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Cleanthes' Pneumatology. Two Testimonies from Tertullian

Summary

In *Adversus Praxean* 5.5–7 and *Apologeticum* 21.10–13 the Christian author Tertullian (c. 160–240 CE) draws on Stoic sources, in particular texts associated with the second Stoic scholarch Cleanthes (c. 330–230 BCE). These passages not only throw light on Tertullian's aims but also bear witness to Cleanthes' development of the concept of πνεῦμα as the creative and life-sustaining warmth and his interest in it as the vehicle of discourse, i.e. of voice and *personae*. This opened up new ways of accounting for psychological phenomena within the framework of Stoic psychological monism. Given the Stoic whole-and-parts scheme, it also served to explain forms of our communion with the divine, conceptualized as a divine voice within us – supported by an analogy to the cosmic role of the sun.

Keywords: dialogue; intellect; God; person; pneuma; Stoicism; sun; trinity; voice

In *Adversus Praxean* 5.5–7 and *Apologeticum* 21.10–13 bezieht sich der christliche Autor Tertullian (160–240 n. Chr.) auf stoische Quellen, insbesondere auf Texte, die mit dem Scholarch Kleanthes (um 330–230 v. Chr.) verbunden sind. Diese Passagen werfen nicht nur ein Licht auf Tertullians Absichten, sondern bezeugen auch Kleanthes' Entwicklung des πνεῦμα-Konzepts als kreative und lebenserhaltende Wärme sowie sein Interesse daran als Vehikel des Diskurses, d.h. von Stimme und *personae*. Dieser Ansatz eröffnete neue Wege, psychologische Phänomene innerhalb des psychologischen Monismus der Stoa auszumachen. Im Hinblick auf das Ganze-und-Teile-Schema diente es auch dazu, Formen unserer Teilhabe am Göttlichen zu erklären, konzeptualisiert als göttliche Stimme in uns – unterstützt durch die Analogie der kosmischen Rolle der Sonne.

Keywords: Dialog; Intellekt; Gott; Person; Pneuma; Stoizismus; Sonne; Trinität; Stimme

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1 Introduction[1]

A great deal has been written on the Stoic concept of pneuma, which may count as the lynchpin of Stoic cosmology and anthropology alike.[2] Even so, some hitherto neglected evidence permits us to improve our understanding of the role played by this concept. In this paper, I shall be arguing that Cleanthes of Assos, the second head of the school (probably ?331/330–230/229 BCE) made a decisive and original contribution based on various ideas he had inherited from his predecessors in and outside the Stoic school. This enriched pneumatology served to explain the communion between individual and universal nature, i.e. between human intellects and the divine realm. In so doing Cleanthes further implemented two schemas fundamental to Stoic thought: (1) the macrocosm-microcosm analogy; (2) the whole-parts-schema. These, then, we should keep in mind in studying the relevant evidence, most notably two passages from the Christian author Tertullian (c. 160–c. 240 CE), which I believe have been underused. The first of these, from the twenty-first chapter of Tertullian's *Apologeticum* found its way into the still standard collection of Stoic fragments, von Arnim's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*,[3] but the context in which it is embedded regrettably did not. I will discuss the whole passage in § 2. The second passage comes from the fifth chapter of *Adversus Praxean*, an altogether different context, though like the testimony from the *Apologeticum* dealing with Trinitarian theology also. It does not mention Cleanthes (or any other Stoic) and has been almost completely neglected in Stoic studies and will be subjected to a thorough analysis in § 3. Together these passages show how Tertullian pressed Stoic pneumatology into the service of his Trinitarian theology, availing himself of a *persona*-theory which we have good reason to believe derives from Cleanthes as well. In fact, the conception of mental life in terms of discourse and role-playing may constitute an original contribution to Stoic philosophy on Cleanthes' part.

2 *Apologeticum* ch. 21.10–13: God and Sun

Chapter 21.10–13 of Tertullian's *Apologeticum* constitutes an at times ponderous passage, which, at least in large part, appears to derive from an account of Stoic theology as based on the macrocosm/microcosm analogy.[4] Tertullian uses this account to make the

1 The present article further develops some ideas stated earlier in a companion study: Tieleman 2014, where the evidence from Tertullian was noted but not discussed (at 40, n. 2).

2 Verbeke 1945, though inevitably outdated in certain ways, remains a useful presentation of the evidence. See also Hahm 1977; Tieleman 2014. Of more general scope but still worth reading are Rüsche 1930 and Rüsche 1933, with repr.

3 Three vols. Leipzig 1903–1905. Vol. 4 offers indexes compiled by Maximilian Adler.

4 For what follows cf. Spanneut 1957, 306–309.

Holy Trinity more palatable to his pagan readership by pointing to parallels with Greek philosophy and in particular Stoicism. This passage is central to our argument and worth quoting in full:

T1 (10) *iam ediximus deum universitatem hanc mundi verbo et ratione et virtute molitum, apud vestros quoque sapientes* λόγον, *id est sermonem atque rationem, constat artificem videri universitatis. hunc enim Zeno determinat factitatorem, qui cuncta in dispositione formaverit; eundem et fatum vocari et deum et animum Iovis et necessitatem omnium rerum. haec Cleanthes in spiritum congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis affirmat.* (11) *et nos autem sermoni atque rationi itemque virtuti per quam omnia molitum deum ediximus, propriam substantiam spiritum inscribimus, cui et sermo insit pronuntianti et ratio adsit disponenti et virtus praesit perficienti. hunc* (*sc. spiritum*) *ex deo prolatum didicimus et prolatione generatum et idcirco filium dei et deum dictum ex unitate substantiae; nam est et deus spiritus.* (12) *et cum radius ex sole porrigitur, portio ex summa; sed sol erit in radio, quia solis est radius, nec separatur substantia sed extenditur ...*

We have already stated that God created this universe through his word, his reason and his virtue.[5] Your philosophers, too, are convinced that the λόγος, that is to say speech and reason, is the artificer of the universe. For Zeno (*SVF* 1.160) designates him as the maker, who has created and ordered everything; (Zeno has also determined that) he is also called Fate and God and Juppiter's soul and ineluctable Necessity. Cleanthes (*SVF* 1.533) brings all these things together in the breath (or 'spirit') which, he declares, permeates the universe. So, too, we describe the substance to which speech and reason as well as virtue – by which, as we have said, God created all things – belong, as breath, in which speech inheres when it speaks out and reason is present when it organizes[6] and virtue presides when it perfects (or 'brings about'). We have learned that this (*sc.* breath) has been put forward from God and has been generated through being put forward and therefore is called Son of God and God from the unity of their substance; for God too is breath. And when a ray stretches itself from the sun, it does so as a portion from the whole; but the sun will be in the ray, because it is a ray of the sun, and the substance will not be separated but extends itself ...

Tertullian, *Apologeticum* (Becker 21.10–13, tr. mine)

5 I.e. excellence, but the term also connotes "strength" or "power," as it is sometimes translated here, not inappositely. See on the relation between virtue and strength forged by Cleanthes, *infra* p. 160.

6 For the Stoic view on the will and conation of God cf. Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.58 (= *SVF* 1.172).

Tertullian adds "virtue," i.e. excellence, to reason and discourse as inhering in the divine πνεῦμα or *spiritus*. But the Latin word *virtus* also conveys the sense of strength or power. The emphasis on psychic power or strength (Greek δύναμις) based on the soul's tension (τόνος) is typical of Cleanthes and implied by his notion of ἀρετή – i.e. excellence or virtue. This he applied both on the microcosmic[7] and on the macrocosmic level.[8] For God's perfection in terms of virtue or excellence (ἀρετή), too, we have a Cleanthean parallel: God is "completely filled with the excellences" (Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos* 9.91 = *SVF* 1 Cleanthes 529).[9] The context of the idea as given by Sextus (*ibid*. 88–91) is relevant as well. This is the argument in favour of God's existence traditionally known as the *argumentum e gradibus entium* ("argument from the levels of beings"): if certain natures are better than others, Cleanthes argued, there must also be a best or perfect being, which is God. Humans, being rational and moral, are better than animals; but since humans are imperfect, this points to there being a perfect being, or God. The testimony in Sextus runs in large part parallel to Cicero's *On the Nature of Gods* 2.33–36 (to which von Arnim aptly refers), i.e. from the book in which Stoic theology is expounded. There is no explicit attribution to Cleanthes in this passage from Cicero, but his influence may be inferred from Sextus and other passages in the second book of Cicero's work, in which Cleanthes does receive mention (cf. *Nat. D.* 2.13,23–24). In *Nat. D.* Cicero does not speak of God's perfection in terms of virtue (*virtus*) but we do have references to God presiding (*praesit, ibid*. 36) and bringing about (*perficere*, *ibid*. 35) such as we have seen in Tertullian (*Apol*. 21.11). The latter verb is linked by Cicero (or his source) to God's being perfect: God's creative activity expressed by the Latin verb *perficere* is a process towards completeness and perfection. But lower natures cannot be brought to perfect realization owing to the obstacles they encounter. Yet this does not prevent nature as a whole (i.e. God) from achieving full realization (*ibid*. 35).[10]

The reference to the sun also points to Cleanthes, who located the governing part (ἡγεμονικόν, i.e. the intellect, διάνοια) of the world-soul in the sun, which then occupies a position corresponding to the heart in the individual living being – another instance of

7 See Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 7, 1034d (= *SVF* 1 Cleanthes 563), with Tieleman 2003, 272, with further references.

8 Cornutus c. 31 (= *SVF* 1.514): Ἡρακλῆς δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις τόνος, καθ' ὃν ἡ φύσις ἰσχυρὰ καὶ κραταιά ἐστιν, ἀνίκητος καὶ ἀπεριγένητος οὖσα ... Τοὺς δὲ δώδεκα ἄθλους ἐνδέχεται μὲν ἀναγαγεῖν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίως ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν, ὡς καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐποίησεν· "Heraclitus is the tension in the universe through which nature is strong and mighty, being invincible and insuperable .. it is possible to refer the twelve labours to the god (*sc.* Heraclitus) not inappropriately, as indeed Cleanthes has done."

9 For further Stoic references to God's virtue and strength see *SVF* 3.149, 215, 246, 248, 250, 251 (where however it is stated that human and divine virtue are the same).

10 There is some Ciceronian wordplay with *perfectum/perficere here*. In Sextus we only have a reference to God as perfect or completed (τέλειον) without the cognate verb τελειόω (for a cognate noun in a relevant context cf. *SVF* 1.566, 3.197: ἀρετή defined as τελείωσις).

the macrocosm-microcosm analogy.[11] This makes the sun the main centre of the divine. Our sources link the Stoic view on the sun to Cleanthes in particular, which is quite in line with his general role in the development of Stoic physics including theology, which was considerable.[12] In addition to the macrocosm-microcosm analogy, the Stoic whole-parts schema is applied: the image of the sun is used to explain how it is possible to take part in God's substance without its being diminished or divided. Tertullian applies this image to explain the relation of the Son to the Father in particular, but in Stoic cosmo-theology it had a wider application: all human intellects are particles of divine reason. Plato in his *Republic* had used the sun as a metaphor to explain the Idea of the Good as the source of being and knowledge in the intelligible realm (*Resp*. 6.508a1–509b9). But he does not say or imply that we receive and indeed are particles of the sun as Tertullian does in keeping with Stoic physics and theology. Cleanthes is on record as having pointed to the sun's rays as reaching out to every part of the cosmos and bringing harmony and order to it – a point which further bears out the Stoic and Cleanthean backdrop of this passage.[13] A parallel from a very similar context is provided by another Stoic author, Seneca, who in *Moral Letter* 41 explains the communion between the "sacred spirit within us" and the divine by using the sun as an image:

> **T2** Even as the sun's rays touch the earth and yet have their existence at their point of origin, so that great and sacred mind (*animus*), that mind sent down to bring us nearer knowledge of the divine, dwells indeed with us and yet inheres within its source. Its reliance is there, and there are its aim and its objective: though it mingles in our affairs, it does so as our better.
>
> Seneca, *Epistulae* 41.5 (tr. Long-Graver)

Tertullian of course cannot follow Cleanthes in identifying the sun as the divine centre or as God's intellect. Neither does Cleanthes' fellow-Stoic Seneca go beyond drawing a comparison between the divine mind and the sun. Tertullian, too, uses the sun as a

11 Eusebius, *Praeparatio evangelica* 15.7 (Ar. Did. fr. 29, Diels 465 = *SVF* 1.499): ἡγεμονικὸν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου Κλεάνθει μὲν ἥρεσε τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι διὰ τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἄστρων ὑπάρχειν καὶ πλεῖστα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων διοίκησιν, ἡμέραν καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ποιοῦντα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὥρας – "Cleanthes held that the sun the ruling part of the cosmos is because it is the biggest of the heavenly bodies and contributes most to the government of the universe, producing day and the year and the other periods." (Tr. mine.) Ps.-Censorinus 1.4 (Jahn 75,14); Diogenes Laërtius 7.139. Aëtius, *Placita philosophorum* 2.4.16 (DG 332b); Cicero, *Academica priora* 2.126; Aët 2.20.4 (DG 349b = *SVF* 1.501); Cic. *Nat. D.* 3.37; Aët. 2.23.5 (DG 353a = *SVF* 1.501, third text).

12 As is clear from Christian as well as non-Christian sources collected as *SVF* 1.499–502; see also next n.

13 See *SVF* 1 Cleanthes 502–504: the cosmos is struck by the sun's light as by a plectrum. Here Cleanthes appears to have been inspired by the figure of Apollo, the lyre-playing god, who is associated, among other things, with harmony and with the sun. For Apollo interpreted as the sun see also Philodemus, *De pietate* 15 (= *SVF* 3 Diog. Bab. 33, 217,12).

metaphor or analogue to explain the relation between Son and Father for which God's breath acts as the physical vehicle. But God's breath is to be taken as a literal, physical truth, given Tertullian's corporealism, which he shares with the Stoics.[14] The Stoics often assimilated the sun's fire to the πνεῦμα as a special, creative kind of fire.[15] As we have noticed, it was Cleanthes who developed a "cosmobiology" (to use David Hahm's apt term) to which the sun was central on the cosmic level and the heart on the individual level. Here he employed medical ideas on the function of the heart as the seat of the innate warmth, which he linked to the intellect as residing in the heart and being sustained by the exhalations from the blood in the heart.[16] In sum, if we make due allowance for the Christian twist given by Tertullian to his Stoic source, *Apol.* 21.10–13 may stand as a further testimony (alongside a few other bits of evidence from Seneca and other Stoic sources) of the Stoic and in particular Cleanthean theory of mind, both human and divine.

3 *Against Praxeas* ch. 5.5–7: an *interpretatio christiana* of the Cleanthean persona theory

A neglected piece of evidence for the Stoic, and in particular Cleanthean, view of deliberation as internal discourse is ch. 5 of *Against Praxeas* written by Tertullian around 213 CE. Tertullian explains the unity of the Trinity in terms of two senses borne by the Greek word λόγος, viz. "reason" (*ratio*) and "word" or "discourse" (*sermo*). So too, Tertullian argues, God, being rational, comprised the Son as his Word even before sending him into the world (cf. John 1.1–2). He then continues:

> **T3** *Idque quo facilius intellegas, ex te ipso, homo, recognosce ut ex imagine et similitudine Dei, quod habeas et tu in temetipso rationem qui es animal rationale, a rationali scilicet artifice non tantum factus sed etiam ex substantia ipsius animatus. Vide, cum tacitus tecum ipse congrederis ratione, hoc ipsum agi intra te, occurrente ea tibi cum sermone ad omnem cogitatus tui motum, ad omnem sensus tui pulsum. Quodcumque cogitaveris sermo est, quodcumque senseris, ratio est. Loquaris illud necesse est in animo,*

14 See further Kitzler 2009; but see already Seyr 1937, 52–62; Spanneut 1957, 150–151.

15 The Stoics from the beginning identify creative, sustaining fire (cf. Heraclitus) with the pneuma and later on with the innate heat from medical theories. θερμασίαν δὲ καὶ πνεῦμα Ζήνων μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναί φησιν – "Zeno says that heat and pneuma are the same thing". Cicero, *Academica posteriora* 1.39 (*SVF* 1.134); *Fin.*; *Tusc.*; Diog. Laërt. 7.157 (*SVF* 1.135). Censorinus, *De die natali* 4.10 (*SVF* 1.124); Varro, *De lingua latina* 5.59 (*SVF* 1.126).

16 Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 15.20.2 (Ar. Did. fr. 39 Diels = *SVF* 1.519, 141), Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.41 (*SVF* 1.504), Galen, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* 2.8.48 (De Lacy 166 = K. 5.283) (=*SVF* 1 Cleanthes 521); cf. *ibid.* 2.8.44 (= *SVF* 3 Diog. Bab. 30). On these passages see further Tieleman 1996, 87–101.

et dum loqueris conlocutorem pateris sermonem in quo inest haec ipsa ratio qua cum eo cogitans loquaris per quem loquens cogitas. Ita secundus quodammodo in te est sermo per quem loqueris cogitando et per quem cogitas loquendo, ipse sermo alius est.

And that you may understand this[17] the more easily observe first[18] from yourself, as made in the image and likeness of God,[19] that you too have reason within yourself, who are a rational animal not only as having been made by a rational Creator but also as out of his substance having been made a living soul.[20] See how when you argue by reason silently with yourself, this same action takes place within you, while reason accompanied by discourse meets you at every movement of your thought,[21] at every impression of your consciousness:[22] your every thought is discourse, your every consciousness is reason; you must perforce speak it in your mind, and while you speak it, you experience as a partner in conversation that discourse which has in it this very reason by which you speak when you think in company of that (discourse) in speaking by means of which you think. So in a sort of way you have in you as a second (*secundus*, *sc.* person) discourse by means of which you speak by thinking and by means of which you think by speaking: discourse itself is another (*alius*, *sc.* than you).

Tertullian, *Adversus Praxean* 5.5–7 (Scarpat ll. 26–39, Kroymann 233.24–234.11, CSEL 47, tr. Evans)

Tertullian was saturated in Stoic philosophy, taking a particular interest in the Stoic conception of the soul – as can be quickly established by taking a look at the texts from his *On the soul* (*De anima*) and other works listed in the index of sources in von Arnim's collection of Stoic fragments.[23] But this does not include the above passage. No individual Stoic, or for that matter the Stoics in general, are mentioned but this did not prevent von Arnim from including texts as 'fragments' in many other cases. Already Spanneut in his 1957 study of Tertullian's use of Stoicism pointed to the Stoic colouring of this passage.[24] And for good reason. It is a fair assumption that Tertullian presents us with

17 I.e. the intimate relationship between divine reason (*ratio*) and word, or discourse (*sermo*).

18 Reading *ante recognosce* with Ursinus and Evans.

19 Cf. *Gen*. 1.26.

20 Cf. *Gen*. 2.7.

21 Typical Stoic language Sext. Emp. *M.* 8.409 (*SVF* 2.85), Sen. *Ep*. 117.13. Cf. also Tieleman 1996, 161–164.

22 Cf. Tert. *Adv. Prax*. 5.2, (Scarpat ll. 12–13): *ratio sensus ipsius est* – "reason is his (*sc*. God's) consciousness" (tr. mine).

23 See Osborn 1997, 3–4, 7–8 and *passim*, Spanneut 1957, 150–165; cf. Seyr 1937.

24 Spanneut 1957, 312–316, who also points out that Tertullian's explanation of the Son in terms of internal (ἐνδιάθετος) and external (προφορικός) reason was anticipated by such Christian authors as Theophilus (cf. *Ad Autolycum* 2.22); cf. Hippolytus, *Contra Noetum* 10 (Nautin 251,15–18). Here the idea of an internal dialogue seems to be implied by the reference to God's deliberation before issuing his Word in Creation. Cf. Moingt 1966, 1041–1050, esp. 1043, who refers to the same distinction in the

the fairly technical doctrine from a Stoic source. In what follows I will further shore up this assumption in the light of more recent research on the relevant parts of Stoicism.

Tertullian may not have taken this directly from a treatise by Cleanthes or Chrysippus (although this is by no means impossible) but may have used a work summarizing or based upon the original exposition of the doctrines concerned. That he does not acknowledge his Stoic source need not surprise us: it would have defeated his purpose if he had appealed to pagan philosophy in a dispute on a point of Christian orthodoxy, whereas in the *Apologeticum* it made perfect sense with a view to selling Christian Trinitarian theology to a pagan audience. Here Tertullian starts from *Gen.* 1.26–27 saying that God created mankind in his own image. When he goes on to say that God created us out of his own substance (*substantia*) this may have resonated with Christian readers in view of *Gen*. 2.7: "Then the Lord God formed a man from the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became a living being" (tr. New International Version).

Substance (*substantia*), however, is a philosophical term referring to corporeal reality. In fact, the passage can also be read in terms of Stoic pneumatology and the Stoic parts-and-whole schema, a point which to my knowledge has been overlooked by Patristic scholars: we have been formed out of God's breath and so, in a sense, we still are a part of God.[25] This in turn can be expanded with the Greek notion of λόγος as referring to discourse and thought[26] and the Stoic articulation of this notion, viz. the theme of internal and external λόγος and of λόγος as discourse.[27] In *Apol*. 21.10–13 we see Tertullian using a Stoic source for these ideas. Tertullian may have found further support for his Stoicizing exegesis in the first chapter of Genesis, according to which God creates the world and the first humans through a series of speech acts (*Gen*. 1.3, 9, 14, 26, 27). Thus, he was in a position to reconcile the text of Genesis with Stoic doctrines, or, put differently, to press Stoic notions in the service of scriptural exegesis. Even the idea that human nature has been in part formed out of the soil (alongside the divine pneumatic spark) can be paralleled from Stoicism starting with Zeno (who of course in his turn availed himself of traditional ideas and myths about our being earth-born).[28]

same authors, but without reference to Stoicism or Spanneut's study.

25 For the parts-and-whole schema see esp. Diog. Laërt. 7.87 (*SVF* 3.4).

26 Cf. in the preceding context *Adv. Prax.* 5.3 (Scarpat 27,14–15). Here Tertullian also avails himself of the Gospel of John: 'Discourse (*sermonem* rendering Greek λόγος) was in the beginning with God' – John 1.1–2, cited *Adv. Prax*. 5.3 (Scarpat 27,16–17).

27 In addition to the Cleanthean material see *SVF* 1.135, 137.

28 Censorinus, *De die natali* 4.10 (= *SVF* 1.124): *Zenon Citieus, Stoicae sectae conditor, principium humano generi ex novo mundo constitutum putavit, primosque homines ex solo, adminiculo divini ignis id est dei providentia, genitos* – "Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic sect, held that the beginning for the human race has been set at the beginning of each new world and that the first humans were born from the soil with the aid of divine fire, that is, through God's providence." Tr. mine.

What we have here is the Stoic version of the idea – anticipated by Plato and Aristotle as well as Homer and the tragedians[29] – of thought as linguistic and, more specifically, dialogic in character. Indeed Tertullian refers directly to an interlocutor within us – an idea that is also implied by Cleanthes' versified dialogue between Reason and Anger.[30] Another salient feature is Tertullian's statement that the substance of our souls is derived from God's substance, which clearly states the Stoic doctrine given e.g. at Tert. *Apol.* 21.10–13 that the human soul and more specifically intellect is a particle of the divine breath (*spiritus*, i.e. πνεῦμα).[31] Hence the intellect is called "the god within each"[32] or, as Seneca puts it, "the sacred spirit within us," acting as an "observer and guardian of all our goods and evils."[33] We should also note the Stoic macrocosm/microcosm analogy, whereby God assumes various functions of the human soul.[34]

The Stoic 'monistic' model of the intellect suited Tertullian's purposes, enabling him to account for the threefold aspect of God while at the same time leaving His essential unity intact. The Stoic doctrine moreover seemed to cohere with the numerous biblical passages where God speaks and with the passage in which man is said to have been created in his image (*Gen.* 1.26). It is noteworthy that Tertullian speaks, as he often does, of *two* persons only, viz. the Father and the Son, quite in line with the Stoic doctrine which, as noted above, typically involves no more than two interlocutors.[35] Interestingly, Tertullian at *Adv. Prax.* 12.3 makes the Trinity complete by ascribing personhood also to God's substance, viz. the *spiritus* (πνεῦμα), thus aligning what in Stoic psychology really are two different aspects, viz. the soul's (or, more specifically, the intellect's) corporeal *substance* on the one hand and its rational-cum-linguistic *activity*, on the other:

> **T4** … the Son is connected with him as a second person (*persona*), viz. his word (*sermo*) and the third (*sc.* person), the Spirit, (*sc.* is connected with him) in the word.
>
> Tert. *Adv. Prax.* 12.3 (tr. Evans)

29 Plato, *Theaetetus* 189e–190a; *Sophista* 263e3–5; Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* 7.6, 1149b9; *De motu animalium* 7, 701a31; *De anima* 3.11, 434a16–21; cf. *Analytica posteriora* 1.10, 76b24–25. See the pioneering study by Gill 1996 for this idea in relation to the development of the notion of personhood.

30 Gal. *PHP* 5.6.35 (De Lacy 332 = K. 5.476 = *SVF* 1 Cleanthes 570). For a full interpretation see Tieleman 2003, 264–277.

31 Epictetus, *Dissertationes* 1.14.5–6.

32 Diog. Laërt. 7.88 (not in *SVF*). Diog. Laërt. 7.85–89 largely derives from Chrysippus' *On Ends* (Περὶ τελῶν).

33 Sen. *Ep.* 41.3 (*sacer intra nos spiritus*). Similarly, Epict. *Diss.* 1.14.

34 See esp. the account of Stoic theology, Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.58 (= *SVF* 1.172). On the properties of the Stoic God see Algra 2003, esp. 166–167.

35 The same holds good for his contemporary Hippolytus, e.g. *Noet.* 7 (Nautin 247,10, 14; 253,30), *On the Blessings of Jacob*, 32.19, ed. Bonwetsch with Andresen 1961, 8–9, 22–23 (repr. in Andresen 2009).

The provenance of Tertullian's concept of *persona* has always been a riddle. This need no longer be the case once it is recognized that this concept played a central part in the Stoic model of mental life.[36] The notion of persona (πρόσωπον) can be traced back to Cleanthes so he may very well be the source for Tertullian's use of this concept too.[37] Admittedly, Tertullian in *Adv. Prax.* ch. 5 does not *mention* the concept of *persona*, but it may be taken to be implied by the terms *alius* and *secundus*.[38] In fact, in a later passage Tertullian explicitly says that the Father and the Son are one substance with two *personae*.[39] In addition, we must note that the very meaning of the concept is defined by reference to speech (*sermo*).[40] Here it has clearly preserved its theatrical connotation of "mask," or "personage."[41] The exegetical underpinning of the Stoic position is strikingly paralleled by Tertullian's reading of a number of psalms and other biblical passages as representing a *dialogue* between the Son and the Father.[42]

4 Conclusion

The two passages from Tertullian we have been discussing, *Adv. Prax.* 5.5–7 and *Apol.* 21.10–13, both cohere with each other and with Stoic sources and in particular texts associated with the name of Cleanthes. By studying the use made by Tertullian of his Stoic source, or sources, and comparing what he writes with other, indisputably Stoic material, it becomes possible not only to learn more about Tertullian's aims and methods but also to supplement the Stoic evidence itself. Particularly notable are Cleanthes' development of the idea of the pneuma as the creative and life-sustaining warmth and

36 Cf. Andresen 1961, esp. 2–9 (repr. in Andresen 2009). On the development of the Stoic notion see Tieleman 2007, 130–140, with further references.

37 See Sen. *Ep.* 94.1 (*SVF* 1 Cleanthes 582) with Tieleman 2007, 132–133.

38 See the useful study by Rankin 2001 on Tertullian's vocabulary in referring to the three divine Persons.

39 E.g. *Adv. Prax.* 12.6–7 (Scarpat 34–5): the son is *alium ... personae non substantiae nomine, ad distinctionem non ad divisionem ... una substantia in tribus cohaerentibus* – "another in the sense of person, not of substance, for distinctiveness, not for division ... one substance in three who cohere." Tr. Evans.

40 E.g. *Adv. Prax.* 7.9 (Scarpat 48–50): *quaecumque ergo substantia sermonis fuit, illam dico personam et illi nomen Filii vindico et, dum Filium agnosco, secundum a Patre defendo* – "Whatever therefore the substance of the Word was, that I call a person, and for it I claim the name of Son; and while I acknowledge him as Son I maintain he is another beside the Father." Tr. Evans.

41 Instances listed by Evans 1948, 46.

42 Eg. Ps. 2 treated, alongside others, in *Adv. Prax.* 5 and 7 in particular; cf. 11.7 *omnes paene psalmi qui Christi personam sustinent, Filium ad Patrem verba facientem repraesentant* – "Almost all the psalms which perform the role of Christ represent the Son as speaking to the Father." Tr. mine. Cf. *ibid.* 12 and Rondeau 1985, 30–34, 322–325, 414–416. On the linkage between the concept of *persona* and that of dialogue between two voices cf. also Origenes, *Contra Celsum* 1.55; *ibid.* 7.36; Justin, *Apologia* 1.36.1f.; Philo, *De specialibus legibus* 4.7.39; *De fuga et inventione* 25.137. These passages depend on an exegetical tradition which used formulas like ὡς ἀπὸ προσώπου and τὸ πρόσωπον τὸ λέγον to differentiate between voices or persons so as to explain seeming contradictions. See Andresen 1961, 14–18 (repr. in Andresen 2009).

his interest in it as the vehicle of discourse, i.e. of voices connected with particular roles (*personae*). This opened up new ways of accounting for psychological phenomena such as mental conflict (or weakness of will, ἀκρασία) within the framework of Stoic psychological monism.[43] One can see how Tertullian could find here ways of explaining and justifying the unity of the Holy Trinity. But, given the Stoic whole-and-parts scheme, this pneumatology also served to explain forms of communion between the human intellect and the divine realm, of conversing with a divine voice within us – an idea supported by cosmic ideas on the role of the sun. Cleanthes' contribution survived not only in the pages of the Christian author Tertullian but, as we have seen, also influenced later Stoics such as Seneca and Epictetus.

43 As is illustrated by Cleanthes' versified dialogue between reason and anger; see *supra*, n. 30 with text thereto.

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