

“Islamic state or state Islam? Fifty years of state-Islam relations in Indonesia”, in:  
Ingrid Wessel (Hrsg.), *Indonesien am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Hamburg:  
Abera-Verlag, 1996, pp. 19-34.

# ISLAMIC STATE OR STATE ISLAM? FIFTY YEARS OF STATE-ISLAM RELATIONS IN INDONESIA

Martin van Bruinessen

In what appeared like a dramatic reversal of previous policies towards organised Islam, President Soeharto in December 1990 gave his personal endorsement to the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia, ICMI), a body in which former regime critics, associated with the banned Muslim party Masyumi, played leading roles. Led by the man who believes himself to be Soeharto's preferred candidate for succession, technology minister B.J. Habibie, ICMI remained in the limelight and pioneered various activities of symbolic importance to many Muslims. It established an Islamic (i.e., interest-free) bank and a Muslim quality newspaper that was meant to break the hold of the leading Christian-owned newspapers on the reading public.<sup>[1]</sup> In the new government, established after the 1992 elections, the Christian ministers who had long controlled the economic ministries were replaced by Muslims with ICMI connections. There was a notable decline of influence of Christians in the higher echelons of the intelligence services and the armed forces.

Even five years after the birth of ICMI, there has not yet emerged a consensus -- neither among outsiders nor among ICMI activists -- as to how to interpret these developments. Do they represent a turning point in the process of forced depoliticisation of Islam that has been characteristic of the New Order since its inception? Are we witnessing, as many of Indonesia's non-Muslims fear, a major step in the direction of an Islamic state, that will ultimately turn these minorities into second-class citizens? Or do we rather see the culmination of earlier policies to tame Islam, a shrewd move to coopt the Muslim opposition with a few small gifts in order not only to strengthen Soeharto's hand vis à vis the armed forces but at the same time to bring Islam under more effective bureaucratic supervision? Are the (former) Muslim radicals in ICMI actually islamising the state, or is the state through ICMI imposing an official and politically innocuous variety of Islam? Does the rise of ICMI, as some foreign observers (e.g. Hefner 1993) appear to believe, reflect a strengthening of civil society in Indonesia or

does it, to the contrary, show that the state has finally penetrated the last significant social force that long has maintained its autonomy?

As my very asking these questions probably shows, I belong to those who are sceptical about apparent changes in Soeharto's Islamic policies and about the possibility for ICMI to realise objectives that are not on Soeharto's own agenda. I see neither an Islamic state nor a stronger civil society approaching. This does not mean, however, that like some who take the long view I would dismiss ICMI as a relatively unimportant phenomenon, an artifact of power struggles in the later Soeharto years that will fade away when the succession struggle is over. The emergence of ICMI, engineered though it may be, was only possible because of major cultural and economic changes, the emergence of a Muslim 'middle class' and a gradual islamisation of daily life, that took place in the 1970s and 1980s. These underlying developments are not going to be reversed when the political circumstances change.

### *Islam and Indonesia's Unity in Diversity*

In sheer number of Muslim inhabitants, Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world (followed by India and Pakistan, which have the second and third largest Muslim populations). Muslims constitute 88% of its total population (which reached just over 200 million in 1995).<sup>[2]</sup> Muslims and Islam play a much less prominent role in the country's public life, in its politics and in the economy, than their numbers alone would lead one to expect. A disproportionate share of the economy is controlled by members of the Chinese ethnic minority, most of whom are Christians; Muslim-owned companies, though not entirely non-existent, are relatively insignificant. Committed Muslims have always been seriously under-represented in the military and bureaucratic elites (only after 1990 this appears to be gradually changing).

Whereas in neighbouring Malaysia, which has only just over 50% Muslims, Islam is the official religion of the state, it does not enjoy the same status in Indonesia, which gives equal recognition to Islam and four minority religions (Christianity in its Catholic and Protestant variants, Hinduism and Buddhism). Instead of a state religion there is a state ideology, *Pancasila*. Strictly speaking, Pancasila is not a secular ideology; the first of its five principles consists of the belief in One God, and the other principles too reflect values that are quite important to Islam as well as other religions. The state, then, claims to be based on religious and moral values that are not alien to Islam but not specifically Islamic either. Many Muslims perceive in this official generalised and *shari`ah*-less religiosity a reflection of syncretic Javanese mysticism, to which Soeharto and many other members of the power elite are believed to adhere (or were believed to adhere prior to Soeharto's recent courting of Islam). Some also fear it functions as a cover for perceived Christian

attempts to subvert Indonesian Islam.<sup>[3]</sup> Pancasila philosophy, in its present formulation, attributes equal validity to all five officially recognised religions and enjoins religious tolerance.

The emphasis on tolerance has good grounds. Because of the great ethnic and religious variety of Indonesia's population and the unequal distribution of resources and assets among the various groups, the potential for serious conflicts is always there. The government is extremely wary of the danger of disruptive ethnic or religious conflicts, summed up in the acronym SARA (for *suku*, 'ethnic group', *agama*, 'religion', *ras*, 'race', meaning Chinese-related issues, and *antar-golongan*, a euphemism for class conflict). Incitement to such conflicts is considered as a subversive activity and liable to severe punishment. The government explains its demand of loyalty to Pancasila over loyalty to one's own religion or ethnic group by the need to prevent disruptive conflict. Many committed Muslims, however, felt that the government, by calling for tolerance, was really telling the Muslim majority to acquiesce in its politically and economically powerless position.

The imposition of Pancasila and 'Pancasila values', that the government carried through with special vigour in the 1980s, clearly had the character of a campaign to stamp out all ideological alternatives and in fact all opposition to the regime, rather than of an effort to maintain national unity and harmony. Political Islam, already weakened by the forced merger of Muslim parties into a single one in 1973, received a severe blow when in 1984 this last remaining Muslim party was obliged to even renounce upon Islam as its foundation and replace it by Pancasila.

The discrepancy between the demographic weight of Islam and the Muslims' lack of political and economic influence, the frustrations to which it gave rise, and efforts to redress it, constitute one of the major themes in the history of independent Indonesia. This theme constitutes the red thread running through the remainder of this paper. As an eminent observer of the Indonesian scene once remarked, Indonesia's Muslims are 'a majority with a minority mentality' (Wertheim 1978). The observation is not entirely correct, though. It is the committed Muslims who have this 'minority mentality' and who have been making great efforts to get a larger share of power. These committed Muslims, however, represent only a fraction of those registered as Muslims for statistical purposes, although they should like to speak on behalf of all of them.

A high proportion of those registered as Muslims are in fact quite averse to the formal, legalistic side of Islam and its canonical obligations. American sociological studies of the 1950s and 1960s have popularised the East Javanese term *abangan* for these nominal Muslims (many of whom adhere to syncretic belief systems incompatible with puritan Islam) and the term *santri* for those who at least pay lip service to the *shari`ah*

(although the degree of their actual performance may vary).<sup>[4]</sup> Although *abangan* varieties of Islam do not enjoy formal recognition, most *abangan* feel that Pancasila protects them from *santri* pressure to conform to formal Islam. Within the *santri* group, too, there are many for whom religion is a private affair and who are wary of fundamentalism. They too embrace Pancasila as a guarantee for pluralism and religious freedom (though not necessarily the present official interpretation of Pancasila).

### *The shari`ah and the state: Jakarta Charter and Darul Islam*

If Islam has had little institutionalised influence on the state, it is not for lack of trying. In the very earliest stage of Indonesia's independence, Muslim leaders fought for the inclusion in the preamble to the constitution of a phrase to the effect that Muslim citizens would be obliged to carry out their religious obligations.<sup>[5]</sup> This would have given the *shari`ah* constitutional status. The attempt failed because of the strong opposition of the secular nationalists -- most of whom incidentally were Muslims too, some even *santri*. The debate on the *Jakarta Charter*, as the preamble to the 1945 Constitution was called, continued through the 1950s until the proponents of the phrase were finally outvoted in the Constituent Assembly in 1959 (Boland 1971; Anshari 1981). The debates in the Assembly may not have been entirely free, but it was obvious that there was no popular majority in favour of the enforcement of the *shari`ah*. In the 1955 elections, the freest ever to be held in Indonesia, the Muslim parties together won not more than 44% of the total vote (Feith 1962:434-5). The party most vocal in its defense of the Jakarta Charter, the Masyumi, received only 20.9% of the vote. These results are not surprising given the well-known observation that many of Indonesia's Muslims (those known as *abangan* in many parts of Java) hold syncretistic beliefs and do not observe the canonical obligations. Among the stricter Muslims, too, many were and are secular in orientation and consider religious performance to be a purely private affair.

There were also more radical attempts to make the *shari`ah* the basis of the Indonesian state. In various parts of the country, Islamic organisations played a dominant role in the struggle for independence. When the (republican) Siliwangi division withdrew in early 1948 from West Java to the Yogyakarta area, the struggle against the Dutch was continued there by Muslim guerrillas led by Kartosuwirjo, who came to control vast parts of the province and who spoke of themselves as the Islamic State of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia*). Kartosuwirjo's movement, later known by the name of *Darul Islam*, developed into a full-blown rival to the Republic, that resisted the return of the Siliwangi division to West Java in 1949, and after 1950 continued a guerrilla war against the Jakarta government. Relations were established with other regions (notably Aceh and South Celebes) where Muslim leaders, for various reasons, rose

against the central government (van Dijk 1981). The Islamic State had its own Constitution, explicitly based on the *shari`ah*, and a judiciary where *ulama* delivered Islamic justice (as opposed to the Republic, which had adopted a secular legal system). The Darul Islam remained a military and political embarrassment to the Jakarta government until Kartosuwirjo's capture and the surrender of the other West Javanese leaders in 1962. In South Sulawesi, the rebellion lasted even longer, until its local leader, Kahar Muzakkar, was finally shot in early 1965.

These two events, the Darul Islam rebellion and the Jakarta Charter debates, have marked state-Islam relations in Indonesia ever since. They lie at the root of the lasting suspicion towards political Islam on the part of the military and political elite and the religious minorities, and they explain much of the government's policy towards Islam in later years. They are also the cause of the underdog feelings of many committed Muslims. If the *shari`ah* is not even given verbal recognition as the supreme source of law, this means to them that the state is un-Islamic; if not sufficient Muslims rose to the support of the *shari`ah*, clearly something was lacking in their Muslim awareness. From time to time, minor movements arose that, apparently inspired by the Darul Islam, totally rejected the authority of the state. The more common response of committed Muslims, however, was to strive for gradual changes in the nature of the state, attempting to islamise it from within, as it were. At the same time, concerted efforts were undertaken to strengthen religious awareness and to improve ritual performance among the Muslim masses. In both aspects, they have made considerable progress.

### *Ummah-state relations: the Muslim political parties*

Republican Indonesia remained, as it had been under colonial domination, to most intents and purposes a secular state. If there is not a strict separation of the political and religious spheres, it is rather the state that exerts control over Islamic affairs than the other way around. The two major institutions by which the state exerts this control, the Ministry of Religion and the Council of *ulama*, have gradually been strengthened, while the role of Muslim political parties has shown consistent decline over the half century of independence.

During the first decades following independence, the major interface in *ummah*-state relations was provided by the Muslim political parties. There were several of them, but by far the most important, during most of the Sukarno years, were the 'reformist' *Masyumi* [6] and the 'traditionalist' *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), which in the 1955 elections won 20.9 and 18.4 percent of the vote, respectively. Although both parties had support all over the country, they had clearly distinct centres of gravity: the *Masyumi* in the outer islands, the NU in East Java. They also had quite distinct political attitudes, to some extent reflecting

differences in regional-cultural backgrounds. The NU, culturally closer to the Javanese value system of the ruling elite and following a long tradition of Sunni political conservatism, was always accommodative towards the government of the day, while the Masyumi did not shy away from open confrontation with Sukarno. Both held in principle that the *shari`ah* should be the supreme source of law, but neither had well-defined conceptions of how this should work in practice.

To the NU, any government that allowed (and, preferably facilitated) its citizens the exercise of their religious obligations was acceptable. Its chief concrete objective seemed to be to secure as much patronage from the government as possible. Since all Ministers of Religion during the Sukarno period belonged to the NU and turned the Ministry into an NU fortress, it was in this respect quite successful. The Ministry, the state religious schools and the Muslim courts it supervised were packed with NU supporters. The State Islamic Academies (IAIN) established by the Ministry from the 1960s onward provided a channel of social mobility to many young people of *pesantren* (traditional Muslim school) backgrounds, the NU's main constituency.

The Masyumi never formulated ideas about a specifically Islamic political (or, for that matter, economic) system either; it basically demanded western-style parliamentary democracy with a greater say for committed Muslims in matters of government policy. Significantly, it often worked closely together with the secularist *Socialist Party of Indonesia* (PSI). Its economic ideas were pragmatic and programme-oriented, and differed little from western liberal thought; it opposed the nationalisation of private enterprises and firmly defended private property against attacks from the left. It seems never even to have thought of the abolishment of interest on loans or the adoption of *zakat* as a model for economic justice, two favourite topics among later proponents of 'Islamic economics'.

Whereas ulama affiliated with the NU continued legitimising Sukarno's presidency, the Masyumi - like the PSI - was on a collision course. In 1958, several of its top leaders took part in an abortive attempt by Sumatra-based military commanders to establish a counter-government, with covert American support. This rebellion was easily suppressed and the Masyumi leaders involved were imprisoned. Soon thereafter, Sukarno ushered in the era of *Guided* (i.e., non-parliamentary and authoritarian) *Democracy*, and took an increasingly anti-Western stand in international politics. The Communist Party, which many Muslims saw as their chief enemy, was rapidly gaining power. The Masyumi, having been rendered impotent, was forced to dissolve itself in 1960, and it was never to be resuscitated again. A Masyumi-affiliated high school students' union, PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia), as well as the ideologically related student union HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), however, lived on, and the informal social networks among

Masyumi followers remained to a large extent intact.

After the abortive Untung coup in 1965, both Masyumi and NU followers took active parts in the suppression of the Communist Party (i.e., in killing alleged members) and in the demonstrations leading to Sukarno's fall. The political rewards they expected never materialised. The Masyumi, suspected by the military for its leaders' involvement in the 1958 rebellion, was not allowed to be resuscitated, and its leading politicians were banned from taking up positions in the new party designed to take its place, the *Parmusi* (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, established in 1968). Government interference in this party, and in the 1971 general elections, was heavy-handed (see Ward 1970, 1974). The Parmusi polled less than 5.5% of the vote - a quarter of the Masyumi's strength in 1955. The lost votes apparently went almost uniquely to the government political machine, *Golkar*. The NU and two other small Muslim parties maintained their previous strength, so that the total Muslim vote amounted to 27%.

The government's next step towards the further regimentation of political Islam consisted in the 'simplification' of the party system: all Muslim parties were forced to fuse into one, the United Development Party (PPP). The nationalist and Christian parties, too, were fused into one new body, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). The move seemed calculated to weaken political Islam by exploiting internal conflicts and rivalries, and it was quite successful in this respect. The existing uneasiness between 'modernist' and 'traditionalist' Muslims was in the following years reinforced by conflicts over the division of parliamentary seats between the various 'streams' within the PPP, and continued government interference in favour of the handpicked party leader, Djaelani 'Joni' Naro.<sup>[7]</sup> The NU, very much aware that it contributed by far the most votes to the PPP, resented that it was not given a corresponding proportion of the party's parliamentary seats. Naro's manipulation of the candidates' list for the 1982 elections was so blatant that the conflict came to a head.

In 1983, the NU as an organisation withdrew from the PPP, leaving its members' free to stay or leave but barring them from holding official positions in both NU and PPP simultaneously.<sup>[8]</sup> While in previous elections NU ulama had issued fatwas obliging their followers to vote PPP, in 1987 the NU explicitly told its members that any party would do. Numerous ulama in fact campaigned for Golkar, with which they had established profitable connections. The PPP's electoral showing drastically declined. Whereas in 1977 and 1982 it had received 29% and 28% of the vote, respectively (i.e., marginally higher than the Muslim parties' combined vote in 1971), it was reduced to 16% in 1987.

The decline of the PPP was not due to internal conflicts

and the departure of the NU alone. Many voters had been lured away from the PPP to Golkar by various forms of persuasion: subsidies for mosques and schools, free tickets to Mecca for locally influential Muslims, promises of local development funds and other forms of patronage, but also pressure and intimidation. Government officials of all levels knew that their chances of promotion depended upon the electoral success of Golkar in their districts, and many applied whatever pressure they could or even resorted to fraud.<sup>[9]</sup>

Moreover, between 1982 and 1987 several important developments had taken place that influenced popular attitudes towards the PPP. As already mentioned, the PPP was obliged to accept Pancasila as its sole foundation (to the exclusion of Islam), so that it was arguably no longer a Muslim party. The reactions to this imposition of the state ideology, its implications for Muslim political involvement, and related developments will be reviewed below.

### *State-ummah relations: the Ministry of Religion*

The Ministry of Religion was founded in 1946 as a concession to the Muslim nationalists, to compensate them for their defeat in the first Jakarta Charter debate. The ministry supervises religious education, Muslim marriages, the Islamic courts (which deal with divorce and inheritance matters only) and the *hajj*. Although it has separate directorates for the other religions, these are insignificant; the ministry is a Muslim institution. It never had any significant influence on government policy, but could dispense much patronage (in the form of jobs, funds and facilities) and served as a powerful machine for cooptation.

The Ministry attempted to bring private Islamic schools under its control, and under its auspices a large number of state religious schools, of all levels from primary to higher education, were established. The Muslim community's reactions to these efforts, though largely carried out by committed Muslims, were ambivalent; government funding was applauded, but there were understandable doubts about government control of the curriculum. Many traditional Muslim schools (*pesantren*) jealously guarded their independence vis a vis the Ministry.

Islamic courts had already existed under Dutch rule, but their judicial competence was very limited. They only dealt with matters of family law, and that only to the extent that the *shari`ah* had been accepted into local custom (*adat*). *Adat* law courts could in practice overrule the *shari`ah* courts. After independence, the *adat* courts were abolished, and the Islamic courts were detached from the Ministry of Justice and placed under the Ministry of Religion, which left their status rather uncertain. For a long time, they led a marginal existence; only in recent years has their authority been strengthened, and a new

draft law promises a more solid legal basis.[\[10\]](#)

### *The Ulama Council, Majelis Ulama Indonesia*

Feeling the need of another channel of communication with the Muslim community, the government established in 1975 a national council of ulama, the *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI). The government's primary objective, as indicated by the theme given to the council's founding conference in 1975 ('*Ulama and Development*'), was to use the MUI as a means of mobilising Muslim support for its development policies. The working programme listed three broad tasks: strengthening of religion (understood in the Pancasila way) as a basis of national resilience, participation of ulama in the development effort, and maintenance of harmonious relations with the other religions.[\[11\]](#)

The council is officially also supposed to advise the government on matters of religious concern to the *ummah*, but in practice most communication goes in the other direction. The MUI is often called upon to provide religious legitimisation of government policies in which it has had no say. In several cases it has been obliged to issue *fatwa* that were almost diametrically opposed to the opinions of large sections of the *ummah* and the independent ulama. In some of these cases, the MUI's official *fatwa* reflected the views of a liberal and enlightened minority among the ulama, with whom it is easy to sympathise; others however seemed to reflect subservience to the government rather than independent thought. In matters not important to the government, the MUI has seldom shown a liberal face; it regularly condemns 'deviant' sects and requests the government to ban them.

One of the controversial questions addressed by the MUI was that of the government's family planning programme. Giving the strong objections to the very idea of birth control in many Muslim circles,[\[12\]](#) the government realised that public consent by the ulama and preferably their direct participation would be essential to the programme's success. Many ulama were persuaded to join government officials in campaigns to propagate the programme, although several of them privately had their doubts or were even opposed. Among those accepting family planning in principle, there remained strong reluctance towards the intra-uterine devices (IUD), the method most favoured by the government. Their application would mean that the woman's sexual parts would be seen by a stranger. One *fiqh* expert, Ibrahim Hosen, produced as early as 1970 arguments allowing this method of contraception, but he remained a minority of one.[\[13\]](#)

Because many ulama remained opposed, the MUI did not issue its *fatwa* until 1983, after long deliberations. The principle of birth control, on condition of being voluntary, was declared

acceptable to Islam, basically on grounds of *maslahah*, ensuring the welfare of the *ummah*. Reservations were made for the use of IUDs, while tubectomy and vasectomy as well as abortion were in principle rejected.<sup>[14]</sup> This *fatwa* went against the views of significant segments of the *ummah*. The NU, though allowing contraception, did not agree with the MUI's reasoning; it issued its own *fatwa*, based on more traditional arguments. Many in Muhammadiyah and Persis circles remain strongly opposed in principle. Much of the social resistance to the family planning programme was, however, overcome due to the MUI's support. The government accepted the MUI's objections to abortion, tubectomy and vasectomy, which are not officially propagated now (although continuing to be practised).

The most emotional issue over which the Council and the *ummah* have been at odds in recent years was the government-sponsored soccer tote, *Porkas* (i.e. 'forecast') and its successors that went by various names. In practice this tote, which was started in 1986, functioned as a lottery and provided Indonesia's only legal form of gambling. Muslim protest was immediate, preachers all over the country demanding a ban of *Porkas*. The Muhammadiyah and NU declared it a form of gambling and therefore *haram*. Several provincial ulama councils followed suit and requested the government to stop the tote. One governor actually banned the tote in his province, but the central government told him to withdraw this ban. It stated in no uncertain terms that it intended to continue *Porkas* because it needed its considerable contributions to the budget for sports and youth affairs.

The *ummah* demanded the MUI, its official mouthpiece towards the government, to make an unambiguous statement, but it was disappointed. The MUI did send a letter to the government, not condemning the tote on religious grounds, however, but pointing to the negative social consequences of *Porkas*. Informed that the government did not wish to compromise, it refrained from further protests. Then Ibrahim Hosen, who had meanwhile become the head of the MUI's *fatwa* committee, published a defense of *Porkas*, arguing that lotteries differ in kind from the type of face to face gambling that is forbidden by Islam, *maysir*.<sup>[15]</sup> This produced an outcry among committed Muslims; independent ulama refuted Hosen's arguments and issued a counter-*fatwa* condemning the tote. Several other leading members of the MUI were known to have very strong feelings about the *Porkas* privately, but they refrained from raising their voices in spite of continuing pressure from all Muslim circles to take a clear stand. More than anything else, the *Porkas* affair has caused the MUI the loss of the confidence of large segments of the Muslim community.<sup>[16]</sup>

The New Order regime that replaced Sukarno has given high priority to rapid economic growth, to which end depoliticisation and authoritarianism were considered necessary. The existence of rival ideologies and competing political parties was seen as inhibiting the development effort. The government demanded national consensus undisturbed by political conflict. *Golkar*, originally conceived as a sort of corporative representative body (Reeve 1985), was strongly promoted as an alternative to the parties and Pancasila, in a form adapted to new political needs, propagated as the only appropriate ideology. By the mid-1970's, the government made public its plans for mass indoctrination in (its own interpretation of) Pancasila, through training courses and its obligatory integration in the school curriculum. This programme was to be formally approved by the 1978 session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR, a super-parliament, meeting once every five years to approve the Basic Guidelines of State Policy, the political 'five-year plan').[\[17\]](#)

The proposed indoctrination programme raised many eyebrows in Muslim circles (and not only there, of course). The more suspicious perceived that it aimed at undermining Islam along with other ideologies. Government spokesmen insisted that it was not Islam but its 'deviant' forms like the Darul Islam movement that were considered as incompatible with Pancasila values. Conveniently, as if to prove that there was a real danger of religious extremism, a radical group that could be linked to the old Darul Islam resurfaced precisely around this time (1976-77) and committed a few terrorist acts. Such radical groups kept surfacing in the following years, often at politically opportune moments, just before elections or major debates in the National Assembly. Muslim politicians, in order to dissociate themselves from such violent activities, felt obliged to assume more accommodative stands than they would otherwise have done.

Nevertheless, the Pancasila indoctrination programme was not accepted without opposition in the 1978 Assembly. It was the NU members in the PPP faction, otherwise accommodative to the point of opportunism, who felt that a matter of principle was at stake. They declared both the indoctrination programme and a passage dealing with the Javanese mystical sects unacceptable; the NU's leading *ulama* even spoke of *shirk*. Rather than being outvoted and having to accept the unacceptable, the NU, followed by most other PPP members, walked out of the Assembly - the most radical form of protest ever seen in this body under the New Order (Radi 1984:147-53). To the regime, this was nothing less than an act of disloyalty to the state.

This opposition to the indoctrination programme genuinely angered the president. Heavy-handed interference in the PPP, whose chairman was replaced by Moertopo's man Naro (see above) was only the first reaction. At an Army commanders' meeting in 1980, Soeharto lashed out against all rival ideologies to Pancasila: marxism, leninism, communism, socialism,

marhaenism, nationalism and religion. Since there were still people who did not for 100 percent accept Pancasila, he said, the Armed Forces had to remain vigilant and protect the state ideology by force if necessary.<sup>[18]</sup> It was a virtual declaration of war on civil society. Undaunted by widespread protest, Soeharto did not soften his stand in the following years but decreed that parties and organisations based on other ideologies than Pancasila had no place in Indonesia. All would have to accept Pancasila as their sole foundation (*asas tunggal*). Laws to this effect (text published in Padmosugondo 1988) were to become effective in 1985 and non-complying organisations would from then on be illegal.

This meant that organisations like the HMI, for instance, which had both Islam *and* Pancasila written into its statutes, had to strike out Islam. Others had to replace Islam with Pancasila as their basic principle, and had to search for other ways of maintaining their Muslim character. The PPP would formally stop being an Islamic party. By various forms of persuasion, the strong initial resistance to these new laws was overcome. One by one, the parties and organisations accepted the 'sole foundation', finding various compromise formulae to preserve their Islamic identities.<sup>[19]</sup> The only Muslim organisation that did not comply, the PII (the Masyumi-affiliated high school student organisation) was ordered to dissolve itself in 1988.

### *Protest and Muslim radicalism*

It is unlikely that the imposition of Pancasila would have gone as smoothly as it did had there not been violent expressions of Islamic dissent and had these not been brutally repressed. The first 'Islamic' violence (since the massacres of suspected communists in 1965) took place in the period leading up to the 1977 elections, the period also when the Pancasila indoctrination programme was first announced. A small group of 'radicals', soon dubbed '*Komando Jihad*' by the authorities, carried out bomb attacks on a nightclub, a movie-house, a luxury hotel and a church in Sumatra. Emissaries visited committed Muslim circles in Java, attempting to recruit new members to their struggle against 'communism' and the pursuit of an Islamic state. Core members appeared to have direct links with the former Darul Islam movement.

There are strong indications that this movement was in fact a creation of the intelligence services, under the direct instructions of Ali Moertopo, Soeharto's highest intelligence officer and close adviser. It is widely believed that the *Komando Jihad* envoys were deliberately sent to several prominent Muslim leaders in order to compromise these once the movement was 'uncovered', and thereby to influence the course of the elections. In 1981 (the next pre-election year), the intelligence services disclosed that similar networks had been

detected in various parts of the country, which again formed the occasion for intimidation of the Muslim electorate.<sup>[20]</sup> In the following years too, several more such groups allegedly preparing for the violent establishment of an Islamic state were brought to light. It is hard to determine how genuine these groups are, and to what extent they were actually involved in what they are accused of. The small numbers they have been able to recruit show, in any case, that even among the most disaffected Muslims there is little inclination towards physical violence.

Muslim protest against Pancasilaisation was mostly verbal: it took the form of critical sermons in mosques, angry articles in a short-lived radical students' journal in Yogyakarta and clandestine leaflets. In 1980, several highly respected Muslim leaders (formerly affiliated with Masyumi) joined with representatives of other political currents, including former ministers and retired generals, in a protest against Soeharto's controversial speech (see note 18). They sent a 'Statement of Concern' (later known as the 'Petition of Fifty', after the number of signatories) to parliament, in which they criticised the president's use of Pancasila as a tool to attack his political enemies. The government struck back with a press blackout, economic reprisals against the signatories and more or less successful attempts to isolate them (Jenkins 1984:162-73; Fatwa 1989:85-100). The 'Petition of Fifty' group kept meeting, however, and remained for most of the 1980s the single major opposition group to the Soeharto regime. The international reputations of many signatories gave them a certain protection; unlike many preachers voicing similar criticism, they were not arrested.

The protests culminated in riots in Jakarta's harbour district Tanjung Priok, in September 1984. For more than a year, mosques in this neighbourhood had given preachers the opportunity to deliver fiery sermons denouncing the replacement of Islam with Pancasila - curiously without being arrested, as happened to less radical preachers elsewhere. This created an atmosphere of defiance, which was reinforced by serious economic grievances. A minor conflict with local security personnel allegedly desecrating a mosque led to large-scale rioting. Military troops, sent in to quell the riots, fired into the crowd with automatic rifles, killing dozens, perhaps even hundreds.

The official reading of the events, presented the following morning by General Bennie Moerdani, spoke of attacks on military personnel and defensive use of fire-power, and quoted a very low number of casualties. It was soon challenged by a 'White Paper' produced by members of the 'Petition of Fifty' group, who had collected eye witness reports. Not long after, Jakarta was rocked by several bomb explosions, which were widely perceived as retaliations for the Tanjung Priok massacre. Many suspects were arrested, and in a series of

subsequent trials the authorities attempted to prove the existence of a subversive conspiracy, linking the radical preachers, the riots and the bombings to members of the 'Petition of Fifty' group. Three of Soeharto's most prominent critics, who had signed the White Paper, A.M. Fatwa (one of the founders of the 'Petition of Fifty' group, and one of the most vocal Muslim critics), H.M. Sanusi (a former minister, affiliated with the Muhammadiyah, and a member of the 'Petition of Fifty' group), and H.R. Dharsono (a former commander of the Siliwangi Division, former secretary-general of ASEAN, close to the 'Petition' group though not a signatory) were charged with subversion, the last two accused of planning the bombings. Although the evidence presented (by witnesses who had been tortured) failed to convince most observers, they were sentenced to extremely long prison terms.[\[21\]](#)

The Tanjung Priok massacre and the trials effectively silenced public opposition to Pancasilaisation. No radical sermons were heard in the mosques any more; the 'Petition of Fifty' group kept a low profile. Fears of a repetition of 'Tanjung Priok' undoubtedly contributed to most organisations' compliance with the 'sole foundation' laws. Muslim criticism of the regime did not cease to exist, of course, but was no longer expressed in public except in the most oblique terms. The major organisations, like the NU and the Muhammadiyah, directed their energies to non-political activities. Significant numbers of Muslims turned to mysticism; the membership of *tarekat* (mystical orders) increased markedly. Muslim students' discussion groups emphasise personal morality and devotion rather than political involvement. Radical Muslim students no longer meet in university mosques but in small groups in private homes, opting out of a system they reject rather than attempting to change it.[\[22\]](#)

Radical Muslim dissent has not entirely died out, but appears to be very marginal. In early 1989, two cases were reported of small groups of Muslims explicitly rejecting the Pancasila state. Both occurred in the outer islands, in Lampung (the southernmost part of Sumatra) and in Bima (on the eastern island of Sumbawa), respectively, and both were bloodily repressed. Little is yet known of the Bima incident, but the events in Lampung were rather widely covered by the press.[\[23\]](#)

The group in Lampung was recruited and organised by a radical preacher, called Anwar or Warsidi, who had established a *pesantren* (Islamic school) in the relatively isolated village of Talangsari. He had gathered several hundred followers around him, and toured the surrounding villages giving radical sermons. The group, reportedly, no longer considered themselves as citizens of Indonesia and prepared themselves for armed confrontation. Significantly, they named themselves *Mujahidin fi sabilillah*, 'holy warriors'. Many came from neighbouring districts, but there were apparently also members who had come from elsewhere, mainly Java (but then, the majority of the

population of this region are Javanese transmigrants). They not only discussed Islam and Pancasila but also received training in the martial arts and learned making molotov cocktails and poisoned arrows. This paramilitary education was allegedly taken care of by a young man from Tanjung Priok (although a connection with the Tanjung Priok events has yet to be proven). Police authorities in the district capital, having heard rumours about radical sermons, summoned Warsidi, who refused to come. A police unit sent to the village got into a violent argument with Warsidi and his followers, a policeman fired his gun, the group counter-attacked with knives and arrows (it remains unclear who took the initiative to the fight), and the policeman was killed. The police unit withdrew. That night, a large army and police force surrounded the village, and attacked before dawn, killing many of Warsidi's followers. The official death toll was 27, but local sources speak of two to three hundred dead.

As far as can be judged from the news reports, Warsidi's movement is more reminiscent of the messianistic peasant rebellions that were a recurrent feature of 19th-century Java, than of modern political protest movements. The group isolated itself from the rest of society, whom they no longer considered as Muslims; there was no apparent strategy, the paramilitary preparations were pitiable. It was as if, by symbolic gestures, they expected to end the rule of the *Dajjal* and bring about the millennium. Like the 19th-century movements, Warsidi's movement seemed also to have a background of land conflict (as even the Indonesian press suggested). Recently many villagers in the area had been driven from the land they had cultivated for many years, because of reforestation projects. Only a few months before, some thousand houses of villagers who refused to move from nearby Gunung Balak had been destroyed by the military.

The violence with which the Army suppressed Warsidi's movement sent also a symbolic message: no dissent was to be allowed. The just, civilised and humane values constituting Pancasila's second principle appeared not to entitle its opponents to humane treatment.

### *Depoliticisation of Islam or islamisation of the polity?*

The New Order government, while suppressing all political expressions of Islam, has been highly supportive of its strictly religious aspects. This is essentially the same policy that was advocated by Snouck Hurgronje a century ago when he was the Dutch Indies government's adviser. Many mosques have been built with government support, Muslim religious education has been boosted, religious holidays are celebrated under state patronage, state-sponsored competitions in Qur'an recital have become major events, the *hajj* has been facilitated and is coordinated by the government (although at extremely high

fees), government officials use much Islamic terminology and religious phrases. Muslim sects considered as heretical by the orthodox majority are commonly banned by the government, and in another symbolic friendly gesture towards the *ummah*, Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* was suppressed.

More significant, because of their potential implications, were the steps that the government in the late 1980s took to give (selected aspects of) the *shari`ah* firmer legal status. Minister of Religion Munawir Sjadzali (in office from 1983 to 1993), who presided over the *ummah*'s acceptance of Pancasila as the sole foundation, also succeeded in steering much of the debate away from politically sensitive subjects to questions of the contemporary relevance of the *shari`ah*. A career diplomat with a pesantren background and a good command of both classical and modern Arabic Muslim writing, he initiated lively intellectual debate by provocatively airing controversial views and asking for reactions. He emphasised that the Qur'an should be understood *contextually*, in one speech even saying that certain verses of the Qur'an (namely, those referring to slavery) have lost their relevance. He suggested that the Islamic inheritance rules, adequate for societies where men are the providers of their families, should perhaps not be applied literally in Indonesia, where it is often women who bring in most of the families' incomes. Noting that in practice many Muslims circumvented the rules, he asked whether there was not a need for a specifically Indonesian *fiqh*, corresponding to the spirit rather than the letter of revelation. The ensuing debate, in which Muslims from all circles took part, was one of the most intellectually interesting to take place in recent years.<sup>[24]</sup>

The debate was related to the government's plans to upgrade the status of the Islamic courts. These courts (which deal, as said, mainly with divorces and inheritance matters) were relatively marginal and their competences were not well-defined. Many conflicts over inheritances were, in fact brought before civil courts. There have been numerous complaints of corruption and incompetence of the Muslim courts. One of the complaints from legal circles was that there was no written jurisprudence that could guarantee uniformity in the courts' decisions. Therefore the High Court and the Ministry of Religion had a compilation of Islamic jurisprudence made by asking the reactions of all Muslim organisations to a long questionnaire focussing on concrete problems (including some of the examples put forward by Sjadzali in his controversial proposals).<sup>[25]</sup> This compilation will serve as a guideline for the judges in the Islamic courts. In 1990 a new law on the Islamic courts was passed, placing these courts on the same level as the civil and military courts, and for the first time implicitly making the *shari`ah* part of the Indonesian legal system.

Although many sceptics suspected political reasons behind this move, it was widely applauded by Muslim circles - and criticised by Christians and secularists, who saw in it a step

back from a uniform legal system for all Indonesians, and perceive that this time it is the government itself that brings back the Jakarta Charter. Even if it was only a symbolic gesture to appease disaffected Muslim circles (and it was precisely Masyumi circles, the most disaffected among them, who considered this an important gain), it showed that, despite Pancasilaisation, Islam continued rising to an ever more prominent place in social discourse.

### *The birth of ICMI: an unlikely alliance*

The most surprising event in the long series of interactions between the New Order government and the Muslim *ummah* was perhaps the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in December 1990, under the personal patronage of President Soeharto and with his close associate Habibie as its chairman. Ostensibly the initiative originated with a group of committed Muslim activists of the 1966 generation, all of them former HMI members and mostly of Masyumi family backgrounds. Several of them were well-known as critics of the New Order's development policies and human rights abuses. Earlier attempts to establish such an association, in which some of the same people had been involved, had at once been blocked by the authorities.<sup>[26]</sup> This raises the question which changes in the political situation made ICMI possible.

The simplest answer to this question -- and the answer usually given by both ICMI supporters and opponents -- is that by the late 1990s Soeharto was believed to be losing his complete control over the army and therefore needed civilian allies, more or less like Sukarno once used the Indonesian Communist Party to balance the armed forces. Military strongman Bennie Moerdani (who during 1983-88 was the armed forces commander-in-chief as well as the chief of the major intelligence services, and was minister of defense from 1988 to 1993) was from 1987 on in virtually open conflict with Soeharto. The Catholic Moerdani was by many committed Muslims seen as the evil genius behind the Tanjung Priok massacre and many other public and undercover operations against Islam. The estrangement between Soeharto and Moerdani helped to explain why this seemed to many Muslims an appropriate moment to seek reconciliation with Soeharto. However, given the relative ease with which Soeharto ousted Moerdani from power and removed his supporters from commanding positions in the early 1990s, it is not immediately evident that Soeharto really was in need of the support of Muslim intellectuals.

An organised civilian support base was, however, essential to Habibie, who had reached his present powerful position solely due to Soeharto's protection but who had great ambitions for the post-Soeharto era. As Indonesia's technology czar, and with Soeharto's consistent backing, Habibie regularly

trespassed on terrain the generals considered as their own -- notably military spending -- which made him impopular with the armed forces. An economic nationalist and firm believer in the need for technological autarky, Habibie also had serious disagreements with the 'technocrats' controlling the economic ministries, whose economic policies painstakingly followed the recipes of the IMF and the World Bank (insofar as these did not violate the interests of the Soeharto family).

It was a smart move on the part of ICMI's founders to approach Habibie and invite him to lead the organisation (if indeed this invitation had not been preceded by discreet overtures from Habibie himself), for he had the willing ear of Soeharto, he needed a power base of his own, and he was in rivalry with precisely those sections of the establishment that were most resented by many committed Muslims. The most prominent 'technocrats' of that period, Radius Prawiro, Adrianus Mooy and Sumarlin, not only were associated with policies that exacerbated the gap between rich and poor, but they also were Christians, just like the hated Moerdani and the other leading intelligence chief, Sudomo, whereas Habibie was, at least nominally, a Muslim.[\[27\]](#)

Habibie and Soeharto soon took the initiative out of the Muslim activists' hands. Habibie supplied money and manpower; members of his own staff, with management skills but no previous involvement in Muslim organisations, filled key positions in ICMI. He made clear that he was not thinking in terms of a few thousand members but in millions. Because of Soeharto's endorsement, many bureaucrats joined the association and soon it became a practical obligation for Muslim civil servants to become members. Most local branches of ICMI were housed in government offices, the overseas sections in consulates and embassies. ICMI came to resemble just another state-controlled corporatist organisation, like the all-Indonesian farmers' or fishers' or physicians' associations. There was one difference, however: the founding Muslim activists kept playing important roles in ICMI and succeeded in realising at least a part of their own agendas.

For one thing, several Muslim activists who had long been banned from giving public addresses suddenly were allowed to speak where and when they wanted because of their ICMI connection. The most important item on the agenda of most, however, can be summarised as 'affirmative action' on behalf of the *ummah*, efforts to achieve parity, politically, economically and culturally, with non-Muslims. Therefore the establishment of ICMI's newspaper *Republika* as the Muslim competitor to Catholic-owned *Kompas* and Protestant *Suara Pamburuan* was considered as a great achievement. Similarly, it was hoped that the Islamic *Bank Muamalat Indonesia* would be an important prop for small and medium Muslim-owned enterprises enabling them to compete with Chinese capital. And it was hoped that through ICMI many educated Muslims would

at last reach key positions in the bureaucracy, and in the new cabinet.

The 1993 session of the MPR, the People's Consultative Assembly, was by many hailed as a success for ICMI. In the contingents that were appointed by the president and by the provincial governors there were many delegates with ICMI connections; the press even spoke of a 'green' (i.e., Islamic) MPR. In concrete policy outcome, however, there were no tangible results. The new cabinet that was presented by Soeharto following the MPR session showed an important change from the previous cabinet: the Christian 'technocrats' were replaced by Muslims, even ICMI members. There were moreover several other ICMI ministers in the cabinet. None of them, however, belonged to the 'real ICMI' of the Muslim activists; all were either Habibie clients or career bureaucrats.<sup>[28]</sup>

Not all leading Muslim intellectuals joined ICMI (although surprisingly many in fact did). Some persons of Masyumi backgrounds who had long been involved in efforts at democratisation, like the highly respected Deliar Noer, remained sceptical about ICMI and suspicious of Habibie. The young radicals close to the *Dewan Dakwah* also were unwilling to be coopted and maintained their distance from ICMI. The most outspoken among the Muslim opponents of ICMI, however, was Abdurrahman Wahid, the general chairman of Indonesia's largest Muslim organisation Nahdlatul Ulama and the most vocal spokesman for a tolerant and nonfundamentalist Islam. In his perception, ICMI's activist founders ultimately strive for an Islamic state in which non-Muslims will be second-rate citizens. He lost no opportunity to accuse them of 'sectarianism' and of craving for power.

In response to ICMI, Wahid established, together with some leading intellectuals of secular and non-Muslim backgrounds, the *Forum Demokrasi*, an informal discussion group that played a significant part in setting the terms of the political debate of the early 1990s. Unlike ICMI, the *Forum* did not spare the government its criticism. In its calls for more democracy and its criticism of undemocratic practices it played a role not unlike that of the *Petisi 50* group a decade earlier, and it was subjected to similar harrassment by the authorities.<sup>[29]</sup> Abdurrahman Wahid is the only prominent Muslim who is active in the *Forum Demokrasi*, and in his own organisation NU he received much criticism for rejecting the opportunity, provided by ICMI, of gaining the favours of the government. In NU as much as in former Masyumi circles, there is a strong desire to move from the margins of the political scene to the centre of the stage. Wahid's counter-argument that they will not be allowed to play a role of significance anyway has great plausibility but cannot overcome the desire to be on the safe side.

Among the reformist Muslim activists of the 'real ICMI',

there is in fact quite a bit of scepticism about what ICMI may achieve. They are quite aware that they have temporarily gained a little more freedom of movement only because Habibie needs some mass support in the power struggle over Soeharto's succession, and they have no illusions as to Soeharto's or Habibie's real dedication to Islam. They believe that in these closing years of Soeharto's reign they have a stronger bargaining position than ever before and may be able to achieve much in the way of institutionalisation of Islam and islamisation of the state. They do not appear worried by the fact that ICMI is at the same time becoming a powerful vehicle for the bureaucratic control of large segments of the *ummah*.

An unambiguous answer to the question whether ICMI represents a turning point in state-*ummah* relations is not possible. It was remarked above that parallel with the depoliticisation of Islam under the New Order there was a gradual islamisation of general culture. Moreover, as increasing numbers of young men of (reformist) *santri* backgrounds became civil servants, there was also certain islamisation of the bureaucracy.<sup>[30]</sup> The very existence of ICMI reflects these processes, and ICMI in turn further contributed to them. The aim of some ICMI activists clearly is the gradual de-secularisation of the state, and as long as this does not threaten Soeharto's or the military's interests they may well achieve a few more gains in this respect. On the other hand, if we consider that after the destruction of the Communist Party the weakening of the Muslim opposition has, at least until 1990, been one of the New Order's unchanging policy objectives, ICMI may well be seen as the culmination of this policy, in that it has turned potentially dangerous Muslim opponents into Soeharto's staunchest supporters.

---

## Bibliography

Abdurrahman, H.

1992                    *Kompilasi hukum Islam di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Akademika Pressindo.

Anshari, H. Endang Saifuddin

1981                    *Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945 dan sejarah konsensus nasional antara nasionalis Islami dan nasionalis 'sekular' tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia, 1945-1959*. Bandung: Pustaka.

Anwar, M. Syafi'i

1992 'Islam, negara, dan formasi sosial dalam Orde Baru: menguak dimensi sosio-historis kelahiran dan perkembangan ICMI', *Ulumul Qur'an* III, no. 3, Suplemen, 1-28.

Arifin, Bustanul

1985 'Kompilasi: fiqh dalam bahasa undang undang', *Pesantren* vol.II, no.2, 25 30.

Baers, Chris

1988 'Heilige oorlog, sociaal protest of provokatie? Indonesische moslims en politiek geweld', in: C. van Dijk (ed), *Islam en politiek in Indonesië*, pp. 51-68. Muiderberg: Coutinho.

Boland, B.J.

1971 *The struggle of Islam in modern Indonesia*. The Hague: Nijhoff.

Bruinessen, Martin van

1985 'Islam en politiek in Indonesië: Spanningen en heroriëntaties', *Internationale Spectator* 39, 484-494.

1990 'Indonesia's ulama and politics: caught between legitimising the status quo and searching for alternatives', *Prisma: the Indonesian Indicator* no. 49, 52-69.

1994 *NU: tradisi, relasi-relasi kuasa, pencarian wacana baru*. Yogyakarta: LKiS. viii +311 pp.

Cooley, Frank L.

1968 *Indonesia: church and society*. New York: Friendship Press.

Departemen Penerangan

1985 *10 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia*. Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan RI.

Dijk, C. van

1981 *Rebellion under the banner of Islam. The Darul Islam in Indonesia.* The Hague: Nijhoff.

Fatwa, A.M.

1989 *Demokrasi dan keyakinan beragama diadili. Pembelaan di depan Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Pusat Desember 1985.* Jakarta: Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia.

Feith, Herbert

1962 *The decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Geertz, Clifford

1960 *The religion of Java.* New York: The Free Press.

Harun, Lukman

1986 *Muhammadiyah dan asas Pancasila.* Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas.

Hassan, Mohammad Kamal

1975 *Contemporary Muslim religio-political thought in Indonesia: The response to 'New Order modernization'.* Ph. D. thesis, Columbia University.

Hefner, Robert W.

1993 'Islam, state, and civil society: ICMI and the struggle for the Indonesian middle class', *Indonesia* 56, 1-35.

Hosen, Ibrahim

1987 *Ma huwa'l-maysir: Apakah judi itu?* Jakarta: Lembaga Kajian Ilmiah Institut Ilmu al-Qur'an.

Irsyam, Mahrus

1984 *Ulama dan partai politik. Upaya*

*mengatasi krisis*. Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan.

Jay, Robert R.

1957 *Santri and abangan, religious schism in rural Central Java*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Jenkins, David

1984 *Suharto and his generals. Indonesian military politics 1975-1983*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.

Kiblat

1983 *DI/TII tidak ditolerir! dan Pembinaan internal ummat Islam*. Reprint Majalah Islam Kiblat No. 18, Tahun XXX, 5-20 Pebruari 1983.

Lev, Daniel S.

1972 *Islamic courts in Indonesia. A study in the political bases of legal institutions*. Berkeley etc.: University of California Press.

Kuntowijoyo

1991 *Paradigma Islam: interpretasi untuk aksi*. Bandung: Mizan.

Majelis Ulama Indonesia

1976 *Ulama dan pembangunan*. Jakarta: Panitia Musyawarah Nasional I Majelis Ulama Seluruh Indonesia.

1984 *Kumpulan fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia*. Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas.

McDonald, Hamish

1980 *Suharto's Indonesia*. Blackburn (Australia): Fontana.

Moertopo, Ali

1972 'Some basic considerations in 25-

year development', *The Indonesian Quarterly*  
No.1, Vol.1.

Muhammad, Abdul Chalim

1990 'Peradilan agama dan kompilasi  
hukum Islam sebagai pranata hukum nasional',  
*Pesantren* Vol. VII, No. 2, 27 39.

Muhammad, Abrar (ed.)

1991 *ICMI dan harapan umat.*  
*Kumpulan tulisan dalam mass media cetak*  
*tentang ICMI.* Jakarta: Ruhama.

Noer, Deliar

1978 *Administration of Islam in*  
*Indonesia.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern  
Indonesia Project, Cornell University.

1987 *Partai Islam di pentas nasional*  
*1945-1965.* Jakarta: Grafiti.

Padmosugondo, H. Iman Sudarwo

1988 *Lima undang-undang bidang*  
*pembangunan politik.* Jakarta: Koperasi pegawai  
Negeri BP-7 Pusat.

Radi, Umaid

1984 *Strategi PPP 1973-1982. Suatu*  
*studi tentang kekuatan Islam tingkat nasional.*  
Jakarta: Integrita Press.

Rahardjo, M. Dawam

1993 *Intelektual, inteligensia dan*  
*perilaku politik bangsa. Risala cendekiawan*  
*Muslim.* Bandung: Mizan.

Ramage, Douglas Edward

1995 *Politics in Indonesia: democracy*  
*and the ideology of tolerance.* London:  
Routledge.

Reeve, David

1985 *Golkar of Indonesia. An alternative to the party system.* Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Saimima, Iqbal Abdurrauf (ed)

1988 *Polemik reaktualisasi ajaran Islam.* Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas.

Schwarz, Adam

1994 *A nation in waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s.* Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Siswoyo, P. Bambang

1989 *Peristiwa Lampung dan gerakan sempalan Islam.* S.l. [Solo].

Tapol

1987 *Indonesia: Muslims on trial.* London: Tapol.

Tebba, Sudirman

1993 *Islam Orde Baru: perubahan politik dan keagamaan.* Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana.

Wandelt, Ingo

1989 *Der Weg zum Pancasila-Menschen. Die Pancasila-Lehre unter dem P4-Beschluss des Jahres 1978. Entwicklung und Struktur der indonesischen Staatslehre.* Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Ward, Ken

1970 *The foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.

1974 *The 1971 election in Indonesia: An East Java case study.* Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.

Wertheim, W.F.

1978 'De Indonesische moslims: Meerderheid met minderheidsmentaliteit', In: Wertheim, *Indonesië: van vorstenrijk tot neokolonie*. Meppel/Amsterdam: Boom, 206-230.

Willis, Avery T., Jr

1977 *Indonesian revival: why two million came to Christ*. South Pasadena, Cal.: William Carey Library.

---

[1] Soeharto inaugurated the Islamic bank and was the first to buy a token share in it. Soeharto strongly endorsed ICMI's daily paper, and it was he who gave it its name (*Republika*). He also blocked the appointment of leading Muslim intellectual Dawam Rahardjo as its editor-in-chief and made sure the job went to a more pliable person.

[2] The remainder of the population consist of 2.5% Catholics, 5.5% Protestant Christians, 2% Hindus, 1% Buddhists and 1% animists. These percentages are those of the 1980 census (as reported in the *Buku Saku Statistik Indonesia 1984*). There are slight fluctuations from census to census.

[3] In the wake of the 1965-66 killings of alleged communists, numerous nominal Muslims apparently sought security by converting to Christianity, which gave rise to triumphant accounts by missionaries (see, e.g., Cooley 1968 and Willis 1977). Many committed Muslims, including the highly respected Muhammad Natsir, have remained convinced that there exists a master plan for the conversion all nominal Muslims to Christianity.

[4] See Jay 1957, Geertz 1960. The analysis of these authors and their use of this pair of terms has been much criticised (especially their use of 'santri', which primarily refers to students of traditional religious schools, appears to be based on a misunderstanding), but the terms have stuck and they are now widely used by Indonesian Muslims in the Jay-Geertzian sense.

[5] The preamble proclaimed that the state was based on the 'belief in God' (*ke-Tuhanan*), "with the obligation, for the adherents of Islam, to carry out their religious obligations" (*dengan kewadajiban mendjalankan sjari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknja*). Complete text and analysis in Boland 1971:25-7. 'Mendjalankan sjari'at' in this context had no connotations beyond praying, fasting, paying the alms tax and when possible making the Meccan pilgrimage.

[6] The Masyumi was a front in which various Muslim organisations were joined, not all of them reformist. In fact, the traditionalist NU was until 1952 part of the Masyumi too, and broke away from it not over matters of religious principle but over the division of important posts among the component organisations. The Masyumi's leadership remained dominated by persons close to the reformist organisation *Muhammadiyah* and (in the case of its most charismatic leader, Mohammad Natsir) the puritan *Persatuan Islam*. Muhammadiyah, established in 1912, was inspired by `Abduh's modernism and engaged in social welfare activities, establishing hospitals and schools. Persatuan Islam was a much smaller organisation that distinguished itself by its literal interpretation of Qur'an and *hadith* and its uncompromising attitude to later accretions. The history of Masyumi is detailed in Boland 1971 and Noer 1987.

[7] Naro, a lawyer, was a long-time associate of general Ali Moertopo, the chief architect of the New Order government's Islamic policy. He was first 'dropped' on Parmusi to replace an unsatisfactory chairman (McDonald 1980:103-4) and in 1978 imposed upon the PPP as its president, a post he has held ever since. In 1988, at the behest of Ali Moertopo's political heir, general Bennie Moerdani, who was then disenchanted with Soeharto, he embarrassed the latter by posing his candidacy for the vice-presidency against Soeharto's own candidate, Sudharmono. This incident boded the end of his political career; in the PPP's congress of August 1989 he and his closest associates were unceremoniously dropped.

[8] On the events leading up to this development, see Irsyam 1984, Sitompul 1989.

[9] Both the PPP and the PDI claimed that there were in many areas serious discrepancies between the count as monitored by themselves and the official final results.

[10] On the Ministry and its role in Islamic education and the Islamic courts, see Noer 1978; on the courts Lev 1972. More recent developments will be discussed below.

[11] See Majelis Ulama 1976; Departemen Penerangan 1985. The third point in the working programme speaks of developing Islam's *universal values* while respecting local tradition and other religions and beliefs (i.e., the syncretic mystical sects).

[12] The *Majlis Tarjih* of the reformist organisation Muhammadiyah, for instance, decided in 1968 that contraception was contrary to the teachings of Islam, and only permissible in situations of exigency (*darurat*). The puritan Persatuan Islam was even more strongly opposed, while many traditional ulama, too, strongly favoured the large family.

[13] See Hassan 1975:106-7n. Hosen declared the threat of over-

population a state of exigency (*darurat*), overruling otherwise valid objections to the IUD. This convenient opinion may have played a part in Hosen's later becoming the head of the MUI's *fatwa*-issuing body.

[14] Majelis Ulama 1984:155-74. IUDs were allowed if inserted by a female doctor or in the presence of the husband or another woman. Regarding the rejected methods, exceptions were made in the case of serious hereditary diseases and threats to the woman's psychological health.

[15] Hosen's reasoning (see Hosen 1987), politically convenient though it may have been, was formally correct and congruent with similar arguments put forward by Muhammad `Abduh and Ahmad Surkati (one of the leading lights of Indonesia's Islamic modernism), who also declared lotteries permissible. It was, however, completely at odds with the *communis opinio* among Indonesian Muslims.

[16] These and other examples of the MUI's ambiguous position between the *ummah* and the government are discussed in greater detail in van Bruinessen 1990.

[17] For an early formulation of the ideas underlying the New Order government's policies by their chief architect, see Moertopo 1972. The development of Pancasila into the leading ideology, and the training courses and school curriculum are discussed in Wandelt 1989. A more sophisticated analysis of Pancasila discourse is to be found in Douglas Ramage's dissertation (1995).

[18] On this speech and the reactions it provoked, see Jenkins 1984:157-73; also Fatwa 1989:85-100 (which reproduces the text of this and another controversial Soeharto speech).

[19] The process of deliberations by which the two major Muslim organisations, Muhammadiyah and NU, finally accepted formulations by which Pancasila is their sole foundation, while retaining Islamic belief (*aqida*) as their identity, are sketched in Harun 1986 and van Bruinessen 1994, respectively.

[20] See Jenkins 1984:55-9, Baers 1988. One of the chief suspects claimed that he believed to be working for an intelligence service and requested Ali Moertopo as a witness for the defense (he never appeared of course, nor did another key witness). Several Muslim leaders made hardly veiled accusations in the direction of Ali Moertopo, see for instance *Kiblat* 1983 (this is a reprint from a journal of that name that is close to the circles of former Masyumi activists who constituted a major target of this entire intelligence operation).

[21] On the Tanjung Priok events, the bombings and the trials, see Tapol 1987; Baers 1988; Fatwa 1989.

[22] This obviously caused official suspicions. During the mid-1980s, there were repeated arrests of members of such discussion groups, known as *usroh* (Ar. *usra*, 'nuclear family'), on charges of conspiracy. The first '*usroh*' trials are reported in Tapol 1987.

[23] The best foreign report appeared in *Asiaweek*, whose correspondent interviewed eye-witnesses (24-2-89); the Indonesian weeklies *Tempo* and *Editor* also carried extensive reports. Indonesian press reports are conveniently summarised in Siswoyo 1989.

[24] Sjadzali's theses and many of the reactions, initially published in the Muslim journal *Panji Masyarakat*, are reprinted in Saimima 1988.

[25] See Arifin 1985 for the plan (behind which the author, the president of the Supreme Court, was the driving force), and Muhammad 1990 and Abdurrahman 1992 for the execution of this project.

[26] For more or less standard accounts of the events leading to ICMI's founding and names of the persons most directly involved, see Hefner 1993, Anwar 1992.

[27] In the 1988-93 period, Radius Prawiro (a Protestant) was the coordinating minister for economy, finance, industry and development supervision, Adrianus Mooy (a Catholic) the governor of the national bank, and Sumarlin (Catholic) the minister of finance. Their predecessors and the real fathers of New Order economic policy, Wijoyo Nitisastro and Ali Wardhana, incidentally, were Muslims. The protestant admiral Sudomo, another long-time Soeharto associate, was coordinating minister for security.

[28] In response to triumphant claims by some ICMI spokespersons, the minister closest to the 'real ICMI', former HMI activist Mar'ie Muhammad (economic affairs), said that his reaching this position had nothing to do with ICMI.

[29] The clash of ideas between Wahid, who is one of Indonesia's most interesting thinkers, and the ICMI ideologists is discussed in much greater detail in Schwarz 1994 and Ramage 1995.

[30] Muhammadiyah, which in the 1950s still could be described as a movement of small Muslim entrepreneurs, is presently by and large an organisation of civil servants. There are very few Muhammadiyah leaders left who are not civil servants!