TIT FOR TAT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF VISA POLICY AS A POLITICAL TOOL The trade-off of more lenient EU visa issuance in return for cooperation on readmission by Third Countries

Abstract

At the beginning of the millennium, the EU sought a new method to encourage Third Countries to become more cooperative on the readmission of irregular migrants. It became a proved formula to offer countries a Visa Facilitation Agreement (VFA) if in return they would commit to better cooperation on readmission as agreed in a Readmission Agreement (RA). With some countries, the EU managed to quickly conclude negotiations on both, while with others negotiations seem endless. This thesis has focused on what the difference is between those negotiations, if the concluded RA has led to better cooperation on readmission as well as look into alternatives to the VFA within the field of visa to entice Third Countries cooperation on readmission. For some countries, the VFA is very attractive and the costs of the RA limited while at the same time they are under pressure to conclude these negotiations. With other countries this balance is different, there is less pressure and they are more able to make use of their negotiation position. The EU has already begun experimenting on other uses of the visa policy to encourage cooperation on readmission, such as (the threat of) sanctions against Third Countries. These threats seem to be effective, although a cautious approach is necessary as it could have unexpected side-effects which lead to a bigger problem on irregular migration than before.