

Chapter 9 Explaining post Palme murder policy innovations

The period following the Palme murder saw fundamental changes in Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking. As reported in part one, the murder as such along with the subsequent managerial problems, mishaps and scandals did not necessitate the changes that followed. Yet the changes are intimately linked to the assassination. The Palme murder was managed far below what could have been expected, but why did reappraisals of counter-terrorism policies follow in its aftermath? This chapter will provide explanations to that empirical puzzle.

9.1 Belief-based perspective and post-Palme murder policy innovations

9.1.1 Terrorism legislation: Majority coalition learns, but not from crisis

Belief-based coalition structures did not change much compared to the situation before the Palme murder. The coalition opposing the legislation had been in a minority position since the inception of the first Terrorist Act in 1973 and consisted of the Communist party (the Left party after 1990), and factions of the Social Democrats and Liberals. The majority had argued that the Terrorist Act was an effective measure for preventing terrorism, until calls for transforming it were made, first by the Jurist Commission in their initial report

(SOU 1987:14 pp. 132–133). The crucial fluctuation in beliefs rather happened within the majority coalition of policy makers that was essentially in favor of the legislation.

The Parliamentary Commission did not side with the skeptics or the reformers, instead favoring the status quo. Its members did not see a reason for changing the existing terrorism legislation from an efficiency standpoint. The main argument was that the Criminal Code and the terrorism sections of the Aliens Act already covered crimes committed for political reasons. To murder, cause mayhem or take hostages was punishable already at the planning or plot stage, regardless of motive, and no non-Swedish citizen had an unconditional right to reside in the country. Since the already existing special laws on terrorism required a rather low level of evidence, making these rules more stringent would have a negative impact on the legal rights of the individual (SOU 1988:18 pp. 162–175). The Parliamentary Commission established in the wake of the Palme murder represents the strand of beliefs that opposed changes to the legislation. The Commission's conclusions reflected the core beliefs that had up till then glued the majority coalition together:

It is important that such special regulations do not receive wider application than motivated with regard to their purpose. The reason behind the inception of the terrorism legislation – the need to protect against violent acts in Sweden – is also, according to us, the only reason that can motivate these far-reaching regulations. The need for protection against violent acts in Sweden can however not be invoked to support an expansion of the applicability of the legislation, as to imply national terrorism as well (SOU 1988:18 p. 168).

The reference to 'national terrorism' was meant to preclude expanding terrorism legislation to apply to presumptive terrorists constituting a threat to countries besides Sweden. But it also reveals the notion that Sweden does not have national terrorism – that terrorism inherently is a foreign phenomenon. The Palme murder did not alter that belief for the Parliamentary Commission.

The Cabinet proposition (1990/91:118) to change the 1989 Terrorist Act provoked criticism from MPs of all parties except the Center. Representatives from the Left and Liberal parties rejected the proposition altogether and wanted the 1989 Terrorist Act to be abolished (Motion 1990/91:Ju 31; Motion 1990/91:Ju 35). The main reason was the discriminatory nature of the law (which only applied to foreigners). The Left party pointed toward recent domestic trends and experience such as arson at refugee camps, which, they argued, showed that politically motivated violence was not reserved for foreigners. They thereby contested the notion of terrorism being a uniquely foreign phenomenon. Factions of the Environmental and Social Democratic parties also objected to

the discriminative character of the law, however without the goal of abolishing it (Motion 1990/91:Ju 32; Motion 1990/91:Ju 34).³⁷

Another concern for the skeptics was the role of the Cabinet as the actual executor of deportations. Since 1973 and over the various changes to the Terrorist Act, including Proposition 1990/91:118, the Cabinet was supposed to arrive at a decision for each case based on information provided by the police. Since there existed no instance for appealing decisions, arguments were made (by the Left and Environmental parties) for transferring the process to a normal court of law. With regard to the proposed regulations on coercive measures, the Left and Environmental parties, along with Social Democratic factions, urged that the level of evidence be raised from “can be suspected” to “there is an obvious risk” (that the person in question will commit acts of terrorism). The only Conservative MP who made a motion (1990/91:Ju 33) regarding the proposition urged more restrictive refugee policies, implying less tolerance towards people entering the country without passports or other papers claiming to be refugees. He also wanted to increase international police cooperation. But as we saw in part one, the Cabinet proposition passed with only minor semantic changes. The majority coalition had found a new equilibrium.

Expanding terrorism legislation to also include presumptive terrorists who did not constitute a threat to Swedish interests had arguably become a secondary aspect to influential elements within the majority coalition. That meant that these aspects were susceptible to change if confronted with reliable evidence.

After the summer of 1988, Säpo Committee chairman Carl Lidbom continued as a one-man investigator on Säpo’s working methods. His efforts in this capacity convinced him that terrorist groups to a large extent used Sweden as a platform for planning terrorist attacks abroad. “There is no doubt at all that Sweden in certain cases has been used as a point of departure for planning and supporting terrorist activities in other countries” (SOU 1989:18 p. 49). According to Lidbom’s informants at Säpo, this situation was related to the fact that many people resided in the country based on the right of asylum, even if they came here without passports or other papers verifying their identities. Lidbom also learnt that these people typically remained inactive or kept a low profile until they received a permanent residence permit, after which it was more complicated, if not impossible, to have them deported (Ibid.: 47-48).

The Terrorism Legislation Committee was explicitly asked to follow Lidbom’s scrutiny of Säpo’s working methods (Instructions 1988:49). For the Terrorism Legislation Committee, the section of SOU 1989:18 referred to above was of particular interest (SOU 1990:104 p. 159). Furthermore, two of the Committee’s most substantial suggestions referred to presumptive terror-

37 The 1988 general elections saw the Environmental party enter Parliament for the first time in Swedish history.

ists working to bring about terrorism abroad and to the possibility of deporting such individuals even if they had been granted permanent residence. The majority coalition hence came to incorporate the belief that terrorism legislation needed to be sharpened to reflect the nature of the problem. Policy-oriented learning is discernible, where Säpo's point of view was taken seriously by the coalition that previously had supported annual prolongations of the Special Investigations Act. Lidbom was a recognized Säpo critic, and the fact that Säpo's security assessment was mediated through him arguably lent reliability of the evidence.

9.1.2 Säpo: Social Democratic Cabinet alters belief through crisis inquiries

The belief structures regarding terrorism legislation cannot be separated entirely from the beliefs dividing coalitions on the issue of Säpo, not least because Säpo is the main authority executing the coercive measures implied in the terrorism legislation. That is also why belief-based coalitions centered on Säpo are interesting for this study.

The political left had been skeptical about Säpo since the 1960s, when monitoring political opinion had become an issue. In Parliament, above all the Communist/Left party advocated Säpo skepticism, not least since they alleged that they were the victims of Säpo activities. And as we have seen, the fact that the Communist/Left party was excluded from parliamentary insight into Säpo policies amplified the distrust. When the Environmental party entered Parliament in 1988, its MPs had the same objection. However, the Social Democrats were also to a large extent suspicious of Säpo. Social Democratic cabinets and Säpo had a less than trustful history (see prior chapters), and Social Democratic cabinets felt under-informed on Säpo activities (Leijon 2004).

The Palme murder itself and the subsequent escape of Stig Bergling in 1987 added grist to the mill of distrust. Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson had plans to initiate a committee to investigate Säpo after the Palme murder, but it was not until the escape of Stig Bergling that it became urgent (Lidbom 1990). In the days after the sensational escape in October 1987, Ingvar Carlsson called on Carl Lidbom to head a committee with the purpose of scrutinizing Säpo. He in fact considered appointing Lidbom temporary head of Säpo, "investigating and cleaning up" the organization. But since Lidbom did not want to leave Paris where he served as Swedish ambassador, he and Carlsson settled on him chairing the Säpo Committee (Ibid.: 24).

Carl Lidbom and the Säpo Committee found irregularities in the way Säpo worked and was organized, but their – or at least Lidbom's – worst fears do not seem to have come to pass. At least solutions were found on a structural

level, which gave Säpo more influence and a more independent position vis-à-vis the National Police Board. Political influence over Säpo prioritizations also increased. It may also be noted that the investigation carried out by county governor Gunnarsson regarding the threat picture against the Cabinet prior to the Palme murder (SOU 1989:1) silenced some suspicions against Säpo.

It is not easy to establish the contours of a pro-Säpo and an anti-Säpo advocacy coalition, arguably because a large majority was more or less Säpo indifferent. It is also a daunting task to separate beliefs from interests. Suffice it here to ascertain that a crucial shift of beliefs in favor of Säpo took place within governmental quarters. Carl Lidbom was chosen to head the Säpo Committee because he was outspokenly critical of the organization; the Liberals and Conservatives therefore did not consider him well suited for the assignment (Protocol 1988/89:6 § 12; Lidbom 1990: 22). Lidbom himself (1990: 29-30) said that the task was his most difficult and ungrateful, “but the Cabinet got to know more about Säpo than it had ever known before. And the work rendered extensive consequences for the organization and work of Säpo”. The belief that Säpo and the National Police Board were part of the problem, apparent above all in the 1970s, had thus swung in the opposite direction. Säpo could, with some adjustments, be trusted to help solve the policy problem of terrorism underscored by not least the Jurist and Parliamentary commissions set up after the Palme murder.

9.1.3 Anti-terrorism policing: Minority coalition becomes majority, but not due to crisis

In chapter four we saw that only the National Police Board and the Stockholm police advocated an anti-terrorist police force after the West German embassy drama. Politically, the issue was silent. The Palme murder did not as such change any beliefs on the matter. It however gained momentum as a consequence of above all the Parliamentary Commission report (SOU 1988:18). Throughout this period, both skeptical and favorable beliefs are discernible.

The belief-based coalition skeptical of an anti-terrorist police force had clearly been in a majority position prior to the Palme murder, but as indicated by the 1990 parliamentary vote on the issue (258 for and 38 against), the pro side clearly became the majority. Again, this indicates that the issue of having an anti-terrorist police force had ceased to be a policy core belief for a large majority, and had become a secondary aspect susceptible to change if confronted with reliable evidence. The Jurist Commission provided statistical data showing that terrorism as a global phenomenon was increasing (SOU 1987:14 pp. 112–115). And the Parliamentary Commission brought into the current debate, not so much the Palme murder in this regard, but the drama at the West German

embassy and situations of that kind (SOU 1988:18 pp. 178–180). Statistics presented by the Jurist Commission certainly revealed that terrorism as a phenomenon was changing, e.g. that business people more often than politicians had become the target for actions, that national terrorism had become more common than international (e.g. ETA and IRA independence struggles) and that terrorism had become less selective (i.e. aiming randomly) to cause public fear rather than targeting public representatives (SOU 1987:14 pp. 112–115).

Such statistics could have spoken against maintaining an anti-terrorist police force, since national terrorism, at least for some, was not believed to exist in Sweden, and there is not much such a force can do to prevent or mitigate the effects of a randomly aimed bomb attack. Arguably, the forum as such – the Jurist and Parliamentary commissions that followed the Palme murder – lent a certain cachet to the issue. If they ascertained that terrorism was an increasing threat and that an anti-terrorist police force was an adequate means for increasing preparedness, there must be some truth to it.

Once up and running, the issue of the special force increasingly fell into the domain of secondary aspects among policy makers belonging to the then-majority coalition, who were in general favorably disposed to its existence. The policy core belief that had cemented the majority coalition prior to the Palme murder, which had also hindered the topic from being politically viable – i.e. that an anti-terrorist police force cannot act under its own command, nor be used for purposes that are not terrorism related – had become concerns of secondary belief aspects.

9.1.4 Summing up

The decade following the Palme murder witnessed profound changes in the realm of Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking. The explanations for these changes provided by the belief-based perspective refer to transformation of belief systems, or policy-oriented learning. What had constituted policy core beliefs for the majority coalition up to the Palme murder quite rapidly became secondary aspects. Changes of political constituencies cannot be attributed to this circumstance. The Social Democratic party led minority governments between 1982 and 1991. None of the counter-terrorism related policy changes discussed above happened during the three years of non-socialist rule between 1991 and 1994, occurring only before and after. However, the coalition that previously had advocated a decentralized police had dissolved, since their objectives had been met with the 1975 Police Commission report (SOU 1979:6), which had been implemented during the first half of the 1980s.

However, the crisis as such did not contribute to changing belief systems or coalition structures. The murder of Olof Palme rather evinced dysfunctional

crisis preparedness in general terms. The policy core beliefs of the majority coalition were reassessed, and thereby found to be obsolete. ACF does not assume policy core beliefs to be eternal, but to have life spans of about a decade. In this case, according to the belief-based perspective, the expiration date had passed. The crisis forced a revaluation that would have probably been prompted sooner or later.

9.2 Attention-based perspective and post Palme murder policy innovations

9.2.1 Terrorism legislation: Immigration policies played up

Responsibility for terrorist legislation was assigned to the assistant minister of labor in 1973, because the justice minister did not want to deal with it. In 1976, the legislation was divided between the Labor Ministry and the department for immigration issues at the Foreign Ministry, since sections of the Terrorist Act had been transferred to the Aliens Act. The laws were however executed by the police, for the most part by Säpo, which belonged to the Justice Ministry. In Parliament, the issue was handled by the Justice Committee.

In a February 1988 parliamentary debate on refugees who were suspected to be terrorists, a Communist MP made the following comment on an answer given by a minister:

Mr. Speaker! I thank the minister of immigration for the answer and regret at the same time that the minister of immigration was saddled with this question. That is in fact the wrong pigeon. This is not a refugee or immigration issue, but an equity and justice issue (Protocol 1987/88:71 § 16).

What the terrorism legislation was actually about is paramount to the understanding of the need for change. When the Cabinet proposed changing the Aliens Act in 1989, there were two reasons for removing the terrorism sections. First, they had made the Aliens Act complicated, and second, placing parts of the terrorism legislation in the Aliens Act “negatively affects the public view of this law, which is otherwise characterized by a generous attitude regarding foreigners’ prospects of residing in Sweden” (Proposition 1988/89:86 p. 139).

The unspecified critique of terrorism legislation from the 1980s (Instructions 1988:49) that motivated the Cabinet to set up the Terrorism Legislation Committee arguably referred to a 1984 decision to include the Kurdish Labor Party (PKK) on the terrorist list, i.e. the list that formed the basis for the organizational requisite. In so doing, nine Kurdish Turks were sentenced to deportation, which was inhibited. They continued to live in Sweden, but with restricted

rights of movement. The Communist MP cited above was in February 1988 concerned about their situation.

One year earlier, Kurds had become associated with the unsuccessful Palme murder investigation, but as victims. The mass arrest of Kurds staged by Holmér and the managerial group had led to his downfall and a reorganization of the entire murder investigation. But it also sparked concerns on how the legislation protected the rights of the individual, what coercive measures were tolerable, etc. In 1984, Sweden had been the only European country except Turkey to label PKK a terrorist organization, which at that time had brought severe criticism from human rights organizations. After the Palme murder, thanks to Holmér's erroneous main lead, the issue became topical again.

The Communist party was marginalized in Parliament in its annual opposition to prolonging the Special Investigations Act, but can to some degree take credit for the overhaul of terrorism legislation mandated by the Terrorism Legislation Committee. It was an entrepreneurial strategy to constantly take a responsible minister to task for individual cases that he or she was formally proscribed to respond to. The case with the Kurds was no exception, but was an inescapable issue because of the implications the failed attempts to find Palme's murderer had. And it also included immigration politics.

Immigration politics also became salient in Carl Lidbom's investigation into Säpo's working methods. But in that case, lax immigration policies were associated with a terrorism-related security problem. It is not clear what views Lidbom had on immigration policies, i.e. whether he had a personal agenda prior to chairing the Säpo Committee. But during the course of investigation, he became convinced and acted as a policy entrepreneur, advocating the idea that existing immigration legislation created vulnerabilities regarding terrorism. This policy image was communicated to the Terrorism Legislation Committee where it first gained momentum, or where a positive feedback is discernible. But to judge from the argumentation that preceded the revision of the Aliens Act (and the 1989 provisional Terrorist Act), it was important to dissociate terrorism legislation from immigration policies. When that was done, potential opposition to more far-reaching terrorism legislation was likely removed.

The explanation for the policy innovation regarding terrorism legislation hence lies in that a perceived necessity to reform legislation – the policy idea or solution – came about through a skilful juggling of associations and dissociations. First the Aliens Act was cleansed of associations with coercive measures. Then foreigners were associated with security problems, which paved the way for stricter legislation on foreigners, however within the framework of the 1991 Terrorist Act and not the Aliens Act.

9.2.2 Säpo: Exonerated or contained?

The Palme murder was certainly not a success for Säpo. The organization however evaded much criticism when it was made clear that Olof Palme himself had declined bodyguard protection the night of the murder. But over the course of events, the image of Säpo would change through two affairs, briefly introduced above: the escape of Stig Bergling and the Ebbe Carlsson affair.

As we saw in chapter four, an inspector at Säpo, Stig Bergling, was sentenced to lifetime imprisonment in December 1979 for having abused his position and the selling of classified information to the Soviet Union (Ds Ju 1980:2). Eight years later, on 6 October 1987, he escaped with the help of his wife while on leave from prison. The escape was at the time sensational and the search efforts immense, at least until it was clear that he had left the country.

When Bergling began serving his sentence, the Cabinet decided that he would be subject to severe restrictions, including isolation and the control of letters, telephone calls and visits. These restrictions were in place at the time of his escape; the Cabinet had in August 1987 denied a petition for mercy and a petition for revoking the restrictions. However, the National Prisons and Probation Administration decided on the regulations for leaves, and these had become more lax in the case of Bergling. On the night of 5–6 October, he was alone with his wife at her apartment. His absence was not noticed until lunch-time the following day. When Justice Minister Wickbom received word of it, he asked Säpo if a nation-wide alert had been sounded and was informed that it was about to be. It took another six hours before it was.

In a parliamentary debate on 20 October (Protocol 1987/88:10 § 5) Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson accounted the facts of the case, referring to a report written by the attorney general who did not see systemic problems, and instead blamed local police, Säpo and above all the prisons and probation administration for failing to fulfill their duties (Ibid.). The director general of the latter chose to resign. When it became clear that the Justice Ministry (however not the justice minister) had known of the nature of Bergling's leaves, Justice Minister Wickbom chose to resign as well (Ibid.). In his place came Anna-Greta Leijon, who in the mid 1970s had been in charge of the Terrorist Act in her capacity as assistant labor minister.

The unaffiliated conservative Stockholm daily *Svenska Dagbladet* published an editorial entitled “The Hunt for Säpo”, which began:

The disappointment was in many circles great when the attorney general last Monday presented his report on the circumstances surrounding the escape of Stig Bergling. Not least Social Democratic creators of public opinion had mounted three gallows, one small for a suitable civil servant at the Prisons and Probation Administration and two larger for well-chosen officials within Säpo (SvD 24/10/1987).

Regardless of the fact that the attorney general had not directed severe criticism against Säpo, the Social Democratic press was less forgiving. The main Social Democratic daily *Arbetet* in Malmö chose the headline “Incompetent Säpo a Security Risk” (*Arbetet* 9/10/1987), and Social Democratic Stockholm tabloid *Aftonbladet* followed up with “Säpo – a joke” (*AB* 10/10/1987). Ingvar Carlsson and the Cabinet had already planned to investigate Säpo, but the escape of Bergling “was the last straw” (Lidbom 1990: 23).

There was a perceived need to scrutinize Säpo from the Social Democratic Cabinet’s perspective. But considering the relatively mild critique of Säpo regarding the Bergling escape, that incident can probably best be described as an attributed trigger. The distrust of Säpo expressed by leading spokespersons within the political left had to be parried. It was a public understanding, or a policy image, of the nature of the problem that had to be dealt with. In that sense, forces outside Cabinet created positive feedback processes that could have been politically costly to ignore. When the Säpo Committee was about to publish its first report, the Ebbe Carlsson affair broke out.

The ‘Palme group’ that took over after Holmér had not prioritized the PKK lead. The new search group continued to investigate the murder from a broad perspective, proceeding without incident for a year and a half until the biggest scandal of the investigation to that point transpired.

On 1 June 1988 the Stockholm tabloid *Expressen* published the sensational story that a secret search group had been running parallel to the official Palme group, and was still pursuing the PKK lead. That was only the beginning of the so-called ‘Ebbe Carlsson affair’. Two days later, Holmér’s former bodyguard, who at this time had been assigned by the head of Säpo as Ebbe Carlsson’s bodyguard, was detained by the Customs Service in the southern Sweden city of Helsingborg. In his car they found illegal bugging equipment, destined to bug a possible witness in the PKK lead. The equipment was ordered by Säpo and procured in England. The bodyguard was also carrying a recommendation letter, provided by National Police Board Director General Åhmansson and signed by Justice Minister Leijon (Krusell 1998; Forsberg 2003). The latter’s political career was thereby over. In the legal aftermath, chief prosecutor (of the Ebbe Carlsson affair) Ola Nilsson found out that, besides the possible PKK witness, the equipment was also meant to eavesdrop on certain Säpo personnel, most notably operative head P.G. Näss. The alleged reason was that Näss did not put much credence in the PKK lead, and besides, Ebbe Carlsson and his group believed that he knew of a threat to Palme before the murder, which he had concealed (SvD 07/01/89).

The Ebbe Carlsson affair broke about a month before the Säpo Committee was to present its first report (SOU 1988:16). According to Lidbom, Ebbe Carlsson was better informed on how Säpo worked than the director general of

the National Police Board, for which reason he had drawn upon his knowledge when conducting the investigation (Lidbom 1990: 32-39). Lidbom's chairmanship of the committee was therefore questioned in the summer of 1988, as the political opposition accused him of being involved in the affair (Ibid.). Instead, Lidbom continued as a one-man investigator from October 1988 and was at the same time (on his own request) dismissed as chair of the Säpo Committee, which was put on hold (Proposition 1988/89:108 p. 5).

The parliamentary Säpo Committee had been unanimous in its conclusion that Säpo needed a higher degree of political oversight as well as stronger leadership. The Ebbe Carlsson affair certainly underlined these conclusions. There is no evidence of entrepreneurial efforts attempting to create processes of negative feedback regarding the Säpo Committee suggestions. But it is easy to see insurmountable obstacles for possible advocates of the status quo.

9.2.3 Anti-terrorism policing: Embassy drama played up

The initiative for an anti-terrorist police force obviously dated back to the early suggestion by the Stockholm police in 1975. And the arguments against such a force – articulated by the Communist/Left party, and from 1988 also by the Environmental party and a Social Democratic faction – were the same as earlier, i.e. that a militarization of the police would lead to more violence than necessary, and the force could be used in situations other than intended. It would hence be counter-productive and risky. The main difference this time however was that arguments for an anti-terrorist force were articulated at all. In the Parliamentary Commission after the Palme murder (SOU 1988:18 pp. 175–203) as well as in the governmental proposition (1989/90:100), the arguments referred to international solidarity and national sovereignty. But what convinced Parliament, in particular its Justice Committee, to reappraise this policy issue, which theretofore had been politically stalemated? Two arguments were pivotal in this regard, of which only one had been brought up by the commission and in the governmental proposition: a reference to the occupation of the West German embassy in Stockholm in 1975. If such a thing happened again, and if a foreign power would insist on using its own police units to handle the incident due to a Swedish lack of capacity, how would we react? The second argument built on experience from abroad. Well-trained and well-equipped police were less likely to resort to unnecessary violence in a stressful situation than were ill-trained and ill-equipped – and therefore insecure – officers (Nylén 2004). The issue was thereby transferred from the original concern, i.e. regarding the type of situations a specially trained and equipped police force would be used (would it also be used against processions of demonstrators?), to

how such a force would handle a given and very particular situation compared with how the existing police would cope.

Representatives of the Stockholm police and the National Police Board paid visits to the Parliament Justice Committee and succeeded in convincing the theretofore indifferent or skeptical in the necessity of the policy solution. Committee members were exposed to a different dimension, or situation, of the problem than they had been exposed to before, which made it politically viable. Given that fifteen years had passed since Sweden last experienced a terrorist situation where a specially trained and equipped anti-terrorist police force was called for (the 1975 West German embassy drama), the alarming statistics presented in the commission reports, together with the prospect of the intervention of foreign countries, arguably functioned as accompaniment.

The police did not initially have a unified front. Reacting to the Parliamentary Commission's suggestion, the National Police Board stated their preference for the Special Response Units of Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö receiving special training and equipment, rather than the suggested changes that were limited to the Stockholm police. But when the National Police Board was asked to develop the Parliamentary Commission's proposal, imitation of sorts can be seen. At least their suggestion closely resembled that of the Inquiry Commission, which may have seemed like a future winner.

Once the Social Democratic Cabinet had decided to propose an anti-terrorist force, they alleged that this was consistent with the Parliament Justice Committee's conclusions of January 1987 (JuU 1986/87:23). That was far from true, since the Justice Committee at that time had rejected the idea of establishing an anti-terrorist police force. But the allegation arguably filled the purpose of legitimizing the proposition in order to start a process of positive feedback among those previously unfamiliar with the issue. The ruse was however uncovered by a Left party MP, but with no effect. The Cabinet had not written a particular proposition about the anti-terrorist police force, but slipped it into the budget proposition (1989/90:100 appendix 15). The parliamentary discussion on the policy initiative hence revolved around more issues than the special police force (Protocol 1989/90:109 § 6). The Left party MP's objection to the revisionist history was left unanswered, with the Cabinet representative answering only questions from non-socialist MPs on the size of the Swedish police force. Placing the proposition in the budget proposition can be seen as an entrepreneurial strategy that made it easier to keep opposing views and interpretations out of the discussion altogether.

Further developments surrounding the anti-terrorist police force (as long as it is followed here), i.e. the discussion on when the force could be used and on whose order, were prompted by incidents not connected to terrorism.

On 22 August 1994 some 100 inmates at Tidaholm prison refused to go back to their cells. The local police were called to the prison, and later in the evening the Stockholm and Gothenburg Special Response Units were brought to the scene as reinforcements. The prisoners were at that point rioting and had set fire to some buildings. The situation was not settled until the next day (Ds 1994:140 pp. 15–22). In the investigation that followed, the potential usage of the anti-terrorist police force was brought up. Even if it was clear that its assault capacity could not have been used, questions still remained regarding its potential use for consulting, logistics, etc. The issue had been overlooked in the original Cabinet proposition and clear guidance was lacking. But the investigation also highlighted that the existing regulations on the use of the force, i.e. that only the Cabinet could activate it, was in conflict with the police regulation (1 chapter, 4 §) that stipulates that police resources should be used as effectively as possible. The investigator hence suggested that the force's mandate be expanded to also include hostage situations at prisons (Ibid.: 43).

On 19 March 1995, a confused man was shot dead by a Stockholm police Special Response Unit at Möja, an island in the Stockholm archipelago. His mother had contacted the police, as he had suddenly started behaving erratically and was carrying a shotgun. Despite gas attacks the man refused to leave the building. When a police officer climbed a stair to see how the gunman was doing from outside the building, he saw the shotgun pointed at him and responded by shooting the man dead. The police commander was later sentenced to pay a fine for breach of duty. The situation had not called for the level of violence applied, including the use of teargas. However, the anti-terrorist force capitalized on the event, saying they would have solved the situation in a different way. Outside the force, this statement was considered disloyal by the police in general and the Stockholm police Special Response Units in particular. But it also prompted the Justice Minister, at the time Social Democrat Laila Freivalds, to reconsider the regulations for the anti-terrorist police force (Flyghed 2000: 153-154).

It came to be a vital interest for the newly established anti-terrorist police organization to get a political mandate to also operate in non-terrorism types of incidents. Otherwise the organization would likely languish, since real terrorism had not occurred. The organization's message after the incidents at Tidaholm prison and Möja – where they had not been used – reinforced the image conveyed before it was set up: the force could do more with less violence. And besides, the issue was portrayed as being about the efficient and effective use of taxpayer's money. This was a clever entrepreneurial strategy, which however presupposed that the public image of the force's mere existence had gained a position of normalcy.

9.2.4 Summing up

When consulting the attention-based perspective for an explanation of the policy changes that followed the Palme murder, timing and entrepreneurial efforts to bend the understanding of certain occurrences and phenomena not surprisingly protrude.

The Palme murder and the crisis it caused fulfilled the function of a window opener. The policy window was opened wide and allowed policy entrepreneurs – however not in the form of pugnacious and charismatic leaders – to advance their ideas. And other crises, like the Bergling escape and the Ebbe Carlsson affair, kept the policy window open, or increased the inlet. They were at least capitalized on to further bend the development of policy in the direction that the Jurist and Parliamentary commissions embarked upon.

Somewhat ironically, the police – both law enforcement and Säpo – were first heavily criticized for their performance in the Palme murder. But in the end, they came out stronger. Their ideas on an anti-terrorist police force and views on terrorism legislation gained momentum after the murder. This was to a large extent because inquiry commissions/committees explored these organizations when investigating the Palme murder.

9.3 Conclusions

An interesting phenomenon can be seen in the period after the Palme murder: the termination of a policy core belief system. And it is to a larger degree the actual beliefs that transformed, rather than coalition structures. Policy core beliefs that had guided policymaking in the realm of counter-terrorism for a good decade were revived as secondary aspects after the murder of Palme. That, rather than the murder as such, explains the prerequisites for policy change according to the belief-based perspective.

The attention-based perspective, however, reveals how the policy changes were brought into good currency. Interesting in that regard is that the actual Palme murder was not the main target for entrepreneurial strategies. It was rather the 1975 embassy drama, the Bergling escape and immigration policies that were played up. As described in chapter five, there are ample examples of shortfalls that could have been capitalized on with regard to the police organization and the criminal justice sector in a wider sense. But attention was directed towards counter-terrorism policies. Arguably this is because the first inquiry commissions embarked on that route (SOU 1987:14; SOU 1988:18).

Inquiry commissions by construction are less rigid institutions compared to authorities, political parties and ministries. They proved in this case to be susceptible venues for advocates of policy change. At the same time, they

represented sufficiently important arbitrary forums; their conclusions gained momentum even when they deviated from the majority's ingrained policy core beliefs.

The patterns of policy change after the Palme murder fit very well with the "garbage can" model of organizational choice (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972; Kingdon 1984). This case suggests that such patterns, implying seemingly odd or far-fetched solutions to the problem at hand, require a state in which a dominating policy core belief has outlived itself, but has yet to be superseded by another. The case in that sense proves quite well how the two perspectives combined enhance explanatory leverage.