

Organised Crime in Europe

Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond

Edited by

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Urban Knights and Rebels in the Ottoman Empire

Yücel Yeşilgöz and Frank Bovenkerk

Highwaymen live off love and fear. If all they do is inspire love, this is a weakness. If fear is all they generate, they are hated and have no followers.

Yaşar Kemal¹

1. Introduction

The appearance of Turks and Kurds in the international organised crime scene is fairly recent (1960s) and connected to the establishment of emigrant colonies in the European countries France, Cyprus, Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain. However, we can trace back to Turkey a well-established underworld with deep historical roots. Some specific cultural traits – courage, fearless manliness and a code of honour – can still be found in present-day Turkish mafia families.

In this contribution we describe three distinct criminal traditions. First, from the thirteenth century onwards, there are recurrent political and religious rebellions (prophetic movements) against the patrimonial bureaucratic political organisation of the Ottoman Empire. The figure of the *kabadayı* (urban knight) stands for a second tradition of informal leaders of urban neighbourhoods who sell forced protection, settle disputes and who protect the poor against oppressive administrations. The third tradition of rebels who took to the mountains after having been treated unjustly (*efe* or *eşkıya*) resembles the western type of Robin Hood folklore. It is not so simple to appreciate the double standards of the rebels as they sometimes act in favour of the poor and at other times collaborate with the government against them.

Once upon a time there were *kabadayı* in Turkey. They were men who protected a neighbourhood or a district in Istanbul. Brave men with a heart that was good, strong men who knew how to use a knife, experienced men who went to prison again and again to pay for their deeds. With their experience, they were able to keep disputes from getting out of hand. They preserved the peace and kept their area safe. Whatever they said went! (Bilginer, 1990: 15)

¹ Y. Kemal (1984), *Memed, My Hawk*. London, Fontana.

Bilginer, the Turkish journalist quoted here, is romanticising. Books of this kind tend to present a picture of the ‘serenity’ of the old underworld, when ‘real men of honour’ were still in charge. Everything used to be so good and honest, and nowadays it is all bad and dishonest.² In these nostalgic accounts, the introduction of the firearms that democratised the violence is always the watershed. This is clear from the words of Koroğlu, the hero of an old folk epic, *Silah icad oldu, mertlik bozuldu* (‘The invention of the gun was what killed honesty!’). There is not a country in the world without an urban underworld, and every language has a word with a similar meaning to *kabadayı*, *penose* in Dutch, *mob* in English, *le milieu* in French, and *Ganoven* in German. And all across the globe, people speak nostalgically of the good old days when ‘honest men’ could still fight with their fists.

On the grounds of fixed norms and unwritten rules, the *kabadayı* used to settle a wide range of questions among the residents of ‘their territory’. Their romantic image has a lot to do with their charmingly daredevil life style. Literature is filled with stories of the long nights they spent with gorgeous prostitutes, their sumptuous meals and bacchanalian revelry, and how they listened to exciting music and watched belly dancers. In Turkish literature, the *kabadayı* are presented as the immediate precursors of the contemporary crime bosses known as *babas*. Their world evokes associations with courage, lawlessness, honour, and defending the weak. Today’s *baba* is only too willing to refer to this noble tradition to justify his conduct. The books by Ulunay, Hiçyılmaz and others about the *kabadayı* do however also include passages that are considerably less romantic. Not that the misfortune they describe is met with by *kabadayı* themselves [...] instead it is the misfortune of the people they deal with. They might have been protective, but they were also violent extortionists, and the residents of the territory they protected paid the *kabadayı* in blood, sweat and tears. Although the first impression of the *kabadayı* is far more enchanting, the second one is no less realistic.

2. Revolts and Rebellion

In traditional accounts of kings, emperors and sultans, *kabadayı* are categorically described as ignoble and unscrupulous men, rebels or separatists who are a threat to law and order and deserve to be officially or unofficially prosecuted and punished. There is no place for them in the ‘history-from-above’ about the powerful rich, the despots and the men who run the country. However, the rise of a variant of social

² For more about the *kabadayı* we recommend *Sayılı Fırtınalar, Eski İstanbul Kabadayıları* by Refi’ Cevad Ulunay (born 1890), who spoke to several old *kabadayı*. Another well-known Turkish journalist who wrote about the underworld of yesterday’s Istanbul is Ergun Hiçyılmaz, see his book *Yosmalar, Kabadayılar* (1996).

history that is now about four decades old and makes a conscious effort to describe the course of 'history-from-below' has turned rogues, bandits and the underworld into a topic of serious study.

In the case of Turkey, it would be useful to go back in history to the time of the Ottoman Empire and examine the rebels and bandits who developed the cultural codes that still shape the conduct of today's underworld in Turkey. This is no simple matter with the dearth of good sources, but Turkish authors have saved a few of these men from oblivion.

Like the empire of the Seljuqs (1040-1244) that preceded it in the Asian part of Turkey, the Ottoman Empire (1299-1923) can be characterised as a society of peasants administered by the court in the fashion of a patrimonial bureaucracy. Power was in the hands of the sultan and a strikingly small group of courtiers and administrators for such a large empire. The grand cultural tradition was preserved at the court and, in the words of Ahmad, the strong and centralised state that is identified in theory with the nation was 'viewed as neutral, as standing outside society, and not as representative of any specific interest' (Ahmad, 1993: 17). The author feels this tradition was a factor in shaping the ideology of the modern Turkish state, which can be expected 'to intervene if and when the national interest seems to be threatened by small self-seeking interests'.

Sultan Osman, after whom the grand empire that existed for six centuries was named, was one of the Islamic monarchs who fought the holy war against the Christian Byzantine Empire and emerged victorious. In reality though, the vast area that stretched all the way from central Asia to Bosnia-Herzegovina was an infinite patchwork of peoples and tribes with their own languages, customs and 'small traditions' (Erdogan, 1999: 27-8). The theory of one nation is ideology, says political scientist Doğu Ergil in his numerous columns and lectures advocating a modern democracy for Turkey. In essence, the Ottoman Empire was the artificial product of military conquests (*Turkish Daily News*, 9 June 1997; Ergil, 1997). Despite the lengthy process of state formation and an all-encompassing assimilation policy in the modern period of the republic, Peter Andrews similarly has no trouble compiling an ethnological atlas for the present-day smaller territory of Turkey with so many combinations of languages, tribal frameworks and religions that there are no fewer than 47 different ethnic groups (Andrews, 1989). The distance between the small feudal administration apparatus and the 85 per cent of the population scattered over the vast countryside was enormous. The administration was extremely decentralised and, according to Erik Zürcher, local rulers were the ones who exerted the actual power (Zürcher, 1993: 19). A social and political constellation of this kind produced weak links in the power hierarchy, which contributed to the emergence of rebelliousness banditry. Who was there to defend the tenant farmers and peasants? Or whom were they keeping under control? Who was the connecting link between them and the large landowners and tax collectors?

In his book on *Dissidents and Capital Punishment in the Ottoman Period*, Riza Zelyut summarises the structural conflicts that led to the rebellions (Zelyut, 1986: 11). Firstly, material conditions played a role, such as exploitation by local rulers via a complicated system of land ownership, especially since there was so little to keep them from increasing the tax pressure. Then there was the resistance to forced Islamisation. The circles who were the first to accept Islam as their religion consisted of prominent wealthy Turks who chose the Islamic movement most advantageous for them, the school of Hanefist law. ‘It offered them the flexibility they needed for their administrative activities’, Zelyut writes (Zelyut, 1986: 10-11). The poor were not as quick to abandon their religions and customs. They did accept Islam, but in their own way.

The third structural problem had to do with the ethnic hierarchy that prevailed throughout the empire. In the Seljuq periods, the authorities viewed Georgians, Iranians and Slavs as the top ranking peoples, and Turks and Turkmens as the lowest. Turkish was a language only to be spoken by people of humble descent, and it is not difficult to find offensive and racist comments in the writings of Seljuq authors: ‘Bloodthirsty Turks [...] If they get the chance, they plunder, but as soon as they see the enemy coming, off they run’.³ Matters were not much different in the Ottoman period, even though the empire was governed by a small elite at the court, which was Turkish itself. According to Çetin Yetkin, one of the major Turkish authors on the Seljuq and Ottoman periods, ‘In the Ottoman Empire, though Turks were a “minority”, they did not have the same rights as the other minorities’ (Yetkin, 1974: 175). In fact the term ‘Turk’ was a pejorative. Ottoman historian Naima, who also wrote a book about the Anatolian rebels, uses the following terms for the Turks: *Türk-i bed-lik* (Turk with an ugly face), *nadan Türk* (ignorant Turk) and *etrak-i bi-idrak* (Turk who knows nothing).

3. Social Bandits or Oppressors?

There is ample resistance potential in all these contrasts, but the question is what significance should be attributed to concrete movements. Authors inspired by socialism – such as Eric Hobsbawm with *Bandits* in 1969 – have tried to turn early modern rebels who rose up against the wealthy into noble rogues promoting the interests of the oppressed masses and thus playing a proto-political role. Some authors have done the same with the mafia in Sicily. Discussion about this criminal organisation contains the same themes connected with bandits in peasant societies. Particularly in the extremely decentralised Ottoman empire, Hobsbawm (1969: 21)

³ Çetin Yetkin based this comment in *Etnik ve Toplumsal Yönleriyle Türk Halk Hareketleri ve Devrimleri* (1974:15), on the words of the Seljuq author Kerimeddin Mahmud.

writes, banditry flourished in the remote and inaccessible mountain regions and the plains where there was no network of good roads.

The most sympathetic outlaw is undoubtedly the Robin Hood kind who is active in peasant societies throughout the world. Those in power might view him as a criminal threat, but he is a man who restores social justice and 'steals from the rich to give to the poor'. This kind of outlaw violates the rules and regulations, but he obeys a higher law of good and evil. This noble rogue is expected to exhibit a fixed career pattern. He is a young man of humble descent who turns to a life of robbery after he himself is a victim of injustice and has to flee. No matter how notorious he is, the rules he lives by are still civilised ones. No one is ever killed except in an honest battle. This kind of Robin Hood is admired by the people, who are always willing to provide him with a place to hide. He is invisible and there is no way the authorities can find him. He is protest incarnate against an unjust social order.

Anton Blok exposes this depiction as a purely romantic one. In his book about the roots of the mafia in Sicily, he describes the men other authors have referred to as 'social bandits'. He however views them as unscrupulous accomplices of the large landowners and the troops who stifle the protest of the peasants (Blok, 1974). He demonstrates how the steward class of the large farming estates became independent in the second half of the nineteenth century and formed its own private armies.

Although the underlying economic and political causes of rebellion are the same in most societies, i.e. poverty, exploitation and oppression, there are two specific types of traditional Turkish rebels. The first is part of a social movement with prophetic aspects and a revolutionary nature. The force of this type of rebel lies in his ability to gather a sizeable following on the basis of a programme. The second type, the bandit, operates individually or in a small band of kindred spirits. In the city they are called *kabadayı* and in the mountains they are known as *efe* or *eşkîya*. With their individual agility, fearlessness and strength, they command the respect of everyone.

The social movement requires its members to obey very strict rules of conduct, but the bandits, in so far as they live in the city, opt for a more worldly life style. The two traditions are separate, and do not represent successive stages in one and the same development, revolutionary or otherwise. Even though the authorities do view the social movement as a criminal group, it is the bandits who constitute the real source for the modern underworld. They are motivated by revenge (it is striking how often their careers begin with a blood feud), and a desire for esteem and personal wealth. They serve a wide range of functions in the local community, but their basic activity is always extortion. In most of the accounts we have been able to find of the *kabadayı* and the *eşkîya*, it is striking that at some point in their career, they are bribed to start working for the authorities. So politically speaking, these predecessors of modern organised crime in Turkey would seem to represent a conservative rather than a revolutionary force. We shall briefly describe the social movement and banditry traditions, and give a number of examples to illustrate them.

4. Early Criminal Groups in the Seljuq and Ottoman Empires

4.1. The Seljuq Period

The earliest sources about Turkey pertain to the Seljuq period. The information is scarce, but the accounts are invaluable. In the literature on Anatolia, a number of primitive 'criminal organisations' are described that are typical of the socio-economic situation in a peasant society. These organisations always have a strongly religious aspect to them (Wertheim, 1974: ch. 2). They can sometimes almost even be described as prophetic movements.

There were for example the Batinis, whose philosophy had its origins in the Sabilik sect and was partially under Hebrew influence. They refused to accept the traditional concepts of heaven and hell. Their trademark was a small box of hashish on a string around their neck. Their famous leader Hassan Sabbah had a beautiful garden where they would smoke hashish and dance all day and night. Since they are viewed as the ones who introduced hashish to Anatolia, they are referred to as *haşhişin*, a term now used in Turkish for people who smoke hashish.

The Ayars were picturesque, the only garb they usually wore was a loincloth and a headpiece made of the bark of a date tree, and they carried a scimitar. The Kalenderis shaved their heads, and the Haydaris refused to acknowledge any law at all. All these groups would attack the rich, plunder their homes, and divide the spoils among the poor.

The popular uprisings named after the Babai sect, which helped end Seljuq rule, were undoubtedly the most important ones, and the sect still has followers in Turkey today. The aim was clearly to promote the power of the poor peasants *vis-à-vis* the usurpers, but there was also an element of religious protest. Babai could be recognised by their red head-dress and extremely simple attire. According to the authoritative encyclopaedia, they soon had numerous followers.⁴ We agree with Camuroglu (1999: 160-6) that sociological and economic factors have been equally important. In 1239 the Seljuqs attacked their leader *baba* Ishak and his 50,000 followers, and the battle went on for a year. Ishak's following in Anatolia grew from day to day, and his followers believed he was immortal. The Seljuqs finally captured him and hanged him near the city of Asmasya at the bastion, after which they cut him up into tiny pieces and scattered them over his followers to convince them he was really gone. As was often the case with prophets, his followers did not want to believe he was dead and assumed he had just gone off to consult with God about getting help.

⁴ *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 1730-1.

The Seljuqs won in the end though, especially since they had the help of French mercenaries. Four thousand *Babai* followers were beheaded and 1,000 were hanged. The movement nonetheless lives on. Poor villagers who could not read the Sunnite manuscripts written in Arabic and Persian – and did not wish to – would listen to Turkish translations of the texts. The *Babai* abandoned the strict rules of the Sunnites – they wanted to drink alcohol and dance and listen to music and pray to music. They did not go to the mosque, they refused to fast in the month of Ramadan or to treat women and children as second class citizens (Şener, 1989: 114). These are all more or less customs of the Alevites, who now constitute about a third of the Turkish population.

4.2. The Ottoman Empire

In the period after the thirteenth century, there were also uprisings for religious, social and economic reasons. According to various sources, Bedreddin was behind the first important rebellion against the Ottomans. A great deal has been published about it in Turkey. The internationally renowned Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet, who was a communist, paid homage to him in a famous epic poem. Bedreddin had a plan for the future, a political programme based upon the principles of honesty and equality. This is why he is depicted in left-wing and intellectual circles as Turkey's first 'socialist' rebel. Bedreddin lived at the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century, and was well-educated and respected as a wise man (Yetkin, 1974: 175). In *Varidat*, a book that presents his thoughts, he expounded his materialist philosophy. When he came to have thousands of followers in the vicinity of Aydin and Manisa in western Turkey, the government in Istanbul grew concerned and decided to step in. The first two attacks by the government were successfully warded off by the philosopher's *müridler* (followers). But a third attack, this time on an even larger scale, was not, and the government troops hanged all his followers. Bedreddin himself was captured and hanged naked in the centre of Serez. In the memory of the local population, Bedreddin and his prominent *müridler* remain alive in many ballads.

The early sixteenth century was the time of the Alevite uprisings, such as the ones led by *şah* (Islam high priests) Kulu in 1511 and Sheyh Celal in 1518-1519. The followers of Sheyh Celal were called Celali, a term the Ottoman rulers later gave to all the rebellions. The most important of the Alevite rebellions was the one led by Pir Sultan Abdal at the end of the sixteenth century. He too still has followers in left-wing and Alevite circles. In Turkey as well as western Europe, there are associations, foundations and other organisations named after Pir Sultan Abdal. This leader of the people and poet from the vicinity of Sivas in Central Anatolia dreamt of a saviour who would liberate the common people from the Ottoman yoke. His hope was mainly focused on the spiritual leader Ali, Mohammed's son-in-law

and the fourth caliph, but in practice, he sought the support of the Shi'ite regime in Persia. Pir Sultan Abdal was hanged in 1590.⁵

Of course there were other uprisings besides the Alevite ones. One was led by Karayazıcı Abdulhalim, and is now also called the Celali rebellion. Most of Abdulhalim's followers were poor peasants, but a role was also played by some prominent people from Anatolia, who had their own multifarious objections to Istanbul. The uprising began in 1598 and spread throughout Anatolia. The Ottoman Empire had no choice but to recruit troops to defeat Karayazıcı, and the striking thing was that Anatolians were not allowed to enlist in the army for fear of their being Celali's followers (Akdağ, 1963: 119). The wars between Karayazıcı and the Ottoman Empire went on until Karayazıcı died a natural death, but his brother Deli Hasan (Crazy Hasan) carried on the resistance with his 30,000 men. Peace was finally established at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and Hasan and his fellow warriors were given prominent positions at the court. This did not mean an end had come to the political and social opposition in Anatolia. In any number of places, groups of various sizes continued the opposition up until the mid-seventeenth century, such as Kalenderoğlu's movement controlling the central region and Canbuladoğlu's controlling the south of Anatolia. The Ottoman grand viziers Kuyucu Murat Pasha (Gravedigger Murat) and later Ismail Pasha murdered tens of thousands of Anatolians and buried them in mass graves.

4.3. Uprisings in the City

After the fifteenth century, the rebelliousness seemed to be shifting from the countryside to the cities, and Istanbul witnessed these tendencies as well. By the sixteenth century, bands of criminals were already active in Istanbul, which was a vast city at the time in comparison with those in Europe. The *Suhteyan* movement has gone down in history as the first 'criminal organisation.' Suhte was a student at one of the religious academies, the *medrese*, and *Suhteyan* is the plural of Suhte. More students graduated from the academies than there were jobs for, and like modern-day students in so many developing countries, they protested and proclaimed themselves revolutionaries. They left the classrooms, formed groups that took to the streets, and started plundering shops and homes. Their targets were the wealthy and the officials and 'accomplices' of the government. They not only stole material possessions but murdered their victims, and earned a reputation for being extremely cruel and amoral.

The social uprisings in the empire always targeted Istanbul, but there were also considerable class differences within the city and, as was the case in Anatolia, ethnic

⁵ Mehmet Bayrak wrote an excellent study on the Alevite leader under the title *Pir Sultan Abdal*, in 1986.

differences as well. The court itself also had a tradition of intrigues, which usually involved military troops. Several sultans lost their lives in these armed skirmishes. The well-known food riot of 1730 was named after its instigator Patrona Halil, and another one was led in 1807 by Kabakçı Mustafa. In a later period, there were conflicts between the Western-oriented reform movement called *Tanzimat* and more traditional thinkers. In 1839, there was a *Tanzimat* victory and the mission statement was read out loud in public at the Square of the Rose Gardens, which is why the statement is called *Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerifi* (noble decree of the Rose Garden). At the rebellion of 1876, a group of leading Ottoman politicians replaced the sultan with crown prince Murad. He did not hold this position for long though, because when a constitution was promulgated a few months later, the new sultan was declared insane and locked up at Çırağan Palace on the shores of the Bosphorus, where he remained imprisoned for almost three decades.

5. The World of the *Kabadayı* and the *Eşkiya*

Mafia bosses like to talk about the kind of *kabadayı* we described at the beginning of this chapter. *Kaba* means crude and coarse and *dayı* means uncle or mother's brother. The word *kabadayı* had and still has a double meaning. It is a figure who is romanticised and in this sense the term has a positive meaning to people in Turkey. However, it also has a negative meaning that implies just the opposite.⁶ *Kabadayı mısın?* Or just *dayı mısın?* This would be the question, which in everyday usage means someone is unjustly demanding something of someone else: 'How can you be such a crude uncle that you would ask such a thing of me!'⁷

What is the social descent of the *kabadayı*? They come from the rather innocent ranks of voluntary firemen called *tulumbacı* or *tulumbacı kabadayısı*. In Istanbul one of the oldest and largest cities of the world where there was, and still is little space between the houses, firemen serve a vital function. Ergun Hiçyılmaz, a former police reporter and a fine story teller, has written some interesting books on this topic. He now sells knick knacks at one of the covered markets in Taxim in Istanbul. According to Hiçyılmaz:

⁶ A second category of *kabadayı* were called *külhanbeyi*. They were the lowest in the *kabadayı* hierarchy. 'Real' *kabadayı* only had one fear, and that was that people would call them *külhanbeyi*. People feared *külhanbeyi*, but there was no element of respect in this fear.

⁷ It should be noted in this connection that outside the world of crime, the word *dayı* is also used in a positive sense. If someone is helpful, people might say *dayı adamdır* ('That man is *dayı*'). There are also other meanings of the term *dayı*, but they do not lie within the scope of this contribution.

Organised Crime in Europe

Every district in the city had a group of *kabadayı* who worked as firemen. The people would pay them to put out a fire. They were known for their strength, their courage, and mainly for the fact that they could run so fast.

These *kabadayı* usually did not go in for a career in crime, they were just fulfilling a duty. There was a certain amount of competition among the various groups of *tulumbacı*. Who could run the fastest? Who could put out the fire first? Cevat Ulunay calls it a kind of sport, not unlike soccer today (Ulunay, 1994: 361-2).

To some people though, it did mean a career in crime. One important pillar of the Ottoman Empire had traditionally been the salaried Janissary infantry corps, but by the early eighteenth century it had degenerated and engaged more in terrorising the local population than defending the empire (Zürcher, 1993: 20, 28). There were Janissaries in the capital who supplemented their income by way of extortion or by serving as a superintendent who helped settle disputes in the neighbourhood. Some former Janissaries turned their sidelines into their main source of income and became *kabadayı* in the modern sense of bandits. However, since the power base of the military status of these neighbourhood tyrants was no longer there, new opportunities opened up for boys from the neighbourhood itself, who could do more justice to the social motif of promoting the neighbourhood interests. This abuse of power was one of the reasons for the military apparatus to be thoroughly reorganised under Sultan Selim III in 1794.

The *kabadayı* were known for centuries for their garb – shoes with golden heels and black cloaks worn loosely over their shoulders, so they could quickly draw the weapon from the strap topping their breeches. It was hard not to know when the *kabadayı* were around, since they would shout every so often to make their location known. Their special shout started with a long drawn out ‘*heeeeyt*’ followed by the text, so everyone knew which *kabadayı* was there.

The status of *kabadayı* was linked more to personal traits than membership in a group or gang. It was all a matter of individuals who had independently earned a reputation of being fearless. To become a true *kabadayı*, a man had to be known for acts of courage ever since his youth. This did not mean just stabbing someone or always getting into fights. A dauntless reputation involved performing courageous deeds, and not pointless violence. A brave man could command respect if he managed to win a fight with a well-known *kabadayı*, but only if it was a totally honest fight in keeping with the code of honour. ‘A *kabadayı* would never shoot someone in the back’, Hiçyılmaz says. And if shooting was not necessary, it would never happen. Knives were – and still are – only used to warn someone, or to cut off a piece of their ear, much as it would be done with a dog, the message clearly being that he is as low as a dog.

What was viewed as honest is clearly illustrated in the following story about a big black *kabadayı* called Reyhan the Arab.⁸ One day Reyhan was attacked by five men known to be skilled with their knives. To defend himself, Reyhan grabbed his chair and used it as a weapon, and the five men ultimately ran off. But Reyhan had lost face, and for two months he could not go to his favourite coffee house! His buddies frowned upon him for not defending himself with his bare hands, and for using a weapon (Ulunay, 1994: 5). A knife would not have been considered a weapon, since it was viewed as part of the body. Every good *kabadayı* had a set of special knives he could quickly draw and use with skill. Sometimes they also had pistols, but they served more as an accessory.

Prisons are the schools where they were trained, and the more experience the better. In the course of his career, a *kabadayı* would cross paths with the police again and again, and usually serve a couple of prison sentences. Although the prison sentence might have been designed to keep the *kabadayı* from committing another crime, in actual fact it educated him in the rules of the underworld and helped him build up a reputation. Once his reputation had been established, the police would also be respectful and whenever they arrested him, they would even forego the usual torture, since they had good reason to fear reprisals. For other *kabadayı*, a reputation was mainly founded upon the capacity to settle conflicts among others in a rapid and effective fashion. The same element has often been described in connection with Sicilian mafiosi. It is based upon the personal authority the Italians call *prepotenza*, which always includes an element of intimidation, a suggestion of the threat of violence (Schneider and Schneider, 1976: 85). Anyone who was able to settle an argument at the *gazino* (Turkish music café) with one simple gesture was a real *kabadayı*.

There were *kabadayı* who did not drink alcohol, like Abu the Arab at the beginning of the twentieth century, but most of them did drink quite a bit and like to associate with women who were entertainers or prostitutes. They were supposed to be able to drink a lot and at the same time keep their self-control, and this was not an easy combination. More than in other urban underworlds, in Turkey the show element seems to be linked to relations with women. There were women in Turkey's night life just as renowned as the most prominent *kabadayı*. For a price the women, who were Muslim and non-Muslim, offered their services to gentlemen. At the brothels, the *kabadayı* associated as equals with rich businessmen and pashas. Ms Manukyan of Istanbul, who died two years ago at the age of over 85, continued in this tradition as 'queen of the brothels', a businesswoman and a benefactor to the city's hospitals and universities. Everyone in Turkey knew her because for years she had been number one on the list of top tax payers.

⁸ In the Ottoman tradition, black people were usually erroneously referred to as Arabs.

In addition to its own slang, the world of the *kabadayı* also had its own clear code of honour. It is this code that stipulated the etiquette of interpersonal relations. The ordinary man in the street came to the *kabadayı* with his problems, but who did the racketeer and the illegal problem solver go to if he had a conflict with a colleague or rival? The solution was to consult *kabadayı* who were older and wiser, called the *racon kesmek*. The members of the *racon* parley were elderly *kabadayı* who were retired but still respected in those circles. They could be found at certain coffee houses in Istanbul. The elderly men of honour would listen to both parties and then pass judgment. The judgment only consisted of a well-founded suggestion, since the board of wise men could not exert any sanction or enforce any decision. Usually both parties listened to them, but sometimes they ultimately still disagreed with each other. If both parties disagreed with the decision, they could make that known, and then all they could resort to was the crude method of settling a dispute, i.e. the fist fight. In the event that one party stated he was willing to accept the judgment and the other one was not, the sanction was that from then on all the other *kabadayı* would avoid any contact with the one who continued to oppose the judgment of the council of elders (Ulunay, 1994).

The worst thing that could happen in the life of a *kabadayı* was to become *madra*, which is slang for losing face. Hiçyılmaz gives an example in an interview with the authors (Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz, 1998: 102):

There was also such a thing as a ‘phony’ *kabadayı*. Someone who pretended to be a *kabadayı*, but when push came to shove, the first punch would have him flat on the ground and he lost face in front of everyone. Then the only thing left for him to do was quickly get out of the neighbourhood.

In a case like this the *kabadayı* has become *madra*. The terms *racon* and *madra* are now part of everyday usage in Turkish, just as many slang words have been incorporated into English or French, but their meaning is no longer the same. In the underworld, *racon* means rule or norm. *Madra* has been changed into *madara* and is now used for people who can no longer be taken seriously, people who have made themselves ridiculous.

It is clear what social role the *kabadayı* have played for centuries. In the power vacuum between the administration and neighbourhood residents, they informally served certain administrative functions, which the local people appreciated because they did it in a more honest way than the authoritarian and repressive formal officials. The police were a state agency that in principle, did not do much more than suppress subversive activities. The police were seen as being ‘against’ the people and not as an agency they could turn to with their problems. The *kabadayı* were the ones who were there to restore justice and settle disputes among neighbourhood residents. Willing to show the nice side of the underworld, Hiçyılmaz mainly views the *kabadayı* as a problem-solver:

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They were the referees of the street. Say there was some kind of disagreement on one of the streets. The *kabadayı* would come and pass judgment. He would say 'you are wrong and you have to apologise'. People would listen to him. So that was the good *kabadayı*. (Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz, 1998: 103)

What we view as extortion can also be seen as a form of 'regulating the market'. After all, entrepreneurs can only flourish under conditions of relatively predictable market shipments. If official agencies cannot provide these conditions, it is only understandable that entrepreneurs should seek the protection of a patron. This is why authors with a positive approach, like Ulunay, might think of the *kabadayı* as a kind of urban knight. For centuries there has been a *modus vivendi* between the *kabadayı* and the police that seems to work to both of their advantages. The *kabadayı* is allowed a certain leeway to 'regulate' matters in the neighbourhood as he sees fit, but in the event of a serious problem or a real threat to the political order, he in turn is obliged to lend the police a helping hand.

There is no denying that in the underworld, a great deal has changed as a result of the introduction of firearms. The unscrupulousness accompanying international drug smuggling has also tarnished the heroic image of the old style underworld. But something of the code of honour has persevered, and the *baba* still like to rise up against injustice and help the poor by acting as the patrons of their less well-to-do clients. The most negative aspects of their own criminal activities are linked to this as well, since they are in effect providing protection against a threat they themselves have caused in the first place. This type of crime is referred to in criminology as a protection racket. It definitely was not always the case that the victims were the rich who were being robbed to benefit the poor, and they still are not today. Instead the victims were apt to be the owners of coffee houses, brothels and restaurants, in other words places where there was ample cash and where the entrepreneurs were in a vulnerable position as far as their reputation was concerned. The *kabadayı* had his own men working for him who would pick up a fixed amount on his behalf, and if the entrepreneurs did not pay up on time, they could expect to be 'taught a lesson'.

In a political sense as well, the role of some *kabadayı* has been far from progressive. Some of them were unofficially in the employ of certain individuals at the sultan's court, such as pashas or ministers (Bilginer, 1990: 18). There were also *kabadayı* who were used to infiltrate and spy on intellectual movements in the period of Abdulhamit, the last sultan. They were mainly Albanians and Kurds. There is much less information about their activities than about the 'nice' side of the *kabadayı* that has lived on in the popular romantic imagination and that the present-day underworld is so fond of using as a shining example.

6. Two Portraits: Chrisantos and Abdullah the Arab

All across the globe, the memory of rogues and bandits is kept alive by telling the tales of individuals. There are innumerable books and films about nineteenth-century American bandits like Jesse James and Butch Cassidy and their twentieth-century counterparts from the urban minorities like Al Capone and Arnold Rothstein (Kooistra, 1982). Every segment of the Turkish population, particularly in Anatolia, has produced its own social heroes, and two of them are presented below. Chrisantos and Abdullah the Arab both gained fame at the beginning of the twentieth century.⁹

6.1. Chrisantos, the Terror of the Istanbul Police

Chrisantos was a champion of the Greek minority in Istanbul in the early twentieth century, but was revered by Turks as well. He was a dauntless bandit who managed to always escape the authorities thanks to a combination of guile, boldness and the unconditional support of the common people. His conduct is symbolic of the latent resistance of the entire populace against the authoritarian administrations. Publications on the topic note that his nickname was Panaiyas, which means ‘holy’ in Greek and ‘God’ according to the Turkish sources, and it was clear that he was expected to avenge all the injustice done to anyone under him.¹⁰ He was definitely not a favourite of the Turkish authorities, and contemporary authors like Hiçyılmaz consider him a murderer. Ulunay does not feel any need to include him at all in his acclaimed book on the *kabadayı* (1994). Perhaps this is because Chrisantos deliberately shot and killed a number of Turkish police officers. His life is extremely well-documented because Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, chief of the Turkish secret service at the time, devoted ample attention to him in his memoirs (Tansu, 1964). Regardless, Chrisantos met all the requirements for a fascinating *kabadayı*, and he was a man who could find hospitality anywhere he wanted in Istanbul – all doors were open to him. In our account of his life, we preserve the style used in the historical Turkish sources.

Chrisantos was born in 1898 in Istanbul. His father left when he was twelve years old and he grew up with his mother and a brother and sister. His older brother worked as a waiter at a café and undoubtedly introduced him to Istanbul’s night life. In the neighbourhood where he also worked at a café, Chrisantos launched a

⁹ During Ottoman times, such men were typically known by one name preceded by an adjective (e.g. Blind Mehmet).

¹⁰ Almost all the *kabadayı* had nicknames. Abdullah was not an Arab, but because of his accent and the fact that he was so dark, he was called the Arab. See the publications by Hiçyılmaz (1996).

new career as an extortionist. He was only 16 when he committed his first murder, slitting the throat of a shopkeeper who did not want to pay up. Chrisantos was arrested and sentenced to prison, but soon managed to escape. He then married Marika, who was to be his wife all his life, but his true love was Eftimya. Despite the efforts of other men to win her hand and the opposition of her brother Yani, Eftimya never stopped loving Chrisantos and remained faithful to him.

In one incident, officer Mehmet of the Taksim Square Police Station was chasing Chrisantos to arrest him for murder when Chrisantos put an abrupt end to the chase by shooting the officer four times. The Ottoman police set out to hunt him down dead or alive. But the police could not get their man, and even the secret service tried in vain. His adventures were the talk of the town and the reason why he was so hard to catch was probably because he would spend every night at the home of a different beauty. At any rate, he managed to remain out of sight of the police. A brave police officer by the name of Ismail wanted to personally take on the challenge and used the mafia method for luring his opponent out of hiding. Ismail told everyone around that he was going to find Chrisantos and kill him. When Chrisantos heard this, it made him so angry that he rushed to the police station where Ismail worked. No one could have predicted this bold step, and after Chrisantos gave a short speech for whatever police officers happened to be there, he left the police station in style and did as he promised when he said 'let a bullet serve as enough of a warning'. The Ottoman police did not know what had come over them, the chief of the secret service later recounted (Tansu, 1964: 258).

Chrisantos was already famous by then, and the hero of the Greeks. Every time he murdered someone, they would shout 'Great! Bravo! He is finishing off the police' (Tansu, 1964: 255). Chrisantos used a different approach for a police officer by the name of Muharrem. When Muharrem was relaxing at a popular *hamam* (Turkish bath) and enjoying a steam bath, it suddenly dawned on him that Chrisantos was reclining to his right on the warm stones. There was a moment of hesitation before the policeman decided to interrupt his pleasure and dash outside. This was not a wise decision. The fact that he was in such a hurry gave him away, and Chrisantos immediately reacted by following him. Chrisantos caught up with Muharrem on the street and asked him why he was in such a rush. 'I am not in a hurry at all,' the policeman replied, 'besides which I do not know you.' This was another error on Muharrem's part. He did not understand that it was too late to carry out his original plan and get his fellow police officers to help him out. He was all alone, and drew his pistol. But he was not fast enough to deal with Chrisantos, who first fired a shot in the air to extinguish the nearby light. With his next shot, Chrisantos killed Muharrem, his fourth policeman.

The police were enraged, but they were also powerless. Every time they thought they had Chrisantos, they would lose him again within a matter of seconds. Chrisantos had Hulusi, his inside informant at the Police Department. The information he got from Hulusi was always enough for some new feat. One evening he

took along a couple of friends and went to the Aynalıçeşme (well-with-a-mirror) Police Station. There were six police officers there and a commissioner, who were all disarmed and taken to the detention room. ‘The commissioner was the only one who wouldn’t give them his gun. He felt it was too much of a humiliation to endure’, the chief of the secret service at the time recounts in his memoirs (Tansu, 1964: 258). Following the only path he knew, Chrisantos only had one option – to kill the commissioner.

This picaresque story – because that is what it is – ended with an inevitable shooting, but this time our hero was hit. Not that he did not die in style. Because where does a wounded animal go? Chrisantos went to Eftimya, the woman who was his first and only true love. This was not a smart move, and he must have been aware of that. Was he tired and looking for a place to rest in peace? It was only a matter of a couple of days before he had to go out and look for a doctor, but he was already too far gone. By the time the police found him, he had virtually lost consciousness. The overwhelming turnout at his funeral showed how popular Chrisantos had been. This murderer was honoured as a *kabadayı* by thousands of mourners who followed the coffin, all clad in black mourning attire.

6.2. Abdullah the Arab and the *Racon*

The story of Abdullah the Arab illustrates the function of the *racon*, the parley that passes judgment on the grounds of the code of honour. Abdullah did not know exactly what year he was born in, but he did know he was born in Suleymanie, which was part of the Ottoman Empire at the time and is now in the border area with Iraq.¹¹ Judging from the peers referred to in the accounts of his life, his peak was in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

As an adolescent, he was sent to Istanbul to complete his education, but studying was not what he wanted to do. Every day, he would be at his regular spot at an Istanbul coffee house. His life was one of fighting by day and then enjoying the company of ladies of the night. It was not long before every other *kabadayı* knew how fast he could draw his knife. He spoke Turkish with a slight accent, which explains his nickname ‘the Arab’, and his friends called him Abu. Not that he had many friends or protectors, and he engaged in his extortion schemes on his own.

Hayk Anuş was an Armenian woman who worked as a prostitute. Abu had a short-lived romance with her, but they did not keep in touch afterwards. She went on to become quite a famous lady known as Hayganoş, who was courted by Istanbul’s finest gentlemen. This aroused Abdullah’s feelings for her, and he

¹¹ Bilginer (1990) and Hiçyılmaz (1996) both include passages about this *kabadayı* in their books, and Ulunay (1994) has written a long story about him and interviewed him.

proposed rekindling the old flame. But it was too late because a man by the name of Necip who had inherited a fortune, took Hayganoş to his home to 'make her his own'.¹² This impossible situation only served to intensify Abu's 'love'. He went to Necip and said to him, 'This is not the way we do it in the world of the *kabadayı*. You are living with Hayganoş now, but I had a relationship with her before you did and you know the rule. In that case no other *kabadayı* can live with her' (Bilginer, 1990: 25). Necip flew into a rage and said, 'I have no idea whether what you are saying is true. But even if it is true it does not change anything because I didn't know anything about it!' Abu's 'hands' (his knives) were itching to go, and Necip's 'friends' (his pistols) were ready for action. But the two men decided to be sensible and go to the *racon* and let them decide. 'They are going to prove you wrong,' Necip sneered, 'but we will do it anyway.' This was not so much a romantic dispute as a question of honour.

At Zehir Ali (Poison Ali), a coffee house in the Tophane district, three older *kabadayı* were willing to listen to both sides of the story. 'Necip,' they concluded, 'in principle you have no right to Hayganoş, but first we have to know for sure that Abu really did have a relationship with her before you.' Necip acted as if it didn't matter whether there had or had not been a relationship in the past, since Hayganoş was working as a prostitute at the time, and could have had a relationship with anyone. The *racon* ruled that neither of the men could associate with Hayganoş unless one of them wanted to demand his right by marrying her. Neither of the men was interested in doing that, nor was either of them interested in obeying the ruling. The men at Zehir Ali managed to keep the two men from attacking each other, but it is clear that a very tense situation was inevitable. First Abu sent a message to Hayganoş telling her to come and see him, but when she did not respond he designed a cunning scheme. He had a letter written in Armenian and signed with the name of Hayganoş' mother, telling Hayganoş that she had taken ill, and her last wish before she died was to see her daughter. Hayganoş broke out in tears and there was no way Necip could refuse to let her go and see her 'dying' mother. On the way, it was not hard for Abu to stop her coach and threaten her guard and coachman with a knife and kidnap her. When she had been with Abu for two days, he threw a big party so everyone could see that Necip's great love was with him. Then Abu sent her back to Necip.

The history books do not mention anything about how Hayganoş herself felt about being manipulated this way, but it was a slap in the face for Necip. This was the worst imaginable insult to his honour!¹³ Necip nonetheless took Hayganoş back

¹² Women of this kind are called *kapatma*. Men do not marry them, but they also do not allow them to have relations with other men.

¹³ As regards the codes of honour, see the PhD dissertation by Y. Yeşilgöz (1995).

into his home, since he was really in love with her and if she stayed with him, then in a way he would have won in the end. But even if he had wanted to forget what had happened, he did not get a chance to. Abdullah kept telling everyone what had happened, and he even devised a totally unacceptable visiting arrangement whereby Hayganoş would come and see him once a week. Necip sought revenge and wanted a chance to shut Abu up once and for all. Until that was done, he could not show his face. One day Necip and three of his friends ambushed Abu, but he lost and one of his friends was killed in the fight. This turned it into a matter for the law and Abu had to appear before the judge and account for his deed. He was counselled by an Armenian lawyer, who argued that it was a case of self-defence. Abu was acquitted, but from then on, Hayganoş stayed with Necip.

To us, the course of Abdullah the Arab's life is also interesting for another reason. He started as the 'protector' of his neighbourhood, but after he was acquitted, this bold man who knew no fear was appointed by the Ministry of Home Affairs to head the Kawas (honorary guard), and then he rose to the position of *pasha*, the highest rank in the Ottoman bureaucracy.

7. The *Efe* in the Mountains

For centuries there has been an Anatolian tradition of people who have been offended in some way going off to the mountains to organise a gang to combat social injustice. In the literature and folklore, there are always the same reasons for this kind of move, an unfair decision on the part of some judge or other authority, or the intolerable exploitation of a labourer or tenant farmer by a landowner.¹⁴ There are numerous examples. Often the person fleeing to the mountains has committed a punishable act, but always for a very respectable reason, for example to avenge the family honour. This is not the kind of thing the perpetrator is willing to go to prison for, especially since he was only doing his duty, so his only choice is to take to the mountains. Once they are there, fugitives have to fight off the government troops that come looking for them, and they manage to stay alive by extorting money from rich people or kidnapping them for ransom. By way of these acts, they earn a reputation in the vicinity and some of them are even known nationally. Because of why they became fugitives in the first place, the local population sympathises with them and the bandits in turn would never do anything to harm the people. The people feed the bandits and give them whatever information they need about the countryside and the movements of the police.

These desperados were also considered folk heroes. They were particularly active in the border regions of the Ottoman Empire where the power of the state is

¹⁴ In Turkish, they are called *ağa*, *beg*, *mir*, and so on.

weakest. They are the men today's smugglers are descended from. Quite a few of the *baba* now operating in Europe are from the border regions where these fugitives were most prevalent, and in fact they often have an episode as a member of a gang in their own personal history. Let us examine the different groups of fugitives in the various regions of Turkey.

In the western part of Turkey, especially in the region around the Aegean Sea, these men are called *efe*. The term is also used as a generic name for young men who are honest and brave. There is also some regional use of the term *dağlılar*, which means mountain people. Sometimes the authorities issue a general amnesty or allow certain *efe* to return to society. They surrender to the authorities and become *düze indi*, i.e. people who have returned to the plateau, and are then recruited to preserve law and order. Hiçılmaz refers to Çakırcalı Mehmet Efe as 'the most important and greatest' of these *efe*. Murad Sertoğlu has written two books about his life (Sertoğlu, 1955, 1956). It is clear from the foreword in one of them how difficult it is for the author to distinguish between the actual facts of Çakırcalı's life and stories traditionally told by the people. The author has spoken to numerous people and the soldiers who played a role in the investigation. He concludes that the existence of *efe* of this kind is the result of a century-old Ottoman policy that went against the interests of the peasants. 'Of course the villagers felt hatred and a desire for revenge against the [Ottoman] authorities, since all they did was levy taxes and plunder the people. This is precisely why the peasants were supporting a man like Çakırcalı who dared to stand up against the Ottomans' (Sertoğlu, 1955: 8).

Perhaps it is useful here to give a short account of the life of this *efe*, whose career as a bandit in Anatolia peaked around the turn of the century. Mehmet's father was also an *efe*, and when he surrendered via the usual amnesty procedure, it turned out the authorities had tricked him. The governor of Izmir had lured him to the plateau only to have him shot. Mehmet himself was brought up by his mother and some relatives to someday do his duty and avenge the murder of his father. After serving a prison sentence, he decided to head for the mountains, where he soon gained fame. His first important act of revenge was to kill the Ottoman officer who had murdered his father. Although he did not deviate from the tradition of stealing from the rich and helping the poor, the very sight of Mehmet brought fear to the hearts of one and all. There are thousands of stories about him, his biographer writes, and they recount far too many acts to have even been committed in one lifetime, so no one knows any more what is true and what is not. He would pop up all over, but no one could actually say they had seen him. There was growing concern on the part of local and national authorities alike about Çakırcalı. After having chased him in vain for years on end, the government drew up an amnesty measure especially for him with all kinds of guarantees. He accepted the term, and as was the case with Abu, the urban knight, he too was incorporated into the system. Çakırcalı was given five gold coins a month and granted the title of *serdar*, which means something like commander, and he was in charge of a special corps that would go to the mountains

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to track down the *efe*!¹⁵ You need to be one to catch one, the people higher up must have thought, and former *efe* were assigned to go out and find the men that used to be their buddies. His departure for the *düz*, the plateau, now left some room for the rise of new *efe* (Sertoğlu, 1955: 85).

Çakırcalı met his end quite predictably in what looked like the result of a blood feud. An act of revenge by the brother of an Ottoman officer who Mehmet had killed made him leave for the mountains one last time. It was one of his own men who shot and killed him 'by accident'. The last command he gave from his deathbed was interesting. 'After I die, cut off my head and my hands and bury them somewhere so the Ottomans won't recognise me and they won't be able to say they killed Çakırcalı.' But it was to no avail. The Ottomans identified him anyway after one of his wives recognised him from a birthmark. His body was hanged from the front of the local government building to serve as a deterrent to others. 'Çakırcalı's fifteen years in the mountains ultimately cost more than a thousand people their lives', was Sertoğlu's final conclusion (Sertoğlu, 1956: 85).

In the region around the Black Sea, everyone is addressed by a nickname. Since so many of the people of this coastal area work at sea, the nicknames are virtually always related to some maritime function. *Kaptan* and the old word *reis* are the most common nicknames. Topal Osman was the most famous robber and rebel of the region, and his nickname was *ağa*. History also repeated itself in his case. Once a fearsome warrior and leader of a gang, he was appointed by Mustafa Kemal, Turkey's first president, to head the guards at his palace. The sad end to *ağa*'s life was later Mustafa Kemal's doing.

In eastern and southeast Turkey, regions mainly populated by Kurds, taking to the mountain was more of a tradition than anywhere else. *Eşkiya*, *asi* and *şaki* were only a few of the numerous terms used by the local peasants and authorities alike to refer to the fugitives. The government saw them as a threat to law and order, but the local people looked up to them and sometimes even venerated them. Their story is very similar to the one of the *efe*. One of the leading Turkish encyclopedias gives the following reasons for their leaving for the mountains:

The Kurdish peasantry constituted an obstacle to the implementation of the rules of the [Turkish] administration. Within the exclusive tribal life style of these peasants, they wanted to preserve their own norms and values. In addition to their tradition of smuggling, they wanted to go on breeding cattle

¹⁵ Former *efes* would be used to track down other *efes* in the mountains, and were then called *kır serdari*.

and farming. The differences between the wishes of the Kurds and the rules stipulated by the authorities are what produced 'social rebels'.¹⁶

According to this encyclopedia, thousands of people left for the mountains as recently as the 1960s and joined forces with gangs there. *Yön*, the popular opposition paper of the sixties, once noted in jest that according to official registration figures, there are even 180 *eşkiya* in a tiny town like Siirt. 'If every *eşkiya* has say about five followers, then we are dealing with a whole town of nine hundred *eşkiya*.'¹⁷

The most famous modern-day *eşkiya* is Koçero, who was shot and killed in 1964. Davudo and Kotto were similarly important. There were heated debates at the time about the positive and negative approach to the *eşkiya*. The authorities always viewed them as gangs of bandits and robbers, but there were also political 'trouble-makers' and romantic souls who liked to project their wishes on to *kabadayı* and *eşkiya*. They have been the subject of any number of films, novels and short stories. The internationally renowned novelist Yaşar Kemal took sides with the *eşkiya* and his masterpiece *Ince Memet* (Memet the Lean) is about one of them.¹⁸

8. Conclusions

The three traditions of political and religious rebels, urban knights and the Robin Hood-type *efe* now survive mainly in folklore, ballads and stories, but it is easy to show that many cultural features are still present in modern mafia families. Smugglers of drugs (especially heroin), traffickers of humans and various types of extortionists try to convey the ethos of the traditional *kabadayı*. They now fight with firearms instead of fists and their business ventures take them all over the globe, but the old spirit is still there to be treasured. However, the panorama of the Turkish underworld has changed dramatically from the moment the news came out that organised crime groups have been drawn into the secret war of the state with the help of the ultra-nationalist forces within the government (MHP, grey wolves) against first Armenian nationalists (1980s) and then especially the Kurdish movement for self-government in the 1990s. The days of independent criminal mafia organisations are over. The new developments require a new chapter on the further underworld story of Turkey.

¹⁶ *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 2117.

¹⁷ B. Ay, 'Mal-can güvenliği olmayanlar', in *Yön*, 2 September 1966.

¹⁸ *Ince Memet* has been translated into various languages including Dutch.

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