The spiritual significance of the giving of alms as a form of religious worship has in fact often been juxtaposed with that of prayer, given that the verses of the Qur'an repeatedly mention the obligation of giving of alms alongside performing prayer. This spiritual dimension is apparently the foremost motive of charitable activism in Islam, and is also referred to by scholars as 'financial worship'.¹⁹ Corresponding to this, the Qur'an highlights various concepts that can be associated with 'charity', the most important of which are *zakat*, a mandatory giving of alms by every Muslim who is capable

of doing so—but also ‘willing’ to do so—and *sedekah*, a voluntary giving practice.

Etymologically, *Zakat* means ‘to purify’ or ‘to grow’. Spiritually, it is aimed at not only purifying one’s assets through sharing with others, but also at cleansing the payer’s heart of greed and selfishness. *Zakat* is also often associated with the growth of one’s wealth, implying that *zakat* payment ‘increases the funds from which it is taken and protects them from being lost or destroyed’.²⁰ Every Muslim is obliged to pay two types of *zakat*. The first is *zakat al-fitr*, which certain scholars also refer to as *sadaqa al-fitr*. It is a form of charity given to the poor by every Muslim during the month of Ramadan. The second is *zakat al-amlal* (*zakat* on wealth), under which concept Muslims whose savings and income reach a minimum level, called *nisab* (equal to or more than 95 grams of gold), are generally obliged to pay 2.5% of their savings. The *zakat* rate varies, depending upon the type of wealth. Farmers may be levied 5% to 10% of their harvest, depending on the type of watering system; those farmers who use an irrigation system will be levied 10% of their harvest, while those employing a ‘rain cistern’ will be levied only 5%. Wealth originating from buried treasure can even be levied as much as 20%.

Historically speaking, *zakat* practice in Muslim societies had much to do with the religious and political authorities of the ‘Islamic state’.²¹ During the era of the Prophet Muhammad and especially during that of his earliest four successors, who are referred to as the ‘Rightly Guided Caliphs’ (*al-khulafa al-rashidun*), an Islamic state’s fiscal system included *zakat* imposed only on Muslim citizens. This practice was complementary to other tax schemes such as *kharaj*, a tax levied on agricultural land and imposed on both Muslim and non-Muslim citizens, and *jizya*, a tax applied only to non-Muslim citizens living under an Islamic state’s protection. Therefore, performing *zakat* in a Muslim society, especially in the era of the Prophet Muhammad and his early successors, could also represent socially-oriented spiritual piety as a citizen and as an individual Muslim. This is because *zakat* at that time was solely handled by an agency of the state, a sort of committee, or an institution such as the House of Treasure (*bayt al-mal*), which was responsible for *zakat* administration and distribution.²² It is widely acknowledged among historians that

during the era of Abu Bakr al-Siddiq (d. 634), the first of the Prophet Muhammad's successors, in addition to being managed exclusively by the Caliphate that represented the 'state', *zakat* started to be imposed officially on all people adhering to Islam. Abu Bakr himself was widely acknowledged for his rigorous endeavours to combat those who refused to pay *zakat*.²³ An innovative development occurred during the era of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (d. 644), the second Caliph of Islam. Umar made the House of Treasure more effective by, among other methods, appointing one of his disciples to be the head of this financial institution, and by creating policies to use the collected wealth originating from taxes (*zakat*, *jizya*, *kharaj* etc.) in times of hardship. While this kind of state-centred organisation of alms was continued by 'Utman ibn 'Affan (d. 656) and 'Ali ibn Abu Talib (d. 661), the success of the state's role in organising *zakat* was also attributed to 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-Aziz (d. 720), whose House of Treasure is believed to have functioned as it should to provide welfare apportionment, alleviate poverty within Muslim societies, and to create a sort of 'welfare state' system.

The above narratives pointing to the Caliphs' 'success stories' in optimising the function of the House of Treasure reverberate in modern times and in the new context of modern nation states. These narratives serve to legitimate advanced government involvement in alms-organising, especially in areas where Muslims are in the majority. As giving practice goes on and the social, cultural, and economic landscape changes, Muslim scholars have endeavoured to translate and reconceptualise the meaning and function of Islamic forms of giving through *ijtihad* (innovation in Islamic legal thought). Islamic scholars have proposed innovative ideas to bring Islamic doctrine in line with the needs of society at large. In the case of *zakat* practice, prominent Muslim jurists such as Abu Hanifa (d. 767), Malik ibn Anas (d. 795), Muhammad Ibn Idris al-Shafi'i (d. 820) and Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855), whose religious and legal opinions evolved to become respective Islamic schools of law (Hanafite, Malikite, Shafi'ite, and Hanbalite), for example, are not always in an agreement in determining the types of wealth subject to *zakat* law, who *zakat* payers and beneficiaries should be, the types of mechanisms of *zakat* distribution and so forth.²⁴

Giving practice can also be seen from other angles. The medieval Muslim scholar al-Ghazali (d. 1111) was more interested in seeing giving practice in the light of a spiritual viewpoint in addition to that of a legal perspective. In his magnum opus *Revival of Religious Learning (Ihya 'Ulum al-Din)*, Al-Ghazali devotes space to discussing the 'mysteries of charities' (*al-asrar al-zakah*). Despite presenting the normative concept of *zakat* and *sedekah* as many other 'ulama have done, al-Ghazali pays attention to the ethical and spiritual dimensions of Islamic charities applicable to benefactors and beneficiaries. According to al-Ghazali, paying *zakat*, seen from the purpose of the Islamic law, constitutes both 'acts of pure devotion' and 'rational benefit', and people's devotion to God is also tested through their attitudes towards wealth and property.²⁵ Al-Ghazali's concerns include the ethics and spirituality of giving, as he discusses the relationship between benefactors and beneficiaries. Al-Ghazali comes to believe that secrecy and publicity in the giving of alms have advantages, but he also lays emphasis on the need to avoid any act that may humiliate and insult the recipient.²⁶

Meanwhile, modern Egyptian intellectual and political activist Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) and Iranian progressive thinker Ali Shari'ati (d. 1977) are very keen on promoting social justice and an Islamic concept of welfare in their conceptions of wealth and power distribution. Sayyid Qutb is known as an inspiring intellectual and political ideologist whose thought has greatly influenced scholars and activists all over the Muslim world. One of his many works, entitled *Social Justice in Islam (al-'Adala al-Ijtima'iyya fi al-Islam)*, specifically outlines the Islamic welfare concept. Stressing the practicality (*waqa'iyya*) of Islam in society, Qutb points out that in essence, Islam has dealt with and promoted 'the principle of equality of opportunity and the principles of justice for all', and at the same time has confirmed the necessity of strengthening social solidarity (*al-takaful al-ijtima'i al-wathiq*).²⁷ To him, cooperation among—and the unity of—the members of the community, which is based on 'the piety and rights conduct',²⁸ is instrumental in underpinning Muslim welfare system, and both *zakat* and *sedekah* cannot be detached from the Islamic social, economic and political order.²⁹

Another perspective on welfare is offered by Ali Shari'ati, an ideologist

and member of the Iranian Muslim intelligentsia, who employs intellectualism as a key force to advocate *mustad'afun*, the grassroots, in opposition to *mustakbirun*, the elites. Class distinction seems to have characterised Shari'ati's understanding of the social, economic, and political system in pre-revolutionary Iran. His critique of the role of religious elites, the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie in the Iranian context, using Marxist concepts, reflects the dynamics of the social, political and intellectual environment in Iran at that time. There are two kinds of class systems that Shari'ati attempts to utilise in his discourse; the first is 'economic classes' which mainly relate to the economic life and material dimension of the society; and the second is 'belief classes' which has much to do with the religious or the clerical system.³⁰ Through these kinds of distinction, Shari'ati believes that unjust relationships between the elites and the grassroots, and notably between the oppressors and the oppressed, should be criticised, because Islam, with the *Tauhid* (monotheism), is the religion of justice.³¹ In Shariati's thought, the Islamic concept of monotheism should inspire Muslims to promote justice by combating idolatry and oppressive social and political structures. According to his view, oppressive actions by the elites can mean the violation of humanity. In a nutshell, although Shari'ati does not tell us much about the Islamic concept of giving, including *zakat*, *khums* and *sedekah* in his works, his perspective on the promotion of equality and justice represents his whole idea of social change for the welfare of the society.

Even though *sedekah* can also mean *zakat*, traditionally it has implied voluntary giving and charitable acts. Under the concept of *sedekah*, it is recommended that Muslims donate certain portions of their wealth to be dispensed for public benefit. *Sedekah*, has not been strictly regulated, as anyone can make a contribution or donate some portion of their wealth to a beggar or the poor whenever they like and regardless of the amount. As a 'benevolent act', *sedekah* also has a wider meaning. It can be regarded as the general concept of Islamic giving, both material (money, land, buildings, and wealth) and non-material (support, dedication, and commitment). Unlike *zakat*, which is prescribed in detail in the Qur'an and *Sunna* (Islamic tradition), the term *sedekah* has a fairly loose meaning. Therefore, in present-day discussions of

social services, the Islamic concept of *sedekah* is perhaps equivalent to—and often closely associated with—the Western concept of ‘philanthropy’, designating love of human beings, benevolent acts and voluntary practices for the public good. It should be noted, nevertheless, that in the Islamic sense, *sedekah* is also heavily redolent of ‘vertical relations’ between human beings and God. Performing *sedekah*, therefore, signifies a way to achieve God’s mercy, vertically, and to help others, horizontally.

While *zakat* and *sedekah* are terms with which Sunni are generally very familiar, and are widely practiced in the Muslim World, an additional concept of giving, *khumus*, has been formulated by and implemented solely among Shi’i. It is widely known among Muslims that *zakat* funds should be dispensed to support the poor, the needy and the other categories of *zakat* recipients mentioned above. In addition, it is also acknowledged that the Prophet Muhammad, his near relatives and descendants were not *zakat* beneficiaries. Yet, according to Shi’ite tradition, the prophet Muhammad and his relatives, as well as the legitimate Imam, along with the poor, were deserving of *khums* (the fifth). Although conceptually similar, there is a significant difference between Sunni’s *zakat* and Shi’i’s *khums*. The spirit of *khums* resembles *zakat* in that it functions as a sort of tax imposed on every individual Muslim whose has saved a certain minimum amount of money. Both *zakat* and *khums* ultimately lead to ‘divine reward and more certain salvation.’ Yet, for the Sunni, *khums* can only be applied to the booty achieved during and after war; for Twelver Shi’ism this concept (the fifth) applies to all seven categories of wealth.³²

The establishment of Islamic charitable foundations (*waqf*) underpinned by both religious narratives and customary acts has also played an essential role in the development of charitable works in Muslim society. *Waqf*, or *awqaf* (plural), is an Arabic term which literally means ‘to hold’, ‘to stop’ or to ‘block’. It has the same meaning as the word *habs* or *habus/ahbas* (plural), commonly used in North Africa, which also implies ‘stopping’.³³ In Muslim societies, both *waqf* and *hubs* represent the benevolent acts of a person, family, group of society, or even an institution (*waqif*), that endows property or assets for public benefit and beneficiaries (*mawquf ‘alayh*). The endowed as-

set, which is referred to as *mawquf* or *mahbus*, is invested and managed, and can be dispensed for religious and social purposes. Therefore, the original owner of the endowed asset no longer has authority to sell or inherit that asset, as his ownership is ‘suspended’ and ‘delegated’ to an administrator (*nazir*) who is responsible for managing the endowed asset and its revenue. There is no precise or thorough prescription for *waqf* in the Qur’an, unlike *zakat*, which is prescribed in the Qur’an and *Sunna* (prophetic tradition) in great detail. Scholars are by and large correct to consider Islamic endowment (*waqf*) as another, but more specific, form of voluntary giving. It mainly relies on customary practice, and for this reason, implementing *waqf* practice, including the management of charitable foundations, is more open to innovation than *zakat*. Interestingly, in many Muslim countries, the state has been more interested in administrating *waqf* (endowment of land and buildings) than *zakat*. This is partly because the endowment system deals with changes to asset proprietary rights, which requires official administrative assistance from the political authorities.³⁴

Islamic Charity

‘Islamic charity’ is increasingly becoming a generic term, and is widely employed by scholars to indicate Islamic acts of benevolence. It is, therefore, worth clarifying what Islamic charity is, its scope, and what sort of motivation lies behind this practice. Such questions are necessary thanks to the complexity and increasing development of spiritually-inspired charitable works in modern times. Scholars such as Michael Bonner, Adam Sabra, Murat Cizakca, Richard Van Leeuwen, Yaacov Lev, and Amy Singer, who have studied Islamic charity practice in early and medieval Islamic societies, have primarily argued that the notion of charity in Islam cannot be separated from that of charitable practice in other religions, notably Judaism and Christianity. The English term ‘charity’ is believed to have emanated from the Latin term *caritas* in the Judeo-Christian tradition. The word charity in a Christian sense presumably covers two meanings: the Greek term *agape* (spiritual love) and almsgiving. It also denotes moral, rather than theological, concepts and ethics. Historian Adam Sabra, in his examination of the roles of charitable

institutions in medieval Islam, explains that Islamic tradition and classical Arabic have no appropriate word to denote charity in its Christian sense. The words signifying altruistic behaviour in Islamic terms, such as ‘doing good’ (*ihsan*) and generosity (*karama*), cannot even be accurately associated with ‘charity’.³⁵ By linking ‘charity’ closely with a Muslim concept of poverty, Sabra defines charity as ‘the practice of wealthy aiding the poor’,³⁶ while Amy Singer describes it as ‘a response to need or poverty.’³⁷

Although the religious foundations of charity within religious traditions may have varied, resemblances can be seen at both practical and doctrinal levels. Observers have explored hypotheses that Islamic charity may have originated from ancient Near Eastern culture. One hypothesis suggests that Islamic charity may have originated from giving practices in pre-Islamic Arabia, as evidenced by ethnographical studies carried out in various villages in the Middle East and Africa. Observers have pointed out that local tribes, including the Bedouin, which are not necessarily ‘Islamised’, have recognised the practice of charity for a long time.³⁸ Another hypothesis states that Islamic charity has a connection with the Judeo-Christian tradition. It bears a resemblance, at least theologically, to charity formulated and practiced among the Jews.³⁹

Despite the prolonged discussion about the origin, similarities and differences of charitable practices within Abrahamic religions, the word charity has become included in the description of—and often employed in recent studies on—traditions of giving within Muslim societies. This suggests that in recent scholarly discourse, this term is no longer exclusively associated with the Jewish or Christian traditions or the term *caritas*. In the case of Muslim society, the Arabic and Islamic terms referring to almsgiving, which etymologically have often been simplified to ‘charity’, are, as discussed above, *zakat* and *sadaqa*. Spiritually, performing *zakat* and *sadaqa* and some kinds of benevolent acts may also signify a Muslim expression of gratitude and thankfulness to God (*shukr*).⁴⁰

The concept of Islamic charity has more than one meaning, or can be justified by other concepts. This is partly because the socio-political context in which Islamic associations operate has already played a significant role in the

evolution of what is called charity. A commendable conceptual comparison between Islamic and Christian notions of charity has been made by Özgüç Orhan from the Fatih University-Turkiye, who explores the Islamic concepts of *himma*, in Arabic, or *himmət*, in Turkish, developed in the Gülen Movement,⁴¹ a worldwide social and spiritual movement led and inspired by the teachings of Fethullah Gülen (Hodjaefendi). *Himmət* (Ar. *himma*) is a Turkish-Arabic term that is often utilised in the process of obtaining financial support from the members of the Gülen community, who are also referred to as members of *hizmet*, in order to sustain spiritual, social, cultural, and educational activities. The Turkish term *himmət* is more often associated with a ‘mystical and spiritual quest for the divine’, under which one is encouraged to do more notable deeds by, among other things, providing help for the needy, sharing wealth, knowledge, and actions, as well as strengthening community. In the Gülen Movement, *himmət* represents a more practical term for Islamic forms of giving and beneficent deeds.⁴²

Recent studies have underlined that in a sociological and economic sense, Islamic almsgiving might have constituted multifarious meanings and functions. Historian Michael Bonner, for example, has pointed out that almsgiving is an Islamic idea of the ‘return of wealth’, meaning that the rich should return or give their possessions to the poor. This is a mechanism for circulating wealth that underpins the fiscal theory of early Muslim society. The main idea of almsgiving is the purification of property,⁴³ and the idea of the redistribution of property is a sociological and economic aspect of Islamic charity. Arguing that Islamic almsgiving serves as a social and political ‘stabiliser’ through which the relation between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ can be bridged, Timur Kuran, a Turkish-American economist, emphasises that almsgiving ‘never became an agent of massive equalization’.⁴⁴ However, as Kuran argues, the failure of Islamic charity to eradicate poverty, improve the quality of life for society, or institute an appropriate welfare system does not prevent Muslims from donating their wealth. This is partly because the purpose of Islamic charity, from the beginning, is as ‘a purifier of wealth, a source of inner comfort for donors, and an instrument of religious solidarity’.⁴⁵ In relation to this, studies have also underlined charitable practice within

Muslim societies in the context of the nation state, suggesting that giving practice is one of the sources of the Islamic welfare system. The proliferation of charitable, philanthropic and welfare institutions that organise the collection of social funds, *zakat* and *sedekah* in Muslim societies has in fact much to do with their efforts to promote an Islamic economic and welfare system.⁴⁶

The studies described above are important in our analysis of the nature of Islamic charity derived from the normative concept of almsgiving (*zakat* and *sedekah*), and the perspectives of the scholars have provided us with theological, historical and sociological foundations of recent studies on Islamic charitable practice. However, other factors that might have heavily stimulated Muslims to mobilise charitable activism in recent social and political landscapes have not been identified. In addition, the perspectives described above are not sufficient to analyse recent trends and developments, such as why charitable institutions set up by Muslim communities in certain regions differ from one another, and why charitable institutions in recent times have carried out different outreach activities, ranging from relieving the poor in urban and rural areas to supporting the victims in man-made and natural disaster-affected areas, both regionally and internationally. Due to this, this present study will emphasise that there has been a *raison d'être* behind charitable practice, driving people to mobilise charity and set up charitable institutions. Therefore, it is worthwhile taking another perspective on this subject by analysing the meaning of charity beyond the normative concept of alms. In this respect, this study will investigate the notions of solidarity (*ta'awun*), brotherhood (*ukhuwwa*), and Islamic community (*umma*), concepts that are used to justify charitable activism socially and politically.

Although the concept of solidarity has become the 'soul' of charitable practice and welfare activism in Muslim societies,⁴⁷ in the past, the religious, social, and political justifications of solidarity in the actual expression of Muslim charitable services were rarely discussed. The works of Jonathan Benthall, Jerome Bellion-Jourdan and Abdel-Rahman Ghandour seem to have filled this gap. Studying aid organisations in the contemporary Muslim world, these authors have framed the discussion of Islamic charities in a political context by observing various Muslim humanitarian relief NGOs. Benthall and

Bellion-Jourdan draw attention to the concept of solidarity. Accordingly, the Islamic concept of *ta'awun al-Islami*, meaning 'mutual help', has broadly been adopted in recent religious charitable works, especially in response to crises in conflict or disaster-prone spots where Muslims have become victims. It is within the context of Islamic solidarity, the Arabic term *al-ighatha al-islamiyya* or 'Islamic relief', that the growing humanitarian activism organised by Muslim associations can be located. Relief activities, which predominantly rely upon charitable and voluntary bases, can be regarded as 'a wider commitment in the name of Islamic solidarity'.⁴⁸

Moreover, the concept of brotherhood (*ukhuwwa*), which is related to the Muslim concept of a global community (*umma*), is also playing an instrumental role in the development of various Muslim humanitarian NGOs. These range from those established by Sufi orders in Africa⁴⁹ to those set up by the middle and upper classes and professionals among the Muslim diaspora in developed countries such as the United States and in Europe.⁵⁰ The establishment of Islamic aid organisations, relief agencies, and social institutions with their transnational networks cannot be detached from the spirit of solidarity. 'Brotherhood in Islam' (*ukhuwwa Islamiyya*) and 'human solidarity' (*ukhuwwa insaniyya*) are terms that may have prompted Muslim communities to mobilise financial and human resources in response to social and political events in which Muslim communities are involved, and at the same time shaped the types of programmes, benefactors, and, more importantly, beneficiaries.

In Indonesia, the concept of *ukhuwwa Islamiyya* has been the subject of numerous discussions and there is a broad consensus that it may be understood in two distinct ways, both of which are legitimate. First, according to Quraish Shihab, a leading Indonesian professor who is an authority on Quranic Exegesis, interpretation of the term emphasises the 'subject' of brotherhood. It signifies 'solidarity among Muslims', because solidarity requires strong cohesion among the subjects, socially, ideologically, and religiously. In this respect, Muslims are urged to help each other. The second interpretation accentuates the principle of brotherhood in Islam, reflecting 'the universal brotherhood', according to which Muslims can and ought to help people

in need, regardless of their religious, social, or political affiliation. By and large, the former meaning is more dominant than the latter, especially in situations where Muslims are the victims of a conflict.⁵¹

It is also worth emphasising that in reality, the concepts of brotherhood, communal unity and solidarity are often mixed, because the more fundamental spiritual inspiration of giving practice in Islam is that of being closer to God (*taqwa*). Therefore, various groups can engage in spiritually-oriented social enterprises such as charities, regardless of their religious and political orientations. These might range from politically-oriented voluntary associations to sufi orders, from progressive grassroots-based NGOs to upper-middle-class social institutions. In line with this, the Qur'anic notion of 'doing good', which refers to the principle of 'commanding right and forbidding wrong' (*amr bi al-ma'ruf wa nahy 'an al-munkar*), can also be taken into consideration. 'Doing the right thing' and 'forbidding wrongdoing' are principles that have been used to underpin social order and missionary activities in Muslim societies.

In certain contexts, it is possible that the expression of 'doing good and forbidding wrong' has also inspired Muslim communities to translate their vision of Islam into social, economic and political realms. For Muslims, it is compulsory to support everything that is considered to be 'good', according to Islam. Participation in missionary-related social, economic and political activities, for instance, can be seen as doing good and is therefore legitimate in a religious sense.⁵² At a conceptual level, it has not always been clear how this expression stimulates Islamic communities to mobilise domestic resources for the sake of the unity of—and solidarity among—communities (*umma*). But one may say that based on the daily societal narratives produced in the course of carrying out social activities such as supporting free schools for disadvantaged children, organising social and religious activities for prostitutes, and mobilising domestic funds for supporting Palestinian fighters against Israel, giving and charities can, in part, be an Islamic expression of upholding what is right and eradicating what is wrong.

Philanthropy and Long-term Social Enterprises

When I started my fieldwork in Indonesia, which I undertook in three consecutive periods between 2008 and 2010, I met a number of volunteers working in voluntary associations or *zakat* agencies. When presenting the social programmes of their associations, these volunteers often emphasised that, in addition to charitable work, they carry out long-term and development projects, which are referred to as ‘philanthropy’. Interestingly, there has been a trend among Muslim voluntary associations working for the poor to label themselves generically as philanthropic associations, despite their overwhelming charitable role. This suggests that the two terms, ‘charity’ and ‘philanthropy’, in spite of their similarities, have often been thought of differently. Charity is more often associated with the relief of the poor, with limited impact. By contrast, philanthropy is believed to have a greater impact on society, as it promotes social change. Indeed, the meaning of charity in present-days scholarly works has connotations of short-term relief projects, and from the perspective of development, the term ‘charity’ tends to be seen as perhaps less impressive than philanthropy.

Moreover, although both charity and philanthropy are frequently employed interchangeably in practice, scholars have made a sharp distinction between the two. As an approach to improve the quality of life in a society, ‘charity’ was extensively employed by religious institutions from the seventeenth to early nineteenth centuries. This is evidenced by the enthusiasm of religious institutions at that juncture, notably churches in ‘Christendom’ and mosques in ‘Islamdom’, to operate charitable works in health, education, cultural and social fields.⁵³ Charity practice has come to be considered an inadequate approach to the complexity of poverty in the social and political landscape of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as the charity approach very much ‘addresses symptoms rather than the causes’ of problems, and its impact is undoubtedly limited to ‘those lucky enough to benefit from the service ... but has not had an impact beyond that.’⁵⁴ Based on the presupposition that ‘no human being should live in misery and suffering and those with the ability to help have an obligation to do so,’⁵⁵ charity practice is not immune to criticism. It is believed that charity may humiliate the poor, as

the well-off offer underprivileged people in 'unfortunate positions' the money that they do not earn. This, it is said, cannot address the causes of problems, and could result in the government, with its public policy, feeling less responsible for increasing people's quality of life.⁵⁶ Therefore, a fundamental change within society, such as social justice, can hardly be achieved through charity.

While charity is believed to have had a limited impact in society, both socially and economically, philanthropy is perceived to have had a broader social impact in terms of enhancing social justice and promoting the public good. Conceptually, philanthropy resembles charity, as both terms represent the idea of giving. In a more practical sense, philanthropy can be seen as 'the act of giving money and other resources, including time, to aid individuals, causes, and organisations.'⁵⁷ Beyond poverty relief, philanthropy, as a 'voluntary action for public good',⁵⁸ covers activities within which social change, social justice and the public good are heavily promoted within communities and negotiated with the political authorities. However, philanthropic action should constitute not only relief, but also the development and empowerment of those in unfortunate circumstances. Philanthropy, as observers have stated, may empower the underprivileged to claim back their social, economic, and political rights, restoring their self-reliance and strengthening their capacity to reach their social and economic goals. As the term 'public good' has wide scope of meanings, ranging from creating a public welfare system to a promoting democratic society, the objectives of philanthropic works, one of which is the promotion of social justice, can be more political in character than charitable practice.⁵⁹ This is because promoting social justice should be negotiated politically and social change is a 'political process', rather than 'simply a matter of better management.'⁶⁰

In present-day practice, Islamic charitable associations have used the term 'Islamic philanthropy' to mean development-oriented social works, in order to distinguish this work from short-term social projects with limited impact. The categories of philanthropic associations, as I have discussed in the Introduction and will examine further in the following chapters, include community-based *zakat* agencies, state-sponsored *zakat* bodies, Islamic humanitarian organisations and the like, which originate from public support and whose

funds are dispensed for public causes. These types of associations have gone to the aid of those in need, such as poor families in city slums, underprivileged villagers in areas that face food shortages due to severe drought, conflict refugees, and evacuees of natural disasters.

Researching Islamic Charities: Resources, Actors, and Institutions

The meaning, functions, and characteristics of Islamic social aid are further illuminated when viewed through the lens of its sources, actors and institutions. When investigating the extent to which the state and market in a non-Islamic state such as Indonesia are involved in charitable practice by supporting the social activities of Islamic charitable associations, we need to ask what Islamic aid is about, how religious impulses are transformed into 'secular' voluntary organisations that administer philanthropic associations, and who the targeted beneficiaries of philanthropic associations are.

Sources of Islamic Aid

Charitable works by Islamic voluntary associations are supported mainly by almsgiving (*zakat* and *sedekah*) from individual Muslims who donate to religious and social institutions such as mosques, orphanages, and some kinds of charitable associations, either regularly or occasionally. In the Indonesian case, most people prefer to give directly to the poorest members of their family or neighbourhood, rather than channelling funds to philanthropic associations managed by the community, the government, or by private sector associations. It is necessary to look closely at the ways in which public resources are mobilised by Islamic associations. When catastrophes or natural disasters strike certain areas, causing humanitarian crises, people feel a need to help the victims and donate a certain proportion of their wealth to humanitarian associations. Muslim scholars have suggested that people's material and non-material contributions aimed at helping the victims in disaster-affected areas can be called a form of 'humanitarian solidarity' (*ukhuwwa bashariyya/insaniyya*), a term signifying the unity of a 'global community' regardless of race and religion. However, it should also be noted that people as benefactors and Muslim NGOs as agencies have their own preferences re-

garding to whom the collected funds should eventually be distributed. Like other religiously-motivated associations, Muslim humanitarian NGOs may select their beneficiaries based on social, religious, cultural, and political considerations, or even simply on a humanitarian basis, by putting sectarian causes aside. In short, Islamic social aid or charities, meaning the aid provided by Muslim NGOs or Islamic humanitarian associations, originate from the general public, whose contribution may or may not be motivated by religious reasons.

The above provision also suggests that what is to be called 'Islamic social aid' provided by Islamic associations does not always originate from *zakat* and *sedekah*, as understood in a strictly religious sense. Another development can be traced in the involvement of commercial enterprises, which support aid associations organised by religious institutions. Some charities channel relief funds from religious associations, as well as from non-religious or non-Muslim agencies or institutions. This means that Islamic voluntary organisations can become agencies bridging the gap between private (and secular) sector organisations that function as 'fundraisers', and beneficiaries from disadvantaged social groups. There has been an increasing tendency within private companies in Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Dubai, and Qatar, to cooperate with religious organisations in order to promote sustainable development programmes. It is also rather common to find private sector organisations participating in the social aid organised by religious associations.

The state's engagement in the sponsoring of relief associations has also become more pervasive in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries. In countries such as the United States and in and Europe and the Gulf, aid provided by religious institutions can even be sponsored by the state. This means that the government may offer a budget that voluntary organisations can access to carry out more effective and well-organised social projects for poverty relief and sustaining education and cultural programmes within the community. In the United States, faith-based charitable associations working for poverty relief and community development may receive federal funds. This is supported by a legislative provision called 'Charitable Choice'.⁶¹ Observ-

ing the dynamics of faith-based voluntary associations in Arab countries, Amani Kandil suggests that the state has played at least two main roles: first, providing a legal umbrella and political atmosphere conducive for the development of the voluntary sector; and second, shaping the patterns of voluntary practice by, among other things, ‘providing public support and acknowledging volunteer programs.’⁶² In response to manmade and natural crises around the globe and especially in Muslim countries, the Muslim World League (*Rabita al-‘Alam al-Islamiyya*), with the full support of Saudi Arabia, established the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO). Other examples of state-sponsored Islamic relief associations include Qatar Charity and the Asian Muslim Charity Fund (AMCF) in the United Arab Emirates. These multipurpose associations operate around the globe to provide relief for the poor and to support Islamic propagation (*dakwah*) and a sort of ‘re-Islamisation’ process.⁶³ In Western developed countries, such as Australia and the United States, the state may sponsor agencies that also work on relief and development projects run in developing countries. As evidenced by decades-long programmes and activities, these agencies, AUSAID (Australia) and USAID (the United States), have been able to work with religious institutions, despite the fact that these agencies do not support any religious propagation.

Middle-Class Roles

The practice of charity is embedded within religious institutions and communities to support their visions of social welfare. The privileged classes seem to have become major actors in the creation of various charitable works from which poorer families may benefit. In the context of the interplay between the state and the market, the middle class, notably well-educated professionals, businessmen, and politicians, also plays an imperative role in the development of more sophisticated social support, and have attempted to translate religious principles in an up-to-date way by, among other things, echoing the notion of community physical (economic) and non-physical (spiritual and political) welfare. Interestingly, the utilisation of religious idiom on the necessity of giving has become increasingly popular among the middle

class. The Islamic form of giving, for example, has been revitalised and regarded as a key institution for the promotion of social welfare. Scholars argue, more or less correctly, that not only has giving practice and philanthropy much to do with charitable practice, but that it also symbolises an upper middle class phenomenon.⁶⁴ There are two main ‘actors’ in charity practice: the givers and the recipients. The givers are represented by the wealthy, the upper and upper-middle classes, who act as ‘welfare providers’, while the recipients are the poor and those economically and politically-disadvantaged groups who become ‘welfare beneficiaries’. Charities have a great influence on the social construction of society and have shaped the relations between the givers and recipients. The relationship between the two is also rather dynamic, because charity may lead to further asymmetry in the position of the rich and poor. This inequality between givers and recipients in charity practice may also result in various kinds of ties: reciprocal, ‘clientelism’ (patron-client), and paternalistic relations.

From the perspective of the ‘haves’, being attentive to those in need is, in part, a moral obligation and religious duty to create a better quality of life within the community. Meanwhile, the needy may also feel that what they receive is their ‘right’, due to their position in the underprivileged classes. However, a process of giving between two entities with unequal positions may result in asymmetrical social and religious privileges, especially as the givers will be regarded as ‘generous’ and thereby achieve a superior position, while the recipients remain inferior, the poor who ought to think of a ‘counter-gift’.⁶⁵ Employing the perspective of social movement theory, the Canadian political scientist, Janine Clark, argues that a charitable act is heavily characterised by ‘strong horizontal but weak vertical ties.’⁶⁶ In the case of Clark’s studies on Islamic social institutions (ISIs) in the Middle East, middle-class groups therefore make great efforts to strengthen their networks among ‘members’ of the middle class, such as medical doctors, university professors, politicians, entrepreneurs, and other professionals, as a means of preserving their charitable works that may benefit poor people but, more notably, also the middle class themselves. Clark’s study of horizontal networks embedded in the Muslim middle classes also emphasises that the lower classes do not

benefit very much from existing social institutions. Meanwhile, Sami Zubaida's scrutiny of the vertical relations between Muslim associations and their needy clients shows that the resulting relationships are generally paternalistic.⁶⁷

In response to Clark's argument, Dutch scholar Egbert Harmsen, in his studies on Muslim voluntary welfare associations in Jordan, points out that while the social institutions set up by the middle class do serve middle-class families, they by no means exclude the needy in other realms. In fact, some institutions carry out programmes such as religious counselling, vocational training, and income-generating projects. Likewise, while Zubaida's findings indicate the Islamists' pivotal role in 'colonising' the religious, moral, and political affairs of the poor through social activities, such 'colonisation', according to Harmsen, does not signify that Islamist NGOs can politically mobilise the poor with ease.⁶⁸ In another context, Sheila Carapico analyses the mix of tribalism, communalism, religious identity, and political power in the social services offered by tribe-embedded religious and social institutions.⁶⁹ She points out that private Muslim philanthropy signifies piety, but at the same time represents 'a form of political patronage and of pre-capitalist investment for the upper classes,' as well as for both political and religious authorities.⁷⁰ Although charitable institutions, as suggested by Clark, seem to have advanced middle-class interests ahead of those of the poor, or become a tool for establishing patronage socially, economically and even politically, as emphasised by Zubaida, Carapico, and Harmsen, the question of whether the middle classes, through their faith-based charitable associations, still foster or perhaps prevent structural change remains an interesting one.

In my view, Muslim middle-class networks may result in very dynamic social activities that are not always characterised by patron-client relationships. This view is based on two arguments. First, the strong ties within the middle classes can become a means of increasing awareness of how to broaden their engagement in alleviating poverty. In fact, social activists among the Muslim middle classes need the 'floating masses' or 'ordinary members' (non-activists) of the Muslim middle-class, whose contribution underpins the social activities in their communities. Second, as the religious views and political affiliations of the members of the Muslim middle classes vary greatly,

ranging from ‘rightist Islamists’ to ‘leftist social activists’, the characteristics of Islamic charitable associations are also shaped by the dynamic interactions among their members. This, in turn, leads to the ability (or perhaps inability) to combine charitable acts with development-oriented projects, or even with activities that promote structural change. The role of the middle classes in conceiving of and carrying out welfare activities can also be discerned from the NGOs they typically establish. This is imperative to our examination of whether or not paternalism and patronage have always characterised the social acts of the upper and middle classes, and the extent to which this works well in the Indonesian social-political context in which these Islamic charitable associations operate.

Networking

Charities run by Islamic associations are a global phenomenon, and operate in small towns, disaster-affected areas, and densely populated, poor urban slums. Islamic charities have increasingly become a global phenomenon, as they operate not only in the Middle East or Africa, but also in Western—notably developed—countries such as the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and other Western European countries. With various motives, ranging from visions of faith-based welfare to politically-driven resistance movements, Muslim communities in Western countries have endeavoured to become involved in humanitarian missions by making the notion of giving the key discursive centre. In the United Kingdom, a number of Islamic NGOs have been established under the protection of the United Kingdom’s law on charity. One of the largest Islamic NGOs is Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW), which was established in 1984. IRW, which should not to be confused and has no relations with Saudi Arabia’s IIRO, has carried out humanitarian aid and development projects around the globe from its headquarters in Birmingham, the United Kingdom. Its fundraising targets are not restricted to Muslim communities within the United Kingdom, but are also based in a variety of countries, ranging from the United States and Western Europe to South Africa and Malaysia.

Another Islamic NGO in the United Kingdom is Muslim Aid, which was

established in 1985 and has its headquarters in London. Muslim Aid has played a similar role to that of Islamic Relief, acting as a worldwide Muslim NGO specialising in disaster relief and development. Despite the fact that some findings suggest that the two aid associations are different in terms of their ideological characteristics as well as specialisations,⁷¹ what is more interesting in the context of the present research is that there has been a process of globalisation of charities in Muslim societies, crossing state boundaries. Islamic Aid (the United Kingdom), Helping Hand and ICNA Relief (United States) have also taken part in wide-ranging humanitarian missions, both nationally and internationally. Along with these, other faith-based NGOs such as World Vision, Catholic Charities, Catholic Relief, Christian Aid, Tzu Chi, Caritas, and Church World Service Indonesia (CWS) are instrumental in offering humanitarian assistance, notably in disaster-affected areas. In the case of Islamic social aid, the experience of international Islamic aid agencies, such as ICNA, Islamic Aid, Helping Hand, the IIRO, the AMCF and Muslim Aid, also reflects the fact that charity practices in fundraising and distribution have become globalised in line with the spread of Muslim communities around the world, as well as with the notion of a global community. Their public appearances and worldwide roles would be almost impossible to fulfil without support from political authorities, which provide a legal umbrella for charitable associations and other voluntary sector institutions.⁷²

The relationships among NGOs and charitable associations are generally characterised by distinctive forms: cooperation, coexistence, and competition. In the case of faith-based NGOs working for humanitarian and charitable causes, for example, the situation can be even more ideological and political. This is especially the case when faith-based associations hold sectarian sentiments and at the same time are unable to transform their religious values into more universally recognised, humanitarian concepts. As Robert Wuthnow has suggested, in spite of being ‘characterized by redundancy and by fluidity’, the proliferation of non-profit organisations, including charities, occurred ‘in a context of market competition much like that of for-profit organisations.’⁷³ Therefore, Islamic charities and Muslim NGOs can be faced

with a similar situation, as they may embrace different orientations, ranging from the politically-oriented to the secular-humanitarian driven. Thus, there may be tension and competition among associations with similar or dissimilar religious identities; among Muslim NGOs or between Muslim, Christian and Western 'secular' NGOs. However, there may also be dialogue and collaboration among NGOs with different religious orientations, such as between Muslim and Christian NGOs, and between Muslim NGOs and international NGOs. All of this is very much contingent upon the social and political context in which these faith-based NGOs function.

Certain areas, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Palestine and Bosnia, are overwhelmingly inhabited by Muslims and have been ruined by 'manmade' disasters, and so Christian NGOs may be reluctant to arrive by themselves for, among other things, safety reasons and the strongly suspicious attitudes of local people or Muslim NGOs. For the same reason, Muslim NGOs may show a similar reluctance to undertake relief operations in Christian majority regions. In other areas, such as Egypt and Indonesia, Christian and Western NGOs may work with local Muslim NGOs. Meanwhile, in the so-called 'areas bordering the Islamic world', it is likely that Muslim and Christian NGOs compete with each other.⁷⁴ Likewise, Christian NGOs such as World Vision and World Help have been accused of including evangelical missions in their humanitarian aid to certain countries and regions, such as Cambodia and Banda Aceh. However, this is not always the case, as evidenced by the cooperation in Indonesia between World Vision and the Muhammadiyah, one of Indonesia's largest Muslim civil society associations.⁷⁵ In an era of massive anti-terrorism campaigns by Western countries, notably the United States, it is easy to accuse Islamist NGOs of having supported terrorism.⁷⁶ However, the UN and international NGOs also worked with jihadists such as the Jami'a Ulama-l-Islami (JUI), Al-Khair Trust, Al-Rashid Trust, and Jamaat-ud-Da'wa in response to the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.⁷⁷ In short, the degree of competition, tension, and cooperation among Islamic charities and with Christian or Western NGOs is very contextual, depending upon the ability of each association to communicate their humanitarian missions and reformulate and contextualise the religious values that they embrace.

Networking is one of the vital aspects that philanthropic organisations cannot overlook. NGOs can use three kinds of networking in order to strengthen their organisational capacity and operational area, as well as support from the public, whether morally, financially or politically. The first is an ‘internal network’ that helps an association solicit support from public individuals or institutions. An association’s internal network can determine an organisation’s ability to enrich its organisational capacity, strengthen human resources and optimise social capital. The second is a ‘local network’ or ‘regional network’ that allows an organisation to expand the scope of its programmes and address more specific groups of people by, among other things, establishing partnerships with other local NGOs and government agencies, as well as other local initiatives. The third is an ‘international network’ that supports an organisation in extending its institutional capacity in terms of human resources, skills, and financial resources.

Moreover, there are factors that have an influence on establishing networks, and these are related to shared values, as well to the religious and cultural similarities between associations and their counterparts. Religion seems to have been imperative to the establishment of networks among philanthropic associations, as religious values are deeply embedded in their social activities. Philanthropic associations sharing a common interest are therefore able to cooperate with each other. For example, relief missions in disaster-prone spots have often been characterised by cooperation among faith-based humanitarian associations that bring and share similar values and interests. It should be noted, however, that sharing similar religious values and having similar identities may also result in a sort of competition, instead of cooperation, among faith-based philanthropic associations. This is because humanitarian associations or faith-based NGOs may represent different ideologies and interests sociologically, economically and politically, that to some extent can become determinant factors in shaping their activities in the field and the typical beneficiaries. The concept of ‘impartiality’ is often contested in the course of humanitarian work in the field, as religious or political affiliations may shape attitudes, and help may be provided to preferred entities based on religion, race, or politics, or simply because both the benefactors

and beneficiaries embrace the religious missionary activities.

Therefore, in recent times there have been initiatives among faith-based NGOs to sharpen their humanitarian visions by promoting impartiality as one of their core humanitarian values. Along with religion, ethnicity and country of origin have characterised philanthropic movements in many parts of the world, both in national and international contexts. The flourishing of ethnically oriented 'Diaspora Philanthropy' in developed countries such as the United States, European countries, and even in major Asian contexts such as Hong Kong and Singapore, reveals that networking is grounded in ethnicity. It is commonly acknowledged that even the so-called 'major' Islamic philanthropic associations operating in developed countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, are mainly initiated by people from Middle-Eastern countries, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Morocco, and elsewhere. Associations run to Indonesian citizens, for example, exist in places such as Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and Korea. Again, despite ethnically-motivated philanthropic activism, religion seems to intersect with activism. As matter of fact, ethnically-oriented philanthropic associations are overwhelmingly characterised by religious values, to the extent that the process of mobilisation and their main targets and beneficiaries are derived from religious narratives.

Islamic Charities and their Embedded Values

Public Welfare

Sociologically speaking, the first and foremost objective of Islamic charities is to promote the welfare of the poor by eradicating poverty within communities. As a form of collective action, Islamic charities represent Muslim efforts to translate the Islamic creed into reality by reformulating the Islamic faith, so as to be able to impact on the actual needs of society, especially when faced with hardship, social disparities and economic crises. Islamic doctrine has provided plentiful reminders of the fact that creating joy (*al-falah*) in the world and hereafter is a Muslim obligation. In practice, in much of the Muslim world, the promotion of the welfare of the community is often associated with various kinds of religiously-inspired philanthropic action, includ-

ing the practice of *zakat*, *sedekah*, and *waqf*. Islam also gives a high degree of respect to individual property rights, but requires those with sufficient wealth to share with others. Islamic charities seem to be one expression of this promotion of welfare. Another, increasing form of advancement of societal welfare in certain Muslim countries is the adoption of a kind of 'Islamic economic system', as recently took place in Sudan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

The production of knowledge in Islamic economics, Islamic banking and professional *zakat* administration shows how the notion of social welfare has often been utilised as one of the discursive centres of Muslim societies. Many Muslim countries that have witnessed the process of re-Islamisation over the past two decades have attempted to reformulate an Islamic economic system by establishing Islamic banks and reviving Islamic notions of giving, such as *zakat*. Islamic banks and *zakat*, by definition, symbolise the refutation of interest charges as practiced in conventional banks. While Islamic scholars continue to debate the issue of bank interest,⁷⁸ advocates of Islamic banks are divided on whether conventional bank interest can be a source of poverty within society. Some Islamic scholars have equated bank interest with the notion of usury (*riba*), while others have perceived difference between the two. But there is agreement on the fact that practicing usury can be regarded as suppressing low-income families, and thus preventing the practice of usury *riba* and practicing *zakat* can mean promoting Islamic 'moral economy'. At the same time, Islamic banks are seen as an alternative to conventional banks in terms of materialising visions of the welfare of society in accordance with Islamic norms.

How is welfare defined? One of the most stringent Islamic jurisprudential concepts utilised by progressive Muslim thinkers in many parts of the Muslim World in order to underpin their social concern is related to their questions about and reinterpretation of the 'objectives of Islamic law' (*maqasid al-shari`a*). Modern Muslim jurists seem to be interested in contextualising Islamic jurisprudential concept such as *maslaha* (public benefit) or *masalih al-`ibad* (the welfare of people) or *al-maslaha al-`amma* (the common good), which was conceptually elaborated by classical or medieval Muslim jurists, such as al-

Ghazali, Ibn Taimiyya, al-Tufi, and notably al-Shatibi.⁷⁹ Literally, *maslaha* signifies ‘a means, an occasion, or a goal which is good’.⁸⁰ It is equivalent to the Arabic term *al-manfa`a* (benefit) and is the antonym of *al-mafsada* (‘evil or malicious acts’).⁸¹ Linked to the objective of Islamic law, *maslaha* also points to the protection of ‘general interest’, ‘social utility’, and the preservation of ‘the common good’.⁸² This is a legitimate concept for Muslim engagement in the public sphere. The notion of *maslaha* has enabled Muslim communities to engage in civic debate in order to reach the goal of *shari`a*.⁸³ According to Muslim jurists, the concept of *maslaha* can mean to preserve the objectives of Islamic law (*al-muhafaza `ala maqsud al-shari`*)⁸⁴ or to benefit the people in the way that Islamic law intends (*al-manfa`a allati qasaduha al-shari` al-hakim li `ibadih*). The objective of Islamic law constitutes five aspects, namely the protection of religion (*hifz al-din*), of life (*hifz al-nafs*), of intellect (‘*aql*), of family (*hifz al-nasl*), and of property (*hifz al-mal*).⁸⁵ The Muslim concept of *maslaha* can also be equated with the Christian concept of the common good, as formulated by Thomas Aquinas. According to Aquinas, the Christian concept of the common good comprises ‘self-preservation, the preservation of the species through procreation and education, the preservation of the rational nature of man warranted by his desire for the knowledge of God, and the inclination towards civilised life.’⁸⁶

The concept of welfare as defined by practitioners of charities and volunteers in Muslim NGOs has much to do with endeavouring to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor, as well as establishing a ‘just’ Islamic society. Charles Tripp’s study, *Islam and the Moral Economy*, suggests that the notion of *maslaha* signifies Muslims’ concern with the welfare of society in general, which can also be referred to as ‘social benefit’ (*al-maslaha al-ijtima`iya*) or ‘public welfare’ (*al-maslaha al-`amma*), instead of ‘a distinctively Islamic society’.⁸⁷ This means that there has been a wide range of perspectives in Muslim societies in conceiving the concept of welfare promoted through social and economic activities, including charitable works. On top on that, as we shall see in the Indonesian context, the concept of *maslaha* has become the essential theoretical framework used by Muslim activists and intellectuals working in the NGO sector.

It is notable that issues relating to private and public interest have underpinned present-day charities. Private interest is mainly related to the individual concerns of givers who may or may not expect rewards, whether materially and immaterially (spiritual, psychological, privileges), from their giving practices. In Islam, for example, paying an annual wealth tax and voluntary giving represent individual duties (*fard 'ain*), despite recent changing attitudes among Muslims in certain countries, which have resulted in the inclusion of institutional or collective duties in *zakat* practice through a new concept called 'corporate *zakat*'. To some extent, Muslim personal interests also intersect with people's concerns about public welfare, creating a better quality of life in society as a whole. Hence, Islamic voluntarism, which is deeply rooted in fundamental Islamic sources, can be converted into the 'spiritual capital' that, in part, underpins the Muslim vision of welfare. Despite the fact that charities organised by governments or civil society associations are often—or, at least not immune to being—politicised by elites, as a means of establishing patronage and 'clientelism', public welfare remains the major concern, as can be seen in the narratives of public welfare utilised in all charitable works carried out by individuals or associations.

Missionary Activities and Religious Identity

Like Christianity, Islam is a religion of *dakwah* (Ar. *da'wa*). *Dakwah* literally means 'to call', 'to summon,' or to 'invite', and encompasses the dissemination of Islamic faith in the social, economic, and political spheres. In a broader context, it also signifies social welfare and missionary activities. Unless we look closely at the experiences of charities organised by religious institutions, we may neglect the fact that 'missionary activities' have characterised—or at least been embedded in—social activities. The proliferation of charitable hospitals in the United Kingdom and other West European countries, for example, cannot be detached from the spirit of religious reform, notably among Protestants and Catholics.⁸⁸ From the seventeenth century until at least the mid-twentieth century, churches and their charitable institutions and Christian '*diaconia*' catered for the poor among the members of the congregation before other segments of society outside the congregation. To

answer the question of whether the idea of religious propagation comes before or after the concept of a humanitarian mission is always problematic. This is because there is a dialectical process in defining the function of religious institutions, whether they promote 'humanitarian values' by putting sectarian sentiment aside, or give priority to community members. Debates and discourse on how missionary groups characterise their social work and humanitarian missions continue today. In particular, Islamic and Christian institutions and their missionary activities have been in close contact and competition for centuries.

In line with the development of humanitarianism within faith-based NGOs during crises, on 17 January 2005, a number of major faith-based relief associations in Indonesia made an agreement against religious proselytising in humanitarian efforts, called the 'Interfaith Press Statement Concerning Humanitarian Work in Aceh'.⁸⁹ This statement emerged as a consequence of the suspicion that certain American evangelist Christian associations, as reported in *the Washington Post*, were intending to relocate Muslim children from Aceh in safer areas either in Java or the United States, before they were finally converted to Christianity.⁹⁰ This was then followed by another striking inter-faith phenomenon, indicated by close collaboration between World Vision, the largest United States-based Christian aid association, Children of the Street, an Australia-based Christian NGO, and the Muhammadiyah, the second largest Islamic organisation, which has also been one of the organisations that has reacted most vigorously to Christian '*diaconia*' since the early twentieth century in Indonesia, in response to the call for emergency assistance in Aceh.

Such cases of collaboration between Muslim and Christian NGOs, or between domestic and international NGOs, reveal that providing humanitarian assistance is not simply an indication of the selfishness of an individual or community, but also the ability of institutions to engage with local compatriots with whom partnerships and patronage should be established. With respect to the variety of charitable works practised in Muslim societies, it is safe, therefore, to conclude that the activities of faith-based charities are not limited to delivering services in the way that religious associations did a cen-

tury ago. Instead, faith-based charities in modern times are as varied as the complexities of the interplay between the state, religion, and market. It is worth considering Philip J Eldrige's depiction of the efforts and encounters of Muslim and Christian organisations within a broader context of faith-based philanthropic and voluntary actions in Indonesia.

In principle, Islamic and Christian organisations confront the same dilemmas in linking their social outreach and mission activities, particularly in relation to whether social programmes are to be taken solely for the benefit of the people, or primarily as a means of extending religious influence and control.⁹¹

With regard to the experiences of Muslim NGOs, the notion of Islamic *dakwah* is instrumental not only in terms of how to disseminate religious values and ideology through humanitarian missions, but also in promoting the practice of volunteering and caring. Islamic *dakwah*, to borrow Amani Kandil's phrase, 'may constitute doing good for the community through unpaid service, thus setting an example of volunteering both for faith and the common good'.⁹² In line with this, as regards the relationship between humanitarian aid and missionary activities, Hossam Said, the Deputy General Manger and Head of Project & Field Offices of Islamic Relief, has noted:

I can understand how a faith-based organisation may not see a contradiction between providing relief and doing missionary work ... Some Muslims, Christians and other faith groups engage in missionary activity, and in principle I can understand this; however, those individuals and agencies that carry out missionary work alongside humanitarian work should be honest, and not by any means link the supplied aid and beliefs they communicate to the poor.⁹³

Interestingly, looking closer at the meaning and function of Islamic charities, as reflected in *zakat* practice, one may wonder whether or not the amalgamation of missionary activities into charitable enterprises is conceptually or perhaps historically justifiable. This is because the objective of *zakat*, as formulated by Islamic scholars, is predominantly related to the welfare of the community, the circulation of wealth, social security, the reduction of social and economic disparities, and social solidarity. Apart from this, the

scope of meaning and concept of *dakwah* in Islamic history and societies has been subject to change, depending on the social construction and political landscape of Muslim societies. One might juxtapose the Islamic concept of *dakwah* and Christian missionary work; propagating religion to those who are regarded 'outsiders' or 'others', for example *dakwah* by a Muslim to a non-Muslim or missionary activities by a Christian to a non-Christian. It should be noted, however, that in practice, the concept of *dakwah* in contemporary Islamic societies has much to do with the process of 're-Islamisation', which means that *dakwah* is conducted by certain Muslim groups or individuals to 're-Islamise' their fellow Muslims instead of 'the others'. Again, the method of *dakwah* in contemporary Muslim societies is not restricted to oral admonition, which is increasingly termed *tabligh* (to deliver messages of Islam), but also involves partnership and social welfare activities.⁹⁴ It can be expressed in the provision of any means to support education institutions, training centres, and social institutions through which Islamic dignity and *shari`a* (the basic principles of Islam) can be preserved, developed, and disseminated.

Therefore, conceptually and practically, missionary and welfare activities in the distribution of Islamic social funds complement each other.⁹⁵ The Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication (DDII) with its *zakat* agency (LAZ DDII), for example, is one association that has clearly attempted to utilise *zakat* funds for *dakwah* activities. From the perspective of this association, Islamic *dakwah* needs strong support from the Islamic community, on the grounds that missionary activities, especially in support of Muslim minorities and converts on the outer island or isolated regions throughout Indonesia, are long-term projects that need sufficient funds. As regards assistance for new converts or Muslims in isolated regions, Muhammad Siddik, head of DDII's Board of Controllers (*Badan Pengawas*), for example, suggests that failing to support new converts and Muslims in isolated regions would mean a failure to uphold the notion of Islamic brotherhood as taught in Islam.⁹⁶ It is worth noting that the interplay between *zakat* and *dakwah* is a result not only of the effort of *zakat* agencies to broaden the scope of their social activities by engaging in *dakwah*, but also because, as evidenced by the DDII and

other associations, there has been a trend within *dakwah* associations to extend their activities by revitalising or establishing their own *zakat* agencies.

Not all Islamic scholars are in agreement on how to use Islamic charity such as *zakat* for missionary activities. This is partly because the term *jihād fi sabilillah* (struggle for the cause of Allah) is unlikely to always be suitable to justify the spending of *zakat* funds for missionary activities. In his lavishly detailed analysis of *zakat* development in Muslim societies Yusuf Qaradawi (b. 1926), a very prominent modern Islamic scholar (*mufti*), describes a variety of viewpoints held by both classical and modern Islamic scholars of how the term *jihād fi sabilillah* is to be interpreted. Accordingly, the majority of classical jurists, as represented by Shafi'ite, Hanafite, Hambalite, and Malikiite, believe that the initial meaning of *fi sabilillah* is restricted to *jihād*; financing those fighting in the Way of Allah against the enemy of Islam. This kind of interpretation is common as it is strongly underpinned by Islamic tradition. Other modern scholars, such as the Egyptian Rashid Rida (d. 1935) and Mahmud Shaltut (d. 1963), include public interests but not individual interests, by which religion and the state can be preserved, such as financing the army, building railways and highways for pilgrims, military and charitable hospitals, and mosques.⁹⁷

To enrich the scope of the meaning of *jihād fi sabilillah*, Qaradawi proposes what he has termed 'jihād by analogy' despite the fact there is not a clear distinction, as far as Qaradawi's explanation is concerned, between the 'analogical' and 'literal' meaning of *jihād fi sabilillah*.

I do not extend the meaning of the term '*fi sabilillah*' to include all deeds. On the other hand, I do not restrict it to military fighting alone. *Jihād* for the sake of Allah includes supporting His Cause by writing and speaking as much as by fighting. *Jihād* may be educational, journalistic, social, economic, and political *jihād* as much as military *jihād*. We must remember that in all kinds of *jihād*, the essential condition is that the action helps make Allah's word supreme on earth.⁹⁸

In another part of his writing, Qaradawi emphasises:

The most honourable form of *jihād* nowadays is fighting for the liberation of Muslim land from domination of unbelievers, regardless of their

religion or ideology. The communist and the capitalist, the Westerner and the Easterner, Christian, Jew, pagan, or unbelievers, all are aggressors when they attack and occupy Muslim land. Fighting in defence of the home of Islam is obligatory until the enemy is driven away and Muslims are liberated ... Today Muslim land is occupied in Palestine, Kashmir, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Chad, Western Somalia, Cyprus, Samarqand, Bukhara, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Albania, and several other occupied countries. Declaring a holy war to save these Muslim lands is an Islamic duty, and fighting for such purposes in those occupied territories is in the Way of Allah for which *zakat* must be spent.⁹⁹

To summarise the preceding discussion, there are various concepts in Islamic creeds which apply to giving practice and distributing Islamic social aid, ranging from the notion of welfare to upholding the supremacy of faith, as well as achieving a better quality of life for low-income households and making the latter more religious. Equally important, as implied in the quotations above, Islamic charities cannot be separated from the notion of solidarity, not only in terms of developing solidarity among the wealthy to help the poor, but also, in an increasingly political way, in supporting the weak fighter on the battlefield.

Solidarity and Political Struggle

Following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, Islamic charities faced a new and difficult episode as a result of the United States' campaign against terrorism. A number of Islamic associations, including charitable institutions, were accused of having contributed financially to wide-ranging terrorist attacks in many regions. Islamic humanitarian associations have also been questioned and some have been accused of having supported 'terrorism'. Despite a few solidarity groups and underground movements using violence in their activities, the majority of charitable organisations have attempted to emerge as well-organised or specialised humanitarian associations, some of which have very good credentials and aptitudes, for they are able to assist those in need out of compassion.¹⁰⁰ What is interesting is that in the current geopolitical

context, the term 'those in need' varies conceptually, as this term may cover those who have only a modicum of wealth, people suffering illnesses and facing crises as a result of extreme dry climates or floods, as well as victims in disaster-prone spots and the general populace in conflict-affected areas.

Relief projects by humanitarian associations can rely upon religiously or ethnically-inspired solidarity movements. Relief missions are frequently set up in conflict-prone areas involving two entities with different ethnic and religious identities. Bosnian Muslims and Serbian (Orthodox) Christians, Palestinians and Israelis, Hui Muslims and Han Chinese in China, Muslims and Christians in the Moluccas, Indonesia, Pattani Muslims and Buddhists in Thailand, are but a few examples of how ethno-religious conflicts may generate ethnically and religiously-inspired solidarity and humanitarian movements. This is because a solidarity movement needs a symbol, through which the objectives of faith-based relief associations can be communicated in order to gain wider public support. Along with the changing nature of ethno-religious conflicts in the recent geopolitical context, a new process of discourse and practice of Islamic charities, representing 'the constructive side of religion,' has emerged.¹⁰¹ The Palestinian struggle against Israel from the 1960s, and the struggle of Afghans against the Russians in the 1980s, are cases in point of how the narratives of humanitarianism have increasingly become Islamised and perhaps politicised. A number of associations have formed all over the world, notably in Muslim countries, in support of oppressed Afghans and Palestinians. The narratives promoted by Islamic humanitarian associations in the course of mobilising support and delivering assistance are no longer restricted to helping the victims as such, but also include liberating them from invasion. In short, charities in this sense can mean an expression of political concern, to the extent that humanitarian associations and solidarity groups have arisen as a result of political dynamics in both domestic and global contexts.

The politics of humanitarianism always raises questions about the extent of the principle of 'impartiality' held by faith-based NGOs during humanitarian missions in ethno-religious conflict-affected areas. The extent to which the concept of impartiality can be translated objectively and actually be imple-

mented in the field remains a heated subject of debate among observers and practitioners of aid missions. One may believe that ‘relief’ can mean helping and at the same time supporting or even defending the victims, the weaker of the parties to a conflict, instead of behaving ‘neutrally’ in response to conflict. ‘Impartiality’, as a humanitarian principle, is then contested; despite the fact there have been endeavours to reconcile the Western and Islamic notions of humanitarianism.¹⁰² In the West, for example, the emergence of Doctors without Borders (*Médecins Sans Frontières/MSF*), suggests that activists in relief agencies have interpreted the concept of neutrality in actual relief assistance in diverse ways. The founders of Doctors without Borders, who were disappointed with the operational concept of neutrality imposed by the Red Cross, expected relief agencies operating in conflict-affected areas to do more than delivering assistance. Accordingly, relief agencies have to be able to ‘speak out against civilian distress and other violations of human rights and humanitarian norms’ and have ‘active solidarity with ‘victims,’ not neutrality.’¹⁰³

It is therefore unsurprising that the involvement of solidarity groups and faith-based relief agencies in delivering assistance to one party to a conflict has characterised recent humanitarian activities in many parts of the world. Transnational faith-based relief agencies, and their encounters with solidarity groups and local counterparts, have contributed much to the political dynamics of relief work, especially in crisis areas. In the field, despite increasing accusations against and suspicions of relief agencies with different ideological stances,¹⁰⁴ the involvement of formal and informal, or legal and ‘illegal’, relief agencies has become a common phenomenon. This is simply because assistance, for victims or even actors in conflicts, is regarded as everyone’s right. Again, no one agency, or even government, could claim to be the only authoritative actor in delivering assistance to conflict victims. In the cases of the Nigerian Civil War from 1967 to 1970, Afghanistan in the 1980s, Bosnia in the 1990s, the Moluccas (Maluku Islands) in the late 1990s, and Gaza-Israel in recent times, the notion of humanitarian assistance as a means of solidarity and political support for the weaker side seems to have been rather dominant, as indicated by the rise of solidarity groups and the involvement

of transnational relief agencies in the given crisis areas.

Interestingly, the mushrooming of solidarity groups and relief agencies has taken place not only in developed countries in Europe, the United States and the so-called petrodollar countries in the Middle East, but also in developing Asian and African countries, such as Indonesia, Pakistan and Sudan. In recent times, the solidarity movement has shifted from being on a simply local or domestic scale to being increasingly global in character. Domestic Islamic relief associations, solidarity groups and *zakat* agencies in Indonesia, for example, have increasingly become politically active in support of their fellow Muslims abroad, such as Afghans and Palestinians, who have witnessed hardship and crisis due to manmade disasters.

Conclusion

The above discussion raises some points that are relevant to the study of Islamic charities in the modern nation state in general, and Indonesia's social, religious, economic and political landscape in particular. We have acknowledged that charitable activism conceals various motives and ideas. It deals not only with ideal, normative religious values, but also relates to societal concerns about life, the common good, dignity, communality, religious identity, solidarity and humanity. In the same way, charitable practice is culturally and socially contextual, and can be shaped by customary law, religion, communal shared aims and humanitarian solidarity. Considering that giving practice is embedded in society, charitable activism can also be found in different cultures and civilisations, and the meaning of charitable practice is as varied as the driving forces behind it. In a very modest way, charitable practice can signify gift exchange, a way to express an awareness of others, and can represent piety, unselfishness and altruism. Moreover, it can be a way in which a person, community or institution establishes patronage, creates partnership, disseminates certain religious and political ideologies, and promotes social democracy, as well as expresses attitudes towards the state and society at large.

As emphasised previously, understanding Islamic charities from a simply doctrinal viewpoint, albeit necessary, is not sufficient. Muslim encounters

with the complexity of social, economic and political currents have resulted in the social, economic and even political reformulation of Islamic precepts. Islamic charitable institutions have in fact emerged in different forms, ranging from locally-embedded, community-based associations to internationally-recognised aid agencies. What seems intriguing, in relation to the changing nature of Islamic charities in contemporary Muslim societies, is the fact that the resources, actors, institutions, beneficiaries and networking involved in the practice of charity have varied. The involvement of private sector institutions and the engagement of state agencies in social activism have in fact given rise to the dynamic social services provided by Islamic charitable associations, as well as a new space for questioning what Islamic charities mean in today's world.

Having flourished in many part of the worlds, whether in the Muslim World or Western developed countries, Islamic charities have increasingly become part of a global movement whose area of operation includes North Africa, South and Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe and even Latin America. The active and widespread engagement of Islamic associations in the delivery of aid in disaster and war-affected zones implies what might be called the 'exchange of aid'. For example, local Muslim organisations in Pakistan, Iran, Malaysia and the Persian Gulf may operate in Indonesia in response to natural calamities. Likewise, a number of Muslim aid organisations operate in Palestine, Iraq, Pakistan, and China to offer disaster relief. It is also within this kind of movement that local Islamic charities in many Muslim countries find international exposure by strengthening partnerships with other organisations from different countries. Emotional relations, religious resemblance, and cultural affinity seem to have been rather instrumental in shaping partnerships among NGOs. As a global movement, major Islamic aid associations from the United States, United Kingdom and Gulf countries have in fact been able to work with local Muslim charitable organisations or NGOs in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. More importantly, a new trend has developed within Islamic charities. They have extended the philosophical foundations of their humanitarianism and broadened their views of religious understanding in pluralistic society by cooperating with other long-es-

tablished secular and Christian NGOs. Despite this, Muslim NGOs with strict and rigid standpoints and which actively define others as ‘the enemy’ instead of looking for partnership, retain a pervasive presence.

Moreover, this chapter has provided us with a general overview of the thought and practices of Islamic charities in the Muslim-majority world. It suggests that Islamic charities should not solely be seen as the endeavour of Muslims to practice Islamic precepts as formulated in the Qur’an and *Sunna*, but also as a result of dynamic encounters between religion, society, the market and politics in the context of the modern nation-state. Welfare issues have, of course, always been political, but this is not always true of the way in which society addresses welfare. Some might expect political structures to provide an adequate, reliable, and accountable economic and political system within which society can participate and thereby achieve the goal of creating a common good. Others might adopt different strategies, using bottom-up schemes, empowering the grassroots and promoting the values of self-reliance, human rights, and independence, by which people can voice, communicate and promote their aspirations without being restrained by the authorities.

Another approach to welfare issues asks whether civil society organisations can fulfil the needs of society, help low-income families survive, and force wealthy families to contribute to the public good. Solidarity, togetherness, mutual aid, love, piety and brotherhood are among the terms frequently utilised to promote the public good (*al-maslaha al‘amma*), to mean the welfare of the people (*al-masalih al‘ibad*). In reality, not all Muslims understand ‘the common good’ and ‘social justice’ to mean the same thing. For some Muslim groups, the promotion of public welfare can also mean the promotion of the establishment of ‘Islamic society’ and perhaps an ‘Islamic state’. Therefore, the next chapter will present an overview of Islamic activism in Indonesia by exploring the relationship between Islam and the state and the way in which Muslim groups in Indonesia conceive the notion of social welfare from an Islamic perspective. We shall also examine the efforts of Muslim societies to address welfare issues by proposing different kinds of strategies in the cultural, political and economic spheres.

Endnotes

- ¹ Robert Wutthnow, *Saving America: Faith-based Services and the Future of Civil Society* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 18; also Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
- ² Armando Salvatore, *The Public Sphere: Liberal Modernity, Catholicism, Islam* (New York & Hampshire: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2007), 46.
- ³ Robert Wutthnow, *Saving America*, 17.
- ⁴ Frederick B. Bird, "Comparative Study of the Works of Charity in Christianity and Judaism," *Journal of Religious Ethics*, Vol. 10, issue 1 (1982): 162; see also Amy Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 5
- ⁵ Commendable works on poverty and charity within religious groups include, for example, Michael Bonner, Mine Ener, and Amy Singer (eds.), *Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Context* (Albany: State University of New York, 2003), Adam M. Sabra, *Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Mark R. Cohen, *Poverty and Charity in the Jewish Community of Medieval Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
- ⁶ Praiseworthy scholarly works on this issue include Miriam Frenkel and Yaacov Lev (eds.) *Charity and Giving in Monotheistic Religions* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009); Warren F Ilchman, Stanley N. Katz & Edward L. Queen, *Philanthropy in the World's Religion* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001).
- ⁷ Amy Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies*, 13.
- ⁸ Andrew Ho, "Asian-American Philanthropy: Expanding Knowledge, Increasing Possibilities," *Working Paper*, The Center for Public and Non-profit Leadership, Georgetown Public Policy Institute (November 2004), 2.
- ⁹ This meaning, 'love of humankind', is derived from Latin's '*caritas*' and Greek '*agape*' which point to 'God's love for humankind'. Amy Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies*, 6.
- ¹⁰ Abdullahi Ahmad An-Na'im and Asma Mohamed Abdel Halim, "Right-based Approach to Philanthropy for Social Justice in Islamic Societies," *Kultur: The Indonesian Journal for Muslim Cultures*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2009), 4.
- ¹¹ Peter Frumkin, *Strategic Giving: the Art and Science of Philanthropy* (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 2006), 5.
- ¹² In the United Kingdom, charity affairs are regulated and administered by the Charity Commission, a public body that was established in 1853. According to the Charities Acts 1960, all charities or associations with charitable purposes have to be registered. In the United States, the government is allowed to support institutions that benefit the public through their social services and charitable works by providing them with direct aid, which is referred to as 'Charitable Choice'.
- ¹³ In Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the competition between civil society organisations and state agencies is rather obvious. See for example, Christopher Candland, "Faith as Social Capital: Religion and Community Development in Southeast Asia," *Policy Science* Vol. 33. No. 3 (2000), 359; Aidit bin Ghazali, "Zakat Administration in Malaysia," in Mohamed Ariff (ed.), *The Islamic Voluntary Sector in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1991), 106.

- ¹⁴ Noteworthy works on people's resistance to government policies on almsgiving include James C. Scott, *Resistance without Protest: Peasant Opposition to the Zakat in Malaysia and to the Tithe in France*, The Fourth James C Jackson Memorial Lecture, Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1986.
- ¹⁵ In the Middle Eastern context, see Barbara Lethem Ibrahim and Dina H. Sherif, *From Charity to Social Change: Trends in Arab Philanthropy* (Cairo and New York: the American University in Cairo Press, 2008); for the cases in Asia and Latin America, see Manuel E Contreras, *Corporate Social Responsibility in the Promotion of Social Development* (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2004)
- ¹⁶ Joaquin L. Gonzalez III, "Corporation-Community Collaboration for Social Development: An Overview of Trends, Challenges, and Lessons from Asia," in Manuel E Contreras, 4.
- ¹⁷ For further discussion of the development of the authority of *Sunna* in Islamic societies see Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982); *Islamic Methodology in History* (Karachi: Central Institute of Islamic Research, 1965).
- ¹⁸ For further discussion see Wael B. Hallaq, *An History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), especially chapter III, "the Articulation of Legal Theory," 82-123.
- ¹⁹ Jonathan Benthall, "Financial Worship", 27-42.
- ²⁰ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh az-Zakat: A Comparative Study*, translated by Monzer Kahfi (London: Dar al-Taqwa Ltd., 1999), xliv.
- ²¹ For the development of the meaning of *zakat* and *sedekah* in Islamic history, and scholarly disagreements about it, see Suliman Bashear, "On the Origins and Development of the Meaning of Zakat in Early Islam," *Arabica*, T. 40, Fasc. 1 (March 1993), 84-113.
- ²² Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh az-Zakat*, 366.
- ²³ The biographers of Abu Bakar include a chapter specifically discussing Abu Bakr's rigorous stand against those who openly refuse *zakat* payments, see Muhammad Hussein Haikal, *Abu Bakr al-Siddiq* (Cairo: Matba'a Masdar Shirka Musahim Misriyya, 1958), especially chapter five on the war against *zakat* refuters (*qital man mana'u al-zakat*), 111-20; also 'Ali Tantawi, *Abu Bakr al-Siddiq: Riwayat al-Sahihah Majmu'a min Nahwi Mia Kitab Baina Makhtut wa Matbu'* (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-Salafiyya, 1372 H), 161-4.
- ²⁴ See for example Mohammad Akhtar Saeed Siddiqi, *Early Development of Law and Ijtihad* (Karachi: Islamic Research Academy, 1983); Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh az-Zakat*.
- ²⁵ Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali, *The Mysteries of Almsgiving: a translation from the Arabic with notes of the Kitab Asrar al-Zakah of al-Ghazzali's Ihya' Ulum al-Din* / by Nabih Amin Faris (Beirut: the American University of Beirut, 1966), 20-21.
- ²⁶ al-Ghazali, *The Mysteries of Almsgiving*, 79.
- ²⁷ Sayyid Qutb, *Al-'Adala al-Ijtima' iyya fi al-Islam* (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1974), 34-35; William E Shepard, *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam* (Leiden, New York, Koln: E. J. Brill, 1996), 37-40.
- ²⁸ William E. Shepard, *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism*, 76.
- ²⁹ Sayed Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: The Theory of Jahiliyya* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 117. See also Sayyid Qutb, *Al-'Adala al-Ijtima' iyya fi al-Islam*, 110. In the modern Arab world, Sayyid Qutb is not alone. There are other Muslim members of the intelligentsia,

some of the major thinkers in the Muslim Brotherhood, who have attempted to reformulate social justice in Islam by addressing a larger Islamic social, economic and political system and, at the same time, criticising capitalism and Marxism. They include Hasan al-Banna, 'Abd al-Qadir 'Awda, Muhammad al-Ghazali, 'Ali Guraysha, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Sa'id Hawwa, Hassan al-Turabi, and Rashid al-Ghannushi, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, and Muhammad Hussain Fadlalla. See Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi', *Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History* (London, Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2004), 204 and 231-233.

- ³⁰ Despite the fact that he faced criticism from his contemporaries, such as Ali Akbar Akbari, Amir-Parviz Puyan, and Maud Ahmadzadeh, Shari'ati seemed to have been interested in addressing politically related issues, such as the relationships between the rulers and the commoners, the elites and the grassroots, and notably between the oppressors and the oppressed. See Ali Rahnama, *An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shari'ati* (London & New York: I.B. Taurus, 1998), 202-205.
- ³¹ Among other important works related to this issue are: *The Visage of Muhammad*, translated by: A.A. Sachedina (Tehran: Committee for International Propagation and the Islamic Revolution, 1981); *The Enlightened Thinkers and Islamic Renaissance*, edited and annotated by: Farhang Rajaee, foreword by John L. Esposito (Houston, Texas: Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986).
- ³² The seven categories of goods among Twelver Shi'ism include: booty (*ghanima*), objects obtained from the sea (*al-ghaws*), treasure (*al-kanz*), treasure trove (*al-ma'din*), gainful earnings (*arbah al-makasib*), *halal* goods mixed with *haram*, and *Dhimmi* land which is bought from Muslims. See Norman Calder, "Khums in Imam Shi'i Jurisprudence, from the Tenth to the Sixteenth Century AD," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 45 (1982), 39-47; Abdul Aziz Sachedina, "Al-Khums: The Fifth in Imami Shi'i Legal System," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (1980), 275-289.
- ³³ Peter C Hennigan, *The Birth of a Legal Institution: the Formation of the Waqf in the Third Century H. H. Hanafi Legal Discourse* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2004), 50; for further discussion of the development of legal perspectives on *waqf* see Asep Saepudin Jahar, "Reinterpreting Islamic Norms: The Conflict Between Legal Paradigm and Socio Economic Challenges: A Case Study of Waqf and Zakat in Contemporary Indonesia," *Ph.D. Dissertation*, Der Fakultät für Geschichte, Kunst- und Orientwissenschaften der Universität Leipzig, 2005.
- ³⁴ Murat C'izakc'a, *A History of Philanthropic Foundations: the Islamic World from the Seventh Century to the Present* (Istanbul: Bogazic'i University Press, 2000).
- ³⁵ Adam Sabra, *Poverty and Charity*, 32. The Qur'an enjoins the concept of benevolence (*ihsan*) with justice or equity (*al'adl*) (QS. Al-Fajr [89]: 21). Both benevolence and equity represent the state of Muslim spirituality, or the 'state of belief', that can or should be achieved by Muslims. There various prophetic narrations (*hadith*) linking the condition of benevolence and equity with the culture of giving, altruism, selflessness, etc. See also Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, *Quranic Philosophy of Benevolence (ihsan)* (Lahore: Idara Minhaj-ul-Qur'an, 1987). 20-24. In the Islamic concept, people whose deeds are good are labelled *al-muhsinun*.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*
- ³⁷ Amy Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies*, 13.

- ³⁸ As cited by Jonathan Benthall from such anthropologists as Emanuel Marx, Wilfred Thesiger and Millbury-Lewis. See Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellian-Jourdan, *The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World* (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 19-20.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁰ See also Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh az-Zakat*, 541.
- ⁴¹ <http://en.fgulen.com/conference-papers/gulen-conference-in-washington-dc/3102-islamic-himmah-and-christian-charity-an-attempt-at-inter-faith-dialogue.html>. (Accessed: March 16, 2010).
- ⁴² *Ibid.* See also M. Fethulla Gülen, *Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism*, translated by: Ali Ünal (Virginia: The Fountain, 1999), especially the concepts of *shukr* (thankfulness), *ihسان* (perfect goodness), and *faqr* and *ghina* (poverty and richness). See also Helen Rose Ebaugh, *The Gülen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam* (Dordrecht etc.: Springer, 2010), 65-81.
- ⁴³ Michael Bonner in Michael Bonner, Mine Ener, and Amy Singer (eds.), *Poverty and Charity*, 14 and 18.
- ⁴⁴ Timur Kuran, "Islamic Redistribution through *Zakat*: Historical record and Modern Realities," in Michael Bonner, Mine Ener, and Amy Singer (eds.), *Poverty and Charity*, 284-5.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 288
- ⁴⁶ Holger Weiss, "*Zakat* and the Question of Social Welfare: An Introductory Essay on Islamic Economics and Its Implication for Social Welfare," in Holger Weiss (ed.), *Social Welfare in Muslim Societies in Africa* (Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002), 7-38; Nejatullah Shiddiqi, "The Role of Voluntary Sector in Islam: A Conceptual Framework," and Muhammad Ariff, "Resources Mobilization Through Voluntary Sector in Southeast Asia" in Muhammad Ariff, (ed), *The Islamic Voluntary Sector*, 6-30 and 31-49; Mitsuo Nakamura (ed), *Islam and Civil Society in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2001), "Introduction", 1-31.
- ⁴⁷ The Qur'an says: "*Help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not one another in sin and rancour: fear Allah. For Allah is strict in punishment.*" (QS. Al-Maidah [5]: 2)
- ⁴⁸ Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellian Jourdan, *The Charitable Crescent*, 69-70.
- ⁴⁹ Rudiger Seesman, "Sufi Leaders and Social Welfare: Two Example from Contemporary Sudan," in Holger Weiss (ed), *Social Welfare in Muslim Societies in Africa*, 98-103; Knut S. Vikor, "Sufism and Social Welfare in the Saharan," in Holger Weiss (ed.), *Social Welfare in Muslim Societies in Africa* (Stockholm, Nordiska African Institute, 2002), 95-6.
- ⁵⁰ Jonathan Benthall, "Islamic Charities, Faith-Based organisations, and the International Aid System," and Julianne Smith and Natalia Filipiak, "Islamic Charities in Europe," in John B. Alterman and Karin von Hippel (eds.), *Understanding Islamic Charities* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 1-14 and 81-97.
- ⁵¹ In another part of his writings, Shihab mentions four types of *ukhuwwa: fi al-'ubudiyya* (brotherhood as God's creation), *fi al-insaniyya/bashariyya* (as human beings), *fi al-wamaniyya* (as a nation), and *fi al-din al-islami* (as a Muslim). See M. Quraish Shihab, *Membumikan Al-Qur'an: Fungsi dan Peran Wahyu dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat* (Bandung: Mizan, 1992). During the 28th Mukhtamar of Nahdlatul Ulama in Krapyak-Yogyakarta, the influential 'ulama, Achmad Siddiq, also mentioned three types of *ukhuwwa: ukhuwwa Islamiyya* (broth-

- erhood among fellow Muslims), *ukhuwwa bashariyya* (brotherhood among human beings at large), and *ukhuwwa wamaniyya* (brotherhood among the state's citizens). Ali Machan Moesa, *Nasionalisme Kyai: Konstruksi Sosial berbasis Agama* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2007), 263; also Syamsun Ni'am, *The Wisdom of KH. Achmad Siddiq* (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2009).
- ⁵² For further discussion of Islamic concept of 'right' and 'wrong' see Michael Cook, *Commanding Right Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge: The University of Cambridge, 2000)
- ⁵³ Meritorious works on charity practices by religious institutions include Ole Peter Grell and Andrew Cunningham (eds.), *Healthcare and Poor Relief in Protestant Europe: 1500-1700* (London & New York: Routledge, 1997); Anne Borsay and Peter Shapely (eds.), *Medicine, Charity and Mutual Aid: the Consumption of Health and Welfare in Britain, c.1550-1950* (Aldershot, Hampshire and England: Ashgate, 2007); in another social and political context see Amy Singer, *Constructing Ottoman Beneficence: An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem* (Albany: State University of New York, 2002); also Michael Bonner, Mine Ener, and Amy Singer (eds.), *Poverty and Charity*, especially chapter 2, "Institutions".
- ⁵⁴ Helmut K. Anheir and Diana Leat, *Creative Philanthropy: Toward a New Philanthropy for the Twenty-First Century* (London and New York: Roudledge, 2006), 4.
- ⁵⁵ Peter Frumkin, *Strategic Giving: The Art and Science of Philanthropy* (Chicago: the University of Chicago, 2006), 5.
- ⁵⁶ Peter Frumkin, *Strategic Giving*, 5-6.
- ⁵⁷ Angela M. Eikenberry, "Philanthropy Voluntary Organisation and Governance Beyond the State: Giving Circles, and Challenges for Democracy," *Administration and Society*, Vol. 39, No. 7 (2007), 860.
- ⁵⁸ Robert L. Payton and Michael P. Moody, *Understanding Philanthropy: Its Meaning and Mission* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2008), 27.
- ⁵⁹ NCRP (National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy), "Understanding Social Justice Philanthropy," April 2, 2003; Aileen Shaw, "Social Justice Philanthropy: An Overview," *The Synergos Institute*, August 5, 2002, 2; also Irfan Abu Bakar & Chaider S. Bamuallim (ed.), *Filantropi Islam dan Keadilan Sosial* (Jakarta: CSRC, 2006), 30-35.
- ⁶⁰ Helmut K. Anheir and Diana Leat, *Creative Philanthropy*, 5.
- ⁶¹ For further reading see Sheila Suess Kennedy and Wolfgang Bielefeld, *Charitable Choice at Work: Evaluating Faith-based Job Programs* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006)
- ⁶² Amani Kandil, "Civic Service in the Arab Region," *Non-profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, supplement Vol. 33, No. 4 (December 2004), 46S.
- ⁶³ Abdel-Rahman Ghandour, "Humanitarianism, Islam and the West: Contest or Cooperation," <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2582> (accessed 2008)
- ⁶⁴ Thomas Adam (ed.), *Philanthropy, Patronage and Civil Society: Experiences from Germany, Great Britain, and North America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 16.
- ⁶⁵ Thierry Kochuyt, "God, Gift, and Poor People: On Charity in Islam," *Social Encompass*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2009), 99-102.
- ⁶⁶ Janine A. Clark, *Charity and Activism: Middle-Class Network and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 146.

- ⁶⁷ Sami Zubaida, "Civil Society, Community and Democracy in the Middle East", in Sudipta Kaviraj & Sunil Khilnani (eds.) *Civil Society: History and Possibilities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 232-249.
- ⁶⁸ Egbert Hamrsen, *Islam, Civil Society and Social Work: Muslim Voluntary Welfare Society Associations in Jordan: Between Patronage and Empowerment* (Amsterdam & Leiden: Amsterdam University Press and ISIM, 2008), 69-72.
- ⁶⁹ Sheila Carapico, *Civil Society in Yemen: the Political Economy of Activism in Arabia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 60.
- ⁷⁰ Sheila Carapico, *Civil Society in Yemen*, 69-73.
- ⁷¹ Marie Juul Petersen, "For Humanity or for the Umma? Ideologies of Aid in Four Transnational Muslim NGOs," *PhD. Dissertation*, University of Copenhagen, 2011.
- ⁷² Holger Weiss, "Zakat and the Question of Social Welfare: An Introductory Essay on Islamic Economics and Its Implication for Social Welfare, in *Social Welfare in Muslim Societies*, 26-29.
- ⁷³ Wuthnow, *Saving America*, 20.
- ⁷⁴ Abdel-Rahman Ghandour, "Humanitarianism, Islam and the West."
- ⁷⁵ During the course of relief mission in Aceh after the 2004 Tsunami and in Padang following the 2009 earthquake, the Muhammadiyah and World Vision had made partnership to relieve suffering and run development and construction projects, such as building shelters, schools and orphanages. Interview with Sudibyo Markus, chairperson of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah and Director of Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center/MDMC (February 16, 2009), and with Jimmy Nadapdap, director of Humanitarian and Emergency-World Vision Indonesia (August 5, 2010).
- ⁷⁶ See J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Matthew Levitt, *HAMAS: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* (Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006).
- ⁷⁷ Jawad Hussain Qureshi, "Earthquake Jihad: the Role of Jihadists and Islamist Groups after the October 2005 Earthquake, *Humanitarian Exchange*, No. 34 (June 2006), 6-8.
- ⁷⁸ See for example, Abdullah Saeed, "The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Riba in Islam Revisited," *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 12: 4 (Winter 1995), 496-517; Charles Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy: the Challenge of Capitalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 124-33.
- ⁷⁹ In the context of the contemporary Arab world, see for example Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi', *Intellectual Origins*, 136.
- ⁸⁰ Muhammad Khalid Mas'ud, *Shatibi's Philosophy of Islamic Law* (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1995), 135.
- ⁸¹ Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Buti, *Dawabit al-Maslaha fi Shari'at al-Islam* (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 2005), 37; see also Mustafa Zaid, *al-Maslaha fi Tashri' al-Islamiyya wa Najmu al-Din al-Tufi* (Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi, 1964).
- ⁸² Muhammad Khalid Mas'ud, 130 and 151.
- ⁸³ See Armando Salvatore and Dale Eickelman, *Public Islam and the Common Good* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2006), xii.

- ⁸⁴ Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Ghazali, *al-Mustasfa min 'Ilm al-'Usul* (Bulaq, 1905).
- ⁸⁵ 'Abd al-'Aziz b. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'id, *al-ijtihād wa Ri'iyat al-Maslaha wa Dar`u al-Mafsada fi Shari`at al-Islamiyya* (Riyad: al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al-Su'udiyya, 1984), 44; Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan al-Buti, *Dawabit al-Maslaha fi Shari`at al-Islam*, 37.
- ⁸⁶ Armando Salvatore, *The Public Sphere*, 117.
- ⁸⁷ Charles Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy*, 119.
- ⁸⁸ Ole Peter Grell and Andrew Cunningham (eds.), *Healthcare and Poor Relief in Protestant Europe: 1500-1700* (London: & New York: Routledge, 1997).
- ⁸⁹ <http://islamlib.com/en/article/interfaith-statement-concerning-humanitarian-work-in-aceh/> (Accessed August 31, 2010)
- ⁹⁰ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7535-2005Jan13.html> (Accessed August 31, 2010).
- ⁹¹ Phillip John Eldridge, *Non-Government organisations*, 178.
- ⁹² Amani Kandil, "Civic Service in the Arab Region," 42S
- ⁹³ Hossam Said, "Faith-based organisations as Political, Humanitarian or Religious Actors: An Islamic Perspective," in *Proceeding Workshop on Faith-Based organisations as Political, Humanitarian or Religious Actors May 18-19 2005*, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, 44.
- ⁹⁴ Johan Hendrik Meuleman, "Dakwah, Competition for Authority and Development," *Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land- en Volkenkunde*, Vol. 167, No. 2-3 (2011), 236-269; see also QS. An-Nahl (16): 125.
- ⁹⁵ See the introductory section, where I discussed the term *jihad fi sabilillah* and its meanings.
- ⁹⁶ *Republika*, 3 Oktober 2003.
- ⁹⁷ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh az-Zakat*, 416-7; Muzammil Siddiqi, "Zakat for *Dakwah* and Public Welfare Programme," <http://www.islamicity.com/Articles/articles.asp?ref=IC0212-1797> (Accessed: May 30, 2010); see also Tawfique Chowdhury, "The Permissibility of Zakat for Islamic *Dakwah* organisations: A Detailed Analysis," <http://muslimmatters.org/2007/10/24/the-permissibility-of-zakat-for-islamic-dawah-organisations-a-detailed-analysis/>. (Accessed: May 30, 2010). Tawfique Chowdhury is the director of Mercy Mission and Al-Kauthar Institute.
- ⁹⁸ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh az-Zakat*, 322.
- ⁹⁹ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh az-Zakat*, 325. It should also be noted that some classical Islamic scholars held different views about the categories of *fi sabilillah*, as well as about the extent to which 'those fighting in the way of God' are able (or not able) to receive *zakat*. Some 'ulama came to the conclusion that Muslims who are involved in the war in the way of god, but at the same time receive sufficient salary from their offices, do not deserve *zakat* funds. Imam Abu Hanafi for example, emphasises that troops who fight in the way of God do not deserve *zakat* funds unless they are poor (*la yu'ta al-ghazi fi sabilillah illa idha kana faqiran*). See Wahba al-Zuhayli, *Fiqh al-Islam wa Adillatuh, al-Juz al-thani* (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1996), 874.
- ¹⁰⁰ See Martin van Bruinessen, "Development and Islamic Charities," *ISIM Review*, 20 (Autumn 2007), 5; Jonathan Benthall, "The Overreaction against Islamic charities," *ISIM Review*, 20 (Autumn 2007), 6-7.
- ¹⁰¹ See David Little, "Religion, Conflict and Peace," *Proceeding Workshop on Faith-Based*

organisations as *Political, Humanitarian or Religious Actors*, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, May 18-19, 2005, 13.

- ¹⁰² See Anniseh Van Engeland, "The Differences and Similarities between International Humanitarian Law and Islamic Humanitarian Law: Is there Ground for Reconciliation," *Journal of Islamic Law and Culture*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (April 2008), 81-99; also Abdel-Rahman Ghandour, "Humanitarianism, Islam and the West: contest or cooperation," <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2582> (accessed 2008).
- ¹⁰³ David P. Forsythe and Barbara Ann J. Rieffer-Flanagan, *The International Committee of the Red Cross: A Neutral Humanitarian Actor* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 65.
- ¹⁰⁴ See for example, Maike Kaag, "Aid, Umma and Politics: Transnational Islamic NGOs in Chad," in Benjamin F. Soares and Renè Otayek, *Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 85-102.

Charities, the Public Good and Islamic Activism

Introduction

One of the intriguing challenges in Muslim societies in an era of nation states is the question of whether Islam can provide an adequate welfare system that can meet the needs of society at large. Muslim thinkers and activists have endeavoured to answer this question by, among other things, referring to early Islamic literature and formulating a theoretical framework to underpin Muslim visions on welfare. Over the decades, Muslim thinkers and political activists in Indonesia have also made great efforts and formulated contrasting proposals to translate principles of Islamic faith into a means of promoting public welfare, eradicating poverty and relieving shortages, as well as fostering democracy in the social, economic and political spheres. Some key normative concepts in Islamic literature, such as benevolent acts, public welfare and social justice are beginning to be re-examined, reinterpreted and re-conceptualised, so as to be relevant to the current needs of society at large.

Over the past two decades, Islamic charities have become increasingly popular among Indonesian Muslims, and the number of Islamic philanthropic and mutual aid foundations in Indonesia has grown rapidly. The enduring practice of giving in Indonesian Islam and the dynamics of Muslim intellectual discourse on the position of religion in the interplay between the state

and society seem to have been instrumental to current Islamic activism in general, and the expansion of the Muslim NGO sector in particular. In the Muslim world, there has been a paradigm shift and a change in methods of paying, collecting, and redistributing *zakat* in the era of the modern nation state. As a sort of fiscal system, the implementation of Islamic tax practices requires that a comprehensive 'Islamic order' is attached to the social-economic and political system as a whole. Yet, in the new era of nation states, Muslim awareness of the notion of 'moral-economy' based on the ethical commands of Islam, such as the circulation and redistribution of wealth, social justice and mutual responsibility, is also constrained by and must negotiate with the current non-religiously inspired economic and political systems being espoused by states.

Portraying the development of the Muslim NGO sector and philanthropic activism in contemporary Indonesia, this chapter explores the ways in which Muslim intellectuals, politicians, and social activists are translating the Islamic faith in the era of the nation state. With more than two hundred million Muslims, one should not be surprised to discover Islamic culture embedded in Indonesian society, for Islam has become deeply intertwined with Indonesia's social, economic and political life. In certain areas, local social customs are heavily influenced by Islam, and so are certain political and economic institutions. Still, Islamic order is not the dominant social economic and political factor shaping Indonesia's social-political landscape as a whole.¹ The intricate relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia was and has often been shaped by questions about what sort of political ideologies and welfare systems are appropriate for Indonesia, as the world's largest Muslim country.

Indonesia: the Socio-Political and Economic Setting

Islam and Socio-Political Change: 1940s-1960s

Immediately after the declaration of Indonesian Independence on 17 August 1945 by Soekarno (d. 1970) and Mohammad Hatta (d. 1980), Indonesian leaders sought a suitable system that could capture people's euphoria over independence.. As in other newly-born states, the founding fathers of

the Republic of Indonesia struggled to discover and implement an ideal political system. The Soekarno era, which has come to be referred to as *Orde Lama* (the Old Order, 1945-1966), witnessed several dramatic political changes. During the course of the formation of the state constitution, there was tension between Muslim politicians and secular nationalists over the draft of the preamble of the constitution, which is also known as *Piagam Jakarta* (the Jakarta Charter). Muslim and secular nationalists disagreed about the draft formula, which stated that the state would be based on belief in One God and ‘the obligation to carry out Islamic law for the adherents of Islam.’ The secular nationalists refused to accept those words, publicly known as ‘the seven words’, which, according to them, were not in accordance with the spirit of a pluralistic Indonesian society.²

The efforts of the founding fathers in the Soekarno era led Indonesia to institute a democratic experiment by applying different political systems, such as those of ‘parliamentary democracy’ (1950-1959) and ‘guided democracy’ (1959-1965). These two democratic systems collapsed, while at the same time a number of Muslim politicians, led by Mohammad Natsir, the leader of the Masyumi party, remained true to their Islamic political agenda. Through the Masyumi, the leading political vehicle of the Modernists in the 1950s, Natsir implanted his political thought and vision. He believed that an Islamic welfare system could only be implemented to the extent that the state system had been adapted to Islamic teaching.³ Despite the fact that Natsir became the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia in the Soekarno era, he struggled to enshrine Islam as the basis of the state. Nevertheless, Natsir’s struggle for an Islamic state was ineffective, and he was to undergo a bitter experience under the Soekarno authoritarian regime. As an expression of his disagreement with the Soekarno leadership, Natsir joined the ‘rebellion’ movement *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (PRRI—the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia), to compete with the central government under President Soekarno and Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawinata. Natsir’s political manoeuvre caused him to be sent to prison for several years.⁴

In 1967, General Soeharto (d. 2008) took power from Soekarno, and

began to establish a new regime, which is referred to as *Orde Baru* (the New Order, 1967-1998). The main objective of the New Order was to restore the Indonesian nation by ensuring political stability and fostering economic growth. To ensure the stability of national politics, General Soeharto's government drew heavily on military support, eradicating the influence of the Old Order regime and exterminating communist ideology. With strong military support, Soeharto became an undefeated political figure and his style of government led the New Order to become an authoritarian regime. Apart from this, as a means of prioritising political stability, Soeharto also endeavoured to greatly limit the influence of Islamic ideology over the state political system. Natsir, as the most prominent Islamic political leader at that time, was released from jail during the Soeharto era, but his political party, Masyumi, was not allowed to be revived. Soeharto's political strategy for maintaining power can also be seen in the fusion of political parties. In 1975, he enacted a law through which he imposed the fusion of political parties, and at the same time he legitimised Golkar (*Golongan Karya*) as his political vehicle.⁵ Muslim political parties were fused into the Union Development Party (PPP), while Christians, Nationalist and leftist parties were merged under the umbrella of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Therefore, only two political parties and Golkar (*Golongan Karya*) participated in the 1975 general election.

Soeharto's severe, authoritarian regime⁶ caused an increase in dissatisfaction and opposition among several interest groups, both inside and outside the regime. One important expression of protest from elite circles was the so-called Petition of Fifty, signed by 50 retired generals, senior politicians and social activists in 1982. The Fifty Petitioners included Mohammad Natsir (ex-Masyumi), Lieutenant General Ali Sadikin (d. 2008, the former governor of DKI Jakarta), and Kasman Singademejo (d. 1982, another Masyumi politician and former Minister of Justice). Their concerns about democratisation and the increasingly authoritarian leadership in Indonesia were expressed in the *Pernyataan Keprihatinan* ('Statement of Concern'), which was signed on 1 May 1980. Other 'critical groups', represented by NGOs that resisted the regime in different ways, also arose in the 1970s, organised by students, intel-

lectuals, social activists and political leaders. An active student movement at the end of the 1970s, in particular, caused the government to depoliticise university campuses.⁷

Under Soeharto's authoritarian regime, some Muslim interest and political groups, including student movements, shifted the emphasis of their activities from politics in the strict sense to forms of social activism labelled '*dakwah*'.⁸ Soeharto's strict political attitude towards political Islam caused Muslim leaders to channel and transform their political energy in two different streams. Some Muslim political leaders, including Mohammad Natsir, 'decided to devote their energies to *dakwah* rather than politics in the traditional sense'⁹. Others preferred to fuse with the ruling party, becoming patrons of the New Order regime. In 1967, Mohammad Natsir founded DDII (Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication), supported mainly by ex-Masyumi activists. Natsir's activism on *dakwah* gained support from modernist Muslims, notably PERSIS. Thanks to Natsir's international exposure and widespread networks with many international Islamic associations, notably *Rabitah 'Alam Islami* (the World Muslim League), DDII became influential among Indonesian Muslims.¹⁰ In local politics, DDII appeared modest, although its voice effectively resonated in response to international political affairs involving Muslim communities, and in response to the Christian missionary movement in Indonesia. The types of DDII activities included a 'reislamisation' process of nominal Muslims in main cities through educational activities and *tabligh* (preaching), as well as despatching *da'i* (preachers) to assist new converts living in non-Muslim majority regions or on the outer islands.

Authors have argued that the marginalisation of political Islam in Indonesia under the early New Order administration resulted in the coagulation of Islamic 'radicalism' at the grassroots, and more tactical, if not pragmatic, formal political activism.¹¹ This view does preserve the way in which institutional transformation and paradigm shifts among Muslim political leaders intensified during the New Order, becoming either 'apolitical' *dakwah* groups, underground militant groups, or pragmatic political activists. And yet, I would argue that the authoritarian regime also resulted in the escalation of 'social Islam' or 'Islamic social activism', which, in this respect, can be defined as

religiously-inspired, morally-driven, and perhaps politically-oriented Islamic outreach activism, whose task it is to make Islam more grounded in—and socially more beneficial for—the community.¹²

The Shift in the New Order's Politics: 1980s-1990s

The New Order regime took a firm political stance, under which political Islam remained on the periphery. Despite endeavours to enshrine Islam as the basis of the state ideology in the Soeharto era, Muslim political groups had to face the New Order's de-politicisation of Islam through the insertion of the *Pancasila* as a 'Single Ideology' (*Azas Tunggal*) into all social and political organisations in Indonesia in the mid-1980s. Mass organisations and Islamic student movements were hardly affected by this policy, for their response to it varied and, to a greater extent, caused disagreements.¹³ Under strong pressure from the regime, *Pancasila* was finally accepted by some Islamic associations, such as the Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and PERSIS, and enshrined in their organisational constitution. PII (the Indonesian Student Association) showed resistance, but the largest Islamic university student association, HMI, split into two groups, namely 'HMI DIPO' (DIPO stands for 'Dipenogoro', the name of the street where HMI's office is located) and 'HMI-MPO' (*Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi*—

Assembly of the Savoir of the Organisation). The former, HMI DIPO, adopted *Pancasila* as their organisational basis, while the latter continued to use Islam as their ideological basis. Therefore, HMI-MPO was considered an 'illegal' organisation by the government.

At the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, university campuses were instrumental in underpinning social and political activism among students and social activists. A wide spectrum of ideological standpoints have characterised student movements in Indonesia. Social theorists and progressive thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci, Paulo Freire, and other leftist thinkers and advocates of 'liberation theology' influenced student activists as they formed their resistance to the regime. Some of these student activists publicly voiced their resentment towards the regime and became advocates of development and movement NGOs. Likewise, progressive Muslim thinkers and political

ideologists in other parts of the Muslim world, such as As-Siba'i of Syria, Sayyid Qutb of Egypt and Abul A'la al-Maududi of Pakistan, who believe in the superiority of Islam (*al-Islam ya'lu wa la yu'la 'alayh*), also greatly influenced Muslim activists in Indonesia. Partly as the result of the Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Iran, Muslim activists also became acquainted with the thought of Iranian thinkers, such as Ali Shariati and Imam Khomeini.¹⁴ Moreover, Islamic *dakwah* flourished on campus, focusing on the study of the religion of Islam inside universities through *halqah* (study groups) and social activities. These student movements expanded their networks and the scope of their activities through campus-based mosques. The movements dealt not only with domestic issues, but also paid attention to international politics, such as the Middle East conflicts and the Balkan wars.

It is evident that the economic achievements of the New Order in the 1970s and 1980s, partly as a result of the 'oil boom', contributed considerably to the rise of a new Indonesian Muslim middle class that played a pivotal role in strengthening Muslims' social and political activism in the post-Soeharto era. With a 'developmentalist ideology', President Soeharto had brought Indonesia a better life economically, at least compared with the previous regime. The rapid economic development, especially in Java, and the establishment of both national and multinational companies in many regions, as well as the production of large agricultural product surpluses, resulted in unprecedented economic development. Due to this incredibly rapid economic growth, Indonesia was labelled a new Asian 'tiger economy'.

In view of this, more opportunities were opened for Indonesian societies to benefit from this economic development and to receive modern education, notably at higher education institutions. Muslim families residing both in rural and urban areas also gained access to better education, enrolling their children in state or private universities to learn wide-ranging subjects, such as the arts, sciences, engineering, agriculture, and religion. Yet, the number of people who benefitted from this economic growth was limited, because wealth only circulated among a few people. The New Order regime had failed in its effort to base its economic project on so-called 'trickle-down policies', under which it is expected that a broader part of the population can

attain the wealth circulating among the elites.¹⁵ Rather than establishing an economic equilibrium, the New Order was perceived as creating a new economic and social gap among different parts of society, and between rural and urban areas, as well as between Java and the other major islands.

The modernisation of educational institutions, along with rapid economic growth, caused the birth a new Muslim middle class, which occupies various strategic positions in both the bureaucracy and private corporations. At the same time, some of the members of the new middle class remain active in a religious sense, and have even organised religious gatherings in their workplaces. The networks among the Muslim middle class, especially those working in government or private institutions, have been essential in the flourishing of social activism organised by Muslim charitable foundations. In the 1980s, despite the fact that most major businesses remained in the hands of Chinese entrepreneurs who had close ties to the regime and corrupt bureaucracy, small and medium-scale economic enterprises were still run by *pribumi* (indigenous entrepreneurs). This political and economic situation resulted in a move among local Muslim elites working in the bureaucracy, some of whom were university graduates and ex-student activists, to revitalise Indonesia's socio-political-economy using an Islamic framework.¹⁶

In the 1990s, a significant political shift took place in Indonesia as Soeharto began implementing a new strategy to placate political Islam. Realising that his political power was no longer as strong as it had been in the 1980s, Soeharto turned 'Islam' into a new driving force to preserve his power. At that juncture, the most prominent example of Soeharto's shift toward political Islam was his approval of the formation of the Indonesian Muslim intellectual association (ICMI), which was followed by the appointment of his vice president Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie (b. 1936-) as the ICMI's chairman. At that time, the ICMI functioned not only as a space within which 'Muslim intellectuals' could share their concerns about social, economic and political issues, but also as a means for structural political mobilisation.¹⁷ The ICMI, to borrow an expression from Adam Schwartz, is a 'hybrid organisation' whose members include 'critical non-governmental Muslim leaders and long-serving cabinet members.'¹⁸ Despite the fact other observers argue that the rise

of the ICMI had little to do with Soeharto's political agenda, but rather with the dynamic processes taking place among middle-class Muslims¹⁹ or with a long continuum of Islamic intellectual movements Indonesia,²⁰ what is obvious is that Islam appeared to be a rather determinant factor in the social, economic, and political domain at that time, as shown by the public appearance of Islamic groups. Apart from this, a significant number of cabinet members, along with more politically independent Muslim scholars, became active members of the ICMI.²¹ The establishment of the ICMI was a momentous political moment, essential to the formation of a new pattern of social and political activism among the Muslim community in Indonesia at large.

Crisis, Inequality, and Islamic Capitalism

Unsteady economic growth in the 1980s, which was not underpinned by an adequate fiscal system or fundamentally strong economy, resulted in an unprecedented economic crisis in 1997, which then caused the fall of the New Order regime in 1998. The crises also caused the government and society to become very vulnerable to instability, insecurity, disintegration, and horizontal conflict. Many companies and banks closed down and the domestic monetary system was no longer under government control, resulting in the dramatic fall of the Indonesian Rupiah against the US dollar. In short, the 1997 financial crisis in Southeast Asia had an overwhelming impact on the social and political landscape of Indonesia. At the grassroots level, people suffered more economic hardship than ever, and the number of unemployed, as estimated in some reports, increased considerably.²² It is under these circumstances that religion, with its notions of giving, benevolent acts, doing good, Islamic solidarity, brotherhood and mutual help, found its voice and, in turn, underwent a revival. In particular, charitable foundations and newly formed *zakat* agencies attempted to reframe their participation in social activism and to reinforce traditional Islamic giving practices with an organised platform.

Quite contrary to the New Order regime's attitude of resistance to so-called 'political Islam', Islamic economic institutions, such as Islamic banks

and Islamic savings and loan cooperatives (*Baitul Mal wa al-Tamwil*—BMT) could grow, and these institutions provided means for Muslim communities to expand small and medium-sized economic enterprises during and after the financial crisis. In the grassroots, the operations of BMTs became increasingly widespread among the lower-middle class.²³ Although the progress of Islamic banks at that time was not as advanced as in the Reformasi era (starting in 1998), it was reported that during the crisis, Islamic banks, with their ‘profit-sharing system’ instead of ‘interest system’, escaped liquidation.²⁴ In the Indonesian context, the term utilised to signify an Islamic financial or profit-sharing institution is ‘*Bank Syari’ah*’ (Shari’a Banks). Applying a non-interest based financial system, Islamic banks have underpinned, conceptually and practically, the development of Islamic charities. Scholars have argued that the basic concept of *zakat* contradicts usury (*riba*),²⁵ and among some Muslim scholars, ‘usury’ is seen as ‘a factor that aggravates inequalities,’²⁶ which undermines the principles of social justice. Although modern and contemporary ‘*ulama* (religious scholars) have distinguished between prohibited usury and interest regulated by political authority (government), public understanding in Indonesia, especially among the Muslim middle class, ‘*ulama* and Islamic organisations, at least at a discursive level, has increasingly supported Islamic banks.²⁷

The Shari’a banks, which are under the supervision of the Bank of Indonesia (BI), utilise various Islamic terms in their transaction and accounting systems, such as *mudaraba* (profit-sharing), *murabaha* (cost plus), *musharaka* (joint venture), *ijara* (leasing), *al-qard al-hasan* (benevolent loan). Shari’a banks have become one, but not the only, venue where charitable foundations deposit their money. This is because Islamic banks are still ‘marginal players’ in the banking area, and therefore a number of *zakat* agencies that enthusiastically promote Islamic financial institutions also support conventional banks. It is still very common for Indonesian Muslims to use both conventional and Islamic banking at the same time. Apart from this, Shari’a banks have included *zakat*, in addition to conventional tax, as a sort of taxation scheme,²⁸ and so unsurprisingly Islamic banks in the Muslim World, especially in the Gulf countries, are instrumental in financing charitable projects.²⁹ Predict-

ably, a number of *zakat* agencies in Indonesia are supported by Shari'a banks. Community-based *zakat* agencies, as discussed previously, also create micro-financing projects in order to deal with the economic problems that people face at the grassroots level. For that reason, several financial institutions, such as cooperatives and BMTs, have been established through *zakat* agencies. These BMTs have become an 'attractive alternative to illegal money lenders'³⁰ and cater for low-income families and communities that larger banks, either Islamic or conventional, cannot reach.³¹

The utilisation of Islamic banks and micro-financial institutions cannot be neglected in a discussion of the development of Islamic charities, for the pattern followed by benefactors channelling their money to *zakat* agencies marks a change from conventional giving practice. Money transfer has gone from being conducted by means of money carried by hand, although this practice still exists, to transfers via inter-bank wire-transfer and SMS (short message service) mobile phone transfer. This is in line with the change in the type of benefactors who pay *zakat* and *sedekah*, especially in major cities, which are no longer restricted to individuals but also institutions.

There has been a shift in the pattern and development of the basic concept of giving within Muslim societies. New nomenclatures and types of *zakat* and *waqf*, for instance, have begun to be formulated or at least revitalised, such as *zakat* on salary (*zakat profesi*),³² *zakat* on corporate wealth (*zakat perusahaan*)³³ and cash endowment (*waqf al-nuqud*).³⁴ Due to this, the fundraising system within *zakat* agencies has been modernised, and the latter now target wealthy families and big corporations. Consequently, community-based *zakat* agencies often design comprehensive project proposals to attract large funds from wealthy families and companies, instead of simply placing a charity box (*kotak amal*) in places of worship. *Zakat* agencies aim for a public image as professional institutions with well-trained staff who are able to communicate with prospective benefactors, with excellently laid-out strategically positioned offices, and with suitable accounting systems. In short, because *zakat* agencies manage public funds, and trust remains essential when dealing with their benefactors, good *zakat* governance has therefore become one of the main current concerns of community-based *zakat* agencies.

Intellectual Discourse and State Policies

Questions about Welfare and Justice

As discussed previously, Muslim thinkers, social activists, and political ideologists in the Muslim world have tried to propose particular Islamic concepts in order to deal with social, economic and political issues in modern nation states. Keeping the political dynamics and socio-economic situation in Indonesia from the late 1960s until the mid-1980s in mind, social activists became increasingly concerned about questions about welfare and justice. A number of key concepts are utilised in Muslim societies to promote public welfare, such as social justice, mutual help and solidarity. It is worth emphasising that although Indonesia is far from the 'axis' of 'Islamic civilisation,' Indonesia is undoubtedly the largest Muslim country in the world. Scholarly debates on particular concepts in Islamic literature have contributed profoundly to the evolution of ideas and praxis in Indonesian Muslim groups, in their dealing with public welfare. Innovation in Muslim legal thought represents one of the rigorous efforts made by Islamic scholars and social activists in Indonesia to translate Islamic *shari'a* for the modern world. In a later section below, I will examine ideas on justice and welfare formulated by Muslim intellectuals and look at how their reflections and opinions impacted the dynamics of Islamic social activism organised by Islamic associations.

In the New Order era, Muslim thinkers demonstrated remarkable achievements in presenting new formulas for Indonesian Islam at both the discursive and practical levels. Since the 1970s and 1980s, public welfare has become one of the major themes attracting Muslim intellectuals and social activists, and their social concern (*syu'un ijtima'iyah*) has increased in response to the social and political currents.³⁵ In particular, the theme of social justice has been voiced by Islamic scholars, both modernists and traditionalists, as a means of promoting and disseminating various relevant concepts for social change, such as 'social piety', meaning the translation of Islam into reality by giving emphasis to the Islamic social welfare system. The term 'social *fiqh*' or 'social piety' seems to have become a generic term, with some modifications, employed by Islamic scholars to show their social concern. For example, the modernist M. Amien Rais used the concept of *Tauhid* ('the Oneness of God')

as a point of departure to analyse the concept of social justice. His deep concern about the sharp disparity between the haves and the have-nots in the New Order era compelled him to utilise the ideas of social justice as a discursive centre.³⁶ He introduced what he termed *Tauhid sosial* (the formulation of social aspects of the Islamic doctrines of monotheism), under which he attempted to reformulate how the Islamic belief system can contribute to the social development process and the welfare of society.³⁷

Amien Rais is a political scientist at Gadjah Mada University who has been active in the Muhammadiyah since he was a student in the 1970s. He wrote about the Islamist political movement of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt for his dissertation at the University of Chicago in 1980. In the early 1990s, Rais became a public intellectual, and his statement on the succession of the national leadership, a very sensitive issue in the Soeharto era, generated public discussion and debate, and at the same time led him to be among the vanguard of the opposition. Apart from his critical attitude toward the regime, he came over as a Muslim activist with a strong awareness of how poorly Muslims were represented in the economic and political spheres.³⁸ Rais later became Muhammadiyah's chairman and a prominent politician after the fall of Soeharto.

It is unsurprising that Rais addressed structural issues of poverty and justice. Rais seems to have been acquainted with the thought of progressive and revolutionary Muslim thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb and Ali Shari'ati, to whom Rais, as indicated in his writings, often referred in formulating notions of Islam and social justice. To him, the roots of social and economic inequality in Indonesia stem from the state's unjust policies and the absence of the state's political will. Islam, in Rais' view, is a religion which advocates social justice. Good Muslims, therefore, should become 'troublemakers' if they have witnessed unjust social, economic and political systems. Being involved in the promotion of justice and equality and being critical of unjust political structures are, according to him, in accordance with *Tauhid* principles.³⁹ To him, social welfare and justice are basically the responsibility of the government, and in this respect Muslim intellectuals can play their part in the promotion of social justice and of a welfare system by being critical of govern-

ment policies, as well as by empowering society.⁴⁰ Rais seems to believe that social change can be effected by intellectuals and educated people. Rais explores Qur'anic notions which illustrate the relationship between the oppressors or exploiters and the oppressed, which in the Qur'an is represented by Moses' rebellion against the Pharaoh.⁴¹ The Pharaoh, in this sense, represents the state, economists and technocrats, while Moses is metaphorically the personification of the believers, Muslim intellectuals, and the grassroots. In his argument, Rais calls for Muslim intellectuals and those at the grassroots level to make a stand against the oppressors.⁴²

The American-educated public intellectual, Moeslim Abdurrahman (d. 2012), refers to social justice in the same sense. He took part in intellectual activism with young Muhammadiyah and NU activists, and drew attention to the interface between Islam and welfare. By exposing 'transformative Islam' as a main issue, Abdurrahman conceives of Islam as an intellectual instrument for social criticism and as a resource to advocate on behalf of those who are often structurally neglected by state policies, such as poor farmers, labourers, and sailors. Having been involved in the promotion of Islamic modernism through the Muhammadiyah, in spite of his close contact with the traditionalists, he is concerned with the need to highlight the Islamic concept of social justice by building awareness among Muslim elites and intellectuals of the problems and hardships faced by most people in the grassroots.⁴³ In expressing his social concerns, Moeslim Abdurrahman frequently criticises Muslim elites, who are often trapped in religious symbolism while at the same time fail to notice the essence of the liberation principles of Islamic precepts. He also criticises Muslim intellectuals' acrobatic manoeuvres in formulating Islamic theological discourse, which has stimulated heated public debate about religious pluralism and liberalism, without showing strong commitment to social justice. Often in his writings, he addresses the increase in the number of affluent middle-class Muslims who seem to have created kinds of religious rituals, but who lack discourse on how to translate the progressive values of Islam.

Jalaluddin Rakhmat (b. 1949-) is another leading personality whose access to early Islamic literature made him aware of the social justice issue. Although

he grew up in a Muslim modernist family, and was even active in the Muhammadiyah in the 1980s, Rakhmat's religious thought was and has been heavily influenced by Shi'i intellectual heritage and tradition.⁴⁴ He has written articles in which he often refers to Iranian Muslim thinkers, or Shi'i 'Ulama so to speak, in constructing his ideas—and arguments—about the necessity of advocating on behalf of the oppressed. According to Rakhmat, Islam considers poverty to be an effect of an unjust social system, of a lack of social solidarity, and of individuality and egocentricity. Therefore, Rakhmat believes that poverty is a social problem that can only be overcome through collective social action, and that Muslims are not supposed to consider poverty simply as an individual matter. To define the segments of society to which Muslims can provide different types and states of assistance, Rakhmat employs two contrary terms, the freemen (*al-hurr*) and slaves (*al-'ibad*), as can be found in Arab societies, especially in the era of the prophet Muhammad. He also refers to the rich (*al-aghniya*) and the needy (*al-fuqara*), terms which relate to property ownership, as well as the strong (*al-mala'*) and the weak (*al-du'afa'*), which relate to power and politics. In this regard, the Prophet Muhammad acted as a liberator of the weak from oppression,⁴⁵ meaning that profound social change requires collective and political effort.

Many Muslim jurists and theologians have pointed out that Islam or the *shari'a* should and will always be suited to the needs of the *umma* (Islamic community) in every time and place (*li kulli al-zaman wa al-makan*) if the *umma* are able to grasp the objectives or the essence of Islamic law (*maqasid al-shari'a*), which is to promote the common good (*al-maslaha al-'amma*). Public welfare in the social, economic, or political spheres can be regarded as one form of what is often called *maslaha* (Arabic) or *kemaslahatan* (Ind.). Some Indonesian Muslim thinkers and reformists, like Nurcholish Madjid (d. 2005) of the Paramadina Foundation, Ahmad Azhar Basyir (d. 1994) of the Muhammadiyah, Munawar Khalil (d. 1961) of the Nahdlatul 'Ulama and Munawir Syadzali (d. 2004), have also utilised the concept of *maslaha*, either implicitly or explicitly, as a sort of theoretical premise to underpin their ideas about Indonesian Islam. Some of the above-mentioned Muslim thinkers fall into what scholars have recently termed liberal-progressive or modernist-pro-

gressive, in some way opposed to the ‘scripturalists’.⁴⁶

The late Nurcholish Madjid reintroduced the notion of Islamic renewal (*pembaruan*) in Indonesia by placing emphasis on *ijtihad*. He frequently refers to the endeavours of the second Caliph (successor of the Prophet) ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab whose innovation in Islamic legal thought represents the earliest progressive Muslim efforts to conceptualise the essence of Islamic teachings and envisage the objectives of *shari’a* in facing new and complex problems in society. Madjid is also renowned for his outstanding reading of classical Islamic literature, contextualised in contemporary debates on religious pluralism and political Islam.⁴⁷ While Madjid was highly praised by his admirers, especially those with a reformist inclination, for his achievements and profound effort in promoting Islamic renewal, he also attracted bitter criticism from both right-wing Muslims who saw Madjid’s notions as ‘too liberal’, and leftist Muslim activists who regarded Madjid’s ideas as ‘too elitist’ and very much oriented towards the upper-middle class. Nevertheless, among younger Muslim activists, Madjid’s ideas remain influential in the Islamic intellectual movement and social activism. As summarised by Martin van Bruinessen, ‘the role of provocative, innovative, and liberating thinker and broker of ideas that he (Nurcholish Madjid-*author*) played for his own generation is now played by a highly varied group of younger men and women, in various institutions, NGOs and informal networks.’⁴⁸

M. Dawan Rahardjo, a leading Muslim intellectual and activist, became one of the pioneers of the proliferation of development NGOs among Indonesian Muslims. His encounters with contemporary young Muslim activists in Yogyakarta in the 1960s, in the HMI or other study circles, acquainted him with Islamic modernist notions. With a background in economic science, Rahardjo’s treatment of welfare differed from that of the Muslim thinkers above, for Rahardjo seems to have taken more concrete and strategic steps in realising his vision of how to empower Muslim societies in the grassroots. His expertise in economics, his social concerns, and his widespread links with Islamic institutions in the grassroots enabled him to expand the NGO sector in Muslim societies. Together with his contemporaries, who have been culturally and politically linked to the Masyumi and PNI, Rahardjo

set up the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information (LP3ES), which became one of the first-generation national Indonesian NGOs. This NGO developed a strong discourse on ‘developmentalism’ by engaging in grassroots activities.

Relating Justice and Welfare to Philanthropic Themes

The way in which Muslim communities translate *shari'a* or carry out the objectives of Islamic law in reality is often, if not always, varied. The vivid intellectual discourse on welfare among Muslim intellectuals has been instrumental in strengthening the Muslim vision on welfare and justice themes. The types of activism that Indonesian Muslims have engaged in are as varied as their religious, social and cultural backgrounds. If we look at the activities of the above-mentioned personalities, we see that they used intellectualism as a tool to promote social change and transformation. What is interesting is that intellectual discourses on justice and welfare seem to have impacted greatly on Muslim conceptions of *zakat* and *sedekah* in Indonesian Islam as a whole. Innovation in legal thought on *zakat*, for example, is one of the most observable facts. Intellectual discourse has also led to the development of a Muslim perspective on defining and categorising the poor and the oppressed segments of society that Muslims are willing to help.

As regards innovation in Muslim legal thought on *zakat*, Amien Rais made the notion of *zakat* on salary publicly known. The notion of *zakat profesi* (*zakat* on incomes) is derived from a Muslim conception of *al-mal al-mustafad*, which means wages earned regularly by an individual. This concept had earlier been discussed by Islamic scholars such as Ahmad Hasan (d. 1958), a much respected *ulama* of PERSIS, and Muhammad Hasby ash-Shiddieqy (d. 1975), a professor of Islamic law at the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta. These two personalities have produced an extensive body of work on Islamic jurisprudence and have become the axis of reference for subsequent generations in the field of *fiqh* development among Indonesian Muslims, especially among the modernists. One of the intriguing issues regarding *zakat* proposed by Hasan and Shiddieqy is *al-mal al-mustafad*, a concept which relates to property and regular income (salary and wages).

They questioned and re-examined the meaning of *al-mal al-mustafad* or *zakat* on earnings, and whether or not *zakat* on *al-mal al-mustafad* can be paid without the requirement of the passing of one year (*hawl*).⁴⁹

As noted previously, Muslims who possess a minimum level of savings after one year are obliged to pay *zakat*, according to Islamic norms. Yet, for agricultural products, *zakat* is paid immediately after the harvest. The concept of *hawl* therefore becomes a core concept discussed by Indonesian 'ulama during the course of defining *zakat* on salary, which in practice is now mainly paid monthly. It appears that Hasan and Shiddiqy share a similar notion that *zakat* on *al-mal al-mustafad* should be paid after one year (*hawl*). What is interesting is that their conclusions on *al-mal al-mustafad*, which was formulated in the 1950s and 1960s, differed from those of major Islamic organisations in Indonesia, such as the Muhammadiyah, which in fact accepted the ideas of *zakat* on earnings in the 1990s, or the NU, which has not yet officially recognised and practiced *zakat* on earnings.⁵⁰

The notion of *zakat* on *al-mal al-mustafad* discussed by Hassan and Shiddiqy in the 1950s and 1960s seems to have become a key concept shaping the discourse on *zakat* mobilisation during and after New Order Indonesia. The development of this newly-invented notion coincided with changes in the types of occupations within Muslim societies at the end of the twentieth century, as these societies shifted from the 'agricultural era' to the 'industrial era'. In recent times, professional workers and civil servants whose salaries are paid monthly are characteristic of the types of occupation in post-independence Indonesia. In contrast, well-paid professions, such as those of doctor, lawyer, banker, engineer, and contractor, apparently have not been included in the discourse on *zakat*, nor has it been asked whether or not these 'white collar' professions should be treated by *zakat* rules in the same way as ordinary people with average wages.

Regarding innovation in *zakat* practice in general, and *al-mal al-mustafad* in particular, Amien Rais delivered a controversial speech in 1986 about the need to reinterpret the concept of almsgiving and redefine its social impact on Indonesian society. Rais was concerned about the notion of justice in *zakat* practice. To him, a 2.5% *zakat* is not only insufficient to foster social

welfare and economic democracy, but is also far from the spirit of Islam as a religion of justice. This is partly because, in reality, there are a number of occupations held by a few groups of professionals that can be categorised as high-paying jobs. According to Rais, it is therefore reasonably fair, seen from the perspective of social justice, that a 10-20% *zakat* levy should be applied to those professionals with very high incomes.⁵¹ Jalaluddin Rahmat seems to have been on Rais's side in his response to this *zakat* issue, a position that was in his case influenced by the Shi'i concept of *khums*. A new reading on *zakat* was also introduced by Masdar F. Mas'udi, a dynamic intellectual in the NU circle.⁵² Mas'udi juxtaposes *zakat* (alms) and conventional tax. He argues that it is necessary for Muslims living in a modern nation state to rethink their views on *zakat*, and to spiritualise the recent practice of conventional tax. This is because what was meant by *zakat* in the era of the prophet Muhammad is similar to the current tax system, as the objective of both these concepts (*zakat* and tax) is to foster public welfare.

In present-day practice, the narrative of *zakat* as an instrument for fostering democracy in social and economic fields is prevalent among practitioners. It is within this context that advanced innovations in Muslim legal thought on *zakat* matters in Indonesia have taken place. The nomenclatures and the types of *zakat* have become increasingly varied, especially after *zakat* was framed from an economic and social development perspective, instead of merely Islamic jurisprudence. Newly invented concepts of *zakat* began to be adopted in Indonesian Islam, despite the fact that only a few of these can effectively be implemented. For example, the increasing encounters between the private and voluntary sectors have led some Muslims, notably among the middle class and urban areas, to reformulate the idea of *zakat* on corporate wealth. Although it is not very popular, others have gone further by exploring the concept of *zakat* on pensions, *zakat* on stocks and shares, and so forth. This implies that a socio-economic perspective and even a pragmatic approach to *zakat* issues have monopolised recent discourse among the Muslim middle class.

In short, Muslim intellectual discourses on justice and welfare have shaped new understandings of the public good in general, and have stimulated im-

portant debates about the social and economic trajectories of the culture of giving, the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of state policies on welfare, as well as the roles of civil society in fostering social democracy, in reducing economic inequality, and promoting the welfare of communities. It can also be suggested that Muslim intellectuals in the 1980s provided the foundations for reenergising social mobility in Islamic societies after the New Order, especially among those social activists working on Islamic philanthropy. In the following section, we shall look at the development of the Muslim NGO sector in Indonesia in general, and Islamic charitable associations in particular, which represent grassroots activities. The next section will also shed some light on the shift in the characteristics of Muslim NGOs in their dealings with both foreign and domestic resources in order to sustain their social enterprises.

The Culture of Giving and State Policies

It is widely acknowledged that modern Muslim social, religious, and educational institutions started to grow and became increasingly visible in the early twentieth century.⁵³ The Muhammadiyah is one of the leading Muslim associations whose activities very much deal with social enterprises by, among other things, operating schools, orphanages, and clinics. Established in 1912 in Yogyakarta and influenced by such modernist Muslim thinkers and theologians as Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935), the Muhammadiyah was at the forefront of the campaign to promote Islamic modernism in Indonesia. There are at least two aspects that the Muhammadiyah has attempted to change. The first is the modernisation of Islamic institutions by adopting a Western-style education system, and the second is the reform in *zakat* practice by setting up *zakat* committees responsible for the collection and redistribution of *zakat* funds. Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of the Muhammadiyah, is renowned as someone who is deeply concerned about social issues, as can be seen in his sermons, which place great emphasis on poverty relief.⁵⁴ The Muhammadiyah's widespread social welfare-oriented and philanthropic activities in the early twentieth century indicated that welfare issues had become a concern for Muslims, and they

were practised in a rather organised way. It should be noted that the Muhammadiyah's autonomous association, the Aisyiyah, which was founded in 1917, also focuses on social welfare activities. Representing the women's wing of the modernist movement, the Aisyiyah pays a lot of attention to such issues as the wellbeing of women, healthcare, children, and family life (see chapters 4 and 5).

Zakat (almsgiving), *sedekah* (voluntary giving), and *waqf* (pious endowment) seem to have underpinned Muslim social institutions, not only among the modernists but also among those who we can call the 'traditionalists'. In the early twentieth century, the traditionalist *'ulama* attempted to organise themselves and, in turn, founded Nahdlatul Ulama (NU; literally, 'the awakening of religious scholars') in 1926, partly as a reaction to the progressive and aggressive modernist movement. A respected *'ulama* from East Java, Kyai Hasyim 'Asy'ari, who also at that time was the principal of *Pesantren* Tebuireng,⁵⁵ played a major role in the establishment of the NU, which is now the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. Islamic forms of giving such as *sedekah* and *waqf*, practised among traditionalist Muslims, have become major resources underpinning the spread of *pesantren* as Islamic education institutions, notably in rural areas. *Pesantren* are led by a *kyai* (religious scholar) to whom people living near the *pesantren* may channel their *zakat*, *sedekah* and *waqf*. Among Muslim traditionalists, the custom of channelling *zakat* to the *kyai* continues to be practised today, especially in rural areas.⁵⁶

Although since the early twentieth century, *zakat* practice has been in the hands of civil society, this does not signify the absence of state engagement in administering *zakat* and *sedekah*. State policy on *zakat* matters in modern Indonesia can be traced back to the colonial era. The Dutch colonial government issued regulations by which they aimed, as Arskal Salim argues, to reduce the misuse of *zakat* funds by local officials, as well as preserve 'the liberty of any Muslim' to perform religious obligations.⁵⁷ It is evident that the rise of colonial power in the Muslim world from the late eighteenth century up to the early twentieth century had a profound impact on the administration of Muslim philanthropy. This impact can be seen in the influences of the French in Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt,⁵⁸ the British in India, Pakistan⁵⁹ and Malay-

sia,⁶⁰ and the Dutch in Indonesia.⁶¹ The main concern of colonial Islamic policy was objects of *waqf*, notably immovable assets (land and buildings), that benefited the public. The Dutch colonial government, for example, decided to avoid too much intervention in *zakat* administration as *zakat* was considered to be practised voluntarily and an individual religious obligation,⁶² which made it different to *waqf*.⁶³ Yet, the Dutch government issued a ‘circular’ (*Surat Edaran*) on ‘Supervising the Building of Houses of Muslim Worship’ (*Toezicht op den bouw van Muhammedaansche bedehuizen*), consisting of an order to register all kinds of buildings, notably mosques whose land had originated from endowment. This mechanism and regulation was applied in order to clarify the status of the land and building, and to investigate whether the endowment process violated local customary law (*adatrecht*).⁶⁴

The political context in Indonesia changed rapidly after the arrival of Japanese military power. One of the most influential Islamic political policies to emerge during the Japanese Occupation was the introduction of *shumubu*, a special office dealing primarily with religious affairs, whose tasks and duties resembled the *Kantoor vor Inlandche Zaken* in the Dutch colonial administration. To a certain degree, the current Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (MoRA) is a continuation (although following a new pattern) of the Dutch *Kantoor voor Inlandche Zaken* and the Japanese *Shumubu*. Yet, the first President of the Republic of Indonesia, Soekarno, emphasised that MoRA was completely ‘disengaged from the colonial past.’⁶⁵ MoRA, which played a crucial role in voicing state interests during the New Order era, was not a completely new office within the Indonesian governmental structure. More importantly, it was through this office, especially in the mid-1970s, that state discourse and policy on *zakat* affairs was formulated.⁶⁶

In the New Order era, especially at the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the President Soeharto apparently reluctantly implemented the government’s policy on *zakat*. After Soeharto’s unsuccessful effort to mobilise public funds through his ‘Presidential *Zakat* Board’ (*Lembaga Zakat Kepresidenan*) that he had operated from 1968 until 1974, Soeharto’s New Order then attempted set up government-sponsored foundations in the 1980s.

For example, Soeharto founded *Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila* (YAMP—the Pancasila Muslim Charitable Foundation) on 17 February 1982. This foundation acted as if it facilitated Muslim civil servants’ ‘voluntary’ (*zakat*) contributions. Even though Muslim contributions were called *dana sukarela* (voluntarily donated), the New Order set up a rule by which the amounts were automatically deducted from civil servants’ salaries. This policy of withdrawing or deducting ‘charity’ from civil servants’ monthly wages was terminated with the downfall of the New Order regime.

During the transitional period from the New Order to the Reformasi era, social and political events compelled civil society organisations to emerge or resurface. A more open political environment, which allowed the mobilisation and administration of public funds and the operation of charitable works, led to an unprecedented growth in charitable institutions that relied on *zakat* and *sedekah* for financial sources. Alongside this, government policies regarding *zakat* changed due to the moves towards decentralisation and regional autonomy, which brought a whole range of associated new policies. In 1999, when President Habibie was in office, the government issued the Zakat Law, consisting of rules and regulations on *zakat* collection and *zakat* organisations. According to this law, there are two types of *zakat* collectors: the first is a government-sponsored *zakat* collector (BAZ), and the second is a community-based *zakat* agency (LAZ). Local governments at the provincial and district levels began issuing local policies on *zakat*, under which they were given the authority to deduct *zakat* from civil servants’ salaries. This local government imposition of *zakat* practice can be seen in many areas, such as Bandung (West Java), Cianjur (West Java), Padang (West Sumatra), Lombok (West Nusa Tenggara), Makassar (Celebes), and Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam.⁶⁷ Local governments have continued to set up and supervise BAZ. After local government became directly involved in organising *zakat*, which had previously been voluntary in Indonesia, *zakat* began to conflict with the local government’s policies that made Muslim civil servants pay *zakat* in addition to conventional tax, through BAZ.

Interestingly, some high-level bureaucrats, politicians and Muslim leaders, including those involved in the government-sponsored *zakat* board, ap-

pealed for an amendment to the Zakat Law. In 2010, eleven years after the legislation of the 1999 Zakat Law, MoRA proposed a draft bill on *zakat*. Some of the main issues in this bill draft caused controversy. First of all, this draft bill seems to give the government-sponsored *zakat* bodies (BAZ) greater authority and the exclusive duty of administering *zakat*, while at the same time it has eliminated the roles of civil society organisations in organising *zakat*. Second, it deals with every Muslim's obligation to pay *zakat*, and punishment for those who do not pay. Third, the draft bill promotes the centralisation of *zakat* administration. Fourth, it endorses the punishment of those who operate *zakat* agencies, but are incapable of collecting *zakat*. Fifth, this draft bill would make *zakat* an instrument of tax deduction. It appears that most Islamic civil society organisations, notably community-based *zakat* agencies, showed their objection to the government-sponsored draft bill on *zakat* because it would officially eliminate the role of community-based philanthropic associations in administering *zakat*. The draft bill was finally legalised as Zakat Law on 27 October 2011.⁶⁸

Social Mobility and the Muslim NGO Sector

Early Development of Faith-based NGOs

Muslim social mobility in contemporary Indonesia can be traced back to the vibrant engagement of Islamic associations in the early twentieth century in various activities, ranging from *dakwah* and relief services to education and welfare-oriented projects. The Muhammadiyah, with its modernist orientation, can be regarded as the first Islamic association that extensively engaged in welfare-oriented activities through modern social and educational institutions. Like other Islamic associations at that time, the Muhammadiyah acted as a service provider in the social and health sectors. In the first two decades of its establishment, the Muhammadiyah was able to operate mosques, schools, orphanages, and clinics to cater to communities in general, and to serve the poor in particular. This modernist Muslim organisation managed hundreds of clinics and hospitals, as well as thousands of schools, ranging from kindergartens to higher education institutions. Until the 1960s, the Muhammadiyah's social engagement in public life was considered progres-

sive, in that this association had implemented a new reading of how to translate Islamic precepts in a 'modern' way. Its counterpart, the NU, acted in a similar way, dealing with education and social activities, especially in rural areas. While these two associations have become pivotal pillars of civil society in contemporary Indonesian Islam, new developments in social activism took place in the early 1970s, represented by the emergent NGO sector specifically working on development-oriented projects.

The NGO sector represents grassroots activities with more limited but more specific goals. In line with the notion of 'developmentalism' in the New Order era, NGOs began utilising self-help-oriented activities as part of their development perspectives. The New Order era can certainly be seen as a period in which newly formed development and advocacy NGOs flourished, albeit slowly. As a means of promoting social democracy, Christian denominations, both Catholic and Protestant, have been operating NGOs since the 1970s, and have provided various development agendas for people in rural and urban areas.⁶⁹ Bina Swadaya and CD-Bethesda, founded in 1970 and 1974 respectively, are examples of faith-based NGOs linked to Christian associations, despite the fact that these NGOs portrayed themselves to the public as 'secular' NGOs.

A major breakthrough in the development of Muslim NGOs with a strong development perspective also took place in the early 1970s. This involved intellectuals and student activists with either nationalist-socialist (PSI-Socialist Party of Indonesia) or Islamic backgrounds (Masyumi), such as M. Dawam Rahardjo, Emil Salim (b. 1930-, Nono Anwar Makarim (b. 1939-), Utomo Danandjaja, Adi Sasono and Ismid Hadad. They attempted to provide alternative views on social and economic development in Indonesia. They established LP3ES, whose objective is to increase people's awareness of social and economic development through a series of research projects, surveys, workshops and policy studies. LP3ES deals with a wide range of social issues, such as democracy, income-generating projects, small-to-medium economic enterprises, and environmental issues. As a pioneering development NGO, LP3ES received financial support from foreign sources, based mainly in Europe and America. To further its impact on society, Dawam Rahardjo and his counter-

parts engaged other Muslim activists, such as Abdurrahman Wahid (d. 2010), Mansour Fakih, and the younger generation with a traditionalist background. This represented an attempt to link the NGO sector with *pesantren* (Islamic educational institutions), which were strongly rooted in rural areas.

This effort resulted in the establishment of P3M in 1983 by M. Dawan Rahardjo (Muhammadiyah), Abdurrahman Wahid (NU), Utomo Danandjaja and Adi Sasono (PII activists). Other founders had Islamic traditionalist backgrounds, including K.H. Alie Yafie (b. 1926-), K.H. Sahal Mahfudz (b. 1937-), K.H. Yusuf Hasyim (d. 2007), Masdar F. Mas'udi, and Djohan Effendy (b. 1939-). P3M became a pioneer of Muslim NGOs specifically working for development-oriented projects, and used *pesantren* to disseminate its notions of welfare, democracy, gender justice, human rights education, and so forth. This new style of Muslim NGO activism drew foreign funding from associations such as the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, the *Humanistisch Instituut voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking* (HIVOS), the Asia Foundation, and the Ford Foundation.⁷⁰

Meanwhile, among the modernists, some personalities have paid attention to the social welfare activities and the NGO sector. M. Amin Azis, a professor of agricultural business at the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB),⁷¹ for example, has concentrated on farmer empowerment in rural areas through various kinds of agricultural and industrial projects. Together with A.M. Saefuddin, Dawam Rahardjo, and Adi Sasono, Azis became a co-founder of the Centre for Agribusiness Development (PPA), a leading consultancy company that has sponsored Islamic intellectual and social activities. The above-listed figures are also renowned for their contribution to promoting and advocating the operation of Islamic savings and loan cooperatives (BMT) in Indonesia.⁷² In 1995, Azis has led the Centre for Small Enterprises Business Incubation (PINBUK), an NGO established by the members of the ICMI that provides assistance through various training and workshops for small-to-medium economic enterprises.⁷³

The increasing involvement of the traditionalist circle in the NGO sector has been stimulated by different factors, one of which is the intensified discourse on public welfare through a new reading of particular jurisprudential

concepts that can be found in early and medieval Islamic literature. In the early 1990s, Muslim public discourse on welfare and justice was enriched by the widespread publication of Islamic books dealing with liberation theology, social democracy, and human rights, gender, and empowerment. The Institute for Islam and Social Studies (LKIS) was instrumental in disseminating the notion of Islamic justice by translating a number of contemporary 'liberal' and leftist Muslim thinkers, such as Hassan Hanafi (b. 1935-), Asghar Ali Engineer (b. 1939-), Farid Esack (b. 1959-), and Fatima Mernissi (b. 1940). Unlike other Islamist groups, which tend to heavily emphasise the slogan 'Islam as a solution,' the younger NU activists who became the advocates of LKiS seem to be more interested in providing a new reading of Islam, linking it with modern discourses on democracy, the public sphere, minority groups, gender equality and structural advocacy. Although this type of intellectual discourse was initiated by activists with traditionalist backgrounds, it has had a wide-ranging impact on younger Muslim activists from the same generation, notably those with a modernist background. Progressive Muslim thinkers such as Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid (d. 2010), Muhammad Abed al-Jabiri (d. 2010), Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na'im (b. 1946-) and some above-mentioned figures also began attracting the attention of young modernist activists, especially those studying Islamic studies.⁷⁴

A similar discourse, still under the framework of 'transformative Islam' or 'neo-traditionalism', which combines access to Islamic classical literature with a willingness to deal with both modern challenges and 'locality' at the same time, also inspired young Muslim traditionalists in several regions, notably in Java. A number of Muslim NGOs with widespread development and advocacy projects played significant roles in echoing the notions of social justice, religious pluralism, interfaith dialogue, gender equality, Islam and human rights, women's empowerment, religious minorities, and democratic values through social activism in local contexts. The LKiS of Yogyakarta, with its discourse on Islamic 'neo-traditionalism' and an advocacy agenda, the Syarikat (the Muslim Community for Advocating the People) with its cultural reconciliation for victims of post-1965 tragedies,⁷⁵ the Fahmina Institute of Cirebon (West Java) with its civil rights issues and minority advocacy

projects, and the Rahima of Jakarta with its Islam and women's rights issues, are examples of Muslim NGOs working with their 'locality'. The above-mentioned NGOs have solid networks and foreign funding, and they prefer acting as 'agents of change,' 'service providers' and 'problem solvers'. They also have very close relationships with other critical groups and leftist activists, such as labour organisations and NGOs working specifically to advocate the needs of neglected people in urban and rural areas.

By contrast, the modernist circles around the Muhammadiyah and PERSIS seem not to have been well-acquainted with the NGO sector, at least until the late 1990s. As an established Islamic organisation, the Muhammadiyah has enjoyed the benefits of managing thousands of institutions, schools, universities, and hospitals, as well as of operating charitable institutions. Unlike the NGOs operated by NU activists, the Muhammadiyah utilised its organisational divisions to cope with such issues as community welfare, poverty alleviation, and economic development. The organisational structure of the Muhammadiyah is very large, covering different working areas, education, healthcare, and social services. Social work and community services, including charities, have apparently persistently characterised Muslim modernist activism.

This does not, however, indicate that personalities with a modernist background have been absent from the NGO sector. Some younger activists in the Muhammadiyah were in fact active in NGOs with development and advocacy orientations. In the mid-1990s, some younger generations in the Muhammadiyah who were active in the Muhammadiyah autonomous organisations (the Muhammadiyah Youth Movement, the Muhammadiyah Student Movement, and so forth) took the initiative to bring their associations into the NGO sector by engaging with development and advocacy issues. Albeit not as strong as their NU counterparts, these younger activists in modernist circles, either through Muhammadiyah campuses or new 'satellite institutions', such as the Maarif Institute, the Centre for the Study of Religions and Civilisations (PSAP), the Institute for Human Resource Development (LaPSI), the Alifah (gender advocacy for students), and 'Peace Generation' (PC), started discovering new discourses and activism. With the sup-

port of foreign and domestic funding, they operate various projects, such as anti-violence movements, poverty eradication, gender justice, civil society empowerment, and structural advocacy, good governance and pro-poor policies.

The Zakat Sector and the Enrichment of Indonesia's NGO World

As discussed previously, philanthropic activism has deep historical roots in Indonesian society. Some studies have outlined that in the twentieth century, charitable work and community services strongly characterised religious institutions in many parts of the world, in Asia as well as in Europe and America. At that time, charity was still a suitable way to support the needs of society. The increasing development of the concept of the nation state in many Muslim countries, with its modern taxation and fiscal system, appears not to have eliminated community-based philanthropic activities. As a matter of fact, the *zakat* sector has become increasingly widespread, especially in the last decade of the New Order. A number of Islamic groups, with their *dakwah* orientation, attempted to enlarge the scope of their activities by engaging in social welfare services in a professional way. Muslim student activists, academics, public intellectuals and social workers instigated new approaches and strategies to overcome hardship. Islamic study circles (*halqah, pengajian, majelis tabligh*), Islamic foundations (*yayasan Islam*), and other long-established Islamic associations have been instrumental in reviving social welfare services in communities. They emerged to set out an alternative discourse and strategy on how to translate Islamic precepts into the social and economic spheres.⁷⁶

Islamic charitable associations and community-based *zakat* agencies such as Dompot Dhuafa (DD), Rumah Zakat Indonesia (RZI), Dompot Peduli Umat-Daarut Tauhid (DPU-DT) and became significant and played more extensive roles following the economic crisis at the end of the 1990s. As mentioned previously (see Chapter 1), DD became the first Islamic association to appear as a professional *zakat* agency that had strong support from the urban Muslim middle class. Since its inception in 1993, DD has actively used mass media to disseminate its vision and mission, as well as its charitable

and development-oriented programmes. Since then, this *zakat* agency has been able to cooperate with the government and private companies to run its social enterprises. DD was then followed by other *zakat* agencies in managing public funds. The question remains as to why some of these institutions focused on organising charities and social work, while others preferred to operate as development and advocacy NGOs to address structural issues and overcome hardship in society. 'Development NGOs' can mean people-focused organisations that mainly work on development-oriented programmes, and these types of NGOs do not work specifically to provide social services; while 'advocacy NGOs' tend to be organisations whose agenda concentrates on structural advocacy as a means of addressing structural change and government policies.

Of course, the ways in which charitable foundations and development NGOs operate are not always contradictory, although there are differences in their institutional strategies and capacities. Some activists of charitable foundations, *zakat* agencies, and development NGOs are university graduates. By nature, and of course by experience, NGOs can implement sophisticated development-oriented projects that can address not only the symptoms of poverty, but also the roots of the problems. As reflected in their discourse, NGO activists look forward to structural changes, by which policymakers are pushed to issue more egalitarian and pro-poor policies. Moreover, in terms of financial resources, not all NGOs are self-funded NGOs working on the basis of community support. It is usual for some NGOs to rely partially, if not fully, on foreign funding.⁷⁷ In line with this, *zakat* agencies and Islamic charitable associations in Indonesia have taken a similar path to other development NGOs, optimising and digging financial resources from foreign funding organisations, notably international aid agencies. Yet, as mentioned previously, *zakat* agencies and Islamic charitable associations can gain considerable support from communities. It is worth emphasising that performance, professionalism, and accountability within Islamic charitable associations have enabled them to cooperate with various corporations: national, international and multinational.⁷⁸

Private conventional banks, which in recent times have set up Shari'a

finance divisions, have also supported the voluntary work of Muslim organisations. The spending of money, even for social purposes, within private agencies is quite different from voluntary organisations, in that private companies are more concerned with performance, professionalism and accountability. Voluntary organisations can rarely obtain subsidies from large private corporations unless they have shown credibility and accountability (vision, mission, and programmes), underpinned by dedicated and well-trained staff. The partnerships between Islamic charitable associations and large international companies indicate that private companies consider the professionalism, institutional capacity, and performance of the voluntary organisations to be adequate. Therefore, through shared values and vision, intensive, productive cooperation between charitable associations and the private sector can be established.⁷⁹

There are also major factors that persuade private companies to cooperate with Islamic institutions or relief agencies. The first is the legislation on corporate social responsibility (CSR), especially the Ordinance on Corporation (*UU Perseroan Terbatas*) No. 40 in 2007 and the Ordinance on Capital Investment (*UU Penanaman Modal*) No. 25, also in 2007 which requires corporations to be involved in sustainable development programmes. Next to this, the number of well-organised Islamic NGOs whose projects deal with relief and development-oriented programmes has increased, and this may provide opportunities for both Islamic NGOs and private companies to establish partnerships.

There are at least three different processes involved in the cooperation between private companies and voluntary organisations. The first and very common way is for cooperation at the initiative of voluntary organisations. These organisations make proposals to private companies for charity and development programmes, such as those involving poverty reduction, health-care for the poor, and education for orphans or disadvantaged social groups, or micro-finance projects for low-income households. As soon as the voluntary organisations and private companies reach an agreement, the planned social enterprises are financed. The second way in which private companies and Muslim organisations collaborate is through initiatives from private com-

panies. In recent times, at least since 2008, private companies have been obliged by the government to participate in, or allocate some portion of their revenue to, sustainable development programmes that benefit society at large. Private companies are urged to show their commitment to communities in addition to working on their core business to earn profits. As a result, private companies are obliged to engage in what Indonesian government policy refers to as CSR. The third way is through study groups involving Muslim workers (*kelompok pengajian karyawan*) and *zakat* agencies (LAZ) that operate within private companies. Both religious study groups and *zakat* agencies have more or less shaped the nature and types of social enterprises run by companies. More specifically, Muslim workers associations and *zakat* agencies have been instrumental in linking corporations with voluntary organisations.

Charitable Activism and the Expansion of Muslim NGOs

Conflict, Natural Disaster, and Relief Organisations

The deadly communal and sectarian conflicts occurring in the late 1990s and early 2000s stimulated the proliferation of Islamic charitable associations in Indonesia. Conflicts in eastern Indonesia, such as Ambon in the Moluccas and Poso in Celebes, in which there were thousands of civilian deaths on both sides, stimulated religious associations to send humanitarian teams to these areas.⁸⁰ In response to the deteriorating situation caused by communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians, a number of Islamic institutions sent humanitarian teams to help the victims. This is partly because the government, represented by military officers and the police, could not handle the situation effectively. At the same time, the elites and policy-makers in Jakarta seemed to have politicised the situation instead of arranging an adequate peace-making process.

The dispatch of dozens of militia by a jihadist group, Laskar Jihad, may be seen as an expression of what is to be called 'radical' Islam.⁸¹ However, this may also indicate a reaction to the government's failure to deal with the riots in Ambon. And, from another perspective, we may also see that this humanitarian and political activism signifies communal 'solidarity', in the name

of which Laskar Jihad aimed to relieve the suffering of their fellow Muslims. Laskar Jihad was well-acquainted with the provision of aid rather than the actual fighting. In the same way, the conflict in Poso between Muslims and Christians caught the attention of DDII. In 1999, DDII launched its humanitarian wing, the Crisis Rescue Committee (KOMPAK), to deal with the deadly clashes in Poso. KOMPAK was chaired by Tamsil Limrung, former president of the Indonesian Student Association (HMI-MPO),⁸² with the aim of distributing aid, partly from the Middle East, to help conflict victims in Ambon, Poso, West Borneo, East Timor and Aceh.⁸³

Observers have suggested that in conflict zones, the implementation of humanitarian principles is often constrained by the ideological inclinations of relief agencies, regardless of whether they can behave neutrally and impartially in the course of humanitarian action. It is perhaps not easy for a *dakwah* association such as Laskar Jihad, which is affiliated to Salafi movement, or KOMPAK, which is the humanitarian wing of DDII, to act professionally as humanitarian agencies and to draw clear distinctions between their religious missionary activities, humanitarian actions, and political struggle.⁸⁴ Yet, another type of Islamic humanitarian agency that is different from KOMPAK can be seen in the formation of the Medical Emergency Rescue Committee (Mer-C) by a group of physicians and medical students in 1999. In this respect, activists from *Tarbiyah*, a movement that is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, were instrumental in the establishment of Islamic relief agencies such as Mer-C, a Muslim relief agency that specifically works in conflict zones, and the Indonesian Red Crescent Society (BSMI), an Islamic relief NGO that actively operates in disaster-prone areas. Established in 2002 by a number of Muslim physicians and social activists, the BSMI conducts widespread humanitarian projects and relief activities in times of natural calamity in Indonesia and overseas.

Some suggest that the BSMI has strong ties to, but no direct or formal affiliation with, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), an Islamic political party.⁸⁵ In short, we can assume that there is a wide ideological spectrum of Islamic humanitarian agencies that have emerged in response to communal conflicts, and that their political orientations are as varied as the social and edu-

cational backgrounds of their founders and volunteers. Thanks to support from medical volunteers, especially physicians working in either private or government hospitals, the humanitarian assistance provided by Mer-C and BSMI in conflict zones consists mainly of medical services, such as the operation of field hospitals and health provision for refugees.

When the earthquake struck in the Indian Ocean and caused the devastating tsunami in 2004, killing thousands in the coastal areas of Aceh and Nias Island, dozens of aid agencies landed in Aceh to offer disaster relief to the victims. Some national and international NGOs operating in Aceh at that time were faith-based NGOs, among them World Vision, Christian Aid, Muslim Aid, and Islamic Relief Worldwide. The tsunami disaster in Aceh caused more devastation and killed more people than other recent disasters in Indonesia, and as such has motivated religious institutions in Indonesia to improve their expertise in humanitarian affairs. Since then, Islamic relief agencies have spread all over Indonesia.⁸⁶ The catastrophe in Aceh fuelled many groups to carry out emergency relief and deliver modest humanitarian assistance for the tsunami victims; not only long-established Islamic organisations such as the Muhammadiyah, the NU and Persatuan Islam, but also new Islamist groups with less well-trained volunteers, such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI-Islamic Defender Front) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI-Indonesian Branch of Hizbut Tahrir), and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI-Indonesian Mujahidin Council). Other Islamic charitable associations with strong backgrounds in relief provision, such as DD, PKPU, and BSMI were also present in Aceh for the same mission.

The tsunami not only devastated the physical environment of the coastal regions in Aceh and Nias, but it also resonated in the minds of Muslim activists. It inspired Islamic associations to work more seriously to prepare sophisticated approaches and comprehensive methods for disaster relief. In short, this major disaster, which ruined Aceh and Nias, triggered Muslim social activists to include humanitarian affairs among their major concerns. It is therefore unsurprising that since then, more specific and professional humanitarian units have been created by Islamic associations. Their experience working in disaster-affected areas in Aceh and Nias was the first step in a

move beyond their regular charitable activity in densely-populated urban areas. If we look more closely at the Islamic humanitarian actors that operated in Yogyakarta and Central Java in response to the 2006 earthquake and the other calamities that took place afterwards, including the eruption of Merapi Mountain, we discover that for the most part, they were former Aceh relief volunteers.

In response to a series of calamities in Indonesia, notably after the 2004 tsunami, the Muhammadiyah, which in the early twentieth century had operated a humanitarian unit called PKO (*Penolong Kesengsaraan Oemoem*—General Poor Relief), began to reconsolidate its social vision by introducing a new humanitarian wing called the Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center (MDMC). The MDMC was chaired by Dr. Sudibyo Markus, a retired Health Department employee, and was under the supervision of the Department of Health and Social Welfare (MKKM) of the Central Board of the Muhammadiyah. As the Muhammadiyah has managed hundreds of hospitals throughout Indonesia, the MDMC projects gained support from the Muhammadiyah-Aisyiah hospitals and higher educational institutions, notably the Faculty of Medical Sciences and Faculty of Engineering at the Muhammadiyah Universities, and nursing schools. Therefore, the MDMC has not only become a vibrant centre for young social activists, but it has also had the full support of medical doctors and nurses working in the Muhammadiyah hospitals. Following the 2010 Muhammadiyah National Congress conducted in Yogyakarta, the Central Board of the Muhammadiyah formalised its humanitarian wing. It became one of the Muhammadiyah's organisational departments, namely the Disaster Preparedness Department (LPB).

In line with this new development of awareness of humanitarianism in Indonesia as a whole, and in order to reduce the devastating impact of natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, volcano eruptions, and so forth), DD has also set up a permanent humanitarian institution whose duties include disaster relief. *Aksi Cepat Tanggap* (ACT-Quick Response Action) is DD's humanitarian wing that in practice cooperates with DD's Charitable Health Clinics (LKC-Layanan Kesehatan Cuma-Cuma). In order to improve its organisational capacity in humanitarian affairs, DD recently launched its

Disaster Humanitarian Center (DMC), based in Jakarta. DMC-DD handles three main projects: Disaster Preparedness, Emergency Response and Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. In 2011, DMC-DD had 850 volunteers throughout Indonesia.

Domestic Charities and International Aid Agencies

The unprecedented development of relief NGOs in Indonesia coincided with the arrival and operation of international faith-based NGOs specialising in charity, relief, and development. The 2004 tsunami tragedy in Aceh and Nias and the 2006 earthquake in Yogyakarta caught the attention of international NGOs. Aceh and Yogyakarta became sites for the influx of numerous humanitarian NGOs with different ideological, religious and political natures. International faith-based NGOs, in particular, played major roles in disaster relief in Aceh, Nias and Yogyakarta. As well as bringing supplies to help with the evacuation and support of the victims, they also cooperated with domestic NGOs and aid associations. When the emergency relief was over, most NGOs left the disaster areas and went back to their central offices in their countries of origin. Some, however, extended their projects in Indonesia and even set up new branch offices. The close interaction between international aid associations and local NGOs has affected aid activities in Indonesia.

Among the dozens of faith-based international aid associations that have operated in crisis areas in Indonesia, some have retained projects there and have set up branch offices in Indonesia. These include Muslim Aid, Islamic Relief Worldwide, ICNS Relief, Helping Hand, IHH, WAMY, ICHAD, and Qatar Charity. There is no single way in which partnerships in disaster-affected areas are built, as the relationships depend upon the opportunities at hand and the availability of resources in the given region. In Yogyakarta, Muslim Aid established its new sub-field office soon after the 2006 earthquake. Muslim Aid, a UK-based international aid agency, contributed significantly in providing assistance in Yogyakarta during the emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction stages. It occupied one building in the Muhammadiyah's orphanage complex in Yogyakarta. Established in 1918,

this orphanage was ruined by the large earthquake in 2006. Muslim Aid rebuilt some parts of the buildings, and since then one of buildings has been used as Muslim Aid's sub-field office.⁸⁷ In Aceh, Muslim Aid and Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) also set up sub-field offices that still operate today. Muslim Aid and IRW rented large houses soon after their emergency projects were in motion. Christian humanitarian and emergency NGOs, such as CARE, Catholic Relief Service (CRS), Christian Aid, Save the Children (SC) and World Vision Indonesia (WVI) seem to have acted in the same way, either in Yogyakarta or in Aceh.⁸⁸

On Nias Island, Christian NGOs, both national and international, participated in delivering assistance following two consecutive natural disasters: the 2004 tsunami and the 2005 earthquake. Unlike in Aceh, there were only a few, if any, Muslim national and international NGOs working on emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction projects. One may argue that the energy of Muslim NGOs at the time of the 2004 and 2005 disasters was already focused on Aceh, and so at that time they perhaps overlooked Nias Island. Other suggest that Nias Island, largely inhabited by Christians, was of less interest to Muslim aid agencies. By contrast, there was a tremendous number of faith-based NGOs and institutions, notably Christian (Protestant and Catholic), operating on Nias Island for both humanitarian missions and religious missionary activities. Of course, we should distinguish between professional Christian NGOs, which in some ways appear as secular NGOs and no longer make missionary activities their main concern, and missionary groups. Likewise, a number of Islamic associations, such as DDII, Al-Azhar Peduli, the AMCF, and the Hidayatullah Foundation operate on Nias Island to run charities, development-oriented projects, and *dakwah*.

We should also acknowledge that evangelists have played extensive roles during emergency relief, while at the same time attempting to 'Christianise' communities. The predominant religious tradition among the local Nias people has changed over time, especially after the arrival of German Christian missionaries in the eighteenth century, and with the increase in the number of Muslim migrants since the mid-twentieth century. The majority of Nias people were Protestants united under one organisation, 'Banua Niha

Keriso Protestan' (BNKP). Later on, BNKP was integrated into a larger Protestant association in Indonesia, the PGI (*Persekutuan Gereja Indonesia*). Unlike on other larger islands, where NGOs have operated quite extensively, on Nias Island there are only a few local organisations. Some international NGOs that established partnerships with national NGOs operating in Aceh also worked on Nias Island. For religious missionary groups, Nias Island, with its tangential position on the outer island, was a likely destination for religious missions among both Christians and Muslims.

Moreover, international faith-based aid agencies also target educational institutions and hospitals as their working partners. Some Muslim and Christian hospitals and universities, such as Bethesda Hospital (Protestant), Panti Rapih Hospital (Catholic), and PKU Muhammadiyah (Islam), the Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta, Sanata Dharma Catholic University, and Duta Wacana Christian University, are among the targets of this cooperation. It can be suggested that international faith-based aid agencies also need adequate and strategic partnerships with local NGOs or local institutions, especially those with sufficient human resources that can underpin their emergency, development and reconstruction projects in education and health (first aid, trauma healing, minor and major surgery, building and school construction, and so forth). Some key international and faith-based humanitarian NGOs, with their well-trained volunteers that operated in Yogyakarta, were major actors in the course of disaster relief in Aceh. In other cases, partnerships have been established on the basis of individual, instead of institutional, agreements. In the course of relief and development projects in Aceh and Yogyakarta, international NGOs recruited and hired experts (university professors, physicians, engineers, nurses, and students) from universities and hospitals, including those affiliated to particular religious institutions.

The proliferation of charitable institutions in Indonesia has not been monopolised by Muslim and Christian groups alone. Ethnically-based organisations, such as those among the ethnic Chinese groups which in the Indonesian context is referred to as Tionghoa, along with smaller religious groups, have begun expanding their social activism through charities. A

transnational, Taiwan-based aid association, called the Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation, has expanded its area of operations by establishing new headquarters in Jakarta, along with branch offices in some regions. Its engagement in disaster relief in Aceh, Yogyakarta, Bandung, as well poverty relief in the slums of major cities, is wide-ranging, focusing on health provision, direct aid (food and clothes), and education.⁸⁹

Through the teachings of the Buddha, which have been translated and reformulated by Master Chen Yen, a pious lady from Taiwan, Tzu Chi has revitalised the giving tradition among Tionghoa families in Indonesia, propagating acts of benevolence and a love of mankind.⁹⁰ Unlike other transnational NGOs, which tend to engage local NGOs in establishing partnerships in the course of humanitarian and relief missions, the Tzu Chi foundation mainly engages government agencies and military officers.⁹¹ This is partly because it avoids any 'conflict of interest' once cooperation with other NGOs is taking place. In comparison with Christian NGOs, it appears that Tzu Chi is less inclusive, but at the same time, it encounters less resistance among Muslim communities.

In summary, the arrival of international relief and humanitarian NGOs in response to disasters has taught local humanitarian NGOs how to deal appropriately with humanitarian affairs: having effective fundraising systems, post-disaster restoration of income to low-income households, the rehabilitation of public facilities, and so forth. Effective and intense interaction between national NGOs and international aid agencies has increased the institutional capacity and professionalism of some national NGOs, including professional *zakat* organisations, such as DD, RZI, and PKPU. In the field of relief projects, Islamic charitable associations working on disaster relief have attempted to adopt international humanitarian law as their basis. Efforts to universalise humanitarian principles within Islamic charitable associations can be seen in their organisational philosophies, which enshrine common terms utilised by humanitarian organisations, such as impartiality, neutrality, humanity, and voluntarism.

The adoption of international humanitarian principles has made close cooperation with other international humanitarian groups possible, espe-

cially when Indonesian Muslim NGOs want to operate overseas, or when they want recognition from other international aid agencies or the United Nations (UN). PKPU, an Islamic humanitarian NGO which is closely associated with a leading Islamist party, PKS, has been recognised by the UN since 2008 as an ‘NGO with Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations’.⁹² Likewise, RZI has been awarded a prize for its contribution to the promotion of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), especially with respect to the improvement of maternal health and reduction of child mortality.⁹³

New Alliances in International Relief Projects

It is not always easy for faith-based organisations to collaborate with national and international humanitarian communities, unless there is shared common ground and mutual understanding between all parties. The adoption of international humanitarian law and the modernisation of organisational performance by Islamic charitable associations in particular have resulted in considerable progress, characterised by growing recognition from international humanitarian groups. Studies reveal that ‘cultural proximity’ can become a determinant factor shaping the type of beneficiaries and partners with which Muslim NGOs can collaborate. International co-operation is possible due to the adoption of international HR norms, not due to Islamic ideology. For example, international Muslim aid agencies working in disaster-affected areas, such as Muslim Aid and the IRW, have adopted international humanitarian law despite the fact that these two associations do not appear publicly as ‘secular’ NGOs. This means that their Islamic values and identities remain embedded in their organisational bases and philosophies. Therefore, Muslim Aid and IRW are able to cooperate with both Christian NGOs and other international, non-religiously-affiliated NGOs.⁹⁴

Linked to this, some Islamic charitable associations in Indonesia have attempted to become professional NGOs by combining and reconciling Islamic notions of mutual help, benevolent acts, and solidarity with the principles of international humanitarian law. By framing Islamic precepts and humanitarian principles in a broader perspective, the sectarian nature of faith-based

NGOs is no longer a barrier to cooperation with other parties from different cultural and religious backgrounds. In the Indonesian context, there has been a shift in the attitude of faith-based NGOs in interpreting their religious views through social expressions. The establishment of the Humanitarian Forum Indonesia (HFI), in which a number of Muslim and Christian NGOs participate, has indicated a paradigm shift among faith-based NGOs; they are now able to work in a broader arena (see chapter 7). The HFI consists of five organisations and relief NGOs operating in Indonesia: the MDMC Muhammadiyah (Islamic civil society organisation), Dompet Dhuafa (Islamic *zakat* agency), Karina (Caritas Indonesia), World Vision Indonesia (Protestant), YAKKUM Emergency Unit (Protestant), the Association for Community Empowerment (ACE), and Yayasan Tanggul Bencana (Catholic). While coordinating several humanitarian missions in the countryside and abroad, the HFI has been involved in and has organised workshops exploring the accountability and professionalism of relief NGOs, and has promoted a new standard for NGO accountability in Indonesia. On its website, the HFI expresses its concerns, stating that ‘we link Muslim and non-Muslim charities and help small NGOs find a voice on the International Arena.’⁹⁵

The adoption of international humanitarian principles has enabled Indonesian Muslim aid agencies to operate disaster relief overseas. DD has sent its humanitarian teams to assist with disaster relief overseas in places such as Iran (earthquake), Pakistan (earthquake and flood), Afghanistan (war), Myanmar (earthquake), China (earthquake), Japan (earthquake and Tsunami), and so forth. Likewise, along with other Islamic solidarity groups, DD has also provided assistance to the people of Gaza in Palestine. In the same way, BSMI and Mer-C, with their well-trained volunteers, have acted as NGOs specialising in medical relief while working in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Southern Thailand, Southern Lebanon and Gaza. Bearing in mind the above activities of Indonesian Islamic charitable associations in the international arena, one may conclude that there has been an institutional transformation of charity activism in Indonesia, from being simply local in character to becoming nationally and internationally recognised NGOs specialising in relief.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the development of Islamic charitable organisations in Indonesia and their encounters with social and political currents in both the national and international contexts. What makes Islamic charities particularly unique, especially in the post-New Order era, is that charities have increasingly become popular as a way to express Muslims' concerns about social, economic and political issues on the one hand, and have represented 'Islamic renewal' on the other hand. During the New Order era, social activism was mainly characterised by top-down policies and mobilisation. Since then, endeavours to strengthen civil society through the rejuvenation of local initiatives and charities have become increasingly pervasive. Islam is no longer seen as merely a set of teachings enshrined in the archives, but also as a spirit by which Muslim communities, represented by voluntary organisations, can reassert the relevance of Islam to the empowerment of society.

The post-Soeharto era, in particular, can be regarded as a period in which long-established discourse among Muslim intellectuals on the transformation of Islam in the social, economic and political domains was realised. Muslim engagement in welfare-oriented activism, in fact, is more visible in the public sphere than ever before. Therefore, welfare and development issues in the *Reformasi* era can no longer be exclusively associated with 'Western style' development NGOs, but also with voluntary organisations, whose philosophy and principles are based on traditional, but modified, concepts of Islamic forms of giving.

In fostering the public good, Islamic NGOs, notably charitable organisations, seem to have been able to combine religious discourses (i.e. the notion of benevolent acts) and social welfare issues. At the same time, they utilise modest language, which can be understood by lay people, and thus win the support of the masses, including wealthy and educated people. Hence, charity practice and poor relief activism have become increasingly popular among both the wealthy and the needy, and charitable organisations, notably *zakat* agencies, survive thanks to the tradition of giving that is embedded in cultural and religious traditions. It should also be noted that there has been a new trend among established *zakat* collectors to incorporate the strategies

used in—or to build partnerships with—development and advocacy NGOs in their social safety net and welfare programmes.⁹⁶

Islamic charitable associations and national *zakat* agencies have also had an impact on the transformation of Muslim perspectives and attitudes toward poverty and welfare issues, including basic nutrition, education, and healthcare. In some ways, Muslim NGOs' social roles have enriched the current perspectives of *'ulama*, who often deal with legal approaches by simply issuing *fatwa*. This legal approach is mainly characterised by a 'black and white' perspective, as well as by passing judgement on what is lawful and illicit. It is, therefore, safe to hypothesise that Islamic activism, through social practices and charities, has increasingly become a new means to translate and actualise Islam into reality. The main players who are able to do so are largely the Muslim middle class, with their extensive horizontal and vertical networks.

Two aspects of Islamic charities and their activities call for further analysis. The first relates to the basic concept of Islamic forms of giving such as *zakat*, *sedekah* and *waqf*. The second aspect relates to the role of charitable associations, which cannot easily be distinguished from that of development NGOs. One should also be aware that in recent times, there have been significant cultural and organisational changes within Islamic charitable institutions and voluntary associations. Islamic NGOs have attempted to develop their capacity, credibility, and accountability so that they can manage welfare and development-oriented programmes properly to meet the needs of the community. Therefore, it is unsurprising, as we will see in the following chapters, that Islamic charities, despite facing cultural, economic and political obstacles, are able to deal with extensive programmes and activities to relieve poverty, strengthen local initiatives, and preserve small economic enterprises. Under the framework of *dakwah*, Islamic charitable organisations can also reformulate notions of social justice, brotherhood, and Islamic solidarity as a means of strengthening the welfare of the *umma* in the national and international arena.

Endnotes

- ¹ Indonesia is neither a secular state, nor an Islamic state. Yet it is the world's largest Muslim country, in which wide-ranging Muslim participation in the public sphere has shaped Indonesia's social, economic and political dynamics. Following the fall of the New Order, Islamic influence in social, economic and political sectors started to increase, as indicated partly by the issuance of 'Islamic policies', and the emergence of Islamic financial institutions.
- ² The political tension between the 'secular nationalists' and 'Muslim nationalists' in the course of the reformulation of the nation's constitution was an example of how Islam remained an important driving force in state formation in the 1940s and 1950s, and the question of whether Indonesia should or should not become an Islamic State. There are a number of noteworthy works on Islam and the State in contemporary Indonesia: Bachtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003); Saiful Mujani and Raymond William Liddle, Muslim Indonesia's Secular Democracy, in *Asian Survey*, vol. 49, 4 (2009), 575-590; and Luthfi Assyaukanie, *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia* (Singapore; ISEAS, 2009).
- ³ See for example, the speech of Mohammad Natsir in front of the Constituent Assembly entitled *Islam sebagai Dasar Negara: Pidato di Depan Sidang Majelis Konsituante untuk Menentukan Dasar Negara RI (1957-1959)* (Bandung: Segarsy, 2004).
- ⁴ For further discussion, see Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Combining Activism and Intellectualism: The Biography of Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993)," *Studia Islamika*, No 1. Vol. 2 (1995), 111-147.
- ⁵ The *Golongan Karya* (Golkar) is a political machine of the New Order regime whose members include all civil servants, military officers, and those people who are considered a state-'dependent' middle class. Soon after the downfall of Soeharto, the Golkar officially became a political party.
- ⁶ The authoritarian regime in Indonesia, like other authoritarian regimes studied by sociologist and political scientist Asef Bayat, has prevented effective political participation by the people through civil-society organisations, because 'the state controls the bulk of the economic, political, and social domains, leaving little space for society to develop itself and for interest groups to surface, compete, and act autonomously.' Asef Bayat, "Activism and Social Development in the Middle East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No. 34 (2002), 1.
- ⁷ The New Order issued a policy which restricted student political activism, namely the NKK (*Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus*-Normalisation of Campus Milieu) and the BKK (*Badan Koordinasi Kampus-Campus* Coordinating Board). The imposition of this rule was refused by almost all student movements at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s.
- ⁸ It is suggested that the types of Islamic *dakwah* in Muslim societies began to resemble Christian types of missionary activities, which combine religious proselytising and social welfare. In the Indonesian context, we may also refer to the Muhammadiyah, which since the early 1920s has been combining social welfare activities with *dakwah*, as its Christian counterparts did in the early twentieth century in the East Indies. In the 1930s, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, for example, pioneered *dakwah* based on social welfare activities. This type of religiously-motivated social activity became increasingly popular among Muslims in many parts

- of the world in the 1970s. See Johan Meuleman, "Dakwah, Competition for Authority and Development," *Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land- en Volkenkunde*, Vol. 167, No. 2-3 (2011), 236-269. see also Umar Ryad, "Muslim response to missionary activities in Egypt: With a special reference to the Al-Azhar High Corps of 'Ulamâ (1925-1935)", in: Heleen Murre-van den Berg (ed.), *New Faith in Ancient Lands: Western Missions in the Middle East in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 281-307.
- ⁹ Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class," *Indonesia (Ithaca)*, No. 56 (1993), 1-35. Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogy of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," *South East Asia Research*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2002), 122.
- ¹⁰ For further discussion of Natsir political and *dakwah* activism, see Panitia Peringatan Refleksi Seabad Mohammad Natsir Pemikiran dan Perjuangannya, *Mohammad Natsir: Politik Melalui Jalur Dakwah* (Jakarta: Media Dakwahh, 2008); Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Combining Activism and Intellectualism: the Biography of Muhammad Natsir (1908-1993), *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 2, No 1 (1995), 111-147. On DDII see Asna Husin, "Philosophical and Sociological Aspect of *Da'wa*: a Study of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia," *Ph.D Dissertation*, Columbia University, New York, NY, 1998.
- ¹¹ See Donald J. Potter, *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia* (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 37-67; Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslim and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton University Press, 2000); Yudi Latief, *Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), 432-458.
- ¹² The term 'social Islam' has been used to denote Islamic NGOs and other kinds of 'non-profit, grassroots, voluntary societies that provide basic goods and services to communities in a manner Islamists deem consistent with Islamic values and practices.' Quintan Wiktorowicz & Suha Taji Farouki, "Islamic NGOs and Muslim Politics: a Case from Jordan," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2000), 696.
- ¹³ See for example Faisal Ismail, "Pancasila as the Sole Basis for all Political Parties and for all Organizations: an Account of Muslims' Response," *Studia Islamika*, vol. 3, 4 (1996), 1-92; Muhammad Rusli Karim, *HMI MPO dan Kemelut Modernisasi Politik di Indonesia* (Bandung: Mizan, 1997), For the historical development of Pancasila as a state ideology, see Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Islam as the Basis of the State: A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia", *Ph.D. Dissertation*, University of Chicago, 1983; also Vedi R. Hadiz, "the Failure of State Ideology in Indonesia: the rise and demise of Pancasila," in Chua Beng Huat (ed.), *Communitarian Politics in Asia* (London: ReouldledgeCurzon, 2004), 148-161.
- ¹⁴ For further discussion see Hilman Latief, "Youth, Mosques, and Islamic Activism: Islamic Source Books in University-based Halqah," *Kultur: the Indonesian Journal for Muslim Culture*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2010), 63-88; Hilman Latief, "The Identity of Shi'a Sympathizers in Contemporary Indonesia: An Overview," *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Vol. 2 No. 2 (Dec 2008), 300-335.
- ¹⁵ See Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown, "Indonesian Conglomerates: Ownership, Concentration, Crisis, and Restructuring," and "Indonesian Corporation, Cronyism, and Corruption," in *The Rise of Corporate Economy in Southeast Asia* (London: Routledge, 2006), 8-47

- and 80-108; Anne Booth, "Poverty and Equality in the Soeharto era: an assessment," in Jonathan Rigg (ed.), *Southeast Asian Development: Critical Concept in the Social Sciences* (London: Routledge, 2008), 298-324.
- ¹⁶ Nur Ahmad Fadhilah Lubis, "Financial Activism among Indonesian Muslims," in Virginia Hooker and Amin Saikal, *Islamic Perspective on the New Millennium* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004), 91-112.
- ¹⁷ R. William Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Volume. 55, No. 3 (1996), 620-31.
- ¹⁸ Adam Schwartz, *A Nation is Awaiting: Indonesia Search for Stability* (Boulder-Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), 175.
- ¹⁹ Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State and Civil Society: I.C.M.I and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class," A Working Paper, Boston University, Massachusetts, 1993; the Indonesian version is *ICMI dan Perjuangan Menuju Kelas Menengah*, translated by Endy Haryono (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 1995).
- ²⁰ Yudi Latif, *Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), 425-9.
- ²¹ Not all Muslim intellectuals are interested in being part of the ICMI. Gus Dur, the leader of the NU, refused to become involved as he thought that the ICMI was politically very partisan. Later on, Gus Dur and his 'nationalist' colleagues, among them Bondan Gunawan, Y.B. Mangunwijaya, Arief Budiman, Franz Magnis Suseno, Todung Mulya Lubis, Rahman Tolleng, Djohan Effendi, and Ghaffar Rahman established 'Forum Demokrasi' (*Democracy Forum- FORDEM*) in 1991. It is believed that this Forum was founded as a response to the establishment of the ICMI.
- ²² The crisis had a considerable impact, not only on the unemployment rate, but also on the labour market, school enrolment, healthcare, social conflict, etc. For further discussion of Indonesia's social and economic landscape before and after the crisis through both monetary and social variables, see for example, Aris Ananta (ed.), *The Indonesian Crisis: A Human Development Perspective* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003).
- ²³ Many Islamic organisations established BMTs as an alternative financial institution, for example, those working in the informal sector and street vendors with small assets in traditional markets. People who become BMT members can put their savings in—and borrow small amounts from—BMTs to run their own small businesses, and can pay back the loans by instalments, mainly on a daily basis, instead of monthly. BMTs are often set up in *pesantren* in order to teach *santri* (students) and *ustadz* (teachers) how to run small economic enterprises. In the past, *pesantren* simply ran 'conventional' cooperatives, but then, along with the increasing awareness of 'Islamic economics', these cooperatives were frequently replaced by the BMT.
- ²⁴ Some argue that the crisis had little impact on Islamic economic institutions because the assets of the BMT and the Islamic banks at that time were very small, unlike in conventional banks. However, during the New Order era, there were inadequate banks with limited capital that were still permitted to operate by the government, as well as a lot of bad bankers who used small banks to fund their own 'mega-projects'. It is therefore understandable that when the crisis hit Indonesia, a large number of foreign investors and local projects found themselves unable to operate due to the decline of buying ability within society, and many

- small, conventional banks were closed or at least merged.
- ²⁵ Michael Bonner, "Poverty and the Economics in the Qur'an," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, xxxv: 3 (Winter, 2005), 391; for a contemporary account on the discourse of *riba* and the practice of Islamic finance system in Muslim societies, see Abdullah Saeed, *Islamic Banking and Interest: a Study of the Prohibition of Riba and its Contemporary Interpretation* (Leiden : E.J. Brill ; New York : Koln, 1996).
- ²⁶ Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan, *The Charitable Crescent*, 37; also Bill Maurer, "Engineering an Islamic Future: Speculation on Islamic financial alternatives," *Anthropology Today*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2001), 8-11. Muhammad Syafii Antonio, "Islamic Microfinance Initiatives to Enhance Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises," in Greg Fealy and Shally White (eds.), *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia* (Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 2008), 253.
- ²⁷ See M. Dawam Rahardjo, "The Question of Islamic Banking in Indonesia," in Mohamed Ariff (ed.), *Islamic Banking in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1992); Bahtiar Effendy, "Islamic Economic Institutions in Indonesia: A Religio-Political Perspective," in K. S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (eds.), *Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), 64-81; the rapid development of Islamic banks in Indonesia took place in 2004-2005 when a number of conventional banks opened Shari'a divisions with 'separate legal entities', Umar Juoro, "The Development of Islamic Banking in the Post-Crisis Indonesian Economy," in Greg Fealy and Shally White (eds.), 230-232.
- ²⁸ As a comparison, in the Malaysian context, Islamic economic institutions emerged alongside the incredible economic growth of the Malaysian economy in the 1980s and 1990s, when the Islamic model of financial institutions played no major role. However, efforts to make the Islamic concept of a banking system a reality remain persistent, especially by Muslim intellectuals. Interestingly, one major part of the Islamic economic institution's agenda is the collection of *zakat* and the restructuring of the *Baitul Mal* (the House of Treasure). See Mohammad Aslam Haneef, "The Development and Impact of Islamic Economic Institutions: the Malaysian Experience," in K. S. Nathan & Muhammad Hashim Kamali, 91.
- ²⁹ Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan, *The Charitable Crescent*, 43.
- ³⁰ Minako Sakai, "Community Development through Islamic Microfinance: Serving the Financial Needs of the Poor in A Viable Way," in Greg Fealy and Shally White (eds.), *Expressing Islam*. 284.
- ³¹ The operation of financial institutions by Islamic associations is not a new phenomenon. For decades, some Islamic civil society organisations, including the Muhammadiyah and the NU, have paid attention to economic development projects and have made great endeavours to establish financial institutions, which are not always necessarily in accord with the principles of an Islamic economic system.³² But in recent times, the Muhammadiyah has also started operating Islamic, besides conventional, financial institutions. The operation of banks, BMTs and cooperatives has enabled the Muhammadiyah to support micro-finance projects. By 2010, the Muhammadiyah was managing at least 19 banks (*Bank Perkreditan Rakyat*), 190 BTMs, and 808 cooperatives. Moreover, there has been a paradigm shift among *zakat* agencies to institutionalise their vision of economic empowerment through so-called *zakat*

produktif (productive alms), meaning that *zakat* funds are dispensed for productive economic activities and income-generating projects among low-income families, instead of simply as a ‘consumptive charity’ (charitable practices).

- ³³ There was a huge debate on the notion of *zakat* on salary in the mid-1980s when M. Amien Rais, one of the Muhammadiyah leaders, reintroduced *zakat* on salaries. Some Islamic associations, especially the Persatuan Islam and the NU, simply argue that *zakat* on salary does not exist in Islamic literature. Other associations do not agree with Amien Rais who insisted that the *zakat* rate on salary can be increased up to 10% or 20%, instead of only 2.5%, and can be applied to those who earn high incomes. The MUI needed nearly two decades to come to an agreement to suggest that *zakat* on salary is acceptable according to Islam.
- ³⁴ The MUI also issued a *fatwa* regarding cash *waqf* and *zakat* on corporate wealth in 2002. This *fatwa* in turn was followed by the enactment of the Waqf Law in 2004. There was not obvious hesitation among MUI’s *fatwa* commissioners in issuing *fatwa* on cash *waqf*, unlike on corporate *zakat*. This is probably because traditionalist views on *zakat* remain prevalent among the members of the MUI; or because *waqf* is a voluntary form of giving that has not been prescribed in the Qur’an and Sunna in precise detail. Therefore, innovation in *waqf* practice will not lead to any religious and legal disputes among Indonesian Muslims.
- ³⁵ Cash *waqf* (*waqf al-nuqud*, charitable endowments established with cash capital), seem to have been predominantly practiced in order to finance charitable institutions. The practice of cash *waqf* has a long historical record within Islamic society as a whole, but it has been developed and promoted only recently in Indonesia. The Indonesian ‘Ulama Council (MUI) issued a *fatwa* (a religious opinion on the matter of Islamic law given by Muslim scholars) on cash *waqf* in May 2002, according to which donating money as *waqf* (instead of using the general term, *sedekah*) is permitted as long as the use of *waqf* fund does not violate shari’a principles. The practice of cash *waqf* in Indonesia is also confirmed in the Ordinance on Endowment Administration, which was legalised as late as 2004. The Ministry of Religious Affairs, *Strategy Pengembangan Wakaf Tunai di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Direktorat Pemberdayaan Wakaf, 2008), 8. The result of a seminar on Cash *Waqf* held in the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, which was sponsored by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Government-owned Telecommunications Company (PT Telkom), suggests that a number of Indonesian scholars shared similar concerns, agreeing that welfare of the *umma* can be increased through cash *waqf*. However, there has been no serious study on the religious foundations of the extent to which ‘cash *waqf*’ is formulated according to an Islamic viewpoint. The article of Uswatun Hasanah entitled “Wakaf Tunai Ditinjau Dari Hukum Islam” (Cash *Waqf* from the Perspective of Islamic Law) which was presented in that seminar, failed even to define cash *waqf* in the Indonesian context, including according to ‘Islamic law’. See Mustafa Edwin Nasution and Uswatun Hasanah (eds.), *Wakaf Tunai, Inovasi Finansial Islam: Peluang dan Tantangan dalam Mewujudkan Kesejahteraan Ummat* (Jakarta: PKTTI-UI, 2005), 51-78. Meanwhile, regarding cash *waqf*, the MUI, on 11 May 2002, came up with the following points: 1) cash *waqf* (Ind. *wakaf tunai*; Ar. *Waqf al-nuqud*) is an endowment performed by individual, institution or corporate body (*badan hukum*) in the form of money; 2) the meaning of ‘money’ in this case covers commercial paper money; 3) the legal status of cash *waqf* is permissible

(*jawaz*); 4) cash *waqf* can only be dispensed and used for purposes that are legally permitted by Islamic law; 5) the core value of money and its perpetuity should be protected and cannot be sold, donated, and or inherited. See *Hasil Ijtima' Ulama Komisi Fatwa se-Indonesia III*, 1430 H/2009M.

- ³⁶ In the case of the experience of Muslim traditionalists, especially among the members of the NU, see Martin van Bruinessen and Farid Wajidi, “*Syu'un Ijtima'iyah* and the *Kiai Rakyat*,” 205-248.
- ³⁷ In particular, Rais raised concerns over the unjust social, economic and political system of the New Order. He expressed his criticism of the existing regime by publishing his opinions throughout the Indonesian media. His thought on and attitude towards the corruption of the New Order can be found in the following books: Hamid Basyaib and Ibrahim Ali-Fauzi, *Ada Undang di Balik Busang: Dokumentasi Pers Kasus Amien Rais* (Bandung: Mizan, 1997).
- ³⁸ See Muhammad Amien Rais, *Tauhid Sosial: Formula Menggempur Kesenjangan* (Bandung: Mizan, 1998). This book is a reflection of his deep concern about welfare issues, social and economic justice, and the transformation of religion into social and political domains.
- ³⁹ At the end of 1990s, along with other leading personalities among politicians and intellectuals, such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soeharto Putri, and Sri Sultan Hamengkubowono, Amien Rais became a leading figure in the reform movement that forced Soeharto to step down from power.
- ⁴⁰ In support of his argument, Rais repeatedly mentions the term *mustad'afun* to signify those people who are systematically oppressed, exploited, weakened and alienated by existing social, economic and political structures. Amien Rais, *Tauhid Sosial*, 111.
- ⁴¹ His critical view of the New Order was in part represented in his proposal relating to the ‘succession of the national political leadership’, which stated his view that it would be necessary to bring down the regime, headed by President Soeharto, and to create a new and more democratic system.
- ⁴² Rais’ acquaintance with the works of such Muslim ideologists as Sayyid Qutb, Ali Shari’ati and Western scholarship seems to have enriched his insight and perspective in addressing structural problems. It goes without saying that his thought is influenced by his experience as a public intellectual and Muhammadiyah activist. Amien Rais, *Tauhid Sosial*, 114.
- ⁴³ In his view, disregarding social *Tauhid* will lead Muslims to lose the essence of Islam and, at the same time, they would not have precise guidance on how to promote social justice. To him, the rise of ‘liberation theology’ in Latin America shows how religious teachings and social issues are—and should be—inseparably linked. According to Rais, Catholic churches have for long time struggled to discover the theological essence of Christianity in the face of poverty and social injustice in Latin America. At that juncture, the Catholic priests were by nature compelled to introduce new insights into Christianity to be able to narrow the gap between societal needs and theological discourse.
- ⁴⁴ Noteworthy works of Moeslim Abdurrahman include: *Islam Transformatif* (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1995), *Islam yang Memihak* (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 20025); *Islam sebagai Kritik Sosial* (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2003).
- ⁴⁵ See “The Identity of Shi’a Sympathizers in Contemporary Indonesia: An Overview,” *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Vol. 1 No. 3 (Dec 2008), 300-335; Zulkifli, “The Struggle of Shi’is in

- Indonesia,” *Ph.D Dissertation*, Leiden University, 2009, 75-88.
- ⁴⁶ Jalaluddin Rakhmat, *Islam Alternatif: Ceramah-ceramah di Kampus* (Bandung: Mizan, 1986), 55 and 80.
- ⁴⁷ R. Michael Feener, *Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2007), 135-137.
- ⁴⁸ Nurcholish Madjid has written a number of works on various issues, such as Islam and modernity, religious pluralism, education, the secularisation of Islam, Muslim politics, etc. Among the very influential works are *Khazanah Intelektual Islam* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor & Bulan Bintang, 1984); *Islam: Kemoderenan dan Keindonesiaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 1987), and *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* (Jakarta: LAZIS Paramadina, 1995).
- ⁴⁹ See Martin van Bruinessen, “Nurcholish Madjid: Indonesian Muslim Intellectual,” *ISIM Review*, 17 (Spring 2006), 23.
- ⁵⁰ Professor TM Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqy wrote a number of articles and books on *zakat*, among which, *Tuntunan Zakah dan Fitrah: Tjaranya memberi, menerima, dan membagi* (Medan: Islamijah, 1949); *Perbendaharaan Zakat* (Bandung: Al-Maarif, 1952); *Pedoman Zakat* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1967). However, in his discussion of *al-mal al-mustafad*, he did not offer new thoughts besides his description of classical ‘ulama’s views of *al-mal al-mustafad*. One of his conclusions is that the *zakat* on *al-mal al-mustafad* should be paid after one year (*hawl*). See for example, his *Pedoman Zakat*, 17. A. Hassan also came up with the same idea of the *hawl*. A. Hassan, *Wajibkah Zakat sebelum Setahun?* (Bangil: Persatuan, 1959), tjetakan-2, 19.
- ⁵¹ In the 1950s, *zakat* on earnings was discussed in Damascus by a number of distinguished Muslim scholars and jurists, such as Abd al-Rahman Hasan, Muhammad Abu Zahrah, and Abd al-Wahab Khallaf. They re-examined the status, meaning and function of *al-mal al-mustafad* (the wealth and saved money which came into one’s possession during the estimation year) in modern times. According to Yusuf al-Qardawi, *al-mal al-mustafad* can be associated with the income earned by Muslims due to their professionalism and expertise, and he writes that ‘*zakat* is due on earned income, whether salaries, wages, professional fees, or return on capital invested in other than trade, such as shipping, planes, and hotels, when received, without the requirements of the passage of one year.’ Al-Qardhawi, *Fiqh az-Zakat*, 321. It is imperative to mention the work of al-Qardawi, because many Indonesians refer to al-Qardawi’s *Fiqh al-Zakat* in determining *zakat* on salary, especially since this book was published in 1999 and translated into Bahasa Indonesia. In accordance with this, Muhammad al-Ghazali in his work *al-Islam wa al-Awda’ al-Iqtisadiyya*, shares a similar view; ‘physicians (*al-thabib*), lawyers (*al-muhami*), engineers (*al-muhandis*) and other professionals and employees are subject to *zakat*.’ Cited in al-Qardhawi, *Fiqh az-Zakat*, 325; see also Muhammad al-Ghazali, *al-Islam wa al-Awda’ al-Iqtisadiyya* (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub wa al-Hadith, 1961) fifth edition, 167; also Mahmood Zuhdi Abdul Majid, “Syarat Hawl: Satu Penilaian terhadap Pandangan Al-Qardawi dalam Masalah Zakat Gaji dan Pendapatan Professional,” *Medium* Vol. 2. (1992).
- ⁵² Muhammad Amien Rais, *Tauhid Sosial: Formula Menggempur Kesenjangan* (Bandung: Mizan, 1998), 114. *Cakrawala Islam antara Cita dan Fakta* (Bandung: Mizan, 1987), 59-60.
- ⁵³ Masdar shows that the amount of *zakat* collected by BAZ is not even sufficient to pay the salaries of the ‘amil. Therefore, he advocates state coercive powers in collecting *zakat*/tax, but

the redistribution of it should be in accordance with classical prescriptions. Interview with Masdar F. Masudi, Director of P3M, in Jakarta, 24 October 2008. On Mas'udi's erudition on *zakat*, see Masdar F. Mas'udi, *Agama Keadilan: Risalah Zakat (Pajak) dalam Islam* (Bandung: Mizan, 2005). For further discussion, see also Feener, *Muslim Legal Thought*, 175-181.

- ⁵⁴ One of the most striking phenomena is the emergence of a number of Islamic associations such as the Muhammadiyah (1912), PGAI (Persatuan Guru Agama Islam-Association of the Teachers of Islamic Religion, 1913), Al-Irshad al-Islamiyyah (1914), PERTI (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Society for Islamic Education, in 1922), and PERSIS (Persatuan Islam-the Islamic Union, 1923), and the Nahdlatul Ulama (1926) whose main activities relate to education and other social enterprises.
- ⁵⁵ For further discussion of the Muhammadiyah's philanthropic and social activism see, Hilman Latief, *Melayani Umat: Filantropi Islam dan Ideologi Kesejahteraan Kaum Modernis* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2010).
- ⁵⁶ *Pesantren* Tebuireng was founded in 1899, and is located in Jombang District, East Java. For the characteristics of *pesantren* in Indonesia, see Zamakhsyari Dhofier, *The Pesantren Tradition: the Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional Islam in Java* (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1999); Martin van Bruinessen, "Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script used in the *Pesantren* Milieu, *Bijdragen tot de Tall, Land- en Volkenkunde*, vol. 146 (1990), p. 226-269; and M. Dawam Rahardjo, "The Kyai, the *Pesantren* and the Village: A Preliminary Sketch," in Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, and Yasmin Hussain (compilers), *Readings on Islam*, 240-246.
- ⁵⁷ It is worth emphasising that unlike within the modernist groups, where educational institutions formally belong to organisations, *pesantrens* among traditionalists are mainly and exclusively owned by kyai and his families. Therefore, even though the existence of the NU cannot be disassociated from the *pesantren*, there are not many *pesantren* officially owned by the NU, and only if the NU simply fulfils the role of an umbrella organisation with which *pesantren* can become affiliated.
- ⁵⁸ See Arskal Salim, "The Influential Legacy of Dutch Islamic Policy on the Formation of Zakat (tax) law in Modern Indonesia," *Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal*, Vol. 15. No. 3 (2006), 689. Yet, Aqib Suminto in his study of Dutch Islamic policy, concludes that it is through the establishment of religious courts, in which administration of religious practice is governed, that the Dutch colonial powers endeavoured to de-Islamise Indonesians politically. For further discussion Aqib Suminto, *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985); Muhammad Hisyam, "Caught between Three Fires: The Javanese Pangulu under The Dutch Colonial Administration 1882-1942," *PhD Dissertation*, Leiden University, 2001.
- ⁵⁹ Janine A. Clark, *Islam, Charity and Activism: Middle Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).
- ⁶⁰ See for example Gregory C. Kozlowski, *Muslim Endowment and Society in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
- ⁶¹ Siti Mashitoh Mahamood, *Waqf in Malaysia: Legal and Administrative Perspective* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 2006); compare with Abdul Azis bin Muhammad, *Zakat and Rural Development in Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1993).
- ⁶² Arskal Salim, "The Influential Legacy of Dutch Islamic Policy on the Formation of Zakat

- (Alms) Law in Modern Indonesia,” *Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2006), 683-70.
- ⁶³ Amelia Fauzia, *Faith and the State*, 102-4.
- ⁶⁴ In practice, the endowment of land is often characterised by disputes between the endowers (*waqif*) and their heirs or offspring who may disagree with the endowers’ decision, between the *waqif* and *nazir* (*waqf* administrator), and even between *waqif* and beneficiaries. Hence, *waqf* cancellation frequently occurred, and in order to keep endowment practice free of any legal disputes, rulers required the registering of property endowments, lands and buildings (such as mosques). For further discussion, see Rakhmat Djatnika, “Les wakaf ou ‘bien de mainmorte’ al Java-est: eitude Diachronique,” *Archipel* (1985), 121-136; “Peranan Wakaf dalam Mewujudkan Kesejahteraan Sosial,” *Ph.D Dissertation*, IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 1997.
- ⁶⁵ This can be found in *Bijblad* 1905 No.6169; *Bijblad* 1931 No.125/3; *Bijblad* 1934 No.13390; *Bijblad* 1935 No.13480. See Abdurrahman, *Masalah Perwakafan Tanah Milik dan Kedudukan tanah Wakaf di Negara Kita* (Jakarta: PT Citra Aditya Bakti, 1990, 18-20. After independence, endowments were regulated by—and incorporated within—Law Number 5 Year 1960 on Agrarian Essential Regulation (*Undang-undang Pokok Agraria*), which preserved the everlasting status of endowed immovable asset.
- ⁶⁶ Soon after, the Government Decree (*Peraturan Pemerintah*) Number 28 Year 1977 on Land Endowment (*Perwakafan Tanah Milik*) strengthened the legal umbrella of the land endowment system in Indonesia.
- ⁶⁷ For further discussion of the development and roles of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Indonesia see Daniel S. Lev, *Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases of Legal Institutions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Azyumardi Azra, “H. M. Rasjidi, BA: Pembentukan Kementrian Agama dalam Revolusi, in Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam (eds), *Menteri-menteri Agama RI: Biografi Sosial dan Politik* (Jakarta: INIS, PPIM, Badan Litbang Agama Departemen Agama RI, 1998); Karel Steenbrink, *Pesantren, Madrasah dan Sekolah* (LP3ES, 1986); and Moch. Nur Ichwan, “Official Reform of Islam: State Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia, 1966-2004,” *Ph.D. Dissertation*, Universiteit van Tilburg, the Netherland (2006).
- ⁶⁸ The state introduced government-sponsored *zakat* collectors, namely BAZIS, which were set up in some provinces and municipalities. For a brief but useful overview of the development and roles of BAZIS in the 1970s and 1980s, see Taufik Abdullah, “Zakat Collection and Redistribution in Indonesia”, in Mohammed Ariff (ed.), *The Islamic Voluntary Sector*, 52-53; M. Dawam Rahardjo, “Zakat dalam Perspektif Sosial Ekonomi,” *Pesantren* No.2/Vol. III/1986, 35-50.
- ⁶⁹ Michael Buehler, “Shari’a By-Laws in Indonesian Districts: An Indication for Changing Patterns of Power Accumulation and Political Corruption,” *Southeast Asia Research*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2008), 255-285; Ahmad Fathan Aniq, *Zakat Discourse in Indonesia: A Study of Teachers’ Resistance to Zakat Regional Regulation in East Lombok*, Master Thesis, Leiden University, 2008; see also Robin Bush, “Regional Shari’a regulation in Indonesia, Anomaly or Symptom?” in Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds.), 174-191.
- ⁷⁰ It seems that MoRA has made great efforts to have the amended bill draft passed as law, and

at the same time, civil society organisations, represented by community-based *zakat* agencies (LAZ), were not very involved in the formulation of the draft bill. Unsurprisingly, certain small and medium-size *zakat* agencies are about to initiate a judicial review of the newly legalised *Zakat* Law.

- ⁷¹ See Edward Aspinall, “Indonesian: Transformation of Civil Society and Democratic Breakthrough,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) *Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 61-96.
- ⁷² From the 1980s to the 1990s, many newly-formed development NGOs were operated predominantly by NU activists, who had less access to power and bureaucracy at that juncture than in the Reformasi era. The NU in general, especially under Abdurrahman Wahid’s leadership, opposed the regime, and the major agenda of the younger activists was that of strengthening civil society.
- ⁷³ M. Amin Azis earned an MSc degree in rural sociology from the University of the Philippines Los Baños Los Banos, the Philippines, and a PhD degree on agricultural economy from Iowa State University, in 1974 and 1978 respectively.
- ⁷⁴ Antonio, “Islamic Microfinance Initiatives”, 269-270; Effendy, “Islamic Economic Institutions,” 71. See also Panitian 70 Tahun M. Amin Azis, *Kegigihan Sang Perintis: Sebuah Biografi* (Jakarta: Embun Publishing, 2007), 107-120.
- ⁷⁵ See for example M. Amin Azis, “Umat Islam dan Perwujudan Keadilan Sosial,” in Sri-Edi Swasono et al, *Sekitar Kemiskinan dan Keadilan: Dari Cendekiawan Kita tentang Islam* (Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia Press, 1985), 65-87; also *Penanggulangan Kemiskinan melalui Pokusma dan BMT* (Jakarta: Pinbuk, 2004).
- ⁷⁶ For further discussion of Muslim intellectual discourse among youth with traditionalist backgrounds, including their social activism, see Farid Wajidi, “NU Youth and the Making of Civil Society: Notes from the Field,” in Hanneman Samuel and Henk Schulte Nordholt, *Indonesia in Transition: Rethinking ‘Civil Society’, ‘Region’, and ‘Crisis’* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004), 67-87.
- ⁷⁷ The 1965 tragedy involved the killing of seven army generals. The Communist Party was blamed for this, and this in turn caused the killing of thousands of people who were regarded as the advocates of the Communist movement.
- ⁷⁸ It can also be suggested that charitable foundations can emerge from different Muslim groups. What is essential to the spread of charitable associations is the use of religious idiom in collecting and mobilising public donations. Most of the founders of new *zakat* agencies, such as Ery Sudewo (Dompot Dhua’fa), Aa Gym (Daarut Tauhid), and Abu Syauki (Rumah Zakat Indonesia), were student activists in campus mosques in the 1980s.
- ⁷⁹ Bob S. Hadiwinata, *Politics of NGOs in Indonesia*, 237.
- ⁸⁰ As we shall see in chapter 4, healthcare projects for the poor carried out by Dompot Dhua’fa, PKPU and Rumah Zakat are partly funded by private sector organisations such as Telkom (government-owned telecommunication company), Indosat (private telecommunication company), Pertamina (government-owned oil company), Exxon Mobile (US-based oil company), CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation) and Freeport (US mining company).
- ⁸¹ Adi Sasongko, “Collaboration of NGOs and Private Sector in Improving the Health and

- Primary School Children in Jakarta, Indonesia (1987-2004),” in Manuel E. Contreras, *Corporate Social Responsibility*, 37-52.
- ⁸² For studies of communal conflict in Indonesia before and after the Reformasi era, see Gerry van Klinken, *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia* (Oxon & New York: Routledge, 2007).
- ⁸³ For a more comprehensive discussion of the militia’s roles in Ambon-Moluccas, see Noorhaidi Hasan, *Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post New Order Indonesia* (Cornell: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 2007).
- ⁸⁴ In 2002, Tamsil Limrung, the Chairperson of KOMPAK, and Agus Dwikarna, head of KOMPAK in the Celebes Region, were captured at an airport in the Philippines. They were accused of having supported terrorist action in conflict spots and other regions of Indonesia. According to the Philippines authorities, Agus Dwikarna was arrested while carrying explosives. Meanwhile, Tamsil Limrung was released after officers found him to be innocent of terrorist crimes.
- ⁸⁵ The ICG Report accused of KOMPAK of taking part in violent actions in Ambon and Poso. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/op-eds/jones-briefing-for-the-new-president-the-terrorist-threat-in-indonesia-and-southeast-asia.aspx> (Accessed Des 28, 2011).
- ⁸⁶ See also Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan, *the Charitable Crescent*, 70; J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Alms for Jihad*, 1-3.
- ⁸⁷ In recent times, the use of the Red Crescent symbol by BSMI seems to have generated tension with long-established humanitarian associations, such as PMI (Indonesian Red Cross Society). For further discussion see Hilman Latief, “Symbolic and Ideological Contestation over Humanitarian Emblem: The Red Crescent in Islamizing Indonesia”, *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2011), pp. 249-286; also Jonathan Benthall, “The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Islamic Societies, with special reference to Jordan,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 24, 2 (1997), 157-177.
- ⁸⁸ One observer has suggested, ‘the vast majority of Islamic actors in Aceh following the Tsunami were representative of Islam in Indonesia.’ John Ratcliffe, “Islamic Charities after Catastrophes: The Kashmir Earthquake and the Indian Ocean Tsunami,” in Jon B. Alterman and Karin von Hippel, *Understanding Islamic Charities*, 52.
- ⁸⁹ One volunteer, a former activist of the Muhammadiyah Youth Association (*Pemuda Muhammadiyah*) in Yogyakarta, was appointed as a coordinator. He was later replaced by a Christian Australian social worker, while the former coordinator was appointed as chair of another Muslim Aid office in Myanmar.
- ⁹⁰ See Report, CARE, *Catholic Relief Service, Save the Children, and World Vision Indonesia: Joint Evaluation of Their Response to the Yogyakarta Earthquake* (July 2007).
- ⁹¹ The Tzu Chi foundation has also enjoyed strong support from Indonesian Chinese entrepreneurs. In the Indonesian context, Tzu Chi humanitarian activism can be seen in the form of schools and dwellings built either in poor urban or disaster-prone areas. Most of Tzu Chi’s humanitarian products are labelled ‘Cinta Kasih’ (love). In Pangalengan sub-district, about 40km from Bandung in West Java, a government primary school was rebuilt and renamed ‘Sekolah Unggulan Cinta Kasih’ (Superior School-Merciful Love). Some dwelling

complexes have been built by Tzu Chi in Aceh and have been labelled *Perumahan Cinta Kasih* Tzu Chi. In response to the frequent floods that strike Jakarta and affect thousands of families, especially those in the squatter settlements along the railroads and rivers, Tzu Chi recently completed an apartment building which can hold 1,100 families, costing US\$ 7.05 million.

- ⁹² Interview with Agus Rijanto, Head of Communication, Buddha Tzu-Indonesian Head Quarter, August 5, 2010. The use of bamboo ‘piggy banks’ in internalising the values of giving within families, the sympathisers of Tzu Chi, is regenerated within communities. People put these bamboo piggy banks in their work places, offices, and homes, and people are encouraged to put pennies in them before or after going to market, so that the idea of ‘save a bit, give a lot’ can be sustained. This tradition is practised by Tzu Chi sympathisers around the globe.
- ⁹³ Hilman Latief, “Medical Charities, Disaster Relief and Public Health Care in Indonesia: Faith-based Charitable Clinics in Post-Disaster Aceh and Nias,” in Justin Pierce and Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown (eds.), *Living Religion and Gifting: Medical Charities, State and Science in Asia and the Middle East* (London: Routledge, 2011).
- ⁹⁴ <http://www.pkpu.or.id/about> (Accessed March 27, 2011)
- ⁹⁵ <http://www.rumahzakat.org/detail.php?id=7596&kd=B> (Accessed March 27, 2011)
- ⁹⁶ For example, when operating in Latin America, the IRW also worked closely with the Catholic Overseas Development Agency (CAFOD) to operate various relief and development projects. Interview with Rianne Tenveen, Policy and Research Division, and Bedreldin Shutta, Head of Asia Region-IRW Headquarters Birmingham, August 10 2009.
- ⁹⁷ <http://hfindonesia.blogspot.com/> (Accessed March 28, 2011)
- ⁹⁸ On the relation between NGOs and *zakat* agencies or charities in Indonesia, see Adi Chandra Utama, *LSM vs LAZ, Bermitra atau Berkompetisi? Mencari Model Kemitraan bagi Optimalisasi Potensi Filantropi menuju Kedilan Sosial* (Depok: Pustaka, 2006).

Health Provision for the Poor*

Introduction

This chapter will shed light on the rise of Islamic charitable clinics in contemporary Indonesia and the multiplicity of roles they have played, ranging from providing health assistance for disadvantaged segments of society to introducing Islamic notions of mutual help and social welfare systems. This topic is interesting to pursue given that in the Indonesian context, no comprehensive work, as far as I am aware, whether historical, sociological or otherwise, has been written on the Islamic charitable clinics that have proliferated in recent years. The studies on the *zakat* movement and social welfare activism share a similar concern, linking the rise of charitable institutions with the inadequacy of the state welfare system, which by definition should benefit people from deprived backgrounds. This chapter argues that there has been an increasing tendency within *zakat* agencies to include health provision for the poor in their major social programmes, along with economic development-oriented programmes. Islamic charitable clinics set up by *zakat* agencies have functioned as a mechanism to redistribute almsgiving to deserved beneficiaries, as an approach to translate religious notions of welfare into social and economic domains, and implicitly, as a strategy to evaluate the weakness of state welfare provision in the arena of healthcare.

Islamic Charitable Clinics in Indonesia

It is necessary to clarify the meaning of the term ‘Islamic charitable clinics’, as used in this chapter. There are at least three main types of hospitals in Indonesia, in terms of ownership and the origin of their resources. The first constitutes public hospitals that receive a substantial government subsidy. These hospitals are governed by various state bodies, such as the Ministry of Health, local governments (provincial and district), state-owned companies, and the Indonesian National Army. The second constitutes private hospitals, both domestic and international, which have emerged as commercial enterprises.¹ The third constitutes ‘non-commercial clinics’ that are run by non-profit organisations, including *zakat* agencies and charitable associations, which have recently received widespread support from the community. Charitable clinics are not a new phenomenon in Indonesia, nor in other countries in South and Southeast Asia, as well as in the Middle East. Charitable clinics tend in particular to arise in countries with a shortage of health services.²

In Indonesia, religious associations are deeply involved in welfare activism and play a dominant role in the establishment of health centres. Historically speaking, since the early nineteenth century, a number of religious groups, notably Christian and Muslim groups, have set up various kinds of health centres. Under the support of the Dutch colonial government, Christian groups in the Netherlands East Indies, for example, enjoyed certain privileges, such as the opportunity to adopt and develop a Western medical system. In subsequent years, this path has been followed by the Muhammadiyah, a modernist Muslim association whose social activities have been overwhelmingly related to welfare issues.³ The Muhammadiyah has recently become renowned as the largest Islamic association running hundreds of clinics, hospitals, and nursing and medical schools in Indonesia. In recent times, we have seen pervasive involvement on the part of Islamic associations in the establishment of clinics in Indonesia, which are not always charitable, but rather commercial in character.⁴ Aside from the preservation of Islamic identity, there is no particular distinction to be made between Islamic clinics and other ‘secular’ private or government clinics. Yet, the roles played by charitable clinics have distinguished them from both ‘conventional’ private and

government clinics: charitable clinics attempt to serve particular segments of society, such as poorer families. Various terms have been employed to signify charitable clinics that are supported by voluntary contributions. Among those are ‘voluntary clinics’, ‘philanthropic clinics’, ‘community clinics’ and ‘non-profit clinics’.⁵

Table 1
Zakat agencies and health programmes

ZAKAT AGENCY	HEALTH PROVISION					
	Provisional Health Service	Mobile Healthcare *	Ambulance	Maternity Clinics	Child Nutrition	Permanent Clinic
Dompot Dhu'afa/DD	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rumah Zakat Indonesia/RZI	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
YDSF	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lazis Muhammadiyah*	No	No	No	No	No	No
DPU Daarut Tauhid	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Al-Azhar Peduli	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Pos Keadilan Peduli Ummat	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

There are two types of Islamic charitable clinic in Indonesia. The first consists of clinics that have become increasingly commercialised. Some Islamic clinics in Indonesia, to borrow a term from Janine Clark’s classification of Islamic social institution (ISIs) in Middle Eastern countries, have become ‘Islamic commercial institutions’ (ICIs), signifying ‘those mostly private commercial (albeit non-profit) institutions that cater, as evidenced by their relatively high fees, to the middle class.’⁶ In this respect, the Muhammadiyah clinics can, to some extent, be included in this category. The second type is of clinics set up by *zakat* agencies and charitable institutions as a means of providing low-cost and free medical care to the poor. Islamic charitable clinics resemble Clark’s definition of Islamic welfare institutions (IWIs) whose overriding aim is to ‘cater to the welfare of the poor ... provide financial aid to orphans and reduce-price medical service to the poor’.⁷ Therefore, in this

dissertation, the term Islamic charitable clinics refers to community health centres or clinics set up by Islamic welfare voluntary associations, notably *zakat* agencies, whose overarching objective is to cater to particular disadvantaged groups of society as the legitimate beneficiaries of almsgiving. In Indonesia, a number of charitable associations have provided various types of health services for the communities. Some Islamic charities have even set up permanent clinics, as can be seen in Table 1.⁸

Community-based *zakat* agencies (LAZ) have expanded the scope of their programmes by engaging in welfare issues since the late 1990s. Amongst the dozens of *zakat* agencies specialising in health provision, two main institutions have recently come to the fore, and have shown remarkable progress by serving thousands of poorer families. These two major institutions are Dompot Dhuafa Republika (DD), an Islamic philanthropic organisation affiliated with the Muslim-based national daily newspaper ‘*Republika*’, and Rumah *Zakat* Indonesia (RZI), which literally means ‘Indonesian *Zakat* House’, a religious gathering-based philanthropic organisation founded in Bandung, West Java. To focus the analysis, I will compare the existing charitable institutions with the Muhammadiyah’s hospitals. The way in which the Muhammadiyah creates hospitals is rather different from the method employed by *zakat* agencies. The clients of the Muhammadiyah’s hospitals come from various backgrounds, ranging from the wealthy middle class to low-income households. A proportion of the revenue obtained by the Muhammadiyah’s hospitals is reinvested in social and economic enterprises. Therefore, the Muhammadiyah’s missions and programmes no longer rely heavily upon almsgiving. In particular I will also look at the social function of the internal *zakat* bodies that exist in the Muhammadiyah’s hospitals, especially with regard to financing patients from deprived economic backgrounds.

Why the Rise of Charitable Clinics?

The following stories reflect the experience of those coming from deprived backgrounds. These people, whom state health policy is unable to reach, seek medical treatment at charitable clinics.⁹ A 60-year-old agricultural worker from a small village in the Pangalengan highlands of Bandung

comes to the city. He is escorting his pregnant sixteen-year-old daughter-in-law, who will deliver her baby in an Islamic charitable clinic. The clinic is located in the suburb of Bandung, about 40 km from the Pangalengan highlands. As a farm labourer, he spends much of his time in the village with his wife, taking care of cultivated areas belonging to his landlord. He entrusted his only small farm near his house to his 18-year-old son, the husband of the pregnant young woman. The monthly income of this family of farm labourers is sufficient for their daily life, but does not cover education and healthcare expenditures. Therefore, the agricultural worker encourages his son to work on the farm instead of sending him to college. When one of the family members gets sick, the family attempts self-medication or, if necessary, looks for low-cost health services at the local health centre. Yet, the situation is rather different when the family requires special but costly medication for a particular illness. The appearance of the agricultural worker and his pregnant daughter-in-law in DD's charitable clinic in Bandung reflects their need for appropriate and lower-cost maternity health treatment for one of the family members.

A similar case is that of a 55-year-old farm labourer from the Cikalong Wetan sub-district, about 45 km from the Bandung Municipality, who escorts his wife (35 years old) for intensive medical care. They decided to visit this clinic because they were worried about medical costs, and wanted to avoid the unpleasant experiences that they might have faced in the conventional clinics due to their economic status. This husband with four children (the elder son has just enrolled in high school, while the youngest is a three-year-old baby) used to work as a construction labourer in Jakarta. He went back to his village to work as a labourer on a tea farm. Although this family can afford daily expenditures and send their children to the schools available in the village, the additional cost of family healthcare is an exception. With a limited income, they have faced great difficulties in managing the healthcare of the family members, either by relying upon a self-pay approach or conventional medical insurance.¹⁰ The above cases were related to me during my visit to the Free Maternity Clinics of Bandung, one type of Islamic charitable clinic established by *zakat* agencies. The two families are among those who

are trying to seek alternative institutions for their medical treatment as they are not being reached by the Indonesian government's current healthcare system.

The Indonesian government has launched various welfare programmes as a means of providing healthcare for uninsured poorer families. One related policy was the enactment of the Law of the National Social Security System (*Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional-SJSN*) No. 40 in 2004,¹¹ which stated that every citizen, especially if poor, would be insured by the government for basic health services.¹² Other government healthcare schemes include the 'Gakin card' (Gakin stands for *Keluarga Miskin*: poor family) and *Jamkesmas* (*Jaminan Keamanan Sosial*: social security system), which allow destitute families to access low-cost or even free healthcare provision. In reality, however, the implementation of the Law of the National Social Security System (SJSN) is by no means comprehensive. In fact, the above-mentioned healthcare schemes cannot be accessed appropriately by the targeted segments at grassroots level, especially among workers in informal sectors.¹³ This is due to: (1) the gap between the number of distributed healthcare cards (*Kartu Askes*) and the actual number of poorer families in the country; (2) the lack of an effective bureaucracy and administration system in both hospitals and local administrations;¹⁴ and (3) people's limited access to information about government healthcare insurance.¹⁵ It is partly under these circumstances that certain poorer families in rural and urban areas seek alternative, more accessible, lower-cost, and less-bureaucratic healthcare outside the government health centres.

The growth in the number of charitable clinics is also influenced by the increase of Islamic aid and various social funds collected by *zakat* agencies. There has been a new trend within national and multinational corporations in Indonesia to channel social funds to *zakat* agencies. As discussed in the previous chapter, in Indonesia, the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) was first introduced formally through the Ordinance on Corporation in 2007, and through the Ordinance on Capital Investment (*UU Penanaman Modal*) No. 25, also in 2007. Since then, the government has attempted to impose these laws on corporations and investments. Legitimised

by the concept of CSR,¹⁶ Muslim workers in large corporations are able to organise social funds derived either from employees' *zakat* payments or corporate social funds. In fact, corporations are not particularly affected by laws (or shari'a by-laws) on almsgiving imposed at the provincial and district levels. Law and shari'a by-laws on almsgiving apparently remain restricted to Muslim civil servants and often overlook employees in the private sector. As *zakat* agencies have not directly benefited from shari'a-by-law in respect of *zakat* payment to any great extent, they have endeavoured to optimise corporate social funds as an alternative source. Research conducted by the Public Interest Research and Advocacy Centre (PIRAC), a Jakarta-based NGO, reveals that although corporate social funds are predominantly allocated for social services, religious activities and education, the allocation for health programmes remains a moderate 33%.¹⁷

Unlike advocacy NGOs that are politically quite resistant to the government's unpopular policy on health, there is no strong discourse and movement within *zakat* agencies opposing the recent government policies on health and economics. Rather, *zakat* agencies seem to have built relations with government officials, making themselves the government's partners in fostering social welfare in the country. Abu Syauqi, the founder of RZI, for example, explains: 'We would like to show that NGOs could help society, and so does the government. I would not bother the government...but rather would like to help them.'¹⁸ It is also common for the inaugurations of Islamic charitable clinics to be attended by high-ranking government officials, ranging from the President to the Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Minister of Health, and other politicians. In 2001, Vice-President Hamzah Haz visited Ciputat-Tangerang, on the outskirts of Jakarta, to inaugurate the Free Health Services (LKC) of DD. On 14 September 2007, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, and Vice-President Muhammad Yusuf Kalla were present at the inauguration of a health centre that had been set up by the Semi-Government-National *Zakat* Board (BAZ-NAS) inside the complex of the Sunda Kelapa Grand Mosque of Jakarta.¹⁹

The presence of high-ranking government officials in the above-mentioned clinics points to the state's encouragement of communities to strengthen

social cohesion. This encouragement arguably arises from the moderate contributions to the social development process, in accordance with government interest in the welfare of society.²⁰ More importantly, however, charitable services offered by *zakat* agencies are regarded by the state—to borrow an expression from Soheir A Morsy—as ‘a contribution towards placating the masses.’²¹ Meanwhile, inviting government officials can be seen as a way in which *zakat* agencies remind the government to provide a viable healthcare service and increase the living standards of low-income households.²²

Charitable Clinics:

Programmes, Actors and Beneficiaries

The Islamic charitable clinics established by DD and RZI in part represent Muslim NGOs’ attitudes toward the welfare of the community. In the following section, I discuss the profiles of two Islamic charitable clinics: their programmes, financial sources, actors, beneficiaries, and their roles in the community. I will also investigate further the limitations and potential of the existing healthcare scheme offered by *zakat* agencies from the perspective of mutual help for the poor.

Dompot Dhuafa (DD): Healthcare and Community Development

Supported by urban, middle-class Muslims, especially professionals, educated people, and celebrities who are very enthusiastic about bringing Islamic teachings into the social and economic domains, DD has grown rapidly. Since 2001, it has operated independently from *Republika* and has been managed professionally. Known as a national *zakat* agency, DD has run various programmes under the concept of a ‘Social Asset Network’, one of which deals with healthcare for the needy. On 6 November 2001, DD launched Free Health Services (*Layanan Kesehatan Cuma-Cuma-LKC*) that were only accessible to those in need. Allocating IDR. 2,804,740,088, DD established 3 *Gerai Sehat* (Health Outlets) in Ciputat and Cipulir in Jakarta, Bekasi in West Java. Since then, these Health Outlets have catered to the needs of dozens of patients from low-income families. Furthermore, DD launched *Aksi Layanan Sehat* (Health Service Action) to reach poor areas (ghettos), and

SIGAP *Bencana* (Disaster Preparedness) to operate in conflict- and disaster-affected areas.²³ Moreover, DD has developed and extended the scope of its health programme by revitalising *Pos Pelayanan Terpadu* (POSYANDU- community health posts), beneficiaries of which include housewives, housemaids and teenagers. In this respect, DD has been remarkably innovative, having incorporated income-generating projects with community health centres so that social and economic welfare could be run altogether. The ongoing and monumental DD project concerning health has been named *Zona Madina Dompét Dhua'fa* ('Medina Zone of Dompét Dhu'afa), under which a more comprehensive Islamic charitable hospital, namely *Rumah Sehat Terpadu*, is currently being constructed. Launched on 7 January 2009, this new project is being funded by the community through 'cash *waqf*' (*wakaf tunai*) (see Table 2).²⁴

Table 2
Zakat funds allocated for healthcare by DD (1993-2002), in IDR

Years	Poor Patient Services /Facilitation	Clinic Support	Explanation
1993	0	0	The amount of money spent by DD prior to the establishment of Free Health Services (LKC).
1994	25,711,585,00	10,000,000,00	
1995	26,794,650,00	11,651,000,00	
1996	29,497,000,00	2,800,000,00	
1997	65,818,200,00	20,850,000,00	
1998	101,687,500,00	8,300,000,00	
1999	116,881,100,00	0	
2000	207,834,700,00	0	
2001	460,688,200,00	2,143,873,155,00	The amount of money spent on clinic support suddenly increased after the founding of Free Health Services (LKC).
2002	356,101,700,00	2,325,025,900,00	
Total	1,390,975,335,00	4,522,500,055,00	
Total	IDR 5,913,475,390,00 ¹		

One of DD's branch offices is located in Bandung and was founded in 2002. It has become DD's representative office in West Java. By renting one

building in Bandung city centre, DD's branch office has made itself accessible to both benefactors and recipients; benefactors/*zakat* payers and *zakat* recipients enter and exit through these doors on a daily basis. The location of this office, only 300 metres away from to the major Public Hospital of West Java, *Rumah Sakit Hasan Sadikin* (RSHS), from which DD's office frequently receives uninsured patients from deprived backgrounds who need more assistance than they can obtain at the Public Hospital. Some need financial help with prescription costs that are not covered by state insurance; others simply require administrative assistance to gain free basic medical care from the government. The most frequent cases that DD treats relate to maternity care, and DD has often been called in by poorer families to finance the costs of maternity care. It works in cooperation with the Maternity Clinic Al-Islam Awi Bitung of Bandung, which bills DD's office for the care of pregnant women. DD's regular expenditure on this programme has increased along with the rising cost of maternity medical treatment, and thus began to operate its own maternity care for low-income households in 2004. The clinic is named the Free Maternity Clinic or RBC (an acronym for '*Rumah Bersalin Cuma-Cuma*') and provides healthcare for infants, children and women. DD's first maternity clinic was set up in Bandung, West Java; it has handled nearly 10,000 health-related cases.

Full- and part-time medical workers have been appointed in this maternity clinic, among them one gynaecology specialist, three physicians, five midwives, and three nurses. There are also employees who work as administrative supervisors, financial supervisors, front office attendants and security guards. This clinic is open 24 hours a day for maternity care and its regular office hours are from 7.30 am to 5.00 pm. It provides antenatal care (ANC), Intranatal care (INC) and *post partum* or postnatal care for uninsured, disadvantaged groups. Its programmes include improving nutrition for children and pregnant women, pregnancy exercises, medical ultrasonography (USG), immunisation, and basic medical treatments. The RBC also functions as a medical advisor, able to refer the needy with particular illnesses to larger public or private hospitals for more appropriate medical treatment.

Initially the RBC was laid out in the form of a small health clinic in a

rural area, occupying a modest house in the suburb of Bandung. In its early years, the RBC clinic had limited facilities and could only host a few patients. In 2007, a new proposal came unexpectedly from local people to set up a more permanent and representative clinic. Admiring DD's social activities, a local family wanted to endow (*waqf*) some parts of their lands to DD for social purposes. An agreement was made between the two (the family and DD), whereby the family would provide the land and DD would construct the building.²⁶ It is worth mentioning that some *zakat* agencies, including DD, never use *zakat* funds to finance physical infrastructure projects, as they believe that *zakat* funds can only be allocated directly to beneficiaries. Therefore, these *zakat* agencies insist that intensive fundraising should be carried out in cases where funds are required specifically for building works and projects. Thus, with the support of DD's central office and with the help of donors and corporations who were aware of the social roles of this institution, a permanent and better-equipped maternity clinic was finally established.²⁷ The RBC in Bandung received different kinds of endowments. Apart from land, for example, it also received endowments in the form of medical facilities and cash. The way in which the RBC attracted its benefactors is also interesting; DD distributed a list of required medical facilities, with the respective value attached to each, to potential benefactors, so that the donor could give according to their own personal preference. Certain medical facilities in the RBC are therefore marked with a list of the benefactors' names.

Rumah Zakat Indonesia (RZI): An Islamic Gathering Group with Social Concerns

As mentioned previously, RZI was originally named Dompot Sosial Ummul Qura (DSUQ) and founded in 1998. The establishment of this *zakat* agency cannot be separated from the activities of the preacher and social activist 'Abu Syauqi' (Deni Triesnahadi),²⁸ who has led the *Majelis Ta'lim Ummul Qura* religious study group for over two decades.²⁹ This *Majelis Ta'lim* was founded by Abu Syauqi in 1996, and initially facilitated religious gatherings and public sermons, in which Abu Syauqi was a key figure. In the following years, the *Majelis Ta'lim*'s activities were broadened to include social activities. The first and foremost item on the agenda at that time was to help poor

orphans living in the surrounding neighbourhood. As leader, Abu Syauqi began by drawing up a proposal comprising the comprehensive files of ten orphans. The proposal was then presented to the community. Having provoked an enthusiastic response, Abu Syauqi, who used to work as a physiological and religious counsellor in a private hospital in Bandung, presented a further 100 files regarding orphans to the community and likewise received passionate support. A number of people then encouraged him to extend his social activities by addressing not only orphans, but also poorer families in the neighbourhood. He then promoted his institution as a *zakat* agency to which Muslims could channel their *zakat*, *infak*, *sedekah* and *waqf*.³⁰

Table 3
The redistribution of RZI's Islamic aid, 2008

Programme	Percentage	Activities
Ecocare	20%	Micro-finance, cooperatives, economic development.
ICD	5%	Facilitating RZI's programme in the community.
National Distribution	9%	Supporting RZI branches throughout Indonesia.
Youthcare	10%	Youth Camp, on-campus volunteer recruitment, training capacity building of volunteers (for community development and emergency rescue team), and Youth Development Centre
Educare	22%	'The Winner School' (scholarship for distinguished preliminary Students), Kids Learning Centre (KLC), Centre for Kids Potential Development, and Student Camp.
Healthcare	34%	Free Maternity Clinics, Free Maternity Service, Free Health service, ambulance, mobile clinics, immunisation, etc.

This agency has, in essence, tried to redefine the concept of Islamic piety and to translate it into reality. It aims to function as an intermediary between givers and recipients, in order to narrow the gap between prosperous and disadvantaged groups in society. Acting as a *zakat* collector, RZI has gained strong support from society, and since 2003 has been acknowledged as a national *zakat* agency by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It is reported that by 2008, this *zakat* agency had been supported by 64,222 benefactors and had been able to operate 44 branch offices throughout Indonesia. To date, it

has provided work for at least 700 employees.³¹RZI's social activities can be basically defined as populist and its programme nomenclatures include *Ecocare*, *Healthcare*, *Educare* and *Youthcare*. RZI won praise from the United Nations (UN) for its contribution to health and for the development of essential nutrients among poorer families. RZI has been involved in the promotion of the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), especially in the field of poverty eradication, education and the reduction of infant and maternity mortality rates. The following table shows the various kinds of projects to which RZI has channelled its aid in 2008.

RZI's Health Services and Integrated Community Development

Integrated Community Development (ICD) is a sub-district or village-based community development programme implemented in certain regions. In order to be more effective in carrying out its activities in the community, RZI's functionaries, namely *Mustahik Relation Officers* (MROs), or people who can regularly interact with *zakat* recipients, are appointed in the targeted locations. MROs act as RZI's representatives, responsible for the success of RZI's missions, including micro-finance projects. The MROs are usually installed in a community, staying close to the people so that they can become acquainted with their societal needs. The MROs' main duties are to assess the socio-economic background of a community, to classify the target groups according to their average income, and to monitor RZI's ongoing economic development programmes in the given region. In short, the MROs function as motivators, coordinators and facilitators. RZI particularly selects young, dedicated and married men to be MROs. The MROs have become key sources in supplying information to RZI's office about actual conditions in the field. It is interesting that the ICD programmes have also become a means for recruiting charitable clinic members.³²

RZI has allocated most of its collected funds to health programmes.³³ Since the Qur'an mentions eight *asnaf*, of which the *'amil* is one, many thinkers have proposed equal distribution of *zakat* funds among the *asnaf*, so that the *'amil* receive one eighth. 12.5% of the total social fund is for the *zakat* administrator (*'amil*); 10% is kept in reserve; and the remaining 77.5% is redistrib-

uted through various programmes. Seven Free Maternity Clinics (RBGs) have been established in Indonesia, notably in major cities such as Bandung, Semarang, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Medan, Pekanbaru and Surabaya. In other areas where the collected funds are insufficient to meet the regular expenditure of charitable clinics, RZI does not operate its own clinics, but offers free maternity care (*LBG-Layanan Bersalin Gratis*) in cooperation with local hospitals and maternity clinics. For example, in Banda Aceh, where RZI is still struggling with the problem of collecting social funds from local people, especially after the Tsunami disaster, health services are provided through local hospitals and clinics, with RZI footing the bill.³⁴

One of RZI's Free Maternity Clinics was set up near the centre of Bandung. Its location is close to the Central Office of RZI and surrounded by different buildings. To the right and left of the clinic there are small higher-education institutions. Bandung Super Mall, the largest shopping mall in Bandung, is located about 400 metres from the clinic. This area is far from the slums of Bandung. A house that functions as a clinic was rented for a couple of years and then bought by RZI.³⁵ This clinic was built in order to cater to the needs of poorer families in the Bandung area. At the time I conducted my fieldwork, this clinic was directed by a young physician who had been working there, with RZI, for six months. He decided to accept RZI's offer of becoming the manager of this clinic after serving as a junior physician in a public hospital in a suburb of Bandung. He told me that during his time with RZI, he had undergone a whole new experience, thanks to RZI's status as a social institution that combines social and religious duties.

Interestingly, these DD and RZI clinics seem to be trying to develop a new 'trademark', one that differs from that of the state-owned and private hospitals and clinics. The term 'hospital' in English is equivalent to the phrase '*Rumah Sakit*' in Bahasa Indonesia, which literally means 'the house of the sick' (comparable with *ziekenhuis* in Dutch). In order for a health centre or clinic to be described as '*Rumah Sakit*', it first must fulfil conditions set by the Ministry of Health. In Jakarta, for example, charitable clinics belonging to DD have been named *Layanan Kesehatan Cuma-cuma* ('Free Health Services') and *Rumah Sehat Indonesia* (Indonesian Health House) rather than *Rumah*

Sakit. In Bandung, RZI and DD use the phrases *Rumah Bersalin Gratis* (RBG) and *Rumah Bersalin Cuma-Cuma* (RBC) respectively to identify their Free Maternity Clinics. Likewise, while the state-managed ‘*Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat*’ (PUSKEMAS) is the official name of the government’s community health centre, DD uses the phrase ‘*Pondok Keluarga Masyarakat Sehat*’ (Family Boarding for Community Health). Not only does this DD brand represent the institution’s function, but it also represents its religious and social identity. The *zakat* agencies appear to use particular brands in order to communicate more effectively with the public, the benefactors and the beneficiaries (see Table 4).

Table 4
Charitable clinics operated by Islamic civil society organisations

Institution	Types of Clinics	Location	Explanation
The Muhammadiyah/ Aisyiyah	345 clinics and hospitals	Throughout Indonesia	Semi-c and non-charitable
Dompot Dhuafa	3 health outlets; 2 RBC (maternity clinics), 3 LKC (community health centres); 2 policlinics/hospitals; 1 lung specialist clinic; and 1 mental health clinic	Jakarta (Ciputat & Sunda Kelapa), Bogor, Bekasi, Bandung, Palembang, Pontianak, Jambi, Bali, Northern Aceh	Charitable
Rumah Zakat Indonesia	7 clinics/maternity Clinics	Bandung, Semarang, Jakarta, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Medan, Pekanbaru and Surabaya	Charitable

‘Health for All’: Clinic Membership and the Targeted Beneficiaries

Clinic Membership: Medical and Financial Reasons

There are two types of beneficiaries: members and non-members. Members are those from low-income households who are entitled to free medical care once they have been approved for membership of a DD or RZI clinic, upon completion of an application form. The applicants enclose a number of specific documents to be approved, such as an ID card, family certificate (showing the numbers of family members), marriage certificate, and a letter

from the local administration approving their economic status. The decision on membership is made by a small team that verifies the applicants' actual economic condition. Often the applicants are visited by the team to ensure that they are suitable for free health provision. During the visit, the team will interview the applicants and observe their dwellings, the number of family members, types of occupation, and so forth. If necessary, the team will also consult with local leaders who are well acquainted with the applicants' socio-economic background. Yet, consultation with local leaders is often overlooked. The team often gives approval during the first visit, when deemed appropriate. It has been reported that up until 2008, the membership of DD's RBC was in excess of 1130 (see Tables 5. and 5.1-4).

Table 5
The number of patients and services, DD's maternity clinic (RBC) in Bandung (until 2008)

No.	Types of activities	Number of beneficiaries
1	Registered beneficiaries	1645 people
2	Members	1130 people
3	Baby delivery	915 people
4	Family planning programme	2492 people
5	Outpatients	2942 people
6	Immunisation	4217 people
7	Antenatal programme	5574 people

Table 5.1




Table 5.2




Table 5.3
Expenditure of RZI on health (as of August 2008)




Table 5.4
Incidental activities, RZI health services, 2008

No.	Types of activities	Number of beneficiaries
1	Registered beneficiaries	1645 people
2	Members	1130 people
3	Baby delivery	915 people
4	Family planning programme	2492 people
5	Outpatients	2942 people
6	Immunisation	4217 people
7	Antenatal programme	5574 people

This membership system, nevertheless, does not prevent poor families who are not members from accessing health services. Some patients are sim-

ply granted membership after receiving health assistance from the clinic. In the case of DD's clinics, the membership system has functioned as a mechanism to control clinics' annual expenditure and to manage patients' medical records. For example, in 2008, the RBC had a very limited budget, amounting to IDR 600 million provided by DD of Bandung to cover its annual expenditure, including utilities and salaries. The number of members certainly shapes the budget proposals put forward by this clinic. The *zakat* fund can only be given to the right types of beneficiaries, notably the poor and the needy. To sum up, clinic membership has functioned as a mechanism to prevent the mishandling of *zakat* funds.

Charitable clinics also present prospective members to benefactors for financial support. In RZI's clinic in Bandung, for example, the clinic's beneficiaries can be grouped into three categories. The first is 'prospective members', consisting of groups of people who have been profiled and surveyed by the clinic. They are conditionally regarded as members until the required funds to support their healthcare costs become available. In 2008, for example, RZI surveyed as many as 419 poor families. The second category is of 'members without financial support', comprising groups of people, about 210 poor families in all, who have been surveyed and approved for membership, but not channelled to certain donors. This highlights the fact that, due to a limited budget, not all members being approved by the clinic automatically receive free healthcare services. In order to overcome this financial problem, RZI presents the profile of the approved members to certain donors. RZI often holds fundraising and social events attended by wealthy people and various companies, during which the profiled members are 'advertised' and then 'auctioned' to the donors. The last type is 'members with financial support'. These people (116 families) are able to access healthcare, as they are funded by particular donors. Bearing the above system in mind, it can be said that the source of funds coming into clinics does not necessarily originate from *zakat*, but rather from *sedekah* and *infak*.

In addition to the availability of funds, the issue of membership is closely related to professionalism in providing medical services. Clinic membership has helped medical workers to become better acquainted with the clients'/

patients' medical records, so that the physicians can ascertain appropriate antenatal and postnatal treatments. Nevertheless, charitable clinics often face a great number of difficulties, especially in dealing with non-member patients who require specialist treatment. DD's clinic reports that its physicians found patients with serious diseases such as *Cardiomyopathy* (a heart muscle disease), *Subarachnoid haemorrhage* (bleeding surrounding the brain), and malnutrition, all of which require intensive medical treatment. In facing this kind of problem, the clinic can often do nothing due to budget constraints. Rejecting patients then becomes clinic's final option, or, if it is possible, the clinic will carry out special fundraising to overcome a particular problem.

Although membership of RZI and DD clinics is valid for one or two years only, these two clinics have different policies on providing free maternity service for their clients. In DD's clinic, for example, every family only has one opportunity to have a baby delivered. This policy is intended to educate poorer families about family planning, sexual and reproductive health, as well as to diminish their dependency on charitable clinics. By contrast, membership of RZI's clinic is renewable. The clients/patients can have more than one period of membership, as long as their membership is renewed before or during the second pregnancy. There has, however, been no such case so far. This may be because, as one physician at RZI's clinic explained, the poorer families are hesitant about coming back to the clinic for a second pregnancy. Special medical treatments are also provided, but very rarely. It depends on the type of disease and the availability of funds. In order to overcome serious cases, such as those requiring surgery, serious bronchitis, recto vaginal fistulas, and so forth, the clinics 'advertise' the clients' profiles on their website and send requests for donations to prospective benefactors, be they individuals or corporations.

Why Maternity Care and Nutrition?

Infant and maternal mortality rates in Indonesia remain higher than those in other South East Asian countries, such as Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.³⁶ This has inspired *zakat* agencies like DD and RZI to pay

much more attention to maternity care and improving nutrition. Luthfi Affandi, the General Manager of Dompét Dhuafa in Bandung, suggests that poorer families in urban and rural areas are vulnerable to infant and maternal mortality as a result of three factors: 1) they do not have sufficient resources to afford their health expenditures, especially regular medical check-ups during pregnancy; in some cases, and especially in rural areas, patients obtain the minimum treatment from a traditional midwife (*paraji*); 2) lack of knowledge and information about healthcare is another major problem: the absence of intensive care from a local health centre may result in a high-risk pregnancy that requires special medical treatment (vacuum extraction or caesarean section); 3) overdue intensive maternity care as a result of long distances between the patient's residences and maternity clinics, as well as patient's hesitation about regularly attending maternity clinics, are two main related factors. It is worth noting that the problem arises because pregnancy is beyond the coverage of the state's health insurance.³⁷ According to a report by the World Bank in 2009, infant mortality rates (IMR) in Indonesia have actually decreased by 50% since the 1990s, but since 2002, the decline has been slower. More importantly, Indonesian's maternal mortality ratio (MMR) in 2009 declined to 420 deaths in every 100,000 births, one of the highest rates in East Asia.³⁸ It is in such circumstances that clinic membership can reduce the incidence of high-risk pregnancies in low-income households.



Figure1. Free maternity care provided by Dompét Dhuafa, Bandung (source: author's collection)

Islamic charitable clinics belonging to DD and RZI can only accept mothers who are up to seven months pregnant as members. Babies born in Islamic charitable clinics are eligible for further provision from the clinics, such as routine healthcare and nutritional assistance. Furthermore, a manager of RZI's maternity clinic in Bandung suggests that, based on the survey conducted by RZI in 2007, health services (notably free ambulance and maternity clinics) are among the programmes preferred by beneficiaries. Therefore, RZI upgraded its basic health provision to include maternity clinics. The manager also emphasises that RZI's maternity clinics have participated in decreasing infant and maternal mortality rates in Indonesia, or at least in the regions where RZI's clinics have been operating.³⁹ The establishment of maternity clinics is closely related to the *zakat* agencies' perspective on the future of the community. Eri Taufiq, the former director of DD in Bandung, for example, explains: 'It is probably from the wombs of poor mothers that those children who may become future leaders may be born. Therefore, we assisted them from the antenatal phase. We do hope that a better and appropriate baby delivery process will result in the rise of leading generations.'⁴⁰ In the wider context, the above statement also reflects people's awareness of the necessity of increasing the quality of life of families in a developing country such as Indonesia. Along with this, family planning is often promoted during the provision of antenatal and postnatal services.



Figure 2. Free maternity care provided by Rumah Zakat Indonesia, Bandung (source: RZI)

The health programmes offered by RBC (DD) and RBG (RZI) are relatively similar. Catering to the needs of women, infants and children has become the major concern of the two institutions, and therefore they have set up similar kinds of clinics. If we look further at the clinics, there are very obvious resemblances between RBG and RBC in terms of mission, objectives, organisational structures, policies, financial resources, and beneficiaries. The clinics of the two agencies have even employed a very similar brand that might be confusing to both benefactors and beneficiaries. As previously mentioned, RBC and RBG are abbreviations of *Rumah Bersalin Cuma-Cuma* and *Rumah Bersalin Gratis* respectively. In Bahasa Indonesia, the words 'gratis' and 'cuma-cuma' have a similar meaning, but express two different psychological senses. The word *gratis*, which is a loanword from Dutch/English, has a more definite meaning: free! *Cuma-cuma* is often used by DD in order to obscure the word 'free' as a means of 'respecting' and 'not disgracing' the poorer families. DD's experience suggests that even poorer families do not want to be directly referred to as such.⁴¹

How to Reach the Targeted Beneficiaries

Whether or not the existing charitable clinics can provide wider access to viable health provision for poorer families can be seen in the way in which they reach—or are willing to be reached by—the beneficiaries. Despite the fact that most charitable clinics are not located in the slums of cities, they publicise themselves by advertising through the local radio and newspapers, as well as putting pamphlets and posters at the crossroads surrounding the clinics. This means that not all people, especially those living in rural areas, are reached by this publicity. A patient who had attended a charitable clinic told me that he had obtained information about the clinic from well-educated people (university students) among his relatives and neighbours who live and work in the city where charitable clinics operate. For example, the experiences of patients who come from the Pangalengan highlands and the Cikalong Wetan sub-district, as described above, suggest that they are informed about the clinics by their relatives and neighbours. This is because their areas are not reached by clinic advertisements. A family from the Pangalengan

highlands was informed by their relatives working in the city of Bandung, while a family from Cikalong Wetan was brought to the clinic by their neighbours who run DD's economic-development projects in a village near the Cikalong Wetan sub-district.

Because access to information among poor villagers and poor urbanites is very limited, 'person to person' contact has greatly contributed to the circulation of information about the clinics. It seems that those who have already accessed medical and health services from charitable clinics inform their neighbours or relatives, who may have the same medical and financial problems, about their experiences. Therefore, it is very common to find many patients residing in the same region and even the same village. This means that the existing system of advertising, which has not reached potential patients, has caused villagers and urbanites to establish their own 'networks' in order to access health services. Meanwhile, this situation provides an opportunity, notably for *zakat* agencies, to set up new clinics or to intensify campaigns for healthcare in areas from which most patients come.

Beyond Health Services: Religious and Economic Activities

Religious and Economic Enterprises

Like other Islamic social institutions in many Muslim countries, Islamic charitable clinics in Indonesia attempt to become involved in poverty alleviation as well as economic stress reduction by creating income-generating projects for poor families. While the patients are receiving charitable services from the clinics, they are encouraged to become involved in other programmes. No less important is the fact that patronage has often characterised charitable works carried out by religious associations. In this respect, Islamic *da'wa* is integrated into the clinics' social missions. Clinic staff, for example, distribute Indonesian-style Islamic veils to women members and clients to encourage them to follow a proper Islamic dress code. The types of veils that are distributed are common in Indonesia; much simpler than the long *hijab* and *niqab* worn in Middle Eastern societies. While messages on Islam and advice on health are apparently delivered by physicians during medical check-ups and consultations, the patients and clients are also often invited to at-

tend monthly religious gatherings held in the clinics. Doctors, nurses, administrative staff, security guards and other clinic stakeholders attend these gatherings.

Most patients who attend regular religious gathering are active members of the clinics who still expect further services from charitable clinics. These gatherings, according to one member of staff at a DD clinic, function as a motivational forum which aims to strengthen cohesion among patients and DD's staff. These gatherings are also important because the income-generating projects are based on group-work, not individual work. In the same way, RZI's clinic has kept close contact with the clients through the MROs (*Mustahik Relation Officers*) installed in the heart of communities. The task of an MRO is greater than simply acting as RZI's representative; he may monitor the religious attitudes of RZI's clients to assess whether they are willing to perform their religious obligations in daily life, and are therefore eligible for further economic support.

In essence, Islamic charitable clinics do not exclusively cater to only 'good Muslims'. They have a basically inclusive approach to poor families, regardless of their quality of religious performance. Yet, they seem to prioritise poorer Muslim families because of their understanding of the use of *zakat* funds and the types of beneficiaries coming to the clinics.⁴² During my research, I did not find any information that revealed non-Muslims having access to free health provision. This is not because the clinics were rejecting non-Muslim patients, but rather because of the absence of non-Muslims coming to the clinics for medical services. As a matter of fact, Christian churches in Indonesia, especially on Java Island, have more sophisticated health programmes for Christian families, including the poor, than those available for Muslims. It is worth emphasising that in the case of RZI's clinics, the pivotal role played by MROs in the recruitment of potential members may have unintentionally prevented non-Muslims from having an opportunity to access free health services. The profiles of the patients who become members of RZI's clinics vary, but they still represent mainly low-income households. Their occupations include farmers, construction labourers, *becak* (pedicab/bicycle taxi) drivers, part-time labourers (*pekerja serabutan*), small

merchants and, of course, the unemployed. These people, as far as their outward appearances are concerned, are not always identifiable as so-called 'devoted Islamists'.

Income-generating projects created by *zakat* agencies are basically aimed at enabling unemployed couples to earn extra income. It seems to me that women have become their main targets. Cake baking, cooking, embroidering, and sewing are among the kinds of 'ordinary' skills provided in the training. There is no particular training provided for the husbands, but in some cases, especially rural areas, the *zakat* agencies have managed to set up income-generating projects through, for example, home industry and animal husbandry. Should the families live in regions where the economic development programmes run by *zakat* agencies do not exist, they cannot enjoy such income-generating projects. It is the case, however, that there are families who are not—or not willing to be—involved in income generating projects even after enjoying health provision from charitable clinics. There have been very rare success stories of economic development projects that are set up as a continuation of the health provision programmes.

From the 'Haves' to the 'Have-nots'

The very short duration of membership seems to restrict the *zakat* agencies and prevent them from creating a more comprehensive mutual aid scheme for the poor. The poorer families, including clinic members, do not engage in the health schemes provided by Islamic charitable institutions. *Zakat* agencies merely act as an intermediary between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'. Health programmes provided by *zakat* agencies are therefore merely a kind of direct aid from the wealthy to the poor. The poor families in this respect are recipients, albeit members of the clinics. So far, there has been no particular effort by *zakat* agencies to create a health insurance system for the poor that, for example, involved them in the system while the *zakat* agencies act as facilitators. The patients/beneficiaries come and go without being obliged to participate further in the system.⁴³ The existing health services are, therefore, undoubtedly characterised by an absence of mutual help from the poor to the poor through which patients are actually able to

share solutions to similar problems.⁴⁴ In other words, there is top-down relationship between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’.

Due to a lack of participation among the clinic members, we can assume that the principle of equity between the givers and the recipients in creating a healthcare scheme has evaporated, as the members have merely become ‘passive objects’ rather than, at least, ‘partial subjects’. As a passive object, accessing health services is absolutely contingent upon the health providers’ approval. While charitable clinics might have reduced the level of stress among poorer families, insecurity about serious illness remains high. The position of the poorer families, even the members of charitable clinics, remains vulnerable. Overall, this shows the failure of the existing institutions to provide a more reliable healthcare system in which the poor can participate in so-called ‘mutual help’. This does not mean, however, that patients with serious diseases have a reduced chance of receiving treatment because *zakat* agencies have made strong partnerships with private sector organisations. Nevertheless, seen from a broader perspective, the lack of effort to include low-income households in the system has, in part, also produced short-term improvement in health in the areas where charitable clinics operate. Charitable healthcare, with its limited capacities, has yet not been designated as a community-based healthcare system that can provide for long-term improvement in the health of low-income households as a whole.⁴⁵

Financing Islamic Charitable Clinics

What is remarkable about the existing *zakat* agencies as voluntary sector organisations in Indonesia is that they emerged in a situation in which the private sector was beginning to enter social domains to implement corporate social responsibility programmes. In our case, permanent Islamic charitable clinics were financed by different parties, ranging from community to commercial corporations. Charitable clinics, like other voluntary organisations, represent third sector associations that are located between the state and the market. However, this does not mean that charitable work and philanthropic activism, according to Thomas Adam, ‘exist outside both’. Nor does it indicate, as Adam goes on to note, that they are ‘not influenced or regulated by

Table 6
Partners of DD's clinics

No.	Partner	Explanation	Contribution
1	PT. Adhimix Precast Indonesia	A big corporation with four major unit business (readymix concrete, precast concrete, construction and property).	Financing patients with special diseases.
2	BI	The Central Bank of the Republic of Indonesia.	Donating ambulances.
3	KFC (Kentucky Fried Chicken)	KFC Corporation is a chicken fast-food chain based in Louisville, Kentucky.	Donating ambulances and medical facilities: ultrasonography & sterilisation.
4	P&G (Protect & Gamble)	A multinational company that produces health products: cosmetics, soap, drugs, nutrition, paper etc.	Donating ambulances and building LKC clinic in Bekasi-West Java.
5	AN TV	Indonesian private TV station.	Through <i>ANTV Peduli</i> , one of the social programmes of ANTV, this TV station ran various fundraising campaigns in support of DD's clinic.
6	Indosat	Indonesian telecommunication company.	Donating Mobile Health Clinic and offering financial support for regular charitable health services and circumcision in Banten Province.
7	Adira Finance	The largest multi-brand automotive financing company in Indonesia.	Participating in the establishment of ' <i>Rumah Sehat Terpadu</i> ' of DD in Bogor.
8	Inceso Foundation	A foundation established by the Worker Union of PT. Adira Dinamika Multi Finance. Its activities include financing health projects for the poor.	Financing LKC's patients with special diseases such as hernias, hydrocephalus, cancer, etc.
9	PT PPA	A government-owned Asset Management Company. The overarching objective of the PPA is to save, protect and manage national assets (banks and government-owned companies)	Financing irregular health services among villagers, circumcision, and patients with special diseases.
10	The Global Fund	A public/private partnership that aims to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria all over the world.	Actively engaging DD in the supervision and campaign against tuberculosis.
11	DKM At-Taqwa PT Denso	PT Denso is one of biggest companies in the business of manufacturing automotive components. At-Taqwa is a mosque set up by this company to facilitate Islamic activities among Muslim workers.	Financing patients with special diseases among the clinic's members.
12	Exxon Mobile Corporation	A US-based multinational oil and gas company.	Actively joining DD's programme on health and community development in disasters and poor areas. This includes the establishment of clinics,
	UPZ BNI Syariah	A <i>zakat</i> agency of BNI Shari'a Bank.	Donating ambulances.

both—the state provides the legal framework, and some philanthropic enterprises produce a profit which is either distributed among the philanthropists or reinvested in the enterprise.’ Adam also concludes that philanthropic activism represents ‘a mixed economy of welfare,’ as ‘the dividing lines between cooperation and philanthropy are not always precise.’⁴⁶ In the discussion that follows, I demonstrate how the private sector associations contribute to, or at least impact upon—but not always regulate—charitable actions held by *zakat* agencies.

Zakat agencies such as DD and RZI do not, as previously explained, use *zakat* funds to pay for physical infrastructure. The task of the *zakat* agencies is to redistribute *zakat* funds directly to beneficiaries through charitable and development-oriented programmes. Given that developing infrastructure is not an appropriate project for *zakat* funds, the existing *zakat* agencies have searched for new strategies to finance charitable clinics. They have, for example, built partnerships with private sector organisations, both national and multinational. The profiles of companies involved in DD’s charitable projects illustrated in Table 7 below imply that not all resources and social corporate funds are derived from religiously-motivated giving. Some sources of Islamic aid, in fact, even have ‘secular-roots’ which are consecutively ‘Islamised’ through *zakat* agencies. The intermediary role played by *zakat* agencies has bridged the gap between the needy, who have limited access to health, and social funds provided by wealthy corporations (see Table 6).

The location of Islamic charitable clinics is very often contingent upon the availability of land. While some *zakat* agencies like DD and RZI have enjoyed significant support from big corporations, other *zakat* agencies have installed their clinics in areas near mosques. In urban areas, a large mosque functions not only as a place where Islamic worship is practiced, but also as a spot where people can gather for social and economic purposes. During Friday prayers, for example, hundreds of small traders or street vendors (*pedagang kaki lima*) display and sell their products, while a number of beggars and poor families line up, awaiting people’s generosity. Of greater relevance to this chapter, mosque-based *zakat* collectors are among agencies to which the majority of Indonesian Muslims prefer to channel their giving. For that reason,

the Indonesian *Zakat* Board (BAZNAS) took the initiative of cooperating with the Grand Mosque of Sunda Kelapa to set up a clinic. Occupying 9,920 m², this mosque was built in 1971. What is interesting is that the Grand Mosque of Sunda Kelapa is set amidst the upper-middle-class dwellings of Menteng, and visited by rich indigenous Muslims. During Friday prayers, thousands of Muslims, notably those residing and working in surrounding areas, come to this mosque for worship, as it is located near to business centres and government offices.

In Indonesia, as in other Muslim countries, many Islamic charitable institutions are located in upper-middle-class areas.⁴⁷ At least three factors determine the location of a charitable clinic in an upper-middle-class area such as Menteng. The first factor relates to the availability of human resources. Many physicians, medical specialists, and professionals attend weekly religious gatherings held in the Grand Mosque of Sunda Kelapa. Their involvement in such gatherings strengthens a form of social capital, which is then projected into collective action. These Muslim upper-middle-class professionals have endeavoured to contribute their skills as physicians and managers to charitable projects such as clinics.

The second factor relates directly to benefactors rather than to beneficiaries. In this case, charitable clinics in urban areas have become a medium for *zakat* agencies to communicate with benefactors and prospective benefactors. It is expected that the donor will continuously make contributions through *zakat* agencies after having witnessed that their funds are being used and redistributed appropriately through a charitable clinic. In other words, charitable clinics set up in urban areas function as a medium to demonstrate how people's donations are redistributed to the right recipients.⁴⁸

The last factor is that poor families in need of assistance from *zakat* agencies reside not only in rural, but also in urban areas. In a developing country such as Indonesia, it is very common for elite housing complexes to be surrounded by numerous small slums. The above three factors provide an answer to the question of why permanent charitable clinics predominantly operate in urban, rather than rural, areas. In rural areas, *zakat* agencies, like other social institutions, mainly carry out direct and short-term basic health services.

While the above narrative defines how a partnership has been established between Islamic voluntary organisations and mosque committees and other Muslim social institutions, cooperation among Islamic voluntary organisations such as DD, RZI, PKPU, and DPU-DT cannot easily be established. This is partly due to differences in ideological background and political orientation, as well as their rivalries in gaining support from the community, private sector organisations, and the government. However, as has so often been emphasised by their representatives, these philanthropic associations expect to build synergy and to create a more comprehensive system of community-based healthcare in the future.

Community participation is another key factor in determining the location of charitable clinics. Some are in fact supported by endowments from wealthy families. In the case of land *waqf*, the initiative usually comes from an individual or family, known as *waqif* ('those who donate'). The *waqif* offer land to be used for social or religious purposes to the existing social institutions, known as *nazir* ('people or institution assigned to manage *waqf*'). After having made an agreement, the *nazir* has the right to develop an infrastructure on the given land. This was experienced by DD's maternity clinic in Bandung, which occupies 1400 Square metres of land. It should be noted, however, that as far as the experiences of *zakat* agencies are concerned, land *waqf* is very rare. Because of this, they vigorously promote other types of *waqf* as an alternative means of financing social enterprises, including charitable clinics.

As mentioned previously, the establishment of charitable clinics has been much supported by cash *waqf*, as the *zakat* agencies will not make use of *zakat* funds for physical infrastructure. *Zakat* agencies have earned quite significant amounts of cash *waqf* from benefactors, surpassing that of land *waqf*. To mobilise cash *waqf*, DD issued the Cash *Waqf* Certificate to be given to *waqif* whose donations amount to IDR 1 million or more. Within four months, from January to March 2009, for example, DD issued 245 certificates with a total value of IDR 2 billion.⁴⁹ This phenomenon of mobilising cash *waqf* represents a new development by *zakat* agencies operating in urban areas. It is shaped by the fact that the land in urban areas is very expensive, and at the

same time, wealth circulated among the urbanites tends to be in the form of cash, not physical property. This trend of charitable endowment cannot be separated from the tendency of Indonesian people to channel *waqf* land to mosques and Islamic civil society organisations that manage Islamic schools, clinics, hospitals, and orphanages, whereas channelling *waqf* land to *zakat* agencies remains rare. Moreover, the notion of cash *waqf* also allows corporate actors in particular to participate in Islamic charitable works and social practices.



Figure 3 *Waqf* practice in the form of medical equipment contributed by benefactors to charitable clinics (source: author's collection)

It is worth emphasising that the improved management and better promotion of *zakat* by professional *zakat* agencies such as DD and RZI encouraged people to channel their *zakat* and *sedekah* funds to the above agencies, rather than to Islamic civil society organisations.⁵⁰ In recent times, the amount of *zakat* funds collected by professional *zakat* agencies has in fact been higher than that collected by civil society associations such as the Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, and Nahdlatul Ulama.⁵¹ Despite *zakat* agencies having increased in number and playing greater roles in urban areas, *kyai* (Islamic clerics) in rural areas still enjoy significant prestige in the communities, and in certain areas of East Java, for example, villagers are still channelling their *zakat al-fitr* to local *kyai* as a means of showing their admiration for the *kyai*'s dedication to the communities.

***The Muhammadiyah Hospitals:
From Charitable to Commercial Enterprises***

As previously discussed, the Muhammadiyah is one of the largest Muslim associations in Indonesia, managing hundreds of hospitals and clinics throughout the country. Unlike *zakat*-based charitable clinics, which merely cater to poorer families, the Muhammadiyah's clinics have been transformed from having a charitable status into 'private commercial clinics', whose clients range from the well-off to the underprivileged. On the other hand, 'social entrepreneurship' has so far characterised the Muhammadiyah clinics, the origin of which can be traced back to an early twentieth-century relief mission. In response to deteriorating social conditions and hardship caused by the eruption of Mountain Kelud in 1919 in East Java, the Muhammadiyah organised a medium-scale relief effort by setting up an independent emergency rescue unit, namely PKO (*Penolong Kesengsaraan Oemoem*). Having carried out various relief services in urban, rural and disaster-affected areas, this unit then set up a polyclinic on 15 February 1923.⁵² Following the Muhammadiyah's National Congress (*Muktamar*) in 2005, this *Majelis* was renamed *Majelis Kesehatan Masyarakat* (Council of Community Healthcare). Even though most of the Muhammadiyah's hospitals have been named *RS PKU Muhammadiyah*, other hospitals are named *RS PKU Aisyiyah*, due to the pivotal role played by the Aisyiah, the women's division of the Muhammadiyah, in the establishment of maternity clinics. In some cases, the Muhammadiyah hospitals have their roots in the small polyclinics and maternity clinics of the Aisyiyah. Other Muhammadiyah hospitals are simply named 'Islamic Hospitals' (*Rumah Sakit Islam*).

Like other Islamic organisations, the Muhammadiyah has long administered *zakat*. One scholar even suggests that one of the ideas of Islamic reform introduced by this association in the early twentieth century concerned *zakat* practice, particularly a reform of the mechanism of redistribution of alms.⁵³ In recent times, while operating *zakat* agencies at different levels of leadership, ranging from the Central Board office (*Pimpinan Pusat*) to the branch offices at the district (*Pimpinan Daerah*) and sub-district (*Pimpinan*

Cabang) levels, the Muhammadiyah’s social institutions, such as hospitals, orphanages, schools, universities, and cooperatives, have also managed autonomous *zakat* bodies. In this respect, my findings suggest that the way in which *zakat* agencies operate in the Muhammadiyah is ‘decentralised’ and thus rather different from the community-based *zakat* agencies discussed above, such as DD and RZI. The Central Board Office of the Muhammadiyah allows all levels of leadership, from the national to sub-district level, to collect *zakat* funds and redistribute them to legitimate recipients.




Figure 4 Sources and redistribution of *zakat* for charitable works

Interestingly, the Muhammadiyah also allows its hospitals, universities, and schools to operate their own *zakat* agencies. It is therefore not surprising that while the Islamic charitable clinics of DD and RZI have become the ‘agents’ distributing *zakat*, *infak*, and *sedekah* funds to legitimate beneficiaries, the Muhammadiyah hospitals take the opposite role. They generate revenues, some portions of which are donated through the Muhammadiyah’s

zakat agencies. This means that as commercial enterprises, the Muhammadiyah's hospitals can reinvest the profits and revenues they have earned in social enterprises, including social, religious (*da'wa*) and charitable activities. In fact, one Jakarta-based *zakat* agency of the Muhammadiyah, Lazismuh, has received large-scale contributions from Muhammadiyah hospitals, either in the form of *zakat* funds or 'corporate social funds'. The acting director of Lazismuh, for example, explains that his *zakat* agency has received a significant amount of money from Muhammadiyah hospitals operating in Jakarta (Islamic Hospital of Pondok Kopi, Islamic Hospital of Cempaka Putih, and Islamic Hospital of Sukapura), Malang (Islamic Hospital of Aisyiyah), and Yogyakarta (PKU Muhammadiyah of Yogyakarta). These funds are allocated to support income-generating projects and entrepreneurship training in certain regions of Java, as well as *dakwa* activities in the outer islands.⁵⁴

The above figure clearly illustrates that the operational budgets of Muhammadiyah hospitals are not heavily derived from significant donations or other forms of giving. The major financial resources of the Muhammadiyah hospitals are self-generated, because the hospitals are run commercially. As increasingly commercialised institutions, with their revenues, Muhammadiyah hospitals can contribute to *zakat* agencies and support charitable work in other Muhammadiyah social institutions.⁵⁵ Unlike Muhammadiyah's orphanages and elderly care homes, which are charitable in nature, there is not a Muhammadiyah hospital or clinic that can be purely categorised as a charitable institution that caters in particular to the needs of poorer families. That is not to say, however, that charitable activism is not present in Muhammadiyah hospitals. In the case below, for example, a sort of 'internal *zakat* committee' in the hospital of the Muhammadiyah, with its low-scale impact and capacity, allows a limited number of poorer households to access health services for free, or at least at a low cost.

The PKU Muhammadiyah: How Poorer Families Are Served

The first and oldest hospital founded by the Muhammadiyah is located in Yogyakarta. This hospital is now located in front of *Kampung Kauman*, an urban ward where Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of the Muhammadiyah,

grew up.⁵⁶ The older Muhammadiyah Central Board Office lies about three hundred metres from the hospital. The PKU can, by definition, no longer be categorised as a clinic, as it provides more comprehensive facilities. As in other government and private hospitals, the patients may choose their rooms, either in first, second or third class, depending on their financial capacity.

All physicians, nurses and administrative staff working in this hospital are Muslims. Some are Muhammadiyah activists and the others have simply become formal Muhammadiyah members. There are part-time physicians who already have permanent positions in government hospitals. Despite the fact that medical schools at the state universities remain the dominant source of physicians in this hospital, the number of physicians and nurses who have graduated from Muhammadiyah universities and are employed in this hospital continues to increase. It has also become an education/teaching hospital (*Rumah Sakit Pendidikan*) for medical students at the Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta. Likewise, the Aisyiyah nursing school has greatly contributed to this hospital in providing human resources.

The extent to which Muhammadiyah hospitals serve poorer families can be seen from the roles played by their internal *zakat* committee. Many low-income households receive medication from the PKU. Some can afford this expenditure; others cannot. Catering to the needs of poorer families is not the main objective of the PKU, as the distinction between patients coming from poor and well-off families is not precisely defined. In some cases, when it is necessary, the patients are required to show acceptable evidence to prove their economic position, while the hospital will make its decision based on the availability of its 'charity funds'. It is frequently the case that for basic healthcare, an internal *zakat* committee under the Islamic Counselling Division's supervision of the hospital foots the bill in order to help patients from deprived backgrounds.⁵⁷ But for a serious disease, this hospital, like other hospitals (charitable, private and government) can often do nothing other than leave the patient to find their own way to overcome their problems. The position of the PKU as an Islam-based commercial hospital means that it is very often faced with moral and professional dilemmas.

The PKU Hospital also cooperates with other Muhammadiyah charitable

institutions, notably orphanages. In Yogyakarta, where the first and oldest Muhammadiyah orphanages and hospitals are located, an effort to bridge charitable institutions (orphanages) and commercial institutions (hospitals) began some decades ago. The orphans from the Muhammadiyah orphanages are given the ‘privilege’ of very cheap and even free health services. Yet the cooperation between the two is not an automatic result of their similar ideologies and ‘historical roots’, because not all orphans that are raised in the Muhammadiyah orphanages receive similar treatment. Rather, the relationship between hospital and orphanage resembles formal cooperation between two different institutions. For example, it is usually the ‘weaker institution’ (orphanage) that initiates cooperation with the ‘stronger institution’ (hospital).

The Aisyiyah’s Health Programmes

As an autonomous association of the Muhammadiyah, the role of the Aisyiyah in the development of health centres, notably maternity clinics throughout Indonesia, is vital to the Muhammadiyah. Some maternity clinics belonging to the Aisyiyah have become Muhammadiyah hospitals, such as the PKU Hospital of Bantul Regency in Yogyakarta, which was originally a maternity clinic set up by the Aisyiyah. This has been run by the Muhammadiyah since the clinic became a hospital in 2002.⁵⁸ Founded on 19 May 1917 in Yogyakarta, the Aisyiyah has paid a lot of attention to women’s and children’s issues, as well as reproductive health, nutrition, and family planning. Despite the fact that the number of Aisyiyah maternity clinics increases every year, the Aisyiyah’s approach to health issues is not restricted to this area alone. The Aisyiyah bears a resemblance to NGOs specialising in women’s issues, as it is acquainted with such causes as the empowerment of women, children’s advocacy, fighting trafficking, and promoting civil society.

Due to the pervasive roles of the Aisyiyah in society, this association endeavours to involve itself in developing healthcare and social welfare through charitable and non-charitable services. Its concerns are disseminated through its extensive organisational structure, reaching even remote areas, from communities in urban areas to small villages. There are two Aisyiyah

programmes that are to this section, namely *keluarga sakinah* (tranquil family) and *qaryah thayyibah* (advanced village) Unlike other health NGOs, the Aisyiah materialises its ideal of society, which is framed under the concept of *qaryah thayyibah*, through religious gatherings.⁵⁹ This is because religious gatherings can be an effective forum to disseminate information to targeted segments of society, especially women. *Qaryah thayyibah*, which literally means ‘good community’, is a generic term used to signify community development programme and the welfare of the community.⁶⁰ In order to implement these two main programmes—*keluarga sakinah* and *qaryah thayyibah*—the Aisyiah has revitalised female religious gatherings.⁶¹ It appears that female religious gatherings constitute potential social capital, as it is possible that women attend religious gatherings more than men. For females in rural and even urban areas, attending religious gatherings tends to be a matter of routine.⁶²

In the health sector, the Aisyiah has carried out a wide-range of activities that are not always charitable in character. Instead, like other development NGOs, Aisyiah focuses on increasing people’s awareness of the necessity community health through a series of training programmes and workshops. In cooperation with both national and international donors, such as the Global Fund, UNICEF, and the Millennium Challenges Corporation Indonesia (MCCI), for example, Aisyiah has carried out a series of training programmes to combat the spread of HIV-AIDS and tuberculosis in 18 Muhammadiyah/Aisyiah hospitals that operate in seven provinces. It also has actively promoted reproductive health programmes in the community.⁶³ All of these activities fall under the Aisyiah’s framework of *qaryah thayyibah*. To run its programmes, the Aisyiah has often been supported by volunteer Aisyiah activists and professionals who work in Muhammadiyah hospitals or government institutions, and students from Aisyiah nursing schools. It is worth emphasising that, even though charitable enterprises are still part of the Aisyiah, it appears there has been a shift in orientation within the Aisyiah, from simply acting as charitable associations to promoting development-oriented social activities in order to build community capacities in both rural and urban areas.

Conclusion

Over the past two decades, the different types of social and religious activities in the health sector carried out by charitable associations indicate that Muslims' perceptions of the welfare of society are not restricted to simply providing authoritative religious opinions (*fatwa*). Instead, Islamic associations have attempted to interpret the Islamic vision of the welfare of the community in a concrete way. It appears that health provision for the poor has become one of their major concerns.

In particular, the spawning of Islamic charitable clinics sponsored by charitable associations and *zakat* agencies signifies Muslims' efforts to translate the notion of benevolent acts into religiously-inspired good social practices. For *zakat* agencies, health provision for the poor seems to have become an alternative strategy to distributing aid to underprivileged groups, and at the same time, a means of promoting public welfare at the community level. Charitable clinics such as RBC and RBG hint at the potential role that *zakat* agencies might play in the relief of the poor, especially in the health sector. They have been active for years and play a pivotal role in stress reduction among poorer families, while at the same time attempting to bring the capital held by both individuals and private institutions down to the grassroots level.

While Islamic charitable institutions work with the grassroots and middle-class groups, Islamic institutions are not sufficiently critical of the state's failure to provide social security, unlike some 'secular' or traditionalist Muslim NGOs. They speak little of the need for structural change. They seem to avoid utilising political issues in their discourse and activities, such as, for example, by organising an advocacy movement for health reform. Therefore, there is no serious tension between charitable institutions and the state apparatus. It can also be suggested that in providing healthcare for uninsured poorer families, *zakat* agencies have simply functioned as an 'intermediary' between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots', be they individuals or institutions, yet not between the state and society at large. Apart from this, top-down relationships between the givers and the recipients have led to a lack of participation by the poor in the long-term agendas of charitable clinics

and in strengthening social security among the poor themselves.

While we cannot disregard the contributions made by charitable clinics to the social development process, as they grow significantly in number, collaboration between the existing charitable institutions remains rare. The absence of a larger association (union) of charitable clinics, through which the existing clinics might address more fundamental issues on healthcare in both urban and rural areas, has shaped the attitudes of Indonesian Muslim voluntary associations towards health. This, in turn, has led to the absence of an attempt within the existing charitable clinics to establish a more comprehensive healthcare system for the poor, over and above that supported by the policies of the state.

Endnotes

- * The major part of this chapter was already published in *Journal of Southeast Asia Research*, 18, 3 (September 2010), 503-553.
- ¹ According to the 2007 Indonesian Health Profile, there are 1,033 hospitals in Indonesia; 582 (56.34%) are government-owned and 451 (43.66%) are private hospitals. Both government and private institutions have also set up smaller special clinics and community health centres (*Puskemas*) in order to reach patients in rural areas. There are 8,324 government-based community health centres (*Puskemas*) operating over the regions. See the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Indonesia, *Indonesia Health Profile* (Jakarta, the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Indonesia, 2008), 101-202.
- ² Dar es Salaam Charitable General Hospital in Tanzania, S.G.L. Charitable Hospital in Punjab, Dinbandhu Charitable Hospital in Gujarat, Makassed Islamic Charitable Hospital in Jerusalem, and Muslim Khatri Charitable Hospital in Karachi are among the non-profit hospitals set up by religious denominations that arose due to the shortage of facilities and poor health services in the regions.
- ³ The Muhammadiyah and its women's division, the Aisyiyah, recently operated 345 clinics and hospitals throughout Indonesia. For further information about the Muhammadiyah hospitals see Majelis Kesehatan dan Kesejahteraan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Profil dan Direktori Rumah Sakit Muhammadiyah-Aisyiyah 2005* (Jakarta: MKKM PP Muhammadiyah, 2005).
- ⁴ See Majelis Syuro Upaya Kesehatan Islam Seluruh Indonesia, *Profil dan Direktori Rumah Sakit dan Lembaga Pendidikan Kesehatan Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Mukisi, 2003).
- ⁵ Religious institutions, in this respect, have played pivotal roles in bringing back the voluntary character of hospitals in treating patients (the needy, the elderly, and so on) free of charge. The Medical Dictionary defines a voluntary hospital as 'a private, not-for-profit hospital that provides uncompensated care to the poor', see <http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/voluntary+hospital>

⁶ Janine A. Clark, *Islam, Charity and Activism*, 35-36.

⁷ Janine A. Clark, *Islam, Charity and Activism*, 35-36.

⁸ It should be noted that charitable clinics can also be found in disaster affected-areas where aid associations deliver aid in the form of medical supplies. For example, in response to major calamities that occurred in certain regions of Indonesia, such as the tsunami in Aceh and Nias, the earthquake in Yogyakarta, West-Sumatra, Bengkulu and others, some Islamic charitable associations have operated various types of medical aid, such as the operation of 'Pushing (*Puskesmas Keliling*, mobile health centres), field hospitals, children's centres, and rehabilitation centres. For further discussion, see Hilman Latief, "Medical Aid, Disaster Relief and Public Healthcare," Institutional Transformation of Faith-based Charitable Clinics in Post-Disaster Aceh and Nias, unpublished paper, presented in the International Workshop on Medical Charities in Asia, the Middle East and Africa, conducted in Penang, Malaysia, 30 November-2 December 2010.

* Mobile healthcare can be in the form of special ambulances that actively visit certain areas, such as poor urban or rural areas, to reach beneficiaries coming from low-income households.

⁹ These two stories are based on my conversations with the families of the patients who came to DD's charitable clinic in Bandung on 18 September 2008 and 3 January 2009.

¹⁰ The 2007 "Indonesia Health Profile" of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Indonesia reported that the percentage of people who attempted to self-treat their disease is higher (65.01%) than that of those who achieved medical treatment (44.14%). See the 2007 "Indonesia Health Profile", 20. While there is no comprehensive explanation of the factors that lead people to self-treat in Indonesia, people's attitudes towards health seems to be in line with the rate of poverty in this country that involves 37.17 million people or 16.58% of the total population (225.64 million people).

¹¹ At the national level, for example, the Indonesian government, through the Ministry of Health, has created an insurance programme for the poor, called Askeskin. By 2008, the state budget allocation for Askeskin programme reached IDR 4.6 trillion to be accessed by approximately 76.4 million people. In managing this programme, the government appointed the state-owned health insurance firm, PT Askes, responsible for the claims by hospitals that have served people coming from deprived backgrounds.

¹² In line with this, the 1945 Indonesian Constitution (Article 34) clearly emphasises that: (1) "Impoverished persons and abandoned children shall be taken care of by the State;" (2) "The state shall develop a system of social security for all of the people and shall empower the inadequate and underprivileged in society in accordance with human dignity." (3) "The state shall have the obligation to provide sufficient medical and public service facilities." See the 1945 Indonesian Constitution; also Sulastomo, *Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional* (Jakarta: Yayasan Penerbitan Ikatan Dokter Indonesia, 2005), 54 & 84.

¹³ For further discussion about social security system in Indonesia, see Michael Raper, *Negara Tanpa Jaminan Sosial: Tiga Pilar Jaminan Sosial di Australia dan Indonesia* (Jakarta: TURC, 2008).

¹⁴ See also Iranda Yudhatama, *Demokrasi Overdosis: Menggugat Tanggungjawab Negara atas Jaminan Sosial dalam Sistem Demokrasi Liberal* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar & Jangkep, 2007),

51-52.

- ¹⁵ *The Jakarta Post*, 21 February 2008; *Kompas*, 8 August 2007; in 2009, the health spending in this country is equivalent to 3.1% percent of its GDP; 55.5% of the Indonesian population is uninsured because health insurance from both the government and the private sector has only reached 44.5% coverage. See Salut Muhidin & Jerico Fransiscus Pardosi, "Time to Overhaul RI's Public Health System," *The Jakarta Post*, June 23, 2009.
- ¹⁶ See Ordinance No. 40 on Corporation in 2007, especially Chapter V and article 74 that regulates corporate social responsibility and sustainable development. This act insisted that every corporation shall allocate some portions of the revenues for social purposes.
- ¹⁷ The PIRAC's study also explains that corporations attempt to avoid political matters when channelling their social funds. Therefore only a few of the companies supported legal reform (3%) and advocacy programmes (12%); some encouraged activities on arts and culture (30%), health (33%), and the environment (38%); and the rest financed programmes on education (57%), religion (61%) and social services (82%). In line with this, the *Indonesia Zakat & Development Report 2009* explains that following the *Era Reformasi*, which is signified by the decline of the New Order, Indonesia has entered two important phases: the institutionalisation phase (1999-2000) and capacity building and synergy (2001 until now). The former phase was indicated by the rise of political awareness among Indonesian Muslims to strengthen *zakat* institutions through the enactment of *zakat* ordinances; while the latter is marked by efforts to rejuvenate the function of *zakat* agencies in society and to create more a powerful impact for *zakat* funding by building synergism among the existing *zakat* agencies. See PEBS FE UI & CID, *Indonesia Zakat & Development Report*, 8-10.
- ¹⁸ http://www.republika.co.id/berita/61469/Abu_Syauqi_Style_Manajen_Kita_Mirip_Perusahaan
- ¹⁹ The newly charitable health centre of the Sunda Kelapa Mosque is composed of 1 general policlinic, 1 dental clinic, 1 laboratory, 1 pharmacy, and 2 USG units. It provides a 24 hour-service for low-income households.
- ²⁰ Free healthcare services have often become a political commodity during elections at the both national and regional (provincial and district) levels. See. "Layanan Kesehatan Gratis jadi Jualan Utama," <http://bolaeropa.kompas.com/ver1/Kesehatan/0801/04/203027.htm>
- ²¹ Soheir A Morsy, "Islamic Clinics in Egypt: The Cultural Elaboration of Biomedical hegemony," *Medical Anthropology Quarterly*, New Series, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Dec. 1988), 359.
- ²² Board members of *zakat* agencies realised that a shortage of viable healthcare could not be solved by service-oriented programmes alone, like the ones offered by *zakat* agencies and their charitable works. However, they also believe that, for the time being, not only do poor people need advocacy from NGOs, but also direct services as an instant solution to the symptoms of the problem. Yet, according to the CEO of one *Zakat* agency, a long-term advocacy programme remains important in order to address the cause of the problems.
- ²³ Dompot Dhuafa, *Annual Report 2004*.
- ²⁴ See Dompot Dhuafa, *Newsletter Masa Kini*, No. 0109 (Shafar 1430 H).
- ²⁵ It should be noted that the value of the IDR is not the same from year to year. Before the economic crisis that took place from 1997 to 1999, the value of the IDR against the US dollar declined from about IDR 2500-3000 per dollar to about 16,000-18,000 per dollar.

- From 1999 to 2002, the rupiah exchange rate has been relatively stable, between 7,500 and 10,000 per dollar. Therefore, the amount of money spent on healthcare and clinics shown in Table 2 should also be seen in relation to the change of the IDR's value in that period.
- ²⁶ This is not to say that the process of endowing this land ran smoothly, because one of the family members later refused to endow the inherited land. RBC was in dispute with one of the family members of the *waqif* over the use of endowed land for social purposes.
- ²⁷ In the case of RBC, the Muslim Workers' Union of PT Indosat TBK, an Indonesian telecommunication company, is among the private institutions contributing a lot to the establishment of RBC.
- ²⁸ The adoption of a new name by Islamist activists suggests an internal conversion. The name may also have been adopted initially as a pseudonym during the time when the Islamic campus movements were semi-illegal. In recent times, the use of a pseudonym (i.e. 'Abu Fulan', means 'the father of somebody') remains popular among salafis and other purist Islamists. Some of them originally had Muslim names, or otherwise Indonesian or Javanese names.
- ²⁹ *Republika*, 22 October 2004.
- ³⁰ It is worth mentioning that Abu Syauqi has a close connection with and was even part of the Tarbiyah Movement in Indonesia. Even so, he chose to become a social activist rather than a politician, as he decided not to join any political party. However, in the election of the City Major of Bandung Municipality, Abu Syauqi was nominated by the PKS as the Vice City Major of Bandung, assisting Taufiqurrahman, a candidate for the City Major of Bandung position.
- ³¹ Interview, *Republika*, 6 July 2009.
- ³² The target beneficiaries for ICDs are poorer families (potential *zakat* recipients) who are considered eligible for both micro-finance (*Ecocare*) and free healthcare provision (*Healthcare*). Interview with dr. Hadiyani Nugraha, Manager of RZI's Charitable Maternity Clinic in Bandung 14 March 2009 in Bandung. The ICD also engages potential benefactors (*zakat* payers among wealthy families) in the given region as their partners. Until March 2009, RZI managed 227 ICDs with 4,062 families throughout Indonesia.
- ³³ *Zakat* agencies in Indonesia seem to agree that 10%-12.5 % of the collected funds are to be allocated for the *zakat* collector, and the rest are to be distributed through various programmes on health, education, micro-finance, and the like. It seems that these programmes are created to reach eight types of *zakat* recipients.
- ³⁴ Interview with Bukhari, Branch Manager of RZI of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 26 November 2008 in Banda Aceh.
- ³⁵ It is said that the current maternity clinic is the place where Abu Syauqi, the founder of RZI, was born.
- * Islamic associations often conduct *Sunatan Massal*, an occasion to facilitate the collective circumcision (one of the Prophet's traditions) of boys from low-income households. Yet, for the time being, female circumcision is rarely practiced in Islamic medical clinics. In certain cases, for reasons of tradition, a family may make a request to the clinic for female circumcision. In order to achieve 'customer satisfaction', the physician attempts to just clean smoothly—not to cut—the skin around baby girl's clitoris, using a certain physiological fluid. For further

discussion of circumcision traditions in Indonesian Islam, see Nico Kaptein, "Circumcision in Indonesia: Muslim or Not?", in Jan Platvoet and Karel van der Toorn (eds.), *Pluralism and Identity: Studies in Ritual Behaviour* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 285-302; Andree Feillard and Lies Marcoes, "Female Circumcision in Indonesia: To 'Islamize' in Ceremony or Secrecy," *Archipel*, 56, Paris (1998), 337-367.

** Health Allert or *Siaga Sehat* is a regular programme carried out by Rumah Zakat to provide healthcare for disadvantaged groups residing in the areas where RZI uses ICD (integrated community development) projects. In this programme RZI conducts medical diagnosis, provides medicine, health campaigns and services in the community, and offers additional highly nutritious food for infant and children.

*** Table 5.4 shows that not all targeted beneficiaries can benefit from Islamic charities. This is due to two factors: first, the number of people who signed up for aid is higher than that of those who are targeted; second, the amount of money for healthcare provided by RZI is lower than the demand from society.

³⁶ See for the 2007 Indonesian Health Profile, 139-142. It should be noted that the method employed by the Ministry of Health to measure infant mortality and maternal mortality was based on hospitals' reports, excluding the numbers from the community, which have not been researched yet.

³⁷ Interview with Luthfi Afandi, General Manager of Dompot Dhuafa, Bandung Branch Office, 24 September 2008; Interview with Head of Administrative staff of DD's Charitable Maternity Clinic, 29 September 2009. See also Luthfi Afandi & Hendi Suhendi, "Riak Kecil di Tengah Arus Besar: Studi Kasus Optimalisasi Dana Ziswaf DD Bandung" in Arifin Purwakanta et al. *Gerakan Zakat untuk Indonesia* (Jakarta: KB Press and Dompot Dhuafa, 2008), 37-57.

³⁸ *The Jakarta Post*, 29 May 2009. The above numbers of IMR and MMR are higher than for 2007. The Demographic and Health Survey reported that in 2007, Indonesia's IMR was 34 per 1,000 live births, while its MMR was 228 per 100,000 live births. The increase in infant mortality in Indonesia, according to some experts, was caused by the economic crisis. See *The Jakarta Post*, 17 April 2003.

³⁹ Interview with dr. Hadiyani Nugraha, Manager of RZI's Charitable Maternity Clinic in Bandung, 14 March 2009.

⁴⁰ *Republika*, 22 October 2004.

⁴¹ In 2005, when the price of oil and cost of public transportation in Indonesia increased, DD took the initiative by introducing free public transportation. DD operated four buses surrounding Jakarta city from 6 am to 6 pm. Each bus was labelled "*Bus Gratis Subsidi Dana Zakat, Infak, dan Sedekah*" (Free Bus Subsidised by Zakat, Infak and badaqa Funds). The result suggests that only a few people wanted to use the charity buses because they felt embarrassed riding on such transportation with such an obvious message to the public: free.

⁴² Among the eight types of *zakat* recipients according to Quranic injunction, only two of them can be classified Muslim recipients, among them '*amilin (zakat collector) fi sabilillah* (who are in the way of God). Meanwhile, other beneficiaries are inclusive in character. One *zakat* collector told me that the Qur'an does not make a clear distinction between the poorer families based upon their religious affiliations. However, because the majority of the Indone-

- sian population is Muslim, the majority of poorer families are also Muslim.
- ⁴³ Lack of participation among the poor in a healthcare system in which charitable clinics are embedded has characterised the relationships between patients/beneficiaries and clinics. Saad Eddin Ibrahim's study on *Grassroots Participation in the Development of Egypt* as cited by Janine Clark confirms that "the poor are largely excluded from PVO activity except as mere recipients of benefits," Janine A. Clark, *Islam, Charity and Activism*, 65.
- ⁴⁴ By the 1970s and 1980s, some Christian NGOs such as YAKKUM and YIS offered a sort of community-based health insurance, namely "Dana Sehat". Despite providing health services, this scheme allows community to participate by contributing about 0.5% of average household income. See David Morley, Jon Rohde, and Glen Williams, "The Ant and the Elephant: Voluntary Agencies and Government Health Programmes in Indonesia," in *Practicing Health for All* (Oxford: Oxford Medical Publications, 1983), 168-189.
- ⁴⁵ There has not been an adequate study exploring the impact of charitable clinics, notably maternity clinics, on the decrease of infant mortality rates in both regional and national contexts.
- ⁴⁶ Thomas Adam (ed.), *Philanthropy, Patronage and Civil Society: Experiences from Germany, Great Britain, and North America* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2004), 4.
- ⁴⁷ Janine A. Clark's studies have confirmed that location of clinics has shaped the type, size, and quality of clinics. Islamic clinics that are set up to cater to poor families and located in poor-urban areas are relatively smaller and less well-equipped than the clinics which are established in surrounding wealthy neighbourhoods. See Janine A. Clark, *Islam, Charity and Activism*, 67-9.
- ⁴⁸ *Suara Merdeka*, Friday 6 October 2006.
- ⁴⁹ http://www.republika.co.id/berita/54672/Wakaf_Tunai_untuk_Kesehatan_Dhuafa
- ⁵⁰ The term Islamic civil society organisation is used here to distinguish between multi-purpose organisations like the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, and charitable associations specialising in managing *zakat*, *sedekah* and Islamic social funds.
- ⁵¹ PEBS FE UI & CID, *Indonesia Zakat & Development Report*, 19.
- ⁵² For further information about the objective of the PKO, see *Reglement Moehammadijah Bahagian Penolong Kesengsaraan Oemoem Hindia Timur di Djokjakarta* (Yogyakarta: Pertjetakan Persatoen); also *Buah Hasil Konperensi PKU (Penolong Kesengsaraan Umum) Muhammadiyah Seluruh Indonesia: 20-22 Mei 1961 di Jakarta*; See Panitia HUT RSU PKU, *Memperingati Milad ke 65 SRU PKU Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta* (Yogyakarta: RSU PKU Muhammadiyah, 1988), 14; also H.S. Prodjokusumo, *Menelusuri dan Napak Tilas Perjalanan Muhammadiyah: 85 Tahun Perjuangan dan Pengorbanan Para Anggota dan Pimpinan* (Jakarta: Yayasan Amal Bakti Masyarakat, 1995), 39.
- ⁵³ Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree*, 285.
- ⁵⁴ Yet, it also should be noted that this network has not been set up with all of the Muhammadiyah's *zakat* agencies. Until now, the LAZISMU has struggled to disseminate its idea to the hundreds of Muhammadiyah *zakat* agencies sporadically operating over the regions.
- ⁵⁵ The term *amal usaha* used in the Muhammadiyah is equivalent to social institutions that can be either charitable or commercial in character. It comprises hospitals, schools, orphanages,

- mosque, and other Muhammadiyah productive assets.
- ⁵⁶ Marcel Bonneff, "Le Kauman de Yogyakarta. Des fonctionnaires religieux convertis au réformisme et à l'esprit d'entreprise," *Archipel*, Vol. 30 (1985), 175-205; Ahmad Adaby Darban, *Sejarah Kauman: Mengungkap Identitas Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta: Tarawang, 2000).
- ⁵⁷ Interview with Wasis Ridlo, Counselling Division, RSU PKU Muhammadiyah, in Yogyakarta, May 2007.
- ⁵⁸ Interview with Siti Chamamah Soeratno, the President of Aisiyah, 19 January 2009 in Yogyakarta; for another case, see for example Muhammad Fuad, "Civil Society in Indonesia: The Limit and Potential of Muhammadiyah," *Sojourn*, vol. 17, No.2 (2002), 141.
- ⁵⁹ In the last ten years, the Aisiyah, in cooperation with both the government and international NGOs, has actively promoted family planning and reproductive health by targeting teenagers and the elderly. It set up *Posyandu Lansia* (health centre for the elderly) and revitalises youth activities in the community. Interview with Triyas Setiawati, January 14, 2009, in Yogyakarta. She is the former President of Naswiatul Aisiyah (Muhammadiyah Young Women Association) and was recently appointed as the General Secretary of the Aisiyah.
- ⁶⁰ The Aisiyah defines *Qaryah Thayibah* as a village or region whose inhabitants are practising Islam comprehensively (*kafah*), including in their religious matters (*habl min Allah*) and social affairs (*habl min al-nas* or *mu'amala duniawiyya*).
- ⁶¹ During the National Congress in Banda Aceh in 1995, the *qaryah thayyibah* programme was officially launched and then disseminated throughout Indonesia. The Aisiyah has attempted to implement the *qaryah thayyibah* concept in 214 villages. Yet it also should be noted that, due to the complex situation faced by villagers as well as by Aisiyah activists, there are only a few villages in which the concept of *qaryah thayyibah* functions as it ought to. This is based on the result of the evaluation and assessment conducted by the Central Board of the Aisiyah and the Department of Community Development of the Muhammadiyah. See PP Aisiyah, *Revitalisasi Konsep dan Strategi Implementasi Qaryah Thayyibah Aisiyah* (Yogyakarta: PP, Aisiyah, 2007).
- ⁶² Interview with Siti Chamamah Soeratno, 19 January 2009; interview with Triyas Setiawati, 14 January 2009.
- ⁶³ The Aisiyah was awarded the 2012 Indonesian MDG (Millennium Development Goals) Award for its achievement in the prevention of the spread of tuberculosis.

Islamic Charities and the Protection of Underprivileged Women

Introduction

This chapter discusses the way in which Islamic charitable associations address women's problems and how issues affecting women, such as domestic violence and human trafficking, have been included in recent Indonesian Muslim discourse and activism. The proliferation over the last three decades of NGOs that specialise in women's empowerment in Indonesia suggests that public awareness of the problems faced by women in this country has increased. A variety of approaches and methods, ranging from providing development-oriented projects to advocacy, have been formulated by NGOs as a means of promoting gender equality, providing a broader space for women's civic engagement, as well as of increasing the quality of women's social and economic lives. Exploring the experience of Islamic charitable associations such as Dompot Dhuafa (DD), Daarut Tauhid (DT) and other development NGOs in addressing women's issues, this chapter argues that the severe problem of poverty, which has put women in an unfavourable position, as some of them become the victims of human trafficking, has stimulated Islamic charitable associations to provide development projects that are oriented towards women. There are substantial differences between Islamic charitable associations and in the ways they formulate their approaches

to the perceived problems and their strategies to overcome women's poverty-related issues.

Poverty, Human Trafficking and the Women's Movement

Poverty and Human Trafficking

Ten years after the economic crisis that took place in 1997, Indonesian society still faced social insecurity and economic hardship, a problem compounded by the lack of comprehensive welfare policies for the grassroots. Thousands of teenagers leave school, notably junior high schools, for different reasons. Most of them cannot afford to stay at school, and must work in order to support their family members, who live in poverty in villages. As the main victims of economic hardship and unjust power relations, as well as gender-based cultural and political inequalities, underprivileged women also become vulnerable to exploitation, such as physical and psychological abuse, domestic violence, and human trafficking.¹ According to UNICEF's estimate, human trafficking in Indonesia remains major problem. Approximately 100,000 Indonesian women and children are sexually exploited for commercial purposes annually, and underage girls make up 30% of the country's prostitutes.²

It is believed that the acute poverty-related problems in some regions in Indonesia lie at the root of the problem of—and may lead to—human trafficking. In particular, rural and urban poverty may stimulate the exploitation of women and children. Lower-income households are believed to prioritise the education of boys, and at the same time, girls are forced to work instead of study. The low level of education among women due to poverty, therefore, becomes another factor that potentially leads to abuse and exploitation. Many girls are forced to work as labourers in factories, as housemaids in the cities, as migrant workers, or even as sex workers. They have to earn their living to support their families, while at the same time leaving school. In certain regencies of Java Island, there are a large number of girls who are forced by their families to work as sex workers or housemaids,

Equally importantly, poverty and lack of education have also become major factors generating the high incidence of under-age marriages among girls

living in poverty. This can be seen mainly in rural areas, where girls from low-income households are vulnerable to unjust gender bias according to social and cultural norms. In rural areas where farming dominates communities, early marriage is still a common phenomenon. It is suggested that parents remain instrumental in the practice of early marriage in rural areas, and some girls who marry before the age of 15 or 18 admit that they decided to get married because of their parents' desires.³ The practice of marrying early has far reaching consequences for the future of the families in general, and the girls in particular. For example, early childbearing without sufficient nutrition may badly affect the health condition of mothers and infants, and this practice has greatly contributed to the increasing maternal and infant mortality in rural areas (see chapter 4). The unsteady economic foundations of new families living in poverty put girls in a risky situation, with regard to their reproductive health, domestic violence and exploitation.

Moreover, in spite of their marginalised position, women are a vital part of the workforce in the informal sector, in rural as well as urban areas. For particular groups of society with limited skills and a low level of education, working in the informal sector in foreign countries seems the 'best' and most 'promising'—but at the same time uncertain—option, which may or may not secure their economic futures or even their lives. As the acute poverty-related problems cannot always be effectively resolved, either by the government or civil society organisations, women in rural areas are still interested in work abroad to secure a better life. This is partly because the government, at both the national and regional levels, cannot provide sufficient workplaces for those less educated-people, and at the same time does not have an adequate system and economic development projects, especially in poor villages, that can prevent women from working overseas.

There are three categories of migrant workers who have left Indonesia to seek employment abroad: the first are high-skilled workers whose considerable expertise is very rare and needed by large companies in developed countries; the second are semi-skilled workers whose practical skills are rather common, and yet needed in both developed and developing countries, and which just requiring short-term training; and the last are 'low'-skilled work-

ers who are mostly assigned to the informal sector. Women migrant workers (*Tenaga Kerja Wanita-TKW*) from Indonesia, who are also termed ‘domestic workers’, are predominately lower-skilled compared with those from other Asian countries, such as the Philippines and Thailand, because most Indonesian workers have merely graduated from primary education and only a few have college diplomas. Working mainly as housemaids, Indonesian migrant workers are paid less.⁴ Men who are willing to work abroad are mainly appointed as labourers in various kinds of ‘dirty, dangerous, and difficult jobs’ (3-D Jobs) in the industrial and construction sector, while women are mainly employed in the informal sector. Women migrant workers’ vulnerability lies mainly in the uncertainty of gaining adequate protection from the state, not only during the course of recruitment by private agencies in Indonesia, but also during their work overseas. It has often been reported in the mass media that some domestic workers from Indonesia working in such countries as Malaysia, Singapore, and Saudi Arabia have had horrifying experiences, have often suffered sexual and physical abuse, and at the same time have received no adequate protection from the Indonesian authorities.

Despite the gloom over these unfavourable conditions, the plight of domestic workers working as housemaids overseas continues. At the same time, the government is failing to develop the quality of human resources in Indonesia. Human trafficking and the dispatch of women migrant workers to work as housemaids overseas have increasingly become NGO concerns, along with the notion of women’s empowerment. In particular, the poor prospects faced by Indonesian women seem to have stimulated Islamic associations to speak up for them and show their dissatisfaction at insufficient government policies. For example, in 2005, the Indonesian ‘Ulama Council (MUI) enacted Islamic legal opinions (*fatwas*), according to which the plight of Indonesian women workers overseas was considered ‘illicit’ (*haram*) and should be avoided by any individual or institution. This *fatwa* also insisted that the Ministry of Manpower should stop sending Indonesian women to work overseas. Similar calls were made by some Islamic associations that urged the government to issue a regulation that could prevent women migrant workers leaving, notably to Saudi Arabia.

NGOs Efforts to Protect Women from Exploitation

Indonesia has witnessed the rise of an Islamic women's movement since the early twentieth century. In 1917, the modernist Muhammadiyah founded an autonomous association called the Aisyiyah to facilitate the involvement of female activists in propagating Islam and running social activities. Since the 1920s, the Aisyiyah has been able to promote particular issues related to the wellbeing of women, children and families. In the same way, the women's wings of PERSIS and the NU, Persistri (*Persatuan Islam Istri*) and Muslimat, emerged at almost the same time to represent women's interests on the one hand, and to enlarge the scope of *da'wa* among their followers and sympathisers on the other.⁵ The long-established women's associations, such as the Aisyiyah and Muslimat NU, pay attention to women's engagement in public life and focus on strengthening women's roles within families. Over the decades, these associations have been instrumental in running *dakwah* and social activities. They actively organise religious sermons or gatherings (*pengajian*), both in rural and urban areas, attended by female participants.

In the 1980s and 1990s, corresponding to the growth of NGO development and advocacy programmes, the discourse on women's issues among Indonesian Muslims evolved. The extent to which Muslim NGOs in Indonesia tackle social and economic problems affecting women is as varied as the types of Islamic associations. A variety of approaches and methods, especially those related to gender issues, have been formulated by NGOs as a means of fostering women's roles in fighting 'patriarchal culture' and promoting gender equality. The newly founded Muslim NGOs, such as Rifka Annisa, the Fahmina Institute, Rahima, and Puan Amal Hayati, are renowned for their advocacy of women's rights.⁶ These NGOs, founded mainly by Muslim NGO activists from the traditionalist circle, are acquainted with such issues as human rights in general, and women's rights in particular. They have attempted to reconstruct the mindset developed within religious institutions and government policies. Together with other feminist groups, these Islamic feminist movements have also begun questioning male 'domination' in the public sector, criticising discrimination on a gender basis, re-examining religious tenets which are insensitive to women's roles, and condemning government

policies that overlook women's empowerment.⁷

Influenced by both Western feminist ideas and progressive feminists from the Muslim world, Muslim feminist movements in Indonesia have engaged in advocacy on behalf of underprivileged women by formulating a more liberal Islamic view of women's rights. At the discursive level, a number of Muslim feminist thinkers and activists from other parts of the world, such as Riffat Hassan, Fatima Mernissi, and Amina Wadud, become known in Indonesia. Their theological perspectives have often resounded among Muslim feminist groups that, in the past three decades, have attempted to bring gender issues into the mainstream, so as to address the social, economic and political problems in Indonesian society. A series of training programmes and workshops on a wide range of women's issues, such as gender equality, reproductive health, empowerment, the protection of migrant workers, and women's leadership and social and political engagement, have become part of Muslim feminists' discourse. Building awareness of gender issues and women's problems among Indonesian societies is their counter-hegemonic discourse against injustice and patriarchal culture.⁸ Beyond their vibrant discourse on women's empowerment, Muslim feminist movements have also been very active in advocating for underprivileged women who have suffered mistreatment, such as sexual harassment and domestic violence.

It appears that the very complex array of poverty-related problems in Indonesia which have put particular groups of Indonesian women, notably the less well-educated, in unfavourable condition, have challenged the above-mentioned NGOs and feminist movements to formulate an effective strategy on overcoming these problems. The advocacy NGOs and feminist movements mentioned above have voiced their concerns partly by criticising the government's weak policies on protecting Indonesian migrant workers.⁹ This kind of voice represents, to borrow Susan Blackburn's expression, not only people's 'humanitarian concern, but also their repugnance at Indonesians working overseas in what were regarded as menial capacities.'¹⁰ These NGOs also deal with gender-related issues, such as women's rights, unemployment, human trafficking, reproductive health, and the welfare of families. Feminist movements mainly believe that the roots of problems lie in the over-

whelming 'patriarchal culture', injustice and gender inequality within society. Due to this, NGOs and feminist movements have incorporated notions of gender justice and women's rights in a perspective for addressing problems affecting women.

While human trafficking and the protection of female migrant workers have occupied almost the entire public discourse among NGOs and current studies on women, Indonesian social activists have realised that in the main problems affecting women are to be found in their home towns. These organisations often cooperate with other women's NGOs locally and internationally, and utilise Islam as a perspective to address a wide range of women's issues. Islamic young women's organisations such as *Nasyiatul Aisyiyah* (*Nasyiah*) and *Fatayat NU*, for example, have focused on building awareness of women's problems. These two associations are concerned with women's issues, such as gender equality, domestic violence, reproductive health, empowerment, family law and leadership, by laying emphasis on the re-interpretation of Islamic precepts on relations between men and women.¹¹ The prevention of abuse of women, including TKW, seems to have become their major agenda.¹²

Since 2000, the *Aisyiyah* and the *Nasyiah* have been paying attention to human trafficking.¹³ Their activities and projects operate on two different levels. The first level relates to the government and public policies that have an impact on women's prosperity. At this level, public hearings, research, workshops and training on gender issues have become core activities. The *Aisyiyah* has a Standard Operational Procedure (SOP) for overcoming the problem of human trafficking, and to implement this SOP, it established cooperation with Indonesian embassies in certain countries to handle migrant workers. In 2006, the *Nasyiah* in particular, in collaboration with foreign NGOs, such as the International Catholic Migrant Commission (ICMC)¹⁴ and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) took the initiative to address human trafficking issues. The publication of a handbook for the struggle against human trafficking, which is disseminated in regions in Indonesia known as major suppliers of women migrant workers, reflects another approach utilised to overcome women's problems in local areas. It is expected

that through the dissemination of knowledge about human trafficking, people will become aware of the precarious nature of illegal work overseas.¹⁵

At a discursive level, together with other women's NGOs, the Aisiyah was active in encouraging the government and the Indonesian Legislative Assembly (DPR) to legalise laws that can protect women in a more comprehensive way, such as the Laws on PKDRT (*Penghapusan Kekerasan Dalam Rumah Tangga*, The Abolition of Domestic Violence), and PTPPO (*Penghapusan Tindak Pidana Perdagangan Orang*, The Abolition of Unjust Deeds of Human Trafficking). At another level, the Nasyiah deals with practical activities, developing skills and knowledge for vulnerable women in urban and rural areas. In the social and economic sphere, the Nasyiah operates BUANA (*Badan Usaha Amal Nasyiatul Aisiyah*), a social economic enterprise in the forms of cooperatives (*koperasi*), Islamic savings and loan cooperatives (BMT), catering businesses, and so forth, that are expected to support the economic life of law-income families in the grassroots. By way of offering knowledge and skills, they expect to reduce the numbers of women interested in working abroad as domestic servants, which in many cases is very risky, and at the same time attempt to encourage the provision of more reasonable choices in the home country. Yet, it is acknowledged that providing and sustaining income-generating projects is not easy for many women's movements, including the Aisiyah.¹⁶

In the same way, in 2010, the Fatayat launched a book relating to migrant workers, entitled '*Mari Kenali Hak-hak Buruh Migrant Indonesia: Perspektif Islam dan Perempuan*' (Let Us Recognise the Indonesian Migrant Workers' Rights: the Islamic and Women's Perspective).¹⁷ This book aims at providing guidance for migrant workers on knowing their rights while working overseas, especially in non-Muslim regions, such as Hong Kong. It consists of material that reveals the status of migrant workers as Muslims, as professional workers, and as Indonesians. This book begins with an introduction to the principles of women's rights according to Islam by explaining the position of women in Islam, their possibilities for public engagement and their ability to change their lives. Accordingly, while many might see becoming migrant workers overseas (BMI) as a destiny, human beings have been blessed

with the ability to make some efforts (*ikhtiyar*) to change their fates. Becoming migrant domestic workers may be one of the choices available for the time being to improve the quality of life for Indonesian women, but they can improve their lives in the future during the course of working overseas, or notably after they return to their home countries.¹⁸ According to this book, as ‘professional’ workers, prospective migrant workers should also know their rights from the beginning, before they take jobs in the workplaces. These rights include being given an adequate place to stay and sufficient meals in the shelter pre- or post-departure, avoiding sexual harassment, and communicating with their families.¹⁹ The issues relating to domestic migrant workers are very complex, and the Fatayat, in this respect, attempts to give guidance and provide knowledge beforehand to diminish the impact of the state’s regulatory failure to protect Indonesian women working in other countries.²⁰

It should be noted, however, that when it comes to the economic arena, Muslim feminist movements and women’s NGOs have often been faced with many difficulties in providing development-oriented programmes that can generate income for women living in poverty. Despite the fact that Islamic NGOs have demonstrated a willingness to create development-oriented projects, they have also found that capital is very hard to come by. It is under these circumstances that Islamic charities that have strong financial support from the public hint at the potential role that Islamic development NGOs can play. They can become new actors that pay attention to women living in poverty. Islamic charities have also been transformed by the social and economic goals they have embraced, acting as both relief agencies and development-oriented NGOs. In their respective ways, Islamic charities have attempted to provide assistance for underprivileged women, either in rural or urban poor areas.

The enduring problems faced by women have apparently stimulated Islamic charitable associations to provide assistance for women. DD and Dompot Peduli Umat-Daarut Tauhid (DPU-DT), for example, have attempted to take part in alleviating poverty by addressing poverty-related issues affecting women and, in turn, by operating development-oriented projects and providing assistance for those who have already left the country (Indonesia)

and face difficulties overseas. Beneath the surface, there are different factors fuelling Islamic charitable associations to address particular beneficiaries, notably women. The first factor is the current extensive discourse on gender issues among Indonesian Muslim feminists. The Muslim feminist movement, represented in part by women's NGOs, has been instrumental in voicing notions of women's empowerment and, at the same time, in building awareness of the problems faced by Indonesian women in the grassroots. The second factor that compels *zakat* agencies to work on women's issues is women's increasing participation in social and charitable enterprises and in the management of philanthropic associations. It has been suggested that increasing opportunities for women's engagement in Islamic philanthropic activism has opened up opportunities for philanthropic organisations to include women as targeted beneficiaries.²¹

Dompot Dhuafa: Relief and Development for Underprivileged Women

Micro-finance and Poor Relief: Domestic Projects

As noted previously, there has been a lot of public concern over women's poverty, trafficking and the plight of migrant workers. Like other development NGOs, DD has extended its social programmes in order to deal with poverty issues in general and women's empowerment in particular. In fact, DD as a growing *zakat* agency has so far operated both relief and development oriented projects in the national and international arenas. For this Islamic charitable association, underprivileged female migrant workers (TKW, see below) can be regarded as one type of *zakat* beneficiary who need assistance from Islamic organisations. There are a variety of expressions in Indonesian that can be used to refer to female migrant workers, the most popular of which are *Tenaga Kerja Indonesia* (Indonesian Workers, TKI), *Tenaga Kerja Wanita* (Indonesian Women Workers, TKW), *Buruh Migran Indonesia* (Indonesian Migrant Labours, BMI), or even PRT (*Pembantu Rumah Tangga*, domestic servants). While these terms are perceived in Indonesian society as referring to occupations that are of an 'inferior status', 'less respectable' and are even associated with a 'subordinate' occupation, DD has endeavoured to employ the more neutral term, '*perantau*' ('migrant').

The term '*perantau*' in the Indonesian context has a strong Minangkabau connection, as this term is mainly used by people from West Sumatra who migrated to other parts of Indonesia to run businesses, notably restaurants, and to build their careers. Despite its 'neutral' connotations, which avoids disgracing women migrant domestic workers, the term *perantau* in Islamic literature can also be translated into, and associated with, one of the *zakat* beneficiaries, called *ibn sabil* ('wayfarer', traveller). The concept of *perantau* in this respect can mean those who are struggling to make a living overseas. It is also worth bearing in mind that, in practice, *ibn sabil* (wayfarer) is an entity that is rarely included as a *zakat* beneficiary. The existence of the concept of *ibn sabil* is even commonly put aside in the whole discussion of *du'afa* or *mustad'afun* (those who are oppressed).²² Arifin Purwakananta, the programme director of DD, for example, suggests that DD aims to act as a 'small general consulate' of Indonesia, an association that may support migrants by giving them both social and legal assistance. He considers the disadvantaged migrants as representing *mustad'afin*, oppressed entities that need both short-term service and, more particularly, long-term political and legal assistance.²³

The dispatch of 'low'-skilled workers to other countries is simply a result of poverty. Before leaving the country, TKW mainly encounter vicious poverty in their hometowns and they do not have alternative solutions to escaping poverty and supporting their families. This means that the main factors that cause low-skilled women to leave their country (Indonesia) and work overseas as housemaids certainly lie at the domestic level, such as limited access to financial resources, lack of education, being overlooked by the authorities for skill development training, and so forth. Therefore, providing development-oriented programmes in areas where many poor and defenceless women reside became DD's top priority.

Under the banner of *Masyarakat Mandiri* ('Self-governing Society'), DD operates income-generating projects and small economic enterprises to support women's livelihoods. The types of activities to support income-generating projects are contingent upon the characteristics of the targeted beneficiaries. In the coastal areas, such as Sidoarjo on East Java, where many fisher-

men live in poverty, DD provides training for women to create home industries and to give added-value to their fishery products (processing, packaging and distributing). This income-generating project, known as the Self-governing Cluster Programme (*Program Klaster Mandiri*), was set up for villages in the coastal area of Sidoarjo as a means of providing entrepreneurship skills for women (the wives of sailors).²⁴ Likewise, for those living in rural areas with agricultural production, DD has organised low-income households to set up home industries, such as producing chips made from cassava, potato and *melinjo*-fruit. Despite the fact that this kind of development project is not a trivial matter, its impact is still limited and can only be achieved by very limited groups of beneficiaries. Because of this, DD prefers extending its projects by providing assistance as well as arranging development-oriented programmes for female migrants working abroad.

It appears the intensified encounters between DD volunteers and women living in poverty have led to the enrichment of DD's social enterprises, by including underprivileged women in rural and urban areas as targets. In cooperation with the Mitra Pesona Foundation, an NGO working on women's empowerment, DD also focuses on women and poverty issues in urban areas. In order to reduce poverty in rural areas, DD considers that women's access to financial resources should be opened up as a means of giving broader roles to women in strengthening the economic condition of families. In this respect, DD as a philanthropic association focuses on providing financial access, assistance, and building partnerships with local institutions. Unlike in rural areas, the types of DD project to develop women's participation in family economics in urban areas are related to microeconomic enterprises run by an individual or communities. In short, the above-mentioned activities encompass DD's concerns about poverty alleviation among communities in urban and rural areas, and at the same time they are effective. DD aims at reducing the severe impact of poverty on women and families.

Another domestic project run by DD, which directly relates to women's issues in general and migrant workers in particular, is known as the Migrant Crisis Centre (MCC). Launched in 2011, the MCC aims to provide assistance for female migrant workers who face significant difficulties before,

during or after their work overseas. According to the director of the MCC, the organisation's presence is intended to 'give protection, advocacy, and mentoring to Indonesian migrant workers, who are fighting for their basic rights.'²⁵ Like the Aisiyah and Fatayat, DD started to build societal awareness society of the advantages and disadvantages of becoming migrant workers overseas. DD volunteers have come to believe that the MCC currently remains necessary due the absence of state protection for migrants. MCC offices were set up in two main 'gates' or cities where migrant women workers leave for abroad, and MCC projects provide legal assistance and campaign for the protection of migrant workers though radio talk shows (especially via community radio stations) and the dissemination of information through newspapers in certain recruitment for Indonesian migrant workers, such as East Java, Central Java, West Java, and Banten.

Assistance for Migrant Workers: Overseas Projects

Since 2004, DD has had a branch office in Hong Kong, one of the largest and most cosmopolitan cities in Asia, and home to approximately 150,000 Indonesian migrant workers. The branch office has cooperated with a number of Indonesian migrant associations.²⁶ Various reasons, mainly humanitarian and religious ones, have been given by DD to explain its presence in a city such as Hong Kong. Humanitarian issues relate to the actual conditions and prospects of migrant workers who have been placed in inopportune and weak positions, especially in facing conflicts between themselves and their employers. A variety of problems have mark the lives of many female migrant workers, problems such as sexual abuse, inappropriate breaking of the terms of the contract by both employers or job providers, and wrongful dismissal. At the same time, the employees, predominantly women, are in a weak position due to their status as migrant workers or 'foreigners', in spite of their legal status as residents. The second reason given by DD, religion, is also instrumental in shaping the typical social activities carried out by DD in Hong Kong. Unlike Indonesian female migrant workers in the Middle Eastern countries, who are very close to 'the cradle of Islam', in Hong Kong, the migrant workers' religious life, as far as DD officials are concerned, has be-

come the target of religious missionary activities. Apart from this, there are a number of Indonesian female migrant workers who fall into the trap of becoming commercial sex workers in Hong Kong.²⁷ The third factor is the political openness in Hong Kong, which makes it possible for the NGO sector to develop, unlike in other countries such as Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, two Muslim countries that are quite resistant to the NGO sector. In fact, in these two Muslim countries, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, the situation of Indonesian domestic workers appears to be considerably worse than that in Hong Kong.



Figure 5 A leaflet created by Dompot Dhuafa to mobilise *zakat* funds from, and to organise social and religious activities among, Muslim migrant workers in Hong Kong (source: author's collection).

DD has created a variety of activities pertinent to the migrants' needs, ranging from providing shelters for those who are homeless due to having been driven from their dwellings, to facilitating the establishment of migrant associations and supporting their activities. Female migrants, in particular, are in great need of support and assistance from not only the government, who may provide a legal umbrella for the protection of migrants, but also other parties like NGOs, who may offer practical and psychological assistance. For example, there are five 'shelters' for Indonesian migrants in Hong

Kong and two in Macao that have been managed by various Indonesian associations. 'Shelter' in this respect means a place in the form of an apartment rented out by NGOs or associations to temporarily accommodate migrant workers who are facing difficulties, such as losing their jobs, something that automatically causes them to become 'homeless' during their stay in Hong Kong. Religious institutions, notably Muslim and Christian ones, are among the most active institutions providing assistance to TKW in Hong Kong. Some shelters, therefore, have been sponsored by Christian congregations, others by Islamic associations, while none are supported by the Indonesian government.²⁸

It appears that migrants who cannot find a new job within three weeks of being fired by their employers have to return to their home countries. In order to survive, and not be sent back to their home countries, migrants have to find new employers. It is in this critical period that they usually stay in the shelter while seeking a new job, contacting many agencies. In short, migrant shelters have become the place for migrants to go once they have been driven from employers' residences. One such shelter is located in Kowloon. It accommodates about 20 domestic workers, whose ages range from 20 to 30 years, with various problems. This shelter is, of course, far from sufficient to accommodate all these unfortunate domestic workers. It is run by a lady who has been living in Hong Kong for more than 30 years. She came to Hong Kong as a domestic worker, and while there she became active in NGOs, such as the Hong Kong Coalition of Indonesian Migrant Workers Organisations (KOTKIHO) and the Coalition for Migrants' Rights (CMR). She often acted as a 'spokesperson' in court, for the police, or even in public when Indonesian migrant workers have problems.

Most of the workers staying in this shelter were looking for new jobs, while others were waiting for the result of jurisdiction processes in court. In some cases, some of the unfortunate migrant workers are the victims of dishonest employers; other migrant workers are fired due to their failure to adjust to a new social and cultural environment, and more importantly, their inability to do their jobs professionally.²⁹ Another shelter is located in the Causeway Bay area. This shelter functions as an office of DD, sponsoring

various philanthropic and development-oriented activities for domestic workers. Some domestic workers often visit this shelter, either to meet their friends or to become DD volunteers. In the month of Ramadan, shelters established or supported by DD and other Muslim associations become more active as religious gatherings are intensified during this period. On certain occasions, migrants, sponsored by *zakat* agencies like DD, even invite popular preachers from Indonesia, from whom Indonesian migrants may learn new insights on current issues involving Islam in Indonesia.³⁰

DD in Hong Kong has several objectives. First of all, it attempts to participate in solving the problems faced by migrant workers.³¹ Abdul Ghafur, head of DD's branch in Hong Kong explains:

For the time being we are dealing with the symptom or fateful result of the problem of poverty in our country (Indonesia). But in our recent programmes we have started to address the "cause" and the "symptom"; for our mission is to create the agents of social change [among female migrant workers or female ex-migrant workers] when they come back to their hometown.³²

Secondly, DD acts as an Islamic philanthropic institution that collects and distributes *zakat* and charity from and for migrant workers; and thirdly, it plays a role as a solidarity-creating and *dakwah* association that assists Muslim migrants who seek Islamic knowledge. As briefly discussed earlier, strengthening religious identity among female migrants is one of the main issues addressed by *zakat* agencies and Muslim community associations.

The concept of female migrants' vulnerability has many aspects, one of which is that when migrant women are faced with difficulties in coping with problems while doing their jobs, many decide to take a 'short cut' and become involved in the commercial sex trade. Religious study groups have functioned not only as a way in which *zakat* agencies and Muslim community associations can set up religious patronage for migrants, but also as a way in which migrant women can overcome their financial and social problems during their work in Hong Kong. This study group also aims to strengthen a female migrant's initial reason for being present in Hong Kong, which is to earn money to support her family in Indonesia. Religious knowledge, there-

fore, becomes guidance for those workers to stick to authorised occupations and to avoid illicit and ‘dishonest’ jobs, and to prepare for their futures after coming back to their hometowns in Indonesia.

Therefore, it can be suggested that the intention of DD’s branch in Hong Kong is also to preserve Muslim workers’ religious commitment to Islam. As a minority people who live far from their hometowns, social cohesion and solidarity among migrant workers is relatively strong. Migrant workers try to forge solid relationships, as they want to share similar—both sweet and bitter—experiences. Hence, the establishment of Indonesian migrant associations inevitably takes place in many countries; Hong Kong is not an exception. In Hong Kong, there are many Indonesian associations with various religious, social and cultural backgrounds. Fifty-two associations have made partnerships with and partly been supported by DD branch offices. DD has functioned as both a *zakat* collector and provider. As a *zakat* collector, DD has organised giving practice among Indonesian migrants, whose donations are used for wide-ranging projects.

In the event of a crisis in Indonesia, which leads people to become impoverished and results in dreadful social and economic conditions, Indonesian migrants overseas in Hong Kong, as in many other countries, usually wish to provide assistance by sending money through humanitarian NGOs. However, the main objective of DD, in this respect, is to collect funds from migrant workers, or what can be referred to as ‘migrant philanthropy’ in Hong Kong, because the migrants’ contributions to DD office, in terms of financial donations, do not amount to much. Instead, DD aims to be a migrant partner, by channelling some portion of the social funds collected in Indonesia to migrants who face difficulties in Hong Kong.³³ This objective is different from the establishment of DD’s branch offices in Australia and Japan, for example, which, in fact, is intended specifically to organise ‘diaspora philanthropy’, as Indonesian workers in developed countries such as Australia can usually expect better social, economic and legal conditions.³⁴

Mutual Help, Solidarity and Religious Gatherings

Like other Islamic philanthropic associations in Indonesia, religious study

groups (*pengajian*) seem to have become one appealing way to disseminate Islamic messages on the necessity of building solidarity among migrants, and in turn these messages are gradually translated into more concrete actions. In order to run its branch office, DD has appointed staff knowledgeable about Islam and acquainted with development-oriented projects. Building solidarity among migrants has become the priority of the DD programme, under which social and moral awareness among migrants of the necessity of helping each other can evolve. Of course, DD is not the only Islamic association in Hong Kong. There are a number of long-established migrant associations whose concerns deal primarily with the welfare of Indonesian migrants. Therefore, the way in which DD engages in the public sphere of Indonesian communities workers in Hong Kong has been expressed through building partnerships with other Indonesian workers' associations. This is partly because Indonesian migrants reside in various areas of Hong Kong, including other cities, such as Macao, and partly because other associations are already more familiar with the work and typical problems faced by migrant workers.



Figure 6 Migrant workers raise their voices and aspirations in a demonstration held in Hong Kong (source: author's collection)

Like other *zakat* agencies that keep low profile and refrain from political criticism, DD portrays itself as a religious and development-oriented Islamic association. To be able to engage in social and economic enterprises, DD has set up three main programmes in Hong Kong that relate mainly to life-skills training and development. The first programme is ‘Self-reliance for Migrants’ (*Migran Usaha Mandiri*), under which DD attempts to cultivate and fortify the entrepreneurship mentality of migrants who may return to their hometowns and start new lives as entrepreneurs. The second is the ‘Migrant Institute’ that offers English and Mandarin courses, computer training, as well as sewing and cooking education. The third programme is ‘Blessed House’ (*Rumah Berkah*), in which migrants may practice their knowledge and skills in cooking, sewing and managing businesses. The migrants usually come to DD’s offices and shelters to participate in DD’s activities or attend a religious study group during a weekend or holy day, which is also known as a ‘Migrant Day’ (*Hari Perantau*).

In order to translate and implement DD’s vision of social entrepreneurship, DD and a long-established migrant association called PERI (*Perantau Indonesia*) have embarked on a joint venture by setting up an Indonesian restaurant that also functions as a ‘social-entrepreneur laboratory’. This restaurant mainly targets the Hong Kong middle class and Indonesians. The aim of this project, besides promoting innovation in doing business and fulfilling the need of Indonesian migrants for *halal* foods, is to teach migrants how to run a business in an ‘Islamic way’ and, more importantly, how successful and economically established Indonesian migrants in Hong Kong can express their ‘social piety’ by supporting and becoming involved in social entrepreneurship for empowering Indonesian women migrants who work in the informal sector.

Thus, it is worth bearing in mind that DD as a *zakat* agency has endeavoured to bridge the gap, at least socially, between Indonesian migrants who have successfully run a good business in Hong Kong, and those women migrants who are in temporary work as housemaids in Hong Kong. No less important is the fact that connecting charitable works with entrepreneurship, as is done by DD and Indonesian migrant associations, in part repre-

sents their efforts to translate the notion of social entrepreneurship into innovative action for social and economic development. DD seems to realise that women migrants are temporary workers who, within a few years, in accordance with their contracts, will return to Indonesia. As the migrants will then start new lives, DD prefers giving the migrants assistance in preparing to face new environments, by providing them with various kinds of life-skills training.

The IWMU: a 'Movement NGO'

In the case of Hong Kong, Indonesian housemaids can raise their voices and protest against any exploitation and mistreatment by employers, criticising exploitative agencies and weak Indonesian government policies, by setting up a migrant association.³⁵ One of the Indonesian NGOs in Hong Kong that has come to the fore and plays a pivotal role in creating solidarity is the Indonesian Migrant Workers Union (IWMU), an advocacy NGO organised directly by Indonesian migrant workers in Hong Kong. Having cooperated with other national and international NGOs basing in Hong Kong, whose overarching concern relates to migrant workers and women's empowerment, the IWMU seems, to a lesser extent, to have a different approach to overcoming migrant problems, compared with Islamic philanthropic associations. This can be seen in the way in which the IWMU addresses the issues, makes its voice heard and expresses its social and political concerns.

To the IWMU, Indonesian workers abroad face many problems in the workplace due to many reasons. The main cause relates to the government's inability to provide an adequate welfare system in the home country, forcing disadvantaged groups in society to survive by working abroad as helpers. Their conditions have deteriorated with the weakness of regulation in Indonesia, enabling unprofessional and irresponsible agencies to act illegally, and in turn have caused female migrant workers overseas to suffer.³⁶ In many cases, the activists of the IWMU also believe that the Indonesian government, including its representation abroad (the Indonesian Embassy), seems to be reluctant to intervene on behalf of TKW when there are problems.

All volunteers working in the IWMU are part-timers; they spent their

time taking care of this NGO during weekends only, either on Saturdays or Sundays.³⁷ Despite gaining support from others, this NGO empowers itself by revitalising contributions from members. Every month, workers or helpers contribute a certain amount of money to the organisation. A pamphlet installed in front of the door of the IWMU Office in order to remind IWMU members, mentions: 'A true workers' union is a union funded by its members' (*Serikat buruh sejati ialah serikat yang dibiayai oleh anggotanya sendiri*). Some other pamphlets and badges used by IWMU volunteers voice their concerns in ways that are redolent of labour movement slogans around the world: 'Reject outsourcing' and 'Give us holidays and rest days'. In short, the IMWU, which was established in 1998, is actively part of the global labour and transnational women's solidarity movement, whose concerns include the minimum wage, exploitation, labour rights, and the protection of female migrant workers from abuse.³⁸



Figure 7 IWMU slogans promoting female migrants' rights

A number of women's and labour solidarity groups and NGOs operate in Hong Kong, notably on behalf of domestic workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and India. The IWMU often engages with other labour unions such as the Hong Kong Coalition of Indonesian Migrant Workers Organisation (KOTKIHO), the Asian Domestic Workers Union (ADWU), the Filipino Migrant Workers Union (FMWU) coalition and OXFAM, en-

abling the IMWU to enrich its insight and reinforce its views on resolving migrant workers' problems. In building awareness among migrants to organise demonstrations, the IWMU has also engaged other Hong Kong-based advocacy NGOs and pro-democracy movement in order echo their aspirations, addressed either to the labour department in Hong Kong, to the public and employers, or even to the Indonesian Embassy as a representative of the government of Indonesia. Participation in the IWMU conference on labour affairs organised by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in various countries indicates the active participation of Indonesian migrant workers in fostering migrant workers' rights.

Compared Islamic associations, it appears that secular workers' movements such as the IWMU are more progressive in building awareness of how to represent workers' interests. This workers' movement can voice aspirations and rights by engaging other workers' movements in Hong Kong. Slogans used by the IMWU to carry their message to the authorities (i.e. both those in Hong Kong and the Indonesian government) are also stronger than those voiced by Islamic associations. While Islamic charitable associations and movement NGOs have their own way to overcome domestic workers' problems, cooperation between charitable associations and movement NGOs has taken place, characterising the dynamic relationships between these two types of associations. In the Ramadan month of 2011, Dompot Dhuafa, the IMWU, *Liga Pekerja Migrant Indonesia* (LIMI-Indonesian Migrant Workers League) and others organised a seminar entitled: '*Dengan Semangat Ramadhan Melawan Perbudakan Modern untuk Mewujudkan Perlindungan Sejati bagi BMI*' (With the Spirit of Ramdhan [we] Fight Against Modern Slavery in order to provide a Comprehensive Protection for Indonesian Domestic workers).

***Daarut Tauhid: Protecting Underprivileged Girls
from Human Trafficking***

We have so far discussed the attempts of DD and other NGOs to reduce women's vulnerability to any abuse while they are working overseas. DD seems to have encouraged female migrant workers who will come back to

Indonesia to be well-prepared mentally, spiritually, and of course economically. Yet, another approach has taken by the Daarut Tauhid Foundation, which has expressed its concern about women's issues and trafficking prevention by offering temporary jobs, such as becoming an infant care worker, by which, as it is expected, female teenagers will be less threatened by the prospect of human trafficking and labour migration, despite the fact that their work remains in the informal sector.

The Daarut Tauhid Foundation (DT) is an Islamic *dakwah* institution in Indonesia that has attracted much public attention in recent years. The establishment of this foundation, as noted previously (chapter 3), was on the initiative of a young, popular preacher from Bandung-West Java, Abdullah Gymnastiar, better known by the familiar appellation of 'Aa Gym' ('Aa' = elder brother). Since the early 1990s, Daarut Tauhid has become a magnet for people, notably university students and the Muslim middle class, seeking Islamic knowledge and spiritual experience. It is one of the popular spiritual training centres emerging in urban areas of Indonesia, along with the popularity of other young preachers who frequently appear on television and can capitalise on their potential.³⁹ It has a 'new' dimension of interpreting Islam in Indonesia by combining spirituality with entrepreneurship skills, human resources development, leadership training, and education, as well as by promoting Islam as an easy, simple, and practical faith.

Different groups of people, ranging from high school students to the elderly, from educators in universities to senior managers and executives in national, multi-national, private and even government-owned corporations, come to Daarut Tauhid's training centre in the city of Bandung.⁴⁰ They attend Daarut Tauhid to participate in spiritual-based leadership and human resource training, called *Manajemen Qalbu-MQ* ('Heart Management'). Groups of people and individuals even attempt to nurture their spirituality at the weekend in Daarut Tauhid's Guest House. During the course of this 'pilgrimage', the visitors perform nightly prayers together (*tahajud berjama'ah*) and attend Aa Gym's Sunday morning religious sermons. Aa Gym's teachings and speeches are favoured not only by various Muslim groups, but also by non-Muslims. This is partly because Aa Gym promoted notions of peace,

brotherhood, social unity, and individual integrity in an enthusiastic and popular way.⁴¹ Interestingly, AA Gym's main supporters in the past were women. Many women admired him because he seemed such a considerate, loving husband. His first wife was highly visible and referred to by the familiar 'Teh' (elder sister). In 2006, this popularity went into steep decline when it became known that he had taken a second wife, a female staff member working in Daarut Tauhid. This decision generated controversy and led to Aa Gym being 'abandoned' by his keen female admirers, as well as having a great impact on his social and religious activities and economic enterprises.⁴²

Most of his preaching concerns the Islamic morality (*akhlaq*) of society, rather than Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*). His criticisms of economic injustice, government corruption, community disorder, and the country's poverty rate are conveyed decorously and yet combined with his great sense of humour. In order to be closer to his audiences, Aa Gym often opens with dialogue and a question-and-answer forum as part of his public speeches.⁴³ In October 2008, at a time when the Indonesian people were anxious about the impact of the 'global economic crisis' that had struck major countries in Europe, America and Asia, Aa Gym stood up and delivered the following brief message after the Friday Congregation in the Daarut Tauhid's Mosque:

With regards to the news about the world's economic crisis that we have recently heard, we have to remain undaunted because Allah is extraordinarily merciful. When we were in our mother's wombs, our livelihood and fortune had been penned. What we need to do is accomplish God's orders ... Our destiny would not be wrongly exchanged and our fortune and livelihood cannot be blocked by anyone except by our own violation of God's law. Therefore, we have to be more confident about this crisis. God is The Riches. Truthfully, this crisis encourages us to work wholeheartedly and to show our forbearance and attitude of resignation. As God has promised us, *Wa man yatawakkal 'ala Allah fahuwa hasbuhu...* [Who relies upon Allah, for he is sufficient...].⁴⁴

Aa Gym has an ability to supplement his teachings by offering supportive facilities, such as mini-markets, student dormitories, childcare and kindergartens, guesthouses, and conventioncentres, so that intellectual, spiritual,

economic and social enterprises can be organised by his students (*santri*) in the area surrounding the Daarut Tauhid.⁴⁵ He has transformed ‘corporate culture’ into his religious institution and strengthened his holding company under the banner of *Manajemen Qolbu Corporation* (MQC). Since then, under his supervision, both the Daarut Tauhid and the MQC have enlarged the scope of their operations by making partnerships with various corporations, ranging from telecommunications and mineral-water companies to travel agents and factories.

Charity Activism, Dakwah and Women’s Issues

In the 1990s, aware of the necessity of increasing the social function of the Daarut Tauhid and supporting its social and charitable works, Aa Gym established a new department called Dompot Peduli Ummat Daarut Tauhid (DPU-DT), which specialises in managing *zakat*, *sedekah*, and *wakaf* funds. Although the development of the Daarut Tauhid’s facilities and activities was financed in part by donations from the public, as well as support from Aa Gym’s economic enterprises (MQC), this new *zakat* agency has increasingly become an important player in the increasing *zakat* funds collected by the Daarut Tauhid.⁴⁶ Like other community-based *zakat* agencies that operate in Indonesia, the DPU-DT provides *zakat*, *sedekah* and *waqf* funds to a variety of social enterprises, ranging from poverty relief to community-based entrepreneurship training. Having adequate social capital, which is partly due to people’s trust in the Daarut Tauhid’s profile and their admiration for Aa Gym, the DPU-DT can become a leading national *zakat* agency that caters to poor households by providing them with charitable and development-oriented social programmes. Officially launched on 16 June 1999, the DPU-DT has so far managed its branch offices in Bandung, Bogor, and Priangan Timur (Eastern Priangan) Regions, which includes Garut, Tasikmalaya, Banjar and Ciamis. Outside West Java, DPU-DT branch offices have been set up in Semarang (Central Java), Jakarta, Lampung, Palembang (South Sumatra), Pontianak (South Borneo), and Yogyakarta.⁴⁷

Since 2006, this *zakat* agency (DPU-DT) has worked with the Muslimat Centre, a women’s wing of Daarut Tauhid that was also founded by Aa Gym.⁴⁸

Together, they run a joint programme called ‘*Baby Sitter Mitra Ibu*’ (infant care workers for mother’s partners), whose participants are mostly female teenagers. ‘*Muslimat*’ is an Arabic term that signifies Muslim women. The Muslimat Centre is concerned with women’s issues and provides tutorials on how to be a better Muslim and how Islamic regulation deals with women’s affairs. In particular, the Muslimat Centre provides training on how to be a courteous wife, how to educate children according to the Islamic tradition, and how to be a female Muslim leader. One of the major concerns of the Muslimat Centre’s education system is the notion of a woman’s ‘golden age’ (*masa keemasan*). There is training specifically for women aged above 50 years, called ‘Muslimat’s Golden Age Schooling’ (*Bimbingan Muslimat Masa Keemasan*) in which the term ‘golden age’ is defined as the period where women begin withdrawing from ‘worldly affairs’ and focus on ‘heavenly affairs’ by intensely studying Islam and performing religious duties.⁴⁹ This training is conducted in classical and private coaching systems, which can last as long as six months. In the classical system, the training is conducted in Daarut Tauhid’s area and the training participants come from different backgrounds. Meanwhile, in a ‘private system’, the class consists of only one person or a family.

Another understanding of the term ‘golden age’ is that it refers to the early years of a person’s life, at which time a basic knowledge of Islam can be cultivated. In this case, children are provided with the knowledge that will shape their attitudes, and given adequate religious knowledge that will particularly strengthen their moral, individual and social integrity. The training of infant care workers by the DPU-DT in cooperation with the Muslimat Centre can be seen in part as a complementary activity to realise the Daarut Tauhid’s notion of a ‘golden age’, a period when human beings can effectively cultivate and develop their spirituality.⁵⁰ The cooperation between Daarut Tauhid’s *zakat* agency, namely the DPU-DT, and the Muslim Centre indicates a shift in the attitude of Islamic charitable institutions in determining and addressing their beneficiaries. Besides charitable services such as distributing groceries for those in need, providing wheelchairs or prostheses for people with disabilities, and delivering basic healthcare for the poor, the

DPU-DT has engaged the Muslimat Centre to operate development-oriented projects by targeting female teenagers. In the following discussion, we will see that Islamic charitable institutions have attempted to link the problems of poverty and women's problems so that this charitable institution can specify its targets.

The DPU-DT, as a *zakat* agency, has so far created and offered economic development-oriented programmes, such as the Community-based Microfinance project (*Microfinance berbasis Masyarakat-Misykat*) and scholarships, through which the goal of promoting people's economic self-reliance seems to have been more promising than infant care training. Why then is the DPU-DT interested in producing infant care workers? What rationale lies behind this, and how is the infant care training project related to greater notions of gender inequality? The idea to set up the infant care training programme came from both the Muslimat Centre and the DPU-DT. The DPU-DT is a key financial supporter of this programme, as it has dispensed a certain proportion of its charitable funds for infant care training project, while the Muslimat Centre functions as a supervisory institution during the training.

Why Infant Care Training?

The story of infant care training begins with the needs of the Daarut Tauhid's female staff. They have to fulfil their professional duties at Daarut Tauhid on the one hand, and take care of their families on the other.⁵¹ As a number of Daarut Tauhid's staff began to manage new families, the Daarut Tauhid considered the establishment of a day-care centre in the Daarut Tauhid's complex to be essential. With a day-care centre at the Muslimat Centre, the babies can receive the best nourishment from their own mothers' milk, and at the same time the mothers can dedicate themselves to developing their professional careers and *dakwah* activities. Therefore, in its initial stage, the objective of infant care training was to fulfil the internal needs of the Daarut Tauhid as a *dakwah* and professional organisation. The infant care workers in turn were appointed at the Daarut Tauhid's day-care centre and kindergarten to take care of the children of the Daarut Tauhid's

staff. This is similar to what was observed by Janine A. Clark in Yemen, where, despite offering services for disadvantaged groups, the middle-class women also benefited from their social enterprises, either materially or non-materially, including ‘friendships and self-confidence,’ and these are instrumental in ‘luring, securing, and retaining active women.’⁵²

A new development in the infant care training was introduced in 2006, as the Daarut Tauhid began targeting infant care trainees from low-income households. It is under these circumstances that the DPU-DT as a *zakat* agency began to be involved, using *zakat* and *sedekah* funds to finance this training. Consequently, the participants are among the legitimate *zakat* beneficiaries (*mustahik*). Several factors compelled the creation of this project. First of all, the economic crisis and the increase in unemployment in the country became the primary motivation for the DPU-DT to carry out infant care worker training. This is partly supported by the fact that unemployed school-leavers are predominantly women. Second, women with limited knowledge and skills in both urban and rural areas are vulnerable to abuse. Therefore, the DPU-DT aimed to provide training that might lead those school-leavers to have temporary jobs, allowing them to earn money to survive. Coincidentally, there was high demand from the middle and upper-middle classes for infant care workers with strong moral and religious integrity. Third, the DPU-DT saw the training as a way to transform its vision of Islamic community and disseminate Islamic principles into society at large through the Islamisation of families. In this respect, infant care workers are a sort of ‘agent of spiritual change’.

The DPU-DT clearly advertises that the aim of infant care training is to ‘empower’ Muslim women who are regarded as beneficiaries, so that they can extend and optimise their roles in society. The prospective participants in infant care training originate from various regions of West-Java, such as Cirebon, Cianjur, Ciamis, Garut, Kuningan, Tasikmalaya, Sukabumi, Subang, Sumedang and Bandung. The Daarut Tauhid targets particular areas in West Java where early marriage among teenagers is widespread. Some of the regions are places of recruitment of TKW for Saudi Arabia and of local prostitutes.⁵³ The participants in the training programme are predominantly teen-

agers under 18 years old, some of whom are school-leavers with no experience of working with babies. A few of the participants are above 20 years old, with experience of working in factories or as employees in the informal sector.

The recruitment of prospective infant care workers is concentrated in West Java. Some trainees heard about the programme from radio advertising, pamphlets, or brochures in their hometowns, others from their relatives, who in turn found out about the programme through the Internet and mass media. Although Aa Gym is quite popular among the Indonesian people, including villagers, and has a good image and reputation in promoting Islam and entrepreneurship, the DPU-DT has had difficulties finding prospective infant care workers. As a matter of fact, it is not always easy to convince prospective infant care workers' parents to let their daughters join the programme because of worries about the increase in human trafficking in the country. Therefore, it is quite risky to let one's daughter be recruited by an unfamiliar employment agency. The prospective infant care workers' parents are also afraid that their daughters might be sent to work abroad or beyond Java Island. Since 2006, the DPU-DT has conducted infant care worker training eight times, each of which involves 30 girls, notably from all over West Java.

Creating Islamic and Talented Infant Care Workers

The duration of infant care worker training is about three months. I had an opportunity to observe the 'seventh batch' of infant care worker training in 2008, when the prospective trainees were tutored on healthcare and Islamic tenets, and the 'eighth batch' in 2010 during the course of the trainees' apprenticeships. In the following paragraphs, I will explore the way in which this training is managed. In running the infant care worker training, the DPU-DT and the Muslimat Centre are not alone, as they have made partnerships with other parties, such as the Nursing School of the Indonesian Air Force (TNI AU), which is responsible for providing teaching materials on health and infant care, and the Indonesian Education University (UPI) provides teaching materials on the family, 'domesticity', psychology and other

practical matters.⁵⁴ By and large, the infant care worker training project is divided into three stages (*marhalah*): the first stage (*marhalah 1*) is orientation; the second stage (*marhalah 2*) is schooling or teaching-learning processes (*Kegiatan Belajar Mengajar*); and the last stage (*marhalah 3*) is apprenticeship.

The training materials provided in the first and second stages are mainly classified into three sections. The first section consists of religious materials. The trainees are obliged to be able to read the Qur'an properly, and to memorise short Quranic verses and daily prayers.⁵⁵ These materials are offered by the Daarut Tauhid staff as a means of cultivating religious skills and a spiritual foundation for the infant care workers. Other subjects, such as Islamic ethics (*akhlaq*), theology (*'aqida*), and jurisprudence (*fiqh*), are also taught intensively every night. The Muslimat Centre seems to be attempting to create sophisticated female Muslim and religious teachers. The infant care worker trainees are obliged to practice the Islamic knowledge they have received from their lecturers by demonstrating their good Muslim characters and conduct.

Every Monday and Thursday, they also perform a voluntary fast (*Puasa Sunnah Senin Kamis*). In a Muslim community, performing voluntary fasts every Monday and Thursday, and on the other days, is recommended by Islamic tradition, and signifies a higher degree of individual piety. This is partly because practising voluntary fasting is more challenging than fasting in the month of Ramadan. Every Monday and Thursday, all trainees are woken up in the early morning to have an early breakfast (*sahur*) before sunrise, and they may break their fast after sunset. As all trainees live in a dormitory, even women who are menstruating and are therefore exempted from fasting are encouraged to take part in the early breakfasts, for reasons of 'solidarity'.

The second section of the training material is composed of matters related to the family and 'domesticity' (*keluarga dan 'kerumahtanggaan'*), which are taught by a group of lecturers from a state-run university in Bandung. 'Domesticity' in this sense signifies the lifestyle of the middle class, with whom prospective infant care workers may work for many years to come. The trainees learn how to operate the modern domestic appliances that most middle

class families use, such as washing machines and the like. Apart from being tutored on how to operate electrical appliances, the trainees are also taught how to purchase groceries in supermarkets, prepare food, cook, how to act in a restaurant, and how to behave within new social environments.

The third section comprises material on infant healthcare (*perawatan kesehatan bayi*). In this section, the trainees receive both theoretical and practical teaching on health and infant care. For this reason, the training is conducted at the Nursing School belonging to the Indonesian Air Force (TNI AU) in Bandung.⁵⁶ In the babysitting classes, the trainees study theoretical aspects of health and caring for babies, and obtain practical experience in the laboratory under the supervision of lecturers from the nursing school.⁵⁷ Using dummy babies of various sizes, ranging from newborn to about three years old, they learned how to bathe and dress babies properly. They practise their knowledge of how to provide food, measure nutrients, detect baby sickness, and to provide first aid for babies. Apart from the above three kinds of material, there are other materials and activities such as outbound training, motivation, psychology, nursing, and basic English.

In the final stage of the training, which is apprenticeship, the trainees become apprentice infant care workers for four weeks to six weeks in the houses of DT workers (*santri*) and DT parishioners (*jamaah*). The length of the apprenticeship is highly contingent upon the trainees' performance. During the apprenticeship, the trainees do not get paid. Instead, the families send biweekly reports to the Muslimat Centre on the trainees' progress. If the trainees pass the apprenticeship phase, they are then ready for their graduation ceremony and will meet with the users of the babysitting service.⁵⁸ In 2007, the infant care worker training programme was temporarily suspended due to an increase in occurrences of calamities in Indonesia, which led the DPU-DT as a national *zakat* agency to focus on delivering humanitarian assistance. Yet, that was perhaps not the only reasons. Aa Gym's 'controversial' decision to take a second wife, that is, to practise polygamy, resulted in a decrease of about 30-40% of *zakat* and social funds for the DPU-DT and led to the destabilisation of the Daarut Tauhid's activities as a whole.⁵⁹

Professionalism or Patron-Client Relations?

By offering such an rich curriculum that develops multiple talents, the Daarut Tauhid seems to be striving to produce talented infant care workers who can, or at least are expected to, handle multiple duties, ranging from teaching religion and keeping house to nurturing babies. As this training of infant care workers has often been promoted publicly by the Daarut Tauhid, it is therefore unsurprising that there has been high demand from middle class families from such cities as Bandung, Bogor and Jakarta for Daarut Tauhid infant care workers. While the Daarut Tauhid can only produce about 30-35 infant care workers per year, there are hundreds of families on the waiting list for an infant care worker. A infant care worker cannot herself find the families for whom she will work. Instead, the Daarut Tauhid uses a sort of ‘agent’ called Global Solution Provider (GSP), a new institution set up within the Daarut Tauhid responsible for placing infant care workers with families.⁶⁰ The families sign up and pay a certain amount of money in order to be put on the waiting list. Families who have already signed up are required to take part in a type of ‘training’ called MQ (*Manajemen Qalbu*, Management of the Heart) and orientation, through which they are introduced to the infant care workers. Through this training, the DPU-DT selects families in order to make sure that the baby care workers will not be subjected to any mistreatment.



Figure 8

Staff at the Muslimah Center/DPU-DT show trainee babysitters how to take care of (dummy) infants
(source: author's collection)

No less important is the fact that GSP has also determined a minimum monthly wage and infant care workers' rights that should be fulfilled by employers, all of which are stated in the one-year contract between the three parties: the infant care worker, the provider (GSP), and the users (the family). Should GSP receive any complaints about the way families (employers) treat infant care workers (employees), GSP can then cancel the contract. Likewise, should the families complain about an infant care worker's attitude, GSP will replace the infant care worker with a new one. It is under these circumstances that Daarut Tauhid, represented by the DPU-DT and the Muslimat Centre, has claimed that the overarching objective of infant care worker training is to help and protect unskilled and vulnerable female teenagers. Every three months, the DPU-DT organises meetings with the infant care workers so that the girls can share their experiences with one another. Likewise, religious gatherings with benefactors, including the families who employ infant care workers, are carried out regularly as a means of preserving benefactors' commitment ('*rawat donator*') to supporting the DPU-DT's social enterprises. In this regard, it is arguable that, in some respects, the DPU-DT has endeavoured to set up patronage for both infant care workers and employers in its attempts to cater to the needs of middle-class families and protect infant care workers.

Islamic *dakwah* remains the ultimate purpose of the Daarut Tauhid's social mission and charity practice. Although religious patronage characterises the relations between the Daarut Tauhid and infant care workers, Islamic materials offered by the Daarut Tauhid during the training seem to address wider families or users among the Muslim middle class. In recent times, there has been a rapid increase in interest among the Muslim middle class, both 'nominal' and 'devout' Muslims, in enrolling their children in Islamic schools.⁶¹ The types of Islamic schooling, ranging from kindergartens to high schools, are culturally and politically as diverse as the Islamic associations in Indonesia, ranging from traditionalist to modernist and Islamist. There are differences, for example, in the practice rituals such as prayer, in terms of style and prayer recital. Infant care workers have been taught different versions of ritual practices. They are also expected to be able to adjust to the

families' religious traditions as a means of reducing misunderstandings between themselves and family members. This is most notable in ritual practices such as prayer recital, during the course of their work.⁶²

The Minimum Wage, Workload, and the Question of Empowerment

The role of GSP as a broker between infant care workers and their employers puts it in an awkward position with respect to the determination of wages. The minimum wage for Indonesian workers, especially labourers in factories, remains controversial among NGO activists and the government, and yet those working in the informal sector have rarely been included in the debates. While there have been government efforts and a strong advocacy movement run by NGOs to supervise the implementation of a Regional Minimum Wage for labourers (UMR), infant care workers and helpers or housemaids, for example, are not included in either government policy or NGOs' advocacy. In the case of infant care workers, the DPU-DT, through its broker, GSP, has determined the infant care workers' minimum wage, ranging from IDR 650 to IDR 750 (US \$65-75) per month. This amount, according to the DPU-DT, is higher than that received by ordinary infant care workers and housemaids.

Despite the infant care workers' apparent pride in having been educated in an Islamic way, in gaining knowledge on Islam, health issues and baby-care, and having an enriching experience during the course of training, they may wonder whether they will have an appropriate workplace and whether they deserve more salary than that which has been determined by their agents. Even though they realise that their function as infant care workers differs from that of a housemaid, in practice it is sometimes hard to distinguish between infant care workers and housemaids in Indonesian families, partly because 'unprofessional' infant care workers are often assigned to do what are called 'domestic duties'. Some prospective infant care workers also wonder about the workload and working hours, as neither issue is included in the contract. Along with this, for example, Yuniarti Chudzaifah, Chairperson of National Women Commission of the Republic of Indonesia, points out that the multitalented infant care workers produced by the DPU-DT

actually deserve a much higher wage, if their job is viewed from the point of view of their professional abilities. This is because teaching how to practice religious rituals and Quranic recitation is a skill that has its own merit, and it has different practical functions from those of caring for babies or children, or even looking after a household.⁶³

In order to ensure that their infant care workers receive the determined wage, GSP recently introduced a new policy, endorsing a transparent payments system by requiring the employers (families) to transfer the infant care worker's salary through GSP. In the same way, infant care workers are asked to create a savings account at a financial institution (*Baitul Mal wa al-Tamwil-BMT*), which is owned by the Daarut Tauhid. This policy was in response to suggestions by former infant care workers, who often spent their savings on 'unnecessary items, and thus at the end of the programme did not have significant savings. Infant care workers may withdraw their money whenever necessary, and the Daarut Tauhid, as often emphasised by staff, never benefits from this policy. Infant care workers are also encouraged to practise voluntary giving (*sedekah*) for *dakwah*.

Beneath the surface lie some difficult questions. One might say that what the DPU-DT and the Muslimat Centre have accomplished through the infant care worker training partly represents action for poverty relief, which attempts to prevent impoverished female teenagers from being socially and economically vulnerable. And yet one might also wonder what the dominant factor is in shaping the social and charitable works offered by the Daarut Tauhid. Some prospective infant care workers expect to continue their studies, so why does this *zakat* agency prefer an infant care worker programme to providing scholarships funded by *zakat* and *sedekah* funds? Is it that this *zakat* agency holds the 'reciprocity' principle to be most important when spending social and *zakat* funds, thus serving both impoverished female teenagers who need cash and wealthy middle-class families who need infant care workers through the babysitting programme? It can be suggested, therefore, that by operating this infant care project, this *zakat* agency can preserve relations with its benefactors while extending *dakwah* activities, and at the same time it can assist vulnerable teenager girls.

From another viewpoint, it appears that the infant care worker training provided by the Daarut Tauhid has become the way in which this association prevents lower-skilled and poorly educated teenagers from leaving to work as housemaids overseas, as well protecting them from the harmful effects of human trafficking. Apart from this, providing provisional job-oriented activities, as expected by the providers (Daarut Tauhid staff), may also prevent disadvantaged teenagers and female school leavers from entering into early marriage in their villages. Yet, how Daarut Tauhid classifies beneficiaries who deserve training for income-generating projects and those who can be included in the infant care worker training programme is far from clear. What is clear, as often emphasised by Daarut Tauhid staff, is that baby care worker training has reduced the number of female teenagers who can be exploited by untrustworthy private employment agencies that do not provide adequate protection for their employees.

Conclusion

There has been an increasing awareness of the ‘women’s empowerment’ agenda promoted by development and advocacy NGOs in Indonesia. Charitable institutions, community-based *zakat* agencies and Islamic development NGOs have also paid attention to women’s issues. They have proposed and executed different approaches to protecting women and to empowering them in the very complex relations between the state and society, domestic poverty problems and international interests. Nevertheless, some NGOs seem to focus on temporary solutions to the hardship faced by female teenagers and women migrant workers. In this respect, the protection of disadvantaged women has become a major issue that compels Islamic associations to carry out charitable activities, as evidenced by the associations’ focus on such issues as female trafficking, early marriage, domestic violence, sexual abuse and the like.

Addressing women as beneficiaries of charitable acts by Islamic charitable associations can be based on various factors, such as the needs of beneficiaries, the needs of benefactors, and the needs of both. The principle of reciprocity has, to some extent, often characterised the ties between benefactors

and beneficiaries, as reflected in the DPU-DT's infant care worker training programme. Charitable acts that aim to relieve and protect women are inadvertently putting the relationships between beneficiaries and benefactors in an asymmetrical position, with one higher than the other. Indeed, the notion of economic development among poor female teenagers who are willing to be infant care workers is publicly promoted, and the DPU-DT has also attempted to protect their infant care workers through certain regulations. However, further attempts to boost the careers of female teenagers seem to have been neglected by this institution, as it could, but has chosen not to, provide a more comprehensive approach, such as providing scholarships or training programmes, by which the trainees might find jobs and develop their careers in the formal sector.

In religious texts, women are not specifically mentioned as a distinct category of recipients of Islamic charity, and the promotion of gender equality is not the main objective of the charitable work of *zakat* agencies. Women appear to have been targeted when charitable organisations have attempted to expand their scope of programmes by addressing a more specific problem that mainly involves women, such as the case of migrant workers overseas. The case of DD's assistance for migrant workers overseas indicates that the primary objective of charitable works is relieving the poor. Seen from the perspective of women's empowerment, DD's approach to overcoming migrants' problems is rather different from the DPU-DT's approach, with its in-country infant worker training.

Both the DPU-DT and DD are similar in their use of the 'language of religion' as a discursive centre in constructing notions of women's empowerment. The use of religious language to address social issues and to envisage a better community is a common phenomenon within Islamic associations. In this respect, promoting gender equality, changing 'patriarchal culture', criticising government gender biased structural policies, or encouraging the authorities to provide a better and well-educated work force, may not be part of the *zakat* agencies' main agendas, nor even their foremost objectives. Nevertheless, by using religious symbols and narratives which deal with individual piety, community and Islamic solidarity, DD believes that a better

quality of life for the oppressed (*mutad'afin*), in this case female migrant workers, can be created, although with very limited results, and the aggravation of the oppressed's social, cultural, and economic conditions can be prevented.

However, the lack of discourse on gender inequality and discrimination against women has meant that Islamic charitable associations have not established long-lasting solutions to women's problems. Yet, the roles played by women's NGOs working on development issues, such as the Fatayat and Nasyiah, seem to be enriching the current discourse of relieving, protecting and empowering Indonesian women. Islamic women's NGOs are instrumental in reconciling Islamic knowledge on women's issues and current gender discourses, and consecutively in sharpening the goals of activities for supporting disadvantaged segments in the Indonesian female population. These endeavours have enriched the way in which Muslim associations formulate some key concepts in Islam concerning gender issues and women's empowerment and in introducing broader communities to how Islamic precepts can be reformulated to combat human trafficking and lessen the impact of poverty on women.

Endnotes

- ¹ For further discussion see Ruth Rosenberg (ed.), *Trafficking of Women and Children in Indonesia* (Jakarta: International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC); Solidarity Centre & USAID, 2003).
- ² <http://www.humantrafficking.org/countries/indonesia>
- ³ See Minja Kim Choe, Shyam Thapa, and Sulistinah Achmad, "Early Marriage and Child-bearing in Indonesia and Nepal," *East-West Center Working Papers*, No. 108-15, November 2001, 7.
- ⁴ Noorashikin Abdul Rahman, "Shaping the Migrant Institution: the Agency of Indonesian Domestic Workers in Singapore," in Lyn Parker (ed.), *The Agency of Women in Asia* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005), 190.
- ⁵ See for example, Lies Marcoes-Natsir, "Profil Organisasi Wanita Islam di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Persistri," also Aisyah Hamid Baidhawi, "Profil Wanita Islam in Indonesia: Studi Kasus Muslimat NU," in *Seminar Wanita Islam Indonesia dalam Kajian Tekstual dan Kontekstual* (Jakarta & Leiden: INIS, 1991); Suraiya It, *The Women's Movement in Indonesia: With Special Reference to the 'Aisyiyah Organisation*," A Doctoral Dissertation submitted to the Temple University, Philadelphia, 2005.
- ⁶ See Djunaidatul Munawwarah, "Al-Tafkir Haul Makanat al-Mar'a bi Indunisiya: Bahs fi Mauqif al-Islam min al-Harkat al-Nisaiyah fi al-Qarnain al-Tasi' 'Asr wa al-'Ishrin al-

- Miladiyyin," *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 6, issue 1 (1999), 121-147.
- ⁷ Among the meritorious works on women's movements and gender issues in Indonesia are Elizabeth Martyn, *The Women Movement in Post-Colonial Indonesia: Gender and Nation in a New Democracy* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005); Susan Blackburn, *Women and the State in Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2004).
 - ⁸ See Martin van Bruinessen, "What Happens to the Smiling Face of Indonesian Islam?: Muslim Intellectualism and Conservative Turn in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," *Working Paper*-Radjaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, (January 6, 2011), 28-29. In Muslim circles, P3M, under the support of the Ford Foundation, seems to have become the first Islamic organisation to initiate and carry out a programme on Islam and reproductive health in Indonesia. P3M has run various workshops and discussions on reproductive health from an Islamic perspective. For further discussion see Rosalia Sciortino, "The Challenge of Addressing Gender in Reproductive Health Programs: Examples From Indonesia," *Reproductive Health matters*. May 1998.6 (11),.33-43; Another worth discussion on this issue can be seen in Linda Rae Bennet, *Women, Islam and Modernity: Single Women, Sexuality, and Reproductive Health in Contemporary Indonesia* (London and New York: RoudledgeCurzon, 2005).
 - ⁹ Sally White and Maria Ulfah Anshor, "Islam and Gender in Contemporary Indonesia: Public Discourse on Duties, Rights, and Morality," in Greg Fealy and Shally White (eds.), *Expressing Islam*, 139; also Sally White, "Gender and the Family," in Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (Eds.), *Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), 273-352.
 - ¹⁰ Susan Blackburn, *Women and the State in Modern Indonesia*, 189.
 - ¹¹ Sally White and Maria Ulfah Anshor, "Islam and Gender in Contemporary Indonesia: Public Discourse on Duties, Rights, and Morality," in Greg Fealy and Shally White (eds.), *Expressing Islam*, 139; also Sally White, "Gender and the Family," in Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (Eds.), *Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), 273-352.
 - ¹² Monika Arnez, "Empowering Women through Islam: Fatayat NU between Tradition and Change," *Islamic Studies*, 21, 1 (2010), 17; Masruchah and Bridget Keenan, "Working from Within: Using Legitimacy of Religion to Create Change in Indonesia," in Geetanjali Misra and Radhika Chandiramani, *Sexuality, Gender and the Rights: Exploring Theory and Practice in South and Southeast Asia* (New Delhi: Sage Publication 2005), 169-185.
 - ¹³ In 2010, the Aisyiyah carried out an international seminar on *Strengthening Synergies among Women's Movements against Poverty to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals in the Developing Countries* In Yogyakarta.
 - ¹⁴ ICMC is an international NGO that actively assists refugees, internally displaced persons, and migrants.
 - ¹⁵ See PP Nayiatul Asiyiyah and ICMC, *Buku Saku: Panduan untuk Menghindari Trafficking* (Jakarta: PP Aisyiyah, 2006); See also PP Aisyiyah and UNFPA, *Perempuan Berhak Tahu: Kumpulan Materi dan Panduan Fasilitator untuk forum bersama Perempuan* (Jakarta: PP Aisyiyah, 2006).
 - ¹⁶ Interview with Abida Muflihati, the President of Aisyiyah, 26 February 2012, in Yogyakarta.

- ¹⁷ This book is the outcome of Fatayat's partnership with the Southeast Asia Research Center and the University of Hong Kong, under the scheme of Women's Empowerment in the Muslim context: Gender, Poverty and Democratisation from the inside out. Nur Rofi'ah and Ala'i Nadjib, *Mari Kenali Hak-hak Buruh Migrant Indonesia: Perspektif Islam dan Perempuan* (Jakarta: PP Fatayat NU Jakarta, 2010).
- ¹⁸ Nur Rofi'ah and Ala'i Nadjib, *Mari Kenali Hak-hak Buruh*, 3-4.
- ¹⁹ These rights are also enshrined in Indonesian government regulations, the Ministry of Labour and Transmigration, No. PER. 07/MEN/IV/2005.
- ²⁰ See also Karimah Hamid et al, *Panduan Motivator Waspada Trafiking Manusia* (Jakarta: Pucuk Pimpinan Fatayat, 2005).
- ²¹ Amelia Fauzia argues that while women's empowerment and gender issues are not yet mainstream within philanthropic organisations, efforts to engage more women in charitable enterprises have been made, especially by certain private Islamic philanthropic organisations whose administration is handled in a more professional way. This in turn can affect the type of beneficiaries of Islamic philanthropy. Philanthropic organisations with professional management in fact can hire more women employees and thus can pay more attention to—and provide development-oriented and charity programmes for—women beneficiaries. Amelia Fauzia, "Women, Islam and Philanthropy in Contemporary Indonesia," in Susan Blackburn, Bianca J. Smith and Siti Syamsiyatun (eds.), *Indonesian Islam and a New Era: How Women Negotiate Their Muslim Identity* (Clayton: Monash University Press, 2008), 167-8 and 184.
- ²² The experience of *zakat* agencies suggests that there are a lot of people who label themselves as travellers and who, having run out of supplies or money, seek assistance from agency offices. They usually ask for a certain amount of cash. Despite the willingness of *zakat* agencies that support these travellers, a more tight procedure has been applied by *zakat* agencies, as there have been many instances of 'fake travellers' abusing the trust of *zakat* agencies. So far, *zakat* agencies have made partnerships with transportation agencies, notably bus companies, and thus only provide a small amount of cash for travellers seeking funds.
- ²³ Interview with Arifin Purwakananta, Programme Director of Dompét Dhu'afa, 25 January 2009, in Jakarta.
- ²⁴ <http://www.masyarakatmandiri.org/artikel408-perempuan-nelayan-produktif.html> (Accessed January 2012).
- ²⁵ <http://www.dompethuafa.org/en/2011/10/31/migrant-institute-to-launch-migrant-crisis-center/>
- ²⁶ It is worth emphasising that the establishment of DD's branches overseas was also stimulated by the fact that there have been many success stories of Indonesian migrants who can be regarded as prospective benefactors of DD. So far, DD's overseas branches have been set up in places such as Hong Kong, China, Japan, and Australia, and these countries are quite distinct from one another in terms of culture, politics and economics.
- ²⁷ The experience of one ex-migrant worker in Hong Kong has been penned, published and filmed in Indonesia. Ani Ema Susanti, *Once Upon Time in Hong Kong: Kisah Nyata Perjuangan Seorang TKW Hong Kong Agar Dapat Mengenyam Bangku Kuliah* (Jakarta: Afra Publishing, 2007).
- ²⁸ <http://www.dompethuafa.org/dd.php?x=muhibah&y=det&z=b118677e4000ee474eb->

- 2112bdd4f0212; also <http://perantauindonesia.com/?p=9>
- ²⁹ Interview in Kowloon-Hong Kong, 6 June 2010.
- ³⁰ It is very common for Indonesian communities abroad to invite preachers (*ustadz*) or Islamic scholars (*ulama*) during Ramadan month, either sponsored by an embassy of the Republic of Indonesia or Indonesian community associations, to assist and give sermons for the whole month in mosques, dwellings belonging to Indonesians, and the office of the Indonesian embassy.
- ³¹ Although DD has targeted female migrants as their charitable beneficiaries, there is no strong discourse on issues such as gender equality and feminism within DD. Instead, DD mainly focuses on protecting and empowering women migrants who work in the informal sector, notably housemaids, without specifically engaging gender-based viewpoints in conceiving female migrants' social, legal and political rights.
- ³² Interview in Causeway Bay-Hong Kong, 5 June 2010. At the time I interviewed the director of DD in Hong Kong, there was a knock on the door. It appears that a young lady came to this office, crying while carrying a big piece of luggage containing her clothes and other kind of belongings. DD's director approached her and asked about what was going on. She replied: 'I've just been fired and my employer did not tell me why'. She then dropped her belongings in DD's shelter and after taking a rest for a while, she went out to see an employment agency office in another region of Hong Kong, that might find her a new family that might need her skills as a housekeeper.
- ³³ For a discussion of 'Diaspora Philanthropy' see for example, Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, "Diaspora Philanthropy in an At-Risk Society: The Case of Coptic Orphans in Egypt," *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, vol. 37, no. 3 (September 2008) 411-433; Adil Najam, *Portrait of a Giving Community: Philanthropy by the Pakistani-American Diaspora* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Peter F. Geithner, Paula D. Johnson, and Lincoln C. Chen (eds.), *Diaspora Philanthropy and Equitable Development in China and India* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2005).
- ³⁴ Interview with Arifin Purwakananta, Programme Director of Dompot Dhu'afa, 25 February 2009 in Jakarta.
- ³⁵ Susan Blackburn, *Women and the State in Modern Indonesia*, 191; see also Titik Indarti, "Representasi Perempuan dalam Sastra Buruh Migran di Hong Kong asal Indonesia: Sebuah Laporan Penelitian Studi Kajian Wanita," A Research Report (Surabaya: Universitas Negeri Surabaya, 2007).
- ³⁶ Interview and discussion with Indonesian women migrant workers in Causeway-Bay-Hong Kong, 6 June 2010.
- ³⁷ In Hong Kong, according to local regulations, domestic workers or helpers should have one day off per week, either Saturday or Sunday. It is very common for helpers from Indonesia to have gatherings in Victoria Park. Thousands of helpers come to the Victoria Park to find funds, to meet friends, to take English courses and computer training, and to attend religious gatherings.
- ³⁸ Sarah Sweider, "Working Women of The World Unite?: Labor Organizing and Transnational Gender Solidarity among Domestic Workers in Hong Kong," in Myrra Max Ferry and Aili Mari Tripp (eds.), *Global Feminism: Transnational Women's Activism, Organizing and Human*

- Rights (New York and London: New York University Press, 2006), 126.
- ³⁹ See for example, Juli Howell, "Sufism in the Silver Screen: Indonesian Innovation in Islamic Televangelism," *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (December 2008), 225-239. It should be noted that Aa Gym's popularity can be juxtaposed with that of other popular preachers such as Kyai Qasim Nurseha in the 1980s and Zainudin MZ in the 1990s. For these popular preachers, Islamic *dakwah* association can become effective vehicles to mobilise social and economic resources.
- ⁴⁰ It should be noted that these business courses still take place but are less popular now than ten years ago.
- ⁴¹ Aa Gym was invited to give a speech in a Christian Church by the Christian community in Ambon to deliver his messages on peace, solidarity, and unity.
- ⁴² James B. Housterey, "Marketing Morality," 76.
- ⁴³ For an anthropological account of the profile of Aa Gym and his typical preaching style, see C. W. Watson, "A Popular Indonesian Preachers: The Significance of Aa Gymnastiar," *Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute*, Number 11 (2005), 773-92.
- ⁴⁴ This speech was delivered on 10 October 2008 at the time I visited Daarut Tauhid.
- ⁴⁵ Zaki Nuraeni, "Daarut Tauhid: Modernizing a Pesantren Tradition," *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2005), 477-509.
- ⁴⁶ At the time I conducted my fieldwork in 2008, the DPU-DT had 40,000 benefactors, 8000 of whom were the DPU-DT's 'permanent benefactors'. Interview with Sarjono, Head of DPU-DT Bandung, 10 October 2008, in Bandung.
- ⁴⁷ The DPU-DT manages three major divisions: the Centre for Community Self-Governing (*Pusat Kemandirian Ummat*), the Centre for Education and Community Training (*Pusat Pendidikan dan Pelatihan Ummat*), and the Centre for Social and Humanitarian Affairs (*Pusat Sosial Kemanusiaan*) Thanks to Aa Gym's personal appeal and the public's popular support, the DPU-DT was acknowledged as a Regional *Zakat* Agency (LAZDA) by the Governor of West Java Province, and as a National *Zakat* Agency (LAZNAS) by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 2002 and 2004 respectively.
- ⁴⁸ The Muslimat Center originated from a learning circle, which was referred to as Daarul Akhwat ('the House of Sisters') by female students who lived in the dormitory near Aa Gym's house in 1995. In line with the growth of Daarut Tauhid and the increase in the number of women who worked in Daarut Tauhid, Daarul Akhwat then formally became a division of Daarut Tauhid in 2005, specifically to facilitate women's social, intellectual and *dakwah* activities. With the support of the *umrah* (lesser pilgrimage to Mecca), participants who used Aa Gym's travel agency, a new building, namely the Muslim Centre, was established in 2005. Now, almost all women-related activities in Daarut Tauhid are organised by the Muslimah Center.
- ⁴⁹ Interview with coordinator of infant care worker training and the staff of the Muslimat Centre, 10 and 11 November 2008, in Bandung.
- ⁵⁰ This does not mean that male teenagers and adults cannot joint the Muslimat Centre's religious training. There is another training programme which admits males ranging from 17 to 55 year old. This training is called *Daura al-Qalbiyyah* ('spiritual training'). In this training programme, materials related to moral and Islamic ethics and entrepreneurship are taught.

- ⁵¹ In this *Pesantren*, *santri* can mean those simply participating in religious education either for a short, medium or long-term programme, and those working in the *pesantren* of the DT. Often the DT's staff identify themselves as *santri* (students) instead of *pegawai* (workers).
- ⁵² Janine A. Clark, *Islam, Charity and Activism*, 144-145.
- ⁵³ In the 1970s the government began to bring the issue of marriage age into the political sphere, for example through the 1974 Marriage Law which established the minimum marriage age as 16 years old for females and 19 years old for males. Since the 1990s the government has imposed a 'longer delay of marriage', which has moved the marriage age to 20 years old and 25 years old for females and males respectively. Despite these actions, early marriage in rural areas remains common practice. For further discussion on the evolution of discourse on early marriages in Indonesia see Susan Blackburn, *Women and the State*, 57-83.
- ⁵⁴ In 2007, infant care worker training gained support from the Ministry of Education through the P2PNFI (*Pusat Pengembangan Pendidikan Non-formal dan Informal*-the Centre for Non-Formal and Informal Education Development) which provided subsidiary funds.
- ⁵⁵ Indeed during the selection process, the prospective infant care workers must show their ability to read the Qur'an. Most of the applicants are able to read the Qur'an properly (*tahsin*), at least according to the standard put in place by the DT staff. Otherwise, the applicants are considered less skilful and therefore required to take additional and Quranic class. All prospective infant care workers have to take various tests, such as a psychological test and Quranic recitation, as well as a health check-up which includes physical, blood and tuberculosis tests.
- ⁵⁶ It is worth mentioning that Aa Gym's father was a retired army man, and Aa Gym himself was a commander of student regiments in a university that was managed by an army-based foundation. Nevertheless, there is no obvious connection between Aa Gym's background and the partnership that the DPU-DT has made with the Nursing School of the Indonesian Air Force.
- ⁵⁷ During this practical learning, three young women, representatives from the Muslimat Centre, were present in the laboratory as observers. The educational background of these young women, representative of the Muslimat Centre varies, but all of them hold diploma degrees (S1). For example, the programme officer of the infant care worker training in 2008 was a female with a BA degree (S1) in Husbandry Science, while her two assistants were holders of BAs in pharmacology and Islamic studies from well-known universities in Indonesia.
- ⁵⁸ During the graduation ceremony, the DPU-DT and the Muslimat Centre usually invite babysitters' parents to witness the training results and of course to be given a briefing before their children start working for new families.
- ⁵⁹ For further discussion of the story of Aa Gym's career as a preacher and entrepreneur, including the impact of his controversial decision to get married to his second wife, see James B. Hoesterey, "Marketing Morality, 95-112.
- ⁶⁰ GSP Company (PT GSP), founded in 2002, is one of the commercial divisions of the DT's cooperative (*Kopontren*). In its initial years, its name was the Daarut Tauhid Service Provider (DTSP) and was owned by the Daarut Tauhid Foundation. Its core businesses at that juncture were landscaping, cleaning and security services, as well as distributing cleaning service equipment. Along with the enactment of the Law on Foundations (*UU Yayasan*) in

Indonesia, which does not allow social foundations to run businesses, the DTSP's status was later transformed into Daarut Tauhid's cooperative with commercial tasks. In Indonesia, cooperatives (*koperasi*) should structurally be separate from foundations (*yayasan*), even if they are managed or owned by the same person. The DTSP was renamed PT GSP, which appears to be a fully commercial organisation. For the last two years, PT GSP has been responsible for managing the distribution of infant care workers to the DT's benefactors. See <http://kopontrendt.com/divisiusaha/detail/4>

- ⁶¹ With regard to the varieties of Islamic education in Indonesia, see for example, Robert W. Hefner, "Islamic Schools, Social Movement and Democracy in Indonesia," in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), *Making Modern Muslims: the Politics of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i, 2009), 55-105; see also Martin van Bruinessen, "Traditionalist and Islamist Pesantrens in Contemporary Indonesia," in Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand & Martin van Bruinessen (eds.), *The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and Transnational Linkage* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 21-46.
- ⁶² During the apprenticeship phase infant care workers may find that some children are already able to recite the Qur'an and memorise prayer recitals and daily prayers, as they have been taught this in their toddler schools or kindergartens. Although to some extent infant care workers may encounter difficulties, they can at least know what sorts of differences in Islamic jurisprudence they will have to deal with, at least in daily ritual practice.
- ⁶³ Interview with Yunianti Chuzaifah, Chairperson of National Women's Commission of the Republic of Indonesia, February 2010, in Leiden.

Islamic Charities and *Dakwah* in the Outer Islands

Introduction

This chapter examines the roles played by Islamic charitable associations that operate on the outer islands. By exploring whether there has been a shift from exclusive solidarity to more universal solidarity and from aid as a means of spreading one's religion to aid as an expression of broader global community, it investigates the way in which Islamic charitable associations negotiate between serving the Muslim community through *dakwah*, and serving humanity at large through social welfare activities. My work focuses on the dynamics of Muslim social and religious activism in Nias, located on the western coast of Sumatra, in the wake of two major natural disasters that struck the island.¹ As a Muslim minority area, post-disaster Nias Island has increasingly become a place where Islamic charitable associations and *dakwah* organisations from outside Nias have attempted to deliver aid as well as to assist the communities, notably the Muslim minority population.² As the outer islands and isolated regions have become an arena of contestation for religious missionaries, Muslim missionaries to a certain extent compete with Christian missionaries and indigenous religious groups.³ In the other outer islands, Christianity is the dominant religion, except in regions of long-time Muslim influence such as West and South Borneo and South Celebes. There

are areas where Muslims remain the minority, such as in Papua, East Nusa Tenggara, Bali Island, North Sumatra, and Nias Island. Therefore, from a broader perspective, Islamic propagation in isolated areas can be seen as a contestation of the two largest religious groups in Indonesia: Islam and Christianity.

Islamic associations, like the Muhammadiyah and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) are among the institutions that are actively supervising *dakwah* activities in isolated regions as a means of serving and strengthening the Muslim minority groups who have settled in non-Muslim majority areas. The Muhammadiyah has run various missionary activities in isolated areas, including the area where Muslim migrants have settled, by being involved in social and economic development processes in these areas. This Muslim modernist association, for example, has sent many *da'i* (Muslim preachers or missionaries) to assist the religious life of Muslims who transmigrated into these isolated areas.⁴ Likewise, DDII is another institution that actively runs *dakwah*-related activities on the outer islands. Since its inception, DDII has been an active *dakwah* institution, not only in terms of supplying missionaries to Muslim minority areas, but also combating 'Christianisation' in Muslim majority areas.⁵ Al-Azhar Peduli (AAP), a newly founded *zakat* agency, has also played considerable roles in providing aid for a Muslim minority, both religiously and financially, on Nias Island.

The Muslim Minority in Nias: Culture and Identity

Culture and Society in Nias

Like other small outer islands, which are far from the heartland of Indonesian economic and political power, Nias Island is considered an unattractive place by Indonesians and the central government. The Nias archipelago—including the Hinako archipelago—comprises 132 islands, 95 of which are uninhabited. Nias Island, or *Tanö Niha*, is the largest island of the Nias archipelago, with Gunung Sitoli as its district capital. Based on the 2000 population census, the Nias ethnic group *Ono Niha* counts for only 0.36% (731,620 people) of the whole of Indonesia's population, but is the third largest ethnic group in North Sumatra (6.36%) after the Batak (41.95% or 4,827,264 people)

and Javanese (32.62% or 3,753,947 people).⁶ According to the 2009 Statistic Bureau report, Nias Island then had 443,492 inhabitants.⁷ Administratively, the Nias Regency (*Kabupaten Nias*) is included in the Province of North Sumatra, and in early 2003, this island was divided into two autonomous regencies: North Nias Regency and South Nias Regency, with Gunung Sitoli and Teluk Dalam as their respective capital cities. Following the implementation of the Government Ordinance of Regional Autonomy, Nias Island is now divided into four Regencies (Gunung Sitoli Municipality, Nias Regency, North Nias Regency, and West Nias Regency). Despite its beautiful landscape, this area has remained relatively untouched by international and even domestic tourism, unlike, for example, Bali and the Lombok islands. Yet, since the end of 2004, Nias has received extensive coverage in the media after it was badly affected by the devastating tsunami and earthquake of December 2004 and March 2005 respectively. As these natural disasters left a trail of devastation behind them, various social, religious, and relief associations landed in Nias in order to reach and help the victims.

The social and economic rhythm of the Niasans suddenly changed after the natural disasters resulted in a flow of domestic and international funds to the region, brought by various NGOs. Along with the government's reconstruction team, both domestic and international NGOs have provided relief supplies and managed social, economic, and physical reconstruction programmes. Some relief NGOs only supervised short-term plans, providing goods and supplies for victims, while others continue to run long-term social and economic development projects, focusing on sustainable livelihoods. Meanwhile, large-scale reconstruction projects are predominantly supervised by the government, government NGOs (G-NGOs), and international NGOs. Various local institutions, such as religious associations, NGOs, and social institutions have played pivotal roles in forging partnerships with domestic and international NGOs operating in Nias.

Moreover, new developments in the social, cultural, religious, and economic domains can also be seen in post-disaster Nias. The flow of foreign funds brought by 'outsiders' (i.e. international NGOs and foreign donors) over the last three years, for example, has had a great impact on the socio-

economic life of this island, as considerable growth in the reconstruction sector has been followed by an increase in wages for people residing in rural and urban Nias. The contact between local people and foreigners can also be said to have influenced the Niasans' views on life and traditions, and even their religious belief systems. It has been reported by local religious and social activists that the numbers of charismatic churches on Nias, representing a 'revival-messianic-nativistic' movement, increased rapidly after local people came into closer contact with faith-based NGOs and evangelist groups.⁸ Likewise, as a result of the disaster, Niasan Muslims now have a greater connection with new domestic and international Islamic associations, such as *zakat* agencies, *dakwah* associations, and certain international Islamic charitable foundations.




Figure 9 Traditional houses of Niasans in Bawomataluo village, Teluk Dalam, South Nias
(Source: author's collection)

Until the mid-nineteenth century, the indigenous Niasans, who call themselves *Ono Niha* (the children of human beings—*anak manusia*), adhered to their indigenous religion that venerates the ancestors' spirits (*roh leluhur*) and two main gods (*dewa-dewa*): *Lowalangi* who represents the 'upper world' and *Baudawanö* who represents the 'underworld'. The ancestors' spirits and the gods are personified in the form of wood sculptures called *Adu*. Subsequent to the arrival of German and Dutch Christian missionaries in Nias as early as the eighteenth century, Protestantism became the dominant religion in Nias.⁹ Smaller numbers of people follow others religions, including

the indigenous creed. In recent times, the Niasan Christians, especially those who reside inland (*pedalaman*) have used the term *Laowo Langi*, which resembles the term ‘*Lowalangi*’ (upper world gods), to signify *Allah* (God).¹⁰ The majority of people in Nias rely on agriculture, handicraft, hunting and breeding pigs for their livelihoods, and those who live in the coastal areas rely on fishing, sailing and breeding water buffalos.¹¹ In the 1960s, Nias was a major exporter of pigs to Singapore. Pigs have been one of the most important animals to Niasans, not only for human consumption, but also for various cultural festivals and religious rituals.¹² The use of pigs in almost every event marks a psychological and cultural barrier, separating the Muslim minority from the Christian majority, and inhibiting to a certain extent the spread of Islam among Niasans. The Muslim communities, about 4.47% of the population (31,227 out of 334,413 people), are concentrated in the coastal areas, such as the Gunung Sitoli, Teluk Dalam, Sirombu and Lahewa districts.

Gunung Sitoli, located on the eastern coast of Nias Island, is the main gate to North Nias, as it facilitates the entry of boats from Sibolga and aeroplanes from Medan in North Sumatra.¹³ Holding the status of a district capital for many years, Gunung Sitoli is a culturally diverse major town. Different ethnic groups, such as Batak (North Sumatra), Minang (West Sumatra), Acehnese (Aceh), Bugis (Celebes), and Javanese (Java) have migrated to—and then resided in—this area for decades. These immigrants have shaped the cultural identities of Muslims on Nias. The religious and cultural traditions of the Niasan Muslims seem to be a hybrid mix of mainly Aceh and Minangkabau cultural heritage. This can be seen in the ceremonies and customary acts performed in marriage ceremonies and religious gatherings, as well as in the Muslims’ traditional dress and daily languages. The social and religious dynamics of Muslims on Nias have also been influenced by the presence of various Muslim associations, such as the Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Al-Washliyah.¹⁴ Therefore, despite struggling for integration with the Christian majority, Muslims’ social and religious entities are shaped by dynamic encounters between Muslim ‘modernists’ and ‘traditionalists’.

Desa Mudik and the Image of Muslim Communities

Desa Mudik, a small village that forms part of the town of Gunung Sitoli, is one of the places where many Muslims are concentrated. It is different from other villages in Nias, because various Islamic institutions exist and operate in this village. Before entering the gate of *Desa Mudik*, a visitor to the village passes a private Islamic primary school (*Madrasah Ibtidaiyah Swasta-MIS*) run by the NU. This *madrasah* occupies a fairly modest building. Established in 1976, this school is supervised by the Al-Maarif Education Foundation (*Lembaga Pendidikan Al-Maarif*) of the NU.¹⁵ The headmaster and teachers of the MIS told me that they are grateful for the school, because it continues to play an essential role for Muslim families in Gunung Sitoli. Another Islamic school, owned by another traditionalist association, namely Al-Jam'iyat Al-Washliyah, is located near the gate of *Desa Mudik*. The Al-Washliyah was founded in Medan-North Sumatra in 1930, and it 'took on an ethnic cast, with a largely Mandailing Batak leadership.'¹⁶ Despite the fact that Al-Washliyah has managed hundreds of Islamic education institutions throughout North Sumatra, ranging from *madrasah* to Islamic universities, the enthusiasm of villagers to enrol at the Islamic school of Al-Washliyah in Nias gradually decreased over the last few decades. The building was in a poor state, and the plank of wood signifying "*Madrasah Ibtidaiyah Al-Washliyah*" remained, but there was no activity inside the school.¹⁷ One local informant told me that a lot of Al-Washliyah schools in Nias have closed and the influence of this association in this area is 'coming to an end'. Yet, its orphanage still operates, protecting local disadvantaged children.¹⁸

The modernist association in Nias, the Muhammadiyah, seems to have been more fortunate than the NU and Al-Washliyah. The Muhammadiyah Education Complex (*Kompleks Perguruan Muhammadiyah*), consisting of a kindergarten, a primary school, and junior and senior high schools, was in a better condition. During my visit to this education complex, some of the high school buildings were under reconstruction, while buildings for the primary school were new or had been newly rebuilt. The area of the Muhammadiyah school complex in Gunung Sitoli is much larger than those of the NU and Al-Washliyah. It is widely known that the Muhammadiyah

Primary School received donations from the central government thanks to President Bambang Yudoyono's visit to Nias after the 2005 earthquake. Elsewhere in Mudik Village, the Grand Mosque of Gunung Sitoli was also under renovation. Its reconstruction was funded by a number of institutions, including the committee of the Grand Mosque of Nias Regency and the Recovery Aceh-Nias Trust Fund (RANTF-BRR),¹⁹ and supported by MERCY Malaysia (a humanitarian NGO).²⁰ It should be noted, however, that the concentration of Islamic education institutions in a village like Desa Mudik does not mean that there are no Christian social, religious and education institutions. Muslims may in fact feel envious because the Christian schools appear to be in better condition. Local Muslim activists often say Christian schools are incomparably better than Muslim schools in Nias, because Christian educational institutions have obtained much more support from their regional and international counterparts.²¹

Another Islamic institution is the Yayasan Pondok *Pesantren* Putri Ummu Kultsum in Gunung Sitoli. The *pesantren* is relatively new, established in 2003 by local Muslims with the support of Muslims of Nias origin in Jakarta. It has 50 female students from surrounding areas, mostly Gunung Sitoli. In order to strengthen its institutional capacity, a former headmaster of the Muhammadiyah Vocational School (SMK Muhammadiyah) of Kebumen-West Java was assigned as a housemaster (*kepala asrama*) to assist the *pesantren*'s management, while the position of headmistress (*kepala pondok pesantren*) was held by the co-founder of this *pesantren*. The chairperson of the Ummu Kultsum Foundation, Haji Danial Tanjung, who is a former member of the Indonesian Legislative Assembly (DPR), is also co-founder of Nias Care Muslim Foundation (YPMN-*Yayasan Peduli Muslim Nias*). This *pesantren* has been struggling to get more students, because people's interest in enrolling their children in the *pesantren* has decreased. This *pesantren* can, in fact, only obtain ten students per year. The *pesantren* has strong ties with the YPMN, a Jakarta-based foundation for Nias Muslims. The YPMN, as we shall see in the subsequent section, has played a pivotal role in giving Muslim communities in Nias access to funding, *zakat* agencies, and social institutions in Java that are able to contribute to the development of Muslim communities in

Nias. Bearing the above profiles of Islamic institutions in Gunung Sitoli in mind, one may wonder how those Islamic institutions survive, what kinds of social networks they have employed to strengthen the communities, and how the notion of *dakwah* (Islamic propagation) is embedded in the Islamic form of giving. In particular, one may ask how a vividly Islamic *dakwah* in Nias is supported by communities both in and beyond the Nias Islands.

The Muslim communities in Gunung Sitoli do not face many difficulties in expressing their religious views and practising their beliefs. At prayer time, the call for prayer (*adzan*) is made through the Mosques' loudspeakers, and Muslims can freely pray in mosques five times a day and conduct religious sermons regularly. Like in other places, many Muslim children attend 'Qur'anic Kindergarten' (*Taman Pendidikan Al-Qur'an*, TPA) before or after the sunset prayer (*maghrib*), to study the Qur'an. Not all Muslim children, however, are enrolled at Muslim schools, as some prefer studying in state-sponsored public schools for their secondary education (junior and senior high school). In a Christian majority region like Nias, the social and religious environment at a public school is very much influenced by Christian customs. Due to this, Muslim students studying at public schools, supported by Muslim teachers, often hold religious gatherings, either inside or outside the schools, as a means of preserving the students' religious identity.

When I was conducting my fieldwork in February 2009, I was able to attend a religious gathering supervised by a Muslim teacher at a public school in Gunung Sitoli. This gathering was held in a student's house and more than a hundred students attended. The students were all seated on the floor on carpets. This gathering, called public speaking training (Ar. *muhadara*), began with a Qur'anic recitation by a female student, which was followed by a recitation of the Indonesian translation of the recited Qur'anic verses by a male student. Another female student move forwards and stood in front of the other students to deliver a speech entitled 'The Problem of Secularism Among Muslim youth', which highlighted what she saw as the dangerous impact of Valentine Day's celebrations on young Muslims. After 15 minutes, a female teacher gave a constructive evaluation of the way in which the female student had delivered the speech and she announced the name of the

student responsible for delivering the speech in the next monthly meeting. Afterwards, the teacher asked the invited *ustadz* (Ar. *ustadh*, Islamic teacher) to give a sermon on a similar subject to that of the female student's speech. The invited *ustadz* had been assigned by a Jakarta-based *zakat* agency, AAP, to assist Muslim activities in Nias.

The increase in religious activities in Nias supported by charitable institutions, *zakat* agencies, and *dakwah* associations from Java cannot be detached from the roles of local Muslim personalities in Nias and Muslim associations set up by people originating from Nias Island, such as the Nias Care Muslim Foundation (YPMN). This foundation was founded in Jakarta on 6 October 2006 (Ramadhan 13, 1427 H) by Niasans residing in Jakarta, such as Haji Muhammad Danial Tanjung (born in Gunung Sitoli Nias to a family with Mandailing ethnicity, the former member of the Representative House Council of the Republic of Indonesia), Teuku Syaiful Anwar (a Muslim activist in Jakarta who was born in Nias to an Acehnese family), and Haji Muhammad Yusuf Sisus (known as Yusuf Lömbu, a Niasan Muslim convert whose former name was Haogödödö Lömbu). In recent times, the YPMN has been headed by Yusuf Lömbu, the former director of the social security programmes of PT JAMSOSTEK (a state-owned Indonesian pension fund). Since its early years, the YPMN has collected data from a wide-range of Muslim facilities destroyed by the 2005 earthquake, such as mosques, *madrasah* and Islamic associations' offices. Therefore, the YPMN has functioned as an intermediary between Muslims in Nias and donors (mass media, *zakat* agencies, *dakwah* associations, charitable institutions, private companies, state-owned companies, and banks) on Java Island and other neighbouring countries such as Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam, in order to accelerate the implementation of reconstruction projects in Nias.

Despite massive reconstruction programmes run by the government and foreign NGOs in Nias, Muslim communities in Nias felt it necessary to set up a new institution that would be able to independently support its own community for several reasons. First, the major issue in the recovery and reconstruction process of disaster-affected areas is bureaucracy. The very long and inflexible bureaucratic procedures in the reconstruction processes that

often occur in many places, including Nias, has compelled communities, either Muslim or Christian, to ‘invite’ their counterparts, both nationally and internationally, to participate in development and reconstruction projects in the given region. Second, the absence of Muslim NGOs in Nias was another, essential reason that induced Muslims on the mainland with Nias origins to take action by setting up an institution like YPMN as a means of projecting Muslim Niasans’ voices and aspirations beyond the island. As mentioned previously, two natural disasters devastated Nias Island: the 2004 tsunami, and the 2005 earthquake. The 2004 events also badly damaged the coastal areas of Aceh. Therefore, due to the enormous devastation in Aceh, most NGOs, notably domestic Muslim NGOs, landed in Aceh and to some extent overlooked Nias Island.²²

Meanwhile, as a Christian majority island, Nias received significant support from Christians NGOs, both domestic and foreign, which operated in this region immediately after the disaster.²³ Third, as a minority group, most Muslims in Nias were reluctant to express their needs or to get involved in humanitarian programmes organised by local churches. It is under these circumstances that the YPMN, which is supported by Niasan migrants on other islands, attempted to mobilise domestic resources from Java to Islamic institutions on Nias, and this foundation in part represents what I would call ‘domestic migrant philanthropy’.²⁴ As we shall see in the next section of this chapter, in running its programmes, the YPMN cooperated with various Islamic charitable associations and *dakwah* organisations from Java, such as AAP, DDII, and others.

Al-Azhar Peduli (AAP):

Reaching out to the Muallaf and Strengthening Dakwah

Al-Azhar Peduli (AAP) is one of the community-based *zakat* agencies in Indonesia that have played a significant role in collecting and distributing aid originating from Islamic social funds. This institution is attached to the Al-Azhar Mosque, one of the most renowned mosques in Jakarta. The Al-Azhar Mosque is located in the upper-middle-class neighbourhood of Kebayoran Baru, South Jakarta, and has been declared by the local government

as one of eighteen major historical sites in Jakarta. On 7 April 1952, a number of Masyumi activists, supported by the Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet of Kukirman-Suwirjo (1951-1952), Mr Sjamsuddin, set up an Islamic foundation, namely the Islamic Education Foundation (*Yayasan Pendidikan Islam*-YPI). On 19 November 1953, the YPI started to build a mosque, which was completed and first officially opened to the public in 1958. This mosque was given the name of another prominent mosque in Cairo, Egypt; the Al-Azhar Mosque.²⁵ In recent times, Al-Azhar and the YPI have operated a wide-range of Islamic education institutions, ranging from kindergartens to universities, where Muslims among the urban upper-middle classes send their children to study.²⁶

AAP and other *zakat* agencies share a similar set of programmes, such as charitable services, income-generating projects, free healthcare provision, and scholarships. Yet, each *zakat* agency has put emphasis on certain activities, and AAP has been heavily interested in *dakwah*, as well as in the construction or reconstruction of Islamic education buildings and mosques. There are two main programmes that AAP has so far focused on, namely renovation of prayer halls (*mushalla*, Ar. *Musalla*; small buildings in public spaces for the performance of religious duties) and reconstruction of *madrasah*. First, ‘renovation of *mushalla*’ is a programme designed to provide a better and more reliable place of worship within *pesantren* and Muslim communities. Since 2007, AAP has built, renovated, and rebuilt 20 places of worship in certain areas of Java. Through this programme, this *zakat* agency attempts to mobilise domestic funds originating from *zakat* and *sedekah*, as well as to optimise the mobilisation of cash *waqf* (endowment). Under the concept of cash *waqf*, urban Muslims may invest their wealth for social and religious purposes in rural areas where *madrasah* and mosques are being built.²⁷ Second, ‘reconstruction of *madrasah* and worship building’ intends to renovate the buildings of Islamic schools and mosques that have suffered major damage caused by age or man-made or natural disasters. The operation of AAP in Gunung Sitoli is the realisation of an AAP programme, namely *Al-Azhar Peduli Muslim Nias*, which was carried out in cooperation with the YPMN in Nias.²⁸



Figure 10 The author with some *ustadz* and *muallaf* families after Friday prayers in the Mushalla 'An-Nur', Botomuzoi-Nias (source: author's collection)

The Muallaf and Mushalla in Botomuzoi

In a small hilly village in the district of Botomuzoi, AAP has supported the construction of a *mushalla* (small place of worship).²⁹ This village is about 20 km from the town of Gunung Sitoli. There is no public transportation to reach this area. One must start by travelling on the main roads, which have been largely destroyed by earthquakes and landslides, and then one must walk or use a motorcycle to reach the village. Along the way to district of Botomuzoi from the town of Gunung Sitoli, we find precipitous roads and seriously damaged bridges. Despite its location inside the district of Botomuzoi, the village also neighbours other districts, such as Alasa, North Mandrehe, and Hili Serangkai. The *mushalla* 'An-Nur' has just recently been established by Muslim converts among the villagers. The initiative was started in 2007 by Ama Niska³⁰, who converted to Islam from Christianity when he was working in North Sumatra and married a woman of Karo Batak ethnicity. Ama Niska's relatives remain Christian, but this has not caused any serious barriers between Ama Niska's family and others.³¹ Overall, there are fifteen

Muslim families able to attend this *mushalla* regularly or irregularly. Four of the families are from this village; others come from different villages and even neighbouring districts. One attendant, Ama Jernih, for example, had to ride a motorcycle and pass through hilly fields to reach this *mushalla* from his home in district of Lasara. Meanwhile, Ama Ope who resided in the hills, had to walk 5 km from his home to the *mushalla*, because his home cannot be reached by public transportation or car, or even by small motorcycle.

Those who live far from the mosque usually come to the *mushalla* on Friday at noon in order to attend the Friday congregation (*Shalat Jum'at*), and they bring all their family members. For them, this small *mushalla* is not only a place where they can listen to the sermon of the *ustadz* (religious teachers), but also a place where they can share and communicate with other fellow Muslim converts. They wear Muslim dress, with *baju koko* and *peci/kopiah* (hats) for males and *jilbab* (veils) for females. Afterward, all congregation participants have lunch inside the mosque, during which time they share their daily experiences with each other. Shortly after lunchtime, the *muallaf* families continue to chat on the *mushalla*'s veranda, while their children study the Qur'an inside the *mushalla* under the supervision of an *ustadz* from the office of Religious Affairs of Gunung Sitoli Regency. It is not always easy for these families to attend this *mushalla*, because they have to bring their children who, at that time, are supposed to be in school.

One *muallaf* often asks the teacher's permission and picks up his children from school every Friday, around two hours before Friday congregation time, in order to be able to come to the *mushalla* and 'Friday school'. This is the way in which this *muallaf* family persuades the school in the village not to force his children to attend the Christian 'Sunday school'. Apart from this, the *ustadz* has introduced Muslim converts to the Ordinance on National Education System (*Undang-Undang Sisdiknas*), which includes an article on religious teaching in schools. Accordingly, students have the right to be taught the religion that they and their families adhere to. On the subject of religion, for instance, Muslim children should be taught about Islam by Muslim teachers, even if they study in a Christian school, and *vice versa*; Christian

children should have subjects on Christianity instead of Islam, despite studying in Islamic schools. In practice, this issue remains a matter of dispute and is being practiced inconsistently by Muslim and Christian Schools. In Nias, because the Christian schools in the village cannot provide Muslim students with Muslim teachers to tutor them on Islam, the Muslim families have attempted to negotiate with the school so that the school can allow Muslim children to attend 'Friday school'.



Figure 11 One *ustadz* teaches Islam to children of *muallaf* families in Botomuzoi-Nias (source: author's collection).

Although there has been no serious controversy among the villagers about the establishment of this *mushalla*, some villagers have raised concerns about this issue. But Ama Niska and some *ustadz* have attempted to convince the Christian villagers that this *mushalla* does not aim to convert anyone in the village, but to fulfil the religious and social needs of Muslim villagers.³² It is worth mentioning that the district head (*camat*) in this region has also become a determinant factor in the establishment of this *mushalla*. Surrounded by two districts, North Madrehe and Hili Serangkai, which have been headed by Muslims, the establishment of the *mushalla* in Botomuzoi became possible as Muslim minority groups in the region took advantage of this political opportunity. Power relations, therefore, have characterised the initiation,

process and execution of the management of this new *mushalla* in the village. Moreover, there are three *ustadz* who regularly attend this *mushalla*. They lead the Friday congregation, teach children Qur'anic recitation, and give sermons. The first two *ustadz* are from the Department of Religious Affairs of Nias, and the other is an *ustadz* who has been specifically assigned by AAP to assist Muslims in Gunung Sitoli, including Muslim converts in Botomuzoi. In Nias, the *ustadz* appointed by AAP, called *Da'i Peduli Mustahik* (preacher taking care of *zakat* recipients), is responsible for organising mass gatherings ('*Tabligh Akbar*') and participating in regular religious gatherings (*pengajian*) conducted by Muslim communities, as well as being the representative of AAP in Nias. In this respect, Al-Azhar aims to help Muslim communities by supporting the reconstruction of certain religious buildings, and encouraging social and religious activities within the communities.

According to AAP's *da'i*, as far as the majority of *ulama* are concerned, the term *muallaf* can basically be applied to people who have recently become interested in Islam and new converts for at least one year. Afterwards, they can be regarded as *mukhallaf*, and can no longer be included among the eight types of *zakat* recipients. However, a long-term programme in a Muslim minority region is necessary for when *muallaf* return to their hometowns in minority Muslim regions. Lacking an Islamic environment, those Muslim converts, as emphasised by *da'i*, still need further assistance from experts in order to prevent their relapse into Christianity. Moreover, according to one *ustadz*, there are two reasons for the absence of other *muallaf* in the *mushalla*. The first is the matter of geographical location and the limitations of public transportation in the villages. The second is the matter of religious commitment, which means that not all *muallaf* have the same degree of religious commitment, and thus further assistance cannot be avoided.

Madrasah and Mosque in Gunung Sitoli

Apart from providing support to Muslim converts in Botomuzoi, AAP and the YPMN have tried to revitalise the Al-Furqan Mosque in Gunung Sitoli, in which an 'Afternoon Islamic Kindergarten' (TPA) has been extremely active for many years. About 200 children study the Qur'an through reading

and writing, and memorise short verses from the Qur'an and Muslims' daily prayer narrations (*doa-doa harian*) in this Mosque every afternoon, from 4 pm until 7 pm. The students are divided into different classes, depending upon their age and level of knowledge. Some *ustadz* organising and teaching at this Mosque are those teaching in the Islamic MIS of the NU. Otherwise, they are volunteers active in Islamic associations or mosque youth activists (*aktivis remaja masjid*). Al-Furqan Mosque, with its emergency building, was and has been quite essential to Muslim communities in Gunung Sitoli district, as it is located in the centre of the town. Positioned right beside the police station of Gunung Sitoli, Al-Furqan Mosque is also very close to the town square (*alun-alun*), and therefore it is accessible from different areas of Gunung Sitoli. Like other public facilities in the region, Al-Furqan Mosque was destroyed by the 2005 earthquake, and three years later, in early 2008, the emergency building remains.³³ Meanwhile other mosques, with limited support from the government and from NGOs, are struggling for adequate reconstruction. It is under these circumstances that the YPMN and AAP took the initiative to build the new and more comprehensive Al-Furqan Mosque, with a budget amounting to IDR 3.4 billion.

In financing this project, AAP and the YPMN are not working alone. Instead, they engage other powerful institutions, such as Dewan Masjid Indonesia (DMI-Indonesian Mosque Board),³⁴ private and government-owned corporations, and the Forum *Zakat* and its associates.³⁵ Having been successful in previous mosque and *mushalla* reconstruction projects in various regions of Indonesia, AAP, with the support of other charitable institutions, has made the decision to run this prestigious project for a variety of reasons, one of which is related to the giving culture of Indonesian Muslims. According to the staff of AAP, mobilising domestic funds for the purpose of building mosques is relatively easier than, for example, setting up income-generating projects. The majority of Muslims in Indonesia, as in other countries, believe that donating a proportion of their wealth to building mosques is a spiritually worthy activity.³⁶ AAP often receives calls from donors who inquire about the project of mosque reconstruction in the outer islands or isolated regions, whereas this does not happen for micro-finance projects.

Therefore, the committee members for mosque reconstruction have come to believe that they will not face many difficulties in raising the required funds. In addition to this, there has been a new trend within corporations in Indonesia of channelling their 'social funds', legitimated by the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), to *zakat* agencies in order to finance social and religious enterprises. It should be noted that although the existing *zakat* agencies in Indonesia are competing 'against' one another in terms of mobilising domestic funds, to a certain extent, they have been able to build synergy with other institutions and to fruitfully execute at least one prestigious project.

Meanwhile, the YPMN has played another role, engaging national and local mass media in Java able to raise funds as a means of supporting various projects on the outer islands, including mosque reconstruction in Nias. The working area of the YPMN is not restricted to Gunung Sitoli. In addition to shoring up Muslim communities in Gunung Sitoli, this institution has facilitated and endorsed the reconstruction of another big mosque in Teluk Dalam, South Nias. It has cooperated with mass media in Java such as *Pikiran Rakyat*, the largest local newspaper in West Java. The YPMN raised funds via various events, such as in the Arifin Ilham's Dhikr meetings, and religious gathering groups conducted in both private and state-owned companies, such as the Mosque Baitul Ihsan of the Bank of Indonesia. Equally importantly, it has attempted to establish networks with Islamic NGOs overseas, such as Islamic Relief of Malaysia and the Foundation of Haji Sultan Hasanah of Brunei Darussalam, to expand its network and partnerships. In this respect, I would argue that the YPMN is not only an ethnic-based Islamic NGO whose overarching function is mobilising potential philanthropic resources for Niasan domestic migrants, but also an agent or foundation that has bridged the gap between the Muslim minority on Nias Island and fellow Muslims on other islands, notably Java.³⁷

Mujahid Dakwah: Muslim Missionaries and their Multiple Affiliations

It is interesting to briefly explain the profile of AAP's *da'i*, Qaimuddin, who participates in charity activism and *dakwah* in Nias. He has been ap-

pointed as AAP's *da'i* in Nias, called *Sahabat Mustahik* (literally 'a friend of beneficiaries'). Qaimuddin's profile is quite unique, as he has been involved in *dakwah* activities organised by various Islamic associations. This means that to him, his involvement in Islamic *dakwah* is more important than his affiliation with any particular Islamic association. As a matter of fact, he has been sent to different regions by various associations to propagate Islam. This experience has given him an opportunity to establish an informal network, crossing the lines of organisational structures. Born in Flores-East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) into a Flores noble Muslim family, Qaimuddin has been involved in *dakwah* activities since his enrolment in the *Pesantren* Persatuan Islam (PERSIS) of Bangil in East Java in the 1980s. After his schooling, he returned to his hometown in Flores in the early 1990s, and subsequently became a *dakwah* volunteer in Ampah (Central Borneo) and Raha (South-east Celebes) in cooperation with a local foundation for one year. Under the support of PERSIS, he assisted *muallaf* in the hinterland of Flores for two years, and continued for another three years with the support of *Jam'iyya Ihya al-Turath al-Islamiyya* (the Society for the Revival of Islamic Heritage), a Quwaiti Salafi Foundation that has actively funded Salafi activities all over the world.

It seems that his connection with the alumni of Bangil has been a significant factor in enabling him to work in different areas. In Bali, for example, Qaimuddin was asked by his friend, an alumnus of Bangil who joined the Muhammadiyah, to take part in *dakwah* in Buleleng of Singaraja in Bali with the Majelis Tabligh of the Muhammadiyah. At that juncture, Qaimuddin identified himself as *Da'i Peduli Ummat*, a person who paid much attention to the problems that Muslim converts might face. Back in Flores, Qaimuddin then became involved in politics by supporting the Moon and Crescent Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang*, PBB)³⁸ during the 1999 general election. Qaimuddin also ran for the People's Assembly at a municipal level (DPRD). He gained strong support from his family, tribes and Muslim communities in Flores, and he was finally given the opportunity to act as a representative in the People Assembly. However, he did not take this opportunity and instead chose to concentrate on *dakwah*. Afterwards, Qaimuddin taught and became a

headmaster at a *Madrasah* founded by the PERSIS, until his appointment as head of a district branch of the PERSIS in Flores. To some extent, his promotion of the puritan ideology of PERSIS in Flores did cause tension between himself and his family, who defended local tradition. The *da'i* then decided to become a freelance *da'i* in Jakarta, under the support of his friend from Bangil. It was during this period that he finally joined AAP, whose programme in Nias was in line with his expertise and experience as a preacher and missionary. Since then, he has been appointed the first AAP *da'i* on what he calls 'the Island of the Cross', Nias.

On this island, Qaimuddin has built a close relationship with other Muslim groups in Gunung Sitoli, such as the Muhammadiyah, the NU, and Al-Washliyah. He is also regularly involved with the 'Qur'anic Kindergarten' (TPA) run in some mosques in Gunung Sitoli. More importantly, he has established strong networks with other *da'i* in other districts throughout Nias, such as Gunung Sitoli, Lahewa, Idanogawo (Bizehena Village), Sirombu and Teluk Dalam, through other domestic *zakat* agencies and international Islamic charitable institutions. The above description suggests that the experience of *ustadz* of AAP in *dakwah* activities has provided him with the possibility of establishing wide-ranging *dakwah* networks, not only on the mainland but also on the outer islands, notably in Muslim minority regions.

Similar '*fikrah*' (ideology or religious viewpoints) seem to have determined the cooperation among *ustadz*. When Qaimuddin came to Gunung Sitoli, he met a number of *da'i* who had arrived earlier in this town and who were sponsored by a Middle Eastern foundation, the Asia Muslim Charity Fund (AMCF). In the 1990s, Al-Birr (the Charitable Foundation of Royal Family of Dubai), which is the former name of the AMCF, and the Muhammadiyah had opened a joint office (*sekretariat bersama*) in the Muhammadiyah Office of Jakarta (*Gedung Dakwah Muhammadiyah*). Since then, various charitable and *dakwah* activities of the Muhammadiyah, ranging from supporting orphanages and clinics to sending *da'i* to isolated regions, have been supported in part by the AMCF. The cooperation has continued, and as a fruit of this, Ma'had Ali (Institutes for Higher Islamic Education) have been established at several Muhammadiyah universities. In recent times, AMCF has man-

aged 16 Ma'had 'Ali, has set up 89 orphanages throughout Indonesia (77 of which are handled by the Muhammadiyah, two by PERSIS, and ten by the AMCF), and has supervised the dispatch of *da'i* to isolated regions. Between 2006 and 2010, for example, AMCF organised eight batches of training for *da'i*.

The AMCF's *da'i* in Gunung Sitoli is an alumnus of the Ma'had 'Ali of Bandung, an educational institution set up by the PERSIS in cooperation with the AMCF. Some of the AMCF's *da'i* in Nias, in fact, graduated from or were trained in the PERSIS *pesantren* in Bangil, Bandung or Jakarta. Meanwhile, Qaimuddin's involvement in the *dakwah* programmes in Flores, under the supervision of *Jam'iyyah Ihya al-Turath*, a Kuwait-based foundation that supports the Salafi *dakwah* worldwide, made it easier for him to be involved in DDII's *dakwah* activities in Nias. This is simply because in the field, the *da'i* appointed on Nias Island have close ties between one another irrespective of their backgrounds, and in particular, PERSIS and DDII have good working relations. However, it should be noted that the cooperation among *ustadz* and *da'i* who become informal charitable actors in Nias, as we shall see in the following section, was not by design. In other words, this cooperation occurred, in my opinion, by coincidence. Overall, seen from the perspective of the genealogy of the Islamic movement in Indonesia, it is arguable that the Persatuan Islam, AAP, and DDII share the same roots ('*Keluarga Besar Bulan Bintang*, the Big Family of the Crescent and Star', i.e. the various groups and associations affiliated with the Masyumi party). For example, Mohammad Natsir was the leader of the Masyumi and the activists of Masyumi later founded Al-Azhar. Natsir was also the founder of DDII, and the leading member of PERSIS. Therefore, the charity activism described above can be seen as a continuation of the larger scheme of *dakwah* movements in Indonesia.

DDII and the AMCF:

Charitable Services, Dakwah and the Struggle for Development

An important player in *dakwah* activities on the outer island is DDII, the Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation. Along with other Islamic asso-

ciations, such as the Muhammadiyah and the NU, DDII has long experience in carrying out *dakwah* activities in isolated regions. Since the 1970s, Natsir, the founder of DDII, has set up *dakwah* programmes for assisting *muallaf* (Muslim converts) and Muslim communities in transmigration areas. In West Sumatra, for example, DDII has carried out and supported extensive *dakwah* activities for Muslim communities on the Mentawai and Siberut Islands, located off the west coast of West Sumatra. Part of the population of these two islands still holds onto pre-Islamic and pre-Christian religious traditions.³⁹ The spread of Islam and DDII's *dakwah* programmes in Mentawai is quite extensive, because West Sumatra has been heavily influenced by Islamic tradition,⁴⁰ and many people from Minangkabau have migrated to this Mentawai over the decades to find a new life. By contrast, Nias Island is part of the province of North Sumatra, one of the most populous provinces with a high concentration of Christians (notably the Toba Batak ethnic group). However, this does not mean that Islamic *dakwah* in Nias is less extensive than in Mentawai, as evidenced by the spread of Islamic associations and institutions in Nias since the 1970s.

DDII has paid great attention to the Muslim communities in Nias by carrying out various programmes, ranging from what can be called 'conventional' methods, for example posting *da'i* to Nias Island, to philanthropic and development-oriented projects. In this respect, DDII has argued that channelling *zakat* funds to *dakwah* is unavoidable, because *dakwah* activities in isolated tribes (*suku terasing*) require a lot of financial support. It has also suggested that overlooking the existence of *muallaf* and new Muslim communities in isolated regions will result in a weakening of brotherhood (*ukhuwwa*) among Indonesian Muslims. In order to provide adequate human resources for assisting the *muallaf*, in 2003, DDII offered scholarships and training for people labelled *Jamaah al-Muhtadin* ('the rightly guided society').⁴¹ The participants in this *dakwah* project were mainly young people who were trained in Islam and then sent to isolated regions for *dakwah*, providing spiritual guidance for Muslims or perhaps converting indigenous people who still adhered to indigenous religions. It is worth emphasising that DDII's *zakat* agency appears to have specialised in *dakwah* instead of, for example, healthcare or

economic development projects. Most of DDII's cadres sent to isolated regions were not equipped with skills to organise community development and livelihood projects. The *da'i* whom I encountered during my fieldwork expressed the opinion that *dakwah* should consist of more than just the despatching of preachers. This is partly because Islamic *dakwah* associations are now challenged by hardships in society. Therefore, Islamic *dakwah* associations should be able to provide more sophisticated and well-prepared economic development and livelihood projects. They believe that the establishment of Islamic Financial Cooperatives (*Baitul Mal wa Tamwil*, BMT) that can support microfinance projects will be essential to poverty alleviation programmes within Muslim communities (*umma*).

BMTs have proliferated throughout Indonesia since the 1990s, along with the emergence of the first Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI). This originated from Muslims' concerns about bank interest and whether or not conventional banks, which apply interest, were in line with Islamic principles of economics. Between 1990 and 2000, the numbers of BMTs in Indonesia moderately increased, reaching 3000 units with small assets of about IDR 1.5 trillion. Unlike banks, the establishment of BMTs has frequently been initiated by Muslim associations or social or profit-oriented institutions with Muslim workers. In recent times, *zakat* agencies have also set up BMTs as a means of managing domestic funds in a more productive way. Unlike on Java Island, where one can find a BMT easily, there is not one Islamic financial cooperative on Nias Island. This is not merely because Nias is a Muslim minority region, but also because it reflects the generally poor development of infrastructure in the region.

By contrast, Catholics villagers in Nias have had access to an extensively supervised Credit Union since 1984, officially established in 1987, in support of small and medium enterprises and economic development among rural communities.⁴² The Credit Union is quite popular among villagers, as it can reach the creditors in isolated villages that conventional banks cannot. In certain regions, the Credit Union is even more well-liked among rural communities than the government-sponsored bank. This is because the CU is, to some extent, embedded within religious institutions, such as the Catholic

Church, while at the same time it offers a less bureaucratic approach, something that is appreciated by creditors, especially those working in non-formal sector areas, such as farmers and craftsmen in small villages.⁴³ Interestingly, some Muslim families have become members and partners of the Credit Union. My informant, a local Muslim who often helps DDII with charitable works, was also a member of the Credit Union. From this he also learned that Muslim communities should be able to operate micro-finance projects in order to attain economic self-reliance. My informant was born into a wealthy family. His father, an ethnic Chinese, runs extensive businesses in Nias and North Sumatra, while his mother is a former member of the local parliament and also the daughter of the former head of Nias Regency. In 2008, for example, under the support of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and in cooperation with DDII's *zakat* agency, my informant organised Training for Trainers/Facilitators (ToT) in the Nias Community Development project. However a lack of support from local and foreign donors has resulted in the postponement of Islamic microfinance projects and BMTs in Nias.

Despite the fact that economic development projects have not become a major concern for Islamic charitable institutions and *zakat* agencies that operate in Nias, local actors and volunteers have played quite unique roles in arranging the charitable programmes of *zakat* agencies in order to avoid overlapping activities. As mentioned previously, under the supervision of local volunteers, AAP pays attention to the reconstruction of mosques and *mushalla* on Nias, while DDII focuses on strengthening the education activities of *madrasah*. Volunteers consisting of local counterparts of the YPMN and mosque youth activists have, for example, included some *madrasah* teachers in the training for Nias Community Development. Following this, DDII's *zakat* agency distributed a set of computers to some *madrasah* in other regencies taking part in the training. It is worth explaining that other informal actors in other districts cooperate with volunteers in Gunung Sitoli: they are *da'i* or *dakwah* activists appointed in Nias by the AMCF, not DDII.

Informal Networks and Charitable Work

The functions of networks and the roles of local counterparts in Nias are instrumental in supporting charity activism run by domestic and international charitable organisations. The term ‘network’ means the linkages between individuals and institutions that hold similar objectives. Networks can be local, regional, domestic or international in character. Local institutions may have close ties with domestic NGOs and may be supported by international NGOs. When domestic and international humanitarian or religious-based associations operate in isolated regions to cater to those facing crises, they normally engage local counterparts. This strategy is often used as a means of overcoming any problems the NGOs may face, such as resistance from local figures or institutions who may feel that they are being overlooked by the foreigners. Therefore, relief missions by domestic and foreign NGOs in disaster-affected areas have often been characterised by cooperation between local, domestic, and international actors. This section will highlight the function of informal networks among *ustadz* and local volunteers who have been able to connect local, domestic and international actors and their charity activism. For the purpose of this work, the term ‘informal network’ means the informal ties and cooperation between one person and another based on common ground and shared values, rather than a formal organisational relationship.

There are several volunteers with various backgrounds on Nias Island who work together in the field to carry out Islamic *dakwah* or various social enterprises and religious activities. The first consists of local people who are often involved in the activities of the YPMN, either formally or informally. These people are not always included in the structure of the YPMN organisation, but consist of former Muhammadiyah associates and Muslim youth activists. The second group comprises *ustadz* appointed by AAP. The third group is composed of *da’i* appointed by the AMCF, DDII, and the Hidayatullah Foundation to assist Islamic *dakwah* in Nias Island. A number of young Muslims have been assigned as *da’i* in different districts throughout Nias, Batu and Mentawai Islands. It is worth noting that these *da’i* are predominantly attached to Muhammadiyah institutions, such as schools, orphan-

ages and mosques. This is because, as mentioned previously, the Muhammadiyah and the AMCF have cooperated in sending *mujahid dakwah* (*dakwah* activists) to isolated regions.⁴⁴ In the field, the overarching role of the AMCF's *da'i* is as religious teachers, giving regular religious sermons in mosques, becoming the *Imams* of mosques, and teaching children about the Qur'an. While they receive limited monthly salaries from the AMCF, some *mujahid dakwah* are also appointed as Islamic teachers at the Muhammadiyah's Islamic schools, as housemasters of the Muhammadiyah orphanage, or as an *imam* of the Muhammadiyah mosques (Masjid At-Taqwa).⁴⁵

The majority of the *mujahid dakwah* are recent graduates, alumni of Salafi-based Islamic higher education institutions in Java, such as the AMCF-sponsored Ma'had 'Ali at Persatuan Islam (PERSIS), LIPIA, and the like. Their skill in Arabic and ability to memorise and understand the Qur'an are instrumental in supporting religious activities among Niasan Muslims. It is widely known that Ma'had 'Ali and LIPIA require students to speak Arabic fluently and to memorise certain Qur'anic chapters (*juz'*). At the same time, the AMCF has also applied certain mechanisms in recruiting prospective *mujahid dakwah*, and prospective candidates are urged to fulfil the required skills: speaking Arabic, memorising the Qur'an and being acquainted with certain Islamic sources (*kitab*). Therefore, the AMCF's preachers usually speak Arabic when meeting up with other preachers appointed by the same institution. They also attempt to learn the local language when they arrive in Nias. Before beginning work in the field, the selected candidates are trained for three to six months.⁴⁶

In the field, most *da'i* live modestly and earn only a small amount of money from their funding agencies, just enough to cover minimal living expenses. Some *da'i* stay in small rooms beside a mosque *mihrab* (a place for the imam to lead prayers). As the construction and the design of mosques on an outer island such as Nias is not as fashionable as in big cities, in many cases the rooms where *da'i* reside are very modest with limited space, just sufficient for a mat for sleeping and to store some clothes and books. They are very often placed in unfinished mosques, and I found no electronic items such as radios or televisions in their rooms. During prayer times, they should be available

to perform *azan* as well as lead prayer five times a day. It is within this setting they dedicate themselves for *dakwah*. In order to sustain such a long-term programme as the *mujahid dakwah* in Nias, some young *da'i* marry local women and become part of the community.

Informal networks can be established among Muslim activists because of their shared values and objective of assisting Muslim minorities on the island. They work together by becoming volunteers at charities run by Islamic associations. The charitable programmes organised by DDII offer an interesting case study. This is because DDII's programmes received enthusiastic assistance from local people, as well as from *da'i* from other Islamic associations. This indicates that in the field, their shared interests compel them to work together by putting differences in organisational background aside. For example, DDII's *zakat* agency, as mentioned previously, has attempted to strengthen the capacity of Islamic schools in rural areas by training teachers and distributing computers and other school equipment to Nias Island. Interestingly, DDII's *zakat* agency in Jakarta does not engage with the office branch of DDII in Gunung Sitoli. Instead, it appoints local Muslim activists, the volunteers of the YPMN, who have no organisational relationship with DDII's office in Nias. In distributing the computers from Gunung Sitoli to Islamic schools in other districts, such as Bizehena and Lahewa, for example, not a single local DDII activist was involved. Instead, the arrival of the team from Gunung Sitoli was prepared by the AMCF's *da'i* and local mosque youth activists (*remaja masjid*).

The Primary School of the Muhammadiyah in Lahewa

The District of Lahewa (*Kecamatan*) is one of the areas that was devastated by the 2005 earthquake. It is located in the northern part of Nias Island, about 60 km from Gunung Sitoli. There are few Muslims in the sub-district of Lahewa, and those who do live there are concentrated in Lahewa village. Besides public and private Christian schools, there is one Islamic school (MIS) that operates in this region, and it serves Muslim communities in the sub-district of Lahewa. This school belongs to the Muhammadiyah and is located in the centre of Lahewa town, near a traditional market. The school

complex consists of two buildings and one mosque (At-Taqwa). The school was founded in 1966, and for 30 years during its 'golden period' was strongly supported by the community. It was closed for eight years, between 1996 and 2004, due to a lack of students and problems with the school's operational budget, as well as, in my opinion, mismanagement. Therefore, for many years, a lot of Muslim families have sent their children to Christian schools in the town. Under the supervision of UNICEF and foreign NGOs that ran rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes in the region, Muhammadiyah activists took this opportunity to revive the closed Islamic school. Since 2005 the school has admitted new students from Muslim families, who make up the majority of the population (80%) of Lahewa village. Muhammadiyah School is not the only institution that has received assistance from a foreign donor. A government-sponsored Preliminary School (*SD Impres*) was rebuilt by ACTED (*Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique et du Développement*) and Caritas, and the library of the Private Islamic Senior High School (*Madrasah Aliyah Swasta-MAS*) was reconstructed by the *Pusat Pengkajian dan Perlindungan Anak* (Study Centre for the Protection of Children, or PKPA) under the support of an Italian NGO, the Cifa Foundation. Like other religious buildings, the reconstruction of the At-Taqwa mosque was supported by the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Board (BRR), a government-supervised agency.

As survival strategy, the Muhammadiyah School has allowed students to enrol and study for free. It also provides two types of education systems: the Muhammadiyah's preliminary school (*Sekolah Dasar*) and an Islamic preliminary school (*Madrasah Ibtidaiyah*). Therefore, people may enrol their children at either a non-religious primary school (SD) or an Islamic primary school (MIS). In 2008, four years after its re-opening, there were 100 students studying at the school, from the first to the fourth grades. In order to afford its operational expenses, the school has to raise funds from local and domestic resources, despite receiving an operational budget from the government under the BOS scheme (operation budget support). It is under these circumstances that local actors who deliver DDII's charity have selected certain Islamic schools on Nias Island, including the Muhammadiyah School in Lahewa, as target institutions. Some of the Islamic schools selected to receive

aid were in fact in poor condition. The Muhammadiyah School in Lahewa village is headed by a Muhammadiyah activist. In his remarks he made after receiving computers equipped with printers and electric automatic stabilisers (to guard against the hazard of sudden electric disconnection that frequently occurs in Nias) from DDII, he emphasised the necessity of brotherhood and solidarity (*ukhuwwa*) within the Muslim community. It is this concept that enables a computer from Java to finally reach his school in an isolated region. In order to optimise the use of the computer, the school's headmaster sent a young staff member to take a course in basic computer operation, a skill necessary for the practical administration of the school.

The Islamic Primary School of the NU in Bezihena

Another school to which DDII's charity has been channelled is an Islamic Primary School (MIS) in Bezihena, a region that was devastated by the 2004 Tsunami. The school is under the supervision of the NU, and it is the only Islamic education institution in that area. The school is in very poor condition. There is only one wooden building used as a classroom and no administration room or office for the three teachers and the headmaster. Everything is managed in a classroom with insufficient facilities: one dilapidated blackboard and only a few chairs. There is no appropriate space for the computer that was donated by volunteers, nor is anyone trained to operate it. Therefore, the team brought this computer to the headmaster's house, which is very close to Bezihena's shore. The headmaster's house is surrounded by the debris of buildings and dead coconut trees, evidence of the tsunami's trail of devastation. It was the AMCF's *mujahid dakwah* who was assigned temporarily to operate the computer, as he had become acquainted with using computers during his studies in Java. His role, in this respect, is to support school administration. Like his colleague in Lahewa and Gunung Sitoli, the *mujahid dakwah* in Bezihena also got married to a local girl, a family member of a local Muslim leader. Like in other places, the AMCF's *mujahid dakwah* aims to support religious activities within communities, including supervising religious gatherings in local mosques.

Along with the reconstruction and rehabilitation project offered by the

government and NGOs, Muslim communities re-established a mosque in Nias that had been ruined by the earthquake and tsunami. Normally, every religious building receives support from the government to be rebuilt and revitalised. Because the promised funding for religious building was not received in time, and the fund from the BRR did not match what was required, the community took the initiative to use the remnant of the rehabilitation fund to repair the temporary mosque, which had been built by a *zakat* agency from North Sumatra. Some NGOs and donors supported clean water projects within the community. Despite receiving a certain amount of funding to build facilities for clean water, a group of 50 people preferred to use the received fund for a different purpose, namely building a mosque. These people considered a mosque to be more important than clean water facilities. This is because clean water can be easily obtained by digging shallow water wells. Another reason for the choice of the mosque over water was that a mosque would function as a place for people to gather and communicate when they were not working, as well as strengthening social cohesion among the community members.⁴⁷



Figure 12 The remnants of a village in the coastal area of Bizehena where Muslim communities resided. It was wiped out by the 2004 tsunami. (source: author's collection)

Like a mosque, a *madrasah* (MIS) is another institution that is expected to preserve the religious identity of a minority Muslim group. With limited facilities, *madrasahs* can become destinations for the children of Muslim families in and around a village. Like other schools, a *madrasah* is a formal education institution recognised by the government. A graduate of this school may continue to a higher level of education, such as a public or private junior high school. While officially, public and private non-religious schools are supervised by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Indonesia, the *madrasah* are supervised by the Ministry of Religious Affairs.⁴⁸ Students come to this school in the afternoon after they have studied in public schools or private Christian schools in the morning. In addition, the Islamic activities of the students continue in the mosque, where they pray and read the Qur'an under the guidance of the *mujahid dakwah*. According to a teacher at the *madrasah*, the students' enthusiasm for attending afternoon school is quite strong, despite the fact that obtaining a certificate from the *madrasah* tends not to be a major objective, as the students will obtain a more 'saleable' certificate from the public schools. The head of al-Ma'arif in Nias, an institution that supervises the NU's *madrasah*, suggests that the position of the *madrasah* as a 'complementary' school instead of a major education institution has resulted in Muslim families having low expectations of the education programme at the *madrasah*. Consequently, before reaching their final years, many students drop out to prepare for their final exams in the public schools. The remaining students often face many difficulties sitting a final exam at the *madrasah*, because there are fewer students than required by the government. In order to take a final exam before graduation, the remaining students join exams in other schools, notably larger *madrasah*, in another district far from Bizehena. As result, many parents and students decide not to take the exams or obtain certificates from the *madrasah*.

The above fact suggests that the institutions chosen by local volunteers are in accordance with the criteria determined by *zakat* agencies such as DDII and AAP, as these agencies attempt to support poor educational institutions under the framework of strengthening *dakwah*. In this respect, local volunteers define the eligible beneficiaries in Nias that will be targeted by *zakat*

agencies in Java. The above *madrasah* are supported by DDII with the help of local volunteers, not only because of their Islamic identity, but also due to their poor condition. Local volunteers are responsible for formulating criteria for actual beneficiaries, while *zakat* agencies give approval and then channel the requested aid. Moreover, the absence of official representatives of DDII and the Muhammadiyah in Nias, both before and during the delivery of aid, reveals that official association representatives do not always work more effectively than informal actors or volunteers. From the perspective of patron-client relations, it is arguable that local volunteers have played a role in reducing the 'sectarian' issue by channelling aid to various associations, such as the modernist Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist NU.

Madrasah and Mushalla as Public Facilities

The reconstruction of public facilities after a disaster has become the concern of many NGOs. However, the framework utilised by NGOs to reconstruct *mushalla* is not always religious, but also social. The widespread participation of NGOs in Nias in the reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes reveals that religious buildings have also been seen as public facilities that need attention from non-faith based NGOs such as PKPA, a North Sumatra-based development and advocacy NGO that operated in Nias after the 2005 earthquake. Muslim NGOs and Christian NGOs can appear publicly as 'secular' NGOs by not incorporating religious identity in their institutions. PKPA is a key so-called development and advocacy NGO, and its national and international networks are quite extensive. In the local context, PKPA has been working with the government and both religious and secular NGOs by, among other things, combining the Chart Protection Working Group and the Disaster Preparedness Programme of Nias Regency. Internationally, PKPA has cooperated with various institutions, such as the Australian Youth Ambassador for Development (AYAD), Save the Children, Communication and Brotherhood Forum of Indonesian Catholics (FKPI), Raleigh (Singapore Red Cross Society), Cifa (Italia-based NGO), Oxfam, Christian Aid, Johanitter, Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe, Kinder Not Hilfe (KNH), and others, on both short and long-term programmes.

PKPA focuses on emergency relief, development and advocacy programmes. Although it is not concerned with *dakwah*, unlike AAP and DDII, the reconstruction of religious facilities such as *madrasah* and *mushalla* have also been part of PKPA's agenda. This is because this association supports communities, especially those overlooked by the government and other NGOs, by any means necessary, including via *mushalla* and churches.⁴⁹ For example, PKPA participated in the reconstruction of Islamic schools belonging to the Muhammadiyah and the Ikhwanul Muslimin in district of Sirombu, as the government had failed to support this reconstruction effort. PKPA believes that *madrasah* and *mushalla*, despite functioning as religious institutions, are imperative to communities as public facilities. Therefore, these institutions deserve assistance from PKPA. This NGO, in fact, has assisted communities in operating their religious institutions so that different kinds of social activities that are useful for community development may be conducted. PKPA has a supervisory function over *madrasah*, supported by foreign funding, by re-establishing libraries and increasing library collections relevant to students' needs. This has also been justified for the same reason; providing public facilities. It is arguable that in the field, the distinction between secular and faith-based NGOs can no longer easily be drawn, as they may work on similar projects.

Nevertheless, unlike AAP and DDII, whose resources are mainly drawn from domestic aid originating from Islamic forms of giving, PKPA's aid is largely, if not entirely, drawn from foreign donors, either Christian associations or secular funding. Domestic support for development and advocacy NGOs in Indonesia is not as strong as for faith-based NGOs and charitable institutions. Therefore, most of development and advocacy NGOs in Indonesia are financially dependent upon foreign instead of domestic or local sources.⁵⁰ Another point is that, while domestic NGOs such as PKPA may refer to development and advocacy issues when framing their activities, *zakat* agencies and Islamic charitable institutions still focus on short-term charity programmes as they have to precisely define the eligible beneficiaries according to Islamic tenets. The lack of interpretation of *zakat* beneficiaries in modern times may result in a stagnant definition of the scope of meaning of

the eight types of eligible *zakat* beneficiaries. Often, *zakat* agencies are reluctant to channel *zakat* and *sadaqa* funds to development and advocacy programmes, despite the fact that both development and advocacy issues have often been utilised in the recent discourse among certain *zakat* agencies.

It is worth emphasising that the flexibility of development NGOs in creating activities and in the variety of resources they can gather is constrained, to some extent, by the differing identities of their stakeholders, both donors and recipients. Negotiations about identity have often characterised the relations among donors, NGOs, and recipients. Although domestic NGOs are mostly independent in terms of creating programmes, including emergency relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation activities, donors have a vested interest in ensuring that the funds are being channelled to what they consider ‘the rightful recipients’. The construction companies and recipients often display boards showing the name of the institutions or NGOs that have participated in the reconstruction project. Yet, problems can occur when donors and recipient have different religious identities. For example, the reconstruction of a *mushalla* in Nias was in part funded by a foreign, Christian NGO. Local people, volunteers, and a domestic NGO worked together in the reconstruction of the *mushalla*. No problems occurred until the end of the project, when the NGO, as required by the donors, attempted to display a board with the name of the Christian NGO written on it. Local people refused to display the NGO’s name in the *mushalla* building because it was thought that it might be a psychological ‘inconvenience’ in the local community. In such a situation, an NGO often takes a middle path, reconciling the interests of both donors and recipients by temporarily displaying a board for the sake of donors, and removing it afterward for the benefit of the community. In short, in order to serve both donor and recipient, a domestic NGO must attempt to negotiate and reconcile two differing—and maybe competing—religious identities.

‘Ashabul Kahfi’: The Pesantren Hidayatullah

ne *dakwah* movement on Nias Island has made a remarkable effort

to lead institutional transformation: the Hidayatullah Foundation, an Islamic institution originating from Balikpapan, East Borneo. Progress in this respect means the ability to provide local people with wider access to education, particularly Islamic education. The Hidayatullah Foundation was founded in 1973 by Ustadz Abdullah Said, a Muhammadiyah activist from South Celebes.⁵¹ As a former Darul Islam (DI) leader and Muhammadiyah activist, Abdullah Said had close relationships with national Muslim leaders, including the Muhammadiyah. After several years, the Hidayatullah Foundation with its *pesantren* and social activities received a warm reception from Muslim communities, not only in Balikpapan in East Borneo, but also in other parts of Indonesia. Recently, the Hidayatullah Foundation has become a large organisation with several branches throughout Indonesia. It manages cooperatives (*koperasi*), a publishing house, a magazine (*Suara Hidayatullah*-the Voice of Hidayatullah), and educational institutions (*pesantren*). More importantly, the Hidayatullah Foundation has also organised Islamic charities (i.e. collecting *zakat* and *sadaqa*, managing *waqf*, and setting up Search and Rescue teams for disaster response), as well as directing the dispatch of *da'i* to isolated regions.

The dispatch of Hidayatullah *da'i* to Nias Island started in 2005, during which time *ustadz* Muhammad Nuh was appointed in Siwalubani II Village, District of Gide, Gunung Sitoli-Idanoi to assist five Muslim families. His arrival was not welcomed by everyone in the community, partly because the villagers at that time were worried that his presence might disturb the Christian families. In his early days, he faced many as local people rejected him.⁵² As a well-trained and experienced *mujahid dakwah*, who was also appointed in Aceh during a time of conflict, *Ustadz* Nuh could handle the situation and remained in place. *Ustadz* Nuh patiently attempted to convince the villagers that his presence was to assist his Muslim fellows who needed to learn Islam. Not long after this, a wealthy Muslim from Gunung Sitoli donated his 2 hectares of hilly land in Siwalubani II Village. A *Madrasah Tsanawiyah* (Islamic Junior High School) was erected there, accompanied by a temporary small place of worship in the top of the hill, namely *Mushalla 'Jabal Nur'* (The Light of Hill), and a modest student boarding house, as well as dwell-

ings for a dormitory caretaker (*pengasuh pondok*). One local permanent building is divided into four rooms: one office and three classrooms. The name of this *madrasah* is ‘*Ashabul Kahfi*’, the term that recalls the Quranic legend about seven pious men who were trapped in a cave for hundred years.⁵³

A Hidayatullah senior *mujahid dakwah* was appointed as a chair (*Pimpinan Pondok*) of this *pesantren*. By the time I visited this *pesantren* and *madrasah*, the founder of this *madrasah* had just been transferred to another isolated area, and he had to start from the beginning, as he had done on Nias Island several years ago. One of the *ustadz* told me this is a ‘custom’ in the Hidayatullah Foundation, so that an *ustadz* who is considered successful in establishing an organisational branch, and even in setting up a new *pesantren* and *madrasah*, does not claim that an educational institution is dependent on his services. This strategy is used by the Hidayatullah Foundation to reduce individuals’ claims to education institutions, and also because the *ustadz* or *mujahid dakwah* is simply accomplishing his duty as God’s servant and as the Hidayatullah’s cadre.

The educational background of the teachers in this Islamic school varies, but only few of them graduated from higher education institutions and hold Bachelor’s degrees. Most of them are transient teachers (*guru honorer*), and only one is a civil servant, appointed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and paid by the government. Otherwise, like other *guru honorer* in Indonesia, they receive a small amount of money and their salaries are simply based on their teaching hours. The headmaster of this *madrasah* was a cadre of the Hidayatullah Foundation, a young Balinese convert who at that time had still studied at an Islamic university to earn his undergraduate degree. In order to support the teaching-learning process, this *madrasah* also engages *mujahid dakwah* from other Islamic organisations, as explained previously. One DDII *da’i* who is staying in Tetelesi 1-Foa village, Gunung Sitoli-Idanoi, about 16.5 km away, frequently comes to this *madrasah*, teaching twice a week and acting as a *guru honorer*. This *da’i* is one of two teachers with undergraduate degree.⁵⁴ Again, the involvement of DDII’s *da’i* and others in this school suggests that there has been mutual help and cooperation between *mujahid dakwah* on Nias Island. Their different institutional backgrounds

seem not to have acted as barriers to cooperation. As people who are ‘in the same boat and have the same duty’, which is preaching Islam in a non-Muslim area, they put differences in ideology and character behind them. This collaboration among *mujahid dakwah* who are sponsored by charitable foundations in Java and abroad is then transformed into an advanced form of partnership through the establishment of a new association in Nias, namely *Forum Silaturahmi Da’i Nias*.

FOSDAN (*Forum Silaturahmi Da’i Nias*)

Some *da’i* whom I met during my first trip in February 2009 got together in order to coordinate their *dakwah*. Despite the fact that they were sponsored by different organisations (DDII, AAP, and AMCF), they realised that a sort of association, through which an effective and more organised collaboration can be initiated, would be indispensable. My second visit to Nias Island in October 2010 suggested a new development in *dakwah* activities on Nias Island. This was in part marked by the establishment of a new association, *Forum Silaturahmi Da’i Nias* (FOSDAN).⁵⁵ The reason for the rise of FOSDAN is that these preachers wish to make broader changes on Nias Island, not only religiously but also socially and economically. They believe that social welfare activities and economic development projects should be included in strengthening the *umma* and, in turn, society as a whole. So that *dakwah* activism can touch the real social problems and economic hardship that communities face. In short, *dakwah*, in their interpretation, should not be restricted to ‘conventional preaching’, but must be augmented with other activities that can cover broader social needs.

Under the banner of FOSDAN, *mujahid dakwah* or *da’i* started publishing a weekly bulletin called ‘*Ad-Dakwah*’, through which *da’i* disseminate information about Islam by writing short popular articles. This also provides an opportunity for the readers to raise questions about Islam. The social conditions on Nias Island, which are heavily characterised by local Nias indigenous culture and Christian tradition, means that the questions raised by the people through the question-and-answer column in *Ad-Dakwah* are varied, dealing not only with normative theological matters but also with interfaith issues.

As we have acknowledged, many Niasan Muslims are converts whose relatives continue to adhere to Christianity and practise local traditions. For example, a reader of *Ad-Dakwah* wrote a letter questioning the extent to which Muslims in Nias could establish appropriate relationships with non-Muslim relatives. More precisely, he asked the FOSDAN Bulletin whether it is acceptable according to Islam to present a swine in order to respect his Christian relatives. On Nias Island, presenting a big and expensive swine symbolises honour and respect. In many cases, Muslim converts who want to maintain good relations with their Christian relatives cannot avoid the tradition of presenting swine. They want to practice Islam properly, but at the same time, hesitate to detach themselves from traditions that are deeply embedded in society, and they are committed to preserving cohesion among families.

In response to that question, the *da'i* affiliated to FOSDAN suggested that in the context of Nias society, presenting swine as a mark of respect to non-Muslim extended families is permitted, on condition that the givers (Muslims) do not consume the gift (swine). Presenting gifts in the form of swine is a means to strengthen relationships and to preserve the unity of families. Islam, as FOSDAN *da'i* explained, is contextually 'applied in every time and place'. Islam also puts emphasis on the necessity of establishing good vertical relations with God (*habl min Allah*), and horizontal relations with human beings (*habl min al-nas*) alike. In this respect, presenting swine may represent an endeavour to create good horizontal relations, not to violate God's orders. The answer of the *da'i* to this local Muslim's query about a socially embedded interfaith issue above reflects a paradigm shift among young *da'i* in understanding the complexity of life of Muslims living in a non-Muslim majority region such as Nias. Yet this was not an unconsidered answer; the FOSDAN *da'i* had to discuss it carefully and to find justifications from authoritative sources. This is because they wanted to give wise answer by not using a strict and clear-cut approach to the problems faced by society, even though prior to their departure in Jakarta, these *da'i* were trained in a very strict religious environment.

Conclusion

It is hard to deny that charity activism has been part of *dakwah*. As a framework, Islamic *dakwah* is strongly embedded in many kinds of activities run by Muslims. At the same time, charity activism can also be regarded as a tool for implementing the five pillars of Islam. The giving of alms, for example, is not only a spiritual obligation for Muslims, as it impacts on the social life of the Muslim community. The establishment of mosques and *mushalla* in Muslim minority regions, funded and supervised by *zakat* agencies, tends to intensify religious practices, such as praying, weekly Friday sermons, studying the Qur'an and, in a broader context, studying Islam and maintaining one's religious identity. *Dakwah* and charity activism can also be seen as a way in which *zakat* agencies and *dakwah* associations strengthen social cohesion and help to fortify their religious commitment among new Muslim converts in Muslim minority regions.

Therefore, *dakwah* associations target both Islamic formal and non-formal education institutions, such as Islamic *madrasah*, mosques and *mushalla*. It is worth noting that, as explained previously, mosques and *mushalla* can be used for multiple purposes, ranging from performing Islamic rituals to educating Muslim children. The lack of adequate formal Islamic education institutions, particularly in Nias, has resulted in an increased role for mosques and *mushalla* as informal Islamic educational institutions. Strengthening the institutional capacity of a mosque can mean providing communities with more adequate informal education institutions. For that purpose, *zakat* agencies and *dakwah* associations have channelled their funds collected from domestic sources to support Islamic *dakwah* and education, especially in isolated regions, rather than to providing healthcare or attending to the basic needs of communities, as has been the case in poor urban contexts.

Moreover, in order to specify the characteristics of Islamic charities and *dakwah* activism in a Muslim minority region, we can explore the extent to which Islamic charitable associations and *dakwah* associations can or cannot work with other non-Islamic associations in Nias, notably Christian associations. This issue becomes interesting because charitable associations and *zakat* agencies such as AAP, DDII, the Hidayatullah Foundation and the AMCF

are not based in Nias. Rather, Nias is simply a place where they operate social and religious services. They appear in Nias, representing internal Muslim solidarity, to support Muslim minority groups in the region. Resource mobilisation by *zakat* agencies and *dakwah* associations, including their campaigns in the mainland during the process of raising funds, is solely intended to support minority groups in Nias that, according to the associations, encountered difficulties following the 2005 disaster. However, we should also note that in practice, the term *muallaf* is often contested, as it has various meanings, such as 'prospective converts', 'those who are sympathetic to Islam', 'new Muslim converts', or 'those Muslims who are less knowledgeable about Islam' due to a less 'Islamic environment'.

A more lasting development appears to be the realisation that delivering aid to isolated regions requires solid networks with local counterparts. To some extent, informal networks and informal actors or volunteers play more effective roles in arranging and managing charitable works than formal organisational structures do. These informal volunteers have increasingly underpinned charity and *zakat* movements in the field, as evidenced by the roles of the AMCF's *ustadz*, AAP's *Da'i Sahabat Mustahik*, and DDII's volunteers among Niasans. At the same time, the long-established Islamic associations, such as the Muhammadiyah, the NU, and Al-Washliyah al-Islamiyah in Nias have taken a lesser role, in terms of organisation, supporting charity activism run by Jakarta-based *zakat* agencies and *dakwah* associations. This is because, in part, their organisational structures may require more bureaucratic procedures in executing effective philanthropic projects and other kinds of social enterprises.

Endnotes

- ¹ Muslim communities have often been overlooked in studies of Nias. The history, culture, language, ethnicity, and the architecture of indigenous Niasans have been studied by scholars for many years. Anthropologist Andrew Beatty, for example, has conducted extensive ethnographic studies on the contemporary culture and society of Nias. While Beatty's work provides rich empirical description and theoretical discussion about the characteristics of local groups, culture, kinship, families and religious practices, this book seems to have overlooked the Muslim communities concentrated in the district capital of Nias (Gunung Sitoli) at the time Beatty conducted his fieldwork in Nias during the 1980s. See *Society and Exchange*

in Nias (Oxford: Oxford Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology, 1992). See also for example, Peter T. Suzuki, *Critical Survey of Studies on the Anthropology of Nias, Mentawai and Enggano* (Leiden: KITLV, 1958); also his "Niasans of Batu Islands, Indonesia: A known but Neglected People," *Bulletin of the International Committee on Urgent Anthropological and Ethnological Research*, Issue 12, (1970), 61-69. Another extensive work relevant to this study, written by Uwe Hummel and Tuhoni Telaumbanua, focuses on the encounters between the indigenous traditions of the Niasans and the teachings of Christianity brought by missionaries. This book also briefly highlights the existence of Muslim communities in Nias, but it does not analyse further the relation between Muslims and Christians in Nias, and Christians' rejection or reception of Islam in Nias. Uwe Hummel and Tuhoni Telaumbanua, *Cross and Adu: a Socio-Historical Study on the Encounter between Christianity and the Indigenous Culture on Nias and the Batu Islands, Indonesia (1865-1965)* (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 2007).

- ² For some Christian NGOs, Nias Island has a long history of Christian missionary activities. The history and development of religions in Indonesia suggest that Islam came to the Indonesian archipelago centuries ago and has increasingly become a dominant religion since the 16th century, its followers outnumbering those who adhere to Hinduism and Buddhism. Christianity came to the archipelago later on, and was first disseminated by Western missionaries during the colonial era. Geographically, Islam is the predominant religion in Java and Sumatra, with parts of the North Sumatra as exceptions, where German-oriented Protestantism is prevalent. For one of the best works on the history of Christianity in modern Indonesia see Kareel Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia 1808-1942*, vol. I (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003).
- ³ See Goodwill Zubir and Sudar Siandes, *Potret Gerakan Kristenisasi di Indonesia Versi Da'i LDK Muhammadiyah* (Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah: Lembaga Dakwah Khusus, 2005).
- ⁴ Badan Dakwah/Bimbingan Masyarakat Terasing-Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Dakwah terhadap Masyarakat Terasing* (Yogyakarta & Jakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 1978).
- ⁵ It appears that missionary activities on the outer islands are on the agenda of certain Muslim and Christian groups who are targeting people who do not adhere to major religions. But it should be noted that the term *dakwah* in the Indonesian context is directed towards Muslims as a means of 're-islamising' Muslims to become 'better Muslims'. Another form of *dakwah* aims at converting non-Muslims, notably non-Christian groups.
- ⁶ Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, *Indonesia's Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003).
- ⁷ BPS Kabupaten Nias, *Nias dalam Angka/ Nias in Figure* (Nias-Gunung Sitoli: BPS, 2009), 47.
- ⁸ Interview with some local NGOs' staff, social activists, and religious leaders during my field-work on Nias Island in February 2009 and October 2010.
- ⁹ According the 2008 survey, there are about 1,821 worship places spread throughout Nias Island (74 mosques, 36 *surau* [small Muslim places of worship], 1,396 Protestant churches, 314 Catholic churches, and 1 Buddhist *vihara*).
- ¹⁰ M. Sani Zega, *Memperkenalkan Pulau Nias* (Gunung Sitoli: Pemerintah Daerah Kabupaten Nias, 1972).
- ¹¹ Yoshiko Yamamoto, "Craftsmanship amidst Changes in Southern Nias," in Contributions

- to Southeast Asian Ethnography, No. 11 (1997), 120-144.
- ¹² Gustanto et al., *Nias: Adat dan Budaya Suku Bangsa Nias di Sumatra Utara* (Banda Aceh: Balai Kajian Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional Banda Aceh, 2005), 26-46.
- ¹³ Another main gate is Teluk Dalam in South Nias. Teluk Dalam, as mentioned earlier, is the district capital of the South Nias Regency.
- ¹⁴ Although the members of the listed organisations are not restricted to specific ethnic groups, it seems most of the Muhammadiyah members are mainly Minangkabau people (*suku minang*), the NU are supported by both Minangkabau and Acehnese, and Al-Washliyyah's followers are ethnic Batak.
- ¹⁵ There was no NU *pesantren* on Nias Island before 2009. The initiative to set up the first NU *pesantren* on Nias Island was taken in August 2009, with the support of the Central Board of the NU's *zakat* agency (LAZ NU) in cooperation with PT Telkomsel. The NU *pesantren* is located in Gamo, Moawo village, Gunungsitoli. Until my second visit to Nias Island in 2010, this *pesantren* was under construction.
- ¹⁶ John Richard Bowen, *Muslim through Discourse* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 53; Anshari, *Mission in Christianity and Islam: A Comparative Study of the Ways the Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (HKBP) and Al-Washliyyah Spread the Mission in North Sumatra (1930-1965)*, Master Thesis-INIS, Leiden University, 1998.
- ¹⁷ I found this condition during my first visit to Nias Island in January 2009. In my second visit in October 2010, this school was temporarily occupied by Quranic Kindergarten (TPA al-Qur'an) of Al-Furqan Mosque, which, as I will discuss further in the next session, started to be constructed by Al-Azhar Peduli, a national *zakat* agency.
- ¹⁸ According to the Directory of *Madrasah*, the Ministry of Religious Affairs (2007), there were about 34 *Private Madrasah Ibtidaiyah* (MIS) on Nias Island: 8 *Madrasah* belong to the NU, 10 *Madrasah* are owned by the Muhammadiyah, and the rest are affiliated to other Islamic associations (i.e. Al-Washliyyah, Ikhwanul Muslim, etc.)
- ¹⁹ RANTF -BRR NAD Nias is a body within the BRR NAD Nias that manages rehabilitation and reconstruction processes in Nangroe Aceh Darussalam and Nias.
- ²⁰ MERCY Malaysia is a non-governmental organisation specialising in medical relief and humanitarian aid to refugees regardless of race, religion, and culture. It was founded by a Malaysian female physician Dr. Jemilah Mahmood in 1999. The first MERCY Malaysia's relief action was the communal conflict and war in Kosovo. For further information about MERCY Malaysia see http://www.mercy.org.my/1001270939%c2%bbOur_History.aspx
- ²¹ This is not always the case inland, where some very modest Christian schools operate.
- ²² From dozens of Muslim NGOs working in Aceh, only a few of which operated emergency relief in Nias. These Nias-based organisations included Mer-C Indonesia in cooperation with MERCY Malaysia, and the Muhammadiyah of the Regional Branch of North Sumatra.
- ²³ My interviews and discussions with Muslim leaders and lay people in Gunung Sitoli in February 2008 suggest that Muslim communities in Nias were complaining about the absence of Muslim NGOs to provide emergency relief. Yet, they were also wondering whether it was a matter of religion or simply due to the region.
- ²⁴ In recent times, there has been a growing effort among domestic migrant Indonesians to mobilise domestic resources. See for example, Irdam Huri, *Filantropi Kaum Perantau: Studi*

- Kasus Kedermawanan Sosial Organisasi Perantau Sulit Air Sepakat (SAS), Kabupaten Solok, Sumatra Barat* (Depok: Pustaka, 2006).
- ²⁵ Professor Mahmoud Shaltout, the rector of Al-Azhar University of Cairo, who was invited to Al-Azhar Mosque, suggested that it also be named Al-Azhar, to reflect the greatness of the mosque's construction at that time. The Al-Azhar Mosque in Jakarta has also become a spot where younger Muslim activists, under the Youth Islamic Study Club Al-Azhar (YISC), have organised vigorous discussions, seminars and conferences since the 1970s.
- ²⁶ HAMKA, the nickname of Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah, is one of the well-known figures of Al-Azhar, and HAMKA became the first Chairperson of the Indonesian 'Ulama Council (MUI).
- ²⁷ Dompot Dhuafa Republika (DD) has utilised the same concept, using cash *waqf* to finance the establishment of Islamic charitable clinics and hospitals (see Chapter 4).
- ²⁸ *Care Newsletter, Al-Azhar Peduli Ummat*, Edisi 12/III (Mei-June 2008/Jumad al-Akhir 1429 H), 14.
- ²⁹ There had not been an active *dakwah* in Botomuzoi before the tsunami and earthquake. AAP came to Botomuzoi in 2008 to support the unfinished construction of a *mushalla* in the land belonging to a Muslim family. It was the YPMN that linked AAP to Muslim converts in Botomuzoi.
- ³⁰ In Nias, one may identify a married man or woman using 'teknonym', instead of proper names. Therefore, Ama Niska means 'the father of Niska', and Ina Niska means 'the mother of Niska'. In certain region of Nias, it is considered impolite to address adult or married people by their proper names. For further discussion about the relationship terminology of Niasan families and clans see Andrew Beatty, *Society and Exchange in Nias*, 81-97.
- ³¹ The only problem to be faced by Muslim families, including Ama Niska and other Muslim converts, is the use of pigs in all family events and cultural festivals, as Muslim families avoid the consumption of pork.
- ³² The construction of *mushalla* is financed by three parties: the YPMN, the YPI, and AAP.
- ³³ It should be noted that the Grand Mosque of Gunung Sitoli is located not in the city centre, but in Mudik village. Receiving a lot of funding from local government, domestic and international NGOs, the Grand Mosque can be rebuilt.
- ³⁴ DMI is an Islamic organization founded in 1972 by a number of mosque-based-organisations and supported by retired generals and active military officers. The former Minister of Religious Affairs, Dr. Tarmizi Tahir, was the chairman of DMI from 2006 to 2011. DMI has functioned as a forum within which mosque-based organisations in Indonesia can share their experience of organising mosque-based activities, such as education, social enterprises, etc.
- ³⁵ Forum *Zakat* is composed of government-sponsored *zakat* bodies (BAZ) and community-based *zakat* agencies throughout Indonesia. Forum *Zakat* was established in 1997 by a number of private *zakat* agencies in cooperation with government-sponsored *zakat* bodies. The overarching aim of Forum *Zakat* is to bridge the gap and to intensify communication among *zakat* agencies in their dealings with *zakat* matters, such as regulation, mobilisation, distribution and development.
- ³⁶ Interview with director and staff of Al-Azhar Peduli, 23 December 2008, and 6 January

- 2009, in Jakarta.
- ³⁷ In 2007, for example, *Pikiran Rakyat* Daily, through its 'social division' *Dompet Pikiran Rakyat*-Bandung, allocated IDR 7.5 billion for relieving Aceh, 1 billion for Nias, 2.5 billion for Yogyakarta and Central Java, and 1.8 billion for West Java (Pangandaran). *Pikiran Rakyat*, 14 July 2007. In 2008, *Dompet Pikiran Rakyat*'s support continued to channel additional funds amounting to IDR 137,150,000.
- ³⁸ Partai Bulan Bintang came into being in 1999 following the political euphoria during the *Reformasi Era* as a result of the decline of the New Order regime. It was initiated by prominent former Masyumi supporters who had been denied the opportunity of political participation by the New Order regime in 1970s.
- ³⁹ See for example, Mas'ood Abidin, *Islam dalam Pelukan Muhtadin: Mentawai 30 tahun Perjalanan Dakwahh Ila'llah, Mentawai Menggapai Cita-cita Iman 1967-1997* (Jakarta: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah, 1997).
- ⁴⁰ For the development of Islam in West Sumatra, see for example reek Colombijn, "Islamic Influences on Urban Form in Sumatra in the Seventeenth to the nineteenth Century," *Indonesian and the Malay World*, vol. 32 (2004), 249-270; in the 1950s, Minangkabau had become the basis of PRRI Rebellion led partly by Mohammad Natsir. See Daniel F. Doeppers, "An Incident in the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion of 1958," *Indonesia*, issue 14 (1972), 183-195.
- ⁴¹ *Republika*, Jumat, 03 Oktober 2003.
- ⁴² The inception of the Catholic Credit Union cannot be separated from the activities of Catholic Missionaries from North Sumatra, such as Pastor Fidelis Sihotang and Mr. K.R. Situmorang. Supported by 110 employees, the Credit Union, which has since 2002 been known as the Rural Development Co-operative (KSP3), manages 21 branches with 48,698 members and total assets of IDR 117.8 billion. <http://ksp3nias.com/en/index.php>
- ⁴³ Credit Union projects have been implemented in various regions, notably in poor rural areas. See other related cases studies Marcell D. Lodo, *Bangun Solidaritas, Selamatkan Tradisi Suku Dayak: Kisah Sukses Credit Union Pancur Kasih, Pontianak, Kalimantan Barat* (Jakarta and Surabaya : Center for Economic and Social Studies, and Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi, 2005); Ary Wahyono, *Study Kasus Koperasi Credit Union "Sejahtera", Cibinong Jawa Barat: Konsep Fungsi Ganda dan Masalah Pengembangan Koperasi di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LIPI, 1989).
- ⁴⁴ Although the Central Board of the Muhammadiyah and the AMCF have cooperated formally, this does not mean that their organisational structures and procedures can function properly at the grassroots level. In fact, the arrival of the AMCF's *da'i* was not organised formally by the Muhammadiyah District of Nias. Instead, they came directly to sub-districts to meet local Muhammadiyah leaders.
- ⁴⁵ On Nias Island and perhaps on other islands, most of the Muhammadiyah mosques, if not all of them, are named 'At-Taqwa'. Therefore, if a mosque has the name 'At-Taqwa', it almost certainly belongs to the Muhammadiyah.
- ⁴⁶ One *da'i* told me that during his period of training there were about 300 candidates participating in the training in Jakarta, only 70 of whom were finally appointed as *ustadz* in isolated-regions. It is said that during pre-departure training, *da'i* should take courses on general knowledge (psychology, anthropology, early emergency aid and basic accounting) as

well as Islamic knowledge theoretically (Quranic exegesis, *‘aqida*, *hadith*, *fiqh*, and *sira nabawiyya*) and practically (micro-teaching and funeral arrangements). Apart from this, after the training, all trainee *da’i* received ‘standard’ Islamic books in Arabic such as *Ibn kathir*, *riya al-salihin*, *fath al-majid*, *fiqh al-sunna*, *al-tarhib wa al-tarhib*, etc.

- ⁴⁷ It should be noted that not all of the group members agreed with the team’s decision. Five of the 50 people refused to use their funds to build mosques, despite the fact that finally the five people did not receive their funds for the clean water project, because the majority of group members decided to channel the fund to support the mosque construction.
- ⁴⁸ Since the 1970s, Indonesia has applied a ‘two roofs’ education system, under which concept two departments, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA), manage and supervise the education institutions. As a Muslim majority country, MoRA runs various Islamic education institutions, ranging from primary schools to universities. For example, MoRA has established special divisions such as the Directorate of *Madrasa* and Directorate of Islamic Higher Education, that focus only on Islamic education institutions.
- ⁴⁹ Interview with a PKPA activist, 26 January 2009, in Gunung Sitoli.
- ⁵⁰ See for example Zaim Saidi, Muhammad Fuad, and Hamid Abidin, *Kedermawanan untuk Keadilan Sosial: Studi Kasus Dompot Dhuafa Republika, Yappika, Mitra Mandiri, Tifa dan Kehati* (Depok: PIRAC and Piramedia, 2006).
- ⁵¹ He moved to Balikpapan on 25 December 1969, and married the daughter of a local Muslim figure. Having been active in the Muhammadiyah and other youth associations, and supported by some of Muslim activists, he began with the instigation of a new Islamic education institution in which he could produce committed *muballigh* and cadres who would always be ready to be appointed to assist their Muslim fellows residing in isolated regions. Regarding the life and activities of the founder of the Hidayatullah Foundation see Manshur Salbu, *Mencetak Kader: Perjalanan Hidup Ustadz-Abdullah Said Pendiri Hidayatullah* (Surabaya: Suara Hidayatullah Publishing, 2009). On the Hidayatullah network, Martin van Bruinessen, “Traditionalist and Islamist Pesantren in Contemporary Indonesia,” 235-236.
- ⁵² <http://majalah.hidayatullah.com/?p=1885>
- ⁵³ Abrahamic religions share elements of this story with a quite different context and place. This story attempts to convey a message about the miracle of pious men who survive after falling into a cave, and who appeared after 100 years. The message to be learned from this story is that one who never gives up will find the way out of a problem.
- ⁵⁴ Having graduated from the *Pesantren* PERSIS Rancabogo-Garut West Java, he pursued his higher education in STID, Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Dakwah (STID) Muhammad Natsir in Jakarta. His ability in reading and speaking Arabic and commitment to *dakwah* results in his arrival on Nias Island as a means of being part of DDII’s *dakwah* activism on the outer island.
- ⁵⁵ It consists of Muslim preachers whose presence in Nias was sponsored by different parties, such as the AMCF (13 preachers); DDII (2); the Hidayatullah Foundation (5); and AAP (1).

Internationalising Domestic Aid, Solidarity Movements and Political Struggle

Introduction

This chapter explores and analyses the ties between the culture of giving and the spread of Islamic solidarity movements in Indonesia's post-New Order era. It argues that what I shall call vertical and horizontal mobilisation of Islamic aid in Indonesia for international relief is mainly contingent upon, and derived from, the emerging political discourse on the ideas of justice, the unity of the *umma*, and anti-imperialism. By vertical mobilisation I mean the roles of relief agencies in engaging other parties, such as government agencies and international counterparts, in providing facilities and opportunities to deliver aid. In turn, horizontal mobilisation indicates the efforts and ability of Islamic relief agencies to persuade the Muslim community at the domestic level to contribute to relief projects overseas. Through an intensified discourse on justice, the unity of the *umma*, and anti-imperialism, the mobilisation of both financial and political resources has become fruitful. It appears that humanitarian aid does not simply represent people's altruism, but may also be part and parcel of the political struggle. Exploring the links between domestic political dynamics and the vibrant international geopolitical context, this chapter analyses the ways in which the Indonesian government and Islamic associations have endeavoured to take a more inter-

ventionist stance towards overseas crises, such as those in Afghanistan and Palestine during and after the New Order. In particular, it elucidates the discourse and the process of humanitarian missions carried out by both the state and society in Indonesia.

Islamic Solidarity and Humanitarianism

Solidarity (*solidarité*) implies having a firm grasp of social unity. It is closely related to *fraternité*, under which concept of the 'solidity of a community' is embedded. Originally 'civic friendship', it has evolved to encompass the idea of a global community,¹ and so the notion of solidarity has also shaped and characterised Islamic communities throughout the world. To Muslims, who represent the world's second largest religious group after Christians, Islam is not simply a religion based on spiritual text, but also a symbol of solidity among its adherents around the globe. The Quran and the prophetic narratives place much emphasis on the necessity of strengthening brotherhood, according to which believers are urged to build reciprocal relations (*al-takaful*) among community members.² Moreover, the notion of solidarity can be manifested in various forms, including giving social, financial and political support to community members who are suffering because of injustices in the social, economic, and political system. The ideas of justice and 'anti-imperialism' seem to have characterised Muslim solidarity groups and their viewpoints on humanitarian and political crises in the Muslim world.

In the complexity of the interplay between religion, society and the state, the meaning of humanitarian aid and Islamic solidarity is, of course, contested, as it does not appear in a linear manifestation. Not all crises occurring in Muslim countries have received similar attention from existing Indonesian Muslim relief associations. The Iraq-Iran wars of the early 1980s and communal conflicts in Bangladesh, Thailand, Darfur, and Somalia are among the events to which Indonesian Muslims have appeared to pay less attention, compared to the Afghanistan and Palestinian cases. As a matter of fact, Indonesian Muslims have sent medium-scale emergency relief teams to Afghanistan and Palestine for the past three decades. Despite the intensifying mobilisation of aid among Indonesians for relief activities in both countries,

a number of Indonesian *Jihad* volunteers (fighters) departed for Afghanistan, joining Afghani fighters (*Mujahidin*) against the Soviet forces, but they carried out no such activity for the sake of Palestine.

Despite the fact that Afghanistan perhaps does not hold quite the same importance in the eyes of Muslims as Palestine, with the conflict over Jerusalem,³ the Soviet Communist regime's invasion of Muslim Afghanistan received widespread attention from young Indonesian Muslim activists and inspired Islamic solidarity groups.⁴ When the political situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, especially after the arrival of the allied force led by the United States, relief missions from Indonesia became less frequent than ever before. By contrast, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has become the most striking case of an international issue that appeals to Indonesians. In the case of the Palestinian-Israeli war, the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem seems to have become a symbol that 'unites' Indonesian Muslims in support of Palestinians by any means necessary. Their collective actions have also been nurtured over the decades by conflict escalation in Palestinian territory in general, and by intensifying discourse on the occupation of Al-Aqsa in particular. I shall demonstrate how Islamic solidarity, which is manifested in the form of relief aid, justifies the process of internationalising domestic aid.

Does ideologically 'universal' and politically neutral humanitarian aid exist? This kind of question often appears in discussions about relief action in response to crises in conflict zones. The fact is that not all relief organisations embrace the same values, as each can be ethnically, religiously, culturally, and politically motivated. Faith-based organisations (FBOs), which are often contrasted to secular organisations, offer a vivid example of how the meaning of 'humanitarian' can vary from organisation to organisation. Unlike secular NGOs, the 'orientation' or 'self-identity' of faith-based NGOs and their pervasiveness are mainly derived from, or at least closely related to, the teachings of certain religions.⁵ In fact, religious values embedded in FBOs have enriched current humanitarian principles, and redefined the concept of humanitarianism itself. For example, the Muslim NGOs that have increasingly emerged and steadily proliferated in the past three decades have attracted the attention of social activists and academics, as these FBOs have

played imperative roles and operated large-scale relief campaigns in certain regions.⁶ As new players, they have engaged in modest relief actions throughout the world, and have begun interacting with other NGOs, either faith-based NGOs or 'secular' NGOs. The results of the encounters between faith-based NGOs and 'secular' NGOs are threefold: cooperation, coexistence, and rivalry. It should be noted, however, that even what we call 'rivalry' can occur not only between religious NGOs and 'secular' NGOs, but within each type of NGO.

Observers have noted that after 9/11, Islamic charities and Muslim NGOs undertaking relief work in conflict zones were accused, notably by Western governments, of supporting 'extremism'. Muslim NGOs report having had a great deal of difficulty, as their charitable works cannot escape Western countries' surveillance.⁷ J. Millard Burr's and Robert O. Collins' book is just one of whole series of recent works that describe, from a security perspective, the emerging Islamic charity activism and relief actions in various areas, ranging from Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and the Balkans, to Southeast Asia, Europe and North America. While this book broadly surveys the possible ties between Islamic charitable organisations and *jihadi* movements around the globe, it suggests that '*jihadi* charities' are 'surely a small percentage of the total number of Islamic charities worldwide'.⁸ In accordance with this, Abdel-Rahman Ghandour, the political advisor of the UN special representative for the Great Lakes region, for example, points out that whereas a few 'Islamic NGOs did stray into militant political extremism ... the majority remain genuinely focused on purely humanitarian objectives.'⁹ He also emphasises that the aggressive attitudes of Muslim NGOs are to some extent triggered by the overwhelming evangelism of certain Christian NGOs and by the culturally insensitive attitudes of 'secular' NGOs.

Moreover, an area that deserves further scrutiny is that of relief missions organised by Muslim NGOs in the international arena. Such charitable works cannot be detached from the influence of the international geo-social and political landscape, on the one hand, and the pervasive role played by Islamic solidarity groups on the other. This is because charity activism is fundamentally a local and domestic phenomenon, but in the era of globalisation,

it has become a global movement. This means that driven by cultural, religious, economic or political reasons, local community-based associations such as NGOs, solidarity groups or charitable institutions may operate in other parts of the world. In particular, contemporary Muslim solidarity groups in Indonesia can be traced back to the late 1960s, when the Islamic solidarity movement in Indonesia ‘had been stipulated by Israel’s dramatic victory in June 1967’, while Muslim mobilisation as a manifestation of solidarity had been much influenced by ‘the increasing impact of Islam in the international environment.’¹⁰

The following case will illustrate how Islamic solidarity develops before it is transformed into social mobilisation. On 8 October 1967, Mohammad Natsir, the prominent Muslim activist, delivered a rousing speech after the early-morning prayer at the Al-Munawwarah Mosque in Jakarta in response to the deteriorating political situation in the Middle East; the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war followed by the occupation of certain areas in Palestine, Egypt and Jordan. His sermon addressed, among other things, the functions of mosques, the status of the *Al-Aqsa* mosque, now in occupied territory, the roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the weakness of the Arab countries’ alliance against Israel. Having visited the refugee camps and shelters in Jordan in early August 1967, Natsir informed his audience that Palestinian refugees needed prompt and large-scale relief action. He bore witness to the condition of the Palestinians in the refugee camps:

Together with my friends, I saw the refugees living in camps; some in good tents equipped with suitable spring beds, others in proper and strong shelters. Some tents were labelled “Iran”, representing Iranian contributions; others greyish tents were marked “Pakistan”; the rest belonged to such countries as Turkey and India. I never saw any tent marked with the Indonesian flag. It made me sad that our absence [Indonesian Muslims] among them was so obvious. As an Indonesian, I lost face in front of my friends. Until now, not a single pill has been sent from Bandung to the region, but in the newspapers it has often been claimed nevertheless that we are going to send this and that: medical doctors, medicines, and blankets ... Although they never directly asked me [about Indonesian aid],

when I caught sight of refugees, I felt that their eyes were questioning me. When they caught sight of me, I pretended otherwise. I just look forward to seeing in this country [Indonesia] Muslim communities who at least symbolically are willing to help people who are suffering.¹¹

In other public lectures and religious gatherings, Natsir also raised questions about failing Muslim solidarity in response to the occupation of Palestine, and he launched an appeal to raise money for the refugees. During the first Asia-Africa Muslim Conference in October 1955, for example, Natsir encouraged the Arab countries to unite and invited the participants to take more concrete action by sending a relief mission to the area.¹² His speeches in several forums on the Palestinian ‘tragedy’ conveyed a great sense of Islamic solidarity. As an influential Muslim thinker, activist and politician, his reaction to the Palestine-Israel conflict received enthusiastic praise from Indonesian Muslim activists. His critical remarks on Israel reverberated in Islamic organisations until recent times. DDII, a *da’wa* council that was established by Natsir in 1967 following his retirement from politics, along with other Islamic associations to be discussed in subsequent sections, for example, has paid much attention to international affairs in the Middle East in general, and in particular to Palestine, emphasising the Islamic dimension of the political problems.

Natsir was not alone. Various Islamic associations and Muslim scholars had shared concerns about Palestine well before Natsir’s visit to Jordan.¹³ For example Haji Agus Salim (d. 1954), a very well-known Muslim nationalist, wrote two articles on Palestine published in *Pedoman Masyarakat* on 10 July 1936 and *Pandji Islam* on 9 January 1939. In the first article, he emphasised the tension between Arabs and Jews, which, he claimed, had nothing to do with religion. In subsequent years he changed his views by utilising the Islamic factor to argue for the Palestinians’ right to protect the Al-Aqsa from the hands of the Jews. In the second article, Salim also showed his appreciation of the Nahdlatul Ulama’s (NU’s) decision to discuss the Palestinian issue in its National Congress (*Muktamar*).¹⁴ At that juncture, the NU took a clear stance on the Palestinian issue; they opposed the invasion of Palestinian ter-

ritory. Therefore, the NU succeeded in drumming up a lot of support from other Islamic elements in the country. Meanwhile, a leading Islamic association, the *Majelisul Islami Ala Indonesia* (MIAI), as explained in the *Pandji Islam* daily, gave only a cautious reaction to the matter. What we can learn from the above passage is that what happens in Middle Eastern countries has had a significant impact on and consequences for the domestic life of Indonesian Muslims, socially and politically. The plurality of Indonesian Muslims' political positions on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be seen not only in the 1970s, when Islamic solidarity groups dominated the public space, but also in recent times, when Indonesia witnessed the expansion of Muslim NGOs.

Indonesia's Responses to the Crises in Palestine and Afghanistan

The crises in the Middle East in general, and Palestine and Afghanistan in particular, have never escaped the attention of Indonesian Muslims, either at the state or societal levels. Although Indonesian Muslims had a connection with Arab countries long before the Republic of Indonesia was founded in 1945, a new chapter in the relationship between Indonesia and Egypt, for example, began shortly after Indonesian independence in 1945. On 18 November 1946, the Arab League encouraged its members to give official recognition to Indonesia as an independent state. The members of the Arab League, including Egypt, also showed their sympathy for and solidarity with Indonesia in response to the Dutch Military Offensive (known as '*Agresi Militer Belanda*' to Indonesians, and 'Police Actions' to the Dutch) in certain areas in Indonesia in 1947, by banning Dutch aircraft from the air space of Arab League member countries.¹⁵ In 1946, Egypt took a historic act, becoming the first country to officially recognise Indonesia as an independent state. Subsequently, during the Cold War between the USSR and the US, both Indonesia and Egypt established the Non-Aligned Movement (*Gerakan Non-Blok*).¹⁶ Therefore, it is not surprising that when the war broke out between Egypt and Israel, Indonesia had much sympathy with the Arabs

(Egypt). At that juncture, Palestine was not a major issue for Indonesia. Yet, it is also worth mentioning that when Egypt recognised Israel as a result of the Camp David Accords, Indonesia, under President Soeharto, did not change its position, and officially never recognised Israel as a state. Since then, the Palestinian issue has increasingly become one of the issues in the Middle East to which Indonesia pays particular attention, especially when conflict escalates between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

The Government's Ambiguous Stance

In analysing the Indonesian response, it is worth discerning between two levels: the level of the state, notably the Indonesian government and its foreign policy; and secondly the level of society, represented by the various Islamic associations and their relief efforts and political support. Despite the fact that in a religious and historical sense, Palestine has been considered a special case by Indonesia, some studies reveal that the government's foreign policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and the people's expectations have not always been aligned. This is because the Islamic factor has been 'very limited' and simply 'a secondary consideration' in Indonesian foreign policy, especially during the New Order era.¹⁷ The state's cautious political stance on this issue has in part been a result of the preservation of its status as a non-aligned country.¹⁸ At the state level, Indonesia basically held a rather clear opinion on the Arab-Israeli conflict; 'a policy of non-recognition toward Israel' and a 'pro-Arab Palestinian stance'.¹⁹ However, this political stance was not based on an 'Islamic factor', as one might have expected, but rather on the principle of justice and the idea of taking a stand against an aggressor. This in turn has led Indonesia, as the world's largest Muslim country, to occupy an 'ambiguous' position. The ambiguous nature of Indonesian foreign policy pertaining to the Palestine-Israel conflict can be observed in the following cases.

The first is Indonesian involvement in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The establishment of the OIC, the second largest inter-governmental association after the United Nations, was compelled by the war between the Arab World and Israel, which resulted in the loss of the Al-

Aqca Mosque in occupied Jerusalem. This in turn gave rise to the historical summit held in Rabat, Morocco, on 25 September 1969, during which the OIC was established. Since then, Indonesia has rarely been absent from the Islamic Summit Conferences held by the OIC. Despite this, until the late 1980s, Indonesia, unlike other Muslim countries, never participated officially in any kind of concrete relief action for the sake of the Palestine people.

The Indonesian political response towards the Palestine Liberation Organisation's (PLO's) proposal to set up a representative office in Jakarta was also quite vague. Since 1974 the PLO has endeavoured to win Jakarta's approval for the office, but the PLO's attempts to be recognised officially in Jakarta have resulted in failure, partly due to its interaction with communists.²⁰ Indonesian top-ranking military officers were therefore quite reluctant to agree to the PLO's request. Under the support of Indonesian Islamic associations, the PLO was finally granted not only political recognition, but also an office building by the Indonesian government in 1989, nearly fifteen years after its first request.²¹ Indonesian recognition of Palestine as an independent state began on 18 November 1988, three days after the declaration of independence, which was held on 15 November 1988.²² Afterwards, the relationship between Indonesia and Palestine considerably improved. The speech of President Soeharto in the Sixth Islamic Summit Conference held in Dakar, Senegal, on 9-12 December 1991, also reflects such an improvement.²³

The third case concerns the Indonesian relationship with Israel. As a non-aligned state, the Indonesian political stance remains one of 'explicitly and consistently giving support to Palestinians to determine their own political future' and appealing to both sides 'to end the conflict in a peacefully diplomatic process'.²⁴ Even though outwardly, the Indonesian government during the New Order refused to acknowledge Israel's existence, this political stance had unsteady foundations. At the end of the 1970s, for example, the government secretly purchased weapons, such as fourteen A-4 Skyhawk ground attack fighter jets and TA-4 Skyhawk Trainers from Israel. On other occasions, Indonesia has also allowed groups of youths and journalists to visit Israel and meet top-ranking government officials.²⁵ Israeli efforts and Indo-

nesian willingness to have more concrete diplomatic relations during the New Order era always ended in failure, however, due to strong and critical reactions from Muslim groups.

*The Occupation of Palestine and Anti-Jewish
and Anti-American Movements*

Islamic associations seem to have refined their perspective in understanding the Palestine case. Israel is simply defined as an aggressor that conquered the holy site of Islam, the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. According to this view, Indonesian Muslims ought to give support to Palestinian Muslims as a means of defending the Al-Aqsa Mosque. The occupation of Arab lands by Israel is seen merely as a part of a Zionist agenda to destroy the Islamic religion. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that Indonesian Muslims' rhetoric on the Palestine-Israel conflict is very much characterised by claims of a 'Jewish conspiracy' to undermine Muslim communities. Judaism has been regarded as a 'symbol of threat' in religious, cultural, and political senses by some Indonesian Muslim associations. This view, in turn, has developed to become an anti-Jewish movement that is not necessarily related to the Palestine-Israel conflict.²⁶ For some Islamists and purists, the term 'Jewish' has also often been used to label other fellow Muslims who are thought to uphold a liberal perspective on Islam. The use of the term 'Jewish' is becoming a tool—a very simple tool—to criticise progressive and liberal thinkers. For example, terms such as 'Jewish conspiracy', 'being a Jewish agent' and 'becoming Jewish successors' are very popular at the grassroots level, especially among Islamists.²⁷ These expressions can also be used by Indonesian Islamists freely and loosely without fear of complaint, because Judaism is not an officially recognised religion in Indonesia.²⁸ Therefore, the war between Palestine and Israel is often simplified as a war between two religions, Islam and Judaism.²⁹

When Israel and the PLO agreed on peaceful terms, the reactions of Indonesian Muslims were diverse. Ahmad Khalil Ridwan of DDII for example, criticised Yasser Arafat and accused him of having deviated from Islamic idealism. In contrast, Anwar Haryono (d.1999), who had led DDII following

the death of Mohammad Natsir in 1993, endorsed Arafat's decision on peaceful co-existence between Palestinians and Israelis. Yusuf Syakir, a deputy secretary-general of the PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*), the only Islamic Party in Indonesia at that juncture,³⁰ also endorsed the agreement and appealed to the government to immediately grant political recognition to Israel. Pertaining to diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Israel, Indonesia's domestic reality displayed its political dynamics. The Muhammadiyah and the NU considered that Indonesia was not in urgent need of political and commercial ties with Israel. According to Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafii (d. 1985), the founder of the Asyafi'iyah Islamic Educational Institute (*Perguruan Islam Asyafi'iyah*), diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Israel would be 'illicit' (*haram*).³¹ This divided opinion on the agreement between Israel and the PLO was caused by the fact that some Arab countries had given official recognition towards Israel as a state and had even set up diplomatic relations with Israel. Nevertheless, Indonesia has never had any diplomatic relations with Israel, but 'undisclosed' liaisons between the two continue to occur, especially in matters of trade and cultural exchanges. The Arab countries' political recognition of Israel seems to have not influenced the political stance of Indonesian Muslims.

After the downfall of the New Order regime, a similar issue re-emerged. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), the President of the Republic of Indonesia, raised the controversial notion of engaging in commercial and diplomatic relations with Israel. A new debate arose when Gus Dur, along with the Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab, prepared to cooperate with Israel in order to extend the scope of Indonesia's international commerce. Gus Dur's position is likely in line with that of some Muslim politicians; as many Arab countries have recognised Israel, why should Indonesia not be allowed to have commercial relations with Israel? Gus Dur argued that Indonesia had so far established diplomatic relations with communist states such as China and the former Soviet Union, thus commercial cooperation with Israel should become a major goal.³²

*The Occupation of Afghanistan and Anti-Soviet
and Anti American Movements*

Another striking event that made an impact in Indonesia was the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviets from 1979 to 1991, and by the Allied Army under American command from 2001. These occupations engendered new 'repertoires of contention', encouraging the rise of Anti-Soviet and Anti-American feeling. In response to the crisis in Afghanistan in the early 1980s, the Indonesian government supported the communiqué that was issued in the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Muslim Countries held in Islamabad, Pakistan, according to which the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces was defined as illegal. As a non-aligned country, the Indonesian government's reaction to Soviet manoeuvres in Afghanistan was unclear, as it showed no strong condemnation.³³ On 3 December 1980, there were a series of Anti-Soviet demonstrations mobilised by Islamic youth associations in Indonesia.³⁴ They protested against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and insisted on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the occupied territories. This demonstration was followed by protests held by other student and Muslim youth associations. Their rhetoric was based on one central theme: the mobilisation of *Jihad* volunteers to Afghanistan if the Soviet forces remained in the occupied territory.³⁵ Between 1983 and 1984, the first Indonesian jihadists left for Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Committee of Solidarity for the Muslim World (KISDI) became more active in the 1990s, holding demonstrations to protest against the occupation of certain areas in Muslim countries.

The impact of the issues surrounding the occupation of Afghanistan changed rapidly in Indonesia after 9/11. The American invasion of Afghanistan following the attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York was dramatically followed by the American invasion of Iraq. The invasion of Afghanistan was a direct response to 9/11, and the later invasion of Iraq was also justified with reference to 9/11 (as well as the 'weapons of mass destruction' claim). Both US invasions provoked a strong reaction among Indonesian Muslims. The semi-official Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars (MUI), which had recently incorporated a number of vocal Islamists, issued a *fatwa* endorsed by no fewer than 32 Muslim organisations, according to which

Islamic *umma* around the globe were obliged to unite to conduct *Jihad fi sabilillah* against America.³⁶ The notion of anti-Americanism remerged and caused radicalisation within certain Muslim groups. This was marked partly by a campaign to boycott American products and ‘sweeping’ (raids on hotels with foreign guests).³⁷ Yet, the boycott campaign did not effectively materialise.³⁸ The geopolitical dynamics in Afghanistan seem to have caused the rise of an Islamic solidarity movement and of relief associations such as the Indonesian Committee for Afghanistan Solidarity (KISA) and the Crisis Prevention Committee (KOMPAK), humanitarian wings of DDII that actively mobilised relief aid for Afghanistan.

The Genesis: Islamic Solidarity Groups and Relief Mission, 1960s-1980s

The mobilisation of humanitarian operations in Indonesia for the benefit of Palestinians occurred in the aftermath of the 1973 war between the Arab World and Israel. Justifying themselves with the notion of solidarity, a number of Islamic associations established an *ad hoc* committee called *Panitia Pembantu Perjuangan Pembebasan Palestina dan Al-Aqsha* (committee for Palestine and Aqca Liberation Support), which was chaired by Sutjipto Judidardjo, a former Indonesian Police Commander in Chief. This committee donated blood in cooperation with the Islamic Hospital of Jakarta and the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) at the Mosque of Sunda Kelapa. Several litres of blood were collected to be sent to the war in the Middle East. This blood acted as ‘a symbol of the unification of the blood of Indonesian Muslims with that of the Arab fighters who are struggling against Israel.’³⁹ New to relief activities, the committee members faced a great deal of difficulty in promptly sending this blood to Palestinian refugees. In order to deliver emergency aid, they needed to find an airline company that had no affiliation with Israel. The blood was finally carried from Jakarta to Singapore by Garuda Airways (GA) and from Singapore to Beirut by Czechoslovakia Airways (CSA). It was successfully received by the Indonesian Embassy in Beirut, to be given to the Lebanon Red Crescent Society and redistributed amongst the Arab refu-

gees.⁴⁰ Gaining support from the Indonesian community, this committee also collected funds, medical supplies, tea, coffee and the like, to be channelled to the PLO and Arab countries. A proportion of the funds were sent to the Indonesian Embassy in Damascus in order to buy two ambulances from Europe. The rest of funds were channelled to Palestinian orphans through the Muslim World League (*Rabita al-Alam al-Islamiyya*). Meanwhile, medical supplies, tea and coffee were entrusted to the Egyptian Embassy in Jakarta. According to Lukman Harun (d.1999), the secretary of the above committee, this mission was the first concrete relief aid to come from Indonesia.⁴¹ In subsequent years, especially in the 1980s, the relationship between Indonesian Islamic solidarity groups and Palestinians continued. From dozens of solidarity groups, two groups, namely the Islamic Solidarity Committee (KSI) and KISDI came to the fore.

Islamic Solidarity Groups: KSI and KISDI

KSI was founded in 1967 by Lukman Harun, a Muhammadiyah activist who became the Muhammadiyah's liaison with the Muslim World League. Owing his fame to this dual connection, Harun had played pivotal roles in organising an Islamic solidarity group such as KSI, both domestically and internationally. This association came into being following the clash between the Arabs and Israelis, which resulted in the defeat of the Arab forces. During his involvement with the Muhammadiyah and KSI, Harun sent aid to Palestinian refugees through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) almost every year.⁴² In cooperation with the PMI and other solidarity groups in the country, he mobilised aid to be sent to Palestine, Afghanistan, and Lebanon.⁴³ The cooperation with the PMI can be said to have been necessary, given that the PMI is recognised as a representative or at least part of the international movement of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies. The PMI has officially operated in the country since 1945, soon after Indonesian National Independence, as a continuation of the *Nederlands-Indische Rode Kruis* (NIRK). During the Independence Era, the objective of the PMI, as a neutral and therefore politically and religiously non-affiliated relief association, was to assist European soldiers who had been

captured by Japanese troops. Since 15 June 1950, the PMI has been an official partner of the ICRC and the IFRC. The cooperation between KSI and the PMI at that time is worth noting because in recent times, along with the emergence of Islamism, it has been difficult to establish partnerships between the PMI and Muslim NGOs. Muslim NGOs, in fact, have been able to establish their own international networks without necessarily requiring the authority of the PMI.

Moreover, holding the position of head of both the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Muhammadiyah and the Indonesian 'Ulama Council (MUI), Harun had many chances to be involved in various international forums, through which he disseminated his vision of Islamic solidarity.⁴⁴ In the 1990s, as a member of *Panitia Solidaritas Muslim Bosnia* (the Committee of Muslim Solidarity for Bosnia-Herzegovina), which was chaired by Probosutedjo (b. 1930), a very well-known entrepreneur and Soeharto's half brother, Harun and his colleagues approached the Indonesian government with a request to deliver aid to Bosnian Muslims. As a result, the Committee sent aid to Bosnia, which was used to build a mosque (the Istiqlal Mosque in Sarajevo) as a gift from the Indonesian people.⁴⁵ His concern with the political affairs in the Muslim world compelled him to also establish the KSRIA (Committee for Indonesian-Afghanistan Friendship).

KISDI is another Islamic solidarity group whose primary concerns are international and Muslim affairs. KISDI can be said to have been born from the womb of DDII,⁴⁶ as it was Natsir who, in 1987, initiated the launch of KISDI as a committee with the main goal of supporting the Palestinian struggle against Israel. The inauguration of KISDI was held at the Al-Barkah Mosque of the As-Syafi'iyah Educational Institute in Jakarta, and was attended by leading Muslim personalities, including Hasan Basri (d. 1998, Head of the MUI), Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafi'i (Head of As-Syafi'iyah Foundation), H. Husein Umar (d. 2007, General Secretary of DDII), Khalil Ridwan (a member of the MUI),⁴⁷ and Ahmad Sumargono (d. 2012, Acting Director of the Jakarta Preachers Corp).⁴⁸ Ahmad Soemargono was appointed as acting director. KISDI has paid much attention to various cases involving Muslim communities in certain parts of the world, for example conflicts in Moro,

Kashmir, Chechnya, Algeria, and Bosnia. As an Islamic solidarity group, KISDI mostly holds street demonstrations to support Muslim groups who are involved in the wars or conflicts. Interestingly, when Saddam Hussein occupied Kuwait and the Americans prepared the first war in Iraq, KISDI refused to protest against the American counterattack, despite the fact that many Indonesian Muslims sympathised with Saddam Hussein. KISDI is also seen as a radical wing of DDII that believes in ‘a Western Jewish and Christian conspiracy to weaken and destroy Islam.’⁴⁹

KSI and KISDI are among the first Islamic associations in Indonesia to be concerned with international affairs relating to the Muslim world in general and Palestine in particular. Unlike the New Order government, which was reluctant to provide concrete support for the Palestinian people, the two associations have moved beyond formal diplomatic and political support by carrying out fundraising in order to help Palestinian refugees. This endeavour, to some extent, could help create better ties between Palestinians and Indonesians. We should also note, however, that none of these solidarity groups have been directly involved in emergency relief by, for example, sending highly-skilled volunteers and physicians who are able to work in the field alongside other humanitarian teams from other countries. This is not because they are unwilling to do so, but presumably because at the time, they had insufficient human resources for that purpose. The absence of professional *zakat* agencies prior to 1990s, which correlates with a lack of experience in the mobilisation of aid, to some extent had a negative impact on the number of Muslim relief and charitable NGOs, especially those specialising in health and disaster emergency relief.

*Helping Muslim Brothers, Sending Jihad Volunteers:
Underground Movements*

The crisis in Afghanistan and the lack of Muslim relief NGOs in Indonesia in the early 1980s provided an opportunity for underground solidarity groups to express their visions of social and communal cohesion by becoming involved directly in the conflict. In contrast to Islamic solidarity groups such as KSI and KISDI, who sent humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, younger

Indonesian students became involved in the war by supporting Afghans against the invading Soviet forces. The war between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union had in fact attracted many *Jihad* volunteers from around the world, especially Muslim countries, and Indonesia was no exception. At that juncture, Afghanistan became a major destination for *Jihad* volunteers, including Indonesian Muslims who had studied abroad in places such as Pakistan and various Middle Eastern countries. Other Indonesian *Jihad* volunteers were specifically recruited to become fighters. Al Chaidar, as cited by Martin Bruinessen, claimed that the number of Indonesian *Jihad* volunteers in Afghanistan reached 30,000 between 1983 and 1989. However, according to Bruinessen, that number is too large and unconvincing.⁵⁰ Whatever the actual numbers, some of the Indonesian veterans of the Afghanistan-Soviet war who returned to their hometowns continued their fight in a different way. Among the more well-known of these veterans is Ja'far Umar Thalib, who went on to set up *Laskar Jihad* (Jihad Fighters) in Indonesia in response to the conflict between Muslims and Christians in Ambon, Moluccas.⁵¹ Other veterans set up *pesantren* (Islamic education institutions) in Indonesia. However, a few veterans, such as Riduan Isamuddin, who is also well-known as Hambali, were involved in radical and underground groups that justify violent attacks and acts of terrorism.

There have been no reports of the involvement of Indonesian *Jihad* volunteers (read: fighters) in Palestine, especially in the 1970s, but there has been instead a growing relief mission.⁵² This is probably because geographically speaking, penetrating the Palestinian border is more complicated than penetrating the Afghan border. Furthermore, the influence of *Jihad* on younger Indonesian Muslim students abroad became a concern for the Indonesian government. In Pakistan, which borders Afghanistan, the Indonesian Embassy was hardly preventing the flow of Indonesian *Jihad* volunteers into Afghanistan. It was reported that the Indonesian Ambassador for Afghanistan reminded Indonesian students studying in Pakistan not to join the fighters in Afghanistan.⁵³ At a domestic level, the Indonesian government warned its people that it would allow Islamic solidarity groups to be involved only in humanitarian assistance, not in the conflict itself. The idea of send-



Figure 13 Rally held in Hong Kong by a number of Indonesian Muslim associations and other humanitarian groups, 2009 (source: author's collection)

ing *Jihad* volunteers is usually revived in conjunction with increasing political tensions and crises in the Middle East, especially Palestine and Afghanistan. Spurred on by America's massive attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq, the recruitment of *Jihad* volunteers took place in certain regions organised the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), an association that accepts the use of violence in its activities. Thus far, the FPI has failed to bring any plan to fruition. Nevertheless, the repeated recruitment of *Jihad* volunteers organised by the FPI has become a symbol of resistance.

New Actors:

Islamic Solidarity Groups and Relief Associations, 1990s-Present

In the late 1990s, there was an expansion in Indonesia of Islamic associations addressing the issue of Palestine. After the collapse of Soeharto, the domestic political dynamics of Indonesian Islamism were marked by the emergence of Islamic political parties that became part of the revival of Islamic movements in the country. The outward appearance of Islamic associations became more obvious after the 'Reformation Era'. The associations were able to publicly show their disagreement if the government's reaction

to issues in the Muslim world was perceived as being too cautious. During the Reformation Era, Islamic solidarity groups have even been able to establish stronger networks with other Islamic solidarity groups and relief associations overseas. For the last ten years, various new forms of associations, ranging from political parties to Islamic solidarity groups, have emerged, and these have played quite a significant role the post-New Order Indonesia. During the New Order era, especially in the 1980s, the numbers of political parties and the roles of Islamic solidarity groups were tightly circumscribed, as this regime took a very strict approach and applied tight regulations to politically-oriented Islamic movements.

As discussed in Chapter 3, in the post-New Order era, the political environment continues to be more open. Muslim groups can freely express their political views in the public sphere, and they can even set up new political parties to which certain Muslim groups may channel their political aspirations. From the dozens of Islamic parties that participated in the last three national elections held in 1999, 2004, and 2009, one Islamic party has come to the fore and has played quite a significant role in the process of mass mobilisation for both political and religious objectives, namely PKS (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, Prosperous Justice Party). PKS is a political party that was established by the campus-based Tarbiyah movement, and represents the highly-educated Muslim middle class. Supported mainly by young and educated urbanites, and unlike other religious or nationalist parties in Indonesia, PKS has been able to extend the scope of its activities by engaging social and relief campaigns, both domestically and internationally. In this respect, PKS seems to have become an important political entity that has largely been linked to the emergence of various contemporary Islamic solidarity groups and Islamic relief NGOs, such as KNRP, PKPU, and probably BSMI.

A few weeks before the Israeli offensive in the Gaza strip of December 2008, an International Humanitarian Conference on Assistantship for Victims Occupation/IHCAVO was held in the Jakarta Convention Centre, from 30 October to 2 November 2008. The National Committee for Palestinian People (KNRP), a new association chaired by Suropto, the member of Parliament from PKS, hosted this conference. About 198 humanitarian organisa-

tions, NGOs, charitable institutions, *zakat* agencies and the like from 26 countries attended this conference. Under the theme, 'End the Occupation ... for a Better Future,' this conference can be viewed from a social movement perspective as a medium to promulgate the issue of Palestine to a wider audience. The conference provided the means not only to strengthen emergency relief in the future, especially with regard to Palestine, but more importantly, to ensure that the Palestinian issue resonated with a wider audience. In short, seen from the perspective of social movement theory, this conference became a medium to 'frame resonance' and act as a 'framing process for movement mobilisation'. The success of Islamic solidarity groups in promulgating and turning their views into actions depended on 'the capacity of a frame to resonate with potential participants.'⁵⁴

New Islamic Solidarity Groups: KISPA and KNRP

In the previous section, we investigated the role of KSI and the activities of KISDI in constructing the discourse on Islamic solidarity during the New Order era. Their critical voices on this issue have been picked up by a new actor, the Indonesian Committee for Palestine Solidarity (KISPA), which was founded on 14 May 2002, under the supervision of the MUI. It was formally founded in the office of the MUI and led by Dr. Din Syamsuddin, the Secretary of the MUI and the Vice President of the Central Board of the Muhammadiyah.⁵⁵ In KISPA, Syamsuddin was assisted by Adian Husaini, an activist from KISDI, who was appointed as its Secretary General.⁵⁶ KISPA has conducted various activities, including disseminating information on issues relating to Palestine by, among other things, holding discussions, seminars, conferences, political statements, and mass demonstrations.⁵⁷ For example, in 2004, KISPA held a gathering to commemorate the *Al-Quds Intifada*.⁵⁸ Husaini was succeeded by Ferry Nur, who had been KISPA's vice secretary as well as the leader of another small Islamic solidarity committee called the Anti-Israel Zionist Movement (GAZA) and the former vice secretary of KISPA. Under Ferry Nur's leadership, the notion of Islamic solidarity has been intensified and has materialised in a more concrete way. Seen from a historical perspective, the genealogy of KISPA cannot be separated from

that of previous Islamic solidarity groups that existed during the New Order era, especially those mobilised by Mohammad Natsir (KISDI/DDII) and Lukman Harun (KSI).⁵⁹ In short, this Islamic solidarity group for Palestine is part of a long continuum.⁶⁰



Figure 14 Donation box for Palestinians displayed at the bazaar during the Humanitarian Conference (IHCAVO) in Jakarta 2008 (source: author's collection)

Meanwhile, the establishment of KNRP is closely connected to the role played by some members of parliament from PKS, such as Suropto, Hasan Ishak and Suryaman, who visited Lebanon by 2006 in response to the war between Israel and Hizbullah. They carried Indonesian aid and medical supplies, along with medical teams and volunteers, to help Palestinian and Lebanese refugees in the region.⁶¹ In 2006, the concept of 'giving', which was legitimised by the notion of solidarity, became the way in which KNRP mobilised humanitarian funds and gained recognition from international Islamic NGOs as one of the Indonesian Islamic solidarity groups specialising in the Palestine issue. It should be noted that KNRP was not the first Muslim solidarity group affiliated with PKS to concern itself with the Palestinian issue; on 7 April 2002, PKS founded an Islamic solidarity group called the Committee for Justice and the Al-Aqsha Liberation (KKPA), headed by Dr. Ahzami Zami'iun Jazuli, a *tarbiyah* activist and member of PKS.⁶² Although KKPA still exists, it has apparently been sidelined by KNRP, which is chaired

by a more influential figure in PKS, Suripto.

Despite the fact that both KISPA and KNRP have similar objectives, they work independently of each other. KISPA and KNRP used to work together before they decided to operate separately by using their own networks. This is due to the diverse backgrounds and political interests of each institution.⁶³ KISPA, for instance, is much closer to the grassroots. It was set up as a Jakarta-based institution that did not need organisational branches in other regions. It regularly carries out religious gatherings and fundraising to contribute to the rehabilitation of Palestine refugees. Thanks to its consistency in building awareness of Palestine and Al-Aqsha among Indonesian Muslims, KISPA has also received enthusiastic acclaim from *Majelis Taklim* (religious gathering groups) in various places, such as national banks, government-owned corporations (BUMN), and private companies. Compared with KNRP, which has engaged *zakat* agencies and NGOs in its dealing with the fundraising system, KISPA seems more conservative in character. Perhaps this is because some people prefer to donate spontaneously after listening to a speech in a religious gathering, rather than sending their aid via a bank transfer. Therefore it is not surprising that apart from money, KISPA often receives various kinds of jewellery, such as gold necklaces, rings, bracelets and watches, from its constituency.⁶⁴ KISPA carries out 'traditional' fundraising such as this, because it attempts to send the collected funds as they are, without having them reduced by operational fundraising expenses. Should KISPA hold 'musical concerts', as has been the case with KNRP, and other costly fundraising events, they would run the risk of having the expenses eat into the amount of money that could be collected.⁶⁵ In this respect, KISPA endeavours to maintain a degree of so-called 'trust' and avoids 'information asymmetry', at least at the domestic level. It is common for relief associations and other NGOs to be challenged by donors who demand that aid be delivered to target beneficiaries and 'actual recipients', even though these may be 'unknown' to both the associations and the donors.⁶⁶

KNRP is managed by a number of top-ranking PKS board members and even some members of parliament. It has a greater access to government officials nationally and internationally. PKS has included the Palestine issue

as part of its political platform.⁶⁷ The Indonesian members of parliament belonging to this party also have close connections with members of legislative bodies in Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, the nature of KNRP is rather different from that of KISPA. Although both KNRP and KISPA carry out regular religious gatherings to mobilise domestic aid, KNRP functions at both a societal and a governmental level, while KISPA works mainly at a grassroots level. It is also interesting to explore the fact that both have recently expanded their networks locally, nationally and internationally, for the purpose of delivering aid to Palestine. As a political party-based NGO, KNRP recently established branches in Sumatra, Java, and Borneo.

Domestically, the character of KNRP has also become increasingly political. In reaction to the blockade of the Gaza Strip, an area politically under Hamas's control, and to Israel's massive attack on Gaza, this association held a mass demonstration in Jakarta on 2 January 2009, only three months before the 2009 elections, but before actual campaigning was allowed. This demonstration was dominated by PKS's symbols, slogans, and flags. Since this anti-Israel demonstration took place in the period when all political parties in Indonesia were not allowed to appear publicly due to election rules and regulations, the Banwaslu (*Badan Pengawas Pemilu*), a semi-governmental election monitoring organisation, accused PKS of violating the election rules by inappropriately stealing the stage for its campaign. PKS was thus reported to the police, as this political campaign was considered illegal.⁶⁸ The above facts indicate that, compared with the New Order era, the issues surrounding Palestine have in recent times become much more complex within the domestic arena, because of the nature of the Islamic solidarity groups, political parties, charitable institutions, relief organisations, and *zakat* agencies involved. What is clear is that KISPA and KNRP have to engage other institutions, notably Muslim NGOs specialising in emergency relief, and even *zakat* agencies, to be able to mobilise domestic funds and to reach the target area, the Gaza Strip. In other words, though the concern with Palestine is genuine, PKS has clearly capitalised on the issue in its rivalry with other political parties, as well as Muslim organisations.

An Interfaith Humanitarian Forum: The HFI

The question of whether non-Islamic associations in the country have similar concerns about the Palestinian issue is one that reflects the dynamics of inter-religious relations in the country. A number of non-Muslim groups, notably Christian and Buddhist groups, have shown strong empathy for the Palestinians, and yet non-Muslims in particular have not organised massive fundraising drives or demonstrations. In relation to this, it is worth explaining the efforts of the Humanitarian Forum Indonesia (HFI), an inter-religious humanitarian-oriented NGO, which was initiated and assisted by a number of faith-based humanitarian associations, such as the Muhammadiyah (an Islamic civil society organisation), YAKKUM (the Christian Public Health Foundation), YTBI (a Christian-inspired relief association), Karina (the Crisis Centre of the Bishops' Conference of Indonesia), Dompot Dhuafa, Islamic Relief, and World Vision Indonesia (WVI).⁶⁹ Although the discourse developed in this association differs from the one voiced by KISPA or KNRP, the HFI expresses the necessity of sending medical doctors, professional nurses and aid to Palestine. At the end of January 2009, the HFI sent relief missions to Gaza via Jordan. Although the HFI's emergency relief in Palestine is not as popular as that provided by other Islamic solidarity groups, this interfaith humanitarian forum, with its limited financial capacity, has been successful in facilitating the involvement of non-Muslim NGOs in Indonesia to cooperate with relief NGOs in Gaza. Non-Muslim associations such as the Indonesian Churches Association (PGI) channelled their aid for Palestinians to the International Red Cross.

Relief NGOs: the PMI, MER-C and BSMI

There are other relief NGOs that have played a pivotal role in sending relief emergency teams in the aftermath of the outbreak of the war between Hamas and Israel, among which are the Indonesian Red Cross Society (PMI), the Medical Emergency Rescue Committee (MER-C), and the Indonesian Red Crescent Society (BSMI). The PMI, as mentioned previously, is the oldest humanitarian association in Indonesia. The PMI adopted the humanitarian principles formulated by the International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). The ICRC only recognises the PMI, not BSMI or MER-C. Like other associations affiliated to the ICRC or the IFRC, the PMI is fairly non-political and non-sectarian, as it strongly upholds universal humanitarian principles such as voluntarism, humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence.⁷⁰

MER-C and BSMI were established by Muslim physicians and professionals. MER-C originated as an *ad hoc* student medical team at Indonesia University (TMM UI) that departed for Ambon in 1999 in order to relieve human suffering as a result of the notorious ‘man-made disaster’ that was the communal conflict between Muslims and Christians. Since then, the team’s members have set up a more formal and professional Islamic relief association that is able to respond quickly to health emergencies. MER-C was formally launched on 14 August 1999. In its early stages, the founders of MER-C wanted to channel resources from the TMM UI to the PMI when conducting medical relief projects. However, their proposal was not accepted by the PMI and the ICRC. This is probably because the PMI and the ICRC have particular systems and mechanisms to recruit volunteers, especially to work in conflict zones. As a result, a new association, MER-C, was established in 1999.⁷¹ MER-C has received financial support from professional, academic and *da’wa* associations to operate its programmes. Like other associations, MER-C functions as a redistribution channel not only for medical supplies, but also *zakat* and *sedekah*.⁷² MER-C is administered by a presidium with Joserizal Jurnal as its principal.⁷³

BSMI (*Bulan Sabit Merah Indonesia*), with its Red Crescent symbol, was formally launched on 8 June 2002 by Muslim physicians and social activists who were mainly associated with the *tarbiyah* movement, and partly represented by PKS. There are disputes regarding the use of the humanitarian symbol, especially between BSMI and the PMI. As a long-established non-sectarian humanitarian organisation, which in some ways is supported by the government, the PMI represents all of Indonesia. Meanwhile, BSMI aims to represent Muslims. The latter has close ties with the government, especially the Ministry of Health. Due to this, it appears that the ICRC is wary of

BSMI's attempts to sideline the PMI. In recent times, both the PMI and BSMI have operated medium and large-scale humanitarian projects abroad. BSMI's progress in the last five years can be seen not only in its relief activities in disaster-affected areas, but also in its ability to set up permanent charitable and semi-charitable clinics in certain regions. Recently, BSMI leadership was taken over by Basuki Supartono, an orthopaedic specialist. Unlike the PMI, BSMI often releases 'political statements' in response to crises overseas, especially in Palestine, as a means of expressing its political views and mobilising domestic resources.⁷⁴ Likewise, although BSMI is rarely involved in street demonstration, it uses mass or religious gatherings conducted in mosque, like Islamic solidarity groups such as KISPA and KNRP, to spread its rhetoric on the crisis in Palestine.

During the crisis in Gaza in late 2008, the PMI, MER-C and BSMI worked separately by engaging different partners. The PMI, on the one hand, benefited from its privileged position within the international community and affiliations with similar movements, such as the ICRC, the IFRC, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, and the Jordanian Red Crescent Society. On the other hand, BSMI and MER-C gained support mainly from domestic Islamic solidarity groups, Muslim NGOs and *zakat* agencies. This is probably because Muslim NGOs and Islamic solidarity groups, in this case MER-C and BSMI, are able to utilise religious and political discourse to attract people, for example by uniting the concepts of giving (*sedekah*), solidarity (*ukhuwah*), justice (*al-'adl*), and struggle (*jihad fi sabilillah*). It is perhaps not too surprising that the domestic financial resources that can be mobilised by Muslim NGOs outnumber those that can be mobilised by non-religious humanitarian associations, like the PMI and even interfaith NGOs, whose fundraising campaigns and rhetoric are less political and lacking a religious underpinning. The PMI's and the HFI's stance as 'neutral' entities has distinguished them from Islamic solidarity groups. It can also be said that their lack of framing of cultural narratives, religious symbols, and populist language has resulted in weaker support from the public, compared to other Muslim NGOs.

***Information Asymmetry, Islamic Humanitarianism and Politics:
Networks and Partnerships***

The Indonesian government's stance on international affairs in the Muslim World is determined by several factors, the most important of which being state capacity, national political elites' perceptions of international affairs, and the dominant culture within political institutions.⁷⁵ The changing domestic culture and the impact of Islamic revivalism in the country seem to have influenced the government's political stance. The confrontation between Hamas and Israel, for instance, moved the government to take action. At the state level, the Indonesian government has committed to providing US\$ 1 million for the Palestinian authorities, and contributes to the peace-building process via social, economic and human resource development.⁷⁶ The Indonesian government can participate in providing humanitarian aid to the Palestinians in two ways. First, the government can directly cooperate with the Palestinian National Authority (PNA or PA), which controls Palestine's West Bank. The PA's representatives in many countries, including Indonesia, are affiliated with the PLO. The PLO is the largest political faction in Palestine that has largely gained international recognition, including from the United Nations.

Following the conflict between Fatah and Hamas that took place in 2006, the Palestinian administration became divided. Since then, the West Bank area has been under the control of Fatah, whereas the Gaza Strip is controlled by Hamas. In this situation, the Indonesian government remains formally in contact with the PA's representative in Jakarta instead of Hamas. However, Islamic associations have been able to construct informal networks with Hamas, especially after the Hamas-Israel conflict in 2008. In order to resolve the diplomatic complexities of the Indonesia-Palestine relationship, the Indonesian government appears to use 'G to G' (government to government) relationships and encourage 'P to P' (people to people) liaison in order to deliver humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip. This could be seen when the Indonesian government sent a preliminary relief team to Gaza through Egypt. Assisted by the both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of

Health, this government-sponsored team consisted of representatives from various Islamic NGOs, including MER-C, the Muhammadiyah, and BSMI.⁷⁷

Interestingly, the government has only engaged Muslim NGOs and seems to have overlooked solidarity groups such as KISPA and KNRP. Other aith-based NGOs (Muslim or non-Muslim NGOs) that have some experience of carrying out emergency relief abroad also seem to have been overlooked. The dispatch of a preliminary team was probably aimed at gaining access for associations in Indonesia to participate in relief missions in Gaza. The government's approach of overlooking some NGOs seems to have compelled other Muslim NGOs, solidarity groups and non-Muslim NGOs to use their own networks to be able to reach Gaza. The government has not offered a precise argument as to why it only engages with Muslim NGOs. A comparable situation could be found in Pakistan in the aftermath of the 2005 earthquake, when 'non-sectarian organisations' were disregarded by the UN and international NGOs, as they preferred to work with Islamist groups such as the Jami'a Ulama-l-Islami (JUI), the Al-Khair Trust, the Al-Rashid Trust, and Jamaat-ud-Da'wa, because of the close ties between Islamist groups and the earthquake victims.⁷⁸

The question that can be raised is: why did the government select certain relief associations and overlook others, and how did a new type of international actor emerge and succeed in sidelining older ones? In the Indonesian case, my hypotheses are: 1) the Islamic factor has influenced government decision-making in sending emergency teams to Gaza; and 2) the personal ties between existing institutions and state officials have also been a determining factor. The government seems to have avoided engaging institutions, at least formally, that have ties with political parties or solidarity groups. In this respect, we can assume that the government wanted the issue to remain simply humanitarian, not political, and thus engaged only with less political institutions. This suggests that the Centre for Justice and the Care of Society (PKPU), a PKS-affiliated national Islamic relief association with rich experience in emergency relief, and solidarity groups specialising in Palestinian issues, would not be included in the team. On the other hand, engaging Muslim NGOs may also be considered more strategic because Indonesian relief

teams will interact with other humanitarian organisations from all over the world, especially from Muslim countries. Nonetheless, in practice, loose partnerships can be established between institutions that are political and non-political in character, between solidarity groups and *zakat* agencies, as well as between Muslim NGOs and solidarity groups.

The Complexity of Delivering Aid

It should be noted that after returning to Indonesia, each institution that had been sent by the government in the preliminary emergency team established its own partnerships and networks with domestic Muslim NGOs and Islamic solidarity groups that were not involved in the government's preliminary team. For example, another team comprising BSMI, KNRP, PKPU (all Islam-based relief organisations), Dompot Dhuafa (a *zakat* agency) and Wahdah Islamiyah (a Salafi movement based in South Sulawesi) departed from Jakarta bound for Egypt to deliver aid. In order to work in the war zones effectively, this team cooperated with Egyptian counterparts, such as the Egyptian Medical Syndicate (EMS). Meanwhile, MER-C cooperated with local Indonesian counterparts such as KISPA, BAZNAS and BSMI. As mentioned earlier, the issue of 'information asymmetry' can be taken into consideration when analysing the process of delivering aid. In order to reach the area, each team has to mobilise domestic resources, either from individuals or corporations. Because of this, all humanitarian organisations aim to ensure that their funds can reach the target beneficiaries, in this case the people in Gaza who had become the victims of Israel's attack. No institution represents Indonesia as a whole, as each flies a different humanitarian flag.

The majority of Muslim NGOs attempted to reach the Gaza Strip by passing through the Raffah Border Crossing. As an international area, the Raffah Border Crossing was built by Israel and Egypt following their Peace Treaty (1979) and the withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai Peninsula (1982). It has so far been under the joint control of Israel and Egypt. In a normal situation, this crossing allows the people of Gaza to buy daily provisions in Egypt. The crossing was closed by Israel and Egypt following Hamas's victory in Gaza in the aftermath of the 2006 election. For humanitarian reasons,

Egypt reopened this crossing to facilitate the dispatch of humanitarian missions, and it is the only way to reach Gaza from Egypt. Due to the delicate situation in the Middle East and as a consequence of very strict regulations applied by both the Egyptian and the Israeli authorities, not all humanitarian organisations that come to the crossing are able to deliver their aid themselves. This privilege is only given to UN organisations, such as the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA), which has established itself in the area, and the ICRC. Other organisations, including those from Indonesia, must patiently follow the schedule arranged by the authorities of Egypt and Israel.

The first team sent by the Ministry of Health could not reach the Gaza Strip by any means. Meanwhile, KNRP and its colleagues stayed in Al-Iris, Egypt, for more than a week. Some of their relief aid, medical supplies, and medicines brought to Egypt in collaboration with the Egyptian Medical Syndicate (EMS) were finally entrusted to the UNRWA.⁷⁹ KISPA faced a delicate situation when the situation became more complicated after the Egyptian authorities ordered all humanitarian teams to leave the Gaza Strip in February 2009. During this time, the Raffah Border Crossing was overwhelmed with humanitarian organisations. It is within this context that humanitarianism and politics intersected. Some Indonesian humanitarian teams, which are overwhelmingly Islamic in character, for example, avoided entering the Gaza Strip via the Jordan-Israel border because of their rejection of Israel.

While many Indonesian relief teams became 'trapped' at the border, the HFI team, consisting of six surgeons, endeavoured to find another means of getting through to Gaza. Managing to do so via Jordan on 29 January 2009, the HFI engaged Israeli and Palestinian humanitarian organisations, such as Magen David Adom (MDA-Israel's version of the National Red Cross Society), the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, the Jordanian Red Crescent Society, and Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) to facilitate its arrival. The HFI's decision to cooperate with MDA and to enter Gaza through Israel not only differed from that of other Indonesian Muslim NGOs, but it also generated controversy. This is partly due to two factors: first, the popular campaigning by certain Muslim groups against Israel; and second, the absence of diplo-

matic relations between Indonesia and Israel.

The HFI's attempt to deliver aid by making a partnership with MDA received widespread criticism from both Islamists and the Indonesian government. Some questioned the relationship between the HFI and MDA. Others consider that the procedure adopted by the HFI in engaging MDA—and entering Gaza Strip through the Jordan-Israel border—was not acceptable and could be considered illegal due to the absence of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Indonesia and Israel. Using Israel as a gate must mean asking Israel's permission.⁸⁰ However, so far no Muslim group has condemned the increasing trend of performing pilgrimages to Jerusalem, organised by Hajj Travel Agents in Indonesia, which surely must go via the Jordan-Israel border.

Relief organisations, or course, have often been faced with this kind of dilemma, especially in war zones. Traditionally, the dilemma includes 'clashing interests, competition for resources, and the complex organisational structure.'⁸¹ Facing this situation, the HFI had to make a decision on how to cooperate effectively with local humanitarian actors in both Israel and Gaza to relieve human suffering. In response to being criticised for its cooperation with Israel-based relief NGOs, the HFI put forward two arguments. The first stated that a humanitarian issue is more important than a political one. Therefore, there should be no hesitation in cooperating with other humanitarian entities, including MDA and Christian NGOs.⁸² The HFI added that the humanitarian principle is supposed to be distinct from political arguments and from the conflict between Hamas and Israel. The second argument reiterated the fact that at the time the HFI had aimed to deliver aid to Gaza, the Raffah Border Crossing had been closed and the Egyptian authorities would not open it, even temporarily. Therefore, looking for alternative means of delivering aid was not only acceptable, but also necessary.

Internationalising Domestic Aid: Minor Criticisms

We have discussed the participation of Indonesian Islamic charitable institutions and Muslim NGOs in Gaza-Palestine relief. The success of Islam-based associations in sending medical supplies and health provisions to Gaza re-

flects their great endeavour to mobilise domestic aid. Soon after the outbreak of the war between Hamas and Israel, the necessity of helping Palestinians who had become victims of that war became a widely-discussed issue. There were anti-Israel campaigns throughout the country. The Palestinian issue became a hot topic for religious gatherings, mass meetings and talk shows on television and radio. This was followed by the launch of an appeal to collect and send immediate aid to Palestine. Some associations, in turn, came up with various programmes and attractive advertising, in the form of banners, pictures and posters, designed to appeal mainly to Indonesian Muslims. Despite being written in *Bahasa Indonesia*, some posters were even written in English in order to deliver the message to an international audience.

Although Indonesians have shown their eagerness to help Palestinians by sending emergency aid to the area, this does not mean that their efforts have been immune from criticism. Various voices have been raised with regard to this issue. Some say that Indonesian Muslims have overstated the case, are too reactive and at the same time, are overlooking the reality of poverty in their own domestic context.⁸³ While the majority of Indonesian Muslims probably agree that sending relief assistance is needed as an expression of solidarity, it is perhaps too rash to say that they overlook the domestic poverty issue, because Muslim relief NGOs mainly focus on domestic crises. The above criticism was a consequence of the mass mobilisation by Islamic solidarity groups and Muslim NGOs. When it was reported that a certain domestic Muslim NGO wanted to set up a permanent hospital in Gaza, there were objections and criticisms in the domestic public sphere: Why don't we prioritise our poor society instead of others abroad? Should we instead send funds that we collected through mass fundraising for Palestine to help our neighbours? Can we seriously run effective fundraising by utilising discourse as a means of assisting poor people on the outer islands? These sentiments were voiced in the mass media and even in daily conversation with ordinary people.⁸⁴ This suggests that the 'Islamic factor' has certainly driven the act of giving. In our case, the overwhelming discourse among Indonesian Muslims on the Palestine issue during the crisis in Gaza, for example, obviously shifted the attention of the media, *zakat* agencies, charitable organisations and even

humanitarian associations away from local domestic crises, such as the earthquake that shook Manokwari, Western Papua, on 21 January 2008. The result is that the mobilisation of aid for Palestine had surpassed that of aid for domestic crises.

Islamic solidarity groups such as KISPA and KNRP seem to have framed their arguments around the idea of independence of Palestine, which, according to both groups, is the fundamental issue underlying the Palestinian case. Therefore, they have come to believe that it is justifiable for Islamic communities in Indonesia, who have enjoyed living in a country free of colonial power, to help their Muslim brothers overseas. Palestinians, according to KISPA and KNRP, have been suffering physically and psychologically for a long time because of the Israeli occupation. The statements that are often raised by Islamic solidarity groups imply that their charities for relieving the suffering of Palestinians also support the Palestinian struggle for independence.⁸⁵ Observers have suggested that in fact the concept of Islamic solidarity is ‘neither mechanical, nor natural, but the result of the mobilisation of governments or groups that invite Muslim to help their “brothers” in religion in the name of defence of the community.’⁸⁶

Conclusion

The intensified discourse on the notions of solidarity and brotherhood has led certain Indonesian Muslim groups to a new consciousness of global community (*umma*). The establishment of Islamic solidarity groups, relief NGOs, and *zakat* agencies in Indonesia, with their domestic and international networks, cannot be detached from the spirit of Islamic solidarity in general, and anti-imperialism in particular. As far as the experience of Islamic societies is concerned, the concept of brotherhood has justified the mobilisation of aid as a reaction to the crises witnessed by Muslim communities throughout the world; the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan and Palestine are not an exemption. In this respect, the concepts of solidarity, justice and benevolence have been utilised in the recent mobilisation of domestic aid by Islamic solidarity groups and Muslim NGOs. The success of the mobilisation of domestic sources for the sake of solidarity

is contingent upon the ability of existing groups to utilise cultural symbols, religious idiom and political contentions.

Nevertheless, the Islamic principles held by Muslim NGOs are not always objectified in the same way. Despite collaboration between organisations in sending relief missions to target beneficiaries abroad, ‘competition’ at the domestic level cannot be avoided. In practice, their similar overarching objectives, helping poor refugees, for example, have not always been easy to reconcile. Three reasons for this can be identified. 1) There have been differences between Muslim NGOs’ views on conflicts in Muslim populated-areas like Afghanistan and Palestine, which determine the relief action. There have therefore been disputes as to whether or not the action should be political in character. 2) While they have similar aid objectives, their access to political institutions within Indonesia and the targeted beneficiaries abroad can vary. 3) The Indonesian government can be said to have an ambiguous attitude, as it engages with certain Muslim NGOs while appearing to overlook others, which may also compel NGOs to work by themselves and establish their own networks, both domestically and internationally. Under these circumstances, cooperation and contestation between NGOs can be based on, and motivated by, either ideological or pragmatic concerns.

Another point has to be made regarding the meaning of charitable work. Through the lens of solidarity, we may see that, in the Indonesian context, Islamic charities have discovered a new role: becoming players in relief missions in international arena. The ability of existing associations to set up a more solid network with international actors, notably in the Middle East, has enabled them to work in conflict areas overseas. Charitable activism should therefore no longer be considered a local form of giving for local beneficiaries, but also for recipients from other parts of the globe. Conceptually, the dispatch of domestic aid to Muslim communities overseas can be classified as an extended manifestation of *sedekah* and *ukhuwwa*, which are specifically justified under the concept of humanitarian aid.

Moreover, the involvement of Indonesian *zakat* agencies in providing relief assistance overseas has indicated a clear shift in the nature of giving practices in Indonesia. Pledging their support for humanitarianism, *zakat* agen-

cies have included disaster preparedness as part of their platform, indicating an expansion in the scope and type of their charitable services, which focus not only on domestic poverty issues, but also on the hardships faced by the global *umma*. They have redefined normative concepts of giving, both conceptually and practically, based on domestic and international social and political conditions. It is also safe to say that Islamic solidarity groups, Muslim NGOs and *zakat* agencies share the same objective of helping people in need, such as refugees and victims of conflict. To some extent, this may also blur the boundaries between political support and humanitarian action. However, we should note that even within secular-inspired relief assistance, the discourse on the neutrality of humanitarian action has always been contested by observers and practitioners, as has whether the help for the victims in conflict zones is the victims' 'need' or their 'right'.

Finally, it is by now clear that there has been—to borrow Jonathan Benthall's turn of phrase—'weak differentiation of roles' amongst the existing institutions, whether they are Islamic solidarity groups, Muslim NGOs or *zakat* agencies, as their duties, responsibilities, and activities 'overlap'. On the one hand, this may result in dilemmas at a domestic level, such as problems in the mobilisation of domestic financial sources; but on the other hand, the institutions complement each other in the distribution of human resources. Observers such as Burr, Collins, Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan have pointed out that the concept of humanitarianism in Muslim societies seems to have become blurred due to the involvement of various motives, ranging from the religious to the political. I argue that in practice, this has also provided an opportunity for the existing associations to cooperate in sending emergency teams. Islamic solidarity groups, whose overarching objective is to support Afghans and Palestinians through speaking out on these issues in public and conducting fundraising at a grassroots level, cannot work by themselves in the field unless they engage professional and experienced relief NGOs at a domestic level.

Endnotes

- ¹ Hauke Brunkorst, *Solidarity: from Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community*, translated by Jeffrey Flynn (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: The MIT Press, 2005), 1-4.
- ² See for example Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: the Search for a New Umma* (London: Hurst & Company), 65.
- ³ For further discussion on Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa as symbols of unity and solidarity among Muslims, as well as being 'an asset' for mobilising the Arab and Muslim world, see Yitzhak Reiter, *Jerusalem and Its Role in Islamic Solidarity* (New York & Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 129.
- ⁴ See Robert W. Hefner, "Global Violence and Indonesian Muslim Politics," *American Anthropologist*, 104, 3 (2002), 754-765.
- ⁵ Carlos Benedetti, "Islam and Christian Inspired Relief NGOs," 849-851.
- ⁶ Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW), Muslim Aid, and the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO) are among the most important and well-recognised FBOs established by Muslim communities. The first two associations were founded in 1984 and 1985 respectively in the United Kingdom, while the IIRO was set up by the Muslim World League in 1978 in Saudi Arabia.
- ⁷ The United States, under the Bush administration, froze the number of Islamic charitable associations following 9/11, legitimising itself with the slogan, 'the War on Terror'. See Mohammed R Kroessin, "Islamic Charities and 'The War on Terror': Dispelling the Myths," *Humanitarian Exchange*, Number 38 (June 2007), 27-9.
- ⁸ J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Alms for Jihad*, 1.
- ⁹ Abdel-Rahman Ghandour, "Humanitarianism, Islam and the West," <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2582>; Abdel-Rahman Ghandour, *Jihad Humanitaire: Enquete sur les ONG Islamiques* (Paris: Flammarion, 2002).
- ¹⁰ Michael Leifer, "The Islamic Factor in Indonesia's Foreign Policy: A Case of Functional Ambiguity," in Adeer Dawisha, *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 152.
- ¹¹ M. Natsir, "Palestina dan Ummat Islam," Unpublished Paper at Masjid al-Munawwarah-Jakarta (1967). He illustrates the ties between Indonesians and Palestinians with the notion of 'solidarity among family members' (*rasa kekeluargaan*) and the Quranic concept of 'one body' (*ka al-jasad al-wahid*): 'we suffer when our family members are in pain'. See also M. Natsir, "Hidupkan Solidaritas Kita pada Bangsa Palestina," *Ceramah Umum di Masjid Agung Al-Azhar, Kebayoran Baru Jakarta, Agustus 22, 1982*, 17; reprinted in M. Natsir, *Masalah Palestina* (Jakarta: Hudaya, 1970), 33.
- ¹² At the end of his speech he quoted from the prophet's sayings (*hadith*), '*Irhamu man fi al-ard, yarhamkum man fi alsama`*' (take pity on those in the world, you would be loved by those in the sky). M. Natsir, *Approach Baru Penyelesaian Palestina* (Bandung: Corps Mubaligh Bandung, 1970). 18-20. At the invitation of CMB (Corps Mubaligh Bandung), Natsir also gave a talk on the same issue in front of some leading Muslim activists involved in such Islamic organisations as Parmusi (*Partai Muslimin Indonesia*-Muslim Party of Indonesia), PSII (*Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia*-Islamic Association Party of Indonesia), Perti (*Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyyah*-Islamic Educational Union), PII (*Pelajar Islam Indonesia*-Islamic Student

- Association), GPI (*Gerakan Pemuda Islam-Islamic Youth Movement*), etc.
- ¹³ Natsir made history in the Muslim World Congress (*Mu'tamar al-'Alam al-Islami*) when he was elected in Pakistan in 1967 as chief deputy of the World Muslim Congress. He also joined the Muslim World League in 1969. It is said that Natsir was invited to to Palestinian camps by his friends in the above organisations.
- ¹⁴ See Haji Agus Salim, "Yahudi dan Arab di Palestina," *Pedoman Masyarakat*, 25 November 1936; "Soal Yahudi dan Palestina," *Pandji Islam*, 9 Januari 1939; reprinted in *Seratus Tahun Haji Agus Salim* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996), 410-4 & 431-5; Salim's article seems to have been inspired by the fact that another Islamic association, the MIAI (the Majelis Islam Indonesia) had responded cautiously to the Israeli-Arab conflict. Meanwhile, the NU in its national congress often dealt with the Palestinian issue, including in its 19th National Congress held in Palembang South Sumatra, 26 April -1 May 1952. See for example H. Aboebakar, *Sedj. Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar* (Djakarta: Panitia Buku Peringatan Alm. K.H.A Wahid Hasyim, 1957), 491 dan 493.
- ¹⁵ Riza Sihbudi, *Indonesia-Timur Tengah: Masalah dan Prospek* (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1997), 26-7; also my personal discussion with Riza Sihbudi, 10 August 2009, in London.
- ¹⁶ It is mentioned that the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and also the Chairman of the Higher Committee, Syekh Amien al-Husayni, showed his support for Indonesian independence. M. Zein Hassan, *Diplomasi Revolusi Indonesia di Luar Negeri* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1980).
- ¹⁷ Rizal Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy* (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 52 & 61; also Leo Suryadinata, "Islam and Soeharto's Foreign Policy: Indonesia, the Middle East and Bosnia," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35 (1995), Issues 3, 291-303.
- ¹⁸ As a non-aligned country, Indonesian foreign policy has relied upon the principle of *Bebas dan Aktif*, meaning that this country, especially during the Cold War era, would not make an alliance with one of the competing blocks (USA and USSR). However, it would actively participate in—and contribute to—peace-making processes organised by the UN. In the international context, Indonesia has, for example, also given support to the UN resolution on the making of peace in the Middle East, but, in the case of Palestine, Indonesia refused the request by countries such as Egypt and Syria to give concrete assistance by, for instance, sending military support to the given region.
- ¹⁹ Rizal Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, 48-9.
- ²⁰ Michael Leifer, "The Islamic Factor," 151.
- ²¹ Again, Indonesia's refusal to grant the PLO's request can be considered ambiguous and in sharp contrast to the Indonesian policy of 'non-recognition toward Israel' and a 'pro-Arab Palestinian stance'. See Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, *Indonesia and Muslim World: Islam and Secularism in Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond* (Copenhagen: Nias, 2007), 73; M. Singgih Hadipranowo, "Sikap Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia terhadap Perjuangan Palestina, in M. Riza Sihbudi and Achmad Hadi, *Palestina: Solidaritas Islam dan Tata Politik Dunia Baru* (Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 1992), 129-30.
- ²² Lukman Harun, "Partisipasi Indonesia dalam Perjuangan Palestina," in M. Riza Sihbudi and Achmad Hadi, *Palestina*, 122. In Palestinian territory, there is a government, namely the Palestinian National Authority (PNA or PA), especially in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But internationally, Palestine is seen not as an independent state yet.

- ²³ The Indonesian version of this speech was later used as the Preface of a book on Palestine. See M. Riza Sihbudi and Achmad Hadi, *Palestina*, 11-22.
- ²⁴ M. Singgih Hadipranowo, "Sikap Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia," 137; also Chalid Mawardi, "Kebijakan Politik Luar Negeri RI terhadap Palestina dan Negara-negara Timur Tengah," in M. Riza Sihbudi and Achmad Hadi, *Palestina*, 145-6.
- ²⁵ Michael Leifer, "The Islamic Factor," 156; Rizal Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, 48.
- ²⁶ Martin van Bruinessen, "Yahudi sebagai Symbol dalam Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Masa Kini," in Y.B. Mangunwijaya et al., *Spiritualitas Baru: Agama dan Aspirasi Rakyat* (Yogyakarta: Interfidei: 1994), 264.
- ²⁷ See for example Ridwan Saidi, *Fakta dan data Yahudi di Indonesia & Refleksi Kritis perdamaian PLO-Israel* (Jakarta: LSIP, 1993). Some parts of this book were published regularly in the *Media Dakwah*, the Islamic Magazine under DDII's management. Saidi's critical comments on Nurcholish Madjid's liberal thought are very much characterised by innuendo and slurs about Jews.
- ²⁸ Martin van Bruinessen, "Yahudi sebagai Symbol," 265.
- ²⁹ Intense discussion of the Palestine-Israel conflict occurs regularly in Islamist periodicals, such as *Sabili*. See for example, Volume 7 (1999); Volume 7 (2000); Volume 8 (2000); Volume 8 (2001); Volume 9 (2002); Volume 10 (2003); Volume 11 (2003); Volume 11 (2004).
- ³⁰ Yusuf Syakir was also the secretary-general of the Association of Islamic Students (HMI) in 1965-1966.
- ³¹ Banyu Perwita, *Indonesia and Muslim World*, 85; see also *The Jakarta Post* (23 October 1993)
- ³² Gus Dur's proposal indeed received widespread reaction from various Muslim groups, among them KISDI, KAMMI, the "Kyai Langitan" (a group of respected Ulama of Traditionalist Islam), and Forum FSMLADK (Alumni Campus-based Da'wa Corps Forum-Forum Silaturahmi Mantan Lembaga Dakwah Kampus). Again, as I mentioned earlier, the term 'Jewish agents' became used, along with some other critical voices accusing him of having betrayed Islam and offended the feelings of Muslims. A number of associations reacted to Gus Dur by holding a press conference in order to counter the argument made by the government officials. See for example, Adian Husaini (ed), *Zionis Israel Prek: Pergolakan Umat Islam Indonesia Melawan Zionis Israel* (Jakarta: KISDI in cooperation with Citra Press, 2000).
- ³³ While some Muslim countries urged a boycott of the International Olympic Games held in Moscow in 1980, Indonesia, as represented by KONI (Indonesian National Sport Committee), decided to participate in the world's largest sport event. In short, the Soviet-Afghanistan war at that time gave insignificant impact on the domestic political environment, especially at the state level.
- ³⁴ GMII (*Gerakan Muda Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Youth Islamic Movement), GP Anshor (Muslim Youth Association that is affiliated to the NU), PMII (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*, Islamic Student Movement of Indonesia) and IPNU (*Ikatan Pelajar NU-Nahdlatul Ulama's Student Association*) held demonstrations in front of the Soviet Embassy Office in Jakarta. These associations protested against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and insisted on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the occupied territories. This demonstration was followed by protests held by other student and youth associations, such as HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam-Islamic University Student Association*), BKPMI (*Badan Koordinasi Pemuda*

- Masjid Indonesia-Board of Coordinators for Indonesian Mosque Youth Activists), and KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia-Indonesian National Youth Committee). Their rhetoric was based on one central theme; to mobilise *jihad* volunteers to Afghanistan if the Soviet forces remained in the territory.
- ³⁵ In the 1980s, Yusuf al-Qaradawi issued a *fatwa* emphasising that *Jihad*, in this case meaning to give military and medical assistance and other skills to Mujahidin in Afghanistan, was obligatory for each individual (*fard 'ain*). See Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *the Charitable Crescent*, 70.
- ³⁶ Sabili, No 8 TH. IX (10 October 2001/22 Rajab 1422), 25; See also Z. A. Maulani, *Amerika: Penjahat Perang dan Kemanusiaan* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sarana Kajian, 2001), 24-32.
- ³⁷ Rizal Sukma, "Indonesia and the September 11 Attack: Domestic Reaction and Implication," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. 30 (2002), 263-278; Saiful Mujani, "Anti-Americanism in Contemporary Indonesia," *Studia Islamika*, vol. 12 (2005), issue 2, 191-217; and Jamhari, "Mapping Radical Islam in Indonesia," *Studia Islamika*, vol. 10 (2003), issue 3, 1-28.
- ³⁸ In Indonesia, American products include Mobil Oil, Caltex, Exxon, Amex Bank, Bank of America, Citibank, KFC, McDonald's, Levi's, Lea, Coca-Cola, Planet Hollywood, Hard Rock Café, Dunkin Donuts, Pizza Hut, and others. In recent times, the above-listed American brands or companies have even become partners of various *zakat* agencies, as they channel their 'social funds' to *zakat* agencies.
- ³⁹ Lukman Harun, "Partisipasi Indonesia, 124.
- ⁴⁰ Lukman Harun, "Partisipasi Indonesia, 124.
- ⁴¹ It is said that Harun was the first Indonesian person to meet formally with Arafat. Harun's efforts to persuade the Indonesian government to accept the PLO's proposal to have an official representative in Jakarta led to him being given the title of 'Unofficial Palestinian Ambassador' by journalists. Lukman Harun, "Partisipasi Indonesia, 124.
- ⁴² The aid may not have been so significant, ranging from \$500 to \$1000 per year, but it became circumstantial evidence that suggested that Indonesian society remained responsive to helping the wounded victims of Israel's 'cruel' invasion. Lukman Harun, "Partisipasi Indonesia, 124.
- ⁴³ The charisma of Harun—to borrow Taufik Abdullah's words—might not be as strong and inspiring as that of Natsir. His rhetoric on Islamic solidarity, nevertheless, led him to become the most well-known Indonesian activist in the Muslim world at that time. Taufik Abdullah, "Pengantar dan Setumpuk Kenangan", in *Lukman Harun Dalam Lintasan Sejarah dan Politik* (Jakarta: Lukman Harun Foundation, 2000), 8; See also Hajriyanto Y Thohari, "Mengenang Lukman Harun," *Ummat*, No. 40 Thn IV (19 April 1999), 63.
- ⁴⁴ Yaser Arafat, "Mengenang Detik-detik Kepergian Seorang Saudara (Al-Qas asy-Syarif yang Paling Beliau Cintai)," in *Lukman Harun Dalam Lintasan*, 12.
- ⁴⁵ This committee was initiated by the MUI under K.H. Hasan Basri's supervision and Surharto's support. Lukman Harun, at that time, was the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the MUI. See Moendes L., "Dari Jakarta ke Dunia Islam: Aktivitas Sosial Politik Lukman Harun," in *Lukman Harun Dalam Lintasan*, 48; see also Masjid Istiqlal di Sarajevo; see Saodah Batin Akuan Syahrudin, *The History of the Indonesian Mosque Istiqlal in Sarajevo* (Budapest:

- Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, 2002), 15-8; for further discussion see also Riza Sihbudi, "Politik Luar Negeri RI terhadap Bosnia, Kosovo, dan Chechnya," and Eni Budiwanti, "Respons Masyarakat Indonesia terhadap Masalah Muslim Bosnia, Kosovo, dan Chechnya," in M. Hamdan Basyar, *Indonesian dan Problematika Muslim di Bosnia, Kosovo dan Chechnya* (Jakarta: LIPI, 2001), 125-52 & 153-75.
- ⁴⁶ In the late 1980s, Natsir invited Ahmad Soemargono and other Muslim activists such as Kiai Nur Ali and Abdullah Syafi'i to watch Palestinian movies and talk about relief aid for Palestine.
- ⁴⁷ Khalil Ridwan is also one of the important figures in DDII, and he has been the head of the BKSPPI-Indonesian Islamic Boarding School Cooperation Body since 1994.
- ⁴⁸ http://www.ahmadsumargono.net/konten.php?nama=Buku&op=detail_buku&id_buku=6
- ⁴⁹ Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism", 137; for further discussion of DDII's magazine and its political and religious views see also R. William Liddle, 'Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia', in Mark R. Woodward (ed.), *Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought*. Tempe, Arizona: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Asian Studies, 1996, 323-356; see also Robert W. Hefner, "Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries among Indonesian Muslims," *Indonesia*, Vol. 64 (Oct. 1997), 77-103.
- ⁵⁰ Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism," 130.
- ⁵¹ See for example, Noorhaidi Hassan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest of Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2006); Muhammad Sirozi, "The Root of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: Jaffar Umar Thalib of Laskar Jihad (Jihad Fighters) and His Educational Background," *The Muslim World*, Vol. 95 (2005), 81-120.
- ⁵² It should be noted that according to Abdul Karim Mc. Donald, an American journalist, as reported in the *Pantjaran Amal Magazine* of Muhammadiyah of Batavia (Cabang Betawi), there were three Indonesian people involved in the war in support of Palestinian against the British Army in Jordan. Their names are Sapulete, Salimin, and Sultan Ibrahim. See *Pantjaran Amal*, No, 21, TH III, (10 November 1938).
- ⁵³ *Sabili*, No. 11, TH. IX 21 November 2001/5 Ramadhan 1422.
- ⁵⁴ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington: Indiana, 2004), 16.
- ⁵⁵ Robert W. Hefner, "Global Violence and Indonesian Muslim Politics," 759. Syamsuddin is known for being the former President of the Muhammadiyah Youth Association and for having close personal ties with the late Lukman Harun, the founder of KSI. Before he became the chairman of Muhammadiyah, Din Syamsuddin was a Golkar politician.
- ⁵⁶ Adian Husaini graduated from the Faculty of Veterinary, Bogor Agricultural Institute, and earned a Master's degree from the University of Jaya Baya, Jakarta. Later on, he continued his doctoral programme in the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC), Malaysia. Husaini has a conspiratorial world view, and believes in Christian-Zionist conspiracies everywhere.

- ⁵⁷ See for example *Kompas* (April 21, 2004); *Era Muslim* (January 30, 2006).
- ⁵⁸ 'al-Intifada' is a popular term of resistance against occupation. The 'second Intifada' movement began with Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount at *al-Haram al-Sharif*, a holy place for Muslims. This visit resulted in further bloody conflict between Palestinians and Israelis.
- ⁵⁹ Interview with Ferry Nur, the General Secretary of KISPA (December 3, 2008) in Jakarta.
- ⁶⁰ Other similar associations whose concern are parallel to KISPA are KKPA, KPA (Palestine Liberation Committee-Komite Pembebasan Palestina, an underbow of Islamic Defender Front -FPI), GAZA, Gazwah Al-Aqsha of Majelis Tarbiyah wa Ta'lim Jammatul Muslim (Hizbullah).
- ⁶¹ The government, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had not allowed this team to leave. After negotiation with the government, however, the team could accomplish its relief mission. Interview with Suripto, the chairperson of KNRP (1 November 2008) in Jakarta.
- ⁶² See *Sabili*, No. 22, TH. IX (2 May 2002/Safar 1423 H), 31.
- ⁶³ The complicated relationships between KISPA and KNRP can in part be traced back to the rivalry between Masyumi/DDII and *Tarbiyah*/PKS in representing political Islam in Indonesia. *Tarbiyah* owes something to DDII but oriented itself primarily to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. When there was the possibility to resuscitate Masyumi, after the fall of Soeharto, *Tarbiyah* refused to join Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB-Crescent Star Party, the Islamic political party which represents ex-Masyumi activists), claiming that they could do better job because of their professionalism. Therefore, in 1998, *Tarbiyah* set up Partai Keadilan (Justice Party), the former name of PKS,
- ⁶⁴ See KISPA Annual Report 2007 and 2008.
- ⁶⁵ Interview with Ferry Nur, the General Secretary of KISPA (3 December 2008) in Jakarta.
- ⁶⁶ Helmut K. Anheier, *A Dictionary of Civil Society, Philanthropy, and the Non-Profit Sector* (London & New York: Routledge, 2005), 133.
- ⁶⁷ When Tifatul Sembiring, the President of PKS, conveyed a coalition proposal to the Democrat Party (*Partai Demokrat*) of Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, he insisted that the PKS include Palestinian liberation in its political platform as a means of contributing to the peacemaking process in the Middle East. *Republika* (28 April 2009)
- ⁶⁸ *Tempo Interaktif*, (08 January 2009); however, the allegation was denied by Tifatul Sembiring. He defended the party members who attended the demonstration, saying that they did so only to show their solidarity to Palestine through various banners and slogans, and he stated that they had nothing to do with the political side of the campaign. See *The Jakarta Post* (January 15, 2009).
- ⁶⁹ One member of the HFI is Dompot Dhuafa, a *zakat* agency that has a strong capacity in mobilising domestic aid and has already been engaged in other humanitarian teams, both nationally and internationally.
- ⁷⁰ For further discussion see Hilman Latief, "Symbolic and Ideological Contestation over Humanitarian Emblems: The Red Crescent in Islamizing Indonesia," *Studia Islamika* Vol. 18, No. 2 (2011), 249-286.
- ⁷¹ See Azimah Rahayu, *Senja Merah di Tanah Maluku: Untaian Hikmah Misi kemanusiaan, Medical Emergency Rescue Committee* (Jakarta: Zikrul Hakim, 2002).
- ⁷² *MERC Newsletter*, August 2001. 6.

- ⁷³ Joserizal Jurnal (b. 1963) is co-founder of Mer-C. He is medical doctor and a specialist in orthopaedic surgery. His journey and experience, together with Mer-C teams, in delivering medical aid in the conflict zones, such as Iraq, Ambon, Afghanistan, Iraq, Gaza, Mindanao-Philippines, etc., can be read in Suhindrati A. Shinta (ed.), *Jalan Jihad Sang Dokter : Kisah dr. Joserizal dan Tim MER-C Menantang Maut, Menyelamatkan Ribuan Nyawa, Demi Kemanusiaan: a True Story* (Jakarta: Qanita, 2011).
- ⁷⁴ See for example, BSMI's response to Western countries' attitudes towards the Hamas victory in the 2006 election
- ⁷⁵ Leo Suryadinata, "Indonesian Foreign Policy under Soeharto: Aspiring to International Leadership (Singapore: Marshal Covendish Academic, 2005).
- ⁷⁶ *The Jakarta Post* (January 24, 2009); even on the eve of the last series of wars, through the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) forum, Indonesia had committed to running a five-year period of capacity building projects for 10,000 Palestinians, to improve infrastructure and socio-cultural development (November 1, 2008).
- ⁷⁷ <http://www.antara.co.id/arc/2009/1/9/bantuan-kemanusiaan-indonesia-diserahkan-dira-fah-palestina/>
- ⁷⁸ Jawad Hussain Qureshi, "Earthquake Jihad: the Role of *jihadists* and Islamist Groups after the October 2005 Earthquake, *Humanitarian Exchange*, Number 34 (June 2006), 6-8.
- ⁷⁹ <http://knrp-kepri.blogspot.com/2009/02/salurkan-bantuan-ke-gaza-knrp-jalin.html>
- ⁸⁰ See also *Radar Sulteng Daily* (February 9, 2009); A year before the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in December 2008, the Muhammadiyah was also criticised by some Islamist groups as a consequence of the presence of Dr. Sudibyo Markus, the member of the Central Board of the Muhammadiyah, in Tel Aviv, Israel. It is reported that Markus, along with Prof Aryono Puspongoro, a director of *Yayasan Ambulan Gawat Darurat 118* (Emergency Ambulance 118 Foundation) visited Tel Aviv in order to enable cooperation with MDA. This cooperation aimed at strengthening the capacity of the crisis management system of the 118 Foundation. The cooperation was achieved thanks to MDA's long experience of conflict, which has led MDA to become one of the world's best crisis centres. Again, critical voices and conflicting opinions were voiced by various Islamic groups and nationalist party MPs in Indonesia. The Muhammadiyah was also accused by Islamists, such as members of the FPI, of receiving certain amounts of money from MDA. Sudibyo Markus gave further clarification of his appearance in Israel. He said that he did not represent the Muhammadiyah; instead he represented himself as a humanitarian activist. Din Syamsuddin, the President of the Central Board of the Muhammadiyah, also insisted that the Muhammadiyah had never cooperated institutionally with political and social institutions from Israel, and would not do so until the Israel-Palestine conflict had been peacefully and fully resolved. In line with this, Sudibyo Markus and Puspongoro also attempted to justify their actions by mentioning that as humanitarian activists, they are basically able to cooperate with MDA because this Israel-based relief organisation has officially been recognised by the international community since 2005 and has been accepted as a member of both the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). 'For me personally,' Markus argues, 'Cooperating with a member of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society is not a big problem.' Markus, who is the founder of the Muhammadiyah University

Student Association (IMM), further notes, 'As a Muhammadiyah activist, I just remember what was said by H.M. Farid Ma'ruf [a leading figure in the Muhammadiyah and the leader of Masyumi Party in 1950s]: for the sake of humanity [*we can cooperate*] not only with human beings, even with the evil ones if necessary'.

- ⁸¹ Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention (World Politics and the Dilemma of Help)* (Colorado, Boulder: West View Press, 1996), 98.
- ⁸² Interview with Nasir Nugroho, chairperson of Council for Health and Welfare-Muhammadiyah (17 February 2009) in Bogor-West Java; Interview with Joko Murdiyanto, an anaesthesiologist and member of the HFI's relief team for Gaza (2 March 2009) in Yogyakarta.
- ⁸³ Liberal Muslim activists such as, for example Luthfi Asyaukanie & Novriantoni, appeared on the television talk show, asking the media to balance the information on the Hamas-Israel war. This is because this war has become 'domestic political consumption'. See also Bramantyo Prijosusilo, "When Gaza is used for Domestic Politics Here," *The Jakarta Post*, June 14, 2009.
- ⁸⁴ See for example, *The Jakarta Post*, March 2, 2009. I often found similar sentiments echoed by ordinary people in their daily conversations.
- ⁸⁵ It is also very typical that the first paragraph of the preamble of the Indonesian Constitution (1945), which states that, 'Where freedom is the absolute right of all nations, colonialism must be eliminated in this world because it is not in compliance with humanity and justice,' is often quoted to substantiate groups' solidarity actions.
- ⁸⁶ Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, *the Charitable Crescent*, 69.

Conclusion: Envisioning a ‘Development Perspective’ for the Public Good

How has Charitable Activism been Conceived in Muslim Societies?

In Muslim societies, practising the Islamic faith as codified in the holy books is, at least normatively, taken as a necessary part of life. Islamic forms of giving and a Muslim spiritual concept of generosity and social piety are essential to the pattern of Islamic social activism. Nevertheless, one should not ignore the fact that the dialectical process within Muslim societies, with their political and economic systems, is instrumental in shaping Muslim thought on and attitudes towards welfare issues. In this respect, while charitable associations in Indonesia have become important actors that play multiple roles in society, charitable activism cannot be detached from the influence of the economic sector and the political sphere. The increasingly close ties between the public or private sectors and the voluntary sector in financing and operating charitable services clearly indicate the interconnection between the state, market, and society in forming Islamic social activism. With shared interests and mutual benefits, these public, private and voluntary sectors need a high level of organisation to be able to work together effectively.

Since the 1980s, many Muslim countries have witnessed an unprecedented development in civil society movements and increasing economic growth,

changes which have affected the social and economic relations within society as a whole. The rise of an affluent Muslim middle class with a new spiritual and social awareness has been instrumental in shaping Islamic social and political activism in general, and has aided a proliferation of Islamic institutions, ranging from educational institutions to charitable associations, whose overarching objective is to increase the quality of life of the community. In particular, Islamic social activism, which is represented partly by charitable associations, has become the locus of discourse among scholars, policymakers, and social activists over the past three decades. In Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, the number of Islamic charitable associations, with their different characteristics and orientations, has increased over time, adding a new feature to the public roles played by Indonesia's Muslims.

It appears that Islamic notions of justice, helping, giving, and Islamic community have practically become the foundation of Indonesian Muslims' widespread social activities (welfare, *dakwah* and politics). Due to this, it seems necessary to look further at the contribution of the religiously-inspired giving tradition to the formation of social security at the grassroots, and to analyse the social, economic and political trajectories of Islamic charitable associations. One may argue that the interwoven activities undertaken by faith-based charities, including those with Islamic orientations, have had mixed purposes, driven by the interest of the actors who are involved in charitable associations. Nevertheless, it can also be suggested that the normative values and principles embedded in Islamic charities are overwhelmingly characterised by Muslims' social, economic, and political lives. As shown in this study, Islamic charities engage in every domain: social, economic, political and religious. As a matter of fact, charities can function as social instruments to support welfare-oriented activism at the grassroots, as a way of bridging and realising religious missions, and as a way of stimulating solidarity movements with political objectives.

Moreover, other central concepts in Islamic literature, such as *al-'adala al-ijtima'iyya* (social justice) and *al-takaful al-ijtima'iyya* (social solidarity), have greatly influenced the nature of Muslim social activism in the social, economic and political spheres. Many verses of the Qur'an, for example, refer

to *al-'adl* (justice) and *al-takaful* (solidarity), and modern Muslim societies have attempted to elaborate and contextualise in proportion to their social, economic and political contexts. Modern Muslim thinkers have invented terms such as *al-'adala al-ijtima'iyya* (social justice) and *al-takaful al-ijtima'iyya* (social responsibility) to narrow and operationalise the philosophical concept of the public good (*al-maslaha al-'amma*) that scholars and Muslim jurists, both classical and contemporary, have formulated.

The creation of a better public life seems to have been the concern of Muslim intellectuals and charitable institutions in Indonesia. Social discourses among Muslims have shaped the characteristic of the public sphere in Indonesia, which^{3/4}in contrast to the colonial era^{3/4}is no longer sidelining religion in general, and Islam in particular. In the modern era, the public sphere is characterised by 'the plurality of voices and a fragmentation of traditional authority.'¹ As a matter of fact, traditional authority is often challenged, undermined and contested by alternative claims. In relation to this, the responses of Muslim intellectuals to poverty and social security for the poor, for example, are as varied as the natures of the NGOs that exist in the country. In the New Order era, notably in the mid-1980s, when Indonesia began its period of rapid economic growth, a number of Muslim intellectuals voiced their concerns and formulated both 'legal reasoning' and 'public reasoning' about welfare issues, by purposely addressing government policies through an Islamic perspective. The New Order was a political phase in which intellectual inquiries about how to reformulate the progressive nature of Islamic thought in the Indonesian context emerged. Some leading Muslim thinkers and activists attempted to introduce new approaches to the notions and practices of Islamic philanthropy. The issue of almsgiving, in particular, was seen from a wider perspective, with thinkers applying economic and political approaches in addition to the religious one. The reformulation of the *zakat* rate in relation to overcoming structural poverty, the notion of juxtaposing almsgiving and conventional *zakat*, as well as the economic development approach to Islamic forms of voluntary giving and endowment, represented a major Muslim intellectual discourse on poverty and social development in the New Order era. This vivid intellectual discourse in the New Order era

had a significant impact on Muslim perceptions of Islamic activism in the subsequent years. Observers are therefore right, to an extent, to consider that the emerging *Shari'a*, to mean the implementation of a particular form of Islamic law in Muslim societies, is partly a result of 'social discourse' among groups in society, notably the elites, rather than 'state action'.²

Both the voluntary and the private sectors have made serious efforts to work together with the purpose of creating a more decisive relief project for poorer families, especially regarding health. Islamic charitable clinics, therefore, are not simply the manifestation of Islamic giving, but also of social aid from 'secular' institutions. The enthusiastic involvement of national and international corporations in social enterprises, and in cooperating with *zakat* agencies, reveals that so-called 'indigenous charity' has been underpinned by the moral economy of 'secular corporations'. Among Islamic scholars, notably jurists, the philosophical concepts of the public good, public benefit, common good, public concern and the like are semantically represented by the term '*masalaha*'. In the case of Muslim societies, *zakat* signifies 'a key component of the moral economy', as it is also overwhelmingly related to redistribution of wealth for 'social benefit' or 'public welfare' (*al-maslaha al-ijtima'yya* and *al-maslaha al-'amma*).³ This arose when a number of Muslim professionals working in NGOs, *zakat* agencies and national and multinational companies were in a position to transform Islamic ideas of social justice in their restricted scope of action into being.

In accordance with this, the mobilisation of Islamic aid and the emergence of Islamic charitable clinics in Indonesia conceal the recent discourse of the 'common good' among Indonesian Muslims. The emergence of Islamic aid associations such as *zakat* agencies that specifically cater to disadvantaged groups in society may signify, to quote Mark Le Vine and Armando Salvatore's words, their 'rational responses to insufficient provision of crucial services (health, education, welfare and security)'.⁴ It is certainly correct that charitable action is closely related to the notion of *maslaha*, 'the public good', 'public interest', or 'public welfare'.⁵ And in Muslim societies, the meaning of the public good may reach 'beyond the immediate family to include extended family, neighbours, fellow subjects or citizens, and the

Muslim *umma* altogether.’⁶

I certainly agree that the concept of *maslaha* has been instrumental in the invention of new types of religiously-inspired social, economic and perhaps political activism. Among Indonesian Muslims, in general, and conservative Islamists, in particular, as suggested in the previous chapters, the concept of *maslaha* is associated with ‘imagined Islamic welfare societies’. In this idea of the good state, Islamic teachings should fulfil the needs of society not only in terms of their physical well-being, but also their spiritual health and religious identity. We may also see that the creation of the ‘good society’ or the ‘good state’ (*balda thayyiba*) that is ‘blessed by God’ is often enshrined as the organisational objective of Islamic associations, whether among modernist or traditionalist, conservative-fundamentalist or progressive-liberal. Yet, their efforts to achieve their goals can be expressed in different ways: some may address ‘structural issues’, while the other utilise ‘cultural approaches’; some perhaps tend to be ‘formalist’, while others become ‘substantialist’.

Islamic Charitable Associations: Enriching Social Activism

Following the decline of the New Order regime, Indonesian Muslims had the opportunity to express their religious duties in the social, economic and political domains more openly than ever before. In his last years in power, Soeharto seems to have taken a big step, in which the repression of organised Islam, which had been the dominant policy in the 1970s and 1980s, was replaced by a process of state ‘Islamisation’ in the 1990s. His supportive response to the establishment of the ICMI in 1990 partly shows how state Islamisation took place and the New Order started placing the Islamic bloc in power, as indicated in the involvement of New Order cabinet members in the ICMI, and vice versa. Yet, the financial crisis undermined the social, economic and political condition of the New Order regime, culminating in the downfall of Soeharto in 1998. His first successor was his vice president, B.J. Habibie, who at that time also was the chairman of the ICMI. The first years after the fall of Soeharto were characterised by economic and political instability, violent communal conflicts in Moluccas, Poso and Borneo, and a remarkable growth in militant Islamic groups.

Coinciding with these social and political changes, the enthusiasm of the Muslim middle class to rejuvenate Islamic philanthropy greatly increased subsequent to the economic crises at the end of the 1990s. The wealthy middle classes and urbanites became ever more interested in being involved in both religious and spiritual activities, as indicated by the flourishing of religious study groups, spiritual trainings, and new urbanite Sufi orders.⁷ The proliferation of Muslim associational life provided the proper context for the emergence of a whole range of charitable associations and Islamic foundations. As far as my research findings are concerned, philanthropic associations with extensive charitable services and development-oriented activities for the most part have originated from religious gathering groups and the *dakwah* movement at large. In certain cases, charitable associations in contemporary Indonesia are also a continuum of politically-oriented Islamic solidarity groups. They utilise Islamic discourse on justice, the supremacy of Islam, welfare, and the Islamic public sphere as a means of envisioning the public good.

Despite the fact that Muslim engagement with social and economic enterprises became prevalent, it was also characterised by the explosion of militant Islamism after 1998. The shift in the political attitudes of the New Order in the 1990s, which coincided with the process of state Islamisation, became instrumental in providing a space for Islamic activism, both socially and politically. Various kinds of Islamists, ranging from the purists to those advocating violent acts, made their presence felt. This is partly indicated by the emergence of Laskar Jihad, FPI, and other militant groups. Yet, we have acknowledged that Islamic social activism in Indonesia's social, economic and political landscape is not a new phenomenon. The long-established modernist and traditionalist organisations in Indonesia, represented, among others, by the Muhammadiyah and the NU, have since the early twentieth century endeavoured to translate and materialise Islamic precepts into reality by organising social services, and educational and economic activities. The presence of newly Islamic charitable associations, such as DD, RZI, AAP, PKPU, BSMI, and the like, as discussed in this study, is a sign of a new trend that is stimulating Indonesian Muslims to be better acquainted with welfare issues,

especially when they consider the state to be rather ineffective in providing an adequate welfare system. Muslim social activists in philanthropic associations believe that they should revitalise their social function, as the country and society are vulnerable to both economic and natural crises.

The attitudes towards the needs of society of long-established Muslim civil society organisations in both modernist and traditionalist circles, newly-formed Islamic aid associations and solidarity groups may differ from one another. Therefore the way in which they interpret and realise basic concepts of social justice, poverty, and welfare, as enshrined in Islamic literature, are instrumental in shaping their activism. Even though the public engagement of Muslim civil society organisations in providing social services is rather pervasive and covers various sectors (healthcare, education, and even politics), the newly-formed philanthropic associations seem to have been able to fill the gap left by the Muhammadiyah and the NU in capitalising on new resources from the public, especially the wealthy middle classes and prosperous urbanites, whose interest in Islam has considerably increased.

Although there are other approaches that are considered more appropriate to poverty alleviation, either through development-oriented activities or structural advocacy, in the social and political domains, the importance of Islamic charities cannot be underestimated. As a tradition, charitable activism seems to have been an alternative means for newly-established Islamic charitable associations to address poverty and welfare issues. Charity can be seen as an initial step to building awareness about giving, poverty relief, and solidarity-building among benefactors (wealthy families or organisations), from which a more strategic approach with the aim of addressing more fundamental structural problems and government policies can be developed. One may be left wondering why charitable associations flourish, when other development-oriented and structural advocacy approaches are available. In this regard, it should be remembered that giving relates to concepts of human dignity, pride, and reciprocal relations, and that the dominant actors that benefit from this giving-receiving process are mainly the benefactors. Scholars have been fairly correct in suggesting that charity may also result in asymmetrical relationships between givers and recipients. It is within this context

that charitable associations, in the form of collective action, can diminish this psychological dimension. Charitable associations can also function as intermediary actors providing a bridge between the specific needs of the recipients and the potential contribution of the benefactors.

Some Muslim charities have experienced the process of modernisation in their visions, attitudes, mechanisms, procedures, and management in terms of the ways they gain public support, run fundraising campaigns, and build networks. The meaning of welfare as understood in charitable associations can be a broad one, from poverty relief (healthcare provision, education) to disaster relief. It is under these circumstances that the contribution of Islamic charitable associations in the social development process and in the creation of the 'public good' is still in the making. In developed countries, charities remain necessary and, to some extent, are still supported by governments, as can be seen in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Western Europe.

In Western countries, faith-based development NGOs and charities, for example, receive support from the government through so-called 'development aid' or 'international aid assistance', enabling them to operate worldwide. Similarly, some Islamic charitable institutions in the Gulf States obtain subsidies, if not full support, from governments to reach areas that Western international NGOs cannot, and to finance religious-based activism in those Muslim societies that Western aid agencies may disregard. However, in Indonesia's social and political landscape, Islamic charitable associations remain predominantly self-governing, relying mainly on public contributions instead of direct government support. But it should be noted that in certain cases, the Gulf States have given considerable support to Indonesian Islamic charities. More importantly, domestic support for 'development' and 'advocacy' NGOs in Indonesia, like in other developing countries, is not as strong as that for faith-based NGOs and charitable institutions. Therefore, most of development and advocacy NGOs in Indonesia are financially dependent upon foreign instead of domestic or local resources.

From another perspective, it can be argued that charity has enriched the patterns of Islamic social activism among Indonesians, partly due to the wide-

spread involvement of the middle class, whose access to economic resources and political institutions is prevalent. This access has far-reaching benefits for the middle class, and allows them to pave the way to strengthening their networks and operate activities that target low-income families. The variety of educational and economic backgrounds of volunteers and professionals involved in social work has also led domestic aid agencies and philanthropic associations to modernise their institutions and improve the quality and impact of programmes and institutional capacity in catering to their beneficiaries. Some examples of this have been presented in this thesis. Although obstacles do exist, efforts have been made by Islamic charitable associations to reach low-income households by providing healthcare, scholarships and income-generating projects, and conducting skill development training and workshops. Due to this process of modernisation at the discursive and governance levels, the way in which Islamic charitable associations operate interwoven activities in the field may overlap, if not compete, with that of other associations that have been labelled ‘development NGOs’. In short, Islamic charities are in a process of transition, as they deal with both short-term poverty relief and development-oriented activities.

The pattern of social activism in Indonesia has changed overtime. As we have acknowledged, in the early twentieth century, charity activism was popular and poverty relief entered the agenda of many religious congregations. Charitable clinics, public kitchens, orphanages, buildings of worship, pilgrimage sites, and educational institutions were among the places set up either by communities, wealthy personalities, religious congregations, or rulers, under the legitimacy of benevolent acts. In Indonesia, many clinics and educational institutions were established to specifically cater to the poor, given that this disadvantaged section of society had limited access to private and government healthcare and education institutions. It is under these circumstances that Christian congregations, both Catholic and Protestant, with the support of the Dutch colonial government or that of religious congregations or orders overseas, engaged in social services in the health sector in Indonesia. The Protestant and Catholic hospitals in Indonesia are notable examples. Likewise, among Muslim groups, the modernist Muhammadiyah set up clin-

ics and hospitals, underpinned by indigenous physicians, which catered to low-income households. What is interesting, in my opinion, is that these hospitals in turn have undergone institutional transformations, as their charitable missions have been sidelined and they have incorporated modern management systems, which have not been charitable in character.

The challenges and opportunities, and the social, economic and political systems in Indonesia are constantly changing. In particular, the neo-liberal transformation of the economy has brought new problems, as large groups of society become further marginalised. This in part has stimulated Islamic charitable associations to play a public role and to attempt to fill the vacuum left by the government and other major NGOs. As one activist in an Islamic philanthropic association emphasised,

We know that outside there are a lot of advocacy NGOs working on poverty alleviation by addressing structural issues. That is a good thing. But we should also be aware that there should be somebody, an institution, to take action to relieve the poor. This is because short-term projects are also necessary.⁸

This statement indicates that charities, development, and advocacy NGOs are alike, not necessarily in terms of their approach, but according to their objectives of promoting social welfare and a prosperous society. Yet, at the same time, the above statement also indicates that differences are noticeable in the attitudes of development and advocacy NGOs and Islamic charitable associations towards social change. The case of charitable clinics operated by Islamic philanthropic institutions, such as DD and RZI, whose overarching concern is to provide adequate basic healthcare for low-income households, signifies that charitable institutions that emerged in the early twentieth century are being revived, concomitant with the 'capitalisation' and 'commercialisation' of faith-based private hospitals, whose nature used to be basically charitable. Of course the story does not end here. To what extent can these clinics survive with their charitable character? Are these clinics also going to grow and in turn be transformed into commercial clinics, like the long-established institutions? While only time can answer these questions, it is necessary to underline the further contributions of Islamic charitable asso-

ciations in enriching Muslim visions and approaches to welfare issues in the health sector. Despite the fact that budget constraints and limits on human resources remain problems for voluntary organisations, some Islamic charities have been able to develop an idea of how Muslims should deal with healthcare issues by not simply issuing *fatawa* (religious opinions), but also addressing public health matters in a more concrete way.

Apart from this, Islamic charities have also enriched Muslims' relief action in disaster-prone areas. In recent times, humanitarian aid has been provided not only by domestic professional and non-religiously affiliated relief NGOs that have operated for decades, but also by aid associations that also act, especially in the Indonesian context, as community-based *zakat* collectors. There has been a strong inclination within Islamic associations to operate humanitarian units to overcome the severe impact of natural disasters in both the domestic and international arena. Their prevalent engagement in relief missions during the course of disaster relief over the last two decades is growing evidence that charity and the giving culture have, in fact, had a great impact on 'innovation' in Islamic social activism. By way of an example, following the 2004 tsunami catastrophe, Aceh and Nias Island became the sites of an influx of domestic Islamic relief agencies, which at that time were predominantly still *ad hoc* institutions. While most of the NGOs landing in this area provided short-term relief projects, some aid agencies that remained until at least the rehabilitation and reconstruction stages were partly organised by faith-based NGOs, including Islamic philanthropic or *zakat* agencies, or Islamic associations which have multiple functions: acting as *zakat* organisations and relief NGOs at the same time.

Challenges and Opportunities in a Pluralistic Society

One interesting aspect that needs further analysis in the giving-receiving process is the type of beneficiaries of Islamic charities. Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country, and a number of Islamic charitable associations, with different ideological backgrounds and political affiliations, have increasingly invested substantially in making their social services beneficial to a wider range of stakeholders. Religious doctrines seem to have predominantly in-

fluenced the increase in Islamic social development projects through the concept of philanthropy, and communal solidarity is also strongly embedded in charity practice. The concept of the unity of Islamic society (*umma*), for example, has become a major theme in Muslim discourse, putting pressure on Muslim communities to organise themselves and, in turn, to promote the public good. The concepts of the ‘common good’ and the *umma* are interpreted in different ways by different Muslim groups, especially when these two terms are juxtaposed with the notion of Muslim solidarity in the context of Indonesia’s multicultural society.

In Islam, as can be seen in the normative sources (the Qur’an and *Sunna*) and Muslim intellectual discourse, the meaning of welfare can include both material and non-material things. In the first meaning, the extent to which welfare is defined relates to the fulfilment of basic needs: food, healthcare, daily income, appropriate dwellings, and so forth. To deal with these issues, Islamic charities have provided widespread social services by targeting particular segments of the poor. The other meaning is more intrinsic in nature, bringing together non-material aspects, such as freedom from injustice, religious expression, education, and the right of an individual Muslim or community to achieve a better life. For example, although there is no particular rule enshrined in the Qur’an and Hadith determining the categories of beneficiaries in terms of their religious affiliation or the degree of their religiosity, Muslims are ordered to perform *dakwah* (Islamic mission) by commanding good and forbidding evil (*al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar*). Therefore, social services are not ‘value free’, for they should be framed in accord with the spirit of commanding right, which, in some way, is expressed to support any kind of activity relevant to the Islamic mission. Yet, the experience of many faith-based charitable associations, including in Muslim societies, suggests that ‘cultural proximities’ remain essential to the formation of Islamic social enterprises and the types of benefactors and beneficiaries.

The concept of *dakwah*, which is incorporated in social and welfare activities, holds a significant place in Islamic associations. *Dakwah* in this sense should be understood not only as an effort to ‘propagate’ Islam among Muslims, but also to strengthen the relationship between welfare providers and

their recipients. Moreover, *dakwah* activities such as studying Islam (*pengajian*) or holding religious gatherings (*majelis taklim*) have functioned as a means of disseminating Islamic associations' social missions and building social networks. Among Muslim women, as noted by Janine C. Clark, who studied Muslim women's organisations in Yemen, the social networks and religious activities become 'a vital component in the negotiation and renegotiation of an Islamist identity.'⁹ Incorporating *dakwah* into social and welfare activities has generally characterised the charitable activities of faith-based voluntary organisations.

In some of the cases presented above, Islamic associations have created *zakat* agencies in order to specifically support their *dakwah* activities in both rural and urban areas. Others have even gone further by specifically working on the outer islands. In practice, there are two kinds of *dakwah*: *dakwah* among Muslims and *dakwah* among non-Muslims. The former, *dakwah* among Muslims, can mean the process of Islamisation in society. As a legitimate Islamic key concept in Muslim societies, *dakwah* is and can be applied in various sectors: social, cultural, economic, and political. Nevertheless, the way in which Muslim activists put the concept of *dakwah* into practice is not always the same. The modernist Muhammadiyah and PERSIS have particular conceptions that may differ from the 'traditionalist' NU conception of what Islamic society should be. The modernist mission has been predominantly characterised by the notion of 'purification', while the traditionalist one seems to have been adaptive to local cultures. The latter concept, *dakwah* among non-Muslims, is not as popular as the former, *dakwah* among Muslims, and some Islamic associations have included this concept of *dakwah* in their organisational programmes. Practically, *dakwah* among non-Muslim bears some resemblance to Christian missionary activities in non-Christian populations.

Another appealing issue to discuss is the relationship between *dakwah* and politics, and how this relationship has shaped and changed the nature of Islamic social activism in contemporary Indonesia. *Dakwah* movements in the Indonesian context cannot simply be regarded as an effort to spread religion in its traditional meaning. As mentioned previously, some *dakwah*

associations were, in fact, founded by prominent former politicians or personalities who are politically still active. DDII (Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation) has been of the most important *dakwah* organizations and has played a considerable role in the production of Islamic discourse in Indonesian. DDII's concern over the issue of 'Christianisation' has also influenced the character of its *dakwah* and social activities, as well as that of its attitudes toward non-Muslims. Likewise, the PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), which has declared itself a *dakwah* party, can also be example of how political interest intervenes in *dakwah* movements, or vice versa. An important part of the political activities of PKS activists has consisted in their engagement in social welfare and the establishing of various types of charitable organizations. Keeping these politically active *dakwah* movements in mind, one may wonder whether they can promote the public good and collective social change in broader context, or they tend to restrict their work to narrowly defined deserving beneficiaries belonging to the same denomination within their religion. It is under these circumstances that the inclusive meaning of social justice promoted by Islamic charities can be contested by their own exclusive ideological and politically-driven orientation.

The Muhammadiyah, AAP, DDII and the Hidayatullah Foundation all offer examples of how Islamic associations can extend their working areas of *dakwah*. Stimulated by the notion of solidarity between the members of the *umma*, these associations operate in the outer islands to assist Muslim minority groups who might need assistance from outside, due to their poor living conditions or because their regions have suffered from social, economic or political neglect. The lack of places of worship, the shortage of adequate educational institutions and skilled worker development training, and more importantly, the scarcity of knowledgeable persons or religious scholars who can teach them to learn and can guide them in the practice of Islamic teaching, all justify Muslim NGOs operating in isolated regions. As matter of fact, local people are in need of these young, dedicated and devout Muslim preachers from the above-mentioned associations, as they play multiple roles (Islamic teachers in schools, language teachers [English or Arabic], mosque organisers, etc.) in the outer islands, where only a few Muslim converts live.

It appears that Christian NGOs operate in the outer islands for the same reasons, and have been doing so since as early as the nineteenth century. Some Christian missionary groups work by providing development-oriented programmes and others simply provide ‘charity without a development framework.’¹⁰

Assisting or defending those in need, or to use a stronger term, the ‘oppressed’, regardless of their religious affiliation, has drawn much attention from Muslim scholars. The progressive Iranian thinker Ali Shari’ati, the Egyptian political activist Sayyid Qutb, and the Indian Muslim thinker Ali Asghar Engineer are among those figures who represent modern and contemporary Muslim thought on the necessity of dealing with disadvantaged groups. Certainly, these Islamic scholars have utilised Islamic idiom to conceptualise Islamic social and political concepts relating to assisting the oppressed. In the Indonesian context, Moeslim Abdurrahman and Mansour Faqih are two figures who have attempted to reformulate Islamic precepts as a means of advocating for the oppressed. Their understanding of Islam is rather unique in the way that they address the structural issues affecting the transformation of Islam in Indonesia’s social and political context.

Moeslim Abdurrahman has written a number of works in which he introduces ‘Transformative Islam’ (*Islam Transformatif*), meaning pro-justice Islam. According to Abdurrahman, in an era when dozens of disadvantaged groups in society suffer due to unjust policies, Islam should be an engine that empowers society. Muslim leaders and Islamic associations, in particular, should be acquainted with particular segments within society, such as farmers, labourers, and sailors, whose access to economic resources are unfortunately restricted by unjust political and economic structures. While holding similar views to Muslim Abdurrahman in focusing on the structure of poverty in Indonesia, Mansour Faqih began by exploring local initiatives to strengthen and empower communities. Faqih set up Muslim NGOs and engaged local leaders in the *pesantren* so that community development projects at grassroots level could be implemented.

In the context of minority groups, some Muslim NGOs have also attempted to formulate Islamic precepts in a more transformative way, but still

refer to the Islamic philosophical, theological, or jurisprudential literature. Among the traditionalist circles, some NGOs operated by the NU have started to widen the scope of people who are included within their concept of the public good, including minority groups, industrial labourers, and domestic migrant workers. They also include gender injustice, economic inequality, social disparities and unjust political policies among their concerns. With a shared interest in aiding the public good, some Muslim NGOs and charitable associations therefore can engage larger beneficiaries and undertake more dynamic activities. Consequently, even though for some Muslim development NGOs, *dakwah* is inherently embedded in their organisational missions, it does limit them when it comes to targeting minority groups irrespective of their religion, and even in terms of cooperating with other NGOs, either 'secular' or non-Muslim in character.

Adopting a development perspective is instrumental in shaping the public face of Islamic charitable associations: coming over as inclusive will give them more opportunities to enlarge their partnerships. Not all charitable associations follow a development perspective when carrying out their social services, but some, such as Dompot Dhu'afa, have made great attempts to place themselves in a strategic position by managing two sectors in their organisations: the 'charity sector' and the 'NGO sector'. The first functions to maximise its mobilisation of Muslim giving practice, while the latter acts as a strategy to enrich social activities. The experience of Dompot Dhuafa, for example, indicates that this Islamic philanthropic association has shifted its attitudes toward 'the others' (notably non-Muslim NGOs). Dompot Dhuafa has established partnerships with other NGOs, such as the Indonesian Consumers Organisation (YLKI), with Islamic civil society organisations, such as the Muhammadiyah in running *dakwah*, as well as with Christian relief NGOs in the Humanitarian Forum. Of course there are some Islamic aid organisations, philanthropic associations, and *zakat* agencies that are still 'inward-looking', and seem to overlook the 'development perspective' or neglect the fact that the creation of the public good in a pluralistic Indonesian society requires more energy and more partners.

Trajectories in Ensuring the Social Security of Poor People

In spite of the ability and enthusiasm of charitable associations in collecting domestic resources or public funds to be dispensed for social and religious purposes, the ability of Islamic charitable associations to relate their activities to structural welfare issues, either at a micro or macro-level, remains an interesting issue for discussion. In some cases, if not many, the beneficiaries are socially and politically passive, while at the same time, the state that is responsible for the future of its citizens is often trapped by bureaucratic obstacles, which prevent the state apparatus from effectively overcoming hardships in society. There is also one important point that we have to bear in mind when linking charitable associations to grassroots hardship: in spite of the ability of Islamic charities to access particular segments of society, to which secular development NGOs and even the state have little access, their contribution is not sufficient to significantly reduce poverty or to ensure social security among the poor. This is due to several factors, such as a lack of human resources, a lack of awareness among the grassroots, and deficiencies in structural support.

The absence of sustained social security systems offered by philanthropic institutions is partly a result of the lack of human resources capable of formulating good strategies to create a system under which social security at a micro-level could perhaps be planned and then executed. In spite of a new trend within a few *zakat* agencies and charitable institutions to deploy professional resources and staff, most are only managed part-time and tend to be too focused on attracting funding from the public. This can be seen, for example, in the case of health services for the poor offered by Islamic charitable clinics. In order to access these health services, low-income families must become members of the clinics, and their profiles are preserved in the clinic databases. Yet, in recent times, these databases have only been used in the course of providing services, and are not yet regarded as a resource for creating community-based healthcare insurance for low-income families. This means that in strengthening their institutional capacity, charitable associations still tend to concentrate on the mobilisation of resources, while paying little attention to effective redistribution of the collected resources in order

to meet long-term objectives. It should also be mentioned that some Islamic charitable associations or community-based *zakat* agencies have begun to pay attention to the dimension of knowledge in the community, building awareness through training and workshops on how to create a healthy community.

Moreover, the programmes offered by charitable associations, like most development NGOs, are mainly based on short-term projects. In the case of healthcare, charitable clinics cater to the needs of many low-income families who may come from different regions or different cities. This results in difficulties for philanthropic associations in organising beneficiaries after receiving healthcare. Apart from this, there are few philanthropic institutions whose charities and development-oriented programmes are based on research. Of the dozens of institutions, only some are able to hire professional researchers or set up research units to shape organisationally progressive and distinctive programmes.¹¹ It is therefore unsurprising that, as admitted by some social activists and volunteers, most new small and medium-sized philanthropic institutions copy what other leading agencies have done without trying to sharpen their distinct features and capacity, or make suitable programmes for the specific needs of the communities they serve.

Philanthropic associations alone cannot be relied upon to organise and ensure social security. I would suggest, and this also is indicated in other research, that the recipients, who often act as 'passive objects' instead of 'active subjects', also have their part to play. Charity activism, in fact, has also shaped the pattern of people's perceptions of and attitudes towards the inevitability of being active participants in the system. This kind of complexity is often faced not only by charitable associations, but also by development NGOs. The providers and recipients, as observers such as Janine A Clark, Asef Bayat, Sami Zubaida, Sheila Carapico, and Egbert Harmsen have remarked, have often been placed in a situation in which it is not entirely clear who derives the most benefit. Efforts by NGOs to engage the grassroots in the system have often yielded unpleasant results, because the recipients show little interest. Predictably, some scholars have argued that the relationship between the providers (the middle class), and the recipients (the grassroots) is pre-

dominantly controlled by the providers. While in certain cases this assumption may be true and can be accepted, one cannot overlook the social and cultural milieu of the recipients, which is complex and can make it difficult to sustain a programme with a development framework.

A lack of structural support from the authorities seems to have considerably contributed to weakening the ability of philanthropic associations to deal with welfare issues. The notion of welfare is has mainly been addressed in small-scale projects. Some community-based *zakat* agencies have come to be recognised as national Islamic charitable associations, thanks to their ability to operate in many places.¹² Yet, in practice welfare-oriented programmes are based in particular regions, either in rural or urban areas. Despite the increasing partnership between the voluntary sector, including Islamic charitable associations, and the government, there are still limitations in the mobilisation of domestic funds. The increasing enthusiasm within Muslim communities for reviving Islamic forms of giving, such as *zakat* and *sedekah*, have indeed drawn the government's attention, and in some regions the government has actively supported community-based *zakat* agencies—so long as they do not attempt to compete with the government—by issuing certain kinds of regulations under which the governance of *zakat* and *sedekah* can be improved. However, further partnerships to create sustained programmes for the poor in the health, economic and educational sectors are extremely rare, and this, in turn, leaves charitable associations with limited budgets, human resources, institutional capacities, skills and influence to work alone.

With reference to the roles played by Islamic philanthropic institutions in Indonesia, we may raise a few questions: to what extent can both the public sector and NGOs sustain charitable institutions? Does the imposition of *zakat* regulation in some provinces in Indonesia prolong giving practice among Muslim communities? Recently, the contribution of Muslim communities to Islamic charities has been along the lines of massive and simultaneous mobilisation by the community, private sector and state-based agencies. However, we may also predict that the religiously-motivated giving tradition cannot be detached from the economic and political context, and may show signs of stagnation after some decades of tremendous growth. The key issue

in this resource mobilisation process is how Islamic charitable associations adjust and adapt to the current interests of the community as a whole, which includes benefactors and beneficiaries, as well as the state and the market. The situation would be undermined if public funds were to become politicised and Islamic philanthropic organisations were unable to espouse good organisational governance.

Moreover, Islamic charities around the globe have had to deal with the various negative effects of the 9/11 tragedy. The public became increasingly suspicious about the use of charities for illegal acts, especially due to mass media and governmental attention to the issue. For nearly a decade, Islamic charities have also been the subject of intelligence scrutiny. The 'War on Terror' became a powerful slogan and a justification for keeping Islamic social and political activists under surveillance. In the Indonesian context, some Islamic charitable foundations have been suspected, notably by the US government, of being involved in illegal activities such as terrorism. Unfortunately, these suspicions were in many cases based on generalisations instead of accurate data, and therefore, many Islamic institutions and charitable foundations that specifically work for the community for social and religious reasons have also been affected. Interestingly, while suspicion on the part of international actors and policymakers remains insidious, new Islamic charitable associations have appeared publicly with professional and well-organised programmes, as well as various activities from which poor people can benefit. This has made it more difficult to undermine Islamic charitable associations in social, economic or political ways.

From Local Dynamics to the International Arena

Islamic charitable associations in Indonesia have found a role in communities and can operate in different areas. Originating as small, creative, community-based groups, Islamic charitable associations have been able to transform themselves from being modest associations that represent local social and religious dynamics to being nationally and internationally recognised relief associations. Their active participation in carrying out social services in many regions throughout the country and in relief missions in many parts of

the world have had far-reaching consequences for the practice of philanthropy among Indonesian Muslims. The increasing number of charitable associations may be seen as a popular expression of an Islamic resurgence in Indonesia, or as an attempt to utilise Islam as a constructive ingredient in the development of communities.

Having gained enthusiastic support in the local and domestic contexts, Islamic charitable associations, seeking to legitimise their authority as intermediaries between the 'haves' and the poor, endeavoured to engage in broader fields. These charities have not restricted themselves to providing services to local people, but also provide means for other disadvantaged communities in other countries. Islamic charitable associations are trying to achieve two kinds of objective in the local and national contexts. The first is to encourage communities to participate in the social development process by channelling some portions of their wealth, individually or collectively, to authoritative, official and legally recognised and well-organised institutions. The second is to provide the newest and more effective means for local communities to improve their quality of life, through nutritional improvement, healthcare, education, and skill development projects. Once Islamic charitable associations have made enough progress in the promotion of the public good and in organising local initiatives, they move to the next step by expanding their operational areas in the national context.

Faith-based philanthropic organisations' expansion of their functions and coverage area, through setting up branches in other regions, notably in major cities, and operating programmes in new places, has been a remarkable achievement. Through this strategy, philanthropic associations are able to gain more public recognition, more support from local communities in different regions (provincial or district), and at the same time can operate nationally. Despite the fact that most Islamic charitable associations are predominantly based in the major cities of Java, such as Jakarta, Bandung, and Surabaya, their branch offices do operate on other islands such as Celebes, Borneo, and Sumatra. New offices are also set up soon after delivering relief aid to disaster-affected areas, such as Aceh, Nias, Moluccas, and Papua. It is partly because of this networking that international communities, represented

by relief NGOs and aid agencies, including 'secular' and Christian NGOs, have started to engage and harmonise their projects with Islamic charitable associations.¹³

It should also be noted that the driving forces propelling domestic NGOs into the international arena relate to the geopolitical context. As discussed previously, for many Islamic charitable associations and Muslim relief NGOs, the notion of Islamic solidarity remains an essential factor in their international exposure. The conflicts in such places as Palestine/Israel, Bosnia and Afghanistan have appealed to feelings of Muslim solidarity and given rise to solidarity movements among Muslims all over the world, including Indonesia. In response to this type of conflict, communal solidarity seems to have become dominant and the notion of 'universal humanitarianism' has surfaced. Alongside the involvement of Indonesian Muslim relief NGOs in providing assistance to victims of conflict, Muslim solidarity groups in Indonesia have also mobilised public sources, justifying this with ideas of protecting and helping their oppressed fellow Muslims in other parts of the world. The extent to which Islamic charities are set up and operate in response to political crises in the international arena also signifies Muslim concerns about the meaning of justice. It seems that Islamic charities, like other humanitarian associations in conflict zones, are not immune to political influence.

Finally, from the overall discussion in this dissertation, we have seen that in the past two decades, Indonesian Muslims have been able to reformulate and translate Islamic faith into different types of welfare-oriented activities. Charitable services seem to have predominated in Muslim social enterprises, despite the fact that tackling economic hardships in society demands more than charitable action. Therefore, it remains necessary to strengthen the development perspective within Islamic charitable associations in Indonesia, so that Islamic associations can have a greater impact on society socially, economically and politically. In particular, a new reading and re-examination of Islamic concepts that relate to the promotion of the public good and public welfare is also needed in order to meet the current social, economic and political challenges in Indonesia, as a culturally and religiously diverse country. I personally believe that, in the absence of enduring efforts to strengthen

the development perspective, Islamic charities will fall into the trap of acting in a routine fashion, will be heavily characterised by sectarian views that limit their ability to effect broader social change, and will gradually lose their significance in overcoming the very complex and multi-dimensional problem of poverty in Indonesia.

Endnotes

- ¹ Muhammad Khalid Mas'ud, "Communicative Action and the Social Construction of Shari'a in Pakistan," in Armando Salvatore and Mark le Vine (eds.), *Religion, Social Practice, and Contested Hegemonies* (New York and Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 155.
- ² Muhammad Khalid Mas'ud, "Communicative Action," 158.
- ³ Charles Tripp, *Islam and the Moral Economy*, 119 & 124.
- ⁴ Mark LeVine and Armando Salvatore, "Socio-Religious Movements and the Transformation of "Common Sense" into a Politics of "Common Good", in *Religion, Social Practice, and Contested Hegemonies*, 32.
- ⁵ Robert L. Payton and Michael P. Moddy, *Understanding Philanthropy*, 27; Amy Singer, *Charity in Islamic Society*, 8.
- ⁶ Amy Singer, *Charity in Islamic Society*, 8.
- ⁷ See for example Julia Day Howell, "Modernity and Islamic Spirituality in Indonesia's New Sufi Networks," in Martin van Bruinessen and Julia Day Howell (eds.), *Sufism and 'the Modern' in Islam* (London & New York: I. B. Taurus, 2007), 217-240; Martin Bruinessen, "Sufism, 'Popular' Islam and the Encounter with Modernity," in Muhammad Khalid Mas'ud, Armando Salvatore and Martin Van Bruinessen (Eds.), *Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debate* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 125-157.
- ⁸ Interview with Arifin Purwakananta, Programme Director of Dompét Dhu'afa, 25 January 2009.
- ⁹ Janine A. Clark, *Islam, Charity and Activism*, 144.
- ¹⁰ See Karel A. Steenbrink, "The Power of Money: Development Aid for and through Christians Churches in Modern Indonesia 1965-1980," in Susanne Schroter, *Christianity in Indonesia: Perspective of Power* (Berlin: Lit., 2010), 105-136
- ¹¹ Dompét Dhu'afa, in cooperation with a research centre at the Universitas Indonesia (UI), has published two noteworthy books on *zakat* issues and poverty eradication: *Peta Kemiskinan: Data Mustahik, Muzakki dan Potensi Pemberdayaan Indonesia* [The Maps of Poverty: The Data of Benefactors, Beneficiaries and the Potential of Empowerment in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Dompét Dhu'afa, 2010); and *The 2010 Indonesia Zakat and Development Report* (Jakarta: Dompét Dhu'afa, 2009). These can be used by policymakers and even other *zakat* agencies to sharpen their development projects (fundraising and redistribution programmes) and to operate pilot projects in poor or isolated areas.
- ¹² In practice, *zakat* agencies whose public and social funds annually reach more than 1 billion per year are regarded by the government as national philanthropic associations. This govern-

ment recognition brings direct and indirect benefits for philanthropic associations, as they may receive a lot of support from public and private sector organisations.

- ¹³ See Karin von Hippel, "Aid Effectiveness: Improving Relations with Islamic Charities," 42-43. Abdel-Rahman Ghandour, "Humanitarianism: Islam and the West," 15-16.

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List of Abbreviations

BAZ/BAZIS	<i>Badan Amil Zakat</i> (government-sponsored zakat bodies)
BAZNAS	<i>Badan Amil Zakat Nasional</i> (National Zakat Body)
BMT	<i>Baitul Mal Wa Tamwil</i> (Islamic savings and loan cooperatives)
BRR	<i>Badan Rekonstruksi & Rehabilitasi</i> (Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Body)
BUMN	<i>Badan Usaha Milik Negara</i> (government-owned corporations)
BSMI	<i>Bulan Sabit Merah Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Red Crescent Societies)
CCU or CU	Catholic Credit Union
DD	<i>Dompot Dhuafa</i> (Wallet for the Poor, an Islamic Philanthropic Association)
DDII	<i>Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication)
DPR	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> (People Representative Council)
FOSDAN	<i>Forum Silaturahmi Da'i Nias</i>
FPI	<i>Front Pembela Islam</i> (Islamic Defender Front)
Hamas	<i>Harakat Al-Muqawamat al-Islamiyya</i> (Islamic Resistance Movement)
HFI	Humanitarian Forum Indonesia

IAIN	<i>Institut Agama Islam Negeri</i> (State Institute of Islamic Studies)
ICMI	<i>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Intellectual Muslim Association)
GAZA	<i>Gerakan Anti Zionis Israel</i> (Anti-Israel Zionist Movement)
KISDI	<i>Komite Indonesia untuk Dunia Islam</i> (the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the World of Islam)
KISA	<i>Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Afghanistan</i> (Indonesian Committee for Afghanistan Solidarity)
KISPA	<i>Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Palestina</i> (Indonesian Committee for Palestine Solidarity)
KKPA	<i>Komite Keadilan untuk Pembelaan Al-Aqsa</i> (Committee for Justice and the Al-Aqsha Liberation)
KOMPAK	<i>Komite Peanggulangan Krisis</i> (Crisis Rescue Committee)
KOTKIHO	<i>Koalisi Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Hong Kong</i> (The Hong Kong Coalition of Indonesia Migrant Workers Organisation)
KNRP	<i>Komite Nasional untuk Rakyat Palestina</i> (National Committee for Palestinian People)
KSI	<i>Komite Solidaritas Islam</i> (Islamic Solidarity Committee)
KSRIA	<i>Komite Setiakawanan Rakyat Indonesia-Afghanistan</i> (Committee for Indonesian-Afghanistan Friendship).
LAZIS	<i>Lembaga Amil Zakat</i> (Community-based zakat agencies)
LIMI	<i>Liga Pekerja Migrant Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Migrant Workers League)
LP3ES	<i>Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial</i> (the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information)
Golkar	<i>Golongan Karya</i> (A political party founded by the regime of the New Order)
GOZIS	a <i>Zakat</i> Agency that affiliates to Golkar
HMI	<i>Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam</i> (Islamic Student Association)
ICRS	International Committee of Red Cross Societies
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

MER-C	Medical Rescue Committee
M.I.A.I	the Majelisul Islami Ala Indonesia
MIS	<i>Madrasah Ibtidaiyah Swasta</i> (Islamic private primary school)
MMI	<i>Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia</i> (Indonesia Fighters Council)
MUI	<i>Majelis Ulama Indonesia</i> (Indonesian ‘Ulama Council)
NIRK	<i>Nederlands-Indische Rode Kruis</i>
NKK/BKK	<i>Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kampus</i> (Normalisation of Campus Life/Committee for Campus Co-ordination)
NU	<i>Nahdlatul Ulama</i> (Renaissance of Islamic Scholars)
OIC	Organisation of the Islamic Conference
PAN	<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> National Mandate Party)
PERSIS	<i>Persatuan Islam</i> (Islamic Union)
PGI	<i>Persekutuan Gereja Indonesia</i> (The Indonesian Churches Associations)
PII	<i>Pelajar Islam Indonesia</i> (Islamic Student Association)
PINBUK	<i>(Pusat Inkubasi Bisnis Usaha Kecil</i> (Centre for Small Enterprises Business Incubation)
PKS	<i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i> (Prosperous Justice Party)
PKPA	<i>Pusat Pengkajian dan Perlindungan Anak</i> (Study Center for Children Protection)
PKPU	<i>Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat</i> (Centre for Justice and the Care of Society)
PMI	<i>Palang Merah Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Red Cross Societies)
PNI	<i>Partai Nasionalis Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Nationalist Party)
PPP	<i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> (The Unity and Development Party)
P3M	<i>Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat</i> (Indonesian Society for Pesantren and Community Development)
RANTF	Recovery Aceh-Nias Trust Fund
RZI	<i>Rumah Zakat Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Zakat House)
TKW	Tenaga Kerja Wanita (Women Migrant Workers)
TPA	<i>Taman Pendidikan Al-Qur’an</i> (‘Qur’anic Kindergarten’)

UMR	Upah Minimum Regional (Regional Minimum Wage for labourers)
UN	The United Nations
YDSF	<i>Yayasan Dana Sosial Al-Falah</i> (Al-Falah Foundation)
YISC	Youth Islamic Study Club Al-Azhar
YPI	<i>Yayasan Pesantren Islam</i> (The Pesantren Foundation)
YPMN	<i>Yayasan Peduli Muslim Nias</i> (Nias Care Muslim Foundation)
ZISWAF	Indonesian acronym for zakat, infak, sedekah and wakaf

Glossary

<i>Adat</i>	Customary law or unwritten traditional norms ordering the social, cultural, and economic lives of the communities
<i>Akhlaq</i> <i>'Aqida</i>	The practice of good manner according to Islamic teachings Islamic faith, religious belief in the fundamental doctrine of Islam
<i>Da'i</i>	Muslim preachers, which in Indonesia, are also named muballigh, 'those whol deliver the messeges of Islam
<i>Dakwah</i> (Ind.), <i>Da'wa</i> (Ar.)	Missioary and social-welfare activities motivated by religious reasons
<i>Dhikr</i>	Remembering God's names to become more conscious of God's presence
<i>Fatwa</i> (Ar. <i>Fatawa</i>)	Islamic legal opinions on a matter of Islamic law issued by mufti or Islamic scholars
<i>Fiqh</i>	Islamic legal prescriptions
<i>Fi Sabilillah</i>	"In the way of God", effort to uphold Islamic teachings in the name of God'

<i>Hadith</i>	Sayings and acts of the Prophet Muhammad as recorded and transmitted by his contemporary
<i>Halal</i>	Lawful activities, or permissible
<i>Haram</i>	Unlawful activities, illicit or forbidden
<i>Ijtihad</i>	The intellectual 'effort' of using scholarly reasoning to interpret Islamic teachings
<i>Jihad</i>	The religious duty of Muslim to fight in the way of God
<i>Jizya</i>	Pol-tax on non-Muslim citizens (<i>dhimmi</i>) applied by Islamic rulers, entitled non-Muslim to protection and to practice their faith.
<i>Kharaj</i>	Tax on agricultural land applied in the early Islam
<i>Khums</i>	One-fifth (1/5), the amount of money that should be paid by Muslims as a tax for their earnings. Applied in the Shi'a tradition. For the the Sunni Muslims, one fifth of tax can only be applied to the 'spoil of war'
<i>Madrasah</i>	Islamic schools or seminaries
<i>Majelis Ta'lim</i>	Islamic study groups
<i>Muallaf</i>	New Muslim converts
<i>Mushalla</i>	Small house of prayer for Muslims
<i>Muhadara</i>	Conversation and public speaking training
<i>Mujahid</i>	Those who perform jihad, or the soldier of God
<i>Muslimat</i>	Muslim women
<i>Mustahik</i>	Legitimate zakat recipients according to Islam
<i>Mustad'afun</i>	The oppressed
<i>Pengajian</i>	Religious study
<i>Perantau</i>	Traveler or those who are travelling to other regions in order to earn money
<i>Pesantren</i>	Traditional Islamic boarding schools
<i>Sedekah</i>	Charitable or voluntary giving
<i>Shari'a</i>	Islamic law or Islamic moral code
<i>Shari'a by-Laws</i>	Islam-based regulation issued by local governments at provincial or district level.
<i>Tabligh</i>	The propagation of the messages of Islam

<i>Tarbiyah</i>	'Education'. It is also linked up to the movements inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.
<i>Tawhid</i> (Ar.)	The Ones of God, the very fundamental principle in Islamic theology
<i>Ukhuwwa</i>	Brotherhood
<i>Umma</i>	The Islamic community
<i>Ustadz</i>	Religious/Islamic teacher
<i>Waqf/Wakaf</i>	Pious endowment
<i>Waqf al-Nuqud</i>	Cash endowment
<i>Zakat</i>	Islamic tax, almsgiving

Samenvatting

Deze studie houdt zich bezig met de opvattingen en het handelen van Indonesische Moslims tegenover liefdadigheid, welzijn en sociale rechtvaardigheid, en onderzoekt de diverse rollen van Islamitische liefdadigheid-organisaties bij het uitvoeren van sociale welzijnsactiviteiten zowel op het platteland als in stedelijke gebieden. Door een exploratie van de relatie tussen drie belangrijke velden van activiteit (welzijn, *dakwah* en politiek), wordt gevraagd of liefdadigheid een sociale beweging kan voortbrengen onder de huishoudens met een laag inkomen als doelgroep, en of Islamitische liefdadigheidsinstellingen in staat zijn om collectieve sociale veranderingen te bevorderen in plaats van slechts de netwerken van de middenklasse te verstevigen of slechts godsdienstige stromingen te dienen.

In het bijzonder zal dit proefschrift ook de volgende vragen trachten te beantwoorden: Hoe Moslims het idee van liefdadigheid opvatten in verband met de wisselwerking tussen staat, maatschappij en de markt; en welke sociale, religieuze, en politieke rechtvaardigingen liggen achter hun sociale, religieuze en politieke gedrag. Hoe Islamitische liefdadigheid instellingen de waargenomen problemen (welzijn, godsdienst en politieke vraagstukken) benaderen binnen de Indonesische samenlevingen; en in hoeverre zijn zij in staat (of niet in staat) om betrouwbare ‘sociale zekerheid’ te verschaffen aan de armen

als een middel om algemeen welzijn te realiseren in een pluralistische maatschappij? Om de bovengenoemde onderzoeksvragen te kunnen beantwoorden, is gedurende enkele perioden tussen medio 2008 en begin 2011 in steden zoals Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Banda Aceh en op het eiland Nias veldonderzoek verricht.

Vanaf 1980 hebben vele moslimlanden, Indonesia inbegrepen, een ongekende ontwikkeling meegemaakt in de civiele samenleving bewegingen en toenemende economische groei, veranderingen die de sociale en economische betrekkingen hebben beïnvloed binnen de gemeenschap als geheel. De opkomst van een welgestelde moslim middenklasse met een nieuw geestelijk en sociaal bewustzijn is bevorderlijk geweest voor het stichten van Islamitisch sociaal en politiek activisme over het algemeen, en heeft bijgedragen aan de proliferatie van Islamitische instellingen, variërend van educatieve instellingen tot welzijnsorganisaties. Daarnaast zijn, na de val van Soeharto, veel moslim NGO's op de voorgrond getreden, zoals de liefdadigheidsverenigingen Dompot Dhuafa, Rumah Zakat Indonesia, DPU-DT, AAP en Bulan Ssabit Merah Indonesia (waarvan enkele reeds in de jaren '90 waren opgericht) en hebben hun activiteitenterrein uitgebreid. Hun uitbreiding werd ondersteund door een algemene wending tot religie en de toenemende belangstelling in de manieren waarop islamitische aalmoezen worden gegeven en goede daden worden verricht. De instellingen hebben hun reputatie gevestigd door effectieve sociale diensten en hulp te verlenen in Indonesië en in het buitenland. Hierdoor worden Islamitische goede doelen steeds populairder bij de Indonesische Moslims. Het scala aan sociaal welzijn activiteiten is aanzienlijk, variërend van verlichting van de armoede in stedelijke gebieden tot het ondersteunen van *dakwah* en politieke activiteiten.

Om een breder inzicht te krijgen van Islamitische liefdadigheid en sociale activiteiten in Indonesië na de Nieuwe Orde tijdperk, onderzoekt deze studie vier typen liefdadigheidsactiviteiten: gezondheidsvoorziening voor de armen in stedelijke sloppenwijken; ontwikkelingsprojecten gericht op tiener meisjes afkomstig van lage inkomens huishoudens, *dakwah*-activiteiten in de buitengebieden, en ook hulp aan de Palestijnen.

Het opkomen van charitatieve klinieken gesponsord door islamitische

liefdadigheidsgenootschappen duiden op de inspanningen van de moslims om goede daden te vertalen in godsdienstig geïnspireerde weldadige sociale praktijken. Gezondheidsvoorziening voor de armen lijkt een alternatieve strategie van de Islamitische charitatieve instellingen te worden om hulp te bieden aan de kansarme bevolkingsgroepen, en op hetzelfde moment, een middel om het algemeen welzijn te bevorderen op maatschappelijk niveau. Charitatieve klinieken duiden op de mogelijke rol die Islamitische charitatieve instellingen kunnen spelen op de verlichting van de armen, vooral in de gezondheid sector. Ze zijn al jaren actief en spelen een centrale rol in het verlichten van stress bij de de armere gezinnen, terwijl ze op hetzelfde moment trachten om het kapitaal, dat in handen is van particulieren en privé instellingen op grassroots niveau te brengen. Deze studie betoogt dat hoewel de islamitische charitatieve instellingen samenwerken met grassroots en middenklasse groeperingen, deze instellingen niet kritisch genoeg zijn tegenover het falen van de staat om sociale zekerheid te bewerkstelligen, in tegenstelling tot enkele 'seculaire' of traditionele moslim NGO's. Ze spreken nauwelijks over structurele veranderingen door, bijvoorbeeld, een beweging te mobiliseren om te pleiten voor een hervormingsprogramma voor de gezondheid.

Enkele islamitisch charitatieve instellingen hebben ook getracht om zich op vrouwenvraagstukken te richten. De ernstige problemen van armoede, waardoor vrouwen in een ongunstige positie worden geplaatst, waardoor sommige vrouwen slachtoffers worden van mensenhandel, hebben Islamitische charitatieve instellingen gestimuleerd om ontwikkelingsprojecten op te zetten gericht op vrouwen. De doelstellingen van de ontwikkelingsprojecten voor vrouwen zijn om vrouwelijke tieners te verhinderen dat ze als huishoudelijke hulpen overzee moeten werken, en ook om ze te beschermen tegen de schadelijke gevolgen van mensenhandel. Het verschaffen van tijdelijke beroepsgerichte activiteiten kan ook verhouden dat achtergestelde tieners en vrouwelijke schoolverlaters vroegtijdig trouwen in hun dorpen. Desalniettemin is in deze studie gebleken dat het bevorderen van gendergelijkheid, de verandering van 'patriarchale cultuur', de bekritisering van beleidsmaatregelen van de regering t.a.v. gender bevooroordeeling, of de

overheid aan te moedigen om een beter en goed opgeleide werkkrachten te verschaffen, maken blijkbaar geen deel uit van de hoofdagenda van Islamitische goede doelen, noch zijn deze hun voornaamste doelstellingen.

Een ander geval betreft de verspreiding van *dakwah*-activiteiten in de buitengewesten die ondersteund worden door de islamitische charitatieve instellingen. De verrichtingen van Islamitische charitatieve instellingen op het eiland Nias, gelegen aan de westkust van Sumatra, resulteerde gedeeltelijk in de verspreiding van *dakwah* activiteiten op dit niet-Moslim meerderheid eiland en de toename van het aantal madrasah en mushalla/moskeeën. In de praktijk zijn er twee soorten *dakwah* : *dakwah* onder de moslims en *dakwah* bij non-moslims. De eerste, *dakwah* onder de moslims, kan het proces van islamisering betekenen binnen een gemeenschap, terwijl de laatste enige gelijkenis vertoont met Christelijke missionaris activiteiten bij niet-christelijke bevolkingen. Enkele islamitische charitatieve instellingen, zoals de AAP, DDII en AMCF kwamen op Nias aan kort nadat er in 2005 dit gebied door een aardbeving werd getroffen. De doelstellingen van deze instellingen zijn om de *dakwah* activiteiten te ondersteunen door jonge *da'i* (priesters) te sturen om de gemeenschappen bij te staan, inbegrepen de Moslim bekeerlingen, in het bestuderen van de Islam, en te helpen om gebedshuizen te bouwen of te reconstrueren. Dit onderzoek suggereert dat islamitische liefdadigheid en andere op geloof gebaseerde liefdadigheid elkaar betwisten om te onderhandelen tussen de moslimgemeenschap te dienen d.m.v. *dakwah*, en de mensheid in het geheel te dienen d.m.v. sociale welzijnsactiviteiten.

Het laatste geval heeft betrekking op de betrokkenheid van islamitische charitatieve instellingen en solidariteitsgroepen in hulpprojecten om de palestijnen te steunen. Het begrip van Islamitische solidariteit blijft, voor vele Islamitische charitatieve instellingen en moslim hulporganisaties (NGO's), een essentiële factor in hun internationale uitstraling. De conflicten in plaatsen zoals Palestina/Israel, Bosnië en Afghanistan spelen in op de gevoelens van Moslim solidariteit en doen de solidariteitsbewegingen toenemen onder de moslims over de hele wereld, Indonesië inbegrepen. Naast de betrokkenheid van Indonesische moslim hulp NGO's om bijstand te verlenen aan slachtoffers van conflicten, hebben moslim solidariteitsgroepen in Indonesië ook

openbare bronnen gemobiliseerd, dit is te rechtvaardigen door de gedachten dat hun onderdrukte medemoslims in andere delen van de wereld moeten worden beschermd en geholpen. De mate waarin de islamitische liefdadigheidsinstellingen worden opgericht en te werk gaan als antwoord op de politieke crises in de internationale arena maakt duidelijk over de bezorgdheid van Moslims van de betekenis van rechtvaardigheid (*al-'adala*) en het concept van eenheid van islamitische gemeenschap (*umma*).

Van alle discussies over islamitische liefdadigheidsinstellingen en sociale beweging in hedendaags Indonesië, stelt deze studie de volgende belangrijkste conclusies voor.

Ten eerste, er zijn tegenstrijdige opvattingen bij de Indonesische moslims over hoe de aanwezige problemen, zoals welzijn, armoede moeten worden opgelost. Islamitische liefdadigheidsinstellingen, en hun betrokkenheid met sociale bedrijven in de gemeenschappen, zijn geneigd om hun activiteiten te beperken tot korte termijn hulp acties, en aarzelen om in de politieke sfeer te dringen om de minderbedeelden te machtigen hun sociale, economische en politieke rechten terug te eisen en hun onafhankelijkheid te herstellen om hun sociale en economische doelen te bereiken. Islamitische liefdadigheidsinstellingen die bloeien in de periode na de nieuwe orde tijdperk in Indonesië, zijn gekomen als een nieuw populaire patroon van sociale beweging, in tegenstelling, zowel praktisch als discursief, tot de NGO's voor ontwikkeling en hulp over het algemeen, die vooral collectieve en structurele veranderingen voorstaan.

Ten tweede, eerdere studies van moslim liefdadigheidsactiviteiten hebben opgemerkt dat welzijnsinstellingen typisch middenklasse instellingen zijn die het netwerk van de middenklasse versterken en die, eigenlijk meer betekenen voor de gevers dan voor de ontvangers. Hoewel waarnemers gesuggereerd hebben dat het lijkt of de liefdadigheidsbeweging de belangen van de middenklasse bevoordeeld heeft boven die van de armen, of dat ze een gereedschap is geworden om sociale, economische en zelfs politieke patronage te vestigen, betekent dit niet dat de armen altijd vervreemd zijn. Daar de religieuze zienswijzen en politieke banden van de leden de van moslim middenklasse nogal variëren, van 'rechtse islam' tot 'linkse sociale activisten',

worden de kenmerken van de islamitische liefdadigheid instellingen gevormd door dynamische interacties tussen hun leden. Dit, op zich, leidt tot het vermogen (of misschien onvermogen) om liefdadigheid acties te combineren met ontwikkelingsgeoriënteerde projecten, of zelfs met activiteiten die sociale veranderingen bevorderen.

Ten derde, religieuze en culturele verwantschap blijven essentieel bij de vorming van Islamitische sociale ondernemingen en de soorten van begunstigen. De meeste islamitische liefdadigheid instellingen hebben hun oorsprong in *dakwah* (religieuze verspreiding) bewegingen of in een omvangrijke politiek georiënteerde islamitische solidariteitsgroepen. Deze oorsprong heeft niet alleen de soorten van omgang en activiteiten binnen de Islamitische liefdadigheidsinstellingen vorm gegeven, maar heeft ook bepaald welke categorieën van begunstigen worden bediend. Dit onderzoek stelde vast dat, zelfs in het kader van de *dakwah*, de Islamitische liefdadigheid in staat is geweest om de noties over broederschap, solidariteit, wederzijds hulp en zelfs sociale rechtvaardigheid te herformuleren, als een middel om het welzijn van de islamitische gemeenschap te versterken, en toch neigen zij hun werk te beperken door nauwkeurig gedefinieerde begunstigen te dienen die dezelfde godsdienst aanhangen of zelfs een stroming binnen hun godsdienst. Daardoor worden islamitische liefdadigheidsinstellingen nu uitgedaagd om hun sociale dienstverlening uit te voeren voor een grotere groep van belanghebbenden in Indonesië, als een breed cultureel en religieus land.

Tenslotte, de wisselwerking tussen godsdienst en politiek heeft de aard van islamitische liefdadigheid in Indonesië beïnvloed en heeft ook de betrekkingen tussen de islamitische liefdadigheidsinstellingen zelf vorm gegeven en ook met andere (niet-islamitische charitatieve instellingen of seculaire NGO's). Dit onderzoek suggereert dat het delen van dezelfde religieuze waarden en het hebben van dezelfde identiteiten niet altijd resulteren in een samenwerking, deels omdat de versnipperde politieke oriëntaties de bestaande instellingen dwingen om met elkaar te wedijveren in plaats van samenwerkingsverbanden op te bouwen voor lange termijn welzijnsprojecten.

Curriculum Vitae

Hilman Latief was born in Tasikmalaya, West Java, in 1975. He completed his basic education at the Ma'had Darul Arqam Muhammadiyah, Garut, and pursued his undergraduate studies at the State Institute for Islamic Studies, Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta (1999). He earned MA degrees from the Center for Religious and Cross Cultural Studies, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia (sponsored by the Ministry of Education/BPPS), and from the Department of Comparative Religion, Western Michigan University, United States (sponsored by a Fulbright Scholarship), in 2003 and 2005 respectively. In early 2008, under the framework of Training Indonesia's Young Leaders (TIYL), with support from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and partial support from the Indonesian Ministry of Education, he was awarded a scholarship to pursue his doctoral studies in the Netherlands. He is currently a lecturer in the Faculty of Islamic Studies, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY).

His selected publications include: (author) *Melayani Umat: Filantropi Islam dan Ideologi Kesejahteraan Kaum Modernis* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2010); 'Health Provision for the Poor: Islamic Aid and the Rise of Charitable Clinics in Indonesia,' *Journal of Southeast Asia Research*, 18, 3 (September 2010), 503-553; 'Symbolic and Ideological Contestation over Humanitarian Em-

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