Chapter 1 Counter-terrorism, crisis management and policy change

1.1 Terrorism and the body politic

Today terrorism has according to many become one of the most salient antagonistic threats to human security, outweighing for example armed conflicts and international crises (Human Security Centre 2005). This observation is obviously relative, and does not say much about patterns of terrorism as such. However, the ubiquity of terrorism is indicative of a transforming world in terms of how security is conceived. Terrorism as a phenomenon is certainly not novel. It is usually dated back to the part of the French Revolution (1793–94) known as the Reign of Terror (Laqueur 1987: 11). But since the 1960s, terrorism has become a more or less permanent feature of political life in Europe (Chalk 1996: 2). Organized violence has since then increasingly become a tool for sub-state actors (Ibid.: 1), posing a different set of challenges to those in charge of security policy. The conclusion of the Human Security Centre (2005) can hence be interpreted that what in the 1960s manifested as aberrations in security policymaking has become the norm today.

Clausewitz ([1832] 1991) defined warfare as a simple continuation of politics, but with different means. Terrorism, too, fundamentally aims at changing policies without heeding the democratic processes of government. In contrast to warfare, terrorism is not constrained by laws and conventions that are to

be respected by the 'combatants' on both sides. From the perspective of state actors, there is not even a well-defined adversary. Virtually anyone could be a terrorist, or support terrorism. Pluralistic democracies ideally tolerate opinions that deviate strongly from the mainstream. Problems arise when these opinions trigger behavior that established society judges to be criminal, in particular if the aim is to overthrow the legitimate order. Terrorism is therefore about bringing deviant, often extremist, ideas into effect, manifested in terrorist acts.[1] Counter-terrorism is essentially about preventing those acts from taking place, or to mitigate the consequences if they do. Every act or ongoing terrorist plot is a failure by the self-respecting state. Terrorist attacks force governments to reconsider their array of resources and countermeasures, including surveillance of and coercive measures against a citizenry the state is supposed to protect. Since 11 September 2001, the United States and most European countries have for instance taken actions to facilitate information gathering for preventing terrorism, without showing a commensurate concern for potential human rights implications (Giorgetti 2005).

Since the terrorist attacks known by the dates 9/11, 3/11 and 7/7, an upsurge in activity aiming at preventing a new such date being added to the list has been seen in both America and Europe (von Hippel 2005). The mayhem that these terrorist acts caused was devastating, and efforts to keep an upper hand on developments has come with a cost that at times brings both George Orwell and Franz Kafka to mind. For those concerned that recent terrorist attacks have provoked too far-reaching countermeasures, surveillance policies (such as the information sharing clauses of the U.S. Patriot Act, and European suggestions to compel telecom businesses to store traffic data) and state coercion of questionable justification (such as detaining suspects at Guantánamo, and the use of 'preventive detention' in for instance England, France and the Netherlands) have in particular caused debate. According to a recent New York Times article, the human rights commissioner at the Council of Europe, Álvaro Gil-Robles, said in reference to newly instituted counter-terrorism measures in European countries, "We are fiddling with rights that only a few years ago seemed untouchable" (NYT 17/4/2006). According to the same article, a spokeswoman for the British Home Office called the European Convention on Human Rights a "cornerstone" of the European Union, but added, "There is a valid question about how rights and freedoms are balanced and interpreted in a phase of the current heightened security threat that Europe faces" (Ibid.).

Just where to strike a balance between state effectiveness in countering terrorism, the individual's need for integrity and a state governed by law, is a normative concern of some societal importance. In that normative discussion,

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1   In all humility, this is not the place to define the essentially contested concept of terrorism. Schmid and Jongman (1988) identified no less than 109 different conceptualizations in use.

one concern is related to crisis experience: how much should the latest case of terrorism affect counter-terrorism policymaking? Thomas Bodström – then Swedish justice minister – recently said, "In policymaking, one must never be directed by particular events," (Bodström 2005) when addressing recent developments in Swedish and European counter-terrorism policymaking. On the other hand, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said immediately after the London bombings of 7 July 2005, "Let there not be any doubt. The rules of the game are changing," (SVT 7/7/2005) indicating that that particular event actually would direct policymaking. How events affect policymaking is a relevant concern, not least in the domain of counter-terrorism, where increasing effectiveness soon becomes normalized, and in that sense irrevocable or at least very difficult to change back.

1.2 Counter-terrorism and crisis management

1.2.1 Terrorism as crisis

Most would probably agree that acts of terrorism inflict archetypal crises upon polities. Crises are usually defined in terms of threats to basic values, uncertainty and a sense of urgency (Rosenthal et al 1989; Rosenthal et al. 2001; Sundelius et al. 1997; Stern 1999; Boin et al. 2005). Acts of terrorism impact not only victims who happen to be at the wrong place at the wrong time, or those who are carefully targeted for a particular purpose. Terrorism almost by definition imposes a sense of insecurity in the populace as a whole, and threatens prized values such as democratic processes of government and the state governed by law, economic interests, interstate harmony etc. (Wardlaw 1982). The uncertainties evoked by terrorist attacks range from the mere surprise of their taking place where and when they do, to the dynamics of the situations they give rise to. Crises often create a sense of urgency, an impetus for action that need not correspond with outspoken deadlines. Terrorist incidents often have explicitly short deadlines and tough ultimata, which turn the sense of urgency into something beyond a feeling.

Terrorist attacks can in most cases also be characterized as 'fast-burning' crises that end as they begin: "short, sharp and decisive" ('t Hart and Boin 2001: 32). This fast-burning characteristic draws attention to the acute response phase of the crisis. Terrorist attacks normally have a clearly defined starting point. Regardless of its origins, however, when a crisis ends in a broader sense arguably depends on how it is managed (Hansén and Stern 2001). If it becomes clear after the acute phase that preparedness was less than expected, that the decision-making during the response phase was ill-advised, that subsequent preliminary investigations were botched etc., then the crisis can transform and live on for

months, years and even decades. The assassination of John F. Kennedy is an obvious case in point. Such crises are better described as 'long-shadow' crises ('t Hart and Boin 2001: 32).

In the sphere of terrorism, the recent attacks in London, Madrid, and in particular New York and Washington constitute a certain type of long-shadow crisis, namely 'agenda-setting' incidents (Ibid: 35).

> This cluster involves incidents that have a certain "frame-breaking" quality. They become symbols of an entire class of hitherto unknown or neglected risks and vulnerabilities. As such they pose a major managerial challenge of coping with new, under-researched problems for which no seasoned policy repertoire exists (Ibid.).

As discussed above, recent developments in European and American counter-terrorism policymaking indicate that recent terrorist attacks were precisely frame breaking. The long shadow refers to the perceived novelty of the phenomenon, and it contains elements of 'warfare' and increasingly far-reaching legislative gestures. Terrorist campaigns have been agenda setting before. For instance, the long shadows that were cast over West Germany as a consequence of RAF terrorism in the 1970s were indeed of similar substance (Varon 2004). The extent to which terrorism, when it first appeared in Sweden in the early 1970s, was 'frame-breaking' will be developed and discussed in part two of this book.

Terrorism can thus manifest itself as fast-burning or long-shadow crises, depending on its aftereffect on the media and public agendas. A question that this study will probe is the extent to which even fast-burning crises survive on the policy agenda after the event is no longer current.

An argument that would seem to cause terrorism issues to retain policy salience is the *étatist* nature of the policy domain. Policing is a core activity of the state, making it an inherently political enterprise (Reiner 2000). Over 120 years ago Maitland observed that "[t]he group of words, *police, policy, polity, politics, political, politician* is a good example of delicate distinctions" (Maitland 1885: 105). It certainly still is. Compared to crises that erupt in other policy sectors, where the state may need to intervene temporarily to protect public interests vis-à-vis private investment in for example public transport, the state is constantly responsible for policing criminal behavior. It is in other words important to keep in mind that terrorism and serious crime are types of crisis that may wax and wane on media and public agendas, but which the state can never disclaim ownership of.

1.2.2   Crisis management opportunities and predicaments

To argue that counter-terrorism equals crisis management may seem to disregard that counter-terrorism fundamentally aims at preventing acts of terrorism

from happening in the first place. But that depends on how crisis management is conceived. As mentioned above, the shadow that a crisis casts tends to be longer if it becomes obvious that poor management was related to suboptimal preparedness, or if subsequent investigations are botched. The acute crisis response is therefore only one managerial challenge.

Crises are sometimes divided into phases: crisis escalation, the acute phase, de-escalation, and accountability and learning, where each phase entails a broad array of predicaments and opportunities for responsible actors (Stern and Sundelius 2002; Hansén and Stern 2001; cf. Brecher 1993). In an effort to more poignantly articulate the leadership challenges of crisis management, Boin et al. (2005) pinpoint five critical tasks: sense making, decision making, meaning making, terminating, and learning, which to some extent overlap with the crisis phases. Whether phases or challenging tasks, one can conclude that there are constantly crisis managerial issues to consider, but that these seldom become acute. The acute phase tends to get most attention, however, even in scholarly analysis. Acuteness pertains to the present – what to do now? (the acute phase or the sense making and decision making challenges). But the recent past also at times stirs up a sense of acuteness – how could this have happened? (the accountability phase or the meaning making and learning challenges). Since this book is interested in the relationship between crisis and subsequent policymaking, a few opportunities and predicaments regarding the learning and meaning making aspects of crisis management will be discussed.

A question that frequently arises in the wake of major emergencies is how to prevent them from happening in the future, and/or how to respond more effectively if they do occur again. The very occurrence of crisis may call attention to the need for change in the existing arrangements, as might an ineffective emergency response. Crises can thus generate strong symbolic and political pressure to make a clear break with past governance practices if those practices are discredited. Crises can also infuse a sense of urgency into ongoing and often stagnant policy struggles or discussions over institutional arrangements in a policy sector. This raises the possibility that crises act as 'reform triggers', 'change agents' or 'learning opportunities' (Keeler 1993; Boin and 't Hart 2000). This notion has been much discussed (Hall 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins Smith 1993), but seldom investigated in the governance literature.

This is an important issue, because there is a fundamental tension that political and bureaucratic actors face in the wake of an emergency between two imperatives: to investigate and reflect upon what happened on the one hand; and to survive the political 'blame games' and media 'witch hunts' that tend to follow most contemporary disasters (cf. Bovens and 't Hart 1996; Hood 2002).

The first imperative fosters learning and policy reappraisal. Many consider crisis an unusually clear form of 'positive feedback', one that cannot be ignored by policy makers and executive organizations (Baumgartner and Jones 2002). Postmortems almost invariably reveal large amounts of intricate information about the shortcomings and faults that made the disaster possible. In a pluralistic polity this provides opportunities for 'entrepreneurs' (Kingdon [1995] 2003) favoring change and innovation, for altering the policy frames of key actors and for gaining support for the policies they seek to sell.

The second imperative constrains learning and policy reappraisal (Stern 1997). The highly mediatized and politicized nature of post-crisis investigations and debate may provide more incentives for policy makers and heads of government agencies to defend existing arrangements (and thereby themselves) than to engage in the thorough soul-searching that genuine learning requires (Argyris and Schön 1978; Staw et al. 1981; Stern 1997). There is much evidence that well entrenched institutions can put up great resistance against efforts to change them. It is by no means clear that the mere occurrence of a major emergency is a sufficient condition for overcoming institutional inertia (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Hall 1993; Rose 1993; Alink et al. 2001). However, this merely underlines Majone's (1989) point that policy alternatives are brought forth by political arguments (driven by interests and beliefs), rather than by rational calculations (even though such may come in handy, not least as justifications).

It may, however, be a highly ambiguous undertaking to ascertain after a crisis whether existing policies enabled it to take place or to develop the way it did (Bovens and 't Hart 1996; Brändström and Kuipers 2003). Also in this regard, policy makers face two imperatives that pertain to meaning making: uphold existing policies or advocate new solutions, both without informed notions of causes and effects.

The first imperative fosters negative feedback, where policy makers strive to convey an image of the policy problem that converges with existing policy structures (Baumgartner and Jones 2002). This is a matter of defining the situation and the policy problem in such a way that actions are taken, and the legislative foundations within which they were made seem reasonable, defensible, or even appropriate (Boin et al 2005).

The second imperative leads to policy reappraisal. Typically political and/or administrative opposition groups capitalize on the event to launch their own pet solutions (Kingdon [1995] 2003). But incumbent administrations may also seize the opportunity to abandon prior practices. In either case, the challenge is to depict the crisis development, decision-making, or aftermath as being symptomatic of ill-conceived or obsolete policy structures.

The notion of terrorism, and thereby counter-terrorism, is 'essentially contested' (Connolly 1993). Means and ends, causes and effects, are in this policy domain inherently subject to beliefs, ideas and preferences. The crises that terrorist attacks and serious crime give rise to are not as obvious to draw lessons from and are therefore more difficult to prevent from happening again, compared to crises of more technical nature.

1.3 Aims of the study

This study has both empirical and theoretical aims. It will explore how Swedish counter-terrorism policies developed between the mid 1960s and the mid 1990s. In so doing, it will probe the effects of three crises: the 1972 Bulltofta skyjacking, the 1975 seizure of the West German embassy in Stockholm, and the 1986 murder of Olof Palme. These cases are not chosen for their actual effect in terms of policy change, but because they created incentives to reappraise existing policy structures and exhibited the managerial challenges, predicaments and opportunities discussed above. *The empirical aim is to present a plausible explanation of Swedish crisis-induced patterns of counter-terrorism policy change.* The rationale is that the role of crises in ongoing policy processes is unclear. An examination of terrorist cases since the turn of the millennium seems to indicate that the relation is rather simple; that such crises cause major policy change. Observations of that kind however do not in themselves say why that would be the case. There is a need for understanding the nature of the political (in a broad sense) forces coming into play in relation to critical challenges. Therefore, *the theoretical aim is to make a contribution to the study of policy change and stability by focusing on the role of crisis.*

In a nutshell, the thesis argues that Swedish policy makers have been heavily influenced by cognitive biases when interpreting crises, which has had a moderating effect on policy change initiatives. Major policy changes or innovations have occurred, although those have been in keeping with dominating policy core beliefs, if such have prevailed. They however needed entrepreneurial exertion to come about. Government and administrative turnovers have had little impact on changing the constituencies for a certain belief structure. Interestingly, crises of types other than the three investigated here, such as scandals and affairs, have had a decisive impact on policy outcomes. They have not sparked new counter-terrorism policy initiatives, but they have been used by policy entrepreneurs to bend the understanding of problems, and they have reinforced cognitive biases.

1.4   Plan of the book

The book is divided into three parts. The first describes crisis cases and policy processes, the second seeks to explain the nexus between those entities, and the third makes conclusions based on the findings and discusses theoretical implications.

Part one will in some detail look into three crises: the 1972 Bulltofta skyjacking, the 1975 seizure of the West German embassy in Stockholm, and the 1986 murder of Olof Palme. All three included a range of managerial problems, but more importantly created pressures for change in the domain of counter-terrorism. The two first cases were also acts of terrorism, whereas the Palme murder has never proved to be so. However, rather than the nature of the crises, it is here important that the cases were precisely national crises for Sweden. They were also chosen because independent or partly independent policy processes with a bearing on counter-terrorism followed them. The thesis covers a roughly thirty-year period, between 1965 when the Swedish police were nationalized and the mid 1990s when the effects of the Palme murder petered out from Swedish counter-terrorism policy-making structures. Chapter two, which covers the period before terrorism became a policy problem, can hence be regarded as a contextual background, the status quo ante.

Part one is largely descriptive and includes a close look into the management and dilemmas of crises, followed by descriptions of what the policy-making processes looked like and entailed. The policy-making processes will in turn be divided into the issue areas that actually became relevant, such as pre-emptive and repressive policing.

The crisis cases of chapters three, four and five describe the managerial dilemmas, the sense of urgency, threat and uncertainty that are typical for crisis situations (Boin et al. 2005; Sundelius et al. 1997; Rosenthal et al. 1989). As discussed above, the policy-making processes that follow crises need not correspond with the problems, shortcomings and dilemmas that the crises exposed. In order to understand how crises relate to policy change patterns, it is however important to get a feeling for what the problems at the scene of the event looked like.

Apart from these three cases, other crises, events and affairs transpired that had an impact on Swedish counter-terrorism policy. One could therefore argue that other crises should have been scrutinized as well (or instead). Events that in some way had an effect on the policy process will be covered only briefly. As mentioned above, the larger case of Swedish counter-terrorism policy-making was broken down into time sequences centering on the three crisis cases because distinct policy processes followed them. Other events affected them, but did not produce independent policy streams.

The policy change patterns that followed the three crises are puzzling. The ambition of part two is to sort these puzzles out and explain the nexus between crisis and policy change in the domain of Swedish counter-terrorism policy.

Theoretical frameworks will be explored in chapter six. This first chapter of part two delves into three significant theoretical frameworks that elaborate policy change and stability, namely multiple streams theory (Kingdon 1984; [1995] 2003), policy advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; 1999) and punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 2002; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). We will look specifically into what these theoretical bodies of work say about crisis and prospects for policy change. The conclusions of chapter six are that the theoretical assumptions of the three theories are largely overlapping and complementary. The complementary assumptions are further collapsed into two perspectives: one belief-based and one attention-based. The puzzles of part one are then analyzed in chapters seven, eight and nine, each from both a belief-based and an attention-based perspective. Each of these chapters ends with a concluding section that discusses the complementary nature of the two perspectives.

It is not usual to place the theoretical chapter in the middle, as it is here. But it reflects the research process. The crises, and to some extent also the policy processes that followed in their wake, have been studied and reported before (Hansén and Nordqvist 2005; Hansén and Hagström 2004; Dekker and Hansén 2004; Hansén and Stern 2001; Stern and Hansén 2001; Hansén 2000). The pursuit of theoretical significance in the field of policy analysis began after. The arrangement of this book allows for presenting the rationale for the theoretical conduits, based on empirical puzzles familiar to the reader.

1.5 Methodological discussions

A few methodological considerations need to be addressed before getting into the study. 1.5.1 presents the explanandum of the study. Section 1.5.2 discusses case studies and process tracing as a means of developing theory. Since the thesis elaborates three theoretical frameworks, which are collapsed into two perspectives, 1.5.3 takes up some issues related to multiple perspectives. 1.5.4 contains a discussion on the sources used, and 1.5.5 describes the delimitations of the research.

1.5.1 Characterizations of the explanandum

This thesis relies on a niche of policy analysis that concerns policy change and stability. The role of crisis is of particular interest. Crises are here assumed to bring about occasions for policy decision-making for at least some political par-

ties, although not necessarily those in office. Crises associated with terrorism and violent crime naturally receive much media attention (Fielding 1991) and thereby gain salience on the public agenda. There is no immediate relationship between the media agenda and the policy agenda in terms of solutions, but salience on the media agenda to a large extent informs both the public and policy makers on "what issues to think about" (Dearing and Rogers 1996: 8). The policy agenda is at any given time fixed, but is better described as a process of controversies over how to prioritize issue importance (Cobb and Elder 1972). Crises in the criminal justice sector are hence likely to disrupt the course of policy controversy. In that regard, subsequent policy dynamics benefit from being traced from the impetus that caused a certain pattern of policy change. Doing the reverse – beginning with manifestations of policy change and tracing the policy process backwards – would certainly say less about the relationship between crisis and policy change. This is not least true to the extent that crises do not produce policy change, but nonetheless have an impact on the policy agenda.

The chapters of part one are essentially efforts to trace policymaking processes, to display the explanandum of this work, which is made up of the policy outcomes resulting from the crisis experiences. These outcomes may be decisions to innovate or change a policy, or decisions not to change the prevailing order. Drawing on the work of Rose and Davies (1994), the patterns of policy change will be given descriptive characterizations that designate policymaking goals and means. The typology was prompted by Rose and Davies' (1994: 40) observation that policy analyses typically treat intended policy goals and program means indiscriminately. They claim that each incoming government has four choices, as presented in Figure 1 below. Here, the focus is not on governmental turnovers but that, arguably, crises and other impetuses for policy change present policy makers with the same alternatives.

Figure 1: Alternative choices about policy (Rose and Davies 1994: 41)

		Intended goals	
		No change	Change
Program means	No change	Maintain routine	Symbolic gestures
	Change	Instrumental adaptation	Innovation

Routine maintenance describes a pattern of policy change where the perceived situation does not compel the majority coalition (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), or policy monopoly (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) holding legislative power over the issue domain to convey policy intentions that break with prior practices, or to actually establish new program means. Status quo ante remains.

Symbolic gestures, on the other hand, describe a pattern of policy change where the perceived situation compels the majority coalition/policy monopoly to signal that new program means are underway, but where those, at the end of the day, are still absent, or do not correspond with the purported need for change.

Instrumental adaptation describes a pattern of policy change where the perceived situation does not compel the majority coalition/policy monopoly to convey policy intentions that break with prior practices, but that result in new program means. This may be due to spillover effects of changes in other and related policy domains, or related to institutional rearrangements within the program means already politically sanctioned.

Innovation, finally, describes a pattern of policy change where the perceived situation compels the majority coalition/policy monopoly to signal that new program means are underway, and where policy changes corresponding with the intentions also follow suit.

The objective of using these descriptive characterizations is to visualize the explanandum, or the policy outcomes that will later be explained. It should however already at this point be made clear that the theories that in chapter six will provide mechanisms for explaining the nexus between crisis and patterns of policy change do not use the same typology. They use minor/major policy change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), or equate policy change with major policy change (Kingdon [1995] 2003; Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Discriminating between intended policy goals and program means in part one is however important in order to not treat intended goals as if they were effective in the analysis of part two. But more importantly, it will be argued in the theoretical chapter that the three theories tend to characterize policy outcomes in terms that are difficult to separate from their explaining variables. Therefore it is helpful to rely on a different, and in that sense independent, characterization for describing the explanandum.

1.5.2 Case studies, process tracing and theory development

Case studies are useful for developing theoretical knowledge. Pioneers such as Lijphart (1971), Eckstein (1975), and George (1979) argue that case studies are useful in the formation, development and testing of theories. The idiosyncratic-case study may pave the way for new lines of thought, unveiling explanatory variables that have previously been overlooked. The case study in the form of a plausibility probe may help make the precise meaning of theoretical concepts and assumptions more exact. Further down the theory development path, the critical case study may corroborate or falsify hypotheses.

The ambition here is to contribute towards developing the body of theoretical knowledge on policy stability and policy change, the 'class' to which this case study pertains. A question that needs to be addressed is in what ways the theoretical 'class' is supposed to be transferred with this endeavor; i.e. what the theory *development* is really about. In Lijphart's (1971) terminology, this case study can be characterized somewhere between "interpretative" and "hypothesis-generating".[2] Knowing that the theoretical frameworks to be elaborated in chapter six are multiple streams theory (MS), advocacy coalition framework (ACF) and punctuated equilibrium theory (PE), one may argue that these constitute proper theories, more apt for testing than development. Edella Schlager (1999), for instance, treats them all as theories and not as frameworks (from which theories can be refined). In chapter six I argue otherwise – that the three theoretical frameworks leave much to be desired. At least with regard to the main concern of this study – the nexus between crisis and patterns of policy change – there are ways to proceed with more caution. Lijphart's "interpretative" category refers to cases that are described and analyzed in terms of theoretically relevant general variables, whereas the "hypothesis-generating" case study aims at discerning important new general problems, identifying possible theoretical solutions, and formulating potentially generalizable relationships that have not been previously apparent (George 1979: 51). Incorporating and scrutinizing the role of crisis in policy processes is an effort of that kind. The crisis concept is here believed to impart potentially generalizable relationships to analyses of the policy process.

This is admittedly a single case study that examines Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking in relation to crises. However, it contains more observations. It has been made clear above that three crisis cases intersect the broader case. The policy processes that follow each crisis will be treated individually, where each observation is presented in the previous subsection. Events and occurrences other than the three crisis cases will also be taken into account, which promises to further increase the number of observations. In addition to this effort, the study can also be regarded as an implicit comparison to cases of the same 'class', i.e. studies of policy change and stability. That is the structure of this study, which allows it to make a contribution to the cumulative knowledge of the phenomenon. It is hence a single case study only to the extent that the cases and observations it contains are likely to be cumulatively contaminat-

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2   Lijphart (1971) distinguishes between the following types of case studies: atheoretical case study, interpretative case study, hypothesis-generating case study, theory confirming and theory infirming case studies, and deviant case study. Eckstein (1975) distinguishes among: configurative-idiographic, disciplined-configurative, heuristic, plausibility probe, and crucial case studies. Lijphart does not designate a separate category for Eckstein's "plausibility probe", and Eckstein does not take Lijphart's "deviant" case study into consideration.

ing each other. They cannot be treated as independent units for comparative analysis.

This study adheres to George's (1979; George and McKeown 1985; George and Bennett 2004) process tracing method. It is widely acknowledged for increasing the number of observations in case studies (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 227). But is that in itself an asset for theory development, as suggested by King et al. (Ibid.)? "In fact, process-tracing is fundamentally different from statistical analysis because it focuses on sequential processes within a particular historical case, not on correlations of data across cases" (George and Bennett 2004: 13).

The process tracing method is conducive to historical explanation. The investigator has to give a reason for the steps of the case's historical development, that is, the observations chosen for analysis – at least hypothetically. And it is precisely the ability of the hypothesized explanation of the intervening steps between impetus and explanandum that is theory developing.

> In using theories to develop explanations of cases through process-tracing, *all* the intervening steps in a case must be as predicted by a hypothesis […], or else that hypothesis must be amended – perhaps trivially or perhaps fundamentally – to explain the case. It is not sufficient that a hypothesis be consistent with a statistically significant number of intervening steps (George and Bennett 2004: 207).

The number of observations within the case study in other words adds to the cumulative knowledge of the studied phenomenon, similar to the way cross-comparisons between cases of the same 'class' do. The theory development consists of the amendments that empirical evidence suggests to the hypothesized links between observations. In this research effort, theory development is about providing a sharper view of the nexus between crisis and policy change than what is currently given by the three theoretical frameworks individually.

The process tracing strategy attempts to capture the underlying reasons for different courses of action – to probe (or at least identify potential) causal mechanisms between explanans and explanandum (Elster 1989). The goal is therefore to explain why actors in the field of Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking – individually or collectively – produced the patterns of policy change displayed in part one. In so doing, the analyses probe two sets of mechanisms derived from the three theoretical frameworks. Both assume the individual to be boundedly rational, but differ in their assumptions about how crises are likely to affect policymaking behavior. Both presume policy change *or* policy stability to result as a consequence of crisis, for which reason the main difference lies in the hypothesized intervening steps. The analyses will therefore tell the same story twice, but from different angles and using partially different sets of general questions.

1.5.3   Multiple theoretical perspectives

The rationale for using the three theoretical frameworks chosen for this study will be further developed in chapter six. Here it is however appropriate to discuss the use of multiple theoretical perspectives. Ever since Allison's seminal study of the Cuban missile crisis (Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999), it has been popular to design studies pitting alternative models against each other (Stern 2004: 106). Such designs are vital for theory development, not least if one of the theories, models or paradigms turns out to be the 'winner' as a result of the research effort. One problem with competitive approaches is the difficulty they tend to have in keeping the explanatory leverage of different perspectives separate. They tend to overlap, which was one of the main critiques of Allison's monograph from the early seventies (Ibid.). However, alternative perspectives can also benefit from being viewed as complementary, instead of competing (Kleiboer 1998). If the ambition is theory development, letting alternative perspectives compete or complement boils down to the maturity of the theoretical body of knowledge, and the proximity of the perspectives in terms of what variables they claim to be explanatory. These two properties arguably interrelate.

The three theoretical frameworks used in this work collapse into two perspectives but, even so, do not compete. The reason is primarily that the explanatory claims of the theories – and the perspectives – are not fundamentally at odds with each other. This will be developed in chapter six. Whereas Allison explains the same episode with three models at least purporting to different units of analysis, the two perspectives developed here do not claim entirely different units of analysis. It is more a question of emphasizing different dimensions. Metaphorically, the two perspectives are like Chinese boxes, where the one perspective is supposed to fit within the other, while Allison's models are like three spotlights directed at different places on the stage.

The choice of theoretical frameworks, or models, is decisive. Allison chooses three models with distinctly different epistemological foundations to illustrate that a particular political outcome could have completely different explanations, depending on what questions one asks. That point is taken. The frameworks chosen here have in common the same epistemological foundation. The objective is not to provide essentially different explanations to the historical case, but to get a richer historical explanation and, importantly, to contribute to theory development.

1.5.4   Discussion on sources

The empirical evidence of this book builds on parliamentary publications, internal reports and memos produced at the various authorities involved, aca-

demic accounts, biographies and interviews. Apart from these, media sources have been used, but to a limited extent.

The Swedish parliamentary publications include governmental propositions, motions by members of Parliament, reports from the various standing committees where governmental propositions and MPs' motions are discussed and assessed within their policy field, governmental official reports, departmental memos, and parliamentary debates. In the yearly indexes, keywords such as terrorism, acts of terrorism, counter-terrorism, police, National Police Board, security service, Säpo or RPS/Säk (Swedish abbreviations for the police's security service) guided the search for the relevant documents and debates. From there, the content of debates and reports have directed further investigation into related issues, such as policies on aliens.

Of these reports, one is worth mentioning in particular: The governmental official report on the country's security and the personal integrity (SOU 2002:87). Due to a rather heated debate on the role of Swedish intelligence and security services (both police and military) since World War II, the government issued a special law when instituting the inquiry commission that obliged the authorities involved to open their archives, without considering security aspects. Current and retired employees alike were obliged to testify in front of the commission (SFS 1999:988). The report has certainly helped penetrate the walls of these well-entrenched institutions.

Sweden is indeed a consensual democracy. A policy suggestion can originate from anywhere. The National Police Board, for instance, can persuade the Cabinet to present a proposition or a group of MPs to deliver a motion, or politicians may come up with ideas of their own. But when it is time to vote, the outcome is hardly ever a surprise. The suggestion has been partitioned and remitted to all conceivable authorities, redrafted and discussed in relevant parliamentary committees. So there is typically a broad consensus about the final policy suggestion. It should however be made clear that consensus is something different from a majority vote in Parliament. At times that majority is narrow, but for the most time it is known. Consensus does not normally include all, but is based on a sufficient and stable majority. Dissenting ideas are put forth, but the process implies that much of the hesitations, deliberations and 'pulling and howling' of the actual policymaking remains invisible in the parliamentary publications. In order to mitigate these circumstances, this thesis consults autobiographies, which in a way have become a legitimate forum for recounting 'how it really happened'.

Swedish counter-terrorism policies have not been subject to policy analysis within the field of public administration, although some criminological research efforts have been made on the topic (see Flyghed 2000). Flyghed's edited volume (2000) covers many of the empirical points this study delves

into, but with different theoretical ambitions. It has however served to indicate avenues for empirical investigation, and occasionally been relied upon as a secondary source.

Moreover this study relies on interviews with some key actors. They are listed in the references, where which issues they were interviewed about as well as what capacity they held in relation to that issue is also indicated. Some of the interviews took place prior to this research project, when I was carrying out case studies on Swedish experiences of crisis decision-making in the criminal justice domain. Other interviews were conducted specifically for this research project. The interviewees hence include a variety of actors over time and consist of politicians both of incumbent and opposition parties, as well as actors within the criminal justice field, including the National Police Board and local police, the National Prosecution Board and local prosecutors, and officials within the justice ministry. The study has benefited greatly from the insights gained from their perspectives. Obviously, human memory of the (sometimes distant) past is not always accurate. The interviews have therefore as far as possible been triangulated with written sources on factual issues.

The different individuals were interviewed for different purposes; either for the purpose of this study or for previous studies on crisis decision-making. The written sources were collected in the same way. The different means of collection thereby makes such data risk being incommensurable; that the crisis cases point at dilemmas that the policymaking cases are unlikely to cover. That is admittedly a caveat worth keeping an eye on. But it should not be exaggerated. Many of both the written sources and interviews have served the purpose of covering crisis episodes and subsequent policy processes.

1.5.5   Delimitations

A few words should be said about what this thesis is *not* about. The empirical focus delimits the scope of inquiry to some extent as does the availability and accessibility of sources. The empirical focus of this study is on processes where state actors have the last say, which is related to the policy domain of counter-terrorism. Issues that ultimately have to do with national security can certainly be salient in various sub-national forums, but unless they at some point get the attention of Parliament, the government, governmental agencies or ministries, they also fall under the radar of this research.

The activities of many organizations certainly have decisive impacts on their capacity to actually manage terrorism (whether the preparedness or acute phase, or preconditions to learn and evaluate). Steps may be – and probably are – taken within for instance a police unit as a result of an experience (related to terrorism or not) that affects its capability in one or more crisis management

activities. When such steps are taken without leaving any paper trail or written documentation in the form of for example biographies, or transpire in interviews, they are neither portrayed nor analyzed here. That is not to suggest that such measures are less important, not even for theoretical purposes. They are just impracticable to trace, which of course is even more the case the further back in history one goes.

These choices have important implications. The focus on state actors directs attention towards legal foundations for counter-terrorism perhaps more than on the operational elements of counter-terrorism capacities. Such issues are probably of more concern the closer to the operational activities one gets. In this thesis they are discussed when they become topical in the processes traced. An implication of the reliance on the paper trail, on actors and their formal justifications for paths taken or shunned, is that more tacit considerations are missed. For instance, when looking at counter-terrorism policymaking today, policy diffusion seems to be rampant, and therefore a viable explanation to policy outcomes in individual countries. Whether policy diffusion was an important factor during the time covered here is unclear because it did not leave a paper trail. The interviews were carried out to complement written documentation, but on this particular issue, they gave little additional information. This is only to say that there are dimensions of the policy process that may potentially be overlooked due to the way the study was set up.

The aims of this study are both to present a viable explanation for patterns of Swedish crisis-induced counter-terrorism policy change and to contribute to theory development on policy change and stability. What are the foreseeable generalizations given the scope and limitations of inquiry presented in this chapter?

The theoretical frameworks elaborated here were developed in the U.S., and the criminal justice sector has not been predominant in their prior application. In that sense this effort – treating counter-terrorism policies in a consensual and corporatist democracy in northern Europe – is theory development in its own right. The ambition is not however to develop a theory tailor-made for Swedish counter-terrorism cases. The conclusions should at least be valid for political systems similar to the one studied here. The extent to which the relationship between crises and patterns of policy change also applies to different political systems and to other policy domains is to be further analyzed elsewhere. The limitations of this inquiry can therefore be regarded as facilitating. The emphasis on state actors arguably helps future comparisons of political systems in a way that foci on sub-national processes have difficulties in doing.