



International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ujic20>

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Precarious State of a Double Agent during the Cold War

Eleni Braat & Ben de Jong

To cite this article: Eleni Braat & Ben de Jong (2023) Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Precarious State of a Double Agent during the Cold War, *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 36:1, 78-108, DOI: [10.1080/08850607.2022.2088951](https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2022.2088951)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2022.2088951>



© 2022 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC



Published online: 25 Jul 2022.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 4292



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

ELENI BRAAT AND BEN DE JONG

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Precarious State of a Double Agent during the Cold War

Abstract: While scholarly literature has paid attention to human intelligence professionalism from the perspective of the agent handler, we know relatively little about the precarious positions in which (double) agents often find themselves and what their ensuing needs from their handlers consist of. This article suggests that (double) agents desire a reciprocal, affect-based relationship with their handlers, involving trust and gratitude, more than just a negotiated relationship based on (financial) agreements. This article explains the importance of such a relationship. The main source of this

Eleni Braat is an Associate Professor in the History of International Relations at Utrecht University. She obtained her Ph.D. from the European University Institute in Florence, Italy (2008). She has been the official historian of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service, and she is a member of the executive board of the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association. The author can be contacted at e.c.braat@uu.nl.

*Ben de Jong is a retired Assistant Professor from the University of Amsterdam. He is a Researcher at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University. His most recent publication is on the life and times of a former Dutch security service official: *Op de bres voor de rechtsstaat in het Verzet en bij de BVD: Ad de Jonge 1919–2002* [In defense of democracy with the Resistance and the BVD: Ad de Jonge 1919–2002].*

© 2022 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

research consists of original, in-depth oral history interviews with former double agent “M.” He operated from the 1960s through the 1990s for the Dutch Security Service and the Central Intelligence Agency against the East German Ministerium für Staatssicherheit. The article analyzes the varying degrees of appreciation that these services showed for his work, and it investigates their consequences on the psychological well-being of the double agent.

Double agents may yield important operational benefits for the service running them by tasking them with acquiring specific information on the personnel, operations, and modus operandi of the adversary service. However, running a double agent requires a high degree of professionalism in the field of human intelligence (HUMINT), entailing much effort, patience, understanding, tact, and firmness. A double agent often operates in a dangerous environment, being in close proximity to the adversary service and, in many instances, with few options for protection when operating in hostile territory. A double agent “works as an agent for one intelligence service but reports to and is loyal to another intelligence service as its agent.”¹ Indeed, it could be said that more than a regular agent, the double agent is potentially mistrusted by the adversary service, which always reckons with the possibility that he may be working for the other side. While scholarly literature has paid attention to HUMINT professionalism from the perspective of the agent handler,² relatively little is known about the precarious position a double agent often finds himself in and what his ensuing needs from his handlers consist of. This research suggests that (double) agents desire a reciprocal, affect-based relationship with their handlers, involving trust and gratitude, more than just a negotiated relationship based on (financial) agreements. What explains the importance of such a relationship?

This research is based on unique empirical data, derived from original, in-depth oral history interviews with a former double agent. He prefers to remain anonymous and, hence, this article refers to him as “M.” To contextualize the interviews, the authors of this article have requested archival material from the Dutch Intelligence and Security Service on the same operation. The service has denied them access. Double agent M. operated from the 1960s through the 1990s, initially for the Dutch domestic security service Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD) and from 1981 for the CIA, against the East German Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS, Ministry of State Security).³ This article analyzes the varying degrees of gratitude that these services showed for his work, such as personal attention,

verbal expressions of gratitude, and material gifts. It also discusses the role of trust in their dealings with M. and investigates how the various signs of gratitude and trust affected the relationships.

This article aims to enrich the literature on agent-handler relationships from an empirical and theoretical perspective. It advances a theoretical framework that explains the importance of socially embedded relationships in secretive professional environments. The methodological section explains how the authors collected and used the empirical data, primarily through oral history interviews. The empirical analysis centers on M.'s different relationships with the BVD, the CIA, and the MfS.

AGENT-HANDLER RELATIONSHIPS IN INTELLIGENCE LITERATURE

Literature on intelligence history has an overriding interest in the historical reconstruction of operations and is less inclined to analytically single out specific operational themes. Consequently, the topic of this article is mostly treated implicitly rather than explicitly in the relevant literature. This article identifies three factors in the relationship between an agent and his handler that to a large extent also apply to the relationship between the double agent and his handlers, in this case from both services.⁴

First, trust and distrust, fear and danger play a major role. A double agent usually operates against experienced intelligence officers of an adversary service. He has regular meetings with them, during which they will always look for indications in his behavior that he might be under the control of another service. If the meetings with the adversary service take place on their turf, as was often the case with double agent M., that evidently adds an extra dimension of fear and insecurity to the situation. During the Cold War, meetings of Western double agents with their Soviet and East European adversaries sometimes took place behind the Iron Curtain, during which they basically risked their lives. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) double agent Morris Childs, for instance, who had first been recruited by the KGB, went on 52 missions behind the Iron Curtain in the 1960s and 1970s, in most cases for several weeks. On multiple occasions, he was subjected to harsh interrogations by the State Committee for Security (KGB) in Moscow after the Russians became suspicious about his loyalty.⁵ In another, rather extreme case in 1975, an FBI double agent who worked against the KGB was lured to Vienna by the Russians and subsequently abducted and killed.⁶ Additionally, the literature on the Double-Cross System is rife with references to British double agents who potentially put themselves in grave danger during World War II when they traveled to Portugal or occupied Western Europe, sometimes for a period of many weeks, to be debriefed by their Abwehr masters.⁷ Even though Portugal was strictly speaking a neutral country during the war, the Abwehr had a strong presence there.

A second factor in the relationship between agent and handler is the dependence of the former on the latter, which is reinforced by the agent's social isolation. It contributes to the security of the operation if nobody, not even the agent's spouse, is aware of his operational activities. However, the presence of a supportive partner, who is at least partially in the know, can make it much easier for a double agent to cope with the psychological strain that is often part of an operation.⁸ From an agency's perspective, preferably, the handler is the most trusted person for an agent, a dependence that infuses the relationship between them with a certain "therapeutic" quality. Ideally, the agent should have the opportunity to bring up any issue he is wrestling with in his daily life, even if it is not directly related to his spycraft.⁹ When it comes to letting the agent know about the value and importance of his work, the well-known case from the early 1960s of the British-American agent, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) officer Oleg Penkovsky, offers a striking example. On his request, the CIA and the British intelligence service MI6, who together ran Penkovsky as an agent, officially made him a colonel in both of their armies at a secret meeting in a London hotel in July 1961. He dressed in a British and an American army uniform and was photographed in both to show appreciation and recognition for the work that he undertook at great personal risk. For Penkovsky his two American and two British handlers

[...] were his lifeline. While he worked hard to be accepted [by them] as a professional intelligence officer, he also craved their personal acceptance and respect. He wanted them to accept him as a friend, to share and support his emotional needs. Despite his bravado and single-minded sense of purpose, Penkovsky had no place or person to turn to except his case officers [handlers].¹⁰

It also makes sense to keep in touch with an agent after an operation has ended, to show appreciation for his service or to check how he is doing, financially or otherwise.¹¹ As we shall see in the case of double agent M., agents sometimes can become extremely dissatisfied with the way an agency treats them after an operation has been terminated.

Finally, the literature shows that financial issues often play an important role in any agent operation, but in a double agent operation especially. Double agents find themselves in the perverse position that they are paid by each of the sides they work for. To eliminate temptation, American and Dutch services do not allow their double agents to keep the money given to them by the adversary service and it seems likely that other services do likewise. After all, if the double agent would be allowed to keep it, he could easily be lured to switch sides, especially if the adversary service pays him more than his own side. Characteristically, the FBI double agent Joe Cassidy

did not even know how much the GRU was paying him. The money was left at dead drops by the GRU inside artificial rocks that he handed over to the FBI without opening them.¹² In situations like this, it is easy to imagine how a suspicion could arise whether the double agent really handed over the money he received from the other service.¹³ As we shall see in the story of double agent M., money became a major irritant in his relationship with the Dutch service.

SECRETIVE PROFESSIONAL ENVIRONMENTS INDUCE SOCIALLY EMBEDDED RELATIONSHIPS

M. specifically emphasizes the nature of the relations he had with the various services with which he dealt and also emphasizes that he directly associates the quality of these relations with his well-being. Relationships in secretive professional environments, such as those involving intelligence and security services, are characterized by social isolation from friends and family, an ensuing dependence of the agent on his handler, and an often precarious situation that involves deception, exploitation, and risk. These characteristics, this article theorizes, reinforce the importance of socially embedded relationships, characterized by trust and reciprocity, rather than relationships solely based on negotiated financial agreements (see Figure 1).

Secrecy separates those who know from those who do not know.¹⁴ It creates a barrier with the “outside” world because it limits the possibilities to seek and maintain proximity to social contacts outside the professional environment of intelligence. There is always the impediment of not being able to speak freely about one’s work, and once the intelligence officer or agent has to invoke his obligation to observe secrecy, openly or not, he distances himself from his family members, friends, or acquaintances. Henceforward, two individuals will not communicate on the same level, as the noninitiated individual may be aware that his initiated interlocutor knows more than he




Figure 1. Consolidating the socially embedded relationship between agent and handler.

does and possibly even knows much about him personally. Such restrictions in the establishment and maintenance of social contacts outside the intelligence environment increase the dependency of the agent on his handler, not only from a professional and operational perspective but also from a personal one.

Relationships in secretive professional environments are characterized by precarious situations, involving deception, exploitation, manipulation, and risk (sometimes including physical danger).¹⁵ Intelligence and security services manipulate their own agents to a greater or lesser degree, to maneuver them in a position to obtain relevant intelligence. Double agents are exposed to additional layers of potential deception, amplifying the uncertainty of the circumstances in which they operate. In the case of M., traveling regularly behind the Iron Curtain for his debriefing sessions with the MfS each time put him in an extraordinarily hazardous position. Operating in such uncertain circumstances made him more likely to seek stable relations or a network of trusted partners from the other side, i.e., from the Dutch service or the CIA.¹⁶ Such relations instigate a sense of security and safety.¹⁷ For M., his agent handlers were the human faces of the intelligence services that loomed as mountains of unfathomable scale. M. desired a reciprocal, socially embedded relationship with his handlers, characterized by trust and reciprocity rather than a relationship governed by negotiated (financial) agreements.¹⁸ A reciprocal relationship, in this case, would have consisted of a fair balance between, on the one hand, the dangers to which M. was exposed on behalf of the services he worked for and, on the other, the gratitude that his handlers expressed for his efforts.¹⁹ Even if the expression of gratitude was partially financial, the uncertainty of the circumstances in which M. operated intensified the significance of a socially embedded relationship.

It is useful to conceptualize agent handlers as “attachment figures”: supportive persons in an individual’s life.²⁰ If an attachment figure is sensitive and responsive for better or for worse and recognizes the individual’s feelings, the individual is likely to view himself as worthy and others as reliable. He will feel secure and will be better able to cope with stressful situations, drawing on his own resources and those of others. On the other hand, an unavailable or unresponsive attachment figure evokes a feeling of insecurity. The individual may become anxious, acquires a negative self-image, and becomes overdependent on the unresponsive attachment figure. Alternatively, the individual may downplay the importance of the relationship and may become more self-reliant and more distant toward his unresponsive attachment figure.²¹

Conceptualizing agent handlers as “attachment figures” has the potential to explain, first, why M. ascribed such importance to the presence of

supportive, caring, and sensitive agent handlers from all sides he worked for – and against. Second, it explains the significance M. attached to a reciprocal relationship with the services he worked for, including expressions of gratitude and recognition, either verbal or material, for his efforts, his ideological motivation, and the personal dangers he was exposed to. In the secretive, isolated, and threatening environment of intelligence, the attachment style of an agent toward his handler may harbor expectations that are more akin to attachment mechanisms in childhood than to those in professional environments.²² Tellingly, M. told about a confusing and disconcerting period when he noticed his East German handlers suddenly appeared less responsive: “[T]hose kinds of services offered you, after all, security and support. They represented the love of the mother, to put it in Freudian terms. You need them, they are your footing.”²³

METHODOLOGY

M. is a tall man, calm and sociable, carefully observing the people he talks to and their reactions to what he tells them. He is eager to tell his story. The authors of this article met M. in 2019 and agreed to interview him on his espionage past, under the condition that certain data would be anonymized.²⁴ Throughout 2019, they interviewed him four times. Each of the sessions lasted between four to five hours, they were structured around open-ended questions, and they were voice recorded. Generally, M. took the lead and shared his experiences in chronological order, organically emphasizing his relationships with his handlers.²⁵

Oral history methods are particularly suited to researching individual memories of historical developments and phenomena. Memories, either individual or collective, are by definition fluid, incomplete, and subjective, as all historical primary sources are in various ways. Therefore, their interpretation consists not only of what the respondent says, but is also determined by how he says it, why he says it, what he might mean to say, and what he does not say (or attempts not to say).²⁶ Consequently, in the transcription and analysis of the interviews, the authors of this article were not only interested in the literal reading of what M. told them; they were equally interested in silences, hesitations, humor and laughter, irony, consistencies and inconsistencies within and between interviews, emphasis on certain aspects (for instance, by banging his fist on the table), and attempts to avoid specific topics.²⁷

The authors also asked themselves why M. chose to share his memories with them. First, they distinguish his growing disillusionment in recent years with the ways the former BVD²⁸ and the CIA responded to his requests for psychological assistance and access to his files. Only the archives of the former MfS granted him partial permission, while the legal successor of the

BVD granted him limited access and only after several attempts, and the CIA granted him no access at all. The conceptualization of these intelligence services and their agent handlers as “attachment figures” to M. explains his disillusionment with their unresponsiveness. M. considered such (partial) refusal even more painful given the considerable personal dangers he faced on behalf of these two services. This has undoubtedly strengthened M.’s need to share his story with a wider public.

A second, related, reason why M. shared his memories is his preoccupation with the possibility of having been betrayed from within the CIA. Since 1994, it is known that, in the mid-1980s, CIA officer Aldrich Ames passed information to the KGB on CIA and FBI agents, including double agents, who operated against the KGB and their allies.²⁹ M. connects Ames’ betrayal to the sudden change around 1988 in his cordial relationship with his handlers of the *Hauptverwaltung* (Chief Directorate) A, the foreign intelligence service of the MfS.³⁰ This important turning point, which at the time was inexplicable to him, intensified his need to understand what has happened. The possible reconstruction of the events around 1988 has been a recurring topic in the interviews.

Finally, as is rather common for those who had a career in secrecy, either as an intelligence officer or an agent, the authors observe with M. a need to break his silence, in his case mostly regarding the psychological costs of his operational past. A career in intelligence usually entails the deliberate creation of a rather dull image of oneself vis-à-vis family and friends with the aim to attract as little attention as possible. Intelligence officers can compensate for the ensuing lack of professional recognition in their personal and social environment with a tightly knit professional environment and, upon retirement, by associating with former colleagues.³¹ However, (former) agents usually have few such outlets to vent professional tensions. Hence, it is plausible that M. was motivated to share his story with the aim to obtain recognition for his extraordinarily lengthy and perilous espionage career.

While the interviews with M. are the primary historical source, this article also refers to the correspondence between M. on the one hand, and the CIA, the AIVD, and the MfS record agency on the other, in the context of his requests to inspect his files. In 2015, the Stasi Records Agency confirmed in a letter to M. that he was indeed registered as an agent of the MfS in their archives.³² Additionally, the authors of this article have also filed requests to inspect M.’s files at the AIVD, but, repeatedly, have been denied access.

WHO IS DOUBLE AGENT M.?

M. grew up in a working-class family in the Netherlands. After spending a year at an American high school, he obtained a degree in higher education in his home country. He fulfilled his military service, started a career with a

large multinational company, and lived in several European, African, and Asian countries. His familiarization with intelligence dates from his military service and subsequent studies. The services he came in touch with initially tasked him to infiltrate on their behalf local anticommunist, fascist, and radical rightwing organizations that were part of international networks.³³ “It was challenging, interesting,” M. recalls. “I did not consider myself as someone who was deceiving others. I was a soldier in the Cold War. [...] In that sense, the word ‘deception’ is a misnomer. [...] I did not support their philosophies,” M. explains, “I was an infiltrator tasked to figure out what was going on there.”³⁴ It is clear from what he said that M. also felt a sense of excitement and satisfaction about his role as a double agent and soldier in the fight against communism.

During an internship in Israel, as part of his studies in the winter of 1967–1968, a somewhat older man introducing himself as “Gerber” approached M. and invited him for dinner. He was interested in M.’s background, the year he had spent at an American high school, and, a rather unusual topic for a casual conversation among strangers, Israeli nuclear developments in the Negev desert.³⁵ M. did not give a reason why this first contact with the East Germans was made in Israel; his internship there was not related to any nuclear issues. Later, in West Germany, “Herr Gerber” sent him his regards via a stranger who approached M. in the street. M.’s intelligence contacts in the Netherlands correctly interpreted this approach as a recruiting attempt by the MfS, especially because the location of the proposed meeting with “Herr Gerber” that the stranger gave was in East Berlin. M.’s Dutch handlers encouraged him to respond favorably.³⁶ A successful “recruitment” would allow the Dutch services to increase their knowledge of the operational methods, personnel, and targets of the MfS in the Netherlands and elsewhere.

Shortly afterward, in the beginning of 1968, the MfS formally recruited M., registering him with the codename JANSEN.³⁷ He became a double agent of several Dutch intelligence and security services consecutively and later for the BVD, operating initially against the *Hauptabteilung* (Chief Department) II of the MfS, while continuing his employment in the Netherlands for a large multinational company.³⁸ “Gerber,” who had approached him in Israel and West Germany, was in fact a codename for Erhard Schierhorn, who became his first handler on behalf of the *Hauptabteilung II, Abteilung* [Department] 2 (HA II/2).³⁹

In 1973, the HV A took over the offensive tasks of the *Hauptabteilung II*, M. was transferred from HA II/2 to the *Abteilung IX* of the HV A (HV A IX).⁴⁰ During most of the following period, Harry Schütt headed HV A IX.⁴¹ M.’s longtime handlers were Wolfgang Koch and Heinz Nötzelmann. Both worked with a subunit of HV A IX that operated especially against the services of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel.⁴²

In 1981, the BVD handed M. over to the CIA. By this time, M.'s residence in Asian and African countries did not correspond anymore with the BVD's national operational remit. The Americans would run him until the early 1990s. While his subsequent CIA handlers would change often, he would still occasionally meet his first handler, who remained a presence as a mentor in the background. In 1985, M.'s operational position became extra complicated when his CIA handlers proposed a new twist to the ongoing operation, in response to the attempts of his HV A handlers to "dangle" him before the CIA with the aim to have the Americans "recruit" him as an agent.⁴³ According to this plan, M. would then pretend to the East Germans to work for them as a double agent against the CIA. That way the CIA would get information about the intelligence requirements of the HV A as they pertained to the CIA. This plan was implemented by the CIA in cooperation with M. in the following years.

M. met his East German handlers and their couriers all over the world, but never in the Netherlands, partly depending on where he was based for his regular employment. Among the locations of the meetings with the MfS were East Berlin, Leipzig, Zürich, Vienna, Budapest, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Muscat, New Delhi, and Jakarta. Personal meetings occurred five or six times a year in safe houses (often in the German Democratic Republic [GDR]), in public spaces, or in hotels. While M. saw his handlers in Eastern Europe for long debriefings that lasted several days, outside Eastern Europe—adversarial territory for his East German handlers—he had only brief meetings or brush contacts with their couriers.⁴⁴ The MfS supplied him with Dutch, American, Swiss, British, and West German passports, which enabled him to travel inconspicuously under different names. He also communicated with the MfS through dead drops and by written or oral messages via East German embassies, which he visited secretly on a few occasions. He also received messages from the MfS through short-wave radio transmissions from Magdeburg in the GDR.⁴⁵

Double agents often have a relatively short "shelf life" of about two to three years. Thereafter, the hostile service is likely to ask for more intelligence than the service that runs the double agent is willing to provide. Moreover, the psychological strains as a result of the agent's double life may become unbearable. There are relatively few known double agent operations that have lasted for a period as long as M.'s operation: 22 years.⁴⁶ If an operation lasts that long, it usually means that the double agent does not have direct access to top secret information.⁴⁷ Still, M.'s professional mobility and his many international contacts gave him access to information that was clearly of operational importance to the HV A.⁴⁸ Moreover, M.'s ability to infiltrate ideological communities, especially those on the far right, was also very valuable in the view of the HV A,⁴⁹ as was his easy access to individuals

living in the Netherlands who traveled to Eastern Europe and the USSR.⁵⁰ When M. was stationed in several parts of the world for his career with a large multinational company, the MfS remained interested in him as a “mole” within the company, and for his access to individuals of operational interest in the countries where he was stationed.⁵¹

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MFS: ATTACHMENT TO THE ADVERSARY

Paradoxically, M. maintained a friendly relationship with the adversary he deceived. The relationship between M. and his East German handlers involved recognition and gratitude on their part for the yield of his work and for the related dangers to which M. was supposedly exposed on their behalf. His handlers appeared responsive to his needs, always cordially receiving him at meetings. They took him on day trips, inquired about his well-being, and offered him gifts. Hence, the sudden change in their attitude around 1988 worried and confused M. considerably.

Until then, M.’s East German handlers treated him as a trustworthy comrade. “We are in this together,” he paraphrases them saying, “you are our *Mitarbeiter* [coworker] in our fight for peace, you belong to us.”⁵² Yet, when M. met his handlers, they usually tried to educate him ideologically. Obviously, they also debriefed him, gave him new assignments, trained him technically, introduced him to new contacts,⁵³ and settled financial accounts. Debriefings usually lasted three to ten days. “The atmosphere was friendly,” M. recalls, but he found these stays exhausting. “We visited nightclubs or a museum in Leipzig, we went for rides. [...] In Budapest we went to those hot baths on the Margareteninsel [Margaret Island].”⁵⁴ Alternatively, they went to saunas, restaurants, they drank Georgian cognac together, and once had tea with the renowned SONYA in East Berlin.⁵⁵ Besides debriefing M., the goal of these meetings was also to appease and reward him as a valuable asset, to guide him psychologically, and to check how sincere he was.

M. is still ambivalent about his relationship with his East German handlers, while he was also touched by their signs of gratitude and appreciation for his efforts. On some level, he personally sympathized with them. “Sometimes,” M. tells us, “I really liked those East Germans from the HV A as human beings, even though I deceived them. Their company was actually quite pleasant.” They were “genuinely cordial, we bonded as men.”⁵⁶ M. and his handlers addressed each other in the familiar German *du* and, although they did not meet each other’s spouses and families, their relationship was informal.⁵⁷

M. felt his handlers knew him through and through, “to a certain degree of course,” not only because of their personal interest in him, but also because they hardly alternated throughout the years.⁵⁸ His long-term handlers, “Heinz” and “Wolfgang,” as M. knew them,⁵⁹ usually assumed “the roles of

good cop, bad cop.” At times M. found bad cop Koch hard to fathom, in particular his body language. Koch had a competitive, “aggressive and distrustful personality,” he was “pushy” and at times almost hostile, M. remembers.⁶⁰ Nötzelmann, “somewhat more corpulent and easy-going,” used to play good cop.⁶¹ He was a “bon vivant,”⁶² more flexible, calm and relaxed, more empathetic than a leader, and more of a go-getter than an intellectual.⁶³ Despite his recurring musings about his personal relationship with his East German handlers, M. concludes that “the question whether you personally like someone is, of course, not decisive. You simply need to do business with someone, just like in the business world, and in such a framework, feelings of sympathy are not really decisive.”⁶⁴

Koch and Nötzelmann lavishly showed their appreciation for M. Besides all visits and trips they did together, they also capitalized on M.’s personal material interests. For instance, they took him to toyshops where—at their expense—he could indulge in his love for model trains. They gave him specific books that corresponded to his interests,⁶⁵ and on the occasion of his marriage, they gave him an exquisite Bohemian vase.⁶⁶

Most importantly, in 1985 the MfS awarded him a Golden Distinguished Service Medal of the National People’s Army (*Verdienstmedaille der Nationalen Volksarmee*).⁶⁷ The HV A presented him with this medal in a remote safehouse not far from East Berlin. M. recollects how Markus Wolf, the elusive, long-term head of the HV A, arrived in a Swedish-made Volvo, escorted by motorcyclists at the front and rear of the vehicle. “We shook hands and talked. I found him a very friendly, amicable man.”⁶⁸ However, the day had started much less amicably when M. was put through the wringer of a mock arrest, an ordeal allegedly meant to prove his loyalty to the MfS, which had lasted from the early morning hours until the afternoon.

During the first couple of interviews in 2019, M. had mentioned this experience only in passing, averting the additional questions of the authors of this article while switching to another subject. In the last interview, after the authors shared their observation that he seemed unwilling to expand on this particular episode, M. explained why, after 34 years, he still found it painful to talk about. He agreed to disclose what happened that day, albeit clearly holding back on specific details. On an early spring day, around 4 AM, while still asleep in a safe house somewhere close to East Berlin, M. was woken up very rudely by a special squad of the MfS that shouted, “Staatssicherheit. Sie sind verhaftet!” [State security. You’re under arrest!] Abducted while still in his pajamas, he was stuffed into a van with blacked-out windows and taken to Hohenschönhausen prison in East Berlin, the MfS penitentiary notorious for its use of torture and psychologically intimidating interrogation techniques.

It was early spring and pretty cold. Their behavior was rough, to say the least. After they have taken you in, they examine you. You are

ordered to undress completely. All body openings are being inspected rather roughly. They threw me in a prison cell, and after a while they took me out again. Naked through the corridors on my way to the interrogation room. The corridors were lit. And if somebody would arrive from the opposite direction, they would push your face against the wall. [...] It was overwhelming, to put it mildly.⁶⁹

M. continues in the second rather than the first person singular. “You become totally demoralized, you cannot do anything anymore and you feel absolutely defenseless. They deprive you, as it were, of your identity and any form of humanity.” His predicament was exacerbated by the knowledge that his wife was home alone and that the CIA was unlikely to find his precise location.

I was naked, tied to a hard chair with handcuffs. Three or four burly fellows in uniform are standing around me, one of them behind me with a truncheon. [...] “Sie sind ein Verräter!” [You are a traitor!], they snap. [...] They did not beat or abuse me. It was pure intimidation.⁷⁰

Mentally, he recited the mantra, “Keep denying, do not give in. Keep insisting that as a foreigner you devoted yourself to the good cause, to socialism [...], that you had expected something better than this inhuman treatment.” They poured cold water over him repeatedly, and after a while, he lost sense of time and place.⁷¹

When he thought his ordeal would last forever, suddenly “Wolfgang” and “Heinz” entered the room. “Congratulations!” they exalted him, adding that he had passed the test and that he was now a real “Kundschafter.”⁷² But M. was “still in a kind of trance,” thinking, “Piss off, I want to get away from this world. I am fed up!” They released him from his chair, returned his clothes to him, and guided him to a room where he could freshen up. That same afternoon M. received his gold medal from Markus Wolf, probably as a direct result of resisting the pressure of the mock arrest. That day proved to be a schizophrenic, traumatic experience for him.

During a meeting in Zagreb in 1988, M. clearly realized he had fallen into disfavor with his East German handlers, in a way that made him suspect treason within the CIA. To his American handlers, he had described Wolfgang Koch as someone whom the CIA could possibly try to recruit. In his descriptions of Koch, M. had emphasized not only Koch’s behavior and personality but also his brown eyes as a distinguishing physical trait. To M.’s dismay, at the three-day meeting in Zagreb Koch asked unexpectedly, aggressively, and in English: “You don’t like brown eyes, do you?” M. was clearly shocked by this turn of events: “You try not to lose your cool, but all alarm bells start ringing. You’re on edge.”⁷³ He mentioned this remark by

Koch in each of the interviews conducted for this research. It ushered in a period when both Koch and Nötzelmann became more distant. The male bonding and the toasting were over, their body language had changed, and their friendly relationship had derailed.⁷⁴ M. kept wondering whether he had made some sort of error, whether something had gone wrong in communications, or whether there was treason within the ranks of the CIA. The end of his reciprocal relationship with his East German handlers, “the insecurity and threat that it generated,” had a considerable impact on M.’s well-being. It contributed to his ensuing depression, for which he later received treatment.⁷⁵

In one of the interviews for this research in 2019, M. showed the authors of this article the last telegram from his East German handler, dated 13 February 1990, in which they canceled their planned meeting in Budapest. “That was the last time I heard from them.” According to M., this abrupt farewell, sharply contrasted with their earlier lavish expressions of gratitude, clearly showed that they knew he had been deceiving them.⁷⁶

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BVD

M.’s reciprocal relationship with his East German handlers, whom he probably managed to deceive for a long period, was as paradoxical as his much more distant, negotiated relationship with his Dutch handlers, under whose authority he operated in extremely dangerous circumstances. M. was specifically tasked to acquire information about his East German handlers and their *modus operandi*, including, for instance, methods of communication with agents and the use of concealment devices. The cordial meetings with the East Germans and their lavish expressions of recognition and gratitude for his efforts contrasted starkly with the sober, bureaucratic relationship between him and his Dutch handlers. M. remains intrigued by the many differences between his Dutch and East German handlers, shown by his frequent comparisons during the interviews. While he discusses his East German handlers independently, he mentions his Dutch handlers mostly in comparison to their East German counterparts.

While working for the BVD over the years, M. was in touch with five or six men whom he knew by their fictitious last names only. They addressed each other by their last name and the formal *u* rather than the informal *jij*, which can be explained partially by the common forms of address in the 1960s and 1970s in the Netherlands. Another explanation, however, is the handlers’ age and social background, both of which contributed to a distant, paternalistic, bureaucratic relationship in M.’s recollection:

My handlers at the BVD were rather aloof, mostly elderly men who had taken part in the resistance against the German occupation during

World War II. They weren't great intellectuals. Some of them were civil servants who had come from the [Dutch East] Indies, people with a somewhat bureaucratic mindset. They were above 50 and I was in my mid-twenties, so our relationship resembled the one between father and son. [...] They showed little psychological empathy, rather a certain arrogance along the lines of "We have seen it all." They didn't guide me psychologically by asking, for instance, "How did you experience it?" or "How did you feel?" Such guidance didn't suit them. [...] I got assignments [...], I reported back to them. Everything was very businesslike.⁷⁷

Some of his handlers, M. thought, were of strict reformed protestant upbringing. His impression corresponds to our knowledge of the postwar generation of BVD officials, which included disproportionately many members of the Dutch reformed church.⁷⁸ To M., their reformed and wartime background transpired through their reactions to certain topics and their sensitivities. For instance, M. noticed that his handlers sometimes talked about "godless communism," and that they had extensive knowledge of arms, munition, and transmitters.⁷⁹

The most striking difference, according to M., between his East German and Dutch handlers was the appreciation and gratitude they showed for his work. "The Dutch never gave me any sign of appreciation or reward, not even a ballpoint," M. recalls resentfully.⁸⁰ Although, on a later occasion, he acknowledges that he received an occasional bottle of wine on top of his regular remuneration. The BVD approached its double operation with M. as a cost-neutral endeavor, both in the reimbursement of expenses and the remuneration. Besides his reimbursement of expenses, M. received payment for his work both from his East German and Dutch handlers. He had to hand over the East German remuneration to his Dutch handlers, who repaid him the same amount and also matched any raise in the East German amount.⁸¹ This financial arrangement had operational and financial benefits for the BVD: it prevented M. from becoming financially dependent on his East German handlers and it made this double operation free of charge for the Dutch service.

M.'s BVD handlers strictly checked up on his bookkeeping.⁸² For instance, once they called M. to account for declaring an excess of fl. 40,-in expenses.⁸³ On regular occasions, they also reminded M. that they were spending taxpayers' money by reimbursing his expenses and taking him out for the occasional dinner. One of his handlers, himself a volunteer with the Red Cross, even advised M. to refrain from declaring any expenses.⁸⁴ What struck and disappointed M. most when reading parts of his BVD files in 2016 was a report of a meeting of the BVD management team in which M.'s recent marriage was discussed. The managers had decided not to buy him a

wedding present because, as they concluded, M. had already claimed enough expenses.⁸⁵

In May 1981, the BVD handed over their double agent to the CIA.⁸⁶ The transfer took place over dinner in a restaurant in Rotterdam, in the presence of a couple of BVD officers, who M. was familiar with, and three CIA representatives, who were stationed at the American embassy in The Hague.⁸⁷ During this meeting, the BVD formally distanced itself from M., which fits in with M.'s recollection of their negotiated relationship, by asking him to sign a letter renouncing any future BVD responsibilities. While this letter did not make a particularly strong impression on him in 1981, he was struck by its contents when inspecting his BVD files in 2016.⁸⁸ "The BVD abandoned me completely," M. recounts. "After all those years that I had risked my life for you," he continues, addressing the former BVD. "In this world, you are being fooled on the spot."⁸⁹

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CIA

During the interviews, M. regularly refers to his relationship with the CIA as casual and informal. Money was not an issue, contrary to the relationship with the BVD and similar to the one with the MfS. However, he appears less attached to his American than to his East German handlers. Similar to his disillusionment regarding the BVD, feelings of abandonment and rejection also dominate M.'s memory of the ending of his relationship with the CIA.

After the transfer meeting in Rotterdam, M.'s second meeting with the CIA was in Frankfurt am Main where he took a polygraph test. He was given another polygraph a couple of years later.⁹⁰ The CIA instructed M. in techniques that were developed to recruit KGB intelligence officers who might know about penetrations in the U.S. Intelligence Community.⁹¹ The operation started in 1987 against the background of investigations into the "1985 losses" the FBI and the CIA had suffered in a wave of arrests among their agents in the USSR.⁹² Potential approaches of KGB officers were preceded by detailed logging of their whereabouts and psychological assessments that could estimate their willingness to collaborate. These assessments also provided clues on how to compromise or manipulate them. M. was tasked by the CIA to analyze his East German handlers' behavior with these techniques. This was preliminary work for a possible future approach by someone else. The operation, codenamed RACKETEER by the CIA, used the Personality Assessment System (PAS) designed by former CIA star psychologist John Gittinger. The CIA mainly applied PAS to focus on deviant traits that might indicate individuals who rejected the values of their society, which allowed the agency to understand the vulnerabilities of such individuals. For practical operational purposes, the Gittinger staff developed a list of 30 to 40 character traits that a skilled observer could look for.⁹³

The CIA trained and instructed M. in observing the behavior of Wolfgang Koch and Heinz Nötzelmann. M. showed the authors of this article a document entitled “Traits to Look For,” that his CIA contacts had given him. It included traits like “ignores danger; exuberant; outgoing; enjoys humor; drives aggressively; socially pushy; interested in the unusual; very ambitious; drinks heavily; openly critical of others; open, playful about sex; rapid bodily actions; highbrow tastes.”⁹⁴ In his descriptions of Koch to his American handlers, M. often mentioned the distinctive color of Koch’s brown eyes. Hence, in 1988, when Koch suddenly asked M., “You don’t like brown eyes, do you?” M. became convinced “they knew more about me than they should have.”⁹⁵

M. remembers his CIA handlers as easygoing and personable; they often used their real names. Contrary to his Dutch and certainly his East German handlers, some of them introduced him to their families, invited him to their homes, and they regularly met their partners.⁹⁶ Because of his work for a large multinational company, M. had legitimate reasons to be in touch with American embassies and firms abroad and, M. notes, his American contacts blended seamlessly with his contacts with other expats.⁹⁷ His wife sometimes joined him in his meetings with the Americans, partly because as a couple they would raise fewer suspicions than M. alone, but also because the CIA was interested in knowing, reassuring, and supporting his wife.⁹⁸ These gatherings with his CIA handlers and his wife were purely social, with much small talk. His wife knew, for instance, that she was meeting a CIA officer, but she did not know any details about her husband’s operations. The CIA gave her an emergency number that she could reach in case of need, and she had to call specific phone numbers with cryptic messages to let the CIA know each time her husband had returned from Eastern Europe.⁹⁹ In general, M. remembers, his American handlers never displayed any shortage of money when showing their appreciation for his work.

“You are meeting a lot of our people,” one of M.’s American handlers once told him grudgingly. Indeed, M.’s handlers changed frequently, due to the fact that M. often relocated to different parts of the world, but also because CIA handlers rotated roughly once every four years. The frequent change of his handlers may have contributed to the little personal attachment M. showed toward them. However, M. developed a longer-term and closer relationship with his first CIA handler, whom he knew by his real name and with whom he reconnected in 2015.

However, in 1988, when Wolfgang Koch made his disconcerting remark about M.’s presumed dislike of brown eyes he realized how overly dependent he was on his American handlers. “The party you need to trust, that needs to back you up, that you can call upon in case of need, that party is being betrayed from within.”¹⁰⁰ M. decided not to report Koch’s remark to his

American handlers, isolating himself in his fear of betrayal. This was a turning point in his relationship with his American handlers. No longer being able to trust the only party he was supposed to trust resulted in “total solitude, helplessness, confusion and alienation,” and the feeling of being “a pawn in a manipulative, well-oiled power machine.” He felt he was forced to dissolve his “maternal” bond of trust with his American handlers and subsequently experienced a “process of mourning.”¹⁰¹ The end of the Cold War further accelerated his separation from the CIA in a way that reminded him of his separation from the BVD a decade earlier.

FAREWELL TO HIS HANDLERS

In the 22 years that M. operated against the MfS for the BVD and CIA, his position over time became increasingly complicated, confusing, and lonely.¹⁰² When the suspicion of treason arose, his position became almost unbearable.

I could no longer trust anyone. [...] I had to be constantly alert and wary. [...] To remain in this position over such a long period of time requires much stamina. [...] There is a line of appreciation, trust, but also of abandonment. [...] You are being used as a pawn by something amorphous, by an entity that you cannot enter. No, they will approach you. [...] You are appreciated for your efforts, but [these services] remain a dark cloud that you cannot enter. They guide you. You have no input.¹⁰³

The BVD in 1981, and the MfS and CIA after the end of the Cold War, abruptly ended their relationship with M. These sudden endings placed him in a situation that was “Kafkaesque,” a term he himself used when reflecting on his psychological state.¹⁰⁴ He did not know what the MfS would do to his files and whether they had shared them with their Russian allies.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, he was no longer able to reach his former handlers. “There was nobody left to share everything with,” M. recalls.¹⁰⁶ He felt abandoned. “You do not have any colleagues in espionage,” he explains.

You are left entirely to your own devices. [The separation from my handlers] was really a turning point. Until then I was engaged in all kinds of geopolitical developments, I was right on top of them. I had interesting contacts. And then suddenly, all this ended, and I was sitting at home. That was a shock.¹⁰⁷

In 2016, M. experienced acute emotional problems and he spent a night in a hospital emergency ward. He asked the AIVD, the legal successor of the BVD, for assistance in getting treatment from an agency “with experience in treating the emotional burdens of a long-time double agent.” After a week, M. received an answer from the AIVD’s legal department (which the authors have seen) saying that “at the Ministries of Internal Affairs and/or Defence

there are no facilities for the psychological help you requested. I advise you to contact your GP, so he/she can put you in touch with a regular therapist.”

CONCLUSIONS

This research suggests that (double) agents prioritize a reciprocal, affect-based relationship with their handlers, involving trust and gratitude. They are less interested in a negotiated relationship based on financial agreements unless financial rewards become one of the few means through which an agent perceives recognition for his work. In such cases, financial compensation risks becoming a source of friction, as the relationship between M. and the BVD has shown.

Agents' prioritization of a reciprocal, affect-based relationship with their handlers is explained by emphasizing the professional and personal dependence of the agent on his handler. This is a result of, first, the agent's social isolation and, second, the dangers he is exposed to. First, operational secrecy isolates agents from their social environments. The case of M. shows that, although his wife knew M. was operationally active, he could not share any operational details with her. His handlers were the only individuals he could confide in and, as such, they developed into attachment figures: central individuals in his life, who made him feel secure and enabled him to cope with stressful situations. The disruptive abandonment M. felt when his handlers broke off contact abruptly confirms how vital his handlers had become in his life.

Second, the dangerous environment in which an agent operates deepens the agent's dependence on his handler. An affect-based relationship was of special significance to M. because of his numerous debriefings by the MfS on enemy territory, behind the Iron Curtain, where he was in a very vulnerable position. The tension and fear that M. often felt in his dealings with the East Germans was partly compensated by feelings of excitement and personal satisfaction because of the success of the operation. His perception of his Dutch handlers as unavailable and unresponsive attachment figures, however, contributed to his anxiety, which became apparent by the way he downplayed the importance of their relationship. He deliberately became more self-reliant, and more distant toward them. Paradoxically, M.'s East German handlers, rather than his Dutch or American handlers, emerged as his most responsive attachment figures. This contradiction between his ideological loyalty as a “soldier” in the Cold War and his personal sympathies made an already tense operational environment even more contradictory and alienating.

Clearly, reactions toward unresponsive attachment figures increase the risk that agents' loyalty toward the adversary outstrips their loyalty toward their home service. From an operational perspective, if the BVD had offered M. at

least a higher rather than similar remuneration to the MfS, as a sign of recognition for his work, it could have strengthened M.'s commitment to the BVD. One could even argue that this double agent deserved a higher remuneration from the Dutch service than from the MfS, given the fact that he put himself in potentially grave danger every time he had his meetings with his East German handlers behind the Iron Curtain.

M.'s memories sketch a predominantly bleak picture of his operational past. They overshadow feelings of excitement and satisfaction that, most probably, were of decisive importance to continue his operational activities on behalf of the West. Throughout his years as a double agent, he did feel strongly that he was engaged on the right side in the fight against communism in the Cold War. This was in spite of his negative feelings about his BVD handlers. Arguably, the abrupt abandonment by his handlers and the subsequent laborious process of accessing his files have shaped his present memories. Further research into the relationship between agents and their handlers could explore the period after an operation has ended. More specifically, it could delve into the attention and aftercare (or lack thereof) a service offers its former agents, including how it deals with their desire to access their files and other sensitive issues.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors are grateful to Dan Mulvenna, a twenty-year veteran of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, for his comments on an earlier version of this article. They also thank the participants of the Cold War Research Network (Utrecht University, Leiden University, and the University of Amsterdam) for their valuable comments on a presentation of this research in January 2021.

REFERENCES

- ¹ James M. Olson, *To Catch a Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019), p. 87. In other words, Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen were Russian agents inside the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), respectively; they were not double agents.
- ² A classic work on double agency like the one by J.C. Masterman on the Double-Cross System of World War II fame, is indeed largely written from the perspective of the service that ran them. This is not surprising given the fact that Masterman for most of the war was the chairman of the XX Committee that ran the operation. J.C. Masterman, *The Double-Cross System 1939–1945* (London: Pimlico, 1995). The Double-Cross System or XX System was an elaborate system of dozens of double agents who had been recruited or turned by the British against the German military intelligence service, the Abwehr. Its most impressive achievement was the successful deception of the German High

Command regarding the location of the Allied landings in France in the spring of 1944.

³ He was originally recruited and run by one of the internal departments of the MfS and later handed over to the Hauptverwaltung [Chief Directorate] A (HV A), the foreign intelligence branch of the MfS.

⁴ For most of the past century and also during the Cold War, the world of intelligence was a very male-dominated one, especially when it came to agents and case officers in the field. Women working at an intelligence or security service were primarily employed in secretarial positions and agents were rarely women. Eleni Braat, “The Construction of Secret Intelligence as a Masculine Profession,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Advance Online Publication. DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2022.2055429. This article therefore refers to an agent or double agent when talking in the abstract as “he.”

⁵ John Barron, *Operation Solo: The FBI's Man in the Kremlin* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1996), pp. 4, 109–110, 156–157, 243–244, and passim.

⁶ This is the notorious case of Nicholas Shadrin, real name Nikolai Artamonov. He was a Soviet naval officer who had defected to the United States in 1959 and was allegedly killed by the KGB by accident. Oleg Kalugin, *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 152–157 and Boris Volodarsky, *The KGB's Poison Factory: From Lenin to Litvinenko* (Barnsley: Frontline Books, 2009), pp. 123–134.

⁷ See, for instance, Nigel West and Madoc Roberts, *SNOW: The Double Life of a World War II Spy* (London: Biteback Publishing 2011), pp. 34–38, 85–90, and passim; Masterman, *Double-Cross*, pp. 39–40. The British double agent Eddie Chapman was treated with suspicion by the Abwehr and interrogated harshly several times during a stay of more than a year in German-occupied Europe in 1943–1944 when he was often in fear of his life. (The money he received from the Germans over this period was spent freely by him and not handed over to the British once he came back.) When he came back to England in June 1944, the British on their turn were for some time also suspicious of him. Nicholas Booth, *ZIGZAG: The Incredible Wartime Exploits of Double Agent Eddie Chapman* (London: Portrait 2007), passim. For another example, see *GARBO: The Spy Who Saved D-Day*. Introduction by Mark Seaman (Kew, Richmond, Surrey: The National Archives 2004), pp. 284–288. GARBO is often seen as the most important agent of the Double-Cross System.

⁸ The Dutch BVD, for instance, sometimes felt it had to inform the partner of an agent to reassure her and explain that her husband was regularly gone for several hours, not to meet a secret lover but to be debriefed by his case officer. Ben de Jong, *Op de bres voor de rechtsstaat in het Verzet en bij de BVD. Ad de Jonge 1919–2002* [In Defense of Democracy in the Resistance and with the BVD. Ad de Jonge 1919–2002] (Amsterdam: Panchaud 2020), pp. 333–334. In the case of the FBI double agent Morris Childs, his wife was not only in the know about his activities: she even accompanied him on most of his missions

to the USSR and to the benefit of the FBI cultivated her own relationships with the wives of Soviet leaders. Barron, *Operation Solo*, pp. 105–107 and passim. The wife of the FBI double agent Joe Cassidy knew about his activities, but she was the only person he could confide in apart from his FBI handlers. His children and friends had to be kept out of the loop. David Wise, *Cassidy's Run: The Secret Spy War over Nerve Gas* (New York: Random House, 2000), pp. 75, 129. GARBO's wife also knew about his spying activities from the outset. *GARBO*, pp. 10.

- ⁹ As a former high Dutch security official put it when discussing the relationship between an agent and his handler, "For an agent it was incredibly important that he could always turn to his case officer if there was a problem. There could be a wide variety of issues having to do with his job, his marriage, or even the homework of his children. In the case of marriage problems, we sometimes tried to find a solution by offering some extra money and friendly words. Such actions were always taken after internal deliberation within the service." De Jong, *Op de bres*, p. 334.
- ¹⁰ Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin, *The Spy Who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992), pp. 217–218. A successful double operation against the Polish intelligence service that the Dutch BVD ran for many years, from the late 1950s through 1991, offers another example. After the operation had been terminated, the head of the service paid a personal visit to the double agent to express his gratitude for services rendered. Dick Engelen, *Frontdienst. De BVD in de Koude Oorlog* [Service at the Front. The BVD in the Cold War] (Amsterdam: Boom, 2007), pp. 253–256.
- ¹¹ This is often not just done by way of a humane gesture, but in the worst case, it also serves to prevent a dissatisfied former agent who was not taken care of properly from opening up to the media, for instance, about his past spying career. Within the Dutch service during the Cold War, there was apparently no proper script to take care of agents after an operation was over. Decisions in this regard were taken on a case-by-case basis. In the case of the double agent against the Polish service, regular meetings with his handler were still taking place after the end of the operation. In most cases, such meetings would take place with decreasing frequency over time, but even after several years, contact with an agent could sometimes be reestablished. Engelen, *Frontdienst*, p. 254.
- ¹² For the money taken from American double agents and the case of Cassidy, see Olson, *To Catch a Spy*, p. 97 and Wise, *Cassidy's Run*, pp. 54–55. For BVD double agents and their money see Engelen, *Frontdienst*, pp. 266, 273; De Jong, *Op de bres*, p. 256.
- ¹³ The sums given to the double agent by the opposing service can sometimes be substantial. According to one FBI official, over a period of 20 years, from 1959 to 1979, the GRU paid Cassidy \$200,000 in total. Wise, *Cassidy's Run*, p. 202. In a BVD double agent operation against the GRU that ran from the early 1960s through 1982, the agent received almost 50,000 Dutch guilders in total, also a substantial sum by the standards of those days. The BVD took this money, but paid the double agent considerably less over the same period,

- namely 30,000 Dutch guilders. In other words, this particular operation was a very profitable one for the Dutch service. According to Dick Engelen, who for many years served with the BVD himself, in most cases the Dutch service paid its double agents roughly the amount they received from the adversary service, not less, unless the double agent was not interested in a financial reward. Engelen, *Frontdienst*, pp. 266, 273.
- ¹⁴ Georg Simmel, “The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies,” *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1906), pp. 441–498; Eva Horn, “Logics of Political Secrecy,” *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 28, No. 7–8 (2011), pp. 103–122; Eleni Braat, “Recurring Tensions between Secrecy and Democracy: Arguments about the Security Service in the Dutch Parliament, 1975–1995,” *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2016), pp. 532–555.
- ¹⁵ “Risk” is defined as the potential to invest in a relationship (or exchange) with someone else without getting something valued or expected in return. Linda Molm, David Schaefer, and Jessica Collett, “Fragile and Resilient Trust: Risk and Uncertainty in Negotiated and Reciprocal Exchange,” *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2009), p. 5.
- ¹⁶ Edward J. Lawler and Jeongkoo Yoon build on the uncertainty-reduction hypothesis in the establishment of relationships. Edward J. Lawler and Jeongkoo Yoon, “Commitment in Exchange Relations: Test of a Theory of Relational Cohesion,” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (1996), pp. 89–108.
- ¹⁷ Mario Mikulincer and Philipp Shaver, “Adult Attachment and Happiness: Individual Differences in the Experience and Consequences of Positive Emotions,” in *Oxford Handbook of Happiness*, edited by Susan David, Ilona Boniwell, and Amanda Conley (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 834–846.
- ¹⁸ On differences between reciprocal and negotiated exchange, and the role of risk and uncertainty in the development of reciprocal exchange, see Molm, Schaefer, and Collett, “Fragile and Resilient Trust,” pp. 1–32.
- ¹⁹ Gratitude is understood as an emotion one feels after receiving a gift that one did not expect or is out of the ordinary. Feelings of gratitude entail expressions of recognition for the other’s effort, profoundly influencing interpersonal relationships. Robert A. Emmons and Cheryl A. Crumpler, “Gratitude as a Human Strength: Appraising the Evidence,” *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2000), pp. 56–69.
- ²⁰ Following attachment theory in the field of social psychology, individuals have an innate behavior to attract and maintain proximity to “attachment figures.”
- ²¹ David Richards and Aaron Schat, “Attachment at (Not to) Work: Applying Attachment Theory to Explain Individual Behaviour in Organizations,” *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 96, No. 1 (2011), pp. 169–182; Mikulincer and Shaver, *Oxford Handbook*, pp. 834–846.
- ²² Attachment theory has been applied primarily to attachment mechanisms of infants toward caregivers (e.g., M. D. S. Ainsworth and J. Bowlby, “An Ethological Approach to Personality Development,” *American Psychologist*,

Vol. 46, pp. 331–341), and to a lesser degree to attachment mechanisms between adults, where the main emphasis lies on romantic relationships (e.g., Mikulincer and Shaver, *Oxford Handbook*, pp. 834–846). Adult attachment in the workplace is limited to organizational contexts (Richards and Schat, “Attachment at (Not to) Work,” pp. 169–182).

²³ Interview, 8 August 2019.

²⁴ The authors of this article agreed M. himself would remain anonymous, and they would not mention his employers, other than the main services he worked for and against. They also agreed that the transcribed, anonymized interviews will be archived in the Dutch national center of expertise and repository for research data. Finally, they agreed that M. would be given the opportunity to correct factual inaccuracies in this article, while they would bear the final responsibility for the contents. The Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Humanities of Utrecht University approved of these agreements.

²⁵ Both M. and the authors of this article had little interest in an operational reconstruction of his espionage activities, even if operational aspects cannot be completely separated from agent–handler relationships. For instance, the informal and cordial way in which East German handlers met M. in several locations in Eastern Europe, how they lionized him materially and verbally, could be considered part of the East German *modus operandi* to deal with him as an agent. The gratitude, or lack thereof, services expressed for M.’s efforts was a principal ingredient of their relationship with him.

²⁶ For a general introduction on the research possibilities of oral history methods, see Lynn Abrams, *Oral History Theory* (London: Routledge, 2010). For a general introduction on the practice of oral history, see Paul Thompson with Joanna Bornat, *The Voice of the Past: Oral History* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2017).

²⁷ For instance, at first during the interviews M. was surprisingly reticent on his experience in East Berlin with a mock arrest by the HV A in the 1980s. In the last interview, the authors of this article shared this observation with him, encouraging him to explain why he had trouble delving into this particular aspect of his espionage past. His subsequent explanation resulted in one of the most probing parts of the interviews with him.

²⁸ The BVD transitioned into the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) in 2002.

²⁹ For the case of Aldrich Ames, see Sandra Grimes and Jeanne Vertefeuille, *Circle of Treason: A CIA Account of Traitor Aldrich Ames and the Men he Betrayed* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012); David Wise, *Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for \$4.6 Million* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995); Pete Earley, *Confessions of a Spy: The Real Story of Aldrich Ames* (New York: Putnam, 1997).

³⁰ Ames may have had access to M.’s files at the CIA and, as a result, he may have betrayed him to the KGB as a double agent who operated against the HV A. If so, it is plausible the KGB informed the HV A, as the two services collaborated closely. M. mentioned a telling example of the close cooperation between the HV A and the KGB. On several occasions, at a prearranged brief

meeting to exchange information and instructions with one of his East German contacts in a Third World country, he unexpectedly met a Russian contact instead. Interview, 7 August 2019. For the close cooperation between the MfS and the KGB during the Cold War, see, for instance, John O. Koehler, *Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 73-106; Jürgen Borchert, *Die Zusammenarbeit des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit (MfS) und dem sowjetischen KGB in den 70er und 80er Jahren. Ein Kapitel aus der Geschichte der SED-Herrschaft* [The Cooperation between the Ministry of State Security (MfS) and the Soviet KGB in the 1970s and 1980s. A Chapter in the History of SED Rule.] (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006).

³¹ The authors of this article have interviewed former intelligence officers extensively about their careers. Several of them, who had spoken to hardly anybody about their careers after their retirements, expressed their pleasure at finally sharing their memories with an “outsider.” For rare oral history publications based on interviews with former BVD officers see Eleni Braat, *Van oude jongens, de dingen die voorbijgaan ... Een sociale geschiedenis van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst 1945–1998* [Of Old Boys, Things that Pass ... A Social History of the Domestic Security Service 1945–1998] (Zoetermeer: AIVD, 2012); Eleni Braat, “Self-Reinforcing Secrecy: Cultures of Secrecy Within Intelligence Agencies,” in *Transparency and Secrecy in European Democracies: Contested Trade-Offs*, edited by D. Mokrosinksa (New York: Routledge, 2021), pp. 118–134; De Jong, *Op de bres*. The endless flow of memoirs by former CIA personnel exemplifies this need to share memories of a career in secrecy with a broader public. Intelligence and security services sometimes respond with legal action to an attempt by former personnel to publish their memoirs, as happened in the well-known case of Peter Wright’s *Spycatcher* in 1987. The CIA formally allows its ex-officers to write memoirs (and even facilitates in the writing of some), provided they submit their manuscript to the Publications Review Board (PRB). As such, while (reluctantly) acknowledging their personnel’s need to share their experiences with a broader public, the PRB functions as a means to control the contents of memoirs even though the process can often be cumbersome and there are regularly accusations of double standards. Christopher Moran, *Company Confessions. Revealing CIA Secrets* (London: Biteback Publishing, 2015).

³² From Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [The Federal Authority for the Records of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic] (BStU) to M., “Verwendung personen bezogener Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,” 17 December 2015. Personal archive M.

³³ Interview, 4 September 2019.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ E-mail from M. to Eleni Braat and Ben de Jong, 11 September 2020.

³⁶ Interview, 14 October 2019.

³⁷ According to M. there were different moments, ranging from 1966 to 1968, when he was contacted by the MfS. Interview, 8 April 2019; 4 September 2019.

A publication on MfS documents mentions that operation JANSEN (according to M. his operational name at the MfS) started in 1968. Helmut Müller-Enbergs, *Hauptverwaltung A (HV A). Aufgaben-Strukturen-Quellen. MfS Handbuch* [Chief Directorate A. Tasking-Structures-Sources. MfS Handbook] (Berlin: BStU, 2011), p. 158. The MfS records agency also confirms that M. was codenamed JANSEN. Letter from the BStU to M., 17 December 2015. Personal archive M.

- ³⁸ Hauptabteilung II was responsible for offensive counterespionage, which also entailed operations in West Germany, among others. Operations against Western secret services, the Bundeswehr, the police, and mass media, all mainly in West Germany, were part of its remit. <https://www.bstu.de/mfs-lexikon/detail/hauptabteilung-ii-spionageabwehrha-ii/> (accessed 30 November 2020).
- ³⁹ In 1989, shortly before the end of the MfS, Erhard Schierhorn was the head of HA II/2. Hanna Labrenz-Weiß, *Die Hauptabteilung II: Spionageabwehr (Handbuch)* [Chief Department II: Counterintelligence (Handbook)] (Berlin: BStU, 1998), pp. 10, 15, 16. <http://www.nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0292-97839421300593> (accessed 30 November 2020).
- ⁴⁰ At the time, this transfer happened without his knowledge. He only found out about it upon inspecting his MfS files in 2015. Interview, 8 July 2019.
- ⁴¹ Interview, 8 April 2019; Schütt headed HV A IX from 1977 to 1989. Roland Wiedmann, *Die Dienstleistungen des MfS 1950-1989. Eine organisatorische Übersicht* [The Service Units of the MfS 1950–1989. An Organizational Overview] (Berlin: BStU, 2012), p. 379; Müller-Enbergs, *Hauptverwaltung A*, p. 260.
- ⁴² Among its objects of interest were the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the well-known American-financed radio station Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The administrative designation of the subunit was HV A IX/A/3. Koch was at some point succeeded as its head by Nötzelmann. Müller-Enbergs, *Hauptverwaltung A*, p. 157.
- ⁴³ From an East German perspective, an allegedly successful American recruitment of M. would allow the MfS to set up a double agent operation against the Americans and thereby get information about the targets and modus operandi of the agency. Then again, from an American perspective, a “recruitment” of M. by the MfS as a double agent against the CIA would offer the Americans insights into what type of information on the CIA the East Germans were seeking. In such a complex, many-layered game, M. would continue to operate as a double agent for the CIA, as he already had done for a few years, while simultaneously lifting his relationship with the East Germans to a new level by pretending to them that he allowed himself to be recruited by the Americans as a double agent on behalf of the MfS against the CIA.
- ⁴⁴ Couriers could be diplomats whom M. had met before, or they could be unknown individuals, at times even Russians, whom he would identify by the passwords or other recognition signals they would use. Sometimes at a particular location in Asia or Africa, a hotel lobby for instance, instead of meeting an East German contact M. would unexpectedly be approached by a Russian. After the prearranged recognition signals the exchange of information

- and money would then take place. Such an unexpected rendezvous with Soviet intelligence personnel illustrates the close collaboration between the KGB and the HV A that existed during the Cold War. When living in the Netherlands M. used public holidays to travel with his wife, for instance, to West Berlin, leaving her there, and crossing over to East Berlin to meet his handlers. Traveling with his wife to Berlin would raise less suspicion than traveling on his own. Interview, 8 July 2019.
- ⁴⁵ This was a one-way voice link of the HV A, where M. deciphered messages spoken by a female voice with the help of one-time pads. Often on Wednesday evenings around midnight he would be listening to his short-wave radio to receive possible assignments from the MfS on a specific wavelength. Interview, 8 April 2019; 8 July 2019.
- ⁴⁶ The double operation with M. ran from 1968 to 1990. Sometimes double agent operations run for a surprisingly long time. The FBI double agent operations against the Russians mentioned earlier, with Morris Childs and Joe Cassidy, respectively, each lasted about twenty years. Both were terminated in the late 1970s. Barron, *Operation Solo*, pp. 57, 308; Wise, *Cassidy's Run*, pp. 19, 177.
- ⁴⁷ In order to be convincing to the adversary service as an agent, the double agent has to hand over real intelligence. Indeed, this is one of the reasons “[a]n ideal [double] agent should have good access but not spectacular access.” If the double agent has very good access, he has to hand over many important secrets to remain convincing in the eyes of the adversary service and for obvious reasons such a situation is to be avoided. Olson, *To Catch a Spy*, pp. 105–106.
- ⁴⁸ Some assignments the HV A gave him were of Soviet rather than East German interest. For instance, the MfS was interested in the Urenco ultracentrifuge project in Almelo, in one of the eastern provinces of the Netherlands, especially its founder, the physicist Jacob Kistemaker, and other specialists. As a student of mechanical engineering in the 1970s, M. could rather easily find opportunities to approach these people. Interview, 4 September 2019.
- ⁴⁹ Anticommunist organizations and Russian émigré groups such as Narodno-Trudovoy Soyuz [Popular Labor Union], better known as NTS, in Frankfurt am Main were an important target, as was a fascist paramilitary rightwing organization such as Jeune Europe [Young Europe]. Interview, 8 April 2019; 8 July 2019; 4 September 2019 and 14 October 2019. Jeune Europe had a branch in the Netherlands that M. managed to contact easily. The BVD was, of course, also interested in these organizations, especially if it was felt there was a potential for political violence, as was the case with Jeune Europe. On the postwar ties between the CIA and the NTS and their efforts to roll back communism, see also David C. S. Albanese, “‘It Takes a Russian to Beat a Russian’: The National Union of Labor Solidarists, Nationalism, and Human Intelligence Operations in the Cold War,” *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 32, No. 6 (2017), pp. 782–796.
- ⁵⁰ M. approached these individuals, for instance by interviewing people in proximity to these targeted individuals while pretending to conduct marketing research or population studies.

- ⁵¹ Interview, 8 April 2019; 4 September 2019.
- ⁵² Interview, 8 April 2019; 14 October 2019. Since his year at an American high school made him the odd man out and could raise suspicions, M. emphasized to the East Germans that his American episode had opened his eyes to the unjust and deplorable situation of the black population in the United States and had made him critical toward American capitalism. Adding his own working-class background to this critical stance vis-à-vis this racial and class division, M.'s American experience presumably was an asset in the eyes of his handlers (Interview, 8 April 2019; 14 October 2019). As another means to strengthen his credibility, M. also made sure that the amount and type of information he passed on to his handlers corresponded to what they considered realistic for him to obtain. Interview, 4 September 2019.
- ⁵³ Such new contacts would include diplomats who would be acting as MfS co-optees. The MfS sometimes made use of diplomats for operational purposes. They would be tasked with transmitting messages to agents, for instance, or handing over money. The KGB regularly made use of Soviet diplomats in the same way.
- ⁵⁴ Interview, 8 July 2019; additions via e-mail 30 September 2020 and 6 October 2020.
- ⁵⁵ Interview, 8 April 2019 and addition via e-mail 30 September 2020. Ursula Kuczynski (1907–2000) was a famous illegal of the Soviet military intelligence service GRU in the 1930s and 1940s. She operated in China, Switzerland, and Great Britain, among other places. SONYA was one of the codenames she used and one of the agents she ran was the atomic spy Klaus Fuchs. For a recent biography, see Ben Macintyre, *Agent Sonya: Lover, Mother, Soldier, Spy* (New York: Viking, 2020).
- ⁵⁶ Interview, 4 September 2019; 14 October 2019.
- ⁵⁷ Interview, 8 July 2019; 8 April 2019. Understandably, M.'s Dutch handlers noticed his enthusiasm and appreciation for his East German handlers, in particular for their comradeship. Interview, 14 October 2019. From a perspective of counterespionage, they arguably wondered whether M. was not sympathizing too much with the other side.
- ⁵⁸ Interview, 8 July 2019; 4 September 2019. His East German handlers obviously knew M. only "to a certain degree" because they were not aware of the fact that his real loyalty was with the BVD and the CIA. It was only at the end, as we shall see, that they started to doubt his loyalty to their cause.
- ⁵⁹ In the years he worked for the HV A, M. knew his handlers only by their first names for security reasons. This is a common practice among intelligence and security services in their relations with agents. M. only found out the real surnames of "Heinz" and "Wolfgang" by doing his own research in the voluminous literature on the MfS that was published in the decades after the end of the Cold War.
- ⁶⁰ Interview, 14 October 2019; 8 July 2019.
- ⁶¹ Interview, 14 October 2019.
- ⁶² Interview, 8 April 2019.
- ⁶³ E-mail from M. to the authors, 30 September 2020.
- ⁶⁴ Interview, 8 April 2019.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Interview, 8 April 2019. Toward his social environment, M. explained his possession of such items with a reference to his frequent travels to countries from where these items originated.

⁶⁷ Interview, 8 April 2019; 8 July 2019. The Golden Distinguished Service Medal of the National People's Army came in "a beautiful scarlet red box" with a certificate that mentioned his name and nationality. While he was allowed to take home the medal, he was only permitted to view the certificate. "I secretly copied the text that same evening," M. recalls. "Obviously, this was rather risky." Interview, 4 September 2019.

⁶⁸ Interview, 14 October 2019. It was not unusual for Markus Wolf, who was chief of the HV A from 1952 to 1986, to meet personally with agents. He had several personal meetings, for instance, with Gabriele Gast, a Federal Intelligence Service (BND) officer since 1973 who was an agent of the HV A from 1968 to 1990. Their meetings took place in the GDR or in countries such as Yugoslavia. Wolf and Gast discuss these meetings in their respective memoirs. Gabriele Gast, *Kundschafterin des Friedens. 17 Jahre Topspionin der DDR beim BND* [Spying for Peace. 17 Years as a Spy for the GDR at the BND] (Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000), pp. 186–213; Markus Wolf, *Spionagechef im geheimen Krieg. Erinnerungen* [Spy Chief in the Secret War. Memoir] (München: List Verlag, 1997), pp. 468–473. Also present at M.'s meeting with Wolf were two colonels, Schütt and a Russian. Interview, 14 October 2019.

⁶⁹ Interview, 14 October 2019.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² For the MfS, "Kundschafter" (literally: "explorer") was roughly synonymous with the English "secret agent," but it had a very positive connotation. The term was only applied to their own agents abroad (in most cases foreigners) or MfS intelligence officers who operated in the West under deep cover. These would often be called "Kundschafter des Friedens" (literally: "peace explorers"). The term "Kundschafter" was never used by the MfS for agents or employees of Western services.

⁷³ Interview, 4 September 2019; 14 October 2019.

⁷⁴ Interview, 8 July 2019.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Interview, 8 April 2019. Regarding the postwar educational level within the BVD and the experience of the postwar generation in wartime resistance groups, see Braat, *Van oude jongens*, pp. 42–47, 55.

⁷⁸ Braat, *Van oude jongens*, pp. 53–55.

⁷⁹ Interview, 8 April 2019.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² M. showed the authors of this article his double-entry bookkeeping. To the right were the expenses that resulted from East German assignments, which M.

could claim with his East German handlers and that amounted to about 90 to 95% of the total amount of operational expenses. To the left of his bookkeeping are the expenses that he made for the BVD, amounting to a tiny proportion of total expenses and relating to, for instance, travel costs to meet his Dutch handlers.

⁸³ Fl. 40,- (guilders) in 1975 is the rough equivalent of €57,- in 2020.

⁸⁴ Interview, 14 October 2019.

⁸⁵ Interview, 8 April 2019; 8 July 2019.

⁸⁶ Interview, 4 September 2019.

⁸⁷ M. is not entirely consistent in his recollection of the number of BVD and CIA representatives. The numbers range from “a couple” and five BVD representatives and two to three CIA representatives.

⁸⁸ M. referred to this signed agreement in all our interviews.

⁸⁹ Interview, 8 April 2019; 8 July 2019.

⁹⁰ Interview, 8 April 2019; 14 October 2019. It is standard operating procedure for the CIA to regularly polygraph their agents, especially if they are in regular contact with an adversary service on foreign territory. Observation by Dan Mulvenna, 25 February 2021.

⁹¹ The FBI codenamed the operation BUCKLURE and the CIA called it RACKETEER. The CIA and FBI used up to one million dollars of hard cash for each approach, and the amount increased over the years. Grimes and Vertefeuille, *Circle of Treason*, p. 108; David Wise, *Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI's Robert Hanssen Betrayed America* (Toronto: Random House, 2012), pp. 199–204; Gus Russo and Eric Dezenhall, *Best of Enemies: The Last Great Spy Story of the Cold War* (New York: Twelve, 2018), p. 174.

⁹² Several of those agents had been recruited by the FBI in the United States. These losses were mainly due to the betrayal by Aldrich Ames of the CIA and Robert Hanssen of the FBI who offered their services to the KGB in 1985. Milt Bearden and James Risen, *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), pp. 145–161 and passim. Ames's betrayal alone is said to have led to the execution of ten Russians. Wise, *Nightmover*, pp. 254–271, 331–332.

⁹³ John Marks, *The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate”: The CIA and Mind Control. The Secret History of the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), 175-93

⁹⁴ “Traits to look for.” Personal archive M., undated.

⁹⁵ Interview, 8 July 2019.

⁹⁶ It could be argued that the fact that his CIA handlers invited M. to their homes, to have dinner even with their families in some cases, was extremely poor tradecraft. The same could be said about the fact that M. knew some of his CIA handlers by their real names. Observation by Dan Mulvenna, 25 February 2021.

⁹⁷ Interview, 8 April 2019.

⁹⁸ “Otherwise, she could think I was having an affair, because I went on regular trips with the Americans,” M. explains. Interview, 8 July 2019.

- ⁹⁹ Interview, 8 April 2019. Wives of CIA intelligence officers often got involved in operations in support of their husbands or their agents, as they did in MI6. Bearden and Risen, *The Main Enemy*, p. 19; Ben Macintyre, *The Spy and the Traitor: The Greatest Espionage Story of the Cold War* (New York: Viking, 2018), pp. 241–242.
- ¹⁰⁰ Interview, 14 October 2019.
- ¹⁰¹ M., “Psychologie van een dubbelagent” [Psychology of a double agent]. Personal archive M., undated.
- ¹⁰² Interview, 8 April 2019.
- ¹⁰³ Interview, 8 July 2019.
- ¹⁰⁴ M., “Psychologie van een dubbelagent.”
- ¹⁰⁵ Interview, 8 July 2019.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*