

# **Second-generation Muslims in European societies**

**Comparative perspectives on  
education and religion**

Fenella Fleischmann



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# **Second-generation Muslims in European societies**

## **Comparative perspectives on education and religion**

Tweede generatie moslims in Europese samenlevingen  
Vergelijkende perspectieven op onderwijs en religie  
(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

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
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# 1

## Introduction



## 1.1 Second-generation Muslims in European societies – research agenda and approach

### Research problems and groups

The presence of Islam and Muslims in Western Europe has become a focal point in debates about immigrant integration and the management of cultural diversity, both among social scientists and policy makers. Popular and political interest in the topic skyrocketed with the major terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London, which were followed by a number of realised and attempted attacks all over Western Europe. In conjunction with the public perception of Islam and Muslims as a security threat, Muslims in Europe are commonly devalued as a group which is unfit or unwilling to integrate; which places religious values such as the honour of the Prophet above core principles of Western liberal democracies such as the freedom of expression (the most prominent example here being the so-called “Danish cartoon crisis”); which oppresses women; and which aggressively tries to dominate European public spaces, for instance through the building of highly visible mosques with minarets. Several European societies today are debating the legal ban of full-cover veils or the banning of headscarves from schools and other public service institutions. The building of minarets was recently ruled out in a referendum in Switzerland. Members of European majority populations are questioning whether or to what extent they should support or even tolerate expressions of the Islamic religion in Europe. Against the backdrop of this polarised and often hostile political climate, a local-born second generation of Muslim minorities struggles to find their place in European societies.

These public debates raise new questions regarding the intergenerational integration of immigrant minorities from majority Muslim countries. Is their religion a bridge or barrier to their inclusion into European societies – and what is the role of public prejudice or discrimination against Muslims and Islam? Or is the focus on religion in public debates misleading because problems regarding the intergenerational integration process are better explained by the social class and migration background of labour migrants from majority Muslim countries? Against the background of these broad questions, this book analyses structural integration and religiosity among Turkish and Moroccan minorities in North-Western Europe. Using a cross-national and cross-ethnic comparative perspective, I aim to contextualise the process of intergenerational integration in relation to structural integration and religion as two major explananda. The analytical focus is on the experiences of two Muslim minority groups, the children of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in North-Western Europe. Throughout this dissertation, the term ‘Muslim’ is applied to individuals who self-categorise as adherents of (a variant of) Islam in surveys. This self-categorisation as member of the social group of Muslims is a form of self-labelling and refers to what Verkuyten (2005) calls ‘identification as’, which needs to be distinguished from ‘identification with’ as an indicator of the level of commitment

to a social identity. Whether and to what extent these self-categorised Muslims actually practice their religion or attach importance to their religious identity then becomes a topic of research. However, it is important to emphasise that I only consider as Muslims those members of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation who self-categorise as such, instead of externally labelling all members of minority groups who originate in majority Muslim countries as Muslims. The latter approach yields 'nominal' (M. Brown, 2000) or 'attributed' (Dassetto, 2003) Muslims and is problematic for research on religiosity because the thus classified individuals may not consider themselves Muslims. On the other hand, to the extent that intergenerational integration is shaped by boundary drawing mechanisms and religion functions as a boundary marker from the perspective of the majority society, the distinction between self-categorised and externally identified Muslims may be less relevant as the bright boundary of Islam (Alba, 2005) is likely to apply just as well to those members of minority groups originating in Muslim majority countries who do not self-categorise as Muslims.

Rather than surveying all Muslim minority groups in Europe, the analysis in this dissertation is limited to the local-born children of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in major cities in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. The terms Turkish and Moroccan in this dissertation therefore refer to the national origin of the parents of the research subjects, the second generation. Much of the research in migration studies relies on current nationality for the categorisation of immigrants, but this is problematic for the local-born second generation since most hold the citizenship of their birth country, though not all receive it automatically upon birth. Similar to the use of the term Muslim as a marker of a person's religious identity, the use of the terms Turkish and Moroccan as markers of ethnicity may be questioned. Using the country of birth of one's parents as an indicator of ethnicity is particularly problematic for members of minority groups within the parental origin country, such as Kurds or Assyrians in the case of Turkey or Berbers in the case of Morocco. For the study of ethnic identification of the second generation, it would be more appropriate to rely on self-categorisation based on open-ended questionnaire items of the type "How do you describe yourself?" (Portes & MacLeod, 1996a). These definitional problems should be kept in mind whenever reference is made to the Turkish or Moroccan second generation in this dissertation, which throughout refers to the national origin of their foreign-born parents and may not reflect their ethnic self-categorisation.

Instead of studying the foreign-born first generation of immigrants, I focus on their local-born children, the so-called second generation. The focus on the second generation is warranted with regard to both explananda of this dissertation. Firstly, regarding structural integration (cf. *infra*), the position of the second generation in education and on the labour market is crucial because it is a more relevant indicator of European countries' ability to integrate immigrant minorities than the position of the first generation. Due to the selectivity of labour migration to North-Western Europe and the restricted convertibility

of country specific resources (Friedberg, 2000), gaps between the majority population and first-generation immigrants may be expected in terms of their educational and labour market attainment (Esser, 2001). Being born and raised in their parents' destination country, the second generation does not face the same problems of convertibility of resources and should in principle have equal opportunities in terms of parity with children of native origin with a similar social background. However, many studies have revealed significant ethnic penalties, but also premiums, on second-generation attainment (Heath & Cheung, 2007a; Heath, Rothon, & Kilpi, 2008). Regarding the more diverse post-1965 immigration to the US, scholars even feared 'second-generation decline' (Gans, 1992) instead of the straight-line assimilation and upward mobility that was observed among the earlier immigrants of European origin (Gordon, 1978 [1964]). The differential positions of second-generation groups from different origins in the US have raised the question of whether intergenerational incorporation still follows the classical path of straight-line assimilation (Alba & Nee, 1997; Alba & Nee, 2003), or whether instead assimilation has become segmented with different attainment levels of the second generation following from the specific modes of incorporation of their immigrant community (Portes, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997).

With regard to the second explanandum, religion among Muslim minorities, the experience of the second generation is unique. On the one hand, the children of immigrants from majority Muslim countries are raised with Islam in their families and co-ethnic communities. Given evidence on the importance of childhood religious socialisation (Kelley & De Graaf, 1997; Myers, 1996) and the role of ethnic communities (Ellison & Sherkat, 1990; Ellison, 1995; Sherkat, 2001) for individual religiosity, one may expect continuously high levels of religiosity in the second generation. At the same time, the local-born children of immigrants to North-Western Europe grow up in societal contexts that are historically Christian, yet highly secularised and that have become increasingly and overtly anti-Islamic over the past decades. To the extent that religion forms a barrier to their inclusion into the mainstream, the second generation may be expected to be less religious in line with their greater structural integration into European societies when compared to their parental generation (Connor, 2010). Summing up, the unique situation of the second generation of immigrants from majority Muslim countries to North-Western Europe raises questions about the effectiveness of intergenerational transmission of religion in migration contexts that are characterised by a stark difference in religious affiliation as well as levels of religiosity between secular hosts and much more religious Muslim immigrants (Voas & Crockett, 2005).

In analysing structural integration and religiosity among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in Europe, this dissertation takes a comparative approach with the twofold aim to theorise contexts as moderators of the intergenerational integration process, and to replicate theoretical processes across different contexts (see also section 1.4 of this

introductory chapter). Three types of contexts and their characteristics are included in different empirical studies: local receiving contexts, immigrant communities, and national receiving contexts. The focus on local receiving contexts (i.e., neighbourhoods and cities) highlights day-to-day interactions between members of different ethnic groups as an important mechanism in the intergenerational integration of immigrants – the importance of local contexts is sometimes downplayed by cross-national comparisons that tend to foreground state-centred institutionalist explanations of the integration process. Relating neighbourhood ethnic composition and structural neighbourhood characteristics to second-generation school attainment, I test theories of the generation of ethnic community social capital and their potential benefits for second-generation attainment. The comparison across different second-generation groups at the same time highlights the importance of community contexts which shape intergenerational integration through their differential modes of incorporation, strategies of investment in co-ethnic vs. mainstream capital and levels of cultural continuity. Thus I can test the moderating role of community contexts, for instance with regard to the intergenerational transmission of religiosity. Finally, the comparison across national contexts allows me to observe cross-national differences in structural integration and second-generation religiosity in line with distinct national patterns of diversity. These patterns of diversity consist of ethnic inequality in education and on the labour market in addition to ethnic exclusionism in public debates as well as distinct institutional arrangements, such as the accommodation of Islam by the nation-state.

### **Explananda and explanatory approaches**

After having specified the groups and contexts under study, the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in North-Western Europe, I will in the following define the two explananda of this dissertation, structural integration and religion, and theoretically motivate the focus on these two explananda for the study of intergenerational integration. The concept of structural integration is understood in this dissertation, following Esser (2000, 2001), as the absence of ethnic group differences in the distribution across attainment levels in all societal domains, most importantly educational and labour market attainment, but also housing, health and political participation, among others. The structural integration of ethnic minority groups thus implies that ethnicity, as an ascribed characteristic of individuals, is not consequential for individuals' life chances, which in turn implies the absence of ethnic penalties or premiums (Heath & Cheung, 2007b). In other words, the state of structural integration refers to equality of opportunity between different ethnic groups within society and to the distribution of outcomes according to strictly meritocratic principles, i.e., based on achieved rather than ascribed characteristics.

It follows from this definition that the analysis of structural integration of the second generation is situated at the macro level and refers to social (in-)equality between

different groups within a society. Theoretically, research on the structural integration of immigrants therefore draws strongly on comparative stratification research (e.g. Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1993; Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993) that has been developed with the primary aim to explain class disparities in educational and labour market attainment. When applying the comparative stratification approach to ethnic minorities of immigrant origin, the question thus becomes whether the same mechanisms that cause disparities between social classes are at work in generating differential outcomes for different ethnic groups (cf. Heath & Cheung, 2007b). Ethnic discrimination based on xenophobic attitudes of the majority population may be an additional mechanism that applies only to ethnic minorities (Heath, 2007). I further extend the comparative stratification approach with a religious dimension, thus asking whether and to what extent religion is another source of social inequality among religious minorities in light of bright religious boundaries between Muslim minorities and European majority populations (Alba, 2005).

Although I follow Esser (2000, 2001) with my analytical definition of structural integration, I do not completely take over his terminology as he would call it structural assimilation. Although he makes abundantly clear that his notion of structural assimilation does not imply in any way the cultural similarity of groups within a societal system, I prefer the term integration over assimilation. This is not only due to the political connotations of the latter term, but mainly due to the differential meaning of the term assimilation in social-psychological acculturation research where it refers to immigrants' adoption of the host culture without maintenance of their heritage culture (Berry, 2001), thus implying exactly the kind of cultural similarity of immigrants and native hosts that should not be included in the concept of structural integration according to Esser (2000, 2001). In his approach, cultural differences of any kind are only relevant in and therefore confined to the private sphere. This reflects a liberal stance towards cultural diversity in which individual rights and opportunities are primary values that must be guaranteed, whereas expressions of cultural distinctiveness are considered as private preferences that are secondary to, and may not in any way restrict, these primary values (Berry, 2001). From the perspective of ethnic or religious minorities, however, the relegation of culture and religion to the private sphere is an additional source of inequality as long as the public sphere is not culturally neutral. With regard to religion, the second explanandum examined in this dissertation, such neutrality is not realised so far in most European countries in light of the absence of a complete separation of church and state (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Foner & Alba, 2008) and the salience of Christianity for European national identities (Kunovich, 2006). Moreover, one may principally question whether complete cultural neutrality of any public sphere can actually be achieved; and if so, whether this is realistic given widespread concern among the majority population in immigrant receiving societies that their culture and identity are undermined by immigration (Geddes, 2003; Sindic & Reicher, 2009). Instead of relegating all expressions of cultural and religious differences to the private sphere,

an alternative to creating equality between the majority population and cultural and religious minorities would be the recognition and accommodation of different cultures and religions. The extent to which Islam as a minority religion is recognised and accommodated in European countries therefore provides an important comparison dimension in cross-national research on the intergenerational integration of Muslim minorities. Even if the Turkish and Moroccan second generation were structurally integrated in terms of parity with the majority population in educational and labour market attainment, their religious minority position in Europe's highly secularised, but historically Christian societies potentially constitutes a source of societal inequality.

In addition to structural integration of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in terms of educational and labour market attainment, this dissertation therefore adds second-generation religiosity as second explanandum in the study of intergenerational integration. Though receiving a great deal of attention in societal debates in European countries in the past years, religion has not figured prominently on the research agenda of European social scientists studying immigrant integration. Research interest in this topic emerged in the early 1990s as a consequence of the 'arrival' of Islam to Europe through the labour and post-colonial migration from majority Muslim countries during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Gerholm & Lithman, 1990; Nonneman, Niblock, & Szajkowski, 1996; Peach & Glebe, 1995). The previous lack of interest in religion in relation to the intergenerational integration of immigrant minorities among European migration scholars can mainly be attributed to the secularisation paradigm. This paradigm predicted the eventual disappearance of religion in modern societies (Berger, 1967) and was seemingly supported by the observed decline in religious attendance among European majority populations and the increasing separation of church and state (Dobbelaere, 1981). However, among sociologists of religion, the debate about the definition, extent and inevitability of secularisation is still ongoing (cf. Gorski & Altinordu), and it is mainly fuelled by the striking contrast between Western Europe and the US. Despite comparable levels of economic development and 'modernisation', religious participation has declined markedly over time in Europe, but remains at high levels in the US. Some attribute this difference to the restrictions of the 'religious market' in Europe where monopolies or privileges of established churches stifle the competition for 'religious customers', whereas 'religious demands' are better met on the open and pluralist 'religious market' in the US (Finke & Stark, 1998; Stark & Iannaccone, 1994). Whatever the precise reasons for the 'exceptionalism' of either the US or Europe, one important consequence of the different levels of religiosity is that "Americans think they are supposed to be religious, while Europeans think they are supposed to be irreligious" (Casanova, 2003, p. 19), thus turning the secularisation paradigm practically into an ideology in the European context.

The different approaches to religion and secularisation, but also the differential religious composition of immigrants with more Christian immigrants in the US and



more Muslims in Europe, have implications for the role of religion in intergenerational integration in the US and in Europe. Against the background of the secularisation paradigm (or ideology), the relatively high levels of religiosity among Muslim minorities, in addition to their religious affiliation as such, have led to the widespread perception of religion as a barrier to the integration of immigrants from majority Muslim countries into European societies (Foner & Alba, 2008). According to some authors, the notion of the secular character of European societies is explicitly created in opposition to an Islamic 'Other' so that the presence of Islam is perceived as a threat in many European societies (Zemni, 2002). The notion of religion as a barrier to immigrant integration in Europe is in stark contrast to the US (Foner & Alba, 2008), in line with the generally more positive attitude towards religiosity in the latter context (Casanova, 2003). This positive attitude towards individual religiosity in the US, in addition to the pluralist character of its 'religious market', has created a context of reception that is very conducive for religious vitality among immigrants from different religious traditions (Warner, 1998).

The importance of religion in intergenerational integration was already emphasised in the early US research on the assimilation of pre-1965 immigrants into American society (Gordon, 1978 [1964]). While ethnic identity (especially the use of the language of the country of origin) was found to erode or turn into a mere symbol within one generation (Gans, 1994), religion was perceived to act as an integrative force assimilating immigrants from different origins into one of the three strands of the 'triple melting pot' of Protestants, Catholics and Jews (Herberg, 1955). Regarding intergenerational changes in religiosity, it was expected that the first generation of immigrants would show high levels of religiosity, both because they were shaped by the culture of their origin countries and as a means of coping with the disruptive experience of international migration. This experience, in fact, led many immigrants of the first generation to display much higher levels of religiosity in their country of destination than in their country of origin. For the second generation, however, the expectations were mixed: while Herberg (1955) expected the local-born children of immigrants to have lower levels of religiosity as one aspect of the rejection of the culture of their parents' country of origin and the active construction of an American identity, Lenski (1961) expected the levels of religiosity to rise from generation to generation as immigrants become more assimilated into American society with its generally high level of religiosity. Nelsen and Allen (1974) tested these competing hypotheses and found that both processes were operating among different groups of immigrants to the US: in groups for which religiosity was an asset for integration (i.e., mainly Protestant Northern and Western Europeans from the first wave of large-scale US immigration), the continuous intergenerational increase in religiosity as expected by Lenski was found. However, members of groups whose religion was perceived as conflicting with the American mainstream (Catholic and Jewish Southern and Eastern Europeans from the second wave) more often followed the path described by Herberg. Thus, instead of a



general pattern of intergenerational change in religiosity after migration, such change appears to depend largely on the specific combination of the prevailing religion in the countries of origin and destination. However, for the third generation, a uniformly high level of religiosity was predicted, since religion would replace ethnicity as a source of a distinct identity within the common category of Americans (Herberg, 1995; Lenski, 1961). In addition, religion is expected to remain important for immigrants as it provides them with resources that enable their economic integration (Bankston & Zhou, 1995; Hirschman, 2004). Moreover, religion can also be a means of civic integration as being religious is commonly understood by highly religious immigrants as a means of being a good citizen (Levitt, 2008). In line with these benefits of religion for intergenerational integration of immigrants to the US, more recent research among post-1965 immigrants attests to the continuing importance of religion for the incorporation of immigrants and the second generation (Warner & Wittner, 1998). However, following the debates about classic straight-line vs. segmented assimilation, scholars have also pointed to the function of religion in enclave formation as a distinct alternative to upward assimilation into the mainstream (Ebaugh & Chafetz, 2000).

US research on religion in intergenerational integration thus highlights the potential benefits of religion for the incorporation of immigrants and the importance of religion as a source of cultural continuity and social support. Given the prevalence of the secularisation paradigm in European societies, the functionality of religion as a tool for intergenerational integration is however likely to be lower in Europe, particularly in contexts where the majority has hostile attitudes towards immigration and cultural and religious diversity (Connor, 2010). Nevertheless, religion may remain important for Muslim minorities in Europe due to its psychological functions (Allport, 1954), but also because religion is a form of culture and as such has meaning-making and world-making functions (Cohen, 2009). As a form of culture, religion encompasses specific practices, particularly in more orthopractic religions such as Islam, and convictions or beliefs, but it also depends on recreation and transmission within social networks of co-religionists. Accordingly, religion may play an important part in the acculturation of immigrant minorities who come from majority Muslim countries and settle in secularised, but traditionally Christian North-Western European societies.

Moreover, religion also functions as a social identity for the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in Europe. According to Social Identity Theory, every individual strives for a positive self-concept and a part of this self-concept is derived from individuals' membership in social groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Following their self-categorisation as a member of a given social category, individuals achieve a positive social identity by establishing the positive distinctiveness of their ingroup through intergroup comparisons with outgroups, as explained by Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). The social identity perspective (Turner & Reynolds,

2001) can be applied to any kind of social category; in fact the minimal group studies of Tajfel and colleagues showed that otherwise meaningless aspects of a situation are readily used by individuals to create ingroups and outgroups and to positively differentiate their ingroup (cf. R. Brown, 2000). From a social identity perspective, religion is particularly well-suited to provide individuals with a positive social identity due to the notions of the good and righteous life that are inherent in any religion (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). In fact, Muslim identity is a good example of strongly self-defining group identities in light of its prescriptive nature and behavioural implications (Baray, Postmes, & Jetten, 2009). So far, however, social psychologists have not devoted much attention to religious identification as a relevant element in group processes and intergroup relations (Verkuyten, 2007).

Conceptualising religion as a social identity draws attention to intergroup and intragroup processes as additional explanations of intergenerational integration. Intragroup processes like religious socialisation may impact on the importance of religious identification among the second generation. Intergroup processes and the quality of intergroup relations with the majority society provide an additional explanatory approach to religious identification among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation. Most theories of intergroup relations address the level of identification with certain social identities. For instance identity threat and the ensuing hypothesis of rejection-identification predicts increased religious identification as a means to buffer the negative effects of experienced (personal) discrimination on self-esteem (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001; Bourguignon, Selon, & Yzerbyt, 2006). I extend existing research on identity threat by considering conflict or compatibility of a rejected Muslim identity with civic identities as an outcome, instead of focusing more narrowly on the level of religious identification as such. I thus apply a social identity perspective to the study of identity multiplicity among the second generation. The multiplicity of social identities is eminent among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation and religious identity, while important, is only one aspect of the multiple identity options they encounter. They may also identify with their ethnic ingroup, the national identity of the country they were born in, the city in which they grew up, their gender identity and many others. In addition to studying patterns of identification and identity multiplicity, I investigate behavioural implications of religious identification in terms of political action and ideology. Finally, conflict or compatibility of social identities as well as politicisation or de-politicisation of Muslim identity are not approached as resulting from cognitive shifts in the salience of identities in the minds of young European Muslims (cf. Roccas, 2003), but rather reflect identity performance (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007) as responsive to the social validation of dual identities of the second generation as (politically vocal) Muslims and Europeans. The contextual comparative approach highlights the reality constraints to combining multiple social identities across different intergroup contexts.

The tension between, on the one hand, restricted room for religiosity in general and Islam in particular in European receiving societies, and on the other, the identity function of religion as well as its alleged psychological benefits in general and its incorporation functions for immigrants in particular, render second-generation religiosity among Muslim minorities in Europe an interesting and relevant topic of research on intergenerational integration. Several scholars have already studied immigrant religiosity in European contexts. However, much of this research looks only at the first immigrant generation (e.g. Connor, 2010; Smits, De Ruiter, & Van Tubergen, 2010; Van Tubergen, 2003, 2007) and therefore does not speak to intergenerational changes in religiosity. Studies that do address trends in terms of changing religiosity between generations and over time (e.g. Diehl & Koenig, 2009; Maliepaard, Lubbers, & Gijsberts, 2010; Phalet, Gijsberts, & Hagendoorn, 2008) yielded mixed results; moreover, they were limited to a single country and therefore do not incorporate a comparative perspective. Diehl and Koenig (2009) found remarkably little change in the level of religiosity between the first and second generation of Turkish immigrants to Germany, particularly among men. Phalet, Gijsberts and Hagendoorn (2008) found slightly declining religiosity over time and generations among Turkish and Moroccan minorities in the Netherlands, but the downward trend was stopped and levels of religiosity stabilised in the most recent wave of the repeated cross-sections, particularly among more highly educated members of the second generation (Maliepaard, Lubbers, & Gijsberts, 2010). Although all previous studies attest to the continuing importance of religion for the second generation, the limitation to a single national context does not allow contextualising second-generation religiosity. The different national approaches towards the institutional accommodation of Islam in European countries (Bader, 2007; Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Koenig, 2007) however warrant comparative research into national differences in second-generation religiosity. Therefore, in addition to focusing on the so far under-researched second generation of Turkish and Moroccan minorities in the study of immigrant religiosity, a second added value of this dissertation is its cross-national comparative approach, which will be explained in more detail in section 1.4 of this introductory chapter.

Empirically, one innovation of this dissertation is the multidimensional conceptualisation and measurement of religiosity among Muslim minorities. Within the sociology of religion, it is generally accepted that religion is a multidimensional phenomenon that cannot be captured with a single indicator but consists at least of affiliation, belief and practice as central components (Voas, 2007). The development of multidimensional conceptualisations of religion (Glock & Stark, 1965) and their first empirical applications (e.g. Boos-Nünning, 1972; Clayton & Gladden, 1974; De Jong, Faulkner, & Warland, 1976), however, have been biased towards historically Christian majority populations. For Muslim minorities, it is less clear how many dimensions can be meaningfully distinguished and how they are mutually related (but see Phalet & Güngör, 2004). Previous studies on

religiosity among Muslim minorities in Europe were most often limited to few indicators of religiosity and focused primarily on religious attendance (Connor, 2010; Diehl & Koenig, 2009; Maliepaard, Lubbers, & Gijsberts, 2010; Phaet, Gijsberts, & Hagendoorn, 2008; Smits, De Ruiter, & Van Tubergen, 2010; Van Tubergen, 2003, 2007). New primary survey data on the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in various European cities from the TIES-project (see section 1.3 in this chapter) allow me to go beyond traditional behavioural measures like mosque attendance and to construct multidimensional models of religion including various Islamic religious practices, religious identification, orthodox beliefs and political attitudes towards the role of Islam in society. Moreover, the comparative approach allows me to test the equivalence of these multidimensional models of religiosity across second-generation groups and across different local and national contexts.

Summing up, this dissertation analyses structural integration and religion among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in Europe from a comparative perspective. The core of the dissertation consists of six empirical chapters that may be read as stand-alone research articles – in fact, they were written as co-authored research papers with the aim to be published as journal articles (see the footnotes to each chapter for information on co-authors, titles and publication status). Chapters 2 and 3 focus exclusively on structural integration, while chapter 4 is devoted to the relation between structural integration and religiosity. Chapter 5 investigates the influence of religious socialisation and acculturation processes on religiosity in young adulthood. Finally, chapters 6 and 7 focus on group processes and intergroup relations relating to identity multiplicity and politicised religion among the second generation. In the following, I explain the specific research questions of each chapter and how they were put to a test. Subsequently, I describe the data sources used in order to provide insights into the empirical basis of my research. In the fourth section of this introductory chapter, I elaborate on the comparative approach of the dissertation in terms of the comparative design, methodological approach and the comparison contexts. The introduction concludes with an outline of this book and an overview of the empirical chapters.

## **1.2 Research questions and aims**

### **Chapter 2: Ethnic composition and second-generation school attainment**

Against the background of severe and persistent ethnic penalties in educational attainment among the second generation in Belgium (Marks, 2005; OECD, 2006, 2007), chapters 2 and 3 examine contextual explanations for second-generation educational attainment. As ethnic penalties vary across local contexts and because of limited resources within immigrant families, I explore the role of local ethnic community forces for second-generation attainment. Concentrations of the ethnic ingroup in the local

living environment can be considered a proxy for ethnic capital which may function as a resource for second-generation attainment, according to segmented assimilation theory (Portes, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997). Looking at residential contexts as an additional explanation for ethnic inequalities in educational attainment adds to existing literature in comparative ethnic stratification as Phalet and colleagues have shown that ethnic penalties in educational attainment of the second generation in Belgium can only partly be explained by restricted parental resources of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation. In contrast with the Italian second generation, significant residual penalties in educational attainment remain when controlling for social background (Phalet, Deboosere, & Bastiaenssen, 2007). Local residential contexts and their resources may offer an alternative explanation for ethnic penalties in education, as neighbourhood research has demonstrated the influence of residential contexts on individual outcomes (for overviews, see Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2000; Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002). One of the measures commonly used in US studies of contextual effects on educational attainment is the ethnic composition of the residential environment (e.g. Albrecht, Albrecht, & Murguia, 2005; Bankston & Caldas, 1996; Cohen, 1998). However, there are different conceptualisations of ethnic composition. Most researchers use the share of ethnic minorities as a measure of diversity, thus making a dichotomous distinction between the ethnic majority on the one hand and all ethnic minorities on the other. An alternative is to look at ethnic density, i.e., the presence of the co-ethnic ingroup at the local level, irrespective of the majority or minority status of the ingroup (cf. Halpern, 1993; Halpern & Nazroo, 1999). Chapter 2 argues that ethnic density is a more meaningful approach to ethnic composition from a minority perspective as it reflects more closely the availability of ethnic capital. In light of distinct conceptual and operational approaches to ethnic residential concentration, chapter 2 asks the following research question:

*How to conceive ethnic composition at the local level and how are different concepts of ethnic composition associated with school attainment among the second generation?*

This research question is addressed with a multilevel analysis of Belgian Census data, comparing the rates of secondary school completion of the Turkish, Moroccan and Italian second generation with a reference sample of native Belgian origin across 201 municipalities. The main focus is on the comparison of two distinct conceptualisations and measures of ethnic composition – ethnic minority concentration and ethnic density – while controlling for socio-economic composition of municipalities. The comparison of the two ethnic composition measures reveals that ethnic density is a more meaningful measure because (1) its positive effect applies equally to majority and minority groups, whereas the effect of ethnic minority concentration depends on ethnic group membership, and (2) ethnic density explains a larger share of ethnic penalties in school attainment of the

second generation. Chapter 2 goes beyond existing research in comparative stratification by testing contextual explanations for ethnic educational inequalities in the Belgian case and it highlights the importance of the ethnic minority perspective in conceptualising and measuring ethnic composition.

### **Chapter 3: The role of structural neighbourhood characteristics and ethnic density in second-generation school attainment**

Chapter 3 builds on the results of chapter 2 and takes a closer look at the structural characteristics of municipalities that may facilitate or hamper the emergence of a positive ethnic density effect. Thus, I further investigate the possible upside of ethnic concentration, as predicted by segmented assimilation theory, by considering neighbourhood stability and quality as important moderators of positive ethnic density effects. Drawing on theory and research on the emergence of social capital within neighbourhoods (Coulthard, Walker, & Morgan, 2002; Halpern, 2005; Putnam, 1995; Völker, Flap, & Lindenberg, 2007), I hypothesise that positive effects of ethnic density are more likely in municipalities that are residentially more stable and/or of higher quality. To this general hypothesis, I add group specific expectations for the three largest ethnic minority groups in Belgium in line with their different modes of incorporation as described by segmented assimilation theory (Portes, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997). Distinct types of ethnic concentration neighbourhoods as proposed by research on spatial assimilation (Logan, Alba, & Zhang, 2002; Yu & Myers, 2007) complement group-specific expectations regarding the availability of and investment in ethnic capital as a resource for second-generation attainment. Italians in Belgium most closely resemble the classical pattern of assimilation and upward mobility, with prevalent investment in mainstream capital and bridging social capital, as exemplified by high intermarriage rates with majority Belgians. The preference for investment in mainstream rather than ethnic capital implies that residential areas of Italian concentration are generally not sites of vibrant ethnic enclave economies, neither do they emerge from a preference of co-ethnic residential concentration. Moroccan Belgians are at risk of downward assimilation due to restricted resources, bright ethnic and religious boundaries that separate them from the Belgian mainstream and little investment in co-ethnic capital. Moreover, their concentration in social housing in inner city areas, which is largely a response to discrimination on the housing market, implies that residential areas with Moroccan concentrations most closely resemble ethnic ghettos in Logan et al.'s (2002) terminology. Finally, the Turkish minority most closely resembles the third incorporation mode described by segmented assimilation in terms of their close-knit community structure and high levels of cultural continuity. In addition, vibrant ethnic economies in areas of Turkish concentration make Turkish neighbourhoods an example of ethnic enclaves (cf. Phalet & Heath, 2010). Whether this mode of incorporation eventually results in intergenerational upward mobility, as predicted

by segmented assimilation, however may be questioned given the restricted resources within Turkish communities, such that the ethnic enclave economy bears the risk of a 'mobility trap' for the second generation (Esser, 2004). Against this background, I analyse whether ethnic density and structural neighbourhood characteristics have differential effects among the three second-generation groups under study. The research questions of chapter 3 read:

*How does ethnic density interact with structural characteristics of local residential contexts to explain educational attainment among the second generation? Do contextual effects differ between ethnic minority groups in line with differential modes of incorporation?*

Chapter 3 draws on the same data source and method of analysis as the previous chapter and presents the results of multilevel models of secondary school completion among the Turkish, Moroccan and Italian second generation and a majority Belgian reference sample from the Belgian Census in 201 municipalities. In a pooled model and in separate analyses for each ethnic group, the analytical focus is on the effects of ethnic density and its interactions with structural neighbourhood characteristics, while controlling for the socio-economic composition of municipalities. In line with different modes of incorporation of the three second-generation groups, different effects of ethnic density in conjunction with structural neighbourhood characteristics are found. Ethnic density is found to overlap considerably with high neighbourhood stability and quality among the Belgian majority, and with low stability and quality among the Moroccan second generation. The latter finding again highlights the risk of downward assimilation among this group in light of the positive associations between neighbourhood stability and quality and school completion. Among the Turkish and Italian second generation, where ethnic density was not so strongly overlapping with neighbourhood stability and quality, we find interactions between ethnic density and structural neighbourhood characteristics. Specifically, ethnic density is positively associated with secondary school completion among the Turkish second generation, but only in residentially stable neighbourhoods. The opposite is the case among Italians, as neighbourhood stability implies staying behind in declining neighbourhoods due to the less recent migration history of Italians as compared to Turkish minorities in Belgium. The findings thus show that, in addition to socio-economic composition, structural characteristics of neighbourhoods are crucial for understanding how local ethnic communities may or may not support second-generation school attainment. Chapter 3 adds to the existing literature by extending segmented assimilation theory to a European migration context and complementing it with theories and research on ethnic concentration neighbourhoods, immigrants' investment strategies and the emergence of social capital in local residential contexts.



## **Chapter 4: Integration and religiosity: individual and institutional perspectives**

After having focused exclusively on structural integration in chapters 2 and 3, chapter 4 extends the comparative stratification approach to religion, the second explanandum of this dissertation. Applying the structural assimilation concept (Esser, 2000, 2001) to the study of religiosity, it is hypothesised that structural integration in terms of educational and labour market attainment and in terms of intermarriage will go together with levels of religiosity that are similar to those of the majority population (Connor, 2010). Given prevalent secularisation among historically Christian majority populations in North-Western Europe (Gorski & Altinordu, 2008), this religious assimilation hypothesis boils down to a secularisation hypothesis, such that Muslim minorities are expected to be less religious, the more structurally integrated they are. A competing hypothesis predicts religious vitality in the second generation due to religious transmission as part of intergenerational cultural continuity within immigrant communities (Ellison & Sherkat, 1990; Ellison, 1995; Sherkat, 2001; Phalet & Schönflug, 2001a) and/or due to reactive religious identification in response to societal exclusion and experiences of discrimination (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). The first research question of this chapter thus addresses the relation between structural integration and religiosity among the second generation.

A second research question in this chapter is concerned with country differences in this relationship which are expected following an institutionalist approach. The general hypothesis here is that the association between structural integration and religiosity may vary as a function of institutional contexts. A lack of recognition of Islam as a minority religion may reinforce the inverse relation between structural integration and religion, whereas the recognition and accommodation of Islam by the institutions of the nation-state may attenuate the link between socio-economic disadvantage and religiosity. This expectation is based on the notion of institutional arrangements as opportunity structures (cf. Koopmans, Statham, Guigni, & Passy, 2005), but should not be understood in a deterministic sense (i.e., as institutions determining individual outcomes such as religiosity). Rather, the institutional recognition of Islam is one aspect of cross-national variation in patterns of diversity that may be more or less inclusive of ethnic and religious diversity (cf. *infra*). To examine the hypothesis of cross-national variation in the coupling of structural integration and religion, I take a comparative case study approach and examine the relation between structural integration and religiosity among the Turkish second generation in four capital cities: Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels and Stockholm. These capitals have been selected because they represent different national histories of church-state relations which have provided distinct opportunity structures for the recognition and accommodation of Islam (Bader, 2007; De Wit & Koopmans, 2005; Koenig, 2007; Soper & Fetzer, 2007;



Statham, Koopmans, Giugni, & Passy, 2005), ranging from religious pluralism and state neutrality, so-called 'pillarisation', in the Netherlands (Doomernik, 1995; Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, & Meijer, 1996), to persistent privilege of established churches in Germany (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Jonker, 2002), with varying levels of state recognition and support for Islam in Belgium (Foblets & Overbeeke, 2002; Kanmaz, 2002, Manço, 2000) and Sweden (Alwall, 2002; Sander, 1996). Summing up, the research questions of chapter 4 read as follows:

*What is the relation between structural integration and religiosity among the second generation? Does this relation differ across national contexts as a function of different approaches to the institutionalisation of Islam?*

These research questions are analysed with new comparative survey data of the Turkish second generation from the TIES-project (cf. infra). Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis is used to test the (non-)equivalence of multidimensional latent models of religiosity across cities. Subsequently, multi-group structural equation models are applied to test whether the associations between structural integration and religiosity differ across contexts. Differential associations between structural integration and religiosity across contexts support the notion that the institutional recognition and accommodation of Islam by the state attenuates the inverse relation between the structural position of the Turkish second generation and their levels of religiosity.

## **Chapter 5: Intergenerational transmission and acculturation**

Chapter 5 shifts the focus back from national institutional arrangements to community forces as contextual moderators and examines the process of intergenerational transmission of religiosity among Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in Belgium. Research among Christian majority populations has revealed the general importance of childhood religious socialisation through parental role-models and religious instruction (Kelley & De Graaf, 1996; Myers, 1996). This chapter extends research from the sociology of religion to Turkish and Moroccan minorities in Western Europe as acculturating groups (Berry, 2001). As a form of culture (Cohen, 2009), religion plays an important role in intergenerational cultural transmission, which in this case moreover occurs against the background of a stark distinction between the societal mainstream and the acculturating groups in terms of religious affiliation and levels of religiosity (Voas & Crockett, 2005). As children of immigrants from majority Muslim countries, the Turkish and Moroccan second generation grow up in historically Christian, highly secularised and increasingly anti-Islamic societal contexts. By comparing the process of religious transmission and acculturation orientations, in particular the maintenance of the heritage culture, across two Muslim minority groups that differ in their internal cohesion and levels of cultural continuity (Dagevos, 2001; De Valk & Liefbroer, 2007; Phalet & Schönplflug, 2001a), the

study aims to shed more light on intragroup processes that reinforce religiosity in the second generation. The research questions of this chapter are:

*What is the influence of religious socialisation within immigrant families and communities on later religiosity among the second generation? How does the process of religious transmission relate to the acculturation of the second generation?*

Like Chapter 4, chapter 5 uses multiple indicators of religion, including religious identification, practices and orthodox beliefs. Multi-group structural equation models of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in two Belgian cities (Antwerp and Brussels) are used to test cross-cultural equivalence of religiosity and acculturation orientations and to examine differential effects of religious socialisation and of acculturation orientations on religiosity in young adulthood. In line with the expectation that acculturation orientations affect the process of intergenerational transmission in acculturating groups, a greater orientation towards cultural maintenance fully mediated the effects of religious socialisation on religiosity of the second generation. The comparative approach moreover revealed group differences in acculturation processes and religious transmission in line with differential levels of cultural continuity and social cohesion of Turkish and Moroccan minorities in Belgium.

### **Chapter 6: Identity multiplicity among the second generation: Compatible or conflicting patterns of ethno-religious and civic identification?**

The final two chapters use a complementary explanatory focus on intergroup processes and zoom in on the identity functions of religion. Due to the inherent notions of the good and righteous life, religion provides a powerful source of a positive self-concept for young Muslims in Europe (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). Thus, the two final chapters focus on religious identification and examine its association with civic disidentification (chapter 6) and political protest (chapter 7).

Chapter 6 builds on existing theory and research on identity multiplicity from a social identity perspective (Turner & Reynolds, 2001) by studying identity conflict or compatibility among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation. Despite the central importance of religious identities among Muslim minorities (Verkuyten, 2007), the Turkish and Moroccan second generation hold multiple identities as Muslims, as members of ethnic minorities, as citizens of the countries in which they are born, and of the cities they inhabit. Their religious and ethnic identities constitute subgroup identities that distinguish the Turkish and Moroccan second generation from the majority population, while national and city identities are superordinate civic identities shared with the majority. These subgroup and superordinate identities may both be important and positively correlated, implying identity compatibility or dual identity (Dovidio, Validzic, & Gaertner, 1998; González & Brown,

2006); or they may both be important but negatively associated, implying identity conflict; or one type of identity might be relatively more important than the other, implying identity dominance (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). I hypothesise that ethnic and religious identities will be conflicting with civic identities as a consequence of perceived discrimination, in line with the well-established rejection-identification mechanism (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001). Moreover, I test a novel rejection-disidentification hypothesis that predicts decreased identification with civic categories as a consequence of perceived discrimination (Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, & Solheim, 2009; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Chapter 6 thus raises the questions:

*When and why are religious and ethnic identities compatible or conflicting with civic identities? What is the influence of perceived discrimination on the compatibility of identities among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation?*

Drawing on comparative survey data of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in five cities (Antwerp, Brussels, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Stockholm), multi-group structural equation modelling is used to estimate distinct identification patterns across groups and cities. Subsequently and following the logic of graphical chain modelling (Cox & Wermuth, 1993), the influence of perceived discrimination on these identification patterns is examined while controlling for social disadvantage. The empirical research presented in this chapter goes beyond existing studies on identity multiplicity by focusing on patterns of identification rather than on mean levels alone and by testing simultaneous pathways of well-established rejection-identification and novel rejection-disidentification. The aim of the comparative approach across groups and cities is to explore contextual variation in identification patterns and to replicate theoretical mechanisms of identification and disidentification across different intergroup contexts.

## **Chapter 7: The politicisation of Muslim identity**

The final empirical chapter investigates a political dimension of religious identification and asks when and why the religious identity of the Muslim second generation becomes politicised or de-politicised. According to the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), religious identification should strongly predict the politicisation of Muslim identity. Moreover, perceived discrimination in tense intergroup relations may be a source of reactive religious identity (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001) and may thus contribute to the politicisation of Muslim identity. Conversely, experiences of discrimination may signal the stigmatisation of Muslim minorities (Crocker & Major, 1989), turning Muslim identity into a spoiled identity (Kamans, Gordijn, Oldenhuis, & Otten, 2009) which is associated with de-politicisation rather than politicisation. In addition to testing these competing

hypotheses, I distinguish between two forms of politicisation: support for political Islam as a long-term ideological project, and political action as a short-term response to shared grievances, in order to find out whether the form of politicisation moderates the effects of perceived discrimination and religious identification. These hypotheses are tested across a range of different intergroup contexts with a view to replicating the theoretical model. The research questions of chapter 7 read:

*When and why is Muslim identity politicised? What is the influence of religious identification and perceived discrimination on support for political Islam and political action?*

Two studies investigate the influence of religious identification and perceived discrimination on support for political Islam (study 1) and political action intentions (study 2). Multi-group structural equation models including the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in 5 cities are used to test the cross-cultural equivalence of latent models of politicisation, religious identification and perceived discrimination and to analyse whether processes of politicisation and de-politicisation differ across contexts. Religious identification is found to be consistently positively associated with both forms of politicisation, but perceived discrimination has differential effects. More experienced discrimination made young Muslims weary of supporting political Islam, yet more ready to engage in political protest. Weak associations between the two forms of politicisation reveal distinct profiles of political engagement among the Muslim second generation, spanning a range from non-politicised; via islamist, but not activist; activist, but not islamist; to activist and islamist participants. The study reveals both the importance of religious identification as an important motivator of political attitudes among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation and the need to distinguish between distinct types of politicised identity.

### 1.3 Data sources

The empirical chapters of this dissertation draw on two main data sources: the Belgian Census of 1991 and the TIES-surveys, gathered between 2006 and 2008 in major cities of several European countries. In the following, I shortly describe the two data sources with the aim to highlight their strengths and constraints for the purposes of this dissertation.

#### The Belgian Census

The analyses in the chapters focusing on the structural integration of the second generation are based on data from the 1991 Belgian Census.<sup>1</sup> I used this data source to test contextual explanations for ethnic penalties on educational attainment among the second generation

in Belgium, looking at the ethnic composition of municipalities (chapter 2) in conjunction with structural municipality characteristics, such as residential mobility and home ownership rates (chapter 3). The analysis was based on random samples of 50% of the total Turkish, Moroccan and Italian minority populations and a 10% random sample of Belgians of native origin. Starting from this random sample, I selected second-generation minority and majority participants in the same municipalities in line with the purpose of the empirical studies as described in more detail in the data and methods sections of chapters 2 and 3.

The Census is the most appropriate data source to document the size of ethnic penalties on educational and labour market attainment due to its quasi-complete coverage of the population and the minimisation of selective non-response. Moreover, the detailed socio-demographic information, the large number of cases, and the possibility to combine individual-level information with contextual information provide the opportunity to test relevant explanations for educational attainment, to examine group differences in outcomes and processes and to analyse contextual effects on individual outcomes. Nevertheless, this data source also has disadvantages. A first drawback of the 1991 Census is that it is rather old and thus may not reflect the present situation of the second generation in Belgium. However, the 1991 Census is the last in which the complete second generation can be identified due to changes in nationality legislation in Belgium in the early 1990s. The most recent Census of 2001 contains members of the second generation who were Belgian citizens at birth and therefore can only be identified as children of immigrants if they lived in the same household as their parents when the Census data were gathered and after applying a matching procedure that combines data on all persons in the same household. The timing of the data collection moreover implies that the children of the Turkish and Moroccan labour migrants, who arrived in Belgium primarily during the 1960s and 1970s, were still quite young in 1991. I therefore focus on the completion of secondary education as a measure of structural integration and do not look at completion of tertiary education or labour market attainment since this would be more problematic with such young samples. Secondly, the cross-sectional character of the data implies that I can only test associations and cannot draw conclusions regarding the direction of causality. Finally and most importantly for the purpose of this dissertation, the Census does not contain any information on religion. Chapters 4 to 7 therefore make use of new primary survey data, the TIES-surveys, to analyse the relation between structural integration and religion among the second generation. Summing up, however, the advantages of the Belgian Census in terms of the large numbers, nationwide coverage and representative samples were judged to weigh up against the first two disadvantages, while the last disadvantage was addressed by making use of a second data-source that is described in the following.

## The TIES-surveys

The acronym TIES stands for The Integration of the European Second generation, the moniker of a comparative survey project among the second generation in major European cities.<sup>2</sup> The main aim of the surveys is to provide new large-scale empirical material to analyse the integration of the children of labour migrants from a cross-national perspective. The surveys target three second-generation groups – the Turkish, Moroccan and ex-Yugoslavian second generation – and a comparison group of native descent. In view of the focus on religion among Muslim minorities, only the Turkish and Moroccan second generation is taken into account in this dissertation. Data were gathered in 15 major cities in 8 European countries. I drew on a limited selection of the entire survey project and used the TIES-data from Belgium (Antwerp and Brussels; TIES07-08 Belgium: CeSO/CSCP), Germany (Berlin; TIES07-08 Germany: IMIS), the Netherlands (Amsterdam and Rotterdam; TIES06-07 Netherlands: IMES/NIDI) and Sweden (Stockholm; TIES07-08 Sweden: CEIFO).

The major advantage of the TIES-surveys for the purpose of this dissertation is the wide coverage of religion among reasonably large second-generation samples in several local and national contexts. The questionnaire module on religion includes not only behavioural measures that were frequently used in previous research, such as religious attendance, but also includes specific Islamic practices like fasting during *Ramadan* and consuming *halal* food. Moreover, participants answered multiple items about their religious upbringing, religious identification and attitudes regarding the role of religion in politics and the public sphere. The Belgian surveys additionally included questions about orthodox beliefs and political action to defend Islam (see chapters 5 and 7). Hence, the TIES-surveys make it possible to construct multidimensional indicators of religiosity and thus provide a multifaceted picture of the ways of being Muslim among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation. Moreover, the comparative scope of the survey allows testing the cross-cultural equivalence of multidimensional models of religiosity and analysing whether associations, for instance with structural integration, are similar or different across ethnic groups and contexts. Finally, the focus on the second generation is particularly interesting with regard to Islamic religiosity as it sheds light on religion in migration contexts that are characterised by a strong difference in terms of religious affiliation and levels of religiosity between parental homes and co-ethnic communities on the one hand and the societal mainstream on the other (Voas & Crockett, 2005). As previous studies often had limited measures of religion, covered mostly the first generation and were usually conducted in a single country, the multidimensional measures of religiosity, the focus on the second generation and the comparative scope of the TIES-surveys all constitute a step forward in empirical research on religion among Muslim minorities in Europe.

Nevertheless, the TIES-surveys also have limitations that must be acknowledged and taken into account when interpreting the results of empirical analyses based on this data source. As in all comparative surveys, the questions arise (1) to what extent the data

are representative of the defined population, and (2) to what extent they are comparable across contexts. Typically, representativeness and comparability cannot be optimised at the same time. Given the comparative approach of this dissertation (cf. section 1.4 of this chapter), the comparability of samples across contexts is considered to be more relevant than optimal representativeness in each context.

As explained in more detail in the appendix to this dissertation, the sampling frames and sampling procedures were not completely equal across cities participating in the TIES-surveys due to different national practices regarding the information available in population registers. Furthermore, low response rates and (potentially context specific) non-response bias pose challenges to the comparative scope of any large-scale survey (Stoop, Billiet, Koch, & Fitzgerald, 2010). Overall, response rates to the TIES-surveys were rather low in most cities (around 30% in Amsterdam, Brussels, Berlin, Rotterdam and Stockholm, but reasonably high at 60% in Antwerp). Although these values may be considered problematically low in surveys of the general population, they are not surprisingly low given the fact that the target population combines three characteristics associated with lower survey response: young age, inner city residence, and ethnic minority background.

Given the low response rates and different sampling frames, however, a detailed investigation of some core characteristics of the TIES-samples is warranted and was undertaken in two steps. Firstly, in order to document to what extent the TIES-surveys are representative of the second generation in the contexts under study, I compared Turkish and Moroccan second-generation participants in the selected cities to available reference data. These reference data generally provide estimates of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation at the national level and cannot be refined to the cities under study. Differences between the TIES-surveys and the reference data therefore may be explained by the fact that differential geographic areas are covered or by a time lag if the reference data were gathered in a different period than the TIES-surveys. Secondly, to investigate the comparability of the second-generation samples across cities and to exclude differential selectivity of the first generation as an alternative explanation of contextual differences, I compared the characteristics of the parents of the participants, i.e., the first generation, across cities. Detailed results of these comparisons as well as more information about sampling and fieldwork can be found in the appendix to this dissertation.

The reference data used for the first comparison were the Belgian Census (matched observations from 1991 and 2001), the German Mikrozensus (2007) and the Survey Integration of Minorities in the Netherlands. In the case of Sweden it was not possible to make a similar comparison as suitable reference data are not publicly available.<sup>3</sup> The comparison focused on educational attainment of the second generation and their parents, the first generation. Some modest deviations from national trends were found in Belgium and Germany and most can be explained in terms of differences between



the city context of the TIES-surveys and national data (e.g. Brussels hosts more highly educated members of the first generation relative to the entire country, cf. Reniers, 2000). However, the German TIES-samples strongly deviated from national statistics with regard to the citizenship of the local-born Turkish second generation. In comparison to nationally representative data from the Mikrozensus, Turkish second-generation participants in the TIES-surveys had German citizenship and dual German-Turkish citizenship much more often. Thus, the TIES-samples of the Turkish second generation in Berlin appear to be biased towards naturalised German citizens. In the Netherlands, considerable discrepancies were found between the two surveys in terms of the educational attainment of the second generation, with participants to the TIES-surveys being educated at the tertiary level much more frequently. Thus the Dutch participants to the TIES-surveys represent a more highly educated part of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation than the national average, which might influence their level of religiosity. However, it has been shown that associations between variables are usually more robust to sampling and non-response bias than mean levels (Stoop et al., 2010; Van de Vijfer & Leung, 1997), such that the selection biases described above should not invalidate the results regarding the relation between structural integration and religiosity. Summing up, a number of deviations between the TIES-samples and national reference data imply that the representativeness of TIES-samples for the national contexts in which they were interviewed may be questioned.

The second, and for this dissertation more important, comparison aimed to investigate the comparability of the TIES-data across cities by showing that the parents of the participants, i.e., the Turkish and Moroccan first generation, have similar characteristics. Indeed the comparison of parental characteristics yielded few differences across cities and revealed the typical profile of Turkish and Moroccan labour migration to Western Europe in terms of the age and timing of migration, rural origin, educational qualifications and labour market attainment of the first generation. Notable deviations were found in Brussels (among both Turks and Moroccans) and Stockholm, where parental levels of education were higher as was labour market participation among mothers. These groups thus appear to be somewhat more positively selected in terms of their human capital than the comparison groups in the other cities.

In conclusion, these comparisons show that the TIES-surveys provide samples of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation that are sufficiently similar across cities to allow for a meaningful comparison and investigation of contextual differences, provided appropriate control variables are used. However, the low response rates and deviations from findings in relevant reference data imply that representativeness is not optimal and warrant the replication of empirical analyses with other data sources in future research. Nevertheless, despite these drawbacks and in light of the lack of suitable alternative large-scale comparative survey data that include extensive measures of religion among the Muslim second generation, the TIES-surveys are considered a useful data source to



analyse the research questions in this dissertation. Finally, the Belgian Census data – which are optimally representative – and the TIES-surveys – which are optimally comparable – are complementary and therefore both contribute to answering distinct questions on the intergenerational integration of Muslim minorities in European societies.

## 1.4 A comparative approach

In line with the aim to contextualise structural integration and religiosity, all empirical chapters of this dissertation apply a comparative approach. The advantage of this comparative approach is twofold: on the one hand, it allows making more general claims about the phenomena under study, because group- or context-specific aspects can be distinguished from more general aspects of the phenomena; on the other hand, group- and context-specific results add important nuances to findings that might otherwise be unduly generalised. Comparisons are made along three dimensions: between different ethnic groups, across national receiving contexts and across local receiving contexts. The comparison across groups comprises the Turkish, Moroccan and Italian second generation, i.e., local-born children of parents who migrated to North-Western Europe from Turkey, Morocco or Italy. Only the Turkish and Moroccan second generation is considered in studies about religion due to their shared Islamic religious heritage. In terms of national receiving contexts, I take into account Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. The comparison across local receiving contexts comprises municipalities in Belgium and major cities in the four countries just mentioned. In the following, I explain the comparative design of and the methodological strategies applied in the dissertation as well as the selection of ethnic groups, countries and cities included.

### Comparative approaches

The main aim of the comparative approach is to expose and explain contextual differences in varying outcomes and to replicate common processes across different contexts. Two main strategies are commonly applied for such a comparative purpose: a small-N approach where contexts are represented by comparative cases or a large-N approach where contexts are decomposed into variables. In the small-N approach, a limited set of contexts is selected based on their similarity or difference in terms of the focal explanatory grounds (e.g. Brubaker, 1992; Favell, 1998). For a comparison of immigrant integration, for instance, a set of countries may be selected because they have similar histories of immigration and similar immigrant populations, yet different policy approaches towards immigrant integration in order to study the effects of these policy regimes (cf. Ersanilli, 2010). The merit of the small-N approach lies in the rich context information and the possibility to contextualise general processes against the background of specific historical and

political circumstances. A drawback of this approach, however, is the lack of empirical demonstration and formal statistical testing of the influence of particular characteristics of the contexts on the outcomes under study. Hence, a small-N approach can reveal differences between contexts under study, but it does not allow testing statistically which contextual characteristics explain these differences.

The large-N approach, on the other hand, aims to maximise the number of contexts included in an analysis and to replace contexts by variables, thus translating important contextual differences into observable variables at the contextual level. Given a sufficient number of contexts and sufficiently harmonised data across contexts, the portion of the variance of the dependent variable that is situated at the contextual level and the influence of contextual variables can subsequently be quantified in a multilevel design (Hox, 2002). In a further development of this multilevel approach, Van Tubergen (Van Tubergen, Maas, & Flap, 2004; Van Tubergen, 2006) proposed a double comparative design for the study of immigrant integration. This approach allows simultaneously estimating origin country effects, such as for instance the prevalent religion in the country of origin, destination effects, such as unemployment rates, and community effects, such as local co-ethnic group size and concentration, on immigrants' outcomes such as labour market integration. The merit of the large-N approach is the proper statistical estimation of contextual effects (and the disentangling of origin, destination and community effects in a double comparative design). A disadvantage of this approach, however, is that the analysis is often limited to neatly quantifiable characteristics of contextual units (for instance, GDP per capita, percentage foreigners, or unemployment rates as country-level indicators). In addition, these contextual variables tend to be associated, which makes it difficult to disentangle distinct contextual effects; moreover, the explained variance at the contextual level is often low. Furthermore, more complex and less readily quantifiable country characteristics like policies and institutional arrangements, historical legacies and public opinion climates can be incorporated into the analysis only tentatively, for instance through the use of proxy variables (e.g. the presence of left-wing parties in the government as a proxy for more inclusive policies towards immigrant integration, or dummy variables for distinct welfare state regimes) or through the construction of indices. However, indices that are capturing many of the complex differences at the country level and additionally have established validity are as yet hard to come by. As a consequence, many interesting and potentially influential country characteristics remain out of sight in studies using a large-N approach.

A third alternative in cross-national research is the approach of Heath and colleagues (Heath & Cheung, 2007a), modelled after previous comparative studies by Shavit & Blossfeld (1993) and Shavit & Müller (1998). In this approach, nationally representative data are analysed separately but using standardised coding of variables and standardised statistical models. This way, similar to the large-N approach, a large number of countries can be incorporated in the comparison and general theoretical explanations can be tested

with equal rigour in each country. This exposes country specific variations in the size and direction of effects as well as in the explanatory power of theoretical explanations. In contrast to a multilevel design, where contextual effects are estimated by main effects across all contexts, this approach of replicating the same analysis across different contexts in separate models is more sensitive to contextual differences and therefore provides a more stringent test of contextual invariance. This way, undue generalisation is avoided as contextual invariance is less easily imposed on the data. On the downside, however, this approach does not allow testing to what extent contextual differences, when they are found, can be explained by characteristics of the contexts under study, i.e., unlike the large-N or multilevel approach, it does not provide estimates of contextual effects. The trade-off of a multilevel approach, however, is that contextual effects may be partly imposed on the data for the sake of identifying general patterns.

Given the advantages and disadvantages of both the small-N and the large-N approach, this dissertation draws on both in different empirical chapters of this dissertation. Chapters 2 and 3 use a large-N approach and multilevel modelling with the aim to identify contextual effects that can be generalised across contexts. The focus in these studies is on the role of municipalities and their characteristics for the structural integration of three second-generation groups and the analysis is based on Belgian Census data. The analyses in the remaining chapters are based on the TIES survey data and use a small-N approach by making comparisons across two Muslim groups in major cities in up to four countries. Following a small-N or comparative case study design, I develop hypotheses on how the contexts under study may affect the outcomes and investigate whether the pattern of findings is in line with this reasoning. Similarities or differences in outcomes and processes between ethnic groups, cities and countries are assessed by use of multi-group structural equation models, with comparison groups being defined by ethnicity and city of the participant. The small-N or comparative case study design that I apply in chapters 4 to 7 is used with the primary aim to replicate processes across contexts with distinct patterns of diversity instead of generalising integration processes across contexts and disentangling different contextual factors. As I will argue below, the contexts under study form a coherent pattern in terms of being more or less inclusive of ethnic and religious diversity in structural, institutional and discursive domains.

Thus, in chapter 4 I examine whether the relation between structural integration and religiosity differs across national contexts, focusing on one group only, the Turkish second generation, and including only capital cities. The reasoning here is that if there are national differences in this relationship, which are expected due to different national approaches toward the institutionalisation of Islam, they will show up in this comparative analysis. However, with only one group and one city in each country, it is not possible to disentangle national from city differences or to parcel out group-specific effects. Therefore, I extend the comparison in chapters 5 to 7 to a second group, the Moroccan second generation,

and include two cities within each country, except Sweden where data were gathered only in the capital of Stockholm. This way, I can show to what extent outcomes and processes differ between groups within the same local and national context, and to what extent they differ within the same group across different local and national contexts. Although this approach falls short of a formal empirical test of contextual effects, it should again be noted that most of the contextual differences that are of interest in this dissertation, such as different histories of church-state relations and their implications for the institutional accommodation of Islam, would be hard to quantify and put to test even in a research design including enough cases at the city and country level to allow for multilevel analysis.

Finally, regarding the comparative design it must be noted that the TIES survey data that are used for the empirical analyses in chapters 4 to 7 were gathered in major cities (Antwerp and Brussels in Belgium, Berlin in Germany, Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Netherlands, Stockholm in Sweden) and thus do not provide national coverage of the second generation in these countries. Accordingly, it is not possible to generalise the findings from these studies to the national level and to draw firm conclusions about the effects of country differences. The city-based rather than countrywide sampling, however, is reasonable and more efficient given the spatial concentration of Muslim minorities within urban areas (Dassetto, 2003). Moreover, cities are strategic research sites where local, national and transnational forces intersect and they are sites of day-to-day interaction between ethnic and religious minorities and members of the majority society. Finally, city differences in terms of job opportunities and social mixing (cf. *infra*) imply that this level of analysis provides interesting comparative cases.

## Comparison groups and contexts

### *Ethnic groups*

In the chapters focusing on structural integration, I compare the Turkish, Moroccan and Italian second generation across municipalities in Belgium with a majority reference sample of native Belgian origin. In the subsequent chapters on religion I focus exclusively on (one of) the two majority Muslim groups while extending the contextual comparison to include cities in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. The Turkish, Moroccan and Italian second generation consist of the children of labour migrants who were recruited in response to the labour shortage during the post-war economic boom in Western Europe. Labour migration from Turkey was numerically significant in all four countries under study, whereas Moroccan immigrants are found in substantial numbers mainly in Belgium and the Netherlands. The Italian immigration to Belgium was concentrated during the first wave of labour migration to this country during the 1950s and early 1960s, whereas Turkish and Moroccan immigrants dominated the second wave during the 1960s and 1970s. In all cases, the primarily male workers of the first generation were later on joined

by their wives and children or brought over marriage partners from their origin countries and started families in the countries of destination (Lesthaeghe, 2000; Münz, Seifert, & Ulrich, 1997; Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000). The Swedish case is somewhat different, because the country has primarily received refugee migration and therefore has a more diverse immigrant population (Corman, 2008). Nevertheless, the country also recruited guest workers in Turkey. Later waves of immigration from Turkey, however, included significant shares of ethnic and religious minorities, such as Kurds and Assyrians (Westin, 2003). The latter group is not included in this research which is restricted to Muslim minorities because Assyrians generally adhere to Eastern Orthodox Christianity.

Turkish immigrants and their offspring are the largest ethnic minority in Germany; including naturalised Turks, the total number of the Turkish community (including first, second and higher generations) is 2.5 million, which constitutes 3.1% of the German population in 2009 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010). In the Netherlands, Turks and Moroccans are the two largest non-Western minorities and, including naturalised immigrants and the second generation, they numbered respectively 0.38 and 0.34 million, thus accounting for 2.3% and 2.1% of the total population of the Netherlands in 2009 (Statline, 2010). In Belgium, Italians, Moroccans and Turks are the three largest ethnic minority groups when discounting immigrants from neighbouring countries; including naturalised immigrants and the second generation, they make up respectively 2.8%, 2.6% and 1.5% of the Belgian population according to the latest Census of 2001 (Phalet, Deboosere, & Bastiaenssen, 2007). In Sweden, the Turkish minority population is relatively small and amounted to approximately 60,000 persons in 2000 including the Swedish-born second generation, which is about 0.7% of the Swedish population (Westin, 2003).<sup>4</sup>

Turkish and Moroccan minorities in North-Western Europe represent interesting comparative cases because they have similar histories of migration and additionally share a religious heritage as they come from majority Muslim countries. Given the widespread perception of Islam as a barrier to integration in European societies (Foner & Alba, 2008), both groups are situated at the far side of a bright boundary which sets them apart from the historically Christian and highly secularised North-Western European mainstream (Alba, 2005). At the same time, the two groups differ with respect to their investment in co-ethnic capital and degrees of collective cultural continuity. Turkish immigrant groups are typically more cohesive and show higher levels of cultural continuity across generations in comparison with less cohesive Moroccan immigrant groups (De Valk & Liefbroer, 2007; Phalet & Heath, 2010). It can therefore be hypothesised that local co-ethnic communities play a more important role in the integration of the Turkish as compared to the Moroccan second generation. Moreover, religion plays a different role in the origin countries of the two groups in terms of a stronger, but heavily politicised, division between the state and religion in Turkey as compared to Morocco. The difference between Turkish and Moroccan minorities stands central in chapter 5 which examines the role of religious socialisation

within immigrant families and communities for religiosity in young adulthood. Finally, the Italian second generation in Belgium is an interesting comparison group because, unlike the Turkish and Moroccan second generation, they are historically Catholic, they enjoy freedom of movement as citizens of the European Union and they migrated mostly during an earlier period and were therefore already more established in Belgium during the economic downturn of the 1980s. For all these reasons, the modes of incorporation of the Italian, Moroccan and Turkish second generation differ in important ways, which is the focus of the analysis in chapter 3.

### ***National receiving contexts***

Four North-Western European countries are included in cross-national analyses: Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. While sharing similar histories of Turkish, and in the case of Belgium and the Netherlands also Moroccan, labour migration and substantial shares of Muslim minorities among their population (cf. supra), the four countries under study differ in a number of respects that can be summarised in terms of more or less inclusive approaches to ethnic and religious diversity. In the following, I will describe the four countries in terms of ethnic inequality in education and on the labour market, exclusionism in public debates and public opinion climate as well as the policy and institutional approach to immigration, integration and the accommodation of Islam. The latter aspect is particularly important in terms of the opportunity structures for Muslims to find a place for Islam within the religious landscape of their destination country. While necessarily selective instead of reflecting all country differences, the following comparison of the four countries along these dimensions aims to show that these dimensions evoke a coherent pattern of distinct national approaches to ethnic and religious diversity that can be more or less inclusive.

Both Sweden and the Netherlands have been early to introduce their own variants of multiculturalism in terms of recognition of ethnic minority rights and support for their organisations. The Swedish government implemented an integration policy already in 1975 which declared as its three main aims equality between native Swedes and immigrants, freedom of choice for immigrants to maintain their culture and/or adopt the Swedish culture and co-operation between native Swedes and immigrant communities (Johansson, 2008). The accommodation of Islam as a minority religion and the equalisation of its formal legal status to that of the Swedish state church follow from these policy objectives. While the question whether Swedish integration policies have been successful or instead generated parallel societies is widely discussed in public debate (Johansson, 1999), the Swedish policy approach to immigrant integration is described as one of the most inclusive in Europe, comparable to those of the classic immigration countries (Kymlicka, 2000). Moreover, right-wing and openly anti-immigrant parties had not gained any noticeable support in elections (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002) until the latest elections of September



2010. Despite a relatively favourable policy context, there is widespread prejudice against Muslims among the Swedish population and in Swedish media reporting (Otterbeck, 2002); moreover, Muslims turn out to be the most rejected group in survey studies among Swedish youth (Bevelander & Otterbeck, 2010; Otterbeck & Bevelander, 2006).

In the Netherlands, integration policies targeting ethnic minority groups reflected the tradition of 'pillarisation' – despite the fact that the traditional 'pillars' were already dissolving when the minority policies were developed (Entzinger, 2001). Pillarisation refers to the provision of social services and maintenance of organisations within separate and parallel segments of society differentiated by religion or philosophy, with all pillars enjoying equal representation at the national level (Lijphart, 1968). Dutch integration policies aimed to help immigrants and ethnic minorities to maintain their culture, language and religion and facilitated the establishment of ethnic and religious minority organisations. This has allowed Muslims to set up organisations and religiously based institutions such as schools and broadcasting networks, which are funded by the state like comparable institutions of other religious denominations or philosophies of life – although the Dutch state does not provide funds for strictly religious purposes (Doomernik, 1995; Rath et al., 1996). In the aftermath of the murders of politician Pim Fortuyn and film-maker Theo Van Gogh, the Netherlands has experienced a shift in policy and public discourse towards a greater emphasis on cultural assimilation (Vasta, 2007; Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005). However, survey data reveal that the Dutch majority population experienced considerable levels of cultural conflict, in particular with Muslim minorities, already before these major national crises and even before '9/11' (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). The increasing emphasis on assimilation has resulted in a more restrictive policy approach to immigration and integration, for instance with regard to higher hurdles for family formation migration (Koopmans, Michalowski, & Waibel, 2010). Nevertheless, despite shifts in public climate and policies, institutions have been slower to change such that the opportunities for Muslims to organise around their religion and receive funding for their organisational activities have not been greatly affected.

Compared to the Netherlands and Sweden, Belgium has been late to formulate and implement integration policies. Moreover, the complex federal structure of the state which includes a national government (that is responsible for issues regarding immigration), regional governments (Flemish and Walloon; they are responsible for political matters bound to their territory, such as housing, economy and welfare state) and linguistic communities (Dutch-speaking, French-speaking and German-speaking; they are responsible for education, among other things) implies that ethnic minorities encounter different policy regimes in different parts of the country (Jacobs, 2000). Although immigrant integration policies are therefore shaped by multiple layers of government, the most striking policy cleavage occurs between Flanders in the North of the country, where policies were modelled on the Dutch approach, and Wallonia, where policies

put more emphasis on cultural assimilation and the attenuation of social inequality, following the French approach (Jacobs, 2000; Martiniello, 2003). As the different layers of government intersect in the capital region of Brussels, ethnic minorities have encountered a comparatively favourable opportunity structure in the Belgian capital that gives a voice to persons and groups of different cultural backgrounds (Favell & Martiniello, 1999). Due to the electoral influence of the extreme-right and openly anti-immigrant Vlaams Blok/Belang in Flanders generally, but particularly in Antwerp, the public climate with regard to ethnic and religious diversity is comparatively more hostile than in Brussels and Wallonia. Furthermore, the integration of Islam as a minority religion has encountered more obstacles in Belgium than in Sweden and the Netherlands. While Islam was recognised as a national religion by the national government, thus granting Muslims a legal status on an equal footing with Christians and Jews, already in 1974, the implementation of this formal status was precluded until recently. The reason for the delayed implementation of state recognition is that the Belgian state required a centralised organisation representative of the Belgian Muslim population and thus imposed upon this group an internal structure modelled after the Christian churches. In addition to this state intervention and attempts to control the organisational process and outcomes, internal divisions within the Belgian Islamic community have contributed to delaying the implementation of the legal equality of Islam (Foblets & Overbeeke, 2002; Kanmaz, 2002; Manço, 2000).

Finally, Germany has often been described in comparative studies on immigrant integration and diversity policies as one of the least accommodating countries, due to its restrictive citizenship regime (Koopmans et al., 2005), based on an ethnic conceptualisation of who is German (and who is not) (Brubaker, 1992) and a monist rather than pluralist approach to cultural diversity (Koopmans et al., 2005). Accordingly, debates about immigrant integration have revolved around the granting of citizenship to foreigners and their local-born children, with pronounced political mobilisation of centre-right politicians who opposed dual citizenship for local-born children of immigrants. The 2000 change in naturalisation procedures has eased the access to German citizenship for German-born children of immigrants. However, there has been a trend towards more restrictive policies after 2000 with the introduction of citizenship tests (Koopmans, Michalowski, & Waibel, 2010). Regarding the position of Islam as a minority religion, Muslims experience considerable disadvantage compared to the established Christian churches that enjoy privileges in terms of their formal juridical status as corporations of public law and ensuing tax benefits. This juridical status has so far not been granted to Islamic organisations because, similar to the Belgian case, the German government required a nationally representative organisational structure (Jonker, 2002; Fetzer & Soper, 2005). In the meanwhile, a Coordinating Council of Muslims was established in 2007 in response to the authorities' need for a partner in dialogue. However, the representativeness of this nation-wide organisation for the Muslim community in Germany is heavily disputed and,



according to a recent survey, only 10% of Muslims in Germany are even aware of the existence of this institution (Haug et al., 2010). More recently, the political controversy instigated by social-democratic politician Thilo Sarrazin has exposed the political mobilisation potential of anti-Islamic and anti-foreigner sentiments in Germany.

Regarding the institutionalisation of Islam as an important focus of the cross-national comparison in this dissertation, country differences are evident since the accommodation of Islam as a minority religion has followed in a path-dependent way the patterns of church-state relations that were historically prevalent in a country (Bader, 2007; Soper & Fetzer, 2007). As a consequence, there is no uniform 'European Islam' today; instead, the position of Islam in the religious landscape differs between European societies with substantial Muslim minorities (Koenig, 2007). The four comparison countries included in this dissertation have reformed their historically developed church-state relations to incorporate Islam and thus provided different opportunity structures for the institutionalisation of Islam as a minority religion (De Wit & Koopmans, 2005; Statham, Koopmans, Giugni, & Passy, 2005). As sketched above and described in more detail in chapter 4, the comparative scope in terms of institutional approaches to Islam in the four selected countries ranges from religious pluralism and state neutrality, so-called 'pillarisation', in the Netherlands (Doomernik, 1995; Rath et al., 1996), to persistent privilege of established churches in Germany (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Jonker, 2002), with varying levels of state recognition and support for Islam in Belgium (Foblets & Overbeeke, 2002; Kanmaz, 2002, Manço, 2000) and Sweden (Alwall, 2002; Sander, 1996).

Focusing on the institutional accommodation of Islam as a cross-national comparative dimension in second-generation religiosity warrants the question of whether such an institutionalist approach, which foregrounds formalistic and overly static conceptions of social processes, does not by-pass alternate and potentially more important resources and forms of agency 'from below', as well as ongoing socio-political struggles reinforcing or challenging institutional inequalities (Bousetta, 2000). It has been argued that public policies towards Islam and Muslims do not reflect a coherent national model, as they have been mainly reactive in response to bottom-up religious organisations and claims on the side of Muslim communities. More importantly, institutional arrangements and reforms may be far removed from (changes in) the public opinion climate in European societies (cf. Guiraudon, 2000, on the politics of stealth). For instance, the Netherlands has pioneered institutional reforms to incorporate Islam as a minority religion. Yet, the position of Islam in the Netherlands today is highly contested and Dutch politics and society are deeply divided over issues of religious diversity (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). For the purpose of this dissertation, I reason that institutional arrangements may not completely overlap with grand national philosophies of integration, yet they do develop in a path-dependent way from existing institutions which are reinvented to accommodate (or not) new forms of diversity. While liberal-democratic states do not – and should not – shape the religious

life of their citizens in a deterministic fashion, institutional regulations nevertheless impose real constraints on the development of religious organisations and institutions by immigrant communities (cf. Bader, 2007; Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Koenig, 2007). More generally, by associating distinct categories of citizens with distinct treatments, national institutional arrangements may over time accentuate or attenuate civic inequalities *in casu* between Muslims and non-Muslims (Brubaker, 2004). In the presence of public recognition and support, for instance, Muslim immigrants have gradually been granted, or they have cumulatively developed, their own religious organisations and institutions. Once these organisations and institutions are in place, they participate in public debates and political decision making, voicing discontents and making claims, developing leadership and learning the rules of the game; and they may act to promote group interests and to protect community members against discrimination and public hostility, particularly in the face of a more recent downturn of the economy and the public climate across European societies. From a comparative perspective, therefore, I still expect a long-term impact of distinct institutional patterns on patterns of integration and religiosity in the next generation, over and above variation as a function of more short-term changes in public sentiments and policy responses.

It remains an open question to what extent cross-national differences in policy approaches towards immigrant integration and the accommodation of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity have resulted in different patterns of ethnic stratification across North-Western European immigrant receiving societies; or whether country differences in ethnic stratification are due to other country differences such as the state of the national economy, the stratification of the school system, the regulation of the labour market, intergenerational class mobility or the level of anti-immigrant prejudice (cf. Heath, 2007). Regardless of the precise (configurations of) reasons for cross-national variation in ethnic stratification, comparative research has exposed distinct patterns of ethnic penalties and premiums in educational attainment and on the labour market for different ethnic minority groups in North-Western European countries, in line with different selectivity of the first generation of immigrants (Heath & Cheung, 2007a). Regarding the four comparison countries considered in this dissertation, ethnic penalties in education and labour market attainment appear least severe in Sweden, which therefore resembles the classic immigrant receiving countries Australia, Canada and the US as well as the UK in terms of the levels of ethnic stratification (Heath, 2007). Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, together with the German-speaking countries Austria and Switzerland, on the other hand are characterised by a stronger degree of ethnic stratification in light of larger ethnic penalties in educational achievement and attainment, unemployment, and access to professional jobs (Heath & Cheung, 2007a). These cross-country comparative trends however need to be nuanced by group-specific patterns in each country and must therefore not be overly generalised.

Summing up these unavoidably brief and selective descriptions of the four national receiving contexts under study, the comparison along dimensions of immigration and integration policies, institutional accommodation of Islam, public opinion climates and ethnic stratification reveals a rather coherent pattern of more or less inclusive contexts of reception. Sweden and the Netherlands come out as more inclusive contexts for ethnic and religious diversity. In the latter country, more equal institutional status of Islam as a minority religion is coupled with more public controversy about ethnic and religious diversity and a turn towards more restrictive immigration and integration policies during the last decade. Belgium and Germany overall constitute less inclusive contexts of reception (with the notable exception of Brussels), although both countries have moved towards greater openness over the past decades (Koopmans, Michalowski, & Waibel, 2010). In terms of the institutional recognition and accommodation of Islam, however, Germany remains the least inclusive context of all countries under study and therefore provides a particularly interesting comparative case to study religion as a dimension of social inequality for ethnic minorities.

### ***Local receiving contexts***

In terms of local receiving contexts as comparative dimension, chapters 2 and 3 look at municipalities in Belgium, while chapters 4 to 7 use cities as comparative cases. Municipalities are used as approximations of neighbourhoods as most fine-grained local units where day-to-day interactions between local residents occur. In line with the literature on neighbourhood effects (e.g. Jencks & Mayer, 1990; Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2000; Mayer & Jencks, 1989; Sampson et al., 2002), such local contexts may impact integration processes because interpersonal networks of neighbours provide social support and access to resources beyond the immediate family or household context. Conversely, neighbourhood distress may hamper structural integration and upward mobility among most disadvantaged minorities, in line with the pathway of downward assimilation described in segmented assimilation theory (Portes, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997). Against the background of ethnic stratification of the Belgian housing market which implies that ethnic minority concentrations are more often found in more distressed neighbourhoods, the combination of general neighbourhood effects and segmented assimilation theory begs the question under what conditions ethnic capital in the form of co-ethnic networks and resources can function as a buffer against negative neighbourhood effects.

To be sure, municipalities as contextual units of analysis are only an approximation of neighbourhoods. Particularly in larger municipalities with more internal heterogeneity, the municipal context may not reflect residents' own perception of their neighbourhood. However, it would seem that the precise measurement of local contexts only marginally affects the size and significance of contextual effects (Sampson et al., 2000). Moreover,

the comparison across a large number of municipalities within the same national context allows contextualising the structural integration of the second generation and moving beyond family or household resources which have been shown to account only partially for rather severe ethnic penalties in second-generation attainment (Phalet et al., 2007).

Chapters 4 to 7 compare cities as local receiving contexts. Some of these cities are capital cities (Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels and Stockholm). As centres of public debate and political decision making, capital cities are most proximal places where national institutions are designed, represented and contested; therefore, chapter 4 which focuses on cross-national differences in institutional opportunity structures relies on a comparison of these four capitals. Subsequent chapters also include Antwerp and Rotterdam as old industrial and major port cities that have attracted substantial immigrant minorities as well. Therefore, all cities included in the analyses are home to highly diverse populations and to large portions of the second generation. As centres of economic growth they tend to be more open to social change than the national peripheries (cf. Phalet & Heath, 2010).

With regard to differences between the cities under study, one should note that some of these are world cities (Berlin, Brussels and Amsterdam), while others are much smaller in terms of their population and are less internationally connected. This has implications for the types of immigrants that were attracted to these cities and the types of jobs offered to the second generation. For instance, Brussels has attracted the more highly educated and French-speaking shares of the first generation of Moroccan immigrants in comparison to more lowly educated Berber-speaking Moroccans who settled more often in Flanders (Reniers, 2000) and in the Netherlands (Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000). Similarly, labour market opportunities in Brussels and Amsterdam are mainly in the service sector and require higher levels of education in comparison to the stronger industrial job sectors in Antwerp and Rotterdam that offer more semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. However, the second generation as well as their peers of native descent are heavily affected by high youth unemployment rates in Brussels and in Berlin. On the other hand, the second generation also finds employment opportunities within ethnic enclave economies in the cities under study, although these are generally more vibrant in Turkish as compared to Moroccan communities (Phalet & Heath, 2010). In addition to differential job opportunities within ethnic enclave economies, it should be noted that Turks are outnumbered by Moroccans as the largest minority group in Brussels, Antwerp, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Moreover, Moroccans are more devalued and figure on the lowest rungs of the ethnic hierarchies in Belgium and the Netherlands (Hagendoorn, 1995; Kamans et al., 2009.). In contrast, Turks are the most visible minority in Berlin, due to the large number of residents with a Turkish migration background and their spatial concentration in specific districts of this city. In Stockholm, on the other hand, where Turks are by far not the largest immigrant group and where they are a more heterogeneous group (Westin, 2003), the second generation encounters a more mixed environment in terms of the ethnic composition

of their neighbourhoods, schools and work sites – although the segregation between immigrants and non-immigrants implies that social mixing occurs mostly with other ethnic minorities rather than the Swedish majority (Andersson, 2000). Summing up, the cities under study provide interesting comparative cases because they host substantial shares of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation of the countries in which they are situated; yet they are characterised by differential group boundaries in terms of relative group size and economic opportunities, with most bright boundaries for Turks in Berlin compared to most social mixing in Stockholm.

## 1.5 Overview of the book

The empirical part of this dissertation consists of six chapters that may be read as stand-alone research articles (chapters 2-7), followed by a chapter in which I summarise the main findings from the six studies and suggest avenues for future research (chapter 8). The research questions raised in the empirical chapters follow up on each other and thus take the reader through a series of steps, starting from questions of structural integration of the second generation in terms of educational attainment, which are analysed drawing on comparative stratification as main explanatory approach (chapter 2 and 3). In the next step, I analyse the influence of structural integration on the religiosity of young adults in terms of religious identification, practices and political Islam (chapter 4), while investigating the role of institutional arrangements with a cross-national comparative case study design. This chapter is followed by a study on the importance of religious socialisation and acculturation orientations for religiosity (in terms of identification, practices and beliefs) in early adulthood (chapter 5). This chapter mainly focuses on intragroup processes with ethnic communities as main comparative dimension. The final two empirical chapters focus on the social identity function of religion and draw on intergroup relations as main explanatory approach. Chapter 6 analyses how Muslim identification is related to other social identities among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation. Finally, chapter 7 focuses on the consequences of religious identification for political attitudes and engagement. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the research questions of the empirical chapters as well as the data sources that are analysed and the groups and contexts that are compared.

**Table 1.1** Outline of empirical chapters

Chapter	Research question	Data source	Comparison groups	Comparison contexts
2	How to conceive ethnic composition at the local level and how are different concepts of ethnic composition associated with school attainment among the second generation?	Belgian Census 1991	Turkish second generation Moroccan second generation Italian second generation Belgian majority	201 Belgian municipalities
3	How does ethnic density interact with structural characteristics of local residential contexts to explain educational attainment among the second generation? Do contextual effects differ between ethnic minority groups in line with differential modes of incorporation?	Belgian Census 1991	Turkish second generation Moroccan second generation Italian second generation Belgian majority	201 Belgian municipalities
4	What is the relation between structural integration and religiosity among the second generation? Does this relation differ across national contexts as a function of different approaches to the institutionalisation of Islam?	TIES-surveys	Turkish second generation	Amsterdam Berlin Brussels Stockholm
5	What is the influence of religious socialisation within immigrant families and communities on later religiosity among the second generation? How does the process of religious transmission relate to the acculturation of the second generation?	TIES-surveys	Turkish second generation Moroccan second generation	Antwerp & Brussels
6	When and why are religious and ethnic identities compatible or conflicting with civic identities? What is the influence of perceived discrimination on the compatibility of identities among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation?	TIES-surveys	Turkish second generation Moroccan second generation	Antwerp & Brussels Amsterdam & Rotterdam Stockholm
7	When and why is Muslim identity politicised? What is the influence of religious identification and perceived discrimination on support for political Islam and political action?	TIES-surveys	Turkish second generation Moroccan second generation	Antwerp & Brussels Amsterdam & Rotterdam Stockholm

## 1.6 Notes

1. I want to thank Patrick Deboosere of Interface Demography at the Free University of Brussels (VUB) for making these data available for my dissertation.
2. The project also engaged in other activities, such as hosting a research and training network. More information about the project's activities, participating countries and institutions, and project publications can be found on the project website [www.tiesproject.eu](http://www.tiesproject.eu). I want to thank my colleagues at CeSO (Centre for Sociological Research at the University of Leuven), CSCP (Centre for Social and Cultural Psychology at the University of Leuven), NiDi (Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute), CEIFO (Centre for Research on International Migration and Ethnic Relations at the University of Stockholm) and the project co-ordinator Maurice Crul (Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies at the University of Amsterdam) for their efforts in gathering the cross-national TIES-data and making them available for this dissertation.
3. The national statistical office provides statistics of the foreign-born population and of the second generation, but these are not split up by specific origin groups.
4. It is difficult to compile basic comparative statistics of the numbers of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and their descendants per country given the different administrative categories used in the different countries. In the Netherlands, the Statistical Office provides information about first- and second-generation immigrants (i.e., foreign-born and local-born persons, regardless of their current nationality) split out by national origin and generation in its online resource StatLine. In Sweden, the Statistical office provides the national origin of ethnic minority members only for foreign and nationalised citizens, but not for the second generation – where available, statistics on this category are not split out by national origin. Identifying the local-born second generation and their national origin is only possible when matching parents and children in Census and other register information (Jonsson, 2007). Publications of the German statistical office based on the Mikrozensus, a yearly 1% probability sample of the German population, split out the category of persons with a migration background into persons with an own migration experience (first generation) and those without own migration experience (second or higher generation) and provide details about specific national origin groups within these categories, regardless of their current nationality. Other population statistics only provide information about nationality which makes it impossible to identify the complete Turkish minority population as naturalised members of this group will be discounted. Similarly in Belgium, the National Office for Statistics provides information about the number of foreigners split out by origin country, but does not provide statistics on the national origin of Belgian citizens. The number of ethnic minority members and their share of the population can be calculated on the basis of Census data only if information of parents and children is matched, which is the procedure used in the article by Phalet et al. (2007).






# 2

## **Ethnic composition and second-generation school attainment**

This chapter is under review as  
Fleischmann, F., Phalet, K., Deboosere, P., & Neels, K.,  
Comparing concepts of ethnicity in ethnic composition measures:  
Local community contexts and educational attainment  
of the second generation in Belgium.



## 2.1 Introduction

While the second generation of the large-scale post-WWII immigration to Europe is coming of age, differential outcomes in educational and labour market attainment are a growing concern among both researchers and policy makers. Repeated findings of ethnic penalties, i.e., unexplained disadvantages, in educational attainment among the children of immigrants in a number of European countries (e.g. Heath, Rothon, & Kilpi, 2008; OECD, 2006, 2007) raise questions about the capacity of European societies to incorporate immigrants and their offspring. To what extent can ethnic inequalities in educational attainment be attributed to different neighbourhood contexts? It is a well-established cross-national finding that parental socio-economic background is a powerful predictor of educational attainment (Breen & Jonsson, 2005). In addition, recent studies both in the US and in Europe using multilevel modelling have shown that ethnic and racial neighbourhood composition may also affect individual educational outcomes (Bygren & Szulkin, 2007; Garner & Raudenbush, 1991; Pong & Hao, 2007). This paper examines the association of neighbourhood composition with ethnic inequality in school completion among the second generation in Belgium. Like other North-Western European countries, Belgium hosts major populations of labour migrants and their offspring. From a comparative perspective, however, the country stands out by its high level of both ethnic educational inequality (Jacobs, Rea, & Hanquinet, 2007; Jacobs, Rea, Teney, Callier, & Lothaire, 2009; Marks, 2005; OECD, 2006, 2007) and residential segregation (Musterd, 2005). Moreover, the availability of high-quality large-scale data with extensive coverage of individual and contextual indicators of the complete second generation across the entire country from the Belgian Census makes the country an interesting case to study.

Previous Belgian research on the educational attainment of the three largest ethnic minority groups – Italian, Moroccan and Turkish Belgians – has revealed significant ethnic penalties on a range of educational outcomes for all three groups. The sizes of these penalties, however, vary considerably with the Turkish-Belgian second generation facing most disadvantage and the Italian-Belgian second generation least (Phalet, Deboosere, & Bastiaenssen, 2007). Parental socio-economic status was found to fully account for the less favourable outcomes of Italian Belgians, while residual disadvantages remained unexplained for Turkish and Moroccan Belgians (Phalet et al., 2007). In light of these findings, our study aims to relate ethnic differences in educational attainment to contextual variation at the level of the municipalities of residence. We use Belgian Census data to test whether the ethnic composition of local residential contexts contributes to ethnic differences in educational attainment. In particular, the analysis contrasts different measures of ethnic composition with a view to distinguishing between the concepts and meanings of ethnic residential concentration for immigrant minority versus majority groups. We first discuss existing research on neighbourhood effects in general and on

ethnic composition in particular. Then we go on to provide more information about the Belgian case before presenting our data and results.

### **Neighbourhood context and educational attainment**

Neighbourhood effects are studied in a number of scientific disciplines, such as sociology, health psychology, economics and geography, and in relation to various outcomes, such as educational attainment, delinquency, drug abuse, teenage pregnancy, problem behaviour and mental health (for reviews see Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2000; Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002). Jencks and Mayer (1990; Mayer & Jencks, 1989) theorised how the neighbourhood context might affect individual outcomes. Among the explanatory mechanisms that they described were the presence of resources and institutions available in the neighbourhood which provide inhabitants with the means that they might lack within their own household and that are necessary to accomplish certain goals, such as school completion. Similarly, the lack of such resources and institutions might account for less favourable outcomes. Social capital in the form of interpersonal networks within the neighbourhood and the ensuing social control allow resources to travel beyond immediate household contexts and may provide protection against negative behaviours, such as truancy or delinquency. In addition, neighbours can function as role models outside the parental home. This process of collective socialisation might have either positive or negative effects depending on the nature of the role models (e.g., successful professionals or gang leaders). Negative neighbourhood effects are also expected where neighbours compete for scarce resources, such as prestigious jobs or high-quality housing, and where the comparison with one's neighbours leads to feelings of relative deprivation among less advantaged inhabitants. Moreover, certain types of negative behaviour, such as truancy, delinquency and teenage pregnancy, are found to spread more easily in less advantaged neighbourhoods, providing evidence for an epidemic or contagion effect (Crane, 1991).

In summary, neighbourhood contexts may affect individual outcomes both positively and negatively and the nature of their influence will depend on the specific characteristics of one's residential area. Moreover, several studies have shown that neighbourhood characteristics do not affect all residents to the same extent, but instead interact with family socio-economic status and ethnic origin (Bankston & Caldas, 1996; Crowder & South, 2003; López Turley, 2003; Pong & Hao, 2007). The evidence of interaction effects is inconclusive, however, with some studies pointing towards larger influences among ethnic minority and low-SES individuals and other studies showing the opposite.

### **Ethnic neighbourhood composition**

Much of the research on the effects of neighbourhood composition in the US has a primary focus on racial inequalities in a number of outcomes. A recurrent finding in those studies is that a higher degree of racial minority concentration at the local level goes together with a larger gap in socio-economic (including educational) attainment (Albrecht, Albrecht, & Murguia, 2005; Bankston & Caldas, 1996; Caldas & Bankston, 1997; Cohen, 1998). In other words, a larger share of racial minorities in the neighbourhood is associated with an increased penalty on the attainment of African Americans. Although all studies find a negative effect of minority concentration net of the negative effects of neighbourhood poverty, the high correlation between these two factors is repeatedly emphasised. The US history of race as a “bright boundary” between social groups (Alba, 2005) raises the question to what extent the negative effect of racial concentrations on educational attainment generalises to other societal contexts with different historical relations between ethnic or racial minority and majority groups. Also within the US, proponents of ‘segmented assimilation’ have argued that local concentrations of ethnic ingroups may have diverging and possibly beneficial outcomes for the second generation, depending on the resources and networks available within local ethnic communities (Portes & MacLeod, 1996b; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). We ask the question whether a dichotomy between the ethnic majority population and the internally diverse ethnic minority population is a meaningful indicator of neighbourhood ethnic composition in Belgium, and more generally, in similar European migration contexts. Do US findings associating the local presence of racial or ethnic minorities with lower levels of second-generation attainment generalise to the second generation in Belgium?

A separate strand of research in the area of mental health has criticised the widespread use of indicators of ethnic composition that aggregate across different ethnic or racial minority groups. In spite of consistent negative relations with mental health among the majority population, these dichotomous indicators cannot account for differential levels of mental health among minorities (Halpern, 1993). This is due to the lack of specificity of the category of ethnic minorities, which glosses over important ethnic and racial group differences. For minority group members, in contrast to the majority group, such aggregate measures do not differentiate the presence of co-ethnics from that of other ethnic or racial groups. Indeed, the presence of members of one’s co-ethnic ingroup was found to have a positive effect on mental health for all groups. In contrast, the presence of both minority and majority outgroups had mainly negative effects. The positive effect of co-ethnic concentration in one’s neighbourhood has been labelled ‘ethnic density effect’. The benefits of ethnic density have been attributed to social support, which is most readily available within the local ethnic community, and to reduced exposure to prejudice or feelings of alienation, which are more frequent in settings where minority group members make up a smaller share of the population. This ethnic density effect was found after controlling for the socio-economic composition of a neighbourhood (Halpern, 1993; Halpern & Nazroo, 1999).

Theorising on ethnic density originated in the field of mental health research. Yet, recent studies among the second generation in Canada and in the Netherlands found a positive influence of the presence of co-ethnic neighbours and classmates on educational outcomes (Boyle, Georgiades, Racine, & Mustard, 2007; Georgiades, Boyle, & Duku, 2007; Peetsma, Van der Veen, Koopman, & Van Schooten, 2006). Specifically, the studies showed that better school achievement and higher levels of academic motivation and effort among ethnic minority students could be explained by the increased well-being, decreased problem behaviour and better mental health that were associated with ethnic density.

### **Expectations**

Seemingly conflicting findings of positive associations of educational attainment with ethnic density and of negative associations with ethnic minority concentration give rise to competing expectations. In order to test these expectations, we compare two measures of ethnic composition of the residential context and their associations with the educational attainment of the second generation. Building on mainly US-based studies of racial residential segregation, we expect the percentage of ethnic minorities of the total population of a municipality to be negatively associated with the educational attainment of native Belgians. Since this measure of minority concentration does not differentiate between ingroups and outgroups for specific minority groups, no consistent negative relation is expected among ethnic minorities, with Italian, Moroccan and Turkish Belgians being the largest minority groups.<sup>1</sup> In line with the well-established ethnic density effect in health sociology, this indicator based on a majority-minority dichotomy could as well be unrelated or positively related to the attainment levels of minority groups, depending on the share of the ethnic ingroup within the overall minority population in a neighbourhood. Conversely, we expect the percentage of one's ethnic ingroup to be consistently positively related to educational attainment across majority and minority groups.

### **Immigration to Belgium**

Like many Western European countries, Belgium has attracted large numbers of labour migrants during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The first wave of immigration in the 1920s consisted of Southern Europeans, mainly Italians, but from the 1960s onwards workers were also recruited in Turkey and Morocco to work in the coal mines of Limburg in the North of the country (Flanders) and in the heavy industry in the South (Wallonia) (Lesthaeghe, 2000). As a consequence of the system of labour migration and its alleged temporary character, the first immigrants were mostly men with limited or no educational qualifications. From the 1970s onwards, many immigrant workers have been joined by their wives and families. Thus, family reunification and family formation gave rise to ethnic communities including a substantial second and, in recent years also a third generation. Not counting

immigrants from neighbouring countries, Italian, Moroccan and Turkish communities are the largest ethnic minority populations in Belgium today: They make up respectively 2.6%, 2.8% and 1.5% of the total Belgian population according to the 2001 Belgian Census (Phalet et al., 2007).

Although immigrants from these groups show many similarities in terms of restricted human capital due to their shared migration history, some inter- and intragroup differences are relevant for this study. According to Reniers (2000), the first generation of Turkish immigrants was very homogeneous in terms of educational qualifications, as most of them had enjoyed formal education at least at the primary level. Moreover, since the earliest waves of Turkish immigration into Belgium, this homogeneity has been maintained through chain migration, i.e., subsequent immigrants were recruited from the same geographical and social segments of Turkish society as the previous ones (Reniers (2000) speaks of “transplanted communities”). The Turkish community in Belgium today lives in the major cities of Brussels, Antwerp and Ghent, and in the North-Eastern former mining areas. The Moroccan immigrants who came to Belgium in the period after the 1960s were a more heterogeneous population, comprising both large numbers without any formal education and a considerable group of more highly educated immigrants. These groups originated in different parts of Morocco; and they settled in different parts of Belgium as well: while the more highly educated and French-speaking Moroccan immigrants, who came from the Northern Arabic-speaking provinces, settled primarily in Brussels, immigrants from the Moroccan Rif mountains, who are mainly Berber-speaking and have the lowest levels of literacy, are more concentrated in Antwerp. In general, Moroccan immigrants with some proficiency in French were more attracted to the French-speaking part of Belgium, with the less educated part of this group settling in the industrial zones of the South of the country (Reniers, 2000).

Mainly due to the earlier timing of Italian immigration, the Italian community differs from the Moroccan and Turkish communities with regard to standard indicators of socio-economic attainment (including educational and labour market outcomes). Italian immigrants usually have higher levels of resources and attainment than the more recent Turkish and North-African immigrants and their offspring. However, they still lag behind the native Belgian population and thus occupy a middle position between Turkish and Moroccan Belgians on the one hand and native Belgians on the other (Martiniello, 1990; Phalet, 2007; Phalet et al., 2007).

### **The Belgian educational system and a note on school choice**

In the Belgian federal system, education is a competence of the linguistic communities, with Dutch-, French- and German-speaking schools operating in different parts of the country and alongside each other in the capital of Brussels. The educational system, however, is the same in all three linguistic communities.<sup>2</sup> Full-time education is compulsory between the ages of 6 and 18.<sup>3</sup> Most children also attend the non-compulsory full-time

nursery school, which starts from the age of 2.5. Primary education lasts for six years. After that, at the nominal age of 12, students continue into secondary education, which is subdivided into two stages: lower secondary education lasts for 2 years and upper secondary education takes another 4 years. At the lower secondary level, students attend either the academically-oriented A-track or the vocationally-oriented B-track. In upper secondary education, students are allocated to four types of tracks: the academic (ASO), the technical (TSO), the artistic (KSO) or the vocational (BSO). In the latter track, students may combine part-time education with an apprenticeship at the upper secondary level. Formally, all tracks give access to tertiary education at universities or polytechnics (*hogescholen/ hautes écoles*). However, pupils who attend vocational schools (BSO) hardly ever enter tertiary education.

We choose completion of full secondary education, i.e., leaving school with a diploma of ASO (academic), TSO/KSO (professional/artistic) or BSO (vocational), as the dependent variable in our analysis. Although the stratification of the Belgian school system has important repercussions for success in the labour market, we use this dichotomous outcome because previous research has shown that it reveals a crucial distinction between students of immigrant and native Belgian origin (Duquet, Glorieux, Laurijssen, & Van Dorselaer, 2006). Among a random sample of 23-year olds including large numbers of the second and third generations, Duquet et al. (2006) found that in Flanders more than 40% of the Turkish and North-African minority pupils left school without a certificate of full secondary education, while this percentage was only around 10% among non-minority Belgians. Moreover, as documented by Phaet et al. (2007), the unexplained educational disadvantage of the second generation is largest at the completion of secondary education and at the completion of university education. Since completion of full secondary education is crucial for labour market outcomes, such as the avoidance of unemployment and access to stable and well-paid jobs, and since relatively small numbers of ethnic minority students enter tertiary education, we focus on the completion of secondary education as a critical outcome.

One special feature of the Belgian school system should be kept in mind, as it warrants caution in interpreting contextual differences in educational attainment. School choice is formally free in Belgium, in contrast to countries such as France and Germany where children are generally obliged to attend school in the district where they are registered. As a consequence, in Belgium the ethnic and socio-economic composition of the residential neighbourhood is not necessarily reflected in the composition of the student population for a given student. Two arguments can be raised in defence of our focus on ethnic residential composition in explaining school attainment. Firstly, the principle of free school choice does not mean that all parents make use of this choice to the same extent. Comparative research has shown that mainly middle-class families make use of this possibility as it requires considerable knowledge about the local educational system, investments in searching for the right school, and possibly additional costs of transportation to and from school, and of



extras such as school trips, which are more common in the 'better' schools (Ambler, 1994; Kristen, 2005). For these reasons, neighbourhood and school composition tend to be more congruent for children from lower social classes and from immigrant backgrounds than for children from the middle classes and from non-immigrant background. Moreover, publicly funded Catholic schools, which make up a large share of the public schools in Belgium, can refuse to register non-Christian pupils beyond minimal quota imposed by educational priority policies. This selection by Catholic schools seriously restricts the possibility of immigrant parents to send their children to schools outside their own neighbourhood. Indeed, schools with a larger share of native Belgian pupils most often are Catholic schools. Secondly, this study is concerned with neighbourhood contexts and not with school or classroom contexts, which operate through different mechanisms such as the student-teacher ratio, the size of the school, or its socio-economic composition (see Jabobs et al., 2009 for a recent analysis of school effects on academic performance of minority students in Belgium). One would ideally want to include both types of contexts into the analysis to test whether neighbourhoods have explanatory power over and above schools and vice versa. The Belgian Census data unfortunately do not allow us to include the school context as well.

## 2.2 Data and method

Our analysis is based on samples of anonymous records from the Belgian Census of 1991. Though not the most recent Belgian Census available, the 1991 Census was the last where the complete second generation could be identified. Due to changes in nationality legislation in the early 1990s, it is not possible to identify the complete second generation in the 2001 Belgian Census as they may have Belgian citizenship at birth.<sup>4</sup>

We start from random samples of 50% of the Italian, Moroccan and Turkish origin<sup>5</sup> populations and a 10% sample of the native origin Belgian population. From this total sample of 538,792 cases covering all 589 Belgian municipalities we selected individuals between the ages of 21 and 35 in order to make the age ranges of the native Belgian and Italian-Belgian populations comparable to those of the younger Turkish- and Moroccan-Belgian second generation. Moreover, we excluded first-generation immigrants, i.e., persons born outside Belgium or who immigrated after the age of six.<sup>6</sup>

This selection process resulted in a sample of 142,485 participants in 201 municipalities. The ethnic composition of the sample is as follows: 99,417 native Belgians (69.77%), 32,798 Italian (23.02%), 6,916 Moroccan (4.85%) and 3,354 Turkish Belgians (2.35%). Of the final sample, 35.1% is located in Flanders (53 municipalities), 50.6% resides in Wallonia (129 municipalities), and the remaining 14.3% lives in the capital region of Brussels (19 municipalities). Women make up 48.8% of the sample.

We conducted multilevel binomial logistic regression analysis with completion of full secondary education as the predicted outcome. This dichotomous variable is 1 if a person's



highest completed level of education is upper secondary education (ASO, TSO, KSO or BSO) or tertiary education. Participants who were still in full-time education at the time of the census were coded as having completed upper secondary education if they were enrolled in tertiary education since this requires prior completion of upper secondary education. Participants who report lower secondary education or lower levels of education as the highest completed degree and those who were still enrolled in secondary education were coded as 0 on the dependent variable. Using this definition, 55.92% of the total sample of young adults is found to have completed full secondary education, but completion rates differ between ethnic groups: 60.95% of the native Belgians, 48.07% of the Italian, 32.42% of the Moroccan, and 31.75% of the Turkish Belgians have completed full secondary education.

We take two levels of analysis into account in our multilevel models: individuals and municipalities. Neighbourhood contexts are operationalised at the level of municipalities because aggregation at this level allows us to include a large number of contextual units while safeguarding privacy concerns. The multilevel structure of the analysis is required as individual participants are nested within municipalities across which they are not randomly distributed. Furthermore, this analysis allows us to correctly model the associations of municipality characteristics with individual outcomes, which are exaggerated in OLS regression due to the underestimation of standard errors of the higher-order effects (Hox, 2002). At the individual level, the following information is taken into account: gender (female dummy), age (centred at its minimal value, 21), ethnic origin (dummies for the three ethnic minority groups using an inclusive definition of ethnic origin categories based on nationality at birth or, if missing, residence of the mother at birth; native Belgians are the reference category), and being married before school-leaving age (dummy that is 1 for participants who married before the age of 18; non-married persons and those who married at a later age are the reference category). We include early marriage into the analysis as this might have a disruptive effect on educational careers, especially among girls. Unlike most other information at the individual level available in the Census, this indicator precedes our outcome variable and can therefore be included as a predictor.

The available information does not allow us to control for parental social background at the individual level, such as parental education, parental occupational class and family composition.<sup>7</sup> As a consequence, socio-economic characteristics of the municipalities cannot be separated from family or household level characteristics. We cannot interpret the latter as purely contextual effects, since contextual effects can only be appropriately assessed after taking into account the variation at the individual level (which is usually much larger). In our analysis, such controls are introduced for ethnic composition, but not for socio-economic characteristics. The reader should keep this caveat in mind when interpreting the effects of variables measured at the municipality level.

Variables at the municipality level are constructed by aggregating individual information of the complete population in the Belgian Census at the municipality

level. Our analysis focuses on the ethnic composition of the municipality. We use two different variables to measure ethnic composition, which relate to distinct and competing conceptualisations (cf. supra). Both measures are based on the entire population in 1991 of the municipalities included in our analysis instead of our smaller and selective sample. The *percentage ethnic minorities* is defined by the percentage of inhabitants of non-Belgian origin as a share of the total number of inhabitants of a municipality. The *percentage ethnic ingroup* is defined by the share of co-ethnic inhabitants (native Belgian, Italian, Moroccan or Turkish Belgian) in the total population of one's municipality of residence. This second measure is the complement of the first measure for the Belgians only. For the ethnic minority groups the two measures may diverge considerably depending on the ethnic composition within the minority population. While the percentage ethnic minorities can take on only one value per municipality, the percentage ethnic ingroup takes on at least two and up to four values per municipality, depending on the number of ethnic groups included per municipality (see Table 2.1 for descriptive information).

In order to control for socio-economic differences between municipalities (which are, for a large part, compositional differences between the inhabitants of these municipalities, cf. supra), we take into account the *percentage of high-quality houses*<sup>8</sup> as a share of all households and the *percentage of university graduates* as a share of the total population over 18.<sup>9</sup> Table 2.1 provides basic information about the distribution of dependent and independent variables in our sample. All contextual variables are centred in the analysis around a realistic value in the sample (for details see Note Table 2.2).

**Table 2.1** Descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis

	<i>N</i>	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	<i>SD</i>
Completed full secondary education	142485	0	1	0.56	
Female	142485	0	1	0.49	
Age*	142485	0	14	6.90	4.26
Moroccan-Belgian	142485	0	1	0.05	
Turkish-Belgian	142485	0	1	0.02	
Italian-Belgian	142485	0	1	0.23	
Native Belgian	142485	0	1	0.70	
Married before school-leaving age	142485	0	1	0.04	
% University degree	201	1.20	15.00	4.74	2.66
% High-quality housing	201	11.19	63.81	33.87	9.75
% Ethnic minorities	201	1.40	57.93	15.02	10.56
% Ethnic ingroup	515	0.14	98.60	64.41	36.96

\* Age is centred on its minimal value of 21 and ranges until 35 in the sample. No standard deviations shown for dichotomous variables

## 2.3 Results

We set up a two-level model which predicts completion of full secondary education using the statistical package *MlwiN* (Rasbash, Charlton, Browne, Healy, & Cameron, 2005). Individual participants ( $N = 142,485$ ) are specified as level one and municipalities ( $N = 201$ ) as level two. A comparison of a one-level and a two-level intercept-only model shows that the two-level model fits the data better.<sup>10</sup> We therefore continue the analysis with a two-level model.

In Model 1 in Table 2.2, we include predictors at the individual level. Girls are found to have 37% higher odds of having completed secondary education than boys,<sup>11</sup> whereas older participants are less likely to have completed full secondary education than younger ones. This might be a consequence of the 1983 reform as older participants were not obliged to attend full-time education until age 18. As expected, marriage before school-leaving age is associated with a significantly lowered probability of having completed secondary education and this negative effect is stronger for girls than for boys. These effects remain significant and do not change in magnitude throughout all subsequent steps in the analysis.

In line with the differential completion rates of the ethnic minorities presented before, we find differential ethnic penalties on the completion of secondary education for the three minority groups. Compared to native Belgians of the same age, gender and marital status, Turkish Belgians have 64.2%, Moroccan Belgians have 64.0% and Italian Belgians have 29.1% lower odds of having completed secondary education. It is these ethnic penalties that we aim to explain by adding contextual variables in the subsequent models. The variables included in Model 1 account for 33.7% of the variance at the municipality level, which implies that about a third of the variance in completion rates between municipalities is due to differential composition in terms of gender, age, marriage age, and ethnic origin.

In the next step of the analysis, we examine whether the effect of ethnic origin is the same in all municipalities by including random slopes of the three ethnic minority dummies. As can be seen in Model 2 in Table 2.2, the effects of Moroccan and Italian ethnic origin differ significantly between municipalities, whereas the Turkish penalty is the same across municipalities. This raises the question which characteristics of municipalities can account for differential ethnic penalties.

We therefore include the percentages of university graduates and of high-quality housing in the next model (Model 3 in Table 2.2) in order to test whether these indicators of the socio-economic composition of municipalities can account for the ethnic differences in completion rates. Both indicators are significant and positively related to school completion: every 1% increase in university educated residents is associated with 5.5% higher odds of school completion, while every additional 1% of high-quality houses is associated with 1.7% higher odds. Compared to Model 2, the variance of the intercept

**Table 2.2** Results of multilevel logistic regression of completion of full secondary education in Belgian Census 1991  
 ( $N_{\text{individual level}} = 142485, N_{\text{contextual level}} = 201$ )

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4a	Model 5a	Model 4b	Model 5b
Intercept	0.740 (0.023)	0.731 (0.026)	0.467 (0.031)	0.462 (0.030)	0.459 (0.031)	0.085 (0.102)	0.194 (0.109)
<b>Individual level</b>							
Female	0.318 (0.011)	0.316 (0.011)	0.319 (0.011)	0.319 (0.011)	0.319 (0.011)	0.320 (0.011)	0.320 (0.011)
Age <sup>a</sup>	-0.056 (0.001)	-0.057 (0.001)	-0.058 (0.001)	-0.058 (0.001)	-0.058 (0.001)	-0.058 (0.001)	-0.058 (0.001)
Married before school-leaving age	-1.530 (0.114)	-1.489 (0.114)	-1.504 (0.119)	-1.505 (0.119)	-1.505 (0.119)	-1.506 (0.119)	-1.505 (0.118)
Female * Married before school-leaving age	-0.518 (0.122)	-0.540 (0.112)	-0.540 (0.127)	-0.541 (0.127)	-0.540 (0.127)	-0.542 (0.127)	-0.542 (0.126)
Moroccan-Belgian	-1.023 (0.028)	-0.954 (0.075)	-0.959 (0.077)	-0.950 (0.078)	-0.934 (0.076)	-0.536 (0.132)	-0.682 (0.159)
Turkish-Belgian	-1.028 (0.040)	-1.011 (0.061)	-1.012 (0.063)	-0.999 (0.064)	-1.007 (0.063)	-0.603 (0.121)	-0.728 (0.140)
Italian-Belgian	-0.344 (0.015)	-0.412 (0.041)	-0.426 (0.044)	-0.425 (0.043)	-0.448 (0.053)	0.011 (0.119)	0.015 (0.120)
<b>Contextual level</b>							
% University degree <sup>a</sup>		0.054 (0.005)	0.054 (0.005)	0.057 (0.005)	0.057 (0.005)	0.057 (0.005)	0.056 (0.005)
% High-quality housing <sup>a</sup>		0.017 (0.001)	0.017 (0.001)	0.015 (0.002)	0.015 (0.002)	0.015 (0.002)	0.015 (0.002)
% Ethnic minorities <sup>a</sup>			-0.005 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.002)		
% Ethnic ingroup <sup>a</sup>						0.005 (0.001)	0.004 (0.001)

<b>Cross-level interactions</b>														
% Ethnic minorities * Moroccan-Belgian							0.014 (0.006)	**						
% Ethnic minorities * Turkish-Belgian							0.005 (0.005)							
% Ethnic minorities * Italian-Belgian							-0.0013 (0.004)	***						
% Ethnic ingroup * Moroccan-Belgian									-0.004 (0.017)					
% Ethnic ingroup * Turkish-Belgian									-0.002 (0.014)					
% Ethnic ingroup * Italian-Belgian									0.026 (0.007)					
<b>Random slopes</b>														
Intercept	0.069 (0.008)	***	0.094 (0.011)	***	0.023 (0.004)	***	0.021 (0.003)	***	0.021 (0.003)	***	0.021 (0.003)	***		
Moroccan-Belgian			0.252 (0.065)	***	0.268 (0.068)	***	0.277 (0.069)	***	0.253 (0.065)	***	0.261 (0.067)	***	0.263 (0.067)	***
Turkish-Belgian			0.062 (0.032)	*	0.068 (0.034)	*	0.072 (0.035)	*	0.066 (0.033)	*	0.067 (0.034)	*	0.068 (0.034)	*
Italian-Belgian			0.205 (0.031)	***	0.245 (0.035)	***	0.238 (0.034)	***	0.237 (0.034)	***	0.232 (0.034)	***	0.200 (0.030)	***
-2LogLikelihood	191688		191156		190668		190663		190686		190603		190525	

Note. Cells contain coefficients and their standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .  
<sup>a</sup> Age is centred on its minimum value (21); hence the intercept in Model 1 can be interpreted as the predicted probability to complete full secondary education for a 21 year old Belgian male who is not married before school-leaving age. Percentage university graduates is centred on 5%, percentage high-quality housing on 20%. Percentage ethnic minorities is centred on 20% and percentage co-ethnic ingroup on 10%. These values are all realistically occurring among the majority and ethnic minorities in the 201 municipalities under study (see Table 2.1).

strongly decreases when these effects are included, yet the ethnic penalties and their variances are not substantially affected. However, the Turkish penalty is now found to vary marginally across municipalities.

In the next steps of the analysis, we test our hypothesis that the ethnic composition of the municipality is related to school completion among the second generation. First, in Model 4a in Table 2.2, we include the percentage ethnic minorities in the municipality. In line with our expectations and findings in the literature, this indicator is negatively related to school completion: people living in municipalities with a 1% higher share of ethnic minorities have 0.5% lower odds of having completed full secondary education. Furthermore, an additional analysis of cross-level interactions (Model 5a in Table 2.2) reveals a significant positive interaction between the percentage ethnic minorities and Moroccan origin, a significant negative interaction with Italian origin and no interaction with Turkish origin. Hence, the empirical results show clearly that the percentage of ethnic minorities is associated in different ways with the school completion rates of the different ethnic groups. Moreover, the inclusion of the percentage ethnic minorities and its interactions does not change the main effects of ethnic origin; neither does it account for the remaining variance at the municipality level.

When instead the percentage of the ethnic ingroup is used as an indicator of ethnic composition in Model 4b of Table 2.2, we find that living in a municipality with a larger share of co-ethnics is positively related to secondary school completion. Every 1% increase in the ethnic ingroup's share of the local population is associated with 0.5% higher odds of school completion. Moreover, only one significant positive interaction of this indicator with ethnic origin is found (see Model 5b in Table 2.2). Co-ethnic concentration is consistently positively associated with school completion across ethnic groups, though somewhat more strongly among Italian Belgians. Furthermore, both in the main effects models and in the interaction models (Models 4b and 5b), the Moroccan and Turkish penalties are significantly reduced and the Italian penalty becomes non-significant. This means that in municipalities with high concentrations of Italian Belgians, the Italian second generation actually has a slightly higher likelihood of school completion than comparable native Belgians. Model 5b accounts for 33% of the ethnic penalty of Moroccan Belgians (compared to Model 1), for 29% of the Turkish penalty, and for the complete Italian penalty. In contrast, Model 5a only accounts for 9% of the Moroccan penalty, 2% of the Turkish and none of the Italian penalty, which is even larger in Model 5a than in Model 1. Although the explanatory power of both models differs between ethnic minority groups, the model using the percentage of co-ethnics better explains ethnic penalties in educational attainment overall. In addition, Model 5b fits the data better than Model 5a. Hence we conclude that the model including percentage co-ethnics is to be preferred over the model including percentage ethnic minorities as a measure of ethnic composition in the analysis of ethnic educational inequality.

### Complementary analyses

In the following, we describe some additional analytical steps that we took to further scrutinise the findings presented above.<sup>12</sup> First of all, we replicated the analysis as presented in Table 2.2 using an individual-level indicator of socio-economic status. The literature on educational attainment (e.g. Breen & Jonsson, 2005) consistently shows that individual differences in parental socio-economic status have a strong influence on children's educational outcomes. Unfortunately our data source does not contain linked information about the parents of the participants. Nevertheless, we could construct a measure which is likely to indicate parental resources rather than those of the participants: the ownership status and quality of the home of the participant. In the Belgian housing market, living in an owner-occupied home of high quality is a good proxy for a high level of parental resources, given the young age of the selected participants. It is unlikely that participants have accumulated enough resources based on their own educational and occupational merits before the age of 35 to be able to afford to buy their own home of high quality. This implies that participants who live in a high-quality owner-occupied home either still live in their parental home or that their family supported them in buying their own home. When adding a dummy variable for participants who live in an owner-occupied home of high quality to the analysis presented in Table 2.2, a strongly significant positive association with school completion is found throughout all models. While the addition of this individual-level indicator reduces the coefficient of housing quality at the municipality level, the coefficients of all other contextual variables and their interactions remain stable. In other words, even when controlling for individual differences in wealth, we find a negative association of the percentage ethnic minorities and school completion among the Belgian majority and varying associations among minorities. Similarly, the relation between percentage co-ethnics and school completion remains significant and consistently positive across minority and majority groups. This additional analysis suggests that our main finding of differential associations of the two measures of ethnic composition with minority school completion is robust to the inclusion of individual differences in socio-economic status. Since we cannot rule out the possibility that living in a high-quality owner-occupied home is a consequence of participants' prior school completion (i.e., that it is endogenous to the outcome variable), however, we decided not to include this variable in the analysis shown in Table 2.2.

Second, another potential weakness of the analysis as presented in Table 2.2 is the fact that ethnic composition and socio-economic composition, as indicated by the percentage university graduates and high-quality houses, might be correlated and, as a consequence, prior inclusion of these socio-economic indicators as controls might have reduced the effects of ethnic composition. We therefore estimated ethnic composition effects before including controls for educational and housing quality characteristics of the municipality.

Whereas the effects of the two ethnic composition indicators were slightly larger without these controls, they were still much smaller than the effects of educational and housing composition. The latter effects were not reduced if ethnic composition was controlled for in a previous step. This shows that ethnic composition is significantly related to the educational attainment of ethnic minorities and the Belgian majority, over and above the effects of socio-economic composition. Nevertheless, we should also emphasise that ethnic composition overall contributes less to the contextual variation of secondary school completion than socio-economic composition.

Third, in order to test the robustness of our results, we repeated the analysis twice: first, we analysed the data separately for the three parts of the country (the regions of Flanders, Wallonia and the capital region of Brussels); secondly, we ran the analysis without the Belgian majority group. The last replication aims to test whether our previously presented results are driven by the numerically dominant majority group and to examine whether they apply to the three minority groups to the same extent. Concerning regional variation, we only found – as expected on the basis of differential practices within the education system (Ouali, 2005; Ouali & Rea, 1994) – that completion rates were higher in Flanders compared to Wallonia and Brussels. We would expect that this Flemish advantage goes together with less academic types of secondary qualification as relatively more pupils in Flanders completing secondary education in the vocational tracks.

When excluding the Belgian majority population from the analysis, the findings attest to the robustness of our previous results. We find a significantly negative main effect of the percentage ethnic minorities. This effect is, however, qualified by a positive interaction with Moroccan origin, which cancels out the main effect. Living in a municipality with a larger share of inhabitants of immigrant origin thus is negatively related to the completion rates of Italian and Turkish Belgians, and it is unrelated to school completion among Moroccan Belgians. In contrast with the results presented in Table 2.2, we did not find a significant difference between Turkish and Italian Belgians (the latter are used as reference category in this analysis), which is probably due to the relatively small number of the Turkish second generation in the sample. The effect of the percentage of co-ethnics in the municipality fails to reach significance by a small margin (the p-value is 0.067) in the model excluding the Belgians, but it is still positive and of the same magnitude as the effect found in Table 2.2. Moreover, no interactions with ethnic origin were found, indicating again that the effect of ethnic composition, if measured as the share of co-ethnics of the total population, does not differ between ethnic groups. Hence, non-significance is not due to differential effects in the three groups which cancel each other out when the groups are jointly analysed. Instead, it is most probably caused by a relative loss of statistical power rather than by substantial differences.



## 2.4 Discussion and conclusion

To conclude, our multilevel analysis of the completion of full secondary education among the Italian-, Moroccan- and Turkish-Belgian second generation and the native Belgian population suggests that living in a residential context which includes a larger proportion of one's ethnic ingroup generally improves one's chances to complete secondary school. In contrast, the percentage ethnic minorities was differentially associated with school completion for the different ethnic groups.

Although ethnic composition is less strongly associated with school completion than the socio-economic composition of a municipality, our finding is important for two reasons. Firstly, in comparison with the more commonly used measure of the percentage ethnic minorities, the share of one's ethnic ingroup of the total population turns out to be a more meaningful indicator as it is consistent across majority or minority status and across different ethnic groups. In addition, the percentage of co-ethnics is found to have more explanatory power in terms of better accounting for the severe ethnic penalties on educational attainment than the percentage ethnic minorities. The latter indicator leaves a larger part of these penalties unexplained. Apparently, the latter measure, though more conventional, is less meaningful for ethnic minorities and its main effect is largely driven by the majority population. The share of the ethnic ingroup instead provides an alternative measure of ethnic composition which is equally meaningful for both the majority group and the three minority groups.

Secondly, weak yet consistently positive net associations of the presence of ethnic ingroup members with school completion are in line with the ethnic density hypothesis. This hypothesis conceives of ethnic density within one's residential context as a source of support which may protect minority youth from detrimental outcomes, such as dropping out of secondary school (cf. Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). Our results are thus in line with previous studies on ethnic density (Halpern, 1993) and its association with educational attainment (Boyle et al., 2007; Georgiades et al., 2007; Peetsma et al., 2006). Drawing on the extensive literature on neighbourhood effects, the protective role of the presence of co-ethnic neighbours is thought to operate through more frequent ingroup contact and interpersonal networks. These co-ethnic ties may provide additional support and resources which are not available within one's own family. Moreover, ethnic density is argued to increase social cohesion and control, which might prevent children from skipping classes and from opting into alternative (criminal) careers. In addition, being part of a sizable local minority group might work as a buffer against prejudice or feelings of alienation, which might be more pervasive where minority group members live in relative isolation from co-ethnics. In the Belgian migration context, where the second generation is faced with severe and persistent educational disadvantage, second-generation school completion refers mainly to achieving vocational qualifications, which give very restricted access to professional occupations. In this research context, therefore, we have to stress the protective

role of ethnic density against school drop-out and the ensuing risk of downward social mobility into enduring unemployment or economic inactivity. In principle, however, the mechanisms that are assumed to underlie the ethnic density effect could also improve the chances for upward social mobility of the second generation. This could be the case where the ethnic community disposes of more or more valued resources in addition to family-based resources.

When drawing conclusions from the results of our analysis, three important caveats have to be kept in mind. Firstly, the fact that we do not include controls for socio-economic status at the individual level is likely to inflate the effects of education and housing quality at the contextual level. The effects of percentage university graduates and percentage high-quality households in the municipality shown in Table 2.2 therefore cannot be interpreted as net contextual effects, which can only be estimated after introducing relevant controls at the individual level. However, as an additional analysis including a measure of individual differences in housing wealth shows (cf. *supra*), the effects of educational and ethnic composition are robust when important individual differences in socio-economic status are included in the model.

A second serious limitation of the analysis is the cross-sectional structure of our data, which does not allow us to empirically determine the causal direction of the relation between residential context and individual outcomes. To this end, longitudinal or experimental designs would be required (e.g. Ludwig et al., 2008). With a cross-sectional design, we cannot know for certain whether living in a municipality with a larger share of one's ethnic ingroup has a positive influence on second-generation attainment, as the literature on ethnic density and neighbourhood effects suggests, or whether our findings are due to a selection process leading individuals who have completed full secondary education to settle in neighbourhoods with relatively more co-ethnics. It seems unlikely, however, that ethnic minorities and Belgian majority group members would decide to live in a municipality with more co-ethnics if they have completed secondary education. It seems equally unlikely that they would prefer to live in areas of less co-ethnic concentration if they have no diploma of upper secondary school. Still, we cannot empirically rule out the possibility of omitted variable bias to the extent that unobserved variables could affect both co-ethnic concentration and completion rates. It seems less plausible, however, that omitted variables would be differentially associated with ethnic minority concentration and co-ethnic concentration as distinct measures of ethnic composition.

A final limitation regards the operationalisation of neighbourhood contexts at the level of municipalities. The Belgian municipalities that are used as contextual units of analysis in this study are distinct from neighbourhoods in two ways. Firstly, they administer resources and have their own institutions. Importantly, the administrative competence for education is not situated at the municipality level, but at the level of the linguistic communities in the Belgian federal system. Thus, while differences in

educational attainment may occur between the three linguistic communities, we have no reason to expect institutional differences between municipalities. Still differential levels and distributions of public resources between municipalities might affect our findings, but only to the extent that such resources are not covered by differential levels of tax revenues, which are captured by the control for average housing quality in our analysis. Secondly, neighbourhood effects are generated through interpersonal interactions between neighbours and should therefore be studied in small areas, ideally such that are perceived as a 'neighbourhood' by their residents (Sampson et al., 2002). Municipalities are of a larger size than 'neighbourhoods' as perceived by inhabitants, which makes it less likely that two randomly selected individuals within one municipality interact with or even know each other. Most studies of 'neighbourhood effects', however, have used larger units of analysis, such as US Census tracts which contain up to 8,000 residents, which are similarly unlikely to meet this condition. Moreover, in their review of studies on 'neighbourhood effects', Sampson et al. (2002, p. 446-7) conclude that – at least in the US context – findings of neighbourhood effects have been robust to the definition and size of the operational unit. Future research should examine whether the conclusions we draw on the basis of municipal units of analysis also hold for smaller units which more closely approximate the concept of a 'neighbourhood'. Nevertheless, the size of the contextual unit of analysis should be less problematic among ethnic minorities due to the extensive practice of chain migration which is well documented in the Belgian case (Reniers, 2000; Surkyn & Reniers, 1997) and which implies a high likelihood of informal co-ethnic networks existing within municipalities.

With these caveats in mind, we conclude that a simple dichotomy between the ethnic majority on the one hand and ethnic minorities on the other hand is not the best way to conceptualise ethnic composition. Alternatively, ethnic density, that is the presence of co-ethnics in one's residential area, appears to offer a better approach. Regardless of the minority or majority status of the ethnic ingroup, ethnic density appears to play a protective role. Moreover, it better explains severe ethnic penalties in educational attainment in the Belgian context. Finally, the role of ethnic neighbourhood composition is less important than that of socio-economic composition. So far we did not directly measure the processes that are assumed to lie behind this protective role of ethnic density. Future analyses should therefore investigate a wider range of neighbourhood characteristics and assess the relative importance of ethnic composition and other structural characteristics. For instance, residential mobility might be an important factor as the social support networks that are assumed to lie behind ethnic density are more likely to emerge in more residentially stable neighbourhoods. More generally, it would be important to further disentangle the net contributions of ethnic composition and of structural neighbourhood characteristics other than socio-economic composition to contextual variation in ethnic educational inequalities.

## 2.5 Notes

1. We use the terms Turks/Turkish, Moroccans/Moroccan and Italians/Italian to refer to ethnic origin which is inclusively defined as foreign nationality at birth or at the collection of the Census. Using only current nationality would be misleading as in 1991, 23.0% of the Italian, 10.8% of the Moroccan and 4.8% of the Turkish second generation had acquired Belgian nationality at the moment of data collection.
2. The actual operation of this system, however, differs slightly between the linguistic communities. For instance, the practice of delaying students by having them repeat a class is more common in the French-speaking community, while in the Dutch-speaking system, demotion to less demanding tracks is more commonly practiced for poor achievers (Ouali & Rea, 1994; Ouali, 2005). As a consequence, completion rates might be higher in Flanders than in Wallonia, although the average level of education might be higher in the latter part of the country. We tested this by replicating the analysis for the three regions of the country (Flanders, Wallonia and the capital district of Brussels) in an additional analysis and found that the expected regional differences did not affect our substantial results regarding the effects of ethnic composition.
3. Compulsory education was extended to the age of 18 in 1983, thus formalising a development towards lengthened school attendance that had taken place among the majority population over previous decades. This reform might affect completion rates as individuals are more likely to complete upper secondary education when they are obliged to stay in full-time education until the age when they normally receive this diploma. We tested whether this change in educational policy affects our results by including a dummy variable for participants who were younger than 18 years in 1983 and thus were affected by the reform. We expected them to have a higher chance of having completed upper secondary education, but found no significant effect. This is probably due to the fact that the effect of the reform was gradual and increased the likelihood to complete secondary education slowly over a number of cohorts.
4. Since almost 20 years have passed since the data used for the analysis were collected, we would like to caution the reader to focus their attention on the explanatory model of ethnic educational inequality that we present rather than on the absolute levels of ethnic educational inequality as they reflect the situation of the early 1990s and not that of today. Recent studies among the second generation in Belgium, however, document the persistence of high levels of disadvantage in educational achievement and attainment, particularly among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation (Duquet et al., 2006; Jabcobs et al., 2007; Jacobs et al., 2009; Phalet et al., 2007; Vandezande, Fleischmann, Baysu, Swyngedouw, & Phalet, 2008).

5. The Italian, Moroccan and Turkish population is identified by current foreign nationality, foreign nationality at birth or, in case both are missing, residential location of the mother at birth. Participants classified as members of these ethnic groups might or might not have Belgian nationality at the time of data collection.
6. In addition, with regard to the three ethnic minority groups, we included only participants in municipalities with at least ten second-generation participants of their ethnic ingroup and at least fifty members of the same group in order to avoid that participants could be identifiable. If no single minority group is sufficiently represented in a municipality, the entire municipality was dropped from the analysis. As a consequence, the Belgian majority group in our sample is not representative of the Belgian population in 1991 as the selected participants reside in municipalities of higher minority concentration.
7. Our data contains information about the quality of the home and its ownership status which allows us to proxy high socio-economic status of the parents – within the age range of our sample and in light of the Belgian housing market in the late 1980s/early 1990s, living in an owner-occupied home of high quality most likely indicates parents' rather than participants' resources. However, as we cannot be sure whether this indicator is exogenous or dependent on participants' school completion, we do not include it in our main analysis. Nevertheless, complementary analyses including this individual-level indicator of socio-economic status support the conclusions drawn from models without this indicator (cf. *infra*).
8. A household is classified as being of high quality if it disposes of an automobile, a telephone connection and a kitchen of more than 4 m<sup>2</sup> in addition to more basic features which are shared with households of lesser quality (such as central heating, private bathroom).
9. We also tested the effects of income per household (taken from data of the National Office of Statistics) and percentage employees in the higher occupations (professional, managerial etc.) (as a share of the employed population between 18 and 64 years). Both variables cannot be included simultaneously with housing quality and university graduates due to high correlations between these indicators (Percentage high-quality housing & household income:  $r = .712, p < .01$ ; percentage university graduates & percentage salariat:  $r = .920, p < .01$ ). We decided to focus on measures of affluence rather than on neighbourhood disadvantage as previous research has found that the positive effect of high socioeconomic status of neighbourhoods is larger than the negative effect of neighbourhood poverty (Boyle et al., 2007).
10. The gain in -2LogLikelihood of the 2-level model over the 1-level model amounts to  $\chi^2(1) 3845, p < .001$ . In an empty model with two levels, the variance at the municipality


is estimated at 0.104 with a standard error of 0.012, which is significant with  $p < .001$ . Since the outcome variable is dichotomous, no variance component is estimated at the individual level.

11. The odds are calculated based on the logistic regression coefficients as displayed in Table 2.2, e.g. for girls  $e^{0.318} = 1.374$ .
12. The results of these additional analyses are available upon request.

# 3

## **The role of structural neighbourhood characteristics and ethnic density in second- generation school attainment**

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neighbourhood characteristics and ethnic density in second generation  
attainment. *International Migration Review*. An adapted Dutch  
version is forthcoming in *Tijdschrift voor Sociologie*.



### 3.1 Introduction

Prompted by the diversification of post-1965 immigration, US research on the second generation has questioned whether the new groups of immigrants would follow the classic pattern of straight-line assimilation over time and generations. This classic pattern of upward assimilation into the mainstream society had been observed among earlier waves of immigrants and was famously described by Gordon (1978 [1964]). While some scholars have proposed qualified variants of intergenerational assimilation for the 'new second generation' (Alba & Nee, 2003; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, & Waters, 2008), proponents of segmented assimilation have argued that there is no longer a uniform pattern of incorporation into US society. Instead, patterns of assimilation would have become segmented into three distinct modes of incorporation (Portes, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997). A first mode of incorporation continues the classic intergenerational pattern of predominant investment in mainstream resources and upward mobility over time and generations. This applies mostly to high-skilled immigrants whose entry and settlement in the country is facilitated by the authorities. A second mode applies to immigrant groups with less resources and facing a less favourable reception, such as undocumented workers. According to segmented assimilation theory, these groups would run a real risk of downward assimilation into an urban underclass of racial minorities. An alternative third mode would combine upward mobility with high levels of investment in co-ethnic resources, resulting in high levels of culture maintenance in so-called 'ethnic enclaves'. Segmented assimilation emphasises the key role of social capital within local ethnic communities in enabling second-generation attainment. In particular, it is argued that the presence of co-ethnics in the neighbourhood may be a protective factor in adverse inner-city environments, where the second generation is confronted with anti-normative behaviours, such as gang violence and drug abuse. Here, a close-knit co-ethnic community may support second-generation attainment by helping parents to enforce and monitor their children's abidance by shared achievement-oriented norms. Thus, the presence of co-ethnics in the neighbourhood would attenuate the negative impact of neighbourhood distress on the second generation.

In parallel, studies of immigrants' spatial assimilation have empirically distinguished between 'ethnic enclaves' and 'ethnic ghettos' as distinct types of ethnic neighbourhoods (Logan, Alba, & Zhang, 2002). So-called 'ethnic enclaves' originate in the restricted resources of the first generation, whose cultural and social capital is ethnically bounded, and refer to co-ethnic concentrations in most often deprived neighbourhoods. In line with third second pattern of upward mobility with high culture maintenance in segmented assimilation theory, Logan et al. (2002) argue that the ethnic economies in such enclaves may provide opportunities for upward mobility in the second generation. Studies in the US (Logan et al., 2002; Yu & Myers, 2007) show that the 'ethnic enclave' type of neighbourhood is most common among immigrant groups in New York and Los Angeles. In contrast, 'ethnic ghettos'



emerge where immigrants are excluded from other residential areas, so that co-ethnic concentration is externally imposed by exclusionary market forces, rather than resulting from strategic choices of immigrants. The latter type of ethnic neighbourhoods reflects most closely the downward assimilation mode in segmented assimilation theory.

Combining different strands of research, we argue that the influence of co-ethnic concentration on second-generation attainment will depend on structural characteristics of the neighbourhoods in which a group is concentrated. Previous studies of ethnic neighbourhoods have typically looked at residential assimilation or locational attainment as an outcome (e.g. Alba, Denton, Leung, & Logan, 1995; Logan, Alba, & Zhang, 2002; Yu & Myers, 2007). Conversely, research about neighbourhood effects on second-generation attainment does usually not distinguish between different types of ethnic neighbourhoods (e.g. Bankston & Caldas, 1998; Pong & Hao, 2007; Portes & Hao, 2004). Bridging these separate research lines, this study examines the joint impact of ethnic concentration and of structural neighbourhood characteristics – while taking into account socio-economic composition. In the Belgian context that is the focus of this study, ethnic minority concentrations emerge mostly through in-migration of new arrivals and selective out-migration of native Belgians and a very limited number of upwardly mobile immigrants (Kesteloot & Cortie, 1998). Longitudinal map comparison analyses show that the residential mobility of ethnic minorities over time is very limited. This is partly explained by discrimination on the housing market, which pushes ethnic minorities into certain areas with high minority concentrations (Kesteloot, De Decker, & Manço, 1997). For instance, areas of Moroccan concentration, which are typically found in urban neighbourhoods with social housing, resemble the ‘ethnic ghetto’ type of neighbourhood. In contrast, high home ownership rates and economic enterprises in the relatively deprived areas of Turkish concentrations resemble more closely the ‘ethnic enclave’ type (Phalet & Heath, 2010).

Building on segmented assimilation theory, this study aims to test to what extent local co-ethnic communities make a difference in the educational attainment of the second generation. More specifically, combining segmented assimilation with different types of ethnic neighbourhoods, the analyses articulate the relations between co-ethnic concentration in conjunction with neighbourhood structure and school completion as an important indicator of second-generation attainment. The research groups include the children of Italian, Moroccan and Turkish immigrants and a comparison group of native descent in Belgium. Secondary school completion is a critical indicator of educational attainment in the Belgian school system, since it coincides with the end of compulsory schooling at the normative age of eighteen and because it is a crucial requirement for access to higher education and to stable and well-paid jobs in the post-industrial labour market. Comparative studies show pronounced and persistent ethnic educational inequalities for immigrant minorities in Belgium (Marks, 2005; OECD, 2006, 2007). For instance, over 40% of the pupils of Turkish and North-African origin in Flanders-Belgium

left school without full secondary education, as against 10% of native origin Belgian pupils (Duquet, Glorieux, Laurijssen, & Van Dorsselaer, 2006). Furthermore, Phalet, Deboosere and Bastiaenssen (2007) showed longitudinally that family-based resources, including parental education, occupational status and quality of housing, fully account for lower completion rates among the Italian second generation in Belgium. In contrast, significant residual disadvantages remained among the Moroccan and Turkish second generation. Importantly, the unexplained disadvantage was largest for drop-out from secondary school at the bottom end of the educational distribution, and for university degrees at the top end. Looking beyond family-based resources, the present study turns to local ethnic communities and neighbourhoods as hitherto under-researched explanatory grounds for differential attainment.

Extending segmented assimilation to the European migration context, we investigate the boundary conditions of the alleged positive effects of local co-ethnic communities on intergenerational mobility. In his critical analysis of segmented assimilation theory, Esser (2004) argues the superior utility of immigrant investments in receiving-country-specific resources, such as language proficiency and educational qualifications in the receiving country, with a view to enabling intergenerational mobility. In particular, he questions the utility of immigrant investments in ethnic resources, which are only accessible and usable within co-ethnic communities, for intergenerational mobility. On the one hand, the immediate utility of investment in ethnic capital is bound to increase with higher degrees of local co-ethnic concentration and with sustained immigration, since these conditions decrease the costs or raise the benefits of ethnic investment, or both. In line with a combination of upward mobility with high culture maintenance in segmented assimilation theory, investments in ethnic capital may pay off, for instance, in terms of labour market opportunities within ethnic economies, which might lay the ground for upward mobility in the next generation. On the other hand, the continued investment in ethnic resources may turn into a 'mobility trap' in the long run, as Esser argues, when the sunk costs of past investment in ethnic capital may make new investments in receiving-country-specific capital comparatively less attractive. Thus, the second generation may get trapped by the restricted range of jobs that are available within the ethnic economy, when the networks and resources of the majority population are prohibitively difficult to access.

In a first part of the introduction to this chapter, we will document the different modes of incorporation of Italian, Moroccan and Turkish minorities in Belgium in terms of differential access to, and investments in, ethnic and mainstream types of networks and resources. Next, we discuss the general processes that are thought to lie behind the expected positive or negative effects of local co-ethnic communities. Thus, we derive theoretical expectations regarding the connecting mechanisms between local ethnic communities and second-generation attainment. Specifically, we refer to theories of social capital as they are applied in the general research literature on neighbourhood effects.

Against the background of the ethnic stratification of the Belgian housing market as it relates to ethnic group differences in educational attainment, our analyses address three more specific research questions. Firstly, we test to what extent the net effect of co-ethnic concentration on attainment (controlling for socio-economic composition) depends on structural neighbourhood characteristics. We argue that enduring social ties are more readily established and maintained in more stable neighbourhoods, so that there will be less close and long-standing contacts between neighbours on average in areas of high residential mobility. Accordingly, we expect that co-ethnic concentration will be more influential in more stable residential areas. Secondly, we examine in which settings the influence of co-ethnic concentration on second-generation attainment is positive or negative. Holding socio-economic neighbourhood composition constant, the direction of ethnic density effects is expected to depend on neighbourhood quality. Taking out socio-economic composition, which is narrowly defined as the average socio-economic status of inhabitants, context effects of neighbourhood quality refer to the availability and value of local resources, norms and role models. Thirdly, the same combinations of ethnic density with neighbourhood structure may correspond to different expected utilities for specific minority groups, depending on distinct incorporation modes (Portes, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997) or on predominant investment patterns in ethnic or mainstream networks and resources (Esser, 2004).

### **Modes of incorporation: the Belgian case**

European migration researchers have raised the question whether and to what extent segmented assimilation applies to European migration contexts with a predominant 'guest worker' type of immigration (Thomson & Crul, 2007). In the absence of decisive evidence, this study extends the concept of segmented assimilation to the Belgian immigration context, which is a typical example of labour immigration to North-Western Europe. Like its neighbouring countries, Belgium has attracted large numbers of immigrant workers starting with the recruitment of mainly Italian workers in the aftermath of World War II, and extending the recruitment of immigrant workforce to Morocco and Turkey from the late 1960s onwards (Lesthaeghe, 2000). Disregarding immigrants from neighbouring countries, Italian, Moroccan and Turkish immigrant communities are the largest minorities in Belgium today, and they make up respectively 2.6%, 2.8% and 1.5% of the total population by national origin at birth in the 2001 Belgian Census (Phalet et al., 2007).

Distinct incorporation modes of the three major immigrant groups make Belgium an interesting case to test the applicability of segmented assimilation in a typical European migration context (see Phalet & Heath, 2010 for a similar argument). These distinct modes of incorporation are reflected in differential patterns of intermarriage, residential segregation and socio-economic attainment. In spite of a predominant working-class background, Italian Belgians are currently the most established minority group in Belgium,

and they exemplify the classic pattern of upward assimilation. Accordingly, high Italian intermarriage rates with native Belgians exemplify prevalent investment in mainstream rather than ethnic networks and resources. Likewise, the Italian population is dispersed over a larger number of municipalities and lives in less segregated municipalities than more locally concentrated and ethnically segregated Turkish and Moroccan minorities. These differential settlement patterns are also due to the different timing of the Italian as compared to the more recent Turkish and Moroccan migration to Belgium. Italians dominated the first wave of labour migration in the 1950s and 1960s that mainly targeted mining and heavy industry in Wallonia and North-East Flanders. Turkish and Moroccan immigration dominated the second wave of labour migration in the 1960s and 1970s that mainly targeted the construction and service sectors in urban areas. Accordingly, Italians show the highest levels of home ownership of the three minority groups, attesting to their prevalent suburbanisation and long-term investments in their residential areas (Eggerickx et al., 1999; Kesteloot, 2005). Finally, compared to more recent Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and their offspring, Italian Belgians, on average, are doing better in school and on the labour market. Thus, the Italian second generation is achieving on a par with the native Belgian working classes, although they still lag behind the middle classes (Martiniello, 1990; Phalet, 2007; Phalet et al., 2007).

In contrast, and mainly due to the later timing of their immigration, both Moroccan and Turkish immigrant workers were disproportionately affected by the post-industrial labour market transformation which pushed large numbers of the first generation out of work when their children were still young. High rates of unemployment and inactivity, especially among the first generation of older Moroccan and Turkish workers, in combination with ethnic discrimination in the Belgian labour market (Phalet, 2007), make the classic route to upward mobility less feasible for the Moroccan and Turkish second generation. In addition, Moroccan and Turkish Muslims face a less favourable context of reception as they are separated by coinciding and bright ethnic, religious and civic boundaries from the historically Catholic and White Belgian majority (Alba, 2005). Accordingly, intermarriage rates of Moroccan and Turkish Belgians with native Belgians are very low, particularly among Turkish Belgians who have the highest rates of co-ethnic marriages (Eggerickx et al., 1999).

Looking beyond major and very similar socio-economic and ethnic barriers, however, we argue that Moroccan and Turkish Belgians represent clearly distinct modes of incorporation due to differential strategies of investment in co-ethnic capital. The Moroccan immigrant community is more heterogeneous in terms of their regional and ethnic origins and more loosely inter-connected than the more homogeneous and close-knit Turkish community (Reniers, 2000). The Moroccan pattern of migration and of more dispersed settlement in Belgium makes investment in ethnic resources rather less attractive. Accordingly, research in Brussels showed that Moroccan Belgians have fewer voluntary

associations and they are less likely overall to participate in associational life than Turkish Belgians (Jacobs, Phaet, & Swyngedouw, 2004). In the housing market, Moroccan Belgians are more concentrated in urban areas, where they are disproportionately allocated to poor-quality social housing in areas vacated by native Belgians (Kesteloot, 2005; Kesteloot & Cortie, 1998). Finally, the Moroccan second generation is internally divided between a small yet increasing group successfully pursuing individual mobility through higher education and professional careers, and large numbers of disenchanting youth leaving school with less than secondary qualifications and with very limited access to the better job segments (Neels & Stoop, 2000). Except for the 'happy few' who successfully pursue an individual mobility strategy, we therefore conclude that, overall, the Moroccan second generation is most exposed to the risk of downward assimilation.

In contrast, Turkish residential concentrations typically reproduce pre-migration local and extended kinship ties in 'transplanted communities' (Reniers, 2000), which are strategically centred on vital economic functions, such as ethnic businesses in urban areas or local factories in old industrial zones. Vibrant Turkish neighbourhoods thus resemble most closely so-called ethnic enclave economies in the US (Phalet & Heath, 2010). Accordingly, large numbers of interrelated voluntary associations with high participation rates corroborate a predominant Turkish investment strategy in ethnic social capital (Jacobs, Phaet, & Swyngedouw, 2004). Moreover, and in spite of restricted resources, home ownership rates of Turkish immigrants in these areas are relatively high, yet they coincide with low quality of the owned homes (Eggerickx et al., 1999; Kesteloot & Cortie, 1998; Kesteloot, De Decker, & Manço, 1997). We conclude that the Turkish second generation in Belgium should be most likely to follow the third pathway of sustained investment in co-ethnic capital – but it remains an open question whether this will lead to intergenerational upward mobility, as proposed by segmented assimilation (Portes, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997) and Logan et al.'s (2002) approach to ethnic enclaves, or whether this will turn out as a mobility trap for future generations, as argued by Esser (2004).

### **Ethnic density, social capital and neighbourhood structure**

In US studies on neighbourhood effects, concentrations of ethnic or racial minorities are usually treated as a 'risk factor' or negative neighbourhood effect (Albrecht, Albrecht, & Murguia, 2005; Cohen, 1998). This negative effect of minority concentration, however, is largely accounted for by high correlations between the presence of ethnic and racial minorities and indicators of neighbourhood distress (Bankston & Caldas, 1996; Caldas & Bankston, 1997). However, this particular association of racial minority concentration with urban pathologies in inner-city areas in the US may not travel well to European urban contexts with generally lower levels of ethnic and socio-economic residential segregation and a more developed welfare state (Musterd, 2005).

Interestingly, studies in the area of mental health propose a different approach to ethnic composition as a neighbourhood effect. These studies have questioned dichotomous indicators of ethnic neighbourhood composition that oppose the ethnic or racial majority on the one hand to all minority groups on the other. While these indicators are consistently negatively related to mental health among the majority population, they do not account for differential levels of mental health among minorities (Halpern, 1993). It was shown that this is due to the lack of specificity of the measure, which glosses over important ethnic and racial differences within this category. More specifically, the presence of members of one's ethnic ingroup was found to have a positive effect on mental health for all groups, while the presence of outgroups had a negative effect – and these effects persisted after controlling for socio-economic neighbourhood composition (Halpern, 1993; Halpern & Nazroo, 1999). Although the notion of ethnic density emerged in the field of mental health, recent studies among immigrant children in Canada and in the Netherlands, the latter including Turkish and Moroccan minority groups, revealed similar positive effects of the presence of co-ethnics in neighbourhood and classroom contexts on educational outcomes (Boyle, Georgiades, Racine, & Mustard, 2007; Georgiades, Boyle, & Duku, 2007; Peetsma, Van der Veen, Koopman, & Van Schooten, 2006). Specifically, improved school performance, higher levels of motivation and effort, and a more positive academic self-concept among ethnic minority students were associated with ethnic density, through the increased well-being, decreased problem behaviour, and better mental health that were related to the presence of co-ethnics.

The positive effect of co-ethnic concentration in one's neighbourhood, termed 'ethnic density effect', is thought to result, firstly, from reduced exposure to prejudice and related feelings of alienation. Such feelings are more frequent in settings where ingroup members make up a smaller share of the population. More importantly, ethnic density effects have also been related to increased levels of social support within the ethnic community. The reasoning behind the ethnic density effect thus emphasises the importance of social capital at the neighbourhood level; and it assumes that social ties are developed and maintained more easily with co-ethnics. Thus an analysis of ethnic density effects should be informed by theories on the emergence and maintenance of social capital at the neighbourhood level.

Social capital plays a crucial role in the theoretical framework of Jencks and Mayer (1990; Mayer & Jencks, 1989) who distinguished several explanatory mechanisms underlying neighbourhood effects on individual outcomes, such as educational attainment. The first is access to local resources and institutions which provide inhabitants with means they might lack within their own household and which they need to accomplish certain goals, such as school completion. Similarly, the lack of such resources and institutions might account for less favourable outcomes. Secondly, social capital in the form of interpersonal networks within the neighbourhood is crucial to enable resources to travel



beyond immediate household contexts. Thirdly, and in line with Coleman's (1988) definition of social capital as consisting of interpersonal networks as well as the norms they help to enforce, local networks ensure social control, enabling effective norm enforcement and sanctioning non-normative behaviours, such as truancy or delinquency. Fourth, neighbours may function as role models outside the parental home. Such processes of collective socialisation might have either positive or negative effects depending on the kinds of local role models that are available (e.g., successful professionals vs. gang leaders). Fifth, negative neighbourhood effects are also expected where neighbours compete for scarce resources, such as prestigious jobs or high-quality housing, and where the comparison with one's neighbours leads to feelings of relative deprivation among the less advantaged. To sum up, neighbourhood contexts may affect individuals both positively and negatively, depending on the specific characteristics of one's residential area.

Regarding the emergence of social capital, Halpern (2005) provides evidence for the preconditions at the neighbourhood level. Residential stability is identified as one of the most important requirements for the development and maintenance of dense social networks, which allow the establishment and enforcement of common norms (*ibid.*). Similarly, Putnam (1995), who has written extensively on the benefits of social capital for thriving civil societies, shows that stabilising factors, such as home ownership and residential stability, contribute to community-level social capital – although they cannot account for an alleged decline over time in 'civic community' in the US. For the Netherlands, Völker, Flap and Lindenberg (2007) also showed that a sense of community was indeed most likely to emerge in neighbourhoods that are residentially more stable, with lower degrees of urbanisation, and that are more homogeneous in terms of ethnic, socio-economic and household composition. Finally, using British survey data, Coulthard, Walker and Morgan (2002) provide evidence that lower rates of residential mobility, urbanisation and single households (as opposed to households with couples with or without dependent children), as well as higher rates of home ownership, go together with more social capital at the neighbourhood level.

With regard to our first research question about the role of neighbourhood stability, these arguments and findings suggest that local social-support networks of co-ethnics will develop more easily in more stable residential areas. Turning to the second research question on the role of neighbourhood quality, we expect that social ties with co-ethnics may have both positive and negative effects on individual outcomes such as school completion. Whether positive ethnic density effects emerge will depend crucially on neighbourhood quality, in which case social ties with co-ethnic neighbours give access to valuable local resources. Therefore our analysis examines the combined effects of ethnic density and structural characteristics of municipalities, while taking into account neighbourhoods' socio-economic status. Finally, our third research question concerns distinct incorporation modes as they relate to different types of local ethnic communities.

We expect most investment in ethnic resources in an 'ethnic enclave' (as distinct from an 'ethnic ghetto') type of residential pattern, which characterise the Turkish communities (as distinct from the Moroccan communities) in Belgium. In addition, the expected utility of ethnic investments may also depend on the (lack of) access to mainstream resources, which distinguishes the Italian community in Belgium from both Turkish and Moroccan communities. To our knowledge, this is the first European study to separate out structural neighbourhood characteristics from co-ethnic concentrations and to test their joint effects on second-generation attainment. We take advantage of large numbers in the Belgian census to describe residential patterns and associations with second-generation attainment separately for Italian, Moroccan and Turkish minorities and for a Belgian majority comparison group. Thus, our analyses provide new insights in the ethnic segmentation of the housing market and in its repercussions for the school careers of the second generation. Specifically, we investigate four indicators of neighbourhood structure that are derived from the empirical literature of community social capital: i) residential mobility, ii) urbanisation, iii) the share of single households, and iv) the rate of home ownership. In all analyses, we include rates of university degrees and high-quality housing as controls for neighbourhoods' socio-economic composition.

### 3.2 Data and method

We made use of random samples of anonymised records from the Belgian Census of 1991, which contain 50% of the total Italian, Moroccan and Turkish<sup>1</sup> minority populations and 10% of the native Belgian majority population. The 1991 Census is the last to identify the quasi-complete second generation by their nationality at birth, which is no longer possible in the most recent Census of 2001 due to recent legislative changes which facilitated the acquisition of Belgian citizenship (Phalet, 2007). From the total sample of 538,792 cases in all 589 Belgian municipalities we selected participants in the age range from 21 to 35 in order to make the age ranges of the Belgian population and the Italian second generation comparable to that of the younger Turkish and Moroccan second generation. Moreover, we excluded first-generation immigrants, i.e., persons born outside Belgium or who immigrated after the age of six. In addition, we included only municipalities with at least 10 members of second-generation participants in the sample, in order to ensure that participants could not be identified. All native origin Belgian participants in the thus selected municipalities were included, while those living in other municipalities were excluded. The native Belgians in our sample are thus a selective group which does not represent the complete native Belgian population. This selection process resulted in a total usable sample of 142,485 participants in 201 municipalities. The ethnic composition of the sample is as follows: 99,417 (69.77%) are of Belgian origin, 32,798 (23.02%) of Italian, 6,916 (4.85%) of Moroccan and 3,354 (2.35%) of Turkish origin. 35.1% of this total



sample is located in 53 municipalities in Flanders, 50.6% resides in 129 municipalities in Wallonia and the remaining 14.3% live in the 19 municipalities of the capital region of Brussels. Women make up 48.8% of the total sample.

The completion of full secondary education is analysed as outcome variable in multilevel logistic regression. This dichotomous dependent variable is 1 if a person's highest completed level of education is upper secondary or tertiary education. Participants who were still in full-time education at the time of the census were coded as having completed upper secondary education when they were enrolled in tertiary education, as this requires prior completion of upper secondary education. Participants who reported lower secondary education or lower levels of education as the highest completed degree and those who were still enrolled in secondary education were coded 0 on the dependent variable. Using this definition, 55.9% of the selected participants have completed full secondary education, but completion rates differ between ethnic groups. Specifically, 61.0% of the native Belgians, 48.1% of the Italian Belgians, 32.4% of the Moroccan Belgians, and 31.8% of the Turkish Belgians in the sample have completed full secondary education.

We take two levels of analysis into account in our multilevel models: individuals and municipalities. Contextual effects are operationalised at the level of municipalities, because aggregation at this level allows us to include a large number of contextual units while safeguarding privacy concerns. The multilevel structure of the analysis is necessary as individual participants are nested within municipalities across which they are not randomly distributed. This type of analysis splits up the variance into a part that is located at the individual level and a component that is located at a higher level, in this case the municipality. This allows us to correctly model the impact of characteristics of municipalities on individual completion of secondary education, which would be exaggerated in OLS regression due to the underestimation of standard errors of higher-order effects (Hox, 2002). We made use of the statistical package *MlwiN* to estimate logistic regression models with a 2-level structure.

At the individual level, the following information is taken into account: gender (dummy with men as reference category), age (centred on its minimal value, 21), ethnicity (dummies for the three ethnic minority groups using an inclusive definition of ethnicity based on nationality at birth; native Belgians are the reference category), and being married before school-leaving age (dummy that is 1 for participants who married before the age of 18; non-married persons and those who married at a later age are the reference category). We include early marriage into the analyses as this might have a disruptive effect on educational careers, especially among girls. This indicator can be included as a predictor because it precedes our outcome variable by definition. Socio-economic characteristics at the individual level, however, might follow from or co-occur with our dependent variable, school completion, and were therefore excluded from the analysis. Note that the effects of socio-economic characteristics of the municipalities cannot be separated out from

socio-economic effects at the family or household level. Hence, they are only included as controls and cannot be interpreted as contextual effects in the strict sense.

At the municipality level, we include five variables: ethnic density, residential mobility, urbanisation, home ownership, and single households. *Ethnic density* is measured as the share of one's ethnic ingroup (Belgian, Italian, Moroccan or Turkish) of the total population of one's municipality of residence. By definition, ethnic density differs between ethnic groups, thus our ethnic density variable takes on at least two and up to four values per municipality, depending on the number of ethnic groups included per municipality. In order to allow for meaningful interpretation of the results, especially the sizes of ethnic penalties in completion, all contextual variables are centred using a realistic value. Ethnic density was centred on 10%, a value that is far from the mean of the native Belgians, but closer to realistic values occurring among the three minority groups (see Table 3.1). *Residential mobility* is measured as the number of moves into and out of a municipality per 1000

**Table 3.1** Municipality characteristics per ethnic group in the sample

		Whole sample (N = 142485)	Belgian (N = 99417)	Italian (N = 32798)	Moroccan (N = 6916)	Turkish (N = 3354)
<b>Ethnic composition</b>						
Ethnic density	Mean	64.41	87.86	11.13	8.48	5.76
	Min	0.14	42.07	0.14	0.25	0.23
	Max	98.60	98.60	30.26	20.48	18.80
<b>Neighbourhood structure</b>						
Residential mobility	Mean	50.67	49.06	50.15	74.66	54.31
	Min	20.30	20.30	24.20	24.30	20.30
	Max	131.00	131.00	131.00	131.00	131.00
Urbanisation	Mean	2,142.19	1,801.95	2,033.80	6,449.82	4,444.41
	Min	62.94	62.94	62.94	161.89	127.06
	Max	19,379.09	19,379.09	19,379.09	19,379.09	19,379.09
Home ownership	Mean	55.46	56.61	56.29	38.19	49.15
	Min	21.32	21.32	21.32	21.32	21.32
	Max	86.92	86.92	86.92	75.52	77.46
Single households	Mean	31.95	31.20	31.46	43.70	34.91
	Min	9.62	9.62	9.62	12.38	12.38
	Max	64.51	64.51	64.51	64.51	64.51
<b>Socio-economic composition</b>						
% University graduates	Mean	4.74	5.11	3.60	5.07	4.20
	Min	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
	Max	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	12.80
% High-quality housing	Mean	33.87	35.55	30.41	27.10	31.72
	Min	11.19	11.19	11.19	11.19	11.19
	Max	63.81	63.81	63.81	57.76	57.76

inhabitants in 1991. As moves within the borders of the same municipality are not taken into account, our indicator is likely to underestimate residential mobility in the larger municipalities and thus provides us with a conservative estimate of the true residential mobility. Residential mobility is centred on the mean value in 1991 (43.9 moves per 1000 inhabitants) across all 589 Belgian municipalities from which the 201 municipalities were sampled. Although our sample is a non-random selection from these municipalities, this centring procedure, which we applied to all neighbourhood characteristics, allows for an ecologically sensible interpretation, as positive values represent residential mobility rates that are higher than the Belgian average. *Urbanisation* is operationalised by the population density of a municipality, which is calculated by dividing the number of inhabitants in 1991 by the area of the community in km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>2</sup> The mean population density for the whole country in 1991 was 340 persons per km<sup>2</sup> and we centred the variable on this value.<sup>3</sup> *Home ownership* is measured as the number of households who own their place of residence divided by the total number of households in a municipality; the mean rate of home ownership across the 589 Belgian municipalities was 70.9% in 1991. *Single households* were computed in a similar way by dividing the number of households with one single inhabitant by the total number of households; the Belgian mean in 1991 was 22.6% single households per municipality.

In addition to these indicators of neighbourhood stability and quality, we control for the percentage of university graduates and the percentage of high-quality housing at the level of the municipality. Both variables are introduced as basic controls for socio-economic composition, since they were highly correlated with other socio-economic indicators, such as average income and occupational class, and were found to capture a large part of the variation in socio-economic composition across municipalities. The percentage of *university graduates* is the share of the population over 18 years old holding a university diploma. This variable is centred on 5%, the mean value in our initial sample. The percentage of *high-quality housing* is the share of all households that dispose of an automobile, a telephone connection, and a kitchen of more than 4m<sup>2</sup>, in addition to more basic features that are shared with housing of lesser quality (such as central heating, private bathroom; note that having an automobile introduces a suburbanisation bias into our measure of high-quality housing since inner-city dwellers are less likely to own a car even if they live in high-quality housing). This variable was centred on 20%, which is the average proportion of households occupying high-quality housing in our sample.

### 3.3 Results

Before presenting the results of our multilevel analysis, we first describe the distributions and correlations of contextual characteristics for the different minority groups and for the majority reference group. Table 3.1 shows the means, minima and maxima of the five municipality characteristics, first for the sample as a whole and then separately for

the four comparison groups.<sup>4</sup> The first column makes clear that the selection procedure described above resulted in a sample of municipalities with a higher residential mobility, higher degrees of urbanisation, lower rates of home ownership and higher shares of single households than the Belgian average. This highlights again that the native Belgian reference group in our analyses is not representative of the total native Belgian majority population, due to the over-representation of urban areas in our sample of municipalities. Despite this selectivity of the native Belgian majority group, the table shows large inter-ethnic differences in mean municipality profiles. The native Belgians in our sample live more often in stable and high-quality municipalities relative to the three minority groups. All deviations from the values of the entire sample point in the direction of a more favourable neighbourhood structure for native Belgian participants. The profile for Italian Belgians is fairly close to the sample mean, which is negatively selected in terms of our neighbourhood indicators when compared to Belgium as a whole. The mean profile for the Turkish Belgians deviates more from the mean profile across the board and is clearly and squarely located on the more unstable and lower-quality side. Lastly, the Moroccan case is an outlier in all respects. Moroccan Belgians live in municipalities that are three times as densely populated, with one and a half times as much residential mobility and one and a half times as many single households, and with only two thirds of the average rates of home ownership in the sample as a whole – which is already negatively selected compared to the overall Belgian mean.

Table 3.2 shows the bivariate correlations between municipality characteristics across the selected municipalities, both for the sample as a whole and separately for each group. High correlations between the four structural characteristics, i.e., residential mobility, urbanisation, home ownership and single households, show that residential areas vary along a continuum from more stable neighbourhoods of higher quality to less stable neighbourhoods of lower quality. Moreover, in addition to our empirical findings, these four indicators are structurally interrelated in the Belgian case. Home ownership is usually the final stage of a housing career and is negatively related to residential mobility because transaction costs for selling homes are relatively high. In addition, home ownership is spatially concentrated in the suburbs and therefore negatively correlated with urbanisation, while single households, which mostly consist of young adults in rental homes at the start of their housing careers are more often located in urbanised areas. Thus, stable high-quality areas are those with high rates of home ownership and with low rates of residential mobility, urbanisation and single households. At the other end, we find municipalities with high levels of residential mobility, urbanisation, and single households, and with low levels of home ownership. Table 3.2 also suggests that there is no inherent relation between ethnic and socio-economic composition on the one hand and structural neighbourhood characteristics on the other hand for the sample as a whole, thus allowing the effects of these neighbourhood characteristics to be tested in the same

**Table 3.2** Correlations between contextual characteristics: pooled sample and separately for each ethnic group

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>1 Ethnic density</b>							
Whole sample	1						
Belgian	1						
Italian	1						
Moroccan	1						
Turkish	1						
<b>2 Residential mobility</b>							
Whole sample	-0.216 ***	1					
Belgian	-0.558 ***	1					
Italian	-0.374 ***	1					
Moroccan	0.666 ***	1					
Turkish	0.235 ***	1					
<b>3 Urbanisation</b>							
Whole sample	-0.259 ***	0.755 ***	1				
Belgian	-0.678 ***	0.708 ***	1				
Italian	-0.190 ***	0.778 ***	1				
Moroccan	0.683 ***	0.790 ***	1				
Turkish	0.454 ***	0.896 ***	1				
<b>4 Home ownership</b>							
Whole sample	0.228 ***	-0.633 ***	-0.737 ***	1			
Belgian	0.575 ***	-0.544 ***	-0.722 ***	1			
Italian	0.216 ***	-0.689 ***	-0.751 ***	1			
Moroccan	-0.724 ***	-0.854 ***	-0.676 ***	1			
Turkish	0.018 (ns)	-0.845 ***	-0.767 ***	1			
<b>5 Single households</b>							
Whole sample	-0.202 ***	0.630 ***	0.689 ***	-0.936 ***	1		
Belgian	-0.514 ***	0.566 ***	0.686 ***	-0.936 ***	1		
Italian	-0.219 ***	0.652 ***	-0.684 ***	-0.911 ***	1		
Moroccan	0.522 ***	0.766 ***	0.585 ***	-0.927 ***	1		
Turkish	-0.095 ***	0.806 ***	0.727 ***	-0.966 ***	1		
<b>6 University graduates</b>							
Whole sample	0.190 ***	0.472 ***	0.189 ***	-0.280 ***	0.354 ***	1	
Belgian	0.052 ***	0.524 ***	0.207 ***	-0.282 ***	0.358 ***	1	
Italian	-0.598 ***	0.551 ***	0.305 ***	-0.376 ***	0.432 ***	1	
Moroccan	-0.257 ***	0.305 ***	0.096 ***	-0.208 ***	0.385 ***	1	
Turkish	-0.180 ***	0.310 ***	0.260 ***	-0.521 ***	0.550 ***	1	
<b>7 High-quality housing</b>							
Whole sample	0.313 ***	-0.214 ***	-0.413 ***	0.553 ***	-0.557 ***	0.350 ***	1
Belgian	0.412 ***	-0.110 ***	-0.373 ***	0.549 ***	-0.545 ***	0.343 ***	1
Italian	-0.279 ***	-0.186 ***	-0.327 ***	0.450 ***	-0.499 ***	0.343 ***	1
Moroccan	-0.650 ***	-0.645 ***	-0.644 ***	0.741 ***	-0.683 ***	0.178 ***	1
Turkish	0.028 (ns)	-0.728 ***	-0.673 ***	0.820 ***	-0.820 ***	-0.244 ***	1

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ , (ns) non-significant

model. However, due to their high inter-correlations, residential mobility, urbanisation, home ownership and single households cannot be analysed in the same model.

In addition, Table 3.2 describes neighbourhood profiles separately for three minority groups with distinct residential patterns and for the majority reference group. When looking at the correlations separately for each group, we observe high correlations between ethnic density and structural neighbourhood characteristics for the Belgian majority as well as for the Moroccan minority, albeit with opposing signs: where a higher concentration of native Belgians is associated with more stability and higher quality, the presence of Moroccan Belgians is associated with very low stability and quality. This pattern implies that we cannot test moderation between ethnic density and neighbourhood structure for these two groups, because their concentration overlaps to a very high degree with positive or negative neighbourhood characteristics in social reality. Among the Italian and Turkish minority groups, on the other hand, the correlations between ethnic density and structural neighbourhood indicators are low, indicating that local concentrations of these groups are less strongly related to the stability and quality of the municipality. Hence, we are able to test the expected moderation of ethnic density effects by structural characteristics of the municipality for the Italian and Turkish second generation only.

In the following, we assess the influence of ethnic composition and of structural neighbourhood characteristics in a multilevel model while controlling for socio-economic characteristics. Tables 3.3a and 3.3b show the regression coefficients (*Bs*) and standard errors of the multilevel logistic regression. The first model does not include any contextual variables. It estimates ethnic penalties on completion rates, net of controls at the individual level (age, gender, early marriage and its interaction with gender). This model reproduces earlier findings of lower completion rates among all three minority groups as compared to the native Belgian majority population, with the largest ethnic penalty in the Turkish second generation, followed by the Moroccan and, at a distance, by the Italian second generation. Compared to native Belgians of the same gender, age and marital status, the odds of having completed full secondary education are 63.6% lower for second-generation Turkish Belgians, 61.5% lower for Moroccan Belgians and only 33.8% lower for Italian Belgians.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, the significant random slopes of the effects of Moroccan and Italian ethnicity show that the penalties for these two minority groups vary across municipalities, while the disadvantage is context invariant for the Turkish second generation. Adding ethnic density and both socio-economic controls in the next model substantially reduces the ethnic penalties of Turkish and Moroccan Belgians, and renders the difference in completion rates between Italians and Belgians non-significant. Moreover, ethnic density has a small yet significant positive effect on secondary school completion net of socio-economic composition: for every 1% increase in ethnic density, the odds of school completion increase with 0.5%. As expected, the percentage university graduates and high-quality housing have significant positive effects on school completion:

a 1% increase in the share of university graduates and high-quality housing results in an increase in the odds of school completion by 5.9% and 1.5% respectively. In the next model, we also find a significant positive interaction with Italian origin, indicating that the ethnic density effect is stronger among Italian Belgians than among the other groups. Interactions between Turkish as well as Moroccan origin and ethnic density are not significant, which might be due to a lack of statistical power as these groups are much smaller in the sample.

Due to the high correlations between the four municipality characteristics of interest, we cannot include them jointly in one model. Instead we present for each indicator one model with its main effect and one with its interactions with ethnicity. The models with main effects do not contribute to the explanation of differential attainment. With the exception of a small and marginally significant negative effect of residential mobility, the other effects of neighbourhood structure are non-significant; the ethnic penalties remain stable; and the model fit does not improve. In all four cases, however, we find significant interactions of structural characteristics with ethnicity for all three minority groups as against the native Belgian majority group. In line with expectations and with the correlations presented in Table 3.2, residential mobility, urbanisation and single households have similar negative effects on second-generation attainment, while home ownership has a positive effect. Thus, the Italian, Moroccan and Turkish second generation have lower completion rates in less stable and more urbanised neighbourhoods and in those with higher shares of single households and lower rates of home ownership. The interactions reveal that ethnic penalties are contingent on neighbourhood structure, so that ethnic disadvantages are larger in more unstable and lower quality municipalities.

Against the background of distinct incorporation modes of the three minority groups in the Belgian migration context, and because the effects of structural neighbourhood characteristics are found to interact with ethnicity, it is interesting to replicate the analysis described above for each ethnic group separately. This allows us to further probe into differential patterns of covariation of ethnic density and structural neighbourhood characteristics and to test interactions between these structural characteristics and ethnic density. We include the same controls for municipality socio-economic composition in these separate analyses (results not shown, available upon request).

First, among the *native Belgian majority*, we find a positive effect of ethnic density in models without structural neighbourhood indicators. Conversely, in a model without ethnic density, we find a negative effect of residential mobility (urbanisation, home ownership and single households are not significantly associated with school completion among the majority group). When both residential mobility and ethnic density are included, the ethnic density effect becomes non-significant, while the negative effect of residential mobility remains significant. Thus, the positive 'ethnic density effect' on majority school completion is explained by a positive association of residential stability

**Table 3.3a** Effects of contextual characteristics and ethnic density on completion of secondary education

	Ethnic penalty model	Ethnic density model	Ethnic density interaction model	Residential mobility model	Residential interaction model	Urbanisation model	Urbanisation interaction model
Intercept	0.731 (0.026)	0.085 (0.102)	0.194 (0.109)	0.194 (0.109)	0.044 (0.112)	-0.029 (0.127)	-0.240 (0.134)
<b>Individual level</b>							
Female	0.316 (0.011)	0.320 (0.011)	0.320 (0.011)	-0.320 (0.011)	0.320 (0.011)	0.319 (0.011)	0.320 (0.011)
Age	-0.057 (0.001)	-0.058 (0.001)	-0.058 (0.001)	-0.058 (0.001)	-0.058 (0.001)	-0.058 (0.001)	-0.058 (0.001)
Married before school-leaving age	-1.489 (0.114)	-1.506 (0.119)	-1.505 (0.118)	-1.508 (0.118)	-1.512 (0.119)	-1.505 (0.119)	-1.508 (0.119)
Female * Married before school-leaving age	-0.540 (0.112)	-0.542 (0.127)	-0.542 (0.126)	-0.541 (0.126)	-0.538 (0.126)	-0.542 (0.126)	-0.540 (0.127)
Moroccan	-0.954 (0.075)	-0.536 (0.132)	-0.682 (0.159)	-0.615 (0.135)	-0.393 (0.140)	-0.451 (0.143)	-0.121 (0.168)
Turkish	-1.011 (0.061)	-0.603 (0.121)	-0.728 (0.140)	-0.680 (0.123)	-0.527 (0.124)	-0.519 (0.133)	-0.193 (0.149)
Italian	-0.412 (0.041)	0.011 (0.119)	0.015 (0.120)	-0.072 (0.122)	0.110 (0.126)	0.104 (0.134)	0.318 (0.141)
<b>Contextual effects</b>							
% University graduates	0.057 (0.005)	0.056 (0.005)	0.056 (0.005)	0.067 (0.006)	0.062 (0.006)	0.054 (0.006)	0.053 (0.006)
% High-quality housing	0.015 (0.002)	0.015 (0.002)	0.015 (0.002)	0.014 (0.002)	0.013 (0.002)	0.016 (0.002)	0.015 (0.002)
Ethnic density	0.005 (0.001)	0.004 (0.001)	0.004 (0.001)	0.004 (0.001)	0.006 (0.001)	0.006 (0.002)	0.009 (0.002)
Residential mobility				-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)		
Urbanisation						0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)



<b>Cross-level interactions</b>									
Ethnic density * Moroccan									
						-0.004			
						(0.017)			
Ethnic density * Turkish						-0.002			
						(0.014)			
Ethnic density * Italian						0.026	***		
						(0.007)			
Residential mobility * Moroccan						-0.007	***		
						(0.002)			
Residential mobility * Turkish						-0.006	**		
						(0.002)			
Residential mobility * Italian						-0.004	*		
						(0.002)			
Urbanisation * Moroccan						-0.004	*		
						(0.002)			
Urbanisation * Turkish						-0.005	***		
						(0.001)			
Urbanisation * Italian						0.000			
						(0.000)			
<b>Random slopes</b>									
Intercept						0.021	***	0.021	***
						(0.003)		(0.003)	
Moroccan						0.263	***	0.263	***
						(0.067)		(0.067)	
Turkish						0.068	*	0.072	*
						(0.034)		(0.035)	
Italian						0.200	***	0.235	***
						(0.030)		(0.034)	
<b>-2LogLikelihood</b>						190525		190539	
						191156		190603	
						190575		190603	
						190569		190569	

Note. Cells show the coefficients (Bs) of the multilevel regression, standard errors in brackets.  
 \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$

**Table 3.3b** The effects of contextual characteristics and ethnic density on completion of secondary education

	Home ownership model		Home ownership interaction model		Single household model		Single household interaction model	
Intercept	0.016 (0.134)		-0.302 (0.138)	*	0.088 (0.133)		-0.001 (0.102)	
<b>Individual level</b>								
Female	0.320 (0.011)	***	0.320 (0.011)	***	0.320 (0.011)	***	0.319 (0.011)	***
Age	-0.058 (0.001)	***	-0.058 (0.001)	***	-0.058 (0.001)	***	-0.058 (0.001)	***
Married before school-leaving age	-1.506 (0.119)	***	-1.511 (0.120)	***	-1.506 (0.119)	***	-1.512 (0.120)	***
Female * Married before school-leaving age	-0.546 (0.112)	***	-0.539 (0.127)	***	-0.542 (0.127)	***	-0.537 (0.127)	***
Moroccan	-0.496 (0.141)	***	0.167 (0.185)		-0.537 (0.132)	***	-0.358 (0.129)	**
Turkish	-0.563 (0.131)	***	-0.047 (0.155)		-0.604 (0.121)	***	-0.482 (0.114)	***
Italian	0.056 (0.131)		0.508 (0.143)	***	0.010 (0.119)		0.103 (0.117)	
<b>Contextual effects</b>								
% University graduates	0.054 (0.006)	***	0.052 (0.006)	***	0.057 (0.006)	***	0.053 (0.006)	***
% High-quality housing	0.016 (0.002)	***	0.016 (0.002)	***	0.015 (0.002)	***	0.015 (0.002)	***
Ethnic density	0.006 (0.001)	***	0.010 (0.002)	***	0.005 (0.001)	***	0.006 (0.001)	***
Home ownership	-0.001 (0.002)		-0.004 (0.002)	*				
Single households					0.000 (0.001)		0.002 (0.001)	*


<b>Cross-level interactions</b>						
Home ownership * Moroccan		0.019 (0.005)	***			
Home ownership * Turkish		0.013 (0.004)	***			
Home ownership * Italian		0.015 (0.003)	***			
Single households * Moroccan					-0.015 (0.003)	***
Single households * Turkish					-0.013 (0.003)	***
Single households * Italian					-0.005 (0.002)	*
<b>Random slopes</b>						
Intercept	0.021 (0.003)	0.021 (0.003)	***	0.021 (0.003)	0.021 (0.003)	***
Moroccan	0.262 (0.067)	0.184 (0.054)	***	0.262 (0.067)	0.202 (0.055)	***
Turkish	0.068 (0.034)	0.040 (0.026)	*	0.067 (0.034)	0.016 (0.017)	*
Italian	0.234 (0.034)	0.188 (0.029)	***	0.232 (0.034)	0.219 (0.032)	***
<b>-2LogLikelihood</b>	190602	190557		190603	190543	

Note. Cells show the coefficients (Bs) of the multilevel regression, standard errors in brackets.  
 \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$

with both completion and ethnic density. This means that it is not the absence of ethnic minorities per se that is associated with higher completion rates among the native Belgian majority. Instead, a positive 'ethnic density effect' in neighbourhoods with more majority group inhabitants is due to the fact that more mono-ethnic Belgian municipalities are also more residentially stable.

Second, among *Moroccan Belgians*, no significant effect of ethnic density is found in models without structural characteristics. Conversely, in models without ethnic density, better neighbourhood quality in terms of a lower degree of urbanisation and higher home ownership rates is significantly positively related to school completion. This implies that Moroccans living in the average Moroccan neighbourhood, which is densely populated (6449.8 persons per km<sup>2</sup>), have 11.5% lower odds of completing secondary education compared to Moroccan peers living in less urbanised neighbourhoods with a population density at the national mean (340 persons per km<sup>2</sup>), all else being equal. Similarly, Moroccan Belgians in the average Moroccan immigrant neighbourhood with relatively low shares of home owners (38.2%) have 34.6% lower odds of completing school than those living in better-quality neighbourhoods with home ownership rates at the national mean (70.9%).<sup>6</sup> To sum up, neighbourhood quality is strongly related to school success among the Moroccan second generation. At the same time, Moroccan Belgians are disproportionately allocated to neighbourhoods of low quality with very high levels of urbanisation and low levels of home ownership (see Table 3.1), in line with a well-documented 'ethnic ghetto' type of residential pattern of the Moroccan minority in Belgium (cf. supra).


Third, for the *Turkish-Belgian minority*, we find the expected negative main effect of residential mobility. Moreover, neighbourhood stability moderates the impact of ethnic density, as evident from a significant negative interaction of ethnic density with residential mobility. Specifically, living in a municipality with many other inhabitants of Turkish origin is associated with higher completion rates *only if* the municipality is stable in its residential composition. As can be seen in Figure 3.1a, ethnic density supports school completion among the Turkish second generation in residentially stable municipalities, whereas it does not play a significant role in less stable neighbourhoods. One should keep in mind that Turkish Belgians, on average, live in less stable municipalities than the national mean as depicted in Table 3.1, so that many Turkish neighbourhoods do not meet the structural conditions for the emergence of ethnic social capital. Moreover, the negative interaction implies that in the least stable neighbourhoods the presence of co-ethnics may even lower completion rates. On the positive side, however, and in line with existing evidence of Turkish enclave formation in Belgium, the Turkish second generation is doing better when residential stability enables the emergence of strong ethnic ties. Specifically, in residentially more stable areas (i.e., at one standard deviation below the national mean level of residential mobility) the conditional probability of school completion is 58.3% if ethnic density is high (i.e., 15%) compared to a conditional



**Figure 3.1a** Estimated probability of school completion among Turkish Belgians (%).  
*Note.* Low and high values of residential mobility are defined as one standard deviation below and above the Belgian national mean. As ethnic density was centred on the realistic value of 10%, 5% is chosen to represent low ethnic density and 15% for high ethnic density.

probability of 50.8% in equally stable areas with low ethnic density (i.e., 5% Turkish inhabitants).<sup>7</sup> A similar negative interaction of ethnic density with urbanisation fails to reach significance by a small margin.

Lastly, additive models yield significant main effects of ethnic density and of all four structural characteristics in the expected direction among the *Italian second generation*. Thus, they are more likely to complete secondary school when they are living in more Italian, more stable, and higher-quality neighbourhoods. When interactions of ethnic density with neighbourhood structure are included, however, the main effects of ethnic density and structural neighbourhood characteristics become non-significant. Figure 3.1b depicts the interaction with residential mobility as an example (significant interactions of similar magnitude and sign were found for other structural neighbourhood characteristics). Contrary to our expectation, positive associations of ethnic density with higher completion



**Figure 3.1b** Estimated probability of school completion among Italian Belgians (%).  
*Note.* Low and high values of residential mobility are defined as one standard deviation below and above the Belgian national mean. As ethnic density was centred on the realistic value of 10%, 5% is chosen to represent low ethnic density and 15% for high ethnic density.

rates are situated in less stable and lower-quality areas; and they are reversed in more stable and higher-quality residential areas. While ethnic density may be a resource for those Italian Belgians who stayed behind in lower-quality and less stable neighbourhoods, the presence of Italian neighbours appears as a hindrance rather than a resource for upwardly mobile Italians in more established residential areas. Specifically, in areas of low stability (i.e., with residential mobility of one standard deviation above the national mean), the conditional probability of school completion is 60.6% if ethnic density is high (15%) as compared to 56.0% in equally unstable areas with low ethnic density (5%), all else being equal; however, whenever ethnic density is high (15%) in highly stable municipalities, the conditional probability of having completed full secondary education is 54.8% compared to 57.5% when ethnic density is low (5%). In light of the earlier timing of Italian (vs. Turkish) immigration and settlement, it should be noted that low stability in the Italian case has

a different meaning of staying behind in declining areas where the native Belgians are moving out and more recent immigrants are moving in (Kesteloot & Cortie, 1998). These areas have also become less attractive in terms of our indicators of neighbourhood quality, so that the presence of co-ethnic residents may function as a buffer against neighbourhood distress. Moreover, there is a structural association between Italian concentration, home ownership and low quality of municipalities, at least in Wallonia, because many Italians bought their homes from their employers when the mine pits closed. Italians in residential areas of higher quality usually are highly skilled, occupied in professional jobs and living in urban and suburban areas. In these contexts, school completion among the second generation is more likely where there are less Italian co-ethnics, which implies that ethnic contacts and resources become obsolete for upwardly mobile Italian Belgians in majority native Belgian neighbourhoods.

Finally, we replicated the analysis presented in Tables 3.3a and 3.3b with two aims. First, we wanted to assess regional differences because in the Belgian federal system, education is a competence of the regions and this may affect the results. When using region as control variable and when replicating the analysis separately for each region, we found that completion rates are higher in Dutch-speaking than in French-speaking regions, but found that the effects of structural municipality characteristics and of ethnic density did not differ substantially (results not shown, available upon request). Secondly, in order to further examine to what extent the omission of important variables may affect the results presented here, we replicated the analysis using an individual-level indicator of socio-economic status (results not shown, available upon request). The literature on educational attainment (e.g. Breen & Jonsson, 2005) consistently shows that individual differences in parental socio-economic status have a strong influence on children's educational outcomes. Unfortunately our data source contains information on individual participants only, not on the households they live in or on their parents. However, we can construct an individual-level measure that is likely to indicate parental resources rather than those of the participants: the ownership status and quality of the home of the participant. In the Belgian housing market, it is unlikely that participants have accumulated enough resources based on their own educational and occupational merits before the age of 35 to be able to afford to buy their own home of high quality. Hence, given the young age of the selected participants, living in an owner-occupied home of high quality is a good proxy for a high level of parental resources, since it implies that participants either still live with their parents or that their family supported them in buying their own home. When adding a dummy variable for participants who live in an owner-occupied home of high quality to the analysis presented in Tables 3.3a and 3.3b, a strongly significant positive association with school completion is found throughout all models. While the addition of this individual-level indicator reduces the coefficient of housing quality at the municipality level, the coefficients of all other variables at the municipality level and

their interactions remain stable. In other words, even when controlling for individual differences in wealth, we find that ethnic density, neighbourhood stability and quality are significantly related to secondary school completion among ethnic minorities in Belgium. Moreover, the interactions between ethnic density and neighbourhood stability and quality in the separate analyses of the Italian and Turkish second generation remain stable after the inclusion of this indicator of socio-economic status. This additional analysis makes clear that our main findings regarding the importance of neighbourhood characteristics, and their differential associations with ethnic density among the three largest minority groups in Belgium are robust to the inclusion of individual differences in socio-economic status. However, since we cannot rule out the possibility that living in a high-quality owner-occupied home is a consequence of participants' prior school completion (i.e., that it is endogenous to the outcome variable), we decided not to include this variable in the model shown in Tables 3.3a and 3.3b.

### 3.4 Discussion and conclusion

We start from our last research question about distinct incorporation modes as they relate to local ethnic communities and neighbourhoods in the Belgian migration context. In line with the three modes of incorporation distinguished by segmented assimilation theory, our findings suggest very different prospects for the Italian, Moroccan and Turkish second generation in Belgium. Thus, the analysis of neighbourhood effects on educational attainment among the second generation indicates the usefulness of this theory in European contexts (cf. Phalet & Heath, 2010), despite different histories of immigration and generally lower levels of ethnic and socio-economic residential segregation in European cities in contrast to the US (Musterd, 2005). At the same time, the analysis documents the boundary conditions of alleged positive effects of local ethnic communities in less stable and/or low-quality neighbourhoods with very restricted access to mainstream resources.

Our results raise most concerns about the Moroccan second generation. The Moroccan immigrant group is characterised by local living conditions that can be described as particularly disadvantaged. They live in areas that combine extremely high rates of residential mobility with very high urban population density, large shares of single households and relatively low home ownership rates. These observations show that the Moroccan minority occupies the bottom of the Belgian housing market which is strongly stratified along ethnic lines. Thus, the concentration of Moroccan Belgians in socio-economically most disadvantaged inner-city areas, which lack valuable resources and effective support networks, resembles typical ghetto-like residential patterns found among some non-white immigrant groups in the US (Logan et al., 2002; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). In line with adverse effects of externally imposed ethnic segregation on the attainment of the second generation in 'ethnic ghetto' types of neighbourhoods in the US, this residential pattern



suggests that the Moroccan second generation is most at risk of downward assimilation in the Belgian migration context. Low levels of secondary school completion suggest the persistence of socio-economic disadvantage for large numbers of the Moroccan second generation, in spite of individual examples of successful upward assimilation.

The Turkish second generation also has high rates of school drop-out, in particular because they live in more urbanised municipalities. However, we also showed that in more residentially stable municipalities, the Turkish second generation benefits from co-ethnic concentration in terms of secondary school completion. Partly, this might be attributed to the establishment of quality Turkish concentration schools in cities with large Turkish minorities such as Antwerp, Ghent and Genk. Thus Turkish immigrants in Belgium are an example of the ethnic enclave model with its focus on co-ethnic social capital and a high level of cultural maintenance. Our results show that above a certain threshold of neighbourhood stability, Turkish immigrants invest in local co-ethnic networks which provide effective support for second-generation attainment. Since the Turkish migration is more recent and the population of Turkish immigrants is relatively small, it is plausible that dense social networks of co-ethnics have not yet emerged in all municipalities of concentrated Turkish settlement to the same extent, because network building has been facilitated in areas with less residential mobility. The history of chain migration and concentrated settlement ("transplanted communities", cf. Reniers, 2000) provided a strong incentive for Turkish immigrants to invest in co-ethnic capital. On the one hand and in line with Logan's (et al. 2002) distinction between ethnic enclaves and ethnic ghettos, this pathway might lead to economic upward mobility in the long run. At the same time, economic stagnation is a real risk due to the high levels of labour market exclusion among first-generation Turkish immigrants and persistent discrimination on the Belgian labour market (Phalet, 2007). Moreover, continuing immigration through cross-border marriage and restricted human capital within Turkish communities may make ethnic investment less effective in the long run, raising concerns that the availability of ethnic capital may turn into a 'mobility trap' for the Turkish second and higher generations (Esser, 2004). Indeed, the residential profile of Turkish Belgians shows clearly that ethnic density in social reality means that many members of the Turkish second generation are stuck in less stable and lower-quality areas where the structural conditions for effective investment in ethnic social capital are not met.

The Italian second generation in Belgium more often lives in municipalities that are less urbanised, have higher home ownership rates and fewer single households. Although their average profile is still considerably worse than that of the native Belgian population, Italian Belgians are most likely to realise upward assimilation in the long run. Moreover, we found that among Italian Belgians ethnic density is an asset in less advantaged neighbourhoods, which suggests that co-ethnic networks function as a buffer against the effects of adverse neighbourhood conditions. However, we also observe that

co-ethnic concentration becomes a disadvantage for upwardly mobile Italian Belgians living in more privileged municipalities. Due to the longer presence and greater acceptance of Italian Belgians, this group is better equipped to accumulate and mobilise resources within the ethnic community. However, a recourse to co-ethnic networks and resources appears as 'second best option' among those Italian Belgians who have stayed behind in declining neighbourhoods, while investment in mainstream contacts and resources is generally preferred as a route to upward mobility. This is in line with other evidence of classic assimilation among the Italian second generation in Belgium and shows that Italian Belgians are not investing in ethnic community types of neighbourhoods. Similarly, it can be argued in terms of Esser's (2004) expected utility approach to intergenerational integration that Italian Belgians are more likely to invest in receiving-country-specific capital and to assimilate over time because immigration from Italy to Belgium is not continuing on a large scale, thus decreasing the incentive to invest in co-ethnic capital for Italian Belgians currently living in Belgium. More importantly, the notion of classic assimilation ties in with our findings of negative effects of ethnic density on the school completion of the Italian second generation in more privileged neighbourhoods. In these neighbourhoods, other ingroup members may be regarded as competitors for scarce resources, as they are trying to gain access to native Belgian networks.

Among the native Belgian majority, our finding of a positive effect of ethnic density at first glance suggests that the absence of ethnic minorities is beneficial for secondary school completion. However, this 'ethnic density effect' is confounded with the lower residential stability that goes together with a higher share of immigrants as ethnic outgroups. Our results for the native Belgian majority thus parallel findings from those US studies that reveal a negative effect on school attainment of ethnic minority concentration – because the presence of ethnic minorities is strongly linked to neighbourhood distress.

Returning to the more general first and second research questions about the role of neighbourhood structure, we conclude that our comparative findings corroborate expectations derived from general neighbourhood studies on the importance of neighbourhood quality (for reviews see Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2000; Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002); and they confirm specific predictions regarding the importance of co-ethnic social ties at the local level (Halpern, 2005; Halpern & Nazroo, 1999). More precisely, multilevel analysis across ethnic minority and majority groups in Belgium has shown that neighbourhood stability and quality are related in the expected way to secondary school completion among ethnic minorities in Belgium. As expected, and holding neighbourhood socio-economic composition constant, the children of immigrant workers from Italy, Morocco and Turkey are less likely to have completed secondary education in less stable and lower quality neighbourhoods. Specifically, completion is less likely in municipalities with high residential mobility, high urbanisation, large shares of single households and low home ownership rates. Moreover, these structural neighbourhood

characteristics may coincide or interact with local co-ethnic concentrations. Reflecting the ethnic stratification of the Belgian housing market, majority residential concentration tends to coincide with high neighbourhood stability and quality and high completion rates, whereas Moroccan concentrations overlap with low neighbourhood stability and quality and low completion rates. The latter pattern resembles closely an 'ethnic ghetto' type of ethnic concentration. For the Turkish and Italian second generation, neighbourhood structure moderates ethnic density effects on school completion, in line with segmented assimilation. In the Turkish case, the interaction pattern reflects the expected enabling role of neighbourhood stability and quality for the emergence and the positive impact of co-ethnic ties in 'ethnic enclave' type of neighbourhoods. In the Italian case, we find the opposite pattern with decreasing utilities attached to local co-ethnic concentration in more stable and better quality neighbourhoods. The latter pattern is more in line with Esser's argument about ethnic neighbourhoods as a mobility trap for the second generation.

Although our analyses provide important insights into the role of structural neighbourhood characteristics for the educational attainment of the second generation, there are also limitations. Firstly, our data allow only an indirect test of the theoretical mechanisms that are thought to underlie the generation of social capital in general and social ties with co-ethnics in particular. Direct observations or measures of interpersonal networks and interactions, as well as the exchange of resources and the enforcement of norms at the community level would be a next step in future research on ethnic density effects. Along those lines, recent qualitative evidence from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS) suggests the importance of strict parental norms and their enforcement by local co-ethnic communities for school success among the most deprived children of immigrants (Portes, Fernández-Kelly, & Haller, 2009). Unfortunately, social capital – and especially its norm-setting and norm-enforcing component – is notoriously hard to quantify and at present we lack the data for such a more direct test in Belgium. On the other hand, the Belgian Census is an excellent data source to contextualise ethnic educational inequality in the major minority communities due to its broad coverage and due to the possibility to combine both individual and contextual characteristics.

A second limitation of our analysis is the cross-sectional nature of our data, which does not allow strong empirical claims about the causal direction of associations of neighbourhood characteristics with second-generation attainment. That is to say, we cannot be certain with the data at hand whether living in a stable high-quality municipality with a larger share of one's ethnic ingroup has a positive influence on the second generation's educational attainment, as the literature on ethnic density and neighbourhood effects would suggest, or whether our findings are due to a selection process leading individuals who have completed full secondary education to settle in stable high-quality neighbourhoods with relatively more co-ethnics. However, it is unlikely that ethnic minorities and Belgian majority group members decide to live in a municipality with more co-ethnics if they have completed

secondary education, while they prefer to live in areas of less co-ethnic concentration if they have no diploma of upper secondary school. Still, as in all neighbourhood studies, there is a risk that associations are caused by omitted variables that select individuals with certain characteristics into specific types of municipalities, thus causing a spurious association between co-ethnic concentration, neighbourhood stability and quality and higher rates of school completion among the second generation (Dietz, 2002). Individual-level data on parental socio-economic status would be an important additional control variable which could not be included due to data constraints, although differences in socio-economic composition were controlled at the municipality level. Moreover, as an additional analysis including a measure of individual differences in housing wealth shows (cf. *supra*), the effects of ethnic composition and neighbourhood structure are robust to the inclusion of important individual differences in socio-economic status.

Moreover, although we cannot empirically rule out that the associations between ethnic composition, other neighbourhood characteristics and educational attainment are partly driven by omitted variables that we cannot include due to data constraints, this is not very plausible. Contrary to the findings on ethnic community emergence among Asians in the US (Logan, Alba, & Zhang, 2002; Yu & Myers, 2007), in the context of Belgium there is no reason to assume that ethnic minorities with higher levels of socio-economic or cultural capital would select themselves into neighbourhoods with more co-ethnics more often than their peers with fewer resources. As described in the introduction to this chapter, ethnic minority concentrations in Belgium emerge mostly through in-migration of new arrivals and selective out-migration of native Belgians and a very limited number of upwardly mobile immigrants (Kesteloot & Cortie, 1998). Moreover, longitudinal map comparison analyses show that the residential mobility of ethnic minorities over time is very limited, which is partly explained by discrimination on the housing market that pushes ethnic minorities into certain districts with high minority concentrations (Kesteloot, De Decker, & Manço, 1997). Therefore, it is unlikely that the positive effect of ethnic density is driven by higher levels of socio-economic or cultural capital of minority families in more ethnically dense neighbourhoods as compared to neighbourhoods with lower concentrations of co-ethnics. However, some variables that we could not include into our analysis due to data constraints might explain the differential relations between neighbourhood stability and quality, ethnic density and school attainment among Turkish and Italian Belgians. It is reasonable to assume that Turkish Belgians in residentially stable municipalities are different from Turkish Belgians in more unstable areas – there will be a larger share of newcomers and recently arrived immigrants with less host-country specific capital in the latter case. Similarly, given the longer history of immigration of Italian immigration in Belgium, it is plausible that those Italian Belgians who stayed behind in municipalities of co-ethnic concentrations are less assimilated than those who moved into more ethnically mixed environments. However, with the data at hand, we cannot put these explanations

to an empirical test. Another limitation of our analysis lies in the operationalisation of neighbourhoods at the municipality level, which may be a better approximation of local communities for smaller or less urbanised units than for larger or more urbanised units.

Keeping these limitations in mind, we may conclude, however, that our results are extending as well as qualifying earlier findings of positive ethnic density effects on second-generation outcomes. In particular, for a good understanding of the role of ethnic density, one should take into account that the presence of ethnic capital is sometimes overlapping with, and sometimes conditional on neighbourhood structure. The role of neighbourhood structure has been suggested by theoretical arguments and empirical findings on the prerequisites for the emergence of social capital in communities. Yet, neighbourhood structure has so far been neglected in second-generation research, which has produced mixed arguments and findings on the role of ethnic social capital in second-generation attainment. Furthermore, detailed descriptive findings in our study cast doubt on generalisations across minority groups with different residential patterns; and separate models for the three major minority groups are suggestive of group-specific strategies of investment in ethnic vs. mainstream resources, in line with distinct incorporation modes among the three largest minorities in Belgium.

To conclude, in addition to neighbourhoods' socio-economic characteristics, structural neighbourhood characteristics are crucial for understanding how local ethnic communities may or may not support second-generation attainment. In particular, ethnic educational inequality in Belgium is systematically linked to the ethnic stratification of municipalities in terms of residential stability and quality. These structural characteristics overlap significantly with ethnic concentration, in particular in the case of Moroccan Belgians. Moreover, neighbourhood structure may turn the presence of co-ethnic neighbours into an advantage or a disadvantage for the second generation, in particular in the case of Turkish and Italian Belgians. Differential structural characteristics of the neighbourhoods of co-ethnic concentration and differential interactions with ethnic density reveal different trajectories of integration of these three minority groups in Belgium.

### 3.5 Notes

1. The Italian, Moroccan and Turkish Belgian populations are identified by national origin, i.e., current foreign nationality, foreign nationality at birth or, in case both are missing, country of residence of the mother at birth. Participants classified as members of these ethnic groups might or might not have Belgian nationality at the time of data collection.
2. Population density is perceived to be a better indicator for the degree of urbanisation than the number of inhabitants, which is often used in other studies, as the latter


would have misrepresented the two largest urban agglomerations in Belgium, Brussels and Antwerp, due to the fact that the entire city of Antwerp is one municipal unit, whereas Brussels is divided into 19 municipalities. Using the number of inhabitants as an indicator of urbanisation would lead to an underestimation of the degree of urbanisation in Brussels, especially in relation to the (smaller) city of Antwerp, but this problem does not apply to population density. Moreover, population density adequately captures the differences between municipalities in Brussels, ranging from densely populated inner-city quarters to more sparsely populated suburbs. Area size was taken from data provided by the National Institute for Statistics (FOD, 2008).

3. In order to make the scale of this variable meaningful, we divided population density by 100 in the multilevel analysis, so that a 1-unit increase in this independent variable represents an additional 100 persons per km<sup>2</sup>.
4. Cell values show the mean value of the respective variable at the municipality level calculated across the participants of a specific ethnic group (and for the entire sample in the first column). Thus, instead of showing, for instance, mean home ownership rates of Italian Belgians (which is an individual variable aggregated to the group level), the mean rate of home ownership in the municipality as a whole is shown for all municipalities where the Italian-Belgian participants in our sample live. Remember that not all three ethnic minority groups are present in all selected municipalities. Given the unequal distribution of ethnic minorities over municipalities, these mean scores can be considered weighted means where municipalities with more participants contribute more and municipalities with fewer participants contribute less to the shown value. These values are calculated using the real, not centred, values of the variables. The same calculation procedure was applied to the minimum and maximum values of the municipality variables – they only vary across groups if not all ethnic groups are represented in the municipality with the highest or lowest value on a particular variable.
5. The odds-ratios are calculated based on the logistic regression coefficients in Tables 3.3a and 3.3b: Turks  $(1 - e^{-1.011}) * 100 = 63.6$ , Moroccans  $(1 - e^{-0.954}) * 100 = 61.5$ , Italians  $(1 - e^{-0.412}) * 100 = 33.8$ .
6. These changes in odds are calculated as follows: for urbanisation  $1 - [e^{-0.002 * (64.4982 - 3.4)} * 100] = 11.5$ , for home ownership  $1 - [e^{0.013 * (38.19 - 70.88)} * 100] = 34.6$ .
7. Conditional probabilities are calculated based on the logistic regression coefficients of a model including variables at the individual level and ethnic density and residential mobility at the contextual level – since all variables are centred, these conditional probabilities strictly apply to unmarried males of 21 years of age living in municipalities with 5% university graduates and 20% high-quality housing.

# 4

## **Integration and second-generation religiosity: individual and institutional perspectives**

This chapter is under review as Fleischmann, F. & Phalet, K., Integration and religiosity among the Turkish second generation: A comparative analysis across four European capital cities. An adapted version has been published (in Dutch) as Fleischmann, F. (2010). Integratie en religiositeit onder de Turkse tweede generatie in Berlijn en Amsterdam: Een analyse van jonge moslims in twee Europese hoofdsteden. *Migrantenstudies*, 26(2), 197-217.





## 4.1 Introduction

Large-scale immigration from majority Muslim countries to highly secularised North-Western European societies has raised the question of how the European-born children of Muslim immigrants, the so-called second generation, relate to and practice their religion. On the one hand, second-generation Muslims are socialised with Islam within their families and local co-ethnic communities; on the other hand, they grow up in societies where the majority is historically Christian, highly secularised and, particularly after '9/11', increasingly anti-Islamic (e.g. Allen & Nielsen, 2002). This study asks to what extent and in what ways the second generation of Turkish origin in Europe is religious, and how their religiosity relates to their religious socialisation in ethnic communities and to their structural integration into European societies. In particular, we investigate contextual variation in the relationship between structural integration and religiosity. To this end, we apply a comparative perspective to the study of second-generation religiosity in four European capital cities – Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels and Stockholm. The four cities represent different national traditions of church-state relations – and distinct related patterns of institutional incorporation of Islam.

The current lack of empirical evidence from large-scale surveys on the religiosity of second-generation Muslims in European societies is mainly due to limited data availability. Previous studies of immigrant religiosity have included only or mainly the first generation of immigrants; they used restricted measures of religious affiliation and worship (such as visiting the mosque); and/or they were usually single-country studies (Diehl & Koenig, 2009; Phalet, Gijssberts, & Hagendoorn, 2008; Smits, Ruiters, & Van Tubergen, 2010). Comparative approaches to the study of religiosity among Muslim minorities in Europe remain an exception (but see Connor, 2010). Recent cross-national surveys under the umbrella of the TIES-project (The Integration of the European Second generation, see e.g. Crul & Schneider, 2010) make it possible to investigate multiple dimensions of religiosity among the Turkish second generation from a comparative perspective. Using the TIES-surveys in the Netherlands (IMES-NIDI 2008), Germany (IMIS 2010), Belgium (CeSo-CSCP 2009) and Sweden (CEIFO 2009), this study analyses religiosity among local-born children of Turkish immigrant workers in four European capital cities – Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels and Stockholm. These capital cities have been selected because they represent different institutional arrangements of church-state relations which have created differential opportunity structures for the practice of Islam by Muslim minorities (Bader, 2007; Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Statham, Koopmans, Guigni, & Passy, 2005). Against this comparative background, we assess competing theoretical expectations of religious decline vs. vitality in the second generation.

In the following, we first present our theoretical framework and derive hypotheses about individual differences in religiosity among the second generation. Specifically, we spell out individual-level determinants of religious decline (i.e., structural integration



and secularisation) and religious vitality (i.e., co-ethnic ties and religious socialisation; reactive religiosity). Next, we build on an institutionalist approach to the incorporation of Islam in European societies to derive hypotheses about contextual differences in the patterning of second-generation integration and religiosity. Specifically, we predict differential associations between religiosity and structural integration as a function of different opportunity structures in the four countries under study. Against the background of Turkish migration to these four countries, we present and discuss our comparative data and results.

### **The hypothesis of religious decline: structural integration and secularisation**

Throughout most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, secularisation was the major paradigm in the sociology of religion: modernisation processes would entail the implosion of the ‘sacred canopy’ (Berger, 1967), as evident from the progressive separation of church and state and from declining religious attendance (Dobbelaere, 1981). Despite continuing scholarly debate about the exact nature, the universality and the inevitability of secularisation (Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Stark & Bainbridge, 1985; Stark & Iannaccone, 1994), empirical trends in the church attendance of European majority populations clearly show a decline in their religious involvement (Gorski & Altinordu, 2008). Moreover, secularisation has almost become an ideology in Europe as compared to the US such that “Americans think that they are supposed to be religious, while Europeans think that they are supposed to be irreligious” (Casanova, 2003, p. 19). In stark contrast with the perception of immigrant religiosity in the US context, immigrant religion is commonly perceived as a hindrance to the integration process in European societies (Foner & Alba, 2008).

As a consequence, in the European context the classic assimilation hypothesis, which predicts that immigrants’ life chances and life styles will gradually converge with those of natives over time and over generations (Gordon, 1978 [1964]), amounts to a secularisation hypothesis. Accordingly, our first hypothesis predicts that second-generation Muslims will become less religious the more integrated they are in mainstream European societies (*Hypothesis 1*). Our study puts the secularisation hypothesis to a test by relating religiosity to the structural integration of the second generation. We define structural integration in terms of social mixing (vs. segregation) and socio-economic inclusion (vs. exclusion) relative to a non-immigrant reference population with a most similar social background (Esser, 2000, 2001). Specifically, we assess educational attainment and labour market participation as key indicators of the socio-economic inclusion of the second generation; and we expect that higher education and participation in the labour market - or pursuing full-time education - will entail lower levels of religiosity (*Hypothesis 1a*). Similarly, we expect that intermarriage with a non-Turkish partner, as a most demanding measure of social mixing, will predict less religiosity. In contrast, co-ethnic marriages with a co-

religionist partner are expected to reinforce second-generation religiosity (*Hypothesis 1b*). The same predictions can also be argued from a more general theoretical framework in the sociology of religion. Here, the expected inverse relationship of religiosity with social mixing and upward social mobility in mainstream society is explained through the increased exposure to a secular worldview (Berger, 1967) and/or through decreased economic uncertainty (Norris & Inglehart, 2004) and social integration into networks of co-religionists (cf. Smits, De Ruiter, & Van Tubergen, 2010).

In support of the first hypothesis on religion and structural integration, religious studies have reliably related primary kinship or co-ethnic ties with co-religionists to religious continuity (Ellison, 1995; Ellison & Sherkat, 1990; Sherkat, 2001). For example, Smits (et al., 2010) found that Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Belgium were more religious if they had lower levels of education and if there were more co-religionists in their residential environment. Conversely, higher educational qualifications and socio-economic activity were revealed as robust predictors of religious decline in North-Western European majority populations (Need & De Graaf, 1996). Research on Muslim minorities in the Netherlands (Phalet et al., 2008; Van Tubergen, 2007) and in Belgium (Lesthaeghe & Neels, 2000) mainly confirms the secularisation hypothesis, i.e., an inverse relationship between integration and religiosity, among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants – although their disadvantaged socio-economic position implies that average levels of religiosity are still high. A more recent trend analysis in the Netherlands, however, indicates overall religious continuity due to an emerging trend towards religious revival among part of the second generation, particularly among the more highly educated (Maliepaard, Lubbers, & Gijsberts, 2010). Similarly in Germany, Diehl and Koenig (2009) found no evidence of the expected religious decline with intergenerational integration, as religious practice was remarkably stable across generations. To our knowledge, there is no such quantitative evidence from large-scale surveys on religion and integration in Sweden. Moreover, this is the first cross-nationally comparative study to test second-generation religious decline against competing hypotheses of religious vitality or reactivity among Turkish Muslims in different receiving contexts.

### **The hypothesis of religious vitality: religious socialisation and reactive religiosity**

An alternative hypothesis expects religious vitality. In parallel with a notion of ethno-linguistic vitality in socio-linguistic studies of minority languages (Giles, Bourhis, & Taylor, 1977; Harwood, Giles, & Bourhis, 1994), we define religious vitality as the continuity of a minority religion through the religious socialisation of the next generation within the family and the co-ethnic community. Turkish immigrants come from a majority Muslim society where levels of religiosity are much higher than those in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands or Sweden (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). This raises the question to what extent Turkish immigrants pass on Islamic traditions and practices to the next generation, which

grows up in historically Christian and highly secularised European societies. Religious studies attest to the importance of a religious upbringing so that the children of more religious parents will themselves be more religious later in life (Kelley & De Graaf, 1997; Myers, 1996). Accordingly, we expect that the religious socialisation of children within immigrant families and communities will foster religiosity among young adults of the Turkish second generation. Thus, chapter 5 presents parallel effects of parental religious practice and attending Koran lessons during childhood on later religiosity among the Turkish-Belgian second generation. Therefore, our second hypothesis predicts that the Turkish second generation will be more religious when their parents visited the mosque more often during their youth and/or when they attended Koran lessons as children (*Hypothesis 2*).

An alternative 'religious reactivity' hypothesis predicts increased religiosity in the second generation. This hypothesis extends a notion of 'reactive ethnicity' among most deprived second-generation groups in the US (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001) to the religious domain. Reactivity implies that the children of immigrants distance themselves from the mainstream culture and society and reaffirm a distinctive ethno-religious tradition as a reaction against social exclusion and experiences of discrimination. In view of the generally disadvantaged position of the Turkish second generation, reactive religiosity mirrors the same inverse relation between socio-economic attainment and religiosity which is also predicted by the secularisation hypothesis. Specific to the hypothesis of reactive religiosity, however, is the prediction that perceived discrimination will increase the orientation towards religion, in line with a well-established rejection-identification hypothesis in social-psychological experiments. Specifically, experimental findings show that the experience of discrimination increases identification with a disadvantaged group, which in turn protects collective self-worth and personal well-being (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001). Since every religion provides a frame for meaning-making with explicit standards for the 'good life', religious group identities may be a particularly attractive source of positive social identity in the face of discrimination (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). Accordingly, Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) report the expected association of perceived discrimination with increased religious identification among Turkish-Dutch Muslims. Hence our third hypothesis predicts that higher levels of perceived discrimination will go together with increased religiosity among the Turkish second generation (*Hypothesis 3*).

### **Different national contexts: the institutionalisation of Islam**

European countries differ substantially in the way in which states accommodate Islam as a minority religion. In general, the institutionalisation of Islam builds on pre-existing national patterns of church-state relations which originate in different histories of nation building across European countries (Bader, 2007; Soper & Fetzer, 2007). As a consequence, there is no uniform institutionalised 'European Islam' today. Instead, the

position of Islam in the wider religious landscape varies across European societies with significant Muslim minority populations as a function of different institutional pathways (Koenig, 2007). More specifically, the four countries of comparison in our study, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, represent distinct institutional pathways towards the incorporation of Islam. As we describe in the following, the different histories of church-state relations in the four countries provide different opportunity structures for the institutionalisation of Islam as a minority religion (De Wit & Koopmans, 2005; Statham et al., 2005). We will argue that, from an institutional perspective, the accommodation of Islam has been most complete in the Netherlands, followed by Sweden and Belgium, and least complete in Germany.

In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Netherlands as a historical multi-faith society was characterised by so-called 'pillarisation'. Historically, this tried and tested system of religious pluralism and state neutrality has enabled the peaceful coexistence of separate and sovereign communities under the same national roof (Lijphart, 1968). Specifically, Protestant, Catholic, liberal and socialist pillars operated independently from each other, yet they enjoyed equal representation in national affairs. Each pillar maintained its own institutions, such as schools, trade unions and broadcasting companies, and the state funded these institutions on an equitable basis. With increasing secularisation, the social barriers between pillarised faith communities within the majority population have largely broken down. At the same time, the history of independent yet equal religious communities has created the opportunity for Muslim minorities to develop their own institutions, which operate on a par with Christian or other religious organisations (Doomernik, 1995; Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, & Meijer, 1996). Thus, Dutch Muslims have built up organisational structures of numerous local mosque associations, with most Turkish mosques being part of national Turkish federations (Waardenburg, 2001). Aside from religious institutions such as mosques, Dutch Muslims have also set up state-funded Islamic broadcasting networks and Islamic schools (Doomernik, 1995). From an institutional perspective, then, Dutch Muslims have been granted formal equality with Christian and other religious groups; and they made the most of the opportunities offered by the Dutch system.

The situation in Sweden is formally comparable to that in the Netherlands since Islam enjoys equal legal status on a par with other religions. Moreover, Islamic institutions are entitled to state funding. As distinct from the Dutch case, however, Sweden has historically established a state church presided by the Swedish king. The centuries-old notion of unity of the nation and the church is still reflected today in the fact that, despite high levels of secularisation, more than 80% of the Swedish majority population are registered as members of the Swedish Lutheran Church (Alwall, 2000). Freedom of religion has been granted in the constitution only in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Svanberg & Westerlund, 1999). Since then, the Swedish state has officially recognised other religious groups, first the Swedish Free Churches, later on Judaism, and still later

Islam, and equalised their status to that of the Swedish Lutheran Church (Alwall, 2002). This implies that Islamic and other religious organisations and their institutions are funded by the state proportionally to the number of their members (Alwall, 2002; Sander, 1996). In addition, Muslims have created state-funded Islamic schools (Johansson, 1999). Thus, the institutionalisation of Islam grants formal equality with the established church(es) in the Netherlands and in Sweden alike. At the same time, the legacy of the state church system and the dominant status of the Swedish Lutheran Church in terms of membership imply that Islam occupies a relatively marginal position in the Swedish religious landscape, which continues to be marked by a quasi-monopoly of the Swedish Lutheran Church.

In Belgium, the institutional status of Islam is formally equal to that of the historically dominant Catholic church and of other recognised religions. Yet, this equal status has not been fully implemented until recently. Although Islam was actually the first religion other than Catholicism to be officially recognised as a national religion in 1974, Belgian Muslims had to wait until the past decade for the practical application of this recognition (Kanmaz, 2002). In order to receive the state funding for Islamic services by imams to which they were legally entitled, Muslim minorities were required to set up a national Islamic council which should represent all Belgian Muslims in relation to the Belgian state and which could be held responsible for the actions of imams (Foblets & Overbeeke, 2002). Only recently has such a council been effectively established upon the initiative of the Belgian authorities as a first step towards implementing the formal position of Islam as a national religion (Kanmaz, 2002; Manço, 2000). The very recent application of equal status to Islam in Belgium implies that Islamic organisational structures on the ground are less fully developed than they are in the Netherlands.

Finally, in Germany, the institutional position of Islam is the most disadvantaged as compared to that in the other countries under study. Due to their privileged juridical status as corporations of public law, Christian churches in Germany profit from church taxes collected by the state and subsequently distributed to the churches. German authorities have used the same argument as the Belgians to deny the same status to Islamic organisations: only if Muslims in Germany would establish a centralised and hierarchical organisational structure similar to that of the Catholic and Protestant churches could they be granted the status of corporation of public law and profit from similar financial resources, the argument goes (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Jonker, 2002). Although a number of Islamic organisations has set up national federations that strongly resemble the model advocated by the German authorities, they were denied recognition based on the argument that they are not representative of the entire Muslim population in Germany – a requirement which is not applied to Christian or Jewish organisations (Doomernik, 1995; Spuler-Stegemann, 1998). Only in 2007, a Coordinating Council of Muslims was established to represent the Islamic faith community in relation to the German authorities. Yet, the legitimacy of this state-imposed organisation is heavily disputed within Muslim communities. Moreover,

according to a recent survey, only 10% of German Muslims would be aware of the existence of this institution, which is supposed to represent their interests vis-à-vis the German state (Haug, Müssig, & Stichs, 2010). In the absence of equal status and financial support, therefore, Islamic organisations in Germany remain in a very marginal position relative to established churches.

Summing up, from an institutional perspective on religious diversity, the position of Islam as a minority religion is most equal in the Netherlands, where Islamic organisations operate on a par with other religious organisations; in Sweden, formal equality and state support for Islamic institutions are paired with the continued dominance of the Swedish Lutheran Church; in Belgium, formal equality with established churches has only recently been implemented; and in Germany, Islamic organisations have not yet achieved parity with established Christian churches.

Returning to our main research question about the relation between structural integration and religiosity, we reason that institutional opportunity structures may make the difference between competing hypotheses of religious vitality or decline with upward mobility among the second generation. In line with the first hypothesis of religious decline, we expect that upward integration will entail decreased religiosity mainly in national contexts that do not (fully) recognise Islam nor facilitate its practice. In these countries, Islamic religious ties and practices are denied or rejected by mainstream institutions, so that continued religiosity stands in the way of successful integration. Conversely, and in line with the hypothesis of religious vitality, in national contexts where the state recognises and accommodates Islam as a minority religion, there will be more room to maintain religious ties and practices also among well integrated members of the second generation.

Institutionalist accounts of immigrant integration have been criticised for their state-centred approach, neglecting the multi-layered structure of local, national and transnational social fields (Favell, 1998). For our current purposes, we do not assume that processes of integration and religious change are unfolding only or even mainly at the national level. Rather, we focus on capital cities as comparative cases because they represent strategic research sites where local, national and transnational forces intersect. As centres of public debate and political decision making; they are most proximal places where national institutions are designed, represented and contested. In addition, the four cities are home to highly diverse populations and to large portions of the second generation; and as centres of economic growth they tend to be more open to social change than their national peripheries (Phalet & Heath, 2010).

A related critique of institutionalist approaches in migration studies refers to a predominant formalistic and overly static conception of social processes, which would by-pass alternate resources and forms of agency 'from below' as well as ongoing socio-political struggles reinforcing or challenging institutional inequalities (Bousetta, 2000). It has been argued that public policies towards Islam and Muslims do not reflect a



coherent national model, as they have been mainly reactive in response to bottom-up religious organisations and claims on the side of Muslim communities. More importantly, institutional arrangements and reforms may be far removed from (changes in) the public opinion climate in European societies (cf. Guiraudon, 2000 on the politics of stealth). For instance, the Netherlands has pioneered institutional reforms to incorporate Islam as a minority religion. Yet, the position of Islam in the Netherlands today is highly contested and Dutch politics and society are deeply divided over issues of religious diversity (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). For the purpose of our study, we reason that institutional arrangements may not coincide with grand national philosophies of integration; yet they do develop in a path-dependent way from existing institutions which are reinvented to accommodate (or not) new forms of diversity. While liberal-democratic states do not – and should not – shape the religious life of their citizens in a deterministic fashion, institutional regulations nevertheless impose real constraints on the development of religious organisations and institutions by immigrant communities (Bader, 2007; Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Koenig, 2007). More generally, by associating distinct categories of citizens with distinct treatments, national institutional arrangements may over time accentuate or attenuate civic inequalities *in casu* between Muslims and non-Muslims (Brubaker, 2004). In the presence of public recognition and support, for instance, Muslim immigrants have gradually been granted, or they have cumulatively developed, their own religious organisations and institutions. Once these organisations and institutions are in place, they participate in public debates and political decision making, voicing discontents and making claims, developing leadership and learning the rules of the game; and they may act to promote group interests and to protect community members against discrimination and public hostility, particularly in the face of a more recent downturn of the economy and the public climate across European societies. From a comparative perspective, therefore, we expect a long-term impact of distinct institutional patterns on patterns of integration and religiosity in the next generation, over and above variation as a function of more short-term changes in public sentiments and policy responses.

To conclude, we predict an inverse relationship between integration and religiosity in contexts where the institutional accommodation of Islam is most restricted (most notably in Berlin, the German capital); and a zero or positive relationship in contexts where Islam has been more fully institutionalised (most notably in Amsterdam, the Dutch capital) (*Hypothesis 4*).

### **The Turkish second generation in North-Western Europe**

Most Turkish immigrants arrived in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands as so-called ‘guest workers’ and later through family-based migration. From the 1960s onwards, Turkish workers were recruited through bilateral agreements to compensate for shortages on North-Western European labour markets during the post-WWII economic boom. Turkish

immigrants were employed mainly in unskilled or semiskilled industrial work; and most of them came from less developed rural areas in Turkey with little or no formal qualifications. The restriction of labour migration following the 1973 oil crisis and the subsequent economic downturn marked the end of large-scale labour migration. Across the three countries, however, the annual intake of immigrants from Turkey did not decrease substantially, due to family reunification and family formation types of immigration (Lesthaeghe, 2000; Münz, Seifert, & Ulrich, 1997; Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000). Turkish immigrants and their offspring are the largest immigrant minority in Germany: including naturalised Turks, the Turkish-German population (including first, second and later generations) is estimated at 2.5 million, which constitutes 3.1% of the total German population in 2009 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010). Similarly, the Turkish-Dutch are the largest group of immigrant workers from less developed countries in the Netherlands: including naturalised Turks and the second generation, they numbered 0.38 million, thus accounting for 2.3% of the total population in the Netherlands in 2009 (Statline, 2010). Finally, Turkish Belgians are the third largest immigrant minority group in Belgium: including naturalised Turks and the second generation, they number approximately 150,000 or 1.5% of the total Belgian population in the last Census in 2001 (Phalet, Deboosere, & Bastiaenssen, 2007).

The Swedish context is somewhat different as labour migration has been a less important part of the total immigration to Sweden after WWII. Instead, Sweden has known a higher rate of refugee migration (Corman, 2008; Westin, 2003). Nevertheless, Sweden also recruited Turkish workers in the 1960s. The Turkish-Swedish population, including the Swedish-born children of Turkish immigrants, is relatively small; and Turkish Swedes are the eighth largest immigrant minority group in Sweden (Corman, 2008). Furthermore, they are more internally diverse than the Turkish immigrant population in other North-Western European countries due to substantial shares of Kurdish and Assyrian refugees from Turkey. While Kurds are mostly Sunni or Alevi Muslims, Assyrians are Orthodox Christians (Sander, 1990). The latter are excluded from our analysis for reasons of comparability. Including the Swedish-born second generation, the size of the Turkish-Swedish minority population amounted to approximately 60,000 persons in 2000, i.e., about 0.7% of the total Swedish population (Westin, 2003).

## 4.2 Data and method

### The TIES-surveys

Our analysis makes use of new cross-national data from the TIES-surveys among the Turkish second generation in four capital cities in the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Sweden (The Integration of the European Second generation, cf. Crul & Schneider, 2010). Across countries, the Turkish second generation is narrowly defined as the children



of immigrants from Turkey who are born in the survey country. The sampling frame is restricted to young adults between 18 and 35 years old because of the generally young age of the second generation in the countries under study. Specifically, our study uses the TIES-surveys from Amsterdam (NIDI-IMES, 2007, TIES06-07-Netherlands), Berlin (IMIS, 2008, TIES07-08-Germany), Brussels (CeSO-CSCP, 2008, TIES07-08-Belgium) and Stockholm (CEIFO, 2008, TIES07-08-Sweden).

A cross-nationally standardised questionnaire instrument was developed in Dutch, German, French and Swedish languages for computer-assisted personal interviewing by trained interviewers at participants' homes. Different available sampling frames in each country pose a major challenge for cross-national surveys of immigrant minorities. In Amsterdam and Stockholm, the native-born children of Turkish-born parents could be identified in the population registers. In Brussels, access to the population register was denied; and in Berlin, the register only contains information about current nationality such that naturalised members of the Turkish second generation cannot be distinguished from Germans of native descent. In Amsterdam and Stockholm, random samples were drawn based on complete information about country of birth, parents' country of birth, age and city of residence. In Brussels, street segments were sampled proportionally to the numbers of Turkish inhabitants in the Census; addresses of potential participants in selected street segments were retrieved from a commercial database; and screening at the doorstep was done to identify target group members at the selected addresses. In Berlin, name recognition was applied to a list of all German-born residents of Berlin in the relevant age range to identify persons of Turkish origin. Subsequently, a random sample was drawn from the list of addresses retrieved through this method (for further information regarding sampling and fieldwork, readers are referred to the technical reports; for the Netherlands Groenewold, 2008; for Belgium Swyngedouw, Phalet, Baysu, Vandezande, & Fleischmann, 2008; for Sweden Renstrand & Lundström, 2008; for Germany, no technical report is available so far).

Reported response rates to the TIES-surveys ranged between 29% (Stockholm) and 31% (Brussels and Berlin). Low response rates are due in part to the quality of available address lists in cities and neighbourhoods with high mobility rates and in part to generally low cooperation rates in inner cities, in young age groups, and in ethnic minority populations, which make up the target population of the TIES-surveys (Stoop, Billiet, Koch, & Fitzgerald, 2010). These data constraints should be kept in mind when drawing comparative conclusions from structural equation models across the four second-generation samples.

To ensure that the results of our comparative analyses are not driven by differential selectivity of Turkish immigrants across the cities, a detailed comparison was undertaken of the characteristics of the parents of TIES-participants, i.e., the Turkish first generation. We looked at (rural or urban) region of origin, year of migration, age at migration and (work-, family-, or refugee-status related) motives of migration, as well as educational

qualifications, and employment status during participants' youth of both the mother and the father of our Turkish second-generation participants.<sup>1</sup> The comparison showed very few differences in the parental characteristics of our samples across the four cities, which tended to converge on the typical profile of Turkish guest worker migration to the North-West of Europe. Specifically, large majorities (> 60%) of mothers and fathers originate from villages or small towns in Turkey and migrated to Western Europe in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with mean ages at the time of migration ranging from 18 to 23 years. Most fathers migrated for economic reasons (with the exception of Stockholm, where a substantial share of fathers migrated for family reasons), while most mothers migrated for reasons of family reunification or formation. Asylum is not frequently mentioned as a migration motive and is most common among the parents of our participants in Berlin (6.3% of the fathers and 2.4% of the mothers arrived as asylum seekers) and Stockholm (4.3% of the fathers and 0.5% of the mothers). Most parents had little or no formal qualifications, with a majority of the parents across the four samples having completed only primary education or less, and with somewhat higher mean levels of parental education in Brussels and Stockholm. Most fathers were working in unskilled or skilled manual jobs when participants were fifteen years old, with the exception of fathers in Amsterdam, who were more often permanently sick or disabled – in line with nationally representative data and reflecting the Dutch policy reaction to the post-industrial restructuring of the labour market (Dagevos, Euwals, Gijsberts, & Roodenburg, 2006). Mothers were most often looking after the home during participants' youth with very low levels of economic activity in Amsterdam and Berlin (20 to 25%), and with higher levels of activity in Brussels (40%) and Stockholm (up to 60%). To summarise, the four comparison samples exhibit the typical parental characteristics of Turkish labour migration to North-Western Europe, although the parents of Turkish Muslims in Brussels and Stockholm are somewhat more positively selected in terms of human capital, which is also reflected in mothers' greater labour market participation. We therefore include parental education as a control for differential selection in comparative analyses.

## Measures

### *Religion*

*Self-categorised Muslims* are those participants who indicated that they currently have a religion; and who stated that this religion was Islam (Sunni, Shi'i, Alevi or Other). Only participants who self-categorised as Muslims answered the following questions on religiosity.<sup>2</sup>

*Religious identification* as a first dimension of religiosity was measured by four items, e.g., "Being a Muslim is an important part of my self" (see Table 4.1 for the other items), which refer to varying degrees of subjective attachment or commitment to a common

Muslim identity. Participants rated their agreement on five-point Likert-scales ranging from one (*totally disagree*) to five (*totally agree*).

Four indicators of religious practices were used to form two composite indices, which were revealed as distinct yet interrelated latent variables, labelled *dietary practices* and *worship*. Dietary practices refer to fasting (i.e., observance during the last *Ramadan* period) and following the rules of consumption (i.e., eating *halal* food); worship refers to self-reported praying (i.e., saying daily prayers) and attending religious meetings or services (i.e., visiting the mosque).<sup>3</sup> Participants rated the frequency of religious practice on five-point Likert-scales from never to regularly (e.g., praying five times a day or more, visiting the mosque weekly or more often). Though both dimensions of religious practices are interrelated, it is useful to distinguish worship from dietary practices as they form distinct clusters in K-means cluster analyses across the same Turkish Muslim populations - with more frequent self-reported observance of dietary practices among the second generation than worship (Phalet, Fleischmann, & Stojicic, in preparation).

An additional political dimension of religiosity refers to *political Islam*, and it is assessed by four statements expressing support for the role of Islam in politics and its representation in the public sphere, e.g., “Islam should be represented in politics and society, along with other religions and viewpoints” (see Table 4.1 for the other items). Again, participants rated their agreement on five-point scales.

### ***Explanatory variables***

To assess the structural integration of the Turkish second generation as an explanatory ground for religiosity, measures of educational attainment and employment status were used, along with marital status and ethnicity of the partner as a measure of social mixing in primary ties.

Four categories of *educational attainment* were distinguished by three dummies on the basis of participants’ highest level of education completed or currently attended: lower secondary or less (as a reference category), vocational, upper secondary, and tertiary qualifications.<sup>4</sup>

Regarding participants’ *employment status*, dummy variables distinguish between four categories: working (i.e., currently employed or self-employed as a reference category), unemployed, full-time student, or otherwise economically inactive. Participants who were currently completing an apprenticeship were categorised as full-time students.

Furthermore, we looked at the *ethnicity of the partner*, with a non-Turkish partner as a proxy for intermarriage outside (vs. inside) the ethnic community of co-religionists. Three dummy variables were created to distinguish between participants who had no partner (as a reference category) and those who had a partner of Turkish origin, or a non-Turkish partner. A partner was categorised as co-ethnic when he/she him/herself or one of his/her parents was born in Turkey. Second-generation partners are thus considered as Turkish partners.

**Table 4.1** Descriptive statistics

Religion	Range	Amsterdam (N = 237)			Berlin (N = 253)			Brussels (N = 250)			Stockholm (N = 185)		
		Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	
<b>Religion</b>													
Self-categorised Muslim	0/1	0.70	0.62	0.62	0.71	0.63							
<b>Religious socialisation</b>													
Attended Koran school	0/1	0.57	0.45	0.45	0.30	0.30							
Frequency of parental mosque visit	1/5	2.38 (2.08)	3.25 (1.46)	3.25 (1.46)	2.29 (1.87)	1.69 (1.92)							
<b>Religious identification</b>													
'Being a Muslim is an important part of my self'	1/5	4.31 (0.86)	4.28 (0.67)	4.28 (0.67)	4.20 (0.92)	4.55 (0.82)							
'The fact that I am a Muslim is something I often think about'	1/5	3.66 (1.16)	3.73 (1.04)	3.73 (1.04)	4.05 (1.01)	3.77 (1.47)							
'I see myself as a true Muslim'	1/5	3.78 (0.97)	4.15 (0.75)	4.15 (0.75)	3.87 (1.00)	3.77 (1.31)							
'When somebody says something bad about Muslims, I feel personally hurt'	1/5	3.80 (1.11)	4.20 (0.85)	4.20 (0.85)	4.00 (1.08)	3.17 (1.57)							
<b>Dietary practices</b>													
<i>Ramadan</i>	1/5	4.07 (1.47)	3.90 (1.25)	3.90 (1.25)	3.84 (1.48)	2.75 (1.75)							
<i>Halal food</i>	1/5	4.33 (0.97)	3.79 (1.19)	3.79 (1.19)	4.49 (1.03)	3.15 (1.50)							
<b>Worship</b>													
Daily prayer	1/5	2.48 (1.51)	3.52 (1.09)	3.52 (1.09)	2.37 (1.30)	2.26 (1.23)							
Mosque visit	1/5	2.60 (1.38)	3.71 (0.95)	3.71 (0.95)	2.59 (1.14)	2.69 (1.39)							
<b>Political Islam</b>													
'Religion should be a private matter between the believer and God**'	1/5	4.25 (0.83)	4.20 (0.86)	4.20 (0.86)	4.47 (0.86)	4.85 (0.54)							
'Islam should be represented in politics and society along with other religions and viewpoints'	1/5	2.68 (1.10)	2.95 (1.23)	2.95 (1.23)	2.64 (1.21)	1.84 (1.22)							
'Islam should be the only and ultimate authority in political matters'	1/5	2.25 (1.08)	2.58 (1.33)	2.58 (1.33)	2.15 (1.03)	1.22 (0.70)							
'Muslim women should wear headscarves or cover their head when outside the home'	1/5	2.72 (1.22)	2.92 (1.44)	2.92 (1.44)	2.52 (1.16)	1.89 (1.18)							

<b>Structural integration</b>						
Education: lower secondary or less	0/1	0.27	0.32	0.25	0.07	0.07
Education: vocational	0/1	0.38	0.53	0.26	0.24	0.24
Education: upper secondary	0/1	0.04	0.08	0.26	0.28	0.28
Education: tertiary	0/1	0.29	0.07	0.23	0.28	0.28
Employment status: working	0/1	0.57	0.58	0.50	0.72	0.72
Employment status: unemployed	0/1	0.10	0.21	0.22	0.08	0.08
Employment status: full-time student	0/1	0.18	0.08	0.22	0.15	0.15
Employment status: otherwise inactive	0/1	0.13	0.13	0.05	0.05	0.05
Partnership status: no partner	0/1	0.55	0.55	0.60	0.50	0.50
Partnership status: Turkish partner	0/1	0.41	0.34	0.31	0.40	0.40
Partnership status: non-Turkish partner	0/1	0.04	0.11	0.09	0.10	0.10
<b>Perceived discrimination</b>						
Perceived personal discrimination	1/5	1.88 (1.10)	2.11 (0.89)	1.98 (0.98)	1.89 (1.06)	1.89 (1.06)
Perceived group discrimination: Muslims	1/5	3.92 (1.27)	3.33 (1.18)	3.35 (1.10)	3.71 (1.05)	3.71 (1.05)
<b>Control variables</b>						
Female	0/1	0.54	0.44	0.36	0.57	0.57
Age	18/36	24.5 (4.3)	26.2 (5.3)	25.7 (5.2)	25.6 (4.8)	25.6 (4.8)
Parental education: one or both primary or less	0/1	0.71	0.80	0.44	0.65	0.65

No standard deviations shown for dichotomous variables.

\* This indicator loads negatively on the political Islam scale.

To assess religious socialisation as an alternative explanation of second-generation religiosity, two indicators were used that refer to participants' religious upbringing during childhood. A dummy variable indicates whether participants have attended *Koran lessons* outside school hours as a child. In addition, participants reported the frequency of *parental mosque visits* during their youth on a five-point scale ranging from one (*never*) to five (*once a week or more*).

To test the reactive religiosity hypothesis, we used two questions on perceived discrimination. Participants were asked to rate on five-point frequency scales how often they had personally experienced unfair treatment or hostility due to their background (*perceived personal discrimination*); and how often they thought that Muslims as a group experienced unfair treatment or hostility (*perceived group discrimination*). Although personal and group level perceptions of discrimination are inter-related, they are distinguished here because they were shown to be distinct phenomena, with group discrimination being reported as more frequent than personal discrimination (Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994).

*Gender* (female dummy) and *age* (in years) were added as control variables, along with *parental education* (dummy which is one if one or both parents have maximally completed primary education) as a rough measure of parental human capital. Table 4.1 displays descriptive information on all variables used in the analysis.

As Table 4.1 shows, a majority of the Turkish second generation self-categorises as Muslim across the four cities, though Muslim self-categorisation is rather less common in Berlin and Stockholm than in Amsterdam and Brussels. Religious socialisation was more frequent in Berlin and Amsterdam than in Brussels and Stockholm, where fewer participants attended Koran lessons and where parents visited a mosque less regularly. Nevertheless, levels of religious identification are similarly high in all four cities, as is the self-reported adherence to dietary practices (with the exception of Stockholm, where participation in *Ramadan* is relatively low.) Regarding political Islam, most participants do not support a prominent role of Islam in politics or in the public sphere, with most disagreement in Stockholm. Looking beyond Muslim self-categorisation then, Muslim participants in Stockholm appear to be the least religious of the four comparison groups. Conversely, overall levels of religious identification, practices and political Islam are highest among Muslim participants in Berlin.

Turning to participants' structural integration across the four cities, we find that the Turkish second generation is most highly educated in Stockholm and least educated in Berlin, where participation in full-time education is also least common among our young sample. Note that the parents of Turkish-German participants in Berlin were also the least educated, with 80% having completed no more than primary education. In Stockholm, participants are most often (self-)employed; and unemployment rates are considerably higher in Berlin and Brussels than in Amsterdam and Stockholm. Given the young age

of our sample, at least half of the participants in each city do not yet have a partner, but those who do mostly have a Turkish partner. Finally, levels of perceived discrimination are similar across cities, with more discrimination perceived at the group than at the personal level. It must be noted, however, that mean differences across cities should be interpreted with caution given previously described data constraints and due to the fact that mean levels are more susceptible to sampling bias than the associations between variables (Stoop et al., 2010; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Yet, differential attainment levels in Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels and Stockholm follow country differences in gross ethnic penalties on qualifications and on access to employment among the Turkish second generation, with larger penalties in Germany and Belgium than in the Netherlands and Sweden (Heath, 2007).

## Method

The analysis of religiosity among the Turkish second generation follows a two-step approach. First, logistic regression is used to investigate the relationship of participants' self-categorisation as Muslim with religious socialisation, structural integration, perceived discrimination, and control variables among the complete samples of the Turkish second generation in the four cities. Subsequently, for the analyses of religiosity, only self-categorised Muslims are retained, since participants who indicated that they do not currently have a religion did not complete the religion module. The measurement equivalence of dimensions of religiosity as latent dependent variables was established by way of multi-group confirmatory factor analyses across the four cities. Next, multi-group structural equation models were estimated to test the hypothetical relationships of religiosity with religious socialisation, structural integration, and perceived discrimination as predictors, while controlling for gender, age and parental background. Measurement equivalence across the four cities is confirmed when the difference in  $\chi^2$  between a four-group model with equality constraints on factor loadings and an unconstrained baseline model is not significant (Schmitt & Kuljanin, 2008). After establishing the equivalence of the four religiosity factors, a second-order factor model of religiosity is estimated with religious identification, dietary practices, worship and political Islam as first-order factors. The general factor religiosity is then specified as a latent dependent variable in structural equation models with hypothetical predictors of religiosity. Throughout our analysis, we consider the values of  $\chi^2$  in relation to the degrees of freedom (*df*), CFI and RMSEA as relevant indicators of model fit. Model fit is considered to be good if the  $\chi^2/df$  ratio is approaching 1.00, if CFI is above .90 and RMSEA is below .05 (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2005).

## 4.3 Results

### Predicting Muslim self-categorisation

Logistic regression analyses are run in each city separately to find out whether Muslim self-categorisation as a dependent variable relates to our explanatory variables as predictors. Table 4.2 shows that between 30% (Stockholm and Brussels) and 47% (Berlin) of the variance in Muslim self-categorisation is accounted for by participants' religious socialisation, educational and labour market attainment, partnership status, perceived discrimination, and controls. Age and parental education are not related to Muslim self-categorisation; and there are few gender differences: only in Stockholm, Turkish women less often self-categorise as Muslims than men. Significant and strong positive effects of attending Koran lessons and parental religious practice confirm the key role of religious socialisation. Turning to structural integration, we find that only in Berlin more highly educated Turkish participants are somewhat less likely to self-categorise as Muslims. Employment status has no effects in any of the cities. Furthermore, those who have a Turkish partner self-categorise more often as Muslims in Stockholm, Amsterdam and Brussels; and only in Berlin, those with a

**Table 4.2** Logistic regressions of Muslim self-categorisation

	Amsterdam (N = 237) Exp (B)	Berlin (N = 253) Exp (B)	Brussels (N = 250) Exp (B)	Stockholm (N = 185) Exp (B)
Constant	0.340	0.124	3.046	0.269
Female	1.085	0.592	1.487	0.400 *
Age	0.955	1.009	0.982	0.992
Parental education	1.523	0.608	0.663	1.402
Koran school	1.356	6.957 ***	4.886 **	3.887 *
Parental mosque visits	3.442 ***	2.998 ***	1.931 ***	1.456 **
Education: lower secondary	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Reference</i>
Education: vocational	0.425	0.400 °	1.387	1.092
Education: upper secondary	0.335	0.592	1.075	1.472
Education: tertiary	2.567	0.132 °	0.714	1.677
Working	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Reference</i>
Unemployed	2.029	0.752	0.835	0.567
Full time student	1.750	0.768	0.456	0.823
Otherwise inactive	0.775	1.842	0.282	0.649
No partner	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Reference</i>
Turkish partner	3.118 °	0.916	2.224 °	4.340 **
Non-Turkish partner	0.315	0.220 *	0.848	0.396
Perceived personal discrimination	0.757	0.724	1.100	1.325
Perceived group discrimination	1.141	1.091	0.680 °	1.082
Cox & Snell's R <sup>2</sup>	0.475	0.446	0.310	0.305

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ , °  $p < .10$



non-Turkish partner self-categorise less often as Muslims. Finally, we find no support for reactive religious self-categorisation: the only significant effect of perceived discrimination goes in the opposite direction with Turks in Brussels who perceive more group discrimination against Muslims being less likely to self-categorise as Muslims.

The first hypothesis on religious decline receives limited support from logistic regression analyses in the four cities. This hypothesis predicts that the second generation will less often self-categorise as Muslims the more integrated they are. Although Turkish Germans in Berlin with/in vocational and tertiary education self-categorise less often as Muslims, no evidence is found in the other cities or for labour market participation. In contrast, and in line with the second hypothesis on religious vitality, participants across the four cities who have been exposed to religious socialisation as children and/or who are married to a co-ethnic partner, are more likely to self-categorise as Muslims. We find no evidence of reactive religiosity.

### Dimensions of religiosity

Next, measurement models of religiosity are estimated for subsamples of self-categorised Muslims by way of four-group confirmatory factor analyses across cities. The analyses largely confirm the equivalence of the four latent religiosity dimensions across groups. For the religious identification factor, loadings of the four indicators could be set equal across the four cities, as evident from a non-significant  $\chi^2$ -difference test between models with and without equality constraints:  $\Delta\chi^2(9) = 14.806, p > .05$ . The factorially invariant model is a good fit to the data:  $\chi^2(17, N = 615) = 27.272, CFI = 0.979, RMSEA = 0.031$ . For religious practices, full factorial invariance of the four indicators of worship and dietary practices is rejected: due to a lower loading of *halal* food in Amsterdam, the  $\chi^2$ -difference test is significant at  $p = 0.042$  ( $\Delta\chi^2(6) = 13.081$ ). All loadings are significant and positive in all four cities, however, and a most parsimonious factorially invariant model is still a good fit to the data:  $\chi^2(22, N = 615) = 39.780, CFI = 0.971, RMSEA = 0.036$ . For the sake of parsimony, therefore, loadings on both practice factors are set equal in comparative analyses across the four cities.<sup>5</sup> For political Islam, full factorial invariance of the four indicators across the four cities was again rejected. The  $\chi^2$ -difference test is significant at  $p = 0.038$  ( $\Delta\chi^2(9) = 18.041$ ) due to a non-significant negative loading of the private-religion indicator in Stockholm. In comparative analysis, all loadings on political Islam are set equal, because loading patterns are very similar in the four cities and because the factorially invariant model is a good fit to the data:  $\chi^2(17, N = 615) = 30.104, CFI = 0.959, RMSEA = 0.046$ .

After establishing the measurement equivalence of religious identification, religious practices, and political Islam across cities, a second-order factor model of religiosity was estimated. This model specifies a common factor, religiosity, which is assumed to explain inter-factor correlations between the four religious dimensions as first-order factors. The second-order factor model was a good fit to the data:  $\chi^2(271, N = 615) = 512.010, CFI$


= 0.880, RMSEA = 0.038. While factorial invariance was confirmed at the level of the first-order factors (cf. supra), the loadings of these four factors on a common second-order factor religiosity differ significantly between the four cities, as it appeared from a significantly worse model fit of a factorially invariant second-order factor model:  $\Delta\chi^2(9) = 39.667, p < .001$ . In comparative analyses, loadings of the twelve indicators on the four dimensions of religiosity are constrained to be equal across cities, while the loadings of the four dimensions on the second-order factor religiosity are estimated separately in each city. All loadings are significant ( $p < .001$ ) and large ( $> .60$ ). Figures 4.1a, b, c and d show standardised factor loadings for religious identification, religious practices, and political Islam in Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels and Stockholm.

The factor models reveal different patterns of religiosity among second-generation Turkish Muslims in the four cities. In Berlin and Stockholm, very high loadings (ranging from .80 to .95) of all four dimensions on a common factor religiosity suggest an undifferentiated pattern of religiosity. Thus, German- and Swedish-Turkish Muslims who are more strongly committed to their Muslim identity, engage more frequently in religious practices and lend more support for the role of Islam in politics and society. In Amsterdam and Brussels, in contrast, patterns of religiosity are more selective.


To test theoretical associations of second-generation religiosity with structural integration, religious socialisation, and perceived discrimination (controlling for age, gender and parental education), all explanatory variables are entered as predictors into multi-group structural equation models with religiosity as a latent dependent variable. The second-order factor religiosity in turn explains varying levels of religious identification, worship and dietary practices, and political Islam.

### Structural integration and secularisation


Our first hypothesis on secularisation predicts that structural integration goes together with decreased religiosity among the second generation. Whereas we find no support of this hypothesised inverse relationship in Amsterdam, Brussels and Stockholm, in Berlin higher educational attainment is associated with lower religiosity, as Table 4.3 shows. This comparative finding of differential associations between religiosity and structural integration is in line with our fourth hypothesis on contextual differences as a function of the institutional accommodation of Islam. As expected, structural integration and religion are inversely related in the German capital. In contrast, religiosity is largely decoupled from the structural integration of the second generation in the other cities. As a formal test of differential associations between Berlin (inverse relationship) and the other cities (no relationship), we constrained the effects of educational and labour market attainment on religiosity to zero; this yields a significantly worse model fit only in Berlin, and not in the other three cities:  $\Delta\chi^2(18, N = 615) = 21.859, p > .05$  (for a model where effects are freely estimated in Berlin and set to zero in all other cities). Similarly, the prediction that




**Figure 4.1a** Second-order factor model of religiosity (standardised loadings): Amsterdam.



**Figure 4.1b** Second-order factor model of religiosity (standardised loadings): Berlin.



**Figure 4.1c** Second-order factor model of religiosity (standardised loadings): Brussels.



**Figure 4.1d** Second-order factor model of religiosity (standardised loadings): Stockholm.

**Table 4.3** Multi-group structural equation models of religiosity (standardised coefficients)

	Amsterdam (N = 166)	Berlin (N = 156)	Brussels (N = 177)	Stockholm (N = 116)
<b>Predictors</b>				
Age	-0.184 *	-0.108	-0.023	-0.196
Female	-0.017	0.103	-0.041	-0.206
Parental education	0.013	-0.019	-0.053	0.097
Koran school	0.270 *	0.441 ***	0.174 *	0.159
Parental mosque visit	0.373 **	0.434 ***	0.364 ***	0.170
Educ.: vocational	0	-0.233 ***	0	0
Educ.: upper secondary	0	-0.120 *	0	0
Educ.: tertiary	0	-0.151 *	0	0
Otherwise inactive	0	0	0	0
Full-time student	0	0	0	0
Unemployed	0	0	0	0
Turkish partner	0	0.182 **	0	0
Non-Turkish partner	0	0.009	0	0
Perc. personal discrimination	0	0	0	0
Perc. group discrimination	0	0	0	0
<b>Loadings</b>				
Religious identification	0.676 <sup>a</sup>	0.876 <sup>a</sup>	0.932 <sup>a</sup>	0.680 <sup>a</sup>
Dietary practices	0.790 ***	0.991 ***	0.677 ***	0.723 ***
Worship	0.802 ***	0.734 ***	0.680 ***	0.743 ***
Political Islam	0.446 ***	0.696 ***	0.579 ***	0.541 ***
Squared multiple correlation	0.398	0.635	0.207	0.199

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$

<sup>a</sup> The unstandardised loading of religious identification on the second-order factor religiosity was fixed to one.

having a Turkish partner would be associated with higher levels of religiosity among the second generation is only supported in Berlin; having a non-Turkish partner, however, has no significant effect on religiosity. In all other cities, the level of religiosity is not associated with having a partner or with the ethnicity of the partner. Thus, there is no significant difference in model fit between an unconstrained model and a model in which the effects of the ethnicity of the partner are constrained to be zero in all cities except Berlin:  $\Delta\chi^2(6) = 7.762$ ,  $p > .05$ .

### Religious vitality and reactive religiosity

In line with our findings on religious self-categorisation, the religious socialisation of children in Turkish immigrant families and communities has a strong joint impact on second-generation religiosity in all cities.<sup>6</sup> Turkish Muslims who attended Koran lessons

as a child or whose parents visited the mosque regularly tend to identify more strongly, practice more regularly, and are more in favour of political Islam. Finally, the hypothesis of reactive religiosity finds no empirical support, as perceived discrimination does not add to the explained variance in religiosity after taking into account religious socialisation, structural integration, and controls. Hence, constraining the effects of personal and group-level discrimination to be zero in all cities does not lead to a significantly worse model fit:  $\Delta\chi^2(8) = 9.323, p > .05$ . Table 4.3 shows within-group standardised parameter estimates for the final most restrictive structural equation models in the four cities. Only effects that are different from zero according to the model fit comparisons described above are included.

Overall, our hypothetical model succeeds in explaining substantial amounts of variance in religiosity in all four cities as indicated by the squared multiple correlations in Table 4.3. Most variance is explained in Berlin and least in Stockholm.<sup>7</sup>

#### 4.4 Discussion and conclusion

Against the background of heated public debates, yet scarce empirical evidence about the integration of Muslim minorities in Europe, this study analysed the relationship between structural integration and religiosity among the Turkish second generation, using logistic regression analysis and multi-group structural equation modelling. The secularisation hypothesis, which expects religious decline across generations with increasing levels of structural integration in mainstream societies, is tested against an alternative hypothesis of religious vitality. The latter hypothesis expects continued or even increased religiosity among the second generation as a consequence of the religious socialisation of the second generation within immigrant families and communities and/or reactive religiosity in response to perceived discrimination against Muslims in European migration contexts. Recently gathered cross-national survey data from the TIES-project (The Integration of the European Second generation) among sufficiently large samples of the Turkish second generation in major European cities combined optimally comparable indicators of structural integration with extensive measures of religiosity. This data source allowed us to examine multiple dimensions of religiosity and to compare patterns of second-generation integration and religiosity between four European capital cities: Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels, and Stockholm. Across cities, a majority of the Turkish second generation self-categorises as Muslim and reports high overall levels of religious identification and practices, in line with earlier findings revealing high degrees of religious continuity across generations of Turkish Muslims (Diehl & Koenig, 2009; Maliepaard et al., 2010; Phalet et al., 2008).

Comparative analyses revealed similar components of religiosity among the Turkish second generation, including religious identification, worship, dietary practices and political Islam. However, across cities we found distinct patterns of religiosity with less

differentiated religious involvement among the second generation in Berlin and Stockholm and more selective combinations of different components of religiosity in Amsterdam and Brussels. In the latter cities, political Islam in particular was distinctive of only a subgroup of highly involved Muslims, while it was more closely associated with identity and practice components of religiosity in Berlin and Stockholm.

Turning to theoretical explanations of second-generation religion from secularisation versus religious vitality, the religious vitality hypothesis finds support across the four cities whereas support for the secularisation hypothesis is restricted to Berlin as a least accommodating receiving context. Support for our first hypothesis on secularisation was only found in Berlin, where educational attainment was inversely related with Muslim self-categorisation and religiosity; in all other cities, second-generation religiosity was decoupled from structural integration. In other words, more highly educated Turkish Muslims or those with a non-Turkish partner were no less religious in terms of their self-categorisation as Muslim and in terms of degrees of religious identification, practice and political Islam. The latter finding is in line with our fourth hypothesis on the moderating role of institutional accommodation. As expected, integration and religiosity were inversely related only in the German context, where the state does not accommodate Islam as a minority religion. In all other contexts, the decoupling of religion from structural integration suggests that continued religiosity is compatible with the integration of the second generation, in the sense of socio-economic inclusion and social mixing in mainstream society. To conclude, in Amsterdam, Stockholm and Brussels, where Islam is publicly recognised and its practice is facilitated – albeit to varying degrees – structural integration and Islamic religiosity are not mutually exclusive.

In line with our second hypothesis on religious vitality, we find that the effective religious socialisation of children within Turkish immigrant families and communities strongly predicts their religious self-categorisation and continued religiosity in young adulthood. Second-generation Muslims whose parents visited the mosque more regularly or who attended Koran lessons as children were more religious as young adults in terms of religious self-categorisation, identification and practices. Importantly, the effective religious socialisation of the second generation within Turkish immigrant families and communities was associated in similar ways with enhanced adult religiosity across the four cities. The latter comparative finding highlights the key role of family and community forces in enabling the vitality of Islam across generations. At the same time, evidence of religious vitality suggests that the regulatory impact of different institutional arrangements is mostly restricted to that part of the social life of second generation which is situated outside the co-ethnic community. Finally, and after taking into account religious socialisation, we found no support for our third hypothesis on reactive religiosity, or the idea that second-generation religiosity would be a reaction in response to perceived discrimination.

Our preliminary conclusions should be interpreted with caution in light of some limitations of our empirical data and analyses. Firstly, the cross-sectional nature of the data does not permit us to empirically establish the direction of causality. That is, with the data at hand, we have no means to assess, for instance regarding the findings from Berlin, whether more integration leads to decreased religiosity, or whether high levels of religiosity are a hindrance to the integration of the Turkish second generation, or whether the negative association of religion and integration works both ways. The issue of causal direction was not the main focus of our study, however, and our conclusions stand regardless of whether the negative association between religiosity and integration in Berlin works in either or both ways. The strength of the study is the comparative design, which allows us to test (differential) associations between integration and religion across four European capital cities which represent different models of church-state relations. Our finding of differential associations, in particular the lack of support for an inverse relationship of integration and religion in Amsterdam, Brussels and Stockholm, strongly suggests that there is nothing inherent in Islamic faith traditions which would stand in the way of the integration of second-generation Muslims in European societies. The orthogonality of religion and structural integration is not an artefact of a lack of variation in the structural integration of the Turkish second generation outside Berlin, since the marginal distributions of the four samples in Table 4.1 show that participants were similarly or more dispersed over different integration outcomes in Amsterdam, Brussels or Stockholm as compared to Berlin. Moreover, our comparative analyses take into account competing explanations of religiosity from the differential selection of the first generation across the four cities; from the childhood religious socialisation of the second generation; and from experiences of hostile or unfair treatment against Muslims. Taking into consideration these precautions, it seems plausible that different patterns of religiosity and integration between Berlin and the other cities can be attributed at least in part to the cumulative impact of (the absence of) institutional recognition and accommodation in the receiving societies.

Secondly, our findings may be affected by generally low response rates to the TIES-surveys in the four cities. In combination with different sampling frames, selective non-response implies that we cannot assume that the TIES-data are representative of the Turkish second generation, nor that they are similarly selected in the four cities. In support of a comparative approach, however, we showed that there were few differences in the selectivity of the first generation of Turkish immigrants across the four samples. Furthermore, we established the equivalence of our religiosity concept and measures across the four samples. Also, our comparative hypotheses and analyses are primarily concerned with differential patterns and associations of religiosity rather than differences in absolute levels, as the latter type of comparison is most vulnerable to sampling and measurement bias (Stoop et al., 2010; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). For these reasons, the present analysis may be considered a first step towards a more comprehensive comparative



analysis of religion among the Turkish second generation in Europe. Future research should cross-validate our findings with other samples as complementary data sources on the integration of the second generation will become available in different countries.

Finally, our comparison focuses on capital cities as strategic research sites to study contextual variation in second-generation religion and integration. To the extent that the differential institutionalisation of Islam affects the relation between integration and religiosity, these effects should show up in our comparative analysis. As our data do not cover the Turkish second generation outside capital cities, however, our findings should not be generalised to the national level. With only one city and one immigrant group per country, it is not strictly possible to disentangle contextual variation at the level of cities or ethnic communities from country-level differences. Our conclusions about the role of the institutionalisation of Islam as a contextual moderator of integration and religiosity among the Turkish second generation can only be tentative at this point and need to be put to further tests with other comparative designs in future research.

Keeping these limitations in mind, our results cast serious doubt on common assumptions of an inherent conflict between Islamic religiosity and integration in European societies. As the inverse relation between educational and labour market attainment and religiosity is restricted to Berlin, the more common finding is that individual religiosity is largely decoupled from the structural integration of the second generation in terms of education, employment and social mixing. In particular, in contexts where Islam is recognised and where there is some degree of state support, also members of the Turkish second generation who are highly educated, or even those who marry a non-Turkish partner, tend to maintain high levels of religiosity. While we explain significant portions of second-generation religiosity from the effective religious socialisation of the second generation across comparison contexts, our main comparative finding is probably the differential association of religion and integration in the different cities. The absence of a consistent trend towards lower religiosity with social mobility or social mixing in Amsterdam, Brussels and Stockholm, in contrast with Berlin, implies that Islamic religiosity should not be considered a sign of failed integration of the second generation. Neither can it be interpreted in any straightforward way as a reaction of the second generation against perceived discrimination – despite widely shared perceptions that Muslims as a group are treated unfairly in European societies.

The lack of recognition and accommodation of the Islamic minority in Germany might explain why the hypothesis about assimilation or secularisation was supported in Berlin. The fact that Islam is treated as a second-class religion with regard to its institutional relations to the state leaves little room for a positive attachment to and active practice of this religion among well integrated members of the Turkish second generation. Thus, in the German context, the combination of problematic structural integration of Turkish minorities (e.g. Kalter & Granato, 2007; Woellert, Kröhner, Sippel, & Klingholz, 2009)



and the disadvantaged position of Islam as a minority religion go together with a strong association between structural integration and religiosity such that the least integrated members of the Turkish second generation are most religious.

That the clear inverse relationship between structural integration and religiosity is restricted to Berlin might be explained by the more advanced institutional accommodation of Islam in the other contexts under study. Socio-economic attainment and mixed partnership relations are not significantly associated with religiosity, which implies that, in contrast to the findings from Berlin, structural integration and religiosity are not mutually exclusive in contexts where Islam is recognised and accommodated – albeit to varying extents. The latter finding implies that structural integration can go together with higher, instead of lower, levels of religiosity in contexts where Islam as a minority religion is recognised and its institutions are supported by the state.

## 4.5 Notes

1. Detailed results are shown in the appendix to this dissertation.
2. The question on current religious affiliation functioned as a filter in the computerised questionnaire such that participants who indicated that they do not currently have a religion did not answer questions on religious identification and practice. While in Amsterdam, Brussels and Stockholm the filter question was formulated such that participants were asked whether they currently have a religion, the question wording was different in Berlin where participants were asked “Are you currently religious?” This differential question wording may have resulted in a greater selectivity of participants who filled out the religiosity measures in Berlin: participants who identify with Islam, but who do not practice or consider themselves as a religious person for other reasons, may not be included in the analyses.
3. Because mosque visit is gendered with higher attendance among men (cf. Diehl & Koenig, 2009), a direct effect of gender on the mosque item is included in all models.
4. Since educational systems differ between the four countries under study, different cut-off criteria were used to create four broadly comparable categories of educational attainment. In Amsterdam, the lowest category includes primary school, special education and preparatory vocational education (vmbo), vocational training refers to school-based vocational training at the upper secondary level (mbo), upper secondary includes higher general and scientific preparatory secondary education (havo, vwo) and tertiary education refers to education at universities or institutes of higher vocational education (hbo). In Berlin, the lowest category includes primary school, special education and lower and intermediate secondary education (Hauptschule, Realschule), vocational


education refers to apprenticeships or school-based vocational training, upper secondary education refers to pre-university education (Abitur) and tertiary education includes both universities and institutes of higher vocational education (Fachhochschule). In Brussels, the lowest category includes participants who have maximally completed the first four out of six years of secondary school, vocational education includes participants who have completed full secondary education in a vocational track (BSO), upper secondary education indicates completion of full secondary education in the general, technical or artistic track (ASO, TSO, KSO) and tertiary education includes universities as well as higher vocational education institutes (hogescholen/hautes écoles). In Stockholm, the lowest category refers to basic school which is attended by children until the age of 15 (Grundskola), vocational education refers to the completion of the three-year Gymnasieskola in one of the 15 vocational tracks (e.g. handicraft, trade & administration, health care program), whereas upper secondary refers to completion of Gymnasieskola in one of the two academic tracks (natural sciences and social sciences program), tertiary education refers to university training.

5. Moreover, model fit statistics suggest that the distinction between the two religious practice scales is a better fit to the data, compared to a model where all four indicators load on one common practice scale. Since these two models are not nested, it is not possible to test formally which one has a better fit using a  $\chi^2$ -difference test. However, in such cases Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) can be used, with smaller values indicating better fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2005). The AIC value of a model with only one religious practice scale is 186.316, while a model with two correlated practice scales has an AIC of 155.780, all other model specifications being equal.
6. The effects of Koran lesson attendance and parental religiosity are not significant in Stockholm, yet constraining them to be zero results in worse model fit ( $\Delta\chi^2 (2) = 8.144, p = 0.017$ ), indicating that religious socialisation affects religiosity also in the Swedish capital.
7. Table 4.3 also shows the loadings of the religiosity dimensions on the second-order latent variable after including structural integration, religious upbringing, partnership status, discrimination and control variables as predictors. Despite some changes in magnitude due to the conditioning of religiosity on the predictors, the loadings are still significantly different between the four cities, since constraining them to be equal still results in significantly worse model fit:  $\Delta\chi^2 (9) = 38.733, p < .001$ .

# 5

## **Intergenerational religious transmission and acculturation**

This chapter is forthcoming as  
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Religious identification, belief, and practices among Turkish Belgian and Moroccan Belgian Muslims: Intergenerational continuity and acculturative change. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* (accepted for publication in the Special Issue "Culture and Religion").



## 5.1 Introduction

As European societies become more diverse, increased research attention has been devoted to the religious vitality of Muslim minorities in highly secularised European societies. So far, psychological aspects of religious diversity have received less attention (but see Saroglou & Galand, 2004). Psychological acculturation studies, which focus on the psychological processes by which individuals or cultural groups react to intercultural contact, have shown the key role of immigrant families as a primary socialisation context where the heritage culture is passed on to the next generation (e.g. Nauck, 2001; Phalet & Schönplflug, 2001a, 2001b). In parallel, the critical role of parents and childhood in the socialisation of religion has been widely documented (Kelley & De Graaf, 1997; Martin, White, & Perlman, 2003; Myers, 1996). Religion often plays a central role in the lives of immigrant families both as a source of social support and psychological strength and as a marker of group belonging and cultural continuity, also in successive generations (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2004; Bankston & Zhou, 1995; Crul & Vermeulen, 2003; Ebaugh & Chafetz, 2000; Warner & Wittner, 1998). Little is known, however, about religious continuity over generations in Muslim immigrant families in Western Europe where family and mainstream contexts are characterised by a stark contrast in their religious orientations (Voas & Crockett, 2005). Secularisation is not only an eminent empirical finding among Western European majority populations (e.g., Gorski & Altinordu, 2008), but is also treated as an ideology, so that “Americans think that they are supposed to be religious, while Europeans think that they are supposed to be irreligious” (Casanova, 2003, p. 19). In addition to this general suspicion towards religion, European societies are particularly unwelcoming towards Muslims (Allen & Nielsen, 2002) and Islam is often considered a barrier to the integration of Muslim immigrants and their families (Foner & Alba, 2008). Combining insights from psychological research on cultural transmission and acculturation with those from the domain of religious socialisation, the present study asks: *How does religious transmission in immigrant families and communities affect the religious life of the second generation of European-born self-categorised Muslims?*

When cultural transmission takes place within a context involving intercultural contact, acculturation orientations become integral to this process, as they affect the extent of cultural continuity and acculturative change across generations (Berry & Georgas, 2009). Specifically, while the orientation towards maintenance of the heritage culture may reinforce cultural continuity, the orientation towards adoption of the mainstream culture may imply acculturative change in the cultural patterns of immigrant families (Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Senécal, 1997; Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000). Although religion constitutes an integral aspect of culture and serves as a source of cultural continuity for immigrant families, the role of acculturation orientations in the process of religious transmission has not been studied extensively and cross-culturally. To fill this gap, we also ask: *Whether and how do acculturation orientations towards culture maintenance and*

*culture adoption among the second generation of Muslim immigrants mediate or intervene with the effectiveness of early religious transmission for current religiosity?*

Core cultural values are shared within families and communities and transmitted from one generation to another through goal-directed and explicit socialisation as well as through more implicit processes of enculturation (Berry & Georgas, 2009). However, the extent and content of transmission depend largely on the quality of intergenerational relations and, in the context of acculturation, also on immigrant acculturation orientations, as we specify later. We compare self-categorised Muslims from two acculturating groups, i.e., Turkish- and Moroccan-Belgians, who make up a sizable proportion of the Belgian population (together more than 4 percent according to 2001 Belgian Census, cf. Phalet, Deboosere, & Bastiaenssen, 2007), who share their religious background as (majority Sunni) Muslims, their immigration history first as guest workers (from the 1960s onwards) from rural and socio-economically less developed areas in the countries of origin and later through processes of family reunification and formation, and their experience of persistent socio-economic disadvantage, as reflected, for instance, by low education attainment, high unemployment rates, and ethnically segregated communal settlement (Bousetta & Maréchal, 2003; Phalet & Kopic, 2006). In addition, Muslim immigrants and their families are exposed to frequent discrimination and their religious practices are seen at odds with Western values by the majority society (Bousetta & Maréchal, 2003). At the same time, these two groups differ in terms of family cohesion and collective cultural continuity, which may influence the effectiveness of religious transmission in culture-specific ways. We use large-scale community samples gathered in a recent survey among Turkish- and Moroccan-Belgians who reside in the two largest and culturally diverse cities of Belgium, i.e., Brussels and Antwerp (TIES, The Integration of the European Second generation; CeSo/CSCP, 2008). The surveys cover retrospective questions on participants' religious socialisation in childhood as well as measures of their current religiosity and acculturation orientations. The cross-cultural approach to religious transmission permits insights into the degree to which findings about hypothesised relations between early socialisation and later religiosity can be generalised. In the following, we first explain our approach to studying religiosity in second-generation Muslims focusing on various aspects of the religious experience. Next, we introduce our hypothesised model linking early religious transmission to current religiosity directly as well as indirectly through acculturation orientations.

### **Dimensions of religiosity**

While mainstream societies in Western Europe attach less importance to religion and devalue Islam in particular, as is the case in Belgium (Bousetta & Maréchal, 2003; Voyé & Dobbelaere, 2001), religion is experienced by both first- and second-generation Muslims as an important and highly valued domain of their heritage culture (e.g., Turkish- and

Moroccan-Dutch in Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2004; Phalet & Güngör, 2004; Verkuyten, 2007; Turkish- and Moroccan-Belgians in Saroglou & Galand, 2004). Regarding the extent of religious continuity, however, the findings are mixed. Some studies show evidence of religious decline in the second generation, particularly in their behavioural involvement in the sense of observing religious rites and rules (Phalet, Gijsberts, & Hagendoorn, 2008; Phalet & Güngör, 2004). Other findings, however, suggest that this decline is not linear and that there might even be a reactive increase in specific forms of religiosity for a part of the second generation (Maliepaard, Lubbers, & Gijsberts, 2010). We distinguish among religious identification, belief, and practice (Voas, 2007) in a view to cover multiple aspects of religious experience. Religious identification refers to the strength of attachment to religious identity (i.e., to being Muslim); religious belief, or orthodoxy, refers to knowledge and acceptance of religious doctrine (e.g., the literal interpretation of the Koran); and religious practice involves participation in religious rituals and services, such as dietary practices (e.g. consuming *halal* food) and worship (e.g. prayer). We examine the specific contents of religious transmission in immigrant families.

### **From religious transmission during childhood to religiosity in adulthood**

Enculturation and socialisation refers respectively to implicit and explicit routes of cultural transmission within families and communities (Berry & Georgas, 2009). Together, these two routes are crucial to secure some degree of religious transmission over generations (Bisin & Verdier, 2000). For example, early enrolment in Koran lessons exposes immigrant children to religious teaching and it implies a goal-directed, explicit parental investment into socialising their children into a desired way of being a religious person. Parental religious practice, e.g., visiting the mosque, is expected to shape the religious behaviour of the children mainly through social modelling as an implicit route of cultural transmission. In line with earlier findings of religious transmission in mono-cultural contexts (Myers, 1996; King et al., 2002), we expect that religion is likely to be effectively transmitted in immigrant families who send their children to Koran lessons and where parents visit the mosque more frequently (*Hypothesis 1a*). In addition, we examine unique effects of attendance to Koran lessons and parental mosque visits on religious identification, belief and different practices of the second generation. In particular, implicit and explicit routes of culture learning may complement each other, so that parental religious practice would narrowly influence the corresponding worship practices in adult children, such as visiting a mosque or praying (King et al., 2002; Regnerus, Smith, & Smith, 2004). Formal religious education occurs within a context where religion is consciously cognised and explicitly communicated, so that early enrolment in Koran lessons may have more generalised long-term effects on religious identification, belief and practice (*Hypothesis 1b*).

### **Culture-specific effects**

Turkish communities in Western Europe tend to maintain higher levels of cultural continuity across generations, gender and levels of education, in comparison with less cohesive and more heterogeneous Moroccan communities. For example, the intergenerational transmission of filial obligations (Phalet & Schönplflug, 2001a) and family values (De Valk & Liefbroer, 2007) is more effective in Turkish than in Moroccan immigrant families. The former group also exerts more social control within tight-knit ethnic networks (Dagevos, 2001) and more conformity pressure within families (Phalet & Schönplflug, 2001b). Moreover, research on intergenerational transmission of religiosity suggests that a most frequent traditional family structure, along with typical warm yet strict parenting styles in Turkish immigrant families (Bao, Whitbeck, Hoyt, & Conger, 1999), should facilitate effective religious transmission. We argue that Turkish immigrant communities constitute a more propitious environment for the religious socialisation of the second generation than Moroccan communities, which show generally lower levels of internal cohesion and ethnic retention (*Hypothesis 2*).

### **The mediating role of acculturation orientations in the effectiveness of religious transmission**

Immigrants vary in their orientations towards culture maintenance and towards culture adoption (Bourhis et al., 1997; Güngör, 2007; Ryder et al., 2000). In general, culture maintenance is less and culture adoption more strongly emphasised in the public domain, such as in school or at work, where immigrants and hosts tend to share the same social spaces and activities. In contrast, culture maintenance is most emphasised, and culture adoption least, in the private domain, such as in immigrant family or community life (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2006; Van de Vijver & Phalet, 2004). In addition to domain specificity, acculturation orientations may also be specific for different forms of culture (Cohen, 2009). Accordingly, we distinguish between acculturation orientations towards the maintenance of related yet distinct ethnic and religious forms of culture among Muslim immigrants.

In an acculturation context, religion loses the taken-for-granted character it often has in mono-cultural contexts. As immigrant minorities are exposed to alternate visions of values and religion in the receiving society, religion becomes an important tool for cultural meaning-making and community building which often results in new forms and functions of religion in the lives of immigrants (e.g., Cadge & Ecklund, 2007; Hirschman, 2004). For example, the first generation of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands were consciously concerned with, and collectively investing in, passing on their religious traditions and values to the second generation in a predominantly secular environment (Doomernik, 1995). Accordingly, more culture maintenance was found to be consistently associated with higher religiosity (Saroglou & Mathijssen, 2007). From the perspective of



the parents, family solidarity and strong ethnic ties facilitate religious socialisation inside the family, as their children are selectively “channelled” into peer groups and partner choices within their faith communities (Cornwall, 1987; Martin et al., 2003). From the perspective of the children, religiosity plays a key role in their identity development and provides an important source of collective self-esteem (e.g., Verkuyten, 2007). Accordingly, religious and ethnic identities and behaviours were found to show increasing overlap in younger generations of Dutch Muslims (Maliepaard, Lubbers, & Gijsberts, 2010). Hence, we hypothesise that the impact of religious transmission in immigrant families on adult religiosity will be mediated by culture maintenance orientations; so that religious socialisation is more effective when the younger generation values culture maintenance more highly (*Hypothesis 3a*).

Early religious experiences might also contribute to religiosity in adulthood through a decreased orientation towards culture adoption as an additional or alternative path to religious continuity. To the extent that conservative cultural values related to religiosity, such as traditional gender role values, conflict with predominant values in the receiving society (Brouard & Tiberj, 2005), the religious education of Muslim children may accentuate their sense of distinctiveness and distance from the mainstream culture. Similarly, educational goals and practices in Koran schools, for example obedience training and rote learning, tend to deviate from what is generally expected from students in school (see Kagitcibasi, 1996, for a discussion). Furthermore, widespread public hostility against Islam in Western Europe complicates the development of a sense of belonging in second-generation Muslims, who are raised with the Islam of their fathers and who are facing the challenge of re-evaluating and reconstructing their own ways of being Muslim (Duderija, 2007). Accordingly, Saroglou et al. (Friedman & Saroglou, 2010; Saroglou & Mathijssen, 2004) found that religious identification and practice among Muslim immigrants to Belgium were negatively related to their Belgian identification and cultural orientation. Similarly, Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) reported that Muslim identification was associated with civic disidentification among Dutch Muslims. Against this background, we hypothesise that religious socialisation might strengthen adult religiosity in part through a reactive path of decreased adoption of the mainstream culture (*Hypothesis 3b*).

## 5.2 Data and method

### Data and samples

Data for this study were drawn from the Belgian TIES-surveys (The Integration of the European Second generation; TIES07-08-Belgium, CeSo/CSCP, 2008). Only participants who self-categorise as Muslim are included in the analysis.<sup>1</sup> Four groups of participants are compared in multi-group analysis: self-categorised Turkish-Belgian Muslims in Brussels

( $N = 175$ , 40.0% female,  $M_{\text{Age}} = 25.8$ ,  $SD = 5.09$ ), Moroccan-Belgian Muslims in Brussels ( $N = 201$ , 51.2% female,  $M_{\text{Age}} = 26.1$ ,  $SD = 5.24$ ), Turkish-Belgian Muslims in Antwerp ( $N = 325$ , 49.9% female,  $M_{\text{Age}} = 25.9$ ,  $SD = 4.65$ ) and Moroccan-Belgian Muslims in Antwerp ( $N = 280$ , 62.1% female,  $M_{\text{Age}} = 26.2$ ,  $SD = 4.84$ ).

## Measures

**Religious transmission.** A dummy variable indicating whether or not participants attended Koran lessons during their childhood (0 = *no*, 1 = *yes*) and the frequency of parental mosque visit while the participant was a child (1 = *never*; 5 = *once a week or more*) were used to measure religious socialisation and social modelling, respectively.

**Religiosity.** We distinguish conceptually between religious identification, orthodox belief, and religious practices as dimensions of religiosity. Using multiple indicators of each dimension (see questionnaire items listed in Table 5.1), and subdividing religious practices into worship, such as daily prayers, and dietary practices, such as eating *halal* food, we specified four latent dimensions of religiosity.<sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, these and the following items were answered on 5-point scales which indicated the extent to which participants agreed with a statement, ranging from 1 (*totally disagree*) to 5 (*totally agree*), or else the frequency with which they engaged in specific practices, ranging from 1 (*never*) to 5 (*frequently*). The four latent dimensions of religiosity – religious identification, orthodox beliefs, worship and dietary practices – were treated as dependent variables in structural equation models including acculturation attitudes and religious transmission as predictors (and controlling for relevant background variables).

**Acculturation.** Four questionnaire items assessed the extent to which participants find it important to adopt Belgian culture in the private domain (at home) and in the public domain (at school and at work), and to maintain their heritage culture in private and public domains.<sup>3</sup>

**Controls.** To control for socio-demographic differences in the composition of the four groups under study, indicators of age, gender, education, employment status and partnership status were also included in the analysis. Most participants have maximally completed secondary education, with less than 20% having completed or attended tertiary education. Levels of education were slightly higher in Brussels than in Antwerp, particularly among Moroccans. Between 50 and 55% of the participants were employed, with the exception of Moroccans in Brussels who had a lower employment rate at 42%. Due to their young age, more than half of the participants did not have a partner; of those who have a partner, the majority had a partner who shares their religion, i.e., who is a Muslim. Turks had a non-Muslim partner less rarely than Moroccans (10% vs. 3%).

**Table 5.1** Means and standard deviations of the measures of religiosity, religious transmission and acculturation

Measures	Turkish Belgians		Moroccan Belgians	
	Antwerp <i>M (SD)</i>	Brussels <i>M (SD)</i>	Antwerp <i>M (SD)</i>	Brussels <i>M (SD)</i>
<b>Religious transmission</b>				
Koran lessons	0.78 <sup>a</sup>	0.40 <sup>b</sup>	0.75 <sup>a</sup>	0.62 <sup>c</sup>
Frequency of parental mosque visit	3.81 (1.49) <sup>a</sup>	3.21 (1.42) <sup>b</sup>	4.35 (1.22) <sup>c</sup>	3.94 (1.43) <sup>a</sup>
<b>Religious identification</b>				
'Being a Muslim is an important part of my self'	4.34 (0.84) <sup>a</sup>	4.18 (0.93) <sup>a</sup>	4.51 (0.69) <sup>b</sup>	4.55 (0.71) <sup>b</sup>
'The fact that I am a Muslim is something I often think about'	4.08 (1.05) <sup>a</sup>	4.03 (1.02) <sup>a</sup>	4.30 (0.94) <sup>b</sup>	4.33 (0.99) <sup>b</sup>
'I see myself as a true Muslim'	3.62 (1.16) <sup>a</sup>	3.86 (1.01) <sup>a, b</sup>	4.03 (1.01) <sup>b</sup>	4.09 (1.01) <sup>b</sup>
'When someone says something bad about Muslims, I feel personally hurt'	3.67 (1.26) <sup>a</sup>	4.05 (1.04) <sup>b</sup>	3.78 (1.20) <sup>a, b</sup>	4.18 (1.04) <sup>b</sup>
<b>Orthodox beliefs</b>				
'There definitely exists only one correct answer to all religious questions'	3.35 (1.18) <sup>a</sup>	3.00 (1.19) <sup>b</sup>	3.20 (1.30) <sup>a, b</sup>	3.10 (1.38) <sup>a, b</sup>
'All that is can be found in the Koran should be taken literally as written'	3.24 (1.31) <sup>a</sup>	3.12 (1.30) <sup>a</sup>	3.17 (1.35) <sup>a</sup>	3.24 (1.37) <sup>a</sup>
<b>Dietary practice</b>				
<i>Ramadan</i>	3.97 (1.52) <sup>a</sup>	3.84 (1.48) <sup>a</sup>	4.79 (0.76) <sup>b</sup>	4.49 (1.19) <sup>b</sup>
<i>Halal</i> food	4.48 (0.99) <sup>a</sup>	4.49 (1.04) <sup>a</sup>	4.79 (0.67) <sup>b</sup>	4.80 (0.60) <sup>b</sup>
<b>Worship</b>				
Daily prayer	2.71 (1.58) <sup>a</sup>	2.37 (1.31) <sup>a</sup>	3.96 (1.56) <sup>b</sup>	3.92 (1.60) <sup>b</sup>
Mosque visit	2.98 (1.49) <sup>a</sup>	2.60 (1.15) <sup>b</sup>	2.51 (1.45) <sup>b</sup>	2.84 (1.40) <sup>a, b</sup>
<b>Culture adoption</b>				
At home	2.83 (1.06) <sup>a</sup>	3.14 (1.04) <sup>b</sup>	2.88 (1.09) <sup>a, b</sup>	2.80 (1.22) <sup>a, b</sup>
At work/school	3.69 (0.94) <sup>a</sup>	3.63 (0.92) <sup>a</sup>	3.58 (1.02) <sup>a</sup>	3.52 (1.01) <sup>a</sup>
<b>Culture maintenance</b>				
At home	4.34 (0.86) <sup>a</sup>	4.21 (0.96) <sup>a</sup>	4.42 (0.75) <sup>a</sup>	4.22 (0.93) <sup>a</sup>
At work/school	3.05 (1.21) <sup>a</sup>	3.02 (1.19) <sup>a</sup>	2.99 (1.17) <sup>a</sup>	2.99 (1.11) <sup>a</sup>

Note. Group differences were tested by  $\chi^2$ - or univariate *F*-tests ( $p < .05$ ). Group means with different superscripts indicate significant group differences. No standard deviations shown for dichotomous variables.

## Analyses

We performed multi-group confirmatory factor analysis to establish measurement equivalence across the four groups (Turkish and Moroccan Belgians in Brussels and Antwerp) of the four dimensions of religiosity (identification, orthodox beliefs, dietary practices and worship) and of acculturation. After establishing measurement equivalence of the latent variables across groups by means of  $\chi^2$ -comparisons of constrained

and unconstrained models, we tested the equivalence of path models across groups. Throughout our analysis, we consider the values of  $\chi^2$  in relation to the degrees of freedom (*df*), CFI and RMSEA as relevant indicators of model fit. Model fit is considered to be good if the  $\chi^2/df$  ratio is approaching 1.00, if CFI is above .90 and RMSEA is below .05 (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2005).

## 5.3 Results

### Descriptive findings

The means and standard deviations of the included variables are shown separately for the four comparison groups in Table 5.1. Mean levels of religious identification and practices were high in all groups, although Moroccan Belgians have significantly higher levels of religious identification and practice than Turkish Belgians. Participation in worship is considerably low relative to the levels of dietary practices in all groups. There are few intergroup differences in orthodox beliefs, which tend to be embraced less than religious identification and practices. Religious transmission in terms of Koran lessons and parental mosque visits is more important in Antwerp than in Brussels and much less important among Turks in Brussels, who thus form the most 'secular' group of participants. There were no group or city differences in acculturation orientations and all participants had high levels of cultural maintenance, particularly in the private domain, and lower levels of culture adoption, with most adoption in the public domain.

Table 5.2 presents bivariate correlations between dimensions of religion, religious transmission and acculturation orientations for Turkish and Moroccan Muslims. Most notably, in line with bi-dimensional approaches to acculturation, the wish to maintain the heritage culture was not related to the degree to which participants wanted to adopt the Belgian culture among Moroccans but these two dimensions were weakly negatively related in Turks, as can be seen in Table 5.2.

### Confirmatory factor analyses

**Religiosity.** A model with equal loadings of manifest items on the four distinct, but correlated latent measures across all four groups fit the data well:  $\chi^2(134, N = 981) = 241.462, p < .001, \chi^2/df = 1.802, CFI = 0.955, RMSEA = 0.029$ . This model fit was not significantly different from an unconstrained model, thus confirming measurement equivalence of religiosity across groups:  $\Delta\chi^2(18) = 26.634, p > .05$ . Alternative models with only one underlying dimension of religiosity or collapsing worship and dietary practices into one practice dimension have worse fit:  $\chi^2(167, N = 981) = 751.923, p < .001, \chi^2/df = 4.503, CFI = 0.756, RMSEA = 0.060$ , and  $\chi^2(149, N = 981) = 382.412, p < .001, \chi^2/df =$

2.567, CFI = 0.903, RMSEA = 0.040 respectively. Each indicator loads significantly on only one latent factor (i.e., simple structure) and all factor loadings are above 0.5 (see Table 5.3). In sum, the concept religiosity falls apart into four structurally equivalent dimensions across the four groups under study.

**Acculturation.** Confirmatory factor analysis supported two latent dimensions underlying acculturation orientations. In line with a bi-dimensional model of acculturation, the best fit was found for a model with two correlated dimensions, heritage culture maintenance and host culture adoption, each with two indicators referring to public and private domains:  $\chi^2(33, N = 981) = 106.218, p < .001, \chi^2/df = 3.219, CFI = 0.795, RMSEA = 0.048$ . The  $\chi^2$ -difference test between the model with equal loadings across groups and an unconstrained model confirmed measurement equivalence across the four groups:  $\Delta\chi^2(6) = 7.675, p > .05$ . An alternative model with one single latent measure of acculturation orientations had a worse fit:  $\chi^2(40, N = 981) = 334.551, p < .001, \chi^2/df = 8.364, CFI = 0.175, RMSEA = 0.087$ . Hence, we considered acculturation orientations in this analysis in the

**Table 5.2** Correlations between measures of religiosity, religious transmission and acculturation

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1 Religious identification		0.32***	0.47***	0.30***	0.13**	0.15**	0.39***	-0.09*
2 Dietary practice	0.45***		0.27***	0.10*	0.13**	0.10*	0.18***	-0.04
3 Worship	0.38***	0.42***		0.15***	0.13**	0.14**	0.25***	-0.02
4 Orthodox belief	0.26***	0.28***	0.14***		0.07	0.01	0.24***	0.02
5 Koran lessons	0.23***	0.28***	0.26***	0.23***		0.27***	0.10*	-0.05
6 Parental mosque visit	0.21***	0.12***	0.38***	0.14***	0.39***		0.07	-0.07
7 Culture maintenance	0.46***	0.43***	0.36***	0.29***	0.22***	0.26***		0.05
8 Culture adoption	-0.17***	-0.11*	-0.09*	-0.02	-0.17***	-0.05	-0.10*	

Note. Turkish Belgians below diagonal, Moroccan Belgians above diagonal.

\*\*\*  $p < .001$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*  $p < .05$

form of two distinct latent dimensions: maintenance of the heritage culture and adoption of Belgian culture. The loadings of the items on the latent dimensions of acculturation orientations are shown in Table 5.3.

### From religious transmission during childhood to religiosity in adulthood

Multi-group structural equation models predicting religiosity and acculturation orientations from religious transmission, and including control variables, were estimated across four groups. Factor loadings of all latent variables were set equal between groups. Next, equality constraints were imposed on structural relations between the variables of interest to test whether they were similar or different across groups. The best fit was found for a model that allows for differences between Turkish and Moroccan minority groups, but not between the two cities:  $\chi^2(847, N = 981) = 1498.04, p < .001, \chi^2/df = 1.769, CFI = 0.854, RMSEA = 0.028$ . According to  $\chi^2$ -tests, this model did not differ significantly from an unconstrained model:  $\Delta\chi^2(18) = 27.556, p > .05$ , but it had a significantly better fit than a model imposing equality across all four groups:  $\Delta\chi^2(27) = 335.452, p < .01$ . Because there were no significant differences between local receiving contexts in terms of religious transmission after taking into account demographic characteristics of the four

**Table 5.3** Parameter estimates (loadings) of manifest items on latent variables

Latent variable	Manifest variables	Parameter (SE)
Religious identification	'Being a Muslim is an important part of my self'	1.00 (-)
	'The fact that I am a Muslim is something I often think about'	1.10 (0.05)***
	'I see myself as a true Muslim'	1.12 (0.05)***
	'When somebody says something bad about Muslims, I feel personally hurt'	0.79 (0.06)***
Orthodox belief	'There definitely exists only one correct answer to all religious questions'	1.00 (-)
	'All that is can be found in the Koran should be taken literally as written'	1.17 (0.12)***
Dietary practices	<i>Ramadan</i>	1.00 (-)
	<i>Halal</i>	0.87 (0.07)***
Worship	Prayer	1.00 (-)
	Mosque	0.58 (0.05)***
Culture maintenance	At home	1.00 (-)
	At work/school	1.23 (0.15)***
Culture adoption	At home	1.76 (0.15)***
	At work/school	1.00 (-)

Note. Parameter estimates are based on a model where all loadings are constrained to be equal across groups. \*\*\* $p < .001$

groups, in the following, we present the results of separate models for Turkish-Belgian and Moroccan-Belgian Muslims across both cities.


In models without acculturation orientations, religious transmission reliably predicted current religiosity among local-born Turkish- and Moroccan Belgians, confirming *Hypothesis 1a*. In line with the predictions, participants who had attended Koran lessons in their childhood had higher levels of religious identification, orthodox belief, worship and dietary practices as young adults (all  $p$ 's < .05 except for orthodox belief and dietary practices among Moroccans). As Figure 5.1 shows, more regular mosque attendance by participants' parents during their youth was related to increased frequency of worship and dietary practices as well as to enhanced religious identification, yet it was unrelated to orthodox belief in both groups, altogether confirming *Hypothesis 1b* to a great extent. While the structural relations between religious transmission and current religiosity were consistently positive in both the Turkish and the Moroccan samples, the amount of variance in current religiosity explained by religious transmission was substantially larger among Turkish as compared to Moroccan Belgians, providing support for *Hypothesis 2*. Explained variances on the four dimensions of religiosity ranged from 6.7% for orthodox beliefs to 22.1% for worship among Turkish Belgians, and from 0.7% for orthodoxy to 9.8% for worship among Moroccan Belgians (see Figure 5.1).

### Religious transmission, acculturation, and religiosity

To test whether and how acculturation orientations affect religious continuity, culture maintenance and culture adoption were added as hypothetical mediators between religious transmission and current religiosity. Path models including effects of religious transmission (standardised within groups) on acculturation and religiosity are shown in Figure 5.2. The path model had an acceptable fit with  $\chi^2(847, N = 981) = 1498.045$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 1.769$ , CFI = 0.854, RMSEA = 0.028. Estimates are based on models including controls for gender, age, education, employment status and partnership, showing that the structural relationships between acculturation and religiosity are not spurious due to gender, education or other background variables as common causes of religiosity and acculturation.<sup>4</sup> Overall, the path models succeeded in explaining most variance in current religiosity. Orthodox belief is the dimension least well explained, but even for this dimension the explained variance ranges from 35 to 39%. More than 50% of the variance in religious identification, worship and dietary practices is explained by religious transmission, acculturation and the control variables. Notably, after the inclusion of acculturation orientations, only the relation between parental mosque visit and worship remained significant among Turkish Belgians, qualifying the link between parents' and participants' religious practice (*Hypothesis 1b*) and providing additional support for *Hypothesis 2*.

As expected, attending Koran lessons and more frequent parental mosque visits during participants' youth were associated with more support for culture maintenance in






**Figure 5.1** Path models of religious transmission and religiosity (Turkish Belgians / Moroccan Belgians).

Note. Paths show standardised effects and pertaining significance, \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*  $p < .05$ , ns: non-significant effect. Explained variances of latent variables are shown within the eclipses for Turkish Belgians / Moroccan Belgians. Model fit:  $\chi^2(221, N = 981) = 826.04$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 3.74$ , CFI = 0.770, RMSEA = 0.053.

young adulthood among both Turks and Moroccans. Thus, religious transmission during one’s childhood was found to affect present acculturation orientations among Belgian Muslims such that they find it more important to maintain their heritage culture in both private and public spheres if the Islamic religion was emphasised during their socialisation. Regarding the relation between acculturation and religiosity, the path models revealed positive associations between culture maintenance and all four dimensions of religiosity in both groups of participants. Thus, *Hypothesis 3a* was confirmed. Remarkably, acculturation orientations fully mediated the effect of having attended a Koran school on current religiosity as well as the effects of parental mosque visits on religious identification and dietary practices. On the other hand, culture adoption did not affect the process of religious continuity, with one exception. Turkish Belgians who attended Koran lessons as a child were more reluctant to adopt Belgian culture, which in turn was associated with enhanced religious identification, a finding that only partially confirmed *Hypothesis 3b*.

The large effects of acculturation orientations on religiosity, and more generally, the large amount of variance of religion accounted for by our model, might raise questions about the causal order of acculturation processes and religion. Religious transmission clearly is a predictor of both as it occurred during participants’ youth and thus precedes



**Figure 5.2** Path models of religious transmission, acculturation and religiosity (Turkish Belgians / Moroccan Belgians).  
 Note. Paths show standardised effects and pertaining significance levels, \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ , ns: non-significant effect.  
 Explained variances of latent variables are shown within the ellipses for Turkish Belgians / Moroccan Belgians. Model fit:  $\chi^2(847, N = 981) = 1498.045$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 1.769$ , CFI = 0.854, RMSEA = 0.028.

current acculturation orientations and religiosity. To scrutinise the causal order of acculturation orientations and religion, while taking religious transmission into account, an alternative model was estimated with reversed arrows, so that religious transmission predicted religiosity, which in turn predicted acculturation orientations. Since this alternative model and the path models as presented in Figure 5.2 were not nested, we cannot rely on  $\chi^2$ -tests to assess whether they differ significantly. However, due to the equal number of *df*, we can use Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) to compare the relative fit of the two models – with lower values indicating better fit (Kline, 2005). This comparison shows that our proposed model with acculturation orientations as predictors of religiosity clearly fits the data better (AIC = 1172.588) than the alternative model with acculturation orientations as an outcome of religiosity (AIC = 1603.038). Although the alternative model fits the data rather well, which implies that both causal directions are compatible with the data, the AIC statistic supports our hypothesised causal path model as shown in Figure 5.2 where acculturation orientations are driving current religiosity, rather than acculturation being shaped by the dimensions of religiosity.

## 5.4 Discussion and conclusion

The present study examined how religious socialisation in family and community contexts affects later religious life so that religiosity remains vital in successive generations of immigrants born and living in a secularised society. Drawing on retrospective data from large-scale community samples of Turkish and Moroccan Belgians, our cross-cultural findings confirm the key role of religious socialisation in immigrant families along with the continued orientation towards culture maintenance in explaining religious continuity across generations. In addition, the models reveal different transmission paths that differentially shape religious identification, beliefs and practices in the two acculturating groups.

### From religious transmission during childhood to religiosity in adulthood

In line with our first hypothesis on religious transmission in immigrant families, cross-cultural findings of significant effects of family socialisation support the effective transmission of religious identification, belief and practices to the next generation. Also in line with the expectations, religious transmission occurred through parallel paths of explicit religious socialisation (sending children to Koran lessons) and more implicit social modelling of religious behaviour (parental mosque visits). While both explicit and implicit paths of early religious socialisation predicted religious identification and behavioural involvement, religious belief or orthodoxy was significantly related only to the explicit path of religious education. The latter finding is in line with more narrow effects of behavioural

modelling through parental ritual practice, as hypothesised. Weaker overall transmission of the religious belief component suggests that orthodoxy might be less salient or less important than orthopraxis as a marker of religious belonging, and hence less likely to be transmitted when religion serves primarily as a common ground for network building and meaning making in an unfamiliar socio-cultural environment.

In line with the second hypothesis on the role of collective cultural continuity in acculturating groups, the strength of transmission paths differed between Turkish and Moroccan communities in the expected way. Stronger effects of family socialisation on Turkish religiosity suggest that religious transmission is more effective in more cohesive community contexts. In other words, even after taking into account the socio-demographic composition, strong ethnic community building may be decisive in enabling the effective socialisation of religion in immigrant families.

### **The mediating role of acculturation orientations in the effectiveness of religious transmission**

Our cross-cultural findings fully confirm the third hypothesis on the mediating role of acculturation orientations. Most importantly, both Koran lessons and parental religious attendance contributed to all dimensions of current religiosity by increasing the orientation of the second generation towards heritage culture maintenance. Acculturation orientations intervened powerfully between religious transmission and all aspects of current religiosity, even after taking into account gender, education, employment, and marital status of the participants as possible sources of spuriousness. The key role of acculturation processes is consistent with the 'channelling hypothesis' in the literature on intergenerational transmission of religiosity (Cornwall, 1987; Martin et al., 2003). Overall, the key role of varying acculturation orientations in our process model of religious transmission implies that the religious domain is susceptible to acculturative change.

Unlike culture maintenance, culture adoption did not mediate religious transmission with one exception: only for Turkish Belgians, early attendance of Koran lessons increased the strength of religious identification through decreased orientation towards culture adoption. This finding suggests a hypothesised reactive pattern of religiosity for Turkish Muslim children, when exposure to religious education accentuates the intercultural distance from mainstream society; or when religious identification implies simultaneous disidentification from mainstream society. Since Turkish Belgians tend to value both culture maintenance and adoption (Güngör & Bornstein, 2009), reactive religiosity is best understood in terms of a heightened sense of culture conflict between multiple cultural commitments among highly identified and ingroup-oriented Muslims, as emerged in the negative correlation between culture maintenance and culture adoption in this group. However, this relation was rather weak and on the whole, there was only little evidence

for reactive religiosity or for religion as barrier to the adoption of Belgian culture.

Finally, some limitations of the present study need to be discussed. First, retrospective longitudinal findings should be replicated in prospective longitudinal research, ideally following up Muslim children through adolescence and including parent data in panel studies with parent-child dyads. Still, the fact that the retrospective measures of religious socialisation which we used all referred to behaviours rather than to attitudes or relations makes them less susceptible to recollection biases (Blossfeld & Rohwer, 2002). Moreover, a comparison of alternative causal models supported the proposed theoretical sequence of acculturation processes and religion. In addition, more extensive measures of acculturation, including ethnic and religious forms of behavioural acculturation, and additional measures of religious socialisation, including the social modelling of other religious practices than visiting the mosque, could further strengthen our findings. Lastly, there is a need to replicate the religious transmission model in other acculturating groups (such as non-Muslim and/or less socially disadvantaged immigrant minorities) and in more inclusive acculturation contexts (such as countries or cities with a longer history of cultural and religious diversity). In conclusion, religious transmission in acculturating groups is an intricate interplay between immigrant parents, children, and local ethno-religious communities. We demonstrated that acculturation processes at the level of persons, families and communities are key to understanding the complex dynamics of religious transmission.

## 5.5 Notes

1. These participants have stated in answer to closed questions that they currently have a religion and that this religion is Islam (Sunni, Shi'i, Alevi, or other, cf. chapter 4). Accordingly, 199 participants were excluded since they said that they did not currently have a religion (75 Turkish-Belgians and 56 Moroccan-Belgians in Brussels, 36 Turkish-Belgians and 32 Moroccan-Belgians in Antwerp). We use only Belgian TIES-surveys for this study as questionnaire items on orthodox beliefs were only included in Belgium.
2. An alternative three-dimensional solution with one common practice dimension, in addition to identification and beliefs, resulted in a worse model fit.
3. The survey included an experimental design with regard to the questions about maintenance of the heritage culture. Participants were randomly assigned to either of two experimental conditions: in the ethnic condition, they were asked to what extent they want to maintain their Turkish or Moroccan heritage, whereas in the religious condition, the questions referred to Islamic heritage. Although there is considerable overlap between ethnic and religious aspects of the cultural heritage of Turkish and


Moroccan participants, the two conditions foreground different forms of culture. The experiment intends to measure whether foregrounding different forms of culture affects participants' orientations towards culture maintenance. Repeated measures ANOVA on pooled data revealed a main effect of experimental condition:  $F(1, 978) = 30.358$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.03$ , but also a significant interaction with domain:  $F(1, 978) = 19.264$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.02$ . Specifically, the wish to maintain the heritage culture was stronger for religious than for ethnic forms of culture in both domains. In line with domain-specificity, the effect of forms of culture was larger in the public domain:  $\eta^2 = 0.04$ , than in the private domain:  $\eta^2 = 0.01$ , suggesting parallel tendencies towards the public assertion of religion and the privatisation of ethnic culture. We take the experimental design into account in our structural equation models by adding a dummy variable which indicates ethnic or religious experimental conditions as a predictor of heritage culture maintenance in models with acculturation orientations. We also conducted multi-group analysis with experimental conditions as grouping variables and found that the structural relations between religious transmission, acculturation and current religiosity were the same across experimental conditions. The only exception was the finding that the positive effect of cultural maintenance on dietary practices was significantly weaker (but still significant and positive) in the religious as compared to the ethnic condition among Turkish-Belgian participants.

4. Female Turkish participants had lower levels of cultural maintenance, but higher levels of religious identification and orthodox beliefs. Among Moroccan participants, women had higher levels of cultural maintenance, but there were no gender differences regarding religiosity. Older participants were less supportive of cultural maintenance, but tended to embrace culture adoption more strongly. Highly educated participants in both groups had lower levels of cultural maintenance and orthodox beliefs, but at the same time displayed higher levels of worship. Regarding employment status, the only significant finding was that participants who have a job hold less orthodox beliefs. Lastly, in relation to partnership status and the religion of the partner, no effects were found among Moroccan-Belgian participants. Among Turkish-Belgian participants, those who have a non-Muslim partner were found to have lower levels of cultural maintenance, while those who have a Muslim partner show higher levels of worship.

# 6

## **Identity multiplicity among the second generation: Compatible or conflicting patterns of ethno-religious and civic identification?**

This chapter is under review as  
Fleischmann, F., & Phalet, K, Compatible or conflicting? The role of  
perceived discrimination in the identification patterns of the Turkish  
and Moroccan second generation in Europe.





## 6.1 Introduction

How do ethnic and religious minorities integrate multiple social identities into particular patterns of identification? This paper aims to find out under what conditions ethnic and religious minority identities are compatible or conflicting with national and city identities shared with the majority population. To this end, the study exploits recently gathered large-scale survey data from different intergroup settings in several major European cities. We study the local-born children of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, the so-called second generation, in Antwerp, Brussels, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Stockholm. The second generation differs from the majority population of their birth countries in terms of their ethnicity and religion since most Turkish and Moroccan immigrants self-categorise and practically all are externally labelled as Muslims. However, being born and raised in European cities and holding citizenship of European countries, these youngsters have also developed a sense of belonging to the country and city where they live. We ask how the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in Europe deals with this identity multiplicity (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005; Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008) and focus on the associations between ethnic, religious, national and city identities.

This study goes beyond existing research and theories in several ways. Firstly, extending experimental studies of relatively benign intergroup relations between artificial groups, we take a rather under-researched minority perspective in a politically salient intergroup context by studying Muslim minorities in Europe. Secondly, looking beyond more commonly studied dualistic ingroup/outgroup relations, we analyse identity multiplicity. In particular, our focus is on patterns of associations between and the diverse forms of coexistence of different categories of identification rather than on absolute levels of identification with certain categories. Thirdly, by connecting conflict between identification with subgroup and superordinate identities with perceptions of discrimination, we complement the well-known rejection-identification model (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001) with a more novel rejection-disidentification path (cf. Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, & Solheim, 2009; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Finally, rather than positing inherent conflict between specific cultural contents of relevant identity categories, we take a contextual approach to social identity as anchored in relatively stable group positions and power relations in society (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). To this end we examine objective group positions and perceived intergroup relations in distinct intergroup settings as explanations for contextual variation in patterns of identification.

Our main research interest is in the perceived compatibility or conflict of ethnic and religious subgroup identities with superordinate national and city identities (see Deaux, 2008, for a similar approach). We ask under what conditions young Turkish and Moroccan Muslims are able to combine ethnic and religious attachments with

attachment at the city and national level. National and city identities are superordinate categories of identification (in the sense of self-categorisation theory, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), shared by the second generation and the majority population. Looking across cities, we expect varying degrees of inclusion or exclusion of the ethnic and religious subgroup identities of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in national and city identities as a consequence of varying group positions and intergroup relations.

### **Identity performance in the context of multiple identities**

Applying existing theoretical insights to the study of identification patterns among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in Europe raises new theoretical problems. The main reason is that the usual dichotomy between ingroup and outgroup that is applied throughout the acculturation and intergroup literature falls short in accounting for identity multiplicity of the second generation. For the Turkish and Moroccan second generation who is born and raised in North-Western European countries, the Dutch, the Belgians and the Swedish are not simply outgroups. Instead, ethnically and religiously defined minority groups, such as the Turkish and Moroccan second generation, and the majority population constitute subgroups within superordinate national and city identities. In other words, children of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants for instance in Amsterdam, while distinguished by a different ethnic and religious subgroup identity, are Amsterdammers and Dutch just like children of native-born parents. However, they might not be accepted as such by the majority population if the latter claims exclusive ownership of the superordinate national and city identities.

The majority population thus is a relevant reference group from which the second generation seeks recognition of their shared membership in superordinate national and city categories (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007). This social validation of their dual identity by the majority group is necessary for the second generation in order to feel secure about their dual identity as ethnic and religious minorities within larger and more diverse civic categories. From the perspective of social identity performance, we argue that acknowledgement of the dual identity of the second generation by the powerful majority population is a requirement for psychological compatibility of subgroup and superordinate identities. Conversely, conflict between these categories of identification does not arise from cognitive incompatibility of different identities in the minds of Muslim minorities, rather it results from a social reality in which the dual identity of these minorities is not validated by the majority group (Klein et al., 2007; see also Kamans, Gordijn, Oldenhuis, & Otten, 2009, on the stigmatisation of Moroccan identity in the Netherlands).

## Perceived discrimination and conflicting vs. compatible patterns of identification

It is well established that perceived discrimination often leads to increased identification with the rejected category (Branscombe et al., 1999; Jetten et al., 2001), particularly if the discrimination targeted the individual rather than the group (Bourguignon, Selon, & Yzerbyt, 2006). In addition, recent research shows that perceived discrimination might also lead to lower identification or even disidentification with superordinate categories, such as national identity (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Experiencing discrimination by the majority group due to one's minority status highlights to minorities that their status is not equal to that of the majority members. In light of pervasive anti-discrimination norms in Europe (Simon, 2005), unfair treatment is a blatant violation of this norm that supposedly applies at the societal level. Personally experiencing that this norm is violated by the powerful majority might lead minority members to devaluing the majority group, and to distancing themselves from civic categories if they are dominated by the devalued majority.

Thus, we analyse whether perceived discrimination is associated with decreased compatibility and increased conflict between valued subgroup identities and socially integrating superordinate identities of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation. Although the Turkish and Moroccan second generation is expected to experience some degree of discrimination due to their status as ethnic and religious minorities in all contexts, varying levels of perceived discrimination are expected to account for differential patterns of identification across local intergroup contexts.

As a first approach to the compatibility of different categories of identification, the dual identity model (Dovidio, Validzic, & Gaertner, 1998; González & Brown, 2006) relates compatibility of subgroup and superordinate identities to intergroup situations that promote identification with a superordinate category while simultaneously acknowledging and embracing distinct subgroup identities. Threats to the identity of subgroups, in particular distinctiveness threat posed by assimilationist pressures, complicate identification with superordinate categories, by invoking a conflict between subgroup and superordinate identities (Hornsey & Hogg, 1999, 2000a, 2000b). Hence, we expect that for the Turkish and Moroccan second generation, subgroup and superordinate identities will be more compatible in contexts where identification with superordinate national and city identities leaves room for identification with ethnic and religious subgroup identities.

The second approach, social dominance theory (SDT; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) predicts a negative relationship between subgroup and superordinate identities for subordinate groups, due to the societal oppression they face in intergroup hierarchies. Conflicting patterns of association between subgroup and superordinate identities develop among subordinate groups because identification with the superordinate category

implies acceptance of the current status-quo which devalues the ingroup. Subordinate status in intergroup hierarchies thus constitutes a chronic identity threat for subordinate subgroups that struggle with a low status position and are excluded from superordinate categories of identification. Applied to our research context, the predictions of social dominance theory highlight the status-based identity threat posed by social exclusion and discrimination of Turkish and Moroccan minorities by the majority population. Hence, more conflicting correlations between subordinate ethnic and religious identities and superordinate national and city identities are expected in contexts where the Turkish and Moroccan second generation faces more social disadvantage and more discriminatory or hostile treatment.

### **Intergroup evaluations and the compatibility of subgroup and superordinate identities**

Research on intergroup relations between subgroups within a superordinate category often focuses on ingroup bias as an outcome of intergroup comparisons. According to self-categorisation theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987), intergroup comparisons always occur against the backdrop of a superordinate category of identification in which different subgroups are included; this superordinate category accordingly sets the standard to which subgroups are compared. Such intergroup comparisons are used by group members to establish positive distinctiveness of their ingroup and thus satisfy their need for a positive social identity, as posited by social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). As a consequence, when making intergroup comparisons, individuals often evaluate ingroups more favourably than outgroups, i.e., they display ingroup bias.

However, research has shown that ingroup bias does not result automatically from the cognitive process of self-categorisation as an ingroup member, but is mainly connected to evaluative dimensions of identification (Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999). As Jackson (2002) showed, evaluative identification leads to biased perceptions in the presence of intergroup conflict due to outgroup derogation, rather than increasing ingroup favouritism. Going beyond the ingroup-outgroup dichotomy in the context of identity multiplicity among the second generation, we predict that perceived discrimination will go together with a less positive evaluation of the majority, while it should not be related to the evaluation of minority groups (cf. Jackson, 2002). The differential evaluation of majority and minority groups that results from the perception of discrimination might thus mediate the relation between perceived discrimination and identification, by increasing identification with minority subgroup identities (the established rejection-identification pathway) and simultaneously decreasing identification with the derogated majority (the novel rejection-disidentification pathway).

## Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical framework outlined above, we expect that perceived discrimination will be associated with conflict between subgroup and superordinate identities and with the derogation of majority groups. Because the majority population is generally perceived to be the source of discriminatory experiences of ethnic and religious minorities, we expect that higher levels of perceived discrimination will lead to the derogation of the majority, without affecting the evaluation of the minority. Conversely, more similar evaluations of minority and majority groups and greater compatibility of ethnic and religious subgroup and national and city superordinate identities among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation are expected in contexts where perceived discrimination is lower.

Before putting these hypotheses to an empirical test, we introduce the groups under study: the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in several European cities. Their multiple social identities include, among others, ethnic and religious subgroup identities, and superordinate identities in the form of attachment to the nations and cities where they live. The inclusion of city identity as a superordinate category of identification is a novel contribution of this study and we discuss in the following why it is useful for the analysis of identity multiplicity among the second generation.

## Nations and cities as superordinate categories of identification

In contrast to the US and other classic immigration countries, European national identities have strong ethnic connotations and this has been described as an obstacle to the construction and maintenance of hyphenated identities among the second generation (Thomson & Crul, 2007). As a result of historical homogenisation processes, national identities in Europe are dominated by ethnically white and traditionally Christian majority populations and are less inclusive of recently arrived immigrant minorities. This is particularly true for Muslims, who are widely portrayed as 'dangerous others' in public opinion and in the media and distrusted by majority populations in Europe (Modood, 2003; Parekh, 2008; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Thus, Alba (2005) has argued that Islam in Europe functions as a 'bright boundary' between the majority group and minorities in a similar way as race functions in the US. Due to the ethnic connotations of European national identities and the role of Islam as a bright boundary marker, we expect that identification with the nation of residence will be in conflict with both the ethnic identity and in particular with the religious identity of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation.

However, while identification with European nations might be problematic for the second generation, cities as sites of enhanced diversity can be an alternative superordinate category of identification to which the children of immigrants develop a sense of belonging (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, & Waters, 2002). Europe's cities are characterised by a higher level

of diversity than their rural hinterland and often have a cosmopolitan outlook. Indeed, migration to Europe is mainly an urban phenomenon and most Muslims are concentrated in urban areas (Dassetto, 2003). Because of the economic opportunities they offer to immigrants, cities are sites of minority concentration and thus constitute an appropriate level of analysis for the study of immigrant integration in Europe (Body-Gendrot & Martiniello, 2000). Due to the concentration of diversity in cities, dominant groups cannot claim exclusive 'ownership' of the city identity (Sassen, 1999). We therefore hypothesise that city identity as superordinate category of identification will be more compatible with the ethnic and religious subgroup identities of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation than European national identities.

### **The Turkish and Moroccan second generation in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden**

Turkish and Moroccan immigrants came to Belgium and the Netherlands as labour migrants and later through processes of family reunification and formation. In both countries, the Turkish and Moroccan communities are the most important Muslim immigrant groups to date and as such figure prominently in public debates on immigration and integration particularly after '9/11' (Lesthaeghe, 2000; Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000). In the Swedish context, the immigrant population is highly diverse in ethnic and religious terms (Sander, 1990) because most immigrants arriving in Sweden are refugees (Corman, 2008). Moreover, the group of immigrants who are born in Turkey and their Swedish-born children is highly internally diverse and includes substantial shares of minorities like Kurds and Assyrians who came as political refugees. While the Kurds are mostly Sunni or Alevi Muslims, the Assyrians are Orthodox Christians (Sander, 1993). Participants of Assyrian origin were therefore excluded from our analysis.

The contexts of reception that are compared in this paper differ in a number of respects. Both the Netherlands and Sweden have been pioneers in developing and implementing multicultural policies of immigrant integration (Entzinger, 2001; Johansson, 2008; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). These policies include the possibility to create state-funded Islamic schools as one example of a range of policy measures aimed to support ethnic minorities in maintaining their heritage culture, language and religion (Doomernik, 1995; Johansson, 1999). Policy approaches towards immigrant integration in Belgium have been more recently developed and less effectively implemented due to the federal structure of the state and dispersed competencies over federal, regional and local levels of government (Jacobs, 2000; Martiniello, 2003). On the whole, Belgian policies targeting immigrants and ethnic minorities have been less imprinted by the ideals of multiculturalism than in the case of the Netherlands and Sweden. However, in the aftermath of the 2002 national elections in the Netherlands, immigration and integration policies have become much stricter following the more assimilationist turn in public discourse (Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005).

## 6.2 Data and method

### Participants

Our analysis draws on survey data from the TIES-project (The Integration of the European Second generation). This project aims to investigate acculturation among comparison samples of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in 15 major cities in 8 European countries. All participants were born in the countries where they were interviewed and their age ranged between 18 and 35 years. We use the TIES-surveys from Belgium (Antwerp and Brussels; CESO-CSCP, 2008, TIES07-08-Belgium), the Netherlands (Amsterdam and Rotterdam; NIDI-IMES, 2007, TIES06-07-Netherlands, 2007) and Sweden (Stockholm; CEIFO, 2008, TIES08-Sweden) in our analysis.<sup>1</sup> The Turkish<sup>2</sup> second generation was sampled in all five cities, but no Moroccan sample is available in the Swedish data.

### Measures

**Identification.** The four categories of identification – religious (Muslim), ethnic (Turkish/Moroccan), national (Belgian<sup>3</sup>/Dutch/Swedish) and city identification – were measured with the question: “How strongly do you feel you belong to the following groups? To what extent do you feel...?” (1) Belgian/Dutch/Swedish, (2) Amsterdammer/Stockholmare/ etc., (3) Turkish/Moroccan, (4) Muslim. Participants could indicate their degree of identification on a 5-point scale ranging (after recoding) from 1 (*very weakly*) to 5 (*very strongly*). Participants who indicated that the target category of identification did not apply to them or who rejected a category were assigned a 0 on the relevant category.<sup>4</sup>

**Perceived discrimination.** Experiences of personal discrimination were rated on a 5-point frequency scale ranging from 1 (*never*) to 5 (*frequently*). The question runs “Have you ever experienced hostility or unfair treatment towards you because of your origin or background, either as a child or later in life?”

**Group evaluations.** Group evaluations were assessed using a feeling thermometer. Participants indicated the ‘warmth’ of their feelings towards Turks or Moroccans (depending on their ethnicity) and towards the national group of the survey country (Belgians, Dutch, Swedes) on a scale between 0 (*cold*) and 100 (*warm*). We opted for two separate measures instead of one combined indicator of evaluative bias as this allows us to examine whether perceived discrimination affects feelings towards nationals, towards co-ethnics or towards both, which cannot be disentangled when using a bias score.<sup>5</sup>

**Controls.** Gender (female dummy), age (in years) and education are included as control variables. Education refers to the highest level completed or currently attended if participants are still in full-time education and is measured with three categories: less than full secondary, full secondary or post-secondary, and any tertiary. Two dummies



were created with full secondary as a reference category. Two measures are used to assess local social contexts: living in a working-class neighbourhood and the presence of co-ethnics in the neighbourhood.<sup>6</sup> Participants were asked to rate the neighbourhood they currently live in; a dummy variable is computed distinguishing working-class (1) from middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods (0). Moreover, participants estimated the share of their ethnic ingroup (Turkish or Moroccan) of the total population of the neighbourhood on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*almost nobody is of the same ethnic origin*) to 7 (*almost everyone is of the same ethnic origin*). Table 6.1 provides descriptive information about all included variables.

## Method

Multi-group structural equation modelling is used to estimate parallel models for 9 groups: the Turkish second generation in all five cities and the Moroccan second generation in all cities except Stockholm. The advantage of this method is that we can test whether correlations and regression coefficients are the same or differ statistically across groups by including equality constraints.<sup>7</sup> Our research interest concerns the correlations between four categories of identification and how these are affected by the variables described above. These correlations are computed in structural equation models by correlating the errors of these four identification variables. Subsequently, explanatory variables and controls are included by drawing paths from each control variable to each of the four identification variables and it is assessed whether the inclusion of these variables affects the magnitude, sign and significance of the correlations between categories of identification. The set-up of the analytical model thus follows the logic of graphical chain modelling (Cox & Wermuth, 1993) where the aim is to ‘explain away’ associations on the dependent side by including indicators at the independent side. We should emphasise, however, that the cross-sectional nature of our data does not allow us to establish the order of causality connecting group positions, perceived discrimination and identification patterns. We do not perceive this to be particularly problematic since there are probably many feedback loops connecting these variables, for instance, perceived discrimination can affect identification which in turn can affect the perception of discrimination (cf. Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). Rather than trying to establish a strict causal order, we exploit the large contextual variation in identification patterns in order to find out why Muslim and Turkish or Moroccan ethnic identities are negatively correlated with national and city identities in some cases and positively in others.

**Table 6.1** Descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis: Means (standard deviations) per group and city

	Range	Antwerp (N = 358)		Brussels (N = 250)		Amsterdam (N = 237)		Rotterdam (N = 263)		Stockholm (N = 151)	
		Turks	Moroccans	Turks	Moroccans	Turks	Moroccans	Turks	Moroccans	Turks	Moroccans
<b>Identification</b>											
Ethnic	0/5	4.15 (1.26)	3.87 (1.46)	3.91 (1.44)	3.99 (1.36)	4.05 (1.14)	4.14 (0.95)	4.19 (0.97)	4.03 (0.97)	3.93 (1.01)	
Religious	0/5	4.06 (1.39)	4.18 (1.33)	3.16 (1.92)	4.12 (1.46)	4.02 (1.23)	4.18 (1.15)	4.22 (1.17)	4.27 (1.04)	3.75 (1.46)	
National	0/5	2.37 (1.90)	2.80 (1.84)	2.98 (1.71)	2.94 (1.78)	3.19 (1.17)	3.27 (1.23)	3.02 (1.21)	3.24 (1.14)	3.01 (1.36)	
City	0/5	2.95 (1.79)	3.17 (1.73)	2.91 (1.88)	3.28 (1.63)	3.74 (1.17)	3.90 (1.00)	3.69 (1.21)	3.96 (1.07)	3.70 (1.34)	
<b>Explanatory variables</b>											
Perceived discrimination	1/5	2.01 (1.05)	2.29 (1.13)	1.98 (0.98)	2.22 (1.10)	1.88 (1.10)	1.77 (1.04)	1.88 (1.12)	1.97 (1.06)	1.88 (1.05)	
Feelings towards Turks/Moroccans	0/100	78.94 (19.52)	73.65 (20.07)	77.89 (23.78)	69.10 (24.64)	74.69 (24.64)	74.65 (22.93)	70.56 (21.32)	71.70 (22.16)	74.49 (21.97)	
Feelings towards country/nationals	0/100	72.53 (19.31)	69.73 (17.91)	73.45 (23.21)	65.95 (20.94)	66.17 (25.12)	67.98 (23.69)	63.64 (20.65)	67.67 (20.55)	71.87 (23.03)	
<b>Controls</b>											
Female	0/1	0.50	0.62	0.36	0.49	0.54	0.51	0.49	0.49	0.46	
Age	18/35	25.9 (4.67)	26.3 (4.81)	25.7 (5.20)	26.1 (5.20)	24.5 (4.31)	23.9 (4.33)	24.8 (4.45)	22.9 (4.09)	26.0 (4.71)	
Education: low	0/1	0.34	0.21	0.37	0.23	0.28	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.08	
Education: middle	0/1	0.49	0.62	0.39	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.42	0.48	0.56	
Education: high	0/1	0.17	0.17	0.24	0.34	0.29	0.31	0.27	0.27	0.36	
Living in working-class neighbourhood	0/1	0.41	0.42	0.34	0.28	0.37	0.42	0.50	0.64	0.18	
% Ingroup in the neighbourhood	1/7	3.07 (1.39)	3.52 (1.37)	3.82 (1.47)	4.18 (1.41)	2.96 (1.19)	3.59 (1.43)	3.22 (1.32)	3.18 (1.11)	2.34 (1.45)	

Note. No standard deviations shown for dichotomous variables.

## 6.3 Results

### Describing identification patterns

Before analysing the relations between ethnic, religious, national and city identification, we briefly describe the mean levels of identification per group and city. The upper part of Table 6.1 shows that, in general, ethnic and religious identifications are significantly higher than national and city identifications, and that identification with the city is significantly higher in all cases than identification with the nation. Compared to Turks, Moroccans identify significantly more strongly as Muslims and with the city of residence. National identification is lowest in Belgium, where the mean levels are even below the midpoint of the scale, indicating prevalent disidentification. National identification in the Swedish sample is at the midpoint and above the midpoint in the Dutch samples.

Mean levels of ethnic, religious, national and city identity leave open the question of how these four categories of identification are associated, i.e., whether they are in conflict, mutually reinforcing, or unrelated. We therefore calculated partial correlations between the four categories of identification, controlling for gender, age and education.<sup>8</sup> Table 6.2 shows the six resulting partial correlations per group and city. Since the magnitude of the correlations is not large in some cases, we formally tested for each correlation whether it is significantly different from 0; non-significant correlations were set to 0 if this did not result in a significant deterioration of model fit as indicated by a  $\chi^2$ -test between constrained and unconstrained models. As a consequence, even despite the modest magnitude of the shown

**Table 6.2** Correlations between four categories of identification per group and city before inclusion of explanatory variables

	National-city	National-ethnic	National-Muslim	City-Ethnic	City-Muslim	Ethnic-Muslim
Turks in Antwerp	0.307 ***	0	0	0	0	0.550 ***
Moroccans in Antwerp	0.348 ***	0.105 ***	0	0.199 ***	0.199 ***	0.497 ***
Turks in Brussels	0.302 ***	0.114 ***	0	0.181 ***	0.131 ***	0.452 ***
Moroccans in Brussels	0.385 ***	0.115 ***	0	0.216 ***	0.187 ***	0.527 ***
Turks in Amsterdam	0.323 ***	-0.185 ***	-0.210 ***	0	0	0.533 ***
Moroccans in Amsterdam	0.521 ***	-0.217 ***	-0.219 ***	0	0	0.549 ***
Turks in Rotterdam	0.317 ***	0	0	0	0	0.645 ***
Moroccans in Rotterdam	0.440 ***	0	0	0	0	0.441 ***
Turks in Stockholm	0.304 ***	-0.186 ***	-0.154 ***	0	0	0.383 ***

Note. Correlations are estimated while controlling for gender, age and education.

correlations, we may conclude that the correlations shown in Table 6.2 are significantly different from 0 and hence cannot be considered 'random noise'. Across all groups, we observe that national and city identification are positively and significantly correlated, as are ethnic and religious identification. Our research interest, however, is in the correlations connecting ethnic and religious subgroup identities to superordinate national and city identities. These vary greatly across contexts as we find negative, positive as well as non-significant correlations. Despite minor variations in magnitude and significance levels, these correlations can be summarised into three distinct patterns of identification.

In a first pattern, we observe negative correlations between national identification and religious (and sometimes ethnic) identification, with non-significant correlations between city and subgroup identities. This conflict pattern occurs among the Turks and Moroccans in Amsterdam and the Turks in Stockholm. Notably, these are the contexts in which national identification is relatively high, as compared to the Belgian samples. Thus for these groups there is tension between their subgroup identities and the national identity of their country of residence: the more they feel Muslim (and Turkish/Moroccan), the less they identify as Dutch or Swedish, while both categories of identification are important in line with relatively high mean levels.

A second pattern displaying compatibility of subgroup and superordinate identities is found among Moroccans in Antwerp and Brussels as well as Turks in Brussels. Note that national identification is particularly low in these contexts. Here we find positive correlations between city, and less frequently national, identity on the one hand and religious and ethnic identities on the other. For members of these groups, Turkish/Moroccan and Muslim identities and city and national identities thus mutually reinforce one another: the more they feel Muslim and Turkish/Moroccan, the more they feel a sense of belonging to the city and country where they live.

The last identification pattern can be described as compartmentalisation and it is found among the Turks in Antwerp as well as the Turks and Moroccans in Rotterdam. Here we find no significant correlations connecting subgroup and superordinate identities such that variations in ethnic or religious identity are decoupled from variations in national or city identity. In other words, whether the Turkish and Moroccan second generation has a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic and religious identity is not related to their identification with the city and country of residence.

Comparing the conflict and compatibility patterns, it is striking that negative correlations of subgroup identities are always related to national identity in contexts of relatively high national identification, while positive correlations are always tied to the city identity. The contrast between national and city identities is in line with the idea that European national identities are less compatible with Muslim religious and Turkish and Moroccan ethnic identities in contrast to more compatible city identities. However, we never find negative correlations with national identity and positive correlations with

city identity in the same group and in three cases, neither correlation is significant. Thus our results at best indicate a trend towards more compatibility of ethnic and religious minority identities with city rather than with national identities.

Since the description in terms of three distinct patterns glosses over minor differences across groups within one pattern, we formally tested the distinction between the three patterns and the uniformity within patterns by constraining the four correlations between subgroup and superordinate categories to be equal within each pattern. Compared to an unconstrained model where the correlations are estimated uniquely for each group, the model with three patterns fits the data equally well ( $\Delta\chi^2$  28.856 with 24 *df*,  $p = .226$ ). In contrast, a model that imposes one common pattern (i.e., all correlations are constrained to be equal across all groups) has a significantly worse fit.

### Explaining differences in identification patterns

In order to test which aspects of local intergroup contexts are associated with a particular pattern of identification of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation, we entered our main explanatory variables, while controlling for gender, age, education and neighbourhood composition. Initially, coefficients are estimated without constraints for each group. As the coefficients in the final model were found to be similar across all groups (although magnitude and significance levels differ), a second model was estimated where all coefficients are constrained to be equal across all groups. This model has an acceptable fit (with  $\chi^2$  (697,  $N = 2,321$ ) = 1704.497,  $\chi^2/df = 2.44$ , CFI = 0.801, RMSEA = 0.025, AIC = 2740.497).<sup>9</sup> The results we present are based on this most parsimonious constrained model.

Table 6.3a shows the regression coefficients of the explanatory variables on the four categories of identification. In line with the rejection-identification hypothesis, higher levels of perceived discrimination go together with higher levels of Muslim identification. Moreover and in line with our rejection-disidentification hypothesis, national identification is lower where the Turkish and Moroccan second generation perceives more personal discrimination. Hence, we find that higher levels of perceived discrimination are associated with more conflict between subgroup and superordinate categories of identification, whereas these categories of identification are more compatible where discrimination is absent. Despite these significant effects, the inclusion of these explanatory variables leads to a change in identification patterns of only one group: among the Turks in Stockholm, the previously negative correlation between national and Muslim identification is no longer significant, so that this group effectively shifts patterns from a conflict to a compartmentalisation pattern.

When we include feelings towards Turks/Moroccans and towards the majority as most proximal predictors of identification and as partial mediator of perceived discrimination, we find that having more positive feelings towards Turks or Moroccans is

**Table 6.3a** Regression coefficients of explanatory variables on four categories of identification (standard errors in parentheses)

	National identity	City identity	Ethnic identity	Muslim identity
<b>Explanatory variables</b>				
Perceived discrimination	-0.079 (0.027) **	Ns.	Ns.	0.057 (0.025) *
Direct effect	-0.079	Ns.	Ns.	0.057
Indirect effect through group evaluations	-0.049	Ns.	Ns.	0.010
Total effect	-0.127	Ns.	Ns.	0.067
Feelings towards Turks/Moroccans	-0.014 (0.002) ***	-0.007 (0.001) ***	0.017 (0.001) ***	0.018 (0.001) ***
Feelings towards survey country nationals	0.022 (0.002) ***	0.010 (0.002) ***	-0.009 (0.001) ***	-0.009 (0.001) ***
<b>Controls</b>				
Living in a working class neighbourhood	-0.198 (0.063) **	Ns.	Ns.	Ns.
% Ingroup in the neighbourhood	Ns.	Ns.	Ns.	0.091 (0.021) ***
Female	Ns.	Ns.	Ns.	Ns.
Age	Ns.	Ns.	Ns.	Ns.
Education: low	Ns.	Ns.	Ns.	Ns.
Education: middle	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Reference</i>
Education: high	0.747 (0.250) **	Ns.	Ns.	Ns.


**Table 6.3b** Regression coefficients of perceived discrimination on group evaluations (standard errors between parentheses)

	Feelings towards survey country nationals	Feelings towards Turks/Moroccans
Perceived discrimination	-2.742 (0.418) ***	Ns.

associated with higher levels of subgroup identification and lower levels of superordinate identification. In parallel, holding the majority in higher esteem is associated with higher levels of superordinate group identification and lower levels of subgroup identification.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, feelings towards the majority, but not towards Turks/Moroccans, are affected by perceived discrimination and partly mediate the relation between perceived discrimination and identification. Higher levels of perceived discrimination lead to more negative feelings towards the majority, which strengthens the negative relation between perceived discrimination and superordinate identification (the rejection-disidentification path) and the positive relation between perceived discrimination and subgroup identification (the rejection-identification path).<sup>11</sup> The direct, indirect and total effects of perceived discrimination on the four categories of identification are shown in Table 6.3a while Table

6.3b shows the coefficients of the path from perceived discrimination to group evaluations. Figure 6.1 schematically depicts the partial mediation of the relation between perceived discrimination and identification through feelings towards the majority.

Once feelings towards the majority are introduced as a partial mediator of the relation between perceived discrimination and identification, several shifts in the identification patterns of groups are observed. Table 6.4 shows the correlations between the four categories of identification after the inclusion of all explanatory variables. Again, we set non-significant correlations to 0 if this did not result in significantly worse model fit. As a consequence, even despite the modest magnitude of the shown correlations, we may conclude that all correlations shown in Table 6.4 are significantly different from 0 and hence cannot be considered ‘random noise’. The most dramatic shift occurs among the



**Figure 6.1** Path model with direct and indirect relations between identity threat and subgroup and superordinate identity.

**Table 6.4** Correlations between four categories of identification per group and city after including explanatory variables

	National-city	National-ethnic	National-Muslim	City-Ethnic	City-Muslim	Ethnic-Muslim
Turks in Antwerp	0.286 ***	0	0	0	0	0.485 ***
Moroccans in Antwerp	0.328 ***	0.133 **	0	0.270 ***	0.176 **	0.457 ***
Turks in Brussels	0.281 ***	0.172 **	0.145 *	0.179 **	0.308 ***	0.474 ***
Moroccans in Brussels	0.384 ***	0.128 *	0	0.214 ***	0.177 **	0.514 ***
Turks in Amsterdam	0.274 ***	0	0	0.172 **	0	0.469 ***
Moroccans in Amsterdam	0.500 ***	-0.242 ***	-0.202 **	0	0	0.562 ***
Turks in Rotterdam	0.279 ***	0	0	0.110 *	0.126 *	0.600 ***
Moroccans in Rotterdam	0.397 ***	0	0	0.137 *	0	0.377 ***
Turks in Stockholm	0.307 ***	0	0	0	0	0.301 ***

Note. The correlations are controlled for gender, age and education and the explanatory variables listed in Tables 6.3a and 6.3b.



Turks in Amsterdam, where the previously negative correlations between national and ethnic as well as religious identification become non-significant; moreover, a positive correlation between city and ethnic identification is now found. This group thus shifts from a conflict pattern to a compatibility pattern. Among the Turks and Moroccans in Rotterdam, where we previously found a compartmentalisation pattern, positive correlations between national and ethnic and/or between city and ethnic and religious identification are found, such that these groups also shift to a pattern of compatible subgroup and superordinate identities. In the three groups in which a compatibility pattern was observed from the start, to name the Moroccans in Antwerp and Brussels and the Turks in Brussels, we find increases in magnitude and significance of the positive correlations between subgroup and superordinate identities such that the compatibility of these categories of identity is effectively enhanced in these groups. Among the Turks in Antwerp, we still observe compartmentalisation, i.e., no significant correlations are found between subgroup and superordinate identities, as is the case among Turks in Stockholm after including all predictors. Only in one case, the Moroccans in Amsterdam, negative correlations between national and ethnic as well as religious identity remain after inclusion of all explanatory variables. Hence, with this one exception, the explanatory model has succeeded in 'explaining away' conflicting relations between subgroup and superordinate identities and identifying factors that increase their compatibility.<sup>12</sup>

Regarding our control variables, we find that living in a working-class neighbourhood is associated with lower identification with the nation of residence. Moreover, the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood is related to identification such that religious subgroup identification is higher in neighbourhoods with more co-ethnics.<sup>13</sup> There are no significant age and gender differences in levels of identification. However, more highly educated members of the second generation have higher levels of national identification and they tend to identify more with the city as well (although the effect fails to reach significance). Since identification is related to superordinate, but not subgroup identification, it does not influence conflict or compatibility of subgroup and superordinate identities. On the other hand, higher levels of socio-economic and ethnic residential segregation are found to go together with stronger subgroup and weaker superordinate identification, rendering national and Muslim identities less compatible. However, taking these characteristics of local social contexts into account does not affect the identification patterns, i.e., the correlations between the four categories of identification remain of similar magnitude and keep their sign.

## 6.4 Discussion and conclusion

The analysis of the patterns of association between multiple categories of identification among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation revealed three different identification patterns. Making use of contextual variation from cross-national surveys, this study

showed that ethnic and religious subgroup identities are in conflict with superordinate national and city identities in some contexts, while they are compatible or unrelated in others. Our findings make clear that there is no inherent conflict between the contents of specific identities, in particular Muslim and national identity in North-Western European societies. Instead our findings support a contextual approach to the study of social identities that analyses in which contexts and why different identities are positively or negatively associated.

In this respect, our analysis showed that after controlling for basic socio-demographic characteristics and neighbourhood contexts, the perception of personal discrimination was associated with more conflict between subgroup and superordinate identities. Thus higher levels of perceived discrimination confront the Turkish and Moroccan second generation with the dilemma of choosing between their ethnic and religious attachments and identifying with their city and nation of residence: the more they feel Muslim and Turkish/Moroccan, the less they feel a sense of belonging to the nation and city where they live. On the other hand, in contexts where perceived discrimination is low, the Turkish and Moroccan second generation does not experience conflict between ethnic, religious, national and city identities; rather these identities are perfectly compatible and mutually reinforcing. These findings are in line with predictions derived from the dual identity model (Dovidio et al., 1998; González & Brown, 2006) and they show in which contexts dual identities can be maintained by members of minority groups.

The conflicting pattern of associations between subgroup and superordinate identities in the presence of perceived discrimination resulted from enhanced identification with subgroups as well as disidentification with superordinate categories. Perceived discrimination was not only positively related to identification with religious and ethnic subgroups, but was additionally negatively related to identification with national and city superordinate identities. Thus, in the context of multiple identities among the second generation, we do not only find evidence for well-known rejection-identification mechanisms (Branscombe et al., 1999; Jetten et al., 2001). The positive association between perceived discrimination and ethnic and religious identification suggests that the Turkish and Moroccan second generation increases identification with their minority ingroups in order to buffer against the negative effects of discrimination. In addition, our analysis establishes a less studied parallel process of disidentification with superordinate categories as a reaction to perceived discrimination. This rejection-disidentification path towards conflicting identities has not been analysed so far in the context of identity multiplicity among the second generation. As Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) have shown, disidentification is not the opposite of high identification on a continuum from more to less identification, but is a distinct concept expressing active dissociation from a particular category of identification. Our analysis thus documents a dual pathway towards conflicting subgroup and superordinate identities through, on the one hand, enhanced identification

with minority subgroups and, on the other hand, disidentification with superordinate categories in reaction to perceived discrimination.

In addition to direct effects of perceived discrimination on levels of identification, we found partial mediation through the evaluation of the majority population. In cities where the Turkish and Moroccan second generation perceives more discrimination, they hold less positive feelings towards the majority, which in turn is associated with enhanced conflict between subgroup and superordinate identities. However, the effect of perceived discrimination on group evaluations was one-sided as the feelings towards Turks or Moroccans were not affected by perceived discrimination. This one-sided effect of perceived discrimination on majority group evaluation is in line with the findings by Jackson (2002) who shows that intergroup conflict affects the evaluation of outgroups, but not of ingroups. Furthermore, it can be explained by the reactivity of intergroup attitudes among minority groups. Their attitudes towards the majority are considerably influenced by metaperceptions, i.e., by how they think the majority thinks about them (Frey & Tropp, 2006). Experiencing lack of acceptance or outright rejection will lead to devaluing the powerful majority group, rather than affecting the evaluation of the minority ingroup. Similarly, it can be argued from self-categorisation theory that experiences of discrimination among minorities show that the majority is violating its own norm of equal treatment, which will lead to a less positive evaluation of the norm-violating group. Our findings concerning the association between perceived discrimination and evaluative bias are in line with experimental research showing that identity threat results in increased bias (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) and with discourse studies showing that identity threat leads to the derogation of outgroups (Klein & Licata, 2003).

While our findings are consistent with the literature on rejection-identification and the effects of identity threat on intergroup evaluations, our study goes beyond existing theoretical approaches in several ways. First of all, we take a minority perspective that is much less common than a focus on majority groups. Secondly, instead of studying dualistic ingroup-outgroup situations using experimentally created groups, we analysed identity multiplicity among natural groups in a highly salient political context. Where studies based on experimentally created groups, as well as readily available but often less meaningful natural groups, raise questions about external validity – in particular regarding the question of how important these group identities are for participants' behaviour and self-concepts outside the laboratory – there is no question that ethnic and religious identities are salient and meaningful for Turks and Moroccans in Europe (cf. Saroglou & Mathijssen, 2007; Verkuyten, 2007). However, despite their ethnic and religious distinctiveness that sets them apart from the majority population, the local-born second generation has a dual identity as citizens of the cities and nations in which they grew up and live their lives. The simultaneous presence of these subgroup and superordinate identities means that an ingroup-outgroup dichotomy is problematic when studying identification patterns among

the second generation. Although research on identity multiplicity is an emerging field (e.g., Roccas & Brewer, 2002), most studies have a strong focus on cognitive aspects of multiple identification that make their approach less useful in the context under study. For instance, Roccas (2003) predicts and finds that individuals increase their identification with a high-status group if their multiple identities also contain lower-status groups in order to secure a positive social identity. Given the status differential between European majority populations and the Turkish and Moroccan second generation, this would suggest that the second generation opts for increased city and national identification and decreased ethnic and religious identification in reaction to the disadvantaged position of their ethnic and religious subgroups. This, however, is a very unlikely scenario, due to the fact that ethnic and religious identities are highly valued and not easily discarded by the second generation, and due to the reality constraints on such identity management strategies posed by the majority's (lack of) acceptance of minorities' dual identities.

Thirdly, we added identification with the city to more commonly studied national, ethnic and religious identities. Although city identity was found to be strongly related to national identity, differential relations to ethnic and religious subgroup identities were found. These provide some support for the idea that cities as sites of enhanced diversity are more open to the inclusion of minority identities than are more rigidly defined European national identities.

Despite these contributions, there are also some limitations to our study that should be discussed. First of all, the cross-sectional nature of our data does not allow us to make claims about causal relations between perceived discrimination, intergroup evaluations and identification patterns. However, our aim was to exploit the contextual differences from the cross-national surveys to find out how different intergroup relations relate to variations in identification patterns. Although future research in more controlled settings is necessary to establish the causal relations between perceived discrimination, intergroup evaluations and identification with multiple identities, our results provide support for the hypothesis that varying levels of perceived discrimination and associated intergroup evaluations can account for differential patterns of association between subgroup and superordinate identities. Our findings do not falsify this hypothesis and show its relevance in a real and salient intergroup context. Moreover, multi-item measures of identification would be a welcome addition to assess the reliability of our findings. However, we would like to argue that the single-item measures that we used provide a more conservative test of the associations between perceived discrimination, intergroup evaluations and identification.

To conclude, our study of identification patterns among young Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in Europe reveals the importance of perceived discrimination for the compatibility of ethnic and religious subgroup and national and city superordinate identities. We found that these categories of identification are more compatible where levels of perceived

discrimination were lower. Where the Turkish and Moroccan second generation perceived more discrimination, they held less positive feelings towards the majority and their ethnic and religious identities were more in conflict with national and city identification. Although the causal ordering of perceived discrimination, group evaluations and identification cannot be established with our cross-sectional data, we think it is plausible that young Muslims will distance themselves from the majority population if they feel discriminated against and, in such cases, they will strengthen their subgroup identity at the expense of superordinate categories of identification that are associated with the agents of the experienced discrimination. This finding also provides some starting points for policy makers who aim to avoid the dilemma of conflicting social identities among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in Europe: striving to combat discrimination could contribute to the development among young Muslims of a strong sense of belonging to the countries and cities where they live without confronting them with the dilemma of choosing between different conflicting identities.

## 6.5 Notes

1. Within the Swedish data, a subsample of participants of ethnic Turkish background is selected based on information about both parents' ethnicity (i.e., Turkish, Kurdish, Assyrian, Armenian, Other) provided by the participant. This is necessary as 25% of the Turkish-origin sample in Stockholm consists of Assyrians, a Christian Orthodox minority group in Turkey that came to Sweden as refugees. As they are not Muslims and many do not identify as Turkish, including these cases would bias our Swedish results. We control for differential sampling distributions across cities by controlling for age, gender and educational attainment in multivariate analyses. Finally, we focus on replicating associations and relative differences within cities and we do not aim to establish absolute levels of identification in the cities. Indeed, city differences in means should be interpreted with caution, since they are most vulnerable to both sampling and measurement biases (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997).
2. We use the terms Turks/Turkish and Moroccans/Moroccan to refer to the ethnic background of the participants, not to current nationality. As all participants to the TIES-survey were born in the country where they were interviewed, a large majority holds the citizenship of the survey country.
3. Flemish and Walloon identities are less relevant for minorities and are therefore not used in the Belgian case where national identity explicitly refers to identifying with Belgians.
4. In Belgium, 30.6% of the Turkish and 25.0% of the Moroccan second generation did not self-categorise as Belgians, 25.3% of the Turks and 18.3% of the Moroccans

indicated that the city identity did not apply to them, while only 7.2% of the Turkish and 8.6% of the Moroccan participants did not self-categorise as Turkish or Moroccan respectively and 14.1% of the Turks and 7.4% of the Moroccans did not self-categorise as Muslims. In the Netherlands, the percentages of participants indicating that a category of identification was not applicable or that they did not identify at all with the respective category are as follows: Dutch identity: 6.3% of the Turkish and 3.4% of the Moroccan participants; city identity: 3.7% of the Turkish and 1.4% of the Moroccan participants; ethnic identity: 2.1% of the Turkish and 1.0% of the Moroccans; religious identity: 2.7% of the Turkish and 1.0% of the Moroccan participants. In Sweden, 9.3% of the ethnically Turkish participants said that they do not identify at all as Swedish, 6.6% did not identify as Stockholm resident, 2.0% did not identify as Turkish and 7.3% did not identify as Muslim. These participants are all included in the analysis and were assigned a score of 0 on the relevant category of identification.

5. We also constructed a measure of intergroup evaluative bias by subtracting feelings towards survey country nationals from feelings towards Turks or Moroccans. Using the bias score instead of the two separate measures of group evaluation yields parallel results in terms of the mediating relationship with identification and threat (cf. *infra*).
6. In addition, we examined a number of indicators of socio-economic disadvantage, such as economic inactivity, unemployment and grade repetition during the school career. However, no significant effects of these variables were found.
7. For instance, to test whether two correlations are equal or significantly different, two models are estimated: one in which the two correlations are constrained to be equal and one in which they are unconstrained and thus estimated uniquely for two groups. Subsequently, the model fit of the two models is compared using a  $\chi^2$ -test. If the model with constrained correlations and the unconstrained model do not differ significantly, it can be concluded that the two correlations do not differ statistically. While  $\chi^2$  is problematic as an indicator of model fit because of its sensitivity to large *N*s,  $\chi^2$ -tests can be used formally test differences in model fit between nested models.
8. Multi-group models in structural equation modelling were used to calculate the correlations (standardised covariances) between the error terms of the four manifest variables ethnic, religious, national and city identity, controlling for gender, age and education. This method is equivalent to calculating partial correlations with the same control variables.
9. The alternative unconstrained model has a worse fit with  $\chi^2(441, N = 2,321) = 1324.635$ ,  $\chi^2/df = 3.004$ , CFI = 0.738, RMSEA = 0.029, AIC = 2872.635.
10. Similarly, when using intergroup bias instead of the two separate measures of feelings towards nationals and Turks/Moroccans, we find that higher evaluative bias in favour

of Turks/Moroccans is associated with higher levels of ethnic and religious and lower levels of national and city identification.


11. Because most studies use bias as an outcome and identification as a predictor, we also examined a model with reversed paths from identification to group evaluations. This model had a slightly worse fit (AIC = 2760.266) compared to the model with paths from group evaluation to identification (AIC = 2740.497). The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is used to compare models that are not nested and that have equal degrees of freedom. Smaller values of AIC indicate better fit. AIC thus suggests that our model fits the data better than a model with identification as a predictor of group evaluation. However, the difference in model fit is not large and the fit of the model with reversed paths is still good in an absolute sense, showing that both models are supported by the data.
12. In order to formally test to what extent the final model is successful in ‘explaining away’ previously negative correlations, we compared the model fit to a model where the relevant correlations were constrained to be zero and found no significant differences. This means that the non-significant correlations listed in Table 6.4 are effectively not different from zero. This is not the case when the correlations are estimated without including the explanatory variables: constraining the significant negative correlations to be zero in this case leads to a significantly worse model fit. Similarly, where non-significant correlations in Table 6.2 turn into significant positive correlations in Table 6.4, constraining these correlations to be zero results in significantly worse model fit. Thus, the positive correlations shown in Table 6.4 significantly differ from 0 and this was not the case for the pertaining correlations in Table 6.2 when the explanatory variables were not included.
13. In addition to the indicators described here, several measures of socio-economic disadvantage were tested such as economic inactivity, unemployment and grade repetition during the school career. None of these variables had any significant effects on the four categories of identification and they are hence excluded from the model shown in Table 6.3.



# 7

## **The politicisation of Muslim identity**

This chapter is under review as  
Fleischmann, F., Phalet, K., & Klein, O.,  
Religious identification, perceived discrimination and politicization:  
Support for political Islam and political action among the Turkish and  
Moroccan second generation in five European cities.



## 7.1 Introduction

The social and political integration of Muslim minorities into Western societies has been described as one of today's most pressing problems (Klandermans, Van der Toorn, & Van Stekelenburg, 2008). Terrorist attacks in major European cities – those realised and those that have allegedly been prevented – have raised public concern about an Islamist threat to democratic rights and liberties in European societies. How do young European-born Muslims position themselves in this tense socio-political climate? Under which conditions does their religious identity become politicised? When do they make political claims and engage in political action as Muslim citizens; and when do they refrain from mobilising on a contested Muslim identity?

This paper analyses the politicisation of Muslim identity among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in five European cities in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. The politicisation of a collective identity implies that individuals “engage as self-conscious group members in a power struggle on behalf of their group knowing that it is the more inclusive societal context in which this struggle has to be fought out” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Some forms of politicised Muslim identity are the public assertion of Islam, political claims on institutional accommodation, participation in political organisations or political action on behalf of fellow Muslims (cf. Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010). For instance, Muslim identity is politicised when Muslims mobilise around visible symbols of their religion in the public sphere (such as headscarves, mosques, or minarets); when they work towards institutional accommodation (such as religious education or religious courts for private law) or political representation (such as religious political parties or representatives); or when they protest against the violation of norms that are central to their belief, as in the aftermath of the Rushdie affair and in the so-called cartoon crisis.<sup>1</sup> In these instances, Muslim identity becomes the basis for political mobilisation on behalf of the religiously defined ingroup seeking to promote religious group goals (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, 2001).

This paper aims to explain when and how the religious identity of European-born Turkish and Moroccan Muslims is politicised or de-politicised. A major strength of our empirical contribution is the cross-national comparative scope of large-scale survey data, which allows the replication of politicisation and de-politicisation processes across local intergroup contexts in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. Focusing on Muslim identity as a devalued and distrusted collective identity in European societies, we test competing expectations of politicisation and de-politicisation of this ‘spoiled identity’ across nine intergroup contexts. Drawing on well-established rejection-identification (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001) and identification-politicisation hypotheses (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), Study 1 tests the joint impact of perceived discrimination and religious identification on support for political Islam. Study 2 adds political action tendencies (such as the willingness to demonstrate or

donate money for the religious ingroup) as a distinct form of politicised Muslim identity. Combining both studies, we argue and test simultaneous processes of politicisation and de-politicisation of Muslim identity as a function of perceived discrimination; we demonstrate the key role of religious identification in enabling politicisation; and we propose a critical distinction between political activism and other forms of politicisation.

### Religious identification and perceived discrimination

Social identity theory argues that collective action is one possible identity management strategy which disadvantaged or devalued groups may adopt to achieve a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Identification with a social category or group thus seems a basic requirement to enable collective action on behalf of a disadvantaged group (Wright, 2001). In a recent meta-analysis of collective action research, Van Zomeren and colleagues have documented and articulated the pivotal role of identification in their Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). This model relates higher levels of identification with a disadvantaged social group to increased support for collective action on behalf of the ingroup. Earlier research comparing low and high identifiers also showed that particularly those members of devalued social groups who are more strongly committed to their social identity will pursue collective rather than individual strategies to protect or promote a positive social identity (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). Similarly, research on politicised collective identity has documented identification as a prerequisite for social movement participation (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). As applied to religious identity, our first identification-politicisation hypothesis predicts that higher levels of religious identification, i.e., a stronger commitment to one's Muslim identity, will increase the likelihood of politicisation. Specifically, high Muslim identifiers will be more ready to support the political role of Islam (*Hypothesis 1a*) and to engage in political action on behalf of their religious ingroup (*Hypothesis 1b*).

Reasoning from Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), experiences of discrimination may induce identity threat as they communicate that one's social identity is devalued or rejected in a particular intergroup setting. Accordingly, experimental research has demonstrated that identity threat reinforces identification with the threatened ingroup (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001). This research gave rise to the rejection-identification hypothesis, which argues that members of devalued groups would increase their commitment to the ingroup to buffer negative consequences of discrimination for their self-esteem. The buffering effect of identification would apply especially to perceived personal discrimination rather than the perception of group-level discrimination (Bourguignon, Selon, & Yzerbyt, 2006). Accordingly, young Muslims' perceptions of illegitimate disadvantage and discrimination due to their religious background may reinforce their identification with a religious ingroup of fellow Muslims.

In light of objective social disadvantage and pervasive discrimination against Muslims in European societies (cf. *infra*), we predict that perceived personal discrimination will increase religious identification among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation (*Hypothesis 2*).

### **Politicisation or de-politicisation?**

With regard to the impact of perceived discrimination on processes of politicisation, there are arguments on both sides of the ledger. On the one hand, perceived discrimination may positively contribute to politicisation. If perceived discrimination reinforces religious identification (in line with the rejection-identification hypothesis) and if higher levels of religious identification entail more politicised Muslim identity (in line with the identification-politicisation hypothesis), perceived discrimination may lead to politicisation through increased religious identification (*Hypothesis 3a*). On the other hand, perceived discrimination might also de-politicise Muslim identity. Thus, young Muslims' personal experiences of discrimination on religious grounds may signal the stigmatisation of Muslim minority groups in the eyes of European majority populations. Crocker and Major (1989, p. 609) define stigmatised social groups as "social categories about which others hold negative attitudes, stereotypes, and beliefs, or which, on average, receive disproportionately poor interpersonal or economic outcomes relative to members of the society at large because of discrimination against members of the social category". In light of widespread public prejudice and discrimination against Muslims in European societies (cf. *infra*), this definition of stigmatisation clearly applies to the Muslim groups under study. Along those lines, Muslim identity has been qualified as a 'spoiled identity' (cf. Kamans, Gordijn, Oldenhuis, & Otten, 2009). To the extent that personal experiences of discrimination signal stigmatisation, Muslims may refrain from mobilising on a stigmatised religious identity. In line with a well-documented strategic side of identity mobilisation (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007), they may anticipate the rejection of religious political claims by the powerful majority group. Thus, Turkish-Dutch Muslims were found to demobilise when their Muslim identity was made salient (Phalet, Baysu, & Verkuyten, 2010). Alternatively, as citizens and members of their local communities, the second generation in our research may mobilise on other collective identities that are less likely to evoke majority group resistance or rejection. Taken together, arguments from stigmatisation and identity mobilisation amount to a hypothesised negative effect of perceived discrimination on the politicisation of Muslim identity (*Hypothesis 3b*). To sum up, we have argued competing hypotheses relating perceived discrimination to opposite processes of politicisation (through reactive religious identification) and de-politicisation.

Finally, we propose a further refinement of the broad concept of politicised collective identity, because we reason that the politicisation or de-politicisation of a contested collective identity might hinge upon which form political mobilisation takes. The concept

of politicisation has been used to refer broadly to very different political attitudes and behaviours, ranging from electoral support for political parties, over civic engagement in voluntary associations, to participation in mass demonstrations (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010). These forms may or may not be highly inter-related depending on particular socio-political contexts. For our current purposes, we propose a critical distinction between political action tendencies, such as taking to the street to demonstrate, signing a petition, or donating money on behalf of a religious ingroup, which reflect most closely the concept and measures of collective action (Van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009), and other forms of support for a religious political project, such as making political claims on the public recognition, accommodation and representation of Islam. Especially the latter form of politicised Muslim identity may meet with strong resistance from powerful majority groups in historically Christian, highly secularised, and increasingly anti-Islamic European societies. On the other hand, the European societies under study share historical traditions of political protest or activism, such as demonstrations or strikes, as tried and tested means to express social grievances and to bring about social change towards more equality or fair treatment. In European socio-political contexts therefore, political activism as a response to perceived discrimination may be seen as a more normative (or less non-normative) and more feasible form of politicisation than propagating the public presence and political representation of Islam (cf. Boen & Vanbeselaere, 2002). Moreover, our measures of political activism reflect most closely a concept of collective action, which has been defined as a response to shared grievances and reliably related to perceived injustice (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Although our studies narrowly focus on perceived discrimination, personal experiences of discrimination contain an element of injustice which may cause grievance and give rise to collective action in response to illegitimate disadvantage. Accordingly, we hypothesise that distinct forms of politicisation may moderate processes of politicisation or de-politicisation of Muslim identity. Specifically, we predict that Muslims who experience more discrimination will be more ready to engage in political action on behalf of a disadvantaged ingroup of fellow Muslims (*Hypothesis 3c*), while they may be less willing to support a strong political role of Islam (cf. *Hypothesis 3b*).

### Research contexts and groups

Social identities are anchored at least in part in relatively enduring and most often unequal group positions in the wider society (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Taking a comparative approach to politicised Muslim identity, our research aims to replicate identification and politicisation processes across a wide range of real-life intergroup contexts. As experiences of disadvantage and discrimination are not evenly distributed among members of the second generation, education and socio-economic disadvantage are included as relevant positional variables along with gender in our models of perceived discrimination,

identification and politicisation. Specifically, our research involves local-born Turkish and Moroccan Muslim groups in five cities in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. The presence of sizable Muslim minority populations in the North-West of Europe originates mainly in post-1960s labour migration and post-colonial migration from majority Muslim countries (Peach & Glebe, 1995). Due to their migration background, second-generation Muslims most often face severe and persistent disadvantages in education and in the labour market (Heath & Cheung, 2007a; Heath, Rethon, & Kilpi, 2008). Consequently, their religious minority status overlaps greatly with their generally low socio-economic status as children of immigrant workers. Moroccan and Turkish minorities are the major (majority) Muslim immigrant groups in Belgium and the Netherlands, while Sweden is home to significant numbers of Turkish Muslims (excluding Christian refugees). Although Sweden counts most highly educated Turkish Muslims, Muslim groups across the three countries of comparison are socio-economically disadvantaged, especially in terms of increased unemployment risks (Heath & Cheung, 2007a).

In addition, most European societies do not fully recognise Islamic affiliations, rites and rules on a par with established Christian religions, in spite of varying degrees of incorporation of Islam in historical national models of state-church relations (Buijs & Rath, 2002; Fetzer & Soper, 2005). In the Netherlands with its tradition of religious pluralism, Muslims have set up religious organisations and institutions on a par with Christian and other religions (Doomernik, 1995; Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, & Meijer, 1996). In Sweden, the formal legal and financial status of minority religions including Islam has been equated to that of the Swedish state church. Since funding is based on membership, however, Islamic religious communities are marginalised in a religious landscape dominated by the national church which counts more than 80% of the population as its members (Alwall, 1998; Sander, 1996). In Belgium, the early formal recognition of Islam as a national religion in 1974 has only recently and after lengthy debates been implemented, thus enabling the organisation of Muslim communities and state funding of their religious services (Kanmaz, 2002; Manço, 2000). Looking beyond formal recognition, Muslims are facing pervasive public prejudice on the part of European majority populations, particularly after the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001 (Allen & Nielsen, 2002). And they are singled out as the prototypical other or 'the enemy within' in political debates over immigrant integration (Zemni, 2002). Against this background, Islam has been characterised as a bright boundary marker between European majority populations and Muslim minorities, much like race in the US (Alba, 2005).

Lastly, participants in our studies all belong to the second generation, i.e., they are the children of immigrant workers from Turkey or Morocco who have been born and raised in the countries where they are living as young adults. Their ethnic and religious identities distinguish the Turkish and Moroccan second generation from the majority population, but, in contrast to their foreign-born parents, the second generation maintains

multiple membership claims as citizens of European countries and as inhabitants of multicultural cities (see chapter 6 of this dissertation). Although their religious identity is central and salient for most European-born Muslims, the identity multiplicity of the second generation implies that they can potentially mobilise on several social identities. In light of the salience of Islam as a bright boundary marker, we analyse to what extent Muslims draw upon their religious identity for political claims-making, asking when and how Muslim identity is politicised or de-politicised.

### The TIES-surveys

Our analysis draws on large-scale survey data from the TIES-project (The Integration of the European Second generation). We use the TIES-surveys from Belgium (Antwerp and Brussels; CESO-CSCP, 2008, TIES07-08-Belgium), the Netherlands (Amsterdam and Rotterdam; NIDI-IMES, 2007, TIES06-07-Netherlands, 2007) and Sweden (Stockholm; CEIFO, 2008, TIES08-Sweden). These surveys aim to investigate group positions, identities and outcomes among comparison samples of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in European cities. Participants in the TIES-surveys are second-generation Turks and Moroccans, narrowly defined as the local-born children of immigrant workers from Turkey or Morocco. Moreover, the sampling frame is limited to young adults between 18 and 35 years old in view of the young age of most children of 'guest worker' immigrants.<sup>2</sup>

In Study 1, we compare self-categorised Turkish Muslims in Antwerp and Brussels (Belgium), Amsterdam and Rotterdam (the Netherlands) and Stockholm (Sweden) and Moroccan Muslims in the first four cities (Turks were the only minority group sampled in Stockholm).<sup>3</sup> Study 2 is restricted to separate subsamples of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in Antwerp and Brussels as measures of political action were only included in Belgium.

## 7.2 Study 1

### Method

#### *Participants*

For Study 1, 1,543 members of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation (Age  $M = 25.05$ ,  $SD = 4.82$ , Female: 51%) in the five cities who self-categorised as Muslims were selected (see Table 7.1 for sample sizes, question wordings, and descriptive statistics). Multi-group structural equation modelling was used to simultaneously estimate parallel models in nine intergroup contexts: the Turkish second generation in all five cities and the Moroccan second generation in all cities except Stockholm. This method allows formal tests of the equivalence of latent factor structures and structural relations between



**Table 7.1** Descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis: Means (standard deviations) per group and city, Study 1

Range	Antwerp		Brussels		Amsterdam		Rotterdam		Stockholm	
	Turks (N = 225)	Moroccans (N = 188)	Turks (N = 120)	Moroccans (N = 147)	Turks (N = 166)	Moroccans (N = 172)	Turks (N = 205)	Moroccans (N = 202)	Turks (N = 118)	Moroccans (N = 118)
<b>Support for political Islam</b>										
1/5	4.14 (1.00)	4.14 (1.07)	4.49 (0.76)	4.48 (0.76)	4.27 (0.80)	4.01 (0.98)	4.14 (0.92)	3.94 (1.17)	4.85 (0.61)	
1/5	2.96 (1.14)	2.99 (1.09)	2.85 (1.18)	2.80 (1.21)	2.70 (1.09)	2.89 (1.10)	2.75 (1.08)	2.94 (1.14)	1.94 (1.31)	
1/5	2.39 (1.09)	2.32 (1.09)	2.30 (1.01)	2.11 (1.03)	2.31 (1.05)	2.42 (1.08)	2.33 (1.00)	2.25 (1.05)	1.28 (0.79)	
1/5	2.91 (1.27)	3.50 (1.21)	2.67 (1.25)	3.37 (1.26)	2.87 (1.20)	3.06 (1.19)	2.74 (1.23)	2.94 (1.25)	2.10 (1.27)	
<b>Religious identification</b>										
1/5	4.32 (0.89)	4.51 (0.69)	4.16 (0.98)	4.54 (0.73)	4.28 (0.88)	4.48 (0.75)	4.19 (0.96)	4.40 (0.77)	4.58 (0.74)	
1/5	4.05 (1.09)	4.32 (0.90)	4.07 (1.02)	4.33 (0.99)	3.62 (1.17)	3.98 (1.18)	3.52 (1.21)	4.01 (1.00)	3.81 (1.46)	
1/5	3.60 (1.16)	4.04 (1.03)	3.89 (1.00)	4.06 (1.03)	3.77 (0.97)	3.99 (0.89)	3.70 (0.98)	3.97 (0.95)	3.84 (1.23)	

'When someone says something bad about Muslims, I feel personally hurt'	1/5	3.70 (1.25)	3.82 (1.20)	3.98 (1.08)	4.16 (1.01)	3.80 (1.11)	3.69 (1.16)	3.67 (1.17)	3.64 (1.15)	3.08 (1.58)
<b>Perceived discrimination</b>										
'Have you ever experienced hostility or unfair treatment because of your origin or background?'	1/5	2.04 (1.05)	2.33 (1.11)	2.03 (1.03)	2.23 (1.05)	1.90 (1.05)	1.76 (1.02)	1.82 (1.06)	1.99 (1.05)	2.03 (1.13)
'Have you ever experienced hostility or unfair treatment because of your religion?'	1/5	1.39 (0.92)	1.62 (1.06)	1.31 (0.71)	1.76 (1.14)	1.35 (0.80)	1.45 (0.93)	1.36 (0.88)	1.54 (0.95)	1.26 (0.67)
'Have you ever been confronted with offensive words because of your origin or background?'	1/5	1.77 (0.90)	2.25 (1.03)	1.86 (0.92)	1.92 (1.02)	1.58 (1.03)	1.41 (0.89)	1.51 (0.93)	1.73 (0.95)	1.86 (0.94)
<b>Controls</b>										
Low education	0/1	0.34	0.22	0.38	0.20	0.26	0.25	0.29	0.24	0.07
Working-class neighbourhood	0/1	0.44	0.42	0.38	0.26	0.37	0.42	0.53	0.65	0.20
Female	0/1	0.50	0.60	0.41	0.51	0.55	0.52	0.52	0.51	0.39

Note. No standard deviations shown for dichotomous variables.

<sup>a</sup>This item loads negatively on the political Islam scale.

factors across intergroup contexts by way of imposing and testing equality constraints on factor loadings and path coefficients between comparison groups.<sup>4</sup> Confirmatory factor analysis was applied in a first step to establish the measurement equivalence of religious identification and support for political Islam as latent dependent variables. Subsequently, structural relations between these latent factors and measures of perceived discrimination were estimated; and their invariance across the nine comparison groups was tested. The theoretical model was conditioned on fixed effects of education, socio-economic segregation and gender as relevant positional characteristics.

### **Measures**

**Support for political Islam** is measured with four items which refer to the public visibility and the political role of religion and which are replicated in all nine intergroup contexts. Participants indicated their agreement on five-point scales (1 = *totally disagree*, 5 = *totally agree*). The items are: “Muslim women should wear headscarves or cover their heads when outside the house”, “Religion should be a private matter between the believer and God”, “Islam should be represented in politics and society, along with other religions and viewpoints”, and “Islam should be the only and ultimate authority in political matters.”<sup>5</sup> Confirmatory factor analysis showed that the four items formed one factor and that factor loadings could be set equal across all nine comparison groups, confirming measurement equivalence (Schmitt & Kuljanin, 2008). The factorially invariant model was a good fit to the data ( $\chi^2(42, N = 1,543) = 53.518$ , CFI = 0.984, RMSEA = 0.013,  $p = 0.110$ ). A  $\chi^2$ -difference test revealed that this model was not significantly different from an unconstrained model where factor loadings were allowed to vary between groups ( $\Delta\chi^2 = 35.659$  (24 *df*),  $p = 0.059$ ). The political representation item was used to anchor the scale of politicisation. The items about ultimate authority and about headscarves loaded positively, whereas the item about private religion had a significant negative loading. Alternative models excluding any of the four items or specifying more than one latent variable had a worse fit.

The latent factor **religious identification** is measured by four items, which were answered on the same five-point scale and which were replicated in all nine comparison groups. Sample items are “Being a Muslim is an important part of my self” and “I see myself as a true Muslim” (see Table 7.1 for remaining items). Confirmatory factor analysis was used to test measurement equivalence across the groups. A model with one factor and equal loadings across groups fit the data well ( $\chi^2(42, N = 1,543) = 52.351$ , CFI = 0.992, RMSEA = 0.013,  $p = 0.131$ ). In support of measurement equivalence, the fit of the factorially invariant model did not differ significantly from that of the unconstrained model ( $\Delta\chi^2 = 21.812$  (24 *df*),  $p = 0.590$ ).

**Perceived discrimination** is measured by three indicators which are available in all nine intergroup contexts and which refer to personal experiences of unfair treatment or hostility against Muslims. The three items were about personally experienced unfair

treatment, offensive words, and hostility due to religion (see Table 7.1 for the exact wording of the questionnaire items) and they were rated on a five-point frequency scale (1 = *never*, 5 = *frequently*). Cronbach's  $\alpha$ , with values above 0.70 in most groups and above 0.65 in all groups, indicates that the three items form a reliable scale and can be used to construct a latent explanatory variable in the nine groups.<sup>6</sup>


**Controls.** Three dummy variables are constructed as measures of relevant positional characteristics. The three dummies measure gender (1 = *woman*, 0 = *man*), low education (1 = *less than full secondary education*, 0 = *full secondary or higher education*) and socio-economic segregation as reported by participants (1 = *living in a working-class neighbourhood*, 0 = *living in a middle- or upper-class neighbourhood*).<sup>7</sup>

Table 7.1 presents descriptive statistics for all measures for each group and city. Looking across intergroup contexts, average levels of support for political Islam are low with means of the four items below the midpoint of the scale in all groups and cities; and they are lowest among Turks in Stockholm. In stark contrast, levels of religious identification are high across groups and cities, with somewhat higher scores among Moroccans as compared to Turks. While most participants report one or more experiences of discrimination, self-reported frequencies are generally low - in line with a general finding that personal discrimination is reported as less frequent or severe than discrimination against one's group (Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994).

## Results

A multi-group path model was specified at the latent level predicting support for political Islam from perceived discrimination and religious identification (see *Hypotheses 3b and 1*), and including significant fixed effects of relevant controls on all three factors. In addition, to test a rejection-identification path to politicised Muslim identity (see *Hypotheses 2 and 3a*), we also specified the effect of perceived discrimination on religious identification. In a first step, nine separate models were estimated for each group in each city. A structurally invariant model where path coefficients were constrained to be equal across intergroup contexts was compared with the unconstrained model, where path coefficients were allowed to vary between contexts. The model comparison confirmed the invariance of structural relations between perceived discrimination, religious identification, and support for political Islam across all nine groups ( $\Delta\chi^2 = 25.666$  (24 *df*),  $p = 0.370$ ). The final structurally invariant model showed a good overall fit to the data:  $\chi^2$  (759,  $N = 1,543$ ) = 1156.13, CFI = 0.882, RMSEA = 0.018. The explained variance of support for political Islam ranged between 15.4% among Moroccans in Antwerp and 25.5% among Turks in Rotterdam).<sup>8</sup> Figure 7.1 shows the standardised path coefficients based on the final model.

In line with our first hypothesis on the pivotal role of identification in the politicisation process, religious identification has a strong positive influence on the support for political Islam across groups and cities (*Hypothesis 1a*). Thus, high religious



**Figure 7.1** Path model of support for political Islam, Study 1.

Note. Values are pooled-within-groups standardised coefficients ( $N = 1,543$ ). \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

identifiers were most likely to support political Islam. Furthermore, a weak yet robust positive effect of perceived discrimination on religious identification is in line with the rejection-identification hypothesis (*Hypothesis 2*). Across the five cities, Turkish and Moroccan Muslims who had personally experienced more hostility or unfair treatment identified (even) more strongly as Muslims than those who reported fewer experiences of discriminatory treatment.

Turning to the impact of perceived discrimination on support for political Islam, we find evidence of both politicisation and de-politicisation of Muslim identity. In support of *Hypothesis 3a*, perceived discrimination has an indirect positive effect on support for political Islam through increased religious identification. Across the five cities, Turkish and Moroccan Muslims who experienced more personal discrimination were more committed to their Muslim identity, and thus more willing (or less unwilling) to support a strong political role of Islam. Conversely, and in line with *Hypothesis 3b*, perceived discrimination has a negative direct and total effect on political Islam across groups and cities. Overall, Turkish and Moroccan Muslims who reported more frequent experiences of personal discrimination were (even) less inclined to support political Islam than those who reported fewer discrimination experiences. The latter finding resonates with the notion that perceived discrimination signals the degree to which Muslim identity is a stigmatised social identity which is de-politicised. Simultaneous processes of politicisation and de-politicisation imply that at equal levels of religious identification, perceived discrimination is associated with less support for political

Islam. As support for political Islam is strongly related to religious identification, politicisation depends critically on a rejection-identification path, when young Muslims increase their commitment to the religious ingroup in response to personal experiences of discrimination.

Finally, we find that Turkish and Moroccan Muslims across the five cities perceive most discrimination when they are more highly educated and when they live in working-class neighbourhoods – in line with a general finding that failed upward mobility heightens the awareness of discrimination among minority group members (Buijs, Demant, & Hamdy, 2006; Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2009).

## Discussion

Comparing across Turkish and Moroccan Muslim groups in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, Study 1 examined the joint impact of perceived discrimination and religious identification on support for political Islam as one form of politicised Muslim identity. Our comparative findings confirm the key role of religious identification in the process of politicisation, in line with the first hypothesis which was derived from Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) Social Identity Model of Collective Action. When second-generation Turks and Moroccans identify more strongly as Muslims, they are much less reluctant to support political Islam. Moreover, and in line with Branscombe et al.'s (1999) rejection-identification hypothesis, we also found evidence of reactive religious identification. Although the size of the effect of perceived discrimination on religious identification was minor, it is nevertheless noteworthy that the perception of discrimination made a significant difference on top of very high levels of religious identification across Turkish and Moroccan Muslim groups in all five cities.<sup>9</sup>

Finally, the study reveals simultaneous processes of politicisation and de-politicisation as consequences of perceived discrimination. On the one hand, a rejection-identification path enables the politicisation of Muslim identity in response to perceived discrimination, as predicted by *Hypothesis 3a*: Turkish and Moroccan Muslims who perceived more personal discrimination were more willing to support political Islam to the extent that they had come to adopt a reactive religious identity. On the other hand, and in line with *Hypothesis 3b* arguing the de-politicisation of a stigmatised Muslim identity, Turkish and Moroccan Muslims who perceived more hostility or unfair treatment were generally more reluctant to support Islam as a political project. The latter finding suggests that more frequent experiences of discrimination may signal the stigmatisation of Muslim identity in the eyes of powerful majority groups. Stigmatisation would thus turn Muslim identity into a 'spoiled identity' which may be strategically de-mobilised. As perceptions of personal discrimination were more frequent with higher levels of education, individual mobility strategies represent a possible alternative identity management strategy. Alternatively, perceptions of discrimination may lead to other forms of political activism or protest

which can be more narrowly defined as collective action on behalf of a disadvantaged ingroup.

With a view to developing the latter line of inquiry, Study 2 extends the role of religious identification and perceived discrimination to other forms of politicised Muslim identity. Specifically, Study 2 analyses political action tendencies (i.e., one's willingness to demonstrate and to donate for the benefit of the Muslim group) along with support for political Islam as distinct forms of politicised Muslim identity. Drawing on Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) Social Identity Model of Collective Action, we expect that religious identification crucially enables both forms of politicisation of Muslim identity. Specifically, we hypothesised parallel identification-politicisation paths towards support for the political role of religion (*Hypothesis 1a*) and towards political action on behalf of a religious ingroup (*Hypothesis 1b*). Thus, we predict that high Muslim identifiers will not only be more supportive of political Islam but also more ready to take political action. In addition, Study 2 returns to the question of politicisation or de-politicisation in response to perceived discrimination by testing the moderating role of distinct forms of politicised Muslim identity. More precisely, we argued that Muslims who experience frequent personal discrimination may refrain from supporting political Islam (*Hypothesis 3b*) while at the same time embracing political protest which may be seen as a more normative or more feasible way of advancing religious group interests (*Hypothesis 3c*). In order to test these hypotheses, political action measures were included in random subsamples of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in Antwerp and Brussels as part of the Belgian TIES-surveys.

## 7.3 Study 2

### Method

#### *Participants*

Study 2 was conducted among 313 Turkish and Moroccan Belgians (100 Turks in Antwerp, 93 Moroccans in Antwerp, 57 Turks in Brussels and 63 Moroccans in Brussels; Age  $M = 25.67$ ,  $SD = 4.59$ , Female 53%). The participants were randomly assigned to the political action questions as part of the data collection for the Belgian TIES-surveys.<sup>10</sup> Multi-group structural equation models with four comparison groups (Turks and Moroccans in Antwerp and Brussels) were specified at the latent level. The path models specify political action as an additional latent dependent variable along with support for political Islam. They test the joint impact of religious identification and perceived discrimination on both forms of politicised Muslim identity, again controlling for gender, education and socio-economic segregation in the same way as in Study 1.



### Measures

Political action refers to action tendencies and is measured with two indicators. The questions probe participants' willingness to participate in a protest demonstration and to donate money for the benefit of the Muslim ingroup. They are answered on a three-point scale (1 = *I would not do it*, 3 = *I would certainly do it*). A latent variable was constructed with the loading of the demonstration item fixed at 1. The donation item had a significant positive and invariant loading on this latent variable, indicating that the two indicators are strongly and similarly correlated across the four comparison groups.

Support for political Islam, religious identification, perceived discrimination, and control variables were measured in the same way as in Study 1. Confirmatory factor analyses supported the measurement equivalence of all latent variables; and loading patterns in Study 2 were very similar to those in Study 1 (details available from authors on request). Table 7.2 shows sample sizes, question wordings, and descriptive statistics for all groups and measures in Study 2.

### Results

A four-group model was estimated where both support for political Islam and political action tendencies were predicted by perceived discrimination and religious identification. As in Study 1, theoretical associations were conditioned on gender, education and socio-economic segregation as key control variables. The fit of a structurally invariant model where effect parameters were set equal across the four groups did not differ significantly from that of the unconstrained model ( $\Delta\chi^2 = 19.779$  (18 *df*),  $p = 0.345$ ). The final model with equality constraints showed an acceptable fit to the data:  $\chi^2$  (451,  $N = 313$ ) = 656.92, CFI = 0.796, RMSEA = 0.038. Explained variances ranged between 10.0% (Moroccans in Brussels) and 30.8% (Turks in Brussels) for support for political Islam and 16.4% (Moroccans in Brussels) and 43.3% (Turks in Antwerp) for political action.<sup>11</sup> Figure 7.2 shows the standardised path coefficients based on the final model. As expected, religious identification was positively and roughly equally related to both forms of politicisation across the four intergroup contexts. In line with *Hypothesis 1b*, religious identification had a strong positive effect on political action. Thus, high Muslim identifiers among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in both cities were not only more willing to support political Islam but also more ready to take political action.


In contrast, perceived discrimination had differential effects on both forms of politicisation. Whereas we replicated a negative association with support for political Islam (i.e., de-politicisation), we found a positive association with political action tendencies (i.e., politicisation), in line with *Hypothesis 3c*. Thus, Turkish- and Moroccan-Belgian Muslims with more personal experience of discrimination were more reluctant to support political Islam, yet more ready to engage in political protest. Importantly, the association

**Table 7.2** Descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis: Means (standard deviations) per group and city, Study 2

	Range	Antwerp (N = 100)		Brussels (N = 63)	
		Turks (N = 93)	Moroccans (N = 7)	Turks (N = 57)	Moroccans (N = 6)
<b>Political action tendencies</b>					
'I would participate in a demonstration'	1/3	1.97 (0.76)	2.18 (0.75)	1.82 (0.77)	2.31 (0.77)
'I would donate money'	1/3	1.84 (0.76)	2.18 (0.69)	1.87 (0.74)	2.07 (0.76)
<b>Support for political Islam</b>					
'Religion should be a private matter between the believer and God' <sup>a</sup>	1/5	4.22 (1.00)	4.09 (1.10)	4.59 (0.73)	4.42 (0.97)
'Islam should be represented in politics and society, along with other religions and viewpoints'	1/5	2.91 (1.15)	3.07 (1.22)	2.87 (1.30)	3.16 (1.31)
'Islam should be the only and ultimate authority in political matters'	1/5	2.36 (1.16)	2.44 (1.11)	2.51 (1.10)	2.36 (1.27)
'Muslim women should wear headscarves or cover their heads when outside the home'	1/5	3.01 (1.25)	3.47 (1.29)	2.64 (1.10)	3.35 (1.21)
<b>Religious identification</b>					
'Being a Muslim is an important part of my self'	1/5	4.38 (0.71)	4.54 (0.68)	4.23 (0.80)	4.66 (0.65)
'That I am a Muslim is something I often think about'	1/5	4.16 (0.93)	4.28 (1.01)	4.07 (1.02)	4.39 (0.94)
'I see myself as a true Muslim'	1/5	3.66 (1.17)	4.02 (0.97)	3.79 (1.00)	4.19 (0.94)
'When someone says something bad about Muslims, I feel personally hurt'	1/5	3.60 (1.30)	3.69 (1.20)	4.18 (0.97)	4.25 (1.10)
<b>Perceived discrimination</b>					
'Have you ever experienced hostility or unfair treatment because of your origin or background?'	1/5	2.00 (1.01)	2.32 (1.16)	1.95 (0.88)	2.35 (1.27)
'Have you ever experienced hostility or unfair treatment because of your religion?'	1/5	1.26 (0.79)	1.46 (0.98)	1.32 (0.76)	1.70 (1.26)
'Have you ever been confronted with offensive words because of your origin or background?'	1/5	1.75 (0.91)	2.20 (1.09)	1.77 (0.74)	2.05 (1.00)
<b>Controls</b>					
Low education	0/1	0.38	0.15	0.40	0.23
Working-class neighbourhood	0/1	0.37	0.47	0.35	0.36
Female	0/1	0.50	0.68	0.37	0.50

Note. No standard deviations shown for dichotomous variables.

<sup>a</sup>This item loads negatively on the political Islam scale.



**Figure 7.2** Path model of political action and support for political Islam, Study 2.  
*Note.* Values are pooled-within-groups standardised coefficients ( $N = 313$ ). \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

between political action tendencies and support for political Islam, though positive, was rather weak. We conclude that political action and support for political Islam emerge as clearly distinct forms of politicised Muslim identity.

**Different forms of politicised Muslim identity.** The weak association between political action and support for political Islam implies that some members of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation are high on one form of politicised Muslim identity and low on the other. Therefore, we are able to define theoretically derived types of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims with different profiles of politicised Muslim identity across intergroup contexts. To this end, group-specific median splits were applied to create four types of (de-)politicised Muslims across groups and cities: (1) those high on both political action and support for political Islam are defined as politicised Muslims who are both activist and islamist (39%); (2) those high on political action and low on political Islam (24%) are the activist type; (3) those low on political action and high on political Islam make up the islamist type (17%); and (4) those who are low on both qualify as de-politicised Muslims (20%). As Table 7.3 shows, (1) the first type of politicised Muslims who are both activist and islamist is characterised by relatively high levels of religious identification and perceived discrimination. (2) The activist type of politicised Muslims reports lower levels of religious identification in spite of high levels of perceived discrimination. (3) The islamist type shows the reverse pattern of high religious identification and lower perceived discrimination. (4) The last type of de-politicised Muslims shows the lowest level of religious identification and moderate levels of perceived discrimination. Interestingly,

**Table 7.3** Profiles of politicised Muslim identity as a function of religious identification, perceived discrimination and controls

	Political action high & Political Islam high (N = 122)	Political action high & Political Islam low (N = 75)	Political action low & Political Islam high (N = 54)	Political action low & Political Islam low (N = 62)
Religious identification	4.38 (0.56) <sup>a</sup>	3.99 (0.69) <sup>b</sup>	4.08 (0.81) <sup>ab</sup>	3.73 (0.91) <sup>b</sup>
Perceived discrimination	1.94 (0.86) <sup>a</sup>	2.00 (0.87) <sup>a</sup>	1.51 (0.60) <sup>bc</sup>	1.73 (0.78) <sup>ac</sup>
Low education	0.25	0.25	0.39	0.31
Working-class neighbourhood	0.46	0.39	0.28	0.39
Female	0.58	0.44	0.53	0.55

Note. Cells display the mean values (and standard deviations of continuous variables). Significant mean differences are indicated by use of different superscripts.

both activist types of politicisation attract more Muslims with educational qualifications than either the Islamist or the de-politicised types; and the first type of activist *and* Islamist politicised Muslims is most over-represented in distressed urban neighbourhoods.

This typology makes clear that political action and support for political Islam are differentially practiced by subgroups within the Turkish and Moroccan second generation which differ in their levels of perceived discrimination and religious identification. Importantly, those who support political Islam and who disengage from political action are most often ill equipped to pursue an individual mobility strategy because of their low education.

## Discussion

Study 2 included political action on behalf of a disadvantaged Muslim group as a distinct form of politicised Muslim identity. The multi-group analysis revealed a positive yet rather weak correlation between the support of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims for a strong role of Islam in politics and society and their willingness to engage in political action to defend Islam. Thus, those young Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in Belgium who support political Islam do not necessarily show a greater readiness to actively defend the interest of their religious ingroup by donating money or by participating in protest demonstrations. And the other way round, those second-generation Muslims who are most willing to defend their religious group interests do not therefore support Islam as a political project. In line with the first identification-politicisation hypothesis derived from Van Zomeren et al.'s (2008) Social Identity Model of Collective Action, religious identification was positively and similarly related to both forms of politicised Muslim identity. In line with

the third hypothesis about simultaneous politicisation and de-politicisation in response to perceived discrimination, personal experiences of discrimination had differential effects on distinct forms of politicised Muslim identity. While Muslims who experienced more discrimination were generally less inclined to support political Islam, they were found to be more willing to take political action to defend religious group interests. Taken together, the low correlation between both forms of politicisation and the differential effects of perceived discrimination support the proposed conceptual distinction between support for political Islam and political action tendencies as clearly distinct, though inter-related forms of politicisation.

## 7.4 General discussion and conclusion

This paper aimed to provide new insights into the politicisation of Muslim identity among young Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin in European societies. Drawing on large-scale survey data from five major European cities, we replicated explanatory models of politicisation across nine local intergroup contexts in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. Combining rejection-identification (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001) and identification-politicisation hypotheses (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), we investigate the joint impact of perceived discrimination and religious identification on politicisation processes. We distinguish between support for political Islam and political action as distinct forms of politicised Muslim identity (Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010). Our comparative findings reveal simultaneous processes of politicisation and de-politicisation of Muslim identity with reactive religious identification as a crucial mediator (Study 1) and with forms of politicisation as a critical moderator (Study 2).

In terms of explanatory power, the single most important comparative finding is the pivotal role of identification processes in explaining political mobilisation. In line with our first hypothesis derived from the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), the level of identification with the religious ingroup was an important predictor of both forms of politicisation. Moreover, we found some support for our second hypothesis, derived from the rejection-identification model (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001). Thus, personal experiences of unfair and hostile treatment due to one's religious background significantly increased the degree to which the Turkish and Moroccan second generation identified with their Muslim ingroup. Consequently, to the extent that religious identification is reactive, those Muslims who experienced more personal discrimination identified more strongly as Muslims, and were hence more likely to politically mobilise on their Muslim identity. Although religious identification is reactive only in part, as evident from small effects of perceived discrimination, the fact that perceived discrimination made a significant

difference in spite of very high levels of religious identification across nine comparison groups can be seen as robust empirical support for a rejection-identification path towards politicised Muslim identity.

In the politicised identity and political action literatures (cf. respectively Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), related notions of perceived injustice and shared grievances have been revealed as significant conduits to, or conditions of political mobilisation. While our measure of perceived discrimination focuses narrowly on personal experiences of hostility or unfair treatment, these experiences contain an element of injustice and they may give rise to shared grievances. Our comparative findings contribute to the above literatures by disentangling simultaneous processes of politicisation and de-politicisation of Muslim identity as they relate to perceived discrimination. In line with *Hypothesis 3a*, experiences of discrimination were positively related to politicisation through a rejection-identification path. At the same time, the direct and total effects of perceived discrimination on support for political Islam were negative, in line with a competing *Hypothesis 3b*. The latter finding of de-politicisation with increasing levels of experienced discrimination suggests that Muslim minorities refrain from making claims on the position of their religion in European politics and society when their religious identity is seen as the target of discrimination. This interpretation is in line with our argument about Muslim identity as a stigmatised identity in Europe, particularly in the political domain. In support of the stigmatised identity argument, European majority populations perceive Muslim minorities as posing a symbolic threat to their way of life and culture, and this symbolic threat reliably predicts prejudice against Muslims (Velasco González, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008). Moreover, political affairs involving Muslim minorities, from the protests in the aftermath of the publication of Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* to the Danish cartoon crisis, reflect widespread public distrust against Muslim citizens when it comes to political participation or institutional recognition and accommodation (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). In view of the stigmatisation of their minority identity as Muslims in Europe, Turks and Moroccans might react to experiences of discrimination by adopting an assimilation strategy, seeking acceptance by the majority group by dissociating themselves from the devalued religious minority group. In other words, perceived discrimination may give rise to individual mobility strategies among young Muslims. This is particularly likely to occur among those members of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation with relatively low levels of religious identification (Doosje & Ellemers, 1997; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997) and with sufficient resources, such as education, to enable individual mobility and assimilation. For highly identified Muslims, however the offence against their Muslim identity posed by discrimination on religious grounds will more likely strengthen their ties to the religious ingroup, increase religious identification, and thus instigate collective strategies for social change (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998).

Finally, the findings of Study 2 indicate that distinct forms of politicisation may be critical moderators of the processes of (de-)politicisation. In line with *Hypothesis 3c*, we found differential associations of perceived discrimination with distinct forms of politicised Muslim identity. While perceived personal discrimination was mainly negatively associated with support for political Islam, it was positively related to political activism. The latter finding is in line with the reasoning that perceived injustice increases support for collective action as a reaction to shared grievances (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Though our measure of perceived discrimination focuses narrowly on personal experiences of hostility or unfair treatment, these experiences contain an element of perceived injustice. Hence, it seems plausible that the perception of unfair treatment may motivate Muslims to participate in political protest. In addition to differential associations with perceived discrimination, the weak correlation between support for political Islam and political action provides strong empirical support for an analytical distinction between both forms of politicised Muslim identity.

Our findings call for a further refinement of the general concept of politicised collective identity. In particular, they raise the question whether different forms of politicisation refer to the same underlying process; or whether they constitute conceptually distinct processes. Our treatment of political Islam and political action as distinct, but interrelated forms of politicised Muslim identity is in line with the approach of Simon et al. (Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010) who consider similar measures as indicative of the concept of politicisation. In other studies, however, politicised collective identity is defined as a predictor of collective action (Klandermans & De Weerd, 2000; Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004), while longitudinal studies reveal feedback loops between politicisation and collective action (Klandermans, 2002).

Moreover, by separating out distinct forms of politicisation our findings document different ways of (dis)engaging with socio-political struggles. A comparison of different types of (de-)politicised Muslims among the Turkish- and Moroccan-Belgian second generation revealed that high levels of religious identification together with high levels of perceived discrimination predicted support for political Islam and political activism among most politicised Muslims. In line with an interpretation of collective action as a reaction to shared grievances (Van Zomeren et al., 2008), those who perceived more discrimination were most likely to engage in political action, without necessarily supporting the public accommodation and representation of Islam as a long-term political programme. On the other hand, high religious identifiers who experienced less discrimination, and thus felt less aggrieved, were less likely to engage in political action in spite of their support for political Islam. It should be added that perceived discrimination, and the different ensuing forms of politicisation, are anchored in relatively enduring unequal positions in society. Thus, Turkish and Moroccan Muslims with more educational qualifications perceived more discrimination, especially when they were living in socio-economically segregated



areas. These associations suggest that perceived discrimination is partly rooted in raised expectations in combination with persistent social disadvantage among the second generation in Europe (Heath & Cheung, 2007a; Heath, Rethon, & Kilpi, 2008).

Last but not least, our conclusions should be qualified in light of some limitations of the comparative data and analyses. Most importantly, the cross-sectional nature of the data precludes conclusive evidence about the causal direction of the relations between politicised Muslim identity, perceived discrimination, and religious identification. Yet, the specification of reversed paths from religious identification to perceived discrimination resulted in a significantly worse model fit across the nine samples of second-generation Muslims. Another constraint is the limited number of indicators in the surveys, which do not allow us to fully cover the very general constructs of identification and politicisation. Repeated analyses showed that our results were not affected by leaving out specific single indicators of latent variables, however, thus supporting the construct validity of our measures. Moreover, multi-group measurement models supported the measurement equivalence of our composite indices of identification and politicisation across comparison groups. Finally, different sampling frames and differential response rates between cities and countries limit the representativeness of our samples. To conclude, data constraints should be appreciated in light of the comparative scope of the data and the analyses as a strong side of this research.

In conclusion, our analysis of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in five European cities has shown that the politicisation of Muslim identity is contingent on varying levels of religious identification and perceived discrimination. Moreover, support for political Islam and political action were demonstrated to be distinct and only partly overlapping forms of politicised Muslim identity. Thus, we could identify distinct types of politicised Muslim identity as a function of differential levels of support for political Islam and/or political activism among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation. Our findings reveal that perceived discrimination politicises young Turkish and Moroccan Muslims by increasing their willingness to engage in political action for social change. The same experiences of discrimination had a predominant de-politicising effect, however, on support for the public role of Islam in European society and politics.

## 7.5 Notes

1. Such protests can be considered as collective action by intuitive theologians according to Van Zomeren and Spears' typology of metaphors of protest (Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009).
2. Due to different sampling frames and response rates, we cannot be certain to what extent the data from the TIES-surveys provide a representative picture of second

generation attainment in all cities under study. Hence, positional characteristics of the participants should not be generalised to judge in which countries or cities the structural integration of the second generation has been most successful.


3. We use the terms 'Turks/Turkish' and 'Moroccans/Moroccan' to refer to the ethnic background of the participants, not to current nationality. As all participants in the TIES-surveys were born in the country where they were interviewed, a large majority holds the citizenship of the survey country.
4. For instance, to test whether a regression coefficient is equal across groups or significantly different, two models are estimated: one in which the coefficient is constrained to be equal across groups and one without equality constraints. Subsequently, the model fit of the two models is compared using a  $\chi^2$ -difference test. If the model fit of the constrained and the unconstrained model do not differ significantly, it can be concluded that the two coefficients do not differ statistically.
5. Looking at the wording of the four items used to construct the scale of support for political Islam, one could argue that some are more radical from the perspective of the majority population than others. In particular the item concerning the obligatory use of headscarves in public and about Islam as ultimate authority in political matters might be perceived to be beyond the limits of what is politically acceptable in European liberal democracies. However, these more extreme items are very highly correlated with the items regarding the political representation of Islam in politics and the (rejection of) separation between private religion and public political engagement. Moreover, leaving out any of the two more 'radical' items or using only the two less 'radical' items to measure politicisation in a repeated estimation of the path model does not substantially affect the structural relations between perceived discrimination, religious identification and politicisation – but the model fit suffers greatly due to the instability of latent variables with less than four indicators (results available upon request). This additional analysis makes clear that the paths from perceived discrimination and religious identification to support for political Islam are similar for more and less 'radical' forms of politicisation. This lack of distinction between normative and non-normative political engagement from the perspective of the majority fits in with the widespread rejection of Muslims' claims for political recognition and accommodation by the majority society.
6. Confirmatory factor analysis could not be applied to test the equivalence of factor loadings on the latent variable perceived discrimination because with only three items, there are no degrees of freedom to test the model fit.
7. In addition to living in a working class neighbourhood, we also tested the effects of being unemployed as an indicator of socio-economic disadvantage – although many

participants are still young and have little labour market experience. Since no effects of being unemployed were found, this predictor was omitted from the final analyses.

8. Standardised coefficients were calculated from pooled-within groups variances and covariances across all 1,543 participants. In order to separate within- from between-group variance, all variables were centred on their respective group mean in the pooled model.
9. An alternative model reversing the direction of causality from religious identification to perceived discrimination was a worse fit to the data – findings available on request.
10. Before answering to what extent they would be willing to undertake certain political actions, participants in Belgium were randomly assigned to either of three conditions regarding the action goals: to defend religious group interests of Muslims, to defend ethnic group interests of Turks or Moroccans, or to defend human rights. Participants in the latter two conditions were included in Study 1, while for Study 2 only participants in the religious condition were analysed. Importantly, participants in Study 2 were excluded from Study 1 in order to be able to cross-validate the path model established in Study 1.
11. The final model in Study 2 is very similar to that in Study 1; and so are the model fit and the explained variances of support for political Islam. However, the latent rejection-identification path to support for political Islam falls short of statistical significance in the multi-group invariant model in Study 2. This is most probably due to the reduced statistical power of a more complex model and smaller sample sizes given similar signs and sizes of the estimates in both studies.

# 8

## Conclusion



## 8.1 Introduction

The presence of Islam and Muslims in Western Europe has become a focal point in debates of immigrant integration and the management of diversity. Ever since the major terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London, Islam and Muslims are perceived as a security threat by European majority populations. Moreover, Muslims in Europe are commonly portrayed as a group which is unfit or even unwilling to integrate; which places religious values above core principles of Western liberal democracies; which oppresses women; and which aggressively tries to dominate European public spaces. Several European societies today are debating the legal ban of full-cover veils or the banning of headscarves from schools and other public service institutions. Members of European majority populations question whether or to what extent they should support or even tolerate expressions of the Islamic religion. Against the backdrop of this polarised and often hostile political climate, a local-born second generation of Muslim minorities struggles to find their place in European societies.

I argued that these public debates raise new questions about the intergenerational integration of Muslim minorities in European societies. The two broad questions of this dissertation were whether Islam is a bridge or barrier to the inclusion of the local-born Muslim second generation, and whether religion forms an additional source of social inequality for Muslim minorities in Europe. In this final chapter, I first provide an overview of the research questions and findings of the six empirical chapters of this book, and discuss the implications for the theoretical frameworks from which I developed my hypotheses. Subsequently, I highlight the contributions of this dissertation to existing research and theory as well as its limitations, and suggest avenues for future research. I conclude with the core findings and messages of this doctoral dissertation.

## 8.2 Overview of findings

In six empirical chapters, I sought to answer research questions about two major explananda, structural integration and religion among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in North-Western Europe, taking the reader through a series of steps. After first addressing structural integration in terms of educational attainment, I focused on the relation between structural integration and religion and on the importance of religious socialisation for continued religiosity among the second generation. Finally, focusing on religion as a social identity, I analysed the compatibility of Muslim identity with civic identities and its consequences for political attitudes of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation.

The first two empirical chapters were concerned with the structural integration of the second generation and tested contextual explanations for ethnic penalties on educational attainment in Belgium – since common explanations from a comparative

stratification approach in terms of parental resources could not fully account for educational disadvantage among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation (Phalet, Deboosere, & Bastiaenssen, 2007). Chapter 2 focused on the role of ethnic composition of the local living environment, while controlling for socio-economic composition, and asked: *How to conceive ethnic composition at the local level and how are different concepts of ethnic composition associated with school attainment among the second generation?* I discussed and empirically compared two distinct conceptual approaches and measures of ethnic composition: ethnic minority concentration, i.e., the presence of non-Belgians in the municipality, and ethnic density, i.e., the presence of the ethnic ingroup in the municipality (Halpern, 1993; Halpern & Nazroo, 1999). Multilevel analysis revealed that from a minority perspective, ethnic density is a more meaningful indicator of ethnic composition than ethnic minority concentration because it is consistently positively associated with secondary school completion among both majority and minority groups, and because it explains a larger share of ethnic penalties in educational attainment even after taking socio-economic composition into account. The empirical results confirmed the reasoning that the minority perspective is important to take into account in assessments of ethnic composition and that the presence of ingroup members in local living environments may be advantageous for educational attainment of the second generation. This suggests that ethnic density can be considered a proxy for ethnic capital at the neighbourhood level, which may be a resource for second-generation attainment, according to segmented assimilation theory (Portes, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1993). However, Esser (2001, 2004) cautions against a too optimistic view of ethnic concentrations in local residential contexts as this may bear the risk of a mobility trap for the second generation.

Therefore, chapter 3 investigated the structural preconditions for the positive ethnic density effect, by looking at residential mobility, urbanisation, home ownership and the share of single households as crucial conditions for the emergence of social capital in local living environments (cf. Coulthard, Walker, & Morgan, 2002; Halpern, 2005; Putnam, 1995; Völker, Flap, & Lindenberg, 2007), while taking differences in socio-economic composition into account. In light of different modes of incorporation of the three most important ethnic minority groups in Belgium and the ethnic stratification of the Belgian housing market, I asked: *How does ethnic density interact with structural characteristics of local residential contexts to explain educational attainment among the second generation? Do contextual effects differ between ethnic minority groups in line with differential modes of incorporation?* The analysis showed differential effects of ethnic density in conjunction with structural municipality characteristics, after controlling for municipalities' socio-economic composition. Municipality stability and quality were found to overlap with concentrations of Belgians of native origin, resulting in high rates of secondary school completion. A similar overlap of neighbourhood stability and quality

and ethnic concentration was found among the Moroccan second generation, albeit with reversed sign: concentrations of Moroccans were found in the least residentially stable municipalities with highest rates of urbanisation and single households and lowest rates of home ownership. These structural characteristics were all related to lower school completion rates. Among the Turkish and Italian second generation, I found that the effect of ethnic density was dependent on structural municipality characteristics, yet the interplay of co-ethnic concentration and municipality stability and quality was different. Among Turks, the effect of ethnic density on school completion was positive only in residentially stable municipalities, in line with the expectation that residential stability is a crucial condition for the establishment and maintenance of social networks that aid second-generation attainment. Among Italians, positive ethnic density effects were only observed in less stable municipalities of lower quality. This is due to the fact that municipality stability has a different meaning for Italians in terms of staying behind in declining neighbourhoods, in contrast to the more recently arrived immigrant community of Turks for whom residential stability facilitates the emergence of co-ethnic networks. I concluded that whether or not stability and quality of local living environments facilitate the emergence of a positive ethnic density effect on educational attainment depends on the specific investment strategies and modes of incorporation of ethnic minority groups – thus confirming the usefulness of applying segmented assimilation theory in European migration contexts (cf. Phalet & Heath, 2010). Though of great importance for second-generation school attainment, structural characteristics of local living environments and the available socio-economic resources are not sufficient explanations for differential educational attainment of the second generation. Despite similar starting positions of ethnic minority groups in terms of socio-economic resources, different modes of incorporation in terms of the ways in which groups invest in and make use of co-ethnic and mainstream resources as well as their opportunities to enter mainstream networks can lead to differential outcomes for the second generation. The different results for the Italian, Moroccan and Turkish second generation suggest that investment in co-ethnic vs. mainstream capital (cf. Esser, 2004) as well as contexts of reception in terms of the permeability of group boundaries (Alba, 2005) and ethnic discrimination, for instance on the housing market, distinguish between different modes of incorporation and lead to differential effects of ethnic density on second-generation school completion.

Chapter 4 introduced the second major explanandum of this dissertation, religion, and connected it to research on structural integration by studying the relation between structural integration and second-generation religiosity. The research questions in this chapter were: *What is the relation between structural integration and religiosity among the second generation? Does this relation differ across national contexts as a function of different approaches to the institutionalisation of Islam?* Applying the concept of intergenerational structural integration (Esser, 2000, 2001) to the study of religiosity,



I hypothesised that structural integration in terms of educational and labour market attainment and in terms of intermarriage would go together with levels of religiosity that are similar to those of the majority population (cf. Connor, 2010). Given prevalent secularisation among historically Christian majority populations in North-Western Europe (Gorski & Altinordu, 2008), this religious assimilation hypothesis effectively predicts secularisation, such that Muslim minorities are expected to be less religious, the more structurally integrated they are. However, I also tested the competing hypothesis of religious vitality in the second generation due to religious transmission as part of intergenerational cultural continuity within immigrant communities (Ellison & Sherkat, 1990; Ellison, 1995; Sherkat, 2001; Phalet & Schönplflug, 2001a) and/or due to reactive religious identification in response to societal exclusion and experiences of discrimination (Diehl & Koenig, 2009; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001).

A second research question in this chapter was concerned with contextual variation in the relation between structural integration and religiosity. The comparative design of this chapter included the Turkish second generation in four capital cities (Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels and Stockholm). The four comparison sites were chosen to represent different national approaches to the institutionalisation of Islam in line with distinct histories of church-state relations (cf. Bader, 2007; Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Koenig, 2007). I argued that the accommodation of Islam as a minority religion is most inclusive in the Netherlands due to the legacy of 'pillarisation' (Doomernik, 1995; Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, & Meijer, 1996) and least inclusive in Germany due to the persistent privileges of the Christian churches (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Jonker, 2002). In Belgium and Sweden, Islam enjoys some recognition and varying levels of state support (Alwall, 2002; Foblets & Overbeeke, 2002; Kanmaz, 2002; Manço, 2000; Sander, 1996). In line with these contextual differences, I hypothesised and empirically confirmed that structural integration is inversely related to religiosity among the Turkish second generation only in Berlin where there is no room for Islamic religiosity; in the other contexts, where Islam is recognised and facilitated – albeit to varying degrees – structural integration is decoupled from religiosity. This suggests that Islamic religiosity and structural integration can go together and are not inherently conflicting, at least where Islam as a minority religion is recognised and accommodated to some extent. These findings provide support for the notion that an inclusive institutional approach of equal recognition of various religions in the public sphere may decouple religiosity from socio-economic disadvantage. However, chapter 4 also showed that religious socialisation is a more important predictor of continued religiosity in the second generation than structural integration in terms of educational and labour market attainment, thus pointing to the importance of ethnic communities for the intergenerational transmission of Islamic religiosity in European migration contexts.

Chapter 5 therefore zoomed in on ethnic communities as moderators of the process of intergenerational religious transmission. I asked: *What is the influence of religious*

*socialisation within immigrant families and communities on later religiosity among the second generation? How does the process of religious transmission relate to the acculturation of the second generation?* In line with expectations derived from the sociology of religion emphasising the importance of childhood religious socialisation (Kelley & De Graaf, 1996; Myers, 1996) I found across all cities and groups studied that young adults of Turkish and Moroccan origin are more religious if they attended Koran lessons outside school hours as a child and if their parents visited the mosque more frequently when they were young. Exposing ethnic group differences, chapter 5 showed that, in line with a more cohesive community structure of Turkish as compared to Moroccan minorities (Dagevos, 2001; De Valk & Liefbroer, 2007; Phalet & Heath, 2010), the effects of religious socialisation on religiosity in young adulthood were stronger for the Turkish than the Moroccan second generation. Moreover, the results revealed the importance of acculturation orientations for intergenerational religious transmission among acculturating groups in a context that is characterised by a stark contrast between immigrant communities and the societal mainstream regarding both religious affiliation and levels of religiosity (Voas & Crockett, 2005). Distinguishing between maintenance of the heritage culture and adoption of the host culture as distinct and independent dimensions of acculturation (Bourhis et al., 1997), I showed that religious socialisation affects religiosity in young adulthood by orienting the second generation towards cultural maintenance. However, cultural maintenance and adoption were found to be unrelated overall and little support was found for the idea that greater religiosity goes together with less adoption of the mainstream culture – the only exception relates to religious identification among the Turkish second generation which is negatively related with host culture adoption, which in turn is negatively predicted by the attendance of Koran lessons. With the exception of this finding, however, adoption of the host culture was decoupled from second-generation religiosity, thus highlighting again that high levels of religiosity among the second generation do not imply less integration into the mainstream. Moreover, the results of this study underline the importance of lived religion in immigrant families and co-ethnic communities for continued religiosity in the second generation.

Conceiving religion as a social identity, I studied Muslim identity as one important facet of identity multiplicity among the second generation in chapter 6. The research questions in this chapter were: *When and why are religious and ethnic identities compatible or conflicting with civic identities? What is the influence of perceived discrimination on the compatibility of identities among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation?* In line with the findings of previous chapters, I did not assume an inherent conflict between Muslim identity and civic identities such as Belgian, Dutch or Swedish national identity. Instead, I took a contextual approach to identity multiplicity, asking in which intergroup contexts ethnic and religious identities are compatible or conflicting with national and city identities. Rather than focusing on mean levels of religious and civic identification, I studied

the patterns of association between Muslim and Turkish or Moroccan ethnic identities – as subgroup identities that distinguish the second generation from the mainstream – and national and city identities – as superordinate identities shared with the majority population. These subgroup and superordinate identities may both be important and positively correlated, implying identity compatibility or dual identity (Dovidio, Validzic, & Gaertner, 1998; González & Brown, 2006); or they may both be important but negatively associated, implying identity conflict; or one type of identity might be relatively more important than the other, implying identity dominance (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Across five different cities, I found both conflicting (i.e., negatively associated) and compatible (i.e., positively associated) identification patterns – with significantly lower civic identification in the latter case. Identity conflict, or negative associations between religious and ethnic subgroup identities on the one hand and national and city superordinate identities on the other, was explained by perceptions of discrimination through a dual pathway model. On the one hand, the experience of discrimination was found to go together with increased identification with religiously and ethnically defined subgroups, in line with the rejection-identification model (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001). At the same time, perceived discrimination was associated with decreased identification with superordinate civic identities in conjunction with the derogation of the majority population, in line with a novel rejection-disidentification path (cf. Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, & Solheim, 2009; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Hence, instead of an inherent conflict between the contents of salient identities of the second generation, the findings of this chapter show that the quality of intergroup relations, in particular the frequency of discriminatory experiences, can explain why in some contexts young Muslims feel they have to choose between similarly important attachment to their religious and ethnic ingroups and a sense of belonging to the city and country where they live.

Finally, chapter 7 focused on the politicisation of Muslim identity and raised the following research questions: *When and why is Muslim identity politicised? What is the influence of religious identification and perceived discrimination on support for political Islam and political action?* I considered two specific outcomes as indicators of a politicised Muslim identity: supporting the ideology of political Islam, and taking political action to defend Islam. In line with the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), I found that religious identification predicts both forms of politicisation such that high religious identifiers more often supported political Islam and were more willing to take political action to defend Islam. Moreover, I tested competing hypotheses regarding the importance of perceived discrimination for politicisation vs. de-politicisation. The perception of discrimination had differential effects on the two forms of politicisation, yielding partial support for the two competing hypotheses. In line with rejection-identification (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001) and the importance of religious identification (SIMCA), perceived

discrimination was found to motivate the Turkish and Moroccan second generation to engage in political action as a response to shared grievances. At the same time, perceived discrimination had a de-politicising effect by reducing support for political Islam, in line with the notion that perceived discrimination signals the stigmatisation of Muslim identity (Crocker & Major, 1989) and that the second generation will not mobilise on this 'spoiled identity' (Kamans, Gordijn, Oldenhuis, & Otten, 2009). Moreover, the two forms of politicisation, political action and political Islam, were only weakly associated. Thus, politically activist Muslims who are protesting in the street do not necessarily share the ideals of political Islam, whereas those who do strive for a stronger role of Islam in politics and society are not necessarily those who are most vocal and politically active in European civil societies. Moreover, a comparison of different types of politicised or de-politicised Muslims revealed that in particular the more highly educated and those who live in more distressed neighbourhoods perceive most discrimination and are therefore most likely to engage in political protest, whereas support for political Islam is largest among more lowly educated and highly religiously identified members of the second generation.

The results of chapters 6 and 7 point to experiences of discrimination as an important aspect of intergroup relations influencing religiosity among the second generation by further increasing already high levels of religious identification, by inducing conflict between similarly important religious and civic identities, and by motivating the second generation to engage in political action on behalf of their religious ingroup. However, when controlling for structural integration and religious socialisation, chapter 4 provided little evidence for reactive religiosity (cf. Diehl & Koenig, 2009; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001), i.e., increased religiosity due to higher levels of perceived discrimination. This implies that reactivity is not the main explanation for sustained religiosity in the second generation. Nevertheless, the quality of intergroup relations contributes to the explanation of religiosity in the second generation in light of the positive associations between perceived discrimination and religious identification found in chapters 6 and 7 – which is remarkable considering the fact that the mean levels of religious identification are very high already and leave little room for further enhancement. Hence, structural integration, religious socialisation, acculturation orientations, intergroup relations and the institutional recognition of Islam as a minority religion all contributed to the explanation of religiosity in the second generation, but the single most powerful explanation of second-generation religiosity is intergenerational religious transmission in immigrant families and communities. Nevertheless, the four empirical studies concerned with religion in the second generation have made clear that the different explanatory approaches drawn upon in this dissertation – comparative stratification, intergenerational integration and intergroup relations – all have added value and provide unique insights into how, why and to what extent the local-born second generation of Muslim minorities continues to identify with and practice their religion.

### 8.3 Contributions and limitations

This dissertation aimed to contribute to existing theory and research on intergenerational integration and religion of Muslim minorities in Europe both empirically and theoretically. Empirically, the main innovative aspects of the research presented in this book are the focus on the second generation, the multidimensional measurement of religion among Muslim minorities, and the comparative approach. Theoretically, the main contributions lie in extending the comparative stratification approach with a religious dimension, applying mainly US based theories on assimilation and religion to prevalently secular European contexts with different histories of church-state regimes, and in applying research and theories on acculturation and intergroup relations to Muslim minorities as acculturating groups in diverse, but increasingly hostile intergroup settings. More generally, this dissertation aimed to bring together two disciplinary approaches to integration and religion by drawing on theories and research from sociology and social psychology. In the following, I first discuss the empirical contributions of my approach and then argue why, based on the findings of my research, I think the combination of explanatory approaches has been fruitful in terms of providing new insights into structural integration and religion among the second generation in Europe.

#### Empirical contributions

Regarding the first empirical contribution, the focus on the second generation of local-born children of immigrants rather than on the foreign-born first generation, three results stand out. Firstly, the analysis of educational attainment as a crucial indicator of structural integration has revealed severe ethnic penalties regarding school completion among the local-born children of guest workers in Belgium. Analysing educational attainment among the second generation is important because this reveals to what extent European educational systems are successful in offering equal opportunities to ethnic minorities. Research that looks at the first generation only cannot fully answer this question as the educational attainment of newcomers is strongly influenced by the selectivity of the migration process and because immigrants are confronted with limited convertibility of qualifications and skills between origin and destination countries (Friedberg, 2000). Although the 1991 Belgian Census data used for the analysis of educational attainment of the second generation are quite dated and do not include information on parental social background, the finding of severe ethnic penalties among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation has been replicated in research based on the most recent wave of the Census and including controls for social background (Phalet, Deboosere, & Bastiaenssen, 2007); in other words, the severe ethnic penalties found in chapters 2 and 3 must not be considered artefacts resulting from the limitations of the data source. Secondly, the focus on the second generation has revealed that the Islamic religion remains important for

the local-born children of immigrants from Turkey and Morocco – not only symbolically (Gans, 1994) or as a source of a positive social identity (Verkuyten, 2007; Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010), but also in terms of regular practice and as a motivator for political action. Importantly, however, despite considerable disadvantages in terms of their structural integration, the relatively high levels of religiosity among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation were found to be largely decoupled from their educational and labour market attainment, at least in more inclusive national contexts that provide some institutional recognition and state support for Islam as a minority religion. This suggests that religion is coupled with social stratification only to the extent that it constitutes a source of social inequality in terms of privileged treatment of some religious communities and disadvantage of others in the public sphere and in interactions with the state. Third and finally, the results revealed the central importance of religious socialisation for religiosity in young adulthood (cf. Kelley & De Graaf, 1996; Myers, 1996) in contexts where the religious traditions of parents who migrated from Islamic majority societies differ starkly from the societal mainstream (Voas & Crockett, 2005).

The second empirical contribution of this dissertation is the conceptualisation of religion as a multidimensional phenomenon and the use of multiple measures of religion among Muslim minorities in line with a multidimensional approach to conceptualising and measuring religion among sociologists (Glock & Stark, 1965; Voas, 2007). In addition to traditional behavioural measures like mosque attendance, I also looked at other specific Islamic practices, like participating in fasting during *Ramadan* and consuming *halal* food, as well as religious identification, attitudes regarding the role of Islam in politics and society, and orthodox beliefs. This way I could (i) build multidimensional empirical models of religiosity in the second generation, (ii) test their cross-cultural equivalence, (iii) document the associations between different dimensions of religiosity, and (iv) compare these associations across contexts. This allowed me to show different ways of being Muslim in different groups and cities instead of focusing more narrowly on higher or lower levels of religiosity. For instance, among the Turkish second generation, I found that the models of religiosity were less complex in Berlin and Stockholm, where different aspects of Islamic religiosity were more closely related, as compared to more complex models of religiosity in Amsterdam and Brussels where selective combinations of different aspects of religiosity were observed. The latter finding underlines that it is problematic to focus on single indicators of religiosity (e.g. mosque attendance, identification) as this will most likely provide only a partial picture of Islamic religiosity in the second generation.

The third empirical contribution of my research is the comparative approach which allowed me to theorise three types of contexts – local receiving contexts, ethnic communities, and national receiving contexts – as moderators of the intergenerational integration process. Municipalities and cities were operationalised as local receiving contexts – as sites of day-to-day interactions among and between the second generation



and the majority population of native origin. Chapters 2 and 3 highlighted the importance of local living environments as contexts where local ethnic communities can facilitate second-generation attainment – provided the structural characteristics of the municipality enable the emergence and maintenance of community social capital. These results reveal how local living environments can affect intergenerational integration and they are a useful addition to cross-national comparative studies on immigrant integration that tend to favour institutionalist, state-centred explanations for integration processes.

Regarding ethnic communities as comparative dimension, I studied second-generation comparison groups that are children of labour migrants and thus share similar profiles with regard to their migration history, social background and the level of resources available within co-ethnic communities. Still I found ethnic differences regarding the impact of co-ethnic residential concentration and religious socialisation, with more investment in co-ethnic capital and more effective intergenerational religious transmission within more cohesive Turkish communities. These ethnic group differences reflect different modes of incorporation of immigrant minorities and attest to the usefulness of applying segmented assimilation theory (Portes, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1993), which was developed in the context of the post-1965 immigration to the US, to European migration contexts (see Phalet & Heath, 2010, for a similar argument). Moreover, these findings imply that a narrow focus on socio-economic community resources or parental characteristics, which is common in the comparative stratification literature, cannot fully explain educational attainment and religiosity in the second generation because these outcomes are additionally shaped by intragroup dynamics which may differ between ethnic minority groups.

In addition, the comparison across national contexts made it possible to study contextual differences regarding more or less inclusive approaches to ethnic and religious diversity. I focused on the role of institutional settings, in particular different histories of church-state relations and national approaches towards the accommodation of Islam as important elements in the opportunity structures for Muslim minorities. However, as I argued in the introduction, the institutional accommodation of Islam as a minority religion is only one out of several elements in distinct national patterns of diversity and ties in with other national differences in policies, public climate and ethnic stratification. Previous research on religiosity among Muslim minorities was usually limited to a single country (e.g. Diehl & Koenig, 2009; Maliopaard, Lubbers, & Gijsberts, 2010; Phalet, Gijsberts, & Hagendoorn, 2008; Smits, De Rooter, & Van Tubergen, 2010; Van Tubergen, 2003, 2007; but see Connor, 2010). In order to study the role of different national settings, I drew on a comparative case study design and selected four capital cities that represent divergent models of institutional accommodation of Islam. While this method did not allow me to formally test the effect of institutional differences, the results of my comparative analysis suggest that the different ways in which Islam as a minority religion is accommodated



by the state create distinct opportunity structures for the second generation to combine Islamic religiosity with structural integration. Thus, the findings evoke different prospects for the maintenance of the link between socio-economic disadvantage and high religiosity which, at present, is the rule among Muslim minorities in Europe.

Finally, regarding identification and politicisation, the comparative approach allowed me to sample from a range of intergroup contexts that differ in the quality of intergroup relations with the majority population and thus to replicate processes of identification and politicisation across groups and contexts. This allowed me to assess the influence of subjective perceptions of intergroup relations, most importantly the experience of personal discrimination, while taking into account individual differences in socio-economic attainment. This is an advantage in terms of external validity over experimentally based social psychological research into identification and politicisation that usually does not take such differences into account. The results of chapter 7 provide insights into the interplay of perceived intergroup relations and social positions as I found that experiences of discrimination are more common among the more highly educated and those living in distressed neighbourhoods. Thus, the results attest to the connection between perceived intergroup relations and social positions, such that reactive religious identification is not only a response to hostile intergroup relations, but also to the specific social position of the second generation.

### **Theoretical contributions**

Regarding the theoretical contributions of this dissertation, the six studies aimed to extend existing explanatory approaches from comparative stratification, intergenerational integration and intergroup relations to the study of the intergenerational integration of Muslim minorities in European societies. The core question in comparative stratification is concerned with explaining the reproduction of social inequality in terms of class disparities in educational and occupational attainment (cf. Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1993; Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993). Applying this perspective to the study of intergenerational integration in general, and to integration and religion among Muslim minorities in particular, raises the question whether the same mechanisms that create class disparities are at work in creating ethnic and religious group differences in attainment. Since the majority of Muslims in Europe, and certainly the two specific groups under study in this dissertation, are ethnic minorities due to their migration background (Peach & Glebe, 1995), religious minority and ethnic minority status overlap considerably in European migration contexts. Hence, any mechanism that creates ethnic in addition to class inequality in socio-economic attainment, such as for instance xenophobic attitudes and discrimination, is likely to affect Muslims just like non-Muslim ethnic minorities. Over and above such ethnic penalties, however, Muslims may face additional barriers to inclusion in European societies due to their religion. Such additional religious penalties may be expected based on Alba's (2005)

description of Islam in Europe as marker of a bright boundary, as bright and impermeable as race is in the US. Moreover, the religious minority status of Muslims constitutes a source of social inequality and lacking structural integration to the extent that European public spheres are not religiously neutral, but privilege historically established Christian churches. The results of chapter 4 suggest that in contexts where Islam as a minority religion is disadvantaged from an institutional perspective, individual religiosity is associated with less structural integration among the Turkish second generation. Such an inverse association between educational and labour market attainment and religiosity was not found in other contexts where the position of Islam is on a more equal footing to the established churches – despite national differences in the extent of accommodation and state support for Islam. These contextual differences in the association between structural integration and religiosity suggest that individual religiosity is an additional mechanism creating disparity in attainment levels between Muslim minorities and the majority population, but only where Islam as a minority religion is not structurally integrated into the religious landscape of the receiving society.

A second explanatory approach that informed this dissertation is derived from intergenerational integration in ethnic and migration studies. Within this field, research focusing on immigrant religion is mainly conducted in the US and finds that religion is an asset in intergenerational integration. This integrative function of religion is related to the fact that religious communities provide new arrivals with resources that facilitate their incorporation (Hirschman, 2004), as well as to the generally positive attitudes towards religiosity in the US (Casanova, 2003; Foner & Alba, 2008; Warner, 1998), which imply that immigrants are predicted to assimilate to the high levels of religiosity of the majority population (Connor, 2008). European receiving contexts differ markedly from the US since religious attendance has been steadily declining among European majority populations throughout the 20th century (Gorski & Altinordu, 2008). In addition to the observation of declining church attendance, secularisation has become almost an ideology among members of European majority societies (Casanova, 2003; Foner & Alba, 2008). Given the very different roles of religion in society in North-Western European immigrant receiving societies as compared to the US, the functionality of religion as a tool for intergenerational integration is likely to be lower in Europe. In terms of religious assimilation, the expectation would thus be that immigrants to North-Western Europe would adjust to the low levels of religious participation with increasing length of stay (Connor, 2010). I applied this approach to Muslim minorities in Europe, incorporating a cross-national comparative and an intergenerational perspective by focusing on the local-born second generation in four North-Western European countries. Going beyond more general US-European comparisons that point to the ‘exceptionalism’ of either of the two contexts in terms of the role of religion in society and the continued cooperation between the church and the state (cf. Foner & Alba, 2008), I could thus study the implications of

specific church-state regimes for the association between structural integration and second-generation religiosity. Moreover, my findings revealed that religion plays a central role in the intergenerational transmission of culture among Muslim minorities, such that religious socialisation within immigrant families and communities effectively recreates religiosity in the second generation. Thus, despite the less welcoming context of reception with regard to religion in North-Western European societies, Islamic religiosity is maintained at considerably high levels in the second generation. While their religion thus may not function to incorporate immigrants from majority Muslim countries and their local-born children into the mainstream, it remains functional as a tool for the integration within co-ethnic communities and for cultural continuity in acculturating groups.

With regard to intergroup relations, the third explanatory approach that I applied to the study of integration and religion among Muslim minorities in Europe, my results provide empirical evidence for the usefulness of studying religious identities from a social identity perspective (cf. Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). Despite varying levels of religious practice, most members of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation showed high levels of commitment to Muslim identity and described it as central to their self-concept. Consequently, an important research question is when and why this religious identity can be maintained simultaneously with superordinate identities shared by Muslim minorities and the majority population. Previous research and theorising on multiple identities in multicultural settings suggests that maintaining, instead of downplaying, minorities' subgroup identities and superordinate identities is the most conducive to intergroup relations (Brown, 2000; Dovidio, Validzic, & Gaertner, 1998; González & Brown, 2006; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b). The study described in chapter 6 aimed to contribute to this line of research by drawing on a broad range of intergroup settings in order to investigate in which intergroup contexts Muslim and civic identities are compatible rather than conflicting. The results highlight the importance of identity threat, specifically subjectively perceived discrimination, as important correlate of less identity compatibility. Thus, from the perspective of Muslim minorities, the findings suggest that making an effort to combat discrimination of Muslims can contribute to less hostile intergroup relations. However, as Brown (2000) pointed out, it is less clear how majority groups can be motivated to socially validate minorities' dual identities. Future research should therefore investigate in which intergroup contexts majority groups are ready to support the maintenance of multiple identities in order to better understand how positive intergroup relations can be achieved in multicultural settings.

In addition to extending sociological and social psychological theories to the study of intergenerational integration and Muslim religiosity in Europe as described above, another aim of this dissertation was to combine two disciplinary approaches, sociology and social psychology, and to show how these two disciplinary perspectives can complement each other in the study of integration and religion. Social psychological

research focuses on connecting mechanisms and is therefore strong in theorising social processes. Moreover, experimental methods with random assignment of participants to conditions aim to maximise internal validity. Sociological approaches on the other hand are stronger on external validity and allow generalisation due to random sampling from the population. Moreover, comparative designs highlight the role of social contexts and allow estimating the influence of contextual differences. Typically, there is a trade-off between external and internal validity such that it is difficult to maximise both at the same time. I aimed to complement social psychological and sociological approaches by explicating the processes (e.g. acculturation) that connect variables on the independent side (e.g. religious socialisation, educational attainment) with variables on the dependent side (e.g. religiosity) while relying on large-scale comparative samples that can expose contextual differences. Moreover, the combination of sociological and social psychological perspectives on integration and religion in the second generation has revealed a more complete picture of these phenomena than a monodisciplinary approach would have. As the six empirical chapters of this dissertation have shown, structural integration and religious socialisation – as distinct sociological explanations – as well as perceptions of intergroup relations and acculturation orientations – as distinct social psychological explanations – all contribute to the explanation of religion in the second generation.

## Limitations

Despite these contributions, this dissertation also has a number of limitations that I want to discuss in the following, as well as suggesting avenues for future research that may address these limitations. It is not my intention to repeat here the specific limitations of each empirical chapter in terms of data constraints (e.g. the lack of parentage data in the 1991 Belgian Census, the cross-sectional survey design of the TIES-data) and theoretical shortcomings (e.g. the conceptualisation of politicisation of collective identities) that I acknowledged and discussed in the discussion sections of the empirical chapters. These constraints generally provide hands-on suggestions for future studies that should be designed in a way that overcomes these limitations, e.g. by including important omitted variables or incorporating experimental designs into surveys. Instead, I want to highlight here three more general limitations of the research project.

The first is again mainly an empirical concern. As mentioned in the introduction and documented in the appendix to this dissertation, the TIES-surveys that I used in four out of six empirical chapters, are problematic in some respects. First of all, it may be questioned to what extent the data are representative of the groups and contexts under study, given low response rates and sometimes considerable deviations from nationally representative reference data. Secondly, due to different sampling frames across countries, it may be asked whether the data can be meaningfully compared across local contexts. The extensive comparison of the parents of the participants to the TIES-data across

contexts was intended to investigate the comparability and the comparison of the TIES-participants with existing reference data on the second generation intended to document the amount of bias. These comparisons (see the Appendix to this dissertation) revealed sometimes significant deviations from nationally representative reference data, but at the same time showed that the participants to the TIES-surveys were sufficiently similar across contexts to allow for meaningful comparisons. Since there is generally a trade-off between optimal representativeness within one context and optimal comparability across contexts, the latter was judged to be the more important aspect in light of the comparative goals of this dissertation. Moreover, relevant control variables were taken into account in order to account for possible bias as documented in the comparison with reference data. While care was thus taken to address the constraints of the data source and control possible confounding variables, replication of the analyses with other data sources in future research is the optimal strategy to maximise the validity of the findings (Brewer, 2000). Sure enough, given the manifold practical problems of conducting large-scale comparative research on the second generation of Muslim minorities, alternative data sources are likely to suffer from similar or other limitations as well. Nevertheless, if similar patterns of findings emerge from a variety of data sources, more confidence in the validity of the empirical findings may be gained.

A second limitation concerns the cross-national comparative scope of the dissertation and relates to the limited number of national contexts that was drawn upon for analysis. The limited number of cities and countries available in the TIES-surveys did not allow conducting multilevel analysis which can show to what extent characteristics at the individual level (e.g. religiosity) are influenced by contextual characteristics (e.g. the accommodation of Islam as a minority religion). This may be considered a data constraint that could be addressed by increasing the number of countries included in the comparative analysis. However, given my interest in more or less inclusive patterns of accommodation of ethnic and religious diversity, in particular the different national approaches towards the institutionalisation of Islam, a large-N approach and multilevel design is not an adequate response to the conceptual problem at hand. In order to demonstrate empirically whether and how institutional settings influence individual-level outcomes such as religiosity, one would have to operationalise patterns of diversity and institutional settings and to control all other contextual characteristics that may be potential confounds. In other words, the large-N approach requires the translation of, among others, distinct national histories of church-state relations, the formal legal status of Islam as a minority religion and state support for Islamic religiosity into neat quantitative variables and to capture all other country differences in the same way in order to control them in statistical analyses. Obviously, this is not a realistic scenario given the limited number of countries that can be meaningfully compared and the many ways in which these countries are similar rather than different. Given this limitation of the large-N approach, I opted for a small-N or

comparative case study design for the analysis of cross-national differences in second generation integration and religion. In this design, hypotheses about contextual effects are tested with an 'if-then' approach that relies on careful argumentation of how exactly cross-national differences will be related to individual outcomes and subsequently assesses whether the cross-national pattern of findings is in line with this reasoning. In combination with the replication of explanatory approaches in each of the contexts under study, this approach is particularly sensitive to contextual differences and avoids the imposition of general contextual effects on the data.

A third empirical limitation lies in the use of survey data that are unavoidably only a shallow representation of complex phenomena such as religion. Closed-ended questions can never provide the kind of in-depth insights into the personal experiences of religiosity and the meaning of religion for individuals that can be acquired with alternative qualitative approaches. With a multidimensional approach to the conceptualisation and measurement of religion, I tried to avoid overly simplistic representations of second-generation religiosity. In addition, the use of large-scale comparative samples of two second-generation groups across numerous local and national contexts implies that the findings of this research can more easily be generalised than evidence acquired through qualitative methods.

A final limitation of the research endeavour that resulted in this dissertation lies in the combination of sociological and social psychological disciplinary approaches to the study of structural integration and religion. Most often I have adopted one disciplinary focus in each empirical chapter and derived hypotheses from theoretical frameworks that are common within that field. Thus, this dissertation may be described as multidisciplinary rather than interdisciplinary in its theoretical approach. Earlier in this chapter, however, I have argued why and how the combination of the two disciplinary approaches has enriched the understanding of structural integration and religiosity among the second generation as presented in this dissertation. Any theoretical integration of these two disciplinary approaches hence occurs mainly *a posteriori*, based on the findings of studies conducted with different disciplinary backgrounds, rather than being based on a coherent interdisciplinary theoretical framework. This would require more explicit theorising regarding the connections between sociological processes like ethnic stratification or intergenerational transmission of culture and religion and psychological processes like identification or perceived intergroup relations. Achieving such theoretical integration across disciplinary boundaries requires a dialogue between disciplines. At present, this is made difficult by different methodological approaches, different levels of analysis and different research questions in the two disciplines (Oishi, Kesimer, & Snyder, 2009) – and, as I would like to add, mutual stereotypes about the other discipline. However, the collection of studies inspired by different disciplinary backgrounds but addressing a common topic – the intergenerational integration of Muslim minorities in European societies – may

function as an example of what the two disciplines can learn from each other. At the same time, this example makes abundantly clear that theoretical integration of these two disciplines is still lacking and needs further theorising in future scholarly work.

## 8.4 Conclusions

This dissertation was concerned with two broad questions, inspired by current societal debates on immigrant integration that have come to revolve mainly around Islam and the religiosity of Muslim minorities. In terms of theories and research on intergenerational integration, these societal debates raise two broad questions: (1) whether religion is a bridge or barrier to the inclusion of Muslim minorities in European societies, and (2) to what extent religion functions as a source of social inequality and stratification in European societies. With these two broad questions in mind, I studied structural integration and religion among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in North-Western Europe from a comparative perspective.

The results of several chapters showed that Islamic religiosity is not inherently conflicting with structural integration, adoption of the host culture and civic integration, thus showing that Islam is not *per se* a barrier to the integration of the Muslim second generation. However, in some contexts, Islamic religiosity was associated with less structural integration and Muslim identity was not compatible with civic identification. Tensions between Muslim identity and religiosity on the one hand and structural and civic integration on the other were found in context where Islam was institutionally disadvantaged and where intergroup relations with the majority population were more hostile as the second generation reported more discrimination. These findings thus shed light on the conditions under which Islam can become a barrier to the integration of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation. Moreover, the finding that Islamic religiosity is decoupled from structural integration and adoption of the host culture in most contexts implies that Islam does not function as a bridge to integration either – in the sense that more religious members of the second generation would be more integrated as much of the US literature on the function of religion in immigrant integration would suggest. Although the comparative findings shed light on the question of when and why religion functions as a barrier to the structural and civic integration of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation, the minority perspective taken throughout this dissertation implies that the findings do not necessarily speak to the perception of European majority populations. In other words, although the different empirical studies provided no evidence for an inherent conflict between Islamic religiosity and integration of Muslim minorities, members of European majority populations may still perceive them to be inherently conflicting – which raises the question of how this impacts on the possibility of local-born Muslims to participate as equal members in European societies.




Regarding the second question of religion as a source of social inequality, the results regarding cross-national variation in the relation between structural integration and religiosity suggest that religion is a source of social inequality and stratification only where institutional arrangements are not inclusive of Islam as a minority religion. Where national patterns of diversity are more inclusive of ethnic and religious diversity, structural integration was found to be decoupled from religiosity among the second generation, implying that religious self-categorisation as well as the level of religiosity of young Muslims do not relate to their social position in European societies. Nevertheless, these findings need to be considered in the light of persistent disadvantage in terms of educational and labour market attainment of the local-born children of guestworker immigrants. A major explanation for this disadvantaged social position of the second generation is certainly the social background of immigrant workers, as suggested by comparative stratification. Moreover, as the findings of the first two empirical chapters showed, community resources embedded in local co-ethnic networks contribute to the explanation of educational attainment of the second generation as well, thus providing evidence for modes of incorporation and investment strategies of immigrant groups as additional explanatory grounds in line with suggestions of segmented assimilation and intergenerational integration theory.

Summarising across the empirical chapters, the findings of this dissertation overall provide little support for the idea that Islamic religiosity is inherently at odds with integration into European societies, both in terms of educational attainment and in terms of civic integration; or that it is mainly a response to socio-economic disadvantage among young Muslims in Europe – despite significant and widespread ethnic penalties in educational and labour market attainment among the second generation (cf. Heath & Cheung, 2007a; Heath, Rethon & Kilpi, 2008). Rather, my findings suggest that immigrant families and vibrant co-ethnic communities (re-)create religiosity in the second generation as a crucial element of cultural maintenance. However, the findings also show that the maintenance of ethnic and religious minority cultures generally does not imply less adoption of or conflict with the mainstream culture. Finally, contextual differences in religiosity and its relation to structural integration relate to divergent approaches to the institutionalisation of Islam as a minority religion as well as to the differential quality of intergroup relations with European majority populations. Personal experiences of discriminatory treatment among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation play an important role as they increase religious identification, inspire young Muslims to take political action to defend Islam, but also increase identity conflict so that they have to choose between similarly valued attachments to their religious community and to the wider society. Thus, from a minority perspective, effectively combating discrimination against young Muslims is likely to reduce the conflict between being a (practicing) Muslim and feeling fully accepted as a member of European societies. Importantly, efforts must be

undertaken to reduce the persistent disadvantage in educational labour market attainment among the second generation. However, even if such efforts eventually resulted in the structural integration of the Muslim second generation in terms of parity with majority peers regarding their educational and labour market attainment, the research presented in this book suggests that this would not necessarily entail a decline of Islamic religiosity because socio-economic disadvantage is not the main explanation for continued religiosity in the second generation. This may be bad news for those who hope that Islam will disappear from Europe as minorities of immigrant origin become structurally integrated over time and generations. On the other hand, however, the results provide a prospect for Islam and Muslims as integral part of Europe's increasingly diverse societies.

# Appendix



## **The TIES-surveys in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden**

### **General aim and procedure**

TIES stands for The Integration of the European Second generation and refers to a comparative survey of three second-generation groups and a native comparison sample in fifteen major cities in eight European countries.<sup>1</sup> The aim of the TIES-surveys is to provide new empirical material to assess the integration of the children of labour migrants across European contexts. The target population of the TIES-surveys is defined as children born in the respective survey country to one or two foreign-born parents from Turkey, Morocco and/or the former Yugoslavia. In addition to the second generation, a comparison group of native origin was sampled, defined as native-born children of two native-born parents. The age range of the target population was set between 18 and 35 years, such that the surveys cover the birth cohorts from 1971 to 1990 (since data gathering occurred between 2006 and 2008).

In view of the comparative scope of the survey, the measurement instrument and fieldwork procedure were harmonised as far as possible. A standardised questionnaire with mainly closed-ended questions was developed. The questionnaire covered demographic information, educational and labour market careers, identification, religion and social integration. The questionnaire was developed in English and subsequently translated into the national languages of the survey countries. In the process, question wordings were adapted to reflect cross-national differences in educational systems. In addition, country teams had some leverage to make changes to the questionnaire by inserting additional questions and or taking out specific items. The fieldwork was conducted by means of computer-assisted personal interviews (CAPIs) in participants' homes. Trained interviewers visited potential participants at their home address; they had to visit selected addresses at least four times during different day times and weekdays before moving on to the next address on the list. The interviews took about 75 minutes on average to complete.

While measurement instruments and fieldwork procedures were thus harmonised, a major challenge for the comparative scope of the survey lies in the different sampling frames available in each country or city. A second challenge was the comparative quality of the fieldwork in terms of response rates and selectivity. To ensure representativeness and comparability, one would ideally draw a random sample of the registered population using exactly the same criteria in each context. However, this was not possible due to different national traditions regarding the registration of ethnic origin in population registers and differential access to register data for the purpose of drawing a research sample. In the following, I describe the sampling procedure and response rates for the cities included in this dissertation.

## Country-specific sampling and response

### *Belgium*

Belgian population registers contain information about the country of birth of a person and of his/her parents, age and residence and thus make it possible to identify the target population of the TIES-survey. In the city of Antwerp, a simple random sample was drawn from the population of 18 to 35 year old Belgian-born persons with both parents born in Turkey or Morocco. The overall response rate to the TIES-survey in Antwerp was 58.4%; among the Turkish second generation it was 63.5%; and among the Moroccan second generation it was 55.9% (see Swyngedouw, Phalet, Baysu, Vandezande, & Fleischmann, 2008). In Brussels, access to the population register for the purpose of drawing a random sample among the target population was denied due to legislative changes in the administration of population register data. Therefore, a sample was drawn in two steps. First, street segments were selected proportionally to the percentage of inhabitants of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation, based on full information from the population register. In the second step, addresses of Turkish and Moroccan households were identified within the selected street segments based on information from a commercial data base supplier. After having thus compiled a list of addresses, interviewers had to perform a screening at the door in order to find out whether one or more members of the target population were living at the address in question. (In case more than one inhabitant was eligible, randomly selection based on the last birthday method was applied.) Due to the poor quality of addresses thus compiled, it was decided to switch to semi-quota sampling halfway through the fieldwork, which implies that interviewers were allowed to replace addresses from their list after two unsuccessful tries by a member of the target population within the same street or an adjacent street. The overall response rate to the TIES-survey in Brussels, calculated conservatively based on the original list of addresses, was 31.0%; 31.5% among the Turkish second generation and 30.6% among the Moroccan second generation. More detailed information about the sampling and fieldwork in Belgium can be found in the technical report for the Belgian TIES-surveys (Swyngedouw, Phalet, Baysu, Vandezande, & Fleischmann, 2008).

### *Germany*

In Germany, it is not possible to identify the German-born Turkish second generation in the population register, because the register contains only information on nationality and country of birth and does not contain information on parents' country of birth. Instead, a list drawn from the population register of all 18-35 year olds living in Berlin was obtained which contained information on place of birth and citizenship. Name recognition analysis of first and last names was applied to this list in order to identify the German-born Turkish second generation. After having thus identified the target population, a random sample

of addresses was drawn. The overall response rate to the TIES-survey in Berlin was 26.4% (31.2% among the Turkish second generation). As yet, a technical report about the data collection for the German TIES-surveys is not available.

### ***The Netherlands***

In the Netherlands, the Dutch-born Turkish and Moroccan second generation can be identified from the population register which contains information about a person's country of birth as well as the country of birth of both parents. Random samples of the target population defined by ethnic origin, country of birth, age and city of residence were drawn from the population registers of the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam within neighbourhoods selected proportionately to the share of inhabitants of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation. The overall response rate in Amsterdam was 31.1% (29.9% among the Turkish second generation, 25.6% among the Moroccan second generation). In Rotterdam, the overall response rate amounted to 29.2% (30.5% among the Turkish second generation, 24.2% among the Moroccan second generation). More detailed information about sampling and fieldwork for the Dutch TIES-surveys can be found in Groenewold (2008).

### ***Sweden***

As in the Netherlands, the Turkish second generation can be identified in the Swedish population register based on the country of birth of a person and both his/her parents. A random sample of 18 to 35 year old persons born in Sweden with both parents born in Turkey living in the greater Stockholm area (Stockholms län) was drawn. The overall response rate to the TIES-survey in Stockholm was 42.6% (31.6% among the Turkish second generation). More detailed information about sampling and fieldwork can be found in the technical report (in Swedish) for the Swedish TIES-survey (Renstrand & Lundström, 2008).

Given the different sampling frames and generally low response rates, one may question (1) to what extent the TIES-data are representative of the target population, the Turkish and Moroccan second generation, in the selected cities and (2) to what extent comparative analyses make sense. In order to investigate these questions, the next paragraphs present comparisons of the TIES-survey results with available reference data and across cities. In the case of Sweden, the comparison to reference data could not be conducted because publicly available reference data provide information on the second generation only for aggregated groups of origin countries.

## Comparison with reference data

### *Belgium*

TIES-survey results from Belgium were compared to matched observations from the 1991 and 2001 Belgian Census with regard to the educational attainment of participants and their parents. The matching procedure is necessary as the second generation cannot be completely identified in the 2001 Census unless the country of birth of their parents is known. Therefore, children who were under 18 years old in 1991 and still lived in their parental household were selected and their data were matched across the two waves of the Census. The Turkish and Moroccan second generation is identified based on the parentage data available in the Belgian Census in 1991, while their educational attainment is measured in 2001; parental education is measured in 1991. Since this matching was applied to persons who were maximally 18 years old in 1991, the age range is limited to 28 year olds in 2001. Moreover, only persons who were at least 18 in 2001 were selected because this is the nominal age of completion of upper secondary education and the start of the age range in the TIES-data. There are three differences between the TIES-surveys and the matched observations from the Belgian Census: the coverage (Antwerp and Brussels vs. the entire country), the age range (18-35 in the TIES-surveys, 18-28 in the Census) and the time of data collection (2007/2008 vs. 2001). These are all possible explanations for deviations between the data sources which make it difficult to determine the exact amount of bias in the TIES-surveys.

Regarding the educational attainment of the second generation, the differences between the estimates from the TIES-surveys and the Census are modest and suggest that the TIES-data are not strongly biased with regard to educational attainment (see Table A1). Tertiary educated persons are somewhat overrepresented in Brussels as compared to the nationally representative data, but this appears realistic given that Brussels hosts several universities and has a strong service economy with highly qualified jobs. In terms of parental education, the differences are larger with the parents of participants to the TIES-surveys being more highly educated compared to the findings from the Census. This trend is particularly apparent in Brussels, but this is in light with findings from a previous survey on first generation Turkish and Moroccan immigrants that also revealed more positive selectivity in terms of human capital among immigrants in Brussels as compared to other regions of Belgium (Reniers, 2000). Summing up, the comparison of the TIES-surveys from Antwerp and Brussels with matched observations from the Belgian Census suggests that there is no substantial bias in the TIES-data in terms of the educational attainment of the second generation or of their parents.

### *Germany*

Findings from the German TIES-surveys were compared to results of the Mikrozensus of 2007 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008), the year in which data gathering for the TIES-survey



**Table A1** Comparison of educational attainment of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation and their parents: Belgian Census 1991-2001 and TIES-samples in Antwerp and Brussels, Percentages (*N*)

	Belgian Census 1991-2001		TIES Antwerp		TIES Brussels	
	Turkish 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation ( <i>N</i> = 1,761)	Moroccan 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation ( <i>N</i> = 3,104)	Turkish 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation ( <i>N</i> = 358)	Moroccan 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation ( <i>N</i> = 312)	Turkish 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation ( <i>N</i> = 250)	Moroccan 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation ( <i>N</i> = 257)
<b>Completed education</b>						
Primary or less	9.0% (159)	8.6% (266)	2.0% (7)	1.9% (6)	4.0% (10)	3.5% (9)
Lower secondary	28.8% (507)	25.4% (788)	37.4% (134)	24.7% (77)	43.6% (109)	32.7% (84)
Upper secondary	848.6% (855)	47.3% (1,467)	53.9% (193)	63.8% (199)	40.4% (101)	42.4% (109)
Tertiary	8.9% (157)	11.0% (341)	6.7% (24)	9.6% (30)	11.2% (28)	16.7% (43)
<b>Father's education</b>						
Primary or none	81.3% (1,431)	82.6% (2,565)	50.8% (182)	49.0% (153)	32.8% (82)	30.0% (77)
Lower secondary	3.7% (66)	1.9% (56)	15.1% (54)	14.4% (45)	18.0% (45)	15.6% (40)
Upper secondary	9.9% (174)	7.9% (245)	22.6% (81)	20.8% (65)	35.2% (88)	27.2% (70)
Tertiary	1.0% (18)	0.6% (20)	3.4% (12)	0.6% (2)	4.0% (10)	6.6% (17)
<b>Mother's education</b>						
Primary or none	92.7% (1,633)	93.6% (2,905)	60.9% (218)	55.8% (174)	43.2% (108)	35.0% (90)
Lower secondary	2.6% (46)	2.1% (65)	16.2% (58)	10.9% (34)	24.0% (60)	17.9% (46)
Upper secondary	3.8% (66)	3.4% (105)	17.0% (61)	21.5% (67)	22.0% (55)	23.7% (61)
Tertiary	0.2% (4)	0.1% (4)	0.6% (2)	0.3% (1)	2.0% (5)	3.1% (8)

Source: Belgian Census 1991-2001, TIES07-08 Belgium, unweighted data.

Note. In the Belgian Census, the Turkish and Moroccan second generation is defined as Belgian-born with both parents born in Turkey/Morocco. Only 18-28 year olds were included.

in Germany started. As in the Belgian case, the German reference data provide estimates at the national level. I compared the Turkish second generation in the two data sources with regard to citizenship, educational attainment, and parental education. The publications of Mikrozensus data cover persons with a migration background and distinguish between those who have an own migration experience (here referred to as first generation) and those without an own migration background, i.e., persons who were born in Germany and never migrated but are considered to have a migration background due to the migration

experience of their parents or grandparents (here referred to as second generation). It should be noted that the definitions of the first and second generation do not overlap completely between the data provided in publications of the Mikrozensus and in the TIES-data. The group of persons with a migration background and without own migration experience in the Mikrozensus may contain members of the third generation, while the group with an own migration experience may contain members of the so-called 1.5 generation, i.e., persons who migrated as children and pursued a substantial part of their education in Germany. Furthermore, it should be noted that the data in the Mikrozensus are not split out by age groups, while about half of the persons in the group with Turkish migration background and without own migration experience is not within the 18-35 age range used in the TIES-surveys, because they are younger (44.2% is under 15 years) or older (3.4% is older than 35). As a consequence, a large part of the Turkish second generation in the Mikrozensus data is still pursuing education and has not entered the labour market. Therefore, the comparison of educational attainment in Table A2 is based only on those members of the second generation who have already completed their education.

The comparison reveals strong differences with regard to citizenship, as a majority of the Turkish second generation TIES-participants in Berlin holds only German citizenship, 10% hold only Turkish citizenship, while 28% hold dual citizenship. According to the 2007 Mikrozensus, however, only 2.9% of the Turkish second generation had dual citizenship and a large majority (67%) had only Turkish citizenship (it is not clear in the publication of the Mikrozensus data whether the remainder holds only German citizenship or other (combinations of) citizenship(s)). Regarding educational attainment, the differences are more modest. Education at the lower and intermediate secondary level (Haupt- and Realschule) is more common among participants in the TIES-surveys, while both more highly and more lowly educated parts of the Turkish second generation seem to be underrepresented. Regarding parental characteristics, it seems that the parents of the participants to the TIES-surveys are more negatively selected than the first generation of Turkish immigrants nation-wide in terms of their educational attainment. However, this difference may be due to inclusion of members of the 1.5 generation in the Mikrozensus data. Summing up, we note that there are remarkable differences in terms of citizenship of the Turkish second generation in the TIES-data that suggest bias in favour of naturalised persons or severe measurement error. In terms of educational attainment and in terms of parental characteristics, the TIES-samples deviate less strongly from the national population as described in the Mikrozensus.

### ***The Netherlands***

The Dutch TIES-surveys were compared to results from the Survey Integration of Minorities (SIM; Dagevos, Gijsberst, Kappelhof, & Vervoort, 2007), which is a nationally representative survey of four ethnic minority groups, including Turks and Moroccans, that was conducted at the same time period as the TIES-surveys. Participants in SIM were selected in line with

**Table A2** Comparison of core characteristics of Turkish second generation and their parents: Mikrozensus and the TIES-sample in Berlin, Percentages (*N*)

	Mikrozensus 2007 x 1000	TIES Berlin
<b>Turkish 2<sup>nd</sup> generation</b>		
<i>N</i>	1,016	253
Citizenship		
Only Turkish citizenship	66.9% (680)	10.7% (27)
Only German citizenship	n.a.	60.9% (154)
Double citizenship	2.9% (29)	28.5% (72)
Completed education		
No degree <sup>a</sup>	8.6% (38)	4.7% (12)
Haupt-/Realschule <sup>a</sup>	73.2% (322)	84.2% (213)
Abitur/ Fachhochschulreife <sup>a</sup>	18.2% (80)	11.1% (28)
In education	56.7% (576)	
<b>Turkish 1<sup>st</sup> generation</b>		
Men ( <i>N</i> )	788	253
Education		
No degree	26.6% (210)	64.4% (163)
Haupt-/Realschule	58.9% (464)	18.6% (47)
Abitur/ Fachhochschulreife	10.5% (83)	1.6% (4)
Women ( <i>N</i> )	722	253
Education		
No degree	41.0% (296)	71.1% (180)
Haupt-/Realschule	47.6% (344)	18.2% (46)
Abitur/ Fachhochschulreife	6.9% (50)	0.8% (2)

Source: Mikrozensus 2007 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008), TIES07-08 Germany, unweighted data.

<sup>a</sup> In the Mikrozensus, the percentages of the three categories of educational attainment refer to the part of the second generation that has already completed their education.

the characteristics of the TIES-target population, i.e., they were born in the Netherlands to parents born in Turkey or Morocco and between 18 and 35 years old. It is principally possible to select participants with these characteristics in Amsterdam and Rotterdam only, but the numbers are too low (less than 25 per group and city) to allow for a meaningful comparison. Therefore, data are presented from the nation-wide samples of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in the SIM-data. However, a comparison between the nation-wide samples and the samples from Amsterdam and Rotterdam does not show substantial differences due to geographical location.

The comparison comprised educational attainment of second generation participants and their parents. Educational attainment of the second generation was defined in both data sources as the highest level of education completed for participants who were not pursuing full-time education or the level currently attended for those who were still in

school. As Table A3 shows, the distribution of parental education is very similar across the surveys, suggesting that similarly selected groups were sampled in both surveys. However, there is a difference in educational attainment of the second generation, with higher shares of participants educated at the tertiary level in the TIES-data as compared to SIM, in both cities and for both groups. This difference cannot be attributed to a difference in city-based as compared to nation-wide data as the shares of tertiary educated participants in the SIM-data from Amsterdam and Rotterdam are similar to those of the nation-wide SIM-data presented in Table A3.

**Table A3** Comparison of education of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation and their parents: Survey Integration Minorities and the TIES-samples in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, Percentages (N)

	SIM		TIES Amsterdam		TIES Rotterdam	
	Turkish 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation (N = 183)	Moroccan 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation (N = 128)	Turkish 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation (N = 237)	Moroccan 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation (N = 242)	Turkish 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation (N = 263)	Moroccan 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation (N = 251)
<b>Education</b>						
Primary or less	13.1% (24)	5.5% (7)	4.2% (10)	6.6% (16)	11.4% (30)	8.8% (22)
Lower secondary	25.1% (46)	11.7% (15)	22.8% (54)	17.4% (42)	19.0% (50)	16.3% (41)
Upper secondary	43.2% (79)	57.0% (73)	43.5% (103)	43.4% (105)	41.8% (110)	48.2% (121)
Tertiary	18.6% (34)	22.7% (29)	27.4% (65)	30.2% (73)	26.2% (69)	25.5% (64)
<b>Father's education</b>						
Primary or less	57.9% (106)	53.9% (69)	47.3% (112)	49.2% (119)	45.3% (119)	56.6% (142)
Lower secondary	20.7% (38)	13.3% (17)	24.1% (57)	11.6% (28)	19.0% (50)	12.4% (31)
Upper secondary	8.7% (16)	7.0% (9)	11.4% (27)	12.4% (30)	15.6% (41)	10.8% (27)
Tertiary	3.8% (7)	11.7% (15)	4.6% (11)	6.6% (16)	7.6% (20)	2.0% (5)
<b>Mother's education</b>						
Primary or less	74.9% (137)	63.3% (81)	61.2% (145)	57.9% (140)	61.2% (161)	64.9% (163)
Lower secondary	12.0% (22)	14.1% (18)	16.5% (39)	16.5% (40)	18.3% (48)	9.1% (23)
Upper secondary	4.4% (8)	5.5% (7)	9.3% (22)	9.9% (24)	4.2% (11)	7.6% (19)
Tertiary	1.6% (3)	4.7% (6)	2.5% (6)	2.1% (5)	4.6% (12)	1.6% (4)

Source: Survey Integratie Minderheden (SCP/CBS, 2007); TIES06-07 Netherlands.

Overall, the comparisons of the TIES-data with reference data from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands reveal some deviations in the distribution of educational attainment (and citizenship in the case of Germany), yet it is not possible to determine whether these deviations are due to sampling bias in the TIES-surveys or due to the fact that the reference data do not perfectly fit the sampled population of the TIES-surveys in terms of their geographical location (cities vs. national samples), the different time period of data collection in the Belgian case and differential definitions of the second generation in the German case.

### **Comparability across cities: the selectivity of the first generation**

In order to assess to what extent the Turkish and Moroccan second-generation samples are comparable across cities, a detailed comparison of the characteristics of their parents, i.e., the first generation, was undertaken. The aim of this comparison is to make sure that the samples in all cities represent the children of labour migrants and thus exclude differential selectivity of the first generation as an alternative explanation for contextual differences found in the second generation.

Table A4 shows parental characteristics of the Turkish second generation in the TIES-surveys from all cities included in this dissertation, while Table A5 shows the same characteristics for the Moroccan second generation. Both tables reveal the typical profile of Turkish and Moroccan labour migration to Western Europe. Most migrants arrived as young adults in the early 1970s and they came mainly from rural areas in their origin countries. Most fathers' migration motive was work or study, while mothers mainly came for reasons of family reunification or formation. The Turkish sample in Stockholm is an exception to this general pattern as a relatively large share of fathers of the second generation also arrived for family related reasons. Refugee migration, however, is of marginal importance as main migration motive in all cities, with somewhat higher shares among Turks in Berlin and Stockholm.

The data on educational attainment reflect the limited human capital of the first generation of labour migrants with 50% or more having completed maximally lower secondary education. Notable exceptions are Turks and Moroccans in Brussels as well as Turks in Stockholm who have higher levels of education. With regard to Brussels, this more positive selectivity of the first generation is in line with findings from earlier surveys (Reniers, 2000). Labour market participation and occupational status of the parents reflects their structural integration in the destination countries rather than their selectivity, but provide important information about parental resources of the second generation. In line with their primary migration motive, most fathers were working when participants were 15 years old. In the two Dutch cities, however, considerable shares of both Turkish and Moroccan fathers were not working because they were permanently sick or disabled. This finding is in line with nationally representative data (Dagevos, Euwals, Gijsberts, & Roodenburg, 2006) and reflects the Dutch policy approach to the labour market surplus in the 1980s. Most fathers who were working were occupied in unskilled or semi-skilled

jobs with higher average levels of occupational status among Turkish fathers in Berlin and Stockholm and among Moroccan fathers in Brussels. The mothers of the second generation were homemakers and not economically active when participants were 15 years old, but working mothers were more common among the Turkish second generation in Brussels and Stockholm. Of the mothers who were working, most were occupied in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs, but again mean levels of occupational status were higher in Stockholm.

Overall, the comparison of parental characteristics revealed that the Turkish and Moroccan second generation samples in the TIES-surveys all share a common background as children of labour migrants. Their parents share their rural origin, their timing of migration in the early 1970s, their primary migration motives (work for fathers, family related migration for mothers), their low levels of educational attainment and their labour market position in the destination countries (most fathers employed in working-class occupations, most mothers homemakers or working in similar types of occupations). Against this common background, however, there are some notable differences which reveal more positive selectivity of the parents of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in Brussels and the Turkish second generation in Stockholm. These groups show higher levels of education and occupational attainment and higher labour market participation among mothers as compared to the findings from the other cities. By including relevant controls, I test whether this more positive selectivity is related to religiosity in the second generation.

## Notes

1. These cities and countries are Vienna and Linz (Austria), Antwerp and Brussels (Belgium), Paris and Strasbourg (France), Berlin and Frankfurt (Germany), Amsterdam and Rotterdam (the Netherlands), Madrid and Barcelona (Spain), Stockholm (Sweden), Zurich and Bern (Switzerland). Detailed information about the set-up of the TIES-project, participating institutions and researchers, and project publications can be found on the project website [www.tiesproject.eu](http://www.tiesproject.eu).

**Table A4** The parents of the Turkish second generation in the TIES samples: Percentages (N) of categorical variables, Mean (SD) of continuous variables

	Belgium		Netherlands		Germany		Sweden	
	Antwerp (N = 358)	Brussels (N = 250)	Amsterdam (N = 237)	Rotterdam (N = 263)	Berlin (N = 253)	Stockholm (N = 185)		
Father's year of birth	n.a.	n.a.	1952 (8.64)	1951 (9.23)	1950 (7.06)	1953 (8.97)		
Mother's year of birth	n.a.	n.a.	1956 (9.16)	1955 (7.98)	1954 (6.62)	1957 (7.04)		
Father grew up in: Village	45.3% (162)	40.8% (102)	48.1% (114)	51.0% (134)	41.1% (104)	44.9% (83)		
Father grew up in: Town	25.2% (90)	24.0% (60)	23.2% (55)	25.5% (67)	39.9% (101)	29.2% (54)		
Father grew up in: Big city	24.6% (88)	18.8% (47)	27.0% (64)	23.6% (62)	15.0% (38)	24.9% (46)		
Mother grew up in: Village	46.4% (166)	48.0% (120)	51.1% (121)	50.6% (133)	45.8% (116)	42.7% (79)		
Mother grew up in: Town	24.9% (89)	22.0% (55)	20.7% (49)	24.0% (63)	33.6% (85)	30.3% (56)		
Mother grew up in: Big city	19.6% (70)	13.2% (33)	27.0% (64)	25.5% (67)	17.4% (44)	25.9% (48)		
Father's age at migration	20.5 (7.02)	19.6 (7.70)	22.1 (7.62)	21.4 (6.83)	21.2 (5.26)	20.3 (6.90)		
Mother's age at migration	18.3 (6.50)	18.0 (7.13)	20.3 (6.13)	20.7 (6.79)	19.4 (5.11)	18.3 (5.73)		
Father's migration motive: Work or study	66.8% (239)	63.2% (158)	62.9% (149)	63.1% (166)	55.7% (141)	43.2% (80)		
Father's migration motive: Family reunification or formation	26.0% (93)	28.4% (71)	21.5% (51)	26.6% (70)	16.6% (42)	41.6% (77)		
Father's migration motive: Asylum	1.4% (5)	0.4% (1)	2.5% (6)	1.1% (3)	6.3% (16)	4.3% (8)		
Mother's migration motive: Work or study	7.0% (25)	9.2% (23)	4.2% (10)	3.0% (8)	2.4% (6)	5.9% (11)		
Mother's migration motive: Family reunification or formation	86.3% (309)	76.0% (190)	84.0% (199)	90.1% (237)	64.4% (163)	81.6% (151)		
Mother's migration motive: Asylum	0.9% (3)	0.4% (1)	1.7% (4)	0.8% (2)	2.4% (6)	0.5% (1)		
Father's education: Primary or less	50.8% (182)	32.8% (82)	47.3% (112)	45.2% (119)	64.4% (163)	44.3% (82)		
Father's education: Lower secondary	15.1% (54)	18.0% (45)	24.1% (57)	19.0% (50)	18.6% (47)	23.8% (44)		
Father's education: Upper secondary	22.6% (81)	35.2% (88)	11.4% (27)	15.6% (41)	0.8% (2)	7.6% (14)		
Father's education: Tertiary	3.4% (12)	4.0% (10)	4.6% (11)	7.6% (20)	0.8% (2)	16.8% (31)		



Mother's education: Primary or less	60.9% (218)	43.2% (108)	61.2% (145)	61.2% (161)	71.1% (180)	53.0% (98)
Mother's education: Lower secondary	16.2% (58)	24.0% (60)	16.5% (39)	18.3% (48)	18.2% (46)	18.4% (34)
Mother's education: Upper secondary	17.0% (61)	22.0% (55)	9.3% (22)	4.2% (11)	0.8% (2)	9.2% (17)
Mother's education: Tertiary	0.6% (2)	2.0% (5)	2.5% (6)	4.6% (12)	0% (0)	10.3% (19)
Father's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Working	75.4% (270)	76.4% (191)	57.0% (135)	62.0% (163)	86.2% (218)	79.5% (147)
Father's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Unemployed	6.2% (22)	7.2% (18)	4.6% (11)	3.8% (10)	9.5% (24)	1.1% (2)
Father's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Inactive	6.7% (24)	4.0% (10)	7.2% (17)	6.8% (18)	2.4% (6)	4.9% (9)
Father's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Sick/disabled	7.0% (25)	6.0% (15)	17.7% (42)	18.3% (48)	0.4% (1)	4.3% (8)
Mother's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Working	26.5% (95)	41.2% (103)	24.1% (57)	22.1% (58)	19.0% (48)	64.3% (119)
Mother's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Unemployed	2.0% (7)	9.6% (24)	6.8% (16)	6.1% (16)	1.6% (4)	4.9% (9)
Mother's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Inactive	69.3% (248)	43.6% (109)	48.5% (115)	61.2% (161)	78.3% (198)	20.5% (38)
Mother's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Sick/disabled	0.6% (2)	3.2% (8)	10.1% (24)	3.4% (9)	0.4% (1)	6.5% (12)
Father's occupational status <sup>a,b</sup> : EGP I & II	3.0% (8)	5.8% (11)	9.6% (13)	7.4% (12)	3.2% (7)	9.5% (14)
Father's occupational status <sup>a,b</sup> : EGP III-VI	36.7% (99)	38.7% (74)	27.4% (37)	41.7% (68)	52.3% (114)	44.9% (66)
Father's occupational status <sup>a,b</sup> : EGP VII	58.9% (159)	51.8% (99)	45.2% (61)	32.5% (53)	35.3% (77)	19.8% (29)
Mother's occupational status <sup>a,b</sup> : EGP I & II	3.2% (3)	6.8% (7)	14.0% (8)	13.8% (8)	6.3% (3)	3.4% (4)
Mother's occupational status <sup>a,b</sup> : EGP III-VI	32.6% (31)	25.2% (26)	14.0% (8)	12.1% (7)	37.5% (18)	51.3% (61)
Mother's occupational status <sup>a,b</sup> : EGP VII	63.2% (60)	65.0% (67)	63.2% (36)	58.6% (34)	54.2% (26)	13.4% (16)

Source: TIES07-08 Belgium, TIES06-07 Netherlands, TIES07-08 Germany, TIES07-08 Sweden, own calculations, unweighted data.

Note. n.a. = not available. Percentages may not add up to 100.0% due to missing values.

<sup>a</sup> Economic activity and occupational status of father and mother refer to the time when the participant was 15 years old.

<sup>b</sup> Percentages are calculated based on the number of fathers/mothers who were working.

**Table A5** The parents of the Moroccan second generation in the TIES-samples Percentages (N) of categorical variables, Mean (SD) of continuous variables

	Belgium			Netherlands	
	Antwerp (N = 312)	Brussels (N = 257)	Amsterdam (N = 242)	Rotterdam (N = 251)	
Father's year of birth	n.a.	n.a.	1947 (9.28)	1948 (8.26)	
Mother's year of birth	n.a.	n.a.	1955 (7.81)	1955 (7.91)	
Father grew up in: Village	52.9% (165)	30.4% (78)	55.0% (133)	55.3% (139)	
Father grew up in: Town	20.5% (64)	28.4% (73)	22.7% (50)	25.1% (63)	
Father grew up in: Big city	19.2% (60)	29.6% (76)	23.1% (56)	18.3% (46)	
Mother grew up in: Village	48.1% (150)	25.3% (65)	47.1% (114)	47.8% (120)	
Mother grew up in: Town	20.5% (64)	26.5% (68)	20.2% (49)	28.7% (72)	
Mother grew up in: Big city	20.5% (64)	28.8% (74)	31.4% (76)	22.3% (56)	
Father's age at migration	21.7 (7.07)	21.3 (7.08)	23.5 (7.70)	23.5 (6.41)	
Mother's age at migration	19.7 (7.15)	18.4 (6.26)	21.3 (6.54)	22.0 (7.23)	
Father's migration motive: Work or study	77.2% (241)	73.5% (189)	81.4% (197)	81.7% (205)	
Father's migration motive: Family reunification or formation	16.7% (52)	16.0% (41)	10.7% (26)	10.8% (27)	
Father's migration motive: Asylum	0.3% (1)	0% (0)	0.8% (2)	0.4% (1)	
Mother's migration motive: Work or study	2.9% (9)	7.0% (18)	2.9% (7)	1.2% (3)	
Mother's migration motive: Family reunification or formation	88.1% (275)	76.3% (196)	90.5% (219)	88.8% (223)	
Mother's migration motive: Asylum	1.3% (4)	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)	
Father's education: Primary or less	49.0% (153)	30.0% (77)	49.2% (119)	56.6% (142)	
Father's education: Lower secondary	14.4% (45)	15.6% (40)	11.6% (28)	12.4% (31)	
Father's education: Upper secondary	20.8% (65)	27.2% (70)	12.4% (30)	10.8% (27)	
Father's education: Tertiary	0.6% (2)	6.6% (17)	6.6% (16)	2.0% (5)	

Mother's education: Primary or less	55.8% (174)	35.0% (90)	57.9% (140)	64.9% (163)
Mother's education: Lower secondary	10.9% (34)	17.9% (46)	16.5% (40)	9.1% (23)
Mother's education: Upper secondary	21.5% (67)	23.7% (61)	9.9% (24)	7.6% (19)
Mother's education: Tertiary	0.3% (1)	3.1% (8)	2.1% (5)	1.6% (4)
Father's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Working	77.2% (241)	76.3% (196)	55.0% (133)	55.8% (140)
Father's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Unemployed	6.4% (20)	6.6% (17)	5.0% (12)	7.2% (18)
Father's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Inactive	6.4% (20)	4.7% (12)	2.5% (6)	4.8% (12)
Father's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Sick/disabled	4.5% (14)	4.3% (11)	19.8% (48)	20.7% (52)
Mother's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Working	9.6% (30)	20.2% (52)	15.7% (38)	13.9% (35)
Mother's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Unemployed	0% (0)	8.2% (21)	5.8% (14)	4.0% (0)
Mother's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Inactive	87.5% (273)	64.2% (165)	63.6% (154)	74.5% (187)
Mother's economic activity <sup>a</sup> : Sick/disabled	1.3% (4)	1.2% (3)	5.8% (14)	2.0% (5)
Father's occupational status <sup>a,b</sup> : EGP I & II	2.5% (6)	7.7% (15)	11.3% (15)	4.3% (6)
Father's occupational status <sup>a,b</sup> : EGP III-VI	22.0% (53)	34.2% (67)	19.5% (26)	32.9% (46)
Father's occupational status <sup>a,b</sup> : EGP VII	75.5% (182)	47.4% (93)	43.6% (58)	37.1% (52)
Mother's occupational status <sup>a,b</sup> : EGP I & II	3.3% (1)	7.7% (4)	7.9% (3)	2.9% (1)
Mother's occupational status <sup>a,b</sup> : EGP III-VI	20.0% (6)	44.2% (23)	34.2% (13)	25.7% (9)
Mother's occupational status <sup>a,b</sup> : EGP VII	73.3% (22)	44.2% (23)	36.8% (14)	60.0% (21)

Source: TIES07-08 Belgium, TIES06-07 Netherlands, own calculations, unweighted data.


Note. n.a. = not available. Percentages may not add up to 100.0% due to missing values.

<sup>a</sup> Economic activity and occupational status of father and mother refer to the time when the participant was 15 years old.

<sup>b</sup> Percentages are calculated based on the number of fathers/mothers who were working.



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
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## Summary



The aim of this dissertation is to describe and explain individual and contextual variation in educational attainment and religiosity of second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in North-West Europe. I develop comparative perspectives on both minority groups across local and national receiving contexts in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden to answer two broad research questions: (i) when is ethnicity and religiosity a resource or a hindrance in the educational attainment of second-generation Muslims; and (ii) when is religiosity a bridge or a barrier in their acculturation and in intergroup relations with the wider society? Six empirical studies make use of multilevel analyses of Belgian Census data (chapters 2 and 3) and of multi-group structural equation models of new cross-national survey data among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation (TIES, 'The Integration of the European Second generation; chapters 4-7). The studies were written as co-authored research articles (chapters 2-7) that are integrated in the introduction and conclusion (chapters 1 and 8).

In a first part of the dissertation, I study the role of ethnicity and religiosity in second-generation attainment. Extending comparative stratification research to ethnic minorities, two studies focus on local co-ethnic communities as a possible source of ethnic social capital enabling second-generation attainment. The first study reveals small yet robust positive effects of 'ethnic density', or the presence of co-ethnic neighbours, on school completion (chapter 2). The second study analyses the interplay of ethnic density with neighbourhood structure and finds that positive 'ethnic density' effects on school completion were cancelled out or even reversed in poor-quality or declining ethnic neighbourhoods (chapter 3). A third study takes an approach from institutional opportunity structures and compares education and religiosity of second-generation Muslims across four countries which differ in the public accommodation of Islam as a minority religion (chapter 4). I find that higher levels of religiosity were coupled with educational disadvantage in Germany; but they were decoupled from education in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden (chapter 4). Taken together, the studies show that ethnicity and religiosity are hindering second-generation attainment only in less favourable local or national receiving contexts, i.e., in lower-quality neighbourhoods or in less inclusive institutional settings.

In a second part of the dissertation, I study religiosity in the acculturation and intergroup relations of second-generation Muslims. A study on the religious acculturation of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in Belgium asks the question how religion is transmitted from one generation to the next in the context of acculturation (chapter 5). The findings support the expected associations of second-generation religiosity with acculturation processes in immigrant families, so that the transmission process was fully mediated by individual orientations towards heritage culture maintenance. The fifth and sixth study on religion as a social identity extend an explanatory approach from 'identity threat' in intergroup relations to the 'threatened' religious identity of second-generation Muslims. Replicating


processes of religious identification and politicisation among Turkish and Moroccan Muslims across nine local intergroup contexts in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, I find that conflict between religious and civic identities is explained by dual pathways from perceived discrimination towards religious identification and civic disidentification (chapter 6). The final study refines the concept of 'politicised identity' by showing that distinct forms of politicised identity are associated with opposite pathways from perceived discrimination towards either politicisation or de-politicisation (chapter 7).

In conclusion, and keeping in mind inherent limitations in cross-sectional data, this dissertation contributes to the sociology of migration by showing that ethnicity and religiosity can be a resource or a hindrance in second-generation attainment depending on structural and institutional conditions in local and national receiving contexts. The dissertation also contributes to research on acculturation and intergroup relations in social and cultural psychology by addressing an under-researched religious dimension of acculturation and identification processes; and it identifies more or less cohesive ethnic communities and more or less threatening interethnic relations as critical contextual factors in these processes.





## Samenvatting



Deze dissertatie beoogt individuele en contextuele verschillen in onderwijsresultaten en religiositeit van de Turkse en Marokkaanse tweede generatie in Noord-West Europa te beschrijven en te verklaren. Met een vergelijkende benadering worden twee minderheids-groepen bestudeerd in lokale en nationale contexten in België, Duitsland, Nederland en Zweden. Twee overkoepelende vragen vormen de grondslag van het onderzoek: (i) waar en wanneer zijn etniciteit en religiositeit een hulpbron of hindernis voor behaalde onderwijsresultaten van de tweede generatie; en (ii) waar en wanneer is religiositeit en brug of barrière voor hun acculturatie en de intergroepsrelaties met de bredere samenleving? Zes empirische studies maken gebruik van multilevel analyse van Belgische Census data (hoofdstukken 2 en 3) en van multi-groeps modellen in structuurvergelijkingsanalyse op basis van nieuwe cross-nationale enquêtes (TIES, 'The Integration of the European Second generation', hoofdstukken 4-7). De empirische hoofdstukken (hoofdstukken 2-7) zijn samen met co-auteurs geschreven als onderzoeksartikels; de introductie en conclusie (hoofdstukken 1 en 8) van de dissertatie zijn bedoeld om deze hoofdstukken te integreren.

In een eerste deel van het proefschrift bestudeer ik de rol van etniciteit en religiositeit voor de behaalde onderwijskwalificaties van de tweede generatie. Hiervoor breid ik het onderzoek vanuit comparatieve stratificatie uit naar etnische en religieuze minderheden. Twee studies richten zich op lokale co-etnische gemeenschappen als potentiële bron van etnisch sociaal kapitaal dat kan bijdragen aan gunstige onderwijsresultaten van de tweede generatie. Het eerste onderzoek toont een klein, maar robuust positief effect van 'etnische densiteit', dwz. de aanwezigheid van co-etnische burens, op het behalen van een diploma middelbaar onderwijs (hoofdstuk 2). Het tweede onderzoek analyseert het samenspel tussen etnische densiteit en buurtstructuur en laat zien dat het positieve effect van etnische densiteit wordt uitgeschakeld of zelfs verwordt tot een negatief effect in achtergestelde buurten (hoofdstuk 3). Een derde studie vanuit de benadering van institutionele gelegenheidsstructuren vergelijkt onderwijsresultaten en religiositeit van tweede-generatie moslims in vier Europese landen die op verschillende manieren omgaan met de islam als minderheidsreligie (hoofdstuk 4). Het onderzoek toont dat in Duitsland een hoger niveau van religiositeit samengaat met grotere onderwijsachterstand, terwijl in België, Nederland en Zweden geen samenhang werd gevonden tussen religiositeit en behaalde onderwijsresultaten. Samengenomen laten deze drie studies zien dat etniciteit en religiositeit de behaalde onderwijsresultaten van de tweede generatie alleen in de weg staan in minder gunstige lokale en nationale ontvangende contexten, dwz. in achtergestelde buurten en minder inclusieve institutionele contexten.


In een tweede deel van het proefschrift bestudeer ik religiositeit in samenhang met de acculturatie en intergroepsrelaties van tweede-generatie moslims. Een studie naar religieuze acculturatie van Turkse en Marokkaanse moslims in België analyseert de vraag hoe religie wordt overgedragen tussen generaties in een acculturatiecontext (hoofdstuk

5). De bevindingen leveren steun voor de verwachte verbanden tussen religiositeit in de tweede generatie en acculturatieprocessen in migrantengezinnen in het licht van volledige mediatie van het proces van overdracht van religie door de oriëntatie op cultuurbehoud. De vijfde en zesde studie over religie als sociale identiteit breiden de verklarende benadering van 'identiteitsdreiging' in intergroepsrelaties uit naar de 'bedreigde' moslimidentiteit van de tweede generatie. Processen van identificatie en politisering worden gerepliceerd over negen verschillende intergroepscontexten van de Turkse en Marokkaanse tweede generatie in België, Nederland en Zweden. De bevindingen laten zien dat conflict tussen religieuze en civieke identiteiten wordt verklaard door ervaringen van discriminatie die door een dubbel pad zorgen voor sterkere religieuze identificatie én civieke disidentificatie (hoofdstuk 6). De laatste studie nuanceert het concept van 'gepolitiseerde identiteit' door te laten zien dat ervaren discriminatie tegenovergestelde effecten heeft op verschillende vormen van politisering en kan samengaan met zowel politisering als de-politisering (hoofdstuk 7).

Met de beperkingen van cross-sectionele data in het achterhoofd wordt geconcludeerd dat deze dissertatie bijdraagt aan de migratiesociologie door aan te tonen dat etniciteit en religiositeit en hulpbron of een hindernis voor de tweede generatie kunnen zijn, al naar gelang de structurele en insituionele omstandigheden in lokale en nationale ontvangende contexten. Daarnaast levert dit proefschrift een bijdrage aan het onderzoek naar acculturatie en intergroepsrelaties in de sociale en culturele psychologie door het bestuderen van een onderbelichte religieuze dimensie van acculturatie en identificatieprocessen waarin meer of minder cohesieve etnische gemeenschappen en meer of minder bedreigende intergroepsrelaties kritieke contextuele factoren vormen.



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Having reached the end of what feels like a long and formative period, I want to express my gratitude to a number of people who supported me during my work on this dissertation – either directly by giving advice and helping me move on with the work, or indirectly by enhancing my quality of life.

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I have been lucky enough to conduct my doctoral research at two host institutions, ERCOMER at Utrecht University and the Centre for Social and Cultural Psychology at the University of Leuven. Both have provided an environment where I could exchange ideas and receive constructive feedback; and numerous more personal exchanges in both places made me feel truly at home in both groups. Having already two home bases, my dissertation project was additionally part of a large-scale cross-national research endeavour called the TIES-project. I want to thank Maurice Crul through whom I was introduced into this group of researchers – it was much fun and a great experience to meet you all. Moreover, I participated together with Karen in a second comparative and still ongoing project on ethnic educational inequality. I am grateful to Anthony Heath and Yaël Brinbaum for organising this project and giving me the opportunity to participate in it, and to Cornelia



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
A number of colleagues have made these past three years a more pleasant, entertaining and relaxing experience and I am glad to have been able to share a part of the pathway through academia with you. Mieke, we shared much more than offices and supervisors (and pertaining struggles to decipher handwriting) and I miss having you around. Véronique and Gülseli were my closest allies in Leuven. But I also want to thank Maïke, Petra, Agnieszka, Aslan and all ERCOMER colleagues in Utrecht as well as Derya, Arjan, Joke, Kaat, Loes and all ACC colleagues in Leuven for your companionship during all kinds of events. Anca, Laurence and Anouk, you were great conference roommates. And though partly included in the previous list, I also want to thank my fellow students of the MERM class of 2007 – I am happy you are still part of my life after MERM.

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Fenella Fleischmann  
Berlin, December 2010



# Curriculum vitae



| Curriculum vitae

Fenella Fleischmann was born on 15<sup>th</sup> July 1983 in Friedberg (Germany). After completing upper secondary education (Abitur) in 2002, she moved to Leiden (the Netherlands), where she gained a BA in Cultural Anthropology and Developmental Sociology in 2005. Between 2005 and 2007 she was a student at the Graduate School of Social and Behavioural Sciences at Utrecht University where she completed the MSc program in Migration, Ethnic Relations and Multiculturalism. Early in 2007 she spent three months as a visiting student at the European University Institute. Between 2007 and 2010 she pursued her doctoral research as a PhD candidate at the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER) at the Department of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences at Utrecht University and at the Centre for Social and Cultural Psychology at the University of Leuven. As of September 2010, she works as senior researcher at the Department Migration, Integration, Transnationalisation at the Social Science Research Centre Berlin (WZB).

Her research interests concern ethnic stratification, in particular with regard to education and the position of the second generation, as well as acculturation and intergroup relations, in particular with regard to questions of identity, religion and discrimination.

