

Chapter 10 Crisis and policy change

A look at the Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking process to date clearly indicates that crises have affected policy outcomes in complex ways. It is for instance clear that terrorist experiences (domestic or foreign) have not been the only events affecting Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking. And not all terrorist events have been conducive to Swedish counter-terrorism policy change.

We have examined three crisis cases in this study, two of which were terrorism related – the Bulltofta skyjacking in 1972 and the seizure of the West German Stockholm embassy in 1975 – and one with unclear origin and purpose – the murder of Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986. The selection fell inductively: when organizing the material, separate or partially separate counter-terrorism policy processes were discernible following these three crises. In this regard it is striking that the most vivid and violent experience of terrorism on Swedish soil – the drama at the West German embassy – had such marginal effects on policy. Equally striking is the fact that a non-terrorism incident (as far as we know) – the Palme murder – produced substantial policy changes. The Palme murder, however, represents one of the most traumatizing crises in contemporary Swedish history. Political and criminal justice systems lost legitimacy and vitality as a consequence of not having prevented the deed, and for the shoddy search efforts and many mishaps and scandals that followed the assassination. The entire process was unsatisfying beyond comparison. The Palme murder was not only a decapitation of national leadership; it also represents a compound failure of the Swedish justice apparatus (Hansén and Stern 2001).

A different set of crises or events – in this study colloquially referred to as affairs – had tangible effects on the policy process. The IB affair in 1973, the

hospital spy affair in 1975, the Stig Bergling affair in 1979 and his escape in 1987, and the Ebbe Carlsson affair in 1988 can all be characterized as institutional crises affecting the public trust in the Cabinet and governmental agencies. The most well known success of Säpo – uncovering and foiling Norbert Kröcher and his band's plans to kidnap Anna-Greta Leijon in 1977 – was however also referred to as an affair – the Kröcher affair. These affairs did not trigger counter-terrorism policy processes, but had an impact insofar as they circumscribed or stretched the room to maneuver in already ongoing processes. In fact, the Wennerström espionage affair in 1963 had already set some parameters for how counter-terrorism came to be managed initially.

This study aims to clarify the relationship between the phenomenon of crisis and patterns of policy change. The empirical chapters have examined the instigation of, discussions about, and reforms of both preemptive and repressive aspects within the law and order domain of counter-terrorism policies. Prior research into the acute response phase and management of crises in the Swedish criminal justice sector (Hansén and Hagström 2004; Hansén and Nordqvist 2005) indeed prompted a few questions, which were further developed in part one of this study. Why did the Bulltofta skyjacking provoke an exceedingly fast policy process, primarily affecting legal means for extraditing unwanted foreigners or refusing them entry? Why did the policy initiatives after the West German embassy drama not result in substantive policy changes? The Palme murder was poorly managed, but why did reappraisals of counter-terrorism policies follow in the wake of the assassination?

These queries in turn nursed an analytical ambition to explore mechanisms providing explanatory leverage to longitudinal policy processes marked by both periods of policy stability and periods of rapid reassessment and change. Attention was paid to multiple streams theory, advocacy coalition framework and punctuated equilibrium theory. Notions of crisis, focusing events and external perturbation play a role in all three theories' accounts of policy dynamics, and all question the empirical validity and analytical cogency of the 'stage heuristics' or 'textbook approach' in studying policy processes (Sabatier 1999: 6-9).³⁸ They instead rely on mechanisms that here have been formed into belief-based and attention-based perspectives. The three theories emphasize somewhat differently the various aspects of these mechanisms, but are largely overlapping and complementary.

The main contribution of this study is its consistent focus on crisis in relation to policy change patterns. The academic discourse on policy change and stability has certainly included crisis as a phenomenon, and at times attributed

38 The stages heuristics divide the complex policy process into discrete stages – normally agenda setting, policy formulation and legitimation, implementation, and evaluation (Sabatier 1999: 6).

explanatory leverage to it in instances of policy change without further ado. But studies that put an explicit primacy on crisis, and organize time sequences thereafter, have been rare. This may seem surprising, given the ubiquity of crisis and the stature they have in everyday policymaking. A contribution to the theoretical frameworks elaborated here is exposing them to the process tracing method, which has facilitated probing mechanisms that they point at as explanatory variables. Another contribution to the policy change discourse is the insertion of a highly *étatist* policy subsystem, dealing with the criminal justice policy domain. That sector is certainly not overrepresented in the literature on policy change and stability, even if it is arguably central to the body politic.

The remainder of this chapter will be structured as follows. Section 10.1 will discuss the policy change patterns. How the theoretically derived mechanisms have exposed Swedish counter-terrorism policy process will be investigated in section 10.2. How the cases at hand have informed the theoretical body of knowledge will be evaluated in section 10.3, where suggestions for further research will also be presented. The broader analytical agenda that emerges from this study will be discussed in 10.4.

10.1 Policy change patterns

In part one of this book, the patterns of policy change were described as they unfolded after each crisis. Here they will be summarized thematically to illustrate the fluctuations of each theme. The categorizations of the policy change patterns were based on Rose and Davies' (1994) effort to discriminate between intended and unintended policy goals and program means. This way the explanandum of the study (these policy change patterns) were successfully separated from the mechanisms that would later explain the nexus between crisis and policy change.

10.1.1 Terrorism legislation: From policy innovation to policy innovation

The 1973 Terrorist Act (SFS 1973:162) was an immediate policy upshot of the Bulltofta skyjacking in September 1972. Croatian separatists had for a number of years harassed symbols of the Yugoslavian state and its interests in Scandinavia. In 1971 they occupied the Yugoslavian consulate in Gothenburg and killed the Yugoslavian Stockholm ambassador in cold blood. But it was the skyjacking that undoubtedly galvanized the policy process.

The legislation was rapidly drafted, and was an innovation without equal in Swedish policymaking at that time. But how can its establishment be characterized? The main clauses of the Terrorist Act made it possible to extradite and

refuse entry to certain individuals, but even before that legislation on terrorism, in particular the Aliens Act (SFS 1954:193), stipulated that no foreigner had an unconditional right to reside in Sweden. However, the Aliens Act required a personal requisite, whereas the Terrorist Act was built on an organizational requisite, i.e. people who belonged to, or could be suspected of belonging to a terrorist group, were subject to the law. The 1973 Terrorist Act also allowed the police to conduct investigations to find out if a person could be suspected of belonging to terrorist organizations. Compared to the Criminal Code, the investigative measures of the Terrorist Act required a lower level of evidence.

In factual terms, the Terrorist Act therefore did not provide law enforcement authorities with radically new tools to prevent crime. An examination of how it was applied reveals that until 1976, only one person was refused entry into the country and eleven were deported, four of who could stay in Sweden based on the right to asylum. Of these eleven, five belonged to Kommando Holger Meins, the group that occupied the West German embassy in 1975. They had already committed crimes when they were extradited, for which reason the Terrorist Act was not applicable in a strict sense (since its purpose was to deport people that could be suspected of committing politically motivated violence). Regulations in the Aliens Act would however have made the deportation possible (Munck 2004). Accounts from the National Police Board and the Justice Ministry indicate that the law was rather toothless (Persson 1990) and merely fulfilled a symbolic function (Munck 2004).

But precisely for symbolic reasons, regardless of its effectiveness in application, the Terrorist Act encountered severe opposition from population segments and Parliament based on principle. For a vocal minority, the Terrorist Act implied a major change of principle, since coercive measures could be taken against individuals who could be suspected of having criminal inclinations but had not yet committed a crime. A 'guilt by association' principle had found its way into Swedish legal usage. From a governmental point of view, the legislation was portrayed as a breach in tradition, although a necessary evil and hence a major change. Its initial status as a time-limited emergency powers act is also indicative of this.

The changes that terrorism legislation underwent in 1976 were described as symbolic gestures. A personal requisite was added to the organizational requisite, indicating who could be subject to the Special Investigations Act (the remainder of the Terrorist Act). A person thereafter had to be individually suspected of a propensity to commit an act of terrorism to fall under the law's jurisdiction. This can be seen as policy-oriented learning, or an adaptation from critique directed towards the legislation. But the change was symbolic in the sense that it was only an adjustment of prevailing practice. The 1980 and 1982 adjustments to the terrorism related parts of the Aliens Act were minor, or even insignificant.

They did not change anything from either a principle or practical point of view. The Aliens Act was reformed which required some adjustments to terrorism legislation, not least since parts of the Terrorist Act had been transferred to the Aliens Act. The changes were however more of an editorial nature.

The question is what kind of change the 1989 and 1991 Terrorist Acts actually implied. The 1989 legislation (SFS 1989:530) came about when the parliamentary Terrorism Legislation Committee was still sitting, and was rather a consequence of the fact that a new Aliens Act was established in 1989 (SFS 1989:529). But the Special Investigations Act (1975:1360), which had been renewed annually since its split from the original Terrorist Act in 1976, was merged into the new Terrorist Act. The opportunity for Parliament to vote annually on a renewal thereby disappeared. However, the Cabinet was still obliged to report each year to Parliament on how the law had been applied. Another change compared to previous legislation stated that foreigners, even if they had obtained permanent residence permits or had otherwise strong connections to Sweden, could be subject to the law. The 1991 Terrorist Act (SFS 1991:572) included three more notable changes: the organizational requisite was abolished, the paragraphs on refusing entry to the country were deleted (the law in those parts thereafter only dealt with deportation), and some restrictions regarding the freedom of movement for presumptive terrorists residing in Sweden under the right to asylum were removed.

In the early 1990s a loud minority still opposed the very existence of a discriminatory law that was only applicable to foreigners. From a belief-based principle point of view, the 1989 and 1991 changes were for this minority inconclusive. Some welcomed the relaxations the 1991 law meant for presumptive terrorists' freedom of movement, for instance. It is notable that the Social Democratic Cabinet did not vindicate the mere existence of the law, and that the issue of making the Special Investigations Act permanent was referred to as pragmatic, rather than as a matter of principle (Proposition 1988/89:86 pp. 139–140). In terms of content, however, the new legislation implied innovations insofar as it received permanent status and wider applicability, but also more restricted investigative means.

10.1.2 Säpo: From “overlooked” adaptations to reform

Säpo has had the main responsibility for implementing the Terrorist Act since its inception in 1973. Based on their intelligence activities, Säpo has recommended to the Cabinet which organizations should be placed on the so-called terrorist list (when the organizational requisite was still in use), and which individuals should be deported based on the personal requisite of the Terrorist Act.

Coercive measures such as wiretapping were used by Säpo to determine if an individual should be suspected as a potential terrorist.

However, when the Cabinet decided to form a parliamentary committee to scrutinize Säpo in 1987 (the so-called Säpo Committee), the justice minister pointed out that Säpo had been largely overlooked when the rest of the Swedish police had been subject to far-reaching reforms in the mid-1980s (Directive 1988:49). It is true that few political initiatives to change policies related to Säpo had been taken over the years.

The policy dynamics between Social Democratic Cabinets and Säpo have since the 1965 nationalization of the police revolved around trust. Before terrorism manifested as a policy problem, subversion filled that space. Countering both security threats were not essentially different activities from Säpo's perspective. When the Cabinet in 1969 passed the Law on Personnel Monitoring (SFS 1969:446) the idea was to better oversee Säpo's investigative measures and in so doing prevent them from applying coercive measures to individuals based on their opinion. Enacting this law implied a breach between the Cabinet and Säpo, not least since the leadership of Säpo and the National Police Board were informed that the military's Information Bureau, with closer ties to the Social Democratic party, continued to keep files on individuals based on their opinion. It would take two decades and the murder of a prime minister before the relationship normalized.

Meanwhile, Säpo underwent reorganizations of an adaptive nature. The mere appearance of terrorism as a phenomenon in Sweden in the early 1970s required internal re-prioritizations away from counter-subversion activities. After the West German embassy drama, political pressure dictated an emphasis on Säpo's counter-terrorism unit despite internal prioritizations leaning towards a greater focus on counter-espionage (Frånstedt 2003). When Bergling was exposed as a spy in 1979, internal reforms were carried out to make the organization less vulnerable to infiltration. This was probably due to pressure from the Jurist Commission, which was formed after the Bergling affair.

The 1989 Säpo reform represents perhaps most of all closure to the infected relationship between Säpo and the Social Democratic cabinets. Säpo was given a more independent position vis-à-vis the National Police Board and increased status, as its head became a director general. Political oversight of Säpo priorities increased, which is also indicative of political trust in the organization. In that sense, the 1989 reform can be seen as a policy innovation.

10.1.3 Repressive policing: From reluctant adaptation to radical reform

The 1975 seizure of the West German embassy in Stockholm revealed that the Swedish police lacked the capacity to manage severe hostage situations. The first visible policy change related to this shortcoming appeared in 1979, when the Stockholm police's Special Response Units started to train and equip to better meet such situations (Proposition 1977/78:100, appendix 5). The Stockholm police and the National Police Board however saw this policy outcome as a disappointment (Ds Ju 1977:2, reservations). The changes were not as extensive as they had aimed for when initiating the process, and they therefore considered them only a minor achievement.

The 1979 changes to the Stockholm police's Special Response Units met political opposition from the more or less same quarters as had opposed the Terrorist Act, citing a general fear of a militarization of the police. But the Cabinet (a non-socialist coalition at the time) reassured them that a small step had been taken deliberately. The justice minister promised Parliament that he would monitor the implementation process to make sure that the Stockholm police's Special Response Units did not transform into something beyond what had been agreed upon politically (Protocol 1978/79:57 § 13). From the Cabinet and Parliament's point of view, the change was therefore also of minor consequence.

The Palme murder generated interest in the police's tactical assault capacity, and in April 1990 Parliament approved a governmental proposition to create a special task force to fight terrorism within the Stockholm police district (Protocol 1989/90:109 § 6 and § 11). In light of the solid opposition to such a force at virtually all political levels before the Palme murder (advocated almost exclusively by the police), the policy change must be considered major. The issue had been lingering on the policy agenda for almost two decades, with minor adjustments being made, but the creation of an anti-terrorist force had never been approached before. When that breach took place, further developments such as moving command from the Cabinet to the police and allowing the force to also be used for non-terrorist events, were regarded as minor and pragmatic adjustments. However, against the backdrop of fear that had previously hindered the force's creation (i.e. that a too-independent police unit with a high assault capacity could produce more violence than necessary), such steps might have been regarded as greater in principle than putting the force into place. By any measure, the establishment of the anti-terrorist police unit was a clear policy innovation.

Table 2: Summary of policy change patterns

	Background	Bulltofta drama	Embassy drama	Palme murder
Terrorism legislation	Non-existent	Major change/ policy innovation	Instrumental adaptation partly due to change in other legislation	Instrumental adaptation and policy innovation
Säpo	Instrumental adaptation – due to mistrusting police/political relations	Maintain routine	Instrumental adaptation	Major change/ policy innovation to restore political/ police trust
Anti-terrorist police force	Non-existent	Maintain routine	Symbolic gestures	Major change/ policy innovation

10.2 Mechanisms

The main thrust of the argument of this study is that the relationship between crisis and policy change is far from self-explanatory. The match between crisis and policy change patterns described above and primarily throughout part one does not suggest that policy change is necessarily related to the shortcomings that the crisis exposed, or that it takes place at all. It is however clear that crisis affects the policy process in ways that justify the careful scrutiny of mechanisms connecting events with policy change patterns. This study relies on a mix of belief-based and attention-based mechanisms derived from the advocacy coalition framework, and the multiple streams and punctuated equilibrium theories. They all encourage viewing the policy maker as a boundedly rational individual. The boundaries of individual choice are made up of contextual opportunities and constraints to help make sense of a complex reality. Below we will see how the belief-based and attention-based perspectives, respectively, helped explain the nexus between the phenomenon of crisis and patterns of policy change observed in the case of Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking.

10.2.1 Belief-based mechanisms and patterns of policy change

The advocacy coalition framework is belief-based. It stipulates that policy core beliefs tend to remain stable, even when confronted with new and strange experiences. The belief structures typically remain stable over long periods of time, and crises are likely to be interpreted as to fit a given belief structure. Policy core beliefs provide an explanatory dimension to the reason behind the scope of potential solutions. For the individual policy maker, policy core beliefs reduce uncertainty as to which policy domain a problem belongs to. An advocacy

coalition shares the same belief structure in a given policy issue and is composed of policy makers such as politicians, bureaucrats, public opinion makers, pressure groups, etc. An advocacy coalition cannot be meaningfully separated from its policy core beliefs. Two to four advocacy coalitions normally compete for legislative power within a policy domain. The coalition holding legislative power over a policy issue is by inference a majority coalition. When a minority coalition defeats a majority coalition, policy change is likely to follow. But a majority coalition can also learn from a minority coalition, if the level of conflict between them is not too high.

The analytical perspective, here called belief-based, does not attribute any of the three crises cases much leverage as change agents of belief systems. It does however give reasonable accounts of both instances of policy change and policy stability. The 1973 inception of the Terrorist Act – regardless of the fact that it signaled a breach with prior legal traditions and that the phenomenon of terrorism was novel – was according to the belief-based perspective a translation of a related policy problem, i.e. counter-subversion. The embassy drama, like the Bulltofta skyjacking, was certainly problematic and challenging, but did not fundamentally alter policy core beliefs on the law enforcement role of the police, and therefore did not challenge beliefs on how to cope with terrorism. The Palme murder served as a catalyst, not to policy change per se, but for reassessing policy core beliefs that in that process were determined to be outdated. That which had been considered policy core beliefs before the murder resurfaced as secondary aspects after. None of the three crises challenged coalition structures with regard to counter-terrorism policymaking.

It should be noted that crises other than the three examined played into reinforcing existing beliefs. The street riots in the 60s and 70s, the hospital spy affair, the Bergling affair and Bergling escape, and the Ebbe Carlsson affair were all interpreted by the Säpo and police skeptical advocacy coalition as confirmation of their distrust. These crises had to some extent a bigger effect on the policymaking process, in the sense that they undid or did one better on affecting policy makers' cognitions, at least compared to the cases where terrorism was managed.

The belief-based perspective suggests that the terrorism legislation described was consistent with the majority coalition's policy core belief that terrorism should ideally be kept out of the country, and that the legislation was effective in a preventive sense. For the police and justice ministry, the legislation was a secondary aspect at best. But the exact contours of the legislation seem to have been secondary aspects for the Social Democratic authors of the Terrorist Act. Different changes and amendments therefore came about through policy-oriented learning. The 1976 partition and incorporation of a personal requisite is indicative of a learning process where the terrorism legislation-averse minority

coalition convinced the majority of the perils connected to the organizational requisite. After the Palme murder, a type of policy-oriented learning is discernible, where the beliefs of Säpo regarding Swedish immigration policies came to have a decisive effect on the 1991 Terrorist Act. To some extent the mere inception of the Terrorist Act in 1973 was also the result of policy-oriented learning. The emergence of Croatian terrorism in the early 70s informed the policy coalition advocating counter-subversion policies that Swedish domestic security also implied keeping some foreigners in check. Those are the only instances where policy-oriented learning had an effect on the policy process. But it should also be remembered that Swedish law enforcement learned the difficulties of dealing with dangerous people. The lessons learned were the results of the Bulltofta and West German embassy cases, as well as the 1973 bank robbery and hostage drama at Norrmalmstorg in Stockholm (Nylén 2004). They did not however have any immediate effects on the policymaking process. But the 1990 establishment of the anti-terrorist police can be seen as a remote form of policy-oriented learning, the result of the Palme murder which forced a reassessment of policy core beliefs. Sweden was thereby preparing to handle not the last but the penultimate crisis.

The belief-based theoretical perspective encourages scrutinizing sufficiently important arbitrary forums that grease the wheels of policy-oriented learning. Over the years, crisis-induced commissions with fairly broad representation have in that respect determined more than anything else the trajectory of policy change patterns. The Terrorism Commission set up after the Bulltofta drama and the various commissions and committees that followed the Palme murder all resulted in extensive policy change. At the same time, the ordinary (non crisis-induced) Police Commission that began an overhaul of the Swedish police in 1975 effectively quelled initiatives to change the prerequisites for the Stockholm police Special Response Units to tackle terrorism. This indicates that institutional, as well as party political, rigidity has been overcome when a particular situation has prompted moving the initiative to groups focusing on that specific problem. They filled functions of sufficiently important arbitrary forums. The 1975 Police Commission was not established due to a particular crisis, and was heavily imbued with Social Democratic beliefs on criminal justice policy. It was not receptive to ideas advocated by the minority coalition.

10.2.2 Attention-based mechanisms and patterns of policy change

Both the multiple streams and punctuated equilibrium theories are attention-based. They certainly admit that beliefs, or preferences, remain stable over long periods of time, or change only grudgingly. However, they acknowledge that novel and unfamiliar situations hold a potential for radical policy change,

depending on how these are framed and understood. Entrepreneurial strategies are not important to ACF – since policy core beliefs are insensitive to spin doctoring – but are paramount to PE and MS. A skillful policy entrepreneur can bend the understanding of a situation to fit a preferred solution. Especially the punctuated equilibrium theory pays attention to the previously disinterested. If advocacy coalitions are supposed to be stable, they should not include all potential constituencies. In accordance with the attention-based perspective, the policy entrepreneur can initiate processes of positive or negative feedback by including or excluding the previously disinterested.

Not surprisingly, the attention-based theoretical perspective ascribes the three specially investigated crises a high level of explanatory leverage for the policy change patterns reported in part one of this study. They all opened opportunity windows for policy entrepreneurs. Policy outcomes are explained by the ways actors managed to put forward their pet solutions, or hindered other parties' initiatives. In this light, the Bulltofta skyjacking opened a window for the Cabinet to push a policy solution in the form of a Terrorist Act through with remarkable speed. The unavoidably dramatic nature of the terrorist attack gave the Terrorist Act sponsors the leeway to promote their legislation which, without the skyjacking drama, would have likely been associated by its opponents with the at the time infected issue of opinion monitoring. The legislation was by all means associated with the monitoring of opinion, but thanks to the Bulltofta drama such associations did not catch on. The 1975 embassy drama certainly gave rise to entrepreneurial efforts to advocate the need for a better-trained and equipped police force. The initiative was quelled by referring it to a policy venue, the 1975 Police Commission, where the prospects of success were minimal. The subsequent effort was quelled with a similar tactics. It was referred back to where it came from, the National Police Board, for further investigation. In 1982, the policy proposal was simply put off with reference to the budget situation. But the Palme murder opened a new window for policy change. This time, the various commissions set up as a direct or indirect consequence of the assassination worked as policy venues that turned out to be highly receptive to ideas that had been developed within the police.

The notion of policy entrepreneurs is pivotal to the attention-based perspective, as is the notion of entrepreneurial strategy. However, the two have slightly different connotations. The former transfers the thought to a pugnacious, charismatic, or at least clever spin-doctor, whereas the latter rather leads the thought to collective ambitions, not as dependent on leadership practices. The empirical evidence provided in this study suggests that entrepreneurial strategies have been paramount in pushing through policy change, but that pugnacious leaders have been less successful in the Swedish context. The General Director of the National Police Board, Carl Persson, had great success in his early efforts

to centralize power and re-equip the Swedish police. But in the domain of counter-terrorism, his efforts were rather counter-productive. With regard to the changes that took place after the Palme murder, it is easier to point towards entrepreneurial strategies than at particular policy entrepreneurs. It was for example a strategy of the police to sell the Parliament Justice Committee on the virtues of creating an anti-terrorist police force, but it was not so clear who managed to do that. The smooth policy entrepreneur, if existing at all, maneuvered far from the public limelight.

The attention-based perspective urges the analyst to focus attention on processes of positive and negative feedback, the reward for skillful entrepreneurial strategies that result in wider endorsement of pet solutions, be they policy change or stability. This tool then helps in explaining the inception of the 1973 Terrorist Act by suggesting that the Bulltofta skyjacking worked to dissociate the legislation from other legal means to monitor citizens. The police initiative to increase its assault capacity after the West German embassy drama was on the other hand associated with a militarization of the police, which many felt was frightening and alien for Sweden. The desired police capacity was hence dissociated from the embassy drama and the dilemmas it implied as such. After the Palme murder, the anti-terrorist police force was associated with international solidarity and national sovereignty, whereas the 1991 Terrorist Act was successfully dissociated from policies on aliens, which it in fact – at least partly – purported to comprise. This time the changes were dissociated from the crisis as such, i.e. the Palme assassination.

Policy entrepreneurial strategies were behind these works of image making that to various degrees aimed at catching the zeitgeist, or politics stream, to receive wider support. That is where other crises come in, according to the attention-based perspective. The National Police Board could not avoid being associated with the hospital spy affair and the Bergling affair, which restricted its possibilities to promote other policy ideas, even if they were unrelated. Interestingly, the many mishaps that followed the Palme murder indeed exacerbated the image of a dysfunctional criminal justice system. Many of the managerial shortfalls were in the process completely overlooked (Dekker and Hansén 2004), but with respect to counter-terrorism, solutions were prompted on a structural level. The message was rubbed in time and again: the system does not work. Entrepreneurial strategies directed the solutions primarily towards counter-terrorism.

10.2.3 Combined analytic leverage

As should be clear by now, the objective has not been to select a winner among the belief-based and attention-based perspectives on analyzing the nexus between

crises and policy change patterns. But it deserves to be emphasized: the different views of the boundedly rational individual, implying two alternative ways of reaching collective action formation, have a synergistic relationship in terms of explaining policy change patterns related to crises. In chapter six it was assumed that the selective attender would be flexible on different secondary aspects within the parameters of a given policy core realm. The relationship between the two perspectives was established a priori, for which reason it is hardly surprising that the relation was also traceable when contrasted with reality.

The belief-based perspective provides an understanding of an issue's stakeholder structure and what is actually at stake prior to the crisis. It points toward the resistance to crisis-induced policy change that advocates of alternative policy solutions need to break through. Policy core beliefs may however survive the type of crisis scrutinized here, and majority coalitions may retain legislative power over policy domains within public administration for extended periods, regardless of changes in government. The scope for policy change related to crises is therefore at any given time circumscribed by the boundaries of the dominant advocacy coalition's policy core beliefs.

The attention-based perspective does a better job in explaining why certain solutions make (or not make) it on to the policy agenda, and from there go on to become new policies. This is because it shows how entrepreneurial strategies and strategists maneuver to promote their solutions, working to instill certain understandings of events and ideas. The perspective comes closer to the notion of crisis-induced policy behavior. However, this study indicates that the complex and ambiguous reality of crisis can be bent to a certain extent, and that dominant core beliefs determine the potential range of that bending. It also shows that crises can trigger reappraisals of belief-systems, and that periods where policy core beliefs are reassessed due to crises are extremely fertile for "garbage can" policy decision making.

The fact that the two perspectives provide a combined explanation to the crisis-induced policy change patterns, which is more viable than each perspective would produce individually, is perhaps the most interesting theoretical finding of this effort. If it holds in more cases, it certainly has contributed to theory development.

10.3 Theoretical implications

There was much explanatory leverage to be found in the two perspectives, which illuminated the nexus between crisis and policy change patterns within the domain of Swedish counter-terrorism. But the Swedish policymaking experience did not always fit well with the theoretical foundation. Some empirical findings challenge MS, ACF and PE assumptions, as will be discussed below.

10.3.1 Implications for the belief-based perspective

The belief-based suppositions, essentially derived from ACF, certainly anticipated that prevailing beliefs would survive crises on the assumption that coalition interaction and cohesion could be preserved. In this study, it has been easier to ascertain that beliefs have survived crises than to establish coalition structures and interaction.

The debacle between the Justice Ministry and the leadership of the National Police Board, as well as the unfortunate relationship between General Director Carl Persson and Säpo chief Hans Holmér in the 1970s, certainly allows for the interpretation that conditions for coalition cohesion were not present. Yet, beliefs were shared on which individuals should be kept under surveillance for counter-subversion or counter-terrorism purposes.

Government turnovers and bureaucratic reshufflings within the criminal justice sector in the period between the embassy drama and the Palme murder do not seem to have provided advantageous conditions for policy stability. Such conditions, according to ACF, are “external (system) events”, which are not so stable and likely to produce at least minor policy change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 149). Such changes on the political and administrative front do not seem to have had any significant impacts in terms of policy change and stability. All policy changes reported in this study came about during periods of Social Democratic rule, and the long period of policy stability was accompanied by political turbulence.

This is of course only one longitudinal case study, focusing on one policy domain in one country. But it includes many observations. The evidence calls attention to interaction patterns of advocacy coalitions, and how these are linked to belief systems. Future research would benefit from making empirical surveys on to what extent shared beliefs need to interact, and how such interaction patterns should be classified. This study also calls for a ‘Europeanized’ application of external system events that should at least include consensual and/or parliamentary systems such as Sweden’s. A body of empirical knowledge is needed to determine the expected implications of political power shifts and for holding office across elections in such polities.

In the theoretical chapter, the ACF notion that policy-oriented learning would likely only produce minor policy change was questioned. The evidence presented by this study points toward instances of policy-oriented learning that were connected to instances of minor policy change. But both the inception of the 1973 Terrorist Act and the major changes it underwent in 1991 were results of policy-oriented learning. These observations underpin the initial questioning, but also suggest a possible solution: the scope of policy change (major/minor) should not be as intimately related to belief-system transformation as

ACF suggests. These changes were major (in the ACF sense) for segments of the majority coalition's constituency, but were rather consistent with prevailing beliefs of the Social Democratic elite and initiators of these changes. Major policy change did not require major changes in their policy core beliefs. The avenue suggested by Rose and Davies (1994), and also deployed in the first part of this book, may be a better way of characterizing patterns of policy change. It certainly eliminates the risk of mixing that which is to be explained with essential explanatory variables.

Lastly, a few comments are in order on the ACF approach to the cognitive world of policy makers, which is explicitly instrumental and as such preoccupied with so-called 'cold cognitions'. Of interest are beliefs that have a bearing on a particular policy domain, a certain subsystem, or a specific policy suggestion. ACF does not encourage the investigator to account for so-called 'hot cognitions', the extent to which 'affect' also has an impact on the boundaries of rational choice (Lebow and Stein 1993). It is clear that the personal tensions between individual decision makers in the Justice Ministry and the National Police Board in the 1970s had an effect on Swedish counter-terrorism policy-making and Swedish police politics overall. These are not easily attributable to beliefs about the instrumental effects of various options. The explanatory leverage of the belief-based perspective would probably benefit from elaborating 'hot cognitions' when accounting for cognitive aspects as boundaries for rational choice. Before moving on to implications for the attention-based perspective, it should be pointed out that this last point is also valid for that perspective. The reasons for attention shifts and efforts to create positive and negative feedback processes may very well stem from affection.

10.3.2 Implications for the attention-based perspective

The attention-based assumptions explain policy change or stability as effects of *intentional* entrepreneurial strategies. The perspective, somewhat deceptively, also highlights successful entrepreneurial strategies. This goes for multiple streams theory in particular, where the policy entrepreneur is discovered while searching for policy change explanations.

The notion of negative feedback processes implies that someone's intentions or aspirations have been successfully subdued. In that regard, a kind of zero sum game is discernible, where one party's success corresponds with another party's failure. The logic of punctuated equilibrium theory recognizes this, even if emphasis is on the successful party. However, this study gives witness to *unintentional* entrepreneurial efforts that have had impact on the patterns of policy change.

There is of course a difference between unintentional policy means and unintended policy effects. The failed attempt by the police to reorganize the Stockholm police Special Response Units in the 1970s is an example of an intentional entrepreneurial strategy with an unintended policy outcome. In that case, the actual outcome corresponded with the intention of an opposing party, and was thus intentional from the perspective of the adversary.

But the reform of Säpo in 1989 speaks of an entrepreneurial strategy of the Cabinet (i.e. to have Carl Lidbom chair the Säpo Committee), the intentions of which remain quite nebulous. Moreover, Lidbom's scrutiny had a decisive impact on the Terrorism Legislation Committee, which – at least from the onset – was unintended in terms of the policy solutions that transpired.

These findings imply that policy entrepreneurship cannot, in an unqualified way, be attributed to explain instances of policy change or stability. To understand the role of policy entrepreneurship, intentional or unintentional instances of both success and failure, requires further analysis. The evidence here certainly encourages the investigator to be cautious with observations of entrepreneurial strategies and efforts. The analysis should not begin with instances of entrepreneurial success that are traced backwards, but should rather start with the impetus for entrepreneurial strategizing and closely monitor where it leads.

10.4 Theoretical perspectives, process tracing and explanations for policy change

This last section will comment on the research process and the broader analytical agenda that emerges from this study.

The historical explanation for the development of Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking was carried out by exploring two theoretical perspectives. The exploration as such followed the process tracing method. How well did that work? The process tracing strategy is a tool for unveiling the causal mechanisms that explain the outcome of a historical case, where the explanation is intimately related to a 'class' of events; a set of theoretical assumptions. Does that imply that this study has actually analyzed two cases, one for each perspective that were however complementary? That would have been true if the Swedish case had only informed the two perspectives individually. It has been discussed above how that aspect of theory development – the generation of new or different variables – was advanced by the Swedish example. With regard to the two perspectives, it was conceptually assumed in chapter six that they were complementary, although this assumption was examined empirically in the chapters that followed. In that sense, the case study method using the process tracing strategy fulfilled a different theory-developing task. In an interpretative way, it

closely examined the roles of causal mechanisms in the context of an individual case, whose complementary relationship could be better hypothesized after empirical investigation. The belief-based perspective provides delimitations, within which policy change is feasible, whereas the attention-based perspective comes closer at explaining policymaking behavior within the parameters provided by dominant policy core beliefs. This hypothesized relationship deserves to be further investigated in different political systems and/or in other policy domains.

How well the exploration of the two perspectives worked using the process tracing strategy is also related to how convincingly the processes were traced. To trace a process to the point of being certain that the underlying reasons for each decision point are unveiled is admittedly a daunting task. But it is also a question of where the theoretical frameworks encourage the researcher to look. The underlying reasons are supposed to correspond with theoretical assumptions. In that respect, it is possible that the process tracing strategy asks too much of the theoretical perspectives. It has been difficult to empirically corroborate assumptions of the belief-based perspective in particular. Mechanisms have been consistent with empirical findings, but maybe less convincingly causal. This point has bearing on both the sources used and the sources needed, but empirical findings that are merely congruent with theoretical assumptions are also helpful in the theory-developing enterprise (George and Bennett 2004: 181-204). Observations of congruency can, at least hypothetically, open the door to and entertain further examination, whereas incongruence alerts the investigator of inconsistencies and the indistinctness of the theoretical frameworks employed. The process tracing method may have had mixed success here, but remains a potentially prosperous route to take in making a contribution to the theoretical body of knowledge on the reasons for policy change and policy stability.