H. Dörrie – M. Baltes, Der Platonismus in der Antike, Bd. 6.1-2, Die philosophische Lehre des Platonismus. Von der >>Seele<< als der Ursache aller sinnvoller Abläufe. Bausteine151—181, Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar. Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt 2002, Frommann-Holzboog. xiv, 437 & ix, 454 p. Pr. € 710.

The first volume of this monumental work was published in 1987, from the Nachlass of Heinrich Dörrie. “Matthias Baltes, Platoniker”, who had taken over the direction of the project from volume 2, passed away January 21 2003. Volume 7, concerned with the theology of the ancient Platonists, was in preparation and will be published by Dr. Marie-Luise Lakmann and other members of the team, under the supervision of Professor C. Pietsch. Matthias’ far too early death is mourned by his relatives, his friends, and the scholarly community. The almost nine hundred pages of volume 6 again demonstrate his astonishing familiarity with the sources for ancient Platonism (and not with those for Platonism alone), as well as with the secondary literature in a number of modern languages. And one is struck by his clear and patient exegetic perfectionism on every page of this precise, detailed, and richly annotated commentary. The Greek and Latin texts ranging from Plato to the late Neoplatonists presented in the Bausteine (suppleted by a plethora of references to other sources in the commentary and footnotes) have been selected and edited with exemplary taste and care. A magisterial achievement.
At p. 388 of vol 6.2 B. writes: “Eine Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse dieses Bandes zu geben ist eigentlich unmöglich. Denn obschon die Seelenlehre im Zentrum allen philosophischen Bemühens der Platoniker stand, gibt es nur wenige Lehren, in welchen sie so unterschiedliche Ansichten vertraten wie gerade in der Lehre von der Seele”. True enough. Nevertheless the main themes—with—variations are briefly described ibid. pp. 388-418: (1) the Platonic doctrine of the soul in the doxography; (2) proofs for the soul’s existence; (3) soul and reason; (4) the origin of the soul; (5) the coming-to-be of the soul; (6) the essence of the soul, i.e. (6a) the soul as what is ‘in between’,  (6b) the soul as intelligible substance, (6c) the soul as mathematical substance, (6d) the soul as vital principle, (6e) further characteristics of soul; (7) the species of soul; (8) the parts of the soul; (9) the soul and the world of bodies, i.e. (9a) the soul’s care of the corporeal, (9b) the soul and the human body, (9c) the descent of soul, (9d) the consequences of this descent, (9e) the soul in the body, (9f) when does the soul enter the body ?, (9g) the body as instrument of the soul, (9h) the doctrine of the vehicle of the soul; (10) the cognitive functions of the soul; (11) the freedom of the soul; (12) death; (13) the destiny of the soul after death, i.e. (13a) the purity of the soul, (13b) the  purification, judgement and punishment of the soul, (13c) the return of the soul to its origin, (13d) metempsychosis; and (14) “Schlussbetrachtung”, from which we may quote the final sentence (p. 418): “Mit der Seelenlehre steht und fällt die platonische Philosophie”.
	As was only to be expected I have found very little to criticize, or to add. A few nugae: At Bd. 6.1 p. 152 B. states that he does not know who located the hêgemonikon in a part of the brain; Erasistratus and Herophilus did. At Baust. 163.1 and p. 305 ff. on the embryo he has missed Clem. Strom. VIII 9.7-12 (see ANRW II 36.4:3186 ff.), earlier than Porphyry and Nemesius. In the comments on 163.2 he might have included a reference to Gal. Propr. plac. chs. 3 and 10 Nutton). For the issue of parts vs. functions of the soul at Baust. 164 see now T. L. Tieleman, Chrysippus’ On Affections (Leiden, 2003) 65-88. Pp. 328-9 on incarnation: cf. Heinze ad Lucr. III.776-80, and ANRW II 36.4:3152 for Lucr. III.741-83. P. 334: T. Tieleman has suggested that this critique of Chrysippus by Galen was located in the lost part of the first book of PHP). The comment at Bd. 6.2 p. 187 is a bit unclear; Macrobius (or his source) knows that Greek énãgnvsiw means ‘reading’—but it also means ‘re-cognition’; so he (or it) awkwardly represents recognition by Latin lectio, ‘reading’ (apud Latinos lectio, Baust. 172.2.129) and in the next line paraphrases énãgnvsiw as repetita cognitio (apud Graecos vocatur repetita cognitio). P. 317 n. 18: one misses a reference to the problem of the constitutio of Heracl. B118 DK. P. 332: B. might have referred back to the excellent exposition at Bd. 6.1, pp. 205-13. Commenting on Baust. 179.2 he should have referred to Aristotle’s argument that the human soul cannot enter into the body of an animal because it is the form of the human body alone. P. 377: (the formula) “Erst spat” … trifft im eigentlichen Sinne nur auf Porphyrius zu”: I do not think so.
One can only regret that these indispensable volumes, just as their predecessors, are so atrociously expensive that not only scholars but also, one is afraid, several libraries will be unable to afford them. One fails to understand why the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, who meritoriously sponsored the project over the years, find this result acceptable. Rumour has it that a paperback edition with French or English translation of the German has been considered. A paperback reprint of the original German would also be more than welcome!

Utrecht University, Department  of Philosophy											    Jaap Mansfeld
Jaap.Mansfeld@phil.uu.nl