

6 Actors and actor coalitions

6.1 Introduction

In the theoretical framework provided in the previous chapter, the argument is that traditional institutional theory underestimates the importance of actors in the institutional development process. Therefore, this chapter introduces the actors and actor coalitions involved first, which is a direct answer to research question 2a, which stresses the importance of strategic actors in the formation of spatial development coalitions in airport areas as cityports in the city-regions. This actor analysis is not exhaustive; there is a focus on the most relevant actors and their interrelations, as well as main differences between the cases.

These actors are presented by the main actor groups in the urban development process: public actors as national, regional and local governments (section 6.2); airport authorities and end-users (6.3); actors with commercial interests as project developers and asset managers (6.4) and advisory boards with and without direct interest at stake, and other actors (6.5). The analysis of actors in the case studies is introduced based on the approach of Burie (1982). This means actors are presented in the framework of the positions in terms of players (the interviewees that represent the actors), their main formal and informal tools (instruments), and mutual relations. Analysis is based on both document analysis and case study interviews with the actors involved.

Section 6.6 is a comparative approach to introduce actor coalitions that are formed at the airport and in the wider airport area, based on literature and on-site interviews. These airport coalitions are a quintessential background for understanding the actor coalitions on the regional level since they determine whether the airport and/or aviation is expanded or not, and under which conditions. These actors and actor coalitions are an essential stepping-stone for further understanding of the actors' behaviour within the rules of the game, which set the playing field for the development of airports as cityports in the city-region. The analysis of actors and the variety of actor coalitions in airports and airport areas lead to conclusions in 6.7.

6.2 National, regional and local governments

Political institutions

The Netherlands is an unitary state with a constitutional monarchy. It has a three-tier governmental system of national government, twelve provincial governments, and 458 municipalities in 2006. On all levels of government, majority coalition governments are created based on proportional representation. Mayors and provincial governors are appointed as local and regional executives by the national government, a situation that is currently under revision. The Netherlands is a decentralised unitary state, where lower tiers of government are guaranteed constitutional autonomy and higher-tier bodies have powers to prevent lower-tier bodies from intervening in their policies (Mastop 2001). After elections, majority coalitions of Social

Democrats (PvdA), Christian-Democrats (CDA), Liberals (VVD and D66) and/or Greens (GL) are formed to govern the three different levels.¹

The Federal Republic of Germany is a federation of 16 states and over 16,000 municipalities in 322 counties plus 115 independent cities, which have constitutionally guaranteed powers of self-government within the federation. The German constitution strictly divides responsibilities between federal government and the states (Schmidt-Eichstadt 2001). Municipalities are either independent cities or are part of a regional county. National parliament chambers consist of directly elected representatives and representatives of the states. The power of the states creates a situation in which constitutional legislation is difficult to change, since a two-third-majority support from the states is required. Governmental leaders at all levels are from the dominant political parties, the Christian-Democrats (CDU-CSU) or the Social-Democrats (SPD). The dominant parties usually form coalitions with the smaller parties, either FDP Liberals or the Greens.

The Japanese empire consists of a national government, a two-tier local government structure of 47 prefectures (the regional level) and 1800 municipalities as of March 2006 after drastic mergers (the local level).² The country can also be subdivided in eight regions, but these regions do not have formal governmental roles as of yet. Japan is a unitary state, with constitutional rights for the prefectures and more financial independence for cities with over 700,000 inhabitants. Parliaments are formed after direct elections and are based on equal representation. There is no need for government coalitions for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), since it has a majority in parliament. LDP has governed Japan for over 40 years with a one-year exception in 1993. In practise however, the LDP is a coalition of divergent factions within itself.

Actors on the national level: the Netherlands

On the Dutch national level, four ministries (transport, planning, economic affairs, and finance) are involved in the Schiphol area planning in the Randstad. Urban planning is within one ministry, the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, but this ministry depends on the 'spending' departments with larger budgets, in particular the ministries in charge of transport and finance. The Netherlands Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (from here on abbreviated as Transport and Water Management) is responsible for the landside accessibility of the airport region in terms of roads, rail and other infrastructure, and also the conditions and enforcement of aviation in terms of environment and safety by the Aviation Law (Interviews Bussink 2005, Jacobs 2005).

The Ministry of Transport and Water Management is the coordinator of the Schiphol Mainport project. Furthermore the Ministry of Transport's policy is to create a level playing field for aviation and airports in the EU. In 2003, the smallest Cargo and Aviation departments merged into one Directorate-General. The current aim of the Ministry of Transport is to become less project-oriented by having a more integral approach (*ibid.*). In the case of Schiphol, this means more distant relations with the airport operators and closer cooperation with other ministries with supervising roles. The Minister of Transport and Water Management and the Ministry of Finance jointly prepare privatisation plans for Schiphol. Closely related but independent from the Ministry of Transport and Water Management is the Civil Aviation Authority (RLD *Rijksluchtvaartdienst*). It is in charge of airplane approaching routes and safety zones, therefore co-determining the capacity of the airport.

The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (*Volksbuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu*, referred to as Ministry of VROM) draws the national plans. There is no legal need for national plans, but every decade revision of the national plans is common practise (Alterman 2001). These planning procedures find their legal embeddedness in the Act on Spatial Planning (WRO) of 1965, revised in 1985, and currently under revision. Technical standards for construction are embodied in the building law.

VROM is the second ministry involved in the Schiphol mainport project. It focuses on environmental regulation and the impact of noise pollution on current and new housing areas. In cooperation with the Ministry of Transport and Water Management, strict noise and safety contours are drawn and environmental impact studies are made. Furthermore, VROM is coordinator of the Monitoring, Evaluation and Implementation Schiphol evaluation to be completed in 2006 (Interview Vink 2005).

VROM's national spatial planning memoranda set the national planning agenda (VROM 2004). The legally binding key national planning decisions (PKB) are a major instrument for providing national guidelines in planning. PKB procedures distinguish national projects from common planning procedures. In the case of national projects, VROM can make legally binding land use plans that are normally municipal jurisdiction. The municipalities can be overruled by VROM with a – rarely used – national assignment (*aanwijzingsbesluit*): VROM can have a final say in case of national interest.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs (*Economische Zaken, EZ*) focuses on national economic priorities and therefore is partner in the interdepartmental Mainport Schiphol project. At first EZ intended to contribute only once to the project, but now the involvement has a more permanent character in order to make use of economic opportunities of the mainport in the region (Interview Van Putten 2005). EZ is furthermore involved in competition and anti-trust laws.

The Ministry of Finance (*Financiën*) is indirectly involved in the Schiphol case. The ministry organises financial relations between Schiphol and the Dutch State, particularly in the current governmental plans of privatisation and stock exchange quotation.

Actors on the national level: Japan

In Japan, spatial planning is closely related to economic planning, where three ministries and two planning agencies play a major role. These are the ministries of Finance (MoF), International Trade and Industry (MITI, in 2004 renamed as Economy, Trade and Industry, METI), and Land, Infrastructure and Transportation (MLIT). In addition two agencies play a crucial role in planning: the National Land Agency (NLA) and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA).

Johnson (1982) argues that in the western economies, government simply sets the rules of the game; in Japan, government nurture industrial development. MITI's successful government bureaucratic capitalism spurred development in the coal sector (1950s), steel and shipbuilding (1960s), semiconductors (1970s) and computers (1980s). By doing so, it strengthened its position in relation to other ministries. MITI therefore has crucial contacts for competing and cooperating with the LDP, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Post and Telecommunication, Bank of Japan, Economic Planning Agency, and business groups. The end of bureaucratic capitalism and decentralisation, deregulation and privatisation has led to the current less dominant position of MITI, nowadays renamed as METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry).

The role played by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) is a natural counterpart to MLIT. MoF approves the projects proposed by MLIT and considers it in the context of financial and economic benefits, including large scale infrastructure plans for *shinkansen* and airports. The Ministry of Finance is therefore a very powerful organisation, in particular since it has close elite contacts with LDP politicians, influential University of Tokyo graduates and researchers and as such it has a high status in society (Van Wolferen 2004).

The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT) is the result of a merger of the former ministries of Construction and Transport in 2001. A focus on public works to generate economic development is at the heart of the political economic system, to be discussed in chapter 8. MLIT does not only have an approved budget set in parliament, there are also special earmarked budgets appointed by bureaucrats, financed by postal savings. The share of GDP for public works is almost double compared to the US and EU. Failures of a series of public works and budget deficits on the national accounts forced MLIT to cut spending (McCormack 1996).

In airport planning, the Aviation Bureau of MLIT is the main actor. The focus of the ministry is mainly the airside, however recently a shift towards the landside of the airport can be seen (Interview Asawa 2004). In the case of first class airports of Kansai, Itami, Narita, Centrair/Nagoya, and in the case of Haneda, MLIT is directly involved in managing the planning process. The role of MLIT in local and regional airports is less dominant and the contribution in costs for these airports is lower.

The Cabinet Office of Prime Minister Koizumi focuses on the reduction of the state budget and the privatisation of postal savings. It has eleven bureaucratic agencies, including the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) and the National Land Agency (NLA).³ EPA and NLA have no separate budgetary powers but are responsible for the national and regional economic and land-use plans. The economic plans are not detailed and are not legally binding. The Economic Council writes the draft of the economic plans. These economic plans are closely related to the National Land-use Plan and the National Development Plan. The role of the NLA here is to coordinate land-use policies of other ministries and to prevent land price speculation through the provisions of the National Planning Act (Tanimura and Edgington 2001).

Actors on the national level: Germany

Planning on the national level in the German federal state is different from centralised Japan and the Netherlands decentral unitary state. In Germany, only the federal ministry for Transport, Construction and Housing (*Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau- und Wohnungswesen*, BMVBW) is indirectly involved in spatial planning of airport areas in the city-region.

According to the federal spatial planning act (*Bundesraumordnungsgesetz*), the main function of the ministry is to offer the legal framework and to set the guidelines for plans and laws made on the state level. The state minister's conference discusses the federal law and strategic planning issues. There are federal spatial planning reports, but the federal powers and instruments are very limited (Schmidt-Eichstadt 2001). Regional economics, transportation and housing planning are mainly the responsibility of the states and there is no jurisdiction for cross-sector planning on this regional level. However, the federal state has the possibility to cooperate with the states (cooperative federalism, Faludi 1997). Local and regional plans have to fit in the broader frameworks set from the national and regional level. On the other hand, bottom-up feedback to

the top is of equal importance (the so-called *Gegenstromprinzip*). The *Baugesetzbuch* law aims to stimulate the coherence in urban design by setting building standards for infrastructure and real estate.

Official procedures are fixed in national sector legislation, *Fachplanung*. These sector plans of the ministry departments involved are in parallel to spatial planning, and therefore have more direct effects on planning, which includes airport planning. In this case, it is relevant to mention that there is no national airport planning strategy and jurisdiction within Germany – the main airports are only acknowledged. Sector planning sets procedures and technical guidelines for the planning of airport runway expansion, long distance trains and stations, and national highways.

Actors on the regional level: Randstad

In the Randstad-Schiphol area, four provinces are involved: Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland and Utrecht, and to a minor extent Flevoland. The province of Noord-Holland is the coordinator between the local and national levels, and private and public interests. Noord-Holland supervises local land-use plans and inspects local land-use practises for VROM. The provincial planning agency and provincial planning deputy also have mandate and active development roles. These roles are mainly on a cooperative basis and enforced by the legally binding *streekplan*, a masterplan for sub-regions within the province. Because of the emphasis on the coordination role, and despite the legally binding status of the regional land-use plan, the province is nowadays considered the weakest level of government in the Netherlands (cf. Mastop 2001), in particular in the areas with dominant large cities such as the Randstad.

In the Schiphol area regional plan, the province of Noord-Holland sets strict zoning regulation, including tests of airport-relatedness for office and industrial locations. The closer the parcel of land is to the airport, the more airport-related the businesses should be. For developing the airport-related industrial locations, the province is joined by the municipalities of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer, both shareholders of the Schiphol Area Development Company (SADC). Furthermore, the province of Noord-Holland chairs the small and larger regional coordination organisations *Bestuurlijke Regiegroep Schiphol* (BRS), *Bestuursforum Schiphol* (BFS), and hosts and participates in the citizens' consultation platform *Commissie Regionaal Overleg luchthaven Schiphol* (CROS). The provinces Zuid-Holland and Utrecht only take part in BRS and CROS.

Actors on the regional level: Tokyo Metropolitan Area

In Japan, the prefectures (*ken*, *fu* or *to*) and their chairs, and the popularly elected governors, are important governmental layers. Even detailed issues as enlargement of shops over a hundred square meters have to be approved by the governor (Porter *et.al.* 2000). In terms of regional planning, the prefecture plays a coordinating and supervising role and is involved in major decisions. The indicative prefectural land-use plan is established by the prefecture, but regional development plans are more often drawn by the region, i.e. by joint and cooperating prefectures; in the case of Tokyo the Capital Region that consists of Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Chiba, Saitama, Kanagawa and Yamanashi-*ken*, and Tokyo-*to* (Tanimura and Edgington 2001). Since Tokyo is a prefecture by itself that contains a large urban area, it is discussed as a local actor below. The important planning tool of land expropriation is controlled on this prefecture level (Kotaka *et.al.* 2001). Every prefecture has a commission that decides on land expropriation in cases of important national interest, for instance international airports.⁴

The involvement of the prefecture in airport construction is related to the type of airport; MLIT is in charge of Class-1 (international) airports, prefectures are responsible for class 2 airports, and local governments manage class 3 airports. In the airport region, prefectures are the main actor. In the case of Narita, Chiba-ken is in charge of zoning the airport related industries near the airport in business parks. At Haneda, Tokyo prefecture is the main landowner of lands near the airport and decides upon redevelopment of the sites.

Actors on the regional level: Frankfurt Rhein-Main

The system of a federal state makes regional governments in Germany a stronger level of government than in unitary state systems in Japan and the Netherlands. In Frankfurt Rhein-Main, the state is not the only actor involved in regional planning; planning tasks are shared with the lower level of administrative districts and the regional planning associations.

In terms of spatial planning, the states have the main responsibility. Other responsibilities include building regulations, protection of monuments, nature and countryside protection and higher education (Schmidt-Eichstadt 2001). The Hessen state ministry involved in spatial and economic planning is the *Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung*. This Hessen Ministry of Economy, Transport and State Development is responsible for supervision of the above local interests in planning and to bring these interests in harmony with the planning concepts of the federation, outlined in the spatial development plans of *Landesentwicklungsprogramm* and *Landesentwicklungsplan*. These plans are for coordination and have no legally binding status and these planning procedures and planning program form the second group of planning instruments. The third instrument in planning is the land registry, and the fourth softer and non-binding instrument is the regional development concept, based on planning concepts or *Leitbilder* (Faludi 1997).

Spatial planning and economic development on the regional level is not limited to the state ministry alone, but shared with administrative districts and a regional planning association. The state of Hessen is subdivided into three public administration districts with executive powers (*Regierungsbezirke*); northern, central and southern Hessen with governors in respectively Kassel, Fulda and Darmstadt.⁵ The main function of the state governors is a limited role in coordination of the policy guidelines and intentions of the national, regional and local governments.

The regional planning association is *Planungsverband Ballungsraum Frankfurt Rhein-Main* (PVFRM) that draws the regional spatial plan. PVFRM is the 2001 successor to the 1975 original *Umlandverband Frankfurt* (UVF), that aimed to create cooperative and coordinated development in the Frankfurt region by transferring planning powers, water, waste, and leisure management to the regional level. This UVF was considered a 'toothless tiger' due to lack of enforcement capabilities, and limited regional coverage (Heinz 2000, Freund 2002a).⁶

The current regional planning association has even less powers, with a larger planning area consisting of more municipalities joining the PVFRM. Unique in Germany is the requirement in Frankfurt Rhein-Main for the Planungsverband to set up a *Regionaler Flächennutzungsplan* that combines regional planning and local structure plans within one plan. In practice this means negotiation between municipalities on the outlining of the spatial development in Frankfurt Rhein-Main. The second main task of the Planungsverband is the coordination of the plan for nature protection.

In airport area planning, the state of Hessen and administrative district Darmstadt play a major role. Since construction of new runways is not foreseen in the *Regionalplan Südhessen 2000*, spatial consequences of changing the plans should be considered in a compulsory *Raumordnungsverfahren*. Then, the regional plan can be changed in a procedure that is called *Planfeststellungsverfahren*. Finally, the airport can start drawing internal expansion plans and, in cooperation with the Hessen Ministry of Economy, Transport and State Development, the airport development plans. The administrative district approves the procedures and final plan. The *Planungsverband* is only involved in discussion forums on the airport expansion without planning instruments.

Actors on the local level: Randstad

The local level of government in the Netherlands is one that creates the legally binding land-use plan *bestemmingsplan* that is approved by the provinces. Furthermore, the local level draws more global structure plans on the sub-regional level, the *structuurplan*. The land-use plan is the successor of local extension plans from the 1901 Housing Act, and should be revised every decade (Mastop 2001). Social and economic dynamics however favour more flexible and less detailed land-use plans today (VROM-Raad 2001). Since the scale of social-economic activities of citizens is rising (see chapter 3), municipalities are merged and spatial planning becomes increasingly inter-municipal. Therefore, intermunicipal and indicative structure plans become more important planning tools on the local level. Although in theory, land-use plans cover most areas, there is no primacy of the plan due to exceptions and loopholes in planning procedures, as well as due to social and economic dynamics (Mastop 2001). The planning system is currently under revision and changes towards a system with more project-led development planning procedures today.⁷

Under Dutch law, larger cities and smaller municipalities have equal legal positions. On the local level, more than thirty municipalities are directly affected by Schiphol airport, in particular noise pollution. Here we limit the framing of actors to the major towns in the airport vicinity Haarlemmermeer, Amsterdam and to a lesser extent the suburban towns Aalsmeer and Amstelveen.

The airport is located in the east of Haarlemmermeer (130.000 inhabitants in 2005). This young municipality that includes the new towns Hoofddorp and Nieuw-Vennep is responsible for the land use plan of the airport. One of the aims of Haarlemmermeer is to realise planning tasks by an active development strategy of land and real estate, embodied in the policy document that reflects the spatial and economic vision Schiphol (REVS). Haarlemmermeer is not only active in area development of Schiphol by participating as a shareholder in Schiphol Area Development Company, it also sells land to project developers for office and industrial site development. As a result, the rapid economic and demographic growth forces Haarlemmermeer to offer new sites for housing in Nieuw-Vennep and Hoofddorp-West.

Amsterdam (735.000 citizens) was until the large airport expansion in the 1960s the main shareholder of Schiphol airport (Dierkx and Bouwens 1997). More important than the shareholder position is the position as largest city in the Netherlands, hence political influence, and the number of jobs that are created for Amsterdam's citizens.⁸ The city of Amsterdam is an actively involved shareholder in SADC and the joint project development in airport region. The

department of Economic Affairs of Amsterdam is the coordinator of the Schiphol dossier in cooperation with the local Urban Planning department.⁹

The municipalities Amstelveen and Aalsmeer, east of Schiphol, are under influence of the airport in terms of noise contours and economic impact. Amstelveen (79.000 inhabitants) accommodates the KLM headquarters, and other airport-related American and Japanese corporations, including many of its employees. Large parts of Aalsmeer experience strong noise, however few of the 23.000 inhabitants work is related to the airport.¹⁰ Active involvement of Aalsmeer and Amstelveen is limited.

Actors on the local level: Frankfurt Rhein-Main

The local level of government in Germany functions as communities (*Gemeinden*) that are part of the *Kreise* (counties), or as independent cities. In Frankfurt Rhein-Main these independent cities are Aschaffenburg (Bayern), Mainz and Worms (Rheinland-Pfalz), Darmstadt, Frankfurt, Offenbach, and Wiesbaden (Hessen).

The federal construction law determines that the *Bauleitplanung* (including *Bebauungsplan*) as land-use plans and *Flachennutzungsplan* (regional structure plan) are the main instruments of planning at the local level. The regional structure plan is not directly legally binding, but the land-use plan is. Since 1975, the common regional plan in Rhein-Main has been a planning tool on the regional level. Although the land-use plan has to fit in the context of the *Flachennutzungsplan* and *Regionalplan*, the bottom-up planning culture often leads to the adjustment of the plans at higher levels. Building permits act as a second planning tool for the communities. Although the tasks and responsibilities of the counties are decreasing, the *Landrat* (county chair) retains a say in planning issues. In the case of airport extension procedures, counties and communities have only an indirect say. Their interests should be considered a part of the planning process. In airport planning, the local government plays a strategic role since *Baugenehmigung* permission is required for all new constructions at the airport.

Since the airport is within the territory of the independent city, Frankfurt's local government is the main actor in charge of airport planning and expansion. The current airport territory includes the AIRRAIL Center, the cargo and A380 docks in the southeast and the redevelopment of Gateway Gardens. However, the new planned runway is partly in the bordering town of Kelsterbach, which benefits and suffers directly from the airport. Kelsterbach (14.000 inhabitants) is part of the county Gross-Gerau (252.000 inhabitants). A runway extension in Kelsterbach is in conflict with the current 44 hectares Ticona plastics manufacturing site. In 2002, Ticona Plastics increased production for its 1000 employees. The manufacturer for the time being refuses to move to other locations since it had earlier warned that airport expansion would have consequences. Frankfurt Airport however did not take these warnings very seriously (FR 26.01.2006).

Actors on the local level: Tokyo Metropolitan Area

Around 80% of all government spending in Japan takes place at the local level, compared to 50% in former West Germany and the U.S (Tanimura and Edgington 2001). In the process of implementing plans, the Japanese central government plays an overseeing role as fund supplier rather than being involved as instigator (*ibid.*). Although the structure of local government is

highly centralised and controlled by the national government, the municipalities themselves are the main actors involved in planning public works, amongst other things.

In Japan, the City Planning Law and the Building Standard Law coexist and form the basis of Tokyo city planning. The City Planning Law is the main law for regulating land use; the law can be applied for both designating areas for specific land uses and designating the type of land use in that area. Although this law can only be applied in the City Planning Area (CPA), zoning is crucial for understanding land uses in Tokyo. Compared to European countries, land uses are not strictly defined.¹¹ The city planning area is the highest level of scale in city planning and is drawn up by the governor of the prefecture. Depending on recent developments, the city planning area can be changed. The city planning area is subdivided in areas of urban dynamics (urbanization promotion area) and urban containment (urbanization control area). Finally, the Building Standard Law (BSL) is a complementary law to the City Planning Law. This law sets technical minimal standards for the construction and design of the buildings. Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) has the most important role to play in setting land use standards. The TMG is responsible for land zoning and the volume and size standards of buildings, as well as the strictness these regulations are enforced.¹²

In legal terms, the role of the cities' wards are limited to implementation and examination of planning laws, however recently some changes can be found. The gap between the regional level of the City Planning Law and the level of the construction itself (BSL) became increasingly problematic and was solved in 1980 by the introduction of the District Plan. The wards are the appropriate actor to develop and implement the district plan in cooperation with local citizens. District Plans make it possible to apply an area-oriented approach as one unit. They must fit into the city planning area's current zonings, and can only be made for urbanization promotion areas. Within the district plan, the shape and construction of a building, the change of use of the building, and land readjustment in a shared land pool, are the main instruments that require the ward mayor's approval. Sorensen (1999) considers land readjustment as the most important and most problematic tool in planning, as it does not avoid urban sprawl.¹³

The local communities have limited involvement in airport area planning. A team that is closely linked to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation manages Haneda Airport. The team is directly involved in Haneda's island area planning in Ota ward. Narita International Airport is located in Narita city and borders other communities such as Tomisato, Shibayama-Osaka and Takomachi. Despite the recent merger of the municipalities around Narita into Narita Airport City, the villages have a very small role in airport area planning (Interview Yamada and Kawaguchi 2004). Until recently, the Aviation Department of the MLIT has been the actor in charge of developing the airport territory. Due to jurisdictional sensitivities, local and regional authorities hesitate to be involved in airport area planning.

Government actors in the case studies

The overview of national, regional and local governments as actors show considerable differences between the case studies. The Netherlands' planning system is unique in the sense that all three governmental tiers have their own land use plans; in theory they perfectly fit together. Therein, national level supervises the regional level, and the regional level supervises the local level. The levels of government in Japan are less ideal-typical, with a national level and formally two-tier local level (regional and local). Planning in Japan is not only about land use, since

economic development takes priority. This makes the 'prohibition planning' of the Netherlands and Germany (e.g. prescribed land use) different, in that Japan has incentives in planning or 'opportunity planning' (e.g. urbanization promotion areas), in addition to planning control instruments.

The German planning system is quintessentially different from the centralised systems, with a decentralised and subsidiary structure. The federal level's planning is carefully limited to technical regulations and general planning guidelines. Different from Japan and the Netherlands, the German state is not involved in regional and local planning. This subsidiarity is reflected in airport area planning. Despite the strategic importance of Frankfurt International Airport for Germany, it is a local and regional planning task. The opposite is true in Japan. With the crucial position of Haneda for Tokyo, Tokyo Metropolitan Government is not involved in planning Asia's largest airport on her own territory. In the Netherlands, all levels of government are involved in planning tasks and consultation rounds.

6.3 Airport operators and airport users

Schiphol Group NV is the operator of Schiphol airport, and major owner of Rotterdam, Lelystad and Eindhoven airports in the Netherlands; their main purpose is to operate the airports and to create added value for its shareholders. Schiphol's main instruments are airport management, and the inherent political and economic influence it has at the regional and national level. The board of management, that presents itself as 'mayor and aldermen of the airport city,' lobbies actively for further privatisation and stock exchange listing of the airport. Abroad, Schiphol Group ownership is limited to New York JFK's Terminal 4 and Brisbane's airport in Australia (Schiphol Group 2005). Schiphol owns the land of the airport territory and is 33,2% shareholder of Schiphol Area Development Company (SADC).

KLM is the dominant user of Schiphol airport and has *grandfather rights* for using the airport and KLM's effective airlines strategy is one of the main reasons that Schiphol could become the fourth largest hub in Europe (Burghouwt 2005). The KLM-Transavia group uses over 70% of the total landing rights, and is therefore an important actor in the region, but does not have a dedicated terminal. The merger of KLM with Air France and the dominant position of the Sky Team at the airport is likely to continue its relationship with Schiphol. The main concerns for KLM are to not to pay high landing fees, and to improve baggage handling, in order to stay competitive.

Fraport AG is operator and owner of Frankfurt, Frankfurt-Hahn, Hannover, Saarbrücken, Antalya (Turkey) and Lima (Peru) airports, with similar business aims and strategies as Schiphol Group (Fraport 2005). The business activities in the Philippines and Kazakhstan were financial disappointments that led to withdrawal. Fraport's main instruments are the airport management and the political influence from being Germany's largest *Arbeitsstätte*. Since the airport already has access to the private capital market and is running out of slot capacity (the number of permitted landings and take-offs), the board of management's focus is on constructing a third runway and a third terminal building.

Lufthansa is the dominant user of Frankfurt Airport based on *grandfather rights*. The airlines force Fraport to provide better services and conditions, including a Lufthansa/Star Alliance

dedicated terminal and a training centre near the airport, in order to compete with other Lufthansa hubs in München and Zürich.

Haneda's airport authority Japan Airport Terminal Co., Ltd. is directly subordinated under The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport's Aviation Department. The government owns the island; therefore the airport authority rents terminal buildings and runways. Japan Airport Terminal sub-rents the shops to retailers and service providers and determines the rent levels, which they are obligated to disclose to the MLIT (Interview Obuchi and Kuniwake 2004). The current focus of Haneda is the airport fourth runway construction and plans for a third terminal. The range of economic activities at and near the airport is limited. Furthermore, there are no plans for privatisation. On the other side of Tamagawa river, local governments of Ota ward and Kawasaki are in charge of Kawasaki coastal redevelopment.

ANA, JAL and Skymark are the dominant users of the airport, with recent terminal buildings for the airlines and alliance partners. The new second terminal is dedicated to ANA and Skymark, while JAL uses Terminal 1.

Narita Airport Authority (NAA) is in charge of managing the airport buildings and runways and focuses on three issues. First, the privatisation of the airport since 2004 with full sale of stocks to private owners in 2007 is a major issue (NAA 2004). Second, access to Tokyo needs improvement. Finally, local relations in order to expand the airport with a full second runway have to be improved. The airport area has strict boundaries and Narita city and Chiba prefecture are in charge of real estate development surrounding the airport. In Narita's violent past, the attitude was not to develop land surrounding the airport. However, recent improvement in cooperation with landowners and privatisation of the airport in 2004 makes NAA more active in buying land surrounding the airport territory (Interview Namekata 2004). This bought land cannot be developed until Chiba prefecture approves the change of land use in the future.

JAL, ANA and a few American airlines companies are the main users of Narita's airport terminals (see chapter 4). The renovation of terminal buildings will also in the case of Narita lead to dedicated terminals for the JAL alliance in Terminal 2 and ANA alliance in Terminal 1.

The involvement of actors is similar in Osaka's Kansai International Airport (KIX, 1994, managed by Kansai International Airport Company), and Nagoya's Chubu International Airport (CIA, 2005, managed by Central Japan International Airport Co.). These airport authorities are in charge of managing the airport terminal buildings and runways, and the land in between. On the other hand, prefectures are managing and constructing the other reclaimed coastal lands (Chunichi Shimbun 30.9.2004 and 4.10.2004).

A crucial difference in actor involvement is that CJIAC is a local and private initiative, where KIX is a prefecture initiative combined with a national prestige public works public-private partnership. CJIAC aims to reduce construction costs by applying the Toyota- management model. On the other hand, Kansai International is for technical and ambitious reasons an expensive airport that could resist the Great Hansin Earthquake of 1995.

In summary, the cases show a variety of positions of airport authorities and airport users. Jurisdiction of Schiphol and Fraport goes furthest; they are not only allowed to manage the airports, but they also develop buildings and infrastructure at the airport territories, and own

and operate airports abroad. In contrast, the number of activities of Haneda's airport are strictly limited, and in the case of Narita because of privatisation slowly expanding. The position of airlines as airport users is most efficient for the home carriers dedicated terminals of Lufthansa at Frankfurt, and JAL/ANA at Haneda.

6.4 Commercial actors

Thus far the roles, instruments and power positions of the actors with a public role are described. On the other side we can find market parties with their own positions, interests and instruments. The developers offer capacity, knowledge, and interim financing that are necessary for developing real estate or entire areas. Developers can be distinguished as independent and traditional developers, developers from construction industries, financial institutes, and specialized airport area developers.

Schiphol investors, project and area developers

Schiphol Real Estate (SRE) was established in 1998 and is a full subsidiary of Schiphol Group. Schiphol Real Estate develops, manages and owns the real estate at the airport territory and at some airport-related locations in the region, e.g. the joint venture at Schiphol Logistics Parc (48% ownership) and A4-Zone. Project development includes platform-related industrial sites and airport-related office locations, thereby distinguishing itself from the airport-related industrial activities of SADC.

Schiphol Area Development Company (SADC) has been developing airport-related industrial sites in the region since 1987. Local and regional governments, Schiphol, and until 2003 the NIB bank participate as shareholders in SADC. The aim of SADC is to make full use of the spatial and economic potential in the region with a harmonized development model. Therefore, core activities are bringing sites on-line ready for development, project management, industrial park management, and regional infrastructure development (SADC 2005). Actual real estate development is not done by SADC itself but outsourced to real estate developers. At the end of the development process however, SADC is involved in the airport-relatedness test of interested industries. Furthermore, SADC shares services with Amsterdam Airport Area (AAA) for foreign marketing and sales of locations in the wider airport region. There is a wide and complicated variation in participation, ownership, management and marketing of locations in the region.¹⁴

Chipshol is a major private landowner, developer and asset manager. Chipshol bought large agricultural sites at the end of the 1980s near the airport territory in Badhoevedorp-Zuid, the High Speed Logistics Park that includes the Groenberg area near Aalsmeer, and Schiphol Rijk. Schiphol Rijk has been developed in cooperation with SADC and these rents are currently the main source of income for the investment company (Interview Poot 2004). Chipshol claims that it has a disadvantaged position and is discriminated against in area development, compared to those close to policy making related to SRE and SADC. They recently won a lawsuit over the Groenberg area construction prohibition by national assignment.

Mainland is a traditional developer that buys and develops land with mainly office real estate for international corporations in Schiphol Rijk, Lutkemeer, Nieuw-Vennep, Lijnden and Rijswijk.

The American distribution real estate specialists AMB and ProLogis are involved in several distribution centres around the airport. ProLogis is primarily focussed on developing sites and AMB's niche is service and ownership of land and real estate. ProLogis has buildings inside and outside of the airport territory, with DHL as one of the users.

Furthermore, there are land positions in the area held by banks, including ING Real Estate, Rabobank Vastgoed, and ABN-AMRO's Bouwfonds. ING Real Estate develops locations at Schiphol. Bouwfonds has bought land in Hoofddorp-West, and Rabobank in the Legmeerpolder, both for large-scale housing development, that has recently been banned because of VROM's new noise contours. Construction industry related developer AM does not have this problem in developing housing in Nieuw-Vennep-West (to be discussed in chapter 9.6).

Finally, national Dutch railways (NS) are partly involved as project developer, since the airport is connected to the Amsterdam-Leiden railway connection. Due large-scale station redevelopment projects in the 1990s, NS Vastgoed (real estate) could become one of the ten largest project developers in the Netherlands, but at Schiphol their role is subordinate to Schiphol Real Estate. The Schiphol train tunnel was build by NS' daughter Strukton joined by BAM and Ballast Nedam. Other relevant construction firms in the Schiphol area are KWS, Heijmans, Ooms, Koop Tjuchem, HBM and Dura Vermeer that join the group Noord-Holland-8 (further discussed in chapter 8.6).

Frankfurt investors, project and area developers

In the case of Frankfurt, Fraport is the main owner of land and real estate in the airport territories. Fraport AG is not directly involved in the project development as an investor, as Schiphol RE does, but is heading in this direction. Their portfolio of assets and facilities management is widening (Interview Rossbrey 2003). Fraport can be seen as the area developer with a general interest in creating an attractive business location and reducing financial risks. Recent cooperation with the city of Frankfurt has resulted in developing locations as Gateway Gardens in the wider airport area.

Deutsche Bahn can be seen as a special project developer as well. The national railway company is similar to Dutch railways in that they are subdivided into several businesses. Separate from the core activities of Deutsche Bahn businesses, are real estate development and energy supply; decentralised to nine regions. DB, including the station at Frankfurt airport Fernbahnhof, owns many attractive railway station sites that are available for redevelopment. Both Deutsche Bahn and Fraport are specialised developers, but not directly in charge of the AIRRAIL Center project.

The traditional developers are dominant in Frankfurt Rhein-Main. The bankruptcy of the Holzmann group has shown the risks of combining construction and developing interests. In AIRRAIL Center, the real estate developers are the subcontracted developers of Fraport and Deutsche Bahn, with their own financial obligations and expertise. Bilfinger+Berger, Adler Real Estate and IVG/Tercon are the main actors. Bilfinger+Berger is a developer from the construction industry. Adler Real Estate is a succession of the traditional real estate developer Roland Ernst, who quit operating as a developer. IVG is a large European project developer, concentrated in metropolitan areas and represented in AIRRAIL by daughter company Tercon.

Haneda/Narita investors, project and area developers

In Japan, real estate developers and constructors are the main players in transforming the cityscape. Mitsui Fudosan, Mitsubishi Estate and Sumitomo Realty & Development are the largest developers with a stock exchange listing, and are directly related to financial institutions. In order to find financing banks, contractors and subcontractors, large real estate developers often use their position in a group of cooperating companies, the *keiretsu*, led by major banks. Mori Building Corporation is a more independent player on the real estate market, without a stock market listing and not being part of a *keiretsu* (Chorus 2002). In addition, there are companies that have mostly retail and rail as core activities, but also own and develop land near the railways, e.g. Tokyu, Seibu and Japan Railways (JR).

The major constructors coordinate the construction activities and cooperate with several subcontractors. Nowadays, constructors are not only involved in construction, but also play a role during the entire real estate development process: buying land, planning, design, maintenance and management. The five largest construction firms are Kajima, Taisei, Shimizu, Kobayashi and Takenaka, and are part of the stable former so-called *zaibetsu* of independent companies. They have strong and privileged relations with the national government and therefore are in a stable position for receiving construction contracts.

In airport planning both major Japanese and foreign constructors are playing a role. Japanese constructors are competing with the steel industry in constructing the terminals and hangars. Despite the wide range of activities, the leading real estate developers in Japan are rarely involved in airport area planning – they are able to focus on more profitable sites in downtown Tokyo. An exception is Penta-Ocean, not a major regular construction firm, but a privileged developer. Penta-Ocean is an expert in Asian airport projects. Their portfolio includes Kansai, Haneda, Chubu, and Singapore.

Foreign real estate developers and constructors are allowed in the Japanese market after the international dispute of Kansai International Airport, where American constructors were not allowed to tender (Bongenaar 2001). Legal procedures and transparency are promoted, but informal cultural rules hamper entrance to the market. In Tokyo, foreign developers are not able to enter the attractive CBD market due to these informal institutions, and thus focus on peripheral attractive locations for development, for instance distribution centres and manufacturing parks near Narita.

Schiphol asset management

The aim of asset managers is to increase direct returns on investment and decrease financial risk by investing in real estate. The asset management market continues to globalise and increase in scale (Uittenbogaard and Rompelman 2002). The result is that more investment capital is available, but this also implies that more locations have to compete for asset managers. The real estate market is becoming more transparent. Trade will go faster in the near future, with less governmental regulation.

Despite the low office rents in the Netherlands, asset managers continue to invest in real estate. The main reason is that Dutch pension funds such as ABP are under the largest in the world, and are constantly looking for investment opportunities (Van der Krabben and Lambooy 1993). Furthermore, financial risks in the Netherlands are low due to governmental-led and stable urban development as a product of the consensus culture.

The Netherlands' National Investment Bank (NIB) was a bank set-up after World War II to invest in strategic sectors for national economic development. NIB was also involved in long-term financing in the Schiphol Area Development Company in 1987. NIB changed its name to NIB Capital, and was later privately owned by pension funds PGGM and ABP. NIB Capital withdrew as a SADC shareholder in 2003, since her intended role was more or less finished (Interview Migchelbrink 2005; see chapter 8).

Although separated by law in the Netherlands, project development and asset management in the airport region are combined within Schiphol Group in separate companies. Schiphol has a dominant position of 50% participation in the Airport City Real Estate fund ACRE. ING Real Estate investment fund owns the other 50% of the asset management company, therefore actually owning half of seven buildings on the airport territory that were brought into this fund in 2002. Finally, Kantorenfonds Nederland (KfN) is a major asset manager in the airport region that owns the World Trade Centres Schiphol and Amsterdam-Zuidas, amongst others.

Frankfurt asset management

Due to a new tax on project development for corporation owners/share holders in the Netherlands, the German commercial real estate market became more attractive for investment (Van Doorn and Jansen 2002). In the case of the AIRRAIL Centre for instance, the development coalition can postpone selling AIRRAIL, or keep it as an ownership trustee, until the real estate market is interested to buy. This is also possible due to the sheer/large size of German asset management companies that have large stakes in property holdings, such as Dutch shopping centres.

German banks operate more at a regional and local level, than in the Netherlands. Therefore it is possible to create coalitions and regional embeddedness for long-term investment in real estate. In particular, this is possible since both Landesbank and Sparkasse banks are partly owned by regional governments.

Owners of real estate in Frankfurt Rhein-Main are satisfied with returns on investment of 5.5%, which expresses the balance of required rents and total value (IVG 2003). This is lower than most of Europe and lower than the Schiphol region (7%). This shows the confidence in the real estate market and the quality of investment – the longer the period of high returns, the lower the expected return in advance. On the other hand, German real estate shareholders are conservative and avoid risks. These conditions of confidence and risk-avoidance made it possible to build the Messeturm tower in downtown Frankfurt with a direct return of 4%. In comparison, on average the real estate is of higher quality than in the Netherlands and with higher added value in the long term. In the central wards of Tokyo, locations are even more attractive for asset managers, with direct return on investment hovering between 2% to 4% (JREI 2003).

Haneda/Narita asset management

Real estate asset managers in Japan can be subdivided into three groups: life insurance companies, credit banks and land owners (Wijers 1988).¹⁵ Since pension funds are not allowed to invest themselves, life insurance companies and banks are the direct investors of pensions. Life insurance companies are the main institutional investors, and as a rule buy the properties from real estate developers. Nevertheless, the recent trend has been insurance companies investing directly in real estate themselves (Chorus 2002). Credit banks are cooperating with land trusts in institutional investments, with Sumitomo, Mitsui and Mitsubishi as market leaders.

The landowner 'trusts' land to the credit bank in order to construct new buildings on the land. After the construction, interest and maintenance costs are assured, the bank shares part of the rent with the landowner. The aim of the land trusts is to have a more effective land use on the parcels. Thanks to the 'never sell mentality' of the land owners, the land trust is a commonly applied method.

The Development Bank of Japan (DBJ) has a special position in the group of credit banks, since it is a government related, but independent bank that supplies loans with interest rates below market level. Therefore, DBJ plays a role in supplying finances for the expensive airport expansions at Haneda, Kansai and Kitakyushu built on reclaimed land in the sea. Foreign direct investors and Japanese public-private companies can apply for DBJ loans. Furthermore, many companies, e.g. Japan Railways East (JR East) and Tokyu Co., own and keep land positions as a guarantee for loans, to avoid high land transfer taxes or make future activities possible. As a result, these businesses set up their own real estate departments and joint arrangements with institutional investors.

In sum, all case studies show project developers, constructors and asset management companies with considerable market positions that give these commercial actors a relevant role to play in the planning process. The activities in the discussed airport areas vary greatly. Commercial actors' activity is highest at Schiphol, ranging from speculators waiting for action to public-private partnerships. A similar pattern is found in Frankfurt, but with more careful consideration of which to play: real estate development is e.g. outsourced by Fraport to constructors, and the city of Frankfurt limits here role to facilitating the planning process. In contrast to Schiphol and Frankfurt, activity at Haneda and Narita is limited. Where the public National Investment Bank in the case of Schiphol invested in area development, the Development Bank of Japan focuses its investments on construction rather than area development, with Kansai as an exception.

6.5 Advisory organisations and other actors

There is a wide range of advisory boards that are involved in airport area development in the case studies. These advisors can be distinguished into advisory boards with a direct stake, and the ones that try to advise more independently. Their main importance is niche knowledge or political-bureaucratic influence based on a formal advising position. In particular in the case of airports, a large number of advisory boards are involved. Fortunately, within the case studies similar kinds of advisors are involved and will be discussed together in brief. The overview of advisory actors is not exhaustive; the focus is on the most important actors involved and those who play a considerable role in the institutional analysis. The groups of advisory organizations are: government-related, advisors with business interests, advisors with interests in the construction industry, advisors with interest in transportation, and finally groups that are more case-study specific advisors.

Government-related actors

In the field of economic and spatial development, the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) is the most influential advisory organisation. In the case of public investment projects, a second consultation at CPB is required. Furthermore, CPB sets standards for forecasting and evaluation as others do, such as OEEI (Overview of Economic Effects of

Infrastructure, Ministry of Transport and Water Management 2000) and MKBA (Society Cost-Benefit Analysis).

The Netherlands National Institute for Spatial Research (RPB) is the second of four national planning agencies, which also include the socio-cultural bureau and the nature- and environment bureau. RPB is directly involved in evaluation of the airport noise reduction policies. Other major formal advisory boards without direct interest in urban planning in the Netherlands are *VROM-Raad* (advisement from Ministry of VROM) and *Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat* (advisement from the Ministry of Transport and Water Management).

Business interests

The second group of advisory boards aim to improve the regional economy. The Chambers of Commerce were founded for two reasons: on the one hand to protect the interests of businesses, and on the other hand to support the government in economic policies with private-sector knowledge. The American Chamber of Commerce in Japan is the local US representative and wrote a report on one of the most urgent economic problems, the lack of foreign direct investment in Japan (ACCJ 2004).¹⁶ However, Keidanren is in Japan the most influential organisation of business interests (see below). In Frankfurt Rhein-Main, about 40 laws state that the Chamber of Commerce (IHK) should be consulted for local and regional issues, including airport expansion. The jurisdiction of IHK thus exceeds the jurisdiction of the Chambers of Commerce in the Netherlands (KvK). KvK Amsterdam stresses in the case of Schiphol, the importance of trade and transportation for the Dutch economy and is in this position joined by the national employers organisation VNO-NCW, and transport sector lobbyists of *Nederland Distributieland*.

Economic interests in Frankfurt Rhein-Main are not only represented by the Chamber of Commerce, but also organised in the *Wirtschaftsinitiative* and *Wirtschaftsförderung*. The latter is in charge of economic promotion on the local level. This organization is a typical German construct of an autonomous administration on the local level, but independent from governmental influence. The merged *Wirtschaftsinitiative – Metropolitana Frankfurt Rhein-Main* was set up by leading businesses, chaired by Fraport president Bender, in order to discuss regional issues with politicians. Efforts for a political-administrative counterweight to the economic interest are being undertaken – but are struggling. Even the name for the region: Frankfurt with or without Rhein-Main as adjective has not been without controversy.

Construction and design

The third group of advisory actors involved in airport area development is related to the construction, design and consultation industries.

The Japan Project-Industry Council (JAPIC) was established in 1979 and became one of Japan's four 'societies.' JAPIC is a council with construction sector related companies as main contributors and members. JAPIC's main aim is to contribute to society by improving infrastructure projects and land utilization in Japan. JAPIC's less influential sister organisation in the Netherlands is *Bouwwend Nederland*, that plays a profound role in advocating the Zuidas new business district between Schiphol and Amsterdam. In Japan, MLIT used to cooperate closely with JAPIC in developing the Trans-Tokyo Bay Highway, Makuhari New City Center and Kansai International Airport. Sorensen (2002) argues that this construction lobby group became highly influential in the 1980s, lobbying for new airports, highways and shinkansen projects, but is currently losing influence.¹⁷

JAPIC is involved in the New Tokyo Metropolitan Airport Research Council for studying a third civil airport for Tokyo in the long term. In cooperation with Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (*Keidanren*), Japan Association of Corporate Executives (JACE) and Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry (TCCI), JAPIC established in 1993 the New Tokyo Metropolitan Airport Research Council (1993), with most Japanese business conglomerates as members. The council was involved in studies that explore the possibilities of a third airport in Tokyo.¹⁸

Table 6.1 Overview of strategic actors in the airport areas case studies

	Randstad-Schiphol	Frankfurt Rhein-Main	Tokyo-Haneda/Narita
National ministries	Transport and Water (V&W) Housing, Urban Planning, Environment (VROM) Economic Affairs (EZ) Finances (FIN)	Transport, Construction, Housing (BMVBW)	Economy, Trade, Industry (METI) Finance (MoF) Land, Infrastructure, Transport (MLIT) Economic Planning Agency (EPA) National Land Agency (NLA)
Regional government	Noord-Holland (Zuid-Holland, Utrecht, Flevoland) provinces	Hessen (Bayern, Rheinland- Pfalz) states Darmstadt administrative district F-R/M regional planning association	Tokyo-to prefecture (Haneda) Chiba-ken prefecture (Narita)
Local government	Haarlemmermeer, Amsterdam, Amstelveen, Aalsmeer	Frankfurt, Kelsterbach, Gross- Gerau	Tokyo Ota-ward, Kawasaki, Yokohama; Narita, Tomisato, Shibayama, Takomachi
Airport authorities	Schiphol Group N.V.	Fraport A.G.	Japan Airport Terminal, Co.Ltd. Narita Airport Authority, Co. Ltd.
Airport users	Air France-KLM	Lufthansa Star Alliance	JAL, ANA
Real estate developers	Schiphol Real Estate (SRE) Schiphol Area Dev. Company (SADC), Schiphol, Mainland, AMB – ProLogis, ING – ABN-AMRO – Rabobank	Fraport Real Estate + Deutsche Bahn Fraport + Frankfurt joint ventures	
Constructors	Ballast Nedam, KWS, Heijmans, Ooms, BAM, Koop Tjuchem, HBM, Dura Vermeer, Stukton	Bilfinger+Berger, Adler, IVG (AIRRAIL)	Kajima, Taisei, Shimizu, Kobayashi, Takenaka Penta-Ocean
Asset managers	NIB Capital ACRE (SRE/ING)		Development Bank of Japan (Kansai, Chubu Intl.)
Advisory	CPB, RPB Chamber of Comm. Amsterdam Raad V&W, VROM-Raad	Chamber of Comm. F-R/M Wirtschaftsförderung Wirtschaftsinitiative Metropolitana	Keidanren, JAPIC Tokyo Chamber of Comm. and Industry, ACCJ
Others	NACO, RAND	RMV, regional media, AS+P	

Technology firms also tend to become stakeholders in the airport area. Siemens offered the technological knowledge and infrastructure for creating high-speed train connections between the airport and city-region in the scenario 'Schiphol in the North Sea' in the 1990s, and for the new München downtown-airport railway. Furthermore, airport consultants NACO globally, RAND in Europe, and AS+P in Frankfurt Rhein-Main have a role in contributing knowledge for the airport as a cityport, but are at the same time stakeholders.

Media and transportation

It is finally worth addressing two other groups of actors involved with Frankfurt Rhein-Main that are essential for regional integration. The Randstad does not have these two actors: regional media and public transportation associations.¹⁹ Regional media are common in Germany since media are dependent on local and regional advertisers, with the German market is too large. Frankfurt Rhein-Main's daily newspapers are the *Frankfurter Rundschau* (FR), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) and *Frankfurter Neue Presse* (FNP). Since the problems of cooperation in the city-region in general and the airport expansion in particular are major issues of debate, journalists are interested and write regularly about these issues and take part in public debates.

Another strategic actor is the publicly financed but independently functioning *Rhein Main Verkehrsverbund* (RMV). The concept of this regional transportation association was both urgent and progressive (Interview Lunkenheimer and Stanek 2003). Urgent, since until 1991 bus passengers had to buy a new ticket at the border of Frankfurt. Progressive, since all transportation companies were coordinated based on a strong concept, political support based on one-city-one-vote, cost-effective financing and solidarity amongst towns and cities. The RMV is taken seriously because it has its own budget. In the airport development, a direct involvement is found with the plans for the regional tangent west, that connects the airport in a more polycentric pattern with towns and villages west and east of the airport, rather than the current axes to Frankfurt. Randstad and Tokyo do not have a counterpart of comparable status and influence in the area development near airports.

The overview of strategic actors is not exhaustive but includes a variety of advisory actors. This is summarised in Table 6.1.

6.6 Airport area coalitions

The actor coalitions that are created in the region can be subdivided at the national debate level: the growth of aviation and airport expansion on the one hand (the airport coalitions), and the spatial-economic development on the regional level on the other hand (airport area coalitions). For the most important decisions on expanding the airport and the construction of runways, the first debate is decisive. However, for further development of spatial and economic spin-offs in the region, a regional public actor coalition is indispensable.

Schiphol airport coalitions

Within the wider airport region, an uncountable number of actors are involved in planning, land and real estate ownership, development and airport usage. A limited number of actors are of decisive importance and are addressed here. In general, Schiphol, KLM, and the Ministry

of Transport and Water Management (V&W) are seen as the sustainable core of the airport coalition (Figure 6.1). The municipalities of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer, and to a lesser extent the province of Noord-Holland and the ministries of VROM and Economic Affairs (EZ), have been active in the Schiphol debates on long-term basis and are part of the (see Figure 6.1). Smaller towns do not participate in the formal airport debates actively; although for instance Aalsmeer opposed the new Aviation Law, but later finally accepted it.

Although the limits of growth of the airport at the current location were already pointed out in 1967 (see chapter 4.3), the national government has shown an unwillingness to acknowledge the conclusions of the report and has reacted with the creation of new commissions for further research (Dierikx and Bouwens 1997). Alternative locations were discussed, but ministries were worried about cost overruns of new airports constructed on islands in the Markermeer or the North Sea. Schiphol was and still is for logistical and financial reasons not fond of investing in an alternative location and lobbied for runway expansion. For decades, aviation continued to grow and Schiphol and KLM managed growth at the current location. In the end, the ministries joined the coalition with Schiphol and KLM. After debate in parliament, it was decided to further expand the airport capacity at the current location by building a fifth runway, despite opposition from local towns, residents and environmental groups. Political consensus was reached with the condition that both economic and environmental targets should be reached. With a fifth runway, noise in the built-up area would decrease, while more flights would be allowed, the so-called double target (*dubbeldoelstelling* in PKB Schiphol en Omgeving (1995)).

Figure 6.2 does not only show the position of actors in the coalition, but it also indicates the dynamics over time. Schiphol and KLM are long-term partners with the Netherlands Ministry of Transport (V&W in Figure 6.1) and its Civil Aviation Authority RLD in the airport growth coalition. Especially in the 1990s, the Ministry of Transport became a leader in the coalition with an expanding role in, managing, maintaining and controlling the development of Schiphol. The Ministry of VROM that introduced the mainport concept initially left the core of the airport coalition for environmental concerns, but recently returned for two reasons:




Figure 6.1 Schiphol growth coalition (left) and environment coalition (right) (Source: Figure based on Smit (2001))

the priority of economic development, and protection of the citizens by not allowing new housing concentrations in the noise contour areas. The province of Noord-Holland as a regional coordinator has recently backed the interests of smaller towns, and therefore opposes VROM's protective stance against further airport development. Before however, Noord-Holland and Haarlemmermeer were more supportive of the growth coalition (see Figure 6.1). Amsterdam was one of the key players in the coalition formation due to its dependence on the airport area for jobs and status of the airport for the city. Haarlemmermeer boomed due to aviation growth and was until recently a loyal but weak partner in negotiations with other actors.

Currently the 'growth machine' has stalled due to a general lack of confidence at the local level (Com. Eversdijk 2006) and remains in 'sleeping mode' (Interview Jacobs 2005). The Netherlands Ministry of Transport has recently become more aware of its ambiguous position between airport development and airport control. The focus on control moves V&W out of the traditional growth coalition. Schiphol Group itself claims to have improved its formal relations in the region but recent conflicts with actors in the environmental coalition show otherwise. Aalsmeer, Haarlemmermeer, Noord-Holland citizens and in particular environmental groups have recently moved further from the airport coalition. Air France-KLM is after the merger no longer a natural sustainable partner in the Schiphol growth coalition either (Van Boxtel or Huys 2005).²⁰ The current lock-in of the growth coalition will be stressed further in the section on institutions of governance, but has direct impact on the area for development near the airport. Not only are the impacts directly related to the noise and pollution problems but also the actor coalitions in the airport area.

Schiphol airport area coalitions

In the Schiphol region a wide number of regional cooperation platforms exist, some because of legal basis, some have legislative powers, and others are on a voluntary basis: BFS, BRS, CROS, ROA and *Noordvleugeloverleg*, in italics in Figure 6.2. *Bestuursforum Schiphol* (BFS) aims to improve economic and spatial development at the airport and in the wider region by nominating industrial and office locations for development, based on the shared policy document REVS. The members of Bestuursforum are Amsterdam, Haarlemmermeer, and Schiphol Group- chaired by Noord-Holland.

Regional coordination of the *Bestuurlijke Regiegroep Schiphol* (BRS) is subdivided into the core groups *BRS-klein* and for the wider region the larger *BRS-groot*. Amsterdam, Haarlemmermeer and Noord-Holland are members of the BRS-klein. They focus on regional planning issues comparable to BFS, however since Schiphol is not part of BRS-klein, an entanglement of public and private interests can in theory be avoided. BRS-groot is BRS-klein plus the provinces Zuid-Holland, Utrecht and 30 municipalities affected by airplanes (see Figure 6.2). The aim of the BRS-G is to inform the provinces on local and regional spatial and economic issues related to Schiphol.

The regional entity Amsterdam ROA (*Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam*) is the 1992 successor of the regional platform of Amsterdam and neighbouring cities. It is a non-binding organisation that recently became more relevant due to the *Kaderwet* regional cooperation act that decentralises investments budgets.²¹

The *Noordvleugeloverleg* coordination platform of local governments in the northern wing of the Randstad recently became important and promising for cooperation in spatial and economic




Figure 6.2 Coordination platforms in the Schiphol area (Source: Com. De Grave (2005:69))

strategies because of its noncommittal character. As a result, there is wide public support in the region (cf. Salet and Molenaar 2003).

Finally, CROS (*Commissie Regionaal Overleg luchthaven Schiphol*) is an independent platform that has representatives from provinces, municipalities, citizens, air traffic controllers, Schiphol and national airlines. More than the economic and spatially oriented BRS-groot, CROS focuses on environmental and safety issues of aviation in the area that is affected by Schiphol.

One of the main coordination organisations of industrial land development is the Schiphol Area Development Company. SADC is a unique public-private institutional innovation that exploits the benefits of an airport and the area surrounding it. It became an example for airport areas in Frankfurt, Berlin, and Stockholm. SADC mainly functions as a company, while other organisations are primarily coordination platforms.

The number of coordination platforms contributes to what Com. De Grave (2005) call 'governmental pressure' in the airport region. In the airport area development 'coalition', it is not only remarkable that many public coordination organisations dominate the playing field, furthermore it is striking that private companies in the right bottom of Figure 6.2, are not directly involved in the development process. Typically they are expected to reside under the Chamber of Commerce of Amsterdam. In particular, land owner and project developer Chipshol considers itself excluded from the development coalition (see chapter 9).




Figure 6.3 Frankfurt growth coalition (left) and environment coalition (right) (Source: author)

Frankfurt airport coalitions

The formation of growth coalitions and environmental coalitions near Frankfurt airport in Rhein-Main has a similar pattern as found in the case of Schiphol in the Randstad area. This might not be a surprise since the kind of spatial-economic and environmental problems are similar. In Frankfurt Rhein-Main, airport expansion by increasing the number of flights and runways is even more sensitive than in the case of Schiphol. The violent past of the second north-south runway construction has made Dierikx and Bouwens (1997:185) called the case “*expansion at all costs.*” This underlines the conflict mode in Frankfurt airport development in the last decades.

The federal level is not involved in the debate, since there is largely no national airport strategy, which makes the case different from Schiphol. The association of entrepreneurs in Hessen already in 1994 demanded a new runway for the airport, in 1997 Lufthansa made the same demands (Troost 2001). The important role of business association lobbies in Frankfurt Rhein-Main is therefore different from the Randstad-Schiphol case. Under a political shift of governing from the left (SPD-Grüne) to right (CDU-FDP), the difference is illustrated by Hessen’s parliament decision to install a 20 member mediation committee in 1998 with three mediators as chairs to explore under which conditions further airport development can contribute to the regional economy, without putting an extra burden on the environment and local citizens. The question was not if, but how to expand the airport. The biased position of the chairmen was the main reason for environmental groups not to participate (Troost 2001).

The mediation process of 1998–2000 should have led to win-win situations and consensus, but in fact created a rift between economic and environmental groups that have their own ideologies (Troost 2001:271). The final report of the mediators was presented as an unanimous decision in favour of airport expansion (Hänsch, Niethammer and Oeser 2002); this remained controversial (Troost 2001). A majority of Hessen’s governing parties CDU and FDP and opposition party SPD supported airport expansion plan and approved the start of the planning procedures. Despite the mediation process, airport growth coalition partners Fraport AG, Lufthansa, the City of Frankfurt, Hessen’s Ministry of Economy, and regional business associations²² are still

at odds with the environmental coalition of environmental and resident groups²³, joined by Planungsverband regional planning association (Figure 6.3). In the public debate, a majority in Frankfurt Rhein-Main supports airport expansion.²⁴ Kelsterbach and Raunheim strongly oppose the new runway. Despite obvious economic spin-offs, the housing environment would be degraded.

Frankfurt airport area coalitions

In the case of Frankfurt, airport area development is focussed on one particular project, the AIRRAIL Center. The project provides insight into the area development process near Frankfurt airport. The real estate development program near the airport is limited in number; in size however the AIRRAIL Center project alone is of serious proportions: 660 meter long and 65 meter wide, in total over nine floors or 200.000 square meters of offices, shops, hotels, warehouses and parking. The focus and technical issues at stake here are therefore different from the analysis of airport area coalitions at Schiphol.

Hessen's role is limited to the airside of the airport – the landside of the airport, with the real estate developments, is considered a local issue of urban design for the cities or counties. In 1999, during the time the new high speed train station at the airport was developed, Deutsche Bahn and Fraport AG intended to build on top of the ICE train station roof. Fraport is the owner of the land and the roof, and DB Station is the owner and manager of the station. Because of the ownership construction and business structure of Deutsche Bahn group, Deutsche Bahn Real Estate is not a direct partner.

The AIRRAIL organisation was set up to lead the development process (Interview Klärner 2003). The architectural competition won by JSK Architekten along with investors IVG/Tercon, Berger+Billfinger and Adler Real Estate became a construction consortium. The main problem of this development coalition was the fact that not all parties had the same interests in developing real estate. The parties were not discussing the plans at the same table, although the legal construction of the *Wohnungseigentumsgemeinschaft* requires support of all actors in the coalition. Technical problems of ventilation and fire security and opposition to demolishing the glass roof made DB oppose the first plans. This was partly because of miscommunication and lack of coordination between the *Eisenbahnbundesamt* that has to approve the construction plans and the City of Frankfurt.

The current problems are concentrated in the group of developers and are related to the lack of demand in the real estate market (Interview Klärner 2003). The project developers are looking for businesses to rent offices, retail and gastronomy on nine floors. Until 2003, Le Meridien Hotels signed to rent a third of the AIRRAIL Center and Ancor cancelled a proposed rental contract. The development consortium is still looking for an asset manager to sell the project; otherwise they keep it in their own portfolio (FAZ 4.11.03).

The crux is that the subcontracted developers do have risk-taking financial obligations to construct the AIRRAIL Center. A construction right of succession (*Erbbaurecht*) organises the ownership of Fraport and the right to sell the rights to develop for third parties. IVG Tercon, Berger+Billfinger and Adler pay a fixed price for the right of succession to Fraport. Fraport and DB themselves do not have direct financial risk-taking participation in the real estate development, but facilitate the project with the station and the roof construction. Although Fraport is expanding the real estate and facility management branch, risk-taking development

of real estate outside of the airport core activities is not the policy of Fraport AG (Interview Rossbrey 2003). The land use is flexible and determined by market conditions. The City of Frankfurt plays a flexible and facilitating role in this process.

In 2004, plans were made to redevelop other areas in the airport vicinity, in particular Gateway Gardens and Mönchhof. Fraport's real estate business division develops the latter. In the case of Gateway Gardens, the City of Frankfurt joined the development coalition with ING Real Estate, OFB and Gross real estate developers (Fraport AG 2004). Furthermore, consultants and architects of Albert Speer's AS+P play a profound role in influencing the City of Frankfurt, from their long-time advising relationship with the City of Frankfurt in spatial developments. Therefore, these actors can be added to Fraport, Lufthansa and to a minor extend Deutsche Bahn as partners in the airport area development coalition.

Tokyo airport coalitions

The subcase studies of Japanese airports are different from the European cases in time and spatial-economic position. The type of actors in airport coalitions however, is comparable and therefore presented simultaneously. Airports in Tokyo, and recent experiences in Nagoya and Kansai, put forward similar relevant actors in airport area development: the airport management, local and national authorities, real estate developers and landowners. However, the balance of power, responsibilities and success varies widely between the actor coalitions.

At the core of the airport growth coalition is the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (Figure 6.4). MLIT in the case of international airports, manage the construction of terminal buildings and runways. Bureaucrats closely cooperate with LDP politicians and the construction industry for developing the airports. For a long time LDP politicians favoured spending on public works in order to obtain prestige and become re-elected (see chapter 8). The firms in the construction industry depend heavily on public works contracts for income. This actor coalition in the developmental state model led to large-scale investments in public works and gave Japan




Figure 6.4 Haneda and Narita growth coalition (left) and environment coalition (right) (Source: author)

the name 'construction state'. The planning of Kansai International Airport is a typical example of this cooperation of bureaucrats, politicians and the construction industry (Bongenaar 2001).

Haneda airport is further expanded into the Bay of Tokyo, near the location it was grounded. For this case study there is hardly an outspoken public debate between opponents and proponents of the airport re-expansion at the current location, since it hardly causes noise and safety problems. The dominant actor here is the MLIT, that owns and paid for the airport, and more recently is benefiting from the profits. The airport authority, Japan Airport Terminal (JAT), is directly linked to the Aviation Department of MLIT. The prefectures and major cities are players in the airport area development too. Yokohama's mayor regularly lobbies for Haneda's expansion and internationalisation. Haneda is one of Tokyo's lifelines. Local governments do not have a formal voice in this development process, and the ministry is basically focussed on the airside infrastructure (Interview Oki 2004). Nevertheless, communities in Chiba that would be affected by the planned fourth runway were able to change the direction of the runway slightly.

The case of Narita is widely considered unique in Japan. It is said that the governor of Tokyo, the governor of Chiba and the Minister of Transport in the late 1960s decided to locate the new international airport in rural Narita.²⁵ This location would relieve air traffic pressure from Haneda and would develop the 'backward' area considered part of Chiba prefecture. Jointly with the airport authority, these actors can be seen as the growth coalition of Narita's international airport. The available imperial domains at Narita would minimise the problems of expropriation. However, the environmental coalition of farmers, local citizens, environmental groups and students protested not only formally, but also violently. Farmers continued by refusing to sell their lands that they either inherited from their ancestors or developed after the Second World War. Narita opposed the airport initially, but more recently has benefited from the economic spin-offs. It slowly prepares for airport area planning for when peace is returned (the shuffle in Figure 6.4).

Tokyo airport area coalitions

The area surrounding the airport territory is either a planning task of local communities, prefectures or project developers. MLIT is by infrastructure planning law not allowed to be involved in landside development near the airports. The position of local communities in airport area coalitions is ambiguous in airport coalitions outside Tokyo Metropolitan Area. Local citizens often fear and oppose the presence of an international airport. Particularly when local communities are surprised by new airport plans, opposition rises. Local politicians however, become convinced of the necessity of the airport after redevelopments and new jobs are promised, as in the cases of Chubu, Kansai and most recently Kobe (Interview Mr. Ueda and Mr. Tsuchiya 2004; Daily Yomiuri 17.02.2006). Local economic development is also used as an important argument for expansion of Narita's airport, although in that case, sensitivities of the local community are considered much more than in the past.

Next to the airport island of Haneda, Tokyo Metropolitan Government owns the land and is able to redevelop the sites. Kawasaki is bordering the airport island on the south side and lobbies MLIT for a new bridge to redevelop the former industrial sites of Tonomachi-Daishigawara (Interview Suzuki and Muramatsu 2004). For Tokyo and Kawasaki, Haneda is the gateway to

other parts of Japan. In reverse however, Haneda's orientation is of the MLIT, and does not consider Tokyo, Ota ward or Kawasaki as important actors in the coalition (Interview Obuchi and Kuniwake 2004).

Because of tensions between the growth coalition and environmental coalition, the City of Narita and to a lesser extent Chiba prefecture refused to take a position, and to coordinate land development in the airport area. In addition, Narita Airport Authority (NAA) primarily focused on the airside development. The current privatisation of the airport is making NAA less dependent from MLIT, although the new chairman is a former MLIT manager.

Privatisation pushes NAA towards generating more constant returns and sharing risks, therefore widening the range of economic activities, including investments on the landside. Narita is therefore more interested in the land surrounding the airport than before (Interview Namekata 2004). For real estate developers, the lands near the airport are not always the best investments, but there are signs of interest. For most office, hotel and housing developers Narita is too far away from the metropolitan area. Nevertheless, distributors are interested in the lands near Narita's airport, and there is interest in manufacturing, distribution and perhaps office development near Haneda.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter first explored the variety of strategic actors involved in the development of the airport as a cityport in the city-region, their changing positions and planning tools. These actors form coalitions, either in favour of airport growth or against further airport expansion and urban development. This answers research question 2a – who are the actors and actor coalitions involved in the spatial and economic development of the airport region – the first step of the case studies' institutional analysis.

In terms of actors' involvement in airport area development, there are striking differences and similarities between the case studies. In the Netherlands and in Japan, the more dominant role of the national ministries in airport planning is remarkable compared to the federal state of Germany. In Japan this leads to a high degree of centralisation, resulting in a lack of cooperation on the local level. However, since the national government level is not allowed to be involved in the landside development, a mismatch of landside and airside development is institutionally embedded.

In Frankfurt Rhein-Main there is a clear picture of the roles to play: the federation is not directly involved in a strategic national project such as Frankfurt Airport. The state of Hessen is responsible for the airside expansion process, but leaves real estate and infrastructure development up to the city. The City of Frankfurt operates as a facilitator for the project developers; this ranges from Fraport's real estate department to other commercial developers.

The strikingly active role of governments in the Netherlands is to reach consensus by a patchwork quilt of coordination platforms. This active role can be seen in the national ministries' role in creating a mainport, but also on the local level exploiting the spin-offs of the airport in industrial and office development in the case of SADC. This public-private company became an international model for public and private benefits of airport spin-offs; Frankfurt and Tokyo

do not have these public-private airport area development companies. On the other hand, government's main role is to supervise and facilitate the private actors involved in airport area development. These different roles that governments play needs further understanding by institutional analysis.

In general, airport authority, dominant airlines and the national government, in particular transportation authorities are at the core of growth coalitions, while local towns, environmental and citizen groups are at the heart of environmental coalitions. There are, however, some differences between the case studies and remarkable changing of positions.

In the case of Schiphol, there has been a long tradition of cooperation between Schiphol Group, KLM and the Netherlands Ministry of Transport and Water. Lesser cooperation can be seen in the environmental coalition of environmentalists and citizens affected by aircraft noise, and other actors opposing airport expansion. Amsterdam, Haarlemmermeer and Noord-Holland supported the growth coalition in the end, but are becoming more sceptical, and in the case of the young and initially naïve municipality of Haarlemmermeer also more independent from and outspoken towards the growth coalition. The environmental coalition has strengthened in the last decade due to a lack of confidence and trust in growth coalition of the airport area. Furthermore, KLM is after a merger with Air France no longer natural long-term partners in the growth coalition.

In the case of Frankfurt, the growth coalition consists of the airport, airlines and business interest groups. Lufthansa and business groups took the initiative for further airport expansion. The airport is essential for the City of Frankfurt and therefore Frankfurt favours airport growth. Local towns oppose this expansion, mainly due to noise concerns, but they also enjoy the economic benefits, especially from the cargo industry. The politicised culture strengthens the position of the environmental coalitions.

In Tokyo, local LDP politicians, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and construction firms form the core of the growth coalition. Airport authorities are less outspoken since they are more dependent on the MLIT. Airlines join the airport growth coalition. In the case of Narita a strong environmental coalition of farmers, citizens and environmentalists developed, but this is an exception in Japan. In most of the cases, cities welcome new airport infrastructure anticipating increased economic activity.

The strategic actors and their positions in the airport coalitions have been analysed. This is the first step of the case study institutional analysis. The actors' positions have been assessed, but it has not been made clear why the actors take certain positions and sometimes change their position. Therefore, it is essential to understand the rules of the game that are set for the actors on the playing field. These institutional dynamics are outlined in the following chapters.

Notes

- 1 In the Netherlands (and Japan), there is no electoral threshold. Therefore, majority coalitions with minor parties are formed, for instance socialists and conservative Christians. In Germany, electoral threshold limits the number of parties in parliaments.

- 2 Despite the formal two-tier local structure (Tanimura and Edgington 2001), the importance of prefectures and regions at the regional level is without doubt. Japan is composed of three tiers.
- 3 Similar to the Netherlands, these planning agencies should not give the incorrect impression of rigid economic planning but are more for forecasting current developments (Tanimura and Edgington 2001).
- 4 Expropriation is a formal planning instrument that has not been applied since members of Chiba's commission were charged at the moment of deciding whether to expropriate landowners for the construction of Narita International Airport. Chiba's commissioners withdrew collectively. Chiba Prefecture decided not to install a new commission and agreed to negotiate with landowners. This case has created a precedent for not applying land expropriation in other cases in Japan (discussed in chapter 8 and 9).
- 5 The roles of the states and *Regierungsbezirke* in Bayern and Rheinland-Pfalz are not considered here and are of less importance for airport area planning in Frankfurt.
- 6 The neighbouring communities of the Airport for instance, were not members of the Umlandverbund Frankfurt.
- 7 The new swift and streamlined Act on Spatial Planning is likely to be enforced in 2007, with shorter participation procedures and project orders.
- 8 Despite Rotterdam's minor shareholder position in Schiphol Group it does not play a significant role in airport area development.
- 9 Therein Economic Affairs focuses more on attracting businesses in the city and Urban Planning has the priority to continue implementing the airport-relatedness test. The current growing awareness of the capital Amsterdam as part of the wider regional economy has shifted priorities from attracting all kinds of businesses to the city, to a more selective approach. Airport-related businesses are found in the western ring road distribution corridor and office development in the southern ring road corridor at Schiphol-Zuidas (Salet and Majoor 2005).
- 10 In economic terms, Aalsmeer relies on the spin-offs of the flower auction (16.000 jobs in the region) and related industries (40.000 jobs), called the 'flower mainport', causing congestion with up to 10.000 daily truck movements.
- 11 Tokyo started in 1919 with four types of zoning, currently there are 12 zoning types, of which seven are related to housing. See Chorus (2002) for a comprehensive study on the land use planning system of Tokyo.
- 12 Chorus (2002) found that despite Tokyo's land use framework, the results in Tokyo are not always in line with planning policies due to loopholes in land use regulations and limited legal punishment
- 13 Land readjustment is a method whereby a group of landowners can join forces to develop or redevelop land. In essence, it is a process whereby landowners pool ownership of scattered and irregular plots of agricultural land, build roads and infrastructure, and then sub-divide the land into urban plots (Sorensen 1999:2333). Land readjustment can lead to leapfrog development since it is easier to develop sites outside the urban area instead of the complicated urban sites with many landowners in this procedure. The district plan can only be made in cases where the majority of landowners that own the majority of the lands agree on proposed redevelopment.
- 14 SADC's developments include Lutkemeer-Osdorp, Lijnden, Schiphol Logistics Park, A4 Zone West, and Schiphol Rijk. Currently under discussion is more remote location development in the Amsterdam harbour area and Almere.
- 15 The main institutional investors amongst life insurance companies are Nippon Life, the 4th largest real estate investor in Japan, and Dai-Ichi Mutual Life, Sumitomo Life and Meiji Mutual Life Insurance Company (Chorus 2002).
- 16 Some consider the US as the main political opposition for Japan, where others consider their involvement as too dominant (Interview Benes 2004). It is a fact that the Americans influence that Japanese politics. The report argues that the Japanese market should be opened for foreign investors, not for the interest of

- American companies, but in order to revitalise Japan's economy and establish sustainable new jobs spread over Japan.
- 17 The main tool was "Japan's second budget", a large-scaled budget that could be spent on infrastructure while sidestepping the legislative process, and is directly under the control of bureaucrats. However, due to budgetary restraints and the financial disasters of the Aqualine and Kansai Airport, JAPIC has lost considerable influence (McCormack 1996, Sorensen 2002).
- 18 However, currently MLIT is focussed on Haneda's re-expansion and the council is thus in a temporary sleeping mode (Interview Ona 2004).
- 19 Neighbourhood and environmental groups are stakeholders in the airport area, but in order to focus on the regional economic development of the airport as a cityport, they are not described in detail in this section, but in 6.6.
- 20 Despite the recent discussion and doubt over the feasibility of the *dubbeldoelstelling* from the beginning, both environmental and economic targets are actually reached: fewer citizens are affected by airplane noise, and aviation could continue to grow (Com. Eversdijk 2006). However, since new areas are affected by airplane noise, the feeling of an unfair target of the growth coalition is dominating the current debates (Haarlems Dagblad 22.06.2005).
- 21 Amongst others, infrastructure from the national level to the regional level, thereby bypassing the province. Currently, ROA can independently decide on budgets of up to €250 million – a budget sufficient for free bus lanes, but not enough for light rail (Interview Jacobs 2005).
- 22 In particular the Chamber of Commerce (IHK) and *Vereinigung der hessischen Unternehmerverbände* (VhU) join the growth coalition.
- 23 A coalition of *Bündnis der Bürgerinitiativen* (BBI), *Interessengemeinschaft zur Bekämpfung des Fluglärms* (IGF), *Kommunale Arbeitsgemeinschaft Flughafen* (KAG), *Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland* (BUND), and *Schutzgemeinschaft Deutscher Wald* (SDW) (Troost 2001).
- 24 In 2006, 62% of Frankfurt Rhein-Main citizens support airport expansion (FAZ 10.08.2006). The *Frankfurter Rundschau* newspaper invited airport, politicians and citizens to an open *Rhein-Main-Dialog* to further discuss the future development of the airport and the impact on communities (FR 12.11.2003).
- 25 There are no documents that correspond with this anecdote, but it is referred to in various interviews.