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Becoming Citizens. Some Notes on the Semantics of „Citizen“ in Archaic Greece and Classical Athens*

1 Questions, aims and methods

The emergence of the *polis* as the prominent form of socio-political life is one of the most important developments of archaic and classical Greece. Its result was a type of society consisting of a group of free inhabitants, who lived in an identifiable territory with some kind of city centre, and who claimed to exercise a form of self-government which might but did not necessarily include a foreign policy of its own.¹ The existence of the *polis* as a socio-political system depended on a sense of territorial and social coherence, both as a subjective experience and as a practice in common activities. This sense of coherence was the outcome of a number of separate but mutually influential processes. Among the most significant and most intensely debated factors involved in the materialisation of the archaic *polis* are population growth, development of common cults, military cooperation especially in the hoplite falanx, the creation of written laws, changes in political discourse, and changing political consciousness in relation to (re)organization of space.²

The process of *polis* formation implied that groups of people accepted and recognised each other as co-inhabitants of the same area and came to identify themselves as a community that shared laws, cults and other vital interests. Among the numerous social activities involved in this process, political decision-making in the strict sense was only

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¹ It is not the aim of this essay to (re)produce a definition of the *polis*, least of all of the *polis* as a specific type of political structure; for a useful description Welwei (2000) 87. For a list of ancient descriptions Hansen (1998); on the meaning of *autonomia* for definitions of the polis, Hansen (1995) with extensive bibliography. The overriding emphasis of the Copenhagen Polis-project on the ‚political‘ nature of the *polis* embodied in institutions, in spite of some modifications as to its social and religious qualities (see for instance Hansen [1998] 34), makes the results of this project only rarely helpful for my present investigations. For valuable comments on the tension between an approach focusing on institutions versus one based on analysis of cultural systems, Ober (1996b).

² Important contributions to the debate include Snodgrass (1980), Osborne (1996) 70–81 on population growth; Sourvinou-Inwood (1990), Polignac ([1984] 1995a), Osborne (1994), Morgan (1994), Polignac (1995b), Burkert (1995) on cults; van Wees (1992), Raaflaub (1993) on the impact of military organisation; Hölkenskap (1999), Behrends (1995), Thomas (1994) and (1995) on law, Adkins (1972), Manville (1990) on political discourse; Snodgrass (1993), Hölkenskap (1997), Hölscher (1998b), Hölkenskap (2002) on the connection between space and *polis*-institutions; on the question as a whole Ehrenberg (1937), Davies (1997).

one element, albeit an important one.³ Some people within the community possessed specific rights to power and influence, and the way in which these rights were claimed and effectuated was a major component of the political structure of the *polis*. Until recently, the predominant historical views implied that the political institutions involved in this structure had developed completely and become manifest in the classical era but could be found in elementary form at the earliest stages of the *polis*.⁴ However, the differences between the *polis*-structures in the early 7th and in the late 4th centuries are such that any relationship between the former and the latter cannot be explained with recourse to an underlying institutional continuity. Instead, the „rise of the polis“ should be approached as an open process, which at some points might have yielded quite different results than the ones so well-known from fifth and especially fourth century sources.⁵

The numerous social and political changes concerned in this development were reflected, ultimately, in the words used to designate the people who made up the *polis*. To call them „citizens“ is begging the question, since our modern usage implies the possession of political rights, while „inhabitants“ might suggest that people lived in the area but were not regarded as full members of the community. Yet obviously, many people for many years did not possess political power but nevertheless were free members of the *polis*. Which words were used to refer to them? The aim of this essay is to trace the semantic changes of the words or terms used to name those who belonged to the *polis*. More precisely, I wish to elucidate how the notion of „citizen“ in the sense of someone being involved in political decision making was related to other uses of the same word that do not refer to political power or to other words indicating that someone belonged to the *polis*. Is the change from „being a (free) inhabitant of the *polis*“ to „having political rights in the *polis*“ actually visible in language?

The present essay is certainly not the first to trace the history of citizenship terminology, and in some respects my investigation confirms earlier conclusions.⁶ Yet, the results to be discussed here are the outcome of a perspective based on a strict adherence to chronology and a special interest in gender aspects. In classical Athens, those who participated in political decision making more or less coincided with the male part of those who belonged to the *polis*. Therefore, the most common word for „male citizen“ in classical Athens, *politês*, is often taken to carry generally the meaning of „a citizen with political power“. The fact that Aristotle in his „Politics“ (1275 b 12) defines the citizen in precisely this way, has seemed to be a convincing argument for this perception.⁷ Nevertheless, I will argue here that the current views on the meaning of *politês* and on the

³ On participation as a vital ingredient of *polis*-life, Walter (1993); on increasing social exchange indicating the emergent *polis*, Morris (1991), Osborne (1996) 81–107.

⁴ A historiographical interpretation of this paradigm in Blok (2004), with lit.

⁵ For a defense of institutional evolution, Hansen (1989); the strongest advocate against this approach is Hölskeskamp (2002).

⁶ On political concepts Ostwald (1969), Welskopf (1981), Bordes (1982), Sealey (1983), Raaflaub (1985); Rein- au (1981) is very close to the present essay concerning the ‚political‘ meaning of *politês* but has no interest in gender aspects, assuming (as does the predominant view) that women were not citizens. The pioneering work of Patterson (1981) and more specifically Patterson (1986) is even closer in aim and perspective, but draws different conclusions as to the meaning of *politides*; the difference seems to depend on varying opinions on the role of cult in Greek politics. The opposite view to the one defended here on the meaning of gender is exemplified foremost by Loraux (1993); on both, c.f. Blok (2004).

⁷ The inclination to argue backwards from Aristotle’s „Politics“ and hence to evaluate *polis*-membership mainly or exclusively in political terms is widespread, even among historians focusing on the premodern nature of the *polis*; Manville (1990) 15; Walter (1993), and see above, note 1.

relevance of Aristotle's definition in this context need to be revised in several respects. As the evidence will demonstrate, male and female members of the *polis* had far more in common than is usually assumed. This conclusion is based, on the one hand, on linguistic analysis, on the other by taking the role of religion in the formation of the *polis* seriously, again in spite of Aristotle who does not include the role of cults in his analysis of the *polis*.⁸

The method of analysing key concepts to elucidate the values and priorities of a particular time and place („Begriffsgeschichte“) is too well established to require clarification. I intend to make such an analysis on a modest, practical scale.⁹ Some aspects, however, of the methods adopted here need to be made explicit. As regards time and place, by tracing the relevant words first in documents of the entire archaic Greek world and next, for the fifth and fourth centuries, narrowing down to Athens, I follow a well-trodden path, the course of which is determined by the quantity of the available sources and by the political perspectives expressed in them.¹⁰ Moreover, the selection of Greek words traced in the extant sources, from Homer until the end of the fourth century, are those that were or came to be connected in various ways with citizenship in the political sense of the word: *politês*, *poliêtês*, *politîs*; *astos* and *astê*; *Athênaios*/*Athênaias* and *Attikos*/*Attikê* as ethnica.¹¹ Some degree of arguing backwards is thus inevitable, as will become most clear in the case of *politês*. Still, great effort has been made to estimate their meaning in their historical context, without the effect of hind-sight. All references are strictly dated to their actual composition; thus words used in Plutarch's „Life of Solon“ are classified as belonging to the second century AD, unless sound arguments for an earlier date are

⁸ „Citizenship meant κοινωμία ἱερῶν; ἀτιμία meant exclusion from ἱερά.“ Burkert (1995) 202; on the exclusion of religion from political analysis in Aristotle and modern liberal historiography, Blok (2004). Rein-
au (1981) 20ff. even locates the very origin of Greek political consciousness in a distinction between divine and human order he claims was created by Solon, in a tradition strongly advocated by Meier (1970), Meier (1980), cf. Hölkeskamp (2002) 302.

⁹ For a full „Begriffsgeschichte“, words surrounding the key concepts should preferably be included; for instance, not just *politai* but also *politēnēsthai* (to live as a *politês*). IG I³ 127 = ML no. 94, *isopoliteia*-decree between Athens and Samos (405 BC), which declares that every Samian may *politēnēsthai* in either city in whatever way he likes. On „Begriffsgeschichte“ widening into cultural history, cf. Koselleck (1979), Richter (1995), Hampshire-Monk et al. (1998).

¹⁰ Compare Reinau (1981) 6–8.

¹¹ Two more terms were analysed, but will not be further discussed here: (*w*)*etês*/*etas*; and *epitimos* and *atimos*. *Etês*, mentioned in Thuk. V 79.4, a few times in Aeschylus, and *etas* in a sixth century law of Elis, was highlighted by Ehrenberg (1937) 151–152, as one of the early terms for member of the *polis*, and picked up again for that reason by Davies (1997). *Etês* is occasionally paired with *betairoi* in Homeric epic (e. g. Il. VII 295), several times with „relatives“ (e. g. Il. XVI 456 = 674; VI 239; Od. IV 3) but occurs rarely on its own. Hesychius s.v. *etai* gives „those who belong to the *oikos* by marriage“ and adds „*politai*“; both meaning, I think, „those who belong to us“ (cf. Hesychius on *politês*, par. 2.2 below). The word has left very few traces and I found no crystallisation into something resembling „citizen“ in the political sense. Sealey (1983) argued for the pair *epitimos* and *atimos* (translated as „with and without citizen rights“) as the concepts operational in the change from „inhabitant“ to „citizen“. I have traced this suggestion extensively, with the following, preliminary conclusions. These terms can hardly have been formative in the creation of citizenship, because: 1. *atimos* occurs very frequently, but *epitimos* very rarely; these terms therefore can barely help to define citizen status in positive terms, 2. outside classical legal contexts (where Sealey's question seems already to be „solved“ precisely because *atimos* there means „without rights to [...]“) it is so difficult to distinguish between *atimos* in the sense of „losing (the right to) respect“ and of „losing citizenship rights“, that this again does not help to establish precisely the change of meaning. Yet, the concepts deserve further analysis, because they bear on the tight connection between citizenship and religion. For the possibility that *atimos* may have to do with what I label the socio-polis, see below.

adduced. Likewise, later commentaries (scholia, lexicæ) can be used with caution as giving information on earlier usage, but the references themselves are dated to the time of their composition. With regard to the meaning of words, the changes in Greek vocabulary can only be traced by translating the Greek; the current trend to transliterate Greek in order to preserve the original meaning cannot be maintained here. Changes in the semantics of a word occur gradually; in day-to-day usage, previous meanings are retained and change their shade to different nuances before making place for new ones entirely.¹² Significant and/or rather sudden changes therefore need explicit qualification (as shall happen in the late fifth century).

Finally, where the actual usage of words is concerned, the extant texts must be considered to be somehow representative of the real historical usage of language. This principle is far from easy to handle, considering factors such as the peculiarities of epic diction, the exigencies of metre, the focus of genres on certain themes or a preference for certain dialects. Moreover, each genre or specimen of text is likely to reflect some spheres of life while excluding others. For instance, no reader of the „Iliad“ could guess at the importance of the goddess Artemis in Greek life, because the epic poem simply is not concerned with those aspects of (religious) life in which Artemis was the dominant divinity. So statements on representativeness will require qualification. The procedure adopted here allows to make statements with some confidence not just on meaning, but also on the frequency of occurrence.¹³ I prefer to indicate this frequency by terms such as: frequent, less frequent, rare, and similar terms, the extant corpus of texts being such that rendering results in percentages makes no sense and would even be misleading. Exact numbers of citations and representative quotes will be rendered occasionally to clarify the conclusions. Initially, the relevant words have been investigated as independent words within the specific context of usage, only differentiated by gender and case. Next, in order to specify some findings, words have been analyzed in (contrasting) pairs; this concerns foremost *politês/astos*; and *astos/xenos*.

A history of concepts is by definition only an historical analysis of words. It cannot replace or even represent a full investigation and evaluation of the phenomena to which the words concerned refer.¹⁴ Likewise, the present analysis will need to be confronted with and elaborated within the framework of the current historical information on Greek and Athenian citizenship, an endeavour which far exceeds the limits of this article. Its aim, however, is to provide the results of a semantic investigation, which may contribute to a fresh view of the political questions involved.

2.1 *politai, poliêtai*

It is no coincidence that this first section is headed by a plural: *politai*, although every dictionary as a matter of course orders the occurrences of this word under the singular *politês*. The singular, however, does not occur in our extant texts until the last quarter of the fifth century. An occasional case of the singular which seems to be earlier, turns out,

¹² Cf. Koselleck (1994).

¹³ The search of relevant words was carried out initially by hand with printed texts and indices, next with the CD-ROMs of the literary and epigraphical texts (Pandora with Thesaurus Linguae Graecae and PHI), then checked again by means of printed texts and commentaries, and in the case of inscriptions, with the entries in the IG and SEG.

¹⁴ Valuable comments on the possibilities and limitations of a „begriffsgeschichtliche“ approach with relevant examples and bibliography in Bleicken (1994) 461–470.

on closer inspection, to be of a later date. For instance, a reference, phrased by Strabo, to Hecataeus of Milete having been the *politês* of Anaximander should be dated to the early first century AD.¹⁵ The meaning of the word in this case, moreover, is obviously „fellow-inhabitant of the town“, without any recognizable politico-legal overtones. Similarly, laws of Charondas on the good behaviour of a *politês* are ‚quoted‘ by Aristotle and Diodorus Siculus. Even if they were a paraphrase of the archaic lawgiver (which may be doubted), they are certainly phrased by (post)-classical authors.¹⁶ So back to the plural.

In the extant epic texts *politai/polietai* occur six times, meaning „inhabitants of a *polis*“ and unmarked in gender. Only the contexts specify the generic „inhabitants“ as men or women. In Hom. Il. XV 558 the word is generic and may refer to men and women, but probably with an emphasis on men; in Il. XXII 429 it refers to men only, by implication in the text. One passage, Il. II 806, refers to military troops; hence the context marks *politai* as male and designates them more specifically as the men who carry weapons.¹⁷ In three passages employing the same formula: „from where the *politai* fetch water,“ the gender reference is neutral, but the narrative context evokes the presence of women.¹⁸ Not only was fetching water particularly a women’s job throughout Greek antiquity (as two of the passages quoted here and other testimonia including visual sources make clear, the job usually was done by the daughters of the house),¹⁹ two of these passages prepare us for the arrival at the well of a group of (highranking) women: in Hom. Od. VII 131 Nausikää and her friends, in Hom. h. 2,99 the women from the palace of Eleusis. As a whole, these passages imply that *politai* could include women and even suggest that *politai* in the three latter passages actually designates women.

This pattern, first set out in epic texts, remains unchanged until the second half of the fifth century. To summarise its main features: *politai* and similar forms (*polietai*; several cases) occur only in the plural, and, moreover, infrequently, as *astoi* is preferred, as we shall see below. Its meaning is best covered with the general notion „inhabitants of a *polis*“, where *polis* itself has the loose meaning of „society in an identifiable area, with some kind of urban center“. As to gender, *politai* may refer to men, women, or both, as all unspecified plurals of this kind, referring to a group of people, may do. In fact, slaves are not explicitly excluded from *politai*, and one might suppose the inclusion of slaves in so far as they belonged to the *oikos* of their masters. On the whole, however, the usages of *politai* in archaic texts render this inclusion unlikely. It is difficult to imagine Pindar inviting all the *politai* to come and celebrate the victor of the Nemean Games and expecting the slaves to gather in the marketplace as well, or to see him grudging the gossip of slaves rather than that of free fellow-townsppeople.²⁰ The strong connection between *polit-*

¹⁵ FGtH 1 T 11a = Strab. I 1,1.

¹⁶ Szegedy-Maszak (1978), Hölkeskamp (1999) 130–144, for the material on/of Charondas.

¹⁷ Hom. Il. XV 558: „the citadel of steep Ilion will be taken and its *politai* killed“; the word recalls all those who live inside the walls of the city, but usually the men were killed and the women taken captive and sold into slavery. Il. II 806: „each man should give orders to those of whom he is leader, and then lead them forwards, after having set his *polietai* in order“; cf. Il. XXII 429: male and female mourners; Od. VII 131; Od. XVII 206; h. 2,99.

¹⁸ ὄθεν ὑδρεύοντο πολῖται; Hom. Od. VII 131; Od. XVII 206; h. 2,99.

¹⁹ Cf. Hdt. VI 137, the only reference to sons fetching water (beside the daughters) when there are no slaves to help; on the representation of women, including elite women, fetching water, Manakidou (1992–3); on the social values involved in ‚women‘ fetching water, Cohen (1991) 152–153, 163; Blok (2001) 109–112, with ref.

²⁰ Pind. N. II 24; P. XI 28.

ai and freedom in classical times makes it improbable that this distinction would have been totally absent in earlier usage.

The general meaning of *politai* as „inhabitants of a city“ does not reveal what kind of city is indicated, nor the social status of the inhabitants. The epic passages obviously represent a world dominated by epic *basileis*, and the *politai* may belong to every level on the social scale. In epic, the *polis* strongly evokes the vision of the strongholds of the city, and living in the *polis* involves the shared risks of facing war which will affect all inhabitants of the *polis*, male and female, albeit in different ways. This awareness fosters a consciousness of shared interest in common affairs that are equally public affairs; the epic world makes a distinction between *idia* (privatè) and *dèmia* (common, public) matters.²¹ Taking decisions is the privilege of the aristocratic leaders, the (other) *politai* partake only by being present in the *agora*. When we list what the *politai* described in archaic texts until the early fifth century actually do, we note for instance that they mourn the dead, fetch water, are marshalled in order (hoplites?), gossip, are jealous, create social chaos, are besieged, cheer victors in the games, are told to behave — in brief, the regular ups and downs of Greek community life. There is no instance of an inherent, unequivocal connection between *politai* and political decision-making or giving judgement until the late fifth century (in circumstantial evidence) and the fourth century (explicitly).²²

The meaning of *politai*, then, can hardly be distinguished from that of *astoi*.²³ In the archaic and early classical records, the *astoi* are involved in exactly the same activities as the *politai*. The main difference appears to be that *astoi* is used more frequently than *politai* as a contrast-term, as will be discussed below. Occasionally, *politai* too is used in a contrast, paired with *xenoi*, once by Aeschylus, once by Lysias and once in a decree of ca. 420 BC, so briefly in the second half of the fifth century. The decree is one of the few inscriptions of the fifth century using the word *politai*, the regular word in decrees being *Athènaioi* by that time.²⁴

2.2 *politês/politis*

From the early archaic age until the last quarter of the fifth century, the „inhabitants of the city“ — all those who constitute the free population of an area with an urban center — were referred to as a collective: *politai*. Yet it seems hardly conceivable that *politês* (in

²¹ Reinau (1981) 10–13 describes the preeminence of the *oikos* over the *polis* in the life of the *politai*, who are emphatically not responsible for or entitled to political decision making; common interests focus on war and peace; *idia* and *dèmia*, 13. Hölkeskamp (2002) 320–323 points to the architectural and spatial structures of the *polis* (as pictured in epic) intended to keep enemies out and bring the populace to the *agora* where common issues are decided. He suggests that *idia* and *dèmia* are related to private versus public space and to gender difference, women belonging to private space in contrast to the *agora*; 323.

²² Only in Aischyl. Eum. 693, the *politai* are addressed as such by Athena when they are about to give verdict; but just a few lines later, in 697, the same citizens are called *astoi*. Obviously, the main point of this scene is that the citizens of Athens are holding the first trial for bloodshed, but the use of *astoi* indicates that this event is not stringently linked to the word *politai*. The choice for *politai* or *astoi* here seems to be made *metri causa*.

²³ Later lexicographers saw indeed little or no difference between *politês* and *astos*: e. g. Hesych., Arist. gramm., and Suda: „*astos*“ = *politês* etc. Cohen (2000) 50–63 has not convinced me that *astos* means „belonging to the same (our) territory“ and that there was a radical difference in meaning, right from the outset, between *astos* and *politês*.

²⁴ Aischyl. Sept. 606–607; Lys. 31,9; IG I³ 1453 (the so-called coinage decree: formerly dated ca. 450–446, now probably 420's, see SEG XLII 18 and SEG XXXVII 6: l. 10: $\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\omicron\nu$ has been added, a quite trustworthy reconstruction. Another instance of *politai* (without contrast) in IG I³ 91,19, dated ca. 416/5.

the singular) was not used in daily speech, beyond the recorded texts. The singular *politês* is attested for the first time in the last quarter of the fifth century. Initially, the word occurs not very frequently nor evenly in different genres. Herodotus uses it only twice, preferring *anêr tôn astôn* or comparable expressions for „a man belonging to the city“. Thucydides does so four times and, when describing the tyrannicide Aristogiton, he uses both terms, calling him an *anêr tôn astôn* and a *mêsos politês*.²⁵ In Sophocles' extant works, *politês* does not occur, but Euripides uses the word seven times, three of which belong to his later works.²⁶ In Aristophanes' comedies *politês* occurs nine times, with a peak in *Equites* (424).²⁷ Numerous texts from the fourth century onward indicate that by then the singular *politês* was used regularly. From the third century onward, the normal way of saying that „X is a free inhabitant of city Y“ was by saying that X is a *politês* of Y. Until that date, as will be discussed more extensively below, the regular way was by saying „X is a [...] (ethnikon, e.g. *Athênaios*)“. This change is prominently visible in, for instance, the formulas of naturalization,²⁸ and in the countless references to cities and persons in ancient dictionaries and lexica. References to cities always mention the ethnikon and biographical notes indicate a person with his or her ethnikon until ca. 300; after that date increasingly as a *politês* or *politis* of city X. Still, these testimonia cannot be used as an argument for archaic and early classical usage. *Polites* as a personal name does occur, although very rarely, namely in the „Iliad“ for one of Priam's many sons and again in Athens in the second half of the fifth century; *Politis* too occurs once and at a later date as a personal name.²⁹ The singular *politês* did exist, then. How to account for its absence as a common noun in other documents until the 420's?

Two explanations are possible. The absence of the singular *politês* could be coincidental, but nevertheless representative. It is a coincidence in that the word did belong to day-to-day speech, but just happened not to have been used by an author of our extant texts. That it did not get into these texts (while the comparable *astos* did, at least twice)³⁰ is an indication of the very scarce use made of the singular *politês*. The other explanation is that the singular *politês* did not exist at all until the 420's, except very rarely as a personal name, and *politai* was a plurale tantum of sorts. Any future find of a singular *politês* predating the 420's will change the date of its genesis. The fact that *both* forms of the word requiring gender distinction are attested for the first time at more or less the same moment, makes the case for entirely new usage even stronger. Whatever explanation one would prefer, both justify the conclusion that until the mid-fifth century *politai* were clearly conceived as a collective – „the inhabitants“.

Against this background, the gendered singulars *politês* (masculine) and *politis* (feminine) clearly appear to be new words or at least to indicate a significantly new prominen-

²⁵ Thuk. VI 54,3; other instances in III 42,5; VI 9,2; VI 14,1.

²⁶ Eur. Iph. T. 495 (413 BC); Phoen. 887 (409); Bacch. 271 (408); Fr. 50,13; 360,13; 512,1; 886,1; plus once in [Rhesus] 946, probably not by Euripides himself.

²⁷ Aristoph. Ach. 595 (425 BC); Equ. 335, 773, 944, 1304 (424), Pax 910–911 (421), Ran. 1041, 1427 (405), Eccl. 574 (392).

²⁸ Osborne (1981–1983), vol. I.

²⁹ *Polites*: IG I³ 1162,23 (ca. 447 BC); 1186,66 (Peloponnesian war); 1032,469 (ca. 400); *Politis*: SEG XXXII 318 (3rd c. BC). Interestingly, personal names with *asty-* are far more numerous than those with *poli-*, in Attica 7:1, in the eastern Aegean 3:1; see P. M. Fraser/E. Matthews (eds.), A lexicon of Greek personal names. Vol. I, Oxford 1987 and M. J. Osborne/S. G. Byrne (eds.), A lexicon of Greek personal names. Vol. II, Oxford 1994.

³⁰ I found two clear instances until the mid 5th c.: Pind. P. II 82; IV 78.

ce and usage. To be precise, *politís* is first attested again in the plural, *politides*, once in Soph. El. 1228, of uncertain date, and once in Eur. El. 1334–1335, dated between 422 and 416.³¹ Henceforth, *politís* in the singular is attested regularly, although not frequently, in the fourth century and later, starting in literary documents and later on increasingly in inscriptions.³² Considering that Euripides, unlike Sophocles, also uses the singular masculine *politês*, one may observe that the first was more inclined to use the novel language of citizenship in his plays than the latter.

Politês makes its appearance in extant texts as a masculinum singularis just slightly earlier than *politides*, Aristophanes' Ach. 595 of 425 being its first datable occurrence. What is even more interesting is that in these earliest occurrences the singular *politês* is often accompanied by a specific qualification: when the citizen is singled out, he is so for being a good citizen (*agathos politês*) or a citizen who makes himself useful to society (*chrêstos* or *chrêsimos politês*) or, conversely, as the victim of hardships (*anêr mochthêros politês*).³³ Here we see the conceptualization of the citizen as an individual, not decked out explicitly in these texts as a bearer of rights and duties, but nevertheless singled out from the collective „inhabitants“ by certain qualifications. Being an individual spokesman on his relations with the *polis*, either as a valuable member or as a victim of the war conditions, the single citizen is certainly someone who claims rights vis-à-vis the community. The values attached to the single citizen fit well with other evidence of the citizen's desire to present himself not just as free (*eleutheros*), but as an individual with leisure to pursue the special qualities of a truly political life (*eleutherios*).³⁴

Herodotus, among the first extant authors recording the new term, provides an interesting case of its usage. In his „Histories“, people are usually designated by their ethnica, but in addition he prefers the more traditional *astoi* to the newer *poli(ê)tai* in a proportion of 2,5:1 to indicate inhabitants of a city.³⁵ It is in the singular, however, that difference in meaning between the two terms becomes most visible. The singulars *astos* and *astê* occur only a few times, in a context indicating „those who belong to us by tradition“ (see also below).³⁶ *Poliêtes* occurs four times in all. Three times the word is put into the mouth of Xerxes, who explains in his council his preference for Achaemenes' advice over that of Demaratos but defends the latter against charges of ill will. Xerxes does so by evoking a picture which recalls a Greek marketplace, where one *poliêtes* who is jealous of another, more successful *poliêtes* will rather keep his mouth shut than give any advice at all, while a stranger (*xeinos*) will give his best advice to another stranger when so asked.³⁷ The second instance features Tisamenos, an Elean diviner who persuaded the Spartans that „they make him their own *poliêtes*, giving him a share

³¹ The date of the *Elektra* is highly contested; on the specific questions concerning the ‚Electras‘ and the problem of the date, J. H. Blok, *Politides: Athenian citizenship in the Electras* (forthcoming). Here I concur with James Diggle, Euripidic fabulae II, Oxford 1981, 58: between 422 and 416.

³² In literary texts until 300 BC: Isokr. or. 14,51; Plat. leg. 814C; Aristot. pol. 1275b 32, 1278a 28; Is. 8,43; Apollod. Neaira 107; Demosth. or. 57,31; 57,43; Demosth. or. 23,213; Men. Sic. 197.

³³ *politês agathos*: Thuk. III 42,5; VI 9,2; VI 14,1; Aristoph. Equ. 944; *chrêstos politês* Aristoph. Ach. 595; Pax 911; Phryn. fr. 59 Kock; Eupolis fr. 118 Kock; *mochthêros*: Aristoph. Equ. 1304; cf. Lys. 24,3: τούτου βελτίων εἰμι πολίτης, „a better citizen than he [...]“. Eupolis fr. 101,1 Kock and Aristoph. Equ. 1304, Pax 910–911, Ran. 1041 use „ἀνὴρ πολίτης“.

³⁴ Raaflaub (1983).

³⁵ Masculine *astoi* 42 occurrences, feminine *astai* 1 time, *poliêtai* 17 times.

³⁶ Hdt. I 173: on legitimacy among the Lycians; III 8,10–11: pledging an oath; also contrast *astos* versus *xeinos*.

³⁷ Hdt. VII 237.

in everything“.³⁸ In the first episode, *poliêtes* means fellow-citizen in the sense of „someone who is a fellow inhabitant of the same city“, the generic meaning intensified into „belonging to us“ through the contrast with *xeinos* – again, *poliêtes* here is practically identical to *astos*. In the second episode, *poliêtes* clearly means „fellow-citizen“, which now includes the political sense. The political meaning of *poliêtes* is inferred by and confirmed in the comparison Herodotus explicitly makes in this story between two forms of political power, *politeia* (citizenship = rule by citizens) and *basileia* (kingship).³⁹ The new meaning of *politês* in which the „citizen in the political sense“ is (or may be) added to the „fellow-inhabitant“ is underscored in Herodotus' story by the phrase „sharing in everything“. This seems a prelude to the fourth-century formula *metechein tês poleôs* – to share in the *polis*, which also refers to all aspects of the community, with or without emphasis on the sphere of political decision making depending on its context.⁴⁰

In the course of the fourth century BC, *politês/politai* are established as the common words for „citizen(s) of a *polis*“, both in the meaning of „inhabitant(s)“ and with the implied meaning of „possessing certain rights and duties“. ⁴¹ This process of formalization in the meaning of *politai* was extended in 229 BC, when the naturalization formula in Athens changed from „becoming an Athenian“ into „being given citizenship (*politeia*)“⁴² – a change implying a transformation from „being one of the inhabitants of city X“ into „having the status of citizenship of city X“. A comparable tendency is visible in the inscriptions of Central Greece, the Peloponnese and Asia Minor: after 400 the ethnika (and in Asia Minor also the frequent use of *astoi*) give way increasingly to the use of *politai* in *polis*-decrees, and from the third century onward the (free) inhabitants of the cities are called *politai* and *politides* all over the Greek world.⁴³

3.1 *astoi*

It is unmistakable that until the fifth century the most current word for „those belonging to the city“ was not *politai* but *astoi*. Like *politai*, *astoi* occurs almost exclusively in the plural until the second half of the fifth century: again, the inhabitants are pictured as a group, not as a sum of individuals. The far greater occurrence of *astoi* than of *politai* in archaic texts, which are nearly all poetic, could be ascribed to exigencies of metre, but, considering the alternative *poliêtai* for *politai* and the variety of metres employed in different types of poetry, this explanation is not entirely satisfactory. The gradual change from *astoi* to *politai* as the normal word for „inhabitants of the city“ can be traced in their usage by several authors of the sixth and fifth century. Solon uses *astoi* twice in his extant poems, and never *poli(ê)tai*.⁴⁴ His laws, so far as they can be reconstructed, contain neither term.⁴⁵ In Theognis the relation of *poli(ê)tai* to *astoi* (not counting repeated formulas) is around 1:4, and in Pindar the same terms occur in a proportion of 1:5.

³⁸ Hdt. IX 33.

³⁹ Hdt. IX 34.

⁴⁰ Demosth. or. 57,3 and passim; Aristot. Pol. 1275a passim for use of *metechein* („to share in“).

⁴¹ For instance, *politai* not just as „inhabitants“ but also „with political rights“: Lys. 34,2–3.

⁴² Osborne (1981–1983) I 15; III and IV passim: Ἀθηναῖος εἶναι and δεδῶσθαι πολιτεῖαν.

⁴³ For a similar investigation of citizenship terminology in the Roman period, Delia (1991).

⁴⁴ Solon F 4,6; F 10,1 West.

⁴⁵ The texts of Solon laws are entirely dependent on reconstruction, see Ruschenbusch (1966) and A. Martina (ed.), Solon. Testimonia vetera, Rome 1968; the words used in the extant sources cannot be trusted to date to the early sixth century without further research.

Aeschylus changes towards a prevalence for *politai* over *astoi* (1,5:1) and once of *Athênaioi*, Sophokles goes back to a more archaic frequency of twice as many *astoi* against *politai* (2:1) and again just once *Athênaioi*. Euripides in his far more numerous extant works uses *politai* more often than *astoi* (1,5:1) and *Athênaioi* nearly twenty times. Aristophanes confirms this pattern even more strongly: *politai* have replaced *astoi* in frequency entirely (3:1) and *Athênaioi* are the most prominent of all (40 times).⁴⁶ Not only the vocabulary of citizenship in the widest sense has changed from *astoi* to *politai*, but *Athênaioi* is even more popular in the later plays, due to the dramatic themes selected by the authors in the second half of the fifth century and to their choice of the ethnicon to designate the citizens of Athens. Lysias, finally, uses *Athênaioi* nearly a hundred times, *astoi* only four times, and *politai* over a hundred times. Similar proportions of the words *astoi* (mainly as a contrast term) and *politês/politai* are to be found in Aristotle.

In the earliest records, *politai* and *astoi* seem to differ little or not at all in meaning, as we saw before: both terms in the masculine plural designate as an unmarked term neutral in gender reference those who belong to the *polis* as a community in the widest sense.⁴⁷ Beside this, we find *astoi* used regularly as a contrast term. The most common opposition is between *astoi* and *xenoi*;⁴⁸ incidentally, *astoi* places humans opposite the gods or denotes the common people by implicit contrast to the aristocracy.⁴⁹ In several, although certainly not numerous decrees the combination „both *astoi* and *xenoi*“ seems to indicate that the decision applies to everybody, of whatever (free) status.⁵⁰ In another, somewhat later decree, the pair makes a contrast between those with and without citizen rights.⁵¹

In the second half of the fifth century, *politai* replaces *astoi* as the most common word for citizen in every sense, as we saw above. Instances of *politai* as a contrast term with *xenoi* start to occur in the same period, doubtlessly as a part of the same change, the first recorded instance being a decree of shortly after 450.⁵² Another and new Athenian word for stranger, *metoikos* (someone who lives among others, or someone who has moved to live somewhere else),⁵³ is recorded for the first time in Aeschylus' dramas, but not in a context of clear contrast to *politai*; it rather indicates the social fact of a stranger living among other people.⁵⁴

The relationship between *astoi* and *politai* clearly interested later grammarians. The grammarian Aristophanes in the early second century BC saw no difference between the

⁴⁶ In absolute numbers: Theognis *astoi* eight times, *politai* twice; Pindar *astos/-oi* ca. 25, *politai* 5; Aeschylus *astoi* ca. 19, *politai* ca. 30; Sophocles *astoi* ca. 17, *politai/politides* (never *poliêtai*) 9; Euripides *astoi* ca. 30, *politai/politides* ca. 46; Aristophanes *astoi/ai* 9, *polites/-ai* 27. Numbers can be approximate due to disputed fragments, emendations etc.

⁴⁷ E. g. unmarked, Hom. Od. 13,193–194: „his wife and *astoi* and friends would not know him, ere he had made the suitors pay for their misdemeanour“.

⁴⁸ E. g. *astoi* marked: the *polis'* own inhabitants versus foreigners: Pind. P. III 70–71: „[. . .] who rules as a king over Syracuse, mild to the *astoi*, not grudging the excellent ones, and to the *xenoi* an admirable father.“ The combination remained fixed and in (rare) use even after the regular use of *astoi* had more or less died out; cf. Aristot. pol. 1278a; 1300b.

⁴⁹ *Astoi* implicitly contrasted to the gods: Solon F 4,1–6 West; *astoi* opposite aristocrats, Pind. P. III 70–71.

⁵⁰ E. g., IG XII (Thasos) 5, line 109; cf. SEG XXXVIII 852 (ca. 407 BC).

⁵¹ IG I³ 138,3 (heavily corrected), before 434.

⁵² IG I³ 1453,10 (addition, but undisputed); ca. 450–446; *astos* was of course not replaced overnight, IG I³ 138,3.

⁵³ Whitehead (1977) 6–7.

⁵⁴ E. g. Aischyl. Pers. 319; Sept. 548; Suppl. 994; Ag. 57; Choeph. 971.

two words, giving *polites* as equivalent to *astos*.⁵⁵ Hesychius (5th–6th c. AD) gave as a definition of *polites*: „he who belongs to and lives in the same *polis* as somebody else“ – in other words, emphasizing the membership of a community, not political status, thus again coming very close to *astos*.⁵⁶ The difference would become clear in the marked usage of *astos*, as exemplified in a Byzantine scholion to a line in Hesiod's „Works and Days“, where the poet uses the pair *xenos* and *endēmos* as contrasts:

„the *astos* is the opposite of the *xenos*, and the one who is away from his country (*apodēmos*) is the opposite of the one who is in his own country (*endēmos*).“⁵⁷

Although *politai* and *astoi* were (almost) synonyms as unmarked words, clearly *astoi* was the regular word in cases of marked usage, where emphasis was intended with a strong connotation of „belonging to us“, a meaning often expressed in its use as a contrast. Likewise, *asty* could be used as a synonym for *polis*, but it could also indicate with emphasis the urban center in contrast to the countryside or a smaller town nearby (for instance, Athens as *asty* in contrast to Eleusis).⁵⁸ Both terms in marked or unmarked usage could include men, women or both, depending on the meanings in context.

3.2 Perikles' citizenship law, *astos* and *astē*

The marked meaning of *astoi* as „those who belong to us“ is decisive in the reconstruction of what probably was the first law describing citizenship as a status, namely Perikles' citizenship law of 451/0. The law laid down the qualification of those who would count as members of a certain group, and thus would have a certain status. The decree itself no longer exists, but comparison of the five extant references yields „from two *astoi* parents“ as the most likely formulation of the required qualification.⁵⁹ But what was the term for the status to which someone born from *astoi* parents was entitled?⁶⁰ Unlike the formula of required qualification, it is impossible to reconstruct this term, because in the quoted phrases *Athēnaios* as well as *politēs* and *metechēin tēs poleōs* (participating in the *polis*) are mentioned. All three are equally possible because all these terms meant more or less

⁵⁵ Aristoph. Byz. nom. act. (frag. Paris.) s. v. ἀστός.

⁵⁶ πολίτης: ὁ συμπολιτευόμενός τινι καὶ συνόν.

⁵⁷ Schol. in Hes. erg. 225 ter; in this line.

⁵⁸ IG I² 837,1: *asty* on a herm of Hipparchos (?) ca. 529 BC; IG I² 763,II,4 (490–489, monument for Marathon battle): *asty* = Athens; IG I³ 32 (ca. 449–447): contrast Athens and Eleusis; IG I³ 79 (422), idem, etc.

⁵⁹ In the four surviving references the requirements and subsequent quality are defined as follows: Aristot. Ath. pol. 26,3: μή μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως, ὅς ἂν μή ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστοῖν ἢ γεγονός Ail. var. 13,24: μή εἶναι Ἀθηναῖον, ὅς μή ἐξ ἀμφοῖν γέγονεν ἀστοῖν. Plut. Perikles 37,3: Περικλῆς [...] νόμον ἔγραψε μόνους Ἀθηναίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐξ δουσὶν Ἀθηναίων γεγονότας. Suda s. v. δημοποίητος: [...] μή ἐξ ἀμφοῖν (ἀστὺ)πολίτην μή εἶναι. The majority of the testimonia clearly indicates the negative phrasing of the statute: he who is not born from [...] will not be [...]. For a discussion of the testimonia, Broadbent (1968) 167–168, who adds a fifth reference (Plut. Perikles 6,10: μή τις ἐξ ἀμφοῖν [...] ἀστοῖν, τούτῳ μὴ μετεῖναι τῆς πολιτείας) which is incorrect; for discussion of this law a. o. Harrison (1968–1971) I 24–27, 62; Rhodes (1981) 331–335; Patterson (1981); Patterson (1986); Boegehold (1994); Ogden (1996) 59–69; Raaflaub (1998) 35–36, who all pursue arguments more or less different from the one advanced here. The possible motives for this law are subject to an extensive debate, which I intend to discuss elsewhere.

⁶⁰ I leave aside here the debate on the, in my eyes unsolved and insoluble, question whether someone born from two *astoi* parents who were, however, not married with the ritual of *engye*, was or was not a full *astos* citizen.

the same in the context of this law.⁶¹ Moreover, it is not improbable that the text of the law not only contained the definition just mentioned, but included more regulations and details, which would have given room for more terms used. In sum, all three terms may have figured in the text of the decree.

The novelty of the law was threefold. Firstly, it is the first recorded instance of a Greek decree providing a definition of a member of the *polis*. Secondly, it changed the traditional practice of Athens, where until then one qualified parent had been sufficient for membership, into a system requiring both parents to be so.⁶² Thirdly, it created a distinction between qualification for membership (descent from two *astoi* parents) and membership itself (*Athēnaios*, *metechēin tēs poleōs*, etc), changing the perception of membership as such, which can be translated as citizenship from now on. In this conceptual change, Perikles used the two existing words for those belonging to the *polis*, which, as we saw above, were very close but would diverge in meaning when used with emphasis. Thus, *astoi*, belonging to us, was used to designate „belonging by descent“, i. e. the qualification. *Politai* recalled *polis* and hence the idea of the community. Circumstantial evidence suggests that at least some parts of the decree were formulated in the singular, considering that many Athenian laws were formulated as „he who does [...]“ or „when someone does [...]“.⁶³ In particular, the requirement of descent for membership was something which would be asked of every single man and woman, thus drawing attention to individuals. The occurrence of the singular *politēs* and *politīs* in extant texts of the 420's suggests that even if the word *politēs* did not actually figure in Perikles' decree, at least the implications of the law contributed to the awareness of „a citizen“ as an individual with certain obligations and certain rights.

The effect of the law's emphasis on the individual participation of qualified members deserves some more attention. Until this stage, membership of the *polis* had always been a matter of collectives (*astoi*, *politai*). The Solonian property classes, the one official qualification structure operating within the *polis*, always concerned the qualifications of an entire *oikos*. The men who participated in political and judicial bodies represented the *oikos* which was the basis of their qualification within the system. The *oikos* was not men's private property, rather it was a household consisting of movable and real property belonging to the patrilinear family in its entirety, run by husband and wife according to traditional division of labour, and represented by men in the legal or political context of the community.⁶⁴ The qualification to belong to a particular class was presented to the *polis* by a demonstration of the *oikos*' wealth, probably in the procession which was a

⁶¹ Rhodes (1981) 335 thinks *μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως* may be a quotation from the law.

⁶² The obvious effect of the law was a decrease of the number of qualified citizens, an effect regarded by Ath. pol. 26,3 as the cause (reason) behind the decree. This seems highly unlikely, considering the massive losses Athens had been through in the previous years. For discussion, see note 59.

⁶³ Formulations would be „he who [...]“ (*τις [...]*) or „if someone [...]“ (*ἐάν [...]*). The reference to the law closest to this type of formulation is the one in Aristot. Ath. pol. 26,3: *μη μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως, ὃς ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστοῖν ἢ γεγινώς*. Since, moreover, this phrase uses the dualis, unlike the phrase of Plutarch, Ath. pol. may indeed echo some of the original. Cf. Rhodes' view, note 61. However, *μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως* does not figure very often in literary or epigraphical texts of the second half of the fifth century; the normal way to call someone a member of the *polis* Athens was by saying (s)he was *Athēnaios/a*. A likely formulation of the text of the decree would seem to me: *μη Ἀθηναίων εἶναι ὃς ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστοῖν ἢ γεγινώς*.

⁶⁴ On the size, the economic and political power of the various classes, Foxhall (1997); on shared, family ownership and the economic and political role of women's dowry in the *oikos*, Foxhall (1989); for further examples as documented in fourth-century legal cases and epigraphical material, Cox (1998).

major part of the Panathênaia. It was fitting that the *polis* presented all those who belonged to it in a festival honouring its protective deity.⁶⁵ Those who could not show the wealth required for the first three classes and together made up the majority of members of the *polis*, participated by forming the rear end of the procession or responding to the spectacle as it passed by.⁶⁶ Subgroups of the *polis* were represented at the Panathênaia, women from different classes in various cultic roles, older men, young men who were to compete in the nightly race, young women carrying lustral water, other young women carrying the *peplos* for Athena, and in the fifth century special roles were added for the *metoikoi*. In this way, the Panathênaia (like other cultic festivities) split the members of a single *oikos* and regrouped them according to sex, age and class. Presiding priests and priestesses were qualified for their task by belonging to one of the traditional, aristocratic families who had laid claims to these functions for many generations. The fact that the semantics of *astoi* and *politai* always concerned *group* identity fits very well with the ways in which membership of the *polis* actually functioned.

On what grounds could one be or become a member of the *polis*, how was this membership established? Again, before Perikles' law, there is only circumstantial evidence, which suggests that neither Solon's laws nor Kleisthenes' regulations defined citizens as a group, but just addressed the free population of Attika as the ones for whom the laws were valid. Belonging to this group apparently depended on being born in the region from at least one parent who had also been born there. Without a written administration, the system of recognizing one another as rightful members of society depended on social connections, control by neighbours and relatives, and shared rites and festivities. In this process of confirming membership based on descent, the phratries and *genê* played an increasingly important role, and after Kleisthenes membership had to be recognised by the demes as well (see also below).⁶⁷ Although the evidence is scarce, it seems there was a scrutiny of sorts after the fall of the tyrants, but this had probably more to do with settling political accounts of the preceding years than with a formal check on birthrights. Moreover, the report of Ath. pol. on Kleisthenes suggests that at least he included all free inhabitants living in Attika at that moment in his regulations as citizens, regardless of their pedigree, as if to make a fresh start also where membership as such was concerned.⁶⁸

There is no doubt that until 451, having one qualified parent was sufficient for a child to be included as a member. Given patrilinear kinship and heritage preference, membership through the father must have been the most common practice. However, in principle the qualified parent could also be the mother, as, for instance, exemplified in a passage

⁶⁵ Connor (1987).

⁶⁶ Foxhall (1997) clearly demonstrates that the first three property classes together constituted the quite wealthy up to the very rich and how wealthy even the third class was in comparison to the fourth, the numerous inhabitants who had a small holding or less.

⁶⁷ On the *genê*, Roussel (1976), Bourriot (1976); on the influence of both studies Schneider (1991/2); on the religious role of *genê* Parker (1996) 56–66, 284–287; on the phratries Lambert 1998²); on the changes in historical views on these bodies, Gehrke (2000). Phratries and *genê* were basically male organisations, and although some phratries enrolled women, the majority did not. Yet women played a (modest) role in phratry activities, notably in cults, Lambert (1998²) 185–8; women were as a rule introduced to the phratries of their husbands, probably at the *gamelia*, or else the principle of descent as basis for *polis*-membership could not work, *ibidem*, 178ff. Women were also members of *genê*, such as for instance the female priests belonging to the Salaminioi and the Eteoboutadaï.

⁶⁸ Aristot. Ath. pol. 21,4, and comm. Rhodes (1981) ad loc; cf. Whitehead (1986) 68: „By registration in the deme where they had or could claim residence in 508/7, all Athenian citizens – so defined by this very act – became members, demesmen (*dēmotai*) of that deme.“ On the scrutiny, Welwei (1967).

from Euripides' *Ion* (see below). Considering the increasing settlement of Greeks, often single males, from other cities in Athens, such unions may have become more frequent.⁶⁹

The requirements laid down in Perikles' law made the qualification for individual citizens more demanding. Consequently, candidates for citizenship became more vulnerable. Citizenship in the sense of membership now had to be proven of both parents and also of the parents of both parents, as lawsuits concerning citizenship demonstrate.⁷⁰ Conversely, the fact that one parent was not sufficient to confer citizenship made the other parent more valuable in this respect. Against the background of the predominance of men, women gained in consequence following the citizenship law, a feeling which was clearly expressed in grave stelae, where family life and public life converged.⁷¹ The fact that a man was an *astos* or a woman an *asté* — in the new, marked sense of belonging to us through descent — had become an equally essential aspect of individual and social life. This is not to say that the roles of men and women in the *polis* were symmetrical. Here, too, a gender division of labour was effective: the public domain was a men's sphere where political decision-making, jurisdiction and war were concerned and it was a sphere of both men and women — women probably even somewhat more prominently — in performing the common cults, festivals and other religious duties.⁷² There is a strong connection after the citizenship law between the increasing emphasis on individual membership of the *polis* of both men and women, and the preeminent role of women in public religion.⁷³ This connection is reflected in the decades after the law in the newly coined words *politês* and *politis*, and new usage of *astos* and *asté*.⁷⁴

⁶⁹ Most historians have simply supposed that legal descent c.q. citizenship was only passed through the males. For instance, the term *métróxenoi* (those with a foreign mother) is usually interpreted as showing that before the law the single citizen parent granting citizenship status was always the father; cf. Ogden (1996) 44 and passim. Yet, the term could imply as well that having a foreign mother was felt to be a problem, at least from the early 5th c. onwards, and that consequently an *asté* mother was considered preferable. The exclusiveness of fatherright, however, is only an assumption, e.g. Rhodes (1981) 26, iv; 332: „I assume that a foreign man could not become a citizen, acquire property in Attica or beget citizen sons, by marrying an Athenian woman.“ (italics added). It is equally possible, on the other hand, that *either* parent could be an *astos*: „Nor is there any reason to suppose that the same (= being *gnésioi*, i.e. legitimate offspring from a lawful marriage) was not true of children of an Athenian woman and a foreign man, though this would have happened more rarely and there is no known instant of it.“ Harrison (1968–1971) I 62. Unlike *métróxenoi* like Themistokles and Kimon, there is indeed no clear case of an Athenian individual known as the child of a foreigner or a *metoikos* and an Athenian woman. There are, however, indications of (Greek) men from abroad settling in Athens who either were made *politai* or remained *xenoi/ metoikoi*, but in both cases would only acquire full Athenian membership by marrying Athenian women; cf. Solon F 75 Ruschenbusch = F 332 Martina, a statute limiting the acceptance of new citizens, which may have been directed against mercenaries. On such marriages to Athenian women by male *metoikoi*, Raaflaub (1998) 355 n. 145. When foreigners were made Athenian citizens (and this applied only to men), they would only acquire full citizenship for their children through marriage with an Athenian woman; cf. the decree for the Plataeans, Osborne (1981) D 1 = Apollod. Neaira 104.

⁷⁰ Cf. Demosth. or. 57,40: Λαβέ δὴ μοι καὶ τὰς τῶν φρατέρων τῶν συγγενῶν τῶν τῆς μητρὸς καὶ δημοτῶν μαρτυρίας, καὶ ὧν τὰ μνήματα ταῦτά. „Now please take the statements of the *phrateres* belonging to my mother's *genos* and of the demes, and of those who are entitled to burial in the same tombs.“

⁷¹ Osborne (1997).

⁷² On the intimate connection between public cult and political life in the *polis* Connor (1988), Sourvinou-Inwood (1990), Cole (1995), Burkert (1995); on the role of women in public cult Sourvinou-Inwood (1995), Kron (1996), Blok (2001), Dillon (2001).

⁷³ Sourvinou-Inwood (1995).

⁷⁴ *Asté* or *asté gyné*. Hdt. I 173; Aristoph. Thesm. 540–542 (plur.); Demosth. or. 57,36 and passim; Apollod. Neaira 63 and passim; Is. 8; 9.

Two passages may exemplify the increased interest in descent as a prerequisite for citizenship in the years following Perikles' law. In Euripides' play *Ion* of about 410 the action is supposed to take place long ago, but it simultaneously reflects the actual situation in Athens, where the strictness of the law's application was a topic of daily concern at the time the *Ion* was produced.⁷⁵ Ion speaks wishfully on the status of his mother to his alleged father Xouthos, who is a Dorian:

„I take my leave; yet there is one thing my fortune lacks;
 father, if I will not find her who bore me,
 my life is not worth living. If I may express another wish,
 let her who bore me be a woman from Athens,
 that from my mother I may get freedom of speech.
 For when a *xenos* lands in a pure city,
 though he may be an *astos* in name, yet he's got
 a slave's tongue, and has no freedom of speech (*parrhēsia*)“
 (Eur. *Ion* 668–675).⁷⁶

Ion still thinks Xouthos is his father. That the audience knows that it is actually Apollo, is irrelevant for Ion's words at this particular moment. Saying farewell to his father, Ion expresses his anxiety and his hopes. If he goes to Athens, he can live there as an *astos*, but he can only act as a real Athenian citizen, with the typical freedom of speech, if his mother is a born Athenian. Ion's words at this point contain a peculiar mixture of anachronisms.⁷⁷ On the one hand, as in the ‚old days‘ one citizen parent would be sufficient to be counted a citizen and in his case this parent would be the mother.⁷⁸ On the other hand, true citizenship, indicated by the capacity to speak freely, is taken to be a hereditary quality, which recalls the essential connection between pure descent (from two citizen parents) and citizenship rights of Perikles' law. *Astos* here has the meaning of ‚citizen“ in both the old and the new sense, the first now including the other, just as *politēs* could do.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ In the later years of the Peloponnesian war the number of male citizens was diminishing so dramatically, that the rules of Perikles' law were alleviated and apparently some men were even allowed to have more than one wife.

⁷⁶ στείχοιμ' ἄν· ἐν δὲ τῆς τύχης ἄπεστί μοι·
 εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦτις μ' ἔτεκεν εὐρήσω, πάτερ,
 ἀβίωτον ἡμῖν· εἰ δ' ἐπεύξασθαι χρεῶν,
 ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν μ' ἢ τεκοῦσ' εἴη γυνή,
 ὥς μοι γένηται μητρόθεν παρρησία.
 καθαρὰν γὰρ ἦν τις ἐς πόλιν πέση ξένος,
 κἄν τοῖς λόγοισιν ἄστος ἦ, τό γε στόμα
 δοῦλον πέπαται κούκ ἔχει παρρησίαν.

⁷⁷ See also K. H. Lee (ed.), Euripides, *Ion* (The plays of Euripides 11), Warminster 1997, 235 (ad. loc.).

⁷⁸ The notion, propounded in particular by Loraux (1993) that the Athenian autochthony myth included the widespread belief that men, being born from the earth, were not related to their mothers/matrikin and only kin of each other, is untenable in the light of the evidence; cf. also Cohen (2000) 79–103, Blok (2004). For an interesting example of a woman incorporating the connection of hereditary citizenship between her father and her son, without mentioning her husband, is Xenokrateia, „daughter and mother of Xeniadēs from Cholleidai, (end of 5th century BC), who dedicated a votive relief to the rivergod Kephisos; IG I³ 987; cf. Dillon (2001) 25, with ref.

⁷⁹ Since in fact only *astoi* could be *politai*, the one category could be the same as the other in daily perception, an identity used in shorthand with the catchword *parrhēsia* by Aristophanes when in the *Thesmophoriazusaē* (411) he comically represents the citizen women (*astai*) giving judgment (540–542): Mnesilochos (disguised

A second example of the interest in the peculiarities of descent in the years following Perikles' law, is again provided by Herodotus. In his discussion of the Lycians, he presents what information he has gathered on the rules of legitimacy of this people. The Lycians take their names not from their fathers but from their mothers. What is more, „if an *asté* woman marries a slave, the children are called of legitimate descent (*gennaia*); but when an *astos* man has a *xené* wife or concubine, even if he is the highest-ranking among them, the children have no rights (*atima*).“⁸⁰ What will have astonished Herodotus' audience is not that an *asté* woman may confer citizen rights to her children, although a slave would certainly have been considered inadequate as a husband, but that an *astos* man cannot confer such rights *alone*.

In conclusion, we find that in Athens *astos/asté* in the sense of „belonging to our own group“ acquired the specific meaning of „belonging by descent“ in the second half of the fifth century. This meaning firmly took root in the fourth century, when *politai/politides* had taken over the regular meaning of „inhabitants of the city“, now in the conscious possession of rights and duties. Since descent itself had become an essential qualification to belonging to the *polis*, it is fitting that *astos* and *asté* figure most prominently in those court speeches, where citizenship by descent or legitimacy in connection with a heritage were at stake.⁸¹ The symmetrical terms necessary to indicate male and female citizens, such as *polites/politis*, were normally available in the Greek language. This symmetry was not so easy, however, in the ethnicon *Athênaios*, because *Athênaiia* was already the name of the city-goddess Athena.

4.1 *Athênaioi/Athênaios, Attikos*

The previous sections described the terminology of citizenship as a status, in its development from „inhabitant“ to „someone possessing certain rights.“ Initially, however, the regular way to indicate that one was the inhabitant of a city was not by labeling oneself (or someone else) „a citizen/inhabitant of [...]“ but by using the ethnicon. Some Greek ethnika referred to a region, others to a city; in both cases the reference was used as an identification with the verb „to be“: „I *am* a Theban, a Megarian [...] etc.“ In all Greek *poleis*, the name of a male or female citizen consisted of a personal name, a patronymikon and an ethnicon, although they were seldom all used.⁸² These names indicated someone's links to the groups to which s/he belonged: the patrilinear family and the original

as a woman): [...] ὃ γυναῖκες· εἰ γὰρ οὖσης παρρησίας κἀξὸν λέγειν ὅσαι πάρεσμεν ἀσταί [...]; „[...] if there is freedom of speech and the right for all of us *astai* here to speak [...].“ The plural, too, may have influenced the meaning of *astai* here, given the traditional meaning of *astoi* as „our own inhabitants“.

⁸⁰ καὶ ἦν μὲν γε γυνὴ ἀσπὴ δούλῳ συνοικήσει, γενναῖα τὰ τέκνα νενόμισται ἦν δὲ ἀνὴρ ἀστός καὶ ὁ πρῶτος αὐτῶν γυναῖκα ξείνην ἢ παλλακὴν ἔχη, ἄτιμα τὰ τέκνα γίνεται (Hdt. I 173).

⁸¹ Demosth. or. 57; Apollod. Neaira 59; Is. 8; 9, all passim. For the rare use of *astos* as a fixed pair with *xenos* in the fourth century, see above. In Is. 8 the whole proof of the case hinges on the woman's participation in a festival and her husband's willingness to pay for this which is to prove that she is an *asté*.

⁸² Ethnika were used predominantly when one was outside one's own *polis* (it makes no sense to label oneself as a Theban within Thebes); when Thucydides calls himself *Athênaios* in the opening sentence of his history, he makes it clear that he also addresses readers from other cities. According to Hansen (1996), most ethnika were ‚political‘, meaning being a citizen with legal, political rights, the ethnicon pointing to its owner's status. Because this conclusion seems to be frustrated by the numerous ethnika of women, who could not possess this status according to Hansen, he suggests a gradual relinquishing of political rights by emigrants, which would have facilitated the use of ethnika by women. For my different view on this matter, see below. On the use of ethnika and demotika, Fraser (1995).

local environment. It is very likely that in the course of time the ethnikon also acquired a political meaning, but the evidence is far from conclusive as to when and how this came about. At Athens, Kleisthenes allegedly selected the demotikon to refer to a male citizen's *deme* as the smallest political unit to replace the patronymikon. The historicity of this aspect of Kleisthenes' regulation is debatable, but from the late sixth century onward usage of the demotikon very slowly increased, taking a long time to become a regular designation and without really replacing the patronymikon.⁸³

In Athens, the use of names based on locality seems confusing because Athens was one city in a larger area, Attika, which included other places such as Rhamnous and Thorikos, but in the course of time came to represent the whole area it dominated. So did its name. The ethnikon *Athēnaios*, which is very common in the Homeric poems, means both „people of Athena“ and „people of Athens“ and probably referred to the inhabitants of Athens itself.⁸⁴ *Attikos* indicated an inhabitant of Attika as a whole, a unit larger than Athens alone and also including the villages and smaller towns. The process towards the formation of the polis would first involve the change of *Attikos* as an adjective of the region Attika into *Attikos* as an ethnikon (the inhabitants feel that as a group they share a regional identity). Conversely, *Athēnaioi* would gradually come to include other inhabitants from Attika, and next replace *Attikoi* as the ethnikon. When and how did this happen? This process can only be traced in dim outlines, particularly at the level of language in the archaic period, but some observations and inferences are possible.

The laws and songs of Solon are vital documents in this respect, not least because they are the only Athenian texts of some length from this period.⁸⁵ The laws, in so far as they are reconstructable, never indicate whom exactly they are addressing, as we saw before. Solon calls himself both *Athēnaios* and *Attikos* in a single poem.⁸⁶ Here, *Attikos* can be interpreted to differ in meaning from *Athēnaios* — the latter representing a smaller (geographical?) section of society, *Attikos* the area as a whole. In another elegy, however, Solon describes himself as a lawgiver for the *Athēnaioi*.⁸⁷ Apparently, the community for which Solon drew up his regulations called itself *Athēnaioi*, but the name itself gives no indication at all of who were to be taken to belong, and why. It may be that *Athēnaios* and *Attikos* just existed alongside each other as ethnika. Yet there may be a different explanation.

⁸³ Only by the very end of the fifth century, demotika had grown into widespread, regular use among the male citizens of Athens, and they rarely replaced the patronymikon, but were added to it, Meyer (1993). On the introduction and meaning of the demotika, a publication is being prepared by D. Kretschmann. Women generally had no demotikon of their own, but were referred to by the demotikon of their husband or father, as the registration system by *deme* was first of all meant for men's participation in political bodies; yet Whitehead (1986) 78–81 rightly stresses the essential role of women for the life in the demes itself. It may be the tight connection between the demes *qua* political structure and citizenship as descent which may explain the few cases of women's demotika from the fourth c. and later.

⁸⁴ B. Snell (ed.), *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*. Vol. I, Göttingen 1979, s.v. Ἀθηναῖοι, including a summary of the question whether, and if so, how much of „Athens“ had been introduced into the Homeric epics in the sixth century. Some Attic influence on the text is unmistakable, as was to be expected since all oral texts are adapted to some extent to the conditions in which they are performed, but this does not turn most epic instances of *Athēnaioi* into interpolations. In the „Iliad“, the genitive plural Ἀθηναίων is by far the most frequent case, fitting better in the exigencies of the hexameter line.

⁸⁵ I leave aside here entirely the question who and what kind of person Solon may have been, including the question whether he alone could be considered the author of the extant poems; for the present investigation, the extant poetical texts ascribed to Solon serve as independent evidence.

⁸⁶ Solon F 2,2 and 5 (M. L. West [ed.], *Iambi et elegi Graeci*. Vol. II, Oxford ²1992).

⁸⁷ F 4,30 West.

In their very structure, the early Greek laws presuppose the existence of a community with some social coherence, often with an elementary council and some magistracies. Such councils and magistracies were filled by a hereditary elite, which by the late seventh century was compelled to deal with deep social-economic problems by means of more or less ad hoc regulations.⁸⁸ This relatively small group were the self-appointed people in charge of the community, wielding power in worldly matters and authority in religious affairs.⁸⁹ In Attika too, Solon's regulations formally changed the composition of the political elite from one defined by birth into one defined by property, but did not diminish the gulf between rich and poor; leadership of the *polis* remained firmly in the hands of the elite.⁹⁰ Considering the hierarchical nature of Athenian society in the seventh and sixth centuries, it is not impossible that *Athēnaioi*, by referring to Athens, the central city where the councils and magistrates would meet and that possessed the most important sanctuary of Athena, was a name associated foremost with the upper strata of society.⁹¹ The occurrence of *Athēnaioi* in the Homeric epics would only enhance the prestige of the name. The name *Attikos*, on the other hand, would indicate the inhabitants of Attika, regardless of their social standing. As such, at least, they were also known outside Attika until the end of the sixth century, for instance to Hecataeus.⁹²

Whether *Athēnaioi* was initially a name associated either with powerful people or with the powerful center of the region, by the middle of the sixth century it came to be used in a wider sense. A votive inscription of that date from Eleusis mentions the *dēmos Athēnaion*,⁹³ the people of the Athenians. The text provides the first epigraphical instance of the ethnicon *Athēnaioi*, as the people for whom stelae were erected at the stadion (?) of Eleusis, and the word *dēmos* ensures that the ethnicon here included the lower-class inhabitants. It is impossible to decide whether any political meaning should be attached to

⁸⁸ Hölkeskamp makes a useful distinction between the organisation and institutions as described in the numerous, semi-mythological stories about the early lawgivers, and those that are implied to exist by the regulations themselves; Hölkeskamp (1992 [1995]), Hölkeskamp (1994), Hölkeskamp (2000); that these regulations in the traditional *poleis* (founding decrees of colonies are a different matter) were drawn up to address conflicts within the aristocratic elite rather than to create a set of laws for the entire community, see also Osborne (1996) 186–90.

⁸⁹ The rule of the few was the normal constitution in archaic Greece and continued to be so in many *poleis*, cf. Ostwald (2000); the main problem was how to decide who belonged to the few and how many the few could be. Nevertheless, in several *poleis*, some elementary form of democracy was practiced in the late archaic period; Robinson (1997).

⁹⁰ For a good discussion of political limits of Solon's law and relevant literature, Bleicken (1994) 442–444; on the wealth of the first three Solonian property classes Foxhall (1997) and above, note 66.

⁹¹ Hecataeus (FGrH I F 127 = Hdt. VI 137) narrated the expansion of Athenian power from the area around the Akropolis against the „early inhabitants, the Pelasgians“ at the foot of the Hymettus, a story reflecting the greed for good farmland in central Attika.

⁹² Of the few relevant references, FGGrH I FF 21, 93 and 136 mention *Attikoi/os*, against only once F 127 *Athēnaioi* (see note 91); compare on the one hand no mention of *Attikoi* or *Athēnaioi* in archaic poetry except Homer and Solon, on the other Hellenicus of Lesbos (FGGrH 4), in the 5th c. BC, numerous references to *Athēnaioi*, and to Attika only as a region.

⁹³ Recent editions: P. A. Hansen, *Carmina Epigraphica Graeca*. Vol. I: Saec. VIII–V a. Chr. n. (Texte und Kommentare 12), Berlin/New York 1983, no. 301; IG I³ 991, both with literature and agreement on the date, ca. 550 BC, confirmed again by J. S. Traill, *Persons of ancient Athens*. Vol. II, Toronto 1994, no. 122365. First two lines in *boustrophedon*, beginning = end of the first line missing. Line 1–2 (ed. IG): δέμοι Ἀθηναίων ἄ[ρχων] | στέλας καδέθεκεν | Ἀλκίφρον καὶ τόνδε δρόμον ποίεσεν [...] etc. The restoration into *archon* is highly uncertain, hence Alkiphron is not included in discussions of the Athenian archon-lists, e.g. Cadoux (1948), cf. ML no. 6, or, as any type of *archon*, in Develin (1989). I am grateful to J. H. M. Strubbe for his comments on this inscription.

dēmos in this case, like in the decrees of the fifth-century, but the text of the dedication makes it highly unlikely. The next instance of epigraphical evidence with the name *Athēnaioi* dates from about forty years later, the Athenians' dedication commemorating their victory over the Boeotians and Chalcidians in 506 BC.⁹⁴ The text recalls triumphantly that the *paides Athēnaiōn* (sons of the Athenians) defeated the *ethnea* of Boeotians and Chalcidians, both formulations meaning „the people“ and, in the case of the Athenians, especially the people's army. The first recorded instance of the concept *isonomia* (equality in law) is from ca. 500, not referring to *Athēnaioi*, however, but to Athens.⁹⁵ The next dedication featuring *Athēnaioi* is the inscription honouring the tyrannicides, ca. 477.⁹⁶ The first extant decree of ca. 510–500 mentions the *dēmos* as taking the decision; the name *Athēnaioi* figures in a different context here, if at all.⁹⁷

From the 470's on, the *Athēnaioi* appear on inscriptions recording the decrees of the *polis*, initially rarely, but after 450 with increasing frequency with the rising number of extant inscriptions.⁹⁸ The word refers to the free inhabitants who belong to the *polis* Athens. Naturalization of foreigners into fellow-inhabitants of the *polis* too was coined in the formula that one was „to be an *Athēnaios*“.⁹⁹ The first case of naturalization mentioned in Athenian sources concerned Menon, son of Menekleides from Pharsalos, ca. 476 or soon after. The evidence suggests that after Kleisthenes granting citizenship (membership of the *polis*) was the right of the Assembly because it required membership of a deme.¹⁰⁰ There is no clear indication as to political rights being included in the word *Athēnaios*. Decrees are decisions made by the council (*boulē*) and the *dēmos*, however, and it is reasonable to add (implicitly) *Athēnaiōn*. After ca. 385/4 the naturalization formula included various clauses concerning membership of phylai, demes and phratries, the right to vote and obligation to partake in a scrutiny.¹⁰¹ By then, explicit statement of the procedures following installation as a member of the *polis* was deemed necessary, but until that date apparently the proper procedure had been taken for granted.

4.2 *Athēnaia, Attikē*

In the feminine cases, however, the ethnikon proved quite problematic. Just like the other collectives *astoi* and *politai*, the plural *Athēnaioi* could be distinguished into a masculine and a feminine singular case. Ethnika ending in *-aios* as a matter of course had *-aia* as the feminine case, just as those on *-eus* and *-es* were paired with *-is* in the femi-

⁹⁴ ML no. 15; DAA 168; IG I³ 501.

⁹⁵ ἰσονόμους τ' Ἀθῆνας; PMG; 893; 896 Page; cf. Alkmaeon 24 B 4 D.-K.; on the dates, Bleicken (1994) 459.

⁹⁶ IG I³ 502.

⁹⁷ ML no. 14, IG I³ 1 is doubtlessly the first decree ‚signed‘ by the Athenian *dēmos*, but the name (*[Athene]st*) is an addition (line 2) and refers to the people who are to settle on Salamis, not to the ones who have taken the decision.

⁹⁸ After the texts already mentioned, *Athēnaioi* figures in dated decrees in IG I³: no. 6 (460); 10 (469–450), 14 (453), 15, 18, 19, 21, 24 (450), 23 (447), 12 (433) etc.

⁹⁹ Osborne (1981–1983) I 16; the naturalisation of Menon, son of Menekleides from Pharsalos took place ca. 476 or soon after, but the wording of the text describing the fact is by Demosthenes (or. 23,199) who here uses *δίδωμαι πολιτείαν*, a description of the granting of citizenship which would only become the official formula in ca. 229. Osborne (1981–1983) III T1, 20.

¹⁰⁰ Osborne (1981–1983) IV 139–140; vgl. Whitehead (1977) 16, 143–147.

¹⁰¹ Osborne (1981–1983) I 16–17.

nine.¹⁰² The plural *Attikoi*, at a relatively early stage, already occurred with *Attikos* in the singular and in the fifth century also with *Attiké* as usual gendered ethnika.¹⁰³ The feminine counterpart of *Athênaios*, *Athênaiia*, certainly existed in the fifth and fourth centuries. Beside some references in literary texts,¹⁰⁴ the most interesting instance is the decree of ca. 448 on the construction of the temple of Athena Niké and the procedure for the appointment of the priestess. The decree ruled that a priestess were to be appointed by lot from all *Athênaiôn*, a genitive plural derived almost certainly from *Athênaiiai*.¹⁰⁵

Yet, *Athênaiia* appears not to have been used frequently, and, unlike *astai* and *politides*, this is not due to the fact that there were just very few occasions when only female citizens would be mentioned, and still fewer occasions when these words were also recorded (and the records preserved).¹⁰⁶ Ancient commentators, foremost among them lexicographers and encyclopaedists interested in language, already noticed the rarity of *Athênaiiai*, in contrast to *Athênaioi*, *Attikai* and *astai*, and recounted various stories explaining why this was the case. One such story, for which Varro is our earliest source, drew on the myth recounting the rivalry of Athena and Poseidon for the protection of Athens in the dawn of its existence. The women were loyal to Athena and helped her gain the victory, but when Poseidon in his anger sent a flood, the men punished the women by prohibiting matriliney, excluding women from political decision making and prohibiting that anyone call them *Athênaiia*.¹⁰⁷ This version has been put center stage in the debate of the last twenty years, as an argument exemplifying women's exclusion from Athenian citizenship exemplified by women's exclusion from the name *Athênaios/Athênaiia*.¹⁰⁸ Ho-

¹⁰² Stephanus Byzantinus' *Ethnika* duly lists the distinctive cases where an ethnikon needed a more complicated change: e. g. „Hippola, an old polis in Lakonia, ethnikon Hippolaïtes and Hippolaïtis in the feminine“; „Kamiroi, a polis on Rhodos, citizen is Kamireus [...] and Kamiretes and Kamiraïos, also in the feminine“ (s. v. Ἰππόλα and Κάμιρος).

¹⁰³ For *Attikoi* and *Attikos*, see above; and cf. Aischyl. Eum. 681–682: κλύοιτ' ἄν ἦδη θεσμόν, Ἀττικὸς λεῶς, πρώτας δίκας κρίνοντες αἵματος χυτοῦ. (Athena): „Now hear my ordinance, men of Attika, who give judgment at the first trial on bloodshed.“ For the feminine: Aristoph. Lys. 56–57 (Lysistrata, to Kalonike:) [...] ὄψει τοι σφόδρ' αὐτὰς Ἀττικὰς, ἅπαντα δρώσας τοῦ δέοντος ὕστερον [...]. „[...] you'll find that they are women of the true Attic stuff, who always do everything later than it should [...].“ *Attiké* could also refer to the country, the Attic land, cf. Hdt. V 76: [...] τέταρτον δὴ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἄπικόμενοι Δωριεῖες [...]. „[...] as this was the fourth time that the Dorians invaded Attika [...].“ The use of *Attikai* for Athenian women leads Patterson to conclude that women's civic status was embodied in this word, rather than in *politides/politides* or *Athênaios*; Patterson (1986).

¹⁰⁴ The comedy-writers Kantharos (F 5 K.-A.), and Pherekrates (F 39 K.-A.) of the 5th c., and Philemon (F 69 K.-A.) and Diphilus (F 10 K.-A.) of the late 4th, all use *Athênaiia* meaning a female Athenian citizen. Ion of Chios (FGtH 392 F 11; ca. 480–420 BC) called Themistokles' daughter an *Athênaiian xenên*, an oxymoron on one individual both possessing and lacking citizenship; both Themistokles and this daughter were *métraxenoi*.

¹⁰⁵ IG I³ 35, plus bibl., 448 BC.; [τῆι] | [Ἀθῆναιαί τῆι Νί]κει ἠέρεαν ἡ ἐγ[κλ] | [ερομένη λάχε]ι ἐχς Ἀθηναίων ἡπα[σθ] | [ν καθίστα]σθαι [...] the relevant words in line 5–6. The inscription is stoichedon, thus hardly allowing for a different reading, and critical discussion has never doubted the present reconstruction; cf. ML no. 44, who prefer to leave open the beginning of line 5 (in ed. ML line 4) but confidently complete the end of the line. The only alternative of the text (but almost certainly impossible given the available space) would be ἐχς Ἀθηναίων ἡπαπτόν, with the consequence that *Athênaioi* would include women. For a parallel to the formulation ἠέρεαν καθίστασθαι, Thuk. 4,133,3.

¹⁰⁶ On the unwritten rules governing public and private discourse and their recording in writing, Blok (2001).

¹⁰⁷ Varro, in Aug. doct. christ. 18, ix.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Loraux (1993), Loraux (1986) and hence more or less the current view on this topic. Obviously, I cannot share this view (anymore). One could equally suggest, however, that in this story citizen women's exclusion from politics is felt to be something that needs explaining.

wever, this story should be considered within the whole group of lexicographic and encyclopaedic accounts dealing with the naming of Athenian women. The explanations, different though they are, collectively reflect and discuss the close relations between the mortal women of Athens and the goddess Athena.

Other accounts are preserved by, for instance, Photius and Eustathius.¹⁰⁹ Both ancient scholars record debates among linguists as to whether *Athénaia* is proper Attic, some denying this to be so, although Attic writers did use the word. The proximity between the goddess and the mortal Athenian women must observe certain limits, and identity in name was apparently considered a transgression of such limits. The aetiologies reveal the tension created by the fact that *Athénaia* as the name of a mortal woman was exactly the same as the name of the goddess. A scholion to Aristophanes' „Birds“ confirms this impression clearly and succinctly:

„[...] thus they called the goddess *Athénaia*. That is why they did not call a citizen woman (*politís*) *Athénaia*, avoiding homonymy; [follow an addition:] [...] but *asté*. Yet they apparently also call a *politís* ‚*Athénaia*‘ in many places.“¹¹⁰

Some accounts say that respect for the goddess initially caused the women to be called *Athénaiai*, but eventually to avoid the seeming identity between mortals and divinity. Eustathius even reports that when the women began to call themselves *Athénaiai*, it was decided to contract the name of the goddess from *Athénaia* to *Athéna* — thus the homonymy was terminated not by changing the name of the Athenian women but of the goddess herself. Similarly, no mortal male in classical Athens would or did carry the very name Apollo or Poseidon.¹¹¹ And indeed, there is no visible or audible difference between *Athénaia* (Athena) or *Athénaiai* (to Athena), inscribed on the numerous votives dedicated to Athena on the Akropolis in the sixth and fifth centuries, and „woman“ or „women of Athens“.¹¹²

One story, recorded both by Photius and Eustathios and derived from a little-known author, Megakleides, sheds a particularly interesting light on the equivalence of *Athénaia* and *Athénaios*. It claims that the men were called *Athénaioi* and the women *Attikéai*, because married women did not want to offend the unmarried woman (= Athena) when addressing her. The background to this story must be the custom that women reached full adulthood when they got married and had their first child, hence became *Athénaiai* at that moment, just like the men became *Athénaioi* when they were admitted to full adulthood after their *ephebeia* and *dokimasia*. This equivalence in civic adulthood was ritually expressed foremost in the Apatouria, a festival celebrating men admitted as members to the *phratries* and women who had their first child, referring to their role as mothers of

¹⁰⁹ Phot. Lex. á 446 Theodoridis; Eust. ad Iliad. á 197, p. 84, 17ff. van der Valk. These passages also include the account of Megakleides (FHG 4, 443), see below.

¹¹⁰ Schol. vet. in Aristop. Av. 828.

¹¹¹ The so-called theophoric names, which were numerous and popular in ancient Greece, were always derived from divine names, not identical to them: e. g. Dionysios, not Dionysos. Lukian. pro imag. 4 claims that some people called themselves Zeus, Leto or Hermes, but his comment must refer mainly to his own time and environment, independent evidence being limited to the post-classical era; cf. Parker (2000).

¹¹² In votive inscriptions the dative *Athénaiai*, *l'Athénaiai* and the complete *tēi Athénaiai*, all meaning „to Athena“, figure equally in large quantities.

citizens and providing the indispensable link in citizen descent.¹¹³ The goddess Athena, however, was proud of being a virgin, and to address her as if she were married just like any other female would have been an insult. Therefore the women of Athens let go of this name, precisely because of their close relationship with the patron divinity of their city.

In sum, all these stories try to explain a linguistic problem by situating it in a comprehensible, historical context. It is not easy to judge whether these stories shed more light on the fifth and fourth centuries rather than on their own time and place. The Varro/Augustine version, for instance, is obviously crippled by the fact that its point of departure, that classical Athenian women were never called *Athēnaia*, is simply not true. Augustine, moreover, presents the story in the first place to illuminate the fickleness of demons like Poseidon and Athena.¹¹⁴ One could also wonder if the use of the ethnicon *Athēnaia* in a context would not immediately have resolved any ambiguity about the identity of mortal and immortal. Taken together, however, these stories show an interesting pattern which needs not refer only to Hellenistic-Roman conditions but seems to reflect some elements of the fifth century because it is corroborated by independent evidence dating to the classical era. All stories consider both men and women to have been citizens in the sense of members of the *polis* Athens, as was indicated by the various terms discussed above. The unusual asymmetry concerning *Athēnaia* as women's ethnicon is interpreted in one case as a symbol of women's exclusion from politics. In all others, the Athenian usage of women's ethnicon was regarded as an act not of social dismissal, but of piety. Considering the avoidance observed in the classical period of immortal names for mortals, this could well explain the proportionally scarce occurrence of the feminine *Athēnaia*.

5 Conclusions: the lack of terminology, or: the use and abuse of Aristotle

5.1 Changes in meanings

We now return to the initial questions to see if the investigation has provided a feasible answer. What was the precise meaning of the Greek words indicating that someone was an inhabitant or citizen of a *polis*, could the change from inhabitant into citizen-with-political-rights be traced in language? What was precisely the impact of gender difference in these respects? The findings can be summarised as follows.

Three sets of words were regular terms in archaic and classical Greece to designate „citizens“, be it with or without specific qualities except freedom: *politai*, *astoi*, and ethnika, here only to be discussed regarding *Athēnaios* and *Attikos* (until the fifth century, texts from the whole of Greece were investigated, with the fifth century attention focused on Athens). Changes in the usage of these words taking account of changes in meaning and in frequency of occurrence, lead to the following periods:

1. from epic to the middle of the fifth century
- 2.a. from ca. 450 to the end of the fourth century
- 2.b. from ca. 425 to the end of the fourth century

¹¹³ On the Apatouria as a festival of male and female citizens, Schmitt-Pantel (1977), unfortunately not included in Lambert's discussion of the Apatouria. Schmitt-Pantel's findings seem to have been confirmed by a relief showing a married couple presenting their children to Athena, Palagia (1995).

¹¹⁴ The Varro/Augustine version even reproaches Athena for abandoning the women of Athens to the vengeance of their husbands, and not even seeing to it that the women, who had been so loyal to her, could keep her name!

1. In this stage, *politai* and *astoi* were very close in meaning, that is „free inhabitants of the city“; there is no indication whatsoever of political rights included in the word. Until ca. 470, *astoi* is the most common, after that date, *politai* gradually becomes more frequent. *Astoi* and *politai* both indicated citizens as a group; individuals were not singled out to be mentioned (*astos* incidentally, early fifth century). *Astoi* had somewhat stronger overtones of „belonging to us“ than *politai*, a difference most visible when used as a contrast to other terms (foreigners, gods).

Athēnaioi occurs frequently in epic and occasionally in other archaic poetry, especially poetry by Solon. Although Solon mentions the *Athēnaioi* as those for whom his laws are made, it is not clear who exactly are meant to be included. In the middle of the sixth century, *Athēnaioi* is used for the first time to refer to all free inhabitants of Attika. It is tempting to relate this expansion of the name to the whole *dēmos* to the reorganization of the Panathēnaia in 566, which played a vital role in bringing the whole population of Attika together in Athens every year and thus enhancing the social coherence. *Athēnaioi* then would be those who were entitled to participate in the Panathēnaia. After 550, the *ethnikon* occurs infrequently in literary and epigraphical sources until the mid-fifth century. By then, *Athēnaios* is almost certainly the regular word for a full member of the *polis* Athens. An almost certain instance of *Athēnaiai* is documented in the early 440's. *Attikos*, a common word for the inhabitants in the sixth century, vanishes gradually in the case of men, being replaced by *Athēnaios*. For women, *Attikē* remains more common also in the fifth century and next gradually seems to disappear.

The majority of the references is neutral in gender: they include men and women. In several cases, the context makes clear that only men were meant by the masculine plural, again often referring to conflict or war; in a few cases, the plural *politai* seems to designate women. Special mention of women occurs only rarely in our evidence. Considering the strongly asymmetrical proportion of the extant evidence concerned with public as opposed to private life and, of great importance in the present context, with the political and legal aspects of public life, this scarcity is perfectly in accordance with what is presently known about ancient Greek society and with what consequently might be expected of our written sources.

In none of these references, any relation between the words used for „citizen“ and the enjoyment of any political or other rights could be found. On the contrary, the majority of references depict the inhabitants involved in various public activities including situations of war, but political or judicial office is not indicated. It is from other sources, or other places in sources, that we know that the inhabitants were in fact citizens engaged (at least sometimes) in those activities that made up public *polis* life: active politics for a rising number of men and cultic activities for men and women.

2.a. From ca. 450 till the end of the fourth century, a clear change concerns an expansion in *politai* in proportion to *astoi*, and an increasing use of *Athēnaioi* alongside *politai*. Beside an increase in frequency, a certain change in meaning can be discerned. Again, it is the context rather than any explicit statement that shows that *politai* can mean not just inhabitants but more emphatically „the active citizens of the *polis*“. Context can either take the form of the textual context such as speeches to the citizens or about civic matters, or (legal) expressions such as the opposition of *politai* with *metoikoi*. This contextual emphasis will have been clear enough for the contemporary listeners. Finally, the singular has a special emphasis in meaning which will be discussed shortly. One cannot say, however, that the new, emphatic meaning replaced the other. Rather, it

seems to have been a qualification in addition to or a specification of the more general one.¹¹⁵

In addition, the modern reader understands that the specific meaning „active citizen“ may be involved by taking account of the historical context, as was the case for the earlier material. After the reforms of Ephialtes in 462/1 and with the heyday of the Attic-Delian League, the male *politai* of Athens were well aware of their potential power both within and outside Athens, an awareness which of course bolstered their self-consciousness as citizens. It is in the 430 's that the word *démokratia* first occurs with its ambivalent values of „power of the people“ and „power of the lower classes“.¹¹⁶ Beside the self-confident atmosphere within the political domain, the Panathēnaia and City-Dionysia were celebrated with great splendour and the number of cults in the framework of the *polis*-religion increased.¹¹⁷ These cults were also important social events in which men and women participated as individual citizens in larger or smaller groups, men and women together or separate. In the majority of these cultic festivities the participants were involved as citizens: their participation was both proof of their membership and a way of putting that membership into practice. Among such festivals the Skira, the Haloa and foremost the Thesmophoria for women only, while the greater part of the Apatouria, for instance, was exclusively for men. An additional influential factor in the emergence of a new selfconscious citizenship might well have been the removal of the entire Attic population within the walls of Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians thus leaving the land of their *oikos* for the first time after countless generations and forced to live packed with their fellow-Athenians.¹¹⁸ To bring this modern interpretation of the historical context to bear on the meaning of *politai* is justified, albeit not without certain risks (see also below).

2.b. The first instances of the singular *politēs*, the singular *astē*, the singular *Athēnaia* and the feminine plural *politides*, later to be followed by the singular *politīs* occur around 425. *Politēs* is accompanied by adjectives enhancing individual qualities; *politides* first occurs in tragedy, a genre on the crossroads of religion and politics. *Astē* is used in the context of descent. The emphasis on the *individual* citizen, male and female, combined with the concern with descent points to Perikles' citizenship law as the origin of a new concept of citizenship reflected in language.

Obviously there is a time gap of ca. 25 years between Perikles' law and the first recorded instances of singulars. An even wider gap separates Ephialtes' reforms and the first instances of *démokratia*. Concerning the available documents, the relative lack of literary sources shortly after 450 plays a part, although the number of decrees compensates this

¹¹⁵ Some questions deserve further investigation. It seems that from ca. 450 to the early fourth century *politai* could either have its wider meaning (free inhabitants) or its specific meaning (active citizens) depending on context, but that in the course of the fourth c. its usage came to depend on perspective: when speaking of one's own city, *politai* would mean „active citizens“ but when speaking of an other city, *politai* had the wider meaning of „inhabitants“. A second problem may also concern perspective. Although ethnika were used as a rule outside the place of origin, *Athēnaioi* was used for the citizen body also in Athens itself. It would be interesting to see if or how its usage from ca. 550 till the end of the fifth century was not only predicated on the people's relation to the city of Athens and Athena, but also on their dealings with the world outside Attika.

¹¹⁶ Hdt. VI 43,3; 131,1; Ps.-Xen. Ath. pol. passim; Aristoph. Ach. 618 of 425; cf. Bleicken (1994) 57 (with full discussion on 459–460): „nicht früher als 440/430“.

¹¹⁷ Parker (1996) ch. 9.

¹¹⁸ Meyer (1993); and see *politēs* singular in Aristoph. Equ. 1304 as victim of the war.

lack to some extent.¹¹⁹ It seems more important to me that in a traditional and strongly oral society like Athens, it takes quite a while for a new law which creates a considerable break with usual practice to affect the mentality of the population. It takes as long for the concomitant changes in words and word-meanings to emerge and settle, and still longer before such new words and meanings find their way into written texts (which also happen to be preserved).

The law defined the requirements for membership of the group of citizens for the first time, shifting attention firmly to the individual members, male and female, both in the procedure of qualification and in its result, membership. The meaning of the two words *astoi* and *politai*, which hitherto had been close, drifted apart. *Astos/asté* developed from „belonging to us“ into „those belonging to us by descent“; *politai* developed from „inhabitants“ into „qualified inhabitants“; here as well the singular *polités/politis* expressed the significance of the individual. This self-awareness of the individual citizens of course tied in with the selfconfidence of the *politai* as a collective. We could add that after the disasters at the end of the Peloponnesian War, when the collective identity of the Athenians received a heavy blow, it may have been partly due to the resilience of individual citizenship that the city managed to recover so soon.

In the fourth century *politai*, with its singulars *polités* (quite often) and *politis* (not very frequently), retained its predominant meaning of „full-right citizen(s)“. Since Perikles' law, reinforced after the Peloponnesian war and once more in the 380's, it was clear to whom the laws actually applied and who were included when custom prescribed „citizens“ to participate. The deeply rooted connection between public cults and citizenship, exemplified by great festivals such as the Anthesteria, the Brauronia and the Panathênaia, and by numerous significant events such as the procedure to confirm male citizens when taking office, confirms the participation of women as citizens already indicated by the linguistic analysis. The multiple roles of women in these cults were as important as they were irreplaceable, constituting a counterpart to men's exclusive control over political and judicial matters.

5.2 The use and abuse of Aristotle

Many historians have accepted Aristotle's models („Politics“, *Athênaiôn Politeia*) as a reliable framework for the history of Greek citizenship to a greater or lesser degree. The liberal tradition in historiography, predominant in the Anglo-Saxon world, defined the individual citizen as the natural bearer of rights and duties, and as the source of political responsibility.¹²⁰ In the German tradition, the focus on the national „Rechtsstaat“ encouraged historians to see the shape of a constitution, in terms of a legal structure, emerging from the dim origins of history to grow into an historically fitting, political framework.¹²¹ A third approach, strongly influenced by French structuralist anthropology, designed a holistic view of the *polis*, in which all parts derived their meaning from their

¹¹⁹ Bleicken (1994) 57.

¹²⁰ Among recent examples: a quite strict adherence in the publications of the Copenhagen Polis project; in an open way Ober (1989), Manville (1990), Manville (1994); Walter (1993) casts his net much wider discussing all kinds of associations in which citizens participated, but he limits this arrangement to the male part of the citizen population.

¹²¹ On the historiographical creation of the *polis* as political institution in the German tradition, Gawantka (1985).

relation to the entire structure of society.¹²² Each type of political theory found important aspects of its own concerns reflected in the Aristotelian models. Consequently, historians felt encouraged to assume that the arrangements discussed in the „Politics“ were more or less reliable representations of Greek or Athenian political conditions, even if the precise relation of Aristotle's text to historical reality was open for recurrent debate.¹²³ It seemed suitable to accept Aristotle's definition of a citizen as a guide to interpret Greek citizenship and to reconstruct its history. However, in several ways Aristotle provided a fundamental break with Greek tradition and practice.

The first break is connected with Aristotle's radically different logical approach. The Greeks never created words to define different kinds of rights.¹²⁴ Until the end of the fourth century, a citizen was conceptualized as a person who is something, such as an inhabitant of A, a member of group B, or a child of C and D, briefly as being related to other people or belonging to a group. Any attempt at greater precision would therefore go in greater detail as to qualifications of membership, or procedure in what members should do to effectuate their membership. Aristotle, on the other hand, aimed at definitions based on outlining the properties of a certain thing, focusing on someone having quality X or Y. Greater precision therefore would lead to a more precise description of quality X, and to asking why someone would or would not have X, and what the consequences of having this property could be. This is an essentially different view of the connection between a person and a quality such as the status of citizenship. It is remarkable that the change in the vocabulary of naturalization in Athens by the late third century BC, changing from „becoming an Athenian“ into „being given citizenship“, is in line with Aristotle's system. Yet because of the change Aristotle brought in the perception of qualities, the use of Aristotle's instrumentarium is hazardous when tracing the vocabulary of citizenship in the archaic and classical period.

The aims of the „Politics“, moreover, in fact led Aristotle to disregard a kind of citizenship which was only a minor factor for his own arguments, but was, to my mind, vital in the emergence and existence of the *polis*. In order to clarify my views, I borrow a set of terms used by Josiah Ober to clarify the word *polis* in the „Politics“. As Ober points out, Aristotle uses the word in two senses, namely:

„[...] as a community of citizens (a „*politico-polis*“) and as a community including those residents of a clearly defined territory who were not citizens (a „*geo-polis*“). [...] when Aristotle uses the term *polis*, he always assumes the existence of, and sometimes refers especially to, the society at large.“¹²⁵

In Aristotle's times, this description made sense in that Attika included numerous *metoikoi* and even more numerous slaves. The *polis* as an independent community could not do without these non-citizens. So the *geo-polis* Athens included all those. Within this same territory, there was a large number of citizens, male and female, who at this time were

¹²² On the grounds for these views and a defense of the holistic approach of the *polis*, Murray (1990).

¹²³ On the views of different disciplines on these questions, Piepenbrink (2001) 15–31; recent contributions Aubenque (1993), Frank (1999), Höffe (2001).

¹²⁴ On the absence of legal definitions in Greek, and particularly Athenian, law, Cohen (1991) 203–210; Todd (1993) 64–67.

¹²⁵ Ober (1996a) 161, 164; cf. on the meanings of *polis* in Aristotle and the question who were members of this *polis*, Hansen (1993).

qualified citizens because they were descended from citizen parents on both sides. They put their citizenship into practice by sharing the worldly and religious activities that constituted the core concerns of the *polis*.¹²⁶ A group selected from among these citizens were entitled to holding political office, notably in the assembly, the council and the courts. This group was only male and was partly subjected to property requirements.¹²⁷ This last group is meant by the term *politico-polis*.

Neither Aristotle nor Ober has a proper word, however, for the larger group of all male and female citizens, so I introduce the term *socio-polis* here.¹²⁸ It would have been feasible to use the word *dēmos* here, if it were not that, on using *dēmos*, most ancient historians immediately think of the politically active body, just as in the case of the word citizen, *politēs* etc.¹²⁹ The *dēmos* could very well include women at the dramatic festivals, precisely an occasion in which the *polis* in the widest sense was involved.¹³⁰ In fact, it would have been perfectly correct to use the word *politai*, which likewise included male and female citizens. But here again, the historiographical tradition based on Aristotle cannot think of *politai* in other meanings than politically active men. More terms would be necessary to do justice to the groups outside the *socio-polis*, considering the legal and at some times social distinction between citizens and *metoikoi*, and the even greater legal and social gulf dividing all free people from the slaves.¹³¹

The aim of Aristotle's political theory was to create a (theoretical) system which might put an end to the *stasis* which had damaged Greek social life for centuries. A system was needed that could guarantee stability but would also do justice to the existing *politeiai* (*polis*-systems).¹³² From the way in which he arrives at his own definition of a citizen, it is clear that Aristotle's empirical information on the Greek *poleis* defined citizens as people belonging to the group by descent, and had little to say about distinguishing those who were entitled to participate in political power and those who were not. The lack of

¹²⁶ E. g. Demosth. or. 57,3: to be a member of the *polis* is to μετέχειν τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ κοινῶν („to share in the religious rites and public affairs“).

¹²⁷ Some property was required for citizenship almost everywhere in archaic and classical Greece; Ostwald (2000) 44ff. but participation in the Athenian *ekklesia* and *dikastēria* at the time of the radical democracy was a notable exception. The *boulē* (council) remained limited to the three higher property classes, Rhodes (1972) 2–5.

¹²⁸ According to Johnson (1984) 74, the existence of many citizens who did not practice political functions was important for Aristotle to find the essential properties of „his“ citizen.

¹²⁹ See for instance Whitehead (1986) 364–5, who discusses *dēmos* as described in LSJ, namely „district, country, land“, and „the people, inhabitants of such a land“ and „hence the common people“, and deplures that LSJ „declined to extend this explanatory framework to the [...] remaining principal meanings of the word *dēmos*, namely 'in a political sense, the sovereign people, the free citizens' [...]"¹²⁹. Emphasis added, JB.

¹³⁰ Henderson (1991); Henderson fruitfully applies the terms „notional“ (the emphatically intended audience) versus „actual“ audience to explain different levels of address (either to men only, or to men and women) in dramatic texts. The strongest opposition to Henderson's views has been voiced by Goldhill (1994), who, however, supports his judgement essentially on the idea that women could not be citizens at all, in the sense proposed by Loraux, such as being excluded from the name *Athēnaios*, which has just been shown to be unjustified.

¹³¹ Cohen (2000) seems to mean by „nation“ what I have just labelled *socio-polis*. But although the difference between citizens and metics in social life was indeed not always very striking (as he rightfully argues), significant distinctions remained both in the legal and in the social-religious sphere. Thus different words are needed for the *politai*-body (male and female) and for all free inhabitants, *politai* plus *metoikoi*.

¹³² Gehrke (2001); on the relation between *politeia*, *stasis* and the composition of the citizen body in Aristotle, Murray (1993).

such a distinction was a certain cause of civil conflict over who could share in political power and who could not.¹³³ Athens had been a clear case, as the *Athênaiôn Politeia* recorded, during the oligarchy of 411. All citizens of Athens were still citizens (a), but only 5000 were to be politically active citizens (b), and a few hundred among these were to fulfill the legislative and executive duties (c). All people of (a), (b) and (c) were called *politai*, the Greek language simply did not differentiate between the distinct meanings. The distinction between the groups depended as usual on procedural rules, namely the quality of descent to get into (a), a property and experience test to get into (b) and internal election to get into (c). *Mutatis mutandis* there were similar situations in other *poleis*, where many people were citizens but only a few held political power. To put it bluntly: Aristotle drew the very same conclusions as have been presented here, namely that in the majority of Greek *poleis* and even in Athens for many years the common usage provided no visible or audible difference between qualified citizens with and without political authority.

For his own system, Aristotle needed to define who was entitled to political power and could be considered representative of the whole *geo-polis*. By assessing variables that were not essential or would exclude important cases, he arrived at the quality „political authority“ of those who would rule the *polis* and at „the right to share in this authority“ as the defining quality of citizenship.¹³⁴ In this process, Aristotle created a definition of a citizen that was purposely unlike what was normally meant by „citizen“:

Aristot. pol. 1275b 17ff.:

„Who [or what] is a citizen is therefore clear from these arguments: we can now state that he, who possesses the right to share in bouletic or judicial office, is a citizen of that *polis* [*politico-polis*], and a *polis* is a group of such people that is sufficient to maintain independence of life [*geo-polis*], speaking generally. But in practice they draw a line that a citizen is someone from both citizen parents [*socio-polis*] and not just from one side only, that is from the father or from the mother; and some others follow this principle even further, that is to two or even more generations [. . .]“ [terms between parentheses added, JB].¹³⁵

Aristotle thus makes an explicit distinction (μὲν [. . .] δὲ; but [. . .]) between what he himself wants to say with the term *politês* and what the Greeks of his time normally mean by that word. Among his objections against the current practices is the relative arbitrariness of the ways in which Greek *poleis* defined their citizen bodies. This arbitrariness was based, as I just mentioned, on a notion of who would or would not belong to the group, thus in fact on descent:

¹³³ Piepenbrink (2001) 41.

¹³⁴ „His intention in defining things is one of comprehensiveness: to include the greatest number of cases within a single definition [. . .] ‚Sharing in deliberative and judicial authority‘ is the final improvement [on the developing definition of citizenship]. Authority of this kind is exercised in every state, and those discharging it can easily be identified.“ Johnson (1984) 80. The system is both complicated and refined by the additional requirement of good government by good citizens, Johnson (1984) 82–86; Develin (1973).

¹³⁵ τίς μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· ὃ γὰρ ἐξουσία κοινωεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς, καὶ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἦδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἰκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν. Ὅρίζονται δὲ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν πολίτην τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν καὶ μὴ θατέρου μόνον, οἷον πατρὸς ἢ μητρὸς, οἱ δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πλεον ζητοῦσιν, οἷον ἐπὶ πάππουσιν δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πλείους.

Aristot. pol. 1278 a 26ff.:

„But in many constitutions the law draws recruits even from foreigners; for in some democracies he who is born from a female citizen [*ek politidos*] is a citizen [*politês*], and the same rule is valid in many places also with regard to *nothoi* [those born outside a lawful marriage]. Nevertheless, since they make such people into citizens because of a lack of citizens born of two citizen-parents – because they make such use of the laws due to underpopulation – as soon as they are doing well in the mass of their population, then they gradually rid themselves first of those born of a male or female slave, and next of those from women [*tous apo tôn gynaikôn* = with only a citizen mother]; in they end, they only make those citizens born from both citizen parents [*ex amphoin astôn*].“

Therefore Aristotle discarded the principle of descent, the regular but unreliable guideline for ages in Greek cities to decide who belonged (being X), in favour of a definition of what a selected group of citizens was entitled to do (having quality X).

In the „Politics“, as in many of his other treatises, Aristotle wants to arrive at a description at a general, highly abstract level, a construction based on elements taken from existing cases and isolated from their original context to serve their new purpose within the theoretical whole. Aristotle applies a similar procedure in the „Poetics“, where the descriptions of tragedy and historiography are conceived at such a level of abstraction that neither Euripides nor Thucydides could qualify as fitting representatives of their genres.¹³⁶ Beside the composition of the citizen-body based on descent, Aristotle leaves out from his model yet another vital element of the *politeiai* existing in his times: the *hierai*, everything belonging to the gods, including the countless activities such as festivals and sacrifices maintaining the ties between the citizens and the gods. Both elements of the *polis* were essential for its survival, but were left out from his model for several reasons. Aristotle's definitions of citizenship created the terms by which to distinguish the *politico-polis* from everything and everybody else. Subdivisions in the outer groups who lacked property X = active political citizenship, were only partly relevant for his argument. Those who are clearly considered citizens in some *poleis* but do not actively participate in politics are eventually not to be included in the definition and are only involved in the discussion in so far as their existence was prerequisite to the existence of the *politico-polis*.¹³⁷

Aristotle's definitions of citizenship, created in accordance with his political theory and logic, cannot be used as a yardstick to measure Greek citizenship backwards into its earlier history. Instead, the „Politics“ are extremely useful to understand the contemporary practice of Greek citizenship as the social system which Aristotle did not so much reflect, as tried to leave behind.

Summary

This essay investigates the semantic changes of the words used to indicate *polis* membership, analysing how „citizen“ in the sense of someone being involved in political decision

¹³⁶ Cf. Ste. Croix (1992) on the relation between Aristotle's genre descriptions and his focus on general patterns; on the tension between historical reality and Aristotle's abstract models in „Politics“, Gehrke (2001) 146–149; on the model's abstraction from the social context, Piepenbrink (2001) 90.

¹³⁷ Mossé (1967); Johnson (1984) 84–85, and n. 49; Piepenbrink (2001) 69ff.

making was related to other uses of the same word that do not refer to political power or to other words indicating that someone belonged to the *polis*. The selected words are those that came to be connected in various ways with citizenship in the political sense: *politês*, *poliêtês*, *politês*; *astos* and *astê*; *Athênaios/Athênaiia* and *Attikos/Attikê*, but great effort has been made to estimate their meaning in their historical context without the effect of hind-sight.

Until the middle of the fifth century BC, *politai/astoi* were represented as a collective, meaning „inhabitants“. Only ca. 425 the singular *politês* and the feminine *politides/politês* gain currency. Simultaneously, the meanings of *politês* and *astos*, previously nearly identical, drift wider apart, *astos* taking on the meaning of „belonging to the *polis* by descent“ and *politês* of „having rights and duties within the *polis*“. These changes can be explained as consequences of both Perikles' citizenship law (451/0) and of the political circumstances of the later fifth century. The marked meanings of *astos* and *politês* were qualifications in addition to or specifications of the more general ones and did not replace them.

Throughout, the evidence demonstrates that male and female members of the *polis* had far more in common than is usually assumed. All relevant words occur as either generic terms referring to both men and women, or, when marked by context or morphological difference in gender, they indicate no difference in meaning other than the gender of the persons referred to. This conclusion is based on linguistic analysis and is explained by considering the essential connection of religion and politics in the structures of the *polis*.

The conclusions encourage a different reading of Aristotle's „Politics“, taking account of the break Aristotle created between contemporary practices and his own objectives by his logic, his methods and his theoretical models. Such a reading should affect the current views on the meaning of *politês* and on the structure of the classical *polis* as a whole.

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