Relative Group Position and Intergroup Attitudes in Russia

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Relatieve groep positie en inter-groep attitudes in Rusland
(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

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Contents

Chapter 1

Introduction

Chapter 2

The Effects of Social Identifications on Ingroup and Outgroup Stereotypes of Russian and Titular Groups

43

Chapter 3

The Content of Outgroup Stereotypes:
Views of Chechens and Jews   **63**

Chapter 4

Perceived Intergroup Conflict:
Testing the Group Position Model   **77**

Chapter 5

The Impact of Group Position
on Supporting Minority Rights   103

Chapter 6

Group Position Moderates Relationships between Social Identifications and Support for Assimilation and Multiculturalism 119

Chapter 7

Summary and General Discussion 145

List of Tables

List of Figures

"How many acres
how much light
Tucked in the woods
and out of sight"

Leslie Feist

Introduction

*"… and no social group is an island-
in the same sense in which
'no man is an island' "*

(Tajfel, 1978, p. 3)

1.1   Background

The power of ethnic and national fault lines to divide human societies and the factors and circumstances that may turn "ingroup love" into "outgroup hate" have been on the research agenda of psychologists (Brewer, 1999; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif & Sherif, 1956; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), anthropologists (Barth, 1969), sociologists (Krysan, 2000; Olzak, 1992; Sumner, 1906; R. M. Williams, 1994) and political scientists (Green & Seher, 2003; Gurr, 1971; Horowitz, 1985; Krysan, 2000) for many years. Our research is along the lines of social psychological studies on intergroup relationships, specifically those using general population surveys in the former Soviet Union countries (Hagendoorn, Linssen, & Tumanov, 2001) and after the reunification of Germany (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999). Interested in how structural arrangements foster intergroup tolerance or conflict, we use social psychological theories and survey data to map the quality of intergroup relationships in the ethnonational context of the Russian Federation.

We align our approach with the research tradition that employs general population field surveys in order to investigate intergroup attitudes around the time of particular historical events. This research methodology provides an opportunity to validate and extend theoretical models explaining intergroup attitudes beyond the confines of laboratory settings or convenient samples. Research in ethno-national settings also brings methodological challenges in conceptualizing and measuring features of the intergroup context and people's responses to them. Balancing the strengths and complexity of field research, this book is a collection of studies on intergroup attitudes using survey data from the Russian Federation at the change of centuries (1999 – 2005).

Our studies focus on the impact of structural arrangements of political power on the intergroup attitudes of various ethnic groups in the Russian Federation. The complex federal structure of Russia and the period of political transition in the 1990s make this setting particularly interesting, because status and power relationships are defined along

several dimensions. From a political viewpoint, the same ethnic group can be simultane-ously categorized as privileged and subordinated depending on the criteria and level of analysis one employs. This is different from Germany after reunification, where status relationships were clearly favouring the West Germans, while the East Germans were seen and saw themselves as "second-class citizens" (Kessler & Mummendey, 2002). It is also different from the situation of the former Borderland republics (such as Ukraine or Georgia), where the disintegration of the Soviet Union resulted in a literal reversal of power relationships between the resident Russians (losing their dominant status) and the indigenous titular nationalities (i.e., Ukrainians or Georgians) who became the dominant group almost overnight (Hagendoorn et al., 2001). The situation of the Russian Federation was and remains more controversial.

In the Soviet Union, political privilege and status were inextricably linked to *ethnicity* and *territory* (Hirsch, 2005; Kaiser, 1994). For example, only 41 out of around 128 eth-nic groups were categorized as *titular nationalities,* which meant that only these ethnic groups were given formal privileges and rights to govern themselves on specific territories. These territories were chosen based on the history of residence of the titular group and their numerical concentration on that territory, at the beginning of the 20th century. Our research is based around the territories of the *autonomous titular republics* of present-day Russia. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there are 21 autonomous republics out of a total of 89 territorial units (federal subjects) constituting the Russian Federation. These republics "belong" to the respective titular groups (i.e., titular nationalities) that gave the republics their names: Tuva is for Tuvins, Tatarstan is for Tatars, Karelia for Kareli and so on. The autonomous titular republics have the highest level of political autonomy compared to the other federal subjects of the Russian Federation (Stepanov, 2000; Tishkov, 1999, p. 34). On the territories of these republics, the respective titular groups hold a position of formal privilege. However, according to the 2002 Census, around 80% of the population of the federation is ethnically Russian, which gives the Russian group overall numerical, political and cultural dominance (especially on the federal territories outside the borders of autonomous republics).

Two criteria, namely, *ethnic group membership* and *residence on a particular admin-istrative territory* have significant potential to confer status and political privileges in the Russian Federation. This potential was consolidated in the decade following the disintegra-tion of the Soviet Union. A series of declarations of sovereignty by Russia's autonomous re-publics triggered new waves of ethno-national determination, seeking to decentralize power from the federal centre to the periphery and increase republics' authority of self-governance (Hale, 2000).The combination of these political arrangements and historical events makes the Russian-titular setting a unique context for the study of intergroup attitudes. Do these status-defining criteria guide people's attitudes towards their own groups and others? What drives intergroup evaluations among those in a position that combines high status based on *ethnicity* with low status given by *residence on a territory* that "belongs" to another ethnic group (the situation of Russians living on republican territories, such as Russians living in Chechnya or Tatarstan)? Also, what predicts the attitudes of those group members whose status as a subordinate *ethnic* minority in the federation is counterbalanced by a dominant position inside the *territory of their own republics* (the case of titulars living inside their

own republics, such as the Tatars living in Tatarstan)? More generally: *How does the relative positioning of groups in a social-political system affect intergroup attitudes?*

The aim of this introduction chapter is to address the general approach and central themes running throughout the following chapters. This book is a collection of a variety of studies, and therefore, every chapter presents reviews of relevant theories, specifying the respective hypotheses and data used for testing. This introduction is not intended to present an overview of the contents of all empirical chapters. Instead, we wish to position our research in the current literature on intergroup attitudes and emphasize the main points of interest in terms of theoretical models and their empirical application in the context of the Russian Federation. We begin by presenting our epistemological approach to the study of intergroup attitudes (Section 1.2), followed by a brief description of the Russian-titular intergroup setting (1.3); the next section (1.4) highlights the wider theoretical framework and main research questions that run throughout the studies in this book; we end with a broad introduction of the two surveys conducted in the Russian Federation (Section 1.5), given that specific information on the data used in the various studies is presented in detail in each chapter.

1.2   Micro-dynamics of Intergroup Relationships Embedded in Ethno-National Contexts, between Psychological and Public Opinion Research

> *"The analyst of public opinion must begin by recognizing the triangular relationship between the scene of action, the human picture of that scene, and the human response to that scene working itself upon the scene of action."*
>
> *(Lippmann, 1922, p. 4)*

When analyzing intergroup phenomena in an ethno-national context, clarity about one's theoretical stance and methodological approach is crucial. This section presents our approach regarding the study of intergroup attitudes as well as an explanation for the use of public opinion survey data. In studying society, one can use theory "to develop a meaningful interpretation of the world", or as a guide in developing intervention policies, or one could concentrate on the "studious cultivation of empirical facts to see if the theory fits" (Blumer, 1954, pp. 3–4). In our research, we choose for the latter approach: we confront previous theoretical models of intergroup processes with data from the Russian Federation.

1.2.1   The Macro-to-Micro Link

Our central assumption is that the social political context and one's group position in this context play crucial roles in shaping intergroup attitudes. We conceive of intergroup processes as embedded in the larger ethno-national context. Thus, without aiming to describe societal phenomena (or find solutions) for intergroup conflict or tolerance in Russia, we use historical and political knowledge about this intergroup context in order to specify how our

social-psychological theories apply to the Russian-titular setting. Thus, both reductionism (i.e., explaining intergroup attitudes as a function of individual concerns, as if the group setting would be of only secondary importance) and universalism (i.e., explaining intergroup attitudes in abstract from contextual factors, as if they are general and unaffected by a particular setting) are dismissed from our understanding of intergroup dynamics.

Our focus is on the links between specific macro-level structural features and micro-level individual responses to these. In Lippmann's words (1922, see the quote above), we investigate the links between the "scene of action" and the "the human response to that scene", or as sociologists would put it, we are interested in "bridge assumptions", connecting macro level processes to micro level dynamics (Wippler & Lindenberg, 1987). Therefore, we avoid both reducing our investigation to exclusively psychological processes (at the individual level), and over-generalizing the applicability of these processes across national contexts, cultures or historical periods, which would ignore the specific institutional arrangements particular to each intergroup setting.[1] Specifically, we argue for a *contextualized approach to intergroup attitudes*, acknowledging that individual (psychological) responses to political and social (structural) features are fundamentally the product of this interaction. Analyzing intergroup processes in isolation from the wider societal forces, or assuming that explanations of intergroup attitudes can be found exclusively in individuals' emotional reactions or instrumental calculations would overlook the interactions between people and their national and institutional context.

A contextualized approach to intergroup relationships requires the analytical integration of the macro-level structural dimension (historical, political, and sociological) with the subjective and interpretative (social-psychological) dimension. In our studies, we relied on previous research in Russia for a specification of the "scene of action" and aimed to provide empirical insights into the "human responses to the scene" (Lippmann, 1922, p. 4). For example, the knowledge that ethnicity and territory are crucial macro-level factors used to define status and negotiate power in Russia is based on previous field studies (Gorenburg, 1999; Hagendoorn et al., 2001; Hale, 2000) and historical and political analyses of the Russian setting (Hirsch, 2005; Kaiser, 1994; Tishkov, 1997, 1999). However, the way people relate to these *specific* factors and the effects of these factors on people's attitudes in the intergroup situation are the core interest of our studies. We label these social psychological processes by which individuals relate to the intergroup context (for example, via group identification, or perceiving group based grievances or threats) and the consequences of this context on intergroup and political attitudes as the "micro-dynamics of inter-group relationships".

We base our investigations on several assumptions. First, *group membership* is expected to be crucially consequential for people's evaluations of the intergroup situation (Tajfel, 1978). Secondly, the *position of one's group in the social-political structure* is expected to condition intergroup relationships and the social psychological responses of individuals to group-related issues (Blalock, 1967; Bobo, 1999). Thirdly, system level features (such as whether one's group is in a minority or a majority, or in a privileged or subordinate posi-

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1   For a discussion of epistemological pitfalls in social psychological studies, see Pepitone (1981, pp. 981–982).

tion) should impact individual attitudes via a *subjective sense of group position,* that people develop and hold based on their group membership and according to the relative position of groups in the particular context (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Tuan, 2006).

These assumptions reflect our theoretical position *in between* the psychological realm of individual and intergroup processes and the political or sociological realms of structural macro-level phenomena. They are also indicative of our attempt to combine objective and structural indicators of status and power (as they are historically and institutionally established in a particular setting; see Section 1.3 for more details), with the subjective understanding and translation of these indicators into a sense of group position held by group members (see Section 1.4.2 for explanations). Finally, they indicate our empirical approach to the micro-dynamics of intergroup relationships aiming to test particular theoretical propositions, rather than describing or interpreting the Russian intergroup setting, or investigating particular problems and their potential solutions.

1.2.2 Public Opinion Surveys

Our investigation into the context-embedded nature of intergroup relationships calls for a research methodology able to provide data from "people in context". Therefore, we use survey data for our studies.

Survey data with participants from the general population fulfil important functions. First, they allow us to assess the relational and interactive aspect of intergroup attitudes, by directly comparing between groups that are structurally situated in different positions. Surveys across multiple groups provide insights into the reach and depth of contextual effects versus the generalizability of psychological processes. Secondly, public opinion data are useful to test the external validity of theories outside laboratory settings. By combining a series of snapshots, public opinion data give an account of how and if our theories "work in the real world". This is particularly important when one is interested in group memberships that are institutionally and historically entrenched in people's everyday realities (rather than "experimentally induced" group identities, see Huddy, 2001). Lastly, the use of randomised experimental designs in surveys provides the means for testing hypotheses without losing the benefits of external validity, gained from representative sampling (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004; Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick, 1991). Thus, public opinion survey data provide advantages to the study of intergroup processes embedded in specific political contexts.

To sum up, the research focus in this book is on the effects of a particular ethnonational context and its specific structures of power arrangements on the micro-dynamics of intergroup relationships. How does a political system that institutionalizes privileges on the basis of ethnicity and territory shape the quality of intergroup relationships? We focus on the micro-foundations of this societal-level problem, whereby individuals' intergroup attitudes are assumed to be affected by the political struggle for group position. We employ public opinion survey data in order to grasp those individual attitudes in context, and, by design, we aim to capture multiple groups perspectives based on real-life variation in relative group position.

1.3 The Research Context:
Intergroup Relationships in the Russian Federation

The Russian context at the end of the 1990's provided a real-life opportunity to explore the struggle for group position, by investigating whether the processes of renegotiation of status and power at the macro level affected intergroup attitudes at the individual level. Defining the relative group positions of Russian and titular groups requires a specification of both historical developments and political practices that came to institutionalize political privileges according to ethnicity and territory in the republics of the Russian Federation.

    Throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, Russia underwent a series of transformations in the social-political standing of its various ethnic groups. After gaining independence from the Soviet Union, the main power negotiations within the Russian Federation were related to the nature of federalism, and the degree to which federal subjects[2] were granted varying levels of autonomy vis-à-vis the federal centre. Nevertheless, due to the "ethnic" nature of the federation, political (administrative) struggles between centre and periphery were stamped by ethnic and territorial claims and required heightened caution to the multi-ethnic character of the federation as a whole, and of its component units in particular. In many ways, the tensions between the Borderland republics and the Soviet Union (Hagendoorn et al., 2001) were replicated within the Russian Federation with the titular autonomous republics also demanding decentralization of the governing power. In other ways, despite the similar ethno-territorial structure, the USSR history of territorial disintegration did not repeat itself in the Russian Federation (Hale & Taagepera, 2002). The ethno-federal structure did encourage political elites to "play the ethnic card" and also provided the institutional resources to enter negotiations over controlling resources (Hale & Taagepera, 2002, p. 1105). Yet, these high level political struggles happened within the confines of the federal borders and targeted a rearrangement of power positions (both ethnic and territorial), rather than further secession and independence (taking the Chechen war for full independence as an exception).

    Much has been debated, described and analyzed in terms of the political outcomes and formal settlements regarding the power relationships within the federation (see for reviews: Hale, 2000; Kahn, 2002). Our research provides a new angle to this literature, by investigating the grass-roots relationships and attitudes between different ethnic groups in Russia. We also look at how the territorial affiliation of these various groups of Russians or titulars affects intergroup attitudes.

1.3.1   Relative Group Positions of Russians and Titulars

Within two years from the break-up of the Soviet Union, all titular republics within the newly independent Russian Federation tried to secure de facto political autonomy to govern

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2 'Federal subject' is a political term referring to the various administrative units constituent of the Russian Federation. The federal subjects (such as republics, oblasts, krais, okrugs) have varying degrees of autonomy in terms of self-governance, but have equal representation in the upper-level political bodies of the federation, namely the Federation Council.

their territories, by negotiating bilateral agreements with the federal centre. Republican sovereignty meant the supremacy of local laws over federal ones, autonomy to control economic decisions and natural resources, and demanded that a larger share of the locally-collected federal taxes was kept within the republics (Lynn & Fryer, 1998). In addition, the rights to promote local languages and customs played a crucial symbolic role in the establishment of titular sovereignty in their republics (Hale, 2000; Kahn, 2002, p. 119). Newly empowered titular groups gained the political legitimacy to claim a larger share of power inside the republics and vis-à-vis the federation. Russian groups, which previously held the undisputed position of dominance throughout the Soviet Union, became confronted with political marginalization within the territories of the 21 titular republics inside the Russian Federation. The challenge to the status of these Russian groups came despite their undeniable numerical and cultural superiority in the federation as a whole (on the territories of the other 68 federal subjects, as well as across the federal territory).

For *titulars*, the constitutional provisions of each autonomous republic and the republican borders confer a privileged status compared to the Russian or other ethnic groups living inside the republics (Codagnone & Filippov, 2000; Stepanov, 2000). For example, policies that granted official status to the titular languages in the republics had considerable consequences in excluding the Russian (or other language-) speaking populations from access to governmental and public offices, or important managerial positions in the labour market (Codagnone & Filippov, 2000; Gorenburg, 1999; Tishkov, 1997). Other policies addressing a range of social-cultural symbolic issues consolidated the position of titular groups: new state symbols like the republican flag were chosen; different religious calendars, and subsequent official holidays were adopted; the alphabet was changed from the Cyrillic script to the Latin or Arab scripts; countries, cities and towns were re-named. As Tishkov (1997, p. 104) commented, these measures expressed "the political battle to establish the status and prestige" of the titular groups (see also: Lynn & Fryer, 1998; Stepanov, 2000; 1997, p. 104).

Thus, for the most part, titular privilege was historically institutionalized on the basis of ethnicity and size (Hirsch, 2005), and it was also vividly *re*negotiated along ethnic and territorial fault-lines in the aftermath of the Soviet Union collapse. The political ideology of national-determination driving titulars' pursuit of more republican autonomy is one of ethnic-entitlement: formal ownership of the republic entitles *titulars* (and no other ethnicities) to a privileged group position inside republican territory. However, outside the territories of their own republics, titular groups are in a subordinate position, rarely given any political or cultural privileges based on their ethnic membership (Codagnone & Filippov, 2000).

For the *Russians*, the reverse is true: living outside the territories of titular republics places them in a dominant position, politically, culturally and numerically (Russians accounted for circa 80% of the population of the Russian Federation in the 2002 Census). For them, ownership of the Russian Federation confers a superior status compared to any other non-ethnically Russian groups. Moreover, even if they are formally disadvantaged inside titular republics, Russians still compose a significant share of the population of some of these republics: in half of them Russians account for 50% or more of the population (Kahn, 2002, p. 117). This numerical presence provides Russians with a basis of entitle-

ment to political power in the republics. Russians within the titular republics do not aim at establishing cultural supremacy, and do not engage in an ethnic entitlement discourse to legitimize their claims to power. Rather, it is group size and wealth that gives Russians a platform for negotiating status within the republics and with the Federal Centre. Data from our surveys indicate that Russians living inside republics joined titulars in supporting separatism, and this was the case especially in the richer republics, and where the titular outgroup was smaller (Hagendoorn, Poppe, & Minescu, 2008). Thus, for these groups of Russians, attachment to the titular republic of residence is an important factor shaping their political attitudes. Russians' republican attachment is a complicating factor in deciding whether ethnicity or location of residence (i.e., territory) is more consequential in shaping their intergroup attitudes. However, for the Russians living outside the republics, this consideration is irrelevant, and their dominant status in the federation is more likely influence their attitudes.

To sum up, depending on the reference framework of either the republic of residence or the federation, both titulars and Russians can lay claims to a privileged group position. Titulars draw their privileged position from claiming ownership of the republics, while Russians' dominant status is ensured by their cultural and numerical dominance in the federation as a whole. Within the territories of autonomous republics, both Russian and titular groups are likely to feel entitled to a share of political power, though their claims are legitimized by different ideological principles: ethnic entitlement is likely to fuel titulars' pursuit for power, and majority rule and relative group size are likely to strengthen Russian claims. Outside the territories of the autonomous republics, on the territories of federal subjects that are not ethnically defined, Russians' position of dominance and titulars' subordination are unquestionable.

1.3.2   Implications of the Russian-titular Intergroup Relationships for the Current Research

The studies in this book drew on the complexity of the Russian-titular intergroup setting in three key areas: the relevant political and social identifications, the comparisons between groups positioned differently in terms of status, and the range of intergroup attitudes we could address in our surveys. We turn to each below.

The multiple nested levels of political organization in the Russian Federation, with various ethnic groups (Russian and titular) living within republics, and the presence of different republics within the same federal territory, designates a particular set of concentric circles of loyalty. From a social psychological perspective, this provides an opportunity to understand the effects of *multiple identities* (with ethnic groups, with republics and with the federation) on a range of intergroup attitudes. In Chapters 2 and 6, we investigate the patterns and effects of these social identifications on participant's intergroup stereotypes and their support for assimilation or multiculturalism, respectively.

Secondly, the natural *variation in the relative group positions of ethnic groups* across the Russian Federation allowed for particular types of comparisons of social psychological phenomena, from the perspective of groups positioned differently in the political structure.

In the first set of surveys (Hagendoorn & Linssen, 2000), we were interested in comparing the intergroup attitudes of Russians and titulars, living across a variety of republics with different patterns of numerical distribution and ethnic diversity (See Table 1.1 for demographic information on the ten republics sampled in the NWO 1999-2000 survey). We draw on the variation in relative group size in Chapter 4, when we use a measure of titulars' relative ingroup size as an indicator of their position of entitlement in their republics. In Chapter 2, we focus mainly on the differences between titulars and Russians, across all surveyed republics. In the second set of surveys (Poppe & Hagendoorn, 2005), our focus moved to comparisons based on the location of residence of titulars and Russians: living inside or outside titular republics (See Table 1.2 for an overview of the groups and their location included in the INTAS 2005 survey). The role of objectively defined group position was investigated by testing for ethnic differences and for variations due to location of residence (both factors are included in Chapter 5, while Chapter 6 deals with the perspective of titular groups only).

By design, our public opinion surveys allowed for an investigation of intergroup attitudes from a multiple group perspective. This investigation benefitted from the actual variation in group positions in Russia, as defined by ethnicity, relative group size and territorial delineations. Most studies that employ similar cross-country comparisons of ethnic group attitudes are disadvantaged by the inability to control for variations at the macro-level, which function beyond the level of the intergroup dynamics of interest (Anderson & Singer, 2008; Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010). Having the federation as a common political background for our comparisons between various ethnic groups and across the republican borders represented an advantage. While a range of differences between republics and ethnic groups do occur within the federation (e.g., in terms of cultural similarity between Russians and titulars or economic differences), the analytical models included in this book did not account for these differences.[3] The focus was on variations based on group position defined mainly in political terms (as mentioned above), rather than cultural or economic ones.

Lastly, studying the micro-dynamics of intergroup relationships embedded in the ethno-national context of the Russian Federation provided the opportunity to investigate *a range of intergroup attitudes* that are socially and politically relevant in this context: from stereotypes to support for minority rights. We were interested in the links between the institutionalization of group based privileges (namely, relative group position) and the quality of intergroup relationships (namely, a series of intergroup attitudes). The common background of the Russian Federation facilitated a multifaceted understanding of the intergroup relationships between titulars and Russians. Intergroup animosity may be captured by stereotypes measures, but this may not necessarily result in exclusionary political attitudes (Hagendoorn et al., 2001; Hagendoorn et al., 2008). Thus, the Russian setting allowed not only for multiple group comparisons, but also for comparisons of social psychological processes across a range of indicators of the quality of intergroup relationships.

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3   In other studies (for example, Hagendoorn et al., 2008), we specifically tested for the impact of republican characteristics on intergroup attitudes.

The following section connects these contextual features (such as, membership in a particular ethnic group, the location of residence with respect to republican borders, and relative ingroup size) to relevant theoretical models used throughout our studies.

1.4 Theoretical Framework for the Studies in the Russian-Titular Intergroup Setting

> *"… human social behaviour can only be properly understood if we are able to get to know something about the subjective 'representations of social reality' which intervene between conditions in which social groups live and the effects of these conditions on individual and collective behaviour"*

> *(Tajfel, 1978, p. 3)*

We are interested in the impact that asymmetries in power and status have on the quality of intergroup relationships. That is, to what degree social and political structures affect individuals' subjective evaluations of their own position (e.g., in their sense of group identification or relative deprivation) and subsequently their attitudes towards other groups. We take a social psychological approach, with the understanding that social psychological processes harbour the potential for social and structural change. While individuals cannot single-handedly change the social conditions and constraints imposed from higher level authorities (e.g., government), they can change and control their own interpretations of social reality, and they have the potential to engage (or not) in collective action that could challenge the status-quo to their best interests. The theoretical framework encompassing the studies in this book is based on two lines of inquiry in intergroup processes: the Group Position Model (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Tuan, 2006) and Social Identity Theory (Reicher, 2004; Tajfel, 1978). Both theoretical traditions promote a view of individual agency, whereby people individually and collectively define, negotiate and re-define their images of themselves and their sense of group position. Before moving to an overview of the specific lines of investigation in the current studies (Sub-sections 1.4.1 to 1.4.3), we explain a few core assumptions of Social Identity Theory and the Group Position Model, which made them particularly relevant for our study of intergroup attitudes in the Russian Federation.

There are three central tenets drawn from the Social Identity Theory and the Group Position Model that lay the foundations of our overall theoretical framework, across the studies of this book. First, there is a basic proposition that the characteristics of stability and legitimacy of the macro level social and political system affect the micro-dynamics of intergroup relationships. Secondly, we expect that people's sense of group position and their intergroup and political attitudes are conditioned by their position in the social structure. This position should be defined in terms of *structural indicators of group position* (see Figure 1.1), because the official criteria of defining and institutionalizing privileges establishes a vertical dimension of dominance-subordination that is beyond individuals' choice and control. Thirdly, at the individual level, it is the sense of group position (defined by *subjec-*

tive indicators of group position, see Figure 1.1) that drives people's intergroup attitudes on the horizontal dimension of inclusion-exclusion.

At the core of the two theoretical traditions,[4] Social Identity Theory and the Group Position Model, lies the assumption that perceived illegitimacy of the system of intergroup relationships (Ellemers, Wilke, & Knippenberg, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and a sense of violated entitlements and threat to the status quo (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Tuan, 2006) are crucial preconditions for individuals' engagement with the fate of one's group. In other words, changes in the way group based privileges are institutionalized in the political system will have top-down consequences on the quality of intergroup relationships (see Figure 1.1). Thus, we assume that group loyalties and the need to re-establish and define one's group position in the new political system were relevant concerns for people at the grassroots. As explained before (see Section 1.3), the 1990's period was one of instability of status relationships, in which Russian and titular groups felt entitled to claim more political power for their own ingroups. In addition, during the political transition, elite level negotiations as well as the migration of Russians and other titular groups (internally, on the territory of the Russian Federation, and externally, from the previous Borderland Republics of the Soviet Union) raised the general level of threat and fear of "losing ground". From a sociological and political viewpoint, the intergroup situation was unstable, and the legitimacy of the system of privilege-distribution was contentious and questioned (similar to the intergroup situation in Germany after reunification, see: Mummendey, Klink, et al., 1999). Survey data from the grass-root population provide an opportunity to test whether, under these conditions of structural change, intergroup attitudes align with the theoretical expectations of the Social Identity Theory and the Group Position Model.

A second important tenet, common to both theoretical traditions, is the crucial role of the *objective structure of intergroup relationships.* Structural and institutionalized group privileges formally define relative group positions along *a vertical dimension of dominance and subordination* (Blumer, 1965). This vertical dimension captures social stratification, and is inherently determined by history and politics, establishing privileges according to nominal criteria (such as race, ethnicity, nationality, class and the like). Given the presence of two structurally embedded criteria of conferring status in the Russian Federation: ethnicity and residence on a particular territory, we can explore how intergroup attitudes are configured when multiple vertical dimensions are taken into account. That is, what drives people's intergroup attitudes when the same group can be simultaneously "defined"

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4   The difference between these theoretical traditions lies mainly in their original focus on subordinate groups dealing with the negative implications of their group's status quo, for Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978), or on the dominant groups expressing prejudice and discrimination, as a protective reaction against threatening subordinate groups, for the Group Position Model (Blumer, 1958). Both Social Identity Theory and Group Position Model research (and theoretical frameworks) have more recently extended to address intergroup attitudes and relationships from a multiple group perspective (namely, also from a dominant and subordinate group perspective, respectively). The most notable difference between the two theoretical traditions lies in the portrayal of groups as either vessels of belonging and loyalty (according to Social Identity Theory), or as means to protect and advance one's interests (according to the Group Position Model). It is noteworthy that while Social Identity Theory generally aims to explain processes of intergroup differentiation which are not necessarily conflictual or leading to outgroup derogation (Brewer, 2001), the Group Position Model is more suitable to explain intergroup relations of discrimination and conflict (Blumer, 1958).

Institutionalized System of Group Based Privileges

Structural Indicators of Group Position

· Ethnic Group Membership: Russian versus Titular Nationality ·
· Location of Residence: Inside versus Outside Republics ·
· Relative Size of the Ingroup ·

Subjective Indicators of Group Position

· Social Identifications
   Subordinate: Ethnic
   Superordinate: Republican & Federal
· Perceived Relative Deprivation
· Perceived Intergroup Competition
· Perceived Threat
· Outgroup Encroachment

Intergroup Attitudes

· Stereotypes
   About Ingroup & Outgroups   Chapter 2
   About Third Outgroups   Chapter 3
· Perceived Conflict   Chapter 4
· Supporting Political Goals
   Minority Rights   Chapter 5
   Assimilation & Multiculturalism   Chapter 6

Figure 1.1 The Role of Group Position in the Micro-Dynamics of Intergroup Relationships

as dominant and subordinate, according to the respective criterion? At the social-psychological level, Self-Categorization Theory (a branch of Social Identity Theory, see: J. C. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) would provide the answer: the dimension/category that is most salient to individuals also drives their evaluations. According to Self-Categorization Theory, people subjectively switch and chose from various identity categories according to the principle of normative fit, namely, the category that is most relevant and clear at a given moment is chosen (J. C. Turner et al., 1987). Nevertheless, at the political-sociological level, one could argue that both the ethnicity criterion and territorial affiliation are equally relevant to people living in the Russian-titular context. Similar to the situation of the Borderland republics, the actual salience, relevance and functions that various group memberships fulfil in a contested ethno-national setting may be a matter that goes beyond the (exclusively) psychological motives addressed by Self-Categorization theorists (for a discussion, see: Hagendoorn et al., 2001, pp. 23-28). The presence of several politically embedded status-conferring criteria and the different combinations of a privileged or subordinated status in the Russian Federation provide an opportunity to refine our understanding of people's group identifications and their role in determining intergroup attitudes.

Thirdly, and lastly, the micro-level dynamics of intergroup relationships are based on the assumption that the motor of social change is located at the *individual* level, in peoples' subjective representations of social reality: their identification with the ingroups (Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004; Wright & Tropp, 2002), their beliefs about the structural features of intergroup relationships (Huddy, 2001; Tajfel, 1978), and their fear that specific outgroups are encroaching on the area of privileges rightfully belonging to the ingroup (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 2004, p. 342 see the horizontal arrow and boxes in Figure 1.1). This *horizontal dimension of inclusion-exclusion* is present in both the Social Identity Theory and the Group Position Model, and it is meant to capture the socio-emotional reactions of people in the intergroup setting, based on their daily interactions with ingroup and outgroup members (Blumer, 1965; Bobo, 1999, p. 454).

Our overarching research question is: *How does the relative position of Russian and titular groups in the Russian Federation affect intergroup attitudes*? Throughout the chapters, predictions are derived in three main areas: 1. the role of social identifications, and in particular the effects of *superordinate identifications*; 2. the conceptualization and operationalization of *group position* and *the sense of group position*; and 3. the differences and similarities in the micro-dynamics of intergroup relationships across *a range of social psychological and political attitudes.*

For the first area of interest, the main contribution of the current studies lies in testing theoretical expectations in the more complex situation of the Russian Federation. Predictions based on the Ingroup Projection Model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) are applied to a set of nested identifications, and we investigate how group position (i.e., group membership according to ethnicity, or based on residence inside or outside republics) conditions the effects of superordinate identifications. The second line of research deals with the theoretical refinement and empirical application of the concept of "group position" (i.e., distinguishing between structural and subjective dimensions) and presents a series of methodological advancements into testing the Group Position Model (i.e., by clear opera-

tionalizations of structural and subjective indicators of group position, by an experiment embedded in the general population survey). Lastly, the third aim was to analyze a range of intergroup attitudes, in order to assess the empirical validity and reach of our predictions. Theoretically, we may expect discrepancies between social and political indicators of intergroup differentiation because different norms may restrict the expression of intergroup exclusion in some areas but not others. Empirically, we argue for a more nuanced and issue specific assessment of the quality of intergroup relationships, which is especially necessary when dealing with intergroup relationships embedded in specific ethno-national contexts.

The following sections clarify the particular points of focus and contribution of the different studies from this book in light of our general theoretical framework.

1.4.1   The Role of Social Identifications in the Russian-titular Context

A long tradition of research in line with Social Identity Theory documents that group identification is crucial in determining intergroup attitudes and behaviour (Reicher, 2004; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Fraser, 1978). The strength of attachment and importance of group membership constitutes the foundations of the sense of group position, because it demarcates group boundaries and a sense of intergroup distinctiveness (Blumer, 1958). But, the type and meaning of these identity categories is likely to be at least equally (if not more) important than their subjective salience (Brubaker, Loveman, & Stamatov, 2004; Huddy, 2001). This is particularly important in ethno-national contexts where identities are politicized and come to represent the official channels of inclusion or exclusion in the political arena (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

We investigate particular patterns of group identification with socially and politically relevant identity categories in the Russian-titular setting: the ethnic group, the republic of residence and the Russian Federation. We contribute to previous research by focusing in particular on the effects of superordinate identifications (See Chapters 2 and 6).

Based on the assumptions of Self-Categorization Theory, superordinate identifications could be seen as a solution to intergroup conflict and prejudice (J. C. Turner et al., 1987). If group boundaries are the problem (i.e., source of division and bias), then diminishing the strength of these boundaries and creating a new overarching category to include the previously divided groups into one common ingroup- are expected to be the solution. Research in line with the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993) has brought some evidence that the presence of a superordinate category can decrease sub-group conflict and generate more positive attitudes, but some findings were mixed (Gaertner, Dovidio, Nier, Ward, & Banker, 1999; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a, 2000b). Even more problematic in the understanding of superordinate identifications as a solution for intergroup antagonism is the fact that recategorization (at the higher level) simply "establish[es] a new line of conflict between the common in-group and a new out-group" (Kessler & Mummendey, 2001, p. 1099). Another more recent conceptualization of superordinate identifications proposes them as "the battleground for groups to claim their superiority" (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2008, p. 367). In line with the Ingroup Projection Model, superordinate identifications may

provide a means of exclusion, rather than inclusion, and may lead to disputes over the rightful "owner" of this identity category between the various subgroups included within the superordinate category.

The basic prediction of the Ingroup Projection Model is: the more (sub)/ group members portray the superordinate identification in the colours of their own (sub)/group (i.e., the more they feel relatively prototypical for the superordinate category compared to other subgroups), the more likely they are to manifest intergroup differentiation and discrimination. These effects of superordinate identifications are manifest as long as people simultaneously identify with their subgroups. However, rather than expecting that a dual identification (both with the subgroup and the superordinate identification, for example the idea of "different groups on the same team") necessarily results in a decrease of intergroup discrimination (which would be in line with the Common Ingroup Identity Model, see Gaertner et al., 1993; González & Brown, 2003; Miles Hewstone & Brown, 1986), the Ingroup Projection Model conditions these effects on the *normative content of the superordinate identification*. For example, given a strong identification of Russians with their ethnic group and with the Russian Federation, Russians may claim that whoever identifies with the Russian Federation (the superordinate identification) *should* behave according to the norms and rules of the Russian ethnic (sub-) group. Therefore, in the eyes of these Russians (who project their relative prototypicality onto the superordinate identification with the federation), the federal identification is *not* inclusive of other ethnic (sub-) groups, and therefore should not decrease antagonism towards those other subgroups. At the same time, a very complex representation of the federal identification (i.e., one which would decrease the projection of relative prototypicality of the Russian ethnic group onto the federal category) would still be likely to generate positive views of other subgroups belonging to the federation, as would be predicted by the Common Ingroup Identity Model (for the role of a complex representation of the superordinate identification, see: Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003).

The presence of two superordinate identifications (republican and federal) and data from groups positioned differently in the socio-political system (namely, the Russians and titulars) provided an opportunity to extend the empirical application of the Ingroup Projection Model. To what degree do the effects of alternative superordinate identifications counter-balance each other, in a way that exclusion from one category prevents or promotes inclusion in the other? And to what degree are these identifications used differently by Russians and titulars? We expect that titulars claim more relative prototypicality of the republican identification, while Russians claim relative prototypicality of the federal identification. And we expect parallel exclusionary effects of these identifications, corresponding to each group's perspective and portrayal of identification content (see Chapter 2).

In addition, we investigate the degree to which the effects of these superordinate identifications are moderated by group position. Data from titulars living inside and outside republics (Poppe & Hagendoorn, 2005) allow for a comparison of the processes of ingroup projection according to the position of dominance or subordination of the ingroup. A dominant group position confers more legitimacy in advancing entitlement claims and establishing the criteria of inclusion. Therefore, we expect groups in a position

of dominance to endorse the superordinate identification on which they can project more relative prototypicality of their own (sub-) group. Conversely, subordinate groups may employ superordinate identifications with a view to integrate into the mainstream society. These groups may appeal to superordinate identifications as a means of inclusion, and thus refrain from projections of relative prototypicality. Our tests on the role of group position in ingroup projection processes is a relatively new extension of the model, because it shows not only that social reality constrains moderate claims of ownership of the superordinate categorizations (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004), but also that people strategically select superordinate categorizations to justify their choices to assimilate or claim assimilation of others (See Chapter 6; and for a similar argument but different analysis methods see, Sindic & Reicher, 2008).[5]

The predictions around the role of ethnic and superordinate identifications are tested with respect to ingroup and outgroup stereotypes, based on the survey conducted in 1999-2000(Hagendoorn & Linssen, 2000), in Chapter 2. Chapter 6 investigates the relationships between social identifications and people's attitudes towards the benefits of promoting multicultural or assimilationist practices, with data from 2005. The first analysis focuses on the interplay of the various identifications and their effects on the social psychological processes of intergroup differentiation as reflected in group stereotypes, and compares titulars and Russians across the surveyed republics of the Russian Federation. The second study emphasizes the role of group position in moderating the effects of social identifications on political attitudes, comparing titulars who live inside republics with titulars living outside their republics.

1.4.2   Defining and Operationalizing Group Position and the Sense of Relative Group Position

The second line of research throughout our studies deals with the theoretical and methodological refinement of the concept of "group position". In this section, we elaborate on the role of structural indicators of group position to increase theoretical clarity about the differences between macro and micro level phenomena. We also present our contribution in defining and operationalizing "the feelings of proprietary claims", introducing a distinction between realistic (i.e., objective) indicators of entitlement and the perceptions of grievances associated with violated entitlements. Lastly, we discuss how the empirical tests for the effects of threat and the fear of outgroup encroachment could be improved by distinguishing particular kinds of threat (with reference to a specific area of entitlements), and by specifying a particular outgroup as the agent of that threat (the main focus of Chapter 4).

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5   Sindic and Reicher (2008) argue for the strategic motivations behind the use of superordinate identifications by showing that people who do not wish to belong to the superordinate category downplay the relative prototypicality of the ingroup for the superordinate identification. In Chapter 6, we argue that the choice of superordinate identification is also a matter of instrumental calculation: one is more likely to appeal to the superordinate identification that offers inclusion in the relevant political category.

1.4.2.1   The role of structural indicators of group position

At the structural (macro) level, relative group position is institutionalized according to criteria like nationality, ethnicity, race or specific policies that provide social status or political power as a function of group membership. These criteria are context specific, configured by political practices that shaped the respective intergroup context throughout history. Nominal membership based on these criteria is conceptualized as the *structural indicators of group position.* We contend that one way of showing how context and the structural position of one's group impacts the effects of the sense of group position on intergroup attitudes is to use group comparisons. Given that in the Russian Federation, political power and status are institutionalized on the basis of ethnicity and territory we investigate the *moderating role* of ethnic group membership and residence inside or outside the republican territory. In other words, we focus on *ethnic group membership* and *location of residence* as two structural indicators of relative group position.

   A series of steps and assumptions are tested: First, does the structural position of one's group in the social-political system affect people's sense of group position? Namely, are there differences or similarities in the identification patterns or relative deprivation based on ethnic group membership and residence in a subordinate or privileged position? Secondly, are the relationships between one's sense of group position (for example, social identification) and particular intergroup attitudes (such as outgroup stereotypes or supporting minority rights) also moderated by the structural position of the ingroup? In other words, if social identifications have an impact on political attitudes, is this impact conditioned by one's group status as privileged or subordinate? Figure 1.1 provides an overview of the concepts we used as subjective indicators of group position, and the various intergroup attitudes used in the different chapters of this book.

   Theoretically, the question is whether the micro-dynamics of intergroup relationships are different for groups who are positioned differently in society. Previous research indicated that such differences do exist: for example members of subordinate groups identify stronger with their ingroup compared to members of the dominant majority groups (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Ellemers & Van Rijswijk, 1997; Simon, Pantaleo, & Mummendey, 1995) and the cognitive and behavioural responses to feelings of relative deprivation also differ between members of higher versus lower status groups (Ellemers, 2002; Ellemers & Bos, 1998). Empirically, we extend these investigations to the Russian-titular intergroup context, taking into account the various criteria of defining group position, and consequently the specific perspectives of the groups living in the Russian Federation. The moderating role of structural indicators is addressed in Chapters 2 and 5 by comparing groups on the basis of ethnic group membership (Russians versus titulars), and in Chapters 5 and 6 by comparing on the basis of residence inside or outside republics.

1.4.2.2   Ingroup size and entitlement claims

In defining the sense of group position, "the feelings of proprietary claim to certain areas of privilege and advantage" are an important element (Blumer, 1958, p. 5; Bobo & Tuan, 2006, p. 39). These claims are based on the structural distribution of rights and resources which

results in perceived relative deprivation and competition with other groups. In previous research, this component of the sense of group position was mainly operationalized by perceptions of intergroup competition (Bobo, 1983; Bobo & Kluegel) or relative deprivation (Taylor, 2002; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972), therefore ignoring the realistic basis which marks group entitlement claims, such as one's connection to the soil, or group size (Gurr, 1971; Horowitz, 1985, pp. 185-207). In our studies we use the objective (i.e., factual as opposed to perceived) measures of relative ingroup size to capture the structural basis of entitlement (See Chapter 4). This is a different approach than that used by Taylor (1998) or Fossett and Kiecolt (1989) who used outgroup (minority group) size as a contextual measure of threat (see also, Quillian, 1995). We propose that contextual–objective indicators can also be used to operationalize the resources or privileges of the ingroup (such as a larger proportion of the population; or the historical connection to the land; or the formal political privileges written in the constitution which entitle the ingroup to a share of power).

Theoretically, it is important to distinguish between the two ways of defining "proprietary claims": 1) as a matter of perceptions of relative competition and deprivation, and 2) as an evaluation based on real indicators, that constitute a heavier currency in political debates. This distinction may explain why in certain contexts, group members' grievances about their current status quo does not escalate into real disputes and power struggles, given than there is no basis to mark their deservingness in factual terms. For example, in many national contexts, minorities are not given political representation in the central government because their share of the population is too small, but if they are concentrated at a smaller unit (e.g. city, municipality), they could access political voice at that level based on their size. Similarly, the objective conditions of entitlement claims may be present (e.g., a group may represent a significant proportion of the population), while the prevailing ideologies or system of repression or social organization prevent the development of a sense of deprivation and violated expectation among that group (e.g., the Indian caste system, the slavery period in the US; for a discussion on group size see Chapter 5 "Minority Percentage and Discrimination" in Blalock, 1967). This component of the sense of group position is likely to become consequential in the intergroup struggle for power, when the two dimensions (subjective and objective) align. Thus, the overall prediction would be that the existence of a realistic basis for entitlement claims is more likely to lead to intergroup differentiation processes, as long as this is accompanied by the subjective sense of relative deprivation.

1.4.2.3   *The role of perceived threat and outgroup encroachment:*
            a survey-embedded experiment

According to the original conceptualization of Blumer (1958), the sense of group position is constituted by a set of *prerequisite elements* and a factor acting as a trigger for intergroup antagonism. The first set of factors includes a *"feeling of superiority"* of the ingroup over other groups (for example a sense of ethno-national superiority); the second refers to *"feelings of distinctiveness",* which set groups aside by depicting particular group stereotypes, by establishing group borders, and by identifying with particular identity categories; lastly,

there are the "*feelings of proprietary claim*" to certain areas of privilege and advantage, which mainly reflect incompatibilities of group interests and violations of expectations and deservingness (i.e., perceptions of group competition and fraternal relative deprivation; see: Bobo, 2004, p. 342). Classic social psychological theories often focus on these "prerequisite" elements of the sense of group position (for a comparison and discussion of theories and concepts overlapping with the sense of group position, see Bobo & Tuan, 2006). What distinguishes the Group Position Model approach from these theories is the emphasis on the decisive role of *group threat*.

According to Blumer (1958, p. 4), the sense of group position becomes catalyzed and prejudice is unleashed when group members feel that an outgroup threatens the prerogatives that should rightfully belong to the ingroup; the triggering factor is the *"fear of encroachment"*, the feeling that ougroups are "getting out of place" (Blumer, 1958, p. 4). While *perceptions of group threat* are seen as the ultimate triggers pushing individuals into intergroup struggles for group position and power, the Group Position Model argues that it is not *any* kind of threat and is it not *any* outgroup that have the potential to polarize intergroup attitudes and move intergroup differentiation into intergroup conflict. Previous studies have operationalized the role of threat into various types of measurements, at the individual level (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993) or contextual level (Fossett & Kiecolt, 1989; Quillian, 1995). However, one needs to situate the analysis of intergroup processes in the particular ethno-national context, in order to identify *the kind of threat* raised by *a specific outgroup* (Bobo & Tuan, 2006; Schneider, 2008; A. W. Smith, 1981). This specification is also in line with Blalock's discussion of competitive versus power threats (1967) and with the distinction between symbolic and realistic kinds of threat (Hagendoorn et al., 2001; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Sniderman et al., 2004; Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005).

Based on including a randomised experimental manipulation of threat in one of our surveys, we investigate how *threat to a specific area of privileges* and the *fear of outgroup encroachment* can be operationally distinguished, in order to provide a better test of the Group Position Model (See Chapter 4; see also Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Sniderman et al., 2004). This goes beyond the previous approaches that use the size of an outgroup as an indicator of threat without measuring the subjective perceptions of threat (see: Kunovich, 2004; Quillian, 1995). Experimentally disentangling the effects of *perceiving threat* from those of the associated outgroup who is the *agent of that threat* represents a more accurate test of the theory. The theory emphasizes the fear of a specific outgroup encroaching on the ingroup's "rightful privileges" (Bobo & Tuan, 2006, p. 33). Intergroup differentiation processes are not based on the sociologically objective conditions and relationships between groups, but on people's normative expectations about how group privileges should be distributed in society (Blumer, 1958, p. 5). Thus, what "represents" a threat cannot be captured by objective indicators of resources, but rather by the subjective suspicion that an outgroup is "getting out of place", aiming to alter the status quo to the detriment of the ingroup.

1.4.3   The Facets of Intergroup Differentiation:
Social Psychological and Political Attitudes

The third aim of our research was to investigate a range of intergroup attitudes as indicators of the wider phenomenon of intergroup differentiation in the Russian context. This approach allows us to see if the theoretical framework of relative group position is applicable for social psychological intergroup attitudes as well as for political attitudes.

Intergroup differentiation depends on the context of comparison (Verkuyten, 2007), on the valence of the evaluation criteria (Mummendey & Otten, 1998) and on the specific issue that is disputed in the intergroup struggle for group position (Sniderman, 1996). Assessing the quality of intergroup relationships as peaceful or polarized in an ethno-national setting requires a range of indicators in order to capture various aspects of intergroup relationships. Measuring different types of intergroup attitudes also allows us to investigate the relationships of similarity or difference between subjective phenomena of differentiation (such as stereotypes about ingroups and outgroups) and political considerations and attitudes (such as perceiving conflicts of interests or supporting minority rights).

This comparison across various indicators of the quality of intergroup relationships is important because the sense of group position is a normative concept, reflecting peoples' concerns of 'what ought to be' rather than 'what is' (Blumer, 1958, p. 5; Taylor, 2002, p. 19). Put differently, individuals have particular normative expectations about the relative position that their group is entitled to, and the effects of these expectations on their attitudes should be influenced by ideologies in the wider society. This could lead to a discrepancy in the effects of the sense of group position on overt and public attitudes (more likely to be subject to social constraints) versus attitudes that can be held privately (under less scrutiny about social norms). For example, if multiculturalism is the dominant ideology in society, people may not openly disagree with the right for political organizations for all minorities (See Chapter 6); but this may not prevent them to hold negative stereotypes of those minority groups (however, see the discussion on positive-negative asymmetry effects, Mummendey & Otten, 1998, in Chapter 2).

We are interested in investigating how group position moderates the process of intergroup differentiation, captured by social psychological attitudes (such as group stereotypes) and political attitudes (such as support for minority rights or assimilation). There are two logical possibilities. On the one hand, we may speak of a continuum of differentiation, whereby the basis of group distinctiveness are laid at the level of social psychological attitudes of intergroup stereotypes, in response to the subjective needs of positive self-esteem. Building on this basic psychological distinction between groups (i.e., "our ingroup is good, or is better than the outgroup"), group interests may be further aligned along specific group boundaries, providing the grounds for perceptions of conflicts between ingroup and outgroup interests (Brewer, 2001, p. 19, for a similar argument). As a consequence these group biases may also be manifested in political attitudes, serving the public function of promoting ingroup interests, and preventing outgroups from encroaching on the area of ingroup privileges. Political attitudes can be subject to normative restrictions in expressing outgroup prejudice and preferential treatment for ingroups, but may ultimately "simply"

reflect the social psychological biases captured by intergroup stereotypes and perceptions of conflict. If this continuum of intergroup differentiation is present, then we should encounter no substantial differences in the patterns of associations between the sense of group position and the various indicators of intergroup differentiation.

On the other hand, the second logical possibility is that social psychological attitudes are driven by different dynamics of the sense of group position than political attitudes. Political attitudes are more likely to be affected by group position considerations than social psychological attitudes (Bobo & Tuan, 2006). Political attitudes are fundamentally aligned with group interests and are therefore explicitly aimed at protecting and promoting group interests. Social psychological attitudes do not necessarily imply outgroup derogation, especially in the absence of intergroup comparison and intergroup competition (Brewer, 1999). Group position concerns are not crucial for establishing a positive sense of self based on group membership. On the contrary, when it comes to social psychological attitudes, people are more likely to employ social creativity strategies to change the comparison dimension or the identification category in order to ensure positive distinctiveness (Kessler & Mummendey, 2002; J. C. Turner et al., 1987). However, in "real" intergroup contexts, it is difficult (if not impossible) to "ignore" the nominal group memberships which often condition access to political and social privileges. Employing identity strategies that avoid intergroup differentiation by means of social creativity (i.e., appealing to an alternative comparison category which puts the ingroup in a more positive light; Tajfel, 1978) may be limited to certain social psychological indicators and may not extend to political attitudes. In the same vein, some social psychological attitudes may be more embedded in the specific history and political role of particular groups than other attitudes. Measuring across a range of outgroup stereotypes and assessing stereotypes of different outgroups may reveal how differences in the quality of attributions (i.e., type of stereotype) are also revealing of group position concerns as are differences in the quantity of derogation (i.e., degree of negativity of the stereotype, or differentiation scores comparing ingroup and outgroup stereotypes; see Chapter 3 on the stereotypes of Chechens and Jews). If these considerations are true, the presence of a continuum of intergroup differentiation is less likely. Instead, each indicator of intergroup differentiation should shed light on particular facets of the intergroup relationships of interest, from different angles rather than reflecting varying degrees of intensity.

Figure 1.1   Map of the Russian Federation

Note: The map indicates the territorial delineations of 89 federal subjects, as listed in the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation. The republics and regions where we conducted our surveys are highlighted in bold, given with the Russian name in Cyrillic Script and numbered on the map above.

After a referendum in 2004, Perm Oblast was merged with Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug to form Perm Krai.

21 autonomous republics:

Republic of Adygeya	**Республика Адыгея**	**1**
Republic of Altai		
Republic of Bashkortostan	**Республика Башкортостан**	**10**
Republic of Buryatia		
Republic of Dagestan	**Республика Дагестан**	**3**
Republic of Ingushetia		
Kabardin-Balkar Republic	**Кабардино-Балкарская Респ.**	**2**
Republic of Kalmykia		
Karachayevo-Cherkess Republic		
Republic of Karelia	**Республика Карелия**	**7**
Republic of Komi	**Республика Коми**	**13**
Republic of Mari El		
Republic of Mordovia		
Republic of Sakha-Yakutia	**Республика Саха (Якутия)**	**15**
Republic of North Ossetia-Alania		
Republic of Tatarstan	**Республика Татарстан**	**8**
Republic of Tuva	**Республика Тыва (Тува)**	**14**
Udmurt Republic	**Удмуртская Республика**	**9**
Republic of Khakasia		
Chechen Republic		
Chuvash Republic		

10 okrugs or autonomous areas:

Aginsky Buryat Autonomous Area
Komi-Permyak Autonomous Area
Koryak Autonomous Area
Nenets Autonomous Area
Taimyr (Dolgan-Nenets) Autonomous Area
Ust-Ordynsky Buryat Autonomous Area
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area
Chukchi Autonomous Area
Evenk Autonomous Area
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area

50 oblasts or regions:

Amur Region		
Arkhangelsk Region		
Astrakhan Region		
Belgorod Region		
Bryansk Region		
Vladimir Region		
Volgograd Region		
Vologda Region		
Voronezh Region		
Ivanovo Region		
Irkutsk Region		
Kaliningrad Region		
Kaluga Region		
Kamchatka Region		
Kemerovo Region		
Kirov Region		
Kostroma Region		
Kurgan Region		
Kursk Region		
Leningrad Region		
Lipetsk Region		
Magadan Region		
Moscow Region		
Murmansk Region		
Nizhny Novgorod Region		
Novgorod Region		
Novosibirsk Region		
Omsk Region		
Orenburg Region		
Oryol Region		
Penza Region		
Perm Region	**Пермская область**	**11**
Pskov Region		
Rostov Region		
Ryazan Region		
Samara Region		
Saratov Region	**Саратовская область**	**6**
Sakhalin Region		
Sverdlovsk Region		
Smolensk Region		
Tambov Region		
Tver Region	**Тверская область**	**4**
Tomsk Region		
Tula Region		
Tyumen Region		
Ulyanovsk Region		
Chelyabinsk Region	**Челябинская область**	**12**
Chita Region		
Yaroslavl Region		
Jewish Autonomous Region		

6 krais or territories:

Altai Territory
Krasnodar Territory
Krasnoyarsk Territory
Maritime Territory
Stavropol Territory
Khabarovsk Territory

2 federal cities:

Moscow	**Москва**	**5**
St. Petersburg		

1.5   Surveys and Samples

Data from two general population surveys collected in the Russian Federation at the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of the twenty first century (2005) were employed in the studies included in this book. The aim of these public opinion surveys was to investigate the relationships between structural group position, the sense of group position and several social psychological and political attitudes in the context of the Russian-titular intergroup setting.

The NWO survey[6] data (Hagendoorn & Linssen, 2000) were collected among Russians and titulars in ten autonomous republics of the Russian Federation at the end of 1999 and beginning of 2000 ($N = 10\,557$; Russians $N = 5\,233$, and titulars $N = 5\,182$). The republics were Karelia, Adigeya, Udmurtia, Komi, Sakha Yakutia, Tatarstan, Tuva, Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Daghestan and were selected in order to provide a large variation in the relative group sizes of Russians and titulars (see Table 1.1 and Figure 1.2). The surveys were carried out in selected urban areas (41 cities, including the capital cities of the republics) with at least 10% of Russian residents. In the cities, the street names were selected by a random-route procedure and in each street the house numbers were randomly selected. At the address, the resident with the birthday closest to the day of the interview was invited to participate in the survey.

The INTAS survey[7] (Poppe & Hagendoorn, 2005) was conducted among titulars and Russians ($N = 4\,858$; Russians $N = 2\,431$, titulars $N = 2\,427$), living *inside 5 autonomous republics* of the Russian Federation (Bashkortostan, Karelia, Komi, Yakutia, Tatarstan: around 400 of each titular group and 400 Russians living inside these republics), as well as *outside these republics*, in 5 locations (around 100 Russians and 100 titulars: Komi in Perm, Tatars in Saratov, Karels in Tver, Bashkirs in Cheliabinsk, Yakuts in Moscow; see Table 1.2). This design was chosen so that one can analytically compare the attitudes of those groups living inside and outside the territories of the autonomous titular republics. Within each location, random samples of titulars and Russians were selected. The selection of the respondents was done following a similar sampling procedure as the one used in the NWO surveys (Hagendoorn & Linssen, 2000). Within each republic, only urban locations with more than 10% Russians of their population were selected. Further, a spiral was placed on top of the plan-scheme of the whole city in order to select 19 survey points. At each survey point (identified streets) buildings and apartments were further selected by applying specific randomizing rules. Within a household the person whose birthday was closest to the interview date was selected.

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6   We use the label "NWO survey" to refer to the data collected during the two projects funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), Hagendoorn/Linssen: NWO project 047.007.009, 1997–1999, and Hagendoorn/Linssen: NWO project 047.011, 1998–2001 (Hagendoorn & Linssen, 2000).

7   We use the label "INTAS survey" to refer to the data collected for the project funded by the International Association for the promotion of cooperation with scientists from New independent States of the former Soviet Union (INTAS), Poppe/Hagendoorn: INTAS, project 03-51-4997/Field 7 (Poppe & Hagendoorn, 2005).

In both studies, participation consisted in answering the questionnaire in a face-to-face interview of about 45 minutes, and participants could choose the language (Russian or titular) of the interview. By this direct approach, the non-response rate was 3% in the NWO survey, and 33.6% in the INTAS survey. Participants were coded as titulars or Russians when their personal ethnic identification matched the nationality in their passport. In the questionnaire, the "titular" label was substituted with the specific names of the group involved (for Tatars, the label "titular" was substituted with Tatar, the label "titular republic" was substituted with Tatarstan, and so on).

Each chapter contains a description of the relevant demographic characteristics of the participants in our surveys. In the Annex, we provide detailed information about the samples of Russians and titulars. The participants' demographic characteristics concerning age, gender, education levels and marriage status indicate a balanced distribution: the Russian samples resemble the titular samples to a great extent. Similarly, when it comes to indicators of economic status, such as income, occupation and brand of economy, the samples of Russians and titulars in both surveys are matched to a large degree. The primary focus of this research was to investigate social psychological intergroup phenomena, rather than aiming at generalizations from the participant samples to the general population. For this reason, samples that were matched on socio-economic status were deemed necessary. Nevertheless, despite the lack of group differences on these variables, in most analyses, we controlled for the individual effects of age, gender, education and income. Generally speaking, these effects were negligible, as well as laying outside the range of our theoretical predictions.

Table 1.1   Demographic Information for Ten Autonomous Republics of Russia Included in the NWO Surveys

Republics*	Population	Percentage of Russians (Republic Level)	Percentage of Dominant Titular Group (Republic Level)
Karelia	776 000	73.6	10.0
Komi	1 161 000	57.7	23.3
Udmurtia	1 636 000	58.9	30.9
Adygei	450 000	68.0	22.1
Yakutia	1 003 000	50.3	33.4
Daghestan	2 095 000	9.2	27.5
Bashkortostan	4 111 000	39.3	21.9
Kabardino-Balkaria	792 000	32.0	48.2
Tatarstan	3 774 000	43.3	48.5
Tuva	310 000	32.0	64.3

Note: * Data from the 1989 Census

Table 1.2   Demographic Information for the Five Autonomous Republics of Russia and
Locations Outside the Republics Included in the INTAS Survey

Inside Republics*	Population	Percentage of Russians (Republic Level)	Percentage of Dominant Titular Group (Republic Level)
Karelia	776 000	73.6	10.0
Komi	1 161 000	57.7	23.3
Yakutia	1 003 000	50.3	33.4
Bashkortostan	4 111 000	39.3	21.9
Tatarstan	3 774 000	43.3	48.5

Outside Republics**	Population	Percentage of Russians (City/Region Level)	Percentage of Dominant Titular Group (City/Region Level)
Karels in Tver	458 000	90.0	0.05
Karels in Likhoslavl (Tverskaya oblast)	14 000	40.0	50.00
Komi in Perm	998 700	89.0	1.00
Yakuts in Moscow	10 000 000	84.8	0.01
Bashkirs in Cheliabinsk	1 090 000	82.0	2.00
Tatars in Saratov	852 400	90.0	2.00

Note: * Data from the 1989 Census; ** Data from the 2005 INTAS Survey

Chapter 2

The Effects of Social Identifications on Ingroup and Outgroup Stereotypes of Russian and Titular Groups

2.1 Introduction

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in the independence of 14 borderland Union Republics from the Russian Federation (Hagendoorn et al., 2001). The complex administrative structure of the former Soviet state was designed to govern a mosaic of some 128 national, ethnic, and cultural groups (Tishkov, 1997). However, it did not eventually prevent the emergence of the nationalistic aspirations that contributed to its own demise. The same complex administrative system characterizes the remaining Russian Federation since 1991 (Brubaker, 1997; Hagendoorn et al., 2001; Laitin, 1998; Tishkov, 1999). This study focuses on the intergroup relations between two main ethnic groups in some autonomous republics of the Russian Federation, the Russians and the so-called titulars, that is, the ethnic group after which the republic is named (e.g., Tatars in Tatarstan, Karelians in Karelia). The question is whether there is a lot of tension between the Russians and titulars and which factors affect these intergroup relations. First, we discuss previous research on the intergroup situation in some former Soviet Union republics and then present new findings on the emerging identifications and intergroup differentiations of Russians and titulars in the Russian Federation.

2.2 Intergroup Polarization in Former Soviet Republics

The breakdown of the Soviet regime resulted in a reversal of the intergroup position of Russians and titulars in the newly independent republics bordering Russia. From a favored high-status dominant majority, Russians became the less powerful minority, while titulars, incited by nationalistic independence movements, fought themselves in higher-status positions (Laitin, 1998).

In previous research Hagendoorn and colleagues focused on the intergroup relations in former Soviet republics by examining Russians' and titulars' national-ethnic identifications, their mutual stereotypes, and their negative intergroup stereotypes and attitudes (Hagendoorn, 1993; Hagendoorn, Drogendijk, Tumanov, & Hraba, 1998; Hagendoorn et al., 2001; Poppe & Hagendoorn, 2001, 2003).

Hagendoorn et al. (2001) used the term intergroup polarization, in a study among Russians and titulars in five former Soviet republics, to describe "the pattern of associations between the attachment to the national ingroup and the negative evaluations of national outgroups." One of the strongest negative correlations was found between national identification and an ethnic definition of citizenship by which outgroups are excluded. This shows one of the important factors leading to outgroup exclusion: the denial of civic citizenship. National identification was also related to negative stereotypes of the outgroup and positive stereotypes of the ingroup. In addition, negative stereotypes appeared to be affected by perceived competition and relative deprivation, whereas positive ingroup stereotypes were affected by speaking the ingroup language and ethnic homogeneity of the family. These associations were further strengthened by perceived threats, such as the fear of an economic crisis, the possible disloyalty of the Russians, and the threat of Russian intervention (Hagendoorn et al., 2001). Hence, national identifications as well as perceived realistic causes of conflict and language and family composition affected the intergroup evaluations.

At the aggregate level, the group attachments of one group appeared to affect those of the other group (Hagendoorn et al., 2001). For example, titulars seemed to have stronger feelings of national superiority if Russians identified stronger with the republic and felt more attached to it (republican patriotism). Similarly, Russians' feelings of national superiority were stronger in republics in which titulars had positive stereotypes of Russians. In other words, across republics, positive views of outgroups co-varied with the feelings of superiority among these outgroups.

Further analysis showed that (national) identification is a multidimensional phenomenon, both Russians and titulars did not identify with just one group, but with several groups to different degrees. Besides ethnic and national identification, people simultaneously identified with their republic of residence and with the Russian Federation. This made clear that there are different patterns of identifications, reflecting ethnic segregation at the one extreme and civic integration at the other extreme (Poppe & Hagendoorn, 2001). Specific individual-level factors as well as aggregate factors relate to specific patterns of identification. If the Russians were better integrated in the republic, then their identification as Russians and as republican citizens were more strongly connected, and this was also true if the titulars were more accepting and less derogative of Russians. However, most of the aggregate-level effects on national identification could be explained by a differential distribution of individual-level factors, which shows that the aggregate-level effects are actually composition effects. For example, a larger Russian minority and a poor economic situation in the republics affected Russians' national identification through the effects they had on perceived ethnic competition (Poppe & Hagendoorn, 2003).

To sum up, it appears that there is a complex circular relationship between national identification, and the positive and negative stereotypes of the respective outgroups, stimulated by perceived intergroup competition and threat. This outcome is in certain respects counterintuitive. It would be expected that positive stereotypes about outgroups would always lead to better intergroup relations, but they seem to fuel the superiority feelings of the members of the outgroups. In return, feelings of national superiority fired negative intergroup reactions, especially if identification with the superior ingroup was strong and competition from the outgroup was feared.

In this chapter we extend the analysis of how different types of identification are connected. We do this on the basis of new data gathered in the Russian Federation in 1999 and 2000. We focus on the question of how intergroup polarization varies with respect to different types of identification. Additionally, given the crucial role played by intergroup competition as indicated above, we control for this factor in order to better identify the predictive power of identification types.

For the viewpoint of political elites in the Russian Federation, preventing ethnic conflict and keeping all the ethnic and national groups together in the federation is vital. The republics of the Russian Federation have a multiethnic composition. The titular populations are an important demographic force in various parts of the Russian Federation; they are a demographic majority in 15 out of the 21 autonomous republics (Tishkov, 1997). Politically, this raises the question of defining "what is a Russian?" and "who is a Russian?" The answers differ from a titular, a Russian, and a federal nationalistic perspective (Tishkov, 1997). Russian national identity is an issue on which individuals as well as political administrators struggle. From this perspective it is obvious that a proper understanding of the intergroup differentiation in the Russian Federation has to start with an analysis of the relevant meanings of various identification types of Russians and titulars.

The multinational Russian Federation has fairly insignificant tradition in cultivating civic principles and citizenship (Tolz, 1998). In the Soviet era the common (unifying) identity was the Soviet identity. Soviet people were perceived as being united by the Russian language, a common ideology, and an interdependent economic and social infrastructure. The dissolution of the Soviet Union transferred the Soviet institutions to the new political elite of the Russian Federation, but the Russian Federation was the only one unit in the Soviet Union that lacked internal cohesion. Hence, the Russian Federation as a true federal state, based on civic rather than ethnic principles of national belonging, had to be built up from the beginning. It was a political entity that did not incite strong feelings of identity. By the same token, as a multiethnic system, the Russian Federation is only able to survive if a federal identity overarches and includes the full variety of the different and potential conflicting ethnic identifications and thus prevents the resurgence of new national aspirations.

Our analysis focuses on the potential of civic identifications that have to fulfill this role, that is, to improve stereotypes of outgroups as well as of ingroups. To put it differently, the question is: whether or not identifications at a higher level of inclusiveness (i.e., civic in contrast to ethnic, federal in contrast to republican) have the potential to reduce intergroup polarization.

2.3   A Social-Psychological Approach to Intergroup Differentiation

We approach the question of the associations between different types of identifications and intergroup differentiation from the perspective of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Social Identity Theory poses that intergroup differentiation not only result from conflicts of interests, but also from the psychological need to positively distinguish one's group from others. In this view intergroup differentiation is dependent on the manner in which group members *comparatively* define their place (identity) in society in relation to other groups (Abrams & Hogg, 1990). Individuals' desire for positive self-evaluations may result in opinions, attitudes, and behaviors that favor the ingroup to the detriment of outgroups (Bourhis, Turner, & Gagnon, 1997).Within this frame of reference we pose the question: What are the consequences of social identifications at different levels of inclusiveness?

National identification is one of the most prevalent forms of social identity in contemporary societies (Billig, 1995). While *national* states usually hold the monopoly of violence and protection, national identification defines where individuals belong and who those who do not belong are. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, *belonging to* the newly independent states including the remaining Russian Federation became a contested domain. This implied that the solidarity and self-esteem found through belonging to a social group shifted from higher to lower levels of inclusiveness, eventually locating the primordial feelings of identity in ethnic and national belonging (Hagendoorn et al., 2001). However, the identifications of the previous period did not immediately wither away and thus a system of "multiple, multi-layered, overlapping or embedded national, ethnic, civic or supra-national categories" remained of which the ultimate balance was yet unknown (Poppe & Hagendoorn, 2001, p. 59).

In the Russian Federation, at least three types of politically significant social identifications are relevant for Russians and titulars: ethnic, republican, and federal identification. Along the inclusiveness dimension, the republican and the federal identifications are superordinate to the ethnic identification, whereas the republican identification is subordinate to the federal identification. The concept of "concentric loyalties" (Brewer, 1999) suitably captures Russians' and titulars' simultaneous membership in an ethnic group, within an autonomous republic, within the Russian Federation.

Ethnic identifications are at the forefront of public preoccupations in the Russian Federation, because ethno-nationalism is a threat to the unity of the federation and an important tool of political mobilization (Tishkov, 1997). In the autonomous republics, the numerical differences between Russians and titulars make *republican identification* an important political factor. The identification with the *Russian Federation* is the most encompassing type of identification and this makes it an important tool for keeping the federation together. The Russians hold the demographic majority position within the Russian Federation while the autonomous republics are the strongholds of the non-Russian populations that bear their name. This intergroup situation implies that the titulars have a special affinity with the (superordinate) republican identification and that the Russians have a special affinity with the (superordinate) federal identification.

These affinities and the implied claims of legitimacy may lead to a projection of norms onto the superordinate categories in which the ingroup offers the typical standard for conduct, which may lead to explicit negativity toward the other groups (Waldzus, Mummendey, & Wenzel, 2005; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003). This leads to a further specification of our initial question: Which type oF (inclusiveness of) identification is most likely to promote a positive intergroup relation for Russians as well as for titulars? If the two superordinate identifications have a different inclusive potential for Russians and Titulars, do they cancel each other's effects out? Does identification at higher levels of inclusiveness reduce the intergroup differentiation equally for Russians and titulars?

2.4 Intergroup Differentiation: Hypotheses on Ingroup and Outgroup Stereotypes

We are interested in the associations between identification at different inclusiveness levels and intergroup differentiation as reflected in ingroup and outgroup stereotypes. In our view identification comes first and stereotypes are the evolving expression of evaluating one's relative group position. Motivated by the search for a positive social identity, people represent intergroup differences along various hierarchies. Research into ethnic hierarchies shows that stereotypes express people's tendencies to positively value those perceived as closer to the ingroup and negatively devalue those who are to be excluded from the ingroup (Hagendoorn, 1993). The pattern of evaluative biases reflected in such stereotypes does reflect the actual intergroup dynamics, albeit in a static "one-moment-in-time" picture (Spears, Oakes, Ellemers, & Haslam, 1997). The positive–negative stereotypes of outgroups (as compared to the ingroup) can be seen as a step in the direction of intergroup tension (Brewer, 2001).

The empirical question is whether superordinate identifications leads to the increased acceptance (positive stereotypes) of other ethnic groups, and whether this pattern is opposite to the effects of ethnic identifications, which should lead to more rejection (negative outgroup stereotypes). However, if we take into account that intergroup discrimination is considered illegitimate and objectionable in most societies, then it should be expected that intergroup evaluations generally are less discriminative in terms of negative than in terms of positive criteria. This effect is known as the positive–negative asymmetry effect (Mummendey & Otten, 1998). Various studies have shown that the positive– negative asymmetry effect is less present under specific circumstances, for instance when the outgroup has low social status (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). Therefore, we expect that Russians show a stronger positive–negative asymmetry effect compared to titulars (*Hypothesis 1*).

2.4.1   Inclusive versus Exclusive Identifications and Intergroup Differentiation

The consequences of different levels of inclusiveness of group categorization for people's behaviors are recognized by self-categorization theory (J. C. Turner et al., 1987). Category inclusiveness is defined as the extent to which a categorization subsumes other social categories in the immediate intergroup context (Crisp, Ensari, Hewstone, & Miller, 2002). In the context of our research, the political administrative structure of the Russian Federation determines the various levels of inclusiveness: the federal, republican, and ethnic levels.

In order to derive hypotheses about the effect of identifications at different levels of inclusiveness on intergroup differentiation, we briefly have to consider the relevant theoretical positions. The first is optimal distinctiveness theory and the second is the common ingroup identity model. Brewer (2001) developed the optimal distinctiveness model of social identity, arguing that an optimal social identity is achieved when one's distinctiveness and inclusiveness needs are simultaneously satisfied. In this view, the expanding boundaries of superordinate identifications reduce distinctiveness. Thus higher levels of inclusiveness lead to more intergroup discrimination (Brewer, 2001; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b).

The common ingroup identity model, however, leads to the expectation that the opposite effect will occur (Gaertner et al., 1993). Recategorization at a superordinate level will decrease the discrimination between the previous subgroups, because they now share common ingroup boundaries. Thereby, the processes of ingroup favoritism are shifted away from the level of subgroups to the level of the superordinate identification.

A third model, the mutual intergroup differentiation model, integrates these conflicting predictions (Miles Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b). The reasoning is that the extension of group boundaries does not lead to a loss of distinctiveness if the lower-level ingroup boundaries remain intact in parallel with a superordinate (re-)categorization. The maintenance of a dual identity ("different groups on the same team") leads to decreased discrimination, and to the generalization of positivity (Gaertner et al., 1993; González & Brown, 2003; Miles Hewstone & Brown, 1986). Consequently, what is required is a test of the simultaneous additive effects of social identifications (Reicher, Hopkins, & Condor, 1997; Van Knippenberg & Ellemers, 1990). On the basis of the mutual intergroup differentiation model we expect that the positive effects of superordinate identifications are manifest (also) in the presence of subgroup identifications.

2.4.2   Ingroup and Outgroup Stereotypes

To study the impact of various types of identifications on intergroup differentiation, we analyze ingroup and outgroup stereotypes. By examining ingroup stereotypes separately from outgroup stereotypes, the two sides of intergroup differentiation: "ingroup focused" (what factors affect ingroup evaluations) and "outgroup focused" (what influences outgroup evaluations) can be investigated (Brewer, 2001; Verkuyten, 2004). We expect that the identification types have a positive effect on ingroup stereotypes, but do not necessarily have a negative effect on outgroup stereotypes. The effects of different levels of identification are expected to follow the assumption that the smallest group (most clearly and

exclusively defined) provides more positive images of the ingroup than the higher order ones (Brewer & Schneider, 1990). Ethnic groups, rather than more inclusive civic types of groups, should contribute more to the creation of a secure ("optimal") sense of self. Therefore, ethnic identification should have stronger positive effects on the ingroup stereotypes than the republican and federal identifications. Specifically, ethnic identification should be associated with more positive ingroup stereotypes and less negative ingroup stereotypes, compared to the associations between republican and federal identifications and ingroup stereotypes (*Hypothesis 2a*).

Outgroup stereotypes should be affected differently. Dichotomous categorizations in terms of "us–them," usually along primary identities like ethnicity or religion, have an inherent dimension of intergroup comparison. They are built through opposition against the "other" (negative interdependence), being more likely to lead to intergroup differentiation and conflicts than other types of identification (Brewer, 2001). Identification at lower inclusive levels (such as ethnic vs. civic, or republican vs. federal) should result in more negative outgroup evaluations than higher superordinate identifications. Based on the mutual differentiation model, we expect that (in the presence of ethnic identification) republican and federal identifications strengthen the positive stereotypes of the ethnic outgroup. In other words: republican identification should be associated with stronger positive outgroup stereotypes and weaker negative outgroup stereotypes (*Hypothesis 2b for republican identification*), and federal identification should be associated with stronger positive outgroup stereotypes and weaker negative outgroup stereotypes (*Hypothesis 2b for federal identification*).

2.4.3 Effects of the Superordinate Identifications on Ingroup and Outgroup Stereotypes

A last set of hypotheses considers the differences in the effects that the superordinate identifications have on the ingroup–outgroup evaluations of Russians compared to titulars. In the context of the Russian Federation, the two superordinate identifications, republican and federal, have a different meaning for Russians than for titulars. The autonomous republics were named after the titular populations, which gives them a claim of ownership to the superordinate republican identification. At the federal level, Russians are a majority group, which allows them to claim the natural ownership of the federal identification.

According to the Ingroup Projection Model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), a superordinate category that is typically claimed by one of the subgroups leads to the exclusion of the other subgroups (more negative evaluations of the outgroups). Therefore, we assume that the republican and federal identification have differential effects for Russians and titulars. Republican identification should have more inclusive effects for the Russians than for the titulars. A Russian who identifies with the republic is expected to have more positive stereotypes of the titulars than a (similarly identified) titular has of Russians. The opposite should be true for the federal identification: a titular who identifies with the Russian Federation should have more positive stereotypes of the Russians than a Russian who does the same has of titulars. That is, a stronger republican identification should be

associated with more positive outgroup stereotypes among Russians compared to titulars (*Hypothesis 3a for republican identification*), and a stronger federal identification should be associated with more positive outgroup stereotypes among titulars compared to Russians (*Hypothesis 3a for federal identification*).

Similar effects should be found for ingroup stereotypes: a stronger republican identification should be associated with more positive ingroup stereotypes for titulars than for Russians (*Hypothesis 3b for republican identification)*, and a stronger federal identification should be associated with more positive ingroup stereotypes for Russians than for titulars (*Hypothesis 3b for federal identification).*

The hypotheses will be tested by controlling for the effects of perceived intergroup competition. We may expect that sharing group membership at a higher level of inclusiveness reduces competition. Gaertner and colleagues (1993) illustrated how intergroup co-operation reduced intergroup differentiation by inducing members to conceive of themselves as one superordinate group, instead of two groups. In order to isolate the independent contribution of identification types to ingroup and outgroup evaluations, besides and in addition to the effects of relative deprivation and conflict, we control for the centered relative deprivation and conflict variable (Aiken & West, 1991).

No specific predictions are formulated with respect to this variable, as the focus of this research is on the differential impact of identification types, rather than the well-documented impact of intergroup conflict and relative deprivation on intergroup attitudes (see e.g., Hagendoorn et al., 2001).

2.5   Method

This study is based on two data sets of comparative samples of Russians and titulars in 10 autonomous republics of the Russian Federation in 1999 and 2000: Karelia, Adigey, Udmurtia, Komi, Yakutia, Tatarstan, Tuva, Bashkortostan, Kabardino–Balkaria, and Daghestan. The surveys were carried out in urban areas with a minimum of 10% Russians. All republic capital cities were included, other cities being chosen at random.[8] Participants were selected using random procedures: Within the cities, an alpha-numerical pool randomly identified street names, house numbers were randomly picked, and if older than 15 years, participants were chosen if their birthday was closest to the day of the interview. The face-to-face interview lasted around 45 minutes, and could take place either in the Russian or titular language, at the choice of the interviewees.

Nationality was asked before the start of the interview, and only participants who considered themselves Russian or titular were selected. Participation was on a voluntary basis and non-response was less than 3%. Approximately 500 participants of each ethnic group in each republic, and about 600 of each group in Tatarstan were interviewed. In

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8   The cities were: Maykop, Ufa, Beloreck, Neftekamsk, Sterlitamak, Salavat, Meleuz, Machatchkala, Kielyar, Naltchik, Naptkala, Trnauz, Prochladni, Maickii, Bakcan, Petrozavodsk, Pitkjaranta, Olonec, Suojarvi, Sictvkar, Uchta, Petchora, Emva, Yakutsk, Njurba, Pokrovsk, Kazan, Naberechne Tchelni, Almetebsk, Elabuga, Mendeleevsk, Zainsk, Kyzyl, Shagonar, Turan, Ishevsk, Votkinsk, Glazov, and Moshga.

total, 5,182 titulars and 5,233 Russians participated, 44.4% were males and 55.6% females. Participants were aged between 16 and 98 years, with a mean of 40.56.

The dependent variables were constructed from survey questions on attributions of positive and negative traits to the ingroup and the outgroup. The questions were formulated in terms of percentages of target group characterized by the respective trait: "How many Russians/titulars, in your opinion, have the following characteristic. ...?" with a continuous answering scale from 0% to 100%. The traits were honest, smart, peaceable, lazy, hostile, showing initiative, rude, and deceitful. The selection of these traits was based on previous research that illustrated the potential of these stereotypical traits in differentiating between groups in Eastern European and former Soviet Union contexts (Hagendoorn et al., 2001; Poppe & Linssen, 1999). Simultaneous component analysis (SCA) was performed on these questions, for the 20 groups (Russians and titular groups in 10 republics), on ingroup stereotypes and outgroup stereotypes. SCA identifies principal components that optimally account for the variance in all 20 groups simultaneously, making them comparable across populations. Both ingroup stereotypes and outgroup stereotypes appeared to have two components (explained variance of 52.59%, and 53.30%, respectively), that is, a positive (honest, smart, peaceable, showing initiative) and a negative one (lazy, hostile, rude, and deceitful). Across groups, for ingroup stereotypes, Cronbach's alpha of the positive component ranged between .40 and .67, and for the negative component: between .58 and .83; for outgroup stereotypes, they ranged between .31 and .78, and between .55 and .80, respectively.

Although the reliability coefficient is rather low among a few of the 20 groups, it is adequate across groups and the dimensions are optimal for group comparison according to SCA. Therefore, we computed four variables as the mean scores of the respective traits: ingroup positive, ingroup negative, outgroup positive, and outgroup negative stereotypes.

Identification variables were constructed on the mean score of two questions in which the participants indicated on a five-point scale the degree of agreement with respect to the importance and pride of group membership (see Annex Chapter 2, Table 2.A). The Cronbach's alphas are for ethnic identification .84 for Russians and .91 for titulars, .71 for republican identification and .86 for identification with the Russian Federation. The variable perceived relative deprivation and conflict was computed as a mean score of three questions on jobs, economic interest, and political competition (see Annex Chapter 2, Table 2.A); Cronbachs's alpha is .73.

All the independent variables were centered (Aiken & West, 1991). In this way, the effects of the superordinate identifications are interpreted when ethnic identification and perceived relative deprivation and conflict are at average values (rather than at the value of zero).

2.6 Analysis and Results

2.6.1   Preliminary Analyses

Table 2.1 presents the degree of identification of Russians and titulars on the various iden-
tification types. As expected, the titulars have a stronger republican identification, and the
Russians have a stronger federal identification. The different patterns of identification of the
Russians and the Titulars are also reflected in the higher correlations between the ethnic
and republican identification among titulars, and the higher correlation between ethnic
and federal identification among Russians (Table 2.2). The significance of these correlation
differences was estimated using the Fisher's Z transformation that converts Pearson r's to
the normally distributed variable Z.

Table 2.1 Identification Types and Differences between Ethnic Groups

	Ethnic Identification		Republican Identification		Federal Identification	
	M^a	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Titulars	4.18	1.17	4.36	.91	3.54	1.28
Russians	3.90	1.26	3.81	1.19	4.10	1.13
	B^b	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Differences between Titulars and Russians	.136	.012	.273	.010	−.280	.012
	$F = 127.93^{***}$		$F = 678.72^{***}$		$F = 551.51^{***}$	

Note: These are results of a multivariate analysis of variance on the three identification variables,
with the Multivariate Pillais $F(3, 5121) = 585.48$, $p < .001$, reflecting the overall significant differences
between Russians and Titulars.
[a] The means and standard deviations are presented. All identification variables were measured on a
scale from 1 to 5.
[b] For each identification variable, the unstandardized regression coefficients and the corresponding values
of their standard errors are reported, and the univariate $F(1, 10247)$ values with the respective
significance levels are given below. These statistics reflect the differences between Russians and Titulars
on each identification type.

*** $p \le .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

For the difference between the correlations between the ethnic and republican identifica-
tions (titulars: $r_T = .532$; $N = 5182$; and Russians: $r_R = .037$, $N = 5067$; $r_T - r_R = .495$), a 95% con-
fidence interval with the lower limit of, .47 and upper limit of .52. was identified. Similarly,

for the difference in correlations between ethnic and federal identifications (titulars: r_T = .110 and Russians: r_R = .373, r_T−r_R = −.263), the interval was between −.22 and −.30. It seems therefore, that the differences between the correlations of titulars and Russians between the specific identification types are significant at the accepted levels.

2.6.2 Hypothesis 1: Intergroup Differentiation in the Russian Federation

In order to test the patterns of intergroup differentiation, repeated measurements multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed on the four dependent variables, across the ethnic groups (Russians and titulars); two within-subject factors were generated: target group (ingroup and outgroup) and valence of trait (positive and negative).

Table 2.2 Correlations between Identification Types

		Republican Identification	Federal Identification	Perceived Relative Deprivation and Conflict
Ethnic Identification	Russians	.037**	.373***	.135***
	Titulars	.532***	.110***	.074***
	Overall	.263***	.202***	.080***
Republican Identification	Russians		.237***	−.205***
	Titulars		.274***	.001
	Overall		.180***	−.165***
Federal Identification	Russians			.049***
	Titulars			.056***
	Overall			.042***

*** p<.001, ** p<.01

The interaction effect between the within-subject factors predicted by Hypothesis 1 was significant, $F(1, 7366)$ = 1,303.33, p<.001, B = 6.56, SE = .18: Ingroup evaluations and outgroup evaluations varied as a function of the valence of traits. Across the two ethnic groups the differentiation in favor of the ingroup was almost three times higher on the positive items, $F(1, 7366)$ = 1,471.73, p<.001, B = −11.09, SE = .19, than on the negative items, $F(1, 7366)$ = 533.39, p<.001, B = 3.79, SE = .19.[9] The positive-negative asymmetry effect was confirmed (see Table 2.3 for the means on each stereotype component).

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9 The square root of the ANOVA F statistics is the t statistic as would be calculated in a regression analysis. A comparison of the F values is possible and valid as long as they are estimated within the same model. Similar to the t statistics of the regression models, F values indicate the strength of an effect.

Additionally, we found a significant three-way interaction with ethnic groups, $F(1, 7\,366) = 12.23$, $p < .001$, $B = .63$, $SE = .18$, indicating differences between Russians and titulars in the positive–negative asymmetry effect. Simple main effect analyses revealed that for Russians the differentiation between ingroup and outgroup stereotypes on positive traits was more than eight times larger than on negative traits, $F(1, 7\,366) = 871.64$, $p<.001$, $B=-6.01$, $SE = .20$, and $F(1, 7\,366) = 103.66$, $p<.001$, $B = 2.37$, $SE = .23$, respectively. Similarly, for titulars, differentiation was higher on positive stereotypes, $F(1, 7\,366) = 610.42$, $p<.001$, $B = -4.98$, $SE = .20$, than on negative stereotypes, $F(1, 7\,366) = 508.18$, $p<.001$, $B = 5.20$, $SE = .23$, but of a much lower magnitude.

Table 2.3 Positive and Negative Stereotypes about Ingroup and Outgroup

	Stereotypes							
	Ingroup Positive		Outgroup Positive		Ingroup Negative		Outgroup Negative	
	M^a	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Titulars	61.20	14.23	54.16	15.25	29.56	15.78	36.92	17.32
Russians	59.63	13.48	51.13	16.81	33.65	15.79	37.00	19.07
	B^b	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Differences between Titulars and Russians	.79	.16	1.52	.19	−2.04	.18	−.04	.21
	$F = 23.73$***		$F = 65.77$***		$F = 123.33$***		$F = .04$	

Note: These are results of a multivariate analysis of variance on the four dependent variables (stereotypes), with the Multivariate Pillais $F(4, 3\,680) = 55.56$, $p<.001$, reflecting the overall significant differences between Russians and titulars on the dependent variables.
a The means and standard deviations are presented. Stereotypes were measured on a scale from 0 to 100.
b The unstandardized regression coefficients are reported together with the corresponding values of the standard errors; the univariate $F(1, 7\,366)$ values with the respective significance levels are given below. These statistics reflect the differences between the two ethnic groups.
*** $p \leq .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Hypothesis 1 was fully confirmed. While both groups clearly favored their ingroup over the outgroup in allocating positive and negative traits, they were less extreme on the negative items. Titulars seemed to *negatively* differentiate between their ingroup and the outgroup almost five times stronger than Russians; while Russians manifested the strongest effect in differentiation on positive traits. The positive-negative asymmetry effect was most salient for the high-status Russian group, and much lower for the low-status groups of titulars, as predicted.

2.6.3   Hypothesis 2: Effects of Identification Types on Intergroup Differentiation

The main test concerned the effects of identification types on ingroup and outgroup stereo-types while controlling for perceived relative deprivation and conflict. The model included the ethnic groups as a factor (Russians and titulars), the two-way interactions between the factor and each identification type, and perceived competition. We employed multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA), which allowed for the valid test of correlated depend-ent variables; the default regression approach was used, allowing for the correction of the individual effects for every other variable in the model (Aiken & West, 1991). MANCOVA also allowed for the test of the additive contributions of the identification types on inter-group stereotypes; this way the effect of each identification type on ingroup– outgroup evaluations could be identified while keeping constant (at average values) the identification with the other types as well as the perception of relative deprivation and conflict.

For the test of Hypothesis 2, we looked at the main effects of the identification types. Hypothesis 2a predicted that, given its optimal distinctiveness, ethnic identification more than republican or federal identification would reinforce *ingroup stereotypes.* This predic-tion was *not* confirmed: the effects of republican identification were twice as strong on both positive and negative ingroup stereotypes, as the effects of ethnic identification, while the effects of federal identification were the weakest (see Table 2.4). It turns out that the republican superordinate identification contributes the most to people's self-evaluations when people identify on average at the ethnic and federal level. The main effects of the superordinate identifications on ingroup stereotypes were qualified by significant interac-tion terms that are discussed under Hypothesis 3b.

Hypothesis 2b predicts negative effects of ethnic identification and positive effects of the superordinate identifications on *outgroup stereotypes.* Table 2.4 shows that the predic-tions on positive stereotypes were confirmed, with the effect of republican identification almost four times stronger than the effects of ethnic identification. Federal identification has the weakest effects. Neither the ethnic nor the federal identifications had a significant effect on the negative stereotypes, but the effect of republican identification was significant and in the predicted direction: those who identified stronger with the republic had more positive stereotypes of the outgroup. The main effects of the superordinate identifications on outgroup stereotypes were also further qualified by significant interactions with ethnic groups, which are discussed under Hypothesis 3a.

In summary, the results show different effects of identification at different inclu-siveness levels. The republican identification should have an intermediate inclusiveness effect, in between the more exclusive ethnic identification and the higher-order federal identification. However, republican identification contributes the most to improving the evaluations of the ingroup as well as the outgroup. By the same token, ethnic identification is the identification that is the most exclusive of outgroups (Brewer, 2001). Identification at the superordinate level of the Russian Federation has a much weaker impact: It has a significant effect only on the positive ingroup and outgroup stereotypes, while it did not affect the negative stereotypes.

Table 2.4 Effects of Identification Types, Perceived Relative Deprivation and Conflict and their Interactions with Ethnic Groups

Dependent Variables	Positive Ingroup Stereotypes			Negative Ingroup Stereotypes			Positive Outgroup Stereotypes			Negative Outgroup Stereotypes		
	B	SE	F	B	SE	F	B	SE	F	B	SE	F
Ethnic groups	.30	.18	2.78	−1.47	.20	51.43***	.37	.20	3.44	1.59	.22	50.00***
Ethnic identification	.99	.15	43.45***	−.57	.17	10.87**	−.98	.17	34.52***	.10	.19	.27
× ethnic groups[a]	−.22	.15	2.23	.40	.17	5.40*	−.18	.17	1.15	.03	.19	.02
Republican Identification	1.70	.18	90.43***	−.97	.21	22.21***	2.37	.20	142.21***	−1.69	.23	56.11***
× ethnic groups	.95	.18	27.95***	.87	.21	−17.99***	−1.50	.20	56.61***	1.17	.23	26.96***
Federal Identification	.43	.14	9.05**	−.12	.17	.51	.64	.16	15.91***	.01	.18	.00
× ethnic groups	−.44	.14	9.37**	.38	.17	5.14*	1.06	.16	43.70***	−.51	.18	7.67**
Perceived Relative Deprivation and Conflict	−.32	.14	4.78*	1.21	.17	52.41***	−2.84	.16	312.38***	4.31	.18	557.22***
× ethnic groups	−.64	.14	19.41***	.17	.17	1.04	.23	.16	2.08	−.91	.18	24.84***

Note: For each dependent variable (stereotype), we report the unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors, and the univariate $F_{(1, 7299)}$ values with significance levels. The MANCOVA model yielded the following multivariate Pillais $F_{(4, 3647)}$ indicating the effects of each predictor across the four dependent variables: ethnic groups ($F = 43.41$, $p < .001$), ethnic identification ($F = 30.73$, $p < .001$), ethnic identification by ethnic groups ($F = 1.83$, ns), republican identification ($F = 50.74$, $p < .001$), republican identification by ethnic groups ($F = 36.81$, $p < .001$), federal identification ($F = 4.98$, $p < .001$), federal identification by ethnic groups ($F = 19.64$, $p < .001$), perceived relative deprivation and conflict ($F = 177.33$, $p < .001$), perceived relative deprivation and conflict by ethnic groups ($F = 13.38$, $p < .001$).

[a] Below each main effect (of ethnic identification, republican identification, federal identification and perceived relative deprivation and conflict), the coefficients of their interaction terms with the ethnic group factor are given (× ethnic groups).

*** $p \leq .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

2.6.4 Hypothesis 3: Differential Effects of the Superordinate Identifications for Russians and Titulars

Hypothesis 3a predicted that the superordinate identifications have different effects on *outgroup stereotypes* of Russians and titulars. The last two rows of Table 2.6 show the results of simple slope analyses that confirm the hypothesis. For Russians, republican identification improves positive and decreases negative stereotypes of titulars. For titulars these effects are not significant for negative stereotypes and very weak for positive stereotypes. Similarly, federal identification improves positive and decreases negative stereotypes titulars have of Russians, but has no significant effects among Russians.

Hypothesis 3b refers to the analysis of the interaction effects between superordinate identifications and ethnic groups on *ingroup stereotypes.* The first two rows of Table 2.6 summarizing the effects on ingroup stereotypes confirm our expectations almost entirely. Republican identification (more typical for titulars) strongly contributes to improving ingroup stereotypes for titulars, but it is much weaker in its effects for Russians, that is, the effect on positive stereotypes is six times weaker, and it is insignificant on negative stereotypes. Similarly, federal identification (more typical for Russians) has no effect on ingroup stereotypes of titulars, while it does contribute to the positive stereotypes of Russians.

In conclusion, identification at more inclusive levels does not always reflect improving intergroup relations; its effect seems to depend on the typicality of the superordinate identification. Those subgroups who are not supposed to claim ownership of the superordinate category, but who do identify at the superordinate level are more positive about the other subgroup than those who are supposed to claim ownership. Russians' republican identification, for instance, results in improved stereotypes of titulars. On the other hand, those subgroups who are supposed to raise claims on being the typical representatives of the superordinate category seem to feel justified not to include other subgroups if they identify with the superordinate category: titulars' republican identification as well as Russians' federal identification barely (or not at all) contribute to positive outgroup stereotypes or weaken negative outgroup stereotypes.

Finally, we present the effects of relative deprivation and conflict. Perceived relative deprivation and conflict had a very strong effect on outgroup stereotypes in particular (almost four times stronger than the maximum effect of republican identification), and more on negative than on positive stereotypes. These effects are in the expected direction: more perceived relative deprivation and conflict leads to more negative and less positive outgroup stereotypes. However, perceiving higher relative deprivation and conflict also slightly lowers one's positive ingroup stereotypes, and increases the negative ingroup stereotypes. This latter effect is surprisingly strong. The simple slope analysis of the interaction with the ethnic groups, as shown in Table 2.6, indicates that the perception of relative deprivation and conflict strengthens Russians' negative stereotypes of titulars (the effect is twice as strong as for titulars and for positive outgroup stereotypes). This result is consistent with what could be expected from threat and the relative group positions theories: the dominant group (Russians) is more likely to feel threatened by a subordinate group (titulars) than

vice versa.[10] This implies that perceived relative deprivation and conflict may undermine the benign (inclusive) effects of the republican identification among Russians (republican identification highly improved Russians' stereotypes of titulars). Further studies should focus on the possible interactions between intergroup relative deprivation and conflict and identification types, to specifically test this assumption (see Table 2.5). These dynamics were beyond the scope of the current analysis.

Table 2.5   Effects of Perceived Relative Deprivation and Conflict for each Ethnic Group: Results of Simple Slope Analyses

	Perceived Relative Deprivation and Conflict					
	Russians			Titulars		
	B	SE	F	B	SE	F
Positive ingroup stereotypes	.32	.20	2.53	−.95	.21	21.13***
Negative ingroup stereotypes	1.04	.23	19.91***	1.38	.24	33.17***
Positive outgroup stereotypes	−3.07	.22	188.01***	−2.61	.23	128.13***
Negative outgroup stereotypes	5.22	.25	420.49***	3.40	.26	168.64***

Note: These are the results of the simple slope main effect analysis of the interaction term between ethnic groups and perceived relative deprivation and conflict (Multivariate Pillais' test: $F(4, 3647) = 13.38$, $p<.001$). We report the unstandardized regression coefficients, the corresponding values of the standard errors, followed by the univariate $F(1, 7299)$ values with the respective significance levels.

*** $p<.001$, ** $p<.01$, * $p<.05$

10   The mean scores on perceived relative deprivation and conflict were as follows: Russians: 2.66 ($SD = 1.17$), titulars: 2.19 ($SD = 1.09$). They are significantly different, with $F(1, 10413) = 461.91$, $p<.001$). Russians perceive more relative deprivation and conflict between themselves and the respective titulars living in the same autonomous republic, than the titular groups do.

Table 2.6 Effects of Superordinate Identifications for Each Ethnic Group: Results of Simple Slope Analyses

| | Republican Identification | | | | | | Federal Identification | | | | | |
| | Russians | | | Titulars | | | Russians | | | Titulars | | |
	B	SE	F	B	SE	F	B	SE	F	B	SE	F
Positive ingroup stereotypes	.76	.14	14.07***	2.65	.30	80.11***	.88	.22	15.22***	-.00	.18	.00
Negative ingroup stereotypes	-.10	.23	.18	-1.84	.34	29.34***	-.50	.26	3.67	.26	.20	1.53
Positive outgroup stereotypes	3.87	.22	298.43***	.87	.33	7.09**	-.42	.25	2.84	1.70	.20	71.17***
Negative outgroup stereotypes	-2.86	.25	126.91***	-.52	.37	1.93	.51	.28	3.24	-.50	.23	4.75*

Note: These are the results of the simple slope main effect analysis of two interaction terms: the interaction between ethnic groups and republican identification (Multivariate Pillais' test: $F(4, 3647) = 36.81$, $p < .001$) and the interaction between ethnic groups and Russian Federation identification ($F(4, 3647) = 19.64$, $p < .001$). We report the unstandardized regression coefficients, the corresponding values of the standard errors, followed by the univariate $F(1, 7299)$ values with the respective significance levels.

*** $p \leq .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

2.7   Conclusions and Discussion

In addition to their primary ethnic identities, people are attached to multiple overlapping identification categories (Poppe & Hagendoorn, 2001). The effects of multiple identifications on patterns of polarization between groups may be rather complex, in particular in the former Soviet Union where a hierarchically layered political structure was designed in order to prevent ethnic conflict. We investigated whether intergroup polarization between Russians and titulars in autonomous republics of the Russian Federation is moderated by superordinate civic identifications (i.e., republican and federal identification). We found support for the claim that the civic superordinate identifications may ensure the desired regional stability. A higher identification with the republic was related to more positive stereotypes and less negative stereotypes of the outgroup, whereas federal identification was also related to more positive outgroup stereotypes, but did not affect negative stereotypes of the outgroup.

The study shows that a simple dichotomy of ingroup–outgroup should be avoided. Ethnic identification was differentially associated with the republican and the federal identifications for the Russians and the titulars and therefore the two superordinate identifications differed in their consequences for Russians' and titulars' negative evaluations of outgroups. For this reason the effect of the superordinate identifications did not completely conform to the mutual differentiation model. Instead, the effects were qualified by the meaning Russian and titulars attached to the superordinate categories and, are therefore more in line with the predictions of the Ingroup Projection Model. In other words, the more attached a group is to the superordinate identification, the more it emphasized its own positive characteristics and the less it emphasized the positive attributes of the other subgroup subsumed under the shared higher-level category.

The meaning of the two superordinate categories (republic and federation) for Russians and titulars in our research is defined by the political reality of the intergroup relations in the current Russian Federation. This reality determines the optional identification choices for both ethnic groups. The social psychological consequences of their choices are as complex as the hierarchically embedded structure of autonomies of the Russian Federation. It is not the case that the higher level units simply unify the lower-level units. The higher-level units rather emerge as a new field of struggle for dominance. The titulars generally seem to claim a special "right" on the republican level (which bears their ethnic name) and Russians claim to be the "true owners" at the federal level. Therefore, it appeared that the superordinate categories did their work as unifiers only half way: for Russians, the republican identification did indeed lead to more positive stereotypes of titulars, but the same was not true for the stereotypes by titulars of Russians. The same dynamic reappeared at the federal level: here the evaluations of Russians by titulars improved, but not those of titulars given by Russians. The two superordinate identifications, in addition, affected the ingroup stereotypes in such a way that the polarization between the groups only increased. Hence, the effects of the superordinate categories on the ingroup side of the intergroup differentiation were negative.

There was another important finding, namely that Russians were much more reluctant than titulars to be explicitly negative about the outgroup. While titulars favored their ingroup on both negative and positive evaluations, the dominant Russian group favored their ingroup only on the positive stereotypes. Hence, also the positive–negative asymmetry manifested itself only half way, namely for the dominant (Russian) group of the Russian Federation. This finding has to be qualified: Russians discrimination (expressed by the reduction of their positive stereotypes of the titulars) exceeded the discrimination manifested by the titulars.

In addition to the literature on intergroup relations between Russians and titulars in the borderland republics of Russia (Hagendoorn et al., 2001), this study indicates the tensions present between Russians and titulars within the Russian Federation itself. Russians seem insecure about their position in the autonomous republics in the Russian Federation. They seem to hesitate between integration in the republic and acknowledging that large conflicts of interests with the titulars are possible. Although Russians perceive the republic in principle as an inclusive unit that grants them an equal position, titulars perceive their republic more as a platform that guarantees their dominance. This antagonistic dynamics is not fully counterbalanced by the inclusive effects of identifying with the federation.

Meanwhile, it should not be denied that the superordinate republican identification is partially fulfilling its role for maintaining peaceful intergroup relations: it makes Russians feel included in the lower administrative levels of the federation, at the price of fueling feelings of pride and ethnic belonging of titulars.

The pattern of associations between identification types and intergroup polarization suggests that political entrepreneurs in Russia can easily destroy the beneficial effects of superordinate identifications by trying to mobilize groups: appealing to republican identity for titulars and federal identity for Russians. Our findings show that identification at a superordinate level affects intergroup evaluations, rather than triggering the personalization of group members (Brewer & Schneider, 1990). Therefore, also superordinate identifications can be used for collective mobilization. This study shows this strategic potential of social identifications and thus complements the previous studies in which this role was assigned only to intergroup competition and threat (Hagendoorn et al., 2001; Poppe & Hagendoorn, 2001, 2003) and it raises new questions about the forms this political mobilization may take.

In any social context, different identity categories can be defined in more or less exclusive terms, reflecting asymmetric claims of entitlement to specific rights. Analyzing the implications that specific categories have on the intergroup relationship, as a function of the meanings attributed to these categories by the groups involved, could be a fruitful contribution of social psychology to understanding real-life power struggles (cf. Reicher et al., 1997). Currently, too little attention is paid to the constructed and disputed character of identity categories.

While the strength of our findings lies in testing the consequences of the assumed meanings of the identification types for Russians and titulars, here lies also one limitation of this research: the lack of measurement of the perceived typicality of the superordinate categories, or individual understanding of the political reality. Future quantitative and qualitative studies should address the way people relate to the political reality of their

intergroup context. Currently, we addressed the way identification at various levels reflect the administrative layers that confer differential power and legitimacy to entitlement claims to the groups of Russians and titulars. Future research could also focus on the impact of different ideologies, such as multiculturalism or assimilation, on defining the inclusiveness or typicality of certain identity categories (cf. Billig, 1995).

Annex Chapter 2

Table 2.A: Scale Items for the Predictor Variables

Predictor	Scale Items
Ethnic Identification	'It is of great importance for me to be a Russian/ titular.' 'I am proud to be a Russian/ titular.'
Republican Identification	'It is of great importance for me to be a citizen of the republic in which I live.' 'I am proud of the republic in which I live'
Federal Identification	'It is of great importance for me to be a citizen of the Russian Federation.' 'I am proud to be a citizen of the Russian Federation.'
Perceived Relative Deprivation and Conflict	'The Titular population/Russian people in our republic have better job-opportunities than the Russians/Titulars.' 'The economic interests of the Titular population in the republic are in conflict with the Russians in this republic.' 'The political interests of the Titular population in the republic are in conflict with the Russians in this republic.'

The Content of Outgroup Stereotypes: Views of Chechens and Jews

3.1 Introduction

It has long been clear that the characteristics people use to evaluate others tend to fall along two general dimensions (Brown, 1965; Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1967; Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968; White, 1980). The names given to these two dimensions vary widely – dynamism and favourability, agency and communion, dominance and nurturance, or competence and warmth. However, the dimension variously referred to as agency, dominance, or competence includes the characteristics indicative of peoples' power. The dimension variously referred to as communion, nurturance, or warmth includes the characteristics indicative of peoples' benevolence. This is the conclusion drawn by Leach (2006) in his recent review of work on the evaluation of groups in the stereotyping, prejudice, attitude, and group bias literatures (see also Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). Most previous research at the group level has asked individuals to ascribe a set of traits to various out-groups. Traits presumed to indicate power or benevolence were then combined to create two (manifest) scales. This approach allowed researchers to locate out-groups along the (manifest) dimensions of power and benevolence, often with the aid of Multi-Dimensional Scaling. For example, Eagly and Kite (1987) used manifest measures to show that university students in the U.S. viewed Iranians as high in "agency" (e.g., dominant, aggressive, independent, egoistical) but low in "communion" (e.g., honest, kind, friendly, likable), whereas they viewed Poles as high in communality, but moderate in agency. With a sample of Eastern European secondary school students, Phalet and Poppe (1997) showed that people from European countries with greater economic and political power were viewed as highly "competent" (e.g., competitive, self-confident, intelligent, efficient). People from countries who were perceived to be in conflict with participants' in-group were viewed as somewhat less "moral" (e.g., honest, tolerant, aggressive, selfish). More recently, Fiske et al. (2002) showed that low status groups such as housewives were viewed as "warm" (e.g., trustworthy, sincere, warm, good-natured), but not "competent" (e.g., competitive, confident, independent, intelligent), whereas high status groups such as Jews were viewed

as "competent", but not "warm" (see also Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996; Poppe & Linssen, 1999).

Although previous studies appear to confirm the two-dimensional model of out-group judgement, it should be apparent that the two dimensions have been conceptualized and measured in different ways across studies (for a review, see Leach, 2006). For example, Eagly and Kite's (1987) scale of perceived out-group power included characteristics such antagonistic and not peaceful. However, other researchers have measured out-group power only with characteristics like competent and confident. Another problem is that traits such as "aggressive" have been used to measure the power dimension in some studies (e.g., Eagly & Kite, 1987) and the benevolence dimension in other studies (e.g., Phalet & Poppe, 1997). Despite the fact that there is widespread agreement that there are two general dimensions of judgement, there is disagreement about how they should be conceptualized and measured.

In this chapter, we offer a novel, two-level, approach to peoples' views of out-group power and benevolence. We conceptually distinguish the general dimensions of power and benevolence from the more specific characteristics often used to measure these two dimensions (see also, Leach, Ellemers, et al., 2007; Osgood et al., 1967). Thus, at a general level of analysis, we conceptualize power and benevolence as latent dimensions that describe how out-groups are viewed in very general terms. Rather than creating manifest scales of power and benevolence from a variety of specific characteristics, we used Factor Analysis to empirically examine whether five specific characteristics fall along latent dimensions that correspond to power and benevolence (see also, Rosenberg et al., 1968; White, 1980). We assess the robustness of the two-dimensional model in part by examining whether it works to characterize views of two contrasting out-groups in the Russian Federation, Chechens and Jews.

As a complement to the general level of analysis offered by the dimensions of power and benevolence, we also conceptualize the content of out-group stereotypes at a more specific level. Thus, we treat the specific out-group characteristics that fall along the general dimensions of power (i.e., smart, show initiative) and benevolence (i.e., moral, peaceful, antagonistic) as manifest variables that are measured directly. Although the two-dimensional model of judgement is useful at a general level of analysis, it is clear that individuals view out-groups in more specific terms than power and benevolence. For example, in a recent study, Leach et al.(2007, study 3) showed important differences in the way that the specific characteristics of morality (i.e., honest, sincere) and sociability (i.e., warm, likeable) were related to the positive evaluation of out-groups. When a relevant out-group was said to be more successful than the in-group, this out-group's perceived morality was more empirically important to positive evaluation than its perceived sociability. However, when this same out-group was said to be less successful than the in-group, it was the perceived sociability of the out-group that was most empirically important to participants' positive evaluation of the out-group. Although the characteristics of sociability and morality should both fall along the general dimension of benevolence, they capture different facets of benevolence (Leach, 2006). Attention to such specific out-group characteristics complements the general level at which most previous research on power and benevolence has been conducted.

The present study aimed to demonstrate the value in examining both the generality and the specificity of stereotype content. We used a large, diverse sample in the largest country in the world – the Russian Federation – to examine views of two contrasting out-groups. Because Jews and Chechens should be viewed in particular ways, we examine whether the power and benevolence dimensions, and the more specific characteristics that fall along them, offer complementary characterizations of the stereotypes of these two out-groups.

3.2 Two General Dimensions: Power and Benevolence

Most previous studies at the group level have treated power and benevolence as manifest variables, where a wide range of specific traits have been combined to create unitary scales. As mentioned above, this has led researchers to employ quite different measures of power and benevolence across studies. Perhaps more importantly, using power and benevolence as manifest measures has resulted in little work examining whether specific characteristics actually fall within the expected two-dimensional structure. Thus, our first broad aim was to examine whether the latent structure of five out-group characteristics – antagonistic, peaceful, moral, smart, and show initiative – is better characterized by dimensions of power and benevolence than by a single dimension. Namely, our first hypothesis is: the latent structure of the five out-group characteristics (i.e., antagonistic, peaceful, moral, smart, and show initiative) should be characterized by 2 dimensions (i.e., power and benevolence) rather than by one single dimension(*Hypothesis 1*). This approach is common in research on implicit personality theory, which examines the two-dimensional latent structure within which specific personality characteristics fall (e.g., Rosenberg et al., 1968).

Treating power and benevolence as latent dimensions also enables an unobtrusive assessment of the empirical importance of each dimension in how out-groups are viewed (Osgood et al., 1967). Thus, we used Factor Analysis to examine whether the power or the benevolence dimension explains more of the variance common to all of the characteristics ascribed to out-groups. This method has been used in studies of the characteristics ascribed to groups (Eagly & Kite, 1987; Leach, Ellemers, et al., 2007) as well as a wide variety of other entities (Osgood et al., 1967). However, most previous research has simply presumed the empirical importance of a dimension from the degree to which it is ascribed to a group. Unfortunately, the degree to which a characteristic is ascribed to a group is not an unambiguous indication of its empirical importance to the evaluation of the group (Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Leach, Ellemers, et al., 2007).

From a theoretical point of view, assessing the empirical importance of power and benevolence in views of out-groups is necessary because there is a long-standing notion that some out-groups are stereotyped mainly in terms of their power whereas others are stereotyped mainly in terms of their benevolence. For instance, (Bettelheim & Janowitz) analysis of working class war veterans' prejudice suggested that superego-based stereotypes of Jews focused on their "exercising control, having power." In contrast, id-based stereotypes of African Americans focused on their "primitive" and "socially unacceptable" behavior. Although, contemporary theory tends to eschew such psychodynamic concepts,

there is broad agreement that power and benevolence are differentially important to views of out-groups (Fiske et al., 2002; Judd et al., 2005). For example, Alexander and colleagues' (1999) suggestion that some low-status out-groups are viewed as (antagonistic and immoral) "barbarians" whereas some high-status out-groups are viewed as (competent, but immoral) "imperialists" comes close to Bettelheim and Janowitz's distinction (Fiske et al., 2002; Phalet & Poppe, 1997).

The present study compared views of two relatively small ethnic groups that have long been viewed as problems in Russia – Chechens and Jews (Markowitz, 1999). We focus on these two out-groups because history and politics suggest that Chechens are seen as a problem because of their perceived (lack of) benevolence, whereas Jews are seen as a problem because of their perceived power. More specifically, Jews are seen as having too much influence in business and politics, despite their very small numbers (Gibson & Duch, 1992; Korey, 1972). It appears that the classic stereotype of Jews as unscrupulously entrepreneurial has re-emerged in the Russian Federation. In contrast, Chechens' reputation as "ruthless and bloodthirsty" mountain warriors (Russell, 2002, p. 87) was reinvigorated in the early 20th century when they initiated a war of independence. Chechnya's recent violent efforts to separate from Russia have further fuelled their image as barbaric and violent people who are inherently antagonistic to others (Jersild, 2004). The popular notion that Chechen separatism is fuelled by Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism serves to reinforce their image as immoral and antagonistic people who prefer violence to peace (Markowitz, 1999; Russell, 2002, 2005).

Fifty years after Bettelheim and Janowitz, and in a very different cultural and political context, we expect that the characteristics ascribed to Jews still focus on their power (i.e., being smart, showing initiative). In contrast, we expect the characteristics ascribed to Chechens to focus on their perceived (lack of) benevolence (i.e., being antagonistic, not peaceful, not moral). More specifically, we expect the power dimension to be more empirically important to the stereotypes of Jews, explaining more of the common variance in the characteristics ascribed to this out-group (*Hypothesis 2a for Jews*). In contrast, we expect the benevolence dimension to be more empirically important to the characteristics ascribed to Chechens (*Hypothesis 2a for Chechens*).

Treating power and benevolence as latent dimensions also enables a more accurate assessment of the association between the two dimensions. Assessing the association between the power and benevolence dimensions is important because they are not necessarily orthogonal, as is often presumed. For example, Judd and colleagues (2005) recently showed that the association between power and benevolence varies across out-group targets. Where an out-group is viewed as like the in-group, or is admired, its perceived power and benevolence are positively correlated (Judd et al., 2005; Leach, Ellemers, et al., 2007, study 3). As we expect Jews to be viewed as having both power and benevolence, these general dimensions should be moderately inter-correlated (*Hypothesis 2b for Jews*). This suggests a view of Jews as a benevolent power (Phalet & Poppe, 1997). In contrast, we expect Chechens to be viewed as "terrorists" who have the power to harm, but lack benevolence (Russell, 2005). Thus, we expect little or no correlation between the power and benevolence dimensions when they are ascribed to Chechens (*Hypothesis 2b for Chechens*).

3.3   Specific Out-group Characteristics

That manifest measures of power and benevolence are too general to characterize the views held of many out-groups is apparent in previous research (for a review, see Leach, 2006). For instance, Eagly and Kite (1987) found U.S. university students to ascribe near equal "agency" to Iranians, Irish, Israelis, Japanese, and Russians. In studies by Fiske and colleagues (2002), Jews, Blacks, Feminists, Hispanics, Muslims, men, and Native Americans were all ascribed moderate "warmth." It seems highly unlikely that these quite different out-groups are viewed in such similar ways. Even where dimensions of power and benevolence are used together, they sometimes fail to characterize how salient and important out-groups are viewed. For example, in Eagly and Kite (1987) Spanish, Mexicans, East Germans, and Afghanis were all viewed as moderately agentic and communal. In Fiske et al. (2002), Arabs, Blacks, blue-collar workers, Muslims, migrant workers, and Native Americans were all viewed as moderately competent and warm.

That many different out-groups are viewed as having similar power and/or benevolence may be seen as suggesting that the two-dimensional model of judgement is too general to adequately account for the content of stereotypes. This may be why some researchers have developed frameworks that offer a greater number of out-group characteristics (e.g., Alexander et al., 1999; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). However, we think the problem is not with the two-dimensional model itself, but rather with the way in which the specificity of the characteristics that fall along the two dimensions has been wholly subsumed under the more general level of analysis. This is why we view the analysis of specific out-group characteristics as complementing analysis of the general dimensions of power and be-nevolence along which the specific characteristics should fall. Thus, our second broad aim is to examine the degree to which five specific characteristics offer a more nuanced characterization of how two contrasting out-groups are viewed than do the more general dimensions of power and benevolence.

A large body of research shows that there are important differences between the spe-cific characteristics that indicate individuals' power and benevolence (Rosenberg et al., 1968; White, 1980; Wiggins, 1979). Although there is less research on various out-groups, the characteristics of out-group sociability, morality, peacefulness, and antagonism each appear to tap specific aspects of the more general dimension of benevolence (e.g, Leach, 2006; Osgood et al., 1967; J. E. Williams & Best, 1982). Some support for this comes from recent studies by Leach and colleagues (2007). They used Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis to show that the group characteristics of morality (e.g., honest, sincere) and sociability (e.g., nice, warm) are distinct from each other. In addition, they used experi-mental manipulations of group sociability and morality to show that these characteristics have distinct effects on self-perception and emotion.

We wish to demonstrate that attention to the specificity of the characteristics that indi-cate out-group power and benevolence allows more precise hypotheses about which groups should be seen in what ways. Although the historical stereotype of Jews (in the Russian Federation and more generally) suggests that they are viewed as powerful, it also suggests a more specific view of Jews as showing initiative and very smart. Thus, Jews should be

seen as showing more initiative and as (much) smarter than Chechens. Although benevolence should be less empirically important to the characteristics ascribed to Jews, they should also be seen as much less antagonistic and more peaceful than the Chechens (*Hypothesis 3a*). Despite this view of Jews as generally benevolent, the notion that they aim to achieve, even by trickery and deceit, suggests that Jews should not be seen as moral. Thus Jews should be seen as less moral than peaceful and (non-)antagonistic (*Hypothesis 3b for Jews*).

The characteristics antagonistic and peaceful, rather than morality, should be the most central aspects of stereotypes regarding Chechen benevolence. If Chechens are indeed seen as the kind of "primitive", "barbarian" described by Bettelheim and Janowitz (1950) and Alexander and colleagues (1999), it is Chechen's presumed antagonism and lack of peacefulness that should take center stage in this stereotype. Thus, Chechens should be stereotyped as more antagonistic, than peaceful or moral. This pattern would fit the "terrorist" label salient in the present political moment. Given Chechens presumed political ambition, they should also be seen as showing initiative more than being smart (*Hypothesis 3b for Chechens*). Put in relative terms, Chechens should be viewed as much more antagonistic and less peaceful than Jews (see *Hypothesis 3a*). The difference between the out-group's perceived morality should be smaller.

3.4 Method

Participants came from urban population samples of about 1 000 in 10 autonomous republics in the Russian Federation. In 1999 and 2000, 10 415 respondents were interviewed face-to-face, with a near equal number of Russians and non-Russians participating in each republic (for details, see (for details, see Hagendoorn et al., 2008; Minescu, Hagendoorn, & Poppe, 2008). The 150 questions of the survey focused on demographics and attitudes toward politics and inter-group relations.

The present study focused on 7 traits that participants were asked about two salient out-groups in the Russian Federation, Chechens and Jews. Likely due to the sensitive nature of the items, as well as normal attrition, 4 356 people (42%) either refused to answer or chose a "don't know" response on all trait items. Supplemental analyses showed the respondents analyzed below to differ very little from non-respondents on in-group identification or attitudes relevant to stereotyping.[11] In addition, participants included in this study had demographic characteristics extremely similar to that of the full sample: $M_{age} = 42$, $SD_{age} = 16$; 56% female, 44% male. In any case, sample attrition is fairly unimportant as we are uninterested in making claims about the population as a whole.

In one section of the survey, participants were asked, "How many Chechens, in your opinion, have the following characteristic?" They were then presented with a list of traits used in previous research (e.g., Poppe & Linssen, 1999), including peaceful, hostile, rude, honest, deceitful, smart, and show initiative. Responses were given on a scale that ranged from 0% to 100%. The

11   Comparisons between respondents and non-respondents on several measures related to stereotypes, such as authoritarianism, distrust, social distance, nationalism and ethnic identification, were statistically reliable, $p<.05$. However, these effects were very small, all partial $\eta^2<.003$. The mean differences ranged from .01–.04 (on normalized scales from 0 to 1), yielding small effect sizes: Cohen's d .05–.10. Comparisons between respondents and non-respondents on several demographic measures showed only very small differences. For example, there were more missing values for women (43%) than men (40%). In addition, non-respondents were two years older: $F(1, 10 400) = 47.70$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta^2 = .005$, Cohen's $d = .13$, and slightly less educated $F(1, 10 253) = 17.05$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta^2<.001$.

same question was then asked about Jews. For analysis, all measures were recoded from 0 to 1. Based on Leach's (2006) review of the indicators of group power and benevolence and Leach and colleagues' (2007) recent studies, the traits honest and deceitful (reversed) were used to measure the characteristic moral ($r = .51$, $p<.001$ for Jews, and $r = .51$, $p<.001$, for Chechens). The traits hostile and rude were treated as indicators of the characteristic antagonistic ($r = .54$, $p<.001$ for Jews, and $r = .57$, $p<.001$, for Chechens).

3.5 Analysis and Results

3.5.1 Two General Dimensions

We expected the characteristics of moral, peaceful, antagonistic, smart, and show initiative to fall along the two general dimensions of power and benevolence (i.e., hypothesis 1). To assess this, we submitted the five characteristics to Principal-Axis Factor Analyses with maximum likelihood estimation and Oblimin rotation ($\Delta = 0$).[12] We use Factor Analysis in a way that is roughly equivalent to the Multi-Dimensional Scaling used in most other research on power and benevolence. However, Factor Analysis has the benefit of being based in the more readily understood common factor model, which treats power and benevolence as latent dimensions that can be rotated non-orthogonally. In addition, Factor Analysis with oblique rotation can empirically assess the correlation between the two dimensions in a way not possible with Multi-Dimensional Scaling (see Kruskal & Wish, 1984).

The characteristics ascribed to Chechens fit the expected two-dimensional structure, $\chi^2 (1) = 39.20$, $p<.001$. A one-dimensional solution produced a very poor model fit, $\chi^2 (5) = 984.55$, $p<.001$. A three-dimensional solution could not be examined with five items. The characteristics of peaceful, moral, and antagonistic fell on one dimension (i.e., benevolence), whereas smart and initiative fell on a second dimension (i.e., power). Upon initial extraction, the benevolence dimension explained almost twice the common variance as the power dimension. The two dimensions were weakly correlated. These results are shown in Figure 3.1a.

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12 Factor analysis appeared appropriate as the five characteristics ascribed to Chechens had low (moral–show initiative, $r = -.046$) to moderate (moral–antagonistic, $r = -.503$) inter-correlations, KMO measure of sampling adequacy = .670. The five characteristics ascribed to Jews also had low (moral–show initiative, $r = -.035$) to moderate (smart–show initiative, $r = .500$) inter-correlations, KMO measure of sampling adequacy = .666.

A parallel analysis showed the characteristics ascribed to Jews to also fit the expected two-dimensional structure, $\chi^2(1) = 73.22$, $p<.001$. A one-dimensional solution produced a very poor model fit, $\chi^2(5) = 869.65$, $p<.001$. Upon initial extraction the power dimension explained almost twice the common variance as the benevolence dimension. The two dimensions were moderately correlated. These results are shown in Figure 3.1b.

Figure 3.1a Factor Analysis of Characteristics Ascribed to Chechens, 2-dimensional Solution

Factor 2 (25% of total variance)   Chechens

Factor 1 (44% of total variance)

Factor Correlation: $r=|.097|$

Note: "Moral" (honest, deceitful) and "antagonistic" (hostile, rude) are an average of two traits.

In support of hypothesis 1, five specific characteristics fit within the expected two-dimensional structure. Whether the out-group was Jews or Chechens, power and benevolence appeared to characterize the content of stereotypes at a general level. In line with hypothesis 2a, benevolence was the dimension that was most empirically important in the view of Chechens, as it explained more of the variance the characteristics had in common. In the view of Jews, the power dimension was more important empirically.

Although the two-dimensional latent structure of the characteristics appeared consistent across the two out-groups, the association between the two dimensions varied. In line with hypothesis 2b, power and benevolence were only weakly correlated regarding Chechens, but were moderately correlated regarding Jews. A Fisher's r-to-z'-transformation showed these two correlations to differ reliably, $z = 10.18$, $p < .001$, 95%CI [10.14, 10.22].

Figure 3.1b Factor Analysis of Characteristics Ascribed to Jews, 2-dimensional Solution

Factor 2 (23% of total variance)   Jews

Factor Correlation: $r = |.301|$ (43% of total variance)

Factor 1

Note: "Moral" (honest, deceitful) and "antagonistic" (hostile, rude) are an average of two traits.

This suggests that the Jewish stereotype is more of a positive gestalt that views this out-group as a benevolent power. On the other hand, Chechens' perceived power was not seen as implying much benevolence. This is consistent with the image of Chechens as dangerous "terrorists" who may use their power to harm others.

3.5.2 Specific Group Characteristics

We used a series of paired samples t-tests to examine participants' ascription of the five characteristics to Jews and Chechens (see Figure 3.2). Given the very large sample size, we report Cohen's (1992) d statistic to aid interpretation (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Cohen's d reports the effect size of mean differences in terms of a pooled standard deviation (Devilly, 2004).

Figure 3.2 Means (Standard Deviations) of Characteristics Ascribed to Chechens and Jews

In order to test hypothesis 3a, we compared the degree to which each characteristic was ascribed to Chechens vs. Jews (see Table 3.1). The differences on the characteristics that fall along the general dimension of benevolence were as hypothesized. Thus, Jews were seen as much more peaceful and less antagonistic than Chechens. Neither group was seen as particularly moral, although Jews were viewed as moderately more moral than Chechens. These results suggest the value of differentiating the specific characteristics that indicate out-group benevolence. If morality, antagonism, and peacefulness were combined into a general benevolence score, we might have been unable to observe the differences in how

the out-groups were viewed. It was the antagonistic and peaceful characteristics that signal cooperativeness (Alexander et al., 1999) that best differentiated the stereotypes of Chechens and Jews. Morality was less diagnostic of the differences in views of Jews' and Chechens' benevolence (see also, Leach, Ellemers, et al., 2007).

Further results show the value of differentiating the specific characteristics that fall along the general dimension of out-group power. In support of hypothesis 3a, Jews were seen as much smarter than Chechens. Both groups were seen as showing initiative, although Jews were viewed as moderately higher in this specific characteristic. The use of a general measure of power would have obscured these differences. Comparing the degree to which the 5 characteristics were ascribed to each out-group separately offers further support of our approach.

Consistent with hypothesis 3b, Jews were seen as much less moral than peaceful and (non-)antagonistic (see Table 3.2). However, there was very little difference in the degree to which participants viewed Jews as smart and showing initiative (Table 3.2). Although the power dimension is more empirically important in the stereotype of Jews, the specific characteristic of morality (which falls along the benevolence dimension) shows an important element of the negative view of Jews in the past and in the present study.

Table 3.1 Comparison of Characteristics Ascribed to Chechens vs. Jews (Paired samples *t*-tests)

Chechens vs. Jews	t	df	Cohen's d
Antagonistic	81.94	3920	1.84
Moral	−25.20	3860	0.57
Peaceful	−79.82	3796	1.79
Smart	−67.61	3721	1.41
Show initiative	−32.32	3771	0.64

Note: Interpretation of Cohen's *d* measure of effect size: .20 = small, .50 = medium, .80 = large.

Consistent with hypothesis 3b, Chechens were differentially ascribed the 5 specific characteristics in ways quite different to that observed for Jews. For instance, Chechens were viewed as more showing initiative than being smart (see Table 3.2). Showing initiative is not inconsistent with the image of Chechens as violent barbarians who are focused on achieving their political goals at the expense of others. Indeed, Chechens were viewed as less peaceful than moral or non-antagonistic. Although benevolence was the general dimension most empirically important to the stereotypes ascribed to Chechens, participants' most extreme view was expressed in terms of Chechens' presumed lack of peacefulness. This fits with the historical and contemporary view of Chechens as violent barbarians and terrorists.

Table 3.2 Comparison of Characteristics Ascribed to Jews, Chechens (Paired samples t tests)

Out-group: Jews	t	df	Cohen's d
Moral vs. Non-antagonistic[a]	−70.09	4614	1.27
Moral vs. Peaceful	−36.02	4626	0.67
Non-antagonistic vs. Peaceful	32.63	4584	0.01
Smart vs. Showing Initiative	6.59	4884	0.09
Out-group: Chechens	t	df	Cohen's d
Moral vs. Non-antagonistic[a]	4.04	4488	0.08
Moral vs. Peaceful	33.39	4353	0.53
Non-antagonistic vs. Peaceful	37.84	4455	0.61
Smart vs. Showing Initiative	−28.36	4017	0.54

Note: Interpretation of Cohen's *d* measure of effect size: .20 = small, .50 = medium, .80 = large.

    a   The scale for "antagonistic" was reversed in order to allow for comparisons with the other two characteristics of benevolence (such that higher scores = more benevolence).

3.6   Conclusions and Discussion

The two-dimensional model of judgement applies to a wide variety of entities. Thus, there was good reason to expect that the dimensions of power and benevolence characterize the content of out-group stereotypes. However, previous studies were hampered by inconsistent conceptualization and measurement. Previous research also suffered from not distinguishing the general dimensions of power and benevolence from the more specific characteristics that fall along these two general dimensions. We offered an approach to the content and structure of out-group stereotypes that was guided by this distinction between the general and specific levels of analysis.

In analyses more common in the examination of individual personality traits than group characteristics, we used Factor Analysis to show that 5 specific out-group characteristics fell along more general dimensions that corresponded to power and benevolence. Although Jews and Chechens are viewed quite differently in the Russian Federation (and

more generally), the two-dimensional model appeared to fit the specific characteristics ascribed to both out-groups. Thus, the present study used a large, diverse sample to provide novel evidence in support of the two-dimensional model. We also showed that the two general dimensions are not necessarily associated in the same way across all out-groups (see also, Judd et al., 2005; Leach, Ellemers, et al., 2007, study 3). Consistent with the more positive view of Jews among participants, their perceived power and benevolence was moderately correlated. Thus, Jews tended to be stereotyped as a benevolent power (Phalet & Poppe, 1997). Chechens' perceived power did not, however, suggest their benevolence.

Often, the stereotype of an out-group as powerful and achievement-oriented (i.e., the classic stereotype of Jews in Europe) has been contrasted to the stereotype of an out-group as dangerous and conflict-oriented (i.e., the classic stereotype of those of African heritage, barbarians, or of contemporary terrorists). We found support for these two stereotypes, with the image of Jews corresponding to Bettelheim and Janowitz's (1950) superego-based stereotype and the image of Chechens corresponding to their id-based stereotype (see also, Fiske et al., 2002). Consistent with the view that Jews are a prestigious minority in the Russian Federation, the power dimension explained nearly twice of the variance common to the five specific characteristics than did the benevolence dimension. However, consistent with the image fuelled by Chechens' violent independence movement within this largely Muslim republic, participants' view of Chechens was better explained by the benevolence than the power dimension.

Complementing our support for the general dimensions of power and benevolence was evidence that the 5 more specific characteristics offered a more nuanced characterization of the content of stereotypes. Thus, consistent with historical views, Jews were ascribed the characteristics smart, showing initiative. However, continuing the long-standing trend to stereotype Jews as deceitful, they were not seen as especially moral despite being viewed as peaceful and non-antagonistic. This suggests that Jewish benevolence is viewed more in terms of cooperation-conflict than in terms of morality. Participants also reproduced the long-standing view of Chechens as non-peaceful, an image only increased by their portrayal as "terrorists." Although Chechens were viewed as neither moral nor non-antagonistic, the most extreme view was expressed in terms of the specific characteristic of non-peaceful.

Future research would do well to examine the two general dimensions, and the specific characteristics that fall along them, across a wider variety of in-group and out-groups. It is important to know if contextual factors might moderate the content and structure of out-group stereotypes. Although there appears to be a good deal of consensus in stereotyping, particular inter-group relations might alter this (Leach, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For example, the in-group's relation to the out-group may alter (1) the specific characteristics that are relevant to the stereotypes of out-group, (2) the exact location of the specific characteristics within the two-dimensional structure, or (3) the association between power and benevolence (see Leach, 2006). We believe that the approach that we have offered here serves as a useful way to examine both the specificity and the generality of the content and structure of peoples' views of groups.

Perceived Intergroup Conflict: Testing the Group Position Model

4.1 Introduction

A wide range of social science research has addressed intergroup conflict. The analysis-spotlight shifted according to disciplinary interest: from intra-individual determinants (e.g. feelings of frustration or relative deprivation) to collective outcomes, such as group cohesion or intergroup discrimination (see for reviews: Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Tajfel, 1978); from general theories to specific models of ethnic antagonism (J. H. Turner, 1986); from describing and classifying types of inter-ethnic conflicts (Tishkov, 1999) to explaining conflict using specific configurations of individual and contextual factors (R. M. Williams, 1994; Yamskov, 1991).

This study focuses on perceived intergroup conflict and its explanations proposed by the Group Position Model (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bobo & Tuan, 2006; Tishkov, 1997). Perceived intergroup conflict is conceptualized as an instance of hostile intergroup attitude, fundamentally connected to the social, cultural and political system in which intergroup power claims are disputed (Bobo & Tuan, 2006). This study aims to extend the empirical applicability of the Group Position Model outside the context of the United States. We examine whether several factors proposed by the model are relevant predictors of perceived conflict in the Russian Federation. We focus on the perspective of ethnically non-Russian groups, living in several autonomous republics of the Russian Federation. These so-called titular groups are the ethnic groups after which the republic was named (e.g., Tatars in the Republic of Tatarstan, or Kareli in the Republic of Karelia; for a discussion of this label, see Hagendoorn et al., 2001, pp. 6–7). The variation in group size of titular groups across these republics reflects the level of institutionalized group entitlement because, historically, more political privileges were allocated to the more numerous titular groups (Tishkov, 1997). Our survey also included an experiment on perceived threat and outgroup encroachment (i.e. the fear of growing outgroup influence). We focus on the combined effects of group size, perceived threat and outgroup encroachment in order to refine and extend previous applications of the Group Position Model.

4.2 The Group Position Model

The Group Position Model is based on Blumer's (1958) theory of prejudice as a sense of group position. The influential insights of Blumer (1958), derived from symbolic interactionism and meant to encourage qualitative studies on prejudice, were recently elaborated by Bobo and colleagues into a model that is more suitable for survey research (Bobo, 1999; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bobo & Tuan, 2006). The Group Position Model was developed as a reaction to explanations of prejudice that focused predominantly on (social) psychological factors. In Blumer's view (1958) prejudice is best understood within the larger socio-historical intergroup context. Prejudice is a general orientation or attitude towards an outgroup fundamentally based on normative beliefs about the rightful position of one's own group vis-à-vis that outgroup.

The Group Position Model considers individual level socio-emotional elements as the prerequisite determinants of intergroup hostility. For example, feelings of ingroup superiority and distinctiveness form the background on which perceived conflict breeds (Bobo, 1999; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bobo & Tuan, 2006). In addition, instrumental concerns with group interests (i.e. group entitlement, perceived competition and threat) are assumed to be crucial catalysts in prompting intergroup disputes. Since the objective structure of institutionalized privileges determines these instrumental concerns, the sense of group position is rooted in these structural asymmetries. However, people have particular normative expectations with respect to the particular intergroup relationships of dominance and subordination. These expectations mediate the link between the objective position of one's group in the societal group hierarchy and one's subjective sense of group position. In other words, while group membership and the associated structural privileges determine the objective position of the group, intergroup conflict is ultimately triggered by the subjective normative expectation about what the rightful position of the groups 'ought to be'.

By acknowledging the role of individual level perceptions and group identification, besides the role of history and politics, in defining the structural positions of ethno-racial groups, the Group Position Model combines social-psychological explanations of intergroup hostility with macro-sociological and political foundations of intergroup inequalities (Bobo, 1999, 2004; Taylor, 2002). By integrating individual and contextual level explanations into a coherent framework, the Group Position Model provides a more comprehensive approach compared to theories that focus exclusively on explanations at either level. We discuss the Group Position Model in more detail and compared to other approaches, after introducing the intergroup context of the present study.

Blumer (1958) focused on the racial intergroup conflicts perceived by the dominant group of Caucasian Americans vis-à-vis the subordinate African American group in the United States (Bobo, 1983; A. W. Smith, 1981). The model was later extended to explain attitudes towards Native Americans (Bobo & Tuan, 2006) and attitudes towards other subordinate groups (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996).

In this study, we apply the Group Position Model in Russia in order to explain perceived intergroup conflict with Russians from the perspective of titular groups living in several autonomous republics of the Russian Federation. Despite their numerical inferiority in the

Russian Federation, these ethnically non-Russian groups (hereafter called titular) enjoy varying degrees of political privilege, depending on a series of factors, such as ethnicity, group size or territory. The fact that these titular groups enjoy a localized position of privilege (i.e., inside their own republics) provides an interesting opportunity to test the Group Position Model.

4.2.1   Titulars in the Autonomous Republics of the Russian Federation

An interesting aspect of the titular-Russian intergroup context is that political privileges were historically institutionalized according to particular combinations of criteria involving not only ethno-racial distinctions (as is generally the case in the United States), but also territorial and numerical considerations.

At the end of the 1920's the Soviet Bolsheviks embarked on the momentous mission to assimilate the extremely diverse population of the former Russian empire into a controllable hierarchy of 'nationality categories' (Hirsch, 2005, p. 14). Although the differentiation between groups was partially based on strategic 'ethnographic processing' (Tishkov, 1997, p. 15), objective criteria were employed to justify the power distribution and administrative organization of the Soviet Union. Internal national borders were created based on census results (i.e. group size) and the ethnographic classification of distinctive cultural traditions defining ethnic groups (Dave, 2004). Linking ethno-national categories to geographically localized resources and republican borders created irreversible links between ethnicity, group size and political power (Dave, 2004, p. 440; Hirsch, 2005, p. 146).

The degree to which a group was larger, more territorially concentrated, and was officially defined as more culturally distinctive greatly determined the degree of allocated power. Certain ethnic groups, identified as *titular nationalities*, were given greater political autonomy, namely the right to govern their own delineated administrative territory (i.e., the titular republics, see Hirsch, 2005, p. 9; Tishkov, 1997). These titular nationalities were given an institutionally privileged position within their own autonomous territories, while their politically subordinate position in the larger federation (i.e. outside the republican territories) was maintained. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, at the beginning of the 1990's, most titular republics claimed more political and cultural autonomy vis-à-vis the new political center of the Russian Federation. Bilateral agreements between the republics and the federal Center strengthened the privileged position of titulars through a series of sovereignty statements and negotiations regarding various issues, from the redistribution of tax to the use of cultural symbols (Hale, 2000; Kahn, 2002).

Throughout the last century the size of the titular groups was used as a contextual criterion that conditioned the degree of political power negotiated with the previous Soviet and current Federal Center. This particular history indicates that group size can be considered as an objective indicator of group entitlement among the titular groups of the Russian Federation. The fact that the relative size of the titular groups varies greatly across the autonomous republics of the Russian Federation provides a natural variation in the potential claims to political entitlements. Across the eight republics included in the present study the size of titular groups ranges from 64.3% in Tuva to 10% in Karelia (see Table

4.1), while the Russian population outnumbers the titular population in most republics with the exception of Tuva and Tatarstan. There are over 80 administrative units within the Federation, out of which 21 are autonomous titular republics, nine krais, 46 oblasts, two federal cities, one autonomous oblast, and four autonomous okrugs. Despite the fact that all federal subjects enjoy equal representation in the Federal Council, the degree of autonomy and self-governance varies greatly between the various units, as well as inside each category.

Besides group size, the ethno-national culture played a crucial role in the historical allocation of political privileges to titular groups and, thus, in the collective definition of group privilege and entitlement (Dragadze, 1996; Dutter, 1990; Hirsch, 2005). The Soviet regime together with ethnographers and local elites went through lengthy and disputed processes of identifying, categorizing and defining ethnic groups and national territories. Language and ethno-cultural customs were central in the process of describing groups in the tremendously diverse population of the former Russian empire (Hirsch, 2005, pp. 8–9; Tishkov, 1997, pp. 15–21). In the eight republics we surveyed, cultural differences between Russians and titulars exist in terms of both religion and language. The dominant religion among titulars differs from Russian orthodoxy in five republics, while none of the titular languages stem from the (East) Slavic language group (see Table 4.1).

To conclude, the (historical) institutionalization of privilege favouring titulars within their own republics, the variation in group position of titular groups across the republics (as indicated by relative group size), and the cultural differences between titulars and Russians provide unique intergroup context features for testing the Group Position Model hypotheses.

4.2.2   The Social-psychological Prerequisites for Perceived Conflict

According to the Group Position Model, there are three categories of predictors for intergroup conflict: social-psychological pre-requisites, factors indicating the degree of entitlement to power, and triggering factors. The first set of factors includes feelings of distinctiveness from outgroups, ethno-national superiority and negative stereotypes towards relevant outgroups. The hypotheses related to these factors are not unique to the Group Position Model.

Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Fraser, 1978), in particular, has inspired a bulk of research on the relationships between group identification and intergroup differentiation (M. Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Jetten et al., 2004; Wright & Tropp, 2002). The baseline assumption is that mere group membership elicits ingroup favouritism (and sometimes outgroup derogation) in order to fulfil needs for positive self-esteem (Tajfel, 1978) and needs of belonging and distinctiveness (Brewer, 2001). Features of the intergroup context, such as the permeability of group boundaries or group status, are seen as moderators of the motivational and cognitive processes underlying intergroup differentiation.

Table 4.1 Ethno-national Features of Eight Republics of the Russian Federation

Republic	Percentage titulars	Percentage Russians	Main Religion of the titulars	Language of the titulars	Federal district (continent)	
Karelia	10.0	73.6	Russian Orthodoxy	Finno-Ugric	North West	(Europe)
Komi	23.3	57.7	Russian Orthodoxy	Finno-Ugric	North West	(Europe)
Udmurtia	30.9	58.9	Russian Orthodoxy	Finno-Ugric	Ural	(Europe)
Adigeya	22.1	68.0	Sunni Islam	Caucasian	South	(Europe)
Tatarstan	48.5	43.3	Sunni Islam	Turkic	Volga	(Europe)
Bashkortostan	21.9	39.3	Sunni Islam	Turkic	Volga	(Europe)
Sakha (Yakutia)	33.4	50.3	Shamanism	Turkic	Far East	(Asia)
Tuva	64.3	32.0	Buddhism Shamanism	Turkic	Siberia	(Asia)

Note: The information in the first two columns is based on census data 1989 and represents the percentage of Russian or titular groups from the total population of the titular republic.

In line with this approach, Blumer (1958) considered the social psychological processes of social identification, outgroup stereotyping and differentiation as fundamental preconditions laying the foundation for the sense of group position. However, rather than focusing on why individuals pursue intergroup differentiation in the first place, the Group Position Model targets the escalation of intergroup differentiation into intergroup struggles that change or maintain the status quo. Moreover, the Group Position Model suggests that a heightened focus on the larger societal context helps specifying the type of group attachment or identity category, and therefore, the particular outgroups, that are politically relevant in a particular intergroup setting (see also Huddy, 2001). This means that intergroup differentiation is conditional on the type of identities that are politically relevant in the allocation and institutionalization of privileges (Bobo & Tuan, 2006).

Ethno-racial and national identifications are powerful forces in fueling intergroup disputes because they represent the major fault-lines in dividing privileges inside modern nation-states (Wimmer, 1997). In order to understand inter-ethnic conflict, attachment to the ethnic and national identity categories should be taken into account. Previous research assessed attachment to the ethno-national group by measuring feelings of ethno-national superiority (also labeled "chauvinism" in Coenders, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2004; and "nationalism" in Hagendoorn et al., 2001), which were often strongly associated with negative outgroup attitudes.

As opposed to these feelings of ethno-national superiority, other types of attachment to ethnic or national groups (also labelled "patriotism" in Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001) were proposed to be less consequential for outgroup rejection (see de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003 for a review). However, ethnic identification often predicts intergroup hostility, especially in contexts where intergroup competition and threat are salient (see Duckitt & Mphuthing, 2002; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005; R. M. Williams, 1994). As long as access to political power is conditioned by one's ethnic group membership, ethnic identification is expected to increase perceptions of intergroup conflict.

Identification with superordinate categories, such as the country (rather than the ethnic group), may also accentuate perceptions of conflict between the ingroup and specific outgroups (see the Ingroup Projection Model of Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Even if superordinate identifications are meant to be inclusive of all the subgroups that belong to the superordinate category, particular subgroups often advance asymmetrically stronger claims of ownership to that superordinate category. These ownership claims diminish the potentially inclusive effects of attachment to the superordinate category (Wenzel et al., 2003). For example, among titulars in the Russian Federation identification with the republic strongly overlaps with ethnic identification indicating the projection of ownership claims of titulars onto the republican category (Minescu et al., 2008). As a consequence, republican identification had weak (though still positive) effects on evaluating the Russian outgroup (see Sinclair, Sidanius, & Levin, 1998 for a similar argument in a different intergroup setting).

Antagonistic outgroup stereotypes are also established predictors of intergroup hostility (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Stephan et al., 2005). A previous study within Russia indicated that titular groups' separatist intentions were fuelled by their negative stereotypes

towards the Russians (Hagendoorn et al., 2008). These effects also reflected titulars' claim to exclusive ownership of their own republic.

To sum up, we expect perceived conflict to be higher among titulars with stronger feelings of ethno-national superiority, who identify stronger with their ethnic group and with their titular republic and who perceive the Russian outgroup as more antagonistic (*Hypothesis 1*). These elements constitute the psychological prerequisites for perceived conflict (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996, p. 955), but are not sufficient to trigger people's protective reactions of their group position (Blumer, 1958, p. 4; Bobo & Tuan, 2006, p. 135). Two additional sets of factors are needed: group entitlement and competition, on the one hand, threat and threatened encroachment, on the other hand.

4.2.3 Group Entitlement through Numbers and Group Competition

This set of factors is focused on the structure of the intergroup relations, reflecting incompatibilities of group interests as well as violations of the normative expectations of what should rightly belong to whom (Bobo, 2004, p. 342). The position of the ingroup determines the type of normative expectations as well as the criteria used to legitimize them, such as the connection to the soil and territory, prior occupation of a country, religiously based myths of homeland and group size (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 185–207). Any of these markers could be engaged in the struggle for group position as basis for claiming power.

Proprietary claims over rights, privileges or resources result in feelings of group entitlement and perceptions of group competition and relative deprivation vis-à-vis relevant outgroups (Blumer, 1958, p.4). These factors are crucial for the Group Position Model because they emphasize individuals' assessment of the relationships between the groups (e.g., in terms of competition for resources or asymmetric entitlements).[13]

The historical overview of the Russian intergroup context indicates that privileges for titular groups within their republics have been institutionalized according to the size of the titular group and had an unquestionable ethno-cultural and territorial dimension(Codagnone & Filippov, 2000; Dave, 2004; Dutter, 1990). Based on a strong association between group size, ethnicity and group entitlement, the power of group size in fueling ethnic conflict is acknowledged in contexts outside the Russian Federation as well (see Horowitz, 1985; Wimmer, 1997 for reviews). Group size can be used as an objective indicator of group entitlement (Horowitz, 1985, p. 194). Thus, we assume that power in numbers results in "protective reactions" among the privileged groups of titulars. Specifically, a larger ingroup size should be associated with more perceived conflicts with Russians (*Hypothesis 2*).

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13 Other social-psychological theories concerning the power asymmetries between dominant and subordinate groups, such as the Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) propose *personality traits and political attitudes* (i.e. the preference for or against group hierarchies within the social system, and the endorsement of legitimizing ideological myths) as central explanations for intergroup conflict. This study aims at a specific test of the group position model, rather than theoretical integration or empirical validation of additional theories, and does not address predictions or explanations based on Social Dominance Theory.

According to the Group Position Model, group entitlement is often accompanied by perceptions that groups are competing for the same resources in a zero-sum game (Bobo, 2004, p. 342; Jackson, 1993; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Olzak, 1992). In previous studies the presence of perceived group competition and relative deprivation was associated with more perceived conflict. This relationship was identified in the Russian setting (Hagendoorn et al., 2001; Hagendoorn et al., 2008), as well as in other contexts (Esses, Jackson, Nolan, & Armstrong, 1999; Taylor, 2002; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984; Wright & Tropp, 2002). Moreover, recent research found privileged groups to be particularly responsive to the feelings of relative deprivation based on structural inequalities in entitlement and rights (Dambrun, Taylor, McDonald, Crush, & Méot, 2006; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). Therefore, we expect that titulars who perceive more intergroup competition and relative deprivation perceive more intergroup conflict with the Russians (*Hypothesis 3*).

4.2.4   Perceived Threat and Outgroup Encroachment

The last set of factors proposed by the Group Position Model concerns individuals' perceptions of threat vis-à-vis those who attempt to change the status-quo to the detriment of the ingroup (Bobo, 2004, p. 342). Perceptions of threat are supposed to considerably heighten perceived intergroup conflict, which is in line with several other theoretical models on intergroup relationships (Jackson, 1993; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Sherif, 1967). However, the Group Position Model focuses on specifying the type of threat raised by a particular outgroup (Bobo & Tuan, 2006; A. W. Smith, 1981).

Two types of threat are often distinguished in previous research: symbolic and realistic threat. Symbolic threat refers to the cultural domain of values, norms, traditions or national identity and worldviews that appear endangered in the presence of a culturally different outgroup (see for example, Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sniderman et al., 2004; Zarate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004). Realistic threat refers to the more material and objective resources perceived to be at risk, such as jobs, education, welfare funding (see for example, Bobo, 1983; Esses et al., 1999; Schneider, 2008; Stephan et al., 2005). Theoretical traditions differ in the predicted effects and weight given to the two types of threat. According to the realistic conflict approach the objective contestation of resources, and thus the realistic type of threat should be more consequential for stirring intergroup animosities (see LeVine & Campbell, 1972, for a review). From the perspective of the Group Position Model, the political relevance of a certain type of threat is determined by the particular historical and institutional context of the intergroup relationships. In addition, even in the absence of objective conditions of competition or deprivation determining threats to realistic or symbolic resources, people may still perceive threat if a particular outgroup is seen as getting out of place (Bobo & Tuan, 2006, p. 33).

The current study investigates the effects of perceived cultural threat on perceiving conflict.[14] In a preliminary analysis we explore our assumption that culture is central in

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14   An additional difference between the realistic conflict and the group position approaches is that the former more readily explains *actual* conflicts, while the latter can be employed to investigate the *perceptions* of intergroup conflict, which may not necessarily correlate with the potential or

the intergroup context by examining whether cultural elements are perceived as important in titulars' subjective definitions of the ethnic ingroup. This analysis provides an insight into the degree to which individual's representations of their ethnic groups have come to reflect the official state-level policies of building ethnic cohesion by emphasizing ethno-national titular cultures and languages. The centrality of culture in the ways groups are defined politically (i.e. by elites) and subjectively (i.e. at the grass-root level) has important consequences for the intergroup relationships (Brubaker et al., 2006). For example, defining national group belonging in terms of essentializing cultural elements is likely to lead to exclusionary reactions towards those who do not share the same ethnicity or culture (McCrone & Bechhofer, 2008; Sibley & Liu, 2007). At the same time, if cultural issues are salient in the public discourse, individuals are more likely to respond to symbolic threats when evaluating the intergroup relationships. Therefore, by virtue of being a fault-line in defining group position and distribution of privileges, cultural issues can become the area of entitlement claims that is most vulnerable to outgroup threats.

However, not all outgroups are threatening, and cultural differences are not inherently threatening. The Group Position Model suggests that perceived threat leads to conflict particularly if it is associated with a specific outgroup, an outgroup that is feared for encroaching on the area of ingroup privileges. Once people perceive that an outgroup threatens to takeover resources and privileges that should rightfully and exclusively belong to the ingroup, they react by trying to protect the status-quo (Blumer, 1958, p. 5). Consequently, we hypothesize that titulars who feel more culturally threatened and who fear outgroup encroachment from the Russians perceive more conflict (*Hypothesis 4*, predicting main effects of perceived threat and outgroup encroachment).

4.3 Extending the Group Position Model: How Group Entitlement, Perceived Threat and Outgroup Encroachment Condition Each Other's Effects

The aforementioned sets of factors are expected to have additive effects in determining perceived conflict, though a heavier theoretical weight is often given to the so-called 'group conflict motives': perceptions of group competition and group entitlement, and perceived threat and outgroup encroachment (Bobo, 2004, p. 342). Bobo and Tuan (2006) showed that including 'group conflict motives' improves the predictive validity of the model, above and beyond the effects of social-psychological predispositions. However, the degree to which some of these factors moderate each other's effects in predicting perceived conflict has not been addressed in previous applications of the Group Position Model. This study investigates the interaction effects between group entitlement (i.e. ingroup size), perceived

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anticipation of real group conflict. This study is particularly focused on the grass-root level *perceptions* of conflict, rather than the *actual* titular-Russian conflicts. For an explanation of the latter, a close examination of elite-level politics (Dave, 2004; Dutter, 1990) as well as an inclusion of realistic (besides symbolic) threats would be paramount (Brubaker, Feischmidt, Fox, & Grancea, 2006; R. M. Williams, 1994; Wimmer, 1997; Yamskov, 1991).

threat and outgroup encroachment. We propose two extensions of the Group Position Model.

The first extension concerns testing the effects of perceived threat and outgroup encroachment. An important distinction is made in the Group Position Model between perceived threat and fear of outgroup encroachment, whereby the latter crucially defines a specific outgroup as the object of threat. The sense of group position "becomes consequential insofar as dominant group members believe that subordinate group members are encroaching on their rightful prerogatives" (Bobo & Tuan, 2006, p. 33). Thus, the effects of perceived threat should be conditioned by the fear that the outgroup is 'getting out of place', invading the areas of privilege of the ingroup (Bobo & Tuan, 2006). More intergroup conflict should be perceived by those who feel threatened, but, particularly, when that threat is associated with the growing influence of a relevant outgroup (*Hypothesis 5*, proposing a two-way interaction effect between perceived threat and outgroup encroachment). Investigating the catalyzing role of outgroup encroachment presupposes an empirical differentiation of the effects of perceived threat from those of outgroup encroachment. Our survey included an experimental manipulation of outgroup encroachment, following a previously used survey-experimental technique (see e.g., Sniderman et al., 2004). This experiment allowed for an innovative test of *Hypothesis 5*.

The second extension of the Group Position Model concerns the interaction between group entitlement, perceived threat and outgroup encroachment. Blumer (1958) originally proposed a stepwise process in which feelings of entitlement become fully engaged into intergroup conflict once individuals felt threatened by a particular outgroup. We propose an interactive relationship between group entitlement and perceived threat. Those who feel more entitled to particular privileges, are likely to be more sensitive to perceiving an outgroup as threatening that area of entitlement. Threat should act as a switch that can either put off or fire up the effects of group entitlement on perceiving conflict.

In the context of our research, we investigate the effects of a contextual measure of group entitlement, namely ingroup size. While in other contexts group entitlement could be captured by other indicators (see Horowitz, 1985 for a discussion of markers of entitlement), in both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, group size was historically used as an objective basis for the allocation of political privileges. Thus, we hypothesize that the association between group entitlement (measured by relative ingroup size) and perceived conflict is stronger among those who feel more threatened (*Hypothesis 6*, predicting a two way interaction effect between ingroup size and perceived threat). In addition, the association of threat to a politically relevant outgroup should further accentuate the interaction between perceived threat and group entitlement in predicting conflict perceptions. We expect that the significant interaction between ingroup size and perceived threat occurs especially when threat is associated with a relevant outgroup (*Hypothesis 7*, predicts a three way interaction between ingroup size, perceived threat and outgroup encroachment).

4.4 Method

The survey data were collected among 4213 titulars in eight autonomous republics of the Russian Federation in 1999 and 2000. The republics (and number of participants) were: Karelia (475), Adigeya (500), Udmurtia (507), Komi (480), Sakha Yakutia (500), Tatarstan (749), Tuva (499) and Bashkortostan (503). These republics were selected in order to provide a large variation in the size of titular groups (see Table 4.1).

The Centre for Sociological Studies of Moscow State University conducted the survey in selected urban areas. A stratified sampling procedure was used in order to select 41 cities, including the capital of the republics. The criterion for selecting the cities was that at least 10% of the resident population was of ethnic Russian origin. In the cities, the street names were selected by a random-route procedure and in each street the house numbers were also randomly selected. At the address, the resident with the birthday closest to the day of the interview was invited to participate in the survey. The face-to-face interview took about 45 minutes, and participants chose the language of interview (i.e. Russian or their own titular language). By this direct approach only 3% refused to participate. For the analysis, participants were classified as *titulars* when their personal ethnic identification matched the nationality in their passport. Of the total sample, 44% were male and 56% were female. Participants were between 16 and 86 years old, with a mean age of 40.3 (*SD*=16).

We measured *perceived intergroup conflict* by asking participants whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "The political interests of the *titulars* are in conflict with the Russians in *this republic*". Participants indicated their level of agreement on a five-point Likert scale, from completely disagree (1) to completely agree (5). In the survey, the names of the *republic* and the *titular* group were specified accordingly (e.g., Tatars in Tatarstan; Kareli in Karelia, Tuvins in Tuva).

Ethno-national superiority was assessed with two items based on previous research on the concept of nationalism (de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). The items were "There are no better people in the world than the *titulars*" and "The more influence the *titular* republic has on other nations and the more other nations will follow our example, the better these nations will fair". Cronbach's alpha was .79.

Antagonistic stereotypes were measured using the percentage estimate method, while the traits were selected from previous research in Russia and the former Soviet Union (Poppe & Linssen, 1999): "How many Russians, in your opinion, have the following characteristics": "Rude" and "Hostile". A continuous answering scale from 0% to 100% was provided. Cronbach's alpha was .66.

Ethnic and republican identifications were measured with items that were previously used in the former Soviet context (Hagendoorn et al., 2008; Minescu et al., 2008). The items were "It is of great importance for me to be a *titular*" and "I am proud to be a *titular*", for ethnic identification; and "It is of great importance for me to live in this republic" and "I am proud of the republic in which I live", for republican identification. The Cronbach's alpha for the two items were: .87 for ethnic identification, and .65 for republican identification

Ingroup size was taken as an indicator of the strength of titulars' entitlement to privileges in their republic. Table 4.1 illustrates the percentage of titulars in the population of

each surveyed republic, according to the census data of 1989. We used these percentages to operationalize *ingroup size*.

Perceptions of fraternal relative deprivation were assessed with respect to the economic and cultural situation, in order to capture the various domains of violated entitlements (Duckitt & Mphuthing, 2002). Perceived economic relative deprivation was assessed by the item: "The Russians in this republic have better job-opportunities than the *titular* people". *Perceptions of cultural relative deprivation* was measured by two items: "The use of Russian language at schools and higher education establishments reduces the educational opportunities of the *titulars* in this republic", and "The use of the Russian language in print, theatre and public media (TV) harms the cultural identity of the *titular* people in this republic". A five-point Likert scale was used. Cronbach's alpha was .73. These items measured the cognitive dimensions of relative deprivation (Duckitt & Mphuthing, 2002).

In order to assess *cultural threat* and the fear of *encroachment from the Russian outgroup* on the cultural privileges of the titular groups, a randomized experiment was embedded in the survey, following the procedures from Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007, pp. 84–95). We asked a randomly selected half of the sample (*N*=2110) whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: "Today the threat to the *titular* culture is growing" (coded as 1). The other half of the sample (*N*=2103) were assigned to the outgroup encroachment condition (coded as 0), and was asked to indicate their (dis)agreement with the following question: "Today the threat to the *titular* culture is growing *because of the increasing influence of the Russian culture*". A five-point Likert scale was used. In this way, the measurement of the object at risk (i.e. the titular culture) was distinguished from the outgroup whose presence would intensify that risk (i.e. the Russians). By experimentally manipulating outgroup encroachment we disentangle the effects of threat as a general feeling of anxiety, from the specific effects of threat coming from a particular outgroup. It is this *inter-group* threat rather than individual or more generalized aspect of threat that the Group Position Model focuses upon.

Two additional questions were included in the questionnaire, used to examine whether the experimental manipulation primed the fear of outgroup encroachment from the Russian group in particular. These test questions were asked at the end of the questionnaire (i.e. after the experiment and after the dependent variable). The items were: "The Russians want to exploit the *titular* labor force for their own benefit" (on a five-point Likert scale) and a statement attributing various degrees of Russians' ambition to have political control over the republic ("Russians strive for no/ small/ proportional/ major/ absolute political power in this republic"). Higher correlations between these questions and the answers on cultural threat in the outgroup encroachment condition, compared to the correlations in the decoupled condition, would provide evidence that the coupled condition primes the fear of encroachment associated with the Russians.

Various *elements of ethnic group cohesion* were measured by asking about the degree to which the titular culture, the autonomous republic, religion or the titular language were perceived as centripetal forces uniting the titular ethnic groups. Five questions were asked in the format: "What unites you most with the people of your ethnicity?", followed by "community of sharing the same language", "community of religion", "historical Motherland- the *titular* republic", "our common culture, traditions and customs" and "our general common

origin and our shared historical past". The answering scale was from completely disagree (1) to completely agree (5).

Table 4.2 Means and Standard Deviations for Model Variables

	Conditions of the Decoupling Experiment				
	Decoupled			Coupled 'Outgroup Encroachment'	
	M	*SD*		*M*	*SD*
Perceived Conflict	.33	.34		.33	.33
Antagonistic Stereotypes	.35	.20		.35	.20
Ethno-national Superiority	.36	.32		.36	.31
Ethnic Identification	.78	.30		.77	.30
Republican Identification	.83	.23		.83	.23
Cultural Relative Deprivation	.25	.29		.25	.30
Economic Relative Deprivation	.32	.34		.32	.35
Ingroup Size	.32	.16		.33	.16
Cultural Threat	.44	.37		.26	.34

Note: Means and standard deviations are reported. For the *decoupled condition*: $N = 2110$, and for the *coupled 'outgroup encroachment' condition*: $N = 2103$.

All scales were recoded to a 0 to 1 scale. Higher values indicate higher levels of perceived conflict, more antagonistic stereotypes, higher ethno-national superiority, stronger ethnic and republican identification, higher levels of cultural and economic relative deprivation, larger ingroup size, and more perceived threat.

The control variables concern education, income, gender and age. Education was measured as high (i.e., university), middle (i.e., high-school) or low (i.e., (less than) elementary school). Income was assessed on a five point scale: 'high', 'higher than average', 'average', 'lower than average', and 'low', being based entirely on participants' self-estimations. The interviewer filled in the gender of the participant (0= men; 1= women). Age was indicated in years. The scales of all variables were transformed to scales from 0 to 1 to facilitate interpretation of the unstandardized coefficients. In addition, for the regression models all predictor variables were centered in order to facilitate interpretation. The effects of each variable are interpreted at the average level of all other controlled variables, which reflects our theoretical assumptions in a more adequate manner. We present the correlations and means of all model variables in Table 4.2.

Table 4.3 Correlations for Model Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
									decoupled condition (superdiagonal)
1. Perceived Conflict		.220***	.116***	.081***	.008	.334***	.361***	.101***	.216***
2. Antagonistic Stereotypes	.222***		.050*	.036	−.015	.110***	.176***	.161***	.084**
3. Ethno-national Superiority	.177***	.076**		.350***	.271***	.148***	.143***	−.047*	.163***
4. Ethnic Identification	.085***	.059*	.356***		.553***	.100***	.096***	.059**	.083***
5. Republican Identification	−.013	−.024	.271***	.544***		.042*	.069**	.050*	−.026
6. Cultural Relative Deprivation	.307***	.160***	.192***	.147***	.070**		.407***	−.054*	.260***
7. Economic Relative Deprivation	.377***	.163***	.198***	.101***	−.005	.413***		.068**	.220***
8. Ingroup Size	.134***	.128***	−.053*	.064**	.036	−.073**	.067**		−.149***
9. Cultural Threat	.330***	.174***	.210***	.141***	.034	.363***	.279***	−.075*	
	coupled 'outgroup encroachment' condition (subdiagonal)								

Note: Bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients are reported. Correlations for the decoupled condition (N=2110) are presented above the diagonal, and correlations for the coupled 'outgroup encroachment' condition (N=2103) are presented below the diagonal. *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05

4.5 Analysis and Results

4.5.1 Preliminary Analyses

4.5.1.1 What unites the titular groups?

About three quarters of the participants agreed that specific elements of culture, such as "our common culture, traditions and customs" (79.8%) and "our general common origin and our shared historical past" (70.1%) are important in uniting the ethnic group. Similarly, the titular homeland republic was seen as an important element of ethnic cohesion (77.4%), while language (61.5%) and religion (47.5%) are seen as relatively less central. These results provide evidence to the importance of both culture and the republican homeland for titulars who participated in our survey. They may also suggest the role of culture in legitimating titular claims to power and privilege in their own republics.

4.5.1.2 Did the experimental manipulation prime the threat of outgroup encroachment with respect to the Russian outgroup?

In order to test whether the experimental manipulation of outgroup encroachment was successful in priming the Russian outgroup in particular, we ran two separate general linear regression models with cultural threat as the independent variable, the experimental condition as a between-subject factor, and the two test questions as outcome variables. The interaction effects between the experimental conditions and cultural threat were found to be significant in both cases. There was a strong association between titulars' belief that the Russians want to exploit the titular labor force for their own benefit and their perceptions of cultural threat, main effect of perceived threat: $B = .29$; $SE = .02$, $F(1, 4209) = 359.28$, $p<.001$. This association was stronger in the outgroup encroachment coupled condition, when the fear of the increasing influence of the Russian culture was mentioned, interaction effect between perceived threat and experimental conditions was: $B = -.12$, $SE = .02$, $F(1, 4209) = 24.13$, $p<.001$. Similarly, the association between titulars' belief that the Russians strive for more political power in the republic, and their perceptions of cultural threat was significant, main effect of perceived threat: $B = .32$, $SE = .02$, $F(1, 4209) = 319.96$, $p<.001$. This effect was stronger in the outgroup encroachment coupled condition, interaction effect: $B = -.08$, $SE = .03$, $F(1, 4209) = 5.77$, $p<.01$.

Figure 4.1 presents all bivariate correlation coefficients between these variables according to experimental condition. These results indicate that the manipulation has increased the focus on the Russian outgroup as the source of encroachment on the area of titular privileges (until the end of the interview). Mentioning the "increasing influence of the Russian culture" in the coupled condition increased the degree to which cultural threat was associated with other beliefs that the *Russian outgroup* is exploiting and aims to undermine the power of the titular group in the republic.

Figure 4.1 Correlations between Perceived Threat and Manipulation Check Questions

(1) Fisher's *r*-to-*z*'-transformations showed these two correlations to differ reliably,
     with a 95% confidence interval from .06 to .17.
(2) Fisher's *r*-to-*z*'-transformations showed these two correlations to differ reliably,
     with a 95% confidence interval from .04 to .16.

The fact that inter-item correlations were all significant and positive (although weaker for those in the control condition) indicates that the experimental manipulation had a relative, rather than absolute effect. Titulars in the control condition still associate the perceived cultural threat with Russia and the Russians, but this association seems to be *relatively* stronger when the Russian outgroup target is made explicit in the question.

4.5.2   Explaining Perceived Intergroup Conflict

We conducted a series of linear mixed-effects model regressions using SPSS (version 16.0. We discuss the choice of statistical methods; secondly, we compare the fit of six successive models in order to assess the relative predictive power of the different sets of predictors of perceived conflict; and thirdly, we discuss the results with respect to our hypotheses on main and interaction effects.

Given the hierarchical structure of the dataset, with participants nested within the eight republics, multi-level analyses were conducted (using linear mixed-effects models in SPSS 16.0). The grouping variable republic was included as a random factor in the model. The mixed-effects models calculate estimates for the covariance parameters at the macro-level of republics and the individual level (i.e. of participants). These parameters estimated in the intercept model indicated that most of the variance on perceived conflict could be attributed to inter-individual rather than republican differences: the intraclass correlation coefficient was .003.[15]

Similar to the step-wise approach of Bobo and Tuan (2006), we estimated several successive models, in order to test the degree to which the model fit changed when various sets of predictors (and interactions) were included. The first model was the intercept model. In the second model we estimated the effects of the control variables: age, gender, education and income. In the third model we added the social-psychological predictors: antagonistic stereotypes, ethno-national superiority, ethnic and republican identifications. In the fourth model, cultural and economic relative deprivation, ingroup size, perceived cultural threat and the decoupling experimental variable were added. The two-way interaction effects between cultural threat, the decoupling experiment and ingroup size were added in the fifth model. And, finally, a sixth model was estimated including the three-way interaction between cultural threat, the decoupling experiment and ingroup size. The difference in fit between the successive models was evaluated in terms of decreases in log-likelihood statistics. According to the Chi-Square test, each consecutive step was significantly better than the previous (at the standard level of alpha <.001), apart from the difference between Models 4 and 5, and between Models 5 and 6. The amount of modelled variance was calculated according to Snijders and Boskers (1999). There was a steady increase in explained variance from Model 2 (Overall R^2 =.018) to Model 3 (Overall R^2 =.071), Model 4 (Overall R^2 = .215), and Models 5 and 6 (Overall R^2 =.241). The significant increase in model fit and explanatory power caused by adding the predictors of the Group Position Model in Model 4 (compared to Model 3), speaks to the predictive validity of this theoretical framework in the Russian setting. Table 4.4 summarizes the results.

Model 2 estimated the effects of control variables, indicating that the older and the more educated participants perceived less conflict, while those with a higher income perceived more conflict. Only the effects of income remained significant in the subsequent models.

The results from Model 3 largely confirm our predictions concerning the social-psychological predictors. Ethno-national superiority significantly increased perceived conflict, according to hypothesis 1. The strength of this effect decreased slightly in the next step (Model 4), though it remained significant. In addition, ethnic identification was also a positive predictor of perceived conflict in Model 3, but became insignificant once the Group Position Model variables were included in Model 4.

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15   An intraclass correlation coefficient of 1 would indicate that the dependent variable can be explained entirely by the differences between the republics, while a value of 0 would mean that the only significant differences are likely to be between individuals, regardless of the republic to which they belong (Snijders & Bosker, 1999).

Table 4.4 Mixed-effects Models Explaining Perceived Conflict

Parameter	Model 1 Estimate	SE	Model 2 Estimate	SE	Model 3 Estimate	SE	Model 4 Estimate	SE	Model 5 Estimate	SE
Fixed model: Intercept	.334 ***	.027	.335 ***	.027	.334***	.026	.321***	.014	.325***	.014
Age			−.069*	.034	−.090**	.035	−.103	.032	−.104**	.032
Gender [a]			−.002	.010	−.002	.010	.007	.009	.006	.009
Education			−.042*	.017	−.033	.017	−.020	.016	−.019	.016
Income			.066**	.023	.055*	.022	.057**	.021	.054**	.021
Ethno-national superiority					.139***	.018	.058***	.016	.058***	.016
Ethnic identification					.075***	.021	.016	.019	.017	.019
Republican identification					−.099***	.026	−.060*	.024	−.062*	.024
Cultural relative deprivation							.206***	.018	.204***	.018
Economic relative deprivation							.221***	.015	.220***	.015
Ingroup size							.277**	.080	.221***	.082
Cultural threat							.139***	.014	.109*	.018
Decoupling Experiment [b]							.017	.009	.017	.009
Cultural threat × Decoupling Experiment									.064*	.026
Ingroup size × Decoupling Experiment									.095	.056
Cultural threat × Ingroup size									.170*	.079
Random Model										
Individual [c]	.107***	.002	.106 ***	.002	.103 ***	.002	.087 ***	.002	.087***	.002
Republic [d]	.006	.003	.005	.003	.005 †	.003	.001	.001	.001	.001
−2 ln Likelihood	2549.18		2479.90		2387.50		1649.67		1638.69	

Note: Model 1 = null; Model 2 = + control variables; Model 3 = + ethno-national superiority, ethnic and republican identification; Model 4 = + economic relative deprivation, cultural relative deprivation, ingroup size, cultural threat, (de)coupling experiment; Model 5 = + two-way interactions (see table). Unstandardized estimates; *N* = 4149.
  [a] Gender: 0 = men; 1 = women
  [b] (De)coupling Experiment: 0 = Coupled 'Outgroup Encroachment' Condition; 1 = Decoupled Condition
  [c] Individual = Variance within the republics in perceived conflict scores
  [d] Republic = Variance between the republics in perceived conflict scores
  † *p* = .06; * *p* <.05; ** *p* <.01; *** *p* <.001

Contrary to predictions, republican identification had negative effects on perceived conflict. Hypothesis 1 also specified positive effects of antagonistic stereotypes on perceived conflict, and this was verified by our results. However, around 24% of the sample ($N = 1007$) either refused to answer or chose a "don't know" response on one of the two items of the antagonistic stereotypes scale.[16] All analyses were conducted with and without antagonistic stereotypes as a predictor, and the results were similar. Table 4.4 presents the analysis excluding antagonistic stereotypes, but all additional analyses are available upon request. To sum up, hypothesis one was confirmed with respect to the effects of ethno-national superiority, ethnic identification and antagonistic stereotypes, but disconfirmed with respect to the effects of republican identification.

Model 4 revealed significant positive effects of ingroup size (confirming *hypothesis 2*), of cultural and economic relative deprivation (according to *hypothesis 3*), as well as cultural threat (predicted by *hypothesis 4*). The encroachment experiment did not have a significant main effect (contrary to *hypothesis 4*). Thus, with respect to the main effects of perceived threat and outgroup encroachment proposed by *hypothesis 4*, only the first was confirmed: those who perceived more threat were more likely to perceive more conflict.

In Model 5, we estimated three interaction effects: between perceived threat and the decoupling experiment (as predicted by *hypothesis 5*), between perceived threat and ingroup size (as predicted by hypothesis 6), and between ingroup size and the decoupling experiment (an interaction that was not predicted, but which was included in order to estimate a fully saturated model). Table 4.4 presents the coefficients and significance of these interactions. The interaction effect between perceived threat and the decoupling experiment was significant (See Model 5 in Table 4.4). Simple main effect analysis, controlling for all the variables presented in Table 4.4, indicated that association between perceived threat and perceived conflict was stronger in the coupled encroachment condition ($B = .173$, $SE = .018$, $p<.001$), than in the decoupled condition ($B = .109$, $SE = .018$, $p<.001$), which confirmed hypothesis 5. The interaction between perceived threat and ingroup size was also significant (See Model 5 in Table 4.4), and the positive coefficient of this interaction ($B = .170$, $SE = .079$, $p<.001$) indicates that the association between ingroup size and perceived conflict is increased at higher levels of perceived threat, as predicted by hypothesis 6. Additional analyses excluding each republic one by one indicated that all two-way interactions were robust and remained significant. In addition, their significance was not affected by excluding any of the other two-way interactions in the estimation model (all additional analyses are available upon request).

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16 Supplemental analysis (Cross-tabulation and One-Way Anova's) revealed few differences between the participants with missing values and those who answered on antagonistic stereotypes. With respect to the encroachment experiment, the missing values seemed to be randomly distributed across the two conditions (12% in the decoupled condition, and 12% in the encroachment condition). There were no significant differences according to gender. Small significant differences were found with respect to education, age and income. Non-participants declared less ethno-national superiority, and more identification with the republic, but did not differ significantly on ethnic identification, perceptions of relative deprivation or cultural threat.

Lastly, in order to test hypothesis 7, we estimated an additional model including the three way interaction effect between cultural threat, ingroup size and the decoupling experiment, in addition to all variables and interaction effects from Model 5. Hypothesis 7 predicted that the association between ingroup size and perceived conflict would be stronger among those who feel more threatened (a positive interaction between ingroup size and perceived threat), and especially when this threat would be associated with a relevant outgroup (in the outgroup encroachment condition). The effects of all other variables in Model 6 were similar to those from Model 5. The three way interaction was significant. This means that a larger ingroup size was significantly associated with more perceived conflict for those who felt more culturally threatened, and especially when this threat was attributed to the outgroup (in the outgroup encroachment coupled condition). We further analyzed this three way interaction, by estimating the simple slope coefficients of ingroup size on perceived conflict for various levels of threat, and in the two experimental conditions. The results of these analyses are illustrated in Figure 4.2.[17]

Figure 4.2   Illustration of the Three-way Interaction Effect between Ingroup Size, Perceived Threat and the Decoupling Experiment

Note: The bars illustrate the effects of ingroup size on perceived conflict, according to levels of perceived threat and conditions of the decoupling experiment (unstandardized coefficients, with SE in error bars). These coefficients represent the simple slopes of ingroup size on perceived conflict after controlling for the effects of all variables presented in Table 4.4 (Model 5).

17   A simpler examination of the three way interaction effect was done by estimating separate models for the two conditions of the experiment. The interaction between perceived threat and ingroup size was significant only in the estimation model from the outgroup encroachment condition ($B = .289$, $SE = .114$, $p<.001$), while it was insignificant in the decoupled condition ($B = .082$, $SE = .109$, $p > .05$).

Based on the fact that all other variables were controlled for and centered, the interaction can be interpreted as follows: people perceive more conflict when their ingroup is larger, especially if they perceive more threat, and when this threat is associated with the Russian outgroup (in the outgroup encroachment condition), given their average levels of felt ethno-national superiority, ethnic and republican identification, and perceived relative deprivation. These results confirm hypothesis 7.

It is important to note that the main effects of all the other predictors specified by Group Position Model were not affected by the introduction of the three-way interaction in the model. These interaction effects of ingroup size, cultural threat and outgroup encroachment were additive to the positive effects of cultural and economic relative deprivation on perceived conflict, while controlling for ethno-national superiority, (antagonistic stereotypes), ethnic and republican identification and the socio-demographic variables. The interpretation of all effects is contingent on the average values of all the other variables included in the estimated models (i.e. because a value of zero on centered variables indicates an average score on that variable).

4.6 Conclusions and Discussion

Over the last 50 years, the Group Position Model proposed by Blumer (1958) provided a reference point in understanding intergroup relations especially in the context of the United States. The current study confirmed the predictive power of Blumer's insights, by extending the application of the Group Position Model to the Russian context, among titular groups of eight autonomous republics.

The aim of this chapter was twofold. First, the Group Position Model (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Tuan, 2006) was tested in a new intergroup situation in order to explain perceived conflict. The model was successful in predicting titulars' perceived conflict. This suggests that the driving force behind titulars' perceptions of conflict is their motivation to protect their privileged position inside their own republics (Minescu, 2007). As predicted, perceived conflict was significantly associated with: stronger feelings of ethno-national superiority, more antagonistic stereotypes, higher cultural and economic relative deprivation, larger ingroup size and more cultural threat. The factors that closely reflect the sense of group position (i.e. relative deprivation, group threat and ingroup size) were particularly important in predicting perceived conflict. Including these factors in the explanatory model reduced some of the effects of the superiority and distinctiveness feelings (i.e. effects of ethnic and republican identification), and significantly increased the predictive power of the model. These results are in line with previous findings by Bobo and Tuan (2006, p. 169).

Our second aim was to extend the analytical application of the Group Position Model in two ways. First, we employed a more direct test for the effects of outgroup encroachment by using a survey-embedded experiment. The (de)coupling experiment provided a route to statistically isolate the effects of outgroup encroachment from those of cultural threat. Secondly, we proposed that the effects of ingroup size (as an objective indicator of group entitlement) should be amplified by perceiving cultural threat and outgroup encroachment.

As predicted, the findings suggest that threat and outgroup encroachment acted as levers or switches that conditioned the effects of group entitlement in fueling conflict perceptions. More conflict was perceived among the *larger groups,* and this association was stronger among those who perceived more cultural threat. In addition, for those in the experimental condition that coupled cultural threat with outgroup encroachment, the effects of ingroup size on perceived conflict were further amplified by perceived threat. This finding suggests that the complex reality of intergroup relations and the dynamic nature of the intergroup struggle for group position could be captured by analyzing interactions between certain predictors of conflict (such as ingroup size and threat), which may catalyze or suppress each other's effects.

These extensions in testing the Group Position Model are deemed important because of their implications from a psychological as well as a political viewpoint. Employing a more refined measurement of threat and outgroup encroachment allows for a sharper specification of the psychological mechanisms behind the effects of threat. Subsequently, we may achieve a better understanding of how intergroup conflicts develop and escalate at the grass-root level. As Blumer (1958) proposed, threat is a specific, not a diffuse predictor of conflict. The real trigger of perceived conflict is the fear that the outgroup "harbors designs on the prerogatives" of the ingroup, undermining its position (Blumer, 1958, p. 4; Bobo & Tuan, 2006, pp. 218-224). This suggests that two aspects of outgroup threat are crucial: first, *specific* threats are determined by the type and definition of relevant "prerogatives" (i.e. the *specific* privileges group members feel entitled to), and, secondly, threat is consequential if it is attributed to a *specific* outgroup. In other words, if the ingroup feels entitled to *cultural* privileges, more intergroup conflict is likely to arise if group members perceive a *culturally different* outgroup as threatening to overpower the ingroup's *cultural* dominance.

In our study, culture and, thus, the symbolic threat associated to it, was deemed to be crucial for intergroup disputes over group position. Three out of four people in our survey declared cultural issues as the most important elements contributing to ethnic group cohesion. Nevertheless, the centrality of culture for defining the ingroup and the likelihood that cultural issues become the platform for intergroup power struggles may still be unrelated. However, their co-occurrence is undoubtedly more conducive to intergroup conflicts, especially in the Russian context, where political privileges are so closely connected to ethno-national fault lines (Hirsch, 2005, p. 14). In other contexts, inter-ethnic conflicts are likely to develop by claiming prestige and political authority on other grounds than ethno-cultural issues (R. M. Williams, 1994; Wimmer, 1997). Future research needs to address this context-dependent nature of intergroup threat more carefully, in order to achieve a better understanding of how and when intergroup power struggles unfold (Sniderman et al., 2004).

One of the central assumptions of the Group Position Model is that associating threat with a specific outgroup amplifies the effects of threat on perceived conflict (rather than measuring threat in more general unspecified ways). In large scale surveys, randomized experimentation techniques allow researchers to disentangle the effects oF (general) threat from those of threatening outgroup encroachment (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007), which makes this methodological innovation highly relevant in testing the Group Position Model.

Nevertheless, future studies should include additional tests in order to disentangle and specify the effects of the experimental manipulation in a more rigorous manner. Within the current survey, we could not rule out alternative explanations for the experimental effects. For example, it may be that participants from the *decoupled* condition of our experiment also attributed the perceived cultural threat to the Russians or to Russia in general. This could be an explanation for the lack of a direct effect of the experimental manipulation on perceived conflict. However, the fact that participants perceived more cultural threat in the decoupled condition (than in the condition priming the Russian encroachment), may also be an indication that threat was attributed to a more general agent (such as globalization, the western influence or the like) in this condition. In this case, it is therefore not surprising that the association between cultural threat and perceived conflict with the Russian outgroup was weaker in this condition (i.e. less conflict is perceived with the group that does *not* pose a particular type of threat to the ingroup). Including additional manipulation checks, such as a third condition specifying a more general agent posing threats to the titular ingroup or measuring threats in areas that do not enter the titular-Russian power struggle, could help isolate the specific effects of outgroup encroachment.

There is another reason why using randomized experiments in general population surveys is highly valuable for testing the Group Position Model in particular. The Group Position Model emphasizes the fact that intergroup attitudes are embedded into the larger historical and institutional setting of a particular society and its social order (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Tuan, 2006). Reproducing this complex background in a controlled laboratory setting is unrealistic and unfeasible. Therefore, including experiments into representative surveys is a more adequate way to examine the causal links between variables driving public opinion. Our survey experiment confirmed that when cultural threat was associated with outgroup encroachment, it increased perceived conflict. We acknowledge that the relationships between various factors of the Group Position Model and perceived conflict are correlational in nature. It is possible, for instance, that ethnic identification intensifies perceived conflict, while perceptions of conflict also reinforces ethnic identification. In order to accurately assess all causal links proposed by the Group Position Model, future studies should employ longitudinal designs or embed additional experiments in cross-sectional surveys (for instance by using double randomization procedures, see MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007).

From a political viewpoint, understanding how and which type of threat affects people's intergroup attitudes is highly relevant for processes of group mobilization. On the one hand, threat may influence all individuals equally, irrespective of their attachment to group identity or to certain areas of privilege. This so-called mobilization effect of threat remains unsupported by previous research (Sniderman et al., 2004). Social identification was suggested as an important moderator of threat effects (Bobo, 1983; e.g., research concerning distinctiveness threat by Jetten et al., 2004; and realistic and/or symbolic threat by Stephan et al., 2005; Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005). On the other hand, threat could be understood more dynamically, as being itself moderated (i.e. by outgroup encroachment), or acting as moderator in its turn (i.e. conditioning the effects of ingroup size). Our results revealed that threat and the fear of outgroup encroachment were *galvanizers* of intergroup

conflict, specifically among those whose entitlement claims were stronger (i.e. whose larger ingroup size legitimized more power claims).

Whether perceptions of threat and outgroup encroachment would condition the effects of ingroup size in other political contexts remains an empirical question. The positions of groups within any society are, by definition, rooted in specific historical, political and social circumstances. Therefore, other characteristics, besides relative group size, could be employed as indicators of entitlement feelings (Horowitz, 1985: 185). In the Russian Federation, the weight of the census and nationality criteria in defining political privileges after the 1920's (Hirsch, 2005, p. 146), made titular group size a powerful signifier of group entitlement. The identification of these entitlement markers is crucial, because claims to power are inherently related to them. The "claim-makers" will mobilize the general public by depicting as threatening the outgroup that illegitimately "claims" those specific areas of privilege and entitlement (Bobo & Tuan, 2006, p. 222). Thus, in order to understand exclusionary intergroup behaviour, the effects of threat should be theoretically modeled and empirically tested in relation to how entitlement is defined in the intergroup context under investigation (Esses et al., 2001; Esses et al., 1999; Gibson, 2006; Scheepers et al., 2002; Sniderman et al., 2004; Wagner, Christ, Pettigrew, Stellmacher, & Wolf, 2006).

The data used in our current study had some limitations. Firstly, our measurement of ingroup size was limited to eight values (for the eight surveyed republics). A larger number of republics would have allowed for a stronger statistical test, using more variance at the contextual level. Alternatively, if a measurement of *perceived* ingroup size was available, it is likely that ingroup size would have been an even stronger as an individual level predictor of perceived conflict. Secondly, perceived conflict is only an instance of hostile intergroup attitudes, which are important to understand, but which do not need to result or reflect real ethnic conflicts or violence between ethnic groups (Tishkov, 1999; Yamskov, 1991). Thirdly, the fact that our survey was conducted exclusively in urban areas could have led to an underestimation of perceived conflict (Scheepers et al., 2002; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). However, the intention of this chapter was not to map the public opinion in Russia, or the extent of real inter-ethnic conflict. Also, we did not aim to generalize our findings to the whole population of Russia's republics (including the rural areas). Instead, our aim was to test and understand the mechanisms behind *perceived* conflict as proposed by the classic Group Position Model, while controlling for certain demographic characteristics (i.e. age, education, income) and using randomization techniques.

Lastly, according to the Group Position Model, ethnic and republican identifications were shown as necessary preconditions for the perception of conflict. However, the effect of republican identification was negative, which was against our predictions. This was surprising because we expected that strong correlations between republican and ethnic identifications among titular groups in Russia (Minescu et al., 2008) would result in specific ownership claims of titulars over the republican category, and imply more exclusionary attitudes towards other groups (Wenzel et al., 2008). However, republican identification decreased rather than increased perceived conflict (given that participants simultaneously identified with their ethnic group), which indicates the civic and inclusive (superordinate) character of the republican identity category. Nevertheless, the effects of both identifica-

tions weakened once the more specific predictors for the sense of group position were included in the explanatory models. These findings indicate the importance of recognizing social identifications as prerequisite conditions for intergroup conflict, and of differentiating the effects of sub- or super-ordinate identification types on perceived conflict.

Overall, the Group Position Model proved to be a useful theoretical tool in analyzing perceived conflict among titular groups in the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the proposed extensions of the Group Position Model indicated that its empirical application can be improved. Using interaction effects between predictors as well as including randomized experiments in surveys may provide innovative insights into the complex dynamics of protecting one's dominant group position.

The Impact of Group Position on Supporting Minority Rights

5.1 Introduction

The discourses in the literature about minority rights are theoretically framed by two sets of political models describing our societies. On the one hand, the liberal ideas on minority rights propose the importance of supplementing individual human rights with group specific rights, given the centrality of cultural belonging to individual identities (Kymlicka, 1995, 2000). On the other hand, the political establishment of human societies as nation-states and their acknowledged freedom to implement their own nationalizing policies give emphasis to fears that minority rights will undermine the stability of the current world order (Codagnone & Filippov, 2000; Etzioni, 1992; Lapidus, 1992).

These perspectives combine to provide several theoretical controversies in need for empirical verification. While minority rights are about expressing and exercising one's own culture, previous research addressed two sets of explanations on why people support minority rights: 1. factors that motivate the endorsement of minority rights were identified, and 2. the minority rights issue was placed in the complex setting of particular intergroup relationships.

In the first set, three types of factors are proposed. First, some argue that supporting minority rights is due to believing in the centrality of cultural identity in individuals' lives, and thus should be highly related to one's cultural/ethnic identity (Verkuyten, 2005a). Others argue for a more instrumental approach, maintaining that individuals who feel particularly vulnerable in one situation will appeal to group rights in order to improve their personal situation (Evans & Need, 2002; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2006). So, it is either the psychological importance of one's membership to the group or the instrumentality of group rights for individuals that determine support for minority rights. A third type of explanation refers to yet a more general ideological stance. A meritocratic view of democratic societies promotes individual merit rather than group rights as the basis of economic, political and social participation. Those with more meritocratic views are less likely to support minority rights. Thus, instead of cultural considerations and social identifications, or more instrumental motives, it is a meritocratic ideology that promotes opposition to minority rights (Barry, 2002; Gilens, Sniderman, & Kuklinski, 1998 1998). The meritocratic

explanation is not further pursued in this chapter, because its applicability to the research setting of our investigation in the Russian Federation is limited.

Furthermore, in the second set of explanations, other authors prioritize the specific structural context and power relationships against which the discussion of minority rights takes place (Massey, Hodson, & Sekulic, 1999; G. Smith, 1998). In the framework of a national state, where usually the dominant majority has a cultural monopoly on the social and institutional life in the state, the actual provision of minority rights becomes a political struggle (Bauböck, 1996; Kymlicka, 2000; McIntosh, Mac Iver, Abele, & Nolle, 1995). While at an individual level, one may agree with the basic right of individuals to express and exercise their own culture, at the group level, minority rights become a matter of power sharing and a challenge to the status quo favoring the majority at the detriment of minority groups (Blumer, 1958). The problem therefore is not only a purely ideological debate about allowing or not certain rights on the basis of group membership, but it is rather a structural debate about preventing or not the institutional legitimization of group-based power claims.

This type of concern about the status-quo is built on the background of the principle of national self-determination which laid the foundations of all modern day states since the later nineteenth century (Kreptul, 2003; Lukic, 1992; Preece, 1997). Ethnic groups concentrated on a particular territory and were given the right to politically control that territory in their own interest, gaining national autonomy or becoming nation-states (Lapidus, 1992; Marshall, 1993; Tishkov, 1997). Presently, national majorities are threatened by the application of the same principle of cultural/national self-determination in the claims for minority rights. The contradiction lies in the potential of minority rights to either prevent or encourage national/territorial separatism and conflict. By institutionalizing the recognition of minorities' rights to power sharing within the borders of the nation-state, the intergroup situation may be stabilized by ensuring equal and fair political representation of all groups (Horowitz, 1985; Rakowska-Harmstone, 1992; G. Smith, 1998). However, the fear is that minorities are not be satisfied with these internal arrangements and instead may continue their struggle for power by pursuing national separatism, thus threatening the territorial integrity of the nation-state (Lukic, 1992).

5.2   Minority Rights in the Russian Federation

In Russia, politics are closely intertwined with the sociological consequences of granting minority rights, because Russian policies of institutionalized multiculturalism provide cultural autonomy to certain ethnic groups, the so-called titular groups (Codagnone & Filippov, 2000; G. Smith, 1998). Of 128 ethnic groups living in Russia, 41 are constitutionally defined as titular nationalities (1977 Soviet constitution), namely "those groups granted territorial autonomy officially recognized and defined as indigenous communities and the only legitimate bearers of state level authority within the territory of 'their' autonomy" (Codagnone & Filippov, 2000, p. 266). For 21 of these titular nationalities, their autonomy is extended to the level of territorially autonomous republics, which represents the highest level of self-governance within the Russian federal system.

This type of "ethnic federalism" originated with the Soviet Nationalities Policy around 1923, which officially institutionalized ethnicity as 'nationality', based on the size of the ethnic group and their historical association with a particular territory (Lapidus, 1992; Rakowska-Harmstone, 1992; Tishkov, 1997). This territorialisation of ethnicity and its implications with respect to the enforcement of group rights leaves 86 non-titular nationalities (6.4% of Russia's population) as well as 53% of all titular nationalities who live outside their own titular republics (in all around 17 million of the total 27 million non-Russian people) without protection of their ethno-cultural rights (Stepanov, 2000; Tishkov, 1997). In addition, worries are raised with respect to the condition and rights of the Russian minorities living in the titular autonomous republics, which also remain vulnerable to the titular nationalizing policies (Rakowska-Harmstone, 1992; G. Smith, 1998).

The question of minority rights is thus highly relevant in Russia, where granting various degrees of cultural autonomy and officially recognizing some groups and their specific rights were means of managing the tremendous ethnic diversity. However, the ethno-territorial principle of enforcing minority rights is problematic in two crucial aspects: first, it strengthens the borders of the autonomous units: what happens to those titulars living outside their autonomies? And, secondly, it may cultivate the seeds for further territorial disintegration of the federation: titular groups aim at extending their rights to self-determination up to claiming separatism from the federation (Hagendoorn et al., 2001; Lukic, 1992, for a discussion of the "domino-effect theory").

Finally, the position of titular groups living in their autonomous republics best illustrates the political and social paradoxes raised by the multicultural doctrine: while it is in their interest vis-à-vis Moscow to support minority rights (to achieve more group benefits), within their own republics opposing minority rights is an important means of establishing and enforcing a dominant status and an advantageous position vis-à-vis the other groups (including the Russians) living within the borders of the republics.

The current research provides an empirical test of the extent to which titulars' and Russians' support for minority rights is affected by the territorialisation of cultural rights, by the relative status of the groups inside and outside the autonomous republics, as well as by their identification to their ethnic groups and their subsequent perceptions of relative deprivation. Furthermore, we investigate the strength of the association between supporting minority rights and the desire for more autonomy in the form of independence from the federation. The next section reviews relevant research aiming to clarify the relationships between the factors mentioned above. Based on these theoretical assumptions and previous findings, specific predictions are derived in the following section.

5.3 Supporting Minority Rights from the Perspective of Sociological and Social-Psychological Theories

We investigate if these theoretical and political controversies about minority rights are reflected in people's attitudes towards minority rights. It is the first aim of this chapter to examine the extent to which minority rights are endorsed in the Russian Federation.

Insights from sociological and social-psychological theories are employed in order to formulate testable hypotheses. Blumer's (1958) theory on prejudice as a sense of group position would propose that, based on the status of one's ingroup, group members are more or less inclined to support minority rights. Specifically, a dominant position provides the motivation to maintain the status-quo and consequently opposing power claims from subordinate minorities. Conversely, a subordinate position suggests minority rights as a political channel to improve one's ingroup status. Previous research showed that multicultural ideologies are often embraced by subordinate groups and rejected by dominant groups for reasons of power and status (Verkuyten, 2005a; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2006). This seems to reflect the asymmetric interest in minority rights, seen as threatening by the dominant groups, but as a means to promote group interests by subordinate groups (Bauböck, 1996; Massey et al.; Scheepers et al., 2002).

This sociological perspective is helpful in providing a framework for the analysis of attitudes toward minority rights. The main claim is that one's group position, by definition, determines individual support for minority rights. However, this claim is only valid as long as group membership is important to the individual. Therefore, social-psychological theories are employed to provide the more specific individual mechanisms, which indicate how the effects of contextual/structural characteristics come to affect individual attitudes.

Social Identity Theory including Self-Categorization theory (Tajfel, 1982) proposes as a central explanation for people's behaviour in an intergroup situation the degree to which people identify with their social group. Categorizing oneself as a member of a particular group has important consequences on people's attitudes and behaviors, such as manifesting ethnocentric and antagonistic biases in favor of the ingroup, and derogating and excluding outgroups (Brewer, 1999; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Leach, Iyer, et al., 2007). Self-categorization is the central mechanism through which individuals internalize the social structure, and which makes individual attitudes responsive to the structural characteristics of the intergroup situation.

Self-categorization as a central social psychological mechanism relating individuals with their social environment determines the extent to which people are tolerant of outgroups and therefore willing (or not) to assist them in their struggle for improved status (e.g., by supporting minority rights), or on the contrary: intolerant and denying that any inequalities in need of remedy even exist (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a; Leach, Iyer, et al., 2007; McIntosh et al., 1995). If ethnic distinctions (ethnic categorizations) are highly salient in a society, intergroup discrimination is more likely (Brewer, 1999; Minescu et al., 2008), and thus the issue of minority rights can become highly divisive. Often, it is the case that ethnic identification is closely linked to claims for minority rights especially for subordinate groups, who can benefit the most from employing these issues in their power struggle with the dominant groups.

Furthermore, the salience of ethnic categories is also related to the degree of group based relative deprivation people perceive in their intergroup context (Gurr, 1971; Leach, Iyer, et al., 2007; McIntosh et al., 1995). People who prioritize their ethnic group membership are more likely to compare their group to others, and thus more likely to perceive group differences in the distribution of social, cultural and political advantage. Runciman

(1966) termed the feelings and perceptions of an unjust distribution of outcomes between ingroup and outgroups as "fraternal deprivation" (different from personal deprivation). It was found that perceiving disadvantage at the group level (relative fraternal deprivation) was associated to engagement in collective action to change the status quo (Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). Relative deprivation reflects the psychological experience of a social structure in which groups are not treated equally, and will most likely be more central in the lives of the subordinate than of the dominant groups (but see Leach et al., 2005). Relative deprivation theory complements the group position theory, by explicitly specifying that structural disadvantage is not in itself a reason for collective action on behalf of the subordinate group. The subordination has to be perceived as illegitimate and unfair, and must be felt by the individuals as a group level process that robs them of their rightful privileges. Only under these conditions, will considerations of group position guide social change (Taylor, 2002).

Ethnic identification and relative deprivation are expected to play a crucial role in motivating support for minority rights, explaining the way relative group position affects individual attitudes. The relative standing of the ingroup vis-à-vis the outgroup has consequences on people's attitudes, as long as individuals identify their own fate with that of their ethnic group, and as long as the current status-quo is perceived as depriving the ingroup from its rightful position in society (Bobo, 1999; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996).

5.4 Research questions

First, to what extent do people support minority rights as a normative political principle and what motivates this support? We specifically address the "normative" support for minority rights, as a sign of a more general belief in the ideology of multiculturalism. In this study, we investigate how specific individual perceptions and the intergroup situation affect the more general normative support for minority rights.

The first set of predictions is based on the assumption that group members who are in a subordinate position are more likely to normatively endorse minority rights. In a study of several East-European countries, it was found that minorities support minority rights significantly more than majorities (Evans & Need, 2002). This entails that minority rights are seen as a threat by majorities/dominant groups and are therefore opposed by them (Massey et al.; Scheepers et al., 2002). In the Russian Federation titular groups represent a numerical minority (altogether, non-Russians amount to less than 15 % of the total population) and compared to the Russians are in a subordinate cultural, social and economic-political position. However, within their own titular autonomous republics, the status of the titular groups is greatly enhanced by their constitutional recognition, which puts even the Russians living inside these republics in a relatively disadvantaged position (Marshall, 1993; Stepanov, 2000).

We expect that in general, in the framework of the larger federation, titulars endorse minority rights more than Russians; however, this relationship should be moderated by the location of residence inside or outside the republics. Titulars should endorse minority

rights more than Russians, especially when they live outside the protective boundaries of the autonomous republics (*Hypothesis 1a*). At the same time, the position of higher status (and sometimes even numerical) dominance inside the republics, should provide incentives to these titular groups to oppose minority rights. Thus, titulars living outside the republic in a minority/subordinate position should endorse minority rights significantly more compared to titulars living a majority/privileged group inside the republics (*Hypothesis 1b*). And, similarly, Russians living inside titular republics (in a minority position) should endorse minority rights more than Russians living outside republics (*Hypothesis 1c*).

A high degree of group identification predicts taking action in the name of the group and being involved in group level strategies of redressing disadvantage (Ellemers et al., 2002). These effects of ethnic identification on supporting minority rights were found to be stronger among subordinate groups (Berry & Kalin, 1995; Verkuyten, 2005a). *Hypothesis 2* proposes that identification with one's ethnic group predicts support for minority rights, especially among the subordinate groups, namely the titular groups.

At the same time, membership in a subordinate group may be associated with feelings of vulnerability and higher perceptions of relative deprivation (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; McIntosh et al., 1995). Thus supporting minority rights may be a function of instrumental concerns of those who need the protection of multicultural ideology and policies (Berry & Kalin, 1995). In other words, the more individuals perceive their group as being relatively deprived, the more inclined they are to pursue some form of collective action to redress the situation. Supporting minority rights can be conceived as a collective strategy to improve the ingroup status. Previous research has verified this relationship with respect to individuals' involvement in the civil rights movement and their participation in riots (Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984), and also regarding individuals' support for nationalistic movements (Guimond & Dubé-Simard, 1983). Thus, we propose that perceptions of relative deprivation are positively associated with support for minority rights, and that this is the case for groups that are especially vulnerable: titulars living outside their republics and Russians living inside titular republics (*Hypothesis 3*).

Secondly, is the support for minority rights associated with separatist claims? Minority rights and multicultural ideology are seen as posing a threat to social cohesion by accentuating and strengthening the divisiveness of ethnic boundaries (Barry, 2002; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a; Kymlicka, 1995) and by undermining the territorial unity of the state (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2006). Thus, it seems that allowing minority rights is perceived as a path to fragmentation of the current national state. Politically, the right to cultural autonomy can be extended to claims for complete territorial separatism, especially for groups considered as national minorities (Bauböck, 1996; Kymlicka, 2000). It is often feared that groups who are already given rights to collective autonomy continue their political struggle by also claiming and implementing the right to secession (Lukic, 1992; Rakowska-Harmstone, 1992; Stepanov, 2000). It is expected that subordinate groups (titulars) aiming at changing the status-quo are more likely to see separatist claims as a positive/natural extension of minority rights. In other words, for titulars, we expect a positive correlation between supporting separatism and supporting minority rights (*Hypothesis 4*). However,

one exploratory question remains: how does the territorialisation of minority rights in the form of cultural autonomy affect this relationship? Will the titulars who live inside the autonomous republics feel protected by their political status and thus diminish their claims for more political power in the form of separatism? Or, on the contrary, in line with the more pessimistic views, will the association between support for minority rights and the support for separatism be stronger among those who feel encouraged by territorial cultural autonomy?

5.5 Method

The way individuals perceive issues around the minority rights question is analyzed with survey data collected in the spring of 2005. In the Russian multi-ethnic setting, inside and outside the territories of the autonomous republics, there is a 'natural' variation in the dominant-subordinate status of the Russian and titular groups, as well as in their group size across several republics of the federation.

The current survey study was conducted among 2427 titulars and 2431 Russians, living inside 5 autonomous republics of the Russian Federation (Bashkortostan, Karelia, Komi, Yakutia, Tatarstan: around 400 of each titular group and 400 Russians living inside these republics), as well as outside these republics, in 5 locations (around 100 Russians and 100 titulars: Komi in Perm, Tatars in Saratov, Karels in Tver, Bashkirs in Cheliabinsk, Yakuts in Moscow). This design was chosen so that we can analytically compare the attitudes of those groups living inside and outside the territories of the autonomous titular republics. Within each location, random samples of titulars and Russians were selected, according to an elaborated procedure aimed at achieving a random sample. Within each republic, only urban locations with more than 10% Russians of their population were selected. Further, a spiral was placed on top of the plan-scheme of the whole city in order to select 19 survey points. At each survey point (identified streets) buildings and apartments were further selected by applying specific randomizing rules. Within a household the person whose birthday was closest to the interview date was selected.

Both Russians and titulars have been interviewed about their support for two general minority rights: "Ethnic groups should be allowed to establish their own schools" and "Ethnic groups should have the right to set up their political organizations". Also, questions were asked regarding their perception of relative deprivation ("The [titular/Russian] people have better job opportunities than the [Russians/titulars]"; "The use of the '[indigenous / Russian] language at schools and higher educational institutions reduces the educational opportunities of the [Russians/titulars]"). These two questionnaire items were combined in a mean score to provide the variable "relative deprivation"; the reliability coefficients (Cronbach's alphas) for the new scale were for the Russians .68, and for the titulars .56. Respondents were also asked questions about their identification with their ethnic groups ("It is of great importance for me to be a Russian/[titular]" and "I am proud to be a Russian/[titular]"). The two identification items were combined in one variable called "ethnic identification" with the reliability coefficients for Russians .87 and for titulars .91. Finally,

support for separatism of the titular republics was assessed with the answers to the question: "The republic should become fully independent from Russia". All questions could be answered on a scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree).

5.6　Analysis and Results

The survey data ware statistically analyzed to provide tests for the hypotheses. Table 5.1 reports the means and standard deviations for supporting the two minority rights,[18] and presents results of several analyses of variance (ANOVA). This analysis type compares the mean scores and variances on the support for minority rights across different groups: between titulars and Russians, and between those living inside and outside the autonomous republics. Thus, the main- and interaction effects of two factors: ethnic groups (Russians and titulars) and location (the current residence relative to the titular republics) are tested against standard levels of significance. Separate analyses were conducted for the "right of ethnic groups to have their own schools" and the "right of ethnic groups to have their own political organizations", aiming to determine which group (ethnical or location-based) scores higher on supporting these goals.

　　The findings largely support hypotheses 1a, indicating that titulars, as subordinate groups in the federation, support minority rights significantly more than Russians. This is true for both rights, especially among those groups living outside the republics: titulars are more in favour of minority rights than Russians in the context of the larger federation ($F(1, 4583) = 9.27$, $p<.01$ for "right to own schools" and $F(1, 4583) = 10.15$, $p<.01$ for "right to political organizations"), while the difference is not significant inside the borders of the autonomous republics (hypothesis 1a is verified).

　　Hypotheses 1b and 1c are only partially confirmed across the two types of minority rights. With respect to the "right to own schools", titulars living outside their republics are significantly more in favour than titulars living inside the republics, where this right is already enforced ($F(1, 4583)= 13.43$, $p<.001$; hypothesis 1b verified). For the Russians there are no significant differences on support for this cultural right, probably because Russian schools are in place everywhere in the Russian Federation. However, regarding the "right to political organizations", there is a significant difference among the Russians depending on their current residence: Russians living inside titular republics score higher on supporting this minority right than Russians living outside the republics ($F(1, 4583) = 22.19$, $p<.001$; hypothesis 1c verified).

18　The two items are analyzed separately in this chapter, based on the relatively low Pearson correlation coefficient of .48 ($p<.001$) as well as additional frequency analysis which suggest substantial difference in supporting the two types of minority rights. Three out of four participants (in each group, over 75%) agree that ethnic groups should have their own schools Support for the right to set up political organizations is less clear-cut, with only one in two participants (50% of each group) agreeing with this minority right. Additionally, there seems to be a stronger tendency towards outright rejection of the right to political organizations, compared to the right to schools: for the first, the percentage of those who disagree strongly is 23%, more than double the percentage of 10% among those who disagree strongly with the right to own schools. These frequency distributions indicates the more heterogeneous basis of support for the right to setup political organizations, compared to the more generally accepted minority right to own schools.

Table 5.1 Support for Minority Rights and Group Position

| Current Residence | Titular Groups | | | | Russian Groups | | | |
| | Inside Titular Republics $N = 1852$ | | Outside Titular Republics $N = 445$ | | Inside Titular Republics $N = 1832$ | | Outside Titular Republics $N = 458$ | |
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Support for Right to Own Schools [a]	4.00	1.32	4.25	1.25	3.98	1.27	3.99	1.36
Support for Right to Political Organizations [b]	3.43	1.37	3.38	1.60	3.43	1.54	3.04	1.56

Note: All variables measured on a scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). Higher scores indicate more support with the minority right.

[a] ANOVA tests on the support for the right to own schools indicated a significant difference in means based on the current residence, for titular groups $F_{(1, 4583)} = 13.43$, $p < .001$; but not for the Russians, $F_{(1, 4583)} = .02$, $p > .05$. Inside the titular republics, titular groups were not significantly different than the Russian groups $F_{(1, 4583)} = .26$, $p > .05$. Outside the republics, the titular groups endorsed the minority right to own schools significantly more than the Russian groups: $F_{(1, 4583)} = 9.27$, $p < .01$.

[b] ANOVA tests on the support for the right to political organizations indicated a non-significant difference based on the current residence for the titulars: $F_{(1, 4583)} = .39$, $p > .05$; while for the Russians, those living inside titular republics endorsed this minority right significantly more than those living outside the republics: $F_{(1, 4583)} = 22.19$, $p < .001$. Inside the titular republics, titular groups were not significantly different than the Russian groups: $F_{(1, 4583)} = .00$, $p > .05$. Outside the republics, the titular groups endorsed the minority right to political organizations significantly more than the Russian groups: $F_{(1, 4583)} = 10.15$, $p < .01$.

These results indicate how support for minority rights is closely linked to the social reality in which individuals live. Endorsing minority rights is a function of the status of one's group, but even more specifically this is adapted to specific spheres of life where this status-difference is employed: the cultural one for the titulars outside their republics, and the political one for the Russians feeling vulnerable (and insufficiently represented) inside the titular republics.

Hypothesis 2 proposed an explanation for the support of minority rights based on ethnic identification of people belonging to subordinate groups in particular. Hypothesis 3 advanced an additional explanation, focusing on the perceptions of relative deprivation as a motivation for the support of minority rights. This explanation should also apply in particular to those groups who feel more vulnerable and appeal to the ideology of multiculturalism as a protection mechanism.

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 present the results of a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) providing the concomitant test of hypotheses 2 and 3, on the two types of minority rights: "right to own schools" and "right to political organizations", respectively. This analysis allows for an overall test of support for minority rights in general (across the two types of rights) by providing a multivariate statistic (the Pillais F). At the same time it pro-

vides independent tests on each of the two minority rights, generating coefficients for the predictor variables for each outcome variable. The analytical model contains two factors (ethnic group and residence), two covariates as predictor variables (ethnic identification and relative deprivation), and several interaction effects between the covariates and the factors. Significant interaction terms indicate whether the effects of ethnic identification and relative deprivation on the support for minority rights are different between titulars and Russians (two-way interaction between the covariates and the ethnic groups factor), or between those who live inside and outside the republics (two-way interaction between the covariates and the residence factor), as well as between ethnic groups in a particular location (three-way interaction between the covariates, the ethnic factor and the residence factor). When significant, the interaction terms are further analyzed by simple slope analyses, which provide coefficients for the predictor variables for each level of the factors (e.g., it indicates how ethnic identification is related to support for minority rights for Russians, and separately for the titulars).

Hypothesis 2 is verified by our analyses: ethnic identification is significantly and positively related to the support for minority rights in general (Multivariate Pillais $F(2, 2226) = 10.99$, $p<.01$), but even more so for the cultural "right to own schools" (Univariate $F(1,4455) = 21.92$, $p<.001$; $B = .10$, see Table 5.1) than for the political "right to political organizations"(Univariate $F(1, 4455) = 6.01$, $p<.05$; $B = .06$, see Table 5.2). Furthermore, the significant interaction term between ethnic identification and ethnic group and the subsequent simple slope analysis revealed that this is the case only for the titular groups. For the Russians, the relationship between ethnic identification and their support for both minority rights is not significant.

Hypothesis 3 is also confirmed by the results: relative deprivation is a significant predictor for the support for minority rights, in general (Multivariate $F(2, 2226) = 8.20$, $p<.001$), and again especially for the cultural "right to own schools" (Univariate $F(1, 4455) = 16.17$, $p<.001$; $B = .08$, See Table 5.2) more than for the political "right to organizations" (Univariate $F(1, 4455) = 6.37$, $p<.05$; $B = .06$, see Table 5.3). Moreover, significant interaction effects further qualify this finding. Perceptions of relative deprivation are positively associated with more support for the cultural "right to own schools" for the groups that are especially vulnerable: titulars living outside their republics (simple slope analysis of the three-way interaction between relative deprivation, ethnic groups and residence: $F(1, 4455) = 21.89$, $p<.001$, $B = .24$) and Russians living inside titular republics (simple slope analysis: $F(1, 4455) = 7.41$, $p<.01$, $B = .06$). The titulars living outside their republic are also the ones for whom higher scores on relative deprivation correspond to higher support of the political "right to organizations" (simple slope analysis: $F(1, 4455) = 15.48$, $p<.001$, $B = .25$). When it comes to residence effects, irrespective of the ethnic differences, it appears that relative deprivation determines support for minority rights especially among those living outside the republics ($F(1, 4455) = 11.64$, $p<.01$, $B = .12$ for the cultural right, and $F(1, 4455) = 7.41$, $p<.05$, $B = .12$ for the political right).

Table 5.2 Predicting Support for the Minority Right to Own Schools from Ethnic Identification and Relative Deprivation

		B	SE	Univariate $F(1,4455)$
Ethnic group (Titulars/Russians)		−.25	.08	10.32**
Residence (inside/outside titular republics)		.10	.10	.90
Ethnic Identification		.10	.02	21.92***
× Ethnic Group				23.18***
Titulars	(simple slope)	.18	.03	49.98***
Russians	(simple slope)	.02	.03	.52
× Residence				.94
Relative Deprivation		.08	.02	16.17***
× Ethnic Group				.29
× Residence				4.84*
Inside	(simple slope)	.04	.02	4.80*
Outside	(simple slope)	.12	.04	11.64**
× Ethnic Group × Residence				14.62***
Inside Titulars	(simple slope)	−.00	.02	.00
Inside Russians	(simple slope)	.06	.02	7.41**
Outside Titulars	(simple slope)	.24	.05	21.89***
Outside Russians	(simple slope)	−.00	.05	.00

Note: Results of Multivariate ANCOVA tests are reported: unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors and the corresponding F test statistic, with significance levels: *** $p<.001$, ** $p<.01$, and * $p<.05$. For all significant interactions, simple slope analyses were conducted, and the parameter estimates for each group (each level of the two factors) are reported.

Lastly, we investigate the relationship between the support for minority rights and support for separatism of the republic from the Russian Federation. Multivariate Analyses of Co-Variance (MANCOVA) were performed on each of the two minority rights. While controlling for the ethnic and residence differences on supporting minority rights (two factors are introduced in the model: ethnic groups and residence), we investigate the main effect of support for separatism (the co-variate predictor) and its two-way interactions with the two factors. In this way we can find out whether support for minority rights is positively associated with support for separatism differently for the two ethnic groups and between the two locations of the survey: inside and outside the republics. Thus we can answer the question whether the association between support for minority rights and the support for separatism is strengthened or diminished for those protected by territorial cultural autonomy (namely, titulars living inside their republics).

Table 5.3   Predicting Support for the Minority Right to Support for Right to Political Organizations
from Ethnic Identification and Relative Deprivation

		B	SE	Univariate $F(1,4455)$
Ethnic group (Titulars/Russians)		−.24	.10	6.09*
Residence (inside/outside titular republics)		.39	.12	10.38**
Ethnic Identification		.06	.03	6.01*
× Ethnic Group		.06	.02	7.93**
Titulars	(simple slope)	.12	.03	15.16***
Russians	(simple slope)	.01	.03	.04
× Residence		−.04	.02	1.98
Relative Deprivation		.06	.02	5.37*
× Ethnic Group				.99 ns
× Residence				6.99**
Inside	(simple slope)	−.01	.02	.17
Outside	(simple slope)	.12	.04	7.41**
× Ethnic Group × Residence				7.53**
Inside Titulars	(simple slope)	−.01	.03	.23
Inside Russians	(simple slope)	−.02	.02	.58
Outside Titulars	(simple slope)	.25	.06	15.48***
Outside Russians	(simple slope)	−.02	.06	.12

Note: Results of Multivariate ANCOVA tests are reported: unstandardized regression coefficients
(standard errors) and the corresponding F test statistic, with significance levels: *** p<.001, ** p<.01,
and * p<.05. For all significant interactions, simple slope analyses were conducted,
and the parameter estimates for each group (each level of the two factors) are reported.

The expectation that subordinate groups (titulars) are more likely to see separatist claims
as a natural extension of minority rights (Hypothesis 4) was confirmed (see Tables 5.4 and
5.5). The significant interaction between support for separatism and ethnic groups and the
subsequent simple slope analysis indicates that for titulars, supporting separatism is posi-
tively associated with their support for both the cultural and the political minority rights
(the relationship with the latter being unsurprisingly stronger: $F(1, 3890) = 38.95$, $p<.001$,
$B = .18$ compared with $F(1, 3962) = 22.31$, $p<.001$, $B = .11$, for the cultural right).

For the Russians, a positive relationship is also found, but only for the political right to
organizations and it is much weaker than for the titulars ($F(1, 3890) = 7.10$, $p<.01$, $B = .11$).
This brings the confirmation of hypothesis 4: supporting separatism is largely seen as an
extension of minority rights, especially for the subordinate titular groups. For the Rus-

sians, the positive relationship between supporting separatism and agreeing with the right to setup political organizations fits in with the finding that Russians living inside titular republics join the titulars in claiming more local autonomy for the republics (Hagendoorn et al., 2008).

Table 5.4 Relationship between Support for Separatism and Support for the Minority Right to Schools

		B	SE	$F(1,3962)$
Support for Separatism		.07	.02	8.71**
Support for Separatism × Ethnic Group				7.34**
Titulars	(simple slope)	.11	.02	22.31***
Russians	(simple slope)	.03	.03	.95
Support for Separatism × Residence				4.95*
Inside for Russians & Titulars	(simple slope)	.02	.01	1.68
Outside for Titulars only	(simple slope)	.13	.05	7.43**
Ethnic Group				5.78*
Residence				.01ns

Note: Results of Multivariate ANCOVA tests are reported: unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors) and the corresponding F test statistic, with significance levels: *** $p<.001$, ** $p<.01$, and * $p<.05$. The analyses of the interaction terms between Support for Separatism and Ethnic Group, and Support for Separatism and Location are simple slope analyses, and results are reported for each group (each level of the two factors).

Table 5.5 Relationship between Support for Separatism and Support for the Minority Right to Political Organizations

		B	SE	$F(1,3962)$
Support for Separatism		.15	.03	23.14 ***
Support for Separatism × Ethnic Group				4.29*
Titulars	(simple slope)	.18	.03	38.95***
Russians	(simple slope)	.11	.04	7.10**
Support for Separatism × Residence				9.54**
Inside for Russians & Titulars	(simple slope)	.05	.02	9.01**
Outside for Titulars only	(simple slope)	.23	.06	17.32***
Ethnic Group				4.66*
Residence				8.49**

Note: same notes as above.

To answer the more exploratory question regarding the effects of the territorialisation of the minority rights by institutionalizing cultural autonomies for the titular republics, we test the interaction effect between support for separatism and residence. It turns out that it is especially those titular respondents who live outside the protective borders of their republics who see a strong connection between separatism and minority rights: $F(1, 3962) = 7.43$, $p < .01$, $B = .13$ for the cultural "right to schools" (see Table 5.4) and $F(1, 3890) = 17.32$, $p < .001$, $B = .23$ for the political "right to organizations" (see Table 5.5). (Outside republics, the question on separatism was only asked to titular respondents). For those living inside the republics, the association between separatism and the cultural right is insignificant, and it is much weaker between separatism and the political right: $F(1, 3890) = 9.01$, $p < .01$, $B = .05$.

5.7   Conclusions and Discussion

The relative position of groups in society conditions to a great extent the support for minority rights, leading those who are in a subordinate position to hold up minority rights more than the dominant groups. Our analyses reveal that it is the specific type of disadvantage experienced by a group that defines people's reactions to the status quo (their group's subordinate/dominant position), and thus influences the support for specific minority rights in a differentiated way. On the one hand, titular groups are mostly threatened by cultural loss, and -as a consequence- living outside the protective boundaries of their republics makes them more supportive of cultural rights. On the other hand, Russians living on the titular-controlled territories of the republics feel more vulnerable politically, and thus support political rights stronger than the Russians living in the larger context of the federation. Specific minority rights seem more or less appealing based on the way group position is defined in particular societal domains, such as culture or politics. In this respect, the politics of minority rights in Russia resemble the dynamics of issue politics of western democracies, where support for particular policies varies as a function of the issue at stake, and not exclusively as a function of principles or group enmity (Sniderman, 1996, p. 202). Methodologically, our findings encourage a more careful consideration of the type and diversity of rights included in public surveys.

Support for minority rights is also a function of the importance people place on their belonging to an ethnic group, and this is especially the case for subordinate groups, such as the titular groups in Russia. At the same time, people's perceptions that their group is relatively disadvantaged fuel their support for minority rights, indicating the strategic use of minority rights as a means to improve one's status in the intergroup context. Perceptions of relative deprivation have a stimulating effect in particular among those who are structurally at a relative disadvantage: titulars living outside their republics (where they lack the legal and political protection offered by the republican borders), but also, interestingly, Russians living inside titular republics (where local laws are especially geared to the advancement and protection of the titulars, at the detriment of other ethnic groups). Thus, we conclude that the impact of social psychological factors (ethnic identification and perceptions of relative deprivation) is further conditioned by the reality of the intergroup situation, namely

the subordinate or dominant position of one's group. A caveat of the current study is that neither ethnic identification, nor relative deprivation seemed to explain minority rights support or opposition among the dominant group, in particular the Russians living outside the titular republics. A more insightful analysis of the social-psychological mechanisms involved in the protection of one's dominant position may be given by measures of relative gratification (rather than deprivation, Dambrun et al., 2006), and by more superordinate political or civic identification types (rather than ethnic, Minescu et al., 2008).

Considerations of group position, which – in the Russian context – are greatly determined by the political status of territorial autonomies attributed to the titular republics, also affect the association between supporting minority rights and separatism. The social consequence of institutionalizing minority rights on a territorial (republican) basis is that titulars living inside their republics are not so quick to extend their support from minority rights to supporting separatism as well. Our survey data substantiate the assumption that power sharing (federal, de-centralizing and autonomy) arrangements may prevent the escalation of separatist conflicts, by appeasing the political claims of the minorities (Lukic, 1992; Lustick, Miodownik, & Eidelson, 2004; Rakowska-Harmstone, 1992). As opposed to previous research, our current analysis documents this relationship at the grass-roots, among both titulars and Russians from five of Russia's republics. However, the design of our study included titulars and Russians who live outside the republican borders, and investigating their attitudes allowed a further specification regarding the impact of the autonomy arrangements. Territorializing privilege is not an unconditional solution, as it does not seem to affect all the members of the titular minorities equally. Rather, the borders that define access versus no-access to privileges are accentuated by territorial autonomy, and are experienced as threatening by titulars living outside their republics. Despite the autonomy of their own republic, these groups of titulars are left vulnerable outside the republican borders and seem to be more radical and quick to manifest a stronger association between support for cultural and political rights and supporting separatism. Territorially based rights can be perceived and experienced as restrictive and as failing to reassure and appease the claims of those living outside the privileged boundaries. Institutionalizing minority rights on alternative basis- such as cultural grounds- may appear more promising at the grass-roots (Codagnone & Filippov, 2000; Stepanov, 2000)

In this study we employed theoretical insights to analyze the empirical reality of Russian-titular intergroup relationships regarding the controversial issue of minority rights. In a systematic effort, we identified specific patterns of support for minority rights, as well as crucial social psychological and sociological factors that can explain this support. Understanding the social consequences of specific policies as well as their social-psychological interpretations has implications for both the theoretical refinement of explanatory models and for the identification of the politically relevant public opinions about minority rights. The classic sociological principle relating structural (dis)advantage between dominant and subordinate groups to intergroup power struggles (Blumer, 1958) should be further specified according to the constitutional arrangements that make the same groups feel culturally or politically vulnerable in one setting (e.g., titulars inside their own republics), but not in another (e.g., titulars living outside the republics).

Besides the conditional role of relative group position in supporting minority rights (stronger among titular subordinate groups, and stronger among those who are not institutionally protected), our results indicate that the impact of group position goes deeper. Support for minority rights varies among people in a subordinate position, and that variance is predictable. It is not only the subordinate position per se, but, additionally, identifying with the ethnic group and perceiving the ingroup as deprived of its rightful privileges is what galvanizes support for minority rights in the ranks of the subordinate group. This is important, because it reveals the importance of social-psychological variables in mediation and interpretation of structural advantages or disadvantages. The individual level mediation is also likely to provide insights into why and how the same institutional provisions of privilege can result in both reassurance (among the protected) and threat (for the unprotected) of the same ethnic group (the specific titular groups) (Codagnone & Filippov, 2000; Stepanov, 2000). The current results point to the difficulties of managing ethnic diversity, by revealing the impact of political ideologies and policies that institutionalize (dis-)advantage, as well as the important mediation of social-psychological processes in relating to the relative standing of groups in a society.

Group Position Moderates Relationships between Social Identifications and Support for Assimilation and Multiculturalism

6.1 Introduction

> *[…] a superordinate identity is not per se a solution to intergroup conflict.*
> *Rather, it may become, under certain conditions,*
> *precisely the battleground for groups to claim their superiority*
> *by representing the superordinate group exclusively in their own group's image*
> *and portraying their ingroup as the most normative and positive subgroup."*

(Wenzel et al., 2008, p. 367)

For a long time, social psychologists alleged that shifting the borders of ingroup categories to more inclusive levels would decrease intergroup antagonism (see Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b, for a review). Creating or emphasizing a superordinate category including the previously excluded outgroups has been proposed as a solution to intergroup conflicts. Recently, increasing attention has been given to the meaning attached to these superordinate identifications, and to the differences between dominant and subordinate groups in claiming ownership of superordinate identifications (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Waldzus et al., 2003).

This chapter investigates the role of group position in moderating the effects of superordinate and ethnic identification types on supporting assimilation and multiculturalism. We build on previous research on the role of group position in conditioning the inclusive or exclusive nature of superordinate identities (see Dovidio et al., 2007, for a review), identification patterns in general (Fleischmann, Verkuyten, & Poppe, 2011) and the endorsement of hierarchy enhancing (e.g. assimilation) or hierarchy attenuating (e.g. multiculturalism) ideologies (Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006 & Bikmen, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; see Verkuyten, 2006for a review). The aim of this chapter was to investigate if group position moderates the relationships between different identification types, on the one hand, and the effects of these identifications on supporting multiculturalism and assimilation, on the other hand. The intergroup context of the Russian Federation provided a unique opportunity to pursue this aim.

Understanding the effects of social identifications in combination with those of group position has relevant implications for understanding how societal change may occur. Dominant groups may wish to maintain the status quo (Blumer, 1958), and thus employ superordinate identification in a more exclusive manner (i.e. increasing support for assimilation). Alternatively, subordinate groups may employ superordinate identifications with a view to either integrate into the mainstream society (i.e. support assimilation, and thus accept the status quo), or with a view to undermine the current distribution of entitlements and thus challenge the status quo (i.e. by supporting multiculturalism). It is important to investigate which identifications are more likely to lead to either maintaining or changing the status quo, and from which groups (positioned in a dominant or subordinate position) these potentially opposing trends may occur.

6.2   Social Identifications and Inter-ethnic Attitudes in the Russian Federation

The identification types that are politically salient in the Russian Federation reflect the multi-layered structure of the federation. Out of the 89 federal units of the Russian Federation, 21 are autonomous republics, where the respective titular[19] populations have a politically privileged position. Various privileges for titular groups inside their own republics were institutionalized by several nationality policies in the Soviet era (Hirsch, 2005; Tishkov, 1997), and re-enforced by more recent legislation and social-cultural practices that raised the status of the main titular groups within their republics (Gorenburg, 1999; Hale, 2000; Lynn & Fryer, 1998).[20] Therefore, reflecting the administrative layers, ethnic, republican and federal identifications are socially and politically relevant, for both titulars and Russians (Fleischmann et al., 2011; Minescu et al., 2008).

Previous research (Minescu et al., 2008) indicated that the effects of superordinate identifications on outgroup stereotypes reflected the asymmetry of institutionalized privilege within the republics (favouring titulars) and the federation as a whole (favouring Russians). As expected, the relatively less prototypical superordinate identifications (republican

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19   The label 'titular' refers to the ethnically non-Russian groups after which the autonomous republics of the Russian Federation were named (e.g. Tatars are the titular group of the republic of Tatarstan, while Karelis are the titular group in the republic of Karelia).

20   Policies that granted official status to the titular languages in the republics had considerable consequences in excluding the Russian (or other ethnic language-) speaking populations from access to governmental and public offices, or other important managerial positions in the labour market (Codagnone & Filippov, 2000; Gorenburg, 1999; Tishkov, 1997). Other policies addressed a range of social-cultural symbolic issues, as an expression of self-definition among the titular nationalities: new state symbols like the republican flag were chosen; different religious calendars, and subsequent official holidays were adopted; the alphabet was changed from the Cyrillic script to the Latin or Arab scripts; countries, cities and towns were re-named, etc., all in "the political battle to establish the status and prestige" of the titular groups (Lynn & Fryer, 1998; Stepanov, 2000; Tishkov, 1997, p. 104). A major source of power was derived from a series of bilateral treaties negotiated between various republics and the Center, by which more control over the local economies (natural resources, industries of processing raw materials etc.) as well as a larger share of the locally-collected federal taxes could be kept within certain republics (Lynn & Fryer, 1998).

identification for the Russians, and federal identification for the titulars) were significantly associated with more positive outgroup stereotypes (Minescu et al., 2008). In other words, individuals who identified stronger with the respective superordinate identifications held more positive outgroup stereotypes.

We build on this previous study, extending it in three directions. First, instead of comparing Russian with titular groups, we focus on a comparison of titular groups whose group position differs (privileged versus subordinate). This allows for a more stringent test of whether intergroup differentiation is based on the ground of ethno-cultural differences (Fleischmann et al., 2011; Minescu et al., 2008), or whether it is a function of group position more generally. Based on the design of the current survey, group position is operational-ized by the location of residence of the titular participants. Survey data were collected from four titular groups, living either inside their republics or outside republican borders, in a region nearby. Thus, the location of residence indicates the status position of titular groups. Titulars living inside their republics are considered to be in a position of privilege. Titulars living outside their republics are considered to be in a subordinate position, given the lack of recognition or privileges based on their ethnicity outside the republican terri-tory (Rakowska-Harmstone, 1992; Stepanov, 2000).[21]

Secondly, by investigating only titular groups we are able to focus on the differences in intergroup attitudes based on living in a position of privilege or subordination (of the same ethnic titular groups), rather than investigating the differences between ethnic Rus-sians versus non-ethnic Russians. In other words, the comparison of identification patterns between titulars living inside the republics and those living outside the republics is more likely to reveal differences based on group position, than differences based on different identification choices and their particular meanings. In this way, we test whether the rela-tionship between (the 'same') ethnic identification and (the 'same') republican identification is stronger for titulars in a privileged position than for titulars in a subordinate position.

Thirdly, this study addresses intergroup attitudes that were more explicitly related to the political acceptance or exclusion of outgroups. If one believes that the right of ethnic minorities to speak their own language and have education in this language is beneficial for the intergroup situation (hereafter referred to as support for multiculturalism), then this indicates a more inclusive orientation towards outgroups. However, if one believes that it is more beneficial for the intergroup relationships if ethnic minorities adapt to the dominant group by speaking and having education in the language of the dominant group (hereafter referred to as support for assimilation), then this may indicate a more exclusive orientation towards those outgroups who are expected to forego their own cultural herit-age and substitute it with that of the host society. Focusing on political attitudes regarding

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21 We analyzed four titular groups which differed in their ethnicity. However, by evading a comparison between any or all of the titular groups with the Russian groups, we could better assess group position effects versus ethnic membership effects (Fleischmann et al., 2011; Minescu et al., 2008). Nevertheless, the comparisons could be further specified by analyzing each titular group separately; for example compare the Tatars living inside the republics with the Tatars living outside the republics. For the aims of this study, and given the fact that there was little group level variation between the titular groups included in this study on the outcome variables, we analyzed all titular ethnic groups together, and focused on the comparisons across the republican borders (titulars living inside the republics compared to the titulars living outside the republics).

language and education rights is of particular importance among titular groups in Russia. Language and education are crucial political means, used to maintain and promote one's culture and traditions, and representing fundamental channels of forging national identities (Bar-Tal, 2000; Kymlicka, 2000).

In the Russian context, gaining political rights concerning language and education is an access-route to gaining political privilege (Hirsch, 2005; Tishkov, 1997). Titular privilege is most prevalent in the cultural domain (Castellino, 1999; Lapidus, 1992). So, promoting multiculturalism in the federation and encouraging assimilation within titular republics represent clear titular attempts to maintain titular political privileges (Kuzio, 2005). By investigating the effects of various social identifications on support for the benefits of multiculturalism or assimilation, we gain a better understanding of how political reality is reflected in individual patterns of identification and how these identifications could potentially contribute to preventing or promoting structural changes in the status-quo.

6.3 Are Social Identification Patterns Conditioned by Group Position and Ideologies of Diversity?

The relationships between (sub-) group identifications (i.e. ethnic, regional) and superordinate identifications (i.e. with the country as a whole) are important because they reflect individuals' perceptions about their membership in different groups. These multiple group memberships may be seen in terms of concentric circles of loyalty, or as opposing and in conflict with each other (Brewer, 2001). The construction and definition of meaning of these identification types and of the relationships between them takes place on the background of particular histories and political systems that give prevalence to certain groups to project ownership claims on the superordinate categories. Once group members claim that their group is more prototypical for the superordinate identification than other sub-groups, they feel entitled to the privileges or resources associated to that category, thus delegitimizing other sub-group's claim to these privileges and resources (Wenzel et al., 2008, p. 336). This may generate a situation in which membership in both the subgroup and superordinate group is viewed as congruent and legitimate only for the "entitled" group. Conversely, for the subgroups whose claims of belonging to the superordinate category are refused or delegitimized, membership in both the subgroup and the superordinate group may be experienced as conflicting, or, at best, unrelated to each other.

Group status often confers the dominant groups a higher degree of legitimacy in claiming prototypicality of the superordinate identification category. In the inter-ethnic contexts of most nation states, only one ethnic group is entitled to claim ownership of the nation, and this group is often the one holding the dominant status (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The holder of the dominant status is most often also the numerical majority group (i.e. Germans in Germany, French in France), or the group that is admittedly the "creator" of the nation (i.e. European Americans in the United States, or Jews in Israel).Based on these historical grounds, there groups claim exclusive access to "the nation, its resources,

and its symbols" (Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997, p. 105). The access of other ethnic or racial national minorities to political status is regulated by various political ideologies promoted and endorsed in different countries. For example, it is restricted within countries that promote the idea of assimilation to the mainstream culture, but relatively legitimized by a multicultural ideology. These asymmetries in entitlement to privilege based on group position, and on the background of particular ideological frameworks, are most readily reflected in the asymmetric patterns of identification among dominant and subordinate groups.

The impact of group position on identification patterns was previously studied by comparing national majorities with, ethnic, racial or national minorities. For example, racial identification and national identification with the country were positively correlated among dominant European-Americans in the United States, while they were negatively associated among racial minority groups (Sidanius et al., 1997). Similar patterns were also evident in the Israeli setting (Sidanius et al., 1997). However, de la Garza and colleagues (1996) found positive associations between the ethnic and national identifications of Latino minorities in the United States, indicating that the different group position of the Latinos relative to other racial minorities in the US may affect minority group members' identification patterns.

Additionally, the ideological context of an intergroup context was also found to be crucial in conditioning identification patterns. Sinclair and colleagues (1998) showed the importance of exposure to the hierarchy attenuating setting of the university: after nine months of exposure, members of ethnic/racial minorities showed positive associations between their ethnic/racial and national group attachments. And, within the political context of New Zealand that legitimizes bi-culturalism, Sibley and Liu (2007) reported similar positive associations between ethnic and national identifications among both the European/Pakeha majority group and the Maoris indigenous group. In the Russian Federation, there is a general acceptance of multiculturalism as an ideological principle. This is based on a history of nationality policies providing various ethnic groups access to a range of privileges, including that of having their own administrative territory (Minescu, 2007; Tishkov, 1997). Fleischmann and colleagues (2011) illustrated how in Russian and Ukrainian cities with a higher (aggregate level) endorsement of multicultural values and norms, the identification patterns (relationships between ethnic and republican identifications) of dominant group members were more similar to those of subordinate group members.

Previous investigations (see Chapter 2) revealed positive correlations between ethnic identification and superordinate civic identifications (i.e. republican and federal) among both Russians and titulars in the Russian Federation (Minescu et al., 2008). However, the group position of Russians and titulars in the autonomous republics, and the relative prototypicality of these groups for the two superordinate identifications also moderated individuals' identification patterns (Minescu et al., 2008). This study showed that for the Russians, ethnic and federal identifications were strongly positively associated (reflecting the dominant position and ownership claims of the Russians onto the Federation), while for the titulars, ethnic and republican identifications were strongly positively associated (reflecting titulars' position of dominance within the republics).

In the current study, we compare titulars living inside with those living outside republics, investigating how their group position conditions the associations between identification types. Specifically, we expect that, despite titulars' general claim to "own" the republican category, this projection of entitlement claims would be accentuated for those living inside the republics who use it to legitimize their privileges. Such a projection would not be functional for titulars living outside republics in a subordinate position who are more likely to appeal to more inclusive categories (i.e. the federal) in order to ensure their sense of belonging. Thus, we hypothesize that for titular groups living inside republics in a privileged position the associations between ethnic and republican identification are stronger than for those living outside republics in a subordinate position (*Hypothesis 1*).

6.4 Does Group Position Condition the Effects of Ethnic and Superordinate Identifications on Support for Multiculturalism and Assimilation?

By virtue of membership in groups that differ in group status and position, individuals also differ in their support for political ideologies that legitimize or delegitimize the right of various groups to belong to the same higher-order political unit. Individuals are likely to support legitimizing principles that most readily correspond to their group interests and goals (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006). Sidanius and Pratto (1999) proposed the ideological asymmetry hypothesis, according to which members of dominant groups would more likely endorse ideologies that are hierarchy enhancing (such as nationalism or assimilation), while members of subordinate groups would more likely be supportive of hierarchy attenuating ideologies (such as the universal rights of men and women or multiculturalism). Extensive research in the US, comparing national majority with ethnic minority groups, has largely confirmed the ideological asymmetry hypothesis (Deaux et al., 2006; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1998 1998; Sinclair et al., 1998). In line with Social Dominance Theory, dominant groups embraced the hierarchy enhancing assimilationist perspective more readily (Lambert & Taylor, 1988; Van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998), while subordinate groups preferred the pluralistic acceptance and tolerance of ethnic diversity, provided by hierarchy attenuating multiculturalism (Lambert & Taylor, 1988; Verkuyten, 2005a).

However, while group position is a structural determinant of attitudes towards multiculturalism and assimilation, it is important to account for the role of social identifications as more proximate subjective determinants of these attitudes (Deaux et al., 2006). Furthermore, given that identifying with particular social categories is itself dependent on the position of the ingroup in the intergroup setting (Blumer, 1958; González & Brown, 2003), it is crucial to analyse the effects of these multiple identification types on political attitudes as a function of group position. In the following sections we derive hypotheses on the interaction effects between ethnic and superordinate identifications and the position of privilege or subordination of titular groups, according to their location of residence.

6.4.1   Ethnic Identification

Ethnic identification is often associated with strong attachment to group goals, and the protection and advancement of these goals (Verkuyten, 2005a). Ethnic categories are the most salient markers of group differentiation. Privileged and subordinate group members have opposing strategies to promote their ingroup's ethnic distinctiveness: while the former use their dominant position in order to impose their own ethnicity onto other groups, the latter need to react by protecting and maintaining their own culture (Deaux et al., 2006; Levin et al., 1998). This means that for subordinate groups (i.e., titulars living outside republics) ethnic identification should be positively associated with support for multiculturalism (*Hypothesis 2a*), and should be negatively associated with support for assimilation (*Hypothesis 2b*). For privileged groups (i.e., titulars living inside republics) ethnic identification should be negatively associated with support for multiculturalism (*Hypothesis 3a*) and positively with support for assimilation (*Hypothesis 3b*).

6.4.2   Superordinate Identifications

While ethnic identification usually increases intergroup differentiation, superordinate identifications are assumed to provide inclusion of more -groups under a larger umbrella of group belonging (Gaertner et al.). However, according to the Ingroup Projection Model, the potential of superordinate identifications in promoting the inclusion of sub-groups depends on the representation of these identifications (Waldzus et al., 2005; Waldzus et al., 2003). These representations are dependent on the ingroup's position in the intergroup setting: privileged groups represent the superordinate identification as the prototype of one single group (i.e. their own ingroup), while subordinate groups prefer a representation of the superordinate categorization as a complex venue that allows entitlement claims from multiple groups.

Consequently, superordinate identifications may promote both *the assimilation* of all groups into the mainstream identity category, particularly among privileged groups, and *the multicultural* acceptance of multiple identity categories, in particular among subordinate groups (Brewer, 2001; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). The effects of superordinate identifications on supporting the benefits of assimilation and multiculturalism should, therefore, be dependent on two factors. On the one hand, the degree to which superordinate identifications are seen as prototypical for the ingroup determines their inclusive or exclusive effects. On the other hand, one's group position in the intergroup setting conditions the choice of strategies to promote ingroup interests (i.e., supporting or preventing diversity), thus further conditioning the employment of specific superordinate identifications.

Given different assumptions about subordinate group members' potential preferences about the status positions, we derive a first set of hypotheses on the effects of superordinate identifications for *subordinate groups*. If subordinate group members prefer the acceptance of the current status relationships and wish to integrate into the mainstream culture, *complex* superordinate identifications are expected to be more consequential for supporting assimilation or multiculturalism. If subordinate group members prefer to change the

status quo, *the more specific and prototypical* superordinate identifications are expected to be employed in pursuit for multicultural recognition and contesting assimilation.

Assuming that subordinate group members prefer to assimilate to the mainstream culture (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), they may appeal to a superordinate identification that is more complex and inclusive in order to foster their own integration into the mainstream society and its culture. At the same time, identifying with a category that is not exclusively prototypical for the ethnic ingroup may undermine support for ideologies that promote recognition of ethnic diversity and intergroup distinctiveness, such as multiculturalism (Deaux et al., 2006). In the context of the Russian Federation, the more inclusive superordinate identification is the federal identification. Provided that titulars living outside their republics (in a subordinate position) pursue the goal of accepting the status quo, federal identification should be negatively related to support for the benefits of multiculturalism (*Hypothesis 4a*) and positively related to support for the benefits of assimilation (*Hypothesis 4b*).

However, if the goal pursued by the subordinate group would be to challenge the status quo, a superordinate identification prototypical for the ingroup (i.e. republican identification for the titulars) is preferred in order to promote intergroup differentiation. In this case, the effects of a prototypical superordinate identification are expected to be similar to the effects of ethnic identification, promoting multicultural recognition and denying assimilation to the mainstream culture. Thus, provided that titulars living outside their republics in a subordinate position prefer the goal of challenging the status quo, republican identification should be positively associated with support for multiculturalism (*Hypothesis 5a*) and negatively associated with support for the benefits of assimilation (*Hypothesis 5b*)

A second set of hypotheses concerns the effects of superordinate identifications for the dominant group members. Dominant groups are expected to promote the status quo that enforces their privileged position (Blumer, 1958). A superordinate category that is exclusively claimed by the dominant group (the relatively prototypical identification) reflects the dominant group members' preferences that other ethnic minorities adopt the mainstream identity and forsake their own. In other words, the superordinate identification that portrays the dominant group as the rightful owner of privileges is more likely to encourage support for the idea that other groups should assimilate to the dominant group's ways of life. Among titulars living inside their republics (in a privileged position), we expect that republican identification (the superordinate identification relatively prototypical for the titulars) is negatively associated with support for multiculturalism (*Hypothesis 6a*) and positively associated with support for assimilation and (*Hypothesis 6b*).

The effects of all identification types on support for multiculturalism and assimilation are expected to be independent of other relevant predictors. According to the Group Position Model, ethno-national superiority and perceptions of relative deprivation are preconditions for the development of intergroup hostility (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Tuan, 2006). Thus, on the one hand, feelings of ethno-national superiority, sometimes labelled as nationalistic attachment (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) are expected to affect individuals' support for ideologies of ethnic diversity, in an attempt to strengthen one's ingroup position. These effects are expected to be different from those of ethnic identification (elsewhere

labelled 'patriotism', see de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Mummendey et al., 2001). On the other hand, perceptions of relative deprivation reflect dissatisfaction with the relative group position (Leach, Iyer, et al., 2007; see Taylor, 2002, for a review; Walker & Smith, 2002), and are often related to attitudes regarding intergroup inequalities. We, therefore, control for the effects of these two established sets of predictors of intergroup attitudes, in order to provide for a stricter test of our hypotheses.

6.5 Method

6.5.1   Participants and Survey Data

The survey was conducted in the spring of 2005 in an urban population sample from four autonomous republics of the Russian Federation (Bashkortostan, Karelia, Komi, and Tatarstan) and from four locations outside these republics (Bashkirs in Cheliabinsk, Karels in Tver, Komi in Perm, and Tatars in Saratov).[22] The participants were 1942 titulars (Bashkirs, Tatars, Komi and Karels), of which 67 were left out of the analysis because of missing answers. Participants were coded as titulars when their personal ethnic identification matched the nationality in their passport. Of those with valid answers, 1496 participants lived inside their titular republics (around 400 of each titular group), and 379 participants lived outside these republics (around 100 titulars per location).

This design was chosen so that we can compare the attitudes of those groups living inside and outside the territories of the autonomous titular republics. Within each location, participants were selected according to an elaborated procedure aimed at achieving a random sample. Within each republic, only urban locations with more than 10% Russians of their population were selected. Further, a spiral was placed on top of the plan-scheme of the whole city in order to select 19 survey points. At each survey point (identified streets) buildings and apartments were further selected by applying random rules. Within a household the person whose birthday was closest to the interview date was selected. Participants could choose the language of the questionnaire, either Russian or their own titular language. The interview lasted around 45 minutes. By this direct approach, a 66.4% response rate was achieved.

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22 The survey was conducted among a fifth ethnic group: Yakuts living in the republics of Yakutia and in the federal city of Moscow. This group was excluded from this analysis, because the intergroup experiences of the Yakuts living in Moscow were expected to be substantively different compared to the situation of other titular groups sampled in regions relatively much closer to the republican borders. Moscow's population of around 10 million people has a much more diverse ethnic composition as well as history of interethnic relations, compared to other regions of the federation (outside republican borders). The attitudes towards multiculturalism and assimilation of the Yakuts living in Moscow would have been at least partially affected by the capital's specific characteristics. We, therefore, focused the analyses on the other four groups, sampled from more comparable locations.

6.5.2   Measures

During the data collection, the questions regarding support for the benefits of multiculturalism and those regarding assimilation were randomly varied in a between-subject design. Thus, participants received either a question regarding support for multiculturalism, or one concerning the support for assimilation. Support for the benefits of multiculturalism was asked as follows, 'Good relations between different groups in the population of the Russian Federation are best guaranteed if Russians and titulars speak their own language and have the right to receive education in their own language' (i.e. for titular participants living outside their republics). Support for the benefits of assimilation was asked as follows for titular participants living inside republics: 'Good relations between different groups in the population of the republic are best guaranteed if Russians and titulars speak the lan*guage and receive education in the titular language'.* For titulars living outside the republics, the Russian language was specified. The answering categories ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) on a five point Likert scale. Apart from these questions on support for either multiculturalism or assimilation, the other questionnaire items were identical for all participants.

In line with previous research (Minescu et al., 2008), the identification variables were mean scores of two questions regarding participants' ethnic group, the titular republic and the Russian Federation (see Annex Chapter 6, Table 6.A). Participants indicated on a five-point scale the degree of agreement with the importance and pride of each of these three group memberships, thus capturing the strength of identification, rather than the categorical membership in an identity category (Huddy, 2001). The following Cronbach's alphas were obtained: for ethnic identification: .88, for republican identification: .76, for federal identification: .85.

Two questionnaire items were included in this study in order to measure perceptions of group based deprivation (Duckitt & Mphuthing, 2002; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984), focusing on two domains of violated entitlements: job prospects and educational opportunities. The variable relative deprivation was computed as a mean score of these two questions (see Annex Chapter 6, Table 6.A); Cronbach's alpha was .60.

Based on previous research on the concept of nationalism or national chauvinism (de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Mummendey et al., 2001), measures of ethno-national superiority were included in the questionnaire. The ethno-national superiority variable was computed as a mean score from two questionnaire items (see Annex Chapter 6, Table 6.A), with a Cronbach's alpha of .72.

The variable location of residence indicates the place of residence of the participants: inside or outside the autonomous republics. In line with our theoretical assumptions, location of residence is an indicator of group position indicating that titulars living inside their republic are in a privileged position, while titulars living outside the republics are in a subordinate position.

Additional questions were asked about the age of the participants (in years, $M = 37$, $SD=16$), the level of education (38% university level, 53% high school, 9% elementary or no education) and income (24% low, 30% below average, 42% average, 4% above average or

high). Around 40% of the participants were men. Participants also indicated their marital status, and the ethnicity of their spouse. A question regarding contact with the Russians via marriage was also asked as follows: "How many of your brothers and sisters, aunts and uncles have married a Russian?". These two questions were included in order to assess the degree of russification of the titular participants, which may affect attitudes concerning assimilation and multiculturalism (Lapidus, 1992). In our sample, only a fifth of our participants were married to a Russian spouse, and around more than half of the sample declared that less than 3 of their close relatives were themselves married to a Russian. However, on both inter-ethnic marriage and inter-ethnic contact, around half of the sample had invalid answers (47% of our participants were not married, divorced or widowed, while 43% replied with 'don't know' or refused to answer on the inter-ethnic contact variable).

The scales of all variables were recoded to scales from 0 to 1, and all the independent variables were centered (Aiken & West, 1991). Centering of the identification variables was of particular theoretical interest, because it provides an interpretation of the effects of superordinate identifications (republican and federal), above and beyond a mean level identification at the subgroup level (ethnic identification), in line with the specifications of the Ingroup Projection Model (Wenzel et al., 2008).

6.6 Analysis

The analysis was pursued in three steps. First we investigated the correlation patterns between the various identification types, according to the location of residence. These analyses were done on the pooled sample. Secondly, we evaluated the differences on all relevant variables between the two locations of residence, separately for the two samples of participants. Thirdly, in order to investigate the effects of identification types on titulars' support for the benefits of multiculturalism and assimilation, we ran mixed-effects model regressions in SPSS (version 16.0). Multilevel analyses were chosen because of the hierarchical structure of the dataset, with responses nested within the eight units (four republics, and four regions outside these republics). The analyses on support for the benefits of multiculturalism were computed and are reported separately from the analyses on support for the benefits of assimilation.

6.7 Results

6.7.1   Relationships between Identification Types

The correlation coefficients between the three identification types for the two locations of residence are presented in Table 6.1. The 95% confidence intervals on the difference between correlations (between the two locations) were calculated using Fisher z' transformation procedures. The correlation coefficients between ethnic identification and republican identification differed significantly between the two locations of residence: 95%CI [.100, .315].

In line with hypothesis 1, the correlation between ethnic identification and republican identification was stronger inside the autonomous republics than among those living outside the republics.

The correlation coefficients between republican identification and federal identification also differed significantly between the two locations of residence: 95%CI [.335, .515]. Inside the autonomous republics, the correlation between the two superordinate identifications was stronger compared to the coefficient obtained among those living outside the republics. Lastly, there was no significant difference in the correlations of ethnic identification and federal identification between the two locations of residence: 95%CI [−.065, .165]. Thus, the associations between ethnic identification and the federal identification were not different according to the location of residence of the respondents.

Table 6.1 Correlations between Identification Types according to the Location of Residence

	Location of Residence	
	Inside Autonomous Republics $N = 534$	Outside Autonomous Republics $N = 380$
Ethnic identification × Republican identification	.428**	.237**
Ethnic identification × Federal identification	.210**	.157**
Republican identification × Federal identification	.439**	.013

Note: Bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients are presented. The analyses were performed on the entire sample.
** $p < .001$

Hence, our data revealed that titulars living inside their own titular republics had a more inter-related pattern of identification (all three identification types were stronger correlated) than the titulars living outside their republics. For this latter category of participants, both superordinate identifications were significantly associated with their ethnic identification, but were insignificantly related to each other. These differences between locations of residence indicate that group position moderated the associations between ethnic and republican identification, confirming hypothesis 1. Additionally, the associations between republican and federal identification were also moderated by group position.

6.7.2   Differences between Locations of Residence

For a comparison across locations for all variables of interest, Table 6.2 presents the mean and standard deviation in the two sub-samples. As expected given the random split of participants between the two samples, there were no differences between samples (see footnote C of Table 6.2). However, within each sample, there were several significant differences based on the location of residence of participants. Most notable was the significantly stronger identification with the republic for those living inside compared to those living outside the republics (see partial eta squares in Table 6.2). Similarly, titulars' identification with the federation was stronger if they lived outside than inside the republics. The strength of ethnic identification did not vary with the location of residence of participants.

Titulars living inside their republics supported the benefits of assimilation (M=.39, SD=.37) less strongly than titulars living outside their republics (M=.65, SD = .37; $F(1,936)$ = 71.90, p<.001, partial η^2 = .071). There were no differences between those living inside and those living outside the republics on supporting the benefits of multiculturalism: $F(1,938)$ = .036, p>.05, partial η^2 = .000. These findings revealed a strong tendency of titulars to endorse multiculturalism irrespective of their location of residence, while they endorsed assimilation in particular when they were in the subordinate position of living outside the republican territory.

6.7.3   Explanatory Models

Mixed-effects multilevel models were employed to analyse the effects of the individual level predictors. The analysis was pursued in three steps. The first step (Model 1) was to estimate the main effects of the between-subject factor location of residence, all predictor variables: the three identification types, ethno-national superiority and relative deprivation, in addition to control variables (age, education, income and gender). Model 2, estimated the interaction effects between all identification types and the location of residence, in addition to the effects of all predictors from Model 1. For the interactions that were significant, a third step (Model 3) followed, estimating the simple slopes of social identifications, within each location of residence: inside and outside autonomous republics. All models included the variable group as a random factor in the estimated models, accounting for the covariance of the residual errors within the eight locations. Most of the variance on both dependent variables was at the individual level rather than the group level (the intraclass correlation coefficient[23] was .068 on support for multiculturalism and .138 on support for assimilation). The results for each outcome variable are discussed below.

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23 An intraclass correlation coefficient of 1 would indicate that the dependent variable is likely explained entirely by the differences between the groups, while a value of 0 means that the only significant differences are between individuals, regardless of the group and location in which they lived (Snijders & Bosker, 1999).

Table 6.2 Means and Standard Deviations of Model Variables

| | Multiculturalism Sample[a] | | | | | Assimilation Sample | | | | | |
| | Inside Republics (N = 747) | | Outside Republics (N = 191) | | Partial η²[b] | Inside Republics (N = 749) | | Outside Republics (N = 188) | | Partial η² |
	M	SD	M	SD		M	SD	M	SD	
Support for benefits of multiculturalism	.61	.38	.59	.37	.000					
Support for benefits of assimilation						.39	.38	.65	.37	.071
Ethno-national superiority	.43[c]	.33	.32	.30	.019	.38	.34	.32	.30	.005
Relative deprivation	.32	.32	.46	.31	.006	.27	.28	.27	.33	.000
Ethnic identification	.82	.24	.81	.25	.001	.81	.24	.79	.26	.000
Republican identification	.84	.23	.32	.34	.409	.82	.26	.41	.35	.261
Federal identification	.77	.28	.86	.22	.019	.77	.27	.88	.23	.027

Note. Entries are mean values and standard deviations; all variables were recoded to range from 0 (strongly disagree) through 1 (strongly agree).

[a] By random selection, half of the surveyed sample was distributed the question regarding support for the benefits of multiculturalism and the other half of the sample was given the question regarding support for the benefits of assimilation. The means and standard deviations of the model variables are presented separately for the two samples.

[b] Partial Eta squared (partial η²) statistics are reported measuring the effects sizes of the differences in means between the two locations, within each sample.

[c] The differences between the samples within each location were largely insignificant, with the following exceptions. Outside republics, participants in the assimilation sample scored higher on republican identification than participants in the multiculturalism sample ($F_{(1, 365)} = 6.29$, $p < .05$, partial η² = .017). Inside republics, participants in the multiculturalism sample scored higher than participants in the assimilation sample on both ethno-national superiority ($F_{(1, 1435)} = 8.17$, $p < .01$, partial η² = .006), and on relative deprivation ($F_{(1, 1425)} = 10.30$, $p < .01$, partial η² = .007). The effect size estimates indicate that these differences between the two samples were very small.

6.7.3.1   Support for multiculturalism

The results of the mixed model regressions on support for multiculturalism are presented in Table 6.3 (page 136)[24]. Comparing the −2 Log Likelihood statistics of Model 1 and the Intercept model revealed a significant improvement in the fit of the model once all predictors were included in Model 1. The effect of location of residence on supporting multiculturalism was insignificant. Both ethnic and republican identifications had positive effects on support for multiculturalism, while federal identification was insignificant. Additionally, support for the benefits of multiculturalism was stronger the higher the feelings of ethnonational superiority and perceptions of relative deprivation.

In Model 2 (Table 6.3) we included the interaction effects between location of residence on the one hand, and ethnic, republican and federal identifications, on the other hand, besides the effects of all predictors included in Model 1. Adding these interaction effects did not significantly improve the model fit. At the same time, none of the interactions with location of residence was significant, which indicated that group position did not moderate the main effects of identification types on supporting the benefits of multiculturalism.

The results disconfirmed hypotheses 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a and 6a concerning the interaction effects between ethnic, republican and federal identifications with location of residence. Irrespective of their location of residence, titulars endorsed multiculturalism stronger the more they identified with their ethnic ingroup, and the more they identified with the republican identification (see the main effects of ethnic and republican identification in Model 1 in Table 6.3; and the lack of significant interaction effects in Model 2 in table 6.3). Model 3 was not estimated due to the lack of significance between the superordinate identifications and location of residence.

6.7.3.2   Support for assimilation

The results of the mixed-effects model on support for assimilation are presented in Table 6.4. Model 1 fitted the data significantly better than the intercept model. The effect of location of residence on support for assimilation was significant and negative. Both ethnic and republican identifications had positive main effects on support for assimilation, while the effect of federal identification was insignificant. Furthermore, support for the benefits of assimilation was stronger the higher the feelings of ethno-national superiority and perceptions of relative deprivation.

In Model 2 (Table 6.4), interaction effects between location of residence and all three identification types were estimated. The inclusion of these interaction terms led to a significant improvement in model fit, as was indicated by the likelihood ratio test. All interaction effects were significant (see Model 2 in Table 6.4). In Model 3 we estimated the simple slope effects of each identification type within each location of residence (see Model 3 in Table 6.4). The simple slope analyses testing for the effects of ethnic identification revealed the significant moderation of these effects by group position.

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24   Because Table 6.4 is spread on two facing pages, Table 6.3 is presented after Table 6.4.

Table 6.4 Explaining Support for Assimilation

Parameter		Intercept		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
		Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE
Fixed model: Intercept		.517***	.054	.687***	.046	.591***	.046	.591***	.046
Age				.015	.080	.007	.079	.007	.079
Education				−.043	.041	−.052	.040	−.052	.040
Income				−.065	.056	−.082	.055	−.082	.055
Gender [a]				.041	.024	.036	.024	.036	.024
Location of residence [b]				−.313***	.057	−.226***	.050	−.226***	.050
Ethno–national superiority				.333***	.040	.318***	.040	.318***	.040
Relative deprivation				.136**	.043	.135**	.042	.135**	.042
Ethnic identification				.109†	.056	−.234*	.111		
Republican identification				.100†	.051	−.106	.079		
Federal identification				.025	.049	.248*	.118		
Ethnic identification × Location of residence						.404**	.127		
Republican identification × Location of residence						.348**	.101		
Federal identification × Location of residence						−.304*	.129		
Ethnic identification	*Inside*							.169**	.063
	Outside							−.234*	.111
Republican identification	*Inside*							.242***	.065
	Outside							−.106	.079
Federal identification	*Inside*							−.056	.055
	Outside							.248*	.118

Table 6.4 Explaining Support for Assimilation (continued)

Parameter	Intercept		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE
Random Model								
Individual [c]	.138***	.006	.115***	.006	.111***	.005	.111***	.005
Group [d]	.022	.012	.004	.003	.001	.002	.001	.002
−2 ln Likelihood	825.32		580.07		548.07		548.07	

Note: Unstandardized estimates and standard errors are presented; N=834.

Model 1 = intercept + control variables (age, education, income, gender) + main effects of location of residence, ethno-national superiority, relative deprivation, ethnic identification, republican identification and federal identification.
Model 2 = Model 1 + interaction effects between ethnic identification, republican identification and federal identification, on one hand, and location of residence, on the other hand.
Model 3 = Model 1 + simple slope estimations of ethnic identification, republican identification and federal identification across the two locations of residence. All continuous predictors were centered.

[a] Gender: 0 = men; 1 = women
[b] Location: 0 = inside autonomous republics; 1 = outside autonomous republics
[c] Individual   = Variance within eight groups in support for the benefits of assimilation
[d] Group   = Variance between the eight groups of participants in support for the benefits of assimilation

† p = .06; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Table 6.3 Explaining Support for Multiculturalism

Parameter	Intercept		Model 1		Model 2	
	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE
Fixed model: Intercept						
Intercept	.603***	.037	.633***	.059	.647**	.066
Age			.086	.084	.090	.085
Education			−.060	.044	−.064	.044
Income			.081	.058	.081	.058
Gender [a]			.028	.026	.025	.026
Location of residence [b]			−.054	.075	−.063	.079
Ethno-national superiority			.098*	.041	.098*	.041
Relative deprivation			.118**	.041	.120**	.042
Ethnic identification			.272***	.057	.302*	.119
Republican identification			.122*	.058	.187	.094
Federal identification			.055	.050	.183	.124
Ethnic identification × Location of residence					−.035	.135
Republican identification × Location of residence					−.089	.120
Federal identification × Location of residence					−.139	.135
Random Model						
Individual [c]	.138***	.006	.126***	.006	.125***	.006
Republic [d]	.100	.006	.008	.005	.007	.004
−2 ln Likelihood	821.41		645.10		643.10	

Note: Unstandardized estimates and standard errors are presented; *N*=821. Model 1 = intercept + control variables (age, education, income, gender) + main effects of location of residence, ethno-national superiority, relative deprivation, ethnic identification, republican identification and federal identification. Model 2 = Model 1 + interaction effects.   * p<.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001

[a] Gender: 0 = men; 1 = women
[b] Location: 0 = inside autonomous republics; 1 = outside autonomous republics
[c] Individual = Variance within eight groups in support for the benefits of multiculturalism
[d] Group   = Variance between the eight groups of participants in support for the benefits of multiculturalism

While stronger ethnic identification was associated with less support for the benefits of assimilation outside the republics (in line with hypothesis 2b), ethnic identification was positively associated with support for assimilation inside the republics (confirming hypothesis 3b). Similarly, identification with the federation was positively associated with support for the benefits of assimilation outside autonomous republics (according to hypothesis 4b), and republican identification was positively associated with support for assimilation inside the republics (confirming hypothesis 6b). Hypothesis 5b which predicted a negative relationship between the prototypical republican identification and the support for assimilation among subordinate groups was not confirmed (regardless of the negative sign, the coefficient was insignificant).

Summing up, the results on support for assimilation indicated the crucial role of group position (location of residence) in determining the direction and the strength of the associations between identification types and endorsement of assimilation. For those in a privileged position, a stronger ethnic identification as well as a stronger republican identification were associated with increased support for assimilation. The prototypical superordinate identification (i.e. republican) had similar effects with ethnic identification. The more complex and inclusive superordinate identification (i.e. federal) was not a significant predictor for titulars in a privileged position (inside the republics). On the contrary, among titulars in a subordinate position (living outside their republics of residence), a stronger identification with the federal identification was positively related to support for assimilation, while the more specific republican identification had no effects on support for assimilation. Nevertheless, for titulars in a subordinate position, a stronger ethnic identification was associated with less support for assimilation, as expected.

6.7.3.3   Additional analysis

Neither inter-ethnic contact nor inter-ethnic marriage was significant predictors of support for the benefits of assimilation and multiculturalism. Furthermore, including these variables into the estimation models did not affect the results presented above. The additional analyses are available from the author upon request.[25]

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25   The bivariate correlations between inter-ethnic contact and the outcome variables were negative, smaller than .10, and only significant for support for assimilation ($p<.05$). The differences between those with a co-ethnic spouse and those with an ethnically different spouse on both outcome variables were negligible (partial eta squared were smaller than .009). Given that on both control variables, around half of the sample had had to be left out of the analysis, due to missing values, we also conducted comparisons between those who answered these two questions and those with missing values. On both outcome variables, and for both control variables, there were no significant differences between those who had a valid answer and those who did not. We also included the two controls, one at a time, in the mixed-effects estimation models. None of these variables had a significant effect, and the results concerning our main hypotheses were largely unaffected. Based on these analyses, and the fact that the inclusion of these control variables led to the exclusion of over 50% of our sample, we are presenting the results without inter-ethnic marriage, and without inter-ethnic contact.

6.8 Conclusions and Discussion

6.8.1 Patterns of Social Identifications among Privileged and Subordinate Groups

The first aim of this study was to investigate the moderating role of group position on social identification patterns. The results indicated that the positive association between ethnic and republican identifications was stronger for titulars inside republics (in a privileged position) than for those living outside republics (in a subordinate position), confirming hypothesis 1.

From a theoretical viewpoint, the stronger associations between ethnic and super-ordinate identifications among the privileged groups as compared to subordinate groups indicate that group position affects the dynamics of social identification (Fleischmann et al., 2011). Dominant groups may feel entitled to view their membership in different categories in terms of concentric circles of loyalty (Brewer, 2001), while subordinate groups may be compelled to view them as alternative sources of membership (i.e. whereby group memberships do not overlap or correlate).

From a political viewpoint, the strong relationship between the ethnic and republican identifications reflect a more exclusionary stance of titulars who live inside their republics, which may undermine the recognition of other non-titular ethnic groups (including the Russians) who also live on the same republican territories. If one views these patterns of identification as a reflection of how privileges and entitlement over the republics are perceived by titulars inside the republics, our findings may have the following implication. At the grass-root level, the territorialisation of privilege in the form of republican autonomy may not have solved the problem of intergroup animosities as was hoped by the political elites (which is in line with previous discussions in the literature, see Codagnone & Filippov, 2000, pp. 266, 270). Instead, this territorialisation of titular privileges has most likely increased the stakes and position of dominance of titulars inside these republics, a position they strive to maintain.

The analysis of identification patterns also revealed an interesting link between belonging to the federation and to one's ethnic group. The significant positive correlation between ethnic identification and federal identification among all titular participants (irrespective of their location of residence) indicates the potential of federal identification to be inclusive, allowing for the civic inclusion of various ethnic groups. This means that belonging to the Russian Federation and holding a titular ethnic membership are not in a zero-sum relationship: one does not exclude the other. This finding is in line with the pluralist model proposed by de la Garza and colleagues (1996) in their study on the attachment of Mexican Americans to their ethnicity and to the United States (see also Sibley & Liu, 2007). The superordinate national identification (i.e. federal in our study) can be positively correlated to ethnic identification among both privileged and subordinate group members (see also Dovidio et al., 2007). For titulars in Russia, ethnic attachments are maintained alongside with their membership in other civic identity categories, such as the republic and the federation.

We conclude that both the predictions of the Ingroup Projection Model on the exclusive character of a relatively prototypical superordinate identification (Wenzel et al., 2008), and those of the Common Ingroup Identity Model proposing a 'dual identity' strategy (Dovidio et al., 2007) are valid at the same time. Our results suggest that their applicability depends on the specific type (meaning) of superordinate identification as well as on the degree to which one feels entitled to claim the superordinate category exclusively for the ingroup, both of which vary as a function of group position.

6.8.2   The Role of Group Position in Moderating the Effects of Ethnic and Superordinate Identifications

The second aim of this study concerned the impact of group position on the relationships between ethnic and superordinate identifications and support for assimilation and multiculturalism. Our findings indicated that group position conditioned the way different identification types were related to support for the benefits of multiculturalism and assimilation. Ethnic identification was a significant predictor of support for both multiculturalism and assimilation. Titulars in a subordinate position (outside republics) opposed assimilation the more they identified with their ethnic group, while their support for multiculturalism was strengthened by ethnic identification. These findings were in line with hypothesis 2a and 2b. The more members of subordinate groups value their ethnic group membership, the more they should oppose an ideology that would contribute to their subordination (i.e. assimilating to the Russian culture among titulars living outside republics), and the more they should endorse an ideology that recognizes diversity, such as multiculturalism.

Titulars in a dominant position (inside republics) endorsed assimilation more, the more they identified with their ethnic group. This finding is in line with our hypothesis (3b) and with previous research showing that members of dominant groups are more likely to support the assimilation of other outgroups to their own culture, the more they value their ethnic group membership (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2006). However, ethnic identification was also positively associated with support for multiculturalism, which was the opposite of what we expected for privileged groups (hypothesis 3a). In the Russian context, the privileged titular groups support multiculturalism more, the more they identify with their ethnic groups. The ideological asymmetry thesis (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) would predict this pattern of results for subordinate, not for dominant groups. This finding may be understood on the basis of the particular type of territorial multiculturalism institutionalized in the Russian Federation, and the position of the titulars in the larger Federation (see below). With this exception (a positive rather than negative relationship between ethnic identification and support for multiculturalism among privileged groups), our results concerning the effects of ethnic identification were largely in line with the ideological asymmetry thesis (Dovidio et al., 2007; Sinclair et al., 1998).

One innovative feature of this study was the investigation of superordinate identifications and their effects on supporting multiculturalism and assimilation. Two types of superordinate identifications were relevant for our titular participants: the republican one (understood as the identification type more specifically prototypical for titular groups), and

the federal one (a more inclusive and complex type of identification). Hypotheses were derived according to the relative prototypicality of these identifications and the dynamics of group position. The findings are discussed below, for subordinate and for privileged groups, respectively.

6.8.2.1   Subordinate groups

Hypotheses on the attitudes of subordinate group members were based on two alternative assumptions regarding their preferences about the status quo. We predicted that subordinate group members would appeal to the more complex identification (federal) in order to feel included in the larger society (assimilate), under the assumption that they preferred to accept the status quo. Conversely, under the assumption that subordinate groups would rather challenge the status quo, the more specific and relatively prototypical identification (republican) was expected to lead to a rejection of assimilation and endorsement of multiculturalism.

With respect to support for assimilation, it was the first set of predictions that was more accurate: for titulars living outside republics, identification with the federation was associated with increased support for the benefits of having to speak and have education in the dominant group's (Russian) language. Republican identification was not associated with support for assimilation among titulars in a subordinate position. With respect to support for multiculturalism, the effects of superordinate identifications were not conditioned by the residence inside or outside republics. Those who identified more strongly with the republic supported multiculturalism more, irrespective of group position. And, federal identification was not significantly related to titular's support for multiculturalism.

To sum up, our results concerning the subordinate groups of titulars living outside the republics indicated that superordinate identifications are differently related to supporting assimilation than to supporting multiculturalism. Support for the intergroup benefits of assimilation was encouraged by the more complex federal identification, while support for the benefits of multiculturalism was increased by the relatively more prototypical republican identification (whose effect was similar to that of ethnic identification). The first set of relationships may indicate an acceptance of the status quo (hypothesis 4b), while the latter suggests an attempt to challenge it (hypothesis 5a).

At the same time, these parallel processes reflect the mixed understanding of multiculturalism and assimilation in the Russian context. Multiculturalism was a political principle of organization in the Soviet Union and remains a formal feature in the current constitution of the Russian Federation (Hirsch, 2005; Tolz, 1998). However, most experts on the former Soviet nationality policy would argue that the principle of ethno-national self-determination has primacy over the more pluralistic tolerance promoted by multiculturalism elsewhere (see Kymlicka, 1995 for a discussion of liberal multiculturalism). The political claims that titular nationalities were entitled to their own administrative territories led to the establishment of territorial multiculturalism (i.e. titular groups "own" their titular republic; see also Lapidus, 1992; Rakowska-Harmstone, 1992). This territorialisation of multiculturalism co-exists with the assumption that nations are (meant to be) ethnically

homogeneous political entities. This assumption comes to strongly undermine the principles of liberal multiculturalism and promote ethno-national assimilation (Codagnone & Filippov, 2000; Dutter, 1990; Kuzio, 2005; Stepanov, 2000). Our findings indicate that at the grass-root level, support for multiculturalism and assimilation is differently affected by various identification types. This is done in a manner that indicates both titulars' expression of belonging to the federation (i.e. the more they identify with the federation, the more they see benefits of assimilation to the Russian culture), and their desire to maintain their republican territorial autonomy (i.e. the more they identify with the republic, the more they support multiculturalism).

6.8.2.2   Privileged groups

For the privileged groups of titulars living inside their republics, we expected that only the specific relatively prototypical identification (republican) would be associated with supporting assimilation and undermining multiculturalism. The findings confirmed our expectations (hypothesis 6b) with respect to support for assimilation. Titulars living in republics use their republican identification to foster their belief that intergroup relationships in the republics would improve if all groups would speak and have education in the titular language. This confirms the assumptions of the Group Position Model (Blumer, 1958) as well as those of the Ingroup Projection Model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) concerning the drive among dominant group members to maintain the status quo, by claiming ownership of the superordinate categorization and thus marginalizing the claims for recognition of other sub-groups.

Moreover, republican identification was also positively associated with support for multiculturalism. This indicates that for titulars inside republics, the same mixed understandings of multiculturalism and assimilation may apply as for titulars residing outside their republic. In addition, this may indicate that the two ideologies of integration are not necessarily opposite poles of the same continuum (cf. Deaux et al., 2006). Rather, depending on the frame of reference and level of categorization and social inclusion, they could be endorsed simultaneously, being fuelled by different superordinate identifications.

The correlational and cross-sectional nature of our study does not allow any conclusions on the causality of the associations between social identifications and support for assimilation and multiculturalism. It is worth noting, however, that titulars who live outside their republics may already be more Russified than titulars living inside autonomous republics (Tishkov, 1997; Tolz, 1998). In this case, supporting assimilation would not be a case of subverting from the protection of their ethnic rights, but a justification of their past behaviour. Similarly, whether republican identification is employed to foster republican assimilation by titular nationalizing elites (Kuzio, 2005), or whether republican identification has gained a specific meaning of prototypicality in favour of the titulars as a result of other assimilationist policies (Tolz, 1998) is a matter that cannot be investigated with our survey data. Our findings, however, do indicate that titulars residing on the opposite sides of the republican borders do have different associations between ethnic and superordinate identifications and support for assimilation and multiculturalism. And these patterns can

be explained in great part by the theoretical assumptions of the Group Position and Ingroup Projection Models, as well as the Social Dominance Theory.

Nevertheless, this study is based on the assumption that differences in attitudes between titulars living inside and those living outside the republics reflect the differences in the position of formal privileges of these groups. This comparison was justified by the fact that all groups and territories belong to the same larger political unit (i.e. the Russian Federation) and that our samples were collected in similar settings (i.e. urban areas). In addition to these contextual considerations, controlling for individual level demographic variables did not affect the findings of our current analysis. However, the differences between these locations of residence and the titular groups could be due to other contextual characteristics above and beyond the political status of the groups (such as differences in the social-economic status of the groups who left the republics compared to those who did not emigrate, or differences in socio-cultural climate and group aspirations).

6.8.3   The Identification Patterns of Titulars in the Russian Federation: Past and Present

The current findings revealed a central role of the federal category in titulars' identification patterns. The relationships between federal identification and ethnic and republican identifications are stronger for the titulars who participated in the current survey, compared to those from a previous survey conducted in 1999–2000 (Minescu et al., 2008). This is indicative of the changing nature of civic identities and the continuous construction and negotiation of identity categories, especially in an intergroup setting where identity is defined and redefined at different levels (Huddy, 2001; Tolz, 1998). This trend towards a more balanced integration of ethnic and civic identifications at the grass-root level may also reflect the impact of the unitary policies advanced during the presidency of Vladimir Putin, throughout the period between the two surveys (Kahn, 2002; Melvin).

Analysing individuals' identifications with one's ethnic and superordinate civic groups may be the most direct insight into the roots of outgroup exclusion or inclusion. Distinguishing the relevant group and superordinate types of identifications in a particular intergroup context allows for a better understanding of the processes by which ownership claims are projected from one identity category to the other. The process of ingroup projection of relative prototypicality (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) is crucial in predicting who should exclude which group, who should choose to assimilate to the other group, as well as who should most readily accept and tolerate other's groups entitlement claims. While ethnic identification was a powerful predictor of multiculturalism support irrespective of group status, it affected support for assimilation differently as a function of group position: with a view to maintaining the status quo among privileged group members and to challenging the status quo among subordinate group members. The effects of superordinate identifications seem to be even more dependent on the intergroup context, in particular with respect to support for assimilation. In our research, both the type of identification, whether it was more specific for the titular group (e.g. republican identification) or complex (e.g. federal

identification), and the ingroup's status position conditioned the effects of superordinate identifications on support for assimilation.

Future research would benefit from a precise measurement and manipulation of the representations of the superordinate identifications (see Waldzus et al., 2003), as well as a direct assessment of the degree of ingroup projection (see Waldzus et al., 2003). In the absence of these measures, we had to rely on the understanding of the Russian political context for the predictions and interpretations of our findings. Future studies could also contribute by analysing the perspective of the Russian groups, as well as that of other non-Russian and non-titular groups that reside on the territories of autonomous republics and in the federation at large (Codagnone & Filippov, 2000). In complex multi-ethnic settings, the sense of group position is particularly determined by the legitimacy of one's entitlement claims to power. This legitimacy is disputed in particular when multiple outgroups are present. An analysis of these processes of contestation from a multiple group perspective should provide insightful knowledge into the subjective processes that determine people's attitudes and behaviours of exclusion or tolerance towards particular outgroups.

Annex Chapter 6

Table 6.A Scale Items for the Predictor Variables

Predictor	Scale Items
Ethnic Identification	'It is of great importance for me to be a [titular].'[a]
	'I am proud to be a [titular] person.'
Republican Identification	'It is of great importance for me to be a citizen of the republic in which I live.'
	'I am proud of the republic in which I live.'
Federal Identification	'It is of great importance for me to be a citizen of the Russian Federation.'
	'I am proud to be a citizen of the Russian Federation.'
Relative Deprivation	'The Russian people in the republic have better job-opportunities than the [titular] people.'
	'The use of Russian language at schools and higher educational establishments reduces the educational opportunities of the [titular] people in this republic.'
Ethno-national Superiority	'There are no better people in the world than the [titulars].'
	'The more influence [the titular Republic][b] has on other nations, and the more other nations will follow our example, the better these nations will fair.'

Notes:
[a]   In the questionnaire, the word 'titular' was substituted with the name of the ethnic ingroup: Bashkirs, Tatars, Komi and Karels, according to the nationality of the participants.
[b]   In the questionnaire, the words 'titular Republic' were substituted with the name of the republics: Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Komi and Karelia, according to the location.

Chapter 7

Summary and General Discussion

7.1 Research Questions and Answers

The overarching research question throughout the previous chapters was: *how does the relative positioning of groups in a social-political system affect intergroup attitudes?* We asked this question among Russian and titular groups living inside or outside the territories of autonomous republics of the Russian Federation, ten and fifteen years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Specifically, we investigated *how the relative position of Russian and titular groups in the Russian Federation affected intergroup attitudes?* This chapter summarizes our findings according to the specific areas of interest outlined in the Introduction chapter, addressing a few limitations and potential directions for future research.

We first provide an overview of the effects of social psychological factors (such as different types of identification, relative deprivation and perceived threat) across the range of intergroup attitudes used in the five empirical chapters. This section discusses our findings about the facets of intergroup differentiation presented in Section 1.4.3 of the Introduction Chapter. Secondly, we address the role of ethnic and superordinate identifications on intergroup attitudes in the Russia-titular context, corresponding to our discussion in Section 1.4.1 of the Introduction chapter. Lastly, we discuss the role of group position on intergroup attitudes, addressing the operationalization and effects of group position and the sense of relative group position as outlined in Section 1.4.2 of the Introduction chapter.

7.1.1 The Facets of Intergroup Differentiation and the Quality of Intergroup Relationships: Social Psychological and Political Attitudes

To understand the role of relative group position and one's sense of group position in conditioning social psychological and political attitudes, we conducted our analyses on a range of intergroup attitudes: from the more psychological evaluative ingroup and outgroup stereotypes (Chapters 2 and 3), to perceptions of political conflict (Chapter 4), to political attitudes reflecting support for minority rights (Chapter 5) or attitudes towards the benefits of assimilation and multiculturalism (Chapter 6).

We now review the associations between the sense of group position indicators and the different types of measures capturing the quality of intergroup relationships. It should be noted that it is difficult to provide a strictly comparative overview of these associations, because the estimated models were not identical across the chapters. The interpretation of any particular effect is contingent on the effects of all other variables included in the multivariate analyses. Also, the evaluation of the moderating role of group position indicators

(such as ethnic group membership or location of residence) is restricted by the fact that we did not include interactions with all predictors in all analyses throughout the chapters. With these limitations in mind, we marked the presence of a significant relationship and the direction of the association (as a positive or negative regression coefficient) in Table 7.1. The purpose of this table is not to formulate any statistically based inferences, but rather to give a summary of the associations between the main predictors of the Group Position Model and the various intergroup attitudes.

Overall, the patterns of associations from Table 7.1 suggest caution in generalizing the effects of group position indicators across social psychological and political attitudes. Intergroup relationships are better understood as multi-faceted processes, where inter-group antagonism can be observed along some facets, but not others. We elaborate on these facets below.

The first facet of intergroup attitudes, intergroup stereotypes, are, for example, best measured and analyzed in a differentiated manner. In Chapter 2, we distinguished between positive and negative traits (cf. Mummendey & Otten, 1998). Depending on their valence, stereotypes were used differently by titulars and Russians. Russians' differentiation between their ingroup and the titular outgroup was stronger on the positive than on the negative items (i.e., they showed more positive-negative asymmetry effects) compared to titulars. This may indicate Russians' sensitivity to the normative constraints regarding expressions of bias and intergroup discrimination in the ethnically diverse Russian Federation. On the contrary, titulars used both positive and negative stereotypes equally in order to establish intergroup distinctiveness, which suggests that particular "aggravating conditions" may characterize the position of titular groups (Otten & Mummendey, 1999, p. 22). Previous research documented the absence of a positive-negative asymmetry effect particularly for low status groups and minorities (Otten & Mummendey, 1999, for a review). However, titulars in the republics of the Russian Federations may be motivated not only by their relatively subordinate status in the Federation as a whole, but also by their position as a "newly empowered" group within the autonomous republics. Therefore, titulars may be motivated to assert their dominance inside the republics irrespective of the normative prescriptions regarding intergroup differentiation.

Table 7.1 Overview of Model Variable Effects on Various Intergroup Attitudes

	Chapter 2				Chapter 4	Chapter 5		Chapter 6	
	Ingroup Stereotypes		Outgroups Stereotypes		Perceived Conflict (titulars)	Support for Minority Rights		Support for the Intergroup Benefits of	
						Schools in own Language	Political Organizations	Multi-culturalism (titulars)	Assimilation (titulars)
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative					
Ethnic Identification	+	−	−	ns	+	+ T	+ T	+	+ Ir
Ethno-national Superiority	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	+	n/a	n/a	+	+
Republican Identification	+	− T	+	− R	−	n/a	n/a	+	+ IR
Federal Identification	+ R	ns	+ T	− T	n/a	n/a	n/a	ns	+ OR
Perceived Relative Deprivation	− T	+	−	+	+	+ T OR + R IR	+ T OR	+	+ IR
Perceived Threat	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	+	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Note: The table presents a summary of findings from the empirical chapters, and indicates the type of association between the various variables ("+" for a significant positive association; and "−" for a significant negative association). Ethnic group moderation effects are indicated by "T" or "R", for effects that were significant only for titulars and Russians, respectively. Moderation effects of location of residence are indicated by "IR" ("Inside republics") or "OR" ("Outside republics"). "ns" indicates a non-significant association and "n/a" means not-applicable, namely when the respective relationship was not tested in the respective chapter.

In Chapter 3 (Leach, Minescu, Poppe, & Hagendoorn, 2008), we analyzed the attribution of stereotypical traits to Jews and Chechens by titular and Russian groups, establishing further distinctions on the stereotypes measures based on specific characteristics of benevolence and power, such as morality, peacefulness or smart (Fiske et al., 2002; Leach, Ellemers, et al., 2007; Phalet & Poppe, 1997). Going beyond the positive and negative valence of stereotypical traits, we approached stereotypes about these third outgroups (i.e., Jews and Chechens) in both the generality of latent dimensions such as power and benevolence, and the specificity of manifest characteristics such as moral, peaceful and smart. A focus on the general dimensions of power and benevolence allowed us to understand the empirical importance of each dimension when judging certain outgroups, as well as the relationships between the two dimensions. For example, in evaluations of Jews, it was the power dimension explaining more variance in the attributions, while the (lack of) benevolence was more important for the views of Chechens. Moreover, our findings are not in line with previous findings that stereotypes are ambivalent (i.e., a high score on one dimension is accompanied by a low score on the other dimension, "efficient but cold", or "warm but incompetent", according to Fiske et al., 2002; Judd et al., 2005). Our findings showed that for the Chechens the two dimensions were unrelated, while for Jews the moderate positive correlation confirmed the historical image of this group as powerful but benevolent (peaceful). However, focusing on the specific traits within each dimension provided a means of differentiating further between particular outgroups, and identifying which "image" most likely fits the target group (Alexander et al., 1999). For example, Jews were attributed less morality but more peacefulness, while for the Chechens attributions were the other way around. Both these characteristics belong to the benevolence dimension, and yet a general score on benevolence would conceal precisely the configuration of traits that distinguishes the Jews from the Chechens the most.

In a similar vein, analyzing intergroup attitudes towards political issues also revealed a nuanced picture of the intergroup relations between titulars and Russians in the Russian Federation. In Chapter 5, the social psychological correlates of supporting the minority right to political organizations differed from the ones associated with the right to schools in minority's own language (Minescu, 2008). Group differences in endorsing these specific rights were context dependent rather than general and abstract (i.e., minority rights in general, Sniderman, 1996). The issue specificity of political attitudes seemed to be a function of the particular type of disadvantage experienced by group members based on their relative position in the specific intergroup context. . For example, the cultural right to having schools in their titular language was more prevalent for titulars living outside their republics, while the right to have political organizations was more salient for Russians living inside republics. Furthermore, the relationships between supporting the political right and supporting separatism were stronger than those between the cultural right and separatism. This distinction is not trivial, because it suggests that appeasing titulars who live outside republics with cultural and language rights (Codagnone & Filippov, 2000) may not be seen as a solution for the political 'voice' and representation that these groups of titulars would like to have. If they are not given rights to organize politically, titulars living outside republics may continue to pursue a stronger form of 'voice' and maybe 'exit' (i.e.,

re-migration to the republican territories, or supporting separatism, Hirschman, 1970). If minority rights were analyzed as a general normative concept (rather than an issue specific set of attitudes), the differences between titular groups based on their residence inside or outside republican borders would have remained hidden.

Given the particular political setting and policies of territorial multiculturalism, we analyzed the normative attitudes towards assimilation separately from those towards multiculturalism in Chapter 6. Based on a random split of the participant sample, we assessed the attitudes towards the benefits of multiculturalism separately from the attitudes towards the benefits of assimilation. The endorsement of both ideological practices among titulars suggested that in Russia these notions are not understood on a continuum from 'allowing all groups the rights to their own culture' (i.e., multiculturalism) to 'requiring that all groups adopt the culture of the mainstream population' (i.e., assimilation). While endorsing multiculturalism was found to be independent from one's residence in a privileged versus subordinate position, the attitudes towards assimilation were significantly conditioned by group position. The results presented in Chapter 6 reflected the political ideology of territorial multiculturalism, typical to the Russian context. This ideology justifies and promotes ethno-national assimilation practices on the republican territories, while ethnic and cultural recognition is restricted to the republican territories. Multiculturalism in the Russian Federation represents the rights of titulars to expect and enforce assimilation practices within their republics. Recognition of ethnic diversity is therefore institutionalized on territorial bases, according to specific administrative borders- especially those delineating a national federal subject such as the republics. Measuring support for assimilation and multiculturalism as mutually exclusive ideologies of diversity (as they are often conceptualized in Western societies, see Kuzio, 2005) would have concealed the particularities of the Russian context.

To conclude, our findings suggest that a more specific assessment of intergroup relationships is more appropriate for capturing the quality of intergroup attitudes and their social psychological determinants. As multifaceted phenomena, intergroup relationships are played out with nuance and complexity, and our empirical investigations should be able to capture these, beyond the analyses of general processes.

7.1.2   The Role of Social Identifications on Intergroup Attitudes

The presence of at least three types of social identifications that are highly salient in the intergroup context of the Russian Federation provided an opportunity to test social psychological theories about the impact of ethnic and superordinate identifications on intergroup attitudes. This section presents a summary of findings from Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6 regarding the effects of the different identification types on intergroup attitudes. We first discuss our contribution regarding the effects of ethnic identification and continue with the role of superordinate identifications. Across our studies (Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6), ethnic identification was a significant predictor of intergroup attitudes. Those who identified more with their ethnic groups were more likely to engage in intergroup differentiation: had more positive and less negative stereotypes about their ingroup, less positive stereotypes

of outgroups, perceived more intergroup conflict, were more supportive of minority rights (only among titulars), supported multiculturalism, and supported the benefits of assimilation (especially among titulars living inside republics). Group position seemed to moderate the effects of ethnic identification especially in the case of attitudes on political issues. In line with previous findings (Fleischmann et al., 2011; Levin et al., 1998; Verkuyten, 2006), ethnic identification among subordinate group members (i.e., titulars living outside their republics) was more strongly associated with group-based rights (Chapter 5), while ethnic identification among dominant groups (i.e., titulars living in the republics) was more related to supporting assimilation to their culture (Chapter 6).

In our studies, we distinguished between ethnic identification and the feelings of ethno-national superiority, and often controlled for the effects of the latter when estimating the effects of the first. Our conclusions regarding the effects of ethnic identification are, therefore, based mainly on an understanding of ethnic identification as "patriotism" (Mummendey et al., 2001), rather than what was previously labelled as "nationalism" (i.e., for which we used the label "ethno-national superiority; see also de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989).

Superordinate identifications also affected intergroup attitudes to a large degree, but their effects were more likely to be conditioned by group position, as well as by their particular meanings for the different ethnic groups. The findings with respect to ingroup stereotypes show that republican identification was associated with more positive ingroup stereotypes among titulars and Russians, while federal identification was associated with more positive ingroup stereotypes only among Russians. Overall, superordinate identifications increased the positive images of one's ingroup, but one type of identification (i.e., republican) was used irrespective of ethnic group membership, while the other (i.e., federal) only improved the ingroup stereotypes of the more relatively prototypical subgroup, namely the Russians (Chapter 2).

The effects of superordinate identifications on outgroup attitudes were tested with respect to outgroup stereotypes (Chapter 2), perceived intergroup conflict (Chapter 4), and support for assimilation and multiculturalism (Chapter 6). Interestingly, the effects of superordinate identifications on outgroup stereotypes were moderated by ethnic group membership, indicating that the projection of ingroup prototypicality on superordinate identifications may prevent the occurrence of their inclusive effects. For example, a stronger republican identification decreased the negative outgroup stereotypes only among Russians, while federal identification had similar effects only among titulars (Chapter 2). These results confirm the expectations based on the Ingroup Projection Model (Waldzus et al., 2005; Waldzus et al., 2003; Wenzel et al., 2003), by illustrating that a stronger identification with a superordinate category is likely to lead to less outgroup derogation when it is not relatively prototypical for the ethnic ingroup.

Chapters 4 and 6 focused on titulars' perceptions of intergroup conflict and, respectively, their support for multiculturalism and assimilation. For titular living inside republics, a stronger republican identification was associated with less perceived intergroup conflict (Chapter 4), but it was also associated with more support for the assimilation of other groups to the titular culture (Chapter 6). This is an example of the complex effects of this superordinate identification: it promotes less perceptions of intergroup conflict (which

could be interpreted as decreased outgroup exclusion), and, at the same time, it also promotes support for an assimilationalist ideology (which could be an indicator for the cultural exclusion of outgroups, given the exclusive promotion of the dominant culture). This example implies the importance of measuring the quality of intergroup relationships with a range of intergroup attitudes. Among titulars living outside republics, federal identification was also associated with supporting the benefits of assimilating to the Russian culture. For these groups in a subordinate position, inclusive effects of superordinate identifications were found in terms of promoting a sense of belonging (subordinate group members supported assimilation into the mainstream society the more they identified with the federal superordinate identification, Chapter 6). However, the exclusive effects of superordinate identifications were more prevalent among dominant groups, who claimed ownership over superordinate identifications, (dominant group members promoted a view that other subgroups should assimilate to their own dominant culture, the more they identified with the republic, Chapter 6).

Summing up, our findings indicate that dominant groups tend to project more claims of relative ingroup prototypicality on relevant superordinate identifications, and that this is likely to translate in exclusive effects of these superordinate identification on specific outgroup attitudes. Groups in a subordinate position seemed to be more likely to use superordinate identifications as a channel of inclusion.

One of the limitations of our studies into the effects of superordinate identifications lies in the lack of direct measurements for the ingroup projection of relative prototypicality onto the superordinate categories. In further analyses of the 1999-2000 NWO data (Minescu, 2010), we investigated the relationships between the three identification types and the endorsement of several identity markers (such as history, language, the motherland, culture and traditions and religion). The findings indicated that the projection of relative prototypicality of the ethnic ingroup onto the superordinate identifications may indeed have occurred. The content of ethnic identification for titulars was similar to the meanings associated with the republican (superordinate) identification. For Russians, the similarity occurred between the ethnic and the federal (superordinate) identifications.

Another limitation of our approach was the treatment of social identifications as predictors of intergroup attitudes, without investigating their potential role as mediators (Livingstone, Manstead, Spears, & Bowen, 2011). As a constitutive element of the sense of group position, it is likely that social identifications themselves are affected by structural elements of group position in the wider society. As was suggested by some of our results, the effects of superordinate identifications in particular seem to be moderated by group position considerations (Chapter 6). It would be interesting to test whether the social structure impacts the degree of identification with the various identification categories, and if this may be the reason why social identifications have different effects on intergroup attitudes for different groups. Some evidence for the role of social identifications in mediating the effects of relative group size on support for different political goals was observed in analyses of the 2005 INTAS data set (Minescu & Funke, 2010). Our understanding of the role of social identifications in intergroup differentiation and discrimination would greatly benefit if future research investigates the potential of social identifications as mediating factors(see also: Minescu, Leach, Poppe, & Hagendoorn, 2010).

7.1.3   The Role of Relative Group Position on Intergroup Attitudes

One of the central arguments in this book is that group position affects the micro-dynamics of intergroup relations. The main theoretical contribution of our studies lies in differentiating between structural and subjective indicators of group position. The first type of indicators is more likely to be context dependent and embedded in the historical and political system institutionalizing power according to particular group membership (such as ethnicity, race, political party affiliation, see Wimmer, 1997). These indicators map the vertical dimension of dominance-subordination which hierarchically positions groups in the social order of a particular society (Blumer, 1965). We investigated how intergroup attitudes are conditioned by this vertical dimension by using structural level indicators of group position: such as privileged or subordinate position of the group (indicated by ethnic group membership), and relative group size. The second set of indicators defined and measured the subjective sense of group position, captured by social identifications, perceived relative deprivation and perceived threat (see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). The sense of group position is experienced on the horizontal dimension of intergroup inclusion-exclusion, in which people engage at the individual, subjective and emotional level (Blumer, 1965). This section provides an overview of findings with respect to the effects of various indicators of group position on the different intergroup attitudes analyzed in this book. We discuss each set of indicators in turn, with a view of illustrating how context (i.e., structural indicators) moderates the social psychological processes of intergroup differentiation, and how social psychological constructs and measures (i.e., subjective indicators) affect intergroup attitudes.

7.1.3.1   *Subjective Indicators for the Sense of Group Position*

In line with both Blumer's specification of the Group Position Model (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Tuan, 2006) and the main tenets of Social Identity Theory (Spears et al., 1997; Tajfel & Fraser, 1978), a fundamental component of the sense of group position is people's attachment to their social groups. We addressed this indicator of the sense of group position in Section 7.1.2, where we discussed the importance of accounting for multiple identification types and for the potentially divisive effects of superordinate identifications (see the Ingroup Position Model, Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999, Chapters 2 and 6).

Another important component of the sense of group position is the feeling of entitlement to particular areas of privilege. In the original formulation and subsequent applications of the Group Position Model (Bobo, 1983; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993), measurements of these entitlement feelings mainly focussed on perceptions of the intergroup relations, and "group conflict motives" (Bobo, 2004, p. 342). In Chapter 4, we expanded this operationalization of entitlement by using relative ingroup size as an indicator of entitlement. The following section (Section 7.1.3.2) focuses in more detail on the use of relative ingroup size as a structural indicator of group position.

Throughout our studies, fraternal relative deprivation, as a subjective indicator of the sense of group position and feelings of proprietary claims in particular, was the predictor that had the most consistent significant effects across the whole range of indicators of

intergroup attitudes: ingroup and outgroup stereotypes (Chapter 2), perceived conflict (Chapter 4), support for minority rights (Chapter 5) and support for multiculturalism and assimilation (Chapter 6). The effects of perceived relative deprivation were also moderated by structural indicators of group position as will be explained in Section 7.1.3.2.

The last set of factors indicating one's subjective sense of group position concerns perceived threat and the fear of outgroup encroachment (see Chapter 4). A survey-embedded experiment extended previous empirical applications of the Group Position Model with a more direct test of the effects of outgroup encroachment. The (de)coupling experiment allowed us to statistically isolate the effects of outgroup encroachment from those of cultural threat in predicting perceived conflict. In short, our findings pointed to the "triggering" role of threat and outgroup encroachment, which amplified the associations between group entitlement (i.e., ingroup size) and perceptions of conflict. More conflict was perceived among the larger groups, and this relationship was stronger among those who perceived more cultural threat, and in particular when this threat was coupled with outgroup encroachment (Chapter 4). It is important to note that the kind of threat and the particular outgroup that may be perceived as threatening should bear a direct relationship to the specific area of privileges that the ingroup is trying to protect. In the context of the titular groups living inside their republics, the relevant type of threat was the threat to the titular culture, and the relevant threatening outgroup was the Russians. In other contexts, the type and agent of intergroup threat will be specific to the respective intergroup setting and will be aligned to the way group power and privileges are institutionalized at the macro-level. This is a specification of the Group Position Model, one that deserves more in-depth context-specific analysis in future research.

Summing up, the subjective indicators of the sense of group position are central in understanding various facets of intergroup attitudes. Clear conceptualization and operationalization of the component elements of the sense of group position are important, especially when we want to extend the empirical applicability of the model to different intergroup contexts. We have advanced current knowledge both by theoretically distinguishing between structural and subjective indicators of group position, and by proposing particular empirical tests for the Group Position Model in general, and for specific defining elements in particular (such as outgroup encroachment). The next section addresses the role of structural indicators of group position in conditioning the effects of various indicators of the subjective sense of group position on intergroup attitudes.

7.1.3.2   *The Moderating Role of Structural Indicators of Group Position*

In this section, we summarize the role of structural indicators of group position (namely, ethnic group membership and location of residence, see Figure 1.1 in Introduction) as moderators of the relationships between the sense of group position indicators and intergroup attitudes.

As discussed in Section 7.1.2, group position did moderate the effects of social identifications on group stereotypes and political attitudes. Predictions based on the Group Position Model were met especially for the attitudes of the privileged groups. Members of groups in a dominant position were more likely to engage in ownership claims over the

superordinate categories (Chapter 2), they were less likely to support minority rights which would give more political ground to minority outgroups (Chapter 5), and they were more likely to demand that other groups assimilate into the mainstream culture, the more they identified with their ethnic and republican identifications (see the case of titulars inside their republics, Chapter 6). However, the attitudes of people living in a subordinate group position were not entirely in line with the Group Position Model and its assumption that subordinate group members wish to undermine and challenge the status quo. Our findings were indicative of a degree of acceptance of the position of subordination especially among titulars living outside the republics who did not reject the benefits of certain assimilation practices and who also did not endorse multiculturalism more than titulars in a dominant position (Chapter 6). These findings seem to indicate that people in a position of subordination may not realistically have the choice of challenging the system of status relationships, while they do have the subjective choice to use a particular superordinate identification in order to feel integrated into the mainstream society (see the positive effects of federal identifications on supporting assimilation among titulars living outside republics in Chapter 6). At the same time, in line with Social Identity Theory predictions, subordinate group members were more likely to use their ethnic identification in order to restore a positive image of the ingroup (see the case of titulars in Chapter 2), and in order to support political goals that would give them voice and relative empowerment, such as the minority right to schools (see the case of titulars living outside republics in Chapter 5) or the minority right to political organizations (see the case of Russians living inside republics in Chapter 5), or multiculturalism (see the case of titulars in Chapter 6).

The effects of perceived relative deprivation on intergroup attitudes were also moderated by structural indicators of group position. For example, the groups in a subordinate position supported minority rights more when they felt more relative deprivation (titulars outside republics and Russians inside republics, Chapter 5). However, those in a dominant position also used perceived relative deprivation to motivate their beliefs that assimilating to the titular culture is more beneficial for intergroup relationships (titulars inside republics, Chapter 6). Similarly, the strong associations between relative deprivation and outgroup stereotypes among Russians inside republics may be indicative of how the relatively recent loss of status and privilege for these groups of Russians led to strong negative perceptions of the titulars in the republics (see Chapter 2). Different dynamics may be at stake for the way this sense of grievance about violated expectations is employed by individuals whose groups are positioned differently in the social-political structure. A sense of relative deprivation can be aimed at redressing disadvantage (in line with classic research on relative deprivation, see Walker & Smith, 2002 , for a review). This is likely to explain the attitudes of subordinate group members or of those whose groups have recently lost status. Relative deprivation can also be perceived in anticipation of potential losses of privileges, especially among dominant group members or those trying to reinforce a newly gained position of high status (in line with research into relative gratification, Dambrun et al., 2006; Leach, Iyer, et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2002).

To sum up, our research indicates that the micro-dynamics of the intergroup relationships are to a great extent dependent on the structural position of the groups of Russians

and titulars in the Russian Federation. This was shown mainly by testing for the moderations effects of the two structural indicators relevant in this context: ethnic group membership and location of residence. This kind of analysis identifies the social psychological processes (associations) that are experienced in particular ways depending on how one's group is positioned in the larger societal structure (Chapters 2, 5 and 6). The assumption and potential explanation for these differences is that they are caused by the constraints or opportunities inherent in the structural position of one's group.

Another matter of interest and contribution of our studies was the consideration of relative ingroup size as a structural indicator of group position (Minescu & Poppe, 2011). An objective measure of relative ingroup size was used to operationalize the sense of entitlement among titulars living in republics (Chapter 4). Results were in line with the expectation that a larger basis for entitlement claims to power (i.e., larger ingroup size) would be accompanied by increased intergroup antagonism (Blalock, 1967). Indeed, a larger relative ingroup size of the titulars was associated with stronger perceptions of conflict among titulars. In Chapter 4, we also proposed a more nuanced way of capturing the interaction between objective indicators of group position and subjective interpretations of social reality. By means of an experiment we showed that the relationship between ingroup size and perceptions of conflict was moderated by people's perceptions of threat. Furthermore, the relationship was even stronger among those who associated that perceived threat to a particular ougroup (Chapter 4). Importantly, this analytical approach provided a more accurate test of the Group Position Model prediction that threat and the fear of outgroup encroachment are triggering factors in the intergroup struggle for group position.

To conclude, we propose that using structural indicators of relative group position represent a worthwhile contribution to the social psychological study of intergroup attitudes. Our findings indicate that a more complex analysis of these factors (i.e., by including interaction effects between structural indicators and relevant subjective perceptions) is likely to reveal a more nuanced understanding of the quality of intergroup relationships. The underlying social psychological processes as they are conditioned by the structural positioning of groups in the larger political system. A limitation of investigating nominal characteristics (such as ethnic group membership) as moderators of social-psychological processes is the fact that alternative explanations are difficult to rule out. For example, the differences between titulars and Russians in the association between relative deprivation and supporting minority rights may be due to a number of other (unmeasured and uncontrolled) factors that were nonetheless captured by the "ethnic group membership" distinction. The fact that throughout the Russian Federations, Russians are more educated and situated higher on the occupational hierarchy compared to titular groups may be an explanation for why Russians perceived less relative deprivation. Controlling for individual characteristics such as education and income (as we did throughout most of our analyses) may not have been able to account for the group or republic level effect of these variables. Including a wider range of contextual characteristics would be highly recommended for future studies, as a way of checking and excluding alternative explanations that may inadvertently be concealed in generic categorizations such as "ethnic group membership" or "location of residence".

Another way to address this limitation of moderation analyses could be to employ specific mediators to explain the moderation effects of structural indicators of group position. This kind of analyses was employed with the current survey data in a set of investigations (Minescu et al., 2010). In that study, we could explain differences in outgroup stereotypes between titular and Russian minorities and majorities, by using a series of structural factors (e.g., relative group size) as well as social psychological ones (e.g., support for separatism and different social identifications) as multiple mediators. In other words, these mediators partially explained the effects of structural indicators of group position based on ethnicity and numerical status (e.g., comparing titular majorities with other groups) on outgroup stereotypes. This empirical approach is recommended if one aims to explain why groups positioned differently in society engage in different micro-dynamics of intergroup attitudes. These explanations could be of a structural nature (as indicated by contextual and objectively defined mediators) or social psychological (e.g., different strengths of identification, or particular identification categories).

7.2   In a Nutshell

The research findings in this book indicate that structural indicators of group position do moderate the effects of the sense of group position on a range of intergroup attitudes.

There are significant differences based on ethnic group membership in people's identification patterns (Chapters 2 and 6). The prism of group position conditions in particular the potential of superordinate civic identification to be inclusive or to provide a "new battleground" for intergroup differentiation. The confirmation of hypotheses H3a and b in Chapter 2 on outgroup stereotypes (see Table 7.2), and of hypothesis H6b in Chapter 6 in support for assimilation (see Table 7.2) indicates how important it is to consider the interactions between social identifications and structural factors.

Residing in a position of privilege or subordination (inside or outside the republican territory) also moderated the effects of group position on political attitudes (Chapters 5 and 6). Within a structure of institutionalized privileges, group members strive to protect their dominant status (see the confirmed hypothesis H6b, in Chapter 6, Table 7.2), and, at the same time a position of subordination seemed to translate in increased support for minority rights (see hypotheses H1a, H1b and H1c, in Chapter 5, Table 7.2).

Nevertheless, our findings also suggest that the moderating effects of contextual factors (such as relative group size) are not as straightforward as predicted by the Group Position Model. The effects of relative ingroup size on perceived conflict were, for example, accentuated by perceptions of threat (i.e., see the confirmed hypothesis H6 on the interaction between ingroup size and perceived threat in predicting conflict, in Chapter 4, Table 7.2). In addition, group members in a subordinate position are not unconditionally motivated to challenge the status quo (see, for example, the disconfirmed hypothesis H5a on support for multiculturalism, and the disconfirmed hypothesis H5b on support for assimilation, in Chapter 6, Table 7.2); instead, they use superordinate identifications to justify their sense of belonging and assimilation into the mainstream (see the confirmed hypothesis H4b, in Chapter 6, Table 7.2).

Table 7.2 Overview of Hypotheses

Chapter 2:	The Effects of Social Identifications on Ingroup and Outgroup Stereotypes of Russian and Titular Groups	
H1	Russians should show a stronger positive–negative asymmetry effect compared to titulars.	Confirmed
H2a	Ethnic identification should be associated with more positive ingroup stereotypes and less negative ingroup stereotypes, compared to the associations between republican and federal identifications and ingroup stereotypes.	Not confirmed
H2b: Republican Identification	Republican identification should be associated with stronger positive outgroup stereotypes and weaker negative outgroup stereotypes.	Confirmed
H2b: Federal Identification	Federal identification should be associated with stronger positive outgroup stereotypes and weaker negative outgroup stereotypes.	Confirmed only on positive stereotypes
H3a: Republican Identification	A stronger republican identification should be associated with more positive outgroup stereotypes among Russians compared to titulars.	Confirmed
H3a: Federal Identification	A stronger federal identification should be associated with more positive outgroup stereotypes among titular groups compared to Russians.	Confirmed
H3b: Republican Identification	A stronger republican identification should be associated with more positive ingroup stereotypes for titulars than for Russians.	Confirmed
H3b: Federal Identification	A stronger federal identification should be associated with more positive ingroup stereotypes for Russians than for titulars.	Confirmed

Table 7.2 Overview of Hypotheses – Continued

Chapter 3:	The Content of Outgroup Stereotypes: Views of Chechens and Jews	

H1	The latent structure of the five out-group characteristics (i.e., antagonistic, peaceful, moral, smart, and show initiative) should be characterized by 2 dimensions (i.e., power and benevolence) rather than by one single dimension.	Confirmed

General Dimensions: Power and Benevolence

H2 a: Jews	The power dimension should be more empirically important to the stereotypes of Jews (i.e., explain more of the common variance in the characteristics ascribed to this out-group).	Confirmed
H2 a: Chechens	The benevolence dimension should be more empirically important to the characteristics ascribed to Chechens.	Confirmed
H2 b: Jews	For Jews the power and the benevolence dimensions should be moderately inter-correlated.	Confirmed
H2 b: Chechens	There should be little or no correlation between the power and benevolence dimensions when they are ascribed to Chechens.	Confirmed

Specific Characteristics

H3 a	Jews should be seen as much less antagonistic and more peaceful than the Chechens. Jews should be seen as smarter and showing more initiative than Chechens.	Confirmed except for 'showing initiative'
H3 b: Jews	Jews should be seen as less moral than peaceful and (non-)antagonistic.	Confirmed
H3 b: Chechens	Chechens should be seen as showing initiative more than being smart.	Confirmed

Table 7.2 Overview of Hypotheses – Continued

Chapter 4:	Perceived Intergroup Conflict in Russia: Testing the Group Position Model	
H1	Perceived conflict should be higher among titulars with stronger feelings of ethno-national superiority, with stronger ethnic and republican identifications and who perceive the Russian outgroup as more antagonistic.	Confirmed except for 'republican identification'
H2	A larger ingroup size should be associated with more perceived conflicts with Russians.	Confirmed
H3	Titulars who perceive more intergroup competition and relative deprivation should perceive more intergroup conflict with the Russians.	Confirmed
H4	Titulars who feel more culturally threatened and who fear outgroup encroachment from the Russians should perceive more conflict.	Confirmed only for 'cultural threat'
H5	More intergroup conflict should be perceived by those who feel threatened, but, particularly, when that threat is associated with the growing influence of a relevant outgroup.	Confirmed
H6	The association between group entitlement (measured by relative ingroup size) and perceived conflict should be stronger among those who feel more threatened.	Confirmed
H7	We expect that the significant interaction between ingroup size and perceived threat occurs especially when threat is associated with a relevant outgroup.	Confirmed

to be continued

Table 7.2 Overview of Hypotheses – Continued

Chapter 5:	The Impact of Group Position on Supporting Minority Rights	
H1a	Titulars should endorse minority rights more than Russians, especially when they live outside the republics.	Confirmed
H1b	Titulars living outside the republic in a minority/subordinate position should endorse minority rights significantly more compared to titulars living a majority/privileged group inside the republics.	Confirmed only on the 'right to own schools')
H1c	Russians living inside titular republics in a minority position should endorse minority rights more than Russians living outside republics.	Confirmed only on the 'right to political organizations'
H2	A stronger identification with one's ethnic group should predict support for minority rights, especially among the subordinate groups, namely the titular groups.	Confirmed
H3	Perceptions of relative deprivation should be positively associated with support for minority rights, especially for groups in a more vulnerable position: titulars living outside their republics and Russians living inside titular republics.	Confirmed
H4	For subordinate groups (i.e., titulars, there should be a positive correlation between supporting separatism and supporting minority rights.	Confirmed

to be continued

Table 7.2 Overview of Hypotheses – Continued

Chapter 6: Group Position Moderates Relationships between
            Social Identifications and Support for Assimilation and Multiculturalism

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| H1 | For titular groups living inside republics in a privileged position, the associations between ethnic and republican identification should be stronger than for those in living outside republics in a subordinate position. | Confirmed |

Support for the Benefits of Multiculturalism

H2a	For titulars living outside their republics in a subordinate position, ethnic identification should be positively associated with support for multiculturalism.	Not confirmed
H3a	For titulars living inside their republics in a privileged position, ethnic identification should be negatively associated with support for multiculturalism.	Not confirmed
H4a	Provided that titulars living outside their republics in a subordinate position prefer the goal of accepting the status quo, federal identification should be negatively related to support for multiculturalism.	Not confirmed
H5a	Provided that titulars living outside their republics in a subordinate position prefer the goal of challenging the status quo, republican identification should be positively associated with support for multiculturalism.	Not confirmed
H6a	For titulars living inside their republics in a privileged position, we expect that republican identification (the superordinate identification relatively prototypical for the titulars) is negatively associated with support for multiculturalism.	Not confirmed

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to be continued

Table 7.2 Overview of Hypotheses – Continued

Chapter 6:	Group Position Moderates Relationships between Social Identifications and Support for Assimilation and Multiculturalism

Support for the Benefits of Assimilation

H2b	For titulars living outside their republics in subordinate position, ethnic identification should be negatively associated with support for assimilation.	Confirmed
H3b	For titulars living inside their republics in a privileged position, ethnic identification should be positively associated with support for assimilation.	Confirmed
H4b	Provided that titulars living outside their republics in a subordinate position pursue the goal of accepting the status quo, federal identification should be positively related to support for assimilation.	Confirmed
H5b	Provided that titulars living outside their republics in a subordinate position prefer the goal of challenging the status quo, republican identification should be negatively associated with support for assimilation.	Not confirmed
H6b	For titulars living inside their republics in a privileged position, we expect that republican identification is positively associated with support for assimilation.	Confirmed

Lastly, group differences based on structural indicators of group position (i.e., ethnic group membership or location of residence) were also reflected in more nuanced ways depending on the particular indicator or facet of intergroup differentiation. From the range of intergroup attitudes we investigated, outgroup stereotypes (Chapters 2) and political attitudes (Chapters 5 and 6) reflected the intergroup struggle for group position in specific ways, according to the particular perspective of the ingroup.

For example, hypothesis H1, in Chapter 2 (see Table 7.2) was confirmed, indicating that positive-negative asymmetry effects were stronger for Russians than for titulars. This means that Russians (and not titulars) used *positive* traits more than *negative* traits to differentiate

between groups. According to Mummendey and Otten (1998), this pattern is indicative of a particular kind of status awareness and belief that discrimination is illegitimate among the Russians, which is absent among the titular groups.

When it comes to political attitudes, the different group positions of our participants also played a role in the type of attitudes displayed by each group. For example, different minority rights were endorsed by different groups: the right for own schools was supported by titulars (see the partial confirmation of hypothesis H1b, in Chapter 5, Table 7.2); while Russians supported the right to political organizations more (see the partial confirmation of hypothesis H1c, in Chapter 5, Table 7.2). Also, the endorsement of assimilation was dependent on the location of residence of titular groups, while multiculturalism was equally embraced irrespective of group position (see the results reported in Section 6.7.2, in Chapter 6).

To sum up, in the context of the Russian-titular relationships, intergroup attitudes were conditioned by structural indicators of group position, and at the same time group position moderated the social psychological associations between the sense of group position and a range of social and political attitudes. Our analyses revealed complex interactions between the macro level (structural) indicators and the micro level (subjective) indicators of group position. Some of our findings suggest that a position of privilege was translated into attitudes that were protective of that privilege, while a position of subordination did not always result in attitudes aimed to challenge the status quo. These conclusions are based on defining the privileged and subordinate positions with a combination of two status-defining criteria, namely ethnic group membership and location of residence.

7.3 Future Directions: The Challenge of Capturing Macro Level Struggles for Group Position in the Micro-dynamics of Intergroup Relationships

In this book, we asked the question: how does the relative positioning of groups in a social-political system affect intergroup attitudes? While we have provided some answers as summarized above, we now turn to some considerations about the nature of this question and the limitations inherent in using survey data to answer it.

One of the main challenges in investigating the effects of structural features on inter-group attitudes is the identification of the frame (or frames) of reference individuals use when judging the quality of intergroup relationships. The reflection of higher-level political struggles into individual attitudes depends on the specific perspective or viewpoint people use to evaluate the intergroup situation. Using objective indicators for measuring the effects of relative group position (such as ethnic group membership or group size) may ensure that we are capturing precisely those macro-level features expected to affect individual attitudes. In other words, if political privileges are institutionalized according to ethnic group membership at the macro-level (i.e., in terms of political representation and power), then ethnic differences should be the main focus of analysis. Consequently, we should observe differences in intergroup attitudes *between* the various ethnic groups

present in the particular context, and in line with their respective relative positions in the system. However, capturing the effects of these objective indicators (such as ethnic group membership) is not as straightforward as identifying which objective indicator should be most consequential in affecting intergroup attitudes. The effects of objective indicators on social psychological attitudes are likely to be conditioned by individuals' interpretation of the world around them.

We captured this "interpretative" stance by operationalizing people's *subjective sense of group position,* such as social identification or perceptions of relative deprivation. Yet, attitudinal research via surveys cannot capture the situational perspective people take when formulating interpretations of their world and judgements about intergroup power struggles (Verkuyten, 2007, p. 118). In other words, with our data, we can draw a conclusion like this: the more people identify with their ethnic group, the more they support minority rights, and this is even stronger for those in a formal position of subordination (i.e., for titulars, see Chapter 5). Thus, the objectively defined position of subordination amplifies specific political attitudes (indicative of striving for more privileges) for those who are more attached to their ethnic groups. But how pervasive are the effects of this position on people's situated decisions on school choices for their children or language learning or on their daily interactions with members of other ethnic groups? Are these attitudinal or behavioural choices also expressive of an underlying preoccupation for group power? Our research cannot speak to these questions and remains "superficial" in that regard, because survey research is by definition detached from the everyday experience of ethnicity (Brubaker et al., 2006) as well as from the strategic and argumentative dynamics motivating people's opinions about the intergroup situation (Billig, 1995; Verkuyten, 2007).

We do, however, argue for the contextual and relational character of intergroup attitudes, claiming that the institutionalization of particular group positions (i.e. power relationships at the macro-level) plays a crucial role in defining both the context and the relationships between groups, and indirectly conditions people's intergroup attitudes. Thus, even if it may not penetrate every fibre of people's life, the positioning of groups at the macro level should be reflected in intergroup attitudes at least to some degree. We propose to investigate this "reflection" processes by combining the use of structural and contextual indicators of group position with a social-psychological toolkit (i.e., subjective indicators of the sense of group position, and the interactive processes that determine intergroup attitudes). For example, taking ethnic group membership as an indicator of status is a legitimate choice in a context where political privilege is distributed on ethnic grounds.

However, the extent to which people's attitudes are in line with the status position conferred by ethnicity is a function of their identification with their ethnic groups, and it also depends on the presence of alternative criteria for defining relative group status. Titulars living in their republics could psychologically position themselves towards the Russians either from an angle of relative dominance (based on their residence in the titular republics) or from an angle of relative subordination (based on the status of their titular ethnicity in the wider federation). Thus, objective indicators of group position could be useful to generate a picture of intergroup relationships, but their "paintwork" is one of thick brushes. Our studies were an attempt to refine this picture with two main strategies: the use of multiple group perspectives and the analysis of the subjective sense of group position.

First, using a multiple group – multiple sample approach in the design of both surveys provided an opportunity to identify ethnic differences. For the second survey (Poppe & Hagendoorn, 2005), the specific design sampling titulars and Russians residing inside and outside titular republics allowed for the analysis of interactions between the two main structural indicators of relative group position (ethnic group membership, and location of residence). Thus, we captured snapshots on intergroup attitudes from different angles and combination of status defining characteristics, using the actual (structural) position of the ingroups of our participants. This brought us closer to the potential frames of reference our participants may have employed, allowing us to trace the power of structural factors in moderating psychological processes.

We also focused on analyzing how the structural level indicators of group position affected the subjective sense of group position. This provided a more nuanced picture of how macro-level features affect micro-level processes in intergroup relationships. For example, even if perceiving more relative deprivation was associated with stronger support for minority rights for those in a subordinate position, the structural differences in supporting minority rights (between those in a privileged and those in a subordinate position) were not fully explained by this individual sense of vulnerability (see Chapter 5). In other words, an independent direct effect of structural indicators on intergroup attitudes was present even after accounting for some indicators of the subjective sense of group position. Future research is needed to advance both conceptualization and operationalization of the processes involved in this macro-to-micro links.

Future studies should also consider more direct measurements of how people interpret and represent specific structural indicators of group position. Of particular interest are the perceptions of legitimacy, stability and permeability of the status relationships (Mummendey, Klink, et al., 1999; Tajfel, 1978). In the tradition of Social Identity Theory, these perceptions would indicate the degree to which macro-level features of the inter-group context are disputed and challenged (resulting in more individual variance in responding to the intergroup context), or interpreted as unchangeable (which may result in more straightforward effects on individual responses). Similarly, direct measurements of beliefs in certain political ideologies (such as nationalism), would allow an investigation into the way people motivate and justify specific intergroup attitudes, especially those related to political issues. Previous research has extensively showed that intergroup attitudes are dependent on ideological principles legitimizing or delegitimizing social inequality (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sinclair et al., 1998; Verkuyten, 2005a, 2005b). Although particular ideologies are institutionally embedded in the political system, the extent to which individuals subscribe or deviate from the macro-level normative prescriptions is an empirical question.

The major contribution of our studies to the literature on intergroup relationships was the application of theoretical models to the intergroup context of the Russian Federation. These studies continued the research previously conducted in several Borderland republics of the former Soviet Union by Hagendoorn, Poppe and colleagues (Hagendoorn et al., 2001; Poppe & Hagendoorn, 2001, 2003), focusing in particular on the ethno-national setting of the Russian Federation. Analysing grass-root processes in the titular-Russian intergroup context represented an addition to previous analyses of the Russian context, which often

addressed elite-level mobilization processes (Hale, 2000; Tishkov, 1997) or macro-level processes regarding the interrelationships between socio-economic, demographic and political or religious dimensions (Kaiser, 1994). The major challenge in studying this real-life intergroup setting was raised by the necessity to integrate, both theoretically and analytically, the relevant features of the context with the social psychological processes of interest. Needless to say, a continued effort is needed to refine both theory and measures, especially regarding the conceptualization of contextual and structural features that are crucial for the definition of group position, and the specification of subjective indicators capturing people's sense of group position.

Finally, of particular interest for future research may be one central concept that seems to transcend all levels of analysis, lying at the core of defining relative group position: the sense of entitlement to privilege. Structurally, entitlement is institutionalized in individual and group rights or specific political distributions of power and status; group identities are created and become politicized once particular entitlements can be restricted only for ingroup members, and these discussions come to define the negotiation of group boundaries and the type of relationships to outgroups (i.e. if there is competition for the same resources, groups engage in debates over who is relatively more entitled to those resources); ultimately, individuals seem to engage in outgroup derogation and intergroup conflicts especially when they project ownership over the superordinate category, which positions their ingroup as the reference point in the distribution of rights and exclusion from privileges (Wenzel, 2000; Wenzel et al., 2008; Wenzel et al., 2003). Gaining political voice from the grass-roots (i.e., mobilization processes) seems to depend on the strategic alignment of the discourse of entitlement between all these levels: structural, intergroup and interpersonal. Understanding how the political discourses on entitlement to privilege triggers down to the individuals (i.e., how individuals come to use particular markers of entitlement, such as ethnicity and group size, in their everyday language and dialogue in order to justify their claims for political power, and the exclusion of other groups), and how these individuals feel empowered to engage in collective (group) action in order to either protect or gain a better group position, seems to be a promising venue of inquiry.

The discourse of entitlement facilitates the construction of identities involving both bottom-up and top-down processes. And, if identity processes are the core preoccupation of intergroup processes research, then the onus is on our field to aspire at more comprehensive multiple-level models for predicting the quality of intergroup relationships. These models should include not only the individual and intergroup levels of analysis, but also integrate the wider structural macro-political level into the theoretical and empirical framework explaining intergroup attitudes and political engagement. In other words, investigating the way people identify, choose and act on behalf of specific group categories should be complemented by embedding these processes in the context of the larger – societal – level politics of identity.

Annex

Table A.1 NWO Survey 1999-2000 Sample Description: Demographic Information

	Overall	**Titulars**	**Russians**
Age			
16 to 25	20.3	22.3	18.8
26 to 35	20.7	21.9	20.1
36 to 45	22.4	22.9	22.6
46 to 55	16.0	14.9	17.5
56 and older	19.2	17.9	21.0
Missing data	*1.5*	*.1*	*.1*
Gender			
Male	43.8	45.3	43.6
Female	54.8	54.7	56.4
Missing Data	*1.3*		
Marriage Status			
Never been married	20.8	22.9	18.8
Married	60.2	57.5	62.5
Divorced	9.4	9.6	9.3
Widowed	8.9	9.1	8.8
Missing Data	*.8*	*.9*	*.6*
Level of Education			
No education at all	.5	.5	.6
Elementary- and incomplete high-school	11.3	12.4	10.5
High-school	59.1	58.1	61.6
University and incomplete University	26.9	28.1	26.5
Master or Doctorate	.9	.9	.8
Missing data	*1.3*		
N	**10557**	**5182**	**5233**

Note: Numbers indicate frequency distributions across the answering categories (column percentages).

Table A.2 NWO Survey 1999-2000 Sample Description: Economic Status

	Overall	Titulars	Russians
How do you assess the level of your total income?			
High	0.5	0.6	0.4
Higher than average	3.3	3.6	3.1
Average	25.8	28.3	24.0
Lower than average	29.2	29.2	30.1
Low	39.8	38.4	42.4
Missing data	*1.3*		
Present Occupation			
Is working	58.5	58.6	60.0
Student	8.6	10.7	6.8
Pensioner	17.4	16.1	19.1
Housewife	4.4	4.7	4.3
Unemployed	8.2	8.2	8.5
Missing data	*2.9*	*1.7*	*1.4*
In which branch of the economy are you occupied?			
Industry	17.3	16.0	19.1
Construction	8.2	7.9	8.8
State management	3.2	3.4	3.1
Education Science Culture	12.7	13.6	12.2
Healthcare Sport Social worker	7.4	8.2	6.8
Army Police	4.4	4.1	4.9
Trade commercial	10.1	9.8	10.7
Finance Insurance	2.0	2.2	1.7
Service Providers	8.1	7.4	9.0
Transportation	6.2	5.2	7.4
Agriculture and Forestry	3.0	3.6	2.6
Unknown	10.8	13.5	8.5
Missing data	*6.4*	*4.9*	*5.2*
N	10557	5182	5233

Note: Numbers indicate frequency distributions across the answering categories (column percentages).

Table A.3 INTAS Survey 2005 Sample Description: Demographic Information

	Overall	**Titulars**	**Russians**
Age			
16 to 25	18.2	18.5	17.9
26 to 35	20.5	21.1	19.9
36 to 45	20.8	21.4	20.1
46 to 55	19.8	20.2	19.4
56 and older	20.4	18.3	22.4
Missing data	*.3*	*.4*	*.3*
Gender			
Male	41.5	43.2	39.9
Female	58.5	56.8	60.1
Missing Data			
Marriage Status			
Never been married	22.6	22.9	21.9
Married	54.5	57.5	53.6
Divorced	11.6	9.6	12.1
Widowed	10.7	9.1	11.6
Missing Data	*.5*	*.9*	*.7*
Level of Education			
No education at all	.3	.3	.3
Elementary- and incomplete high-school	7.0	7.2	6.7
High-school	50.7	49.6	51.7
University and incomplete University	40.4	40.7	40.1
Master or Doctorate	.8	1.1	.6
Missing data	*.8*	*1.0*	*.5*
N	4858	2427	2431

Note: Numbers indicate frequency distributions across the answering categories (column percentages).

Table A.4 INTAS Survey 2005 Sample Description: Economic Status

	Overall	Titulars	Russians
How do you assess the level of your total income?			
High	0.3	0.4	0.1
Higher than average	4.4	4.9	3.9
Average	40.6	40.0	41.1
Lower than average	27.6	27.6	27.6
Low	23.4	22.6	24.2
Missing data	*1.5*	*4.5*	*3.1*
Present Occupation			
Is working	63.3	65.0	61.6
Student	10.5	11.2	9.7
Pensioner	19.5	17.3	21.6
Housewife	3.1	2.9	3.3
Unemployed	2.7	2.7	2.7
Missing data	*1.0*	*0.9*	*1.1*
In which branch of the economy are you occupied?			
Industry	14.6	13.1	16.0
Construction	7.3	7.3	7.4
State management	2.8	2.9	2.7
Education Science Culture	13.5	13.0	14.0
Healthcare Sport Social worker	7.4	7.7	7.2
Army Police	3.3	3.1	3.4
Trade commercial	13.3	13.5	13.0
Finance Insurance	2.3	2.5	2.1
Service Providers	9.9	9.9	10.0
Transportation	6.3	6.1	6.4
Agriculture and Forestry	2.1	2.6	1.7
Missing data	*17.2*	*18.8*	*16.1*
N	4858	2427	2431

Note: Numbers indicate frequency distributions across the answering categories (column percentages).

Table A.5 NWO Survey 1999-2000 Sample Description: Religion

Do you adhere to any of the listed confessions?	Titulars	Russians
No confession at all	25.9	26.5
Catholicism	0.2	0.5
Russian Orthodoxy	13.7	46.0
Protestantism	0.1	0.5
Just Christian	5.2	20.3
Muslim	42.1	0.4
Buddhism (Lamaism)	6.8	0.2
Missing data	6.0	5.5
N	5182	5233

Note: Numbers indicate frequency distributions across the answering categories (column percentages).

Table A.6 INTAS Survey 2005 Sample Description: Religion

Do you adhere to any of the listed confessions?	Titulars	Russians
No confession at all	36.0	34.7
Catholicism	0.2	0.5
Russian Orthodoxy	27.2	51.8
Protestantism	0.2	0.5
Just Christian	2.8	8.8
Muslim	29.0	0.0
Buddhism (Lamaism)	0.0	0.1
Other	0.4	0.5
Missing data	4.1	3.0
N	2427	2431

Note: Numbers indicate frequency distributions across the answering categories (column percentages).

Samenvatting in het Nederlands

Relatieve groep positie en inter-groep attitudes in Rusland

De studies in dit boek onderzoeken de invloed van machtsstructuren op verhoudingen tussen groepen. Het uiteenvallen van de Sovjet-Unie heeft de politieke grenzen in de regio veranderd en gaf aanleiding tot bezorgdheid over de kwaliteit van de verhoudingen tussen Russische en zogenaamde titulaire groepen in de (21) autonome republieken van de Russische Federatie. Twee grote vragenlijstonderzoeken werden uitgevoerd, in 1999–2000 en 2005, onder Russen en de titulaire bevolking in 10 autonome republieken van de Russische Federatie. We onderzochten hoe variatie in de relatieve positie van de groep (gebaseerd op het lidmaatschap van een etnische groep en het wonen in een bepaald bestuurlijk gebied) een scala aan attitudes beïnvloedde: stereotypen over andere groepen, de perceptie van inter-groep conflict, en steun voor rechten voor minderheden, multiculturalisme en assimilatie. Onze resultaten geven het belang aan van de interactie tussen enerzijds de (ervaren) positie van de groep (bijvoorbeeld in termen van sociale identificatie), en anderzijds de op het macroniveau gedefinieerde criteria voor groepsstatus.

Theoretisch kader en de intergroepscontext in de Russische Federatie

De intergroepscontext van de Russische Federatie biedt de mogelijkheid specifieke theoretische modellen over verhoudingen tussen groepen te toetsen en uit te breiden. In Hoofdstuk 1 wordt het theoretische kader van onze studies gepresenteerd. Dit kader is gebaseerd op twee theoretische tradities: de Sociale Identiteitstheorie (Tajfel, 1968) en het Model van Groepsposities (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Tuan, 2006). De belangrijkste aanname is dat zowel de sociale en politieke context als iemands groepspositie een cruciale rol spelen bij de vorming van iemands houding tegenover andere groepen. Hoofdstuk 1 bespreekt verder de studies in dit boek ingaan op de complexiteit van Russisch-titulaire groepsverhoudingen op drie deelgebieden: het onderzoek naar sociale identificaties, het vergelijken van groepen met verschillende status, en de variatie aan inter-groep attitudes die met onze vragenlijstonderzoeken gemeten konden worden.

Allereerst creërde de gelaagde politieke inrichting van de Russische Federatie, met verschillende etnische groepen wonend in republieken en verschillende republieken binnen één federaal gebied, een bepaalde set van concentrische cirkels van loyaliteit. Vanuit een sociaalpsychologisch perspectief biedt dit de mogelijkheid de effecten van meervoudige sociale identiteiten (identificatie met etnische groepen, met republieken en met de federatie) op verschillende inter-groeps attitudes beter te begrijpen (zie hoofdstukken 2 en 6).

Ten tweede konden we door middel van de variatie in relatieve posities van etnische groepen in de Russische Federatie, gebaseerd op etniciteit, relatieve groepsgrootte en territoriale afbakeningen, inter-groeps attitudes vergelijken tussen bevoorrechte (geprivilegieerde) en achtergestelde groepen. In de eerste set vragenlijstonderzoeken vergeleken

we de inter-groep attitudes van Russen en titulaire groepen (zie hoofdstuk 2). In de tweede dataset verschoof de aandacht naar de woonplaatsen van titulaire en Russische groepen: binnen of buiten de titulaire republieken (hoofdstukken 5 en 6).

Tot slot bestudeerden we verschillende inter-groep attitudes: van de meer psychologische ingroep- en outgroep-stereotypen (hoofdstukken 2 en 3), tot percepties van inter-groep conflicten (hoofdstuk 4), attitudes ten aanzien van steun voor rechten voor minderheden (hoofdstuk 5), assimilatie en multiculturalisme (hoofdstuk 6).

De impact van sociale identificaties op inter-groep attitudes

Het uiteenvallen van de Sovjet-Unie beïnvloedde de sociale identificaties en de verhoudingen tussen groepen in de Russische Federatie. In hoofdstuk 2 onderzochten we het effect van de identificatie van Russen en titulaire groepen met hun etnische groep, hun republiek en de Russische Federatie op in-groep en out-groep stereotypen, met gegevens uit tien autonome republieken van de Russische Federatie. In hoofdstuk 6 werden de effecten onderzocht van deze identificaties op steun voor multiculturalisme en assimilatie onder titulaire groepen die leefden binnen en buiten vier autonome republieken.

Hoofdstuk 2 illustreerde hoe de 3 typen sociale identificatie gerelateerd waren aan de positieve/negatieve stereotypen over de in-groep en de out-groep. Terwijl in-groep stereotypen positief werden beïnvloed door alle 3 typen sociale identificaties, was er een negatieve associatie tussen out-groep stereotypen en etnische identificatie en een positieve associatie tussen deze stereotypen en republikeinse en federale identificaties. Verder verwachtten wij, in overeenkomst met het In-groep Projectie Model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) dat de effecten van overkoepelende identificaties beïnvloed (gemodereerd) zouden worden door het lidmaatschap van een etnische groep. Zoals verwacht, maakte identificatie met de republiek de in-groep stereotypen van titulaire groepen en out-groep stereotypen van Russen positiever, terwijl identificatie met de federatie in-groep stereotypen van Russen en out-groep stereotypen van titulaire groepen positiever maakte. De bevinding dat Russen vaak een voorkeur hadden voor hun eigen groep in positieve termen (d.w.z. op basis van positieve stereotypen), terwijl titulaire groepen vooral een voorkeur hadden voor hun eigen groep op basis van zowel negatieve als positieve stereotypen, wees op de aanwezigheid van positieve-negatieve asymmetrie effecten (Mummendey & Otten, 1998) in de Russisch-titulaire context.

In hoofdstuk 6 vergeleken we titulaire groepen die in een geprivilegieerde positie leefden (d.w.z. in hun eigen autonome republieken) met degenen die in een ondergeschikte positie leefden (d.w.z. titulairen die buiten hun autonome republiek wonen). Groepspositie modereerde de relaties tussen de verschillende typen identificatie en de relaties tussen deze identificaties en inter-groep attitudes. De associaties tussen etnische en overkoepelende identificaties (d.w.z. met de republiek en de federatie) waren sterker voor degenen die een geprivilegieerde positie hadden dan voor degenen in een ondergeschikte positie. Bovendien was etnische identificatie positief gerelateerd aan steun voor multiculturalisme ongeacht groepspositie. Etnische identificatie was echter negatief gerelateerd aan steun voor assimilatie onder degenen in een ondergeschikte positie en positief gerelateerd aan steun voor

assimilatie onder degenen in een geprivilegieerde positie. De effecten van de overkoepelende identificaties op steun voor assimilatie werden ook beïnvloed door groepspositie. Identificatie met de republiek (onder degenen in een geprivilegieerde positie) en federale identificatie (onder degenen in een ondergeschikte positie) waren positief gerelateerd aan steun voor assimilatie.

In beide hoofdstukken bespraken we de potentieel tweesnijdende effecten van de overkoepelende identificaties op inter-groep attitudes als een gevolg van overwegingen over groepsposities. Bijvoorbeeld, in het geval van titulaire groepen die leven binnen hun republieken, leek identificatie met de republiek exclusieve effecten te hebben ten opzichte van andere groepen, terwijl deze identificatie door de Russen die leefden in de republieken werd gebruikt als middel voor saamhorigheid.

De inhoud van inter-groep stereotypen

In hoofdstuk 3 illustreerden we hoe de specifieke inhoud van de out-groep stereotypen het product is van een twee-dimensionele evaluatie (namelijk op: macht – welwillendheid) en van de specifieke geschiedenis van de intergroep context. We hebben gekeken naar de toekenning van de vijf kenmerken (moreel, vreedzaam, antagonistisch, slim, tonen initiatief) aan Tsjetsjenen en Joden, door Russen en titulaire groepen die leven in tien republieken van de Russische Federatie.

Factoranalyses toonden aan dat deze vijf kenmerken passen binnen de verwachte tweedimensionale structuur van macht (slim, tonen initiatief) en welwillendheid (moreel, vreedzaam, antagonistisch). In overeenstemming met historische stereotypen, toonden factoranalyses aan dat macht empirisch gezien de belangrijkere dimensie was met betrekking tot joden, terwijl welwillendheid empirisch gezien de belangrijkere dimensie was met betrekking tot Tsjetsjenen. Hoewel het tweedimensionale model werd ondersteund, leverde aandacht voor de specifieke kenmerken gerelateerd aan deze dimensies aanvullende informatie op. Het toeschrijven van grote welwillendheid aan joden was bijvoorbeeld meer uitgesproken voor de eigenschappen antagonisme en vreedzaamheid dan voor moraliteit. Daar tegenover staat dat het toeschrijven van weinig welwillendheid aan Tsjetsjenen meer uitgesproken was voor het kenmerk vreedzaamheid dan voor antagonisme of moraliteit.

We bespraken de toegevoegde waarde van het analyseren van de twee algemene dimensies van macht en welwillendheid en de specifieke kenmerken die binnen deze dimensies vallen als we inter-groep stereotypen bestuderen. Samen bieden ze een meer uitgebreid model van de inhoud van out-groep stereotypen.

De effecten van groepsposities op percepties van conflict tussen groepen en steun voor de rechten van minderheden

In het Model van Groepsposities (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Tuan, 2006) wordt ervan uitgegaan dat het verwerven van een geprivilegieerde of betere positie van de eigen groep een bepalende rol speelt voor de attitudes ten opzichte van andere groepen. Wij toetsten dit model

in Hoofdstuk 4, aan de hand van percepties van groepsconflict van de titulaire bevolking, en in Hoofdstuk 5, waarin steun voor de rechten van minderheden werd geanalyseerd.

In Hoofdstuk 4 werden de resultaten gepresenteerd van een experiment dat tot doel had de effecten van ervaren dreiging en van de angst voor groeiende invloed van andere groepen (out-groepen) op waargenomen conflict te onderscheiden. We verwachtten dat de titulaire bevolking in een geprivilegieerde positie (d.w.z. binnen de titulaire republieken) in toenemende mate een conflict zou waarnemen naarmate de dreiging door de out-groep toeneemt. De bevindingen lieten zien dat inderdaad meer conflict werd ervaren in con- texten waar de out-groep groter is (en daarmee beter in staat om privileges op te eisen) en in het bijzonder bij degenen die zich sterker bedreigd voelden. Dit verband was nog sterker bij deelnemers voor wie het gevaar van een groeiende invloed van de out-groep werd benadrukt.

In Hoofdstuk 5 werd onderzocht hoe structurele kenmerken van de groepspositie (d.w.z. de etnische groep waar men toe behoort en de geprivilegieerde dan wel onderge- schikte positie van die groep) doorwerken op het effect van individuele percepties van de inter-groepsrelaties (d.w.z. etnische identificatie en waargenomen relatieve deprivatie) op individuele steun voor de rechten van minderheden. In overeenstemming met het Model van Groepsposities verleenden ondergeschikte groepen meer steun aan rechten van min- derheden dan geprivilegieerde groepen. Deze bevinding was bovendien een resultaat van het specifieke type van de onderzochte rechten voor minderheden: de titulaire bevolking die in een ondergeschikte positie leefde (d.w.z. buiten de eigen republiek), onderschreef het recht op eigen scholen in sterkere mate, terwijl de Russische bevolking in een onderge- schikte positie leefde (d.w.z in een titulaire republiek) meer steun verleende aan het recht op eigen politieke organisaties. Daarnaast werd een samenhang gevonden tussen de mate van etnische identificatie en de waarneming van relatieve deprivatie enerzijds en steun voor de rechten voor minderheden anderzijds, in het bijzonder bij de groepen die zich in een ondergeschikte positie bevonden. In de bespreking van deze resultaten gingen wij in op de rol van de institutionalisering van groepsposities aan de hand van specifieke criteria (zoals etniciteit of territoriale grenzen) en van sociaalpsychologische processen, die houdingen ten opzichte van rechten voor minderheden beïnvloeden.

Implicaties van de bevindingen

In Hoofdstuk 7 bespraken we de bevindingen van onze studies en de implicaties daarvan voor het overkoepelende theoretisch kader. Wij presenteerden een overzicht van de ef- fecten van sociaalpsychologische factoren (zoals sociale identificatie, relatieve deprivatie en ervaren dreiging) op een reeks van attitudes ten aanzien van andere groepen. Daarbij gingen wij in op interacties tussen deze factoren met structurele kenmerken van groeps- posities (zoals het behoren tot een bepaalde etnische groep, leven in een geprivilegieerde of ondergeschikte positie). Onze analyses lieten complexe interacties zien tussen (struc- turele) kenmerken van groepsposities op het macro niveau en (subjectieve) kenmerken van groepsposities op het micro niveau. Over de gehele linie bleek uit de bevindingen dat een geprivilegieerde positie gerelateerd is aan inter-groep attitudes die dit privilege be-

schermen, maar dat een ondergeschikte positie niet altijd leidde tot inter-groep attitudes die gericht waren op een verandering van de status quo. Onze aanbeveling is daarom de analyse van structurele en contextuele kenmerken van groepsposities te combineren met een sociaalpsychologische benadering (d.w.z. subjectieve kenmerken van de waargenomen groepspositie, en het interactieve proces waardoor attitudes ten aanzien van andere groepen worden bepaald).

Onze studies naar intergroepsprocessen op het individueel niveau in de context van titulaire en Russische bevolking in Russische Federatie zijn een aanvulling op eerdere studies in de Russische context, die zich richtten op mobilisatie processen op het niveau van elites (Hale, 2000; Tishkov, 1997) of op processen op het macro niveau aangaande de verbanden tussen sociaaleconomische, demografische, politieke of religieuze dimensies (Kaiser, 1994). De grootste uitdaging bij het bestuderen van deze etnisch-nationale inter-groepscontext bestond uit de noodzaak om de relevante aspecten van de context en de relevante sociaalpsychologische processen zowel theoretisch als analytisch te integreren,. Wij concluderen dat het conceptualiseren van de contextuele/structurele factoren die een cruciale rol spelen bij het bepalen van groepsposities, en het specificeren van de subjectieve indicatoren die de individuele beleving van groepsposities weergeven, mogelijkheden bieden voor vervolgonderzoek in de context van de Russische en titulaire bevolking, maar ook in andere etnisch-nationale contexten.

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Curriculum Vitae

Anca Minescu was born on August 8, 1979, in Ploiești (Romania), where she completed her primary and secondary education. She began her undergraduate studies at the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work, at the University of Bucharest, Romania, in 1998. After studying at Utrecht University for one semester on a Socrates-Erasmus exchange scholarship, she continued her undergraduate education at University College Utrecht, the Netherlands. She graduated in 2002 with Bachelor degree in Social Sciences (*summa cum laude*).

Having been awarded a Utrecht Excellence Scholarship from Utrecht University and a grant for Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund (SYLFF), she continued with the Research Master Program in Migration, Ethnic Relations and Multiculturalism. In 2004, she graduated with a Master degree (*cum laude*) and enrolled as a part-time PhD candidate at the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS), Department of Sociology, Utrecht University.

She worked (part-time) for the Graduate School of Social and Behavioural Sciences and was an active fellow of the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations, at Utrecht University. Throughout the years, she also participated in various activities of the International Graduate College, at the Friedrich-Schiller University of Jena, Germany, and attended several meetings of the Kurt Lewin Institute in the Netherlands. With the support of a California Scholarship, from the University of California and Utrecht University, and a travel grant (Emancipatiefonds) from the Department of Sociology, Utrecht University, she was a visiting fellow at the Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, in 2007, and at the Department of Psychology, University of Sussex, in the UK, in 2008.

In January 2010, she was appointed as assistant professor at the Department of Psychology, University of Limerick, in Ireland. As a permanent member of the academic staff and academic co-ordinator for international exchanges, she has been involved in the development of the newly established Department of Psychology. Currently, she is also a member of the Centre for Social Issues Research, at the University of Limerick.

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Two large scale surveys were conducted in the Russian Federation, in 1999–2000 and 2005, among ethnic groups living inside and outside the borders of ten autonomous republics. We asked how the variation in relative group position (based on ethnic group membership and residence on a particular administrative territory) affected a range of attitudes: intergroup stereotypes, perceptions of conflict, support for minority rights, multiculturalism and assimilation. Our analyses from a multiple group perspective revealed crucial interactions between one's sense of group position (especially individuals' social identifications) and criteria of group status defined at the macro-level. We discuss the implications of our findings for the wider theoretical modelling of intergroup attitudes.

Anca Minescu studied at the University of Bucharest, Romania, and at University College Utrecht, The Netherlands. Following her MSc degree in Migration, Ethnic Relations and Multiculturalism, she conducted this research at the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations, and the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology, in Utrecht.