

Chapter 7 Explaining the 1973 policy innovation

In part one we learned that the 1973 inception of the Terrorist Act came about as a direct consequence of the 1972 Bulltofta skyjacking drama. In this chapter, we will analyze this period, taking stock from the politics of counter-subversion, which prior to terrorism dominated the domestic security agenda in Sweden. From part one, we impart the empirical puzzle: why did the Bulltofta skyjacking provoke an exceedingly fast policy process, primarily affecting the legal ability to extradite foreigners considered a potential security risk, or refuse them entry in the first place?

7.1 Belief-based perspective and the 1973 policy innovation

7.1.1 Before terrorism: Policy core beliefs remain through shattered coalition structures

Up until the mid 1960s, the issue of monitoring citizens was rather uncontroversial. The leading government circles, including Prime Minister Tage Erlander and Justice Minister Herman Kling as well as Säpo chief P.G. Vinge and the first director general of the Swedish National Police Carl Persson, all belonged to a generation for which the Soviet and communist threat was real. For the Cabinet, the heritage from the 1950s was a struggle with the non-socialist parties on being the most persistent anticommunist advocates. Oftentimes, leading Social Democrats insisted on being the real champions of the struggle against communism (SOU 2002:87 p. 152–153).

The stage of *détente* that marked the Cold War decade after the 1962 Cuban missile crises paved the way for radicalism internationally. Communism was not associated with evil as it had been in the 1950s, and for a large part of the growing student population, communism stood out as an attractive alternative to liberal capitalism. In Sweden, like in many other countries, the radical movement was strongly related to anti-imperialism. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam formed a point of departure for this development (Ibid.: 158-161).

Justice Minister Kling supported the police, which were often a target of radical frustration. Both Carl Persson (1990) and Säpo chief Vinge (1988) testify in their memoirs to their good rapport with Kling. Vinge (1988: 75) gives an example that illustrates both the radicals' aversion to Säpo and Kling's devotion to the staff under his jurisdiction:

One who never ducked was Justice Minister Herman Kling. At a meeting with the Stockholm branch of the Social Democratic party, around 1968, a [person] asked the rhetorical question:
– Maybe someone in this hall is from Säpo?

Herman Kling entered the rostrum, pointed demonstratively at himself and said:

– Yes, here is one.

The police, including Säpo, were backed by the Social Democratic Cabinet, especially its justice minister. Leading circles within the police and Cabinet shared the same view on communism and the Soviet Union, which also meant a green light on registering potential subversive elements in Swedish society. Prime Minister Erlander is supposed to have said in 1965 that Säpo's "Red Scare" was a bit exaggerated, and that for him the communist threat was not a priority (SOU 2002:87 p. 567). But in his 1965 speech to students at the University of Lund, he said that "it is better to register ten people too many than one too few" (Hederberg 2003).

The Swedish Communist party transformed itself in the second half of the 1960s. From 1964 under new party leader Hermansson, formal ties with Moscow were cut. At the 1967 party congress, the Communists established that the only way of reaching their political ends was through parliamentary and democratic means (SOU 2002:87 p. 178). Although some communist factions remained faithful to the revolutionary ideal, the official break with that commitment by the largest communist party – the only one represented in Parliament – meant rapprochement with the Social Democrats.

However, in terms of electoral support, the relative strength of the socialist and communist parties rather changed to the benefit of the former. The Social Democratic party, which had received around 46–47 % of the vote in post-World War II parliamentary elections, received 50,1 % in 1968. At that

election, the Communist party, which during the same period had been stable around 5 %, received only 3 % electoral support. This result is arguably attributable to the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia earlier that year (Ibid.). The Social Democrats governed Sweden uninterruptedly from 1932 to 1976, but only for two years – between 1968 and 1970 – did they have a majority government. The rest of the time the Social Democrats reigned with the support of the Communist party, which was disinclined to overthrow a socialist Cabinet (Halvarson et al. 1999).³⁰ The communists did not however hold any ministerial posts.

By the late 1960s, SÄpo had become skeptical of the Communist party's break with Moscow and their revolutionary commitment. The conversion was seen as a tactical maneuver to improve their chances for future opportunities in pursuing subversive warfare (SOU 2002:87 p. 178).

The large-scale demonstrations that emerged in the years around 1968 were primarily a problem for the local police in charge of law and order. But SÄpo also kept an eye on them. Carl Persson made a comment in a 1968 memo to the chancellery that reveals his understanding of the problem (SOU 2002:87 p. 186):

The reason for the leadership of the demonstrations to provoke violence from the police is that the organizations [...] that back them up are disposed to overthrow the established society with violent means. To reach these goals, according to the theories of these organizations, “a revolutionary situation” needs to be created. In the long run, they work to undermine the confidence in the authorities in general and in the police in particular.

The police, the Cabinet and the military intelligence establishment shared a belief that political extremists, in particular to the left of the parliamentary Communist party, constituted a threat to democratic society. Until 1968, this posture was rather open and unproblematic (even though the existence of IB – the defense intelligence Information Bureau – was highly classified). However, from the mid-1960 this world-view was challenged. Competing ideas regarding the threat from communism gained momentum, which were blended with aversion to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Nothing indicates that the Cabinet, SÄpo or military intelligence abandoned the belief that some communist factions were threatening democratic society and that their members and sympathizers should therefore be monitored. Registration continued more or less unabated.

In the late summer of 1969, rumors reached Erlander that the SÄpo chief Vinge considered Palme a security risk (SOU 2002:87 p. 568). Vinge, as well

³⁰ For exact figures on each election, see www.val.se.

as Carl Persson, vehemently denied these rumors (Vinge 1988; Persson 1990). Regardless of their veracity, they seem to have had a negative impact on the Cabinet's confidence in Säpo, if only because Palme became prime minister later that year.

In October 1969 the Social Democratic party elected Palme, who had been Prime Minister Erlander's protégé for many years, as their new chairman. Palme consequently became prime minister in November the same year. The Cabinet was restructured, with Lennart Geijer taking over for Herman Kling as justice minister. As an advisor in legal issues, Carl Lidbom was appointed cabinet minister in the chancellery and Ingvar Carlsson – also one of 'Erlander's boys' – became the new education minister. The Cabinet restructuring meant a rapprochement between the Social Democrats and the radical movement.

Palme and the pre – and post-1969 Cabinets were supportive of the registration activities of IB, the head of which, Birger Elmér, was a friend of Palme since they had worked together in the defense staff's foreign department in the 1950s. Elmér was well connected with the top of the Social Democratic party. With their consent, Social Democratic union representatives reported to IB on communist activities at their work places. The Social Democratic leadership suspected that the creation of socialist people's parties in Norway and Denmark had been instigated by Moscow in order to shatter the Social Democratic parties there. They hence had an interest in seeing that the same thing did not happen in Sweden, and thereby an incentive to maintain the parallel intelligence infrastructure (SOU 2002:87 pp. 590–600).

The new Cabinet, with Prime Minister Palme and Justice Minister Geijer, had a much less confiding relationship with the police, and in particular Säpo (Ibid.: 560 ff.). The new justice minister's worldview differed radically with Carl Persson's, and it did not take long before the two had severe cooperation problems.

The cleavage between the Cabinet and Säpo was primarily rooted in a lack of confidence in the latter's head, which was until 1970 P.G. Vinge. According to Cabinet Minister Carl Lidbom, Vinge was clearly unsuitable for the post, since he was 'dark blue'. He could not be trusted to serve a Social Democratic government (Lidbom 2004), which resulted in his demise. His successor Hans Holmér had more suitable political opinions, but soon became marginalized within Säpo on sensitive issues. He is conspicuously absent from all crisis situations during his tenure. Instead it was Director General Carl Persson of the National Police Board in tandem with Säpo Deputy Director Olof Frånstedt who ran the show (Falkenstam 1983; SOU 2002:87 p. 568). But the lack of confidence was mutual. Frånstedt did not have much trust in the Cabinet's commitment to its security service. He was irritated that the Cabinet regularly

ridiculed their assessments. In fact, he was incredulous of them taking anything that was not politically correct seriously (Frånstedt 2003).

Carl Persson handpicked Holmér from his own staff because of his administrative skills (Persson 1990: 201). Holmér had good connections with the Cabinet and Geijer soon allied with him. It did however not take long before the relationship of trust between Holmér and Persson came to an end. According to Persson (1990: 202), Holmér had drawn up far-reaching plans on how to reorganize Säpo, according to which all sensitive information and decisions should run through him. Persson, in his capacity as director general, rejected these plans when Holmér presented them to him. From then on, their relationship deteriorated rapidly. A situation arose where Holmér allied himself with Justice Minister Geijer, but where Carl Persson sidestepped the Säpo head on sensitive security issues and instead confided in deputy director Frånstedt. For governmental communications, Persson turned to other ministers, preferably Palme over Geijer, since they were not on speaking terms (Frånstedt 2003; Falkenstam 1983: 16). Persson (1990: 203-204) speculates that Holmér wanted to appeal to the young generation, for which reason he was keen on seeking media attention for himself and projecting an outwardly transparent image of Säpo.

Despite the cooperation problems between Persson and Holmér, they shared a belief that political extremists should be registered. As head of Säpo, Holmér initiated a redrafting of the secret instructions (HT 15), which in 1971 became HT 16, with more far-reaching mandates to register communists on the basis of their opinion (SOU 2002:87 pp. 309–310). Publicly, however, Holmér sided with Geijer and flirted with the media.

In sum, the new Cabinet essentially retained the policy core belief of their predecessors: that a strict watch needed to be kept over subversive elements in Swedish society. Despite the leadership reshuffle, Säpo likewise continued to adhere to this worldview, as did the military intelligence apparatus. The change from Vinge to Holmér as head of Säpo can to some extent be seen as an attempt to keep the advocacy coalition intact. But the main difference discernible in the period just before terrorism became a salient policy problem is the dissolution of the advocacy coalition in terms of interaction and mutual trust between its main players. It is also important to see that for the Cabinet, openly bestowing authorities with coercive powers was perhaps in line with policy core beliefs, but due to the problematic relation with the National Police Board and also with regard to the national mood, such measures were arguably not in their interest.

7.1.2 Terrorism legislation: Translation from counter-subversion

When Prime Minister Palme responded to questions in Parliament only days after the killing of the Yugoslavian ambassador, he maintained that preventing all possible political crimes before they happened was without any prospect of success. The proposed punishments regarding unlawful possession of weapons and explosives were already a difficult step to take: the much-cherished open society was thereby being eroded (Protocol 1971:69 § 8).

But the killing of Ambassador Rolovic made the problem concrete, and also entailed new and unfamiliar dimensions. In a governmental meeting after the murder, Olof Palme asked an open question to his cabinet: "What is this the beginning of? Has Sweden become an arena for international terrorism?" Finance Minister Gunnar Sträng muted the discussion before it started: "We brought too much shit into this country" (Peterson 2002: 169).

In February 1972 Palme learned from his undersecretary Thage G. Peterson that Yugoslavian authorities were concerned over the amount of forces subversive to the Yugoslavian state residing in Sweden. Palme became upset and said:

Sweden is not a sanctuary for terrorists. We do not give shelter to gangsters [...] we shall chase gangsters and terrorists out of the country. They will not have a sanctuary in Sweden (Ibid.: 170–171).

This may be seen as an indication that the Social Democratic Cabinet started to reappraise the open society in conjunction with the emergence of Croatian terrorism. Swedish society was not prepared for the new problem that terrorism implied. The Bulltofta drama made this insight excruciatingly vivid, after which Palme maintained:

The democracy needs a capacity to defend itself. Those who hijack planes shall be arrested and punished. Those who in organized forms try to carry on political terror must be tracked down and prevented from their intents (Peterson 2002: 172).

But the emergence of Croatian terrorism also challenged partly different interests of the Social Democratic Cabinet. Yugoslavians represented one of the larger immigrants groups, and in the late 1960s Swedish industry carried out recruitment campaigns in Yugoslavia to fill the need for manpower (Leijon 1991: 135). It was important to maintain good relations with the Tito regime, and its discontent with the activities of Croatians scattered abroad could not be ignored.

A working group at the chancellery had been occupied with terrorism-related policy problems since the 1971 murder of the Yugoslavian ambassador. After the Bulltofta skyjacking, the Cabinet turned the working group into a commission with parliamentary representatives including all parties except the

Communists. The general director of the National Police Board and a representative from Säpo, together with representatives from the justice ministry, served as experts to the commission. The government appointed Cabinet Minister Carl Lidbom as chairman. The leaders of the non-socialist parties wholeheartedly supported the idea of the commission's creation (Peterson 2002: 172).

The commission was mandated to find solutions to the terrorism problem, and was hence a sufficiently important arbitrary forum for brokering policy. The creation of a Terrorist Law was far from uncontroversial. According to the commission's instructions, "[t]he point of departure for the work of the commission should be that all suggestions that can minimize the risk of political outrage be tested" (Ds Ju 1972:35 p. 7). But during the little more than two months that it worked, it is unlikely that alternatives to the suggested Terrorist Act were ever on the table. It seems as if the commission inherited the Cabinet's belief on the need to monitor certain foreigners.

When the commission's report became a governmental proposition, the Conservative party supported the Social Democratic Cabinet. Conservative MP Kristensson, who was the head of the Parliament Justice Committee and a member of the Terrorism Commission, said in a parliamentary debate on the proposed legislation:

Mr. Speaker, I first want to say that when we [in the commission] started to discuss legislation of this content, I also felt certain skepticism, because of the unusual point of departure of the legislation. But as we twisted and turned the arguments, I became convinced that this is the right way to go (Protocol 1973:64 § 6).

However, the proposed Terrorist Act met criticism from Liberal and Center party MPs. Some Liberal MPs attacked the abandonment of the principle of individual responsibility. To them, the notion of 'guilt by association' was something associated with non-democratic polities. Furthermore, the law was discretionary since it only applied to foreigners. The legal rights of the individual were threatened since the degree of suspicion under the law was very low. They also questioned the necessity of the new law and instead suggested amendments to the already existing Alien's Act, the Code of Judicial Procedure and the Penal Code (Motion 1973: 1605; 1606; 1608; Protocol 1973:64 § 6). Factions of the Center party backed these arguments (Motion 1973: 1607; 1609; Protocol 1973:64 § 6).

The Communist party's opposition to the Terrorist Act was more expected. Above all, they criticized the arbitrariness with which foreigners would be subject to its powers. No clear degree of suspicion would guide its application (Motion 1973:1604; Protocol 1973:64 § 6). The Social Democrats defended the need for a Terrorist Act, although some voiced warnings on the risk of infringing on the legal rights of the individual. The time limit would allow

revision in accordance with implementation problems, and the right to apply for asylum should prevail even for people falling under the law's jurisdiction (Motions 1973: 1602; 1603; Protocol 1973:64 § 6). The voting behavior in Parliament – which was strongly in favor of the legislation – does not capture the ambivalence that actually surrounded the Terrorist Act.

Arne Nygren, a Socialist member of the Parliament Justice Committee, shed light on the Social Democratic divide on the topic. He referred to a 'domestic' and an 'international' flank of the Socialist party. The Terrorist Act was a product of the international flank, which was heavily represented in the Cabinet (Nygren 2004). Their take on the law was that it was consistent with international standards, and were more concerned by terrorism as an inter- or transnational phenomenon. Sweden could not afford to lose face internationally for not taking measures against terrorists. To ratify international, UN sanctioned conventions was uncontroversial.

Within the Justice Ministry and the National Police Board, the Terrorist Act was not of great importance. Johan Munck, who started working for the Justice Ministry in 1974 as an expert adviser to the unit for order and security, claims that it had more of a symbolic value in demonstrating resolve. Already existing laws fulfilled more or less the same purposes.³¹ After the inception of the Terrorist Act in 1973, it was not a concern of great importance to the ministry (Munck 2004). Carl Persson mentions in his memoirs that it's very foundation – to prevent terrorists from entering or staying in the country – was severely undermined by poor border controls, i.e. the ease with which people could enter Sweden with fake passports, etc. (Persson 1990: 388-390). That is only to say that there was no pressure from the police and Justice Ministry to adopt the legislation.

From Säpo's point of view, there was a slow transition from counter-subversion to counter-terrorism in the early 1970s. The idea that the most fundamental threat to national security did not stem from Moscow-sponsored subversion was too drastic to some. Säpo was divided on the issue. However in 1972, Holmér declared that there were two reasons for continuing to attentively follow revolutionary communist factions: Säpo had to monitor if they militarized or cooperated with foreign powers, and they had to prevent the infiltration of the national defense establishment (SOU 2002:87 p. 198).

Terrorism as a threat to deal with became salient for Säpo only after the first serious attack: the murder of the Yugoslavian ambassador to Sweden in April 1971. Before that, chief inspector Axman's warnings fell on deaf ears as he ran

31 Sections of the Terrorist Act, such as so-called municipal arrest, were of course unique and without equivalence in other legislation. The most central parts of the Terrorist Act – having to do with deportation of or denying entry to foreigners – were covered in the existing Aliens Act.

a one-man show trying to figure out what exile Yugoslavians were up to. When it became clear that terrorism was also a Swedish policy problem, Säpo did not have any ready-made solutions. They had from the late 1960s paid attention to potential links between Swedish revolutionary groups and Palestinian terrorist organizations, such as PFLP and Black September. Swedish Marxist-Leninists supported the Palestinian cause and organized demonstrations and meetings, but links to terrorist organizations could not be established. Only in the 1970s, after Croatian separatists had perpetrated terrorist acts in Sweden, did Säpo begin accentuating the risk that individuals within the so-called “Palestine groups” could support Palestinian terrorists (SOU 2002:87 p. 197).

The issue of a Terrorist Act touched upon policy core beliefs on the propriety of infringing on the integrity of the individual based on a low level of evidence, for the sake of preventing acts of terrorism in Sweden. Many actors’ belief systems permitted such measures, whereas they were very alien to others. In that sense, two belief-based coalitions opposed each other on the policy issue. But in terms of cohesion, the advocacy coalitions were shattered. As mentioned in the previous subsection, the communication and information flows between the National Police Board and the Cabinet were problematic at best. If added to the divide within the parliamentary parties, the policy innovation stands out as quite remarkable.³²

Besides the problems between Säpo and the Cabinet, problems also arose in relations between the National Police Board and the local police. From the beginning, the National Police Board was meant to be a small administrative authority for the country’s 119 local police districts (Gullnäs 2004; Munck 2004). Under Carl Persson’s leadership much police power was centralized. The second half of the 1960s was a golden age for the police, in which most of their material needs were met (Falkenstam 1983). By the early 1970s, many thought that the development had gone too far. The parish constable walking a beat had been exchanged for a patrol car dispatched from the closest population center. The rapid re-equipping of Swedish police precincts led to the basis of police work becoming technological development instead of traditional law enforcement methods (Ibid.). The district police commissioners started to lament their lack of influence in the process, and received the backing of county governors on the issue. The National Police Board was often seen as a commanding rather than administrative body. Also, factions within government (the domestically oriented) and parliamentary circles started to feel anxious about the role of the National Police Board and of Carl Persson personally (Welander 2003; Munck 2004; Gullnäs 2004; Nygren 2004).

32 A division is evident within the Social Democratic, Liberal and Center parties. No Conservative MPs came out against the Terrorist Act, and no Communist MPs voiced support for the legislation. But that cannot be taken as a pretext for a complete unity within these parties.

The proud ambitions of the National Police Board – which in its first years had had overwhelming success – eventually ran into a twofold hangover. On the local level, the National Police Board was perceived as an imperialistic force intervening in everyday policing, for which reason local actors questioned the centralization of police authority. At the political level above the National Police Board, people began questioning whether the concentration of power collected around Carl Persson was what they had decided upon. Some suggestions for centralizing power, e.g. regarding airport policing, ran counter to the policy core beliefs of those skeptics. Of course, opinion was divided and there were those who thought that the centralization of power had put the police on the right path (Munck 2004). But at this time, most opposed setting up a special capacity within the police to fight terrorism. Carl Persson and a few police who had personal experience identified the need, but in most quarters the mere idea was alien and undesirable (Welanders 2003; Munck 2004; Nygren 2004).

Did the emergence of terrorism in Sweden change beliefs? It seems as if Olof Palme and the circle around him were deeply troubled by the occurrence of terrorism. But in terms of counter-measures, the new phenomenon above all added a new dimension to an already existing belief structure: some foreigners should be added to the list of subversive elements that the state needed to keep in check. The counter-subversion belief scheme was in other words translated into the domain of counter-terrorism. And the 1972 Terrorism Commission turned out to be the venue where the translation reached an accord. If it had included actors who were principally hostile to the coercive measures implied by the law, it is unlikely that it would have resulted in a report in such a short period of time. There were probably more actors nursing policy core beliefs against the legislation compared to the coalition for which the Terrorist Act was a necessity based on policy core beliefs.

7.2 Attention-based perspective and the 1973 policy innovation

7.2.1 Monitoring issue between wind and water

During the second half of the 1960s, the theretofore-homogenous establishment's view on the threat of communism broke down. In 1964, the Communist party launched an attack on Säpo and the military security service. With reference to the Wennerström affair (the most large-scale case of espionage in Sweden, see chapter two), the drift of the critique was that these bodies were

directing their attention towards communists rather than those who had access to classified files (SOU 2002:87, p. 288).³³

When large-scale demonstrations became a recurrent feature of bigger cities, Communist MP's framed the confrontations between the police and protesters as part of Säpo's monitoring activities. After the 1966 demonstration against the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the fact that the police had filmed the protest was taken as a pretext for these monitoring activities. The Communists, who were rather marginalized in Parliament, managed to capitalize on the wave of radicalization by insinuating that Säpo monitored anyone who happened to express his or her opinion against the war in Vietnam (Protocol 13/12/1966). However, the general idea within Säpo was that these attempts to discredit the agency were remote-controlled from Moscow (SOU 2002:87 p. 289).

The issue of monitoring citizens became controversial in wider circles. The leading national daily – the Liberal-leaning *Dagens Nyheter* – began ridiculing Säpo's openly held view of communism being a threat. Liberal and Social Democratic debaters followed suit (Ibid.). A book that became influential at the time argued that innocent people were denied jobs because of the files that Säpo had on them (Rydenfelt and Larsson 1966). The Wennerström Committee dissociated itself from the growing criticism of Säpo. Neither did they find that Säpo could be blamed for the cases that Rydenfelt and Larsson (1966) had presented in their book (SOU 1968:4).

The wave of radicalization was at the same time relentless and global, and to some extent malleable with regard to specific national concerns. The communist parties that had not abandoned the idea of an armed revolution were certainly small and marginal, but they infiltrated and influenced the FNL groups. In 1967 the scattered FNL groups were organized under a central committee, which to a large extent consisted of the Marxist-Leninist communist alliance. This alliance's working committee stated in 1968 that the FNL groups were their tools to reach the public (SOU 2002:87 pp. 184–185).

The Social Democratic party did its best to absorb the radicalization wave. The Social Democratic Student Association became an especially important forum for the 'solidarity with Vietnam' movement (the so-called FNL groups). The young minister for education, Olof Palme, nursed an understanding for the FNL movement's insistence on U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. On 21 February 1968 he, together with the North Vietnamese ambassador to the Soviet Union, participated in a torchlight procession through Stockholm against the Saigon military junta and U.S. engagement in Vietnam (SOU 2002:87 p. 567). The Social Democrats were quite successful in attracting the radical movement.

33 It is important to keep in mind that Wennerström did not have any political or ideological motives for his espionage. His motives were purely economical.

When the monitoring issue became associated with demonstrators against U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the policy issue was cast in a new light for the young up and coming generation of Social Democratic policy makers. Beliefs regarding what threat communism implied did not change, but the opposition to the war in Vietnam could not without nuance be included to that threat frame. The 1969 Law on Personnel Monitoring was a policy innovation aimed at safeguarding those parts of public opinion that had become skeptical towards Swedish security policing.

Internally, IB and Säpo competed on the same 'market' and safeguarded their turf. But since they were interested in the same people, unfortunate collisions were inevitable. In a meeting regarding Säpo in September 1969, Carl Persson confronted Prime Minister Erlander, Justice Minister Kling, Finance Minister Sträng and Education Minister Palme with the question: who is responsible for domestic security, the police or the military? The Cabinet representatives assured that it was the police, and that IB's domestic activities should cease (Persson 1990: 307; SOU 2002:87 p. 531). It was hence only when the director general of the National Police Board directly confronted the Cabinet that the issue was settled in his favor. The solution does not seem to have been ideal for the Cabinet, let alone for IB. The arrangement with IB had allowed for monitoring activities sheltered from public and parliamentary insight. A skillful entrepreneurial maneuver is discernible. Carl Persson chose a setting where more than the Cabinet ministers most involved in the issue were present. Framing it in terms of police versus military in a domestic policy problem did not leave much of a choice for the gathered quorum. Ever since 1931, military intervention in domestic affairs was taboo for any Social Democratic Cabinet, at least as an open policy.³⁴

Prior to Geijer, the justice minister post was seen as rather apolitical (Nygren 2004). With Geijer, the Social Democrats for the first time had a political platform on criminal justice issues. However, Geijer was, at least in his first years in office, totally disinterested in Säpo and the police altogether (Falkenstam 1983; Persson 1990; Rainer 1984; Welanders 2003; Gullnäs 2004). He focused on penal policy instead. According to Persson (1990), Geijer's posture towards criminals and delinquents was overly liberal. Even among senior Social Democratic parliamentarians, the 'let the prisoners loose' policy attitude of Geijer was a bit thick, even though it appealed to Palme (Nygren 2004). The new justice minister's posture was in line with the radical *zeitgeist*. But more importantly in this regard, he allowed for alternative understandings of criminality in general.

³⁴ In 1931, a union demonstration in Ådalen was put down by military force, whereby five demonstrators were shot dead.

In the early 1970s police education became a hot topic for different reasons. From the vantage point of the National Police Board, the need for a professional and coherent education was paramount. However, recruiting staff turned out to be politically sensitive. It turned out that a majority of the leading staff at the police academy had military backgrounds. In the media and also among politicians, this caused a heated debate around the purported ‘militarization’ of the police. Were police now being trained to become soldiers? In the summer and fall of 1971 more than sixty articles were published in twenty different newspapers on the theme. Descriptions of a ‘military junta’ at the police academy were common (Falkenstam 1983: 103-123).³⁵ The National Police Board had had enormous success in the second half of the 1960s in terms of re-equipping and modernizing the police corps. The debate on the purported militarization of the police is important to have in mind to understand why the emerging terrorism threat never made a specially trained and equipped anti-terrorist police a salient topic on the policy agenda. It was at this time not likely to be a future winner.

7.2.2 Terrorism legislation: A pretext for monitoring political opinion?

The Terrorist Act was controversial and caused misgivings among the public, media and political elite alike. It was not a matter of course that it would be widely endorsed, as skepticism towards it transcended political blocs. The Social Democrats led a minority government, with their supporting party – the Communists – strongly opposing the law. Even some Social Democrats were reluctant to support the Terrorist Act.

Logrolling, arguably, to a large extent explains the seemingly overwhelming support for the Terrorist Act. But in the debates, the issue turned out to imply a siding with or against the Communist understanding of the law, i.e. as an extension of the monitoring of political opinion. And there a positive feedback is discernible to the benefit of the law and to the detriment of the Communist aversion to the National Police Board and Säpo.

Already after the first outbursts of Croatian terrorism, the Communist leader asked in Parliament why Säpo and thereby the Cabinet spent so much energy on monitoring communists, when the real threat consisted of what he described as right-wing Yugoslavian fascist organizations. The Center party and Liberal representatives instead wondered if the Cabinet was now willing to increase the budget and size of the police force, which they had refused to do in previous years (Protocol 1971:69 § 8).

³⁵ The figures are from Falkenstam (1983: 118). At this time Falkenstam was the director of information at the National Police Board.

In a parliamentary debate on 7 March 1973, a Communist MP urged Parliament to cut Säpo's budget by half since they anyway spent most of their energy persecuting innocent left-wing activists instead of fascists. The proposed Terrorist Act would only give Säpo a wider mandate, for which reason it should be rejected (Protocol 1973:37 § 16). A Social Democrat MP defended Säpo and reminded Parliament that Sweden had one of the most transparent security services in Europe (Ibid.). During the main debate on the Terrorist Act on 6 April 1973, the Communists lamented the aim and direction of Säpo, the fact that Communist MPs were excluded from parliamentary control over their activities, and that the proposed Terrorist Act would only reinforce existing structures (Protocol 1973:64 § 6).

Cabinet Minister Lidbom helped in obfuscating the boundaries between counter-subversion and counter-terrorism by presenting the Terrorist Act in broad outline during a parliamentary interpellation regarding the 22 September 1972 restrictions on the Law on Personnel Monitoring (Protocol 1972:136 § 8). The interpellators had not asked for this information. Rather, they had asked for the Cabinet's intentions with the restrictions (which meant that the Cabinet instead of the National Police Board drafted the secret instructions to Säpo, see chapter two). For the Conservative and Liberal MPs, the reasons behind the restrictions appeared strange in light of the announced terrorism legislation; domestic control would be dismantled while at the same time external control would be strengthened. The Conservative/Liberal flank depicted the Communists as still not being politically house-trained, for which reason the 22 September decision was a step in the wrong direction. It also mismatched the conclusions regarding the Terrorist Act (Ibid.).

The 1972 Terrorism Commission, whose results Carl Lidbom presented to Parliament in December 1972, was appointed on 22 September, one week after the Bulltofta skyjacking and the same day as the Cabinet decided on the personnel monitoring restrictions. Setting up the commission close in time to the Bulltofta drama was certainly not a coincidence. But the intentional nature of the coinciding date of the Cabinet decision to restrict the National Police Board's initiative on monitoring issues will likely remain an open question. The fact that the commission's results were presented quite uncalled for while the monitoring issue was on the Parliament agenda may be interpreted as a pretext for an entrepreneurial effort to reconcile differences between counter-subversion and counter-terrorism with the help of the attention generated by the skyjacking. One cannot preclude that it was in the interest of the Cabinet to have the issue out of the way before the upcoming general elections of September 1973, which then made it yet more urgent to capitalize on the skyjacking crisis.

The role of the commission can then be seen as a venue where all parties' spokespersons on criminal justice issues (except the Communists) and the main

bureaucratic actors were gathered close to the Cabinet – not to act as policy entrepreneurs, but as targets for an entrepreneurial strategy. The solution, in the form of the Terrorist Act, was already there, arguably to some extent drafted by the working group. The monitoring issue was however not a favorite question for the Cabinet, as it did not play to the gallery. It was therefore convenient to palliate that discussion with the results of a unanimous commission on a topic that was more likely to gain greater exposure while the skyjacking was still topical.

In the late 1960s, the Communists had with some success capitalized on the Wennerström affair to drive home the point that monitoring communists, or opponents of the Vietnam War, implied aiming at the wrong target. When using Croatian terrorism for the same purpose, forces of negative feedback instead set in. The forces of positive feedback in favor of the law were at least to some extent corresponding to the negative feedback processes to quell the entrepreneurial strategies of the Communist party. The non-socialist concern over terrorism legislation was not rooted in a mistrust of the police, as it was for the Communists and to some extent the Social Democrats. And the leading criminal justice representatives of the non-socialist parties had already committed to the conclusions of the 1972 Terrorism commission.

When consulting the attention-based propositions, the value complexity between the integrity of the individual and the effectiveness of security policing is to some extent relegated to the back seat. The explanation for the swift policy innovation lies rather in the way the problem was framed and with what it was associated. The explanation however highlights the profound ambiguity that surrounded the policy problems that terrorism implied. The winning solution was not far-fetched; it already existed in the form of monitoring activities that the police and IB had been carrying out for decades.

7.3 Conclusions

Why did the Bulltofta skyjacking provoke an exceedingly fast policy process, primarily affecting the legal ability to extradite or deny entry to suspect foreigners? The two theoretical perspectives come to more or less the same conclusion, but for slightly different reasons. The belief-based perspective allows for the interpretation that the emergence of terrorism in Sweden did not fundamentally alter beliefs. The Terrorist Act was a translation from a related policy sub-system: counter-subversion. The attention-based perspective suggests that the Terrorist Act had been prepared and considered for some time, and that the fast policy process after the Bulltofta drama therefore resulted in the legislation. The fact that suggestions to increase the capacity of law and order police were absent from the policymaking agenda can be explained either as a function of

their incompatibility with existing belief structures regarding the police, or as a result of their likely limited prospects for success. Both types of explanation can obviously be true without friction. The question is how they interrelate and add value to each other.

The belief-based perspective gives the boundaries of the potential scope for policy change. It designates the dominating belief-based coalition and its competitors. In this case the Social Democratic Cabinet, in particular its international flank, constituted the holder of the core belief. It was supported by the Conservatives, some Liberal and Center party factions, and the National Police Board and Justice Ministry. The supporters may have wished to go further or in slightly different directions, but they were reluctant to oppose the legislation. Only the Communist party and factions of the Liberal and Center parties objected to the law. The constituency supporting or at least not objecting to the law was large. But the content of the proposed legislation was limited by the beliefs of the smaller Cabinet circle, for which it was important to be in line with international standards and agreements. Options such as increasing law and order police effectiveness were not conceivable.

The attention-based perspective gives a clearer picture on how – within parameters given by the belief-based perspective – policy choices were met. Within the boundaries determined by dominating belief structures, the room to maneuver was not negligible. And the way to success to any one option must be cultivated, sometimes through deception. In theory, there are no delimits to how far a policy image can be stretched, for which reason policy punctuations are possible. But the evidence of this case tells that limits indeed circumscribed the scope for change. But even the change that took place needed strategizing. The support of the law was big, but to some degree the size was created. In order to achieve support – arguably most of all within disquiet layers of the Social Democratic movement – the Terrorist Act could not be associated with the issue of monitoring political opinion. In that regard, the Bulltofta skyjacking, in tandem with other domestic incidents and international experience, was capitalized on.

At the same time, the inception of the Terrorist Act in close relation to repeated incidence of Croatian terrorism in Sweden demonstrates policy-oriented learning according to the belief-based perspective. That is only to say that insights on a cognitive level do not exclude that solutions deemed appropriate also need to be presented and conveyed with consideration taken to the prevailing context.