

C. G. HARTMAN, *Emphasizing and connecting particles in the thirteen principal Upanishads*. Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae. Ser. B, Tom. 143, 2. Helsinki 1966. 180 pp. Price: Fmk 14,50.

Among those provinces of Sanskrit grammar which have been more neglected than they should be is a systematic study of the role, functions and frequency of adverbs, particles and other indeclinable words. However valuable, Delbrück's collections of relevant facts are in need of supplementation and the history of these words from the earliest period till far into classical times should be rewritten in accordance with modern methods and principles.

Dr. Hartman has deserved well of all Sanskrit scholars interested in questions of syntax and semantics by compiling the many facts which are contained in his book. Notwithstanding a certain lack of originality (compare e.g., the page devoted to *kāla*, p. 40 f. and the distinction made between particles with a connecting and those with an emphasizing function, p. 160), some incautious formulations (e.g., p. 162 'a particle placed after the first word of a sentence or another unit does not refer to that single word') and the unnecessarily large size of the book he makes various useful remarks (e.g., on the occurrences and functions of *kālu*, p. 43; on the archaic character of some of these words in the upanishads, p. 160; on the incorrectness of the view that they are to be regarded as, to a considerable extent, synonymous and interchangeable; on the 'irregularity' (or rather inconsistency, or lack of homogeneity) of the upanishadic texts in connection with their being composed and compiled by different authors at different times, p. 165).

Dr. Hartman's research has been largely based on the upanishadic texts edited and translated by Radhakrishnan. This has involved the risk of being continually confronted with a translation into modern English which, although the subtle nuances of the ancient Indian particles are in many cases not translatable by similar elements of a modern European language, suggests that here *u* means 'and', there *api* (when left untranslated) is expletive, etc. etc. Thus the author is (p. 22) of the opinion that in Śvet. Up. 6, 5 *paras trikālād akalo 'pi dṛṣṭaḥ* 'He is seen as beyond past, present and future and as without parts' '*api* seems to be equivalent to *ca*': but is 'and' in modern translations a rendering of *api* or the consequence of the incongruity between an ancient Indian and a

modern English asyndeton, that is to say of the predilection, in cases such as this, of English to use a conjunction? In 5, 8 however, where *api* is left untranslated (... *ātmaguṇena caiva ārāgramātro hy aparō 'pi dṛṣṭaḥ* 'but only with the quality ... of the self he seems to be of the size of the point of a goad', Radhakrishnan) the same *api* 'seems to be a mere expletive in the metre'. If however Dr. Hartman had consulted A. Silburn's translation (Paris 1948, p. 70) he would probably have adopted her felicitous 'il apparaît autre encore' and asked himself whether this rendering would not suit other contexts also. This is not to contend that *api* 'means' 'encore'. As to the combination of *api* and the pronominal stems *ka-* and *ki-* touched upon on p. 24 the author labours under the delusion that the addition of the particle has 'turned an interrogative pronoun into an indefinite one' (for a thorough discussion of this point see my article Notes on the Indo-European *kui-* and *kuo-* pronouns, *Lingua* 4 (1955), p. 241 ff.).

It would therefore appear to me that the author is too much inclined to follow beaten tracks and to join those many grammarians and lexicographers who — it must be conceded for didactic and other practical purposes — use every effort to furnish their readers with 'equivalents' of these words which may suit a large variety of contexts, and in so doing create the impression that these 'particles' may as to their function be described in conformity with the categories known to the traditional European school grammars. In some long articles which seem to have eluded the author's attention (The use of the particle *ca*, *Vāk*, 5 Poona, 1957, p. 1–73 and The History and original function of the I. E. particle *kue*, especially in Greek and Latin, *Mnemosyne* 1954, p. 177–214; 267–296), I at the time instituted a thorough inquiry into the 'meaning' and function of the particle *ca* and its relatives in other ancient Indo-European languages (Gr. *τε*, Latin *-que* etc.) to arrive at the conclusion that this element, though mostly translatable by 'and', sometimes by 'but', and not rarely otherwise, really was a means of indicating complementary unity and connection; it was a marker pointing to, or emphasizing, the fact that two (or more) words of the same category or groups of words were not only considered as belonging together, but constituted a complementary pair (or set). If the context gives occasion to speak of copulative or adversative connection a 'rendering' 'and' or 'but' may be adopted, but this

does not mean that it is an equivalent of these English words. Nor is it the counterpart of the Greek *καί* or the Latin *et* and a translation of BĀU. 1, 4, 10 *aham manur abhavaṃ sūryaś celi* 'I was Manu and the sun too' (Hartman, p. 49, following Radhakrishnan) is therefore incorrect. If a condition is implied in the context a rendering 'if' is possible, but one should not contend (with Hartman, p. 46) that *ca* is employed in the sense of 'if'. It would in my opinion have been worth while to investigate the character and function of other particles along the lines followed in my above-mentioned articles – and it is indeed my intention to revert to some of them in another publication – because there are many other cases in which some force or other traditionally ascribed to one of those small words is really implied in the context. Then there are no real (e.g., Hartman, p. 76 in connection with *vai*), but only seeming contradictions between the various uses of one and the same particle.

There is a long introduction (p. 7–18) in which the author deals, among other things, with the question as to how to define a particle. He prefers a definition which is based on the literal meaning of the term: particles are small with regard to their quantity (one or two syllables) and with regard to their quality (they have no independent meaning or use). There are however many other 'small' words which cannot be described as particles in the traditionally grammatical sense. I would not blame him for consulting only a few modern publications (Marouzeau, Entwistle, Dyen) on this point and for not entering into a discussion of the extremely vexed problems connected with the word-classes in general, the less so as anybody who really knows Sanskrit is completely able to distinguish the particles without bothering about definitions which as all products of human endeavour are always susceptible of improvement. Yet many grammarians and lexicographers do not draw a sharp line between particles and other indeclinables in Sanskrit, defining and describing these indeclinables often differently and inconsistently. Thus *u* is according to Monier-Williams an indeclinable enclitic copula and (further on) called a particle, whereas Stchoupak-Nitti-Renou describe it as a 'conjonction' and 'interjection d'appel'. Now one should here also guard, as far as possible, against terminological confusion. These words which are indeclinable as to their grammatical form, (and at least in many cases) particles (in the literal sense) because of their relative

length, often enclitic because of their strong tendency to accentlessness and their tendency to lean against another word in the sentence, and not rarely 'empty' (in the Chinese sense) because of their being devoid of a definable meaning, were generally speaking distinguished by the author or the ancient Indian Nirukta as *nipāta*. This group of words was further assumed to consist of three classes, viz. those expressing a simile or comparison, the conjunctive elements and the expletives. This secondary classification is not fictitious, because the difference in syntactic function is, to a considerable extent, a reality. These *nipātas* were rightly distinguished from those words which 'have no full meaning of their own, but only express a subordinate sense of nouns or verbs' (to quote Śākaṭāyana's definition of the *upasargas* freely): these words may function as 'prepositions' (or rather postpositions), preverbs and initial elements of compounds. The adverbs (called *kriyāviśeṣaṇa* 'defining a process more closely' by Patañjali) are conveniently grouped as those which are recognizable by special adverbial suffixes and those which are formed by case-endings. There are – naturally enough, but no doubt to the great annoyance of those who spend years in unsuccessful attempts to discover rigid rules valid for more than individual texts of limited extent – cases of a double function (*ati*, *api* etc.). As is well known the ancient Indian grammarians were already not unanimous in distinguishing the different types of indeclinables.

These few remarks may suffice to show that in my opinion Dr. Hartman's explanation cannot be expected to be the last word in these matters.

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