THIS AIN'T THE ROAD OF PEACE.
THE SHEPHERDSTOWN DOCUMENT (THE ISRAELI DRAFT) AND BARAK'S PUBLIC
MESSAGES DO NOT SIGNAL PEACE.
[Background: Following the Shepherdstown's Syria-Israel talks, the
US
issued a concealed document summarizing the positions of the two
sides. The Arab (London) paper 'Al Hayat' printed a summary draft
of this document, based on Syrian sources. Israeli sources denied
the
authenticity of this version, and exposed the full document, which
appeared
in the Israeli papers on January 13. A comparison of these
two drafts
is highly revealing.]
* * * * * * *
For many in Israel, it is already difficult to remember the joy and
relief in which they received the news about the forthcoming peace
with
Syria, about a month ago. What was this joy about?
>From the Israeli perspective, it appeared that some sort of a cold
status-quo has been maintained with Syria for years: Israel received
the Golan Heights, and Syria is just sitting still. But in practice,
it
has been impossible to forget for a minute that this is not peace.
Without
the Golan Heights, Syria will not lift a finger against the
Hizbolla
guerilla forces that fight the Israeli army in Lebanon, and
if Israel
withdraws from Lebanon without peace with Syria, there is
no guarantee that
the Hizbolla will not direct fire to the Northern-
Galilee parts of Israel.
What appeared as great hope a month ago, was peace with Syria, with
peace
for the Galilee. Peace as with Egypt: Israelis can visit the
Red Sea
or eat humus in Cairo, but it needs to be done as customary
between two
neighboring countries - with visas and borders control
in Eilat.
If we examine the Syrian version of the Shepherdstown document, printed
in 'Al Haiat' on January 9th, it appears that those who rejoiced were
right, and peace is within reach. First, it seems that a solution
could
be found to the borders dispute: It has been often claimed in
the Israeli
media (though not attributed directly to Barak) that the
debate remaining
between the Israeli and Syrian negotiators regards
a small strip of land
between the international border (Israel's
position) and the border at the
time of the 67 war (the 'June 4' line -
Syria's position). The
importance of this strip is that it contains
valuable water sources. The
news in the Syrian version of the document
is the clause that "Syria
acknowledges that the June 4th line is not
a border and is not drawn, and
therefore is willing to cooperate in
drawing the lines". (Section A.)
Interpreters in Israel view this
clause as signalling that Syria may be
willing to compromise on this
issue, and perhaps will agree to symbolic
water gestures, as was the
case with Jordan.
Another claimed area of dispute has been the nature of the peace
relations. On this, Syria proposes now "to constitute regular peace
relations, as between two neighboring countries" (Section B), that
is,
peace like with Egypt.
As for the security concerns of Israel, Syria "welcomes the presence
of
international forces under the US command in the Golan Heights"
(Section C).
Even more significant, in this respect, is what's behind
the screen: Syria
is committed to make sure that the Hizbolla will
not operate against
civilians in the Israeli North, and has already
passed a painful test, when
Lebanese children were bombarded in the
Southern Lebanon village Arab
Salim. Syria prevented retaliations
against Israeli civilians (which
are permitted in case civilians are
targeted in Southern Lebanon, according
to the terms of the agreement
reached between Israel and the Hizbolla
following the 1996 'Grapes
of Wrath' war).
So, Syria is signalling readiness for peace, and the rest is a matter
of
taste. I personally actually find A-Shara more sympathetic than
Barak
and Clinton, but this, indeed, is not something that must be
agreed
upon. There is room for joy over the chance of peace.
But the joy cools off when one looks at the Israeli version of the
same
Shepherdstown document. Contrary to the common belief, Barak
himself has
never declared readiness to withdraw to the international
border or to any
specific line, but rather insisted, like Rabin before,
that the borders will
be decided only at the end of the negotiations.
This is confirmed in the
document, which specifies Israel position
to be that "the border will be
determined by security considerations
and other considerations..."
(Section I). More peculiar is the
Israeli view regarding what this
future border may mean: Throughout
the whole document the Israeli side
stresses that after the peace
treaty there will be no 'withdrawal' of the
Israeli army, but only
'redeployment of forces'. The distinction
between withdrawal and
deployment was made clear since the Oslo accords,
which specify only
redeployment in the areas of the West Bank.
Withdrawal entails
complete evacuation, including civilian settlements, and
shifting
sovereignty, while redeployment means only moving the forces
outside
certain areas, thus maintaining control of the occupying side.
Indeed,
Israel insists that only military forces, but no citizens of Israel,
will be redeployed in the Golan Heights, namely the settlements will
not
be evacuated. To make things clearer, Israel does not accept the
Syrian
stand that (after the moving of forces) "Each side will exercise
its
sovereignty in its side of the border" (Section I). So, whatever
line
will be eventually declared as 'border', the sovereignty over
the
Golan Height will remain Israeli. It seems that Israel is proposing
to Asad
the same plan it forced on Arafat.
And in the meanwhile, our days are filled with double messages, which
emanate from above: We want peace, but with Syria it is simply
impossible. They are dishonest, they are rude, they are primitive,
they are not democratic and, on top of all, they are totally
insensitive
to Israeli public opinion. Every day that passes, Asad
is perceived more by
the media as a demonic tyrant whose crimes we
cannot forgive. We start
hearing even that 'the Syrians understand
only power'. That's not how
one prepares people for peace. That's
how one prepares them to war.
Against the scenario of peace, there has always existed the script
of
power to guarantee peace and quiet to the Galilee. In 1982, the
then
Colonel Barak pressed Sharon to extend the war being prepared
in Lebanon
also to a smashing confrontation with Syria (1). He
proposed to
prepare this secretly, with a series of "ordinary" military
exercises, whose
real goal should be concealed from the government
(where "it would be
difficult to discuss this explicitly and with
clear identification of the
targets"), as well as from the army's
chain of command "except for five or
six officers who know the extent
of intentions". Then it turned out
impossible to execute this without
heavy losses to the Israeli army, but
today, with the sophisticated
military machinery that we witnessed in the
Iraq and Kosovo wars,
it seems a bit more realistic. This is the
equipment which Israel
requests now from the US, for tens of billions of
dollars. As the
Shepherdstown talks were taking place, the Israeli army
performed
a grand maneuver exercising war with Syria - the fifth of a series
of 'ordinary exercises' of this sort. What would Israel say had Syria
done the same in the midst of negotiations?
Peace is indeed reachable, but it is not where Barak is taking us.
(1) The full memorandum that Barak sent to Sharon in 1982 was exposed
in
Haaretz, January 8, 1999 by Amir Oren, and 'not denied' by Barak.