

Identities of public servants

Performance-driven, but professional public managers

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Abstract

Performance related pay introduces complex situations in public organizations. Serving the public interest seems to be hard in an entrepreneurial, performance related environment. This paper focuses on this complex situation, by elaborating two identities of public servants; one based on Weber and the other based on NPM. As this paper shows, the identities help to understand 'personal-stake-driven' behaviour of civil servants. These identities are elaborated by using concepts of public and private interest, politics – administration dichotomy and professionalisation as background. The paper shows the complexity and ambiguity of a civil servants' work and also makes clear that conflicting identities in the service of the 'res publica' cause undesirable, though logical, consequences for the implementation of the political will.

1. Introduction

“We do not only swing into action to score.” With this statement Dutch commissioner Eringa of the Flevoland police force emphasized that his contract, which contains performance targets, will not influence decision making about which cases will be investigated and which will not. However, there are many examples of performance contracts where the agreements do influence decisionmaking. Dalrymple, for example, describes a case of two police officers in Paris who refuse to investigate a case of robbery on the street, for it would raise the crime rate of their district and thus jeopardize their chances of receiving a bonus at the end of the year. (Dalrymple, 2004: 171-172)

These examples demonstrate two entirely different situations in which performance contracts play a role. The first example shows a responsible commissioner who still seems to be fully aware of his duty for the *res publica*. Of course this may all be just rhetoric. In the second case the police officers have totally lost their feeling for public service for the sake of their personal interests. This contrast is at least remarkable. We would expect civil servants, like police officers, to serve the public interest, but other considerations appear to be of more importance in some cases. The identity of the organization in the second case resulted in losing the feeling with the ‘public’. Private stakes determine the service of public interests.

Performance related pay (PRP), as we call the payment mechanism that links salary (partly) to performance, can result in officials experiencing their function more like a *private* matter, as the two police officers in the Paris case do. They have personal stakes that apparently prevail over the public interest they should serve. In this case this identity change is visible. It is this identity change of public services that is central in this paper.

In the ‘pre-Weberian’ era one can observe the mingling of public and private interests, for the possible advantages of standardized work processes and the *impersonality* of public functions were not yet thought of. Weber then introduced his idealtyp of a bureaucracy (Weber in Gerth & Mills, 1991: 196 onward), as a reaction to public officials more serving their private interests (in close contact with politicians, e.g. spoils system) than the *res publica*. Weber introduced for instance appointment based on merit

and education, and a fixed salary. This development of professionalising (cf. Wilensky, 1964; Freidson, 1986; 2001) the public service has recently gone into a new stage with the introduction of managerial concepts (NPM). The introduction of performance related pay can be seen in this light. (Hood, 1991; Farnham et al., 1996; Hood, 1998; Pollit & Bouckaert, 2000; Christensen et al., 2004; Hood & Peters, 2004)

In this paper the focus is on the change of identity of public service, especially caused by the payment mechanism. Professionalising administrative functions (and organizations) has entered a new stage with the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) and linked to this a performance related pay mechanism. In order to understand the behaviour of administrators in cases like the two mentioned above, we have to concentrate on the changing identities of public administration caused by professionalisation. Main question of this paper is: how can we understand behaviour of administrative officials in a performance-driven identity?

We will first introduce the concept of professionalisation. Professionalising public administration aims to attain a better service of the *res publica*. Because of this, we will introduce the concept of defining public interest. This makes it possible to observe public interest considerations in the behaviour of civil servants, and add this to our identity concepts. These considerations of course are made in an organisational setting, where a political body also is concerned with public interest. This organisational setting is analysed with the politics – administration dichotomy. The concept shows where public interest is taken into consideration (and also where *not*). This conceptual background then will be used to analyse what identities of public service can be observed in three police cases (pre-Weberian, Weberian, post-Weberian). Our focus in these cases will be the payment mechanism, for this aspect of professionalisation has the most direct link to individual, thus private, interests.

2. Professionalisation of public service

Thoughts on the arrangement of government and public service probably have been developing constantly ever since prehistory. (Finer, 1999) However, with this development ideas about civil service and servants also have been changing on aspects like position and autonomy as well as education and skills. This development can be discussed in terms of professionalisation, based on six aspects.

Firstly, all members of a profession should have followed a *training program* required for their occupation. (Wilensky, 1964; Freidson, 2001) This condition makes it possible to assure that every member of the profession received decent education. The second condition then is a logical consequence of the first demand; that is to have *a certain degree of knowledge*. (Wilensky, 1964; Freidson, 1986, 2001; Greenwood, 1974; Raadschelders, 2003) These two conditions assure a certain intellectual level.

Besides these intellectual conditions, there are also demands regarding *practices* of professions. These are laid down in *codes of ethics*, which is the third characteristic of a profession. (Wilensky, 1964; Freidson, 2001; Greenwood, 1974; Noordegraaf, 2004) The profession's association upholds this code by reprimanding offences. The fourth feature of a profession is *protection of the job title*. (Freidson, 1986, 2001) In most cases, it is the association that grants titles to its members. Greenwood (1974) holds the vision that associations should have full power over their profession (cf. Freidson, 2001), but not without the community's recognition of the association. Gouldner (in Freidson, 1986: 46-47) points out that there is a demand for professional autonomy, because of the formal knowledge professionals possess. This fifth feature can be summarised as *delegation of power over the profession to the association* (by the state).

The sixth characteristic of a profession concerns *payment*. Wilensky (1964) states a profession can only be a full-time job. Freidson however does not mention the term full-time, he articulates that it is necessary that one can make a living out of his occupation. This facet of professionalisation makes sure that employees can fully develop themselves in their profession. For reasons of professional independency it seems to be important not to have several jobs.

These components of professionalisation form the lines along which developments in public administration have been taking place. Plato already stated that education and knowledge are very important for governing a country. (Plato, 2005) At times when the distinction between politics and administration was conceptualised (Goodnow, 1900; Wilson, 1887), Weber wrote about the bureaucratic organisation, with education, expertise, full-time functions in combination with a fixed salary. (Weber in Gerth & Mills, 1991: 196 onward)

New Public Management emphasizes the entrepreneurial spirit of a civil servant and empowerment of managers. As Hood puts it: “this movement helped to generate a set of administrative reform doctrines based on the ideas of “*professional management*” expertise as *portable*, *paramount* over technical expertise, requiring high *discretionary power* to achieve results (“free to manage”) and *central* and *indispensable* to better organisational performance, through the development of appropriate cultures and the active measurement and adjustment of organisational outputs. (Hood, 1991: 6, italics in original text)

In this paper the focus is on the financial aspects of professionalising administrative functions, for this aspect forms the most direct link between a function and a functionary. Professionalisation is aimed at a better service of the ‘public’, therefore it should serve the public interest. However, perceptions of what public interest is, how it can be defined, differ. In the next section we will elaborate several approaches of public interest. The approaches will be used later to clarify public interest perceptions within identities of public service.

3. Public interest

There are two approaches of discussing the public interest: formal, focusing on the process of public interest definition, and substantive, where the content of public interest is the central issue. Since the substance can be seen as a result of the procedure, our focus is on the *process* of public interest definition.

Three formal approaches of public interest can be distinguished: (based on Held, 1970)

- a) Preponderance procedure
- b) Common interest approach
- c) Unitary conceptions

Firstly, the *preponderance procedure* means majority sets public interest. The rationalist and realist categories of Schubert (Schubert, 1962) can be seen in the light of this approach. Rationalists define public interest in the majoritarian tradition, realists acknowledge the role of parties or interest groups, before the majority role comes into play. Descriptions of the role of politics (derived from politics – administration

dichotomy) fit in this realist vision: “Politics is [...] seen as the arena in which a range of private preferences is reformulated into one public preference.” (Pesch, 2003: 41) Administration’s task then is to execute that will. (cf. Goodnow, 1967, see next section)

In this first approach of course the power concept is a central issue. It is the majority determining whether a possible governmental action is in the public interest. However, exchanging issues in deliberation processes can disturb the thought of public interest as a result of the majority rule.

Secondly, in the *common interest approach* individual interests are equal to public interest. (Held, 1970) This means public interest is equal to Rousseau’s Will of All conception: aggregation of all individual interests. (Rousseau in Ebenstein & Ebenstein, 2000: 448-449; Bentham in Bodenheimer, 1960)

This ‘adding of interests’ is complicated, for in detail all individual interests are different. This makes it impossible to simply add them up. (Bodenheimer, 1960) Pennock also states that public interest is not equal to the sum of all individual interests. He presents four considerations for this statement. “First, the public interest is not confined to interests that are recognized by those whose interest they are. [...] Second, the public interest includes the interests of persons who are not yet born.” Third, “private interests must be conceived as including the individual enjoyments, satisfactions, fulfilments, and so on that come only in and through society. [...] Finally [...] I would say that anything that is part of the public interest must be capable of recognition by individuals as an interest they share in the sense that they wish to see it furthered or think it ought to be furthered.” (Pennock, 1960; 180-181)

Goodin introduces the ‘least common denominator’ approach of public interest, in which “the public interest is equated, literally, with the common good, with that which is common among my good and yours.” (Goodin, 1996) His example of clean air and water clarifies the shortcomings of the least-common-denominator logic.¹ Goodin’s

¹ “Some people, however, stand to profit from polluting the air or water, and their personal profits from so doing sometimes exceed the costs they must personally pay in terms of damaged lungs and livers. Now, insofar as anyone at all has a strong private interest in undermining such common pool resources, least-common-denominator logic would conclude that protecting those resources is not in the public interest after all.” (Goodin, 1996)

alternative changes the focus from interests we *happen* to have in common to interests we *must* have in common: “the public interest is necessarily and not merely contingently, public.” Goodin then formulates three conditions:

1. it is an interest people *necessarily* share;
2. by virtue of their role as a member of the public;
3. which can best or only be promoted by concerted public action.

Thirdly, in the *unitary conceptions approach* public interest is described as conceptions on a higher moral level. (Held, 1970) This means they are important for all humankind. A clash with morality means a clash with the public interest. Schubert’s third category, the idealists, fits in this approach, for they proclaim that the public interest reposes in ‘natural law’. (Schubert, 1962) The ‘symbol-approach’ of Goodsell includes the idea that public interest is “felt emotionally, rather than known in a precise cognitive way”. (Goodsell, 1990: 102) This is essential in the unitary conceptions theory, when public interest is derived from natural law. This idea comes very close to the somewhat vague ‘x’ factor of Sorauf. (Sorauf, 1957: 617)

Now that we have shaped the background of how public interest can be defined, the question of *where* this definition takes place needs to be answered. Since administration’s task is to serve the public interest, both identities might have a different conception of what this public interest exactly is and as a consequence where it is defined. If for example only political bodies are competent to determine the public interest, than administrative’s role conception is purely executive. This is another perception of serving the public interest than for instance advising political bodies or even partly policymaking in case of professional latitude. The next section concentrates on this relation.

4. Politics – administration

The death of royal absolutism in the 17th century’s Glorious Revolution meant ‘power to the people’, i.e. the parliament. (Ebenstein & Ebenstein, 2000: 380) The main function of parliaments (‘politics’) according to Goodnow (1967, first printed in 1900), is the expression of the state’s will. Administrations subsequently executes that will. Studies on (strict) separation of functions can be seen as a reaction to the spoils system, as stated in the introduction.

The spoils system is derived from the adage ‘to the victor belong the spoils’. This system gives elected officials the opportunity to ‘build’ their own administration. As a result, appointed civil servants have the same political background as the elected officials. Often they share a history within their party or election campaign. The medieval credo *no cooperation, no job, no income* applies here as well. According to Weber, the spoils system causes un-ideological parties with job seekers as their members. (Weber, 1999: 78-83) Weber also mentions the powerful ‘bosses’, who gain power with their political entrepreneurial skills. In nineteenth century American public administration this spoils system was very usual. However, “the Grand administration scandals, the efforts of civil service reformers, president Garfield’s assassination by a disappointed office-seeker, and the huge Republican losses in the 1882 elections” (Therault, 2003) are seen as possible causes of the ending of the spoils system, which is marked by the passage of the Pendleton Act (1883). This act had two important consequences: “first, it prohibited mandatory campaign contributions, [...] second, it implemented entrance exams for would-be bureaucrats and therefore it is the start of the merit-system in American public administration.” (Therault, 2003) Entrance exams reflect a step forward in the intellectual professionalisation of public functions.

It was by this manner that the ‘de-politicization’ of bureaucracy started. Following the Pendleton Act, a Civil Service Commission was set up “to administer a system based on merit rather than political connections.” (website I) Four years after the passage of the Act, 86,000 jobs were classified as unavailable for political appointments.

After the Pendleton Act several scholars studied the issue of the politics – administration dichotomy. In 1887 Woodrow Wilson wrote his famous article “The study of administration” in which he sets out that public administration has everything to do with the “detailed and systematic *execution* of public law. [...] The broad plans of governmental action are not administrative.” (Wilson, 1887) Administration is a field “removed from the hurry and strife of politics.” (Wilson, 1887) With these statements Wilson made clear that the function of administration differs from politics. Goodnow distinguishes the expression of the will, which is the function of politics, and the execution of that will, i.e. the administrative function. (Goodnow, 1967: 18) This presupposes subordination of administration to politics. The distinction between these

two functions is good; the separation of them is bad, maybe even impossible. (Goodnow, 1967; Waldo, 1948) “There is always a meeting and mingling of two functions, and the organs of government to which the discharge of these functions is entrusted cannot be clearly defined.” (Waldo, 1948: 107) Bozeman and Straussman turn the situation around by defining public management as “the management of political authority.” (Bozeman and Straussman in Lynn, 1996: 43) Gulick states that everyone who has professional latitude determines policy. Since every civil servant has some professional latitude, it seems impossible, according to Gulick, to separate the function of politics from the function of administration. Waldo comes to the conclusion that division of government in politics and administration is inadequate. We must accept the interrelation of the two spheres. (Waldo, 1948: 128) As a consequence of the payment mechanisms used, the two identities show differences in the shape of this interrelationship, as will be showed in the next section.

So far we discussed professionalisation, public interest and the politics – administration dichotomy. In the next section our focus is on the earlier mentioned formalistic and flexible identity of professional public service, where these approaches will be used.

5. Two identities of public service

In section two, which described several aspects of professionalisation, we already mentioned a Weberian and an NPM way of professionalisation. In this section we elaborate this approach by describing two identities of public service, *formalistic* and *flexible*, in which the contrast between Weber and NPM forms the basis. As stated earlier, our focus is on the payment aspect of professionalisation.

The *formalistic* identity basically reflects the traditional approach of a bureaucratic organisation. Procedures are standardised and functions have an *impersonal* character. All this is in service of the equity principle (every case is dealt with in a standard way). Weber emphasized the importance of splitting public and private property. This is important because of the idea that a civil servant has to serve the public interest, instead of his personal (private) interest. In this line lies the idea of a fixed salary mechanism meaning the amount is set in advance. (Weber in Gerth & Mills, 1991; Van Braam, 1988) An employee does not have to reach certain targets in order to make a living. Of course he has to carry out his tasks properly, but no financial pressures distract him

from his work. Weber states that properly paid work is more precise. (Weber in Gerth & Mills, 1991: 214) Hegel adds to this that “a comfortable level of payment would free the officials from worldly cares and make them act in the altruistic pursuit of the collective interests of the state.” (Hegel in Hood & Jackson, 1991: 55) Hood and Jackson call this the *disinterested* service. (ibid.) Pratchett and Wingfield show several studies that confirm the altruistic motivations of civil servants: civil servants joined local government because “they felt that it would be rewarding and would enable them to do something of value for the community.” (Mallaby Committee 1967, in: Pratchett & Wingfield, 1996: 641) Pratchett & Wingfield conclude that “motivation amongst civil servants [...] is primarily altruistic rather than financial.” (Pratchett & Wingfield, 1996: 642)

Because of this disinteresting consequence of a fixed salary mechanism, civil servants should have full attention for public interest considerations. These are made based on the common good and the unitary conceptions approach. Their expertise, derived from training programs etc., helps them to interpret unitary conceptions and the common good. These interpretations are used in case of professional latitude, i.e. where political decisions are not specified in detail. The relation between politics and administration also follows traditional lines. The mechanism used to construct the political will follows the idea of the (earlier discussed) preponderance approach, i.e. the majority rule according to which a representative democracy works. Execution of the general (political) will is the function of the administrative organisation. Of course in practice mingling of the two fields can occur, however, the basic line follows the separation of the two fields and thus different mechanisms of public interest determination. In this identity serving the public interest means serving the political will *to the spirit*.

The *flexible* identity is derived from the New Public Management approach. In this approach the entrepreneurial spirit of a civil servant is central. It is for this reason that NPM introduced a performance related pay mechanism. This system of payment is comparable with the payment-per-action method. Payment-per-action can be seen as piece-wage or incentive wage. Therefore, it corresponds to our concept of performance related pay. Also the philosophy of the profit-in-office system is included in performance related pay. Profit-in-office means buying a function and make a profit on

it. (Raadschelders, 1998: 158) Of course it is impossible to buy an office nowadays, however, thinking in terms of making a profit fits well in NPM’s philosophy.

PRP, in contrast to the formalistic identity, brings private interests into a function. Where the formalists, according to Hegel, *disinterested* public administration (see above, section on formalistic identity), now private considerations form incentives for efficiency and effectiveness. Serving the public then is a matter of secondary importance, private interests form the real motivation: private incentives dominate the service of public interest. (Maesschalck, 2004) Professionalisation, as a development for the public good, thus includes private-aimed-instruments. We can distinguish two consequences of these private incentives: (1) personalisation, functions in the Weberian sense become *persons* with *personal stakes*, and (2) privatisation, personal stakes become *money-driven*.

In this case, there is no contemplation on public interest in administrative organisations. In terms of politics – administration this means that politicians determine the targets. Administration in this arrangement is nothing more than an executive organisation. “Politicians are there to set the goals but then get out of the way.” (Stoker, 2005) Serving the public interest in this identity means serving the political will *to the letter*. Professional latitude consists of ‘policy making’ on how to attain the political targets, i.e. procedural considerations.

Two identities in keywords

	Formalistic	Flexible
Payment mechanism	Fixed salary	Payment per action
Public interest approach	Common good, unitary conceptions	Private approach
Politics – administration perception	To the spirit	To the letter

Note that the two identities show overlap. One might argue that the formalistic identity is also flexible, referring to the professional latitude and the absence of targets. On the other hand, the flexible identity is formalistic because of its output standards. Maesschalck notes that one can also see NPM as a step further in the process of

bureaucratisation. (Maesschalck, 2004) The flexible approach thus contains a ‘new rigidity’.

6. Three Cases

In the foregoing we described two identities of public service, formalistic and flexible, which we linked to Weberian tradition and NPM. In this section we analyse three cases in the development of the Dutch police-organisation. This analysis shows how these identities ‘work’ in practice. The first case is the *schout*², a typical pre-Weberian case. This case is selected to show how this complicated political and administrative function almost *had* to result in a Weberian bureaucracy. The second case then is Weberian and the third case shows influences from the NPM philosophy.

6.1 Pre-Weberian period

The schout’s task was to enforce the law in the name of the ruler (e.g. a count, duke etc.). In this function he can be seen as commissioner of the police as well as public prosecutor and member of the city council. The schout was appointed by the ruler, however, some cities obtained the privilege to appoint their own schout. (Jacobs, 1986)

Schouten³ did not enjoy a formidable reputation. Their salary consisted of two thirds of the fines they received. Haarman (1933) states that the count was not able to completely check the income of the schouten, which led to his decision to farm out the position. This is a fine example of the profit in office mechanism. The schout probably had more interest for his income than he had for the administration of justice, for making deals with offenders was very common at that time. On top of this came the rule that the schout only could be impeached because of misconduct *after* he had recovered the costs of his function. (i.e. his ‘investment’) (Haarman, 1933)

The function of schout seems to be a *private* public function. A good example of this personal and money-driven behaviour is the following example: (derived from Haarman, 1933: 12 [transl. JvB])

² We use the word schout, because we are not convinced of a good English translation

³ Plural of ‘schout’

Money obviously was the only goal they [the schouten] would pursue. [...] The ancient right of the ruler over the belongings of someone who committed suicide transferred to the schout, for he rented the function of the ruler. The schout prohibited to get a drowning or drowned person out of the water without him or one of his servers being present. Feared for being punished, no one tried to rescue a drowning person, which was exactly what the schout wanted. He then assumed that the victim committed suicide. Later the prohibition was changed, one then was allowed to pull someone out but the feet still had to hang in the water.

This example makes perfectly clear which interests were more important for this schout. However, it speaks for the schout that he acted in a very weak institutional setting, one can call this flexible. An altruistic character would not survive the function of schout for the simple reason that he would have a hard time earning enough money.⁴

6.2 Weberian period

In the twentieth century the function of the police was much more standardised and restricted. Consequently, tasks and competencies were clear. The director of the force, in casu the mayor, could submit requests to the police, later this relation was formalised. In this relation, the mayor gives account for the execution of the police matter. (Haarman, 1933) To speak in terms of Waldo: politics (mayor) and administration (police force, commissioner) are interrelated. Because of political pressure on a number of issues, the commissioner has to decide on priorities. His decisions are based on a consideration of priorities related to the common good and unitary conceptions. These decisions are part of the professional latitude inherent to the public manager's job. (Boin et al., 2003)

The position of civil servants, in casu policemen, was institutionalised by means of the *Ambtenarenwet* (Civil Servants Act). This act provided appointments of commissioners and sub-commissioners by a Royal decree, and the obligation to take an oath as part of the appointment (taking an oath was obligatory for all civil servants). In contrast with the case of the schout, everyone was allowed to apply for police functions, selections had to be made based on merit. Two aspects of professionalisation can be observed in this case. Firstly, in the first half of the twentieth century an educational program for

⁴ Note that some schouten 'exaggerated' their effort to survive

policemen was introduced. Constables were encouraged to attend this training.⁵ Secondly, a fixed salary system was introduced and acceptance of tips, gratuities or other donations from private organisations or private individuals was prohibited.

This case clearly shows a formalistic identity of the police organisation in the first half of the twentieth century. Appointments are based on merit, functions and relations are formalised and salary is fixed and linked to the function.

6.3 Post-Weberian period

In the eighties of the twentieth century the organisation of the Dutch police force was reorganised. Of course aspects like education and skills (as discussed in the professionalisation section) were already institutionalised. Part of this reorganisation was the introduction of 26 'regiokorpsen' (forces attached to regions). Each force was given its own commissioner. The ministry of Home Affairs emphasized this reorganisation would result in a clear relation between politics and administration wherein the police force could not become an independent division. (Boin et al., 2003)

Introduction of contracts with performance agreements is the latest development in the relation between politics (ministry and mayor) and administration (commissioner and force). Since the ministry of Home Affairs already concluded performance contracts with the 'korpsbeheerder' (director of the force, i.e. the mayor), now the director of the force has reason to do the same with the commissioner. After all, the commissioner is responsible for the performance of the force. As mentioned in the introduction, Pier Eringa, commissioner of the Flevoland police force, is Holland's first commissioner with a performance contract. Good performance will result in a bonus, poor performance leads to his dismissal.

M-Magazine (November 2003) published a report on how the Utrecht police force deals with targets derived from their operation schedule. This case is comparable with performance contracts, except the fact that this operation schedule does not have the status of an agreement between the force and the ministry. In contrast with the statements of Eringa (we do not only swing into action to score) the police force of

⁵ By means of gratification

Utrecht works with a so called 'shopping list' of offences they have to 'deliver' to the public prosecutor. The article shows that many police officers find it very hard to work according to these figures, instead of their own expertise. The result is a mix of expertise and planning and control, in practice a conflict between formalistic and flexible identities of public service.

Eringa (Flevoland's commissioner) claims that his contract is of no influence on his priorities, he even thinks that police officers must be 'visible on the street' for crime prevention (NRC Handelsblad, 10-11-2004, p.6), which does not directly lead to measurable results.

This post Weberian case shows a flexible identity of public service. Performance targets and agreements determine the execution of the police matter. The Utrecht case is a fine example of how two identities clash. This case also shows the paradoxical new rigidity of the flexible approach: *formalised* output of the police force.

7. Conclusion

This paper presented two identities of public service, which were showed by means of three cases. In these cases professionalisation of the financial aspect of the police force was central. In the first case the profit in office mechanism was at stake. The second case showed a fixed salary mechanism and in the third case performance related pay was introduced.

Several processes concur with this payment development. The schout case showed a clear flexible identity, where the Weberian case demonstrated an overall formalistic identity. In the last case the identity is more flexible, but new rigidities point at formalistic influences, which caused clashes in the implementation. Shifting identities also caused shifting of interest considerations. The schout acted out of self-interest in most cases, the disinterested weberian policeman served the public interest and in post-weberian times private interest is reintroduced in police matters, although formalistic relics can be observed. In terms of the relation between politics and administration we can say that the weberian era cleared the relation, after all the schout incorporated both fields, and that the post-weberian case showed a more hierarchical relation between the

two. The distinction between stating and executing the will is more clear in the new flexible identity.

All this brings us to a closer understanding of what is happening in the two examples mentioned in the introduction of this paper. We already stated that Eringa's words might well be just rhetoric. This fits perfectly in the entrepreneurial spirit, where the manager almost literally has to sell his performance to the public. The Paris example shows the consequences of institutionalising private interest considerations by means of a performance contract. A flexible identity of public service is introduced in a formalistic identity, a clash between private and public interests is a logical consequence. Hegel's statement about how to attain a disinterested organisation still seems to apply.

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