

The Gap between Decision and Implementation

Decision making, Delegation and Compliance
in Governmental and Organizational Settings

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in Governmental and Organizational Settings

De Kloof tussen Besluit en Implementatie

Besluitvorming, Delegatie en Compliance
binnen Overheid en Organisaties

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Chapter 1 –

General introduction

1.1 Introduction

Everyday many of decisions are made within organizations. Yet, implementing these decisions is often complicated. Moreover, half of the decisions in organizations turn out to be ineffective and this is mostly due to incorrect implementation (Nutt, 1999). Within the governmental arena, the implementation of decisions is also complex. There are many examples of national governments making new policies (e.g. integration policy, smoking policy). However, many of these policies are not implemented in compliance with the prescription.

Although noncompliant implementation may sometimes result in improving or correcting the decision, decision makers often strive for a high level of compliant implementation. The following quote by a director of a large private sector organization illustrates the desire for compliant implementation of a decision: “To ensure consistency throughout the organization, it is crucial that everybody sticks to the decision”.

To attain more grip on the implementation of decisions, it is crucial to comprehend how the decision making and implementation process influence compliant implementation. In this dissertation, we investigate the process of decision making and implementation and examine how different features of this process affect compliant implementation. In doing so, we question differences in compliant implementation between decisions and between implementers: Why are some decisions implemented more in compliance than other decisions? And why do some implementers comply better with decisions than others? We analyze the implementation of governmental decisions by public organizations and the implementation of organizational decisions by employees within public and private sector organizations. We start this dissertation with two hypothetical examples that illustrate the complex process from decision making to implementation.

Example A. Improving the quality policy in a private company

At a partner meeting of a large multinational organization held in 2009, the president informed the partners that, in the light of the financial crisis, it is crucial to improve the quality of service to clients by adjusting the company’s quality policy. At this meeting, the partners discussed possibilities to improve the quality policy. Due to the scope of the policy and the diverse points of view of the partners, designing a realistic quality policy is complex. After a few meetings, the president and partners decided on a new quality policy, which encompasses three aspects: (i) employees should improve their service skills through training and coaching, (ii) employees should design a project planning at the start of the project, and (iii) client contacts should be better structured.

The next step was to hand over the implementation of the new quality policy to the employees. However, because most of the employees were quite satisfied with the old quality policy, there was a threat of noncompliance. To increase the overall quality of service to its clients and to ensure uniformity among the service standards of the organization, the president aimed at full compliance with the new quality policy among employees. To ensure compliance, the president exerted several means for controlling implementation. Specifically, the new policy set clear tasks and responsibilities, leaving little room for employee interpretation. Each aspect of the quality policy was described in detail, with strict and clear guidelines for implementation. In addition, the president and partners controlled the employees closely by monitoring implementation and organizing feedback meetings with each employee.

Subsequently, the employees implemented the new quality policy. Some employees complied to a large extent with the rules of the new quality policy, whereas others hardly complied. Differences in compliance also existed between the three components of the quality policy (see i, ii and iii above). The second component of the quality policy was largely implemented with compliance: many employees designed a project planning at its inception. To the contrary, the first and third components of the quality policy were hardly implemented in compliance: employees hardly worked on improving their service skills via training and coaching and the client contacts have not been better structured.

Why do some employees comply with the new quality policy, while others do not? Why is the second component of the quality policy implemented with more compliance than the other two components? Can this variation be related to employee satisfaction with the decision: do employees comply better with those components of the quality policy with which they are satisfied? To what extent can we explain this with characteristics of the decision making about each component of the quality policy: are some policy components more complex than others and does this affect compliant implementation? Or does a combination of these different features explain compliant implementation?

Example B. National smoking policy

In February 2008, the Dutch national government made a final decision about a new smoking policy - to prohibit smoking in all public hospitality buildings, including bars, restaurants and discotheques. The government enacted the new smoking policy in a reaction to a European Union agreement, to better protect employees and clients from the harmful effects of secondhand smoking. During decision making some political parties disagreed with the decision: the Liberal party (VVD) and the Freedom party (PVV). Though, since a majority of the political parties agreed with the decision and

since the decision is taken under qualified majority rule, it was easy to reach a decision. The decision was very important for the national government and they strived to realize full compliance, especially since the Dutch government had to meet the performance standards for smoking policies as prescribed by the EU.

Following the decision, the smoking policy had to be implemented. The hospitality industry had to make sure that its properties were smoke free by July 2008. Yet, many of the bar and discotheque owners did not agree with the new policy rules, as they feared that their profits would decline. To ensure that the owners of public hospitality buildings complied with the new smoking policy, the national government controlled the implementation strictly and a fine of 300 Euros was imposed if an establishment were not smoke free.

In practice, some bars, restaurants and discotheques are still not smoke free. Why do some bars, restaurants and discotheques comply with the smoking policy rules, while others do not? To what extent can we explain this, among others, by the preferences of the hospitality industry: do implementers comply better with policies when they agree with the policy? To what extent can this be explained by the level of control: would more frequent controls increase the level of implementer compliance with the policy? Do we also need to incorporate features of the decision making about the new policy; for example, if the decision is very important for national government, will there be more compliance with the policy? Or is it the combination of features that affects compliant implementation?


1.2 From Decision Making to Implementation

The two previous examples illustrate that the process from decision making to the actual implementation of the decision is complex and can be affected by various factors. Moreover, the examples show how similar processes occur within organizations and in government: decision makers reach a decision and the implementation of the decision is delegated to employees or organizations who implement the decision with a certain level of compliance. The examples illustrate that similar questions emerge when analyzing the implementation of decisions in organizational and governmental settings. Yet, there are also differences between the two settings. For example, the implementation of governmental decisions is often delegated to external organizations, whereas the implementation of organizational decisions is often delegated to employees within the organization.

To understand what factors affect implementer compliance with decisions and to analyze whether similar processes are visible in both settings, we divide the process from decision making to implementation into three different stages: decision making, delegation and implementation. Figure 1.1 is a schematic representation of these

different stages (cf. Lasswell, 1951; Rosenbaum, 1991). Figure 1.1 is a theoretical simplification, which should be taken as a systematic approach to capture the complexity of the process. In reality, some stage may be repeated or skipped (Nakamura, 1987) and the implementation of one decision often interacts with the implementation of others (cf. Sabatier, 2007:7). Throughout this dissertation, we have included various conditions of decision making, delegation and implementation to address this complexity. Furthermore, although the stages are represented here as distinct stages, we take into account the interplay between the stages in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.

Figure 1.1 From decision making to implementation: three stages



During the first stage, decision makers discuss the alternatives to addressing a problem. In organizations, decisions may be made by the board of directors, as well as stakeholders or managers. In government settings, decisions are made by the national or local government and sometimes public organizations are also involved in decision making. In both government and organizations, the rules for making decisions may differ: some must be unanimous, whereas other decisions can be made by a (qualified) majority rule. The outcome of the process is the decision, a prescription for how the problem will be addressed. For instance, in Example A, the decision to improve the quality policy prescribes the rules and guidelines of the new quality policy.

The second stage in the “decision making to implementation” process is the delegation stage. Decision makers often delegate the implementation of decisions to employees within organizations (organizational decisions) or to organizations (governmental decisions). The logic behind delegation is that the implementer often has specific competences, skills, information, or simply the time that a decision maker may lack. In this stage, decision makers delegate certain levels of authority for implementation that are regulated by ex ante and ex post controls. An implementer can be controlled ex ante, when the decision makers strictly describe the guidelines, roles and responsibilities for implementation. An implementer can also be controlled during or after the implementation process via ex post controls. Decision makers can control implementers ex post by monitoring and sanctioning the implementers’ actions. In

Example B, the owners of public hospitality buildings are controlled ex post by imposing a fine of 300 Euros on places that are not smoke free.

Stage three is the implementation stage. Broadly defined, implementation refers to converting a decision into concrete actions. Hill and Hupe (2002) refer to implementation as accomplishing, carrying out, fulfilling, producing or completing a decision. The decision is implemented with a certain level of compliance which can range from implementing a decision completely in conformity with the decision (full compliance) to implementing a decision totally different than prescribed (noncompliance).

In this dissertation, we aim to give insight in explanations for the level of compliant implementation by focusing on the interplay between the decision making, delegation and implementation stage. Furthermore, we aim to gather insight in the similarities between explanations for compliant implementation in governmental and in organizational settings. We study to what extent organizations comply with governmental decisions (organizational level) and to what extent employees comply with organizational decisions (employee level). We can grasp the main aim of this dissertation in the following research question:

To what extent do features of the decision making, delegation and implementation stage affect (1) organizational compliance with governmental decisions and (2) employee compliance with decisions within organizations?

1.3 Literature on (Compliant) Implementation

1.3.1 Implementation of governmental decisions

The implementation of governmental decisions has been intensively studied since the 1970s (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; Hargrove, 1975). We build on two strands of literature to investigate how features of the decision making, delegation and implementation stages affect organizational compliance with governmental decisions: the delegation literature and the implementation literature. The delegation literature explains implementation patterns while focusing on the decision making and the delegation stages. In particular, the delegation literature provides insight in how decision making features affect delegation and, thereby, indirectly affect compliant implementation. The implementation literature concentrates on the delegation and implementation stages and provides insight into the effects of delegation and implementation features on compliant implementation.

Delegation literature

Delegation models distinguish between two main features of the decision making stage that affect the delegation stage and thus indirectly affect implementer compliance with the decision: political disagreement and decision complexity (e.g. Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; Huber & Shipan, 2002; McCubbins et al., 1989; Weingast & Moran, 1983).

In particular, delegation models show that political disagreement during decision making has consequences for the delegation of authority to implementers. Political disagreement refers to the diverging preferences of decision makers about the proper course of action (the decision). For instance, in Example B, political disagreement exists between the coalition parties on the one side, and the Liberal and the Freedom parties on the other about the smoking policy. Furthermore, Example B shows a specific type of disagreement, a polarized distribution, whereby two opposing groups of parties are formed that have a high level of disagreement between the groups of parties and high consensus within each group of parties. Delegation models show that disagreement among decision makers can affect the delegation stage with respect to the level of authority delegated to implementers (e.g. Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; Huber & Shipan, 2002; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, 1989; Weingast & Moran, 1983). Yet, the direction of this effect is unclear. Some delegation models predict a positive effect of political disagreement on the level of authority delegated to implementers (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996, 1999; Ferejohn & Shipan, 1990; Torenvlied, 2000), whereas others predict a negative effect (Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004; Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992; May 2003).

Delegation models that predict a positive effect of political disagreement on the authority delegated to implementers assume that political disagreement increases the likelihood of compromise, resulting in lower levels of ex ante controls and hence in higher levels of authority delegated. In particular, formulating a strict compromise policy is costly and time intensive. Consequently, decision makers have stronger incentives to reduce transaction costs by agreeing on a compromise policy that displays low levels of ex ante control and thereby delegates high levels of authority to implementers (Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004; Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992; Hill & Hupe, 2002; May 1993, 2003; McCarthy, 2007; Thomson & Torenvlied, 2010).

However, other delegation models predict a negative effect of political disagreement on the authority delegated to implementers. These models assume that political disagreement makes it more likely that the preferences of implementers differ from the decision. These diverging preferences of the implementers increase the likelihood of noncompliance, as an implementer is likely to implement a decision in accordance with his or her own preference. Due to this threat of noncompliance,

decision makers will delegate less authority under political disagreement (Bawn, 1997; Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004; Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; McCubbins et al., 1989).

In addition, the classic work of McCubbins et al. (1989) states that when decision makers have conflicting preferences, implementers are faced with multiple decision makers who prefer different decisions. As a result, some decision makers may favor noncompliance, while others disapprove of it. This results in less effective ex post controls. In addition, since the ex post controls are less effective, decision makers who favor the decision will have a strong incentive to control the implementation ex ante.

Furthermore, delegation models have shown that decision complexity affects the delegation of decisions. Decisions can vary in complexity for a number of reasons such as the scope or the technical aspects of the decision. For example, in Example A the design of the quality policy in the organization was complex due to the scope of the policy. The quality policy covers the work of all employees within the organization and is designed to be applicable for a range of situations and tasks. Delegation models assume that decision complexity negatively affects ex ante controls, since decision complexity increases uncertainty about which decision will best achieve the decision makers' objectives (e.g. Holmstrom, 1979, 1980; Waterman & Meier, 1998). That is, decision makers may know what they want to achieve, but may not know what decisions to make in order to achieve this outcome. Consequently, it is difficult and thereby time and cost intensive to define a strict decision. Hence, decision complexity is likely to result in lower levels of ex ante controls (Mastenbroek, 2006).

Implementation literature

The implementation literature provides insight into the link between the delegation and implementation stages (Hill & Hupe, 2002). Implementation scholars investigate the link between delegation and implementation in two directions: top-down and bottom-up.

In the top-down approach, scholars study the effects of features of the delegation stage on the implementation stage and, in particular, on implementer compliance with decisions. Implementation scholars show that higher levels of ex ante controls increase the level of implementer compliance with the decision (e.g. Chun & Rainey, 2010; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). In particular, when the rules for the methods and procedures used for the operation of the decision are not specified, the implementer has more discretionary authority over how to implement the decision and may use this discretion for undesired interpretation (Chun & Rainey, 2005; Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; Huber & Shipan, 2002; May, 2003; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). When ex ante controls are strict, implementers have less room for

interpretation and, hence, are more likely to comply with a decision (Lazin, 1973; Levin, 1980; Lipsky, 1971).

In addition, implementation scholars show that ex post controls are effective instruments for realizing compliance (Bawn, 1997; Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992; McCubbins et al., 1987, 1989; Miller & Friesen, 1983). Ex post controls increase the threat of the detection and sanctioning of noncompliant implementation. This threat of sanctioning makes it more likely that implementers will comply with decisions (Brehm & Gates, 1997; Torenvlied, 2000).

Implementation scholars who apply a bottom-up approach aim to gain insight into how the different features of implementers affect implementation. One of the key factors of their study is policy conflict. Policy conflict refers to the difference between the most preferred decision of an implementer and the decision the implementer has to implement (Matland, 1995). An implementer's level of policy conflict with a particular decision may affect his or her willingness to implement this decision in compliance with the decision (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992). Implementation scholars assume that implementers aim to realize a decision implementation as close as possible to their own preference. Hence, when an implementer disagrees with the decision (when policy conflict is high), the implementation will likely be less in compliance with this decision (cf. Berry, 1997; Elmore, 1980; May, 2003; O'Toole, 2000; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975).

Implementation studies from a bottom-up approach, also, show that the salience implementers attach to the implementation of the policy affects compliant implementation (e.g. Torenvlied, 2000). The salience of a decision refers to the importance of a decision and defines the distribution of attention by actors to the different aspects of decisions (Noordegraaf, 2000). When implementers rate the decision as more important, they will dedicate more attention and time to its implementation, which will likely result in more compliance with the decision (Versluis, 2007:13).¹

1.3.2 Implementation of organizational decisions

We draw on insights from the management literature to address part number two of the research question: to what extent do features of the decision making, delegation and implementation stages affect employee compliance with decisions within organizations? Within the management literature, there are a variety of studies that

¹ In addition to decision salience, scholars have identified another type of salience, namely, position salience (e.g. Stokman, 2005; Van Houten, 2008). Position salience defines to what extent the implementer attaches high salience to implementing his or her preference.

investigate organizational compliance with governmental regulations, such as organizational compliance with environmental decisions (e.g. Potoski & Prakash, 2005; Segerson, 1985), healthcare mandates (Snell, 2001) and women diversity guidelines (Salancik, 1979). The study of compliance within organizations is less well developed. There are some studies on change management that explain employee compliance with organizational change (Anderson & Johnson, 2005; Daley & Geyer, 1994; Meyer et al., 2007). Strategic management scholars have investigated the extent to which the upper-level management of an organization complies with strategic decisions (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993). The best known of these studies is one by Kim and Mauborgne (1993), who looked at the compliance of top management with strategic decisions made by the board of directors. In addition, Anderson and Johnson (2005) studied the compliance of supervisors in public sector organizations and Hickson et al. (2003) wrote a case study based on their investigation of how to best manage implementation within organizations.

These studies demonstrate that features of the implementation stage affect compliant implementation. In particular, Kim and Mauborgne (1993) and Hickson et al. (2003) show that the satisfaction of top management of subunits with the decision taken by the head office positively affects their compliance with strategic decisions. Decision satisfaction refers to the extent to which an employee is content with a decision. Scholars expect that when employees are satisfied with a decision, they are more likely to adjust their implementing behavior in favor of the organization (Hickson et al., 2003). Hence, when employees are more satisfied with the decision, they may be more inclined to comply with it (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993).

Furthermore, the case study by Hickson et al. (2003) shows that the priority employees attach to the decision implementation affects compliant implementation. The priority reflects the importance of the implementation of the decision for the employee. When an employee rates a decision as highly important, he or she will more likely invest time and energy in its implementation, resulting in more compliance with the policy (Hickson et al., 2003:1812).

Management scholars have also shown that procedural justice affects employee (e.g. top management and supervisors) compliance with decisions within the organization (Anderson & Johnson, 2005; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993). Procedural justice refers to the fairness of the procedures and dynamics of decision making (e.g. Lind & Tyler, 1988). Procedural justice increases employee compliance because it increases trust in decision makers (Anderson & Johnson, 2005; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993). When employees trust the decision makers (e.g. the board of directors), they are more likely to believe that the decision makers chose the best alternative. This confidence motivates employees to accept the decision and to comply with the decision (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993).

In addition, management scholars have demonstrated that commitment positively affects employee compliance (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993). Commitment refers to the loyalty and bond that the employee has with the organization. One of the explanations for this positive effect is based on social exchange theory. Social exchange theory assumes that people seek to reciprocate those who benefit them (e.g. Blau, 1964). When employees are more committed to an organization, they believe that the organization benefits them. When employees perceive the organization as beneficial, they are more likely to behave in a reciprocate manner and thereby comply with decisions (cf. Kim & Mauborgne, 1993).

1.3.3 Critiques and shortcomings

Delegation literature

The delegation literature has met with three main critiques. The first critique contends that, although delegation models assume that the level of authority delegated to implementers affects the implementation of the decision, there are few empirical delegation studies that test this assumption (Meier & O'Toole, 2006).

A second critique is that delegation models assume that implementers disagree with the decision, without empirically testing whether or not they really do (cf. O'Toole, 2000). Indeed, most delegation models do not include a measure of policy conflict in their empirical tests of the theoretical models. Though, more recent studies, especially those on the delegation to EU member states, do take into account preferences of member states in their explanation of delegation patterns (Franchino, 2007; Steunenbergh, 2006; Thomson & Torenvlied, 2011; Zhelyazkova & Torenvlied, 2009).

A third critique concerns the contradictory theoretical predictions made by different delegation models. Delegation models make contrasting predictions on the effect of political disagreement on the amount of authority delegated by the use of ex ante controls (e.g. Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004; Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996, 1999). Some political scholars have pointed to the effect of the decision making and implementation conditions to explain theoretical and empirical contradictory findings, such as the political system (e.g. multi-party system or two-party system) (Huber & Shipan, 2002). Yet, there is scant evidence on exactly which conditions influence the size and direction of the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls. For instance, in Example B some parties disagreed with the decision to prohibit smoking in bars, cafes and restaurants. Which conditions affect whether this political disagreement affects delegation of authority? Is it important to define the political system, namely a multiparty system and the role of each political party (e.g. coalition partner or

opposition)? And does the fact that the smoking policy was important for the decision makers influence the effect of political disagreement on delegation?

Implementation literature

The implementation literature has met with two main critiques. The first critique emphasizes that implementation scholars focus mainly on the delegation and implementation stages in their explanation of compliant implementation (e.g. Matland, 1995), but fail to consider the significance of actions taken earlier in the implementation process. There are many implementation barriers in the initial stages of the implementation process, e.g. during decision making (Winter, 1985). In addition, Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) argue that studies on compliant implementation that assume a decision is a given and do not consider how this decision was made, omit vital information in order to be able to offer explanations for compliant implementation.

The second critique of the implementation literature concerns the limited number of large scale empirical studies. For instance, Meier (1999:5-6) characterizes current implementation literature as “47 variables that completely explain 5 case studies”. Moreover, implementation observations are often dependent: one policy is implemented by several implementers and one implementer implements several policies. New techniques for data analysis, such as hierarchical linear modeling, have a potential for advancing implementation research (O’Toole, 2000). However, the multi-centered and multi-actor contexts, typical of the implementation processes, as well as the limited data available are obstacles for the application of such techniques (O’Toole, 2000: 271).

Management literature

Two main critiques emerge in the management literature on compliant implementation. The first critique addresses the limited number of studies on employee compliance with decisions within organizations. Management studies have shown that employee compliance is vital in order to realize organizational performance (Bartlett & Ghosha, 1989; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Klein & Ralls, 1995; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). However, management scholars investigating compliant implementation focus mainly on organizational compliance with external regulations. Studies on employee compliance with decisions within organizations are scarce. Indeed, studies within organizations are shaped mainly around the decision making stage (cf. Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992), or around the effects of decisions (e.g. Becker & Gerhart, 1996), whereby the implementation stage is included, only, to offer an explanation for the effectiveness of decisions within organizations (cf. Douglas & Judge, 2001; Nutt,

1990). Although management scholars demonstrate that employee compliance with a decision positively affects the effectiveness of this decision (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Klein & Ralls, 1995; Prahalad & Doz, 1987), the explanations for employee compliance with decisions within organizations is largely overlooked as compared to those in governmental settings.

The second critique of the management literature is that it focuses exclusively on features of the implementation stage to explain compliant implementation. Management scholars, thereby, fail to consider the significance of actions taken earlier in the implementation process, namely during the decision making and delegation stages. Studies of the implementation of governmental decisions emphasize that features of the decision making and delegation stages influence organizational compliance with decisions (e.g. Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980). Management studies acknowledge similarities between the governmental settings and organizations (e.g. Mintzberg, 2002; Schein, 1977) and study the politics within organizations (e.g. Ferris, Russ & Fandt, 1989). It seems, therefore, reasonable to expect that decision making and delegation features also affect compliant implementation of decisions in organizational settings.

1.4 The Present Study

In this dissertation, we address some of the important critiques of previous studies in the delegation, implementation and management literature. Furthermore, we combine the strengths of each of these strands of literature in order to gain more insight into the overall process and investigate how the interplay between decision making, delegation and implementation characteristics affect compliant implementation.

1.4.1 Combining explanations


The delegation, implementation and management literature have studied the implementation processes from different angles. Each strand of literature shows several features that affect the process of decision making to organizational compliance (delegation and implementation literature) and employee compliance (management literature) with decisions. In Figure 1.2, we present an overview of the features that have been indicated by delegation, implementation and management scholars to affect compliant implementation.

For the decision making stage, we distinguish (based on the delegation literature) two features that affect the level of compliant implementation, namely, the level of political disagreement and the decision complexity. In addition, based on the delegation and implementation literature, we differentiate between two features

apparent in the delegation stage that affect compliant implementation: ex ante and ex post controls. Finally, based on the delegation, implementation and management literature, we identify several features from the implementation stage that affect compliant implementation: decision satisfaction/policy conflict, priority/salience, procedural justice and commitment.

Two features emerge from both the implementation and management literature that affect compliant implementation of decisions. Specifically, decision satisfaction (in the management literature) and policy conflict between organizations and the decision (in the implementation literature) affect compliant implementation. Policy conflict can thereby be seen as an inverse indicator of the level of decision satisfaction as applied in management studies. Furthermore, the priority employees attach to a decision (management literature) is comparable to the salience implementers attach to a decision (implementation literature).

Figure 1.2 Features of decision making, delegation and implementation



1.4.2 Outline of the dissertation

This dissertation is based on five studies that comprise chapters 2 to 6. Because these chapters are written as independent articles, some overlap could not be avoided. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 analyze governmental decision making, delegation and implementation and focus on explanatory variables of the decision making, delegation and implementation stages. Chapters 5 and 6 study the compliant implementation of decisions within organizations. Chapter 5 investigates broadly how decision making, delegation and implementation features affect compliant implementation with decisions within various organizations. Chapter 6 gives specific insight into compliant implementation, focusing on the delegation and implementation of one policy in one organization at two moments in time.

Chapter 2 studies the effect that political disagreement among decisive decision makers has on compliant implementation in a multiparty system. We focus on the interaction between the decision making and implementation stages. Specifically, we examine the interaction effect of political disagreement and policy conflict on compliant implementation. We then test our hypotheses for different sets of decision makers in local decision making and implementation in the Netherlands.

Chapter 3 looks at the effects of decision making on delegated authority. In particular, we focus on the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls and we identify which conditions trigger the mechanisms driving the effect of political disagreement on the level of ex ante control. Furthermore, we empirically explore the mechanisms for decision making and delegation in the UK.

Chapter 4 broadly explores a special type of political disagreement, namely, polarization among politicians and polarization within society and looks closely at the conditions that drive polarization. In particular, we study how the salience of a policy and policy preferences of voters and elites affect polarization trends in both politics and society.

Chapter 5 combines insights from delegation models, implementation and management literature to explain compliant implementation in organizations. We analyze how features of the decision making, delegation and implementation stages (see Figure 1.2) affect employee compliance with decisions within different organizations. We then test our theoretical framework on a dataset on decision making, delegation and implementation in organizations (DID2010).

Chapter 6 focuses on employee compliance and looks at the delegation and implementation of one policy in one organization at two moments in time. We investigate the implementation of a quality management policy in a private sector organization and examine how changes in ex ante controls, ex post controls and priority affect employee compliance over time. We then test our hypotheses on a longitudinal dataset on delegation and implementation (DIDL2010).

This dissertation closes with Chapter 7, which discusses the main conclusions that can be drawn from the studies, the contributions of this dissertation and suggestions and recommendations for future research.

1.4.3 Theoretical contributions

This dissertation contributes to the theoretical literature on compliant implementation in two ways. First, we explain compliant implementation with the interplay between decision making, delegation and implementation features. Second, we address contradictory findings in the literature by taking into account the decision making and

implementation context when studying the effect of decision making, delegation and implementation features on compliant implementation.

Bridging the delegation, implementation and management literature

We explain compliant implementation by combining insights from the delegation, implementation and management literature. First, we investigate how the interdependencies between decision making, delegation and implementation features affect compliant implementation of governmental decisions (Chapters 2 to 4). We contribute to the quest of implementation scholars to consider the significance of actions taken earlier in the implementation process in explanations of compliant implementation. Moreover, we investigate the effect of decision making features on delegation and implementation and empirically measure policy conflict between the organization and the decision and thereby respond to critiques on delegation scholars.

In addition, we investigate whether we can explain employee compliance with a combination of features of the decision making stage, the delegation stage and the implementation stage (Chapters 5 and 6). By including features of the decision making and delegation stage in the explanation of compliant implementation, we respond to the critique on the management literature of a too narrow focus on the implementation stage in explaining employee compliance.

Distinguishing conditions of decision making and implementation

We explain contradictory findings in the literature by specifying the decision making and implementation context. First, in Chapter 2 we specify disagreement among decision makers in conjunction with the decision making context. The decision making context determines which decision makers are decisive. In the U.S., decisive decision makers are formed by parties that control the White House and the United States Congress. In a multiparty democracy, like the Netherlands, these decisive decision makers are the parties that form the majority of seats (either the ruling coalition or a combination of governing parties and opposition parties). For instance, in Example B on smoking policy, the decision rule was a simple majority rule; more than 50 percent of the decision makers agree to adapt the smoking policy. The decisive decision makers are the ones who formed the majority.

In addition, we study the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls while taking into account the context of decision making and delegation (Chapter 3). We compare the decision making and delegation context of the theoretical and empirical studies showing a negative effect of political disagreement on delegated authority, with the decision making and delegation context of the studies that demonstrate a positive effect. For instance, with regard to the decision rule applied. By

taking into account the decision making and delegation context, we can derive more plausible hypotheses on the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls.

Furthermore, we analyze the impact of the conditions of the decision making stage on political disagreement among decision makers (Chapter 4). We examine a specific type of disagreement: polarization. In particular, we compare polarization trends in politics and society with (a) trends in preferences of elites, (b) trends in preferences of partisans, and (c) the salience of a policy.

Finally, we take into account the organizational sector when explaining employee compliance. Scholars have demonstrated differences between public and private sector organizations (Chapter 5) (e.g. Meyer, 1982; Rainey, 2009). While public sector organizations are often characterized as soft, those in the private sector are known as tough with strict targets. Moreover, the emphasis on performance-based rewards is more prevalent in the private sector (Solomon, 1986). In addition, private sector employees face more intense competitive pressures (Boyne, 2002). We expect that these differences influence the effectiveness of ex post controls on employee compliance. When employees' rewards are based on performance, the consequences of noncompliance are more prevalent. Hence, because of the threat of consequences for their rewards, we predict ex post controls will have a more positive effect on employee compliance in private sector organizations than in public organizations.

1.4.4 Empirical and methodological approach

We test our theoretical predictions on compliant implementation on various datasets, using advanced statistical designs. First, we test our predictions on the effects of political disagreement on organizational compliance with governmental decisions (Chapter 2), on a pooled dataset containing information on decision making and implementation in the social policy domain for three Dutch local governments: Weststellingwerf, Groningen and Arnhem (Torenvlied, 2000). The dataset includes specific information about decision making features, as the data contains detailed information about the preferences and salience of all decision makers involved in decision making. This detailed information enables us to test our hypotheses about disagreement among the decisive set of decision makers. Furthermore, the dataset includes detailed information about the preferences of all the organizations involved with the implementation of the policies, enabling us to include a measure of policy conflict in our explanations of compliant implementation.

Second, we test our theoretical predictions about the conditional effect of political disagreement on the level of authority delegated via ex ante controls (Chapter 3), on a dataset that contains information on decision making and delegation of the local and regional economic development policy in the United Kingdom (Bennett &

Payne, 2000). The dataset contains precise information about the policy preferences of all actors involved in the negotiations. We complement the existing dataset with an additional data collection on the level of ex ante controls expressed in the policies.

Third, we use two existing data sources to explore how policy preferences of elites and partisans and the salience of a decision affect polarization in politics and society (Chapter 4). We focus on one specific policy, the ethnic integration policy. We use Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES, 1994-2006) to measure the salience of the ethnic integration policy and the preferences of Dutch voters on ethnic integration policy over time. Second, to define the positions of the political parties over time, we perform a content analysis of the party programs of all Dutch political parties between 1994 and 2006.

Fourth, in Chapters 5 and 6, we test our explanations for employee compliance within organizations using two novel datasets: the Decision, Delegation and Implementation Data 2010 (DID2010, Oosterwaal, Torenvlied, Buskens & Van der Lippe, 2010a) and the Delegation and Implementation Data Longitudinal 2010 (DIDL2010, Oosterwaal, Torenvlied, Buskens & Van der Lippe, 2010b). The DID2010 includes the characteristics of decision making, delegation and implementation of various decisions within five Dutch organizations. From this, we obtain information about a wide variety of decisions, including rules for teleworking, risk diagnosis procedures and training procedures for employees. We study effects of decision making characteristics for each of these decisions, as well as delegation and implementation characteristics and organizational and actor features. The DIDL2010 is a two wave study on compliance with a quality management policy in one large private sector organization. We examine the extent to which employees of the organization comply with different aspects of the quality policy. We investigate delegation and implementation characteristics at two moments in time.

The dataset on the implementation of governmental decisions and the datasets on the implementation of decisions within organizations facilitate the study of various decisions implemented by different implementers. Consequently, we are able to analyze how one organization/employee implements various decisions, as well as the variation among implementers' compliance with a single decision. We, thus, pursue a multi actor approach in implementation research advocated by delegation and implementation scholars (cf. Klein & Sorra, 1996; O'Toole, 2000).

Analysis of this type of data requires a statistical tool that controls for the clustering within both implementers and decisions. In particular, the datasets have a complex interdependency structure including two levels that are cross nested: decisions and implementers. Each implementation is nested in a specific decision/implementer combination. Furthermore, each decision is implemented by different implementers and each implementer is involved with the implementation of a mixture of decisions.

Thus, the implementation of a decision can be influenced both by the characteristics of the implementer and the decision or by the interaction of both. Studying this requires an analysis that accounts for variation in compliant implementation created by the crossing of two levels (decisions and implementers). By applying a cross-classified multilevel design, we control for these cross-nested dependencies. A cross-classified design, accommodates observations that are statistically dependent, simultaneously at different levels (decision and implementer), while preventing that we overestimate statistical confidence in the effects, which would occur if we treat observations as if they are independent (Fielding & Goldstein, 2006: 24; Snijders & Bosker, 1998: 155-65). By using such an approach, we improve on most existing studies, which hardly control for this nesting structure typical to implementation studies.

In Table 1.1, we provide an overview of the different chapters. Table 1.1 gives an outline of the stages, the explanatory variables, the outcome variable, the field of research and the type of decisions that apply to each chapter.

Table 1.1 Chapters of this dissertation

Chapter	Stages	Explanatory variables	Outcome variable	Field of research	Type of decisions
2	Decision making Implementation	Political disagreement Decision satisfaction	Organizational compliance with governmental decisions	Governmental decisions	Social renewal policies
3	Decision making Delegation	Political disagreement	Ex ante controls	Governmental decisions	Economic restructuring policies
4	Decision making	Decision salience Preferences of partisans Preferences of elites	Political disagreement	Governmental decisions	Integration policy
5	Decision making Delegation Implementation	Political disagreement Decision complexity Ex ante controls Ex post controls Decision satisfaction Priority Procedural justice Commitment	Employee compliance with decisions within organizations	Organizational decisions	A range of decisions, e.g. rules for teleworking, training procedures, digitalization of administration systems
6	Delegation Implementation	Ex ante controls Ex post controls Decision satisfaction Priority	Employee compliance with decisions within one organization	Organizational decisions	Quality policy

Chapter 2 –

Political disagreement and organizational compliance in governmental settings

This chapter is co-authored by René Torenvlied. A slightly different version is forthcoming in the *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* as ‘Compliant implementation: how disagreement among decisive decision makers reinforces the effect of policy conflict’. The paper received the Academy of Management conference award for the best paper in the division: Conflict Management in Context.

2.1 Introduction

In modern democratic systems of political decision making, many decisions are taken under political disagreement (e.g. Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999). Political disagreement refers to situations where decision makers hold diverging preferences about their most preferred decision alternative. Political disagreement often exists between different legislative institutions. For the United States, political disagreement is often conceptualized by divided government: situations in which the House and Senate each are dominated by a different party. Political disagreement can also exist between decision makers within a specific legislative institution. In Western-European parliamentary systems, political disagreement is often conceptualized by the level of disagreement among the different political parties in parliament about their most desired outcome of the decision making: their most preferred decision alternative.

Intuitively, it sounds quite plausible that political disagreement affects the implementation of decisions. Suppose, for example, that local politicians strongly disagree about the necessity of urban development programs in their community or city. The compromise decision ultimately reached by the different political parties must be implemented by local agencies, such as housing corporations or community organizations. Given that the local agencies have their own preferences for urban development, they might use the political controversy to advance their own most preferred alternative for urban renewal. Hence, the actual renewal efforts made by these local agencies could diverge from the original compromise decision adopted by the local political parties.

The present chapter focuses on a specific outcome of the implementation of decisions: the level of compliance. Compliance refers to the extent to which an implementer implements the decision in conformity with the decision. Implementation agencies may completely, or partly, refuse to take required actions and thereby implement the decision with a certain level of noncompliance.

Although it seems likely that political disagreement among decision makers reduces the extent to which implementers comply with decisions, there is no consensus in the scholarly literature about the size and direction of this effect. Effects of political disagreement on the behavior of implementation agencies have been studied, in the first place, in the delegation literature (e.g. McCubbins et al., 1989; Weingast & Moran, 1983). Scholars in this tradition predict that political disagreement affects implementer compliance indirectly through the effect of political disagreement on the strength of the ex ante and ex post controls (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; Huber & Shipan, 2002). Ex ante and ex post controls are modeled as intervening variables in the relation between political disagreement and implementer compliance (e.g. Bendor et al., 2001; Torenvlied, 2000).

The delegation literature does, however, not provide strong empirical support for its prediction that political disagreement affects implementer compliance. In particular, delegation models assume rather than empirically test effects of administrative procedures on implementer behavior (Evans et al., 1985; Meier & O'Toole, 2006; Waterman & Meier, 1998). As Meier and O'Toole (2006: 177) lucidly illustrate the problem: "Ironically, the modal test of political control over bureaucracy omits everything, or nearly everything, regarding the asserted problematic institution itself—bureaucracy." Moreover, the few empirical studies that do exist report no significant effect of political disagreement on the behavior of implementers (O'Toole, 2000; Torenvlied, 2000).

Effects of political disagreement on implementation have been studied, in the second place, by implementation scholars. In the implementation literature, two major and contrasting, perspectives on implementation have developed: the top-down perspective versus the bottom-up perspective (Barrett, 2004; Cho et al., 2005; Cline, 2000; DeLeon & DeLeon, 2002; Goggin et al., 1990; O'Toole, 2000; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). Following the top-down perspective, we would expect that characteristics of decision making exert considerable influence on the implementation of these decisions. Studies in the top-down tradition predict a strong negative effect of political disagreement on implementer compliance (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). The bottom-up perspective stresses that it is much more important to focus on characteristics of the implementers. Rather than implementing a single and coherent decision, implementers make themselves ongoing choices about the appropriate courses of action in specific contexts. Furthermore, studies in the bottom-up tradition move beyond the standard single-actor perspective and adapt a multi-actor approach to implementation (cf. O'Toole, 2000). Instead of taking decision and delegation features as an exclusive framework for the analysis of implementation, we should also take into account the preferences of multiple implementers if we wish to explain the compliance of implementers (Berman, 1978; Lipsky, 1980; May & Winter, 2009; Percival et al., 2009).

More recently, the top-down and bottom-up debates in the implementation literature have been resolved into a mutual recognition of the strength of each perspective (Barrett, 2004; Goggin et al., 1990; Matland, 1995; O'Toole, 2000). Aspects of political control in combination with the incorporation of preferences of multiple implementers into models of bureaucracy have become vital in any explanation of implementation (cf. Cho et al., 2005; Meier & O'Toole, 2006). For example, Koski and May (2006) show that in the implementation of voluntary regulatory programs both characteristics of the decision makers and implementers affect the course and outcomes of implementation. Such an approach fits well within a

third generation of implementation studies (DeLeon & DeLeon, 2002; Goggin et al., 1990).

The present chapter addresses the effect of political disagreement on implementer compliance incorporating insights from the delegation and implementation literature. We study political decision making and implementation in a multi party, parliamentary setting. We derive hypotheses about the effect of political disagreement among political parties in a multi party setting on implementer compliance. These hypotheses are tested on data collected in the local policy domain of social renewal, in three Dutch cities (each with a multi party local government).

We contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, we include three different conceptualizations of political disagreement in our study. Existing studies on multi party parliamentary systems typically focus on political disagreement among all political parties—the elected representatives in parliament (e.g. Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999; Huber & Shipan, 2002; Matland, 1995). However, a more realistic analysis should focus on political disagreement within a set of decisive political parties within the whole legislature (Martin & VanBerg, 2004). In multi party systems, decisions are often taken by different subsets of political parties. One subset of political parties is formed by the coalition parties in government. A second subset of political parties is formed by all political parties who support a decision. If the size of the latter subset of supportive political parties exceeds the majority criterion, a majority alternative exists. The present study systematically tests the size and direction of effects of the level of political disagreement in each of these two subsets of decisive political parties against the effect of political disagreement among all political parties.

In the second place, we integrate characteristics of both decision makers and implementers in our theoretical explanation and empirical test of compliance. We integrate the theoretical core of the delegation literature with one of the main variables in bottom-up studies of implementation: implementer preferences. The policy preferences of an implementer are crucial for explaining the level of implementer compliance (Berry, 1997; Elmore, 1980; May, 2003; O’Toole 2000; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). We introduce the concept of policy conflict between the implementer and the outcome of political decision making. Policy conflict is the difference between the most preferred policy alternative of an implementer and the decision the implementer has to implement (Matland, 1995).

The third contribution is the empirical and statistical test design. The present chapter examines the effects of political disagreement in three Dutch cities. We analyze the information contained by 131 implementations by various implementers, which is the implementation of 38 decisions taken by the local political parties in these three cities. Although a previous study on this dataset did not report significant effects of political disagreement on agency behavior (Torenvlied, 2000), the theoretical

integration of implementer characteristics and the re-specification of the subsets of decisive political parties, as well as the application of recent techniques for data analysis, have made it possible to better detect such effects.

Indeed, new techniques for data analysis—such as hierarchical linear modeling—have a potential for advancing implementation research (O’Toole, 2000). However, the multi-centered and multi-actor contexts—so typical to implementation processes—as well as the limited data available, often form obstacles for the application of such techniques (O’Toole, 2000: 271). The present study aims to overcome these obstacles by acknowledging that implementer compliance is the property of unique implementer-decision combinations: the level of compliance is clustered both within an implementer and within a decision. Thus, the level of compliance can be influenced simultaneously by the characteristics of the implementer, the decision, or by an interaction of these two. Such a particular clustering can statistically be analyzed using a cross-classified multi level design. A cross-classified design is appropriate for situations in which observations are statistically dependent at different levels simultaneously (here the decision and implementer level). The design avoids that we overestimate our statistical confidence in effects when—erroneously—assuming that observations are independent (Fielding & Goldstein, 2006, 24; Snijders & Bosker, 1999: 155-65). Although such situations often occur in the analysis of implementation (O’Toole, 2000), cross-classified statistical designs are scarcely applied in current implementation research (e.g. Brudney et al., 2005; Langbein & Felbinger, 2006).

2.2 Policy Conflict, Political Disagreement and Implementation

2.2.1 Policy conflict

Most analytical models of the relation between political decision making and implementation are based on some assumption(s) of principal-agent theory (e.g. Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999; Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992; Waterman & Meier, 1998). Principal-agent theory conceptualizes the process of implementation as a bilateral relation between principals and agents: the principals (political parties) avoid the transaction costs of monitoring and sanctioning the agent (implementer) by delegating the implementation of a decision to the agent (Waterman & Meier, 1998). An agent could implement the decision differently than prescribed, which results in some level of noncompliance.

A wide range of scholars have shown that the decision preferences of the implementer influence the level of compliance of an implementer (Berry, 1997; Elmore, 1980; May, 2003; O’Toole, 2000; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). To model the preferences of implementers, decisions are often conceived as one-dimensional

decision spaces—which span the status quo, the decision adopted by the decision makers and all other decision alternatives. The decision is the outcome of political decision making and represents the prescribed alternative the implementer is supposed to implement. However, implementers are assumed to hold a most preferred position themselves in the one-dimensional decision space; a position that reflects their most preferred decision alternative. An implementer can prefer to realize the decision or to preserve the status quo, or any other decision alternative.

We define the level of policy conflict as the distance between the most preferred decision alternative of the implementer and the decision adopted by the decision makers (Matland, 1995). Thus, policy conflict reflects the level of divergence between the decision and the decision alternative most preferred by an implementer. Because implementers implement various decisions and decisions are implemented by various implementers, the level of policy conflict varies across implementers and decisions. For example, a public housing corporation may strongly adhere to the decision to upgrade a particular urban neighborhood, but may strongly oppose the decision to grant much of the project to private investors.

The implementer's level of policy conflict with a particular decision is expected to affect the implementer's willingness to implement this decision—assuming that the instrumental goal of an implementer is to realize a decision alternative as close as possible to their most preferred decision alternative (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992; Lundin, 2007). We expect that the level of policy conflict negatively affects the level of compliance with this decision (cf. Berry, 1997; Elmore, 1980; May, 2003; O'Toole, 2000; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Hence, we arrive at the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2.1 The larger the policy conflict, the lower the compliance.

2.2.2 Political disagreement

Delegation models assume that implementers can be encouraged in their compliant behavior by decision makers who build in administrative procedures to control the implementation—such as political appointments, regulatory controls and monitoring by interest groups (Balla, 1999; Bendor et al., 2001; Waterman & Meier, 1998). The literature on political control distinguishes between ex ante and ex post procedures to (partly) control the behavior of implementers (e.g. Brehm & Gates, 1997; McCubbins et al., 1989; Moe, 1989).

Ex ante controls increase the likelihood of compliance through actions taken prior to the implementation. Ex ante controls are extensive when the description of a decision is clear and precisely described (Balla, 1999; Bawn, 1997; McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins et al., 1989; Torenvlied, 2000). For example, each component of the

decision is described in a detailed way, with a clear description of rules, roles and responsibilities. Ex ante procedures increase the likelihood of compliance. In particular, when the rules for the methods and procedures used for the operation of the decision are not specified, this gives the implementer room for interpretation and higher levels of discretionary authority over how to implement the decision (Chun & Rainey, 2005; Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; Huber & Shipan, 2002; May, 2003; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1983; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Implementers can use this freedom and opportunities to not comply with the decision. Accordingly, when ex ante controls are limited, implementers are more likely to not comply with the decision (e.g. Lipsky, 1980).

Once a decision is reached and while it is being implemented, decision makers have additional possibilities to increase compliance. These ex post controls consist of monitoring and control procedures (McCubbins, 1985). For example, decision makers can organize feedback meetings to discuss the process of the implementation. Furthermore, decision makers can monitor the implementation with the use of external audits. Ex post controls are expected to be effective instruments in realizing implementer compliance (Bawn, 1997; Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992; McCubbins et al., 1989; Miller & Friesen, 1983). Ex post controls increase compliance through the threat of the detection and sanctioning of noncompliance (Brehm & Gates, 1997; Torenvlied, 2000). This threat of sanctioning makes it more likely that implementers comply with the prescribed decision.

Yet, conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information make it very difficult for decision makers to address most decisions substantively before implementation (e.g. Ferejohn & Shipan, 1990; McCubbins et al., 1989). As a consequence, it is not possible to fully control the behavior of implementers using ex ante controls.² Moreover, political disagreement among political parties increases the costs of designing proper ex ante and ex post administrative procedures (Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992; Hill & Hupe, 2002). Scholars specify two mechanisms that explain how political disagreement increases these costs and indirectly affects the behavior of implementers.

The first mechanism describes the effects of political disagreement among political parties on the costs of ex ante controls. Political parties have to make compromises in order to reach a common decision when their preferences differ (i.e. under political disagreement). Defining a strict compromise decision is however costly and time-intensive. As a result, legislators reduce their transaction costs by agreeing on

² The present chapter does not partake in a normative discussion about whether procedures for control are needed for a successful implementation, or whether compliance is good or bad for policy effectiveness. Many scholars have pointed at the functional nature of noncompliance with formal policy goals when they adjust to the implementation environment (cf. Barrett, 2004). Thus, noncompliance is not necessarily bad for practice when implementers correct or work their way around erroneous assumptions in the causal policy theory (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984).

a decision that displays low levels of ex ante controls (e.g. Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004; Chun & Rainey, 2005; Hill & Hupe, 2002; Horn, 1995: 26; Winter, 2006). Implementers can use the low levels of ex ante controls associated with decisions reached under political disagreement to implement a decision closer to their own preferences (e.g. Bendor et al., 2001: 247; Chun & Rainey, 2005; Torenvlied, 2000). Early studies of Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) and Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) have already highlighted the importance of clear and consistent decisions and emphasized that a reduction of ex ante controls is likely to decrease the level of compliance by implementers. Later work by Chun and Rainey (2005) also shows that ambiguous goals leaving room for interpretation have negative consequences for the performance of implementers.

Political disagreement thus decreases the likelihood that implementers comply with the decision (e.g. Horn, 1995; Lohmann & O'Halloran, 1994). One would expect that, as the likelihood of compliance decreases, decision makers' incentives to ex post monitor and control implementers become stronger (Martin & VanBerg, 2004). Yet, the effectiveness of ex post controls tends to be lower under political disagreement, because some decision makers may tacitly or overtly agree with noncompliance—if this acquiesces to their own policy preference (McCubbins et al., 1989; Pollack, 1997). If a majority of decision makers prefers the noncompliance over the decision, this noncompliance would actually replace the decision (McCubbins et al., 1989).

In sum, as the potential for ex ante controls is limited due to political disagreement and the effectiveness of ex post procedures for control decreases because of political disagreement, opportunities increase for implementers to implement a decision closer to their own preference. Accordingly, we expect that when the preference of an implementer differs from the decision, this is likely to result in more noncompliance, when the level of political disagreement is higher.

We thus expect an interaction effect of political disagreement among political parties with policy conflict:

Hypothesis 2.2 The larger the political disagreement among political parties, the stronger the negative effect of policy conflict on compliance.

2.2.3 Sets of decisive decision makers

Most implementation studies typically reflect the structure of the U.S. policy-making system (cf. O'Toole, 2000). Consequently, political disagreement is often expressed as conflict in Congress, for example as the occurrence of divided government which captures disagreement between the House and Senate. For multi party systems, however, the concept of divided government is inadequate to capture political disagreement. Most parliamentary democracies are characterized by the existence of

multiple parties in the legislature. Among these parties within the legislator, a multi party governmental coalition consisting of the majority of seats in parliament is responsible for policy making. Also, non-governing parties in the legislature can be decisive during decision making, as all parties in the legislature vote for the decision under simple majority rule. These parties are especially important when the multi party government disagrees about the decision and cannot form the majority of seats needed to pass the decision. Thus, for each decision, a majority of political parties is responsible for substantive decision making, as well as for the creation of ex ante and ex-post controls. Therefore, we should focus on the majority of political parties, rather than on all legislators.

Several combinations of political parties could form a majority in (bi-cameral) institutions (Müller & Strøm, 2000; Tsebelis, 1995). Majority sets of political parties can be formed either on the basis of: (a) a formal institution—which exogenously defines a majority coalition of political parties—or (b) support for a decision alternative—which endogenously defines the existence of a majority of political parties supporting a specific decision.³ We refer to these majority coalitions as two specifications of the set of decisive political parties.

The first specification of the set of decisive political parties is based on the concept of “partisan veto-players” (Tsebelis, 1995: 302), which are those political parties who take part in the governmental coalition. Veto-players are defined as the individual or collective actors who, according to the formal institution, have to agree in order to reach a decision (Tsebelis, 2002: 2).⁴ Research has clearly demonstrated that for multi party governments in parliamentary systems the characteristics of the governmental coalition is a better predictor for political activity or political control than the characteristics of all political parties (Martin & VanBerg, 2004; Tsebelis, 2002).

We specify the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2.3 The larger the political disagreement among members of the government coalition, the stronger the negative effect of policy conflict on compliance.

The second specification of the set of decisive political parties departs from the decision alternatives. It establishes whether a unified, simple majority of political parties exists at the median voter position on the decision scale. If this is the case, no disagreement will exist among a simple majority of political parties, because they all share a common decision preference. In that case, a decision alternative exists—the majority alternative—that is supported by a (simple) unified majority of political

³ In this study, we do not focus on individual voting behavior, but at party positions. We do not take into account that some politicians may not support the vote of their own political party.

⁴ Veto-players not necessarily have veto-power over the decision making process.


parties. This unified majority could consist of political parties that are part of the ruling governmental coalition, but also of political parties who take part in the opposition, or a combination of both.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the concept of the majority alternative. The figure presents two hypothetical distributions of positions of political parties on a one-dimensional decision scale. Although disagreement between preferences of political parties is the same for both distributions (defined by the standard deviation of positions on the one-dimensional decision scale, which is 1.4), the shapes of the distributions are remarkably different. In distribution (a) the preferences of political parties are roughly normally distributed, without a clear majority supporting one of the alternatives. In distribution (b) the median voter position is occupied by a majority of political parties. For this distribution, a majority alternative exists: a subset of a majority of political parties who unanimously agrees about the most preferred alternative.

When a majority alternative exists, no compromise bargaining is needed. In addition, implementers will not be able to manipulate any other majority coalition if a majority coalition exists. As explained above, compromising reduces the level of ex ante controls. Thus, even though the level of disagreement among all legislators could be high, the two mechanisms that relate political disagreement negatively to compliance do not apply when a majority alternative exists. When, by contrast, a majority alternative is absent, compromise bargaining is needed and majority coalitions can be manipulated. We arrive at the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2.4 The negative effect of policy conflict on compliance is stronger when no majority alternative exists.

Figure 2.1 Distributions of preferences of decision makers on a decision scale



2.3 Research Context, Design and Data

We examine a pooled dataset that contains information on political decision making and implementation in the social policy domain for three Dutch cities: Weststellingwerf, Groningen and Arnhem (Torenvlied, 2000). The social policy domain is selected, because this domain covers many different policy decisions and comprises of many different implementers—which would assure at least some

variation in policy conflict and political disagreement in the data. The local decision makers are formed by city councils, which consist of different political parties that are elected on the basis of proportional representation. Thus, the present chapter studies three different city councils with different numbers of political parties, depending upon the size of the municipality and election results. The city council of Weststellingwerf has six political parties, the city council of Groningen has nine political parties and the city council of Arnhem has seven political parties. In all three city councils the local government coalition was formed by three political parties. The number and composition of implementation agencies varied between local authorities.

In fall 1991, the city council of the three local authorities started to develop plans for social renewal: a national policy with decentralized budgets targeting at the improvement of neighborhoods through citizen participation. In each of these plans, the Mayor and aldermen of each city formulated a number of policy decisions—supported by the coalition parties—and assigned a number of implementers. In Weststellingwerf, 14 agencies were charged with implementing some of the 15 policy decisions formulated on neighborhood development and reforms. In Groningen, 12 agencies were charged with implementing several of the 17 policy decisions on administrative reforms formulated in that city. In Arnhem, 10 agencies were charged with implementing several of the six policy decisions on neighborhood platforms. In total, 38 policy decisions were taken in the three cities and 36 agencies were charged with implementing some of these policy decisions. There were 131 specific combinations of an agency realizing a policy decision and hence a total of 131 compliant implementations—distributed across the three cities ($n = 32$ in Weststellingwerf; $n = 62$ in Groningen and $n = 37$ in Arnhem) (Torenvlied, 2000).

In each of the cities relevant data was collected at two different measurement moments (Torenvlied, 2000). The first measurement moment concerned data collection on the decision preferences of the political parties in council, as well as the preferences of all the implementers. This data collection took place just after the adoption of the final policy decisions in city council. At this measurement moment data were also collected about the policy decisions. The second measurement moment concerned the measurement of the level of compliance of implementers. This measurement moment took place about one-and-a-half year after the policy decision was adopted by city council.

2.3.1 First measurement: preferences on the policy decision scale

The data collection on the preferences of political parties and implementers by Torenvlied (2000) followed an approach that has its roots in comparative studies of national policy-making (Laumann & Knoke, 1987) and which was further developed

by Bueno de Mesquita (1999). It combines the strengths of qualitative data collection with quantitative analysis. Recent applications of this approach can be found in international relations (Bueno de Mesquita, 1999) or studies in European policy-making (Stokman & Thomson, 2004; Thomson et al., 2007). In a first step, the coordinating senior policy-maker for social renewal policies in each city was approached. In-depth interviews were held with these senior policy-makers and they provided a comprehensive set of documentation. From these interviews and documents a short-list of four local officials and key stakeholders in each city was compiled, with whom a second series of in-depth interviews were held in October - December 1991 (Weststellingwerf), October - December 1992 (Groningen) and September - October 1993 (Arnhem).⁵ All informants approached agreed to participate in the research. Local officials were aldermen, members of city council, or policy advisors. Key stakeholders were directors of the largest implementation agencies in the social policy domain. Using the transcripts of these interviews combined with a desk research of the policy documents, minutes of council meetings and project team meetings and letters and statements from organizations in the policy domain, a precise record was obtained of all policy decisions, alternatives and actors involved in the domain of social renewal. This record was subsequently used to map preferences of decision makers and implementers on policy decision scales.

The mapping of preferences onto policy decision scales took place in a third series of interviews (Torenvlied, 2000). A more detailed description and an elaborate foundation of this approach are provided by Bueno de Mesquita (1999), or Thomson et al. (2007). Twelve key informants were interviewed to identify these preferences for the 38 policy decisions.⁶ These informants were selected on the basis of two main criteria. In the first place, their position in the policy process (job function) should provide them with a solid overview of all the actors involved in the social policy arena and the network of bureaucratic policy preparation and implementation (Johnson, 1990). In the second place, the key informant should be concerned with the policy decision as a result of his professional position and less from an advocacy position. Hence, the key informant should be relatively independent from the political arena. Individuals who are likely to fulfill these two requirements are the chief coordinating policy administrators. These administrators not only have access to the necessary information, but also active use on a daily basis. They participate in the relevant discussion platforms, organize consultation meetings and report to the office holder. To locate these informants, the relevant policy documents were scrutinized and were referred by our respondents from the second series of interviews. Not all interviewees

⁵ Although policy preparation started in 1991 in all three municipalities, the actual timing of decision making varied between the three municipalities.

⁶ Key informants were asked to provide preferences at the proposal stage and not at the stage of adoption.

from the second series of interviews agreed to participate as an expert, because they felt unable to address more detailed questions. Nevertheless, five of the twelve key informants had participated earlier, in the second series of interviews. Most key informants (seven) were professional administrators in the city government; the others were external advisors and members of city council. About 40 percent of informants were male and the average age of the informants was 53, reflecting the seniority of their positions. Interviews lasted on average one-hundred minutes each.

For each policy decision, the key informant was asked to indicate the two most extreme positions taken in decision making about this policy. These two extreme positions on each policy decision scale represent the most extreme positions considered in the negotiations in the city council. Examples of such policy decisions are: scope of housing improvements in the city (with no improvements versus complete reconstruction as extreme positions), scope of residents' self-governance in allocating subsidies (with no involvement of residents versus full self-governance as extreme positions), or composition of neighborhood platforms (with employees of social service departments versus volunteers and residents as extreme, opposite positions). These two most extreme positions were assigned the values 0 and 100 and subsequently used as anchors for mapping the other (intermediate) positions, with questions such as: is this intermediate position substantively more different from the one extreme than from the other extreme? Thus, the relative distances between intermediate positions on the policy decision scale reflect substantive differences between them and with the extreme positions. For example, the scope of housing improvements in the city policy in Weststellingwerf, was a scale with the following positions: 0 (no improvements), 20 (incidental improvements), 50 (acceleration of the maintenance program), 80 (ibid., plus additional improvements), 90 (ibid., plus limited reconstructions), 100 (complete reconstruction) Subsequently, the key informant placed all decision makers and implementers involved on the policy decision scale to represent the position these actors favored most. The sources for coding the preferences of decision makers and implementers were the relevant (policy) documents and minutes from meetings, in which both political parties and implementation agencies (as well as other actors involved) made statements about the policy alternative they most preferred (See Torenvlied 2000 for a full overview of all policy decisions, actors and positions).⁷

There could be potential biases in key informant's responses. Key informants may be prejudiced as experts, or may lack knowledge and insight. There is even the

⁷ The sources used to code the policy decisions for Weststellingwerf were the minutes of the city council meeting on December 16th 1991 and the Plan of Operations of November 14th 1991. The sources for Groningen were the minutes of city council meeting on December 2nd 1992 and the decision proposal from the Mayor and aldermen of Groningen. The sources for Arnhem were the policy document "Effects of Look Further", from November 1993 and the minutes and council proposal of city council meeting on September 14, 1993.

possibility that key informants might lie if this serves their direct interest (cf. Bleek, 1987). However, research shows that information from key informants is not always of poorer quality than information from respondents in the classical sense (cf. Killworth & Bernard, 1976). Ideally, an informant should supply precise information on the policy preferences and characteristics of all actors involved in the policy area and must be objective when making these estimates. These abilities can sometimes be found in only few informants and interviews were combined with desk research to identify these individuals.

An attempt was made to minimize the chance of bias in the answers of informants by selecting these individuals carefully, by monitoring the consistency of and argumentation behind their estimations and by confronting their data with those from other sources (Torenvlied, 2000). Data-triangulation was applied in order to reduce the chance of bias in the informant data (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Each informant was asked to provide arguments for his estimations during the interviews. When the informant's estimation did not coincide with the information from the desk research of policy documents or information provided by another expert, this policy decision was raised during the interview. The informant was asked to explain the discrepancy (without explicitly referring to the source of disagreement). If the informant was unable to do so, additional data sources and informants were consulted.

After measuring the preferences of political parties and implementers on the selected policy decision scale, each policy decision was mapped on the relevant policy decision scale (hence, the preferences and outcome of decision making were mapped on the same scale) (Torenvlied, 2000). For example, on the policy decision of the scope of housing improvements in the city, the city council of Weststellingwerf adopted the policy decision to accelerate the maintenance program with additional improvements. Hence, this policy decision was assigned the value 80 for that policy scale. To map the policy decision, policy documents and key informant judgments were used. The latter judgments were essential to obtain information in cases where the legislative intent was not clearly and explicitly specified in the various documents. Key informants were able to consistently map the policy decisions on the policy scales—also in the case of policy decisions that were adopted under political conflict.

2.3.2 *Second measurement: compliance*

After a significant period of time, about one-and-a-half years after the policy decision was adopted, the implementing behaviors of the agencies were assessed (Torenvlied, 2000). For each policy decision, the courses of action of all the agencies assigned with implementing the policy decision were mapped onto the same policy decision scale

that was constructed during the first measurement moment.⁸ To map the relevant courses of action, a content analysis of formal evaluation reports was combined with key informant interviews. For almost all policy decisions, formal evaluation documents were available because the law on social renewal policy required the evaluation of policies at the local level. Other written sources about the implementation process were scrutinized—among others the results of surveys among clients, yearly reports of implementation agencies and the reports of controllers. Interviews with nine key-informants involved in the evaluation of the policy decisions, were held. For each city, one of these informants overlapped with the informants who provided information on preferences at the previous measurement moment. The in-depth interviews provided detailed information about the specific courses of action taken by each implementation agency.

All the courses of action were coded in relation with the original list of alternatives and later mapped onto the one-dimensional policy decision scale by assigning the corresponding value. For example, two main agencies were involved in implementing the decision on the scope of housing improvements in the city: a large housing association and a housing corporation. Whereas the housing association speeded up its maintenance program and indeed initiated additional improvements in its housing stock (with a corresponding value of 80 on the policy decision scale), the housing corporation did virtually nothing extra (with a corresponding value of 0 on the policy decision scale).

The dependent variable of the present study, the level of compliance of an implementer with a policy decision, was constructed by comparing the mapping of the courses of action taken by each relevant implementer with the mapping of the policy decision on the policy decision scale. The level of compliance is defined on the basis of the absolute distance on the policy decision scale between the value assigned to the implementer's course of action and the value of the policy decision, as was adopted roughly one-and-a-half years earlier. The level of compliance is calculated as 100 minus the absolute distance. In the example of housing improvements, the housing association would have a level of compliance of 100 (the absolute difference between action (80) and policy decision (80) is zero and hence, the level of compliance is $100-0=100$) and the housing corporation would comply with a score of 20 (the absolute

⁸ The measures for policy conflict, political disagreement and compliance imply that distances from the different policy decision scales are comparable to the extent that they provide indicators of the distance between implementers' policy preferences and the policy decision, or differences between decision makers in their policy preferences. This is a justifiable assumption based on the application of the same data-collection procedures to each case (Bueno de Mesquita, 1999; Thomson et al., 2007). Nevertheless, we do acknowledge that a distance of twenty scale points on one policy decision may be associated with more profound effects on social and administrative renewal than a distance of twenty scale points on another policy decision. These distances are relative to the range of implementers' preferences and not absolute measures of substantive differences between alternative policy decisions.

difference between action (0) and policy decision (80) and hence the level of compliance is $100-80=20$).

From our definition of compliance as a dyadic variable, it follows that: (a) a single implementation agency has multiple scores on the level of compliance, which depend upon the number of policy decisions they should implement and (b) that single policy decisions could be complied with by multiple implementation agencies, depending upon the number of agencies involved in implementing the specific policy decision. The specific implementation structure for each policy decision defines these dyads. For example, although in Weststellingwerf 15 policy decisions \times 14 implementation agencies = 210 dyads were hypothetically possible, yet only 32 dyads were defined by the implementation structure.

2.3.3 Construction of independent variables

Policy conflict. The implementer's policy conflict represents the difference between the decision and the preference of the implementer. We measured the level of policy conflict of each implementer with the decision as the absolute value of the distance on the policy decision scale (0-100) between the value of the policy decision and the value of implementer's policy preference.⁹

Political disagreement. We constructed three measures of political disagreement, each corresponding to another theoretical specification of political disagreement. Disagreement among all political parties was computed as the weighted standard deviation of the policy preferences of the local political parties in city council, which were measured during the first measurement. Politicians within a political party are assumed to share a preferred policy alternative. The weights are the number of seats of each political party in city council, as a simple indicator of the relative impact of each political party in the decision making. The Shapley-Shubik index—which is an alternative measure for the impact of a party taking into account a party's inclusion in all potential winning coalitions given the majority rule—was applied to check for robustness of results (Shapley & Shubik, 1954). Disagreement in the governmental coalition was computed as the weighted standard deviation of the preferences of the parties in the local governmental coalition. In all three local authorities under study, the local government coalition was formed by three political parties. Finally, the absence of a majority alternative was measured as a dummy variable, which for each policy decision indicates whether it is supported by political parties who together reflect a majority of seats in city council.

⁹ The strong assumption is, of course, that the implementing behaviors of implementation agencies can be mapped onto the same underlying policy decision scales of decision making, and hence that policy decisions have not considerably evolved in substantive meaning, and that the feasible set of positions has remained relatively unaffected in time.

2.3.4 *Controls*

In addition to the two main independent variables—policy conflict and political disagreement—we included variables at the policy decision and implementer level as control variables. First, at the implementer level, the type of agency which implemented the policy is included as a control. The literature suggests that an implementer's ability to take independent action is a function of the implementer's political support (Meier & O'Toole, 2006). The level of political support differs for different types of implementation agencies, more specifically: governmental agencies, semi-public organizations and private organizations. We include two dummy variables to distinguish between these three groups.

Second, at the policy decision level, the salience of a policy decision for decision makers is included as a control. The literature shows that salience affects the level of compliance (May & Winter, 2009). For highly salient policies, decision makers invest more in realizing high levels of compliance (e.g. Calvert et al., 1989: 590). Hence, administrative procedures for political control and sanctions will be strengthened for salient policy decisions (Calvert et al., 1989: 589). For each party, the salience was derived from a priority list of policy decisions. Differences in salience attached to policy decisions aim to reflect relative differences in priority set by the legislators as indicated by the key informants. These relative differences were rescaled between zero (legislator attaches no salience to the policy decision) to 100 (legislators attaches extremely high salience to the policy decision). Subsequently, the salience of a policy decision was measured as the average salience political parties attached to that policy decision.

Third, we control for the number of agencies that implement the policy decision, to take into account the networked versus hierarchical nature of implementation. The exercise of procedures for administrative control will be less effective when policy decisions are implemented by larger numbers of agencies (cf. Barrett, 2004; O'Toole, 1986). From a bottom-up perspective, a multiplicity of agencies is expected to lead to problems of communication and coordination between the different links in the chain, which result in lower levels of compliance (O'Toole, 1986). Moreover, from a top-down perspective we also expect a negative effect: the larger the number of implementation agencies, the more difficult to exercise control, because of increased uncertainty about the course of action of each agency.

Finally, we include controls for the municipality in which the policy decisions were adopted and implemented. We also checked for robustness of results and control for the nesting of the policy decisions in broader, overarching policies (which would further affect the independence of policy decisions). For example, two policy decisions could be shared under the same overarching policy of housing improvement, with each policy decision focusing on a specific aspect of housing improvement, such as: the

scope of the improvements or the rules governing the selling of rental apartments to residents.

More control variables could be added to the analysis on the basis of implementation theory, for example the size, budget or work load of implementation agencies. Yet, we refrained from introducing too many control variables, simply because we have only a limited number of cases (which would cause identification problems in the statistical analysis).

2.3.5 Structure of the dataset

The dataset has a two-level hierarchical structure: 38 policy decisions and 36 implementers. Each of the 131 cases of compliance is nested in a specific combination of a policy decision and an implementer. Because a policy decision could be implemented by several agencies and one implementer could implement several policy decisions, the level of compliance can be influenced both by characteristics of the implementation agency and by characteristics of the policy decisions, or by an interaction of these two. Figure 2.2 shows a schematic representation of this complex nesting structure for eight implementations, nested within four policy decisions and five implementation agencies.¹⁰

Figure 2.2 Cross-classified nesting structure of seven implementations within three policy decisions and four implementation agencies




Figure 2.2 shows that an implementation is cross-classified by two higher level units (policy decision and agency). Therefore, the following random terms are included in our regression models: (i) a random effect of the specific implementation agency; (ii) a random effect of the specific policy decision; and (iii) a unique residual for each policy

¹⁰ The exact nesting structure can be derived from the dataset, which is available upon request.

decision-agency combination. In other words, we statistically analyze the variation in the level of compliance created by the crossing of two random factors (policy decisions and implementation agencies). This variation describes the policy decision, the implementation agency and the interactions between agency and policy decision variables. Effects of variables at the level of the policy decision can vary randomly across agency-level predictors, and vice versa (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). If we would fail to recognize this cross-classified, hierarchical model, we would under specify the model and lack proper controls for potentially confounding effects (Fielding & Goldstein, 2006: 24). This is true both for effects of explanatory variables, but also for the random effects of factors in the data structure (Fielding & Goldstein, 2006). Hence, using an ordinary regression model without properly specifying the random effects, we would report understated estimates of their precision through standard errors, which would lead to the conclusion that the effect is statistically significant, when in a correctly specified model it would not be” (Fielding & Goldstein, 2006).

Table 2.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analyses. Table 2.1 reveals that the level of compliance ranges between 40 and 100 with a mean compliance of 89.3 on the policy decision scale. This shows that the distribution of compliance is skewed, with many decisions that are highly complied with by implementers and fewer decision implementations with small levels of compliance.¹¹ Furthermore, policy conflict ranges between 0 and 100, which indicates that for some policy decisions some implementers fully disagreed with the policy decision, whereas for other policy decisions some implementers fully agreed with a policy decision. The level of political disagreement ranges between 0 and 42. The maximum of political disagreement within the ruling coalition is 37.8. Hence, some policy decisions are adopted under no disagreement within the ruling coalition, whereas other policy decisions are adopted under highly diverging preferences among members of the ruling coalition. The low correlations between policy conflict on the one hand and the three measures of political disagreement, on the other hand, indicate that we indeed can treat these variables empirically as independent from each other.

¹¹ We performed additional analysis to check whether outliers biased the effect. The additional analysis showed that the effect is not driven by outliers.

Table 2.1 Means, standard deviation and correlations (N=131)

	Mean	Std.	Min.	Max.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Compliance	89.3	16.0	40	100								
2. Policy conflict	26.5	26.7	0	100	-.44**							
3. City council disagreement	19.8	13.7	0	41.6	-.05	.11						
4. Coalition disagreement	12.8	12.0	0	37.8	-.16*	.15	.73**					
5. Majority alternative absent	.5	.5	0	1	.04	.05	.48**	.31**				
6. Semi public agencies	.21	.41	0	1	-.01	.03	.08	.04	.04			
7. Private organization	.40	.50	0	1	-.02	.21*	.04	.06	-.13	-.41**		
8. Number of implementers	5.65	2.9	1	10	-.20*	.11	.25**	.32**	.23**	-.21*	.29**	
9. Political salience	72	22	6	100	-.01	-.18*	.06	-.08	.41**	.04	-.11	.20*

In addition, Table 2.1 reveals that there is a rather strong, but not perfect association between disagreement among all political parties city council and disagreement among political parties of the local government coalition (Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.73). The high correlation indicates that there is a high association between disagreement among all decision makers in city council and disagreement among political parties of the local government coalition. Though, disagreement among all political parties does not in all cases correspond with a high level of disagreement within the coalition.

Table 2.2 provides further insight in the associations between the three measures of political disagreement.

Table 2.2 Mean disagreement in the city council and governing coalition for policy decisions with and without the presence of a majority alternative (standard deviation between parentheses)

	Majority alternative		T-test
	Present (N=18)	Absent (N=17)	
City council	10.52 (3.52)	25.34 (2.14)	$t = 3.55; p < .001$
Government coalition	6.62 (3.09)	14.75 (1.96)	$t = 2.19; p < .05$

Table 2.2 shows that mean political disagreement is significantly higher—both in city council and in the governing coalition—when a majority alternative is absent than when a majority alternative exists. Table 2.2 also reveals that when a majority alternative is present, disagreement within the governing coalition is not always absent. This implies that the presence of a majority alternative does not automatically imply that all members of the coalition (who together hold a majority of seats) support the decision. For some decisions the majority is formed by a mixture of parties of the governing coalition and other political parties.

2.4 Results

2.4.1 Structure of the analysis

The level of compliance is expected to be explained by policy conflict (Hypothesis 2.1) as well as by the interaction of policy conflict with various measures of political disagreement (Hypotheses 2.2 through 2.4). The (interaction) effects of political

disagreement are estimated in separate models, because of the high correlations between the three measures of political disagreement. The first (baseline) model includes disagreement among all political parties in city council (Hypothesis 2.2). The second model includes disagreement among political parties in the governmental coalition (Hypothesis 2.3). The third model includes the dummy for absence of a majority alternative (Hypothesis 2.4). For each analysis, we checked for robustness of results when controlling for dependencies between policy decisions that are covered by the same overarching policy. We controlled for this dependency in two ways: by including dummies for the 10 overarching policies (fixed effects), as well as by including the policies as an extra hierarchical level in our model (random effects). We found no qualitative differences in strength or size of effects, when controlling for these dependencies.

2.4.2 Test of hypotheses

Table 2.3 presents the results of three cross-classified multilevel analyses with compliance as the dependent variable. The Wald-test shows that for all models a multi level design indeed significantly fits the data better than a linear regression model. The first column of Table 2.3 reports the variance estimates for the empty model. The other models report the estimates for the city council model (model 2), the coalition model (model 3) and the majority model (model 4) respectively. We centered the variables for a better interpretation of our results. All three models include the same independent and control variables, but differ with respect to the specification of the variable for political disagreement. The second model tests Hypothesis 2.2, the third model tests Hypothesis 2.3 and the fourth model tests Hypothesis 2.4. Because each of the three models includes the variables policy conflict, all three models test Hypothesis 2.1.

All three models report a strong and significant estimate for the direct effect of policy conflict on compliance. When the preference of an implementer differ more from the policy decision, this results in lower levels of compliance. The results strongly support Hypothesis 2.1 and indicate that the policy preferences of an agency should be included in any explanation of compliance.

Table 2.3 Cross-classified multi level analysis of compliance (standard errors between parentheses, N = 131)

	Empty model	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	12.28** (3.05)	10.23* (4.67)	11.29* (4.57)	11.27* (5.00)
<i>Implementer level</i>				
Policy conflict		-0.32** (0.06)	-0.32** (0.05)	-0.45** (0.09)
Semi public agency [†]		3.51 (5.14)	3.40 (4.98)	4.15 (5.20)
Private organization [†]		5.44 (4.52)	5.53 (4.34)	4.92 (4.60)
<i>Policy decision level</i>				
Number of implementers		-0.89 (0.65)	-0.65 (0.67)	-0.96 (0.63)
Saliency		-9.22 (7.19)	-12.36 ⁺ (7.45)	-5.90 (7.24)
Legislative conflict		-0.02 (0.12)		
Coalition conflict			-0.09 (0.14)	
Majority alternative absent				-1.70 (3.23)
<i>Cross-level interaction</i>				
Policy conflict *		-0.006 (0.00)		
Legislative conflict				
Policy conflict *			-0.01* (0.00)	
Coalition conflict				
Policy conflict * Absent majority alternative				-0.23* (0.11)
<i>Random components</i>				
Policy level variance	3.79 (2.78)	3.66 (2.44)	4.18 (2.28)	3.34 (2.40)
Agency level variance	6.26 (2.43)	7.13 (2.42)	6.49 (2.10)	7.47 (2.59)
Residual	15.83 (1.24)	13.79 (1.10)	13.57 (1.06)	13.59 (1.11)
Deviance	1068	1034	1030	1019
Wald χ^2	4.66 ⁺	7.24*	8.24*	6.96*

[†] Reference category = governmental agency; Note. ⁺ $p < 10$, * = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$.

Hypothesis 2.2 predicts that the negative effect of policy conflict on compliance is reinforced, when the political disagreement among all political parties in the city council is higher. The estimate for this cross-level interaction effect is not significant. Hence, Hypothesis 2.2 is not confirmed. This replicates the results of a previous study that applied this variable in a different test design (Torenvlied, 2000). Hypothesis 2.3 predicts that the negative effect of policy conflict on compliance is stronger the higher the disagreement among the political parties in the local government coalition. The third column in Table 2.3 shows that political disagreement in the governing coalition indeed affects compliance through its cross-level interaction effect with policy conflict.¹² This interaction effect is negative and significant, which supports Hypothesis 2.3: disagreement in the governing coalition significantly reinforces the negative effect of policy conflict on compliance with the policy decision. Hypothesis 2.4 predicts that the negative effect of policy conflict on compliance is stronger when no majority alternative exists. Indeed, the estimate for the cross-level interaction effect in this model in the last column of Table 2.3 is strong, positive and significant. Hence, Hypothesis 2.4 is supported by the data: when no majority alternative exists, the effect of policy conflict on compliance is reinforced.

Table 2.3 also reports estimates for the effects of control variables. There is no significant difference in compliance between the three different types of implementation agencies. The effect of the number of implementers is neither significant. Finally, the salience of a policy decision significantly and positively affects compliance—but it does so only in the coalition model. For the other models the effect is not significant. We also controlled for differences between the municipalities and no significant effects exist.

2.5 Conclusion and Discussion

The present chapter studied the effect of political disagreement on the level of compliance in governmental settings, combining insights from the delegation and implementation literature and with a multi-actor perspective on policy implementation. We focused on the level of compliance of implementation agencies and we explicitly integrated policy conflict—as a central bottom-up aspect of policy implementation—into the explanation. In addition, we specified political disagreement among decision makers in conjunction with the decision making context and hypothesized that political disagreement among decisive decision makers reinforces the negative effect of policy

¹² Additional analyses are performed to investigate the direct effects of the three measures of political disagreement, without the inclusion of the interaction effect. We analyzed three models (each with another specification of political disagreement). The models without the interaction effect replicate the findings of the models including the interaction effect.

conflict on compliance. These hypotheses were tested in the research context of local social policy in three Dutch municipalities. We draw three main conclusions.

The first conclusion is that implementers' preferences affect compliance with the decision. Thus, the analysis further supports the recent critique from public administration scholars on the political control of bureaucracy/top-down perspectives—that implementer preferences are neglected in current explanations and indicates that controlling for implementer preferences might explain away effects of political control (Meier & O'Toole, 2006). The analysis in the present chapter consistently reveals a significant negative effect of an implementer's policy conflict on the compliance with the policy decision.

The second conclusion is that political disagreement among political parties significantly reinforces the negative effect of policy conflict on level of compliance. However, the interaction effect of political disagreement pertains only to disagreement among decisive political parties—hence, it is not the political contentiousness of the policy area in general which counts, but only the political contentiousness among decisive political parties (members of the coalition government or the majority set of proponents of the policy decision). This underscores, again, the importance of the conditions of decision making and the multi-actor implementation structure, for shaping the course and outcomes of implementation.

The third conclusion is methodological. An implementation is the property of both an implementation agency and a policy decision. We have applied a cross-classified multi level design to control for this clustering structure and were thus able to statistically model dependencies in multi actor implementation (O'Toole, 2000). The analyses show that indeed both the implementation agency level and policy decision level simultaneously explain variance in compliance. Because a cross-classified structure is typical for implementation structures, future analyses could benefit from employing this technique.

Several directions for future research are possible. First, the present study may be replicated for other types of policy decisions in different countries. Social policy may be especially prone to an underlying contentiousness of decisions and more research is necessary on policy domains that may be less contentious. Second, whereas the present research demonstrates the presence of an interaction effect between policy conflict and political disagreement on compliance by implementation agencies, other moderators could exist—for example with the (lack of) clarity as expressed in the policy statute, which require text analysis of the relevant policy statutes. Another extension of the present study would be to incorporate network effects, as an additional moderator between policy conflict and compliance. Finally, similar designs with a large enough n to include more relevant implementer level variables would be very helpful to provide a deeper explanation for compliance.

Chapter 3 –

Political disagreement and ex ante controls in governmental setting

This chapter is co-authored by René Torenvlied. A slightly different version is forthcoming in *Administration and Society* as ‘The effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls: mechanisms and conditions’. The paper is also available from the *UCD Geary Institute discussion paper series*.

3.1 Introduction

The delegation of power, a fundamental aspect of contemporary policy making, has been studied in many different contexts: international relations, state-centric national and local systems of policy-making and in the European Union. Delegation refers to the process in which a decision maker transfers his or her authority to implement a policy decision to an implementer (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009; Elgie, 2006; Thatcher & Stone Sweet, 2002; Thomson & Torenvlied, 2011). The implementer often has specific competences, skills, information, or simply the time that a decision maker lacks (Kiser, 1999; Strom, 2000).

When delegating, decision makers give implementers a certain level of discretionary authority for implementing the decision. This level of discretionary authority is regulated by *ex ante* and *ex post* controls (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1994, 1999). *Ex ante* controls are exerted prior to the implementation and are often expressed in the description of the decision (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1994; Huber & Shipan, 2002). *Ex ante* controls are extensive when the decision is precisely described and include a detailed description of rules, roles, procedures and responsibilities of implementation agencies (e.g. Balla, 1999; Bawn, 1997; Huber & Shipan, 2002; McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins et al., 1989; Moe, 1989; Torenvlied, 2000). In contrast, *ex post* controls are exercised during and after implementation and consist of monitoring and sanctioning procedures.

Research shows that political disagreement plays a central role in the delegation of discretionary authority to implementation agencies (Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004; Epstein & O'Halloran, 1994, 1996, 1999; Franchino, 2004; Hammond & Knott, 1996; Huber & Lupia, 2001; Huber & Shipan, 2000; Torenvlied, 2000). Political disagreement is reflected by the extent to which decision makers disagree about which policy decision is preferred. In this chapter, we focus on the effect of political disagreement on the transfer of discretionary authority through *ex ante* controls, as expressed in the description of the decision. When the level of *ex ante* controls is high (e.g. when the decision is prescribed in a strict manner) the levels of discretion for the implementer will be low.

The effects of political disagreement on *ex ante* controls have been studied extensively in delegation models (e.g. Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996, 1999; Hammond & Knott, 1996; Huber & Shipan, 2002). Yet, the question of exactly how political disagreement translates into the level of *ex ante* controls remains unresolved. Some delegation models predict a negative effect of political disagreement on the level of *ex ante* controls (Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992; Hammond & Knott, 1996; May, 2003), whereas others predict a positive effect (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996, 1999; Thomson & Torenvlied, 2011). There are also contradictory results in past empirical research.

Some studies show that political disagreement has a positive effect on ex ante controls (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999). Others report a negative effect and some studies find no significant effect at all (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996; Torenvlied, 2000). Recently, scholars have attributed the influence of the decision making and implementation context in explaining the contradictory findings (e.g. Franchino, 2004; Huber & Shipan, 2002; Thomson & Torenvlied, 2011). However, which specific factors of the decision making and implementation context drive a positive effect and which specific factors drive a negative effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls is yet unclear.

In this chapter, we attempt to enrich our understanding of the contradictory findings of political disagreement on ex ante controls. To do this, we define the mechanisms that drive a positive or negative effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls and specify the conditions under which these mechanisms are triggered. In particular, based on the delegation literature, we single out one mechanism - the compromise mechanism - to explain a negative effect of political disagreement on the level of ex ante controls. We also distinguish two mechanisms - agency selection and coalition support - to explain a positive effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls. Subsequently, based on empirical studies of the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls, we specify decision making and implementation conditions that trigger each mechanism to explain when to anticipate a negative or a positive effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls.

In addition, we make a first step in exploring this theoretical framework, using the case of economic restructuring in the UK. Based on our theoretical framework, we derive predictions on the direction of political disagreement on ex ante controls for the specific conditions of decision making and implementation of economic restructuring in the UK. We explore these contextual predictions using an existing dataset of local and regional economic development policy in the UK under New Labour (Bennett & Payne, 2000).

3.2 Theoretical Framework

As previously stated, findings on the effects of political disagreement on the level of ex ante controls limiting discretionary authority of implementation agencies are contradictory (e.g. Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996, 1999; Hammond & Knott, 1996; Huber & Shipan, 2002). However, in the literature, we can distinguish between three different mechanisms that drive the effect of political disagreement on the level of ex ante controls. We label these the compromise, the agency preference and the coalition support mechanism. These mechanisms could work simultaneously, and are inclusive, but produce different effects of political disagreement on ex ante controls.

3.2.1 *Compromise*

The compromise mechanism predicts that political disagreement negatively affects ex ante controls that are expressed in the decision. The reasoning behind this is that political disagreement increases the likelihood of compromising and that it is costly to define a strict compromise decision. Therefore, lower levels of ex ante controls are more likely when political disagreement is high. In particular, it is difficult for decision makers to make a decision when they have diverging preferences (e.g. political disagreement) (i.e. Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996, 1999; Huber & Shipan, 2002; Torenvlied, 2000). As a result, a compromise decision is more likely. Yet, formulating a strict compromise decision is costly and time intensive. Because of this, decision makers have strong incentives to reduce transaction costs by agreeing on a compromise policy that displays low levels of ex ante controls (Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004; Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992; Hill & Hupe, 2002; May, 1993, 2003; McCarthy, 2007; Thomson & Torenvlied, 2010). Consequently, compromise decisions are often not described in detail, contain a vague description of criteria and often leave room for exceptions and multiple interpretations. Thus, the compromise mechanism implies that, under political disagreement, low levels of ex ante controls are expressed in the policy decision.

A crucial condition strengthening the compromise mechanism is that decision makers have limited capacity to invest in the policy decision. Capacity is expressed in the decision makers' available staff, capabilities, time and money (Huber & Shipan, 2002:188). When decision makers do have enough capacity, this can cover the extra costs of writing a detailed policy decision (Huber & Shipan, 2002). Hence, when decision makers have high capacity, political disagreement is less likely to result in low levels of ex ante controls, since decision makers will use the high capacity to cover the costs of exerting high levels of ex ante controls (e.g. writing detailed policy decisions, with a clear description of tasks, responsibilities and procedures for implementation).

Empirical studies corroborate this prediction. Huber and Shipan (2002) show that under divided government less ex ante control is exerted than under unified government (Huber & Shipan, 2002: 218). In addition, they also state that, when states have a sufficient level of capacity to write specific policies, a divided government produces more policy details (Huber & Shipan, 2002: 217-218).

Yet, a crucial aspect that is often overlooked in the literature is whether or not the decision makers are willing to invest this capacity in writing detailed decisions. We assume that the willingness to invest their capacity to exert ex ante controls depends upon the salience of the decision; how important the decision is for decision makers (e.g. Flanagan, 1973; Torenvlied, 2000). The benefits of compliant implementation to decision makers are higher for decisions that are highly salient to decision makers. Furthermore, compliant implementation is more likely the more elevated the levels of

ex ante controls (Lazin, 1973; Levin, 1980; Lipsky, 1971). *Ceteris paribus* benefits will more likely outweigh the costs for exerting high levels of ex ante control. We assume that this potential surplus of benefits increases the likelihood that decision makers are willing to yield their capacity to exert ex ante controls. Hence, we expect that political disagreement is less likely to result in low ex ante controls when a decision is highly salient to decision makers.

3.2.2 *Agency preference*

The second mechanism we distinguish is the agency preference mechanism, which builds on the classic ally principle and predicts a positive effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls. According to the ally principle, an implementer strives to implement a decision that is close to his or her own policy decision preference. Hence, the threat of noncompliance is higher when implementers disagree with the decision they have to implement (Bawn, 1997; Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004; Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; McCubbins et al., 1989). When decision makers have divergent preferences during decision making, it is more likely that the implementers' policy preferences also differ from the decision (Thomson & Torenvlied, 2011). Thus, political disagreement is assumed to increase the threat of noncompliance as it is more likely that implementers also disagree with the decision they have to implement. To reduce this threat, decision makers will delegate low levels of discretionary authority by exerting high levels of ex ante controls on the decisions that are implemented by agencies who disagree with the decision. Hence, because political disagreement increases the threat of noncompliance, high levels of ex ante controls will be exerted to limit noncompliance (e.g. O'Toole, 2000; Torenvlied, 2000).

The agency preference mechanism has a stronger impact on ex ante controls when decision makers are involved in implementation. Even when decision makers reach a decision, some may still favor a different one. That is, some decision makers may have a policy preference that differs from the chosen decision (McCubbins et al., 1989). Consequently, when decision makers and implementing agencies are the same actors, diverging policy objectives may indicate not only political disagreement, but also the diverging preferences of implementation agencies and hence of the threat of noncompliance (Thomson & Torenvlied, 2011). The ally principle states that when all else is equal, the threat of noncompliance is higher when implementation agencies do not share the same policy objectives as expressed in the decision (e.g. Bawn, 1997; Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004; Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; McCubbins et al., 1989). Therefore, we predict that more ex ante control is exerted when actors who are involved in decision making and in implementation have preferences that differ from the decision.

Empirical studies emphasize that the institutional function of actors is an important condition for the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls. In particular, Epstein and O'Halloran (1996) show that disagreement between Congress and the President results in higher levels of ex ante control. However, in a later study, Epstein and O'Halloran (1999) report that when the committee and the floor disagree on a decision, lower levels of ex ante controls will be expressed in the decision. In addition, studies of delegation in the European Union show a remarkable difference between the delegation of authority to the Commission and delegating powers to the member states (Franchino, 1999; Thomson & Torenvlied, 2011). In EU policy making, the member states are directly involved in the implementation of directives and the Commission monitors the progress. These empirical studies underscore the argument that when actors are involved in decision making as well as in implementation, the effect of political disagreement will more likely increase the levels of ex ante controls and, thus, reduce the levels of delegated discretionary authority.

3.2.3 *Coalition support*


The third mechanism we distinguish is coalition support. The coalition support mechanism is described in the classic work of McCubbins et al. (1989). They state that when decision makers have conflicting preferences, implementation agencies are faced with multiple decision makers who prefer different decision alternatives. The result is that some decision makers may favor noncompliance, while others may not. Implementation agencies preferring a different decision might benefit from such a lack of commitment in order to pursue their own preferences for implementation. Therefore, the decision makers who favor the decision and aim to avoid noncompliance will have a strong incentive to monitor the implementation process. Thus, because of the threat of support for noncompliance, decision makers will exert higher levels of ex ante controls and thereby delegate less authority ex ante (McCubbins et al., 1989).

A crucial condition which triggers the coalition support mechanism is the decision rule applied. Under majority rule, up to 49 percent of the decision makers might not agree with the decision, while a decision is still reached. Consequently, some decision makers may favor noncompliance, escalating the threat of noncompliance. However, under unanimity rule, the assumption is that all decision makers voted for the decision (e.g. either due to log rolling or because that decision fits their preference). Consequently, the probability that decision makers may favor noncompliance is low. Hence, the threat of noncompliance is low as implementation agencies can hardly benefit from disagreement among decision makers in order to pursue their own preference when implementing the decision.

Empirical evidence underlines that the decision rule is a crucial condition which explains how political disagreement affects ex ante controls. In particular, Franchino (1999) and Thomson and Torenvlied (2011) show that for EU decision making under unanimity rule, higher levels of political disagreement lead to lower levels of ex ante controls. The decision rule seems a crucial condition in predicting the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls. Political disagreement on decisions taken under unanimity rule decreases the level of ex ante control exerted.

Figure 3.1 presents a schematic overview of the three mechanisms and the conditions that affect each mechanism.

Figure 3.1 Political disagreement-ex ante controls theoretical framework: mechanisms and conditions



3.3 An Exploration of the Theoretical Framework

In this section, we use the case of economic restructuring in the UK to explore the applicability of our theoretical framework. First, we introduce the case of economic restructuring in the UK. Subsequently, we analyze this case with respect to each of the four conditions: capacity of decision makers, salience of each policy decision, implementers' involvement in decision making, and the decision rule applied.

3.3.1 The case

In 1997, New Labour came into power in the UK. Its main goal was to increase economic welfare. There was a major revision of the economic policy as New Labour placed a stronger emphasis on social objectives, as well as the imperative for local and regional economic development (Bennett & Payne, 2000). In particular, the economic restructuring led to the redesign of four main policies: Local Learning and Skills Councils, Small Business Service, Regional Development Agencies, and New Deal.

The Local Learning and Skills Councils are sub-regional bodies that contract for the supply of training and vocational education. The Small Business Service is a network of local outlets providing information, advice, help with government grants and a referral service to other public and private sector suppliers. The Regional Development Agencies are designed to increase the physical economic development, workforce skills, physical infrastructure, higher education and regional economic needs (Bennett & Payne, 2000:70). The New Deal's mandate is to recommend training and job placement programs for the unemployed and a reform of the welfare benefits system, the tax system and the way in which education and training is financed, accredited and quality assured (Bennett & Payne, 2000:105).

3.3.2 Conditions of decision making and implementation

How can the structure of decision making on local and regional economic development in the UK be characterized in terms of the crucial conditions we derived above (see Figure 3.1)? If we are able to specify these conditions for the policy of economic development policy, we can make an informed prediction about the direction of the effect of political disagreement in this specific policy context. With respect to the first condition, capacity, we infer that the actors responsible for making decisions about economic restructuring in the UK had excellent financial and administrative expertise (Payne & Bennett, 2003). Hence, the capacity for designing of the policy decisions for economic restructuring was high.

Second, the salience of the economic restructuring differed for each decision. Overall, the economic restructuring was viewed as the flagship of New Labour and thus many resources were invested in deciding on and implementing the different economic policy decisions (Payne & Bennett, 2003). Yet, there was variation in the salience for each policy decision. Some decisions were of higher salience than others and there was, also, variation among actors vis-a-vis the salience they attached to each decision. Some decisions were of high importance to governmental bodies. Others were salient to business agencies.

Third, decision making on the four policy areas of economic restructuring occurred in multilevel governance settings. Actors from the national, regional and local levels partook in decision making and implementation (see also Appendix 3.A for an overview of the actors involved). At the central government level, three main departments were responsible for economic development. On average, 26 actors were involved in decision making. Given the multifaceted nature of local and regional economic development, numerous government departments were involved with the policy process. At the UK regional level, there were various implementation agencies for economic development. Local government in the UK comprised of locally-elected

representatives and appointed officials, also played a key role in decision making and implementation of policy initiatives for local economic development (Bennett & Payne, 2000). In addition to business and economic agents, a range of social and public agents, as well as some voluntary or community actors, were involved in the decision making and implementation for all the policy initiatives. Hence, decision makers were also involved in the implementation of economic restructuring policies and vice versa.

Fourth, the decision rule during the economic restructuring was a simple majority rule. In general, about 26 actors had to decide on each policy decision, whereby more than fifty percent of these decision makers had to agree on a decision before it was accepted (Payne & Bennett, 2003).

In total, three of the four conditions were constant across the different decisions in this context: the decision makers' involvement in implementation, the decision makers' capacity and the decision rule applied. Given these three constant conditions, we are now able to specify which of the mechanisms are triggered in this policy context and which of the mechanisms are suppressed. Accordingly, we can make a prediction about the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls for economic restructuring in the UK. Figure 3.1 shows that, due to the high capacity of decision makers in this case, the negative effect of the compromise mechanism is relatively weak and hence we expect a weak or absent negative effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls. Moreover, because the decisions in this case are made under majority rule, we expect a strong impact of the coalition support mechanism. Also, the involvement of decision makers in the implementation process is expected to trigger the agency preference mechanism. The two latter mechanisms, which both generate a positive effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls are thus reinforced, whereas the mechanism which would drive a negative effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls is suppressed. Hence, we expect that in the case of economic restructuring in the UK, political disagreement positively affects the level of ex ante control exerted.

One condition varies across the policy decisions in this case, the salience of the decision. According to the theoretical framework, we expect that the level of salience that decision makers attach to a decision will weaken the impact of the compromise mechanism. The reason is that the more salient a decision is to decision makers, the more likely it is that these decision makers will cover the extra costs of exerting high level of ex ante controls caused by political disagreement. Hence, the variation we observe in the salience condition leads us to the expectation that the overall effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls is more positive for decisions that are more salient to decision makers.

3.4 Data and Design

We explore our theories on an existing dataset on social and economic restructuring in the UK (Bennett & Payne, 2000) and complement the dataset with an additional data collection to measure ex ante controls. The dataset includes specific information regarding 42 negotiated policy decisions. For each of these policy decisions, the dataset contains information about the policy preferences, the salience and the capacity of each actor involved in decision making. Furthermore, the additional data collection lead to information about the level of ex ante controls for each of the 42 policy decisions. In the following sections, we first describe the method of data collection and how we measure the dependent and independent variables. Following this, we present an example of one decision examined that is part of the New Deal program in order to illustrate the type of data used and the research design techniques that were employed.

3.4.1 Method of data collection

The following steps were performed to reconstruct decision making. First, interviews with experts and key negotiators were used to define the policy decisions and the range of possible positions and decisions. For each policy decision, the key negotiator was asked to indicate the two most extreme positions taken by decision makers. These two extreme positions were placed on a one-dimensional policy decision scale. Because they represented the most extreme positions, they formed the ends of the scale. In addition, the key informant mapped the outcome of decision making, the decision, as a position on this policy decision scale. Furthermore, during the expert interviews, the precise preferences of all of the other decision makers involved were mapped. Then, using questions such as: *Is this position substantively more different from the one extreme than from the other?*, the two most extreme positions were used as anchors for mapping intermediate ones. Thus, intermediate positions represent more moderate positions and the relative distances between positions on the policy decision scale reflect substantive differences between them. All actors involved in decision making were placed on the policy decision scale to represent the position they favoured most (Bennett & Payne, 2000).

This data record was subsequently validated through more than 60 intensive interviews with all the actors, including ministers and senior civil servants. A process of triangulation of each actor's individual assessments of him or herself and others was performed by examining actor information (e.g. policy preferences) about themselves and other interviewed actors. The interview process was supplemented with information from existing literature, parliamentary debates and parliamentary committee proceedings, press coverage and other documentary sources. The data collection on policy preferences used by Bennett and Payne (2000) followed an

approach that has its roots in comparative studies of national policy-making (Laumann & Knoke, 1987) and which was further developed by Bueno de Mesquita (1999). It combines the strengths of qualitative data collection with quantitative analysis. Recent applications of this approach can be found in international relations (Bueno de Mesquita, 1999), local policy-making (Torenvlied, 2000) and in studies in European policy-making (Stokman & Thomson, 2004; Thomson et al., 2007; Zimmer et al., 2005). A more detailed description and elaborate foundation of this approach is also described in Bueno de Mesquita (1999) and Thomson et al. (2007).

Additional information on the level of ex ante control per policy decision was gathered from policy and government documents, parliamentary debates and parliamentary committee proceedings. For all the policy decisions examined here, we examined the content and guidelines for each policy decision specified by the decision makers in a policy document, such as for example, the White Paper Learning to Succeed (1999) or the Business Link Service Manual (1995). The level of ex ante controls exerted prior to the implementation of the policies for the socio-economic restructuring is identified in these policy documents. Some of these documents were also used by Bennett and Payne (2000), but for most policy decisions, additional documents were collected and analyzed for a more complete overview of the ex ante controls expressed in the description of the policy decision. It is crucial to include all policy documents, as each document describes different aspects of a policy decision (e.g. the guidelines or the goals). Through intense contact with the government departments working on economic restructuring, we minimized the possibility of overlooking documents.

3.4.2 Measurement of the dependent variable: ex ante controls

The dependent variable of the present study is the level of ex ante controls exerted. The method used to measure ex ante controls is closest to the work of Epstein and O'Halloran (1999), Franchino (2004) and Thomson et al. (2007), who studied the level of discretion in the legal provisions of legislative documents. We performed a more direct content analysis, based on theoretically-defined characteristics of ex ante controls (cf. Epstein & O'Halloran, 1994), because this is a study of policy decisions, which are expressed in policy documents, rather than a study of law provisions from legal documents. In the theoretical concept of ex ante controls, the level of ex ante controls is lower when the description of the policy decision is vague with room for interpretation. In addition, ex ante controls are low when criteria for meeting standards and guidelines are vague and when authority for exceptions is high. We scored each policy decision on the basis of four theoretically-defined characteristics of ex ante controls. Scholars have shown that ex ante controls are higher when (p) the description

of the policy is strict and leaves no room for interpretation, (g) strict guidelines are specified, (a) authority to make exceptions to the policy decision is high and (m) criterion for meeting standards are specified (Balla, 1999; Bawn, 1997; McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins et al., 1989; Moe, 1989; Torenvlied, 2000).

We then coded the text of all policy documents using select search terms. For each criteria a policy decision could score zero or one. A zero indicates that the criteria is not met and a score of 1 means that the criteria is met. A combination of these scores results in a variable that ranges between zero and four. Table 3.1 provides a detailed breakdown of each of the policy decisions examined and includes the four ex ante control indicators (p, g, a and m) plus the overall ex ante controls score for each policy decision, based on the sum of these four indicators measured.

3.4.3 Measurement of independent variables

The level of political disagreement reflects the extent to which decision makers disagree about the most-preferred policy decision. The preferences of all decision makers were used to measure political disagreement. The data includes a measure of policy preferences, as mapped on one-dimensional policy decision scales. This enables us to compile a measure for political disagreement by calculating the standard deviation of the preferences of decision makers as positioned on the one-dimensional policy decision scale. We next compiled the standard deviation for each policy decision, weighting the standard deviation by the relative power of each actor (as an indicator of the relative impact of each actor in the decision making).

Using the expert interview technique described above, we measured the relative power of each of the actors based on both their formal decision making power and their informal weight (Bennett & Payne, 2000). The formal power of the actors is derived from their legal or constitutional position; whereas, their informal weight is determined by many factors, including the degree to which they have timely access to information and the financial and/or personal resources they can mobilise to gain access to resources. We then applied the Shapley-Shubik Power Index, which takes into account a party's inclusion in all potential winning coalitions with majority rule,—to check for robustness of results (Shapley & Shubik, 1954).

Table 3.1 Level of ex ante control per policy decision

Policy decision	New Deal			Local Learning and Skills Council			Regional Development Agencies			Small Business Services									
	p	g	m	p	g	m	p	g	m	p	g	m							
													Ex ante controls	Policy decision	Ex ante controls	Policy decision	Ex ante controls	Policy decision	Ex ante controls
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	3	1	0	1	1	0	2	
2	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	1	0	1	3	2	0	0	0	1	3	
3	1	1	1	0	1	0	3	0	1	1	0	4	3	1	1	1	1	4	0
4	0	1	0	0	1	0	4	1	0	0	1	4	4	1	1	1	1	4	1
5	0	1	1	0	1	1	5	1	1	1	1	4	5	1	1	1	1	4	1
							6	0	1	1	1	3	6	0	1	0	1	2	3
							7	0	0	1	1	2	7	1	1	1	1	4	1
							8	0	1	1	1	3	8	0	1	1	1	1	1
							9	0	1	1	0	2	9	0	1	1	0	2	2
							10	0	1	1	0	2	10	1	1	1	0	3	3
							11	0	0	1	0	1	11	0	1	1	1	3	3
							12	1	1	0	0	2	12	0	1	1	1	3	3
													13	1	1	1	1	4	4
													14	0	0	1	1	2	2
													15	0	0	1	1	2	2
													16	1	1	1	1	4	4
													17	0	1	1	0	2	2
													18	0	1	1	1	3	3

Note. Ex ante control scores of policy decisions on four indicators: (p) policy description is strict, no room for interpretation (=1); (g) guidelines specified (=1); (m) meeting standards specified (=1); (a) authority for exceptions is low (=1). Code terms: vast numbers/percentages/budget versus a lot of/around/minimize; stepwise descriptions versus overall final goal; forcing terms versus guiding terms; exceptions specified versus no exceptions are permitted. Ex ante controls is measured as: score on item (p) + score on item (g) + score on item (m) + score on item (a).

The salience represents the importance of a policy decision. Salience was constructed as a relative measure of the importance an actor attached to a policy decision. The relative salience was scaled between zero - an actor attaches no salience to the policy decision - to 100 - an actor attaches extremely high salience to the policy decision. Differences in salience attached to policy decisions reflect relative differences in priority set by the actors. For each policy decision, we calculated the average salience of actors.

3.4.4 Controls

We controlled for the number of decision makers included in the analysis because we expect that when more decision makers are involved in decision making, it becomes more difficult to agree on a specific policy decision. As a result, we expect that decision makers have stronger incentives to reduce transaction costs by agreeing on a less strict policy decision, thereby exerting low levels of ex ante controls. We thus predict that the number of decision makers negatively affects the level of exerted ex ante controls.

In addition, we controlled for type of policy decision, distinguishing between (i) content policy decisions and (ii) boundary policy decisions. A boundary policy decision specifies the rough format of the policy; whereas a content policy decision addresses the policy's substance. For example, a boundary policy decision of the Regional Development Agency specifies that the Regional Development Agencies would provide interview training, whereas a content policy decision says for how long participants may join the training program. The level of ex ante controls for boundary policy decisions is expected to be higher than for content policy decisions.

3.4.5 An example

In the following example of a policy decision, we use the New Deal for the long-term unemployed to illustrate how we collected data for this study. The first step was to identify those policy decisions part of the New Deal that were discussed during decision making. To do this, we studied those policy documents in which the policy program was formulated (DSS/DfEE, 1998; HoC, 1998, 1999; NDD, 1997; NDL, 1998; Welfare Reform and Pensions Act, 1999). From these, we selected those policy decisions that were identified by the experts as controversial and also most relevant in terms of the overall policy. Based on this, five policy decisions were selected that were at the centre of the controversy to establish the New Deal program. These included: (i) the length of time in the gateway, (ii) the proportion of jobs subsidized and the extent of public and private employer involvement, (iii) the size of the subsidy to employer

wage and training costs, (iv) the partnership and contracting structure, and (v) the flexibility of contracts (Bennett & Payne, 2000).

Next, we selected those actors involved in the decision making process. The selection was made after studying the minutes of project groups meetings, regional assessment panels and House of Commons reports (HoC, 1998, 1999; NDD, 1997; NDL, 1998). At the same time, we conducted a number of qualitative exploratory interviews with key-informants from the departments of education and employment (DfEE), business members of the New Deal task force, project managers of the New Deal and the Confederation of British Industry and the Trade Union Congress. The criterion for being involved in decision making about the policy decision usually reflected an actor's formal authority and/or his or her role in implementation of the policy area or as a key private sector provider of services in that area. The purpose of these exploratory interviews was to discover what the alternatives for each of the policy decisions of the New Deal had been. First the key informants were asked what policy alternatives were discussed and which of these had support. Then, the informants were asked to categorize the alternatives in order from most to least extreme.

The fourth policy decision, the partnership and contracting structure of the New Deal, led to seven distinct alternatives. The most extreme alternative for this policy decision implied that the national Employment Service (ES) should take the lead in contracting suppliers of New Deal. In the extreme alternative at the other end, the local ES would take the lead in contracting suppliers of New Deal. In between these, the alternatives ranged from "the national ES, in cooperation with the district ES, should take the lead" to "the national ES should only focus on large employer contracts, with the district covering the rest of the contracting" and "the district ES takes the lead", or "the district in combination with the local ES cover the contracting".

The next step was to define the positions of each actor on the policy decision scale. For the policy decision on contracting structure, most of the regional and local actors preferred the alternative in which the national ES is the primary contractor for large employer contracts and the district ES, in cooperation with the local services, delivers all other contracts. The national actors, like the department of trade and industry, preferred the option in which the national ES, in cooperation with the district ES, take the lead in contracting for suppliers of the New Deal.

Subsequently, the salience of the policy decision was defined. The salience of a policy decision is defined on the basis of the salience each actor attaches to the policy decision. For the policy decision on contracting structure of the New Deal, most actors on the national, regional and local levels indicated that the salience was average (scores around 50).

Finally, based on the description of the policy decision, we coded the level of ex ante controls. The policy decision on the contracting structure of the New Deal scored low in ex ante controls. In particular, the focus of activity of these partnerships at the local level was not explicated in the policy decision and exceptions were accepted (NDD, 1997). Also, the policy decision was not very explicit and left room for interpretation. For example, the policy document states that “in some areas the lead delivery partner will be the ES, in other areas this will be local partners” (NDD, 1997). This statement fails to clarify in which areas and to what extent the local partners have authority, leaving much room for local level discretion in delivery. Ex ante controls were also low regarding the terms of who were the appropriate New Deal partners at the local level in any local ES district. Consequently, considerable variety of local partnerships was permitted. In addition, the meeting standards regarding who should be consulted or involved in meetings and decision processes were vague. For example, a decision was made that, as much as possible, the ES should involve relevant private partners in contracting decisions. How the ES fulfills this standard depends on the interpretation of terms such as “as far as possible” and “relevant”. Hence, ex ante controls, as expressed in the policy documents are low, which allows considerable room for undesired interpretation for the implementing agencies.

3.5 Results

Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis.

Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics for the main variables in the analysis

	N	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Standard deviation
<i>Dependent Variable</i>					
Ex ante controls	42	3.1	0	4	0.2
<i>Independent Variables</i>					
Political disagreement	42	33.1	12.1	56.1	9.1
Policy decision salience	42	29.3	9.6	50.1	10.2
<i>Control Variables</i>					
Type of policy decision	42	0.3	0	1	0.5
Number of decision makers	42	26.2	16	31	6.2

Table 3.2 shows that the level of exerted ex ante controls varies between zero and four. A score of zero indicates a policy decision characterized by low levels of ex ante controls. A score of four indicates a policy decision characterized by high levels of ex ante controls. Some policy decisions are strictly described and express high levels of ex ante controls, whereas other policy decisions hardly control implementation agencies prior to the implementation. The average level of ex ante control exerted is 3.1. The disagreement among decision makers ranged between 12.1 and 56.1, with an average of 33.1. The salience of a policy decision varied between 9.6 and 50.1.

3.5.1 Structure of the analysis

We use two models to explore our expectations. The first model includes the main independent variable, political disagreement. In the second model, we add the interaction effect of political disagreement and salience. The control variables, the number of decision makers and the type of policy decision, are included in both models. Furthermore, we control for the dependencies between policy decisions within one policy, by including dummies for the four main policies (Local Learning and Skills Councils, the Small Business Service, the Regional Development Agencies and the New Deal). We performed additional analysis to ensure the robustness of our findings and ensured that outliers are not responsible for the effects. Table 3.3 presents the results of the linear regression analysis with ex ante controls as the dependent variable. The first column of Table 3.3 shows the estimates of the effects for the models.

3.5.2 Explaining ex ante controls

First, we explore the effect of political disagreement on the level of ex ante controls as expressed in the policy decisions in the regional restructuring in the UK. Model 1 estimates the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls, while controlling for the type of decision, the number of decision makers and the nesting within policies. The analysis shows a positive and significant estimate for the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls. We then performed an ordered logistic regression to check the robustness of the results. The ordered logistic regression replicated the results and showed a significant positive effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls. We also included dummy variables to control for dependencies between the four policies. The results remained unchanged after including the dummies. This result supports our expectation that, for the research context of economic restructuring in the UK, political disagreement leads to higher levels of ex ante controls.

Table 3.3 Linear regression analysis explaining ex ante controls (standard error in parentheses, N = 42).

	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	5.2 (.9)**	5.8 (1.6)**
Political disagreement	.04 (.02)*	.06 (.02)*
Saliency		.02 (.03)
<i>Interactions</i>		
Political disagreement * Saliency		.01 (.01)
<i>Controls</i>		
Type of policy decision	-.18 (.36)	-.21 (.39)
Number of decision makers	.04 (.03)	.03 (.04)
R ²	.27	.29

Note. * = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$.

Furthermore, we expected that the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls is stronger when the saliency of a policy decision is higher. In model 2, we estimate the interaction effect of political disagreement and saliency of a policy decision on ex ante controls, while controlling for the type of decision and number of decision makers. The analysis shows no significant interaction effect of saliency and political disagreement on ex ante controls. Hence, the findings do not support our expectation. In the research context of economic restructuring in the UK, the positive effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls is not strengthened by the saliency of a policy decision.

In addition, Table 3.3 shows the estimates for the effects of the control variables: type of policy decision and number of decision makers. The analysis shows that, in both models, neither the type of policy decision nor the number of decision makers has a significant effect on ex ante controls.

3.6 Conclusion and Discussion

In this chapter, we studied in which situations and under which conditions we can expect a positive or negative effect of political disagreement on the level of ex ante controls. The main goal of this chapter is to explore this puzzle by specifying the mechanisms and conditions that drive the positive/negative effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls. Based on the delegation literature, we have specified a theoretical framework for explaining the opposed findings on the effects of political disagreement on ex ante controls. This framework can be applied to derive at more plausible predictions concerning the direction of the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls within various contexts of decision making and implementation. We explored our theoretical framework with the case of economic restructuring in the UK.

The main conclusion of this chapter is that several conditions of decision making and implementation appear to be crucial for predicting the direction of the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls. We thereby adopt a point of view that is different than the classic idea of the standard model of delegation. Most delegation models explain the effect of political disagreement on delegation while mostly disregarding variations in institutional contexts (e.g. Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004; Calvert et al., 1989; Weingast, 1984). Some scholars do highlight the importance of institutional context in relation to other factors that explain delegation. For example, the work of Huber and Shipan (2002) suggests the vital role of institutional contexts for regulatory designs. In this chapter, we elaborate upon this discussion. In particular, we discuss specific conditions and mechanisms that define how the institutional context matters for the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls.

We have applied our theoretical framework to the case of economic restructuring in the UK in the 1990s. This restructuring is characterized by high levels of capacity. Decision makers had good resources and were, therefore, able to invest in ex ante controls. Various actors at the regional, national and local levels were included in the decision making and implementation of the policy decisions of economic restructuring. Since the decision makers were involved in the implementation and implementers were involved in decision making, political disagreement is not only an indication of preference divergence in decision making, but also in implementation. Therefore, we expected that political disagreement increased the threat of noncompliance during economic restructuring in the UK. In addition, the decisions were taken under majority rule. Therefore, the preference divergence between decision makers (and hence implementers) leads to an increased threat of noncompliance. Accordingly, we expected that the level of ex ante controls expressed in the policy decision will be higher for policy decisions characterized by higher levels of political disagreement. In

the case of economic restructuring in the UK, the regression analysis confirms our expectation that political disagreement leads to higher levels of ex ante controls.

Our analysis does not support the expectation that the level of salience decision makers attach to a policy decision strengthens the positive effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls. We expect that a high level of salience strongly reduces the negative effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls, as generated by the compromise mechanism. The reason is that salience enforces the willingness of decision makers to invest their capacity in writing detailed policies. A possible explanation for the non-significant interaction effect could be found in the generally high capacity of the decision makers in the case of economic restructuring in the UK. Possibly, when capacity is high, decision makers are not forced to choose on which particular policy decision(s) to use the capacity. When capacity of decision makers is low, the salience of a policy decision could be significant, as it could define whether decision makers will use the capacity to specify detailed policy decisions.

There are several directions for future research. This study is restricted to one context of decision making and many important institutional conditions do not vary. This had the advantage that we could single out the effects of some important variables, but comes at the cost of omitting important other influences. Therefore, our analysis can be best seen as a first step towards exploring this theoretical framework, with a more in-depth analysis of the interaction effect with the salience of a policy decision and a more general exploration of the full theoretical framework. Further research should check whether our theoretical expectations also hold under varying institutional conditions. Additional research is needed to control for other factors interacting with the effect of political disagreement on discretion and control for other potentially confounding factors. For example, future research should include the level of ex post controls and complexity of a policy decision. As our dataset is restricted to 42 policy decisions, we are restricted with respect to the number of variables we could include in the model is restricted. Consequently, this analysis should be seen as a first step towards a more comprehensive exploration of our theoretical framework.

Appendix 3.A Overview of the Actors Involved in Decision Making and Implementation of Economic Restructuring in the UK

Government departments

Department of Education and Employment
Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions
Department of Social Security
Department of Trade and Industry
Home Office
Treasury
Prime Minister

Business agencies

Business in the community
Chambers of Commerce
Business leaders
Business Link managers
Business Links unit
Business Link network
British printing industry federation
Confederation of British Industry
English tourist board
Federation of Small Businesses
Industrial training organization
Institute of Business Advisors
Institute of Directors
Invest in Britain Bureau
Local Employer Network
Local partnerships
Private Employment Agencies
Sector employer representative bodies
Sponsors
Trade association

Governmental agencies

Enterprise agencies
National Council for Voluntary Organizations
Employment Services
Further education colleges
Further education funding council
Government office of the regions
Higher education council for England
Local authorities
Local Education Authority
English partnerships
Regional chambers
Regional Development Agencies
TEC national council
TEC boards
Trade Union Congress
Universities
Urban development corporation
Welsh development agency

Commissions

Commission for new towns
Commission for racial equality
Manpower Services Commission
Regional Development Commission

Chapter 4 –

Explaining trends in political and societal polarization

This chapter is co-authored by René Torenvlied. A slightly different version is published as ‘Is Dutch politics divided from Dutch society? Three explanations for trends in societal and political polarization, *West European Politics*, 33(2): 258-279 in 2010’. A Dutch version is published in *Mens en Maatschappij*, 84(4): 369-392 in 2009.

4.1 Introduction

A large share of policy decisions is not reached in harmony but under political disagreement. In Western-European parliamentary systems political disagreement is reflected by diverging preferences about the policy decision among parties within the multi party government. In the Netherlands, the growing disagreement among political parties, especially with regard to ethnic integration policy, is a dominant theme in current discussions of Dutch politics. In the present chapter, we study the trend in a specific type of disagreement, namely polarization. Polarization characterized by a division into two opposites, with large disagreement between groups and high similarities within groups (Esteban & Ray, 1994).

At the start of the new millennium, opinion leaders and scholars in The Netherlands observe a clear, dramatic trend towards political polarization (Bovens & Wille, 2006: 59; Halsema & Snels, 2005; Lunshof, 2003; Pellikaan & Trappenburg, 2003; Wansink, 2004), most strongly reflected by ethnic integration policy (Pellikaan, 2002; Pennings, 2005; Van Holsteyn & Den Ridder, 2005; Van Kersbergen & Krouwel, 2008). Remarkably, preferences in Dutch society do not appear to reflect a similar trend towards polarization (Adriaanse et al., 2005: 239; Van Holsteyn & Den Ridder, 2005: 226-8; Van Wijnen, 2000: 145). If both observations hold true, Dutch politics seem to be divided from Dutch society (Aarts, 2008; Tiemeijer, 2006). From the perspective of democratic representation, such a discrepancy would be highly remarkable and even undesirable: politicians become more and more trapped in polarized debates while ordinary citizens acquiesce to stable preferences and beliefs.

Discrepancy in trends in polarization between Dutch citizens and political parties has hardly been analyzed systematically. Most research on polarization trends in the Netherlands is based on general observations, or on approximate inspections of trends in the preferences of Dutch political parties and citizens—rather than on a (sophisticated) measure of polarization (Aarts et al., 2007; Pellikaan, 2002; Pennings, 2005; Van Holsteyn & Den Ridder, 2005). Although some scholars use the standard deviation of preferences as a measure of polarization (e.g. Achterberg, 2006), this measure falls short in distinguishing general disagreement from polarization (Alvarez & Nagler, 2004; Esteban & Ray, 1994; Van der Eijk, 2001).

The present chapter analyzes trends in polarization of Dutch political parties and citizen preferences in more detail than before, by using the ER polarization measure of Esteban and Ray (1994). Whereas conflict measures only focus on alienation between groups, the ER-measure also takes into account the identification within groups. We compute the trend in polarization of preferences of Dutch citizens regarding ethnic integration policy, as well as the trend in polarization of party positions on the same policy. This offers a unique way to compare societal and political polarization trends.

We focus on ethnic integration policy, because this policy is portrayed as being (both in the scientific community and in the public debate) the most controversial policy of the past years (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003; Pellikaan, 2002; Pennings 2005; Van Holsteyn & Den Ridder, 2005; Van Kersbergen & Krouwel, 2008). If political polarization increases in the Netherlands, it must be visible at least for ethnic integration policy.

Another contribution of the present chapter concerns the mechanisms which may drive a discrepancy in polarization trends. Scholars offer different explanations for a gap between politics and society. Scholars of the U.S. Congressional system hypothesize that parties in Congress are responsive to a polarized political elite and consequently grow apart from the ordinary U.S. citizen (Brady et al., 1995; Dimaggio et al., 1996; Fiorina, 2005; Hetherington, 2009; Lindamann & Haider-Markel, 2002). Models of political competition in multi party systems, on the other hand, claim that political parties are responsive to the mean position of their constituency, rather than to the median position of the electorate (Abromiwtz & Saunders, 1998; Adams et al., 2005; Ezrow et al., 2008; Oosterwaal, 2007). A third mechanism that could explain a discrepancy in polarization trends between politics and society is an increase in policy salience. Models of political competition show that the salience of a policy positively affects the divergence of equilibrium party platform positions of political parties (Adams et al., 2005; Bernstein, 1995; Lindamann & Haider- Markel, 2002).

The present chapter explores these three possible mechanisms. It compares polarization trends in the positions of Dutch political parties and the preferences of Dutch citizens on ethnic integration policy, with: (a) trends in preference polarization of political elites; (b) trends in preference polarization of mean partisans and (c) trends in salience of ethnic integration policy.

4.2 The Dutch Political Arena

Whereas between 1994 and 2002 the Dutch political arena was characterized by stability and a politics of consensus, the political climate changed dramatically from 2002 onwards. The stable years of cooperation in the purple cabinets ended abruptly and was replaced by a dramatic upsurge of the anti-establishment movement led by the provocative independent Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn was notorious for his xenophobic positions and controversial views about ethnic integration. His movement clearly filled a conservative gap in Dutch politics— by some even interpreted in terms of a new, ‘multiculturalism’ political dimension (Van der Lubben, 2006: 57).

The Fortuyn movement and the assassination of its political leader in May 2002—only few days before the parliamentary elections—dramatically changed the Dutch political landscape. Political parties repeatedly changed their manifestos and the

traditional assignment of votes to mainstream parties was replaced by a completely new political reality in parliament. Without their leader, the Fortuyn party entered into a government coalition with the Christian-democratic party (CDA) and the liberal party (VVD), which lasted only 86 days. New elections were held in 2003. The Fortuyn party lost dramatically and was replaced in the coalition by the small liberal party D66. Yet, internal conflicts made it impossible for the coalition to complete their term in government. As a result, new elections were held in 2006, which resulted again in a major shift of seats occupied by parties in parliament (Aarts et al., 2007). At the left and right extremes of the political spectrum, parties gained votes at the expense of the political center.

4.2.1 *What is (political) polarization?*

Dutch politics has long been characterized by instability: Political parties changed their manifestos repeatedly and major shifts in the distribution of parliamentary votes occurred. In addition, citizens tended to shift their vote for parties so dramatically, that Dutch elections are among the most volatile in Western Democratic countries (Mair, 2008). Opinion leaders and scholars repeatedly use the term *polarization* to capture the political instability and growing conflict in Dutch politics. Notwithstanding the intuitive attractiveness of the term ‘polarization’, a systematic measure and a theoretical underpinning of the concept of polarization is lacking (cf. DiMaggio et al., 1996). Thus, the question remains fully open whether the events between 1994 and 2006 indeed reflect an increased polarization of Dutch politics.

In the present chapter, we define polarization as a conflict that is characterized by a division into two opposites, with large differences between groups and high similarities within groups (Esteban & Ray, 1994). Political polarization points at large differences in policy positions between opposed ‘camps’ or ‘coalitions’ of political parties and high similarities in policy positions within these coalitions. Examples include a left-wing coalition of parties versus a right-wing coalition, or a coalition of tolerant parties versus a coalition of xenophobic coalition. Societal polarization is the equivalent for the existence of a few, large groups in society with opposing preferences (or opposing policy preferences).

At the theoretical level, polarization combines the mechanism of alienation between groups (of political parties, or individual citizens) with the mechanism of identification within these groups (Esteban & Ray, 1994). The impact of alienation between groups on polarization is reinforced by identification within groups. The within-group identification impact implies that larger sizes of opposed coalitions of parties (or a decline in the number of coalitions) result in higher levels of polarization. Thus, even when the position of a coalition remains stable, changes in party sizes affect

polarization. Polarization reaches its maximum when two equally-sized coalitions of parties (or simply two coalitions) take an opposed position at the extremes of a distribution. The ER-measure was previously applied in policy research by Torenvlied and Haarhuis (2008) and Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied (2009).

Currently, a wide range of polarization measures is applied in various studies. Typically, scholars measure polarization from indirect indicators. Examples are the number of parties in an electoral system, the size of extremist parties or categorization of parties as Left, Right or Center parties (e.g. Pennings, 1998; Powel, 1982). In addition, popular measures are the range between extreme party positions or the standard deviation in party positions. Furthermore, some measures for polarization include a variation, combination or extension of these measures (Dalton, 2008). An example of a combination of both measures is the measure of party system compactness, which adjusts the standard deviation between parties for the dispersion of party voters in the policy space (Alvarez & Nagler, 2004: 49). Other measures are combinations of higher-order descriptive statistics for distributions—such as skewness and kurtosis (DiMaggio et al., 1996)—or coefficients of agreement (Van der Eijk, 2001). Figure 4.1 illustrates the difference between the standard deviation—the most commonly used measure of polarization in political science—and the ER-measure of polarization.¹³

Figure 4.1 Two hypothetical distributions of policy positions




Figure 4.1 shows two hypothetical distributions of policy positions held by parties on an identical policy scale. Clearly, distribution (b) is much more polarized than distribution (a). In distribution (b), all policy actors line up in two opposing coalitions, whereas distribution (a) represents a more equal distribution of policy actors. Yet, both

¹³ Van Eijk (2001) also points to the lack of the standard deviation as a measure of dispersion or polarization, by showing that the standard deviation is highly sensitive to skewed distributions. The standard deviation is therefore inappropriate as a measure of dispersion (Van Eijk, 2001: 328).

distributions have the same standard deviation. The ER-measure of polarization better captures the differences in polarization of the distributions and gives a higher value of polarization for distribution (b) than (a).

4.3 Three Explanations for Trends in Societal and Political Polarization

We explore three theoretical mechanisms that predict a discrepancy in trends between political and societal polarization. The first mechanism focuses on the preferences of *political elites*—such as active members. The second mechanism focuses on the preferences of the *mean partisan*. The third mechanism builds on the effect of *salience* on party competition.


4.3.1 *Responsiveness to political elites*

A large number of scholars have identified political elites as the main source of increasing political polarization and an increasing gap between politics and society (Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich & Rhode, 2001; Fiorina, 1999; Jacobson, 2000; King, 2003; Layman et al., 2006; Saunders & Abramowitz, 2004). The idea stems from May's general law of curvilinear disparity (May, 1973), which holds that party activists are more radical than their leaders, due to differences in power and interests between party leaders, activists and voters. In the United States, party elites hold more extreme policy positions than the electorate in general. More importantly, party elites have grown increasingly polarized (Aldrich, 1995; Collie & Mason, 2000; Fleisher & Bond, 2000; Hetherington, 2001; Jacobson, 2000; Layman & Carsey, 2002; Poole & Rosenthal, 1997; Rohde, 1991). If party elites are capable of pulling away the policy platforms of their party from the median voter, this would result in an increased political polarization (Aldrich, 1983; Burden, 2001; Miller & Schofield, 2003). Because party elites are active political participants (Converse, 1964; Sniderman et al., 1991) this mechanism is a modern equivalent of the 'mobilization of bias' in politics (cf. Schattschneider, 1957). Consequently, we expect similar trends for elite polarization and political polarization and dissimilar trends for elite polarization and societal polarization. This is the *responsiveness to political elite hypothesis*.

4.3.2 *Representation of the mean partisan*

A second mechanism is derived from models of political competition and holds that political parties shift their platform positions in accordance with shifts in the position of their mean party supporter—or constituency (Abramowitz & Saunders, 1998; Adams et al., 2005; Dalton, 1985; Ezrow et al., 2008; Oosterwaal, 2007; Weissberg, 1978; Wessels, 1999).

Figure 4.2 Two distributions of preferences of partisans of four parties within a citizen population (a and b), with the corresponding weighted distributions of mean partisan preferences (c and d).



For the mechanism of mean partisan representation, the dynamics of polarization depends upon the decomposition of the distribution of citizen preferences into separate distributions of partisans within the electorate. When party supporters change their preferences towards one of the extremes, the distribution of party platforms is expected to diverge as well (Adams et al., 2005). Figure 4.2 shows a hypothetical example of this decomposition.

Distributions (a) and (b) in Figure 4.2 present citizen's policy preferences on a seven-point scale. These two distributions are similar with respect to societal polarization: The ER-measure of polarization is 0.27 for distribution (a) and distribution (b). However, a striking difference occurs when we decompose these citizen distributions into four distributions of partisans for parties A, B, C and D—with partisan positions defined by the mean partisan. The citizens' policy preferences in distribution (a) now translates into four coalitions in distribution (c). The citizen preferences in distribution (b) likewise translate into the partisan positions in distribution (d). For matters of simplicity, we assume that all citizens are partisans. Compared to distribution (c), the mean partisans of all parties are more extreme in distribution (d). As a result, the latter distribution is much more polarized, as the ER-measure of polarization confirms.

Figure 4.2 informs us that, changes in the distributions of partisans which do not affect the overall distribution of citizens, may dramatically polarize the political landscape. Thus, the mechanism of mean partisan representation by political parties could result in a gap between societal and political polarization. Hence, similar trends are expected for mean partisan polarization and political polarization and dissimilar trends are expected for mean partisan polarization and societal polarization. This is the *mean partisan representation hypothesis*.

4.3.3 *Salience*

A third mechanism that predicts dissimilar trends in political and societal polarization focuses on the salience of a policy. Bernstein (1995) shows that, for salient policies, the equilibrium platform position of parties is not at the overall electoral mean, but is located somewhere between the overall mean and the policy position of strong proponents of the policy. Other studies likewise show that a high salience of a policy results in a divergence of equilibrium party platform positions from the overall median (Adams et al., 2005; Fiorina, 2005; Lindaman & Haider-Markel, 2002). Adams et al. (2005) for example use computer simulations to study effects of salience. They show that when the salience of a policy increases: (a) the divergence of (Nash) equilibrium party platform locations expands linearly and (b) a local convergence of equilibrium party platform positions occurs at the extremes—under the condition that parties differ

with respect to their proportions (Adams et al., 2005: 55). Because global divergence reflects alienation and local convergence reflects identification, we expect the salience of a policy to be associated with political polarization, irrespective of citizen preferences for types of policy. Hence, a positive effect is expected of salience on political polarization and no effect is expected of salience on societal polarization. This is the *salience hypothesis*.

4.4 Data and Design

The description of trends in political and societal polarization on the ethnic integration policy in the Netherlands and the exploration of our hypotheses require data on the preferences of (specific) groups of voters and on the platform positions of political parties. Data on voter preferences regarding ethnic integration policy are available from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies for the years 1994 - 2006. Data on party platform positions regarding ethnic integration policy were obtained from Dutch party manifestos. The relatively small number of the available data points (five years) do not allow for a strict quantitative test. Therefore we explore our hypotheses more qualitatively by comparing changes in trends over time.

4.4.1 Political polarization

For each election year, the relevant polarization variables were computed using the ER-measure of polarization (see appendix 4.A). The first variable, *political polarization*, relates to the party platform locations of all Dutch political parties with respect to ethnic integration policy. These data were obtained by means of a content analysis of all Dutch Party Manifestos for the election years between 1994 and 2006¹⁴. Similar to the Manifesto Research Group (Budge et al., 2000; Klingemann et al., 2006), we first coded the text of party manifestos using selected search terms. This selection was subsequently cross-validated with a content analysis performed by the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR, 2007)¹⁵. Search terms used are identical for different parties within one election period, but may vary between elections. After we coded the text, we did not count the percentages of sentences a party devotes to the subject (as the Manifesto Research Group does), but scored the content of the coded

¹⁴ An alternative is to use the data of the Manifesto Research Group (Budge et al. 2006). However, these data cannot be used because they do not include all parties, which is necessary for a measure of polarization. Furthermore, these data are based on one single, and highly unstable item. For example, for the year 2002 the Manifesto Research Group places the Fortuyn party at a middle position, while the Green party is placed at a conservative position, promoting a mandatory cultural assimilation of minorities.

¹⁵ The WRR reported about the political discourse on ethnic integration in the Netherlands. The report includes a content analysis of the Party Manifestos of Dutch parties between 1998 and 2006.

text (cf. Thomson, 2001). We constructed a seven-point scale for the position of political parties on the ethnic integration policy.

The party manifesto position scale builds on three aspects of the ethnic integration policy: multiculturalism, preserving own culture and responsibility for integration. The first aspect is multiculturalism. The party manifestos reflected the viewpoints of political parties towards a multicultural society. Party manifestos that described a multicultural society as a threat or as something negative were coded as minus one. A positive viewpoint on multicultural society resulted in the score of plus one. A neutral view on the multicultural society was coded as zero. The similar method was applied for the other two aspects. A party which is positive towards ethnic minorities preserving their own culture scored a plus one. A party who held a negative view towards ethnic minorities preserving their own culture scored a minus one. A score of zero was applied when neither a negative nor a positive viewpoint was stated. The last aspect is the responsibility of integration. A party that sees integration as the responsibility of ethnic minorities themselves scored a minus one. A score of plus one was assigned to a party stating that the government is foremost responsible for the integration of ethnic minorities. Parties stating that the government as well as ethnic minorities are both responsible for integration scored a zero. A party that scores a minus one on all three aspects, holds a xenophobic position of seven ($4 - (-1-1-1)$). A party with a neutral score on all three aspects is located at a position four. A positive score on all aspects results in a position one. Table 4.1 provides a more detailed description of the coding scheme.

The variable, political polarization on ethnic integration policy, was subsequently computed on the basis of the platform positions of political parties. Parties with similar platform positions are merged into one policy coalition with aggregate proportions of parties within the coalition. The values for these proportions are the relative number of seats in Dutch parliament resulting from the particular election. The ER-measure weights positions by relative number of seats, since the relative size of groups of parties affects polarization. Smaller parties have less influence so that their position does not strengthen polarization as much as parties with a large number of seats in parliament do (see also Ezrow, 2007).

Table 4.1 Coding of political parties on ethnic integration policy between 1994 and 2006

	1994			1998			2002			2003			2006							
	i	c	m	Position	i	c	m	Position	i	c	m	Position	i	c	m	Position				
CDA	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	0	4	-1	1	0	4	0	0	-1	1
PvdA	0	1	0	3	1	0	0	3	1	0	1	2	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	4
VVD	0	0	1	5	-1	0	0	5	1	1	0	6	-1	1	0	6	-1	0	-1	6
D66	0	0	0	4	-1	1	1	3	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	1	0	0	3
GL	1	1	0	2	0	1	0	3	0	1	1	2	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	4
SP	1	1	0	4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
SGP	0	1	-1	6	-1	-1	-1	7	-1	-1	-1	7	1	1	-1	7	-1	-1	0	6
RPF	0	1	-1	4	0	-1	0	5												
GPV	0	1	0	5	-1	-1	0	6												
CD	1	1	-1	7																
CU									0	0	-1	5	0	0	-1	5	0	1	0	3
LN									0	-1	0	5								
LPF									-1	-1	0	6	-1	-1	-1	7				
PVV																	-1	-1	-1	7
PvD																	0	0	0	4

Note. Scores of parties on three indicators: (m) *multiculturalism*; (c) preserving own *culture*; (i) responsibility for *integration*. Position score = 4 - (m + c + i). Code terms: 'minorities', 'allochtoon', 'multiculturalism', 'assimilation', 'pluriform', 'multi-ethnic', 'immigrant', 'stranger', 'identity', 'newcomer', 'adaptation', 'struck roots'.

4.4.2 *Societal polarization*

The second variable, societal polarization on ethnic integration policy, was computed on the basis of data provided by the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) for each election year between 1994 and 2006. Each DPES consists of a dataset of at least 1200 respondents. A question on ethnic integration policy was incorporated in the survey as of 1994, with the standard phrasing for all election years: Should ethnic minorities be able to live in the Netherlands while preserving all customs of their own culture? A seven point scale was used, varying between (1) ethnic minorities should be able to preserve the customs of their own culture, to (7) ethnic minorities should completely adjust to Dutch culture. Each category of the scale is a group of citizens with a position ranging from one to seven. The frequency of each category is the proportion of each coalition of citizens sharing a similar policy position. For each election year between 1994 and 2006, the ER-measure was computed using the position and proportion of each coalition of citizens.

4.4.3 *Elite polarization*

The third variable, elite polarization on ethnic integration policy, used the self-reported positions of a subcategory of voters: the party members. Each DPES includes a variable indicating whether a respondent is a party member and, if so, of which party. Consequently, our conceptualization of the elite is related to party activism and party membership (Mair, 1997) rather than to social and economic status. Admittedly, this is a crude measure, but unavoidable in elite studies (Parry, 2005). The polarization measure was computed as described above for each election year.¹⁶

The fourth variable, mean partisan polarization was computed by taking the mean self-reported position on the seven points ethnic integration policy scale of voters for each specific party. Mean partisan polarization was computed from the mean positions and proportions in a similar way as described above.

Finally, the fifth variable, salience of ethnic integration policy, was defined as the importance of ethnic integration policy relative to other policies. In each DPES, respondents reported what they consider as the most important national problems in the Netherlands. The percentage of respondents who mention integration of ethnic

¹⁶ Parties with similar positions are merged into one policy coalition, with party proportions aggregated. As a criterion for a similarity of mean partisan positions we applied a maximum of one percent point difference on the scale. Also note that we apply the same proportions—based upon the number of seats in parliament—to calculate political polarization and mean partisan polarization. Consequently, differences in values of these two measures are due to differences in positions and not to differences in proportions. We checked whether similarity is driven by the weighting—computing trends with and without weights for party proportions—and found no evidence for this. Results without the weighting replicate those with weighting.

minorities among the five most important national problems is taken as indicator of salience.

4.5 A Polarized Representation of a Conservative Electorate

We precede our analysis in two steps. The first step in our analysis is to compare trends in political and societal polarization on ethnic integration policy for all election years between 1994 and 2006. We first discuss the frequency distributions and subsequently present trends in polarization. The second step is to explore the different explanations for dissimilarity in trends.

4.5.1 *Distributions of party positions and citizen preferences*

Figure 4.3 shows the frequency distributions of platform positions on ethnic integration policy for all Dutch political parties in each election year. We observe that in 1994 the Dutch political landscape on ethnic integration policy was split in seven different policy coalitions. The xenophobic wing is represented by two small parties: An extreme xenophobic party at position seven, the Centre Democrats (CD) and the Christian reformed party, the SGP, at position six. A more tolerant wing is represented by the Christian Democratic Party CDA, which hold a relatively large number of seats in parliament and the green party (GroenLinks), which has a small share in parliament. The social democratic party (PvdA) is located at position three. The liberal Democratic Party D66 and the socialist party (SP) hold the moderate position. The liberals (VVD) and reformed party (GPV) share position five, a moderate to more extreme preference.


Between 1994 and 1998, the tolerant parties slightly converged towards more moderate positions: The CDA moved towards position two and GroenLinks moved towards a shared third position with the PvdA and D66. Furthermore, the extremist party CD disappeared. As a result, the two extreme positions were hardly represented, with only a small Christian reformed party (SGP) holding an extreme xenophobic position. The moderate position is taken by the socialist party. The liberals (VVD) are at position four.

Between 1998 and 2003 a change in the distribution of platform positions on ethnic integration policy occurred. Especially in 2002, the political landscape changed dramatically. We observe the emergence of three large, homogeneous coalitions at positions two, four and six on the seven point scale. Together, these three coalitions obtained 92 percent of the votes. This shift clearly reflects the general political reaction to the upsurge of the Fortuyn movement in terms of positions in the ethnic integration policy debate. Fortuyn's party, LPF, held—together with the liberal party VVD—a large coalition at a more xenophobic position. At the same time, a larger coalition of

parties (the PvdA and GroenLinks) appeared at the tolerant end of the policy scale. The CDA shifted from a tolerant position, to a moderate position. This resulted in a large group of parties at the moderate position. In 2003, the political landscape changed once more. Yet, this change is mainly due to large changes in the amount of seats of the VVD, PvdA and LPF. Four policy coalitions appear, but now the more tolerant parties (PvdA and GroenLinks) obtained larger proportions of seats in parliament and Fortuyn’s radical, xenophobic party was decimated.

In 2006, the more tolerant parties, such as GroenLinks and the social democratic party, became less tolerant and moved towards the moderate position. The CDA, in 1994 the most tolerant party, moved towards position five. The VVD remained at a more extreme position. The extreme xenophobic position was now occupied by the rise of a new and popular party, the ‘Freedom Party’ PVV. This is a one-issue party with an explicit xenophobic (anti-Muslim) program, which fills the gap that is left by the decline of the Fortuyn party.

Figure 4.3 Positions of Dutch political parties on ethnic integration policy scale




Note. Weighted distribution by year. Source: party manifestos of all Dutch parties 1994 – 2006. Coding scheme based on seven point ethnic integration policy scale. Position one: tolerant, position seven: Xenophobic. Weight is the percentage of seats in Second Chamber of Parliament.

Figure 4.4 presents the frequency distributions of Dutch citizen preferences on ethnic integration policy for all election years between 1994 and 2006. As reported in earlier research (Adriaanse et al., 2005: 239; Van Holsteyn & Den Ridder, 2005: 226-8; Van Wijnen, 2000: 145), Dutch citizens indeed align on a stable pattern of preferences towards ethnic integration policy. Figure 4.4 shows that the preference pattern is skewed, with an overrepresentation of more conservative preferences and an average around position five on the seven-point scale. Only small differences in the general pattern are visible: In 1998 the percentage of citizens with a more xenophobic position is smaller than in the other years and in 2002 and 2003 the percentage of tolerant citizens decreased.

Given the concentration of preferences of Dutch citizens at the more xenophobic end of the ethnic integration policy scale, the positioning of mainstream Dutch parties on ethnic integration policy in 1994 and 1998 differed greatly from the Dutch citizens. Yet, in 2006, the positioning of political parties seems to be more similar to the preference distribution of the electorate.

Figure 4.4 Preferences of Dutch citizens on ethnic integration policy




Note. Weighted distribution by year. Source: Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies 1994 – 2006, full sample. Preferences measured on seven point ethnic integration policy scale. Position one: tolerant, position seven: xenophobic. Weight is the percentage of voters.

4.5.2 Comparison of trends in political and societal polarization

For a more direct comparison of trends in political polarization and societal polarization, we computed the ER-measure for the polarization of preferences of citizens and party locations on ethnic integration policy for all election years between 1994 and 2006. Figure 4.5 shows the trends, with all values standardized for 1994. It is observable that political and societal polarization show dissimilar trends.

Political polarization on ethnic integration policy remains stable between 1994 and 1998, then sharply increases with 30 percent between 1998 and 2003, followed by a strong decline of 55 percent after 2003. Overall, political polarization on ethnic integration policy decreased with 20 percent in the interval between 1994 and 2006. By contrast, societal polarization follows a stable trend, with only small fluctuations. Compared to 1994, societal polarization has decreased with six percent in 2006. The only similarity in trends that we observe is a simultaneous increase in political and societal polarization between 1998 and 2002, but which greatly differs in size.

Figure 4.5 Societal and political polarization on ethnic integration policy in the Netherlands: 1994 - 2006




Note. Source: Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies 1994 - 2006 and party manifestos 1994 -2006. All measures are standardized for 1994.

4.5.3 Exploration of hypotheses

Below, we explore the three different mechanisms that predict dissimilar trends between political polarization and societal polarization: (a) responsiveness to political elites, (b) representation of the mean partisan and (c) salience.

Figure 4.6 shows that the polarization trend of the elite strongly resembles the trend in societal polarization and clearly does not mirror the trend in political polarization. The polarization in preferences of the political elite on ethnic integration slightly decreased between 1994 and 2003 and slightly increased between 2003 and 2006. Hence, it is unlikely that political polarization on ethnic integration policy in the Netherlands was driven by responsiveness to the Dutch political elite. By contrast, the Dutch political elite strongly mirrored the polarization in preferences of the Dutch citizen in general.

Figure 4.6 Political, elite and mean partisan polarization and salience on ethnic integration policy in the Netherlands: 1994 – 2006



Note. Source: Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies 1994 - 2006 and party manifestos 1994 -2006. All measures are standardized for 1994.

When we inspect the polarization trend of the mean partisans, it strikes how strongly it resembles political polarization. Changes in both trend lines have the same direction: both sharply increase between 1998 and 2002 and then suddenly drop between 2003 and 2006. In addition, the polarization in preferences of the mean partisan has a somewhat more extreme trend than political polarization, which is exactly as predicted by the unified model of Adams et al. (2005). We obtain these results both for a measure that includes and a measure that excludes a weight for party proportions. Hence, it could be likely that the responsiveness of political parties to their constituency—the mean partisan—has driven political polarization as reflected in the party manifestos.

Finally, Figure 4.6 shows the trend line in salience of ethnic integration policy for 1994—2006. Salience shows a steady increase between 1994 and 2002, which shows

that the Fortuyn movement stepped into an existing debate which grew in importance. Saliency remained at a high level in 2003, but suddenly declines to a saliency level of below the 1998 value. Although the trend in saliency is comparable to the trend in political polarization, the trend in preference polarization of the mean partisan much better resembles political polarization. Two striking differences exist. First, saliency increases already between 1994 and 1998, whereas political polarization and mean partisan polarization both sharply increase between 1998 and 2002. Second, the decline in political polarization and mean partisan polarization between 2003 and 2006 are much sharper than the decline in saliency. Although we cannot rule out that the predicted relation exists between saliency and political polarization, the association is somewhat stronger for the mechanism of mean partisan polarization.

4.6 Conclusion and Discussion

The present chapter describes trends in societal and political polarization on ethnic integration policy in the Netherlands between 1994 and 2006. We apply the ER-measure of polarization to capture the joint effect of alienation and identification in the measurement of polarization (Esteban & Ray, 1994). The analysis reveals that—on ethnic integration policy—political polarization and societal polarization had markedly different trends. Whereas polarization in Dutch society remains fairly stable between 1994 and 2006, political polarization was highly unstable.

As one would expect from the public and scholarly debate on the new politics of polarization in The Netherlands, the upsurge of the anti-establishment Fortuyn movement in 2000 went along with a sudden, dramatic increase in the measure of political polarization applied on ethnic integration policy. In 2006, the Dutch political landscape was confronted again with the upsurge of a new, relatively xenophobic party: the Freedom Party (PVV). At the same time, the left-wing parties—especially the socialist party (SP)—gained votes. This redistribution of votes towards the extremes, combined with a renewed focus on ethnic integration policy by the xenophobe Freedom Party, made many scholars believe that political polarization had increased again in the Netherlands (e.g. Aarts et al., 2007; Achterberg, 2006; Van Kersbergen & Krouwel, 2008). However and importantly, the more sophisticated ER-measure of polarization reveals that the upsurge of the Freedom Party was not associated with an increase in political polarization on ethnic integration policy. By contrast, Dutch politics showed a sharp decline in polarization on ethnic integration policy in 2006. The explanation is that many large tolerant Dutch political parties changed their programs in favor of more restricted ethnic integration policies. Consequently, these programmatic shifts reduced political polarization.

The results of our analysis thus clearly demonstrate the viability of (more) sophisticated measures of polarization for election studies. In addition, the trend in political polarization we observe on the basis of the ER-measure has some wider implications for the study of polarization and elections. The trend in political polarization illustrates that the upsurge of a new extremist party—such as the Fortuyn party or the Freedom party—is not a sufficient explanation for political polarization. A more sophisticated analysis of programmatic (re)actions in the political system and voter responses is needed to account for the polarizing effects of new, extreme parties. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of the present chapter. In any case, our revised interpretation of the 2006 election results may call for new research in that direction.

We also explored different mechanisms that could account for a discrepancy in polarization trends for politics and society. We found no evidence for the effect of (biased) political elite of party members and party activists on party polarization, which still is the most common explanation for disparities between political and societal polarization (Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich & Rhode, 2001; Fiorina, 1999; Jacobson, 2000; King 2003; Layman et al., 2006; Saunders & Abramowitz, 2004). These studies, based on polarization in U.S. Congress, may simply not apply to multi party systems such as in the Netherlands and future research should provide more solid evidence on differences between party systems.

To explain the observed disparities between political and societal polarization under study here, a much different mechanism seems to be at work. Political polarization clearly followed the trend in preference polarization of the mean partisan polarization and the trend in salience of the ethnic integration policy. This result not only supports recent models of political competition in multi party systems (Adams et al., 2005; Ezrow et al., 2008), but also has a wider and more profound implication. The effect of salience on political polarization trends implies that salient policies are more vulnerable to polarization. More important, however, is the finding that changes in political polarization can be interpreted as the simple by-product of changes in the distribution of preferences of party constituencies. Suppose that a justified feature of a democratic system of representation is the existence of a strong link between party programs and the preference of the mean party constituent. Then, exactly this feature of a democratic system may polarize politics while citizen preferences remain fairly stable in the aggregate.

Thus, we should be careful to avoid any normative expectation that trends in political polarization should automatically reflect trends in societal polarization. We neither need to assume that political polarization is functional for the democratic process. All we need to know is that the dynamics of political competition and the realignment of voters within distributions of constituents may have subtle and unexpected effects on political polarization.

Chapter 4

Clearly, the results of the present study are limited to the study of one policy dimension in one multi party system. Although the ethnic integration policy is the second most important dimension and most controversial dimension in Dutch politics (Van der Lubben, 2006: 57), our conclusions are restricted to this particular context. The challenge for future research is to include more policies and more countries, which is difficult given the limited availability of systematic data on all party positions and citizen preferences for policies that are comparable across different elections. Thus, a comparative case-study will be the first feasible step in that direction.

Appendix 4.A The ER-Polarization Measure

Polarization exists between *actors*, denoted by $i \in \{i, j, k, \dots, n\}$ who hold a *position* on a policy, denoted by x_i . Actors can be political parties (which defines political polarization), citizens (which defines societal polarization) or other types of actors, such as subsets of citizens (which defines elite polarization or mean partisan polarization). For each policy, groups of actors are defined in terms of *coalitions* c , where $c \in \{c, d, \dots, h\}$. These coalitions are subsets of parties that all share a common policy position on policy scale x . A policy coalition c_d has two specific properties: (1) the common policy position x_c on policy scale x and (2) the proportion π_c of all actors i who hold this position on the policy scale. The proportion π_c is an aggregate of the number of members of a policy coalition, which is the aggregate proportion of all members: $\pi_c = \sum_{i=1}^k \pi_i$. Equation (1) presents the Esteban-Ray polarization measure in the notation of policy coalitions.

$$P_{\alpha}(\pi, x) = K \sum_{c=1}^h \sum_{d=1}^h \pi_c^{1+\alpha} \pi_d |x_c - x_d|$$

for $0 \leq \pi_c, \pi_d \leq 1$; $K > 0$; $\alpha \in (0, \alpha^*]$, where $\alpha^* \cong 1.6$

Parameter α adjusts for the level of identification within the policy coalitions and can be interpreted as the polarization sensitivity of the measure (Esteban and Ray 1994: 834). It is restricted to a specific domain in order to satisfy the axioms and requirement of invariance to population size. K is a scaling parameter used to normalize the measure.

Chapter 5 –

Managing employee compliance in organizational settings

This chapter is co-authored by Vincent Buskens and Tanja van der Lippe and is currently under review as ‘Managing employee compliance: decision making, delegation and implementation’.

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter we examine compliant implementation within organizations at the employee level. Employee compliance is vital for decision success (e.g. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Klein & Ralls, 1995; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). Employee compliance refers to the extent to which an employee implements a decision in conformity with the decision made by decision makers (e.g. the board of directors). Noncompliance of a decision by employees could have major consequences for the organization. For example, when employees implement a strategy decision incorrectly, there could be strategy inconsistencies throughout the organization (e.g. Wenzel, 2002).

Half the decisions in organizations result in failure which is often due to the incorrect implementation of these decisions (e.g. Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Klein & Ralls, 1995; Nutt, 1999). In particular, implementation is the catalyst between the decision and the actual consequences of the decision in the organization: during decision making process, stake holders decide which decision is best for inducing the required change in the organization. Then, during implementation, employees translate the decision into practice (Nutt, 1986: 230).

Although noncompliance may sometimes result in correcting or improving a decision, the practical importance of compliance has been highlighted repeatedly. Insights in explanations for variations in employee compliance is, however, scarce (e.g. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Nutt, 1999; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). So far, scholars have investigated different types of compliance. In particular, they have studied compliance of individuals with governmental regulations, such as the compliance of taxpayers (e.g. Wenzel, 2002). In addition, Oosterwaal & Torenvlied (2009) investigated organizational compliance with governmental decisions and found that political disagreement and the preferences of the organizations influence organizational compliance with the decisions. Furthermore, scholars have focused on organizational compliance with governmental regulations, such as environmental regulations (e.g. Potoski & Prakash, 2005; Segerson, 1988), healthcare mandates (Snell, 1992) and women diversity policies (Salancik, 1979).

The study of compliance within organizations is less developed. Few studies have investigated employee compliance with decisions within an organization. These studies mainly focus on compliance at the upper level of the organization (top management and supervisors). A study by Kim and Mauborgne (1993) examines the extent to which top-management teams of subunits comply with strategy decisions of the head office and Anderson and Johnson (2005) studied the effect of organizational mandates on

supervisors' compliance with organizational regulations within a university (Anderson & Johnson, 2005).¹⁷

In this chapter, we look at employee compliance at various levels in the organization (e.g. management, lower management and operations) by analyzing the effects of the features of the decision making, delegation and implementation stages on employee compliance. We aim to explain variations in compliant implementation across employees and across decisions. Why are some decisions implemented more with compliance than others? And how can we explain why some employees implement a decision with high compliance, whereas others hardly comply with that decision?

This chapter contributes to the literature on employee compliance in three ways. The first contribution to the management literature is that we gain insight into explanations for the variation in employee compliance with decisions within organizations. We do this by bridging insights from delegation, implementation and management studies that explain compliance, which provide different valuable insights for the study of employee compliance. In particular, management scholars studying compliance within organizations have shown how implementation features and organizational sector differences, such as the decision satisfaction of employees, decision priority and industry type affect compliance (e.g. Kim & Mauborgne, 1993). In both the delegation and implementation literature, researchers have investigated governmental decision making and implementation. Delegation and implementation scholars have shown that characteristics of decision making (e.g. disagreement among decision makers), delegation (e.g. level of control) and implementation (e.g. the priority) are important in explaining compliant implementation (e.g. McCubbins et al., 1989; Oosterwaal & Torenvlied, 2009; Torenvlied, 2000). By combining these strands of literature, we gain insight into how the decision making, delegation and implementation stages affect compliant implementation. The use of political theories in management studies is recognized by a wide range of scholars in other areas of management research (e.g. strategy research). Various organizational studies acknowledge the similarities between the political arena and organizations (e.g. Cyert & March, 1963; Mintzberg, 2002; Schein, 1977), or study political games within organizations (e.g. Ferris et al., 1989).

The second contribution of this chapter is empirical. We test our theoretical framework on a novel dataset on decision making and implementation in organizations, namely the Decision, Delegation and Implementation Data 2010 (DID2010,

¹⁷ Another field of study within organizations that is somewhat related to explaining employee compliance is the study of organizational behavior within organizations. Yet, organizational behavior scholars aim to explain organizational obedience or internalization, rather than compliance with decisions (e.g. Graham, 1991).

Oosterwaal et al., 2010a). Large-scale quantitative studies on employee compliance in organizations are scarce. A main reason for this scarcity is the sensitivity of the data. It is difficult to get information about implementation processes in organizations, especially with respect to whether employees comply with decisions. In addition, it is time intensive to include factors of decision making, delegation and implementation in the data collection. The DID2010 includes information on decision making, delegation and implementation processes in five Dutch organizations. These organizations are all large, with over 500 employees. Three organizations are public sector organizations (health care) and two are private sector organizations (facility and commercial). We study a variety of organizational decisions, such as decisions about teleworking rules, risk diagnosis procedures and training procedures for employees. These decisions are discussed at different levels in each of the organizations. Some of these decisions have been made by the chief officers of the organizations, others by managers and some by a combination of chief officers and managers. Furthermore, these decisions have been implemented by a range of actors, varying from managers, planners and psychologists and coordinators. For each of these decisions, we investigated decision making, delegation and implementation characteristics, while controlling for organizational features. The result is a unique dataset, which enables us to empirically test our hypotheses.

Finally, this chapter makes a methodological contribution to the field. For each decision, the DID2010 covers the perceptions of decision makers and employees. In addition, the DID2010 includes the implementation of several decisions for each employee, allowing analysis of how one employee implements various decisions. Furthermore, this enables analysis of variations among employees for every single decision. We thereby respond to the quest for a multi actor approach in implementation research by political and organizational scholars (cf. Klein & Sorra, 1996; O'Toole, 2000). The analysis of this data requires a statistical analysis that controls for the clustering within both implementers and decisions. Therefore, we applied the necessary cross-classified multilevel design to control for these dependencies and to prevent overestimating statistical confidence in the effects, which would occur if observations were treated as if they were independent (Fielding & Goldstein, 2006: 24; Snijders & Bosker, 1999: 155-65).

5.2 Explaining Employee Compliance

5.2.1 The process from decision making to (compliant) implementation

The process from decision making up to the actual implementation of the decision is complex and can be affected by various factors. To gather insight into those factors

affecting employee compliance with decisions, we divided the process from decision making to compliant implementation in three different stages following the model of the policy process of Laswell (1951), Rosenbaum (1991) and others: the decision making, delegation, and implementation stage.

In the first stage, decision makers discuss the problem that needs to be tackled or the situation that needs to be improved. Furthermore, they weigh the different alternatives for the decision. The decision makers may be different for each decision; some decisions are made by the board of directors, whereas others are made by the managers of the organization. The outcome of this process is the decision. The decision prescribes how the problem will be addressed and specifies the rules and procedures for implementation.

The second stage is the delegation stage. Decision makers often delegate the implementation of the decision to employees. Employees may have specific competences, skills, information, or time that a decision maker often lacks (e.g. Baliga & Jaeger, 1984:29).

The third stage is the implementation stage. Implementation refers to accomplish, carry out, fulfill, produce and complete a decision (Hill & Hupe, 2002). During this last stage, the decision is implemented with a certain level of compliance: some decisions are implemented fully in compliance with the decision, whereas others are implemented differently than prescribed. Moreover, some employees comply with most decisions, whereas others hardly comply with any decision. Features of decision making, delegation and implementation influence to what extent an employee complies with a decision (e.g. Huber & Shipan, 2002; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Oosterwaal & Torenvlied, 2009).

5.2.2 Decision making characteristics

Based on insights from the delegation literature, we distinguish two decision making features that affect compliant implementation: the complexity of a decision (Collins & Earnshaw 1992; Mastenbroek 2003) and the conflicting preferences among decision makers (e.g. Oosterwaal & Torenvlied, 2009; Torenvlied, 2000).

In particular, decision complexity during decision making is expected to negatively affect compliant implementation. A decision can be more complex for decision makers, for example, due to the technical aspects or the scope of the decision (e.g. Potoski, 1999; Ringquist, Worsham & Eisner, 2003). Decision complexity negatively affects compliance with decisions, since it increases uncertainty about which decision will best achieve the decision makers' objectives (e.g. Holmstrom, 1979, 1980; Waterman & Meier, 1998). That is, decision makers may know the outcome they want to achieve, but may lack knowledge on which decision will achieve

this outcome. Accordingly, when a decision is complex, decision makers are more dependent on the knowledge and information of the implementer. As a result, the implementer can use this information advantage to not comply with the decision during the implementation (Potoski, 1999). The first hypothesis reads:

Hypothesis 5.1 Decision complexity for decision makers negatively affects employee compliance.

In addition, disagreement among decision makers (e.g. the board of directors) about the decision affects compliant implementation (e.g. Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992; Torenvlied, 2000). We refer to disagreement among decision makers as the level of political disagreement. Political disagreement refers to the extent to which the preferences of decision makers diverge.

We expect political disagreement to negatively affect the level of compliance (Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992; Hill & Hupe, 2002; Torenvlied, 2000). The reason is that when decisions are made under political disagreement, some decision makers will still disagree with the decision after it is made (McCubbins et al., 1989; Torenvlied, 2000). Hence, some decision makers prefer another decision over the one chosen. Consequently, even when employees implement the decision, some decision makers will continue to favor noncompliance with the prescribed decision over compliant implementation of the decision (McCubbins et al., 1989; Torenvlied, 2000). For example, during a supervisors' meeting in a health care organization, a decision is made to increase uniformity in how team leaders report results on the status of clients. As possibilities for increasing uniformity are discussed, the divergent viewpoints of the supervisors emerge. Some supervisors prefer the status quo or the older system (over the proposed new reporting system). After several meetings, the final decision is reached: team leaders will use a new system for reporting results on the status of their clients to the supervisor. However, during implementation of this new reporting system, it is obvious that some supervisors still prefer the old system. As a result, supervisors who prefer the old system and who are supervising team leaders who continue using the old reporting system are less reluctant to penalize this noncompliance, since this noncompliance is closer to their own position.

The second hypothesis reads:

Hypothesis 5.2 Political disagreement among decision makers negatively affects employee compliance.

5.2.3 Delegation characteristics

After a decision is made, the decision makers delegate certain levels of authority for implementation to employees (e.g. Bendor et al., 2001; Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999;

Huber & Shipan, 2002; McCubbins et al., 1989). The level of authority delegated differs per employee and per decision. For example, some employees have little authority for implementing the decision, whereas others have more authority to perform their tasks for this decision.

The authority delegated to employees is regulated by ex ante and ex post controls. Decision makers can control implementers prior to the implementation with the use of ex ante controls. Ex ante controls are extensive when the description of a decision is clear and precisely described (Balla, 1999; Bawn, 1997; McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins et al., 1989; Torenvlied, 2000). For example, the decision is described in a detailed way, with a clear description of rules, roles and responsibilities. In addition, ex ante controls are extensive when decision makers require an employee to use specific procedures while implementing the decision (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996; Franchino, 2004; Huber & Shipan, 2002).

Ex ante procedures increase the likelihood of employee compliance. In particular, when the rules for the methods and procedures used for the implementation of the decision are not specified, the employee has room for interpretation and higher levels of discretionary authority over how to implement the decision (Chun & Rainey, 2005; Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; Huber & Shipan, 2002; May, 2003; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1983; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Employees can use this freedom and opportunities to deviate from the decision. Accordingly, when ex ante controls are limited, employees are more likely to not comply with the decision (e.g. Lipsky, 1980).

Hypothesis 5.3 Ex ante controls positively affect employee compliance.

In addition, an employee implementing a decision can be controlled ex post. Once a decision is reached and while it is being implemented, decision makers have additional possibilities to increase compliance. These ex post controls consist of monitoring and control procedures (McCubbins, 1985). For example, decision makers can organize feedback meetings to discuss the implementation. Furthermore, they can monitor the implementation with the use of external audits.¹⁸

Ex post controls are expected to be effective instruments in realizing compliance (Bawn, 1997; Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992; McCubbins et al., 1989; Miller & Friesen, 1983). Ex post controls increase compliance through the threat of the detection and sanctioning of noncompliance (Brehm & Gates, 1997; Torenvlied, 2000). This threat of

¹⁸ The combination of ex ante and ex post controls relates to the concept of task autonomy as used by various management scholars (cf. Langfred & Moye, 2004). Task autonomy of employees gives the employee considerable discretion and control in carrying out his/her tasks (Langfred & Moye, 2004). Management scholars have studied the effect of task autonomy on various performance types (such as task, team or organizational performance) (e.g. Godard, 2001; Wall et al., 1986). Yet, how autonomy relates to compliance has not been hypothesized in management studies, neither do management scholars empirically test this relation.

sanctioning makes it more likely that employees comply with the prescribed decision. We expect that the effect of ex post controls depends upon the sector of the organization.

In particular, we expect differences in the effectiveness of ex post controls between public sector and private sector organizations. We expect that ex post controls are more effective in realizing compliance in private than in public sector organizations. The reasoning behind this prediction is that the emphasis on performance-based rewards is more prevalent in the private sector (Boyne, 2002; Solomon, 1986). When employees' rewards are based on performance, the consequences of noncompliance are more prevalent. Consequently, employees within private organizations are more likely to comply with a decision if they are controlled during implementation. In addition, private sector employees face more intense competitive pressures (Boyne, 2002). As a consequence, when noncompliant behaviour of employees in private organizations is noticed due to ex post controls it is likely there will be more consequences because of intensive competition, than for employees in public sector organizations. We therefore predict that ex post controls are more effective in realizing employee compliance in private sector organizations than in public sector organizations. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5.4 Ex post controls positively affect employee compliance and this positive effect is stronger for private sector organizations than for public sector organizations.

5.2.4 Implementation characteristics

After the decision is delegated, various employees implement the decision. Implementation and management scholars distinguish two implementation features that affect employee compliance: (1) the priority employees attach to a decision (Hickson et al., 2003; Torenvlied, 2000) and (2) the satisfaction of the employee with the decision (e.g. Anderson & Johnson, 2005; Hickson et al., 2003; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Oosterwaal & Torenvlied, 2009).

First, the priority an employee attaches to implementing the decision affects his or her compliance with the decision (e.g. Calvert et al., 1989; Hickson et al., 2003; Mastenbroek, 2003; Rein & Rabinovitz, 1978; Torenvlied, 2000). The priority reflects how important the policy is for the employee.¹⁹ The decision priority can vary between employees and decisions. Some employees prioritize a certain decision, whereas other employees do not. An employee might prioritize one decision and prioritize others less.

¹⁹ The decision priority differs from the 'position priority' of employees. Position priority is used by political scholars to identify how important it is for the implementer to realize its own preference (Stokman, 2005; Van Houten, 2008: 51).

Because employees often have too many tasks to fulfill, they must choose how much time to devote to each task. Employees will choose to devote more time to decisions they prioritize than to decisions they consider less important (Mastenbroek, 2003; Versluis, 2007: 13). In other words, priority defines the distribution of attention by employees to different decisions (Noordegraaf, 2000). When employees devote more attention to the implementation, it is more likely that they will implement the decision in compliance.

Versluis (2007) shows that noncompliance of EU member states is, to a large extent, explained by the priority of the decision. Hickson et al. (2003) also showed that in cases where employees prioritize a decision, the decision was successfully implemented (Hickson et al., 2003: 1812). Hickson et al. (2003) investigated the construction of a sophisticated production facility. The implementation of the construction was delegated to various experts (including production, engineering, marketing, transportation and warehousing experts). To all these experts, realizing the production facility was top priority. It resulted in a most successful implementation; within four years, the plant had reached full production (Hickson et al., 2003: 1810). The fifth hypothesis reads:

Hypothesis 5.5 Employee's priority for the decision positively affects employee compliance.

Another crucial factor for realizing compliance is that employees are satisfied with the decision they must implement. Decision satisfaction refers to the extent to which the employee agrees with the content of the decision. When employees are satisfied with the decision, they are more likely to comply with the decision during implementation (e.g. Kim & Mauborgne, 1993). Decision satisfaction differs per employee and per decision. For example, some employees are satisfied with the decision as prescribed by decision makers, whereas others are less satisfied with the content of that decision. Also, an employee might be completely satisfied with one decision and less satisfied with another.

The reasoning behind the positive effect of decision satisfaction on compliance is: When employees agree with the prescribed decision, they experience the positive feeling of satisfaction. When employees have this positive feeling of satisfaction with the decision, they are more likely to adjust their implementing behavior in favor of the organization (Hickson et al., 2003). Hence, when employees are more satisfied with the decision, they may well be more inclined to carry out the decisions according to plan (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993).

Hypothesis 5.6 Employee decision satisfaction positively affects employee compliance.

5.3 Data and Design

We test the hypotheses on decision making and implementation in organizations with the Decision making, Delegation and Implementation Data 2010 (DID2010; Oosterwaal et al., 2010a). This dataset includes specific information about 26 decisions taken by chief officers and managers in five large organizations in the Netherlands. The organizations are public sector (health care) and private sector (facility and commercial). All have over 500 employees.

The data collection started in January 2009 and was completed in February 2010. It began with interviews with the chief officer of each organization. During the first open interview, we, together with the chief officer, made a preliminary selection of decisions to investigate. We based our selection on two main criteria: (1) decision making should have taken place in the past six months and (2) the decision should have been implemented. The decision need not have been implemented in conformity with the decision, but, in order to measure the level of employee compliance, the implementation phase must have been reached.

Next, we performed a document analysis, in which we gathered information on the content of the decisions and the actors involved. For example, we analyzed the minutes of important meetings of the chief officer and management over the past year. Subsequently, during a second interview, we selected the final decisions. Our aim was to cover a wide variety of decisions. Some decisions that were included were those about digitalizing processes, complaint procedures and risk calculations. A detailed overview of these decisions is presented in Appendix 5.A. In a final interview, the chief officer together with members of the management team identified those employees involved in the implementation of the decision. Overall, 163 potential respondents (both decision makers and employees), were involved with decision making and/or implementation across the five organizations.

We compiled a web questionnaire and the chief officer's assistant in each organization distributed the web questionnaires among the employees. These questionnaires were accompanied by an introductory letter from the chief officer with information about the study. The letter also guaranteed the employees anonymity. Employees had three weeks to complete the questionnaire.

We compiled a web questionnaire that consisted of three parts. The first covered decision making characteristics; the second, implementation characteristics; and the third, organizational and personal characteristics. The different parts of the web questionnaires were assured via routings. Actors involved in decision making were routed to part one, whereas actors involved only in implementation were routed to the second part of the questionnaire. Actors involved in decision making and in implementation were routed to both parts one and two. Because all actors were not involved in all decisions, we had a different routing to control for this with the

question: Were you involved in decision making about decision X? and Are you involved in the implementation of decision X? Part three was given to all respondents and covered organizational characteristics (e.g. reward system) and personal characteristics (e.g. organizational commitment). Of the questionnaires distributed across the five organizations, 138 (85%) were returned, which included decision makers and implementers. The respondents included managers (e.g. human resource, sector, department, account and operational managers), coordinators, chief officers, analysts, team leaders and medical employees. A possible reason for this high response was the distribution method of the questionnaires. They were distributed from and in the name of the chief officers of the organization. To minimize non-response to a question, the questionnaire was designed in a web format that prevented respondents from going on to the next question without answering all of the questions on the page. Twelve respondents did not complete the web questionnaire and dropped out halfway. Because of this, there was item non-response on the questions about the employee's relation with the organization in part three. Regardless, due to the structure of the dataset, these exclusions were not for any questions on decision characteristics and employee specific decision characteristics. It only resulted in fewer employee decision combinations since these twelve respondents did not complete the questions for all decisions.

5.3.1 Measures: dependent variable

Compliance. For each employee, we operationalized the extent to which they implemented each decision in conformity with the decision prescribed. The compliance scale was based on the compliance scale developed by Kim and Mauborgne (1993). Our scale consists of four items: (1) "I followed the description of the decision with extreme care", (2) "I fully implemented the decision according to the guidelines", (3) "I tended to disregard and subvert the decision" (reversed coded) and (4) "My actions have been fully consonant with executing the decisions". Answer categories ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). We reversed the coding of the third item. The reliability of the scale was adequate (Cronbach's $\alpha = .75$).

5.3.2 Measures: independent variables

There are three levels of independent variables. One is at the organizational level: the organizational sector. Two independent variables are at the decision level and specify characteristics of the decision making: decision complexity and political disagreement. A second level is the employee decision level and these variables specify employee-specific decision characteristics: ex ante controls, ex post controls, decision satisfaction and priority.

Decision complexity. The decision complexity is taken as an aggregate measure of the complexity per decision as perceived by each decision maker. The average is taken, since we are not so much concerned with the individual perceived complexity, but we are interested in the decision characteristics. The decision complexity is operationalized with a four item scale (cf. Sharfman & Dean, 1991): (1) “The effect of this decision was completely predictable” (reversed coded), (2) “How this decision would be implemented was already clear during decision making” (reversed coded), (3) “The decision has consequences for the many departments of the organization” and (4) “It was difficult to foresee long term consequences of the decision”. Answer categories ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The reliability of the scale was good (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .77$).

Political disagreement. The political disagreement is taken as an aggregate measure of the political disagreement per decision as perceived by each decision maker. Again, we take the average, since we are not so much concerned with the individual perceived political disagreement, as with the decision characteristics. The measure of political disagreement is based on the cognitive conflict scale developed by Jehn (1994) and used by many scholars including Amason (1996) and Janssen, Van de Vliert & Veenstra (1999). The political disagreement scale is operationalized with a four item scale. “The decision makers agreed on the content of the decision” (reversed coded) and “Diverging perspectives on this decision were the rule rather than exception” represent scale items. Answer categories ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The reliability of the scale was good (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .86$).

Ex ante controls. We operationalized the perceived level of ex ante controls of implementers for each decision they implemented. The ex ante controls measure is based on the theoretical concept of ex ante controls used in the delegation literature (see also Chapter 3 of this dissertation) (e.g. Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999; Franchino, 2004; Huber & Shipan, 2002; Thomson et al., 2007) and the method and scheduling autonomy scale of Breugh (1985; 1999). The scale consists of four items. “I am free to choose the method(s) to use in carrying out the implementation of this decision” (reversed coded) and “The procedures and rules in the decision are clearly and precisely described” represent scale items. Answer categories ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The reliability of the scale was adequate (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .71$).

Ex post controls. We operationalized the perceived level of ex post controls of implementers for each decision they implemented. The measure of ex post controls is based upon the control scales of Langfred and Moye (2004), Snell (1992) and Costa (2000). The scale consists of four items. “How I implement the decision is strictly supervised” and “If I deviate from the decision, then this will be noticed” are

representative items. Answer categories ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The reliability of the scale was good (Cronbach's $\alpha = .80$).

Decision satisfaction. For each employee, we operationalized the level of decision satisfaction on each decision he or she had to implement. The four item scale is a combination of the outcome satisfaction scale developed by Kim and Mauborgne (1993). The scale consists of four items. "I am satisfied with the content of the decision" and "I agree with the decision" represent scale items. Answer categories ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The reliability of the scale was good (Cronbach's $\alpha = .87$).

Priority. For each employee, we operationalized the level of priority they attached to each decision. The priority employees attach to a decision is measured with a scale based on Hickson et al. (2003). We constructed a four item scale. "The decision has my priority above other tasks" and "The decision is of high importance to me" represent scale items. Answer categories ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The reliability of the scale was good (Cronbach's $\alpha = .83$).

Organizational sector. We differentiate between private sector (coded 0) and public sector (coded 1).

5.3.3 Controls

We included several control variables in our model. First, we controlled for the organizational procedural justice. Procedural justice refers to the fairness of the procedures and dynamics of decision making (e.g. Lind & Tyler, 1988). Research has shown that procedural justice increases employee compliance with decisions (e.g. Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993). The measure of procedural justice was based on the procedural justice scale of Kim and Mauborgne (1993). Procedural justice is measured as the organizational procedural justice as perceived by the employee on a four item scale. "Consistent decision-making procedures are applied across departments and decisions" and "The procedures for decision making are correct and fair" are representative items. Answer categories ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The reliability of the scale was good (Cronbach's $\alpha = .87$).

Second, we control for the organizational employee commitment. Commitment highlights the strength of the attachment of the employee to the organization and positively affects compliance (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Mowday et al., 1979). The measure of commitment of each employee was measured using the commitment scale developed by Meyer and Allen (1991). "This organization is of strong personal meaning to me", "I have a strong feeling that I belong to this organization" and "This organization deserves my loyalty" represent scale items. Answer categories ranged

from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The reliability of the scale was adequate (Cronbach's $\alpha = .75$).

Third, we controlled for the type of decision. The dataset covers a wide range of decisions. Some scholars have shown that the type of decision affects decision making and implementation (e.g. Kvidera & Koutstaal, 2008; Sagie & Koslowsky, 1996). We distinguish between two different types of decisions: organizational and task related decisions. Organizational decisions are related to common organizational rules, such as the rules for teleworking. Task-related decisions specify the rules for day-to-day tasks, like the methods used for client registration. Organizational decisions are coded 0 and task related decisions are coded 1.

5.3.4 *Structure of the dataset*


The dataset has a complex interdependence structure with three levels: organizations, decisions and employees. In particular, each of the 228 implementations is nested in a specific combination of a decision and an employee and in a specific organization. On average three decision makers were involved with each decision and each decision maker is, on average, involved in the decision making of two decisions. Furthermore, on average, each decision is implemented by eight implementers and each implementer is, on average, involved in the implementation of two decisions. This results in 26 decisions by 83 decision makers and 228 implementations by 106 implementers. Of these 106 implementers, 61 are involved in both decision making and implementation of one or more decisions. Ten employees completed the questionnaire, but indicated that they were neither involved in decision making nor took part in its implementation. These employees were excluded from the analysis.

Furthermore, each decision and employee is nested in an organization and the decision and employee have a cross-classified nesting structure. Thus, the dataset has a three level structure, of which two levels are cross-classified. The combination of employees differs per decision and vice versa. Thus, a decision implementation can be influenced both by the characteristics of the employee and the decision or by an interaction of both and by the characteristics of the organization. Figure 5.1 is a schematic representation of this nesting structure for one organization, with eight implementations, nested within four decisions and five employees.

Figure 5.1 shows that decision implementations are clustered in decisions and in employees. Above this cross-classification is a higher level unit, the organization. Therefore, the following random effects are included in our regression models: (i) a random effect for the organization, (ii) a random effect for the specific implementer, (iii) a random effect for the specific decision, and (iv) a residual for each unique decision implementer combination. In other words, we analyzed the variation in

compliance created by the crossing of two random factors (decisions and implementers) and the organizational level. In addition, effects of decision level variables can vary randomly across implementer's level predictors and vice versa (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). If we would fail to recognize the cross-classified nesting, we would under-specify the model and obtain poor estimates of effects (cf. Fielding & Goldstein, 2006:24). This is true both for effects of explanatory variables and for the random effects of factors in the data structure (Fielding & Goldstein, 2006). In addition to the random effects of organizations, we also analyze a fixed effects model for organizations to check the robustness of our results across the same sector organizations.

Figure 5.1 Cross-classified nesting structure of seven implementations within three decisions and four employees



5.4 Results

5.4.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 5.1 reports the correlations between the explanatory and outcome variables, along with the means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values of the variables included in the analyses. The correlations show that ex ante and ex post controls, priority, procedural justice and organizational sector are positively correlated to compliance. Decision satisfaction is strongly correlated with compliance. Decision complexity is negatively correlated with compliance. Furthermore, complexity and political disagreement are positively correlated. Political disagreement is negatively correlated with ex ante controls and decision satisfaction.

Table 5.1 Means, standard deviation and correlations


	N	Mean	Std. dev	Min.	Max.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Employee compliance	228	3.85	.70	1.5	5.0								
2. Decision complexity	26	2.50	.43	1.8	3.4	-.17**							
3. Political disagreement	26	2.42	.57	1.6	4.0	-.09	.40**						
4. Ex ante controls	228	3.42	.85	1.0	5.0	.14*	-.12	-.25**					
5. Ex post controls	228	2.92	.84	1.0	4.8	.28**	-.09	-.08	.12				
6. Decision satisfaction	228	3.85	.78	1.25	5.0	.60**	-.14**	-.23**	.02	.32**			
7. Priority	228	3.30	.89	1.0	5.0	.25**	-.18**	-.21**	-.11	.22**	.18**		
8. Decision type	26	0.52	.50	0.0	1.0	.11	.09	-.04*	.03	.13	.06	.13	
9. Organization sector	5	0.64	.48	0.0	1.0	.16*	.00	.00	.34**	.04	.01	.14*	.00

Note. * = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$.

The descriptive statistics of employee compliance show that a decision is implemented with an average of 3.85 on the compliance scale, with a minimum of 1.5 and a maximum of 5. This indicates that none of the employees, implemented a decision completely different from the prescribed decision and some employees have implemented a decision fully compliant with the decision.

Figure 5.2 shows the level of compliance of employees on the decisions and demonstrates that some employees implemented a decision in complete conformity with the decision. An example of such a decision is the digitization of the health administration. This digitization was implemented in a Dutch health care organization with around 3000 employees. The respondents to the questions were the managers responsible for the implementation of the new digital system. The data show that the guidelines and procedures for the digitizing were implemented by the managers with high compliance. Noncompliance would occur when managers still use the older health administrative system.

Figure 5.2 Level of compliance of employee (x) on each decision



Note. Employees sharing the same position on compliance are indicated by the thickness of the cross.

Figure 5.2 also indicates that, on some decisions, the employees highly differed with respect to how well they complied with the decision. An example is the decision and implementation of a child policy, in which employees of a health care organization (with over 4000 employees) were asked to follow specific guidelines and procedures when the client is a child. The level of compliance in implementation ranged between 2.5 and 4.75 for this decision. Some employees followed these rules strictly and used different methods and procedures when their client was a child. Others indicated that they often deviated from these guidelines.

5.4.2 *Analysis*

Table 5.2 demonstrates the results of the analysis on employee compliance. The first column of Table 5.2 displays the empty model, with a random component to control for organizational differences. The second column displays the full model with all explanatory variables and a random component to control for organizational differences.

The empty model shows that there were considerable differences among employees and among decision-employee combinations, as indicated by a relatively high individual level (0.17) and residual (0.27) variance. The differences between decisions and organizations are lower, with a decision level variance of 0.03 and an organizational level variance of 0.02. Comparing the variances of the empty and the full models indicates that the employee, the decision and the decision-employee level variances are, to a large extent, explained by the model. The organizational variance is hardly explained by the model.

5.4.3 *Test of hypotheses*

First, we examine the effects of the decision making features on employee compliance. We expect that for more complex decisions, employee compliance is less likely. The analysis shows that decision complexity has a negative significant effect on employee compliance: employees comply less with decisions that are more complex for decision makers. The coefficient of complexity indicates that a one-point increase in complexity corresponded with a -0.24 decrease in employee compliance on a scale from 1 to 5. This result supports Hypothesis 5.1. We furthermore expect that political disagreement has a negatively affect on employee compliance. The correlations between political disagreement and employee compliance are negative and insignificant. However, the analysis of political disagreement in the cross-classified multilevel design reveals, a positive and significant effect: employees comply better when decisions are taken under higher levels of political disagreement. This finding contradicts our prediction and we therefore reject Hypothesis 5.2.

Second, we analyze the effects of delegation features on employee compliance. The analysis shows that the higher the level of ex ante controls, the significantly higher the level of employee compliance. The coefficient of ex ante control indicates that a one-point increase in ex ante controls corresponds with a 0.15 increase in employee compliance. This result supports Hypothesis 5.3 and demonstrates that ex ante controls contribute to employee compliance. In addition, we expect that ex post controls positively affect employee compliance and that this effect is stronger for private sector organizations. The results show that employees of private sector organizations implement decisions less in conformity with the decision than employees in the public sector. Moreover, the interaction effect between ex post controls and private sector reveals that ex post controls are effective for compliance in private organizations. The direct effect of ex post controls on employee compliance in public organizations is negative and insignificant (when private sector = 0). This result indicates that ex post controls do not lead to more employee compliance in public sector organizations. These findings partly support Hypothesis 5.4.

Third, we investigate the effects of implementation features on employee compliance. In particular, we take into account the level of decision satisfaction of employees and the priorities employees attach to the decision to explain the level of employee compliance. The analysis demonstrates a positive significant effect for the priority employees attach to a decision on the compliance with the decision. In addition, the results show a strong and significant estimate for the effect of decision satisfaction on employee compliance. The coefficient of decision satisfaction indicates that a one-point increase in decision satisfaction corresponds with a 0.47 increase in employee compliance. These results strongly support Hypotheses 5.5 and 5.6.

Finally, we control for the effects of procedural justice, organizational commitment and decision type. The analysis shows that procedural justice does not significantly affect compliance. Although the correlations reveal a positive and significant correlation of procedural justice with compliance, the cross-classified multilevel analysis does not replicate this finding. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that the commitment of employees to the organization does not affect the extent to which an employee complies with the decision. Furthermore, the type of decision does not significantly affect employee compliance.

Table 5.2 Cross-classified multi level analysis explaining employee compliance (standard error in parentheses), N = 228.

	Empty model	Model 1	Full model
Intercept	3.85 (.09)**	.94 (.51)*	1.06 (.52)*
<i>Decision</i> (<i>Decision level</i>)			
Decision complexity		-.27 (.12)*	-.24 (.12)*
Political disagreement		.27 (.09)**	.25 (.10)*
<i>Delegation</i> (<i>Employee-decision level</i>)			
Ex ante controls		.14 (.05)**	.15 (.05) **
Ex post controls		.01 (.05)	-.05 (.12)
<i>Implementation</i> (<i>Employee-decision level</i>)			
Decision satisfaction		.47 (.05)**	.47 (.05)**
Priority		.17 (.04)**	.17 (.04)**
<i>Organization</i> (<i>Organizational level</i>)			
Private sector		-.19 (.20)	-.80 (.36)*
<i>Interaction</i>			
Ex post control * Private sector			.22 (.11) *
<i>Controls</i> (<i>Employee level</i>)			
Procedural justice		.06 (.07)	.05 (.07)
Organizational		.02 (.08)	.02 (.09)
Task related decision		.11 (.10)	.08 (.09)
Organizational level variance (N=5)	.02 (.04)	.03 (.04)	.02 (.04)
Decision level variance (N=26)	.04 (.02)	.02 (.01)	.02 (.02)
Employee level variance (N=106)	.17 (.05)	.07 (.03)	.06 (.03)
Residual	.27 (.04)	.19 (.02)	.19 (.02)
Log likelihood	-228	-186	-185

Note. * = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$.

Additional analysis. To check the robustness of our findings, we performed an additional analysis with fixed effects for organizations. The fixed effect model includes dummies to control for differences between organizations, while the random effect for organizations is removed. We include the same explanatory and control variables as in the full model, but, in addition to adding dummies for the organizations, we also separately add interactions of ex post controls with each organization. The fixed effects model replicates all the substantive findings of the random effects model with respect to variables that are not directly related to the different organizations in the analysis.

In addition, because of the limited number of organizations, we check whether the interaction effect of ex post controls and private sector organizations is robust across organizations. This analysis reveals that ex post controls only have a positive significant effect in one of the two private sector organizations. In the other private sector organization, the effect is also positive, but not significant. Furthermore, ex post controls have a negative significant effect in two of the three public sector organizations. In the other public sector organizations, the effect is negative and insignificant. Therefore, although the model with fixed effects for each organization and for organizations, in general, supports and is in line with Hypothesis 5.4, other potential explanations for the dependency of the effect of ex post controls on organizations that are related to other unmeasured properties of the few organizations involved cannot be excluded.

5.5 Conclusion and Discussion

Various scholars have found that compliance contributes to decision success (e.g. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Klein & Ralls, 1995; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). In this chapter, we explain employee compliance, by distinguishing features of decision making, delegation and implementation that affect employee compliance. We base our predictions on insights from delegation, implementation and management studies on compliant implementation and investigate employee compliance with decisions in five large Dutch organizations.

This chapter demonstrates that the extent to which employees comply with decisions in organizations is influenced both by decision making, delegation and implementation features. First, we demonstrate that decision complexity for decision makers negatively affects employee compliance with the decision. In particular, this study demonstrates that, the more complex the decision is for decision makers, the lower the level of employee compliance with the decision during the implementation stage.

Second, this study shows that features of delegation, in particular ex ante and ex post controls, influence employee compliance with the decision. We predict that the delegated authority reflected by the levels of ex ante and ex post control, is crucial for employee compliance. Indeed, this study shows that ex ante controls stimulate employee compliance. This finding implies that organizations can increase the likelihood of employee compliance by exerting high levels of ex ante control. These controls may include a more detailed description of the decision, in which the roles and responsibilities are explicated, as well as defining strict and clear guidelines for implementation. Furthermore, this study indicates that ex post controls stimulate employee compliance in private organizations, whereas, in public sector organizations, ex post controls do not seem to affect employee compliance. Although additional analysis shows that also among private sector organizations, the effectiveness of ex post controls in realizing employee compliance may differ, it seems that overall in private organizations employees who are stricter controlled in their tasks are more likely to comply with the decision. This finding suggests that private sector organizations can increase the likelihood of compliance by exerting high levels of ex post controls. These ex post controls make sure that there will be consequences for those employees who do not comply with a decision. Ex post controls can be increased by strict monitoring of the employees. Also, regular feedback meetings, in which the implementation of the decisions is discussed, increase the level of ex post controls and thereby the compliance.

Third, we demonstrate that implementation characteristics affect employee compliance, namely decision satisfaction and priority for the decision. In particular, this chapter shows that employees need to agree with the decision in order to stimulate employee compliance. This implies that, in order to increase the extent to which employees comply with the decision, it is vital to fully or partially adapt the decision to the preferences of the employees or to increase the employees' support for the decision. In addition, this study reveals that the priority employees attach to a decision affects employee compliance. Hence, for decisions where compliant implementation is essential, it is valuable to increase the priority employees attach to a decision.

Finally, we show that employee compliance is influenced by variances at the employee, decision and organizational level, using a cross-classified design to control for the dependencies. Future analysis could benefit from employing this technique, since a cross-classified nesting structure is typical for data on implementation: decisions are often implemented by various employees and various employees implement different decisions.

This study had some unexpected findings. We predicted that political disagreement would have a negative effect on employee compliance. The correlation between political disagreement and employee compliance is negative, but not

significant. Yet, the cross-classified multilevel analysis showed a positive significant effect of political disagreement on employee compliance. A possible explanation for the contradictory findings between the correlation and the cross-classified multilevel analysis is that the effect of political disagreement on employee compliance is actually an indirect effect of decision satisfaction and ex ante controls. Hence, because of the strong effects of especially decision satisfaction on employee compliance, it is difficult to estimate the direct effect of political disagreement on employee compliance and the interpretation of the direct effect is not straightforward.

The data also have some limitations. Quantitative studies on implementation are scarce. This research is a first step toward an empirical test of more comprehensive implementation models. However, the data is limited with respect to cross-sectional representation. Consequently, we cannot make any firm conclusions about causal relationships between the same source variables. The decision making indicators came largely from a different source (decision makers) than the outcome variable (employees). Yet, the delegation and implementation variables came largely from the same source as compliance. It is, for instance, possible that employees who comply with a decision, value a decision therefore as more to their priority. In addition, some personal characteristics may have biased the answers, as some employees are more satisfied in general than other employees. These traits may have biased their perception of the satisfaction with the decision and their priority of and compliance with decisions. In addition, the use of self-reports may have caused bias, due to the desire to give socially acceptable answers. Team member or supervisor assessments could improve the measurement of compliance in future studies. Furthermore, the number of organizations included in the study is small. This limited insight into how the interaction effect of ex post controls and organizational sector might affect the outcome. By including more public and private sector organizations in their research, future researchers might generate more insight into the differences in the effect of ex post control in public and private sector organizations.

Appendix 5.A Decision Overview

Decisions

1. Rules for teleworking
 2. Rules for use of mobile phones
 3. External recruitment rules
 4. Compensation travel expenses
 5. Remonstrations policy
 6. Protocols about shower and bathing of clients who are physically and/or mentally ill
 7. Steps to be taken in care arrangements
 8. Growth and development policy for employees
 9. Sexuality policy
 10. Child policy
 11. Support plan
 12. Risk diagnosis
 13. Methods on location
 14. Training procedures
 15. Report system on location
 16. House rules for open-office
 17. Tasks of dedicated team
 18. Damage policy
 19. Digitalization of the health administration
 20. Procedures for commercial decisions
 21. Change in risk calculations
 22. Tasks of the product team
 23. Conditions for fair value
 24. Rules in reporting
 25. Product selection
 26. Revenue system
-

Chapter 6 –

Managing employee compliance over time

This chapter is single-authored and will be soon submitted as ‘Managing employee compliance: an in depth analysis of compliant implementation of a quality management policy over time’.

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we examine employee compliance with one policy within one organization over time. In particular, we investigate to what extent employees of a commercial service sector organization comply with a quality management policy at two moments in time. We focus on a quality management policy, as quality management is an essential policy in many organizations. In particular, already in 1992, almost 80 percent of the large U.S. organizations had adopted a quality management policy as a means of increasing their organizational performance (cf. Douglas & Judge, 2001; Shea & Howell, 1998; Sitkin et al., 1994). More recently, in the light of the financial crisis, quality management reappears again high on the agenda of organizations as an important means to improve their market position, e.g. to distinguish themselves from other organizations and to attract new costumers.

Yet, whether a quality management policy is indeed a sufficient tool in realizing organizational performance largely depends on how the quality policy is implemented (cf. Douglas & Judge, 2001; Dow et al., 1999; Hackman & Wageman, 1995; Reger et al., 1994). In order to realize organizational performance it is crucial that employees comply with the various rules and guidelines of the quality policy (e.g. Douglas & Judge, 2001: 164; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Klein & Ralls, 1995; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). The level of employee compliance refers to the extent to which an employee implements the policy in conformity with the prescribed rules and guidelines of the policy. Yet, how to explain variations in employee compliance with a quality management policy is largely unknown. Indeed, various scholars assert that studies explaining the implementation of quality management policies are scarce (e.g. Dale et al., 2001; Dean & Bowen, 1994; Taylor & Wright, 2003; Wilkinson et al., 1994).

The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, we aim to improve the study of implementation of quality management policies, by providing insight in how factors of delegation and implementation affect the implementation of various aspects of a quality management policy. We distinguish various predictors for employee compliance with the quality management policy by building on insights from the management, delegation and implementation literature (see also Oosterwaal et al., 2010). Scholars provide different valuable insights for explanations of compliant implementation of decisions. In particular, management scholars studying compliance within organizations have shown how implementation features, like the decision satisfaction of employees, affect employee compliance (Anderson & Johnson, 2005; Daly & Geyer, 1994; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993). Delegation and implementation scholars have shown that, in addition to the implementation factors, factors of the delegation stage should also be included in explanations of compliant implementation (see also Oosterwaal et al., 2010) (e.g. Chun & Rainey, 2005; Huber & Shipan, 2002;

May, 2003; McCubbins et al., 1989). We bridge these insights and investigate to what extent the various predictors of the delegation stage (as distinguished by delegation and implementation scholars) and the implementation stage (as distinguished by management and implementation scholars) affect employee compliance with the quality management policy. We empirically test our predictions, using a novel dataset on delegation and implementation: Delegation and Implementation Data Longitudinal 2010 (DIDL2010, Oosterwaal et al., 2010b). The DIDL2010 covers detailed information of the quality management policy. In particular, the dataset takes into account that the quality management policy comprises a number of different policy decisions that have to be implemented. For example, the quality policy consists of a policy decision about increasing the quality of the product and a policy decision about the quality of the contact with clients. The DIDL2010 covers the perceptions of employees for each policy decision of the quality management policy.

Our second aim is to provide insight in how changes in delegation and implementation features affect employee compliance over time. We study employee compliance at two moments in time, covering a period of six months. In between these six months the organization under study altered the delegation and implementation features (expected to affect employee compliance) of the quality management. The DIDL2010 includes measures of the delegation and implementation features at two time points. The longitudinal design enables us to investigate to what extent changes in delegation and implementation features affect the level of employee compliance. To analyze this unique dataset requires a statistical analysis that controls for the clustering within both employees and within different policy decisions of the quality policy at two moments in time. This study applies a cross-classified multi level design to control for these cross nested dependencies. A cross-classified design accounts for situations in which observations are statistically dependent simultaneously at different levels (employee and policy decision) and prevents that we overestimate statistical confidence in the effects, which would occur if we treat observations as if they were independent (Fielding & Goldstein, 2006: 24; Snijders & Bosker, 1999: 155-65).

6.2 The Quality Management Policy

In this chapter, we study the implementation of a quality management policy in a commercial service sector organization concerned with accounting and consultancy. The organization is a large multinational organization. We investigate one subunit of the organization located in the Netherlands. The subunit has more than 150 employees and is mainly concerned with accounting in public and private sector organizations.

The quality management policy under study comprises of seven different policy decisions. The first policy decision of the quality management policy includes the

decision that employees should fill in an action program, which highlights their goals and specifies how they attain their goals. The second policy decision entails the use of specific systems and computer programs. The third policy decision addresses the planning of the year cycle. Every employee is demanded to fill out and adapt their year cycle, which includes their project planning for one year. The fourth policy decision encompasses the organization of kick-off meetings, where employees discuss the project with the team and the partner or manager. The fifth policy decision of the quality management policy covers the dossier archive and sets specific procedures for archiving files of clients. The sixth policy decision addresses the review processes by partners, whereby partners and employees should have various review processes during the project to discuss the different phases of the project. The seventh policy decision entails that employees should send a draft version of their report to the client one week before the actual deadline, in order to inform their client.

In October 2009, the organization decided to increase the quality of their products to obtain a better position in the market than competing accounting firms. The organization aimed to increase the compliance of employees with the current quality management policy, as they believe that increasing employee compliance will result in a better quality of their services. To increase compliance with the quality management policy, the board of directors decided to alter various delegation and implementation characteristics of the current quality management policy. First, the organization aimed to give a better instruction of the tasks, roles and responsibilities of each employee for each policy decision of the quality management policy, resulting in higher levels of ex ante control. In addition, the organization aimed to monitor employees more strictly and to build in more meetings where employees present their work to their superior, leading to higher levels of ex post control. In addition, the board of directors aimed to increase the importance of the quality management policy among employees. Several lunch meetings and breakfast sessions were organized to highlight the importance of the quality policy. By altering these three delegation and implementation features, the organization aimed to increase the employee compliance with the quality policy.

6.3 Managing Employee Compliance: Delegation and Implementation

6.3.1 Delegation

Employees have to implement the policy decisions of the quality management policy. The decision makers thereby delegate a share of their authority to the employees over how to implement the policy decisions. The logic behind delegating powers to an employee is that the employee may have specific competences, skills, information, or

simply the time that a decision maker often lacks (e.g. Baliga & Jaeger, 1984: 29). The authority delegated to employees is regulated by ex ante controls and ex post controls.

First, decision makers can control employees prior to the implementation with the use of ex ante controls. Ex ante controls are extensive when the description of the roles and responsibilities of an employee for the implementation of a policy decision of the quality management policy is clear and precisely described. Moreover, ex ante controls are extensive when decision makers specify the procedures for implementation (Balla, 1999; Bawn, 1997; McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins et al., 1989; Moe, 1989; Torenvlied, 2000). Ex ante controls can vary per employee. For example, the fourth policy decision encompasses the organization of kick-off meetings, where employees discuss the project with the team and the partner or manager. Every employee has his/her own role during these meetings and some employees might be strictly controlled ex ante (e.g. they are given strict guidelines with respect to their roles and responsibilities during these meetings), whereas other employees have more authority in defining themselves how to fulfill their role during these meetings. In addition, the level of ex ante controls can vary per policy decision, whereby an employee is strictly controlled on one policy decision, but hardly controlled on the implementation of another policy decision.

Ex ante controls are expected to increase employee compliance. The reason is that ex ante controls give employees little room for interpretation and authority on how to implement the policy decision. As a result, employees will be more likely to comply with the policy decision (e.g. Huber & Shipan, 2002; Motwani, 2001; Shortell et al., 1995). On the other hand, when the rules for the methods and procedures used for the operation of the decision are not specified, this gives the employee room for interpretation and higher levels of authority over how to implement the decision (Chun & Rainey, 2005; Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; Huber & Shipan, 2002; May, 2003; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1983; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). It is likely that employees stretch the given room for interpretation, resulting in undesired interpretation and noncompliance with the policy decision. Accordingly, when ex ante controls are lower, employees are less likely to comply with the decision.

For example, the fifth policy decision of the quality management policy covers the procedures for archiving files of clients (to ensure secure storing of files). When decision makers exert high levels of ex ante controls on this policy decision, they will define the exact time deadline for returning the dossiers of clients to the archive, e.g. within 180 days the dossier should be stored in the archive. If instead the levels of ex ante controls are low, than the policy decision would, for instance, specify that dossiers should be returned to the archive as soon as possible. This low level of ex ante controls makes it more likely that employees will use this vagueness to deviate from the rules. The reason is that they will stretch the room for interpretation, since it is hard to define

the turning point where the employee does not comply with the policy decision, since this is related with the interpretation of employees.

Hypothesis 6.1 Ex ante controls positively affect employee compliance with the quality management policy.

In addition, controls can be exerted during and after the implementation of the quality management policy. These ex post controls consist of monitoring and sanctioning (McCubbins, 1985). Decision makers can monitor the implementation in different ways, for example with the use of audits or they can organize feedback meetings to control implementation. The archiving of files of clients (the fifth policy of the quality policy), can for instance, be controlled with the use of a computer system that registers when employees return the dossiers of clients to the archive.

The level of ex post controls can vary per policy decision. On some policy decisions employees are hardly controlled, whereas the ex post controls on other policy decisions of the quality management policy are stricter. The level of ex post controls can also differ per employee, depending on their function and their supervisor. For the archiving of files of clients, the ex post controls are highly comparable for every employee, although some differences may exist due to supervisors reaction on the delays noticed by the computer system. For other policy decisions, differences between employees are larger, whereby some employees are hardly controlled in their tasks and others are strictly controlled in whether they comply with the rules and guidelines of the policy decision. The sixth policy decision, for example, states that partners and employees should have various review processes during the project to discuss the different phases of the project. The ex post controls on this policy decision are exerted by the partner and to a small extent by the board of directors (who control the partner). Depending on the partner, the sanctioning for not attending review processes differs per employee. Also, it is likely, that trainees are more likely to be controlled in attending these review processes, than senior managers.

Ex post controls make it more likely that noncompliant behavior is noticed and sanctioned. Thus, the consequences of noncompliance are larger when ex post controls are stronger (Bawn, 1997; McCubbins et al., 1989; Miller & Friesen, 1983). This threat of sanctioning makes it more likely that employees comply with the policy decision (Brehm & Gates, 1997; Torenvlied, 2000). The fifth hypothesis reads:

Hypothesis 6.2 Ex post controls positively affect employee compliance with the quality management policy.

6.3.2 Implementation

Characteristics of the implementation process itself also influence the level of compliant implementation with the quality management policy. The implementation and management literature distinguish several characteristics of the implementation stage that affect the extent to which employees comply with the decision.

First, management and implementation studies indicate that the *priority* of the policy decision affects the implementation of the policy decision. The priority reflects how important the policy decision is for the employee (e.g. Mastebroek, 2003; Noordegraaf, 2000; Torenvlied, 2000). The priority can differ per employee and per policy decision. For example, the third policy decision of the quality policy addresses the planning of the year cycle. We can expect that this policy decision is of high priority for senior project managers, who have a few big projects of which most are known already a year in advance. The year cycle helps them to ensure that their planning is realistic. For trainees the planning of the year cycle is less priority, as their planning is more ad hoc and the year cycle does not directly advance their jobs. Another example is the first policy decision of the quality management policy, which entails that employees should fill in an action program highlighting their goals and specifying how they attain their goals. This policy decision is likely to be of priority by ambitious employees who aim to develop themselves and would like to gain a higher position in the organization. This policy decision is likely to be of lower priority to employees who are satisfied with their current capabilities and do not aim to develop themselves.

We expect that when employees have a policy decision to their priority, this will lead to a higher level of employee compliance. The reason is that employees often have too much tasks to fulfill and therefore they have to choose how much time they devote to each task. Employees will choose to devote more time to tasks they prioritize than to tasks that are not so important to them (Mastebroek, 2003; Versluis, 2007: 13). Moreover, when employees devote more attention to the implementation of the policy decision, it is more likely that they will implement that policy decision in compliance with the prescription.

Hypothesis 6.3 The priority employees attach to a policy decision, positively affects their compliance with the policy decision of the quality management policy.

Another crucial factor in realizing employee compliance is the level of *decision satisfaction* for the quality management policy. Decision satisfaction refers to the extent to which employees agree with the content of the policy decision. The decision satisfaction can vary among employees and policy decisions. For example, the second

policy decision of the quality policy entails the use of specific systems and computer programs. When employees are not satisfied with the decision to use these specific systems, they are likely to use other (older or less advanced) systems for their work and thereby not comply with the quality decision. This noncompliance has consequences for the consistency throughout the organization and therefore for the collaboration among employees, for instance due to difficulties in sharing files with other employees.

When employees are satisfied with a policy decision of the quality management policy, they are more likely to comply with that policy decision during implementation (e.g. Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Torenvlied 2000). The reasoning behind the positive effect of decision satisfaction on employee compliance is as follows: When employees agree with a prescribed decision of the quality management policy, they experience the positive feeling of satisfaction. When employees have this positive feeling of satisfaction, they are more likely to adjust their implementing behavior in favor of the organization (Hickson et al., 2003; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993). Hence, when employees are more satisfied with a quality policy decision, they may well be more inclined to carry out that policy decision of the quality management policy in conformity with the prescription.

Hypothesis 6.4 Decision satisfaction positively affects employee compliance with the quality management policy.

6.3.3 Employee compliance over time

The quality management policy under study, as described in Section 6.2 was altered in between time point one and two. The board of directors aimed to increase the level of employee compliance with the policy decisions of the quality management policy and therefore altered various delegation and implementation features. In particular, the organization aimed to give a better instruction of the tasks, roles and responsibilities of employees for the quality management policy, resulting in higher levels of ex ante control. In addition, the organization aimed to monitor and control employees more strictly, leading to higher levels of ex post control. Furthermore, the board of directors aimed to increase the importance of the quality management policy among employees. We thus expect that the level of ex ante and ex post controls and the priority of the quality policy are increased after the alteration of delegation and implementation features in December 2009. The hypotheses read:

Hypothesis 6.5 The level of ex ante controls, ex post controls and priority of the quality management policy are higher at time point two than at time point one.

We furthermore predict that ex ante controls, ex post controls and the priority employees attach to the decision positively affect employee compliance. Accordingly, we expect that the level of employee compliance with the quality management policy has increased between time point one and two and that this change can be explained by ex ante controls, ex post controls and priority.

Hypotheses 6.6 Employee compliance with the quality management policy has increased over time. This change is mediated by: (a) ex ante controls, (b) ex post controls and (c) priority.

6.4 Data and Design

The hypotheses are explored with a longitudinal dataset on delegation and implementation in the organization: the Delegation and Implementation Data Longitudinal 2010 (DIDL2010; Oosterwaal et al., 2010b). The dataset includes specific information about the implementation of the different policy decisions of the quality management policy by all employees in a subunit of the multinational commercial service organization. We performed two waves to investigate the implementation of all the policy decisions of the quality management policy. The first wave was conducted before the delegation and implementation characteristics were altered. We conducted the second wave after the delegation and implementation characteristics were changed. The time span between wave one and wave two is six months.

The data collection started in October 2009 and was completed in April 2010. The data collection started with two interviews with the director of the subunit of the organization. During the first open interview, the different policy decisions of the quality policy were assessed. Subsequently, we performed a document analysis to gain information about the content of the quality management policy. For example, we analyzed the minutes of the partner meetings of the past year and the description of the quality management policy. In the second interview, we did a final check on the different policy decisions of the quality management policy and discussed how to address the employees of the organization. We decided to incorporate all the employees of the subunit of the organization in the research. The organization counted 179 employees during wave one. During wave two, 185 employees worked for the organization. Some employees left the organization and new employees entered the organization. The largest share of employees (95 percent) remained the same.

Via the chief officer's assistant of the organization, we distributed web questionnaires among the employees, accompanied by an introductory letter from the director with information about the study's aim and the procedure. The procedure and content of the web questionnaire was similar in waves one (November 2009) and two (March 2010). Employees had three weeks to fill out the web questionnaire. The web

questionnaire consisted of two parts. The first part covered delegation and implementation characteristics and the second part addressed organizational and personal characteristics. The different parts of the web questionnaires were assured via routings. Not all employees were involved in the implementation of all policy decisions of the quality policy. We controlled for these differences with routings via the question “are you involved in the implementation of policy decision X”. The second part was answered by all employees and covered personal characteristics (e.g. organizational commitment, procedural justice, sex and age).

Of the questionnaires distributed in the organization, 90 were returned (50%) in the first wave. In the second wave, 62 respondents (34%) filled out the questionnaire. Overall, 53 respondents only replied to the questionnaire in wave one, 25 employees responded only to the second wave (and not to the first wave questionnaire) and 37 employees filled out the web questionnaire in waves one and two. Overall, 115 (90 + 62 - 37) different respondents are included in the data (as they filled in one of the questionnaires or both questionnaires). The respondents included all employees of the organization, e.g. managers, supervisors, trainees, partners, assistant managers, juniors, administrative personnel and seniors. The respondents were involved with the implementation of several policy decisions of the quality policy. Table 6.1 gives an overview of the distribution of the respondents per wave and per policy decision of the quality management policy that are included in the analysis.

Table 6.1 **Number of observations in the dataset**

	Wave one	Wave two	Total
Employees	83	56	133
Policy decisions	7	7	7
Policy decision implementations	509	344	853

Note. Some employees were not involved in the implementation of all policy decisions. In total 105 unique employees are included in the analysis. Some employees responded to the questionnaires in waves one and two (N=34).

To minimize item non-response, the web questionnaire was designed in a web format that prevented respondents from continuing in the questionnaire when they did not answered all questions on the page. Some employees dropped out halfway the questionnaire and did not respond to the second part of the web questionnaire

addressing the personal characteristics. Due to these missings in the personal characteristics variables we could not include 42 cases in the analysis. This resulted in total in 83 employees in wave one and 56 in wave two. These employees were involved with the implementation of several policy decisions of the quality policy, resulting in 853 cases of employee compliance with a policy decision.

6.4.1 Measures: dependent variable

Compliance. For each policy decision of the quality management policy, we operationalized the extent to which the policy decision is implemented in conformity with the description on time point one and two. The employee compliance scale was based on the compliance scale as developed by Kim and Mauborgne (1993). Our scale of compliance consists of four items: (1) “I followed the description of policy decision X with extreme care”; (2) “I fully implemented policy decision X according to the guidelines”; (3) “I tended to disregard and subvert policy decision X”; (4) “My actions have been fully consonant with executing policy decision X”. Answer categories ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). We reversed the coding of the third item. The reliability of the scale was good (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .82$).

6.4.2 Measures: independent variables

Ex ante controls. We operationalized the perceived level of ex ante controls of implementers on each policy decision on time point one and two. The ex ante controls measure is based on the theoretical concept of ex ante controls as used in the delegation literature (see also chapter 3 of this dissertation (e.g. Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999; Franchino, 2004; Huber & Shipan, 2002; Thomson et al., 2007) and the method and scheduling autonomy scale of Breugh (1985, 1999). The scale consists of four items. “I am free to choose the method(s) to use in carrying out the implementation of policy decision X” (reversed coded) and “The procedures and rules in policy decision X are clearly and precisely described” represent scale items. Answer categories ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The reliability of the scale was adequate (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .70$).

Ex post controls. We operationalized the perceived level of ex post control of employees for each policy decision of the quality policy on time point one and two. The measure of ex post control is based upon the control scales of Langfred and Moye (2004), Snell (1992) and Costa (2000). We used a four item scale. “How I implement policy decision X is strictly supervised” and “If I deviate from the prescriptions of policy decision X, then this will be noticed” are representative items. Answer categories ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The reliability of the scale was adequate (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .74$).

Priority. For each employee, we operationalized the level of priority on each policy decision of the quality management policy on time point one and two. The priority is measured with an item scale based on Hickson et al. (2003). We constructed a four item scale. “Policy decision X has my priority above other tasks” and “Policy decision X is of high importance to me” represent scale items. Answer categories ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The reliability of the scale was good (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .88$).

Decision satisfaction. For each employee, we operationalized the level of decision satisfaction on each policy decision of the quality policy on time point one and two. The four item scale is a combination of the decision satisfaction scale as developed by Kim and Mauborgne (1993) and Oosterwaal et al. (2010). We constructed a four item scale. “I am satisfied with the content of policy decision X” and “My own preference is similar to what is decided on policy decision X” represent scale items. Answer categories ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The reliability of the scale was good (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .86$).

6.4.3 Controls

We include several control variables in our model. First, we include gender, measured by a dummy variable coded 0 (male) or 1 (female). Second, we include education, measured on a six point scale ranging from 0 (not finished school) to 5 (academic education). Third, we include the number of years the employee is working for the organization. We add a dummy for the second wave.

6.4.4 Structure of the dataset

The dataset has a complex interdependence structure including three levels: policy decisions of the quality management policy ($N=7$), employees ($N=105$) and one or two observations per policy decision-employee combination over time. Furthermore, each employee implements a specific policy decision and each policy decision is implemented by several employees. In addition, an employee implements a policy decision in one or two moments in time. Furthermore, each time period is nested in a combination of policy decision and employees, whereby the combination of employees differs per policy decision and vice versa.

The implementation of a policy decision of the quality policy can be influenced by the characteristics of the employee, the policy decision, an interaction of these two and by the characteristics of the time period. Hence, implementations are clustered in policy decisions and in employees. Below this cross-classification is a lower level unit (time). Therefore, the following random effects are included in our models: (i) a random effect for the policy decision; (ii) a random effect for the specific employee;

(iii) a random effect for policy decision-employee combination and (iv) a residual for each unique observation in time. In other words, we analyze the variation in compliant implementation created by the crossing of two random factors (policy decisions and employees) and the time level. In addition, effects of policy decision level variables can vary randomly across employee level predictors and vice versa (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). If we would fail to recognize the cross-classified hierarchical model, we would under-specify the model and might obtain biased estimations of effects and standard errors (cf. Fielding & Goldstein, 2006, 24). This is true both for effects of explanatory variables, but also for the random effects of factors in the data structure (Fielding & Goldstein, 2006).

6.5 Results

6.5.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 6.2 reports the correlations between the explanatory variables, control variables and the outcome variable along with the means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values of the variables included in the analysis. Table 6.2 displays the descriptive statistics of the variables for wave one and two together. We discuss the descriptive analysis of the differences in the variables between wave one and two in section 6.5.2.

The descriptive statistics of compliance show that some employees fully complied with some policy decisions of the quality management policy (score 5). The average of compliance indicates that overall the policy decisions were pretty well complied with (mean = 3.56). Furthermore, the level of perceived ex ante control is generally not very high (mean = 2.97). This indicates that overall employees indicated that the policy decisions left some room for interpretation. The employees experience a bit more ex post controls (mean = 3.29).

The correlations show that decision satisfaction, priority, ex post controls and ex ante controls are positively correlated with employee compliance. In addition, a positive correlation between decision satisfaction and priority is observable. The time component is not significantly correlated to any of the variables included in this analysis. Remarkably, ex post controls and ex ante controls are not strongly, nor significantly related to time. This is in contrast to what we would expect. We expect that the perceived ex ante and ex post controls are related to time, as the organization aimed to increase the ex ante and ex post controls in between the waves.

Table 6.2 Means, standard deviation and correlations

	N	Mean	Std. dev	Min.	Max.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Employee compliance	853	3.56	.76	1.0	5.0								
2. Decision satisfaction	853	3.50	.77	1.0	5.0	.53**							
3. Priority	853	3.82	.72	1.0	5.0	.28**	.26**						
4. Ex ante controls	853	2.97	.94	1.0	5.0	.42**	.19**	.04					
5. Ex post controls	853	3.29	.93	1.0	5.0	.42**	.21**	.07*	.47**				
6. Work years	133	8.90	7.7	0.0	37	-.04	.02	.11*	-.07*	-.02			
7. Female	133	0.20	.40	0.0	1.0	.04	-.01	-.01	.12**	.00	-.18**		
8. Education	133	4.38	.95	1.0	5.0	-.01	.08*	.02	-.16**	-.02	.08**	-.29**	
9. Time	853	1.33	.47	1.0	2.0	.05	.01	-.02	-.04	-.02	.02	.05	.00

Note. * = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$.

6.5.2 Analysis

Table 6.3 provides insight in the differences in ex ante control, ex post control, priority and compliance between time point one and two. We predicted that these delegation and implementation features would be higher at time point two than at time point one (Hypothesis 6.5). The reason for the expected increase in the level of ex ante controls, ex post controls and priority, is the decision of the organization to alter various delegation and implementation characteristics of the current quality management policy in order to increase employee compliance.

Table 6.3 demonstrates that the ex ante controls, ex post controls and the priority employees attach to a policy decision did not significantly increase over time. In particular, the t-tests show that the mean level of ex ante controls, ex post controls and priority was not higher at time point two, than at time point one. These findings do not support Hypotheses 6.5. Furthermore, the t-test shows that the mean level of compliance was higher at time point two, than at time point one. This indicates that the level of compliance increased over time. Employees complied better with the quality policy at time point two than at time point one.

Table 6.3 Differences in the mean of delegation and implementation features at two moments in time

	Mean t_1	Mean t_2	T-Test ($t_1 < t_2$)
Ex ante controls	3.31	3.26	$t = 0.78$; $p = .78$
Ex post controls	2.98	2.97	$t = 0.16$; $p = .56$
Priority	3.84	3.81	$t = 0.52$; $p = .69$
Compliance	3.53	3.64	$t = -1.89$; $p < .05$

Table 6.4 presents the results of the analysis on employee compliance with the quality management policy. The first column of Table 6.4 displays the empty model. The second column displays the time model, whereby the time variable and control variables are included. The third column presents the full model. The empty model shows that there are considerable differences between policy decisions of the quality management policy, between employees and over time, indicated by a relatively high policy decision level variance (.15), employee level variance (.12) and residual variance (.30). Furthermore, the difference due to specific combinations of policy decisions and employees was lower, with a variance of 0.05. Comparing the variances

of the empty model and the time model shows that the time variable explained the variances only to a minor extent. The policy decision level variance and the residual variance decreased by 0.01. The employee level variance and the combination employee and policy decision variance did not change. In contrast, the full model did explain the variances to a larger extent. The last column of Table 6.4 shows that the policy decision level variance and employee level variance are to a large extent explained by the full model. The residual variance and the variance for the combination of policy decision and employee level variance are to a lesser extent explained by the full model.

The time model (second column of Table 6.4) is included to test the changes in employee compliance with the policy decisions of the quality management policy over time and to analyze whether these changes can be explained with variation in delegation and implementation features. In addition, a full model is analyzed, including all variables, to test predictions about the effects of delegation and implementation features on employee compliance with the quality management policy.

The analysis of the full model includes two delegation features to explain employee compliance. The analysis shows a positive and significant effect of ex ante and ex post controls. Employees who are stricter controlled ex ante on the implementation of a policy decision of the quality management policy, comply more with that policy decision. This finding supports Hypothesis 6.1. In addition, ex post controls are an effective mean in realizing employee compliance. When employees are more controlled in the implementation of a policy decision of the quality policy, they are more likely to comply with that policy decision. This finding supports Hypothesis 6.2.

The effects of implementation features on the level of employee compliance are represented by the decision satisfaction of employees and the priority employees attach to the implementation of the quality management policy. The full model, as displayed in column three, demonstrates a positive and significant estimate for the effect of priority on employee compliance. This strongly supports Hypothesis 6.3. When employees attach higher priority to the policy decision, they are more likely to comply with that policy decision of the quality management policy. In addition the analysis demonstrates a strong and significant effect of decision satisfaction on employee compliance. The analysis reveals that when employees agree more with the policy decision of the quality policy, they are more likely to comply with this policy decision. This result strongly supports Hypothesis 6.4.

Table 6.4 Cross-classified multi level analysis explaining employee compliance (standard errors between parentheses), N = 853.

	Empty model	Time model	Full model
Intercept	3.53 (.15)**	3.43 (.27)	1.11 (.30)**
<i>Employee-policy decision level</i>			
Decision satisfaction			.38 (.03)**
Priority			.12 (.03)**
Ex ante controls			.09 (.03)**
Ex post controls			.15 (.02)**
Wave 2		.12 (.05)*	.09 (.04)*
<i>Controls</i>			
Female		.09 (.10)	.05 (.07)
Education		.00 (.05)	-.01 (.03)
Years working		-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.004)
Policy Decision Level Variance (N=7)	.15 (.09)	.14 (.09)	.05 (.03)
Employee Level Variance (N=116)	.12 (.02)	.12 (.02)	.05 (.01)
Employee-Policy decision Level Variance (N=850)	.05 (.03)	.05 (.03)	.03 (.02)
Residual	.30 (.02)	.29 (.02)	.22 (.02)
Log likelihood	-881	-824	-682

Note. * = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$.

The second column of Table 6.4 reveals that in the second wave of the questionnaire employees comply more with the policy decision of the quality policy than in the first wave. This could imply that the measures to alter the delegation and implementation characteristics lead to an increase in compliant implementation of the quality management policy. We compare the effect of the time variable in the second and third column of Table 6.4 to investigate whether the differences in the level of employee compliance between time point one and two can be explained by the alteration in the delegation and implementation features. It is expected that when the delegation and implementation features change over time, this would explain away the effect of time on employee compliance. The test already showed that the delegation and implementation features did not significantly change over time. Our analysis confirms this finding. The third column of Table 6.4 shows that the effect of time on employee compliance remains positive and significant after including the variables ex ante control, ex post control and priority and even does not decrease significantly. This implies that the delegation and implementation variables do not explain the effect of time on employee compliance with the policy decisions of the quality management program. This would thus indicate that the increase in employee compliance over time, is not explained by an increase in the perceived ex ante control, ex post control or priority employees attach to the policy decisions of the quality policy. The (small) change over time in the level of employee compliance with the quality management policy is explained by other unmeasured factors. These findings do not support Hypothesis 6.6.

Finally, we control for the effects of gender, education and the number of years the employee is working for the organization. The analysis shows that none of these controls have a significant effect on employee compliance. There is neither difference between men and women, with respect to how strict they followed the rules and guidelines of the quality management policy, nor is there a difference between highly educated and lower educated employees in the extent to which they comply with the quality management policy. Also, there is no significant difference in the level of compliance with the quality management policy between employees who have been working for the organization for a long time and employees who just joined the organization.

6.6 Conclusion and Discussion

The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, we aim to improve the study of implementation of quality management policies, by providing insight in how factors of delegation and implementation affect the implementation of various aspects of a quality management policy. Second, we aim to study how changes in ex ante controls,

ex post controls and priority of a policy affect the level of employee compliance. We used a longitudinal design to analyze the variation in delegation and implementation features between time point one and two and to analyze the level of employee compliance at two moments in time.

This study demonstrates that variations in compliant implementation among employees and among policy decisions of the quality management policy are to a large extent explained by differences in delegation and implementation characteristics of the policy decision, which differ per employee. We demonstrate that the delegated authority reflected by the levels of ex ante and ex post control is crucial for employee compliance with policy decisions of the quality management policy. When employees are stricter controlled ex ante, they are more likely to follow the rules of the quality management policy. This finding implies that organizations can increase the likelihood of employee compliance with the quality management policy by increasing the (perceived) levels of ex ante controls. That is, the organization can improve compliant implementation of the quality policy by describing the roles and responsibilities of each employee explicitly in the quality management policy.

In addition, organizations can increase employee compliance with the quality management policy by exerting high levels of ex post controls. Ex post controls can be increased by strictly monitoring employees in whether they follow the rules and guidelines of quality management policy. Also, a regular feedback meeting, where the implementation of the quality management policy is discussed, increases the level of ex post controls. When employees are stricter controlled on a policy decision via ex post controls, the organization is more likely to realize compliant implementation of the quality policy. This conclusion is in line with the findings in Chapter 5. In Chapter 5, we show that the effect of ex post controls on employee compliance depends on the organizational sector. In particular, we reveal that ex post controls only lead to more employee compliance in a commercial service organization. The results of this chapter underline this conclusion.

Furthermore, our study demonstrates that implementation characteristics are important predictors for the extent to which employees comply with the quality management policy. More specific, this study demonstrates that the decision satisfaction of employees with the policy decisions and the priority employees attach to the policy decision lead to a higher level of employee compliance with that policy decision of the quality management policy. When employees are more satisfied with the policy decision they have to implement, they comply more with this policy decision. In addition, when employees attach higher priority to the policy decision, they implemented this policy decision with more in conformity with the prescription. These findings highlight the crucial role of the employees during implementation and imply that, in order to increase employee compliance with the quality management

policy, it is vital to increase the satisfaction of employees with the quality policy and to highlight the importance of the quality policy.

Finally, we show that variation in employee compliance with the quality policy is influenced both by variances among employees, policy decisions and in observations over time, using a cross-classified design to control for these dependencies. Future analysis could benefit from employing this technique, since a cross-classified nesting structure is typical for data on implementation: employees implement various policies and a policy is implemented by various employees.

Our study also revealed some unexpected findings. We expected the level of ex ante controls, ex post controls and priority employees attach to the quality policy would change over time and that this would result in an increase in employee compliance. Our analysis revealed that these delegation and implementation factors hardly vary between time point one and two. The level of employee compliance did increase between wave one and two. We cannot explain this increase in employee compliance with the expected increase in priority, ex ante controls and ex post controls. A possible explanation for the absent effect could be that employees filled in the questionnaire as a relative perception of each policy decision of the quality management policy. The alteration of delegation and implementation features of the quality management policy included every aspect of the policy. As a consequence, the overall perception of the full quality management policy might be changed, yet it could be that we do not observe this change due to the increase in *all* policy decisions and answers based on the relative policy decision perception of employees.

A limitation of the present study is the limited measurement moments over time. The present study measures employee compliance with the quality management policy at two moments in time. More measurements over time could provide better insight in the exact changes over time and could study whether the longitudinal effect is stable or fluctuates. Also, the present research can only partly explain the differences in employee compliance at time point one and two. An experimental design, whereby the delegation and implementation features differ between the experimental and control group, could provide better insight in the effect of altering the delegation and implementation features on the level of compliant implementation. For instance, the experimental group is strictly controlled in whether they comply with the quality management policy and the other group is not. Furthermore, this study tests the hypotheses with the perceptions of employees. This may have led to bias due to desirable answers. Finally, our study design is restricted to only one organization. Additional research should examine whether our findings can be generalized to the implementation of other quality management policies in other organizations.

Chapter 7 –

General conclusion

7.1 Introduction


In the introduction of this dissertation we have described two examples of implementation: (A) the introduction of a quality policy within a commercial organization and (B) the implementation of the Dutch smoking policy in the hospitality industry. These cases are exemplary for the complex process of getting a decision implemented in conformity with the prescribed decision. In particular, some employees of the commercial organization hardly complied with the quality policy and some hospitality buildings were not smoke free. Although noncompliance does not always result in a harmful outcome—for example, sometimes noncompliant implementation may result in correcting or improving the decision—decision makers nevertheless often strive to realize a high level of compliance.

The aim of this dissertation is to provide a better understanding of the level of implementer compliance in governmental settings and within organizations by focusing on the combination of characteristics of the decision making, delegation and implementation stage. We thereby aim to explain variations between decisions and between implementers in the level of compliance: Why are some decisions implemented more in compliance than other decisions and how can we explain that some implementers comply with a particular decision, whereas others do not? Furthermore, we aim to provide better insight in the similarities and differences between explanations of compliant implementation in governmental settings (organizational level) and in organizational settings (employee level).

In this concluding chapter we bundle the main findings of this dissertation. In Section 7.2, we recapitulate the predictors under study for compliant implementation in governmental and organizational settings and present the overarching conclusions. In Section 7.3, we subsequently reflect on this dissertation's contribution to research on compliant implementation, followed by Section 7.4, which gives suggestions for future research. This final chapter closes with a concluding remark on bridging the gap between decision and implementation.

7.2 Explaining Compliant Implementation

We describe the results of this study per stage from decision making to implementation as illustrated in Figure 7.1 (Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1) and discuss for each stage separately how their characteristics affect compliant implementation. Furthermore, we compare our findings in governmental settings (organizational level) with those in organizational settings (employee level). We start by presenting our results for predictors of the decision making stage. Subsequently, we describe how predictors of the delegation stage and implementation stage affect compliant implementation.

Figure 7.1 From decision making to implementation: three stages

7.2.1 *Decision making*

The studies in both the governmental and organizational settings show that the decision making stage should be included in any explanation of compliant implementation. We argue that when decisions are more complex to decision makers, this has consequences for the implementation process (Chapter 5). When a decision is relatively complex to decision makers, decision makers may know the outcome they want to achieve but often lack the precise knowledge of how to achieve this outcome (e.g due to a lack of information about proper technology). As a result, decision makers are dependent on the knowledge and information of the implementer (who is assumed to have more technological knowledge). The implementer can use this information advantage to deviate from the decision during implementation (Holmstrom, 1980; Mastenbroek, 2003; Potoski, 1999; Waterman & Meier, 1998). Our findings confirm that when a decision is more complex for decision makers this results in less employee compliance. For example, we show in Chapter 5 that employees of private organizations hardly comply with the board's decision about a technical tool to calculate the risks for insurance contracts, which was a highly complex, technical decision for the board of directors.

In addition, our study shows that disagreement among decision makers affects the extent to which implementers comply with a decision, but that this effect differs highly per decision making context. In particular, we argue that the standard measure of political disagreement in governmental settings, namely disagreement among all decision makers in the legislature is not adequate to capture political disagreement in multi party democracies and that a more appropriate measure should distinguish between decisive decision makers (Chapter 2). Our findings in the governmental setting confirm that disagreement among decisive decision makers (rather than disagreement among all decision makers) reinforces the negative effect of policy conflict on compliance. In the example of the implementation of the smoking policy

(A), this finding implies the following: Although some political parties disagreed with the smoking policy, this did not affect the level of compliant implementation, since the decisive decision makers (e.g. a majority of political parties) agreed with the smoking policy as proposed.

Surprisingly and in contrast to our findings in governmental settings, disagreement among decision makers within organizations increases rather than reduces the extent to which employees comply with the decision (Chapter 5). We are thus presented with contradictory findings about the effect of political disagreement on compliant implementation in governmental settings (organizational level) and organizational settings (employee level).

Contradictory findings on the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls are also expressed in studies within governmental settings. Some delegation models predict a negative effect of political disagreement on the level of ex ante controls in governmental settings (Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992; Hammond & Knott, 1996; May, 2003), whereas others predict a positive effect (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996, 1999; Thomson & Torenvlied, 2011). Empirical studies as well report contradictory results. (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996; 1999; Torenvlied, 2000). We are thus presented with a puzzle on the direction of the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls. We address this puzzle in Chapter 3 and argue that these contradictory findings on the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls can be partially explained by conditions of decision making and delegation (e.g. Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004; Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996, 1999; Thomson & Torenvlied, 2010). In particular, based on delegation models, we derive one mechanism driving a negative effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls and two mechanisms resulting in a positive effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls. The strength of these three mechanisms and thereby the direction of the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls depends on conditions of decision making and delegation. In particular, political disagreement results in less ex ante controls, because political disagreement increases the costs of writing a detailed policy (compromise mechanism). Yet, when decision makers have high capacity and attach high salience to the decision, they are more likely to invest these higher costs and hence it is less likely that political disagreement results in low ex ante controls. On the other hand, political disagreement increases the level of ex ante controls, because political disagreement increases the threat of noncompliance (coalition support mechanism and the agency preference mechanism). To reduce this threat of noncompliance, decision makers exert higher levels of ex ante controls. The strength of the coalition support mechanism and agency preference mechanism is dependent on the decision rule and the involvement of decision makers in implementation. Our findings confirm our expectation, that in the context of decision

making on the regional economic development in the UK in the nineties, political disagreement positively affects ex ante controls.

In addition to the study on the effects of political disagreement on ex ante controls and on compliant implementation, we focused on the sources of political disagreement in governmental settings. In particular, we compare in Chapter 4 three different explanations for trends in a specific type of political disagreement, namely polarization. First, we explore whether political parties follow the positioning of the political elite (cf. Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich & Rhode, 2001; Fiorina, 1999; Jacobson, 2000; King, 2003; Layman et al., 2006; Saunders & Abramowitz, 2004). Second, we explore whether political parties follow the positioning of their constituencies (Adams et al., 2005). Third, we explore whether the positioning of political parties diverge more for more salient policies, arguing that for more salient policies the equilibrium platform position of political parties is not at the mean of their constituencies, but is located towards a more extreme position (Adams et al., 2005; Bernstein, 1995; Fiorina, 2005; Lindaman & Haider-Markel, 2002). We investigate these three explanations and show that we can explain trends in political polarization on the integration policy in the Netherlands with trends in the salience of the integration policy: when the integration policy becomes more important for society this increases polarization among political parties. Furthermore, political polarization follows the polarization trend from their voters: political polarization increases when the polarization among the constituencies of political parties also becomes more polarized.

7.2.2 *Delegation*

The organizational studies reveal that how the decision is delegated to employees offers an important explanation for employee compliance. While delegating, decision makers within the organization can manage the implementation by exerting ex ante controls and ex post controls.

Controlling employees prior to the implementation (ex ante) is an effective way to realize employee compliance on various decisions in various organizations. We argue that when the decision strictly describes the responsibilities and tasks of each employee, employees have less room for undesired interpretation, resulting in higher levels of compliance (e.g. Chun & Rainey, 2005; Huber & Shipan, 2002; Lipsky, 1971). Our empirical test confirms that for decisions where the responsibilities and tasks are more strictly described, employees are more likely to comply (Chapters 5 and 6). For example, we demonstrate in Chapter 5 that the protocols for a risk policy in a private organization that describes the tasks and responsibilities of employees clearly was complied with more than the decision about the fair value policy, which was described more vaguely with no strict guidelines.

In contrast to the positive effects found for ex ante controls, controlling employees during and after the implementation process (ex post controls) does not always advance employee compliance. Our findings show that for public sector organizations, controlling ex post does not contribute to employee compliance (Chapter 5). In private sector organizations, on the other hand, ex post controls do increase the level of employee compliance (Chapters 5 and 6). However, Chapter 5 also reveals that the effectiveness of ex post controls largely differs between private organizations. Ex post controls seem especially effective in commercial service sector organizations. For example, our findings illustrate that ex post controls on the implementation of both a quality management policy in a commercial service sector organization (Chapter 6) and a variety of decisions in a commercial service sector organization (Chapter 5) result in more employee compliance.

7.2.3 Implementation

Features of the implementation also offer important insights in the explanation of compliant implementation. A crucial predictor of compliant implementation is that implementers agree with the decision. We show that implementers comply more with decisions, when they are more satisfied with the decision (Chapters 2, 5 and 6). We find this effect in governmental settings as well as in organizational settings. For example, Chapter 2 demonstrates that the level of policy conflict between implementers and the decisions adopted by city council has a strong positive effect on the level of compliance with several policy decisions on social renewal in three Dutch municipalities. Also within organizations compliant implementation is more likely when employees are more satisfied with the decision (Chapters 5 and 6). For example, in Chapter 6 we studied employee compliance with a policy over time and reveal that some policy decisions of a quality management policy are better implemented by employees than other policy decisions of this same policy and that the level of employee compliance also varies over time. We show that this variation is partly explained by the extent to which employees are satisfied with the policy decision they have to implement.

In addition, the studies on employee compliance within organizations reveal that it is crucial that employees acknowledge the importance of the decision. We argue that the priority employees attach to the decision intensifies the attention devoted to the implementation of decisions, which results in more compliance (Hickson et al., 2001; Mastenbroek 2003; Versluis, 2007). We show for various types of decisions and in various organizations, that when employees prioritize a decision, they comply more with this decision (Chapters 5 and 6). In Chapter 5 we show, for example, that the decision about the digitalization of a report system in a health care organization was

implemented with more compliance by employees who perceived the decision as highly important.

7.3 Contributions

This dissertation contributes to the study of compliant implementation in multiple ways. First, we have combined insights from delegation, implementation and management literature and included the decision making, delegation and implementation stage in our study of compliant implementation. We thereby respond to the main critique on the delegation, implementation and management literature, that they often have a too narrow focus on either the decision making and delegation stage (delegation models), or the delegation and implementation stage (implementation and management literature) (e.g. Matland, 1995; Meier & O'Toole, 2006). Our studies in both the governmental and organizational settings have clearly shown that characteristics of the decision making, delegation *and* implementation stage should all be taken into account in any explanation of compliant implementation: the characteristics of each stage interdependently affect compliant implementation. In particular, we show that for the implementation of social renewal policies characteristics of stages interact: the preferences of the (decisive) decision makers during decision making reinforce the negative effect of preferences of the implementers during implementation of these policies. Furthermore, we demonstrate that factors in all stages affect the extent to which employees comply with the decision: the complexity of the decision during decision making, the level of ex ante controls and the decision satisfaction and priority during implementation influence to what extent an employee implements the decision with compliance.

Second, this dissertation extends theoretical insights on employee compliance within organizations. We thereby respond to the critique on the management literature of a narrow focus on either decision making or the outcomes of the decision, resulting in a limited number of studies on implementation and limited insight in explanations for variations in compliant implementation (e.g. Dale et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 1994; Wright, 2003). We apply delegation and implementation models to the study of compliant implementation within organizations and demonstrate that these models offer valuable insights for explaining variations in compliant implementation in organizational settings. In particular, we show that the decision complexity negatively affects employee compliance, which is in line with the prediction derived from delegation models. Furthermore, we demonstrate that, following the prediction of implementation models, ex ante controls have a positive effect on employee compliance. Our study also reveals that some findings of delegation and implementation models in governmental settings are not in line with our findings in

organizational settings. In particular, our study reveals that the effect of ex post controls differs per organizational sector. Our study indicates that ex post controls result in more employee compliance mainly in private service sector organizations. Furthermore, our study shows contradictory findings on the effect of political disagreement on compliant implementation in governmental and organizational settings.

Third, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of the influence of the conditions of decision making and implementation in explanations of compliant implementation. One of the critiques to the delegation models concerns the contradictory theoretical predictions on the effect of decision making features on the delegation and implementation of decisions and the absent knowledge about how decision making and implementation conditions can explain these contradictory findings (e.g. Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996, 1999; Huber & Shipan, 2002). In particular, this dissertation has demonstrated that decision making conditions are indeed important for the effect of political disagreement on organizational compliance with governmental decisions: disagreement among decisive decision makers affects organizational compliance. In addition, we define that the direction of the effect of political disagreement on ex ante controls depends highly on decision making and implementation conditions: the available capacity, the salience of the decision, the decision rule and the extent to which implementers are included in decision making.

Furthermore, this dissertation empirically contributes to the study of compliant implementation in governmental and organizational settings. We made use of various datasets to test our predictions. Moreover, in Chapter 6, we included a longitudinal design to test our predictions. One of the critiques on implementation research is the limited amount of quantitative studies, especially data encompassing the three stages of decision making, delegation and implementation (e.g. Meier, 1999; O'Toole, 2000). This dissertation has tested a wide range of explanations for organizational and employee compliance. In particular, we have tested our (institutionalized) predictions for organizational compliance with governmental decisions on a pooled dataset that contains detailed information on decision making and implementation in the social policy domain for three Dutch local governments: Weststellingwerf, Groningen and Arnhem (Torenvlied, 2000). Furthermore, to explore our predictions on the conditions of decision making and implementation that influence the effect of political disagreement on ex ante control, we have used decision making and delegation data on the economic restructuring in the UK (Bennett & Payne, 2000). We have tested our predictions on employee compliance with two novel datasets: the Decision, Delegation and Implementation Data 2010 (DID2010, Oosterwaal et al., 2010a) and the Delegation and Implementation Data Longitudinal 2010 (DIDL2010, Oosterwaal et al., 2010b). The DID2010 offers a more broad insight in the implementation of various

decisions in five different organizations. The DIDL2010 enables an in depth analysis of the implementation of one policy within one organization at two moments in time.

Finally, we contribute to the quest for a multi-actor approach in implementation research by political and organizational scholars (e.g. O'Toole, 2006). The dataset on implementation of governmental decisions and the datasets on implementation of organizational decisions make it possible to investigate variations among; (i) different decisions for every single implementer and (ii) various implementers for every single decision. To analyze this type of data requires a statistical analysis that controls for the clustering within both implementers and decisions. By applying a cross-classified multi level design we controlled for these cross nested dependencies. A cross-classified design accounts for situations in which observations are statistically dependent simultaneously at different levels (decision and implementer) and prevents that we overestimate statistical confidence in the effects, which would occur if we treated observations as if they were independent. This has resulted in a more precise estimation of the effects of the decision making, delegation and implementation features on compliant implementation. We thereby improved on most existing studies, which hardly control for this nesting structure typical to implementation studies.

7.4 Future Research

While performing this research and explaining compliant implementation, several questions remained unanswered and new questions came up. In this study, we have shown that the effect of political disagreement on compliant implementation differed for governmental decisions implemented by organizations and organizational decisions implemented by employees. These contradictory findings raise the question which conditions drive these opposed effects of political disagreement. We partly address this question, by taking into account the decisive decision makers in our measure of political disagreement in the governmental settings. Future research could provide more insight in these contradictory findings by testing the predictions of political disagreement on employee compliance, while controlling for different organizational contexts, such as the organizational structure and organizational culture (Jehn, 1992). In addition, future research on employee compliance within organizations could include a measure of political disagreement while controlling for decisive decision makers, with respect to their formal or informal power.

Furthermore, we have studied implementation in governmental and organizational settings using different data collection methods in each setting. We used expert interviews to investigate compliance with governmental decisions. In contrast, to test compliance with decisions in organizations, we applied questionnaires using self-reported measures. In addition, the studies differed with respect to length of the

data collection. Data on governmental decisions were collected at various moments in time. The decision making data were collected in the first phase and in a second phase we collected the implementation data. Data on decision implementation in organizations were collected at the same moment in time, resulting in cross-sectional data. These different data methods could have resulted in biased findings and could possibly have influenced our findings. Future research could overcome these possible problems and provide a more solid comparison by collecting data on implementation in both governmental and organizational settings, while using the same method of data collection.

In addition, we have studied compliant implementation at the organizational and employee level. Future research could investigate whether similar explanations can be given for the level of compliance at the team level within organizations. Organizations increasingly use cooperative work processes, whereby groups of employees implement decisions (Cohen & Bailey, 1997). Hence, it would be valuable to learn more about variations in team compliance with decisions. Possibly, other processes appear to be relevant in explaining team compliance, such as team composition.

Finally, our study showed that delegation and implementation models offer valuable insights for explaining variations in compliant implementation in organizational settings. However, our study also revealed that some findings in governmental settings are not in line with our findings in organizational settings. In particular, we have shown that the effect of political disagreement on employee compliance differs for organizational and governmental settings. Future research could focus on these differences and analyse possible explanations for these different effects of delegation and implementation. For instance, it could be that these differences are due to the differences in physical distance between the decision makers and implementers. The physical distance between decision makers and implementers is often small in organizational settings (e.g. between manager and employee), and this is larger in governmental settings (e.g. between local government and organization). In addition, the effect of ex post controls differs per organizational sector. Ex post controls have a positive effect on employee compliance in two commercial service sector organizations and not in the other private sector organization and in the public sector organizations. These findings raise the question whether the result is robust across other private service sector organizations, or whether other unmeasured organizational characteristics could account for the variation in findings on the effectiveness of ex post controls in realizing compliance. In addition, possibly, the different effects can be traced back to different methods of ex post controlling. It might be that controlling employees with the use of feedback meetings stimulates employees to comply with the decision, whereas controlling via sanctioning is less effective (e.g. Snell, 1992). Also, it can be that the effectiveness of each method of controls differs

per organization (Boyne, 2002). Future research should provide more insight in the theoretical explanations for the different findings and could for instance investigate more precisely under which conditions ex post controls are an effective mean to realize compliant implementation and which type of controls in which type of organization are more effective than others in realizing compliance. Also, additional studies on employee compliance within different organizations are needed to test the robustness of our findings across different organization types and sectors.

7.5 The Gap between Decision and Implementation

This dissertation illustrates that the gap between decision making and implementation is apparent in governmental and organizational settings: many decisions are implemented differently than prescribed. To bridge this gap, we have to combine insights from delegation, implementation and management literature. Insights from studies in governmental settings offer valuable insights for explanations of employee compliance within organizations. Furthermore, although the stages from decision making, delegation and implementation are often investigated separately to explain compliance, this dissertation demonstrates that the interplay between the different stages should be an essential aspect of any explanation for compliant implementation.

Summary in Dutch (Samenvatting)

Inleiding

Dagelijks worden er binnen organisaties besluiten genomen. De helft van de besluiten in organisaties blijken echter niet effectief te zijn. Dit komt onder andere doordat werknemers zich bij de implementatie niet altijd houden aan het besluit (Nutt, 1999). Ook binnen de overheid is de implementatie van besluiten complex. Besluiten die door de regering zijn genomen, worden door uitvoerende instanties vaak anders geïmplementeerd dan het voorgeschreven besluit.

In dit proefschrift onderzoeken we zowel de implementatie van overheidsbesluiten als de implementatie van besluiten binnen organisaties. In beide domeinen onderzoeken we waarom sommige besluiten beter volgens plan worden uitgevoerd dan andere besluiten en waarom sommige uitvoerders zich beter aan een besluit houden dan andere uitvoerders. In de analyse van de implementatie van besluiten in beide domeinen bestuderen we de interactie en samenhang tussen drie fases: de besluitvormings-, de delegatie- en de implementatiefase.

Van Besluitvorming tot Implementatie

Tijdens de eerste fase, de besluitvormingsfase, worden de verschillende alternatieven voor het besluit besproken en wordt er door de besluitvormers een besluit genomen. De besluitvormers van overheidsbesluiten zijn overheden, bijvoorbeeld op nationaal, lokaal of regionaal niveau. Binnen organisaties vormen de raad van bestuur en eventueel het managementteam vaak de besluitvormers. Nadat een besluit genomen is, wordt in de delegatiefase de implementatie van het besluit gedelegeerd naar uitvoerders. De delegatie van besluiten wordt gereguleerd met behulp van ex ante en ex post controles (o.a. Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; Huber & Shipan, 2002; McCubbins et al., 1989). Met behulp van ex ante controles kan de implementatie van het besluit voorafgaand aan de implementatie worden gereguleerd. Dit kan plaatsvinden door middel van een strikte omschrijving van het besluit, waarbij de richtlijnen, rollen en verantwoordelijkheden van de uitvoerders gedetailleerd zijn beschreven (Balla, 1999; Bawn, 1997; McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins et al., 1989; Torenvlied, 2000). De controles die tijdens en na afloop van de implementatie plaats vinden, zijn de ex post controles. Deze controles zijn intensief indien de implementatie uitvoerig wordt gemonitord en er sancties volgen bij afwijking van het besluit (Bawn, 1997; Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992; McCubbins et al., 1989; Miller & Friesen, 1983). Tijdens de laatste fase, de implementatiefase, zet de uitvoerder het besluit om in concrete acties (vgl. Hill & Hupe, 2002). Het besluit wordt geïmplementeerd, waarbij de uitvoerder het besluit in meer of mindere mate in compliance implementeert. Compliance is de technische

term die we gebruiken om aan te geven in welke mate een besluit volgens plan is uitgevoerd.

De implementatie van overheidsbesluiten is sinds de jaren zeventig uitvoerig onderzocht door de delegatie- en implementatieliteratuur (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; Hargrove, 1975). De delegatieliteratuur stelt dat kenmerken van de besluitvormingsfase (zoals de mate van politiek conflict) doorwerken op de delegatie van overheidsbesluiten en daarbij ook indirect op de implementatie van deze besluiten (o.a. Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; Huber & Shipan, 2002; McCubbins et al., 1989; Weingast & Moran, 1983). De implementatieliteratuur benadrukt dat de implementatie van overheidsbesluiten wordt beïnvloed door kenmerken van de delegatiefase (zoals de mate van ex post controle) en implementatiefase (onder andere de voorkeuren van uitvoerders) (o.a. May, 2003; O'Toole, 2000).

De delegatieliteratuur focust met name op de link tussen besluitvorming en delegatie, en de implementatieliteratuur onderzoekt voornamelijk de link tussen delegatie en implementatie. Het ontbreekt echter aan een overkoepelend inzicht, waarbij kenmerken uit verschillende fases worden samengevoegd om de implementatie van overheidsbesluiten te analyseren. Zo laat de delegatieliteratuur buiten beschouwing in hoeverre delegatiekenmerken daadwerkelijk doorwerken in de implementatie (Meier & O'Toole, 2006) en worden implementatiekenmerken (zoals de mate waarin de uitvoerder het eens is met het besluit) veelal verondersteld in plaats van gemeten (O'Toole, 2000). Ook zijn de delegatiemodellen vrij algemeen en worden condities waaronder het besluit genomen wordt (bijvoorbeeld een meerpartijen- of tweepartijenstelsel) vrijwel buiten beschouwing gelaten. Ook de implementatieliteratuur kent kritieken. Zo laat de implementatieliteratuur kenmerken van de besluitvorming vaak buiten beschouwing. Barrières in eerdere fases kunnen echter een belangrijke verklaring bieden voor de mate waarin het besluit volgens plan wordt uitgevoerd (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980; Winter, 1985). Een tweede kritiek op de implementatieliteratuur betreft het beperkte aantal empirische studies naar implementatieprocessen (Meier, 1999:5-6, O'Toole, 2000).

In tegenstelling tot onderzoek naar de implementatie van overheidsbesluiten is onderzoek naar de implementatie van besluiten binnen organisaties schaars. In de managementliteratuur is er weinig aandacht voor factoren die de mate van compliance met besluiten verklaren. Dit is opmerkelijk aangezien de managementliteratuur erkent dat een goede implementatie van besluiten essentieel is voor de effectiviteit van besluiten (Bartlett & Ghosha, 1989; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Klein & Ralls, 1995; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). Enkele uitzonderingen zijn het onderzoek van Kim en Mauborgne (1993) en het onderzoek van Anderson & Johnson (2005). Beide onderzoeken laten zien hoe kenmerken van het implementatieproces doorwerken in de

mate waarin managers zich houden aan organisatorische besluiten (Anderson & Johnson, 2005; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993). In welke mate kenmerken van de besluitvorming en delegatie doorwerken op de implementatie van organisatorische besluiten blijft onderbelicht. Het lijkt echter aannemelijk om te verwachten dat de besluitvormingsfase en delegatiefase, net zoals bij de implementatie van overheidsbesluiten, van invloed zijn op de mate waarin organisatorische besluiten volgens plan worden geïmplementeerd. Eerdere studies wezen al op dergelijke overeenkomsten tussen de politieke arena en de organisatorische arena (o.a. Ferris et al., 1989; Mintzberg, 2002; Schein, 1977).

Deze Studie

In deze studie onderzoeken we de implementatie van overheidsbesluiten en van besluiten in organisaties. Het eerste doel van dit proefschrift is om inzicht te geven in de invloed van kenmerken van besluitvorming, delegatie en implementatie op de mate waarin organisaties overheidsbesluiten in overeenstemming met een besluit implementeren. Het tweede doel van dit proefschrift is om inzicht te geven in de invloed van kenmerken van besluitvorming, delegatie en implementatie op de mate waarin werknemers binnen organisaties besluiten in overeenstemming met het besluit implementeren. De combinatie van deze twee doelstellingen leidt tot de volgende onderzoeksvraag:

In welke mate beïnvloeden kenmerken van de besluitvorming, delegatie en implementatie (1) de mate waarin organisaties overheidsbesluiten volgens plan implementeren en (2) de mate waarin werknemers organisatorische besluiten volgens plan implementeren?

Benadering

We benaderen de onderzoeksvraag door inzichten uit de delegatie-, implementatie- en managementliteratuur te combineren. De verschillende literatuurstromingen onderzoeken de fases van besluitvorming, delegatie en implementatie veelal onafhankelijk en afzonderlijk van elkaar. Door studies vanuit de delegatieliteratuur te combineren met studies uit de implementatieliteratuur wordt inzicht verkregen in hoe de effecten van besluitvormingskenmerken (zoals politiek conflict en complexiteit) en implementatiekenmerken (zoals beleidsvoorkeuren van uitvoerders en het belang dat zij hechten aan de implementatie) op de mate van compliance met besluiten met elkaar samenhangen. De combinatie van inzichten uit de delegatie-, implementatie- en managementliteratuur maakt het bovendien mogelijk om de invloed van de verschillende fasen op de implementatie van besluiten binnen organisaties te

onderzoeken. We brengen het onderzoek naar compliance binnen overheid en organisaties daarmee theoretisch tot een hoger plan.

Methoden

Inzicht in de effecten van besluitvorming, delegatie en implementatie op de mate waarin organisaties overheidsbesluiten volgens plan implementeren, wordt verkregen door theoretische inzichten te toetsen met kwantitatieve gegevens over: de besluitvorming en implementatie van sociaal beleid in Nederlandse gemeenten (Torenvlied, 2000); de besluitvorming en delegatie van economisch beleid in het Verenigd Koninkrijk (Bennett & Payne, 2000) en met behulp van data van het Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek (NKO). Inzicht in het tweede deel van de hoofdvraag, de mate waarin kenmerken van de besluitvorming, delegatie en implementatie effect hebben op de mate waarin werknemers organisatorische besluiten volgens plan implementeren, wordt beantwoord met behulp van twee kwantitatieve datasets: de Decision making, Delegation and Implementation Data 2010 (DID2010, Oosterwaal et al., 2010a) en de Delegation and Implementation Data Longitudinal 2010 (DIDL2010, Oosterwaal et al., 2010b). De DID2010 bevat informatie over de besluitvorming, delegatie en implementatie van diverse besluiten binnen private en publieke organisaties. De longitudinale dataset (DIDL2010) bevat informatie over de implementatie van besluiten binnen één organisatie op twee tijdmomenten.

Bevindingen

Deze studie laat zien dat kenmerken van zowel de besluitvormings-, delegatie- en implementatiefase effect hebben op de implementatie van overheidsbesluiten en op de implementatie van organisatorische besluiten. Er zijn echter ook effecten die anders zijn voor de implementatie van organisatorische besluiten dan voor de implementatie van overheidsbesluiten. We bespreken onze bevindingen en de overeenkomstige en verschillende effecten per fase van besluitvorming tot delegatie en implementatie.

Besluitvorming

In dit proefschrift tonen we aan dat, zowel voor overheidsbesluiten als voor organisatorische besluiten, de besluitvormingsfase belangrijk is in de verklaring voor de mate van compliance met een besluit. Onze studie laat zien dat conflicterende voorkeuren tussen besluitvormers gevolgen hebben voor de naleving van besluiten, maar dat de sterkte en richting van dit effect sterk verschillend zijn voor verschillende condities van besluitvorming. In hoofdstuk 2 laten we zien dat de standaardmaat voor

politiek conflict, namelijk conflicterende voorkeuren van alle besluitvormers, minder geschikt is voor het operationaliseren van politiek conflict in een meerpartijstelsel. We tonen aan dat de mate van conflicterende voorkeuren van de beslissende besluitvormers een passendere maat is voor politiek conflict in een meerpartijstelsel. De beslissende besluitvormers in een meerpartijstelsel worden gevormd door de besluitvormers die samen de meerderheid vormden om tot het besluit te komen. Onze bevindingen benadrukken dat conflicterende voorkeuren van de beslissende besluitvormers, het negatieve effect van conflict van uitvoerders met het besluit op de mate van compliance versterken. Opvallend is echter het effect van conflicterende voorkeuren tussen besluitvormers op de implementatie van besluiten in organisaties. In tegenstelling tot onze bevindingen in het overheidsdomein leiden conflicterende voorkeuren van besluitvormers in organisaties juist tot meer compliance met het besluit (hoofdstuk 5).

In de delegatieliteratuur vinden we ook tegengestelde resultaten over het effect van conflicterende voorkeuren tussen besluitvormers op de delegatie van overheidsbesluiten. Sommige delegatiemodellen voorspellen een negatief effect van politiek conflict op de mate van ex ante controle bij de delegatie van overheidsbesluiten (Ferejohn & Weingast, 1992; Hammond & Knott, 1996; May, 2003), terwijl andere modellen een positief effect voorspellen (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996, 1999; Thomson & Torenvlied, 2011). We onderzoeken deze tegengestelde voorspellingen van het effect van politiek conflict op ex ante controle in hoofdstuk 3. We onderbouwen dat de tegengestelde bevindingen te verklaren zijn door de condities van besluitvorming en delegatie, namelijk de besluitvormingsregel, de betrokken besluitvormers, het belang van het besluit en de capaciteit die besluitvormers hebben (o.a. Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004; Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996, 1999; Thomson & Torenvlied, 2010).

In hoofdstuk 4 focussen we op de oorsprong van een specifiek type van politiek conflict, namelijk politieke polarisatie. We vergelijken drie verklaringen voor de trend in politieke polarisatie in Nederland op het gebied van het integratiebeleid. We onderzoeken of polariserende voorkeuren tussen politieke partijen te verklaren zijn door; de beleidsvoorkeuren van de politieke elite (vgl. Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich & Rhode, 2001; Fiorina, 1999; Jacobson, 2000; King, 2003; Layman et al., 2006; Saunders & Abramowitz, 2004); de beleidsvoorkeuren van hun kiezers (Adams et al., 2005); en / of door het belang van het beleid (Adams et al., 2005; Bernstein, 1995; Fiorina, 2005; Lindaman & Haider-Markel, 2002). We tonen aan dat de polarisatie op het integratiebeleid tussen politieke partijen een vergelijkbare trend vertoont met het belang van het beleid en met de polarisatie tussen hun kiezers.

Tot slot hebben we binnen organisaties onderzocht wat de gevolgen zijn van de complexiteit van een besluit voor de implementatie van dit besluit. Onze bevindingen

tonen aan dat indien een besluit complexer is voor de besluitvormers, de implementatie van werknemers minder in overeenstemming is met het besluit (hoofdstuk 5).

Delegatie

Onze studies naar de implementatie van besluiten binnen organisaties tonen aan dat de delegatiefase van invloed is op de mate waarin werknemers zich houden aan het besluit. In hoofdstuk 5 en 6 laten we zien dat het effectief is om werknemers voorafgaand aan de implementatie (ex ante) te controleren. Indien een besluit strikter is omschreven, hebben werknemers minder ruimte voor ongewenste interpretatie, waardoor het besluit beter volgens plan wordt uitgevoerd (Chun & Rainey, 2005; Huber & Shipan, 2002; Lipsky, 1971).

Het effect van ex post controle op de compliance met besluiten is echter minder eenduidig (hoofdstuk 5 en 6). We laten zien dat in publieke organisaties ex post controles niet leiden tot een betere naleving van het besluit. In private organisaties dragen ex post controles daarentegen wel bij aan de naleving van het besluit. Een nadere analyse in hoofdstuk 5 benadrukt echter dat de effectiviteit van ex post controles ook tussen private organisaties verschilt en dat ex post controles met name effectief blijken te zijn in commerciële dienstverlenende organisaties (zie ook hoofdstuk 6).

Implementatie

Een belangrijke voorspeller voor de mate waarin uitvoerders een besluit volgens plan implementeren, is de mate waarin de uitvoerders het eens zijn met het besluit. We laten zien dat dit effect zowel voor de implementatie van overheidsbesluiten als voor de implementatie van organisatorische besluiten geldt (hoofdstuk 2, 5, en 6). Indien uitvoerders het meer eens zijn met het besluit, houden zij zich beter aan het besluit bij de implementatie.

Tevens laten onze studies naar de implementatie van besluiten binnen organisaties zien dat het cruciaal is dat werknemers het belang van het besluit erkennen. Indien werknemers een besluit belangrijker vinden, dan is de mate van compliance met het besluit hoger. We tonen dit positieve effect aan voor diverse besluiten in diverse organisaties (hoofdstuk 5 en 6).

Bijdragen

Dit proefschrift heeft verschillende bijgedragen geleverd aan de studie naar implementatieprocessen. Ten eerste hebben we een overkoepelend inzicht gegeven in de effecten van besluitvormings-, delegatie- en implementatiekenmerken op de

implementatie van besluiten. We reageren daarmee op de belangrijkste kritiek op de delegatie- en implementatieliteratuur, welke veelal een te beperkte onderzoeksfocus hebben. Ze beperken zich namelijk vaak tot één afzonderlijke fase van besluitvorming, delegatie of implementatie (o.a. Matland, 1995; Meier & O'Toole, 2006).

Ten tweede heeft dit proefschrift bijgedragen aan de theoretische verklaringen voor de mate waarin werknemers zich houden aan besluiten. Onze studie laat zien dat inzichten uit de delegatie- en implementatieliteratuur een waardevolle toevoeging bieden voor de verklaring van de mate waarin besluiten volgens plan worden geïmplementeerd in organisaties.

Ten derde heeft dit proefschrift bijgedragen aan inzicht in de invloed van de condities van besluitvorming (o.a. de besluitvormingsregel) en delegatie (o.a. of de uitvoerders betrokken zijn bij de besluitvorming) op de tegengestelde theoretische voorspellingen van delegatiemodellen. We reageren hiermee op de kritiek dat delegatiemodellen te weinig aandacht besteden aan de condities waaronder het besluit genomen is en gedelegeerd wordt (o.a. Epstein & O'Halloran, 1996, 1999; Huber & Shipan, 2002).

Tot slot heeft dit proefschrift een empirische bijdrage geleverd aan de studie naar implementatieprocessen door de theoretische bevindingen te toetsen op diverse kwantitatieve datasets. Een van de kritieken op implementatiestudies is de schaarste aan kwantitatieve studies, met name data die informatie over besluitvorming, delegatie en implementatie bevatten (o.a. Meier, 1999; O'Toole, 2000).

De Kloof tussen Besluit en Implementatie

Dit proefschrift laat zien dat, zowel in het overheidsdomein als in het organisatiedomein, er vaak een kloof bestaat tussen een besluit en de implementatie ervan: veel besluiten worden anders geïmplementeerd dan voorgeschreven. Om deze kloof te onderzoeken hebben we inzichten uit de delegatie-, implementatie- en managementliteratuur gecombineerd. Onderzoeken naar implementatieprocessen binnen het overheidsdomein bieden waardevolle inzichten voor verklaringen van compliance met besluiten binnen het organisatiedomein. Tevens toont dit proefschrift aan dat, in tegenstelling tot eerdere studies die de fases van besluitvorming, delegatie en implementatie veelal onafhankelijk van elkaar onderzochten, het van essentieel belang is om het samenspel tussen de verschillende fases mee te nemen in de verklaring voor de compliance met besluiten.

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Curriculum vitae

Annemarije Oosterwaal was born in Rozenburg, the Netherlands, on September 7, 1984. She obtained a Bachelor degree in Social Sciences at Utrecht University in 2007 and followed her Master at the Sociology department, where she specialized in policy and organizations (cum laude). For her master thesis she received the Daniel Heinsius award from the Dutch Political science Association (NKWP) and the Swanborn award from the Faculty of Social Sciences of Utrecht University. In September 2007, Annemarije joined the PhD program of the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS) at Utrecht University and started her research on the decision making, delegation and implementation of decisions within government and organizations. She has published her work in peer-reviewed international journals, such as *West European Politics*, and presented her work at international conferences. In 2009 she received the Academy of Management conference award in the division Conflict Management: Conflict in Context. Annemarije is currently employed as a consultant at KPMG.

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